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THE
Two Bookes of Sr.
FRANCIS BACON.

Of the Proficiencie and Aduance-
ment of Learning, DIVINE
and HUMANE.

To the KING.



LONDON:
Printed for *William Washington*, and are
to be sold at his shop in *S. Dunstons*
Church-yard. 1629.



THE FIRST BOOKE
of Sir *Francis Bacon*; of the pro-
ficiency or Aduancement of Lear-
ning, *Divine and Humane.*

To the King.



Here were vnder the Law (excellent King) both daily Sacrifices, and free will Offerings; the one proceeding vpon ordinary obseruance; the other vpon a deuout cheerefulnesse: In like manner there belongeth to Kings from their Seruants, both Tribute of duty, and presents of affection: In the former of these, I hope I shall not liue to be wanting, according to my most humble duty, and the good pleasure of your Maiesties employments: for the latter, I thought it more respectiue to make choyce of some oblation, which might rather referre to the propriety and excellency of your indiuidual person, than to the businesse of your Crowne and State.

VVherefore representing your Maiesty many

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times vnto my mind, and beholding you not with the inquisitiue eye of presumption, to discover that which the Scripture telleth me is inscrutable; but with the obseruant eye of duty and admiration: leauing aside the other parts of your vertue and fortune, I haue beene touched, yea and possessed with an extreame wonder at those your vertues and faculties, which the Phylosophers call intellectuall: The largeness of your Capacity, the faithfulness of your memory, the swiftnesse of your apprehension, the penetration of your Iudgement, and the facility and order of your elocution; and I haue often thought, that of all the persons liuing, that I haue knowne, your Maiesty were the best instance to make a man of *Plato's* opinion, that all knowledge is but remembrance, and that the minde of man by nature knoweth all things, and hath but her owne natie and originall notions (which by the strangeness and daikeness of this Tabernacle of the body are sequestred) againe reuiued and restored: such a light of Nature I haue obserued in your Maiesty, and such a readinesse to take flame, and blaze from the least occasion presented, or the least sparke of anothers knowledge deliuered. And as the Scripture sayth of the wisest King: *That his beard was as the sands of the Sea*; which though it be one of the largest bodies, yet it consisteth of the smallest and finest portions: So hath God giuen your Maiesty a composition of vnderstanding admirable, being able to compasse and comprehend the greatest matters, and neuertheless to touch and apprehend the least;
where.

whereas it should seeme an impossibility in Nature, for the same Instrument to make it selfe fit for great and small Workes. And for your gift of speech, I call to minde what *Cornelius Tacitus* sayth of *Augustus Caesar*: *Augusto profuens & que principem deceret, eloquentia fuit*: For if we note it well, speech that is vitered with labour and difficulty, or speech that saoureth of the affectation of art and precepts, or speech that is framed after the imitation of some patterne of eloquence, though neuer so excellent: All this hath somewhat seruite, and holding of the subiect. But your Maiesties manner of speech is indeed Prince like, flowing as from a fountayne, and yet streaming and branching it selfe into Natures order, full of facility and felicity, imitating none and inimitable by any. And as in your ciuill Estate there appeareth to be an emulation and contention of your Maiesties vertue with your fortune, a vertuous disposition with a fortunate regiment, a vertuous expectation (when time was) of your greater fortune, with a prosperous possession thereof in the due time; a vertuous obseruation of the Lawes of marriage, with most blessed and happy fruite of marriage; a vertuous and most Christian desire of peace, with a fortunate inclination in your neighbour Princes thereunto: So likewise in these intellectuall matters; there seemeth to bee no lesse contention betweene the excellency of your Maiesties gifts of Nature, and the vniuersality and perfection of your Learning. For I am well assured, that this which

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I shall say is no amplification at all, but a positive and measured truth: which is, that there hath not beene since Christs time any King, or temporall Monarch which hath bin so learned in all literature and erudition, diuine and humane. For let a man seriously and diligently reuolue and peruse the succession of the Emperours of *Rome*, of which *Cesar* the Dictator, who liued some yeares before Christ, and *Marcus Antoninus* were the best Learned; and so descend to the Emperours of *Grecia*, or of the West, and then to the lines of *France*, *Spaine*, *England*, *Scotland*, and the rest, and hee shall finde his iudgement is truly made. For it seemeth much in a King, if by the compendious extractions of other mens Wits and Labour, hee can take hold of any superficiall Ornaments and shewes of Learning, or if hee countenance and preferre learning and learned men: But to drinke indeed of the true Fountaynes of learning, nay, to haue such a fountayne of learning in himselfe, in a King, and in a King borne, is almost a Miracle. And the more, because there is met in your Maiesty a rare Coniunction, as well of Diuine and sacred literature, as of prophane and humane: So as your Maiesty standeth inuested of that triplicity, which in great veneration, was ascribed to the ancient *Hermes*; the power and fortune of a King; the knowledge and illumination of a Priest; and the learning and vniuersality of a Phylosopher. This propriety, inherent and indiuiduall attribute in your Maiesty, deserueth to be expressed, not onely in the fame and admiration

admiration of the present time, nor in the History or tradition of the ages succeeding; but also in some solide worke, fixed memoriall, and immortall monument, bearing a Character or signature, both of the power of a King, and the difference and perfection of such a King.

Therefore I did Conclude with my selfe, that I could not make vnto your Maiesty a better oblation, then of some Treatise tending to that end, whereof the summe will consist of these two partes: The former concerning the excellency of Learning and Knowledge, and the excellencie of the merite and true glory, in the Augmentation and Propagation thereof: The latter, what the particuler actes and workes are, which haue bene imbraced and vnder-taken for the advancement of Learning: And againe what defects and vnder-values I finde in such particuler actes: to the end, that though I cannot positively or affirmatiuely aduise your Maiesty, or propound vnto you framed particulers; yet I may excite your Princely Cogitations, to visite the excellent treasure of your owne minde, and thence to extract particulers for this purpose, agreeable to your Magnanimity and Wisedome.

IN the entrance to the former of these; to cleere the way, and as it were to make silence, to haue the true Testimony concerning the dignity of Learning to be better heard, without the interruption of tacite Obiections: I thinke good to deliuer it from
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the discredit and disgraces which it hath received; all from Ignorance; but Ignorance feuerally disguised, appearing sometimes in the zeale and iea'lousie of Diuines; sometimes in the feuerity and arrogancy of Politiques; and sometimes in the errors and imperfections of Learned men themselues.

I heare the former sort say, that knowledge is of those things which are to be accepted of with great limitation and caution, that th'aspiring to ouermuch knowledge, was the originall temptation and sinne, whereupon ensued the fall of Man; that knowledge hath in it somewhat of the Serpent, and therefore where it entreteth into a man, it makes him swell. *Scientia instat.* That *Salomon* giues a Censure, *That there is no end of making Bookes, and that much reading is wearines of the flesh* And againe in another place, *That in spacious knowledge there is much contraction, and that he that increaseth knowledge increaseth anxiety:* That *Saint Paul* giues a Caueat, *that wee be not spoyled through vaine Philosophy:* that experience demonstrates, how learned men, haue beene Arch-heretiques, how learned times haue beene enclined to Atheisme, and how the contemplation of second Causes doth derogate from our dependance vppon God, who is the first cause.

To discouer then the ignorance and error of this opinion, and the mis-understanding in the grounds thereof, it may wel appeare these men do not obserue or consider, that it was not the pure knowledge of Nature and Vniuersality, a knowledge by the light whereof

whereof man did giue names vnto other creatures in Paradise; as they were brought before him; according vnto their proprieties, which gave the occasion to the fall; but it was the proude knowledge of good and euill; with an intent in man to giue law vnto himselfe; and to depend no more vpon Gods Commandements, which was the forme of the temptation; neither is it any quantitie of knowledge, how great soeuer that can make the minde of man to swell; for nothing fill, much less extend the soule of man; but GOD; and the contemplation of GOD; and therefore *Salomon* speaking of the two principall senses of Inquisition, the Eye, and the Ear, affirmeth that the Eye is neuer satisfied with seeing, nor the Ear with hearing; and if there bee no fullnesse, then is the continent greater, than the Content; so of knowledge it selfe, and the minde of man; whereto the senses are but Reporters; hee describeth likewise in these wordes, placed after that *Kalender* or *Ephemerides*, which hee maketh of the diuersities of times and seasons for all actions and purposes; and concludeth thus: *GOD hath made all thinges beautifull or decent in the true returne of their seasons. Also hee hath placed the world in Mans heart; yet cannot Man finde out the work which GOD worketh from the beginning to the end: Declaring not obscurely, that GOD hath framed the minde of man as a mirrour, or glass; capable of the Image of the vniuersall world; and royfull to receiue the impression thereof, as the*

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Eye ioyeth to receiue light, and not onely delighted in beholding the varietie of things and viciffitude of times, but rayfed also to find out and discern the ordinances and decrees which throughout all those Changes are infallibly obserued. And although hee doth insinuate that the supream or summarie law of Nature, which hee calleth, *The worke which GOD worketh from the beginning to the end, is not possible to be found out by Man*; yet that doth not derogate from the capacitie of the minde; but may bee referred to the impediments as of shortnesse of life, ill coniunction of labours, ill tradition of knowledge ouer from hand to hand, and many other Inconueniences, whereunto the condition of Man is subiect. For that nothing parcell of the world; is denied to Mans enquirie and inuention: hee doth in another place rule ouer; when hee sayth, *The Spirite of Man is as the Lampe of God, wherewith hee searcheth the inwardnesse of all secrets.* If then such bee the capacitie and receipt of the minde of Man, it is manifest, that there is no danger at all in the proportion or quantitie of knowledge howe large soeuer; least it should make it swell or out-compasse it selfe; no, but it is meereley the qualitie of knowledge, which bee it in quantitie more or lesse, if it bee taken without the true correctiue thereof, hath in it some Nature of venome or malignitie, and some effects of that venome which is ventositic

The first Booke.

or swelling. This correctiue spice, the mixture whereof maketh knowledge so Soueraigne, is Charity, which the Apostle immediately addeth to the former Clause, for so he sayth, *Knowledge bloweth vp, but Charitye buildeth vp*; not vnlike vnto that which hee deliuereth in another place: *If I speake (sayth hee) with the tongues of Men and Angels, and had not Charity, it were but as a Tinkling Cymball*; Not but that it is an excellent thing to speake with the Tongues of Men and Angels, but because if it bee seuered from Charity, and not referred to the good of Men and Mankind, it hath rather a sounding and Vnworthy glorie, than a meriting and substantial Vertue. And as for that Censure of *Salomon*, concerning the excesse of VVriting and Reading Bookes, and the anxiety of Spirit which redoundeth from Knowledge, and that Admonition of *Saint Paul*, *That wee bee not seauced by vaine Phylosophy*; Let those places bee rightly vnderstoode, and they doe indeede very excellently set forth the true bounds and limitations, whereby humane knowledge is confined and circumscribed: And yet without any such contracting or coarctation, but that it may comprehend all the Vniuersall nature of things: For these limitations are three: The first, *That wee doe not so place our felicity in knowledge, as wee forget our mortality.* The second, *That we make application of our Knowledge to giue our selues repose and contentment, & not distast or repining.*

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The third : That we doe not presume by the contemplation of Nature, to attaine to the Mysteries of God ; for as touching the first of these, *Salomon* doth excellently expound himselfe in another place of the same Booke ; where he sayth ; *I sawe well that knowledge recedeth as farre from ignorance, as light doth from darkenesse, and that the wise mans eyes keepe watch in his head, whereas the Foole roun- deth about in darkenesse* : But withall I learned, that the same mortalitye involueth them both. And for the second, certayne it is, there is no vexation, or anxiety of minde, which resulteth from knowledge otherwise than merely by accident ; for all knowledge and wonder (which is the feede of know- ledge) is an impression of pleasure in it selfe ; but when men fall to framing Conclusions out of their Knowledge, applying it to their particular, and ministring vnto themselves : thereby weake feares, or vast desires, there groweth that carefullesse and trouble of minde, which is spoken of : for then Knowledge is no more *Lumen siccum*, whereof *Heraclitus* the profound sayd, *Lumen siccum opti- ma anima*, but it becommeth *Lumen madidum*, or *maceratum*, being steeped and infused in the humors of the affections. And as for the third poynt, it defectueth to be a little stood vpon, and not to be lightly passed ouer : for if any man shall thinke by view and inquiry into these sensible and materiall things to at- tayne that light, whereby he may reueale vnto him- selfe the nature or will of God : then indeede is he
spoyled

spoiled by vayne Philosophy: For the contemplation of Gods Creatures and Workes produceth (having regard to the workes and creatures themselves) knowledge, but having regard to God, no perfect knowledge but wonder, which is broken knowledge. And therefore it was most aptly sayd by one of *Platoes* Schoole, *That the sence of man carrieth a resemblance with the Sunne, which (as we see) openeth and revealeth all the terrestriall Globe; but then againe it obscureth and concealeth the starres and celestiall Globe: So doth the Sence discover Naturall things, but it darkeneth and shutteth up Divine.* And hence it is true, that it hath proceeded that diuers great Learned men have bene Hereticall, whilst they have sought to flye up to the secrets of the Deity, by the waxen Varges of the Sences: And as for the conceite that too much knowledge should incline a man to Atheisme, and that the ignorance of second causes should make a more deuoute dependance vppon God, which is the first cause: First, it is good to aske the question which *Iob* asked of his Friends: *will you lye for God, as one man will doe for another, to gratifie him?* for certayne it is, that God worketh nothing in Nature, but by second causes, and if they would haue it otherwise beleued, it is meere imposture, as it were in fauour towards God; and nothing else, but to offer to the Author of Truth, the vncleane sacrifice of a lye. But further, it is an assured Truth, and a Conclusion of Experience, that a little or superficiall

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knowledge of Phylosophy may incline the minde of man to Atheisme; but a further proceeding therein doeth bring the minde backe agayne to Religion: For in the intrance of Phylosophy, when the second Causes, which are next vnto the senses, doe offer themselves to the minde of Man, if it dwell and stay there, it may induce some obliuion of the highest cause; but when a man passeth on further, and seeth the dependance of causes, and the workes of Prouidence; then according to the Allegory of the Poets, hee will easly beleue that the highest Linke of Natures Chayne must needs bee tyed to the foote of *Iupiters* Chayre. To Conclude therefore, let no man vpon a weake conceite of Sobriety, or an ill applyed moderation thinke or maintayne, that a man can search too farr, or bee too well studied in the Booke of GODS Word, or in the Booke of GODS Workes: Diuinity or Phylosophy; but rather let Men indeauour an endlesse Progresse, or proficiencie in both: onely let men beware that they apply both to Charity, and not to swelling; to vie, and not to ostentation; and agayne, that they doe not vnwisely mingle, or confound these Learnings together.

And as for the disgraces which Learning receiuet from Politiques, they be of this Nature; that Learning doth soften mens minds, and makes them more vnapt for the honour and exercise of Armes; that it doth marre and peruert Mens dispositions for
matter

matter of gouernement and policie; in making them too curious and irresolute by varietie of reading; two peremptorie positive by stricktneffe of rules and axiomes; or too immoderate and ouerweening by reason of the greatnesse of examples; or too incompatible and differing from the times, by reason of the dissimilitude of examples; or at least, that it doth diuert mens trauels from action and businesse, and bringeth them to a loue of leasure and priuatenesse; and that it doth bring into States a relaxation of discipline, whilst euery Man is more readie to argue, then to obey and execute. Out of this conceit, *Cato* surnamed the Censor; one of the wisest men indeede that euer liued, when *Carneades* the Philosopher came in Embassage to Rome; and that the young men of Rome began to flocke about him being allured with the sweetenesse and Maiestie of his eloquence and learuing, gaue counsell in open Senate, that they should giue him his dispatch with all speede, least hee should infect and inchaunt the mindes and affections of the youth, and at vnawares bring in an alteration of the manners and Customes of the State. Out of the same conceite or humor did *Virgill*, turning his penne to the aduantage of his Countrie, and the disaduantage of his owne profession, make a kind of separation betweene policie and gouernement, and betweene Arts and Sciences, in the verses so much renowned, attributing and challenging the one to the Romanes, and

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learning and yielding the other to the Grecians, *Tu legere imperium populos Romanos meminit, Hic tibi cruentarios* &c. to likewise wee see that *Anaxim* the accuser of *Socrates* layd it as an Article of charge and accusation against him, that hee did with the varietie and power of his discourses and disputations withdraw young men from due reverence to the Lawes and Customes of their Countrey; and that hee did professe a dangerous and pernicious Science, which was to make the worst matter seeme the better, and to suppress the truth by force of eloquence and speech.

But these and the like imputations haue rather a countenance of grauitie, than any ground of iustice: for experince doth warrant, that both in persons and in times, there hath beene a meeting, and concurrence in Learning and Armes, flourishing and excelling in the same men, and the same ages. For as for men, there cannot bee a better nor the like instance, as of that payre *Alexander* the Great, and *Julius Caesar* the Didicator, whereof the one was *Aristoteles* Scholler in Philosophie and the other was *Cicerones* Riual in eloquence; or if any man had rather call for Schollers, that were great Generals, then Generals that were great Schollers; let him take *Epaminondas* the Thebane, or *Xenaphon* the Athenian, whereof the one was the first that abated the power of *Spaxia*; and the other was the first that made way to the ouerthrow of the Monarchie of *Perfia*: And this concurrence is yet more visible in times than in persons, by how much an age is greater ob-

ieſt than a Man. For both in *Egypt*, *Aſſyria*, *Perſia*, *Grecia*, and *Rome* the ſame times that are moſt renowned for Armes, are likewiſe moſt admired for Learning; ſo that the greateſt Authors and Philoſophers, and the greateſt Captaines and Gouvernours haue liued in the ſame ages: neither can it otherwiſe be; for as in Man, the ripeneſſe of ſtrength of the body and minde commeth much about an age, ſaue that the ſtrength of the body commeth ſomewhat the more early; So in States, Armes and Learning, whereof the one correſpondeth to the body, the other to the ſoule of Man, haue a concurrence or neere ſequence in times.

And for matter of Policy and Government, that Learning ſhould rather hurt, than inable thereunto, is a thing very improbable: we ſee it is accounted an error, to commit a naturall body to Emperique Phiſitions, which commonly haue a few pleaſing receipts, whereupon they are confident and aduenturous, but know neither the cauſes of diſeaſes, nor the complexions of Patients, nor perill of accidents, nor the true methode of Cures; We ſee it is a like error to rely vpon Aduocates or Lawyers, which are onely men of praſtiſe, and not grounded in their Bookes, who are many times eaſily ſurpriſed, when matter falleth out beſides their experience, to the preiudice of the cauſes they handle: ſo by like reaſon it cannot be but a matter of doubtfull conſequence, if States be managed by Emperique

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] rique Statesmen, not well mingled with men grounded in Learning. But contrariwise, it is almost without instance contradictory, that euer any government was disastrous; that was in the hands of Learned Governours: For howsoever it hath bene ordinarie with politique men to extenuate and disable Learned men by the names of *Pedantes*: yet in the Records of time it appeareth in many particulars, that the Governements of Princes in minority (notwithstanding the infinite disadvantage of that kinde of State) haue neuerthelesse excelled the government of Princes of mature age, euen for that reason, which they seeke to traduce, which is, that by that occasion the State hath bene in the hands of *Pedantes*: for so was the State of *Rome* for the first five yeares, which are so much magnified, during the minority of *Nero*, in the hands of *Seneca* a *Pedanti*: So it was againe for ten yeares space or more, during the minority of *Gordianus* the younger, with great applause and contention in the hands of *Misithens* a *Pedanti*: so was it before that, in the minority of *Alexander Suerus* in like happineffe, in hands not much vnlike, by reason of the rule of the women, who were ayded by the Teachers and Preceptors. Nay, let a man looke into the government of the Bishops of *Rome*, as by name, into the government of *Pius Quintus*, and *Sextus Quintus* in our times, who were both at their entrance esteemed but as Pedanticall Friers, and he shall find that such Popes doe greater things, and proceede vpon truer principles

principles of Estate, than those which haue ascended to the Papacy from an education and breeding in affayres of Estate, and Courts of Princes; for although men bred in Learning, are perhaps to seeke in poynts of conuenience, and accommedating for the present which the Italians call *Ragioni di stato*, whereof the same *Pius Quintus* could not heare spoken with patience, teaching them Iuentions agaynst Religion and the morall Vertues; yet on the other side to recompence that, they are perfite in those same plaine grounds of Religion, Justice, Honour, and Morall vertue; which if they be well and watchfully pursued, there will bee seldome vse of those other, no more than of Physicke in a sound or well dyeted body; neyther can the experience of one mans life, furnish examples and presidents for the euent of one mans life. For as it happeneth sometimes, that the Graund-Child, or other descendent, resembleth the Ancestor more than the Sonne: So many times occurrences of present times may sort better with ancient examples, than with those of the latter, or immediate times; and lastly, the wit of one man, can no more counteruayle Learning; than one mans meanes can hold way with a common purse.

And as for those particular seducements, or indispositions of the minde for Policy and Gouvernement, which Learning is pretended to insinuate; if it bee granted that any such thing bee, it must bee remembered withall, that Learning ministreth in euery

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of them greater strength of Medicine or Remedy, than it offereth cause of indisposition or infirmity: For if by a secret operation, it make men perplexed and irresolute, on the other side by playne precept, it teacheth them when, and vpon what ground to resolve: Yea, and how to carry things in suspence without preiudice, till they resolve: If it make men positue and regular, it teacheth them what things are in their nature demonstratiue, and what are conjecturall; and aswell the vse of distinctions, and exceptions, as the latitude of principles and rules. If it mislead by disproportion, or dissimilitude of Examples; it teacheth men the force of Circumstances, the errors of comparisons, and all the cautions of application: so that in all these it doth rectifie more effectually, than it can peruert. And these Medicines it conueyeth into mens minds much more forcibly by the quicknesse and penetration of Examples: For let a man look into the errors of *Clement* the seuenth, so liuely described by *Guicciardine*, who serued vnder him, or into the errors of *Cicero* painted out by his owne pensill in his Epistles to *Atticus*, and he will flye apace from being irresolute. Let him looke into the errors of *Phocion*, and he will beware how he be obstinate or inflexible. Let him but read the Fable of *Ixion*, and it will hold him from being vaporous or imaginatiue; let him looke into the errors of *Eato* the second, and he will neuer be one of the *Antipodes*, to tread opposite to the present World.

And for the conceite that Learning should dispose

pose men to leasure and priuatenesse, and make Men slothfull : it were a strange thing if that which accustometh the minde to a perpetuall motion and agitation, should induce slothfulnesse, whereas contrariwise it may bee truely affirmed, that no kinde of men loue businesse for it selfe, but those that are learned ; for other persons loue it for profite ; as an hireling that loues the worke for the wages ; or for honour ; as because it beareth them vp in the eyes of men, and refresheth their reputations, which other wise would weare ; or because it putteth them in mind of their Fortune, and giueth them occasion to pleasure and displeasure ; or because it exerciseth some faculty, wherein they take pride, and so intertayneth them in good humour, and pleasing conceites toward themselues ; or because it aduanceth any other their ends. So that as it is sayd of vntrue valors, that some mens valors are in the eyes of them that looke on; so such mens industries are in the eyes of others, or at least in regard of their owne designements, onely learned men loue businesse, as an action according to nature, as agreeable to health of mind, as exercise is to health of body, taking pleasure in the action it selfe ; and not in the purchase : So that of all men, they are the most indefatigable, if it bee towards any businesse which can hold or detain their minde.

And if any man be laborious in reading & study, and yet idle in busines and action, it groweth from some weaknesse of body, or softnes of spirit ; such as *Seneca*

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speaketh of: *Quidam tam sunt umbratiles, ut putent in turbido esse, quicquid in luce est*; and not of Learning; well may it be, that such a point of a mans nature may make him giue himself to learning, but it is not Learning that breedeth any such point in his Nature.

And that Learning should take vp too much time or leasure: I answere, the most actiue or busie man that hath beene or can be, hath (no question) many vacant times of leasure, while he expecterh the tides and returnes of businesse (except he be eyther readi-ous, and of no dispatch, or lightly and vnworthily ambitious, to meddle in things that may be better done by others) and then the question is, but how those spaces and times of leasure shall bee filled and spent: Whether in pleasures, or in studies; as was well answered by *Demosthenes* to his aduersary *Aeschynes*, that was a man giuen to pleasure, and told him, *That his Orations did smell of the Lampe: Indeed* (said *Demosthenes*) *there is a great difference betweene the things that you and I doe by Lampe-light*: So as no Man neede doubt, that Learning will expulse busi-nesse, but rather it will keepe and defend the posses-sion of the minde agaynst idlenesse and pleasure, which other-wise, at vnawares, may enter to the pre-udice of both.

Againe, for that other conceit, that learning should vndermine the reuerence of Lawes and Gouverne-ment, it is assuredly a meere deprauation and ca-lumny without all shaddow of truth: for to say that a blind custome of Obedience should be a surer ob-ligation

ligation, than duty taught and vnderstood; it is to
 affirme that a blind man may tread surer by a guide,
 than a seeing man can by a light: and it is without
 all controuersie, that Learning doth make the minds
 of men gentle, generous, maniable, and pliant to
 gouernment, whereas Ignorance makes them chur-
 lish, thwart, and mutinous; and the euidence of time
 doth cleere this assertion, considering that the most
 barbarous, rude, and vnlearned times haue bene
 most subiect to tumults, seditions, and changes.

And as to the iudgement of *Cato* the Censor, he
 was well punished for his blasphemy against Lear-
 ning in the same kinde wherein he offended; for
 when he was past threescore yeeres old, he was ta-
 ken with an extreame desire to goe to Schoole a-
 gaine, and to learne the Greeke tongue, to the end
 to peruse the Greeke Authors; which doth well de-
 monstrate, that his former censure of the Grecian
 Learning, was rather an affected grauity, than ac-
 cording to the inward sence of his owne opinion.
 And as for *Virgels* verses, though it pleased him to
 braue the world in taking to the Romanes; the Art
 of Empire, and leauing to others the arts of subiects:
 yet so much is manifest, that the Romanes neuer as-
 cended to that height of Empire, till the time they
 had ascended to the height of other Arts: For in the
 time of the two first *Casars*, which had the Art of
 gouernement in greatest perfection, there liued the
 best Poet *Virgilius Maro*, the best Historiographer
Titus Linius, the best Antiquary *Marcus Varro*, and
 the

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the best or second Orator *Marcus Cicero*, that to the memorie of man are knowne. As for the accusation of *Socrates*, the time must be remembred, when it was prosecuted; which was vnder the thirty Tyrants, the most base, bloody, and enuious persons that haue gouerned; which reuolution of State was no sooner ouer, but *Socrates*, whom they had made a person criminall, was made a person heroycall, and his memory accumulate with honors diuine and humane; and those discourses of his which were then tearmed corrupting of manners, were after acknowledged for foueraigne Medicines of the minde and manners, and so haue bene receiued euer since till this day. Let this therefore serue for answere to Politiques, which in their humerous seueritie, or in their fayned grauity haue presumed to throwe imputations vpon Learning, which redargution neuerthelesse (saue that we knowe not whether our labours may extend to other ages) were not needfull for the present, in regard of the loue and reuerence towards Learning, which the example and countenance of two so learned Princes, *Queene Elizabeth*, and your Maiestie; being as *Castor* and *Pollux*, *Lucida Sydera*, Starres of excellent light, and most benigne influence, hath wrought in all men of place and authority in our Nation.

Now therefore, we come to that third sort of discreditte, or diminution of credite, that groweth vnto Learning from learned men themselues, which commonly cleaueth fastest; It is either from their
fortune,

Fortune, or from their manners, or from the nature of their Studies: for the first, it is not in their power; and the second is accidentall; the third only is proper to be handled, but because we are not in hand with true measure, but with popular estimation & conceit, it is not amisse to speake somewhat of the two former. The derogations thereof, which grow to Learning from the fortune or condition of learned men, are eyther in respect of scarcify of meanes, or in respect of priuatenesse of life, and meannesse of employments.

Concerning want, and that it is the case of Learned men, usually to beginne with little, and not to grow rich so fast as other men, by reason they conuerge not their labours chiefly to luke, and encrease; It were good to leaue the common place in Comendation of pouerty to some Fryer to handle, to whom much was attributed by *Macciauell* in this poynt, when he sayd, *That the Kingdome of the Clergy had beene long before at an end, if the reputation and reuerence towards the pouerty of Friers had not borne out the scandall of the superfluities and excesses of Bishops and Prelates.* So a Man might say, that the felicity and Jelicacy of Princes and great Persons, had long since turned to Rudenes and Barbarifine, if the pouerty of Learning had not kept vp Ciuility and Honor of life; But without any such aduantages, it is worthy the obseruation; what a reuerent and honoured thing pouerty of fortune was, for some ages in the Romane State, which neuerthelesse was a State without Paradoxes. For we see what *Titus Li*

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uius sayth in his Introduction. *Ceterum aut me non negotij suscepti fallit, aut nulla unquam res publica, nec maior, nec sanctior, nec bonis exemplis ditior fuit; nec inquam tam serua auaritia luxur aque immigrauerint, nec ubi tantus ac tam diu paupertati ac parsimonia honos fuerit.* We see likewise after that the State of Rome was not it selfe, but did degenerate; how that person that tooke vpon him to be Counsellor to *Iulius Caesar*, after his Victory, where to beginne his restoration of the State, maketh it of all poynts the most summary to take away the estimation of Wealth. *Verum hac & omnia mala pariter cum honore pecunie desinent: Si neque Magistratus, neque alia vulgo cupienda venalia erunt.* To conclude this poynt, as it was truely sayd, that *Rubor est virtutis color*, though sometime it come from vice: So it may be fitly sayd, that *Paupertas est virtutis fortuna*. Though sometimes it may proceede from mis-gouernement and accident. Surely *Salomon* hath prononced it both in censure, *Qui festinat ad diuitias non erit insons*; and in precept: *Buy the truth, and sell it not: and so of wisdom and knowledge*; Iudging that meanes were to be spent vpon learning, and not learning to be applyed to meanes: And as for the priuatenesse or obscurenesse (as it may be in vulgar estimation accounted) of life of contemplatiue men: It is a Theme so common, to extoll a priuate life, not taxed with sensuality and sloath in comparison, and to the disadvantage of a ciuill life, for safety, liberty, pleasure and dignity, or at least freedome from indignity;

tic, as no man handleth it, but handleth it well: such a consonancie it hath to mens conceits in the expressing, and to mens consents in the allowing: this onely I will adde; that Learned Men forgotten in States, and not living in the eyes of men, are like the Images of *Cassius* and *Brutus* in the fume: all of *Iunia*; of which not being represented, as many others were, *Tacitus* sayth, *Et ipso presulgebant, quod non visabantur.*

And for meaneffe of employment, that which is most traduced to contempt, is that the gouernment of youth is commonly allotted to them, which age; because it is the age of least authorieie, it is transferred to the disesteeming of those employments wherein youth is conuersant, and which are conuersant about youth. But how vniust this traducement is, (if you will reduce thinges from popularitie of opinion to measure of reason) may appeare in that wee see men are more curious what they put into a new Vessell, than into a Vessell seasoned; and what mould they lay about a young plant, than about a Plant corroborate; so as the weakest Termes and Times of all thinges vse to haue the best applications and helpes. And will you hearken to the Hebrew *Rabines*; *You young men shall see Visions, and your old men shall dreame dreames*, say the youth is the worthier age, for that Visions are neerer apparitions of God, than dreames? And let it bee noted, that how soeuer the Conditions of life of *Pedantes* hath bene scorned vpon Theators; as the Ape of Tyrannie;

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and that the moderen loosenes or negligence hath taken no due regard to the choise of Schoole-masters, and Tutors; yet the ancient wisdom of the best times did alwaies make a iust complaint; that States were too busie with their Lawes, and too negligent in point of education: which excellent part of ancient discipline hath beene in some sort reuiued of late times, by the Colledges of the Iesuites: of whom, although in regard of their superstition I may say, *Quo meliores, eo deteriores*, yet in regard of this, and some other points, concerning humane Learning, and Morail matters, I may say as *Agefilau* said to his enimie *Farnabafus*, *Talis quum sis, uinam noster esses*. And thus much touching the discredit drawne from the fortunes of learned men.

As touching the Manners of learned men, it is a thing personall and indiuiduall, and no doubt there bee amongst them, as in other professions, of all temperatures; but yet so as it is not without truth, which it sayd, that *Abeunt studio in mores*, Studies haue an influence and operation, vpon the manners of those that are conuersant in them.

But vpon an attentiu, and indifferent reuiue; I for my part, cannot find any disgrace to Learning, can proceed from the manners of learned men; not inherent to them as they are learned; except it bee a fault, (which was the supposed fault of *Demosthenes*, *Cicero*, *Caeso* the second, *Seneca*, and many more) that because the times they read of, are commonly better than the times they liue in; and the duties taught,
better

better than the duties praetised: They contend sometimes too farre, to bring things to perfection; and to reduce the corruption of manners, to honestie of precepts, or examples of too great height; And yet hereof they haue Caueats ynough in their owne walkes: For *Solon*, when hee was asked whether he had giuen his Citizens the best laws, answered wisely, *Yea of such, as they would receiue: and Plato* finding that his owne heart, could not agree with the corrupt manners of his Country, refused to beare place or office, saying: *That a mans Country to bee used as his Parents were, that is, with humble perswasions, and not with contestations.* And *Cesars* Counsellor put in the same Caueat, *Non ad vetera instituta reuocans que iam pridem corruptis moribus ludibrio sunt;* and *Cicero* noteth this error directly in *Cato* the second, when he writes to his friend *Atticus*; *Cato optime sentit sed nocet interdum reipublice; loquitur enim tanquam in repub. Platonis, non tanquam in face Romuli;* and the same *Cicero* doth excuse and expound the Philosophers for going too far, and being too exact in their precepts, when he saith; *Isti ipsi praeceptores virtutis & Magistri, videntur fines officiorum paulo longius quam natura vellet protulisse, ut cum ad ultimū animo contendissemus, ibi tamen ubi oportet, consistere:* and yet felte might haue said: *Moniti sum mince ipse meū,* for it was his owne fault, though not in so extreame a degree.

Another fault likewise much of this kind, hath bene incident to learned men, which is that they

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haue esteemed the preservation, good, and honor of
 their Countries or Maisters before their owne for-
 tunes or safeties. For so saith *Demosthenes* vnto the
Athenians; *if it please you to note it, my counsells vnto*
you, are not such, whereby I should grow great amongst
you, and you become little amongst the Grecians: But they
be of that nature as they are sometimes not good for me to
give, but are alwaies good for you to follow. And to *Seneca*
 after hee had consecrated that *Quinquennium Ne-*
ronis to the eternall glorie of learned Gouernors, held
 on his honest and loyall course of good and free
 Counsell, after his Maister grew extremely corrupt
 in his gouernment; neither can this point otherwise be
 for Learning endueth mens mindes with a true sence
 of the frailtie of their persons; the casualtie of their
 fortunes, and the dignitie of their soule and vocation;
 so that it is impossible for them to esteeme that any
 greatnesse of their owne fortune can be, a true or wor-
 thy end of their being and ordainment; and therefore
 are desirous to giue their account to God, and so like-
 wise to their Maisters, vnder God (as Kings and the
 States that they serue) in these words; *Ecce tibi lucre-*
feci, and not *Ecce mihi lucre feci*: whereas the corrupter
 sort of; meere Politiques, that haue not their thoughts
 established by Learning in the loue and apprehension
 of dutie, nor neuer looke abroad into vniuersalitie; doe
 referre all thinges to themselves, and thrust them-
 selues into the Center of the world, as if all times
 should meet in them and their fortunes; neuer ca-
 ring in all tempests what becomes of the shippe of
Estates,

Estates, so they may saue themselves in the Cocke-boate of their owne Fortune, whereas men that feele the weight of duty, and know the limits of selfe-loue, vse to make good their places and duties, though with perill. And if they stand in seditious and violent alterations; it is rather the reuerence which many times both aduerse parts doe giue to honesty, than any versatile aduantage of their owne carriage. But for this poynt of tender sence, and fast obligation of duty, which Learning doth indue the minde withall, howsoeuer Fortune may taxe it, and many in the depth of their corrupt principles may despise it, yet it will receiue an open allowance, and therefore needes the lesse disprooffe or excusation.

Another faulte incident commonly to Learned men, which may be more probably defended, than truly denyed, is; that they fayle sometimes in applying themselves to particular persons, which want of exact application ariseth from two causes: The one, because the largenesse of their minde can hardly confine it selfe to dwell in the exquisite obseruation or examination of the Nature and customes of one person: For it is a spech for a Louer, and for a wise man: *Satis magnum alter alteri Theatrum sumus*: Neuerthelesse I shall yeeld, that he that cannot contract the sight of his minde, as well as disperse and dilate it, wanteth a great faculty. But there is a second cause, which is no inability, but a rejection vpon choyse and judgement. For the honest and just bounds of obseruation, by one person vpon another,

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ther, extend no further, but to vnderstand him sufficiently, whereby not to giue him offence, or whereby to be able to giue him faithfull Counsel, or whereby to stand vpon reasonable guard and caution in respect of a mans selfe : But to be speculatiue into another man, to the end to know how to worke him, or winde him, or gouerne him, proceedeth from a heart that is double and clonen, and not entyre and ingenuous; which as in friendship it is want of Integrity, so towards Princes or Superiors, is want of duty. For the custome of the Leuant, which is, that subjects doe forbear to gaze or fixe their eyes vpon Princes, is in the outward Ceremony barbarous; but the Morall is good: For men ought not by cunning and bent obseruations, to pierce and penetrate into the hearts of Kings, which the Scripture hath declared to be inscrutable.

There is yet another fault (with which I will conclude this part) which is often noted in learned Men, that they doe many times fayle to obserue decency, and discretion in their behaviour and carriage, and commit errors in small and ordinary printes of action; so as the Vulgar sort of Capacities, doe make a Iudgement of them in greater matters, by that which they finde wanting in them, in smaller. But this consequence doth oft deceiue men, for which, I doe referre them ouer to that which was sayd by *Themistocles* arrogantly, and vnciuilly, being applyed to himselfe out of his owne mouth, but being applyed to the generall state of this question pertinent-
ly

ly and justly; when beeing invited to touch a Lute, he sayd: *He could not fiddle, but he could make a small Towne, a great state.* So no doubt, many may be well seene in the passages of Gouvernement and Policy, which are to seeke in little, and punctuall occasions: I referre them also to that, which *Plato* sayde of his Master *Socrates*, whom he compared to the Gally-pots of Apothecaries, which on the out-side had Apes and Owles, and Antiques, but containd within in soueraigne and precious liquors, and confections: acknowledging that to an externall report, he was not without superficialle leuites, and deformities; but was inwardly replenished with excellent vertues and powers. And so much touching the poynt of manners of learned men.

But in the meane time, I haue no purpose to giue allowance to some conditions and courses base, and vnworthy, wherein diuers Professors of Learning, haue wronged themselues, and gone too farre; such as were those Trencher Philosophers, which in the latter age of the Romane State, were usually in the houses of great Persons, being little better than solemne Parasites; of which kinde, *Lucian* maketh a merry description of the Philosopher, that the great Lady tooke to ride with her in her Coach, and would needs haue him carry her little Dog, which he doing officiously, and yet vncomely, the Page scoffed, and sayd: *That he doubted, the Philosopher of a Stoike, would turne to be a Cynike.* But aboue all the rest, the grosse and palpable flattery, wherunto

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many (not vnlearned) haue abbased and abused their wits and pens, turning (as *Du Bartus* saith,) *Hecuba* into *Helena*, and *Faustina* into *Lucretia*, hath most diminished the price and estimation of Learning. Neither is the moderne dedications of Bookes and Writings, as to Patrons to be commended: for that Bookes (such as are worthy the name of Bookes) ought to haue no Patrons, but Truth and Reason: And the antient custome was, to dedicate them onely to priuate and equall friends, or to intitle the Bookes with their Names, or isto Kings and great persons, it was to some such as the argument of the Booke was fit and proper for; but these and the like Courses may deferue rather reprehension, than defence.

Not that I can taxe or condemne the mortification or application of Learned men to men in fortune. For the answer was good that *Diogenes* made to one that asked him in mockerie, *How it came to passe that Philosophers were the followers of rich men, and not rich men of Philosophers?* He answered soberly, and yet sharply; *Because the one sort knew what they had need of, and the other did not;* And of the like nature was the answer which *Aristippus* made when hauing a petition to *Dionysius*, and no care giuen to him, he fell downe at his feete, whereupon *Dionysius* stayed, and gaue him the hearing, and graunted it, and afterward some person tender on the behalfe of Philosophie, reprooued *Aristippus*, that he would offer the Profession of Philosophie such an indignitie,

tie, as for a priuate Suit to fall at a Tyrants feet: But he answered, *It was not his fault, but it was the fault of Dyonisius, that he had his cares in his feet.* Neither was it accounted weakenesse, but discretion in him that would not dispute his best with *Adrianus Caesar*; excusing himselfe, *That it was reason to yeeld to him, that commaunded thirty Legions.* These and the like applications and stooping to points of necessitie and conuenience cannot be disallowed: for though they may haue some outward basenesse; yet in a Iudgement truely made, they are to be accounted submissions to the occasion, and not to the person.

Now I proceede to those errors and vanities, which haue interueyned amongst the studies themselves of the Learned; which is that which is principall and proper to the present argument, wherein my purpose is not to make a iustification of the errors, but by a censure and separation of the errors, to make a iustification of that which is good & sound; and to deliuer that from the aspersion of the other. For we see, that it is the manner of men, to scandalize and depraue that which retaineth the State, and vertue, by taking aduantage vpon that which is corrupt and degenerate; as the Heathens in the Primitive Church vsed to blemish and tayne the Christians, with the faults and corruptions of Heretiques: But neuerthelesse, I haue no meaning at this time to make any exact animaduersion of the errors and impediments in matters of Learning, which are more secret and remote from vulgar opinion; but

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onely to speake vnto such as doe fall vnder, or heere vnto, a popular obseruation.

There be therefore chiefly three vanities in Studies whereby Learning hath bene most traduced: For those things wee doe esteeme vaine, which are either false or friuolous, those which either haue no truth, or no vse: and those persons we esteeme vaine, which are either credulous or curious, and curiosity is either in matter or words; so that in reason, as wel as in experience, there fall out to be these 3. distempers (as I may tearme them) of learning; the first fantastical learning: the second contentious learning, and the last delicate learning, vaine inaginations, vaine Altercations, and vaine affectations; and with the last I wil begie, *Martin Luther* conducted (no doubt) by an higher prouidence, but in discourse of reason, finding what a Prouince hee had vndertaken against the Bishop of *Rome*, and the degenerate traditions of the Church, and finding his owne solitude being no waies ayded by the opinions of his owne time, was enforced to awake all Antiquitie, and to call former times to his succors, to make a partie against the present time: so that the ancient Authors, both in Diuinity, and in Humanity, which hath long time slept in Libraries, began generally to be read and reuoued. This by consequence, did draw on a necessity of a more exquisite trauaile in the language originall, wherein those authors did write: For the better vnderstanding of those Authors, and the better aduantage of pressing and applying their words: And thereof grew
again,

agayne, a delight in their manner of Stile and Phrase, and an admiration of that kinde of Writing; which was much furthered and precipitated by the enmity and opposition, that the propounders of those (primitive, but seeming new opinions) had agaynst the Schoole men: who were generally of the contrary part: and whose Writings were altogether in a differing Stile and Forme, taking liberty to coyne, and frame new tearnes of Art, to expresse their owne sence, and to auoide circuite of speech, without regard to the purenesse, pleasantnesse, and (as I may call it) lawfulness of the Phrase, or Word: And agayne, because the great labour then was with the people (of whom the Pharisees were wont to say: *Execrabilis ista turba que non nouit legendi*) for the winning and perswading of them; they grew of necessity in chiefe price, and request, eloquence, and variety of discourse, as the fittest and forciblest accessse into the capacity of the vulgar sort: so that these foure causes concurring, the admiration of ancient Authors, the hate of Schoole-men, the exact study of Languages: and the efficacy of Preaching, did bring in an affectionate study of eloquence, and copy of speech, which then beganne to flourish. This grew speedily to an excesse: for men began to hunt more after Wordes, than matter, and more after the choysenesse of the Phrase; and the round and cleane composition of the sentence; and the sweete falling of the clauses; and the varying and illustration of their workes with tropes and figures:

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then after the weight of matter, worth of subject, soundnesse of argument, life of inuention, or depth of Iudgement. Then grew the flowing, and watry wayne of *Osius* the Portugall Bishop, to be in price: Then did *Sturmius* spend such infinite, and curious paynes vpon *Cicero* the Orator, and *Hermogenes* the Rhetorician, besides his owne Bookes of Periods, and imitation, and the like: Then did *Car* of *Cambridge*, and *Ascham* with their Lectures and VVritings, almost deifie *Cicero* and *Demosthenes*, and allure, all young men that were studious vnto that delicate and polished kinde of Learning. Then did *Erasmus* take occasion to make the scoffing Eccho: *Decem annos consumpsi in legendo Cicerone*: and the Eccho answered in Greeke, *One; Asine*. Then grew the Learning of the Schoole-men to bee vtterly despised as barbarous. In summe, the whole inclination and bent of those times, was rather towards copy, than weight.

Here therefore, the first distemper of Learning, when men study words, and not matter: VVhereof though I haue represented an example of late times: yet it hath beene, and will be *Secundum maius & minus* in all time. And how is it possible, but this should haue an operation to discredite Learning, euen with Vulgar capacities, when they see Learned mens workes like the first Letter of a Patent, or limned Booke: which though it hath large flourishes, yet it is but a letter. It seemes to me that *Pigmaleons* frenzie is a good embleme or portraiture of this vanity:

for wordes are but the Images of matter, and except they haue life of reason and inuention : to fall in loue with them, is all one, as to fall in loue with a Picture.

But yet notwithstanding, it is a thing not hastily to be condemned, to cloath and adorne the obscurity, euen of Phylosophy it selfe, with sensible and plausible elocution. For hereof we haue great examples in *Xenophon, Cicero, Seneca, Plutarck*, and of *Plato* also in some degree, and heereof likewise there is great vse : For surely, to the seuerer inquisition of truth, and the deepe progresse into Phylosophy, it is some hindrance ; because it is too early satisfactory to the minde of man, and quencheth the desire of further search, before wee come to a iust period. But then if a man be to haue any vse of such knowledge in ciuill occasions, of conference, counsell, perswasion, discourse, or the like : Then shall he finde it prepared to his hands in those Authors, which write in that manner. But the excesse of this is so iustly contemptible, that as *Hercules*, when he saw the Image of *Adonis, Venus Mignon* in a Temple, sayd in disdainne, *Nil facies*. So there is none of *Hercules* followers in learning, that is, the more seuerer, and laborious sort of Enquirers into truth, but will despise those delicacies and affectations, as indeede capable of no diuinesse. And thus much of the first disease or distemper of learning.

The second which followeth is in nature worse then than the former : For as substance of matter is
better

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better than beauty of words: so contrary-wise vaine matter is worse, than vayne words: wherein it seemeth the reprehension of *Saint Paul*, was not onely proper for those times, but propheticall for the times following, and not only respectiue to Diuinity, but extensiuē to all knowledge. *Deuita prophanis vocum nouitates & oppositiones falsi nominis scientie.* For he assigneth two Markes and Badges of suspected and falsified Science: The one, the nouelty and strangenesse of tearmes; the other, the strictnesse of positions, which of necessity doth induce oppositions, and so questions and altercations. Surely like as many substances in nature which are solide, doe putrifie and corrupt into Wormes: So it is the propriety of good and sound knowledge, to putrifie and dissolue into a number of subtle, idle, vniwholesome, and (as I may tearme them) Vermiculate questions; which haue indeede a kinde of quicknesse, and life of spirite, but no soundnesse of matter, or goodnesse of quality. This kinde of degenerate Learning did chiefly raigne amongst the Schoole-men, who hauing sharpe and strong Wits, and abundance of leasure, and small variety of reading; but their wies being shut vp in the Cels of a few Authors. (chiefly *Aristotle* their Dictator) as their persons were shut vp in the Cells of Monasteries and Colledges and knowing little History, eyther of Nature or time, did out of no great quantity of matter, and infinite a gitation of VVit, spin out vnto vs those laborious VVebs of Learning, which are extant in their

Bookes.

Bookes. For the wit and mind of man, if it worke vpon
 matters, which is contemplation of the creatures
 of God worketh according to the stuffe, and is limi-
 ted thereby; but if it worke vpon it selfe, as the Spi-
 der worketh his webbe; then it is endless, and brings
 forth indeed Copwebs of learning, admirable for
 the finesse of thread and worke, but of no substance
 or profite; as from such to such: *non est finis*
 This same vnprofitable subtiltie or curiositie is
 of two sorts: either in the subject, in selfe that they
 handle, when it is frailelesse speculation or contro-
 uersie, (whereof there are no small number both in
 Diuinity and Philosophie) or in the manner or me-
 thod of handling of a knowledge; which amongst
 them was this; vpon euery particular positio or asser-
 tion to frame obiections; and to those obiections, so-
 lutions: which solutions were for the most part not
 confutations; but distinctions; where as indeede the
 strength of Sciences, is as the strength of the old
 mans faggot in the bond. For the harmony of a
 science supporting each part the other, is and ought
 to be the true and brieue confutation and suppressi-
 on, of all the smaller sort of obiections: but on the
 other side; if you take out euery Axiome, as the
 stickes of the faggot one by one, you may quarrell
 with them, and bend them and breake them at your
 pleasure: so that as was sayd of *Seneca: Verborum*
minutis rerum frangit pondera: So a man may truly
 say of the Schoole-men, *Questionum minutis Scien-*
tiarum frangunt soliditatem. For were it not better
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for a man in a faire roome, to set vp one great light, or braunching candelsticke of lights, than to goe about with a small watch candle. into euery corner, and such is their method; that rests not so much vpon euidence of truth prooued by arguments, authorities, similitudes, examples; as vpon particular confutations and solutions of euery scruple, cauillation and obiection: breeding for the most part one question as fast as it solueth another; euen as in the former resemblance, when you carry the light into one corner, you darken the rest: so that the Fable and fiction of *Scylla* seemeth to bee a liuely Image of this kinde of Philosophie or knowledge, which was transformed into a comely Virgine for the vpper parts; but then, *Candida succinētam, latrantibus in gūina monstris*. So the Generalities of the Schoolemen are for a while good and proportionable; but then when you descend into their distinctions and decisions, instead of a fruitfull wombe; for the vse and benefite of mans life; they end in demonstrous altercations and barking questions. So as it is not possible but this quantity of knowledge must fall vnder popular contempt, the people being apt to contemne truth vpon occasion of Controuersies and altercations, and to thinke they are all out of their way which neuer meete, and when they see such digladiations about subtilties, and matter of no vse nor moment, they easily fall vpon that iudgment of *Dionysius*. of *Siracusa*, *Verba ista sunt senum et ioforum.*

Not-with-standing certaine it is, that if those
 schoole-

Schoole-men to their great thirst of Truth, and vnwearied trauaile of wit, had ioyned variety and vniuersality of Reading and Contemplation, they had prooued excellent Lights, to the great aduancement of all learning and knowledge; but as they are, they are great vndertakers indeede, and fierce with darke keeping. But as in the inquiry of the diuine Truth, their pride enclined to leaue the Oracle of Gods word, and to vanish in the mixture of their owne inuentions: So in the inquisition of Nature, they euer left the Oracle of Gods workes, and adored the deceiuing and deformed Images, which the vnequall mirrour of their owne minds, or a few receiued Authors or principles, did represent vnto them. And thus much for the second disease of Learning.

For the third vice or disease of Learning, which concerneth deceite or vntruth, it is of all the rest the fowlest; as that which doth destroy the essentiall forme of Knowledge; which is nothing but a representation of truth; for the truth of being, and the truth of knowing are one, differing no more then the direct beame, and the beame reflected. This vice therefore brauncheth it selfe into two sorts; delight in deceiuing, and aptnesse to be deceiued, imposture and credulity: which although they appeare to be of a diuers nature, the one seeming to proceede of cunning, and the other of simplicity; yet certaynely, they do for the most part concurre: for as the Verse noteth.

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Pertontatorem fugito, nam Garrulus idem est:

An inquisitive man is a prattler: so vpon the like reason, a credulous man is a deceiuer: as we see it in fame, that hee that will easily beleeuē rumors, will as easily augment rumors, and adde somewhat to them of his owne, which *Tacitus* wisely noteth, when he sayth: *Fingunt simul creduntque*, so great an affinity hath fiction and beleefe.

This facility of credite, and accepting or admitting things weakly authorized or warranted, is of two kindes, according to the subiect: For it is eyther a beleefe of History, (or as the Lawyers speake, matter of fact:) or else of matter of arte and opinion: As to the former, we see the experience and inconuenience of this errour in ecclesiasticall History, which hath too easily receiued and registred reports and narrations of Miracles wrought by Martyres, Hermits, or Monkes of the desert, and other Holy men; and their Reliques, Shrines, Chappels, and Images: VVhich though they had a passage for time, by the ignorance of the people, the superstitious simplicity of some, and the politique tolleration of others, holding them but as diuine poesies: yet after a periode of time, when the mist began to cleare vp, they grew to be esteemed, but as old wiues fables, impostures of the Cleargy illusions of spirits, and badges of Antichrist, to the great scandall and detriment of Religion.

So in naturall History, wee see there hath not
becne

beene that choyle and iudgement vsed, as ought to haue beene, as may appeare in the VVritings of *Plinius, Cardanus, Albertus*, and diuers of the *Arabians*, being fraught with much Fabulous matter; a great part, not onely vntried, but notoriously vnttrue, to the great derogation of the credite of naturall Phylotophy, which the graue and sober kind of wits; wherein the wisdome and integrity of *Aristotle* is worthy to be obserued, that hauing made so diligent and exquisite a History of liuing Creatures, hath mingled it sparingly with any vayne or fayned matter, and yet on th'other sake, hath cast all prodigious Narrations, which he thought worthy the Recording into one Booke: excellently discerning that matter of manifest truth, such wherevpon obseruation and rule was to be built, was not to bee mingled or weakened with matter of doubtfull credit: and yet agayne that rarities and reports, that seeme vncredible, are not to bee suppressed or denied to the memory of men.

And as for the facility of credite which is yeilded to Artes and opinions; it is likewise of two kinds, eyther when too much beleefe is attributed to the Arts themselues, or to certayne Authors in any Art. The Sciences themselues which haue had better intelligence and confederacy with the imagination of man, than with his reason, are three in number: *Astrology, Naturall Magicke, and Alcumy*: of which Sciences neuerthelesse the ends or pretences are noble. For *Astrology* pretendeth to discouer that

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correspondence, or concatenation, which is betweene the superiour Globe and the inferiour. Naturall Magicke pretendeth to cal and reduce natural Philosophy from variety of speculations to the magnitude of workes; and *Alcummy* pretendeth to make separation of all the vnlike parts of bodies, which in mixtures of nature are incorporate. But the deriuations and prosecutions to these ends, both in the theories, and in the practises are full of Errours and vanity; which the great Professors themselues haue sought to vayne over and conceale by enigmaticall writings, and referring themselues to auricular traditions, and such other deuises, to saue the credite of Impostures; and yet surely to *Alcummy* this right is due, that it may be compared to the Husband-man whereof *Aesope* makes the Fable; that when he dyed, told his Sonnes, that he had left vnto them gold, buried vnder ground in his Vineyard; and they digged ouer all the ground, and gold they found none, but by reason of their stirring and digging the mold about, the rootes of their Vines, they had a great Vintage the yeare following: so assuredly the search and stirre to make gold hath brought to light a great number of good and fruitfull inentions and experiments, as well for the disclosing of Nature; as for the vse of mans life.

And as for the ouer-much credite that hath bene giuen vnto Authors in Sciences, in making them Dictators, that their words should stand, and not Consuls to giue aduise; the damage is infinite that
 Sciences

Sciences haue receiued thereby, as the principall cause that hath kept them low, at a stay without growth or aduancement. For hence it hath comen, that in arts Mechanical, the first deuifer comes shortest, and time addeth and perfecteth: but in Sciences the first Author goeth furthest, and time leeseeth and corrupteth. So we see, Artillery, sayling, printing, and the like, were grossely managed at the first, and by time accommodated and refined: but contrarywise the Philosophies and Sciences of *Aristotle, Plato, Democritus, Hypocrites, Euclides, Archimedes*, of most vigor at the first, and by time degenerate and imbased, whereof the reason is no other, but that in the former many wits and industries haue contributed in one; and in the later many wits and industries haue ben spent about the wit of some one; whom many times they haue rather depraued than illustrated. For as water will not ascend higher, than the leuell of the first spring head, from whence it descendeth: so knowledge deriued from *Aristotle*, and exempted from liberty of examination, will not rise againe higher, than the knowledge of *Aristotle*. And therefore although the position be good: *Oportet discipulum credere*: yet it must bee coupled with this *Oportet edoctum iudicare*: for Disciples doe owe vnto Maisters onely a temporie beleefe, and a suspension of their owne iudgement; till they bee fully instructed, and not a absolute resignation, or perpetuall captiuitie: and therefore to conclude this point, I will say no more, but; so great Authors haue

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have their due, as time which is the Author of Authors be not deprived of his due, which is further and further to discover truth. Thus have I gone over these three diseases of learning; besides the which there are some other rather peccant humors, then formed diseases, which neuertheless are not so secret and intrinsike, but that they fall vnder a popular observation and traduceiment; and therefore are not to be passed over.

The first of these is the extreame affection of two extremities; The one Antiquity: The other Nouelty; wherein it seemeth the children of time doe take after the nature and malice of the father. For as hee deuoureth his children; so one of them seeketh to deuoute and suppress the other; while Antiquity enuieth there should be new additions; and Nouelty; cannot be content to adde; but it must deface. Surely the aduise of the Prophet is the true direction in this matter, *Stare super vias antiquas, & videte quoniam sit via recta & bona, & ambulate in ea.* Antiquity deserueth that reuerence; that men should make a stand wherevpon, and discover what is the best way, but when the discovery is well taken then to take progression. And to speake truly, *Antiquitas seculi Iuuentus Mundi.* These times are the ancient times when the world is ancient, and not those which wee count ancient *Ordine retrogrado*, by a computation backward from our selues.

Another Error induced by the former is a distrust that any thing should bee now to bee found out
which

which the VVorld should haue missed and passed ouer so long time, as if the same obiection were to be made to time, that *Lucian* maketh to *Iupiter*, and other the heathen Gods, of which hee wondreth, that they begot so many Children in old time, and begot none in his time, and asketh whether they were become septuagenary, or whether the Lawe *Papia* made agaynst old mens Marriages had restrayned them. So it seemeth men doubt, least time is become past children and Generation; wherein contrary-wise; we see commonly the leuity and vnconstancy of mens iudgements, which till a matter be done, wonder that it can be done; and as soone as it is done, wonder agayne that it was no sooner done, as we see in the expedition of *Alexander* into *Asia*, which at first was preiudged as a vast and impossible enterprize; and yet afterwards it pleaseth *Liuie* to make no more of it, than this, *Nil aliud quam bene ausus vana contemnere.* And the same happened to *Columbus* in the VVesterne Nauigation. But in intellectuall matters, it is much more common; as may be seene in most of the propositions of *Euclide*, which till they be demonstrate, they seeme strange to our assent; but being demonstrate, our minde accepteth of them by a kind of relation (as the Lawyers speak,) as if we had knowne them before.

Another Error that hath also some affinity with the former, is a conceit that of former opinions or sects after variety and examination, the best hath still preuayled; and suppressed the rest: So as if a

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man should beginne the labour of a new search, hee were but like to light vpon somewhat formerly reiected; and by reiection, brought into obliuion; as if the multitude, or the wisest for the multitudes sake, were not readie to giue passage, rather to that which is popular and superficial, than to that which is substantiall and profound, for the truth is, that time seemeth to bee of the nature of a Riuer, or streame, which carryeth downe to vs that which is light and blowne vp; and sinketh and drowneth that which is weighty and solide.

Another Errour of a diuerse nature from all the former, is the ouer-early and peremptory reduction of knowledge into Arts and Methodes: from which time, commonly Sciences receiue small or no augmentation. But as young men, when they knit and shape perfectly, doe seldome grow to a further stature: so knowledge, while it is in Aphorismes and obseruations, it is in groweth: but when it once is comprehended in exact Methodes; it may perchance be further polished and illustre, and accommodated for vse and practise; but it encreaseth no more in bulke and substance.

Another Errour which doth succeed that which wee last mentioned, is that after the distribution of particular Arts and Sciences, men haue abandoned vniuersality, or *Philosophia prima*; which cannot but cease, and stoppe all progression. For no perfect discoverie can bee made vpon a flater, or a leuell.

Neither

Neither is it possible to discover the more remote, and deeper parts of any Science, if you stand but vpon the leuell of the same Science, and ascend not to a higher Science.

Another Error hath proceeded from too great reuerence, and a kinde of adoration of the minde and vnderstanding of man: by meanes whereof, men haue with-drawne them-selues too much from the contemplation of Nature, and the obseruations of experience: and haue tumbled vp and downe in their owne reason and conceits: vpon these Intellectuallists which are not-with standing commonly taken for the most sublime and diuine Philosophers, *Heracitus* gaue a iust censure, saying: *Men sought truth in their owne little worlds, and not in the great and common world*: for they disdain to spell, and so by degrees to reade in the volume of Gods works, and contrary-wise by continuall meditation and agitation of wit, doe vrge, and as it were inuocate their owne spirits, to diuine, and giue Oracles vnto them, whereby they are deseruedly deluded.

Another Error that hath some connexion with this latter, is, that men haue vsed to infect their meditations, opinions, and doctrines with some conceits which they haue most admired, or some Sciences which they haue most applyed; and giuen all things else a tincture according to them, vtterly vntue and vnproper. So hath *Plato* intermingled his Philosophie with Theologie, and *Aristotle* with Logicke, and the second Schoole of *Plato*,

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Proclus, and the rest, with the *Mathematiques*. For these were the Arts which had a kinde of *Primo geniture* with them severally. So haue the *Alchymists* made a *Phylosophy* out of a few experiments of the *Furnace*; and *Gilbertus* our Country man hath made a *Phylosophy* out of the obseruations of a *Load-stone*. So *Cicero*, when reciting the severall opinions of the nature of the soule, he found a *Musitian*, that held the soule was but a *Harmony*, sayth pleasantly: *Hic ab arte sua non recessit*, &c. But of these conceites *Aristotle* speaketh seriously and wisely, when he sayth: *Qui respiciunt ad pauca, de facili pronuntiant*.

Another Error is an impatience of doubt, and hast to assertion without due and mature suspension of iudgement. For the two wayes of contemplation are not vnlike the two wayes of action, commonly spoken of by the *Antients*. The one plaine and smooth in the beginning, and in the end impassable: the other rough and troublesome in the entrance, but after a while faire and euen, so it is in contemplation, if a man will begin with certainties, he shall end in doubts; but if he will be content to beginne with doubts, he shall end in certainties.

Another Error is in the manner of the tradition and deliery of Knowledge, which is for the most part *Magistrall* and *peremptory*; and not *ingenuous* and *faithfull*, in a sort, as may be soonest beleeued; and not easiest examined. It is true, that in *compendious Treatises* for practise, that forme is

not

not to be disallowed. But in the true handling of knowledge, men ought not to fall eyther on the one side into the Veyne of *Velleius* the Epicurean : *Nil tam metuens quam ne dubitare aliqua de re videretur* : Nor on the other side, into *Socrates* his ironically doubting of all things, but to propound things sincerely, with more or lesse asseueration : as they stand in a mans owne iudgment, proued more or lesse.

Other Errours there are in the scope that men propound to themselves, whereunto they bend their endeauours : For whereas the most constant and deuote kinde of Professors of any science ought to propound to themselves, to make some additions to their Science ; they conuert their labours to aspire to certaine second prizes ; as to be a profound Interpreter or Commenter ; to be a sharpe Champion or Defender ; to be a methodicall Compounded or Abridger ; and so the Patrimony of knowledge commeth to be sometimes improued ; but seldome augmented.

But the greatest Errour of all the rest, is the mistaking, or mis-placing of the last or furthest end of Knowledge : for men haue entred into a desire of Learning and Knowledge, sometimes vpon a naturall curiosity, and inquisitiue appetite ; sometimes to entertayne their mindes with variety and delight ; sometimes for ornament and reputation ; and sometimes to inable them to victory of witt and contradiction, and most times for luke and profession, and seldome sincerely to giue a true accompt of their

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guift of reason, to the benefite and vse of men: As if there were sought in knowledge a Cowch, where-vpon to rest a searching and restlesse spirit; or a tar-rasse for a wandring and variable minde, to waike vp and downe with a faire prospect: or a Tower of State for a proud minde to raise it selfe vpon; or a Fort or commaunding ground for strife and contention, or a Shoppe for profite or sale; and not a rich Store house for the glory of the Creator, and the reliefe of Mans estate. But this is that, which will indeede dignifie and exalt knowledge; if contemplation and action may bee more neerely and straightly conioyned and vnited together, than they haue beene; a Coniunction like vnto that of the two highest Planets; *Saturne* the Planet of rest and contemplation; and *Iupiter* the Planet of ciuile society and action. How be it, I doe not meane when I speake of vse and action, that end before mentioned of the applying of knowledge to luke and opression; For I am not ignorant how much that diuerteth and interrupteth the prosecution and advancement of knowledge; like vnto the goulden ball throwne before *Atalanta*, which while shee goeth aside, and stoopeth to take vp, the race is hindered.

Declinat cursus, aurumque volubile tollit:

Neither is my meaning as was spoken of *Socrates*, to call Philosophy downe from heauen to conuerse vpon the earth, that is, to leaue naturall Philosophy aside, and to applie knowledge onely to manners and policie.

polesie. But as both heauen and earth doe conspir^c
and contibute to the vse and benefice of man : So th^e
end ought to bee from both Philosophies , to sepa^r
rate and reiect vaine speculations , and what soeuer
is empty and voyd , and to preferue and augment
whatsoeuer is solide and fruit-full : that knowledge
may not bee as a Curtezian for pleasure , and vanity
only, or as a bond-woman to acquire and gaine to her
Masters vse, but as a Spouse, for generation, fruit, and
comfort.

Thus haue I described and opened as by a kinde of
dissection , those peccant humors (the principall of
them) which hath not only giuen impediment to the
proficiencie of Learning , but haue giuen also occa-
sion, to the traducement thereof : wherein if I haue
beene too plaine, it must bee remembered;

Fidelis vulnera amantis, sed dolosa escula malignantis.

This I thinke I haue gained, that I ought to be the
better beleued , in that which I shall say pertayning
to commendation: because I haue proceeded so freely
in that which concerneth censure. And yet I haue no
purpose to enter into a lauditiue of Learning , or to
make a Hymne to the Muses (though I am of opinion
that it is long since their rites were duely celebrated)
but my intent is without varnish or amplification,
iustly to weigh the dignity of knowledge in the bal-
lance with other things , and to take the true value
thereof by testimonies and arguments diuine , and
humane.

First therefore , let vs seeke the dignity of know-
ledge

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ledge in the Arch-type or first plat-forme, which is in the attributes and acts of God, as farre as they are revealed to man, and may be observed with sobriety, wherein we may not seek it by the name of Learning, for all learning is knowledge acquired, and all knowledge in God is originall. And therefore we must looke for it by another name, that of wisdom or sapience, as the Scriptures call it.

It is so then, that in the worke of the Creation, we see a double emanation of vertue from God: the one referring more properly to power, the other to wisdom, the one expressed in making the subsistence of the matter, and the other in disposing the beauty of the forme. This being supposed, it is to be observed, that for any thing which appeareth in the History of the Creation, the confused Masse, and matter of Heauen and earth was made in a moment, and the order and disposition of that *Chaos* or Masse, was the Worke of sixe dayes, such a note of difference it pleased God to put vpon the VWorkes of power, and the workes of VWisdom: wherewith concurreth that in the former, it is not set downe, that God sayd; *Let there be Heauen and Earth*, as it is set downe of the workes following, but actually, that God made Heauen and Earth: the one carrying the stile of a Manufacture, and the other of a Law, Decree, or Councell.

To proceede to that which is next in order from God to spirits: We find as farre as credite is to be giuen to the celestiall Hierarchy, of that supposed

Dionysius the Senator of Athens, the first place or degree is given to the Angels of loue, which are teamed *Seraphim*, the second to the Angels of light, which are teamed *Cherubim*, and the third; and so following places to thrones, principalities, and the rest, which are all Angels of power and ministry, so as the Angels of knowledge and illumination, are placed before the Angels of Office and domination.

To descend from spirits and intellectuall formes, to sensible and materiall formes, wee reade the first forme that was created, was Light, which hath a relation and correspondence in nature and corporall things, to knowledge in Spirits and incorporall things.

So in the distribution of dayes, wee see the day wherein God did rest, and contemplate his owne workes, was blessed aboue all the dayes, wherein he did effect and accomplish them.

After the Creation was finished, it is set downe vnto vs, that Man was placed in the Garden to worke therein, which worke so appointed to him, could bee no other than worke of contemplation, that is, when the ende of worke is but for exercise and experiment, not for necessity, for there being then no relictation of the Creature, nor sweat of the browe; mans employment must of consequence haue bene matter of delight in the experiment, and not matter of labour for the life. Again, the first Act which was begun in Paradise, consisted

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consisted of the two summary parts of Knowledge, the view of Creatures, and the imposition of Names. As for the Knowledge which induced the fall, it was, as was touched before, not the naturall Knowledge of Creatures; but the morall Knowledge of good and euill, wherein the supposition was, that Gods Commandements or prohibitions were not the originals of good and euill; but that they had other beginnings which Man aspired to knowe, to the end, to make a torall defection from God, and to depend wholly vpon himselfe.

To passe on, in the first euent or occurrence after the fall of Man; we see as the Scriptures haue infinite Mysteries, not violating at all the truth of the Storie or letter) an Image of the two Estates, the Contemplatiue State, and the Actiue State; figured in the two persons of *Abell* and *Cain*, and in the two simplest and most primitiue Trades of life; that of the Shepheard (who by reason of his leasure, rest in a place, and liuing in view of heauen, is a liuely Image of a contemplatiue life) and that of the Husbandman; where we see againe, the fauour and election of God went to the Shepheard; and not to the tiller of the ground.

So in the age before the flood, the holy Records within those few memorials, which are there entered and registred, haue vouchsafed to mention, and honour the name of the Inuentors and Authors of Musique, and workes in Mettall. In the age after the Flood, the first great iudgement of God vpon the ambition

ambition of Man, was the confusion of Tongues; whereby the open Trade and intercourse of Learning and Knowledge, was chiefly imbarred.

To descend to *Moyſes* the Law-giuer, and Gods first penne; he is adorned by the Scriptures with this addition, and commendation: *That he was ſcene in all the Learning of the Egyptians*; which Nation we know was one of the moſt antient Schooles of the world: for, ſo *Plato* brings in the Egyptian Prieſt, ſaying vnto *Solon*: *You Grecians are ever Children, you haue no knowledge of antiquity, nor antiquity of knowledge.* Take a view of the ceremoniall Law of *Moyſes*; you ſhall find beſides the prefiguration of Chriſt, the badge or difference of the people of God, the exerciſe and impreſſion of obedience, and other diuine uſes and fruits thereof, that ſome of the moſt learned *Rabines* haue trauielled profitably, and profoundly to obſerue, ſome of them a naturall, ſome of them a morall ſence, or reduction of many of the ceremonies and ordinances: As in the Lawe of the Leprouſie, where it is ſayd: *If the whiteneſſe haue ouerſpread the fleſh, the Patient may paſſe abroad for cleane; But if there be any whole fleſh remaining, he is to be ſhut vp for unſcleane*: One of them noteth a principle of nature, that putrefaction is more contagious before naturitic than after: And another noteth a poſition of morall Phyloſophy, that men abandoned to vice do not ſo much corrupt manners, as thoſe that are halfe good, and halfe euill, ſo, in this and very many other places in that Lawe, there

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is to be found besides the Theologicall sence, much ascription of Philosophie.

So likewise in that excellent Booke of *Job*, if it be revolved with diligence, it will be found pregnant, and swelling with naturall Philosophie, as for example, Cosmographie, and the roundnesse of the World: *Qui extendit aquilonem super vacuum, & dependit terram super nihilum*: wherein the penitenesse of the Earth, the pole of the North, and the finitenesse, or connextie of Heauen are manifestly touched. So againe matter of Astronomie, *Spiritus eius ornabit Calos & obstetricante manu eius educetis est coluber tortuosus*: And in another place, *Nunquid coniungere valebis micantes stellas pleyadas, aut gyrum arcturi poteris dissipare?* where the fixing of the Starrs, ever standing at equall distance, is with great elegancie noted: And in another place, *Qui facit arcturum, & oriona, & hyadas, & interiora austris*, where againe he takes knowledge of the depression of the Southerne Pole, calling it the secrets of the South, because the Southerne Starrs were in that climate vnseene. Matter of generation, *Annon sicut lac mulsisti me, & sicut caseum coagulasti me, &c.* Matter of Mynerals, *Habet argentum verum suarum principia: & auro locus est in quo conflatur, ferrum de terra tollitur, & lapis solutus calore in as vertitur*: and so forwards in that Chapter.

So likewise in the person of *Salomon* the King, we see the guift or endowment of Wisedome and Learning both in *Salomons* petition, and in
Gods

Gods assent thereunto preferred before all other terrene and temporall felicitie. By vertue of which grant or donatiue of God, *Salomon* became inabled, not onely to write those excellent Parables, or Aphorismes concerning Diuine and Morall Philosophie; but also to compile a naturall Historie of all verdor, from the Cedar vpon the Mountaine, to the Mosse vpon the wall, (which is but a rudiment betweene putrefaction, and an hearbe) and also of all things, that breath or mooue. Nay the same *Salomon* the King, although hee excelled in the glorie of Treasure and magnificent buildings of shipping and Nauigation, of seruice and attendance, of fame and renowne, and the like; yet hee maketh no claime to any of those glories; but onely to the glory of Inquisition of Truth: for so he sayth expressly: *The glorie of God is to conceale a thing, But the glorie of the King is to find it out*, as if according to the innocent play of Children the diuine Maiestie tooke delight to hide his workes, to the end to haue them found out, and as if Kings could not obtaine a greater honour, than to bee Gods play-fellowes in that game, considering the great commandement of wits and meanes, whereby nothing needeth to be hidden from them.

Neither did the dispensation of God vary in the times after our Sauour came into the world; for our Sauour himselve did first shew his power to subdue ignorance, by his conference with the Priests and Doctors of the Law; before he shewed his power

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to subdue nature by his miracles. And the coming of the holy spirite, was chiefly figured and expressed in the similitude and gift of tongues; which are but *Vehicula scientiæ*.

So in the election of those Instruments, which it pleased God to use for the plantation of the Faith, notwithstanding, that at the first hee did employ persons altogether vnlearned, otherwise than by inspiration, more evidently to declare his immediate working, and to abbase all humane Wisedome or Knowledge, yet neuerthelesse, that Counsell of his was no sooner performed, but in the next vicissitude and succession, he did send his Diuine truth into the world, waited on with other Learnings, as with Seruants or Handmaidens: For so we see Saint *Paule*, who was onely learned amongst the Apostles had his pen most vsed in the Scriptures of the New Testament.

So againe, we finde that many of the antient Bishops and Fathers of the Church, were excellently bred, and studied in all the learning of the Heathen, in so much, that the Edict of the Emperour *Iulianus* (whereby it was interdicted vnto Christians to be admitted into Schooles, Lectures, or exercises of Learning) was esteemed and accounted a more pernicious engine and machination against the Christian Faith; than were all the sanguinary prosecutions of his Predecessors, Neither could the emulation and lealouisie of *Gregory* the first of that name, Bishop of *Rome*, euer obtaine the opinion of pietie or deuotion:

deuotion : but contrary-wise receiued the censure of humour, malignity, and pusillanimity, euen amongst holy men: in that he designeth to obliterate and extinguish the memorie of Heathen antiquity and Authors. But contrary-wise it was the Christian Church, which amidst the inundations of the *Scythians*, on the one side from the Northwest: and the *Saracens* from the East, did preserve in the sacred lappe and bosome thereof, the pretious Reliques, euen of Heathen Learning, which otherwise had bene extinguished, as if no such thing had euer bene.

And we see before our eyes, that in the age of our selues, and our Fathers, when it pleased God to call the Church of Rome to account, for their degenerate manners and ceremonies: and sundry doctrines, obnoxious, and framed to vphould the same abuses: At one and the same, it was ordayned by the diuine prouidence, that there should attend with all a renouation, and new spring of all other knowledges: And one the other side, we see the Iesuits, who partly in themselves, and partly by the emulation and prouocation their example, haue much quickned and strengthened the state of Learning: we see (I say, what notable seruice and reparation they haue done to the Romane Sea.

Wherefore to conclude this part, let it bee obserued, that there bee two principall duties and seruices besides ornament and illustracion, which Philosophy and humaine Learning do performe to
faith

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faith and Religion. The one, because they are an effectuall inducement to the exaltation of the glory of God. For as the Psalmes, and other Scriptures doe often inuite vs to consider, and magnifie the great and wonderfull workes of God, so if wee should rest onely in the contemplation of the exterior of them, as they first offer themselues to our senses; we should do a like iniury vnto the Maiesty of God, as if wee should iudge or construe of the store of some excellent Jeweller, by that onely which is set out toward the streete in his shoppe. The other, because they minister a singular helpe and preseruatue against vnbeleefe and error; For our Saviour saith. *You erre not knowing the Scriptures, nor the power of God*: laying before vs two Bookes or volumes to study, if wee will bee secured from error: first the Scriptures, revealing the will of God; and then the creatures expressing his power; whereof the latter is key vnto the former; not onely openly our vnderstanding to conceiue the true sence of the Scriptures, by the generall notions of reason and rules of speech; but cheefely opening our beleefe, in drawing vs into a due meditation of the omnipotency of God, which is chiefly signed and ingrauen vpon his workes. Thus much therefore for diuine testimony and euidence, concerning the true dignity and value of Learning.

As for humane proofes, it is so large a field, as in a discourse of his nature and breuity; it is fit rather to vse choice of those things, which wee shall produce,

duce, than to embrace the variety of them. First therefore in the degrees of humane honour amongst the heathen, it was the highest, to obtaine to a veneration and adoration as a God. This vnto the christians is as the forbidden fruit. But we speake now separately of humane testimony; according to which, that which the Grecians call Apotheosis, and the Latines, *Relatio inter diues*, was the supream honour, which man could attribute vnto man; specially when it was giuen, not by a formall Decree or Act of State, as it was vsed amongst the Romane Emperours; but by an inward assent and beleefe, which honour being so high, and also a degree or middle Terme: For there were reckoned aboue humane honours, honour Heroicall and Divine: In the attribution, and distribution of which honours; wee see Antiquity made this difference: That whereas Founders and Vnivers of States and Cities, Law-giuers, extirpers of Tyrants, Fathers of the people, and other eminent persons in ciuill merite, were honoured but with the Titles of Worthies or Demy-gods: such as were *Hercules, Theseus, Minos, Romulus*, and the like: on the other side, such as were Inuentors and Authors of new Arts, endowments, and commodities towards mans life, were euer Consecrated amongst the gods themselves, as was *Ceres, Bacchus, Mercurius, Apollo*, and others, and iustly: for the merit of the former is confined within the Circle of an age, or a nation: And is like fruitfull showers, which though they be profitable and good: Yet serue but for that

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season, and for a latitude of ground where they fall: But the other is indeede like the benefits of Heauen, which are permanent and vniuersall. The former agayne is mixt with striffe and perturbation; but the latter hath the true Character of Diuine presence; commonly in *aura leni*, without noyse or agitation.

Neyther is certainly that other merite of learning, in repressing the inconueniences which grow from man to man; much inferiour to the former, of relieuing the necessities which arise from nature; which merite was liuely set foorth by the Ancients in that fayned Relation of *Orpheus* Theater; where all beasts and birds assembled; and forgetting their seuerall appetites; some of pray, some of game, some of quarrell, stood all sociably together listening vnto the ayres and accords of the Harpe; the sound whereof no sooner ceased, or was drowned by some lowder noyse; but eucry beast returned to his owne nature; wherein is aptly described the nature and condition of men; who are full of sauage and vnreclaymed desires; of profite, of lust, of Reuenge; which as long as they giue care to precepts, to Lawes, to Religion, sweetely touched with eloquence and perswasion of Bookes, of Sermons, of haranges; so long is society and peace maintayned: but if these instruments bee silent; or that sedition and tumult make them not audible; all things dissolue into Anarchy and Confusion.

But this appeareth more manifestly, when Kings themselves, or persons of authority vnder them, or
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other Governours in Common-wealthes, and popular Estates, are endued with Learning. For although he might be thought partiall to his owne profession; that said, *They should people and estates be happy, when eyther Kings were Phylosophers, or Phylosophers Kings:* Yet so much is verified by experience; that vnder wise and learned Princes and Governours, there hath beene euer the best times; for howsoeuer Kings may haue their imperfections in their passions and Customes, yet if they be illuminate by learning, they haue those Notions of Religion, policy, and morality: which doe preserue them, and refrayne them from all ruinous and peremptory errors and excesses; whispering euermore in their eares, when Counsellors and seruants stand mute and silent; and Senators, or Counsellors likewise, which be Learned, doe proceede vppon more safe and substantiall principles; then Counsellors which are onely men of experience; the one sort keeping dangers a far off; whereas the other discover them not, till they come neere hand; and then trust to the agility of their wit, to ward or auoyde them.

Which felicity of times, vnder learned Princes, (to keepe still the Law of breuity, by vsing the most eminent and selected examples) doth best appeare in the age, which passed from the death of *Domitianus* the Emperour, vntill the Raigne of *Commodus*: Comprehending a succession of sixe Princes, all learned or singular Fauourers and Aduancers of Learning: which age for temporall respects, was

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the most happy and flourishing, that euer the Roman Empire, (which then was a modell of the World) enjoyed: a matter reuealed and figured vnto *Domitian* in a Dreame, the night before he was slayne; for he thought there was growne behinde vpon his shoulders, a necke and a head of Gold, which came accordingly to passe, in those golden times which succeeded; of which Princes, wee will make some commemoration: wherein although the matter will be vulgar, and may be thought fitter for a Declamation, then agreeable to a Treatise infolded as this is; yet because it is pertinent to the poynt in hand, *Neque semper arcum tendit Apollo*, and to name them onely were too naked and cursory, I will not omit it altogether. The first was *Nerua*, the excellent temper of whose gouernement, is by a glance in *Cornelius Tacitus* touched to the life: *Postquam diuus Nerua res olim insociabiles miscuisset, imperium & libertatem*: And in token of his Learning; the last Act of his short Raigne left to memory, was a missiue to his adopted sonne *Traian*, proceeding vpon some inward discontent, at the ingratitude of the times, comprehended in a Verse of *Homers*:

Telis Phœbe, tuis, Lachrymas ulciscere nostras.

Traian, who succeeded; was for his person not Learned: But if wee will hearken to the speech of our Sauour, that sayth, *Hee that receiueth a Prophet in the name of a Prophet, shall haue a Prophets reward*, hee deserueth to be placed amongst the most learned Princes: for there was not a greater
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admirer of Learning or Benefactor of Learning, a founder of famous Libraries, a perpetuall Advancer of Learned men to office, and a familiar conuerser with learned Professors and Preceptors, who were noted to haue then most credite in Court. On the other side, how much *Traians* vertue and gouernement was admitted and renowned, surely no testimony of graue and faithfull History doth more liuely set forth, than that legend Tale of *Gregorius Magnus*, Bishop of *Rome*, who was noted for the extreame enuy he bare towards all Heathen excellency; and yet hee is reported out of the loue and estimation of *Traians* morall vertues, to haue made vnto God, passionate and feruent prayers, for the deliuey of his soule out of Hell: and to haue obtayned it with a *Caueat* that he should make no more such Petitions. In this Princes time also, the persecutions agaynst the Christians receiued intermission, vppon the certificate of *Plinius secundus*, a man of excellent Learning, and by *Traian* aduanced.

Adrian his successor, was the most curious man that liued, and the most vniuersall enquirer: in so much as it was noted for an errour in his mind: that hee desired to comprehend all things, and not to reserue himselfe for the worthiest things, falling into the like humour that was long before noted in *Phillip* and *Macedon*, who when hee would needes ouer-rule and put downe an excellent Musitian, in an argument touching Musique, was well answered by him agayne, *God forbid Sir* (sayth hee)

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that your fortune should be so bad, as to know these things better than I: It pleased God likewise to use the curiosity of this Emperour, as an inducement to the peace of his Church in those dayes: For hauing Christ in veneration, not as a God or Sauour, but as a wonder or nouelty; and hauing his Picture in his Gallery, matched with *Apollonius* (with whom in his vayne imagination, he thought he had some conformity) yet it serued the turne to allay the bitter hatred of those times agaynst the Christian name: so as the Church had peace during his time, and for his gouernement ciuill, although he did not attayne to that of *Traians*, in the glory of Armes, or perfection of Iustice: yet in deseruing of the weale of the Subiect, he did exceede him. For *Traian* erected many famous Monuments and buildings, insomuch as *Constantine* the Great, in emulation was wont to call him *Parietaria*, Wall-flower, because his name was vpon so many Walls: But his buildings and workes were more of glory and tryumph, than use and necessity: But *Adrian* spent his whole Raigne, which was peaceable in a perambulation, or Suruey of the Romane Empire, giuing order, and making assignation, where he went for reedifying of Cities, Townes and Forts decayed: and for cutting of Ri- uers and streames; and for making Bridges and pas- sages; and for pollicing of Cities, and Commonal- ties, with new ordinances and Constitutions; and granting new Franchises and incorporations: so that his whole time was a very restauration of all the lapses,

lapses and decayes of former times.

Antonius Pius, who succeeded him, was a Prince excellently learned; and had the patient and subtile wit of a Schoole-man: Infomuch as in common speech, (which leaues no vertue vntaxed) hee was called *Cymini Sector*, a Caruer, or a diuider of Comine seede, which is one of the least seedes: such a patience hee had and setled spirit, to enter into the least and most exact differences of causes: a fruite no doubt of the exceeding tranquillity, and serenity of his minde: which being no wayes charged or incombred, cyther with feares, remorse, or scruples, but hauing beene noted for a man of the purest goodnesse, without all fiction, or affectation, that hath raigned or liued: made his minde continually present and entyre: hee likewise approached a degree neerer vnto Christianity, and became as *Agrippa* sayd vnto *St. Paul*, *Half a Christian*; holding their Religion and Law in good opinion; and not onely ceasing persecution, but giuing way to the aduancement of Christians.

There succeeded him the first *Diui fratres*, the two adoptiue brethren; *Lucius Commodus Verus*, Sonne to *Elius Verus*; who delighted much in the softer kinde of Learning; and was wont to call the Poet *Martiall* his *Virgil*: and *Marcus Aurelius Antoninus*, whereof the latter, who obscured his colleague, and suruiued him long, was named the Phylosopher: who as he excelled all the rest in Learning, so hee excelled them likewise in perfection of all Royall vertues:

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tues: inſo much as *Julianus* the Emperour in his booke intituled, *Ceſares*, being as a Paſquill or Satyre, to deride all his Predeceſſors, fayned that they were all invited to a Banquet of the gods, and *Sylenus*, the Ieſter ſate at the nether end of the Table, and beſtowed a ſcoffe on enery one as they came in, but when *Marcus Philoſophus* came in, *Sylenus* was grauelled, and out of Countenance, not knowing where to carpe at him, ſaue at the laſt, he gaue a glance at his patience towards his wife. And the vertue of this Prince continued with that of his Predeceſſor made the name of *Antoninus* ſo ſacred in the World, that though it were extreemely diſhonoured in *Commodus*, *Caryocolla*, and *Heliogabalus*, who all bare the name, yet when *Alexander Seuerus* reſuſed the name, becauſe he was a ſtranger to the Family, the Senate with one Acclamation ſayd, *Quomodo Auguſtus ſic & Antoninus*. In ſuch renowne and veneration, was the name of theſe two Princes in thoſe dayes, that they would haue had it as a perpetuall addition in all the Emperours ſtile. In this Emperours time alſo, the Church for the moſt part was in peace, ſo as in this ſequence of fixe Princes, wee doe ſee the bleſſed effects of Learning in ſoueraignty, paynted forth in the greateſt Table of the World.

But for a Tablet or Picture of ſmaller volume (not preſuming to ſpeake of your Maieſty that liueth, in my Iudgement the moſt excellent, is that of *Queene Elizabeth*, your immediate Predeceſſor in this part of *Brittaine*, a Prince, that if *Plutarch* were

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now alieue to write lynes by parallells would trouble him I thinke, to find for her a parellell amongst women. This Lady was indued with learning in her sexe finguler and rare euen amongst masculine Princes; whether wee speake of Learning; or Language or of science, moderne, or ancient: Diuinity or Humanity. And vnto the very last yeare of her life, shee accustomed to appoynt set houres for reading, scarcely any young Student in any Vniuersity, more daiely, or more dully. As for her gouernement, I assure my selfe, I shall not exceed, if I doe affirme, that this part of the Iland, neuer had 45. yeares of better times: and yet not through the calmenesse of the season; but through the wisdome of her regiment.

For if there be considered of the one side, the truth of Religion established; the constant peace and security: the good administration of Iustice, the temperate vse of the perogatiue, not slackened, nor much strayned: the flourishing state of Learning, sortable to so excellent a Patronesse; the conuenient estate of wealth and meanes, both of Crowne and Subject: the habite of obedience, and the moderation of discontent: and there bee considered on the other side, the differences of Religion, the troubles of Neighbour Countreys, the ambition of *Spaine*, and opposition of *Rome*, and then, that shee was solatary, and of her selfe: these things I say considered: as I could not haue chosen a instance so recent and so proper: so, I suppose, I could not haue chosen one more remarqueable, or eminent, to the purpose now

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in hand; which is concerning the coniunction of learning in the Prince, with felicity in the people.

Neither hath Learning an influence and operation onely vpon ciuile merit and morall vertue; and the Arts or temperature of peace, and peaceable gouernement; but likewise it hath no lesse power and efficacie in inablement towards martiall and military vertue and prowesse; as may bee notably represented in the examples of *Alexander* the Great, and *Cesar* the Dictator mentioned before, but now in fit place to be resumed, of whose vertues and Acts in waire, there needes no note or recitall, hauing bene the wonders of time in that kind. But of their affections towards learning, and perfections in learning, it is pertinent to say some what.

Alexander was bred and taught vnder *Aristotle* the great Philosopher; who dedicated diuers of his Bookes of Philosophie vnto him; hee was attended with *Calisthenes* and diuerse other learned persons that followed him in Campe, throughout his Iourneyes and Conquests: what price and estimation hee had learning in, doth notably appeare in these three particulars: First, in the enuie hee vsed to expresse, that hee bare towards *Achilles*, in this, that hee had so good a Trumpet of his prayses at *Homers* verses: Secondly, in the iudgement or solution he gaue touching that precious Cabinet of *Darius* which was found amonge his iewels, whereof question was made, what things was worthy to be put into it, and hee gaue his opinion for *Homers* workes. Thirdly, in
his

his letter to *Aristotle* after he had set forth his bookes of Nature ; wherein hee expostulateth with him for publishing the secrets or Mysteries of Philosophy, and gaue him to vnderstand that himselfe esteemed it more to excell other men in Learning and knowledge, than in power and Empire. And what vse he had of learning, doth appeare, or rather shine in al his speeches and answeres, being full of science and vse of science, and that in all variety.

And herein againe , it may seeme a thing scholasticall, and somewhat idle to recite thinges that euery man knoweth ; but yet, since the argumen I handle leadeth mee thereunto , I am glad that men shall perceiue I am as willing to flatter (if they will so call it) an *Alexander*, or a *Cesar*, or an *Antoninus*, that are dead many hundred yeares since , as any that now liueth: for it is the displaying of the glory of Learning in Soueraigntie that I propound to my selfe, and not an humour of declayming in any mans prayses. Obserue then the speech hee, vsed of *Diogenes* , and see if it tend not to the true estate of one of the greatest questions of morall Philosophy ; whether the enioying of outward things , or the contemning of them be the greatest happinesse ; for when hee saw *Diogenes* so perfectly contended with so little: hee sayd those that mocked at his condition: *were I not Alexander, I would wish to be Diogenes.* But *Seneca* inuerteth it, and sayth; *Plus erat, quod hic uolet accipere, quam quod ille posset dare.* There were more things which *Diogenes* would haue refused, than

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those were which Alexander could haue giuen or enioyed.

Obferue againe that ſpeech which was vsuall with him, *That he felt his mortality chiefly in two thinges, Sleepe and Luſt:* and ſee if it were not a ſpeech extracted out of the depth of naturall Philoſophy, and liker to haue comen out of the mouth of *Ariſtotle*, or *Democritus*, than from *Alexander*.

See againe that ſpeech of Humanity and poeſie: when vpon the bleeding of his wounds, he called vnto him one of his flatterers, that was wont to aſcribe to him diuine honor, and ſaid, *Looke, this is very blood: this is not ſuch liquor as Homer ſpeaketh of, which ran from Venus hand, when it was pierced by Diomedes.*

See likewise his readineſſe in reprehension of Logique, in the ſpeech hee vſed to *Caffander*, vpon a complaint that was made againſt his father *Antipater*: for when *Alexander* happed to ſay: *Doe you thinke theſe men would haue come from ſo farre to complaine, except they had iuſt cauſe of grieſe?* and *Caffander* answered, *Yea: that was the matter, becauſe they thought they ſhould not be diſprooued;* ſaide *Alexander* laughing: *See the ſubtilties of Ariſtotle, to take a matter both wayes, Pro & Contra, &c.*

But note againe how well hee could vſe the ſame Art, which hee reprehended to ſerue his owne humor, when bearing a ſecret grudge to *Calliſthenes*, becauſe hee was againſt the new ceremony of his adoration: feaſting one night, where the ſame *Calliſthenes* was at the table: it was mooued by ſome after ſupper, for entertainement ſake, that *Calliſthenes* who
was

was an eloquent man, might speake of some theame or purpose at his owne choise, which *Callisthenes* did; chusing the praise of the Macedonian Nation for his discourse, and performing the same with so good manner, as the hearers were much ravished: where vpon *Alexander* nothing pleased, sayd: *It was easie to be eloquent, vpon so good a subject*: But saith hee, *Turne your stile, and let vs heare what you can say agaynst vs: which Callisthenes* presently vndertooke, and did with that stinge and life; that *Alexander* interrupted him, and sayd: *The goodnesse of the cause made him eloquent before: and despight made him eloquent then againe.*

Consider further, for troopes of Rhetorique, that excellent vse of a Metaphor or translation, where-with he taxed *Antipater*, who was an imperious and tyrannous Governour: for when one of *Antipaters* friends comended him to *Alexander* for his moderation; that he did not degenerate, as his other Lieutenants did into the Persian pride, in vse of purple; but kept the ancient habit of Macedon of blacke; *True* (saith *Alexander*) *but Antipater is all purple within.* Or that other, when *Parmenio* came to him in the plaine of *Arbella*, and shewed him the innumerable multitude of his enemies, especially as they appered by the infinite number of lights; as it had beene a new firmament of starres; and thereupon aduised him to assaile them by night: wherevpon he answered, *That he would not steale the Victory.*

For matter of policy, weigh that significant distinction so much in all ages embraced, that he made be-

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tweene his two friends *Ephestion* and *Craterus*, when he sayd, *That the one loued Alexander, and the other loued the King*; describing the principall difference of Princes best seruants, that some in affection loue their person, and other in duety loue their crowne.

Weigh also that excellent taxation of an Error ordinary with Councillors of Princes, that they counsell their Maisters according to the modell of their owne mind and fortune, and not of their Masters, when vpon *Derius* great offers *Parmenio* had sayd: *Surely, I would accept these offers were I as Alexander*: sayth *Alexander* so would I, were I as *Parmenio*.

Lastly, weigh that quicke and acute reply, which hee made when hee gaue so large gifts to his friends, and seruants, and was asked what hee did reserue for himselfe, and he answered, *Hope*: Weigh as I say, whether he had not cast vp his account aright, because *Hope* must bee the portion of all that resolute vpon great enterprises. For this was *Cesars* portion, when he went first into *Gaule*, his estate being then vtterly ouer-throwne with *Largeesse*: and this was likewise the portion of that noble Prince, howsoeuer transported with ambition, *Henry Duke of Guise*, of whom it was vsually sayd: that he was the greatest *Vsurer* in *Fraunce*, because hee had turned all his estate into obligations.

To conclude therefore, as certaine *Critiques* are vsed to say hyperbolically: *That if all Sciences were lost, they might bee found in Virgill*: So certainly this may bee sayd truely; there are the prints, and footesteps

Steps of Learning in those few speeches, which are reported of this Prince. The admiration of whom, when I consider him, not as *Alexander* the Great, but as *Aristotles* Scholler, hath carryed me too farre.

As for *Iulius Caesar*, the excellency of his learning, needeth not to be argued from his education, or his company, or his speeches: but in a further degree doth declare it selfe in his writings and workes, whereof some are extant, and permanent, and some vnfortunately perished: For, first wee see there is left vnto vs that excellent Historie of his owne warres, which hee entituled onely a Commentary, wherein all succeeding times haue admired the solide weight of matter, and the real passages, and liuely Images of actions, and persons expressed in the greatest propriety of words, and perspicuity of Narration that euer was: which that it was not the effect of a naturall giift, but of Learning and precept, is well witnessed by that worke of his, intituled *De Analogia*, being a grammaticall Philosophy, wherein hee did labour to make this same *Vox ad placitum*, to become *Vox ad licitum*: and to reduce custome of speech, to congruities of speech, and tooke as it were the picture of wordes, from the life of reason.

So wee receiue from him as a Monument, both of his power and Learning, the then reformed computation of the yeare, well expressing, that hee tooke it to bee as great a glory to himselfe, to obserue and know the law of the Heauens, as to giue law to men vpon the earth.

So

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So likewise in that booke of his *Anticato*, it may easily appeare that he did aspire as well to victory of wit, as victory of warre: vndertaking therein a conflict against the greatest Champion with the pen that then liued, *Cisero* the Orator.

So againe in this Booke of *Apothegmes*, which hee collected, wee see that hee esteemed it more honor to make himselfe, but a paire of Tables, to take the wise and pithy words of others, than to haue euery word of his owne to be made an Apothegme, or an Oracle; as vaine Princes, by custome of flattery, pretend to doe. And yet if I should enumerate diuerse of his speeches; as I did those of *Alexander*, they are truely such as *Salomon* noteth, when hee sayth; *Verba sapientum tanquam aculei, & tanquam clauis in altum defixi*, whereof I will onely receite three not so delectable for elegancie, but admirable for vigor and efficacy.

As first, it is reason hee bee thought a Master of words, that could with one word appease a mutiny in his Army; which was thus. The Romanes when their Generals did speake in their Army, did vse the word *Milites*; but when the Magistrates spake to the people, they did vse the word, *Quirites*: The Soldiers were in tumult, and seditiously prayed to bee cassiered: not that they so meant, but by expostulation thereof, to drawe *Cesar* to other Conditions; wherein hee being resolute, not to giue way, after some silence, hee began his speech, *Ego Quirites*, which did admit them already cassiered; where-
with

with they were so surprized, crossed, and confused, as they would not suffer him to go on in his speech, but relinquished their demaunds, and made it their suit, to be agayne called by the name of *Milites*.

The second speech was thus : *Caesar* did extreame-ly affect the name of King ; and some were set on as he passed by , in popular acclamation to salute him King ; whereupon finding the cry weake and poore ; he put it off thus, in a kind of Jest, as if they had mistaken his surname ; *Non Rex sum, sed Caesar*, a speech, that if it be searched, the life and fulnesse of it , can scarce be expressed : For first it was a refusall of the name , but yet not serious : agayne it did signifie an infinite confidence and magnanimity , as if he presumed *Caesar* was the greater Title ; as by his worthinesse, it is come to passe till this day ; but chiefly, it was a speech of great allurement toward his owne purpose : as if the State did strive with him, but for a name ; whereof meane families were vested : for *Rex* was a surname with the *Romanes* , as well as *King* is with vs.

The last speech, which I will mention , was vsed to *Metellus* : when *Caesar*, after War declared , did possesse himselfe of the City of *Rome* , at which time entring into the inner Treasury, to take the money there accumulate, *Metellus* being Tribune forbad him : Where to *Caesar* sayd, *That if hee did not desist, hee would lay him dead in the place* : And presently taking himselfe vp, hee added : *Young man it is harder for me to speake it,*

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than to do it : *Adolescens, durius est mihi, hoc dicere, quam facere.* A speech compounded of the greatest terrour, and greatest clemency, that could proceede out of the mouth of man.

But to returne and Conclude with him, it is euident himselfe knew well his owne perfection in learning, and tooke it vpon him; as appeared, when vpon occasion, that some spake, what a strange resolution it was in *Lucyur Sylla*, to resigne his Dictature: he scoffing at him, to his owne aduantage, answered: *That Sylla could not skill of Letters, and therefore knew not how to Dictate.*

And here it were fit to leaue this poynt, touching the concurrence of military Vertue and Learning: (for what example should come with any grace, atter those two, of *Alexander* and *Cesar*) were it not in regard of the rarenesse of Circumstance, that I finde in one other particular; as that which did so suddainly passe, from extreame scorne, to extreame wonder: and it is of *Xenophon* the Phylosopher, who went from *Socrates* Schoole into *Asia*, in the expedition of *Cyrus* the younger, agaynst King *Artaxerxes*: This *Xenophon* at that time, was very young, and neuer had seene the Wars before: neyther had any commaund in the Army, but onely followed the War, as a Voluntary, for the loue and conuersation of *Proxemus* his Friend: hee was present when *Falibus* came in Message from the great King, to the *Grecians*; after that *Cyrus* was slayne in the field; and they a handfull of men left to themselves
in

in the midst of the Kings Territories, cut off from their Country by many nauigable Riuers, and many hundred miles : The Message imported, that they should deliuer vp their Armes, and submit themselves to the Kings mercy: To which Message before answer was made, diuers of the Army conferred familiarly with *Falinus* ; and amongst the rest *Xenophon* hapned to say: *why Falinus, we haue now but these two things left; our Armes, and our Vertue; and if we yeeld vp our Armes, how shall we make vse of our Vertue?* Whereto *Falinus* smiling on him, said; *If I be not deceiued, young Gentlemen, you are an Athenian; and I beleene, you study Philosophy; and it is pretty that you say; but you are much abused, if you thinke your Vertue can withstand the Kings power:* Here was the scorne; the wonder followed; which was, that this young Scholler, or Phylosopher, after all the Captaynes were murdered in parly by Treason, Conducted those ten Thousand foote, through the heart of all the Kings high Countreyes from *Babylon* to *Grecia* in safety, in despight of all the Kings forces, to the astonishment of the world, and the encouragement of the Grecians in times succeeding, to make inuasion vpon the Kings of *Persia*; as was after purposed by *Iason* the Thessalian; attempted by *Agessilaus* the Spartan, and archieued by *Alexander* the Macedonian; all, vpon the ground of the act of that yong Scholler.

To proceede now from Imperiall and Military vertue, to Morall and priuate vertue; first, it is an as-

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sured truth, which is containd in the Verses :

Scilicet ingenuas didicisse fideliter artes,

Emollit mores nec sinit esse feros.

It taketh away the wildnesse, and Barbarisme and fiercenesse of mens minds; but indeed the accent had need be vpon, *fideliter*. For a little superficial learning doth rather worke a contrary effect. It taketh away all leuity, temerity, and insolency, by copious suggestion of all doubts and difficulties, and acquainting the minde to ballance reasons on both sides, and to turne backe the first offers and conceits of the minde, and to accept of nothing but examined and tryed. It taketh away vayne admiration of any thing, which is the Roote of all weakenesse. For all things are admired, eyther because they are new, or because they are great. For nouelty, no man that wadeth in learning or contemplation throughly, but will find that Printed in his heart, *Nil novi super terram*: Neyther can any man maruayle at the play of Puppets, that goeth behind the Curtayne, and aduifeth well of the Motion. And for Magnitude, as *Alexander* the Great, after that hee was vsed to great Armies, and the great Conquests of the spacious Prouinces in *Asia*, when hee receiued Letters out of *Greece*, of some fights and seruices there, which were commonly for a passage, or a Fort, or some walled Towne at the most, hee sayd: *It seemed to him, that hee was aduertised of the Battails of the Frogs, and the Mice, that the old tales went of.*

So

So certaynely, if a man meditate vppon the Vniuerfall frame of Nature, the earth with men vppon it (the Diuinesse of soules except) will not seeme much other, than an Ant-hill, whereas some Ants carry Corne, and some carry their yong: and some goe empty, and all too and fro, a little heape of Dust. It taketh away, or mitigateth feare of Death, or aduerse Fortune: which is one of the greatest impediments of Vertue, and imperfections of manners. For if a mans minde bee deeply seasoned with the consideration of the mortality and corruptible nature of things, he wil easily concurre with *Epicletus*, who went forth one day, and saw a VVoman weeping for her Pitcher of earth, that was broken; and went soorth the next day, and saw a VVoman weeping for her Sonne that was Dead, and thereuppon sayde: *Heri, vidi fragilem frangi, hodie vidi mortalem mori.* And therefore *Virgil* did excellently, and profoundly couple the Knowledge of cause, and the Conquest of all feares, together, as *Comitantia*.

Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas,

Quique metus omnes, & inexorabile fatum

Subiecit pedibus, strepitumque Acherontis anari.

It weere too long to goe ouer the particular remedies, which Learning doth Minister, to all the diseases of the minde, sometimes purging the ill humours, sometimes opening the obstructions, sometimes helping Digestion, sometimes encreasing

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appetite, sometimes healing the wound and exulcerations thereof, and the like; and therefore I will Conclude with that which hath *Rationem totius*; which is, that it disposeth the Constitution of the minde, not to be fixed or settled in the defects thereof; but still to be capable, and insceptible of growth and Reformation. For the vnlearned man knowes not, what it is to descend into himselfe, or to call himselfe to account, nor the pleasure of that *Suauissima vita, indies sentire se fieri meliorem*: The good parts hee hath, hee will learne to shew to the full, and vse them dexterously; but not much to encrease them: The faults he hath, hee will learne how to hide and colour them, but not much to amend them; like an ill Mower, that mowes on still, and neuer whets his Syth: whereas, with the learned man, it fares otherwise; that he doth euer intermix the correction and amendment of his minde, with the vse and employment thereof: Nay further in generall and in sum: certaine it is, that *Veritas* and *Bonitas* differ, but as the Seale and the Print: for Truth prints Goodnesse, and they be the cloudes of Error, which descend in the stormes of passions and perturbations.

For Morall vertue, let vs passe on to matter of power and commandement, and consider whether in right Reason, there be any comparable with that, where with Knowledge inuesteth and Crowneth mans nature. VVe see the dignity of the Commandement, is according to the dignity of the Commaunded: to haue commaundment ouer Beasts, as
 Heard-

Heard-men haue, is a thing contemptible: to haue commaundment ouer Children, as Schoole-masters haue, is a matter of small honor: to haue commaundment ouer Gally-slaues, is a disparagement, rather than an honour. Neyther is the commaundment of Tyrants, much better ouer people, which haue put off the Generosity of their mindes: And therefore it was euer holden, that honors in free Monarchies and Common-wealthes, had a sweetnesse more than in Tyrannies, because the commaundment extendeth more ouer the wils of men, and not onely ouer their deedes and seruices. And therefore when *Virgil* putteth himselfe forth to attribute to *Augustus Caesar* the best of humane honours, hee doth it in these words:

Victorque volentes

Per populos, dat iura, viamque efficit Olympo:

But yet the commaundment of Knowledge, is yet higher, than the commandment ouer the will: for it is a commaundment ouer the reason, beleeve, and vnderstanding of man, which is the highest part of the minde, and giueth law to the will it selfe. For there is no power on earth, which setteth a Throne or Chayre of Estate in the spirits and soules of men, and in their cogitations, imaginations, opinions, and beleeves; but Knowledge and Learning. And therefore wee see the detestable and extreame pleasure, that Arch-heretiques, and false Prophets, and Impostors are transported with, when they once finde in themselues, that they haue a superiority in the faith
and

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and Conscience of men ; so great, as if they haue once tasted of it, it is seldome seene, that any torture or persecution can make them relinquish or abandon it. But as this is that which the Author of the Reuelation, calleth the depth or profoundnesse of Sathan : so by argument of contraries, the iust and lawfull Soueraignty ouer mens vnderstanding, by force of truth rightly interpreted, is that which approacheth nearest to the similitude of the Diuine rule.

As for fortune and aduancement, the beneficence of learning, is not so confined to giue fortune onely to States and Common-wealths: as it doth not likewise giue Fortune to particular persons. For it was well noted long agoe, that *Homer* hath giuen more men their liuings, than eyther *Sylla*, or *Cesar*, or *Augustus* euer did, notwithstanding their great largesses, and donatiues, and distributions of Lands to so many legions. And no doubt, it is hard to say, whether armes or learning haue aduanced greater numbers. And in case of Soueraignty, wee see, that if armes or descent haue carried away the Kingdome: yet learning hath carryed the Priest-hood, which euer haue bene in some competition with Empire.

Againe, for the pleasure and delight of knowledge and learning, it far surpasseth all other in nature: for that the pleasures of the affections so exceed the pleasures of the senses, as much as the obtayning of desire or Victory, exceedeth a song, or a dinner? and must not of consequence, the pleasures of the intel-
lect

lect or vnderstanding exceede the pleasures of the affections? we see in all other pleasures, there is a facietie; and after they be vsed, their verdour departeth, which sheweth well, they be but deceits of pleasure, and not pleasures; and that it was the noueltie which pleased, and not the quality. And therefore we see, that voluptuous men turne Friars; and ambitious Princes turne melancholy. But of knowledge there is no facietie, but satisfaction and appetite, are perpetually interchangeable; and therefore appeareth to be good in it selfe simply, without fallacie or accident. Neither is that pleasure of small efficacie, and contentment to the minde of man, which the Poet *Lucretius* describeth elegantly.

Suaue mari magno, turbantibus aequora ventis, &c.

It is a view of delight (saith he) to stand or walke vpon the shoare side, and to see a Shiptossed with tempest vpon the sea; or to be in a fortified Tower, and to see two Battailles ioyne vpon a plaine. But it is a pleasure incomparable for the minde of man to be settled, landed, and fortified in the certainty of truth; and from thence to descric and behold the errors, perturbations, labours, and wanderings up and downe of other men.

Lastly, leauing the vulgar arguments, that by learning, man exceileth man in that, wherein man exceileth beasts; that by Learning man ascendeth to the heauens and their motions; where in body he cannot come; and the like; Let vs conclude with the dignity and excellency of Knowledge and Learning, in that whereunto mans nature doth most aspire;

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which

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which is immortality or continuance; for to this tendeth generation, and raising of houses and families; to this tendeth buildings, foundations, and monuments, to this tendeth the desire of memory, fame, and celebration; and in effect, the strength of all other humane desires; wee see then how far the monuments of wit and learning, are more durable, than the monuments of power, or of the hands. For haue not the Verses of *Homer* continued 25. hundred yeares, or more, without the losse of a syllable, or letter: during which time, infinite Pallaces, Temples, Castles, Cities haue bene decayed, and demolished? It is not possible to haue the true pictures or statuaes of *Cyrus*, *Alexander*, *Cesar*, no nor of the Kings, or great Personages of much latter yeares: For the originals cannot last; and the Copies cannot but leese of the life and truth. But the Images of mens wits and knowledges remayne in Bookes, exempted from the wrong of time, and capable of perpetuall renouation: Neyther are they fitly to be called Images, because they generate still, and cast their feedes in the mindes of others, prouoking and causing infinite actions and opinions, in succeeding ages. So that if the inuention of the Shippe was thought so noble, which carryeth riches and commodities from place to place, and consociateth the most remote Regions in participation of their Fruites: how much more are letters to bee magnified, which as Shippes passe through the vast Seas of time, and make ages so distant, to participate of the wisdom,

illumi-

illuminations and inuentions the one of the other? Nay further wee see, some of the Phylosophers which were least diuine, and most immersed in the senses, and denyed generally the immortality of the soule; yet came to this poynt, that whatsoeuer motions the spirit of man could act, and performe without the Organs of the body, they thought might remayne after death; which were onely those of the vnderstanding, and not of the affection; so immortall and incorruptible a thing did knowledge seeme vnto them to be: But wee that know by diuine Reuelation, that not onely the vnderstanding, but the affections purified, not onely the spirite, but the body changed shall be aduanced to immortality, doe disclayme in these rudiments of the senses. But it must be remembred, both in this last poynt, and so it may likewise bee needefull in other places, that in probation of the dignity of Knowledge, or Learning, I did in the beginning separate Diuine testimony, from humane; which Method, I haue pursued, and so handled them both a part.

Neuerthelesse, I doe not pretend, and I know it will be impossible for me by any Pleading of mine, to reuerse the Iudgement, eyther of *Aesops* Cocke, that preferred the Barly-corne, before the Gemme; or of *Midas*, that being chosen Iudge, betweene *Apollo* President of the Muses, and *Pan* God of the Flockes, iudged for Plenty: or of *Paris*, that iudged for Beauty, and loue agaynst *VVisedome* and Power: Or of *Agrippina*, *Occidat matrem, modo im-*

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peret: that preferred Empire with any condition never so detestable; or of *Vlysses*, *Qui vetulam prætulit immortalitati*, being a figure of those which preferre Custome and Habite before all excellency; or of a number of the like popular Iudgements. For these things must continue, as they haue bene: but so will that also continue, wherupon Learning hath euer relied, and which faileth not: *Iustificata est sapientia à filijs suis.*

THE



THE SECOND BOOKE

of Sir *Francis Bacon*; of the pro-
ficiency or Aduancement of Lear-

ning, Diuine and Humane.

To the King.



IT might seeme to haue more conue-
nience, though it come often other-
wise to passe, (Excellent King) that
those which are fruitfull in their ge-
nerations, and haue in themselues the
foresight of Immortality, in their de-
scendents, should likewise be more carefull of the
good estate of future times; vnto which they know
they must transmitte and commend ouer their de-
arest pledges. *Queene Elizabeth* was a sojourner in
the World in respect of her vnmarried life: and was
a blessing to her owne times; and yet so as the impres-
sion of her good Governement, besides her happy
M 3 memorie,

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memorie, is not without some effect, which doth suruiue her. But to your Maiesty, whom God hath already blessed with so much Royall issue, worthy to continue and represent you for euer: and whose youthfull and fruitfull bedde doth yet promise many the like reuocations: It is proper and agreeable to bee conuersant, not onely in the transitory part of good gouernement but in those acts also, which are in their nature permanent and perpetnall. Amongst the which (if affliction doe not transport mee,) there is not any more worthy, then the further endowment of the world which sound and suitfull knowledge: For why should a fewe receiued Authors stand vp like *Hercules Columes*; beyond which, there should be no sayling, or discovering, since wee haue so bright and benigne a starre, as your Maiesty: to conduct and prosper vs? To turne therefore where wee left, it remaineth to consider of what kind those Acts are which haue bene vndertaken, and performed by Kings and others, for the increase and advancement of learning, wherein I purpose to speake actiuely without digressing or dylating.

Let this ground therefore bee layd, that all workes are ouercommen by amplitude of reward, by soundnesse of direction, and by the coniunction of labors. The first multiplyeth endeauour, the second preuenteth error, and the third supplieth the frailty of man. But the principall of these is direction: For *Claudus in via, auerterit cursorem extra viam*: And *Salomon* excellently setteth it downe; *if the Iron be not sharpe,*

it requireth more strength: But wisdom is that which preuaileth: signifying that the Invention or election of the Meane, is more effectually then any inforcement or accumulation of endeouours. This I am induced to speake; for that (not derogating from the noble intention of any that haue benee deseruers towards the State of Learning) I do obserue neuertheless, that their workes and Acts are rather matters of Magnificence and Memorie, then of progression and proficiencie, and tende ratherto augment the masse of Learning in the multitude of Learned men, then to rectifie or raise the Sciences themselves.

The Workes or Acts of merit towards Learning are conuersant about three objects, the Places of Learning; the Bookes of Learning; and the Persons of the Learned. For as water, whether it be the dew of Heauen, or the springs of the Earth, doth scatter and leese it selfe in the ground, except it be collected into some Receptacle, where it may by vnion, comfort and sustaine it selfe: And for that cause the Industrie of Man hath made and framed Spring-heads, Conduits, Cesternes, and Pooles, which men haue accustomed likewise to beautifie and adorne with accomplishments of Magnificence and State, as well as of vse and necessitie: So this excellent liquor of Knowledge, whether it descend from diuine inspiration, or spring from humane sence, would soone perish and vanish to obliuion, if it were not preserved in Bookes, Traditions, Conferences, and Places.

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Places appointed, as Vniuersities, Colledges, and Schooles, for the receipt and comfort of the same.

The workes which concerne the Seates and Places of Learning, are foure; Foundations, and Buildings, Endowments with Reuenues, Endowments with Eranchizes and Priuiledges, Institutions and Ordinances for gouernement, all tending to quietnesse and priuatenesse of life, and discharge of cares and troubles, much like the Stations, which *Virgil* prescribeth for the huiing of Bees.

Principio sedes Apibus, statione petenda:

Quo neq, sit ventis aditus, &c.

The workes touching Bookes are two: First Libraries, which are as the Shrynes, where all the Reliques of the antient Saints, full of true vertue, and that without delusion or imposture, are preserued, and reposed; Secondly, New Editions of Authors, with more correct Impressions, more faithfull translations, more profitable glosses, more diligent Annotations, and the like.

The workes pertaining to the persons of Learned men (besides the advancement and countenancing of them in generall) are two: The reward and designation of Readers of Sciences already extant and inuented: and the reward and designation of Writers and Enquirers, concerning any parts of Learning, not sufficiently laboured and prosecuted.

These are summarilie the Workes and Actes, wherein the merites of manie excellent Princes, and other worthie Personages haue bene conuersant.

fant. As for any particular commemorations, I call to minde what *Cicero* sayd, when hee gaue generall thanks. *Difficile non aliquem; in gratum quenquam preterire*: Let vs rather according to the Scriptures, looke vnto the parte of the Race, which is before vs; then looke backe to that which is already attained.

First therefore amongst so many great Foundations of Colledges in *Europe*, I finde strange that they are all dedicated to Professions, and none left free to Artes and Science at large. For if men iudge that learning should be referred to actions, they iudge well: but in this they fall into the Error described in the ancient Fable; in which the other parts of the body did suppose the stomache had beene ydle, because it neyther performed the office of Motion, as the lymmes doe, nor of Sence, as the head doth: But yet notwithstanding it is the Stomach that digesteth and distributeth to all the rest: So if any man thinke Philosophy and Vniuersality to be idle Studies; hee doth not consider that all Professions are from thence serued, and supplied. And this I take to be a great cause that hath hindered the progression of learning, because these Fundamentall knowledges hath beene studied but in passage. For if you will haue a Tree beare more fruite then it hath vsed to do; it is not any thing you can do to the bougbes, but it is the stirring of the earth, and putting new mould about the Rootes, that must worke it. Neyther is it to be forgotten, that this dedicating

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of Foundations and Dotations to professoꝝ Learning, hath not onely had a maligne aspect and influence vppon the growth of Sciences, but hath also beene preiudiciall to States and Governements. For hence it proceedeth that Princes finde a solitude, in regard of able men to serue them in causes of estate, because there is no education collegiate, which is free; where such as were so disposed, mought giue themselues to Histories, moderne Languages, Bookes of pollicy and ciuill Discourse, and other the like inablements vnto seruice of estate.

And because Founders of Colledges doe plant, and Founders of Lectures doe water: It followeth well in order to speake of the defect, which is in publique Lectures: Namely, in the smalnesse and meane-nesse of the salary or-reward, which in most places is assigned vnto them: whether they be Lectures of Arts or of Professions. For it is necessary to the progression of Sciences, that Readers be of the most able and sufficient men; as those which are ordayned for generating, and propagating of Sciences, and not for transitory vse. This cannot be, except their condition and endowment be such, as may content the ablest man, to appropriate his whole labour, and continue his whole age in that function and attendance, and therefore must haue a proportion answerable to that mediocrity, or competency of advancement, which may be expected from a Profession, or the Practize of a Profession: So as, if you will haue Scyences flourish, you must obserue *Dauids* military

military Law, which was, *That those which staid with the Carriage, should haue equall part with those which were in the Action*: else will the carriages be ill attended: So Readers in Sciences are indeede the Guardians of the stores, and prouisions of Sciences, whence men in actiue courses are furnished, and therefore ought to haue equall entertaynemet with them; otherwise if the fathers in Sciences be of the weakest sort, or be ill maintayned.

Et Patrum invalidi referent ieiunia nati.

Another defect I note, wherein I shall neede some Alchymist to helpe me, who call vpon men to sell their Bookes, and to build Fornaces, quitting and forsaking *Minerua*, and the *Muses*, as barren Virgines, and relying vpon *Vulcan*. But certayne it is, that vnto the deepe, fruitfull, and operative study of many Sciences, specially Naturall Phylosophy, and Physicke, Bookes be not onely the Instrumentals; wherein also the beneficence of men hath not beene altogether wanting: For wee see, Spheares, Globes, Astrolabes, Maps, and the like, haue beene prouided, as appurtenances to Astronomy and Cosmography, as well as Bookes: We see likewise, that some places instituted for Physicke, haue annexed the commodity of Gardeins for Simples of all sorts, and doe likewise command the vse of dead Bodies for Anatomies. But these doe respect but a few things. In generall, there will hardly be any Mayne proficiencie in the disclosing of nature, except there be some allowance for expences about experiments;

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whether they be experiments appertayning to *Vulcanus* or *Dedalus*, Furnace or Engine, or any other kind; And therefore as Secretaries, and Spyalls of Princes and States bring in Bills for Intelligence; so you must allowe the Spyalls and Intelligencers of Nature; to bring in their Bills, or else you shall bee ill advertised.

And if *Alexander* made such a liberall assignation to *Aristotle* of treasure for the allowance of Hunters, Fowlers, Fishers and the like, that he mought compile an History of Nature, much better do they deserue it that trauailes in Artes of Nature.

Another defect which I note, is an intermission, or neglect in those which are Governours in Vniuersities, of Consultation, and in Princes or Superior persons of Visitation: To enter into account and consideration, whether the Readings, exercises, and other customes appertayning vnto Learning, anciently begunne, and since continued, be well instituted or no, and thereuppon to ground an amendment, or reformation in that which shall be found inconuenient. For it is one of your Maesties owne most wise and Princely Maximes, *That in all vsages and Presidents, the Times be considered wherein they first beganne, which if they were weake or ignorant, it derogateh from the Authority of the Vsage, and leaueh it for suspect.* And therefore in as much, as most of the vsages and orders of the Vniuersities were deriued from more obscure times, it is the more requisite they be re-examined. In this kind I will giue an
instance

instance or two for example sake, of things that are the most obuius and familiar: The one is a matter which though it bee ancient and generall, yet I hold to be an error, which is, that Schollers in Vniuersities come too soone, and too vnripe to Logick and Rhetoricke; And sifter for Graduates then Children, and Nouices: For these two right y taken, are the greatest of Sciences, being the Art of Arts, the one for Iudgment, the other for Ornament: And they be the Rules and Directions, how to set forth and dispose matter, and therefore for minds empty and vnfrayght with matter, and which haue not gathered that which Cicero calleth *Sylua* and *supellex*, stuffe and variety to beginne with those Artes (as if one should learne to weigh, or to measure, or to paynt the Winde) doth work but this effect: that the wisdom of those Arts, which is great and vniuersall, is almost made contemptible, and is degenerate into childish Sophistry, and ridiculous affectation. And further, the vntimely learning of them hath drawne on by consequence, the superficial and vnprofitable teaching and writing of them, as fitteth indeed to the capacity of children: Another, is a lacke I finde in the exercises vsed in the Vniuersities, which do make too great a diuorce between Inuention and Memory: for their speeches are eyther premeditate in *Verbis conceptis*, where nothing is left to Inuention, or mecerely *Extemporall*, where little is left to Memory: wheras in life and action, there is least vse of eyther of these, but rather of intermixtures of premeditation and Inuention: Notes and

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Memory. So as the exercise fitteth not the practise, nor the Image the life; and it is euer a true Rule in exercises, that they be framed as neere as may be to the life of practise, for otherwise they do peruert the motions and faculties of the minde, and not prepare them. The truth wherof is not obscure, when Schollars come to the practises of professions, or other actions of ciuill life, which when they set into, this want is soone found by themselues, and sooner by others. But this part touching the amendment of the Institutions and orders of Vniuersities. I will Conclude with the clause of *Casars* letter to *Oppian* and *Balbus*, *Hoc quemadmodum fieri possit, nonnulla mihi in mentem veniunt, & multa reperiri possunt: de ijs rebus rogo vos, ut cogitationem suscipiatis.*

Another defect which I note, ascendeth a little higher then the precedent. For as the proficiencie of learning consisteth much in the orders and institutions of Vniuersities, in the same states and kingdomes: So it would bee yet more aduanced, if there were more Intelligence mutuall betweene the Vniuersities of *Europe*, then now there is. We see, there be many Orders and Foundations, which though they be diuided vnder seueral soueraignties and territories, yet they take themselues to haue a kind of contract, fraternity and correspondence; one with the other, in somuch as they haue Prouincials and Generals. And surely as Nature createth Brother-hood in Families, and Arts Mechanicall contract Brother-hoods in Communalities, and the Anoyntment of God

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Super induceth in a Brother-hood in Kings and Bishops: So in like manner there cannot but be a fraternity in learning and illumination, relating to that Paternity, which is attributed to God, who is called the Father of illuminations or lights.

The last defect which I wil note, is, that there hath not beene, or very rarely beene, any publique Designation of VVriters or Enquirers, concerning such parts of knowledge, as may appeare not to haue bin already sufficiently laboured or vnder taken, vnto which point it is an Inducement; to enter into a view and examination; what parts of learning haue been profecuted, and what omitted: For the opinion of plenty is amongst the causes of want; and the great quantity of Bookes maketh a shewe rather of superfluity then lacke, which surcharge neuerthelesse is not to be remedied by making no more Bookes, but by making more good books, which are as the serpent of *Moses*, mought deuour the serpents of the inchantors. The remouing of all the defects formerly enumerate, except the last, and of the actiue part also of the last (which is the designation of VVriters) are *Opera Basilica*; towards which the endeuours of a private man may be, but as an Image in a crosse way; that may poynt at the way, but cannot go it. But the inducing part of the latter (which is the suruay of Learning,) may bee set forwarde by private trauayle: Wherefore I will now attempt to make a generall and faithfull perambulation of learning, with an inquiry what parts thereof lye fresh and
walt,

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wast, and not improvd and converted by the industry of man; to the end that such a plot made and secreted to incertainty, may both minister light to any publique designation: and also serve to excite voluntary endeavors; wherein neuertheless my purpose is at this time; to note onely omissions and deficiencies; and not to make any redargution of errors, or incomplete prosecutions: For it is one thing to set forth what ground lyeth vnnanured; and another thing to correct ill husbandry in that which is manured.

In the handling and vndertaking of which worke, I am not ignorant, what it is, that I doe now mooue and attempt, nor insensible of mine owne weaknes, to sustayne my purpose: But my hope is, that if my extreame loue to Learning carry me too farre, I may obtaine the excuse of affection; for that *It is not granted to man to loue, and to be wise.* But I know well I can vse no other liberty of Iudgement, then I must leaue to others; and I for my part shall be indifferently glad eyther to performe my selfe; or accept from another, that duty of humanity: *Nam qui erranti comiter monstrat viam, &c.* I doe fore-see likewise, that of those things, which I shall enter and Register, as Deficiencies and Omissions: Many will conceit and censure, that some of them are already done and extant: Others to see but curiosities, and things of no great vse: and others to see of too great difficulty, and almost impossibility to be compassed and effected: But for the two first, I referre my selfe to

the

the particulars. For the last, touching impossibility, I take it, those things are to be held possible, which may be done by some person, though not by every one: and which may be done by many, though not by any one: and which may be done in succession of ages, though not within the houre-glasse of one mans life: and which may be done by publique designation, though not by priuate indeauour.

But notwithstanding, if any Man will take to himselfe rather that of *Salomon*, *Dicit piger, Leo est in via*, then that of *Virgil*, *Possunt, quia posse videntur*: I shall be content that my labours be esteemed, but as the better sort of wishes: for as it asketh some Knowledge to demaund a question, not impertinent; so it requireth some sense, to make a wish not absurd.

THE *Parts* of humane Learning haue reference to the three partes of Mans vnderstanding, which is the seate of Learning: *Historie* to his *Memorie*, *Poesie* to his *Imagination*, and *Philosophie* to his *Reason*: Diuine Learning receiueth the same distribution, for the Spirite of Man is the same: though the Reuelation of Oracle and Sence be diuerse: So as Theologie consisteth also of *Historie* of the Church; of *Parables*, which is Diuine *Poesie*: and of holy *Doctrine* or *Precept*. For as for that part, which seemeth supernumerarie, which is *Prophecie*: it is but Diuine *Historie*: which hath that prerogative ouer humane, as the Narration

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may be before the fact, as well as after.

*Historia
Literarum.*

Historie is *Naturall*, *Ciuile*, *Ecclesiasticall* and *Litterarie*, whereof the three first I allowe as extant, the fourth I note as deficient. For no man hath propounded to himselfe the generall state of Learning to be described and represented from age to age, as many haue done the workes of Nature, and the State *Ciuile* and *Ecclesiasticall*; without which the *Historie* of the *World* seemeth to me, to be as the *Statua* of *Polyphemus* with his eye out, that part being wanting, which doth most shewe the spirite, and life of the person: And yet I am not ignorant that in diuerse particular sciences, as of the *Iurisconsults*, the *Mathematicians*, the *Rhetoricians*, the *Phylosophers*, there are set downe some small memorials of the *Schooles*, *Authors*, and *Bookes*: and so likewise some barren relations touching the *Inuention* of *Arts*, or *vlsages*.

But a iust story of Learning, containing the *Antiquities* and *Originals* of *Knowledges*, and their *Sects*; their *Inuentions*, their *Traditions*; their diuerse *Administrations*, and *Managings*; their *Flourishings*, their *Oppositions*, *Decayes*, *Depressions*, *Oblitions*, *Remoues*; with the *causes*, and *occasions* of them, and all other euent concerning Learning, throughout the ages of the *World*; I may truly affirme to be wanting.

The use and ende of which worke, I doe not so much designe for curiositie, or satisfaction of those that are the louers of Learning; but chiefly for a
more

more serious, and graue purpose, which is this in fewe wordes, that it will make Learned men wise, in the vse and administration of Learning. For it is not Saint *Augustines*, nor Saint *Ambrose* workes that will make so wise a Diuine, as Ecclesiasticall History, throughly read and obserued: and the same reason is of Learning.

Historie of Nature is of three sorts: of *Nature in Course*; of *Nature Erring*, or *Varying*; and of *Nature Altered* or wrought, that is *Historie of Creatures*, *Historie of Miracles*, and *Historie of Arts*.

The first of these, no doubt is extant, and that in good perfection: The two latter are handled so weakely and vnprofitably, as I am moued to note them as deficient.

For I find no sufficient, or competent Collection of the Workes of Nature, which haue a Digression, and Deflexion, from the ordinary course of Generations, Productions, and Motions, whether they bee singularities of place and region, or the strange euent of time and chance, or the effects of yet vnknowne proprieties, or the instances of exceptions to generall kinds: It is true, I finde a number of bookes of fabulous Experiments, and Secrets, and friuolous Impostures for pleasure and strangeness.

But a substantiall and seuer Collection of *Heteroclitites*, or *Irregulars of Nature*, well examined and described I finde not: specially not with due reiection of fables, and popular Errours: For, as

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things are, if an vntruth in Nature bee once on foote, what by reason of the neglect of examination, and countenance of Antiquitie, and what by reason of the vse of the opinion in similitudes, and ornaments of speeche, it is neuer called downe.

The vse of this worke, honoured with a president in *Aristotle*, is nothing lesse, then to giue contentment to the appetite of Curious and vaine Wittes, as the manner of *Mirabilaries* is to doe: But for two Reasons, both of great waight: The one to correct the partiality of Axiomes, and Opinions: which are commonly framed onely vpon common and familiar examples: The other, because from the Wonders of Nature, is the neereft Intellgence and passage towards the Wonders of Arte: For it is more, but by following, and as it were, hounding Nature in her wandrings, to be able to leade her afterwarde to the same place againe.

Neither am I of opinion in this *Historie of Maruailes*, that superstitious Narrations of Sorceries, Witch-crafts, Dreames, Diuinations, and the like, where there is an assurance, and cleere euidence of the fact, be altogether excluded. For it is not yet knowne in what cases, and howe farre, effects attributed to superstition, doe participate of Naturall causes: and therefore howsoeuer the practise of such things is to be condemned, yet from the Speculation and consideration
of

of them, light may be taken, not onely for the discerning of the offences, but for the further disclosing of Nature: Neither ought a man to make scruple of entring into these things for inquisition of Truth, as your Maiestie hath shewed in your example: who with the two cleere eyes of Religion and naturall Philosophie, haue looked deeply and wisely into these shadows, and yet proued your selfe to be the Nature of the Sunne, which passeth through pollutions, and it selfe remains as pure as before.

But this I hold fit, that these Narrations, which haue mixture with superstition, be sorted by themselves, and not to be mingled with the Narrations, which are meereley and sincerely naturall.

But as for the Narrations touching the Prodigies and Miracles of Religions, they are either not true, or not Naturall; and therefore impertinent for the Storie of Nature.

For *History of Nature wrought, or Mechanicall*, *Historia Mechanica.* I finde some Collections Made of Agriculture, and likewise of Manuall Artes, but commonly with a reiection of experiments familiar and vulgar.

For it is esteemed a kinde of dishonour vnto Learning, to descend to enquire or Meditation vppon Matters Mechanicall; except they bee such as may be thought secrets, rarities, and speciall subtilities: which humour of vaine, and su-

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percilious Arrogancie, is iustly derided in *Plato*: where hee brings in *Hippias* a vaunting *Sophist*, disputing with *Socrates* a true and vnfained inquisition of Truth; where the subject being touching beautie, *Socrates*, after his wandering manner of Inductions, put first an example of a faire Virgine, and then of a faire Horse, and then of a faire Pot well glazed, whereat *Hippias* was offended; and sayd; *More then for curtesies sake, he did thinke much to dispute with any, that did alleage such base and Sordide instances,* whereunto *Socrates* answered; *you haue reason, and it becomes you well, being a man so trimme in your vestiments, &c.* And so goeth on in an Ironie.

But the truth is, they be not the highest instances, that giue the securest information; as may be well expressed in the tale so common of the Philosopher, that while he gazed vpwards to the Starres, fell into the water: for if he had looked downe hee might haue scene the Starres in the water, but looking aloft he could not see the water in the Starres: So it commeth often to passe, that meane and small things discover great, better then great can discover the small: and therefore *Aristotle* noteth well, *That the nature of euery thing is best scene in his smallest portions,* and for that cause he enquireth the nature of a Commonwealth, first in a Family, and the Simple Coniugations of Man and Wife; Parent and Child, Master & Seruant, which are in euery cottage;

Euen

Euen so likewise the nature of this great Citie of the world and the policie thereof, must be first sought in meane concordances, and small portions: So we see how that secret of Nature, of the turning of Iron, touched with the Load-stone, towards the North, was found out in needles of Iron, not in barres of Iron.

But if my iudgement bee of anie waight, the vse of *Historie Mechanicall*, is of all others the most radicall, and fundamentall towards Naturall Phylosophie, such Naturall Phylosophie, as shall not vanish in the fume of subtile, sublime, or delectable Speculation, but such as shall bee operative to the endowment, and benefite of Mans life: For it will not onely minister and suggest for the present, Many ingenious practizes in all trades, by a connexion and transferring of the obseruations of one Arte, to the vse of another, when the experiences of seuerall mysteries shall fall vnder the consideration of one mans minde: But further, it will giue a more true, and reall illumination concerning Causes and Axiomes, then is hitherto attained.

For like as a Mans disposition is neuer well knowne, till he be crossed, nor *Proteus* euer changed shapes, till he was straightened and held fast: so the passages and variations of Nature cannot appeare so fully in the libertie of Nature, as in the trials and vexations of Art.

For

FOR *Ciuile Historie*, it is of three kindes, not vnfitly to be compared with the three kindes of Pictures or Images: for of Pictures or Images, wee see some are Vnfinished, some are parfitte, and some are defaced: So of Histories, wee may finde three kindes, *Memorials*, *Parfitte Histories*, and *Antiquities*: for *Memorials* are Historie vnfinished, or the first, or rough daughters of Historie, and *Antiquities* are Histories defaced, or some remnants of Historie, which haue casually escaped the shipwracke of time.

Memorials, or *Preparatorie Historie*, are of two sortes, whereof the one may bee tearmed *Commentaries*, and the other *Registers*: *Commentaries* are they which set downe a continuance of the naked euents and actions, without the mo- tiues or designs, the Counsels, the Speeches, the pretexts, the occasions, and other passages of action: for this is the true nature of a *Com- mentarie* (though *Cesar* in modestie mixt with greatnesse, did for his pleasure apply the name of a *Commentarie* to the best Historie of the World) *Registers* are collections of Publique Actes, as Decrees of Counsell, Iudiciall proceedings, Declarations and Letters of Estate, O- rations, and the like, without a perfect continu- ance, or contexture of the threed of the Narra- tion.

Antiquities, or Remnants of Historie, are

as was sayde, *Tanquam Tabula Naufragij*, when industrious persons by an exact and scrupulous diligence and obseruation, out of Monuments, Names, Wordes, Prouerbs, Traditions, Priuate Recordes, and Euidences, Fragments of Stories, Passages of Bookes, that concerne not Story, and the like, doe saue and recouer somewhat from the deluge of time.

In these kindes of vnperfect Histories I doe assigne no deficiency, for they are *tanquam imperfecte Mista*, and therefore any deficiency in them is but their nature.

As for the Corruptions and Mothes of History, which are *Epitomes*, the vse of them deserueth to bee banisht, as all men of sound Iudgement haue confessed, as those that haue fretted and corroded the sound bodies of many excellent Histories, and wrought them into base and vnprofitable dregges.

Historie which may be called *Iust* and *Perfite* History, is of three kindes, according to the object which it propoundeth, or pretendeth to represent: for it eyther representeth a *Time*, or a *Person*, or an *Action*. The first wee call *Chronicles*: The second *Lines*; and the third *Narrations*, or *Relations*.

Of these although the first bee the most compleate and absolute kinde of History, and hath most estimation and glory: Yet the second excelleth it in profit and vse, and the third in verity

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and sincerity. For *Historie of Times* representeth the magnitude of Actions, and the publique faces and deportments of persons, and passeth ouer in silence the smaller passages and Motions of men and Matters.

But such beeing the worke-man ship of God, as he doth hang the greatest weight vppon the smallest VVyears, *Maxima è Minimis suspendens*, it comes therefore to passe, that such Histories doe rather set forth the pompe of businesse, then the true and inward resorts thereof. But *Liues* if they bee well VVritten, propounding to themselues a person to represent, in whom actions both greater and smaller, publique and priuate haue a commixture; must of necessity contayne a more true, natieue, and liuely representation: So agayne Narrations, and Relations of actions, as the VVarre of *Peloponnesus*, the Expedition of *Cyrus Minor*, the Conspiracy of *Catiline*, cannot but bee more pure and exactly true, then *Histories of Times*, because they may choose an Argument comprehensible within the notice and instructions of the VVriter: whereas he that vnder-taketh the Story of a Time, specially of any length, cannot but meete with many blankes, and spaces, which hee must be forced to fill vp, out of his owne wit and coniecture.

For the *Historie of Times*, (I meane of ciuill History,) the prouidence of God hath made the distribution: for it hath pleased God to ordayne and illustrate two exemplar States of the VVorld,
for

for Armes, Learning, Morall Vertue, Policy and Lawes.

The *State of Grecia*, and the *State of Rome*: The Histories whereof occupying the *Middle part* of time, haue more ancient to them, Histories which may by one common name, bee tearmed the *Antiquities* of the *world*; and after them, Histories which may bee likewise called by the name of *Moderne History*.

Now to speake of the deficiencies: As to the *Heathen Antiquities* of the *VVorld*, it is in vayne to note them for deficient: Deficient they are no doubt, consisting most of Fables and fragments; but the deficiency cannot bee holden: for Antiquity is like Fame, *Caput inter nubila condit*, her head is muffled from our sight: For the *History* of the *Exemplar States*, it is extant in good perfection. Not but I could wish there were a perfect Course of History for *Grecia* from *Theseus* to *Philopamen*, (what time the Affayres of *Grecia* drowned and extinguished in the affayres of *Rome*) and for *Rome*, from *Romulus* to *Iustinianus*, who may bee truely sayd to be *Vltimus Romanorum*. In which sequences of Story the Text of *Thucidides* and *Xenophon* in the one, and the Texts of *Liuius*, *Polybus*, *Salustius*, *Cesar*, *Appionus*, *Tacitus*, *Herodianus* in the other to be kept intyre without any diminution at all, and onely to bee supplied and continued. But this is Matter of Magnificence, rather to be commended then required: and wee speake now of parts of

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Learning supplementall, and not of supererogation.

But for *Moderne Histories*, whereof there are some few very worthy, but the greatest part beneath *Mediocritie*, leauing the care of Forraigne stories to Forraigne States, because I will not bee *Curiosus in aliena Republica*, I cannot faile to represent to your Maiesty, the vnworthinesse of the History of *England* in the Mayne continuance thereof, and the partiality, and obliquity of that of *Scotland*, in the latest and largest Author that I haue seene; supposing that it would bee honour for your Maiesty, and a worke very memorable, if this Iland of Great *Brittany*, as it is now ioyned in Monarchy for the ages to come: So were ioyned in one History for the times passed, after the manner of the sacred History, which draweth downe the Story of the Ten Tribes, and of the Two Tribes, as Twinnes together. And if it shall seeme that the greatnesse of this Worke may make it lesse exactly performed, there is an excellent periode of a much smaller compasse of time, as to the Story of *England*, that is to say, from the Vniting of the *Roses*, to the Vniting of the Kingdomes: a portion of time wherein, to my vnderstanding, there hath bin the rarest varieties, that in like number of successions of any hereditary Monarchy hath bin knowne: For it beginneth with the mixt Adeption of a Crowne, by Armes and Title: An entry by Battayle, an Establishment by Mariage; and therefore
times.

times answerable; like waters after a tempest, full of working and swelling, though without extremity of Storme; but well passed through by the wisdom of the *Pilote*, being one of the most sufficient Kings of all the number.

Then followeth the Raigne of a King; whose actions how soever conducted, had much intermixture with the affayres of *Europe*: balancing and inclining them variably, in whose time also began that great alteration in the State Ecclesiasticall, an action which seldome commeth vpon the Stage: Then the Raigne of a Minor; then an offer of an vsurpation; (though it was but as *Febris Ephemera*.) Then the Raigne of a Queene matched with a Forraigner: Then of a Queene that liued solitary, and vnmarried; and yet her gouernment so masculine, as it had greater impression, and operation vpon the States abroad; then it any wayes receiued from thence: And now last, this most happy and glorious euent, that this Island of *Brittany* deuided from all the World, should bee Vnited in it selfe: And that Oracle of Rest giuen to *Aneas*, *Antiquam enquire Matrem*, should now bee performed and fulfilled vpon the Nations of *England* and *Scotland*; beeing now revnited in the Ancient Mother name of *Brittany*; as a full periode of all instability and peregrinations: So that as it commeth to passe in Massiue bodies, that they haue certayne trepidations and wauerings before they fixe and settle: So it seemeth, that by the prouidence of God, this Monarchy be-

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fore it was to settle in your Maieſty, and your generations, (in which I hope it is now eſtabliſhed for euer,) it had theſe preluſiue changes and varieties.

For *Liues*, I doe finde ſtrange that theſe times haue ſo little eſteemed the vertues of the times, as that the Writings of Liues ſhould bee no more frequent. For although there be not many Soueraigne Princes or abſolute commanders, and that States are more collected into Monarchies; yet are there many worthy perſonages, that deſerue better then diſperſed Report, or barren *Elogies*: For herein the inuention of one of the late Poets is proper, and doth well enrich the ancient fiction; for he ſayneth, that at the end of the threed or VVebe of euery mans life, there was a little *Medall* contayning the *Perſons* name, and that *Time* wayteth vpon the ſheeres, and aſſoone as the threed was cut, caught the Medals, and carried them to the Riuer of *Lethe*, and about the bank there were many Birdes flying vp and downe, that would get the Medals and carry them in their Beake a little while, and then let them fall into the Riuer. Onely there were a few Swans, which if they got a Name, would carry it to a Temple, where it was Conſecrate.

And although many men more mortall in their affections, then in their bodies, doe eſteeme deſire of name and memory, but as a vanity and ventofity:

Animi nil magna laudis egentes.

VWhich

Which opinion commeth from the Root, *Non prius laudes contempimus, quam laudanda facere desivimus*: yet that will not alter *Salomons* iudgement, *Memoria Iusti cum laudibus, at impiorum nomen putrescet*: The one flourisheth, the other either consumeth to present obliuion, or turneth to an ill odor.

And therefore in that stile or addition, which is and hath bin long well receiued, and brought in vse, *Felicis memoria, pia memoria, bona memoria*, wee do acknowledge that which *Cicero* saith, borrowing it from *Demosthenes*, that *Bona Fama propria possessio defunctorum*, which possession I cannot but note, that in our times it lieth much wast and that therein there is a Deficiency.

For *Narrations* and *Relations* of particular actions, there were also to bee wished a greater diligence therein, for there is no great action but hath some good penne which attends it.

And because it is an ability not commonly to Write a good History, as may well appeare by the small number of them: yet if particulariery of actions memorable, were but tollerably reported as they passe, the compiling of a complete *Historie* of *Times* mought bee the better expected, when a *Writer* should arise that were fit for it: for the collection of such relation mought be as a *Nursery* gardein, wherby to plant a faire and stately gardein; when time should serue.

There is yet another pertition of *History* which *Cornelius Tacitus* maketh, which is not to bee forgot-

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ten specially with that application, which hee accoupleth it withall, *Annals*, and *Journals*, appropriating to the former, Matters of estate, and to the latter, Acts and Accidents of a meaner nature. For giuing but a touch of certayne Magnificent buildings, he addeth, *Cum ex dignitate populi Romanis repertum sit, res illustres annalibus, talia diurnis urbis Actis mandare*. So as there is a kind of contemplatiue Heraldry, as well as Ciuill.

And as nothing doth derogate from the dignity of a state more then confusion of degrees: So it doth not a little imbase the Authority of an History, to intermingle matters of triumph, or matters of Ceremony, or matters of Nouelty, with matters of State: But the vse of a *Journal* hath not onely bin in the History of Time; but likewise in the History of Persons, and chiefly of actions; for Princes in ancient time had vpon poynt of honour and policy both, *Journals* kept, was passed day by day: For we see the *Chronicle* which was read before *Anassuerus*, when he could not take rest, contained matter of affayres indeed, but such as had passed in his owne time, and very lately before: But the *Journal* of *Alexanders* House expressed euery small particularity, euen concerning his Person and Court; and it is yet an vse well receiued in enterprises memorable, as expeditions of War, Nauigations, and the like, to keep *Dyaries* of that which passeth continually.

I cannot likewise bee ignorant of a forme of *Writing*, which some graue and *Wise* men haue vsed,

used, containing a scattered History of those actions, which they have thought worthy of memory, with politique Discourse and Observation thereupon; not incorporate into the History, but seperately, and as most principall in their intention: which kinde of *Ruminated History*, I thinke more fit to place amongst Bookes of Policy, whereof we shall hereafter speake, then amongst Bookes of History: for it is the true office of History to Represent the events themselves, togetherwith the Counsels, and to leaue the obseruations and conclusions thereupon, to the liberty and faculty of euery mans iudgement: But Mixtures, are things irregular, whereof no man can define.

So also is there another kinde of History many-foldly mixt, and that is *History of Cosmographie*, being compounded of Naturall History in respect of the Regions themselves, of History ciuill, in respect of the Habitations, Regiments and Manners of the people; and the *Mathematiques* in respect of the Climats, and Configurations towards the Heauens, which part of Learning of all others in this latter time hath obtayned most Proficiencie. For it may be truely affirmed to the honor of these times, and in a veruious emulation with Antiquity, that this great Building of the world, had neuer through lights made in it, till the age of vs and our Fathers: For although they had knowledge of the *Antipodes*:

Nesque ubi primus equis Oriens affluit anhelis:

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illis

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Illic sera rubens accendit lumina vesper :

Yet that mought bee by demonstration, and not in fact, and it by Trauayle, it requireth the Voyage but of haife the Globe. But to circle the earth, as the Heauenly bodies doe, was not done, nor enterprised, till these latter times : And therefore these times may iustly beare in their word, not onely *Plus ultra* in precedences of the ancient *Non ultra*, and *Imitabile fulmen*, in precedence of the ancient :

Non imitabile fulmen,

Demens qui nimbos et non imitabile fulmen, &c.

---*Imitabile Calum :*

But likewise, in respect of many memorable Voyages after the manuer of Heauen, about the Globe of the earth.

And this Proficiency in Nauigation, and Discoveries, may plant also an expectation of the further proficiency, and augmentation of all Sciences, because it may seeme they are ordayned by God to be *Coevals*, that is, to meete in one Age.

For so the Prophet *Daniel* speaking of the latter times, fore-telleth : *Plurimi pertransibunt, & Multiplex erit Scientia*, as if the opennesse and through passage of the World, and the encrease of Knowledge were appoynted to bee in the same ages, as wee see it is already performed in great part, the Learning of these latter times not much giuing place to the former two Periods or Returnes of Learning, the one of the *Gracians*, the other of the *Romanes*.

History.

History Ecclesiasticall, receiuech the same diuisions with History Ciuill; but further in the propriety thereof may bee diuided into History of the Church, by a generall name. History of Propheſie, and History of Prouidence: The first diſcribeth the times of the militant Church; whether it be fluctuant, as the Arke of Noah, or moouecable, as the Arke in the Wilderneſſe: Or at reſt, as the Arke in the Temple: That is, the ſtate of the Church in Perſecution, in Remooue, and in Peace. This part I ought in no ſort to note as deficient, only I would the vertue and ſincerity of it, were according to the maſſe, and quantity. But I am now in hand with cenſures, but with omiſſions.

The ſecond, which is History of Propheſie, conſiſteth of two Relatiues, the Propheſie, and the accompliſhment; and therefore the nature of ſuch a work ought to be, that euery Propheſie of the Scripture be ſorted with the euent fulfilling the ſame, throughout the ages of the world, both for the better confirmation of faith, and for the better illumination of the Church, touching thoſe parts of Propheſies, which are yet vni-fulfilled: allowing neuertheleſſe that Latitude, which is agreeable and familiar vnto Diuine Propheſies, beeing of the nature of the Author, with whom a thouſand Yeares are but as one day, and therefore are not fulfilled punctually, at once, but haue ſpringing and germinant accompliſhment throughout many Ages, though the height or fulneſſe of them may erre, to ſome one Age.

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*Historia
Prephetica.*

This is a worke which I finde deficient, but is to bee done with wisdom, sobriety, and reuerence, or not at all.

The third, which is *Historie of Providence*, containeth that excellent correspondence, which is betweene Gods reuealed will, and his secreete will: VVhich though it bee so obscure, as for the most part it is not legible to the Naturall man; no, nor many times to those that behold it from the Tabernacle: Yet at some times it pleaseth God for our better establishment, and the confuting of those which are as without God in the World; to write it in such Text and Capitall Letters, that, as the Prophet saith, *he that runneth by, may read it*: that is, mee re sensuall persons, which haften by Gods iudgements, and neuer bend or fixe their cogitations vpon them, are neuerthelesse in their passage and Race vrged to discern it.

Such are the notable euent and examples of Gods iudgements, chastizements, deliuerances and blessings: And this is a worke which hath passed through the labours of many, and therefore I cannot present as omitted.

There are also other parts of Learning which are *Appendices to Historie*, for all the exterior proceedings of man consist of Wordes and Deedes: whereof History doeth properly receiue and retayne in Memory the Deedes, and if in VVords, yet but as Inducements and passages to Deedes: So are there other Bookes and Writings, which are appropriat to
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the custody, and receite of VVordes onely : which likewise are of three sorts : *Orations*, *Letters*, and *Briefe Speeches*, or *Sayings* : *Orations* are *Pleadings*, *Speeches of Counsell* ; *Laudatiues*, *Inuectiues*, *Apologies*, *Reprehensions* ; *Orations of Formality*, or *Ceremony*, and the like : *Letters* are according to all the variety of occasions ; *Aduertisments*, *Aduises* ; *Directions*, *Propositions*, *Petitions*, *Commendatory*, *Expostulatory* ; *Satisfactory*, of *Complement*, of *Pleasure*, of *Discourse* ; and all other passages of *Action*.

And such as are VVritten for *Wise men*, are of all the words of *Man* ; in my iudgement the best, for they are more *Naturall* then *Orations*, and *publicke speeches* ; and more *aduised* then *conferences*, or *present speeches* : So *agayne Letters of Affaires* from such as *Manage them*, or are *priuy to them*, are of all others the best *instructions for History*, and to a *diligent Reader*, the best *Histories* in themselves. For *Apothegmes* : It is a great losse of that Booke of *Cesars* ; for as his *History*, and those few *Letters* of his which wee haue, and those *Apothegmes* which were of his owne, excell all mens else : So I suppose would his *Collection of Apothegmes* haue done ; for as for those which are *Collected by others*, eyther I haue no taste in such *Matters* ; or else their *choyce* hath not beene happy. But vpon these three kinds of *VVritings* I doe not insist, because I haue no deficiencies to propound concerning them.

Thus much therefore concerning History, which is that part of Learning, which answereth to one of the Cells, *Domiciles*, or offices of the mind of Man; which is that of the Memory.

P*oesie* is a part of Learning in measure of Wordes for the most part restrayned; but in all other poynts extreamely licensed; and doth truly referre to the Imagination: VWhich beeing nottyed to the Lawes of Matter; may at pleasure ioyne that which Nature hath seuered; and seuer that which Nature hath ioyned, and so make vnlawfull Matches and Diuorces of things: *Pictoribus atque Poetis, &c.* It is taken in two senses in respect of Wordes or Matter: In the first sense it is but a *Character* of stile, and belongeth to Artes of speech, and is not pertinent for the present. In the latter, it is (as hath beene sayd) one of the principall portions of Learning; and is nothing else but *Fained History*, which may bee stiled as well in Prose as in Verse.

The *Vse* of this *Fained Historie*, hath beene to giue some shaddowe of satisfaction to the minde of Man in those poynts, wherein the Nature of things doth deny it, the World beeing in proportion inferiour to the soule: By reason whereof there is agreeable to the spirite of Man, a more ample Greatnesse, a more exact Goodnesse; and a more absolute variety then can bee found in the Nature of thinges. Therefore, because the acts

of euent of *true History*, hath not that Magnitude, which satisfieth the minde of Man, *Poesie* fayneth A&ts and Euent Greater and more Heroicall; because *true History* propoundeth the successles and issues of actions, not so agreeable to the merits of Vertue and Vice, therefore *Poesie* faines them more iust in Retribution, and more according to Reuealed prouidence, because *true History* representeth Actions and Euent, more ordinary and lesse inter-changed, therefore *Poesie* endueth them with more Rarenesse, and more vnexpected, and alternatiue Variations. So as it appeareth that *Poesie* serueth and conferreth to Magnanimity, Morality, and to Delectation. And therefore it was euer thought to haue some participation of Diuinesse, because it doth rayse and erect the Minde, by submitting the shewes of things to the desires of the Minde; whereas reason doth buckle and bowe the Minde vnto the Nature of things.

And wee see that by these insinuations and congruities with mans nature and pleasure, ioyned also with the agreement and consort it hath with Musicke, it hath had accesse and estimation in rude times, and barbarous Regions, where other Learning stood excluded.

The diuision of *Poesy* which is aptest in the propriety therof (besides those diuisions which are common vnto it with History: as fained Chronicles, fained Liues, and the Appendices of History, as fained Epistles, fained Orations, and the rest) is into *Poesie*,

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Narrations; *Representative*, and *Allusive*. The *Narrative* is a meere imitation of History with the excesses before remembered; choosing for subiect common VVars, and Loue; rarely State, and sometimes Pleasure or Mirth.

Representative is as a visible History, and is an Image of Actions in nature as they are, (that is) past; *Allusive* or *Parabolicall*, is a *Narration* applyed onely to expresse some speciall purpose or conceite. Which latter kind of *Parabolicall* wisdom was much more in vse in the ancient times, as by the Fables of *Aesop*, and the brieft sentences of the *seuaen*, and the vse of *Hieroglyphikes* may appeare.

And the cause was for that then of necessity to expresse any poynt of reason, which was more sharpe or subtiler then the vulgar in that manner, because men in those times wanted both variety of examples, and subtilty of Conceite: And as *Hieroglyphikes* were before Letters, so *Parables* were before Arguments: And neuerthelesse now, and at all times they doe retayne much life and vigor; because reason cannot bee so sensible, nor examples so fit.

But there remaineth yet another vse of *Poesie* *Parabolicall*; opposite to that which wee last mentioned: For that tendeth to demonstrate, and illustrate that which is taught or deliuered, and this other to retire and obscure it: That is when the Secrets and Misteries of Religion, Pollicy, or Phylosophy,

phy, are inuolued in Fables and Parables.

Of this in Diuine Poesie, we see the vse is authorised. In Heathen Poesie, we see the exposition of Fables doth fall out somerimes with great felicitie, as in the Fable that the Gyants beeing ouerthrowne in their Warre against the Gods, the Earth their mother in reuenge thereof brought forth Fame.

*Illam terra Parens ira irritata Deorum,
Extremam, ut perhibent, Cæo Enceladoque Sororem
Progeniuit.*

Expounded that when Princes and Monarches haue suppressed actuall and open Rebels, then the malignitie of people (which is the mother of Rebellion) doth bring forth Libels and slanders, and taxations of the States, which is of the same kinde with Rebellion, but more Feminine: So in the Fable that the rest of the Gods hauing conspired to binde *Iupiter*, *Pallas* called *Briareus* with his hundred hands to his ayde, expounded, that Monarchies neede not feare any courbing of their absolutenessse by Mightie Subiects, as long as by Wisdom they keepe the hearts of the people, who will be sure to come in on their side: So in the Fable, that *Achilles* was brought vp vnder *Chyron* the Centaure, who was part a Man, and part a Beast, Expounded Ingeniously, but corruptly by Machiavell, that it belongeth to the education and disci-

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pline of Princes, to knowe as well how to play the part of the Lyon, in violence, and the Foxe in guile, as of the Man in vertue and Iustice.

Neuerthelesse in many the like incouounters, I doe rather thinke that the fable was first, and the exposition deuised, then that the Morall was first, and thereupon the Fable framed. For I finde it was an auncient vanitie, in *Christippus*, that troubled himselfe with great contention to fasten the assertions of the *Storckes* vpon fictions of the auncient Poets. But yet that all the Fables and fictions of the Poets, were but pleasure and not figure, I interpose no opinion.

Surely of those Poets which are now extant, euen *Homer* himselfe (notwithstanding he was made a kinde of Scripture, by the later Schooles of the Grecians) yet I should without any difficultie pronounce, that his Fables had no such inwardnesse in his owne meaning. But what they may haue, vpon a more originall tradition, is not easie to affirme, for he was not the inuentor of many of them.

In this third part of Learning which is Poesie, I can report no deficiencie. For being as a plant that commeth to the lust of the earth, without a formall seede, it hath spring vp, and spread abroad, more then any other kinde: But to ascribe vnto it that which is due for the expressing of affections, passions, corruptions and customes, we are beholding to Poets, more then to the Philosophers workes, and for Wit and Eloquence, not much lesse then

to Orators harangues. But it is not good to stay too long in the Theater: Let vs now passe on to the Iudiciall Place or Pallace of the Minde, which we are to approach and view, with more reuerence and attention.

THE Knowledge of Man is as the waters; some descending from aboue, and some springing from beneath, the one informed by the light of Nature, the other inspired by diuine reuelation.

The light of Nature consisteth in the Notions of the minde, and the Reports of the Sences; for as for Knowledge which Man receiueth by teaching, it is Cumulative, and not Originall, as in a water, that besides his owne spring-head is fed with other Springs and Streames. So then according to these two differing Illuminations, or Originals, Knowledge is first of all deuided into *Diuinity* and *Philosophie*.

In *Philosophy*, the contemplations of Man do either penetrate vnto God, or are circumferred to Nature, or are reflected or reuerted vpon himselfe. Out of which severall inquiries, there doe arise three Knowledges, *Diuine Philosophie*; *Naturall Philosophie*, and *Humane Philosophie*, or *Humanity*. For all things are marked and stamped with this triple Character of the power of God, the difference of Nature, and the vse of Man. But because the distributions & partitions of Knowledge, are not like severall liues, that meet in one Angle, and for touch but in a point,

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but are like branches of a Tree, that meete in a stemme; which hath a dimension and quantitie of entyrenesse and continuance, before it come to discontinue and breake it selfe into Armes and boughes, therefore it is good, before we enter into the former distribution, to erect and constitute one vniuersall Science; by the name of *Phylosophia Prima*, *Primitiue* or *Summarie Philosophie*, as the Maine and common way, before we come where the wayes part, and diuide themselues, which Science, whether I should report as deficient or no, I stand doubtfull.

For I finde a certaine Rapsodie of *Naturall Theologie*, and of diuerse parts of *Logicke*: And of that other part of *Naturall Philosophie*, which concerneth the *Principles*, and of that other part of *Naturall Philosophie*, which concerneth the *Soule* or *Spirit*, all these strangely commixed and confused: but being examined, it seemeth to me rather a depre-dation of other Sciences, aduanced and exalted vnto some height of tearmes, then any thing solide or substantiue of it selfe.

Neuerthelesse I cannot be ignorant of the distinction which is currant, that the same things are handled but in seuerall respects: As for example, that *Logicke* considereth of many things as they are in *Notion*: and this *Philosophie*, as they are in *Nature*: the one in, *Apparance*, the other in *Existence*: But I find this difference better made then pursued; For if they had considered *Quantitate*,

Simsi

Similitude, Diuersitie, and the rest of those *Externe Characters* of things, as *Philosophers*, and in Nature: their inquiries must of force haue bene of a farre other kind then they are.

For doth any of them in handling *Quantitie*, speake of the force of *Vnion*, how, and how farre it multiplieth *Vertue*? Doth any giue the reason, why some things in Nature are so common and in so great *Masse*, and others so rare, and in so small quantitie? Doth any in handling *Similitude* and *Diuersitie*, assigne the cause why *Iron* should not mooue to *Iron*, which is more like, but mooue to the *Loade-stone*, which is lesse like? Why in all *Diuersities* of things there should be certaine *Participles* in Nature, which are almost ambiguous, to which kinde they should bee referred? But there is a meere and deepe silence, touching the Nature and operation of those *Common adiuuents* of things, as in nature; and onely a resumming and repeating of the force and vse of them, in speech or argument.

Therefore because in a Writing of this Nature, I auoide all subtilitie: My meaning touching this Originall or Vniuersall *Philosophie*, is thus in a plaine and grosse description by *Negative*: *That it be a Receiptacle for all such profitabie observations and Axioms, as fall not within the compasse of any of the speciall parts of Philosophie, or Sciences; but are more common, and of a higher stage.*

Now that there are many of that kinde neede

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not to be doubted : for example ; Is not the rule :
Si inaequalibus aequalia addas, omnia erunt inaequalia.

And is there not a true coincidence between commutative and distributive Justice, and Arithmetical and Geometrical proportion? An Axiome as well of Justice, as of the Mathematicques? Is not that other rule, *Quae in eodem tertio conveniunt, & inter se conveniunt*, a Rule taken from the Mathematicques, but so potent in Logicke as all Syllogismes are built vpon it? Is not the observation, *Omnia mutantur, nil inperis*, a contemplation in Philosophie thus; that the *Quantum* of Nature is eternall, In Naturall Theologie thus, That it requireth the same Omnipotencie to make somewhat Nothing, which at the first made nothing somewhat? according to the Scripture, *Didici quod omnia opera quae fecit Deus, perseverent in perpetuum, non possumus eis quicquam addere, nec auferre.*

Is not the ground, which *Machiavill* wisely and largely discourseth concerning Governements, That the way to establish and preserue them, is to reduce them *ad Principia*; a rule in Religion and Nature, as well as in Ciuill administration? was not the *Persian* Magicke a reduction or correspondence of the Principles and Architectures of Nature, to the rules and policie of Governements? Is not the precept of a Musitian, to fall from a discord or harsh accord, vpon a concord, or sweete accord, alike true in affection? Is not the Trope of Musicke, to auoide or slide from the close of Cadence, common with the
 Trope

Trope of Rhetoricke of deceiuing expectation? Is not the delight of the Quauering vpon a stop in Musicke, the same which the playing of Light vpon the water?

-- *Splendet tremulo sub Lumine Pontus.*

Are not the Organs of the scences of one kinde with the Organs of Reflexion, the eye with a glasse, the Eare with a Cane or Straight determined and bounded? Neither are these onely similitudes, as men of narrow obseruation may conceiue them to bee; but the same foote-stepes of Nature, treading or printing vpon seuerall Subiects or Mat- ters.

This Science therefore, (as I vnderstand it,) *Philosophia prima, sive de Fontibus Scientiarum.* may iustly report as deficient; for I see sometimes the profounder sort of Wits, in handling some particuler argument, will now and then draw a Bucket of Water out of this Well, for their present vse: But the spring-head thereof seemeth to me, not to haue bene visited; being of so excellent vse, both for the disclosing of Nature, and the abridge- ment of Art.

This Science beeing therefore first placed, as a common parent, like vnto *Berecinthia*, which had so much Heauenly yssue, *Omnes Coelicolas; omnes supra alta tenentes*; we may returne to the former di- stribution of the three Philosophies; Diuine, Natu- rall, and Humane.

And as concerning *Diuine Philosophy*, or *Natural Theologie*, It is that Knowledge or Rudi- ment

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ment of Knowledge concerning God, which may be obtained by the contemplation of his Creatures: which Knowledge may be truly termed Divine, in respect of the object; and Naturall in respect of the Light.

The bounds of this Knowledge are, that it sufficeth to convince Atheisme; but not to inform Religion: And therefore there was neuer Miracle wrought by God to convert an Atheist, because the light of Nature might haue led him to confesse a God: But Miracles haue beene wrought to convert Idolaters, and the superstitious, because no light of Nature entendeth to declare the will and true worship of God.

For as all workes doe shewe forth the power and skill of the workeman, and not his Image: So it is of the workes of God; which doe shew the Omnipotency and Wisdome of the Maker, but not his Image: And therefore therein the Heathen opinion differeth from the Sacred truth: For they supposed the world to bee the Image of God, and Man to be an extract or compendious Image of the world: But the Scriptures neuer vouchsafe to attribute to the world that honour as to be the Image of God: But onely *The worke of his hands*, Neither do they speake of any other Image of God, but Man: wherefore by the contemplation of Nature, to induce and inforce the acknowledgement of God, and to demonstrate his power, providence, and goodnesse, is an excellent argument, and
hath

hath bene excellently handled by diuerse.

But on the other side, out of the contemplation of Nature, or ground of Humane Knowledges, to induce any veritie, or perswasion concerning the pointes of Faith, is in my iudgement, not safe: *Da fidei, que fidei sunt.* For the Heathen themselves conclude as much in that excellent and Diuine fable of the Golden Chayne: *That men and Gods were not able to draw Iupiter downe to the Earth, but contrariwise, Iupiter was able to draw them vp to Heauen.*

So as we ought not to attempt to draw downe or submit the Mysteries of God to our Reason: but contrariwise, to raise and aduance our Reason to the Diuine Truth. So as in this part of Knowledge; touching Diuine Philosophie: I am so farre from noting any deficiency, as I rather note an excesse: whereunto I haue digressed, because of the extreame preiudice, which both Religion and Philosophie hath receiued, and may receiue by being commixed together; as that which vndoubtedly will make an Heriticall Religion; and an Imaginarie and fabulous Philosophy.

Otherwise it is of the Nature of Angels and Spirits, which is an Appendix of Theologie, both Diuine and Naturall; and is neither inscrutable nor interdicted: For although the Scripture sayth, *Let no man deceiue you in Sublime discourse touching the worship of Angels, pressing into that he knoweth not, &c.* Yet notwithstanding if you obserue well

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that precept, it may appeare thereby, that there be two things onely forbidden, Adoration of them, and Opinion Fantastickall of them, either to extoll them, further then appertaineth to the degree of a Creature; or to extoll a mans Knowledge of them, further then he hath ground.

But the sober and grounded inquitie which may arise out of the passages of holy Scriptures, or out of the gradacions of Nature is not restrained: So of degenerate and reuolted spirits; the conuersing with them, or the imployment of them is prohibited; much more any veneration towards them. But the contemplation or Science of their Nature, their power, their illusions, either by Scripture or reason, is a part of spirituall Wisedome. For so the Apostle sayth, *We are not ignorant of his Stratagems*: And it is no more vnlawfull to enquire the Nature of euill spirits, then to enquire the force of poysons in Nature, or the Nature of sinne and vice in Morality; But this parte touching Angels and Spirites, I cannot note a deficient, for many haue occupied themselues in it: I may rather challenge it in many of the Writers thereof, as fabulous and fantastickall.

Leauing therefore *Diuine Philosophie*, or *Naturall Theologie*, (not *Diuine* or *Inspired Theologie*, which we referue for the last of all, as the Haue and Sabbath of all Mans contemplations) we will nowe proceede to *Naturall Philosophie*: If then it bee true that *Democritus* sayde, *That the Truth*
of

of Nature lyeth hid in certaine deepe Mines and
Caves.

And if it be true likewise, that the *Alchymists* doe so much inculcate, That *Vulcan* is a second Nature, and imitateth that dexterouslie and compendiously, which Nature worketh by ambages, and length of time, It were good to deuide Naturall Philosophie into the Myne and the Fornace, and to make two professions or occupations of Naturall Phylosophers, some to bee Pyonners, and some Smithes, some to digge, and some to refine, and Hammer : And surely I doe best allowe of a deuision of that kinde, though in more familiar and Scholasticall tearmes : Namely that these bee the two partes of Naturall Philosophie, the *Inquisition of Causes*, and the *Production of Effects* : *Speculative*, and *Operatiue*, *Naturall Science*, and *Naturall Prudence*.

For as in Ciuile matters there is a Wisedome of discourse, and a Wisedome of direction : So is it in Naturall : And here I will make a request, that for the latter (or at least for a parte thereof) I may reuiue and reintegrate the mis-applied and abused Name of *Naturall Magicke*, which in the true sence, is but *Naturall wisedome*, or *Naturall Prudence* : taken according to the aun-
tient acceptation, purged from vanitie and superstition.

Now although it be true, and I knowe it well, that there is an entercourse betweene *Causes* and

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Effects, so as both Knowledges *Speculative* and *Operative*, haue a great connexion betweene themselves: yet because all true and fruitfull *Naturall Philosophie*, hath *A double Scale or Ladder*, *Ascending* and *Descending*, ascending from experiments to the *Inuention of causes*; and descending from causes, to the *Inuention of newe experiments*; Therefore I iudge it most requisite that these two parts be severally considered and handled.

Naturall Science or *Theory* is deuided into *Phisicke* and *Metaphisicke*, wherein I desire, it may be conceiued, that I vse the word *Metaphisicke*, in a differing sence, from that, that is receiued: And in like manner I doubt not, but it will easily appeare to men of iudgement, that in this and other-particulars, wheresoeuer my Conception and Notion may differ from the Auncient, yet I am studious to keepe the Ancient Termes.

For hoping well to deliuer my selfe from mistaking, by the order and perspicuous expressing of that I doe propound: I am otherwise zealous and affectionate to receiue as little from Antiquitie, either in termes or opinions, as may stand with truth, and the proficiencie of Knowledge.

And herein I cannot a little maruaile at the Philosopher *Aristotle*: that did proceede in such a Spirit of difference and contradiction towards all Antiquitie, vndertaking not onely to frame newe words of Science at pleasure: but to confound and extinguish all ancient Wisedome; in so much as he
neuer

neuer nameeth or mentioneth an Ancient Author or opinion, but to confute and reprove: wherein for glory, and drawing followers and disciples, he tooke the right course.

For certainly there cometh to passe, and hath place in humane truth, that which was noted and pronounced in the highest truth: *Veni in nomine Patris, nec recipitis Me, Si quis venerit in nomine suo, eum recipitis*. But in this diuine Aphorisme (considering, to whom, it was applied, Namely to *Antichrist*, the highest deceiuer,) we may discern well, that *the coming in a Mans owne name*, without regard of *Antiquity*, or *paternity*; is no good signe of truth; although it be ioyned with the fortune and successe of an *Eum recipietis*.

But for this excellent person *Aristotle*; I will thinke of him, that he learned that humour of his Scholler; with whom, it seemeth, he did emulate, the one to conquer all Opinions, as the other to conquer all Nations. Wherein neuerthelesse it may be, he may at some mens hands, that are of a bitter disposition, get a like title as his Scholler did.

Felix terrarum Prado, non utile mundo

Editus exemplum &c, So

Felix doctrina Prado.

But to me on the other side that do desire as much as lyeth in my Penne, to ground a sociable enter-

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course betweene Antiquity and Proficiency, it seemeth best, to keepe way with Antiquity *vsque ad aras*; And therefore to retaine the ancient termes, though I sometimes alter the vses and definitions, according to the Moderne proceeding in Ciuill Gouvernement; where although there bee some alteration, yet that holdeth which *Tacitus* wisely noteth,

Eadem Magistratum vocabula.

To returne therefore to the vse and acceptation of the terme *Metaphisicke*, as I do now vnderstand the Word; It appeareth by that which hath bene already sayd, that I intend, *Philosophia Prima: Summary Philosophy*, and *Metaphisicke*, which heretofore haue bene confounded as one, to be two distinct things.

For the one, I haue made as a Parent, or common Ancestor to all Knowledge; And the other I haue now brought in, as a Branch or descendent of *Naturall Science*; it appeareth likewise that I haue assigned to *Summary Philosophie* the common principles and *Axiomes* which are promiscuous and indifferent to seuerall Sciences: I haue assigned vnto it likewise the inquiry *touching the operation of the Relatine and Aduentive Characters of Essences*, as *Quantity, Similitude, Diuersitie, Possibility*, and the rest: with this distinction, and prouision: that they be handled as they haue efficacy in Nature, and not Logically. It appeareth likewise, that *Naturall Theologie* which heretofore hath bene handled confusedly

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confusedly with *Metaphisicke*, I have inclosed and bounded by it selfe.

It is therefore now a question, what is left remaining for *Metaphisicke*: wherein I may without prejudice preferue this much of the conceite of Antiquity; that *Phisicke* should contemplate that which is inherent in Matter, and therefore transitory, and *Metaphisicke*, that which is abstracted and fixed.

And againe that *Phisicke* should handle that which supposeth in Nature onely a being and moving, and *Metaphisicke* should handle that which supposeth further in Nature, a reason, understanding, and platforme. But the difference perspicuously expressed, is most familiar and sensible.

For as wee deuided *Naturall Philosophy* in *Generall* into the *Enquire* of *Causes*, and *Productions* of *Effects*: So that part which concerneth the *Enquire* of *Causes*, wee doe subdiuide, according to the receiued and sound deuision of *Causes*; The one part which is *Phisicke* enquireth and handleth the *Materiall* and *Efficient Causes* and the other which is *Metaphisicke* handleth the *Formall* and *Finall Causes*.

Phisicke, (taking it according to the deriuations, and not according to our Idiome, for *Medicine*) is situated in a middle terme or distance betweene *Naturall History* and *Metaphisicke*. For *Naturall History* describeth the *variety of things*:
Phisicke

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Phisicke the Causes, but Variable or Respective Causes; and Metaphiscke the Fixed and Constant Causes.

*Limus ut hic durascit, hic & ut Cera liquescit,
Vno eodemque igni.*

Fire is the cause of induration, but respective clay: Fire is the cause of colliquation but respective to Wax. But fire is no constant cause either of indurations or colliquation: So then the Phisicall causes are but the Efficiency and the Matter.

Phisicke hath three parts, whereof two respect Nature *United or collected*, the third contemplateth Nature *diffused or distributed*. Nature is either into one entyer *Totall*, or else into the same *Principall* or *Se-des*. So as the first doctrine is *Touching the Contexture or Configuration of Things*, as *De Mundo, de universitate Rerum*.

The second is the *Doctrine Concerning the Principles or Originals of Times*; The third is the *Doctrine Concerning all Variety and Particularity of Things*: whether it bee of the differing substances, their differing qualities and Natures; whereof there needeth no enumeration; this part being but as a *Glos* or *Paraphras* that attendeth vpon the Text of *Naturall History*.

Of these three I cannot report any as deficient, In what truth or perfection they are handled, I make not now any Iudgement:

But

But they are parts of Knowledge not deserted by the Labour of Man:

For *Metaphisicke*, wee haue assigned vn- to it the Enquiry of *Foamall*, and *Final! Causes*, which assignation, as to the former of them may seeme to bee Nugatory and voyde, because of the receiued and inueterate Opinions, that the inquisition of man, is not competent to finde out *Essentiall formes*, or *True differences*; of which Opinion wee take this holde: That the Inuention of *Formes* is of all other parts of Knowledge the worthiest to bee sought, if it bee possible to bee found.

As for the possibility, they are ill Discoverers, that thinke there is no Land, when they can see nothing but Sea.

But it is manifest, that *Plato* in his Opinion of *Ideas*, as one that had a wit of elevation scituate as vpon a Cliffe, did descry, *that formes were the true object of knowledge*; but lost the reall fruits of his opinion by considering of formes, as absolutely abstracted from matter, and not confined and determined by matter: and so turning his opinion vpon *Theology*, wherewith all his *Naturall Phylosophy* is infected.

But if any man shall keepe a continuall watchfull and seuerer eye vpon action, operation, and the vse of Knowledge, hee may aduise and take Notice, what are the *Formes*, the disclosures whereof are fruitfull and important to the State

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of man. For as to the *formes* of substances (Man onely except,) of whom it is sayd, *Formavit hominem de limo terra, & spiravit in faciem eius. spiraculum vite*, and not as of all other Creatures, *Producam aque, producat terra*, the *formes* of substances; I say (as they are now by compounding and transplanting multiplied) are so perplexed, as they are not to be enquired. No more then it were eyther possible or to purpose, to seeke in grosse *The formes of those sounds which make wordes*, which by composition and transposition of Letters are infinite.

But on the other side, to enquire the *forme* of *those Sounds or Voices, which make simple Letters*, is easily comprehensible, and being knowne, induceth and manifesteth *the formes of words*, which consist, and are compounded of them; in the same manner to enquire *the forme* of a Lyon, of an Oke, of Gold: Nay of Water, of Ayre, is a vayne pursuit: But to enquire *the formes* of Sence, of voluntary Motion, of Vegetation, of Colours, of Gravity and Leuity, of Density, of Tenuity, of Heate, of Cold, and all other Natures and qualities, which like an *Alphabet* are not many, and of which the essences (vpheld by Matter) of all Creatures doe consist: To enquire, I say *the true formes* of these, is that part of *Metaphisicke*, which wee now define of.

Not but that *Phisicke* doth make enquiry, and take consideration of the same Natures, but
howe

how? Onely, as to the *materiall and sufficient causes* of them, and not as to the *formes*. For example, if the *cause of whitenesse* in Snow or Froth be inquired, and it be rendred thus: *That the subtile intermixture of Ayre and water is the cause*, it is well rendred, but nevertheless is this the *forme of whitenesse*? No, but it is the *efficient*, which is ever but *vehiculum forme*.

This, part of *Metaphisicke*: I doe not finde laboured and performed, whereat I maruaile not. Because I hold it not possible to bee inuented by that course of inuention which hath beene vsed, in regard that men (which is the Roote of all error) haue made too vntimely a departure, and to remote a recourse from particulars.

But the vse of this part of *Metaphisicke* which I report as deficient, is of the rest the most excellent in two respects: The one because it is the duty and vertue of all Knowledge to abridge the infinite of indiuiduall experience, as much as the conception of Truth will permit, and to remedy the complaint of *vita breuis, ars longa*; which is performed by vniting the Notions and Conceptions of Sciences: For Knowledges are the *Pyramides*, whereof *History* is the *Basis*: So of *Naturall Philosophy*, the *Basis* is *Naturall History*: The *Stage* next the *Basis* is *Physicke*: The *Stage* next the *Verticall point* is *Metaphisicke*: As for the *Verticall Point*: *Opus quod operatur deus a principio vsque ad finem*, the *Summary Law of Nature*, we know not whether

*Metaphisica
sine de formis
& Finibus
re utro.*

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Mans enquiry can attayne vnto it. But these three bee the true *Stages* of Knowledge, and are to them that are depraued, no better then the Gyants Hills.

*Ter sunt conati imponere Pelio Ossam:
Scilicet atque Ossa frondosum inuoluere Olimpum.*

But to those which referre all things to the Glory of GOD, they are the three acclamations: *Sancte, Sancte, Sancte*: holy in the description, or dilatation of his workes, holy in the connexion, or concatenation of them, and holy in the vnion of them in a perpetuall and vniforme loue.

And therefore the speculation was excellent in *Parmenides* and *Plato*, although but a speculation in them, That all things by scale did ascend to vntity. So then alwayes that knowledge is worthiest, which is charged with least multiplicity, which appeareth to bee *Metaphisicke*, as that which considereth the *simple formes or differences of things*, which are few in number, and the *degrees and co-ordinations* whereof, maketh all this variety.

The second respect which valueth and commendeth this part of *Metaphisicke* is, that it doth enfranchise the power of Man vnto the greatest liberty, and possibility of workes and effects. For *Phyficke* carrieth men in narrow and restrayned wayes, subiect to many accidents of impediments, imitating the ordinary

nary flexuous courses of Nature; But *Lata vnde que sunt sapientibus via*: To sapience (which was anciently defined to bee *Rerum diuinarum, & humanarum scientia*) there is euer choise of Meanes. For *Physicall causes* giue light to new inuention in *Simili materia*. But whosoever knoweth any forme knoweth the vtmost possibility of *super-inducing* that Nature vppon any variety of matter, and so is lesse restrained in operation, eyther to the Basis of the matter, or the condition of the efficient: which kinde of knowledge *Salomon* likewise, though in a more Diuine sort elegantly describeth, *Non ardeabuntur gressus tui, & currens non habebis offendiculum*. The wayes of sapience are not much lyable, either to particularity or chance.

The second part of *Metaphisicke* is the enquiry of *Finall Causes*, which I am moued to report, not as omitted, but as misplaced; and yet if it were but a fault in order, I would not speake of it. For order is matter of illustration, but pertayneth not to the substance of Sciences. But this misplacing hath caused a deficiency, or at least a great improficiency in the Sciences themselues. For the handling of *finall causes* mixed with the rest in *Physicall Enquiries*, hath intercepted the seuer and diligent enquiry of all *Reall and Physicall causes*, and giuen men the occasion, to stay vppon these *satisfactory and specious causes*, to the great arrest and prejudice of further Discouery.

For this I finde done not onely by *Plato*, who

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ever ancreth vppon that shoare, but by *Aristote*, *Galen*, and others, which doe vsually likewise fall vppon these flats of *discourfing causes*: For to say that the hayres of the *Eye-liddes* are for a quicke fit and fence about the *Sight*: Or, that the firmeneffe of the *Skinnes and Hides* of *liuing Creatures* is to defend them from the extremiti. s of heate, or colde: Or, that the bones are for the *Columnes* or *Beames*, where vppon the frame of the bodies of *liuing Creatures* are builte: Or, that the leaues of *Trees* are for the protecting of the *Fruite*: Or, that the *Cloudes* are for watering of the *Earth*: Or, that the *solidneffe* of the *Earth* is for the station and mansion of *liuing Creatures*: And the like, is well enquired and Collected in *Metaphisicke*, but in *Physicke* they are impertinent. Nay, they are indeede but *Remoraes* and hinderances to stay and slugge the *Shippe* from further sayling, and haue brought this to passe, that the search of the *Physicall Causes* hath bene neglected, and paid in silence.

And therefore the naturall *Phylosophy* of *Democritus*, and some others, who did not suppose a *minde* or *Reason* in the frame of things, but attributed the forme thereof able to maintayne it selfe to infinite essays or proofes of *Nature*, which they tearme *Fortune*, seemeth to mee (as farre as I can iudge by the recitall and fragments which remaine vnto vs) in particularities of *Physicall causes* more recall and better enquired then that of *Aristotle* and *Plato*, whereof both intermingled *small causes*, the one as a part of

Theology,

Theology, and the other as a part of *Logicke*, which were the *saucourne studies* respectively of both those persons.

Not because those *small causes* are not true, and worthy to be enquired. being kept within their owne prouince; but because their excursions into the limits of *Physicall causes*, hath bred a vastnesse and solitude in that Tract. For otherwise keeping their precincts and Borders, men are extremely deceiued if they thinke there is an Enmity, or repugnancy at all betwene them. For the cause rendered that *The Hayrs about the eye liddes, are for the safe-guard of the sight*, doth not impugn the cause rendered, *That Palestitie is incident to Orifices of Moisture: Mus. ofi. fontis &c.* Nor the cause rendered that *the firmnesse of Hides is for the armour of the body against extremities of heate or cold*: doth not impugn the cause rendered, *That contradiction of pores is incident to the outwardest parts; in regard of their adiacence to forreigne or unlike bodies*; and so of the rest; both Causes beeing true and Compatible, the one declaring an *Intention*, the other a *Consequence* only.

Neither doth this call in question, or derogate from Diuine Prouidence, but highly confirme and exalt it. For as in ciuill actions he is the greater and deeper politique, that can make other men the Instruments of his will and ends and yet neuer acquaint them with his purpose: So as they shall doe it, and yet not know what they doe, then hee
that

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that imparteth his meaning to those hee employeth : So is the Wisedome of God more admirable, when nature intendeth one Thing, and Prouidence draweth fourth another ; then if hee had communicated to particular Creatures and Motions the Characters and Impressions of his Prouidence ; and thus much for *Metaphisicke*, the latter part whereof, I allow as extant, but wish it confined to his proper place.

Neuerthelesse there remaineth yet another part of *Naturall Philosophie*, which is commonly made a principall part, and holdeth ranke with *Physicke* speciall, and *Metaphisicke* : VVhich is *Mathematicke*, but I thinke it more agreeable to the nature of things, and to the light of order, to place it as a Branch of *Metaphisicke* : For the subiect of it being *Quantity*, not *Quantity Indisfinite* : which is but a *Relative*, and belongeth to *Philosophia prima* (as hath beene sayd,) but *Quantity determined, or proportionable*, it appeareth to be one of the *essentiall formes* of things ; as that, that is causatiue in nature of a number of effects, insomuch as wee see in the Schiooles both of *Democritus*, and of *Pythagoras*, that the one *Did ascribe Figure to the first seeds of things*, and the other *did suppose numbers to bee the principalls and originalls of things* : And it is true also that of all other formes (as wee vnderstand formes) it is the most abstracted, and separable from matter and therefore most proper to *Metaphisicke* ; which hath

hath likewise beene the cause, w^hy it hath beene better laboured, and enquired, then any of the other *formes*, which are more immersed into Matter.

For it beeing the Nature of the Minde of Man (to the extreame preiudice of knowledge) to delight in the spacious liberty of generalities, as in a champion Region; and not in the inclosures of particularity; the *Mathematicks* of all other knowledge were the goodliest fieldes to satisfie that appetite.

But for the placing of this Sciences, it is not much Materiall; onely wee haue endeouered, in these our Partitions to obserue a kind of perspective, that one part may cast light vpon another.

The *Mathematicks* are either *Pure*, or *Mixt*: To the *Pure Mathematicks* are those Sciences belonging, which handle *Quantities determinate* meereley seuered from any Axiomes of *Naturall Philosophy*: and these are two, *Geometry* and *Arithmetike*, The one handling *Quantity continued*, and the other disseuered.

Mixt hath for subiect some Axiomes or parts of *Naturall Philosophy*: and considereth *Quantity determinate*, as it is auxiliarie and incident vnto them.

For many parts of Nature can neuer bee inuented with sufficient subtilty, nor demonstrated with sufficient perspicuity, nor accommodated

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vnto vsfe with sufficient dexterity, without the ayde and interueyning of the Mathematickes : of which sort are *Perspectiue*, *Musicke*, *Astronomy*, *Cosmographie*, *Architectur*e, *Inginarie*; and diuers others.

In the *Mathematickes*; I can report no deficiency, except it be that men doe not sufficiently vnderstand the excellent vsfe of the *pure Mathematickes*, in that they doe remedy and cure many defects in the Wit, and Faëulties Intellectuall. For, if the Wit bee dull, they sharpen it; if too wandring, they fixe it: if too inherent in the sense, they abstract it. So that, as Tennis is a Game of no vsfe in it selfe, but of great vsfe, in resp^t it maketh a quicke eye, and a body ready to put it selfe into all postures: So in the Mathematickes, that vsfe which is collaterall and interuement, is no lesse worthy, then that which is principall and intended.

And as for the *Mixt Mathematickes*, I may only make this prediction, that there cannot fayle to bee more kinds of them, as Nature growes further disclosed.

Thus much of *Naturall Science*, or the part of *Naturall Speculative*.

For *Naturall Prudence*, or the part *Operatiue* of *Naturall Philosophy*, wee will deuide it into three parts, *Experimentall*, *Philosophical*, and *Magical*, which three parts *Actiue*, haue a correspondence and Analogy with the three parts *Speculative: Natu-*
rall

ra^l History, Phisicke, and Metaphisicke: For many operations haue bene inuented, sometime by a casuall incidence and occurrence, sometimes by a purposed experiment: and of those which haue bene found by an intentionall experiment, some haue bene found out by varying, or extending the same experiment, some by transferring and compounding diuers experiments the one into the other, which kinde of inuention an Empericke may manage.

Agayne, by the knowledge of Physicall causes, there cannot faile to follow, many indications and designations of new particulars, if men in their speculation will keepe one eye vpon vse and practise. But these are but Coastings along the shore; *Præmendo litus iniquum*, For it seemeth to mee, there can hardly bee Discouered any radicall, or fundamentall alterations, and innouations in Nature, cyther by the Fortune and Essayes of experiments, or by the light and direction of Physicall causes.

If therefore wee haue reported *Metaphisicke* deficient, it must follow, that wee doe the like of *Naturall Magicke*, which hath relation therunto. For as for the *Naturall Magicke*, whereof now there is mention in Bookes, containning certayne credulous and superstitious Conceites and Obseruations of *Sympathies*, and *Antipathies*, and *hidden Properties*, and some friuolous experiments, strange rather by disguisement, then in themselves: It is as

*Naturalis
Magiasus
Phisica Opes
ratina Ma-
ior.*

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farre differing in truth of Nature, from such a knowledge as wee require, as the Story of King *Arthur* of *Brittanie*; or *Hugh* of *Burdeaux*, differs from *Cæsars* Commentaries in truth of Story. For it is manifest that *Cæsar* did greater things *de vero*, then thole *Imaginary Heroes* were fayned to doe. But hee did them not in that fabulous manner. Of this kinde of Learning the Fable of *Ixion* was a figure: who designed to enioy *Iuno* the Goddesse of power; and in stead of her, had Copulation with a Cloud: of which mixture were begotten *Centaures*, and *Chymeraes*.

So whosoeuer shall entertayne high and vaporous imaginations, in steede of a labourious and sober enquiry of truth, shall beget hopes and beleeves of strange and impossible shapes. And therefore wee may note in these Sciences, which holde so much of imagination and beleeve, as this degenerate Naturall Magicke, Alchymy, Astrology, and the like, that in their propositions, the description of the meanes, is euermore monstrous, then the pretence or end.

For it is a thing more probable, then hee that knoweth well the Natures of *Weight*, of *Colour*, of *Pliant*, and *Fragile* in respect of the Hammer, of *volatile* and *fixed* in respect of the fire, and the rest, may superinduce vpon some Mettle the nature and forme of Gold by such *Mechanicke* as longeth to the production of the Natures afore rehearsed, then that some graynes of the Medicine projected, should in

a few Moments of time, turne a Sea of Quicke-
 siluer or other Materiall into Gold. So that it is more
 probable that he that knoweth the Nature of *Arefa-
 ction*; the Nature of *Affimilation*, of nourishment
 to the thing nourished; the manner of *encrease*, and
clearing of spirits: the manner of the *depredations*,
which Spirits make upon the humors and solide parts:
 shall, by Ambages of dyers, bathings, annoyntings,
 medicines, motions and the like, prolong life, or re-
 store some degrees of youth or viucity, then that it
 can be done with the vse of a few drops, or scruples
 of a liquor or receite. To conclude therefore, the true
Naturall Magicke, which is that great liberty and la-
 titude of operation, which dependeth vppon the
 knowledge of *formes*, I may report deficient, as the
 Relatiue thereof is: To which part if wee be serious,
 and incline not to vanities and plausible Discourse,
 besides the deriuing and deducing the Operati-
 ons themselves from *Metaphisicke*, there are per-
 tinent two poynts of much purpose; the one by
 way of preparation, the other by way of caution:
 The first is, that there be made a *Kalender resembling
 an Inuentory* of the estate of man, containing all the
 inuentions, (being the workes or fruits of Nature or
 Arte) which are now extant, and whereof man is
 already possessed, out of which doth naturally re-
 sult a Note, what things are yet held impossible, or
 not inuented, which *Kalender* will bee the more
 artificiall and seruiceable, if to euery *reputed impos-
 sibility*, you adde what thing is extant, which

*Inuentarium
 Opum human-
 narum.*

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commeth, the neereſt in degree to that *Impoſſibility*; to the end, that by theſe *Opiatives* and *Potentials*, Mans inquiry may, bee the more awake in diducing direction of workes from the ſpeculation of cauſes. And ſecondly, that thoſe *experiments* be not onely eſteemed which haue an immediate and preſent uſe, but thoſe principally which are of moſt Vniuerſall conſequence for inuention of other experiments, and thoſe which giue moſt light to the Inuention, of cauſes; for the Inuention of the Marriners Needle, which giueth the direction, is of no leſſe benefit for Navigation, when the inuention of the Sayles which giue the Motion.

Thus haue I paſſed through *Naturall Phyloſophie*, and the deficiencies thereof; wherein if I haue differed from the ancient, and receiued Doctrines; and thereby ſhall moue contraction; for my part, as I affect not to diſſent, ſo I purpoſe not to contend: If it be Truth.

Non canimus ſurdus reſpondent omnio ſylua:
The Voyce of Nature will conſent, whether the voyce of man doe or no. And as *Alexander Bergia* was wont to ſay of the expedition of the French for *Naples*, that they came with Chaulke in their hands to marke vp their lodgings, and not with weapons to fight: So I like better that entry of truth which commeth peaceably with Chaulke, to marke vp thoſe Mindes, which are capable to lodge and harbour it; then that which commeth with pugnacity and contention.

But

But there remaineth a diuision of Naturall Philosophy according to the *Report of the enquiry*, and nothing concerning the Matter or subiect, and that is *Positive* and *Considerative*: when the enquiry reporteth eyther an *Affertion*, or a *Doubt*: These doubts or *Non Liquets*, are of two sorts, *Particular* and *Total*. For the first, wee see a good example thereof in *Aristotles Problemes*, which deserved to haue had a better continuance, but to neuerthelesse, as there is one poynt, whereof warning is to bee giuen and taken: The Registering of doubts hath two excellent vses: The one that it sauieth Philosophy from errors and falshoods: when that which is not fully appearing, is not collected into assertion, whereby error might draw error, but reserved in doubt. The other that the entry of doubts are as so many suckers or sponges, to draw vse of Knowledge, insomuch as that which if doubts had not preceded, a man should neuer haue aduised, but passed it ouer without Note, by the suggestion and sollicitation of doubts is made to bee attended and applied. But both these commodities doe scarcely counteruayle an inconuenience, which will intrude it selfe if it be not debarred, which is that when a doubt is once receiued, men labour rather how to keepe it a doubt still, then how to solve it, and accordingly bend their Wits. Of this wee see the familiar example in Lawyers and Schollers, both which if they haue once admitted a doubt, it goeth euer after Authorized for a doubt. But that vse of Wit and Knowledge is to be
allowed

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allowed which laboureth to make doubtfull things certayne, and not those which labour to make certayne things doubtfull. Therefore these *Kalenders of doubts*, I commended as excellent things, so that there be this caution vsed, that when they bee thoroughly sifted and brought to resolution, they be from thence forth omitted, decarded, and not continued to cherish, and encourage men in doubting. To which *Kalender* of doubts or Problemes, I aduise be annexed another *Kalender* as much or more Materiall; which is a *Kalender of popular Errors*, I meane chiefly, in naturall History such as passe in speech and conceite, and are neuertheless apparently detected and conuicted of vnt ruth, that Mans knowledge bee not weakened nor imbased by such drosse and vanity.

*Continuatio
Problema-
tum in Natu-
ra.*

*Catalogus
Falsitatum
grassantium
in Historia
Naturæ.*

As for the *Doubts or Non liquets general or in Total*, I vnderstand those differences of opinions touching the principles of Nature, and the fundamentall poynts of the same, which haue caused the diuersity of Sects, Schooles, and Phylosophies, as that of *Empedocles, Pythagoras, Democritus, Parmenides*, and the rest. For although *Aristotle* as though he had bin of the Race of the *Ottomans*, thought he could not Raigne, except the first thing he did he killed all his Brethren; yet to those that seeke *Truth* and not *Magistrality*, it cannot but seeme a Matter of great profit, to see before them the seuerall opinions touching the foundations of Nature, not for any exact *Truth* that can bee expected in those Theories: For as the
same

same *Phenomena* in *Astronomie* are satisfied by the received *Astronomie* of the diurnall Motion, and the proper Motions of the Planets, with their *Eccentriques* and *Epicycles*, and likewise by the *Theorie* of *Copernicus*, who supposed the Earth to moue; & the Calculations are indifferently agreeable to both: So the ordinarie face and view of experience is many times satisfied by seuerall *Theories* & *Philosophies*, whereas to finde the reall truth requireth another manner of seueritie & attention. For, as *Aristotle* saith that children at the first will call euery woman mother: but afterward they come to distinguish according to truth: So Experience, if it be in childhood, will call euery *Philosophie* Mother; but when it commeth to ripenesse, it will discern the true Mother. So as in the meane time it is good to see the Seuerall *Glosses* and *Opinions* vpon Nature, whereof it may bee euery one in some one point, hath seene clearer then his fellows; Therefore I wish some collection to be made painfully and vnderstandingly *de Antiquis Philosophijs* out of all the possible light which remaineth to vs of them. Which kinde of worke I finde deficient. But heere I must giue warning, that it bee done distinctly and seueredly; The *Philosophies* of euery one throughout by themselves; and not by titles packed, and sagotted vp together, as hath beene done by *Plutarch*. For it is the harmonic of a *Philosophie* in it selfe, which giueth it light and credence, whereas if it bee singled and broken, it will seeme more forraine and

De Antiquis Philosophijs.

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dissonant. For as, when I read in *Tacitus*, the Actions of *Nero*, or *Claudius*, with circumstances of times, inducements and occasions, I finde them not so strange: but when I reade them in *Suetonius Tranquillus* gathered into titles and bundles, and not in order of time, they seeme more monstrous and incredible; So is it of any Philosophy reported entier, and dismembred by Articles. Neither doe I exclude opinions of latter times to bee likewise represented, in this Kalender of Sects of Philosophie, as that of *Theophrastus Paracelsus*, eloquently reduced into an harmonic, by the Penne of *Seuerinus the Dane*: And that of *Tylesius*, and his Scholler *Dennis*, being as a Pastoral Philosophy, full of sence, but of no great depth. And that of *Fracastorius*, who though hee pretended not to make any new Philosophy, yet did vse the absolutenessse of his owne sence, vpon the olde. And that of *Gilbertus*, our countreyman, who reuiued, with some alterations, and demonstrations, the opinions of *Xenophanes*, and any other worthy to be admitted.

Thus haue we now dealt with two of the three beames of Mans knowledge, that is *Radius directus*, which is referred to Nature; *Radius Refractus*, which is referred to God, and cannot report truely because of the inequalitye of the *Mediū*. There resteth *Radius Reflexus*, whereby Man beholdeth and contemplateth himselfe.

WE come therefore, now to that knowledge, whereunto the ancient Oracle directeth vs, which

which is, *the knowledge of our selves*: which deserueth the more accurate handling, by how much it toucheth vs more neerely. This knowledge as it is the end and Terme of Naturall Philosophy *in the intention of Man*: So notwithstanding it is but a portion of Naturall Philosophy *in the continent of Nature*: And generally let this be a Rule, that al partitions of knowledges, be accepted rather for *lines & veines*, then for *sections and separations*: & that the continuance and entirenes of knowledge be preserved. For the contrary hereof hath made particular Sciences, to become barren, shallow, and erroneous: while they haue not bin Nourished and Maintained from the common fountaine: So we see *Cicero* the Orator complained of *Socrates* and his Schoole, that he was the first that separated Philosophy, and Rhetoricke, whereupon Rhetoricke became an emptie and verball Art. So we may see that the opinion of *Copernicus* touching the rotation of the earth, which Astronomie it selfe cannot correct, because it is not repugnant to any of the *Phainomena*, yet Naturall Philosophy may correct. So we see also that the Science of *Medicine*, if it be destituted and forsaken by *Natural Philosophy*, it is not much better then an Empeiricall praetize: with this reseruatiō therefore we proceed to *Humane Philosophy* or *Humanitie*, which hath two parts: The one considereth Man *segregate, or distributiuely*: The other *congregate or insocietie*. So as *Humane Philosophy* is either *Simple and Particular*,

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Humanitie Particular consisteth of the same parts, whereof Man consisteth, that is, of *Knowledges which Respect the Body*, and of *Knowledges that respect the Mind*. But before we distribute so farre, it is good to constitute. For I doe take the consideration in generall, and at large of *Humane Nature* to be fit to be emancipate and made a knowledge by it selfe; Not so much in regard of those delightfull and elegant discourses, which haue bin made of the dignitie of Man, of his miseries, of his state and life, and the like *Adiuncts of his common and undivided Nature*, but chiefly in regard of the knowledge concerning the *sympathies and concordances betweene the mind and body*, which being mixed, cannot be properly assigned to the sciences of either.

This knowledge hath two branches; for as all leagues and Amities consist of mutuall *Intelligence*, and mutuall *Offices*. So this league of mind and body, hath these two parts, *How the one discloseth the other, and how the one worketh upon the other*. *Discouerie*, and *Impression*. The former of these hath be gotten two Arts, both of *Prediction* or *Prenotion*, whereof the one is honoured with the enquirie of *Aristotle*, and the other of *Hippocrates*. And although they haue of later time beene vsed to be coupled with superstitious and fantastickall arts; yet being purged and restored to their true state; they haue both of them a solide ground in nature, and a profitable vse in life. The first is *Physiognomie*, which

which discovereth the disposition of the minde, by the Lineaments of the bodie. The second is the *Exposition of Naturall Dreames*, which discovereth the state of the bodie, by the imaginations of the minde. In the former of these, I note a deficiencye. For *Aristotle* hath verie ingeniously, and diligently handled the façures of the bodie, but not the gestures of the bodie; which are no lesse comprehensible by art, and of greater vse, and aduantage. For the Lineaments of the bodie doe disclose the disposition and inclination of the minde in generall; but the Motions of the countenance and parts, doe not onely so, but doe further disclose the present humour and state of the minde and will. For as your Maiestic sayth most aptly and elegantly; *As the Tongue speaketh to the Eare, so the gesture speaketh to the Eye.* And therefore a number of subtile persons, whose eyes doe dwell vpon the faces and fashions of men, doe well know the aduantage of this obseruation; as being most part of their abilitie; neither can it bee denied, but that it is a great discouerie of dissimulations, and a great direction in Business.

The later Branch, touching *Impression* hath not bene collected into Art; but hath bene handled dispersedly; and it hath the same relation on *Aristophe*, that the former hath. For the consideration is double, *Either how, and how farre the humours and affects of the bodie, doe alter or worke vpon the mind; or againe, How and how farre*

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the passions, or Apprehensions of the minde, doe alter or worke upon the Bodie. The former of these, hath beene enquired and considered, as a part, and appendix of Medicine, but much more as a part of Religion or superstition. For the Physitian prescribeth Cures of the minde in Phrensies, and melancholy passions; and pretendeth also to exhibite Medicines to exhilarate the minde, to confirme the courage, to clarifie the wits, to corroborate the memorie, and the like: but the scruples and superstitions of Diet, and other Regiment of the body in the sect of the *Pythagoreans*, in the Heresie of the *Manicheas*, and in the Law of *Mahumet* doe excede; So likewise the ordinances in the Ceremoniall Law, interdicting the eating of the blood, and the fat; distinguishing betweene beasts cleane and vncleane for meate; are many and strict. Nay, the faith it selfe, being cleere and serene from all cloudes of Ceremonie, yet retaineth the vse of fastings, abstinences, and other Macerations and humiliations of the bodie, as things reall, and not figuratiue. The roote and life of all which prescripts, is (besides the Ceremonie,) the consideration of that dependencie, which the affections of the minde are submitted vnto, vpon the state and disposition of the bodie. And if any man of weake iudgement doe conceiue, that this suffering of the minde from the bodie, doth either question the Immortalitie, or derogate from the soueraignie of the soule, hee may be taught in easie instances, that the Infant in the mothers wombe

wombe, is compatible with the mother, and yet separable: And the most absolute Monarch is sometimes ledde by his seruants, and yet without subiection. As for the reciprocall knowledge, which is the operation of the conceits and passions of the minde vpon the bodie; Wee see all wise Physitians in the prescriptions of their regiments to their Patients, doe euer consider *Accidentia animi*: as of great force to further or hinder remedies, or recoveries; and more specially it is an inquirie of great depth and worth concerning *Imagination*, how, and how farre it altereth the bodie proper of the Imaginant. For although it hath a manifest power to hurt, it followeth not, it hath the same degree of power to helpe; No more than a man can conclude, that because there be pestilent Ayres, able sodainely to kill a man in health; therefore there should bee soueraigne ayres, able sodainely to cure a man in sicknesse. But the inquisition of this part is of great vse, though it needeth, as *Socrates* said, *A Delian diuer*, being difficult and profound. But vnto all this knowledge *De Communi vinculo*, of the Concordances betweene the Mind and the bodie: that part of Enquirie is most necessarie, which considereth of the *Seates*, and *Domiciles* which the seuerall faculties of the minde, doe take & occupate in the Organs of the bodie, which knowledge hath beene attempted, and is controuerted, and deserueth to be much better inquired. For the opinion of *Plato*, who placed *the Vnderstanding in the Braine; Animositas*, (which

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(which hee did vnfitly call *Anger*, having a greater mixture with *Pride*) *in the Heart*; and *Concupiscence* or *Sensualitie in the Liver*, deserueth not to bee despised, but much lesse to be allowed. So then we haue constituted (as in our owne wish and aduise) the inquirie *Touching humane nature entire*, as a iust portion of knowledge, to be handled apart.

The knowledge that concerneth mans bodie, is diuided as the good of mans bodie is diuided, vnto which it referreth. The good of mans body, is of foure kindes; *Health, Beautie, Strength, and Pleasure*: So, the knowledges are *Medicine, or Art of Cure: Art of Decoration, which is called Cosmetike: Art of Activitie, which is called Athletike: and Art Voluptuarie, which Tacitus truely calleth Eruditus Luxus*. This Subiect of mans bodie, is of all other things in Nature, most susceptible of remedie: but then that Remedie is most susceptible of errour. For the same Subtiltie of the subiect, doth cause large possibilitie, and easie sayling: and therefore the enquirie ought to be the more exact.

To speake therefore of *Medicine*, and to resume that we haue sayd, ascending a little higher; The ancient opinion that *Man* was *Microcosmus*, an Abstract or Modell of the world, hath beene fantastically streyned by *Paracelsus*, and the Alchimists, as if there were to be found in mans body certaine correspondences, and parallels, which should haue respect to all varieties of things, as *Starres, planets, mineralls*, which are extant in the great world.

But

But thus much is evidently true, that of all substances, which Nature hath produced, mans bodie is the most extreemly compounded. For we see hearbs and plants are nourished by earth & water; Beasts for the most part, by hearbs and fruits; Man by the flesh of Beasts, Birds, Fishes, Hearbs, Grains, Fruits, Water, & the manifold alterations, dressings, and preparations of these severall bodies, before they come to be his food & aliment. Adde hereunto that Beasts have a more simple order of life, & lesse change of Affections to worke vpon their bodies, whereas man in his Mansion, sleepe, exercise, passions, hath infinit variations; and it cannot be denied, but that the *bodie of Man* of all other things is of the most compounded Masse. *The soule* on the other side is the simplest of substances, as is well expessed.

Purumq; reliquis

Æthereum sensum, atque Aurai simplicis ignem.

So that it is no maruaile, though *the soule* so placed, enioy no rest, if that principle be true, that *Motus rerum est rapidus extra locum, Placidus in loco.* But to the purpose, this variable composition of mans bodie hath made it as an Instrument easie to distemper; and therefore the Poets did well to conioyne *Musicke* and *Medicine* in *Apollo*, because the Office of *Medicine*, is but to tune this curious Harpe of mans bodie, and to reduce it to Harmonie. So then the *Subject* being so *Variable*, hath made the *Art* by consequent more *coniecturall*, and *Art* being *Coniecturall*, hath made so much the more

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place

place to bee left for imposture. For almost all other Arts and Sciences, are iudged by Acts, or Masterpieces, as I may terme them, and not by the successes, and euent. The Lawyer is iudged by the vertue of his pleading, and not by issue of the cause: The Master in the Shippe, is iudged by the directing his course aright, and not by the fortune of the Voyage: But the Phisician, & perhaps the Politique, hath no particular Acts demonstratiue of his abilitie, but is iudged most by the euent: which is euer but as it is takē; for who can tell if a Patient die or recover, or if a State be preserued, or ruyned, whether it be Art or Accident? And therefore many times the Impostor is prized, and the man of vertue taxed. Nay we see weakenesse and credulitie of men, is such, as they will often preferre a Montabanke or Witch, before a learned Phisician. And therefore the Poets were cleere sighted in discerning this extreame folly, when they made *Æsculapius*, & *Circe*, Brother and Sister, both Children of the Sunne, as in the verses.

Ipse repertorem medicina talis & artis,

Fulmine Phœbigenam stygias descendit ad undas,

And againe.

Dives inaccessos ubi Solis filia Eucos, &c.

For in all times in the opinion of the multitude, Witches, and old women, and Impostors haue had a Competition with Phisicians. And what followeth? Euen this, that Phisicians, say to themselues, as *Salomon* expresseth it vpon an higher occasion: *If it be-*

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fall

fall to me, as befalleth to the fooles, why should I labour to be more wise? And therefore I cannot much blame Phisitians, that they vse commonly to intend some other Art or pra&ise, which they fancie, more than their profession. For you shall haue of them: Antiquaries, Poets, Humanists, Stares-men, Marchants, Diuines, and in euerie of these better seene, than in their profession, & no doubt, vpon this ground, that they find, that mediocrity and excellency in their Art, maketh no difference in profit or reputation towards their fortune: for the weakenesse of Patients, and sweetnesse of life, and nature of hope, maketh men depend vpon Phisitians, with all their defects. But neuertheless, these things which wee haue spoken of, are courses begotten betweene a little occasion, & a great deale of sloath and default: for if we will excite and awake our obseruation, we shall see in familiar instances, what a predominant facultie, *The Subtiltie of Spirit*, hath ouer the *Varietie of Matter*, or *Forme*: Nothing more variable then faces and countenances: yet men can beare in memorie the infinite distinctions of them. Nay, a Painter with a few shells of colours, and the benefit of his Eye, and habite of his imagination can imitate them all that euer haue been, are, or may be, if they were brought before him. Nothing more variable than voices, yet men can likewise discern them personally, nay you shall haue a *Baffon*, or *Pantomimus* will expresse as many as he pleaseth. Nothing more variable, than the differing

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sounds of words, yet men haue found the way to reduce thē to a few simple Letters; so that it is not the *insufficiency or incapacity of mans mind*; but it is the *remote standing or placing thereof*; that breedeth these Mazes and incomprehensions; for as the sense a far off, is full of mistaking, but is exact at hand, so it is of the vnderstanding; The remedie whereof, is not to quicken or strengthen the Organ, but to goe neerer to the object; and therefore there is no doubt, but if the Phisitians will learne, and vse the true approaches and *Auenues of Nature*, they may assume, as much as the Poet saith;

Et quoniam variant Morbi, variabimus artes,

Mille Mali species, mille Salutis erunt.

Which that they should doe, the noblenesse of their Art doth deserue; well shadowed by the Poets, in that they made *Æsculapius* to be the sonne of the Sun, the one being the fountaine of life, the other as the second streame; but infinitely more honored by the example of our Sauiour, who made the body of man the object of his miracles, as the soule was the object of his Doctrine. For wee reade not that euer he vouchsafed to doe any miracle about honor, or money; (except that one for giuing Tribute to *Cesar*) but onely about the preserving, sustaining, and healing the bodie of man.

Medicine is a Science, which hath beene (as we haue said) more professed, than labored, & yet more labored, than aduanced; the labor hauing beene, in my iudgement, rather in circle, than in progression.

For

For I finde much Iteration, but small Addition. It considereth *causes of Diseases, with the occasions or impulsions*: The *Diseases themselves, with the Accidents*: and the *Cures, with the Preservations*. The Deficiencies which I thinke good to note, being a few of many, & those such, as are of a more open & manifest nature, I will enumerate, and not place.

The first is the discontinuance of the ancient and serious diligence of *Hippocrates*, which vsed to set downe a *Narratiue of the speciall cases of his patients*, and how they proceeded, & how they were iudged by recouery or death. Therefore hauing an example proper in the father of the art, I shall not neede to alledge an example forraine, of the wisdom of the *Lawyers*, who are carefull to report new cases and decisions, for the direction of future iudgements. This continuance of *Medicinall History*, I find deficient, which I vnderstand neither to be so infinite as to extend to euery *Common Case*, nor so reserved, as to admit none but *Wonders*: for many things are new in the *Manner*, which are not new in the *Kinde*, and if men will intend to obserue, they shall finde much worthy to obserue.

*Narratio-
nes Medi-
cinales.*

In the inquirie which is made by *Anatomie*, I find much deficiencie: for they enquire of the *Parts*, and their *Substances, Figures, and Collocations*; But they enquire not of the *Diuerfities of the Parts*; the *Secrets of the Passages*; and the *seats or nestlings of the humours*; nor much of the *Foot-steps, and impressions of Diseases*; The reason of which omissions, I suppose

*Anatomia
comparata.*

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to be, because the first enquirie may be satisfied, in the view of one or a few Anatomies: but the latter being comparative and casuall, must arise from the view of many. And as to the diuersitie of parts, there is no doubt but the fa^{cture} or framing of the inward parts, is as full of difference, as the outward, and in that, is the *Cause Continent* of many diseases, which not being obserued, they quarrell many times with the humors which are not in fault, the fault being in the very frame and Mechanicke of the part, which cannot be removed by medicine alteratiue, but must be accomodate and palliate by dyets and medicines familiar. And for the passages and pores, it is true which was anciently noted, that the more subtile of them appeare not in anatomies, because they are shut and latent in dead bodies, though they be open and manifest in liue: which being supposed, though the inhumanity of *Anatomia uinorū* was by *Celsus* iustly reprobued: yet in regard of the great vse of this obseruation, the inquiry needed not by him so sleightly to haue been relinquished altogether, or referred to the casuall practises of Surgerie, but might haue bene well diuerted vpon the dissection of beasts aliue, which notwithstanding the dissimilitude of their parts, may sufficiently satisfie this inquiry. And for the humors, they are commonly passed ouer in Anatomies, as purgaments, whereas it is most necessarie to obserue, what cauities, nests and receptracles the humors doe finde in the parts, with the differing kinde of the humor

humor so lodged and received. And as for the footsteps of diseases, and their deuastations of the inward part, impostumations, exulcerations, discor-tinuations, putrefactions, consumptions, contracti- ons, extensions, convulsions, dislocations, ob- structions, repletions, together with all preterna- turall substances, as stones, carnosities, excrescences, wormes, and the like: they ought to haue bene ex- actly obserued by multitude of Anatomies, and the contribution of mens seuerall experiences; and carefully set downe both historically according to the appearances, and artificially with a reference to the diseases and symptomes which resulted from them; in case where the Anatomy is of a dead pa- tient; whereas now vpon opening of bodies, they are passed ouer sleightly, and in silence.

In the inquirie of diseases, they doe abandon the cures of many, some as in their nature incurable, and others, as passed the period of cure; so that *Syl- la* & the *Triumvirs* neuer proscribed so many men to die, as they doe by their ignorant edicts, where- of numbers do escape with lesse difficulty, then they did in the *Romane* proscriptions. Therefore I will not doubt, to note as a deficiency, that they inquire not the perfite cures of many diseases, or extremi- ties of diseases, but pronouncing them incurable, doe enact a law of neglect, and exempt ignorance from discredit.

Nay further, I esteeme it the office of a Physiti- an not onely to restore health, but to mitigate pain and

*Inquisitio
ulterior de
Morbis in-
sanabilibus.*

*De Eustha-
sia sine exne-
rione.*

and dolours, and not onely when such mitigation may conduce to recouery, but when it may serue to make a faire and easie passage: for it is no small felicitie which *Augustus Caesar* was wont to wish to himselfe, that same *Eurbanasia*, and which was specially noted in the death of *Antoninus Pius*, whose death was after the fashion and semblance of a kindly & pleasant sleepe. So it is written of *Epicurus*, that after his disease was iudged desperate, he drowned his stomacke & senses with a large draught and ingurgitation of wine, whereupon the Epigram was made; *Hinc stygias Ebrius hausit aquas*: He was not sober enough to taste any bitterness of the stygian water. But the Physicians contrariwise doe make a kinde of scruple and Religion to stay with the patient after the disease is deplored, whereas, in my iudgment they ought both to enquire the skill, and to giue the attendances for the facilitating and asswaging of the paines and agonies of death.

*Medicina
experimen-
talis.*

In the consideration of the Cures of diseases, I finde a deficiency in the Receipts of proprietie, respecting the particular cures of diseases: for the Physicians haue frustrated the fruit of tradition and experience by their magistralties, in adding and taking out and changing *Quid pro quo*, in the receipts, at their pleasures, commanding so ouer the medicine, as the medicine cannot command ouer the disease: For except it be Treacle and Mythridatum, and of late *Diascoridum*, and a few more, they tye themselves to no receipts seuerely and religiously:

ously: for as to the confessions of sale, which are in the shoppes, they are for readinesse, and not for proprietie: for they are vpon generall intentions of purging, opening, comforting, a'tering, and not much appropriate to particular Diseases; and this is the cause why Emperiques, & old women are more happie many times in their Cures, than learned Physitians; because they are more religious in holding their Medicines. Therefore here is the deficiency which I finde, that Physitians haue not partly out of their owne practize; partly out of the constant probations reported in bookes; and partly out of the traditions of Emperiques; set downe and deliuered ouer, certaine *Experimentall Medicines*, for the Cure of particular Diseases; besides their owne *Coniecturall* and *Magistrall descriptions*. For as they were the men of the best Composition in the State of *Rome*, which either being Consuls inclined to the people; or being Tribunes inclined to the Senate: so in the matter we now handle, they be the best Physitians, which being learned incline to the traditions of experience; or being Emperiques, incline to the methods of learning.

In preparation of Medicines, I doe finde strange, specially, considering how minerall Medicines haue beene extolled; and that they are safer, for the outward, than inward parts, that no man hath sought, to make an Imitation by Art of Naturall Bathes, and Medicinable fountaines: which neuerthelesse are confessed to receiue their vertues from Mine-

Z

rales;

*Imitatio
Naturæ in
Balneis, &
Aquis Me-
dicinalibus*

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rals : and not so onely, but discerned and distinguished from what particular Minerall they receiue Tincture, as Sulphur, Vitriole, Steele, or the like : which Nature if it may be reduced to compositions of art, both the varietie of them will be increased, and the temper of them will be more commanded.

*Filum Medicinale, siue de vici-
bus Medicinarum.*

But lest I grow to be more particular, than is agreeable, either to my intention, or to proportion, I will conclude this part with the note of one deficiency more, which seemeth to me of greatest consequence, which is, that the prescripts in vse, are too compendious to attaine their end: for to my vnderstanding, it is a vaine and flattering opinion, to thinke any Medicine can be so soueraigne, or so happie, as that the Receit or vse of it, can worke any great effect vpon the bodie of man; it were a strange speech, which, spoken, or spoken oft, should re-claime a man from a vice, to which he were by nature subiect: it is order, pursuite, sequence, and interchange of application, which is mightie in nature; which although it require more exact knowledge in prescribing, and more precise obedience in obseruing, yet is recompenced with the magnitude of effects. And although a man would thinke by the daily visitations of the Physitians, that there were a pursuance in the cure, yet let a man looke into their prescripts and ministrations, and he shall finde them but inconstancies, and euerie dayes deuises, without any setled prouidence or proiect; Not that euerie scrupulous or superstitious pre-
script.

script is effectually, no more than euery straight way, is the way to heauen, but the *truth of the direction* must precede *seueritie of obseruance*.

For *Cosmetique*, it hath parts *Ciuile*, and parts *Effeminate*: for cleanness of bodie, was euer esteemed to proceed from a due reuerence to God, to societie, and to our selues. As for artificiall decoration, it is well worthy of the deficiencies which it hath: being neither fine enough to deceiue, nor handsome to vse; nor wholesome to please.

For *Athletique*, I take the subiect of it largely; that is to say, for any point of abilitie, whereunto the bodie of man may be brought, whether it be of *Actiuitie*, or of *Patience*: whereof *Actiuitie* hath two parts, *Strength* and *Swiftnesse*: And *Patience* likewise hath two parts, *Hardnesse against wants and extremities*; and *Indurance of paine, or torment*; whereof we see the practises in Tumblers, in Sauges, and in those that suffer punishment: Nay, if there be any other facultie, which falls not within any of the former diuisions, as in those that diue, that obtaine a strange power of containing respiration and the like, I referre it to this part. Of these things the practises are knowne: but the Philosophie that concerneth them is not much enquired: the rather I thinke, because they are supposed to be obtained, either by an aptnesse of Nature, which cannot be taught; or onely by continuall custome, which is soone prescribed; which thought it be not true: yet I forbear to note any deficiency.

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ces: for the Olympian Games are downe long since: and the mediocritie of these things is for vse: As for the excellency of them, it serueth for the most part, but for mercenary ostentation.

For *Arts of pleasure sensuall*, the chiefe deficiency in them, is of Lawes to repressse them. For as it hath bene well obserued, that the Arts which flourish in times, while vertue is in growth, are *Militarie*: and while vertue is in State, are *Liberall*: and while vertue is in declination, are *voluptuarie*: so I doubt, that this age of the world, is somewhat vpon the descent of the wheele; with Arts *voluptuarie*, I couple praesises *locularie*; for the deceiuing of the senses, is one of the pleasures of the senses. As for Games of recreation, I hold them to belong to Ciuile life, and education. And thus much of that particular *Humane Philosophie*, which concernes the Bodie, which is but the Tabernacle of the minde.

FOR *Humane knowledge*, which concernes the minde, it hath two parts, the one that enquireth of *The substance, or nature of the soule or minde*; The other, that enquireth of the *Faculties or functions thereof*: vnto the first of these, the considerations of the *Originall of the soule*, whether it be *native or aduentine*; and *how farre it is exempted from Lawes of Matter*; and of the *Immortalitie thereof*; and many other points doe appertaine, which haue bene not more laboriously enquired, than variously reported; so as the trauaile therein taken, seemeth

seemeth to haue bene rather in a Maze, than in a way. But although I am of opinion, that this knowledge may be more really and soundly enquired euen in Nature, than it hath bene; yet I hold, that in the end it must be bounded by Religion; or else it will bee subiect to deceit and delusion: for as the substance of the soule in the Creation, was not extracted out of the Masse of heauen and earth; by the benediction of a *Producat*. but was immediately inspired from God; so it is not possible that it should bee (otherwise than by accident) subiect to the *Lawes of Heauen and Earth*; which are the subiect of *Philosophie*; And therefore the true knowledge of the nature, and state of the soule, must come by the same inspiration; that gaue the substance. Vnto this part of knowledge touching the soule, there be two appendices, which as they haue bene handled, haue rather vapoured forth fables, than kindled truth; *Diuination*, and *Fascination*.

Diuination, hath bene anciently and fitly diuided into *Artificiall* and *Naturall*; whereof *Artificiall* is, when the minde maketh a prediction by argument, concluding vpon signes and tokens: *Naturall* is, when the mind hath a presention by an internall power, without the inducement of a signe. *Artificiall* is of two sorts; either when the argument is coupled with a deriuation of causes, which is *rationall*; or when it is onely grounded vpon a Coincidence of the effect, which is *experimentall*; whereof the latter for the most part, is *superstitious*.

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ous: Such as were the Heathen obseruations, vpon the inspection of Sacrifices, the flights of birds, the swarming of Bees, and such as was the *Chaldean Astrologie*, and the like. For *Artificall Diuination*, the seuerall kinds thereof are distributed amongst particular knowledges. The *Astronomer* hath his predictions, as of coniunctions, aspects, Eclipses, and the like. The *Physitian* hath his predictions, of death, of recouerie, of the accidents and issues of Diseases. The *Politique* hath his predictions; *O urbem venalem, & cito perituram, si emptorem inuenerit*; which stayed not long to bee performed in *Sylla* first, and after in *Cæsar*. So as these predictions are now impertinent, and to be referred ouer. But the *Diuination*, which springeth from the internall nature of the soule, is that which we now speake of, which hath beene made to be of two sorts; *Primitiue* and by *Influxion*. *Primitiue* is grounded vpon the supposition, that the minde when it is withdrawne & collected into it selfe, and not diffused into the Organes of the bodie, hath some extent and latitude of prenotion; which therefore appeareth most in sleepe, in extalies, and neere death; and more rarely in waking apprehensions; and is induced and furthered by those abstinences, and obseruances; which make the minde most to consist in it selfe. By *influxion*; is grounded vpon the conceit; that the minde, as a mirror or glasse, should take illumination from the fore-knowledge of *God*, and *Spirits*, vnto which the same Regiment doth

doth likewise conduce. For the retyring of the minde within it selfe, is the State which is most susceptible of diuine influxions; saue that it is accompanied in this case with a seruencie and eleuation, (which the ancients noted by *furie*) and not with a repose and quiet, as it is in the other.

Fascination is the power and act of Imagination, intensiue vpon other bodies, than the bodie of the Imaginant; for of that we spake in the proper place; wherein the Schoole of *Paracelsus*, and the Disciples of pretended Naturall Magicke, haue beene so intemperate, as they haue exalted the power of the imagination, to bee much one with the power of *Miracle-working* faith: others that draw neerer to Probabilitie, calling to their view the secret passages of things, and specially of the Contagion that passeth from bodie to bodie, doe conceiue it should likewise be agreeable to Nature, that there should be some transmissions and operations from spirit to spirit, without the mediation of the senses; whence the conceits haue growne, (now almost made ciuile) of the Maistring Spirit, and the force of confidence, and the like. Incident vnto this, is the inquirie how to raise and fortifie the imagination; for if the Imagination fortified haue power, then it is materiall to know how to fortifie and exalt it. And herein comes in crookedly and dangerously, a palliation of a great part of *Ceremoniall Magicke*. For it may bee pretended that *Ceremonies, Characters, & Charms* doe worke, not by any *Tacite* or *Sacramen-*

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call contract with euill spirits; but serue onely to strengthen the imagination of him that vseth it; as Images are said by the *Romane Church*, to fix the cogitations, and raise the deuotions of them that pray before them. But for mine owne iudgement, if it be admitted that Imagination hath power; and that *Ceremonies* fortifie Imagination, and that they be vsed sincerely and intentionally for that purpose: yet I should hold them vnlawfull, as opposing to that first edict, which God gaue vnto man; *In sudore vultus comedes Panem tuum*. For they propoundt those noble effects which God hath set forth vnto man, to be bought at the price of labor, to be attained by a few easie and sloathfull obseruances. Deficiencies in these knowledges I will report none, other than the generall deficiency, that it is not knowne, how much of them is veritie, and how much vanitie.

The knowledge which respecteth the faculties of the minde of man, is of two kinds: The one respecting his understanding and Reason, and the other his will, appetite, and Affection, whereof the former produceth Direction or Decree, the later Action or Execution. It is true that the Imagination is an Agent, or Nuntius in both prouinces, both the Iudiciall, & the Ministeriall. For Sense sendeth ouer to Imagination, before Reason haue iudged: and Reason sendeth ouer to Imagination, before the Decree can be acted. For Imagination euer precedeth Voluntary Motion. Sauing that this Ianus of Imagination hath differing

differing faces; for the face towards *Reason*, hath the print of Truth. But the face towards *Action*, hath the print of *God*, which neuertheless are faces.

Quales decet esse sororum. Neither is the *Imagination* simply and onely a Messenger; but is inuested with, or at leastwise vsurpeth no small authoritie in it selfe; besides the duty of the Message. For it was well said by *Aristotle*: That the minde hath ouer the Bodie that Commandement which the Lord hath ouer a Bond-man; But that *Reason* hath ouer the *Imagination* that Commandement, which a *Magistrate* hath ouer a free Citizen; who may come also to rule in his turne. For wee see, that in matters of *Faith* and *Religion*, we raise our *Imagination* about our *Reason*, which is the cause why *Religion* sought euer access to the minde by *Similitudes*, *Types*, *Parables*, *Visions*, *Dreames*. And againe in all persuasions that are wrought by eloquence, and other impression of like Nature, which doe paint and disguise the true appearance of things, the chiefe recommendation vnto *Reason*, is from the *Imagination*. Neuertheless, because I finde not any Science, that doth properly or fitly pertaine to the *Imagination*, I see no cause to alter the former diuision. For as for *Poesie* it is rather pleasure, or play of imagination, than a worke or dutie thereof. And if it be a worke, wee speake not now of such partes of learning, as the *Imagination* produceth, but of such Sciences, as handle

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and consider of the *Imagination*. No more than wee shall speake now of such *Knowledges*, as reason produceth; (for that extendeth to all Philosophy) but of such *Knowledges*, as doe handle and enquire of the facultie of *Reason*; So as *Poesie* had his true place. As for the power of the *Imagination* in nature, and the manner of fortifying the same; wee have mentioned it in the Doctrine *De Anima*, whereunto most fitly it belongeth. And lastly, for *Imaginative*, or *Insinuative Reason*, which is the subject of Rhetoricke, wee thinke it best to referre it to the *Arts of Reason*. So therefore we content our selues with the former diuision, that Humane Philosophy, which respecteth the faculties of the minde of man, hath two parts, *Rationall* and *Morall*.

The part of humane Philosophie, which is *Rationall*, is of all knowledges, to the most wits, the least delightfull; and seemeth but a Net of subtiltie and spinositie. For as it was truely said, that Knowledge is *Pabulum animi*; So in the Nature of mens appetite to this foode, most men are of the tast and stomach of the Israclites in the desert, that would faine haue returned *Ad ollas carnum*, and were wearie of *Manna*, which though it were celestiall; yet seemed lesse nutritiue and comfortable. So generally men tast well knowledges that are drached in flesh and blood, *Ciuile Historie*, *Moralitie*, *Religion*; about the which mens affections prailes, fortunes doe turne and are conuersant. But

this same *Lumen siccum*, doth parch and offend most mens watry and soft natures. But to speake truly of things as they are in worth, *Rationall Knowledges*; are the keyes of all other Arts; For as *Aristotle* saith aptly and elegantly, *That the hand is the Instrument of Instruments; and the minde is the Forme of Formes*: So these be truly said to be the Art of Arts: Neither doe they onely direct, but likewise confirme and strengthen: euen as the habite of shooting, doth not onely inable to shoote a neerer shoote, but also to draw a stronger Bowe.

The *Arts intellectuall*, are foure in number, diuided according to the ends wherunto they are referred: for mans labour is to *inuent* that which is sought or propounded: or to *judge* that which is inuented: or to *retaine* that which is iudged: or to *deliuer* ouer that which is retained. So as the Arts must be foure: *Art of Enquirie or inuention*: *Art of Examination or Iudgement*: *Art of Custodie or Memorie* and *Art of Elocution or Tradition*.

Inuention is of two kindes much differing, The one of *Arts and Sciences*, & the other of *Speech and Arguments*. The former of these, I doe report deficient: which seemeth to me to bee such a deficiency, as if in the making of an *Inuentorie*; touching the State of a defunct, it should bee set downe, *That there is no realtie money*. For as money will fetch all other commodities; so this knowledge is that which should purchase all the rest. And like as the *West Indies* had neuer been discouered,

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ed, if the use of the Mariners Needle, had not been first discovered; though the one bee vast Regions, and the other a small Motion. So it cannot be found strange, if Sciences bee no further discovered, if the Art it selfe of *Inuention* and *Discouerie*, had beene passed ouer.

That this part of Knowledge is wanting, to my Iudgement; standeth plainly confessed: for first *Logicke* doth not pretend to inuent *Sciences* or the *Axiomes* of *Sciences*, but passeth it ouer with a *Chig*, *in sua arte credendum*. And *Celsus* acknowledgeth it grauely; speaking of the *Empiricall* and *Dogmaticall* Sects of *Physicians*, *That Medicines and Cures, were first found out; and then after the Reasons & causes were discoursed: & not the Causes first found out, and by light from them the Medicines and Cures discovered.* And *Plato* in his *Theætetus* noteth well, *That particulars are infinite, and the higher generalities giue no sufficient direction: and that the pythe of all Sciences, which maketh the Art-man differ from the inexpert, is in the middle propositions, which in euerie particular knowledge are taken from Tradition and Experience.* And therefore wee see, that they which discourse of the *Inuentions* and *Originalls* of things, referre them rather to *Chance*, then to *Art*; and rather to *Beasts*, *Birds*, *Fishes*, *Serpents*, than to *Men*.

Dictamnium genatrix *Cretæa* carpit ab *Idæis*,
 & *Rubribus* canlem folijs, & flore comantem.

*Purpureo: non illa feris incognita Capris,
Gramina cum tergo volucres hæsere sigilla.*

So that it was no maruaile, (the manner of *Antiquitie* being to consecrate Inuentors) that the *Egyptians* had so few humane Idols in their Temples, but almost all Brute :

*Omnigenumque Deum monstra, & latrator Anubis
Contra Neptunū & Venerem, contraq; Minervam, &c.*

And if you like better the tradition of the *Grecians*, and ascribe the first Inuentions to Men, yet you will rather beleëue that *Prometheus* first stroake the flints, and maruailed at the sparke, than that when he first stroake the flints, he expected the sparke; and therefore wee see the *West Indian Prometheus*, had no intelligence with the *Europæan*, because of the rarenesse with them of flint, that gaue the first occasion : so as it should seeme, that hitherto men are rather beholden to a wild Goat for Surgerie, or to a Nightingale for Musique, or to the *Ibis* for some part of Phisicke, or to the Pot lidde, that flew open for Artillerie, or generally to *Chaunce*, or any thing else, than to *Logicke* for the Inuention of Arts and Sciences. Neither is the forme of Inuention, which *Virgill* describeth much other.

*Vt varias usus meditando extunderet artes,
Paulatim.*

For if you obserue the words well, it is no other methode, than that which brute Beasts are capable of, and doe put in vre; which is a perpetuall intend-

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ding or practising some one thing urged and imposed, by an absolute necessitie of conseruation of being; For so Cicero saith verie truly; *Vsus vni rei deditus, & Naturam & Artem saepe vincit*: And therefore if it bee said of Men,

Labor omnia vincit

Improbis, & duris vrgens in rebus egestas;

It is likewise said of beasts, *Quis Psittaco docuit sumi xaupe?* who taught the Rauē in a drowth to throw pibbles into an hollow tree, where she spyed water, that the water might rise, so as shee might come to it? who taught the Bee to sayle through such a vast Sea of ayre, and to finde the way from a field in flower, a great way off, to her Hiue? who taught the Ant to bite euerie graine of Corne, that she burieth in her hill, least it should take roote and grow? Adde then the word *Extundere*, which importeth the extreame difficultie, and the word *Paulatim*, which importeth the extreame slownesse; and wee are where wee were, euen amongst the *Egyptians Gods*, there being little left to the facultie of Reason, and nothing to the dutie of Art for matter of Invention.

Secondly, the Induction which the *Logicians* speake of, and which seemeth familiar with *Plato*, whereby the *Principles of Sciences* may be pretended to be inuented, and so the middle propositions by derivation from the Principles; their forme of Induction, I say is vtterly vitious and incompetent: wherein their erroure is the soler, bee
cause

cause it is the dutie of *Art* to perfect and exalt Nature : but they contrariwise haue wronged, abused, and traduced Nature. For hee that shall attentiuely obserue how the minde doth gather this excellent dew of Knowledge, like vnto that which the Poet speaketh of *Aere mellis caelestia dona*, distilling and contriuing it out of particulars naturall and artificiall, as the flowers of the field and Garden : shall finde that the minde of her selfe by Nature both mannage, and Acte an Induction, much better than they describe it. For to conclude vpon an Enumeration of particulars without instance contradictorie : is no conclusion : but a coniecture; for who can assure (in many subiects) vpon those particulars, which appeare of a side, that there are not other on the contrarie side which appeare not ? As if *Samuell* should haue rested vpon those Sonnes of *Issay*, which were brought before him, and failed of *Dauid*, which was in the field. And this forme (to say truth) is so grosse, as it had not beene possible for wittes so subtile, as haue managged these things, to haue offered it to the world, but that they hasted to their *Theories* & *Dogmaticals*, and were imperious and scornefull toward particulars; which their manner was to vse, but as *Lictores* and *Viatores* for Sargeants and Whiffers, *Ad summonendam turbam*, to make way and make roome for their opinions, rather than in their true vse and service; certainly, it is a thing may touch a man with a religious wonder,

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to see how the footsteps of seducement, are the very same in Diuine and Humane truth: for as in Diuine truth, Man cannot endure to become as a Child; So in Humane, they reputed the attending the Inductions (whereof wee speake) as if it were a second Infancie or Child hood.

Thirdly, allow some *Principles* or *Axiomes* were rightly induced; yet neuerthelesse certaine it is, that *Middle Propositions*, cannot be deduced from them in *Subiect of Nature* by *Syllogisme*, that is, by *Touch and Reducttion of them to Principles in a Middle Terme*. It is true, that the Sciences popular, as *Moralities*, *Laws*, and the like, yea, and *Diuinitie* (because it pleaseth God to apply himselfe to the capacity of the simplest) that forme may haue vse, and in *Naturall Philosophie* likewise, by way of argument or satisfactorie Reason, *Que offensum parit, Operis Effæta est*: But the subtiltie of Nature and Operations will not bee inchained in those bonds: For *Arguments* consist of *Propositions*, and *Propositions*, of *Words*, and *Wordes* are but the *Current Tokens* or *Markes of popular Notions of things*: which Notions if they bee grossely and variably collected out of particulars; It is not the laborious examination either of *Consequences of Arguments*, or of the truth of *Propositions* that can euer correct that Errour, being (as the Physitians speake) in the first digestion; And therefore it was not without cause, that so many excellent Phylosophers became

came *Sceptiques* and *Academiques*, and denied any certaintie of Knowledge, or Comprehension, and held opinion that the knowledge of man extended onely to Appearances, and Probabilities. It is true, that in *Socrates* it was supposed to bee but a forme of *Irony*, *Scientiam dissimulando simulavit*: For he vsed to disabie his knowledge, to the end to inhanse his Knowledge, like the Humor of *Tiberius* in his beginnings, that would Raigne, but would not acknowledge so much; And in the later *Academy*, which *Cicero* embraced; this opinion also of *Acatlipsia* (I doubt) was not held sincerely: for that all those which excelled in Copie of speech, seeme to haue chosen that Sect; as that which was fittest to giue glorie to their eloquence, and variable discourses: being rather like Progresses of pleasure, than Iournies to an end. But assuredly many scattered in both *Academies*, did hold it in subtiltie, and integritie. But here was their chiefe Error; They charged the deceite vpon *The Sences*; which in my Iudgement. (notwithstanding all their *Cauillations*) are verie sufficient to certifie and report truth (though not alwaies immediately, yet by comparison;) by helpe of instrument; and by producing, and vrging such things, as are too subtile for the sence, to some effect comprehensible, by the sence, and other like assistance. But they ought to haue charged the deceit vpon the weaknesse of the intellectuall powers, and vpon the maner of collecting, and concludaing

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upon the reports of the senses. This I speake not to disable the minde of man, but to stirre ievp to seeke helpe: for no man, be he neuer so cunning or practised, can make a straight line or perfecte circle by steadinesse of hand, which may bee easily done by helpe of a Ruler or Compasse.

*Experientia
literata,
& interpre-
tatio Naturæ*

This part of *Invention*, concerning the *Invention* of *Sciences*, I purpose (if God giue mee leave) hereafter to propound: hauing digested it into two parts: whereof the one I terme *Experientia literata*, and the other *Interpretatio Naturæ*: The former, being but a degree and rudiment of the latter. But I will not dwell too long, nor speake too great vpon a promise.

The *Invention* of speech or argument is not properly an *Invention*: for to *Inuent* is to discover that we know not, and not to recouer or resummon that which wee already know; and the vse of this *Invention*, is no other; But out of the Knowledge, whereof our minde is already possessd, to draw forth, or call before vs that which may bee pertinent to the purpose, which wee take into our consideration. So as to speake truly, it is not *Invention*, but *Remembrance* or *Suggestion*, with an *Application*: Which is the cause why the Schooles doe place it after Iudgement, as subtequent and not precedent. Nevertheless, because wee doe account it a Chase, aswell of Deere in an inclosed Parke, as in a Forrest at large: and that it hath already obtained the name: Let it bee called *Invention*, so as it be perceued

perceiued and discerned, that the Scope and end of this *Invention*, is readinesse and present vse of our knowledge, and not addition or amplification thereof.

To procure this readie vse of Knowledge, there are two Courses : *Preparation* and *Suggestion*. The forme of these, seemeth scarcely a part of Knowledge; consistiing rather of Diligence, than of any artificiall erudition. And herein *Aristotle* wittily, but hurtfully doth deride the *Sophists*, neere his time, saying; *They did as if one that professed the Art of Shooe-making, should not teach how to make up a Shooe, but onely exhibite in a readinesse a number of Shooes of all fashions and Sizes.* But yet a man might reply, that if a Shooe-maker should haue no Shooes in his Shoppe; but onely worke, as he is bespoken he should bee weakly customed. But our Sauiour, speaking of Diuine Knowledge, saith: *That the Kingdome of Heauen, is like a good Housholder, that bringeth forth both new and old store :* And wee see the ancient Writers of *Rhetoricke* doe giue it in precepts: That Pleaders should haue the Places, whereof they haue most continuall vse, readie handled in all the varietie that may bee, as that, To speake for the literall Interpretation of the Law against Equitie, and Contrarie : and to speake for Presumptions and Inferences against Testimonie; and Contrarie : And *Cicero* himselfe, being broken vnto it by great experience, deliuereth it plainly; That whatsoeuer a man shall haue

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occasion to speake of, (if he will take the paines) he may haue it in effect premeditate, and handled in those. So that when he commeth to a particular, he shall haue nothing to do, but to put to Names, and times, and places; and such other Circumstances of Individuals. We see likewise the great exact diligence of *Demosthenes*, who in regard of the great force, that the entrance and accessse into causes hath to make a good impression; had readie framed a number of *Prefaces* for Orations and Speeches. All which Authorities and Presidents may ouer-weigh *Aristotles* opinion, that would haue vs change a rich Wardrobe, for a paire of Sheares.

But the Nature of the Collection of this *Prouision* or *Preparatorie store*, though it be common, both to *Logicke*. and *Rhetoricke*; yea hauing made an entry of it here, where it came first to be spoken of; I thinke fite to referre ouer the further handling of it to *Rhetoricke*.

The other part of *Inuention*, which I terme *Suggestion*, doth assigne and direct vs to certaine *Markes* or *Places*, which may excite our Minde to returne and produce such Knowledge, as it hath formerly collected : to the end wee may make vse thereof. Neither is this vse (truly taken) onely to furnish argument, to dispute probably with others; But likewise to Minister vnto our Iudgement to conclude aright within our selues. Neither may these places serue onely to apprompt our *Inuention*;

uention; but also to direct our enquirie. For a facultie of wise interrogating is halfe a knowledge; For as *Plato* saith; *Whosoever seeketh, knoweth that which he seeketh for, in a generall Notion; Else how shall he know it, when he hath found it.* And therefore the larger your *Anticipation* is, the more direct and compendious is your search. But the same *Places* which will helpe vs what to produce, of that which we know already; will also helpe vs, if a man of experience were before vs, what questions to aske; or if we haue *Bookes* and *Authors*, to instruct vs what points to search and reuolue: so as I cannot report, that this part of *Inuention*, which is that which the Schooles call *Topiques*, is deficient.

Neuerthelesse *Topiques* are of two sorts, *generall* and *speciall*. The *generall* we haue spoken to; but the particular hath bene touched by some, but reiected generally, as inartificiall and variable. But leauing the humor which hath raigned too much in the Schooles (which is to be vainely subtil in a few things, which are within their command, and to reiect the rest) I doe receiue particular *Topiques*, that is places or directions of *Inuention* and *Inquirie* in euery particular knowledge, as things of great vse; being Mixtures of *Logique* with the Matter of Sciences: for in these it holdeth; *Ars inueniendi adolescet cum Inuentis*: for as in going of a way, wee doe not onely gaine that part of the way which is passed, but wee gaine the better sight of that

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that part of the way which remaineth: So euerie degree of proceeding in a Science giueth a light to that which followeth; which light if wee strengthen, by drawing it foorth into questions or places of inquirie, wee doe greatly aduance our pursuite.

Now we passe vnto the *Artes of iudgement*, which handle the Natures of *Proofes* and *Demonstrations*; which as to *Induction* hath a Coincidence with *Inuention*: For in all *Inductions* whether in good or vitious forme, the same action of the Minde which Inuenteth, Iudgeth; all one as in the sence: But otherwise it is in prooffe by *Syllogisme*: For the prooffe being not immediate but by meane: the *Inuention of the Meane* is one thing: and the *Iudgement of the Consequence* is another. The one *Exciting* onely: the other *Examining*: Therefore for the reall and exact forme of Iudgement, wee referre our selues to that which we haue spoken of *Interpretation of Nature*.

For the other Iudgement by *Syllogisme*, as it is a thing most agreeable to the Mind of Man: So it hath bene vehemently and excellently laboured. For the Nature of Man doth extreanely couet, to haue somewhat in his Vnderstanding fix d and vnmoueable, and as a Rest, and Support of the Mind. And therefore as *Aristotle* endeoureth to prooue, that in all Motion, there is some pointe quiescent; and as hee elegantly expoundeth the ancient Fable of *Atlas*, (that stood fixed, and bare vp the Heauen from falling) to bee
meant

meant of the Poles or Axel-tree of Heauen, where-
 vpon the Conuersion is accomplished; so assuredly
 men haue a desire, to haue an *Atlas* or Axel-tree
 within: to keepe them from fluctuation, which is
 like to a perpetuall perill of falling: Therefore men
 did hasten, to set down some Principles, about
 which the varietie of their disputations might
 turne.

So then this Art of *Iudgement*, is but the *Reducti-*
on of *Propositions*, to *Principles* in a *Middle Terme*.
 The *Principles* to bee agreed by all, and exempted
 from Argument; The *Middle terme* to bee elected
 at the libertie of euerie Mans *Inuention*: the *Re-*
duction to bee of two kindes *Direct*, and *Inuerted*;
 the one when the *Proposition* is reduced to the
Principle; which they terme a *Probation ostensue*:
 the other when the contradictorie of the *Proposi-*
tion is reduced to the contradictorie of the *Prin-*
ciple, which is, that which they call *Per Incommo-*
dum, or *pressing an absurditie*: the *Number* or
Middle Termes to bee, as the *Proposition* standeth,
Degrees more or lesse, removed from the *Principle*.

But this Art hath two seuerall *Methods* of
Doctrine: the one by way of *Direction*, the other
 by way of *Caution*: the former frameth and setteth
 downe a true *Forme of Consequence*, by the varia-
 tions and deflexions; from which *Errours* and *In-*
consequences may bee exactly iudged. Toward
 the *Composition* and *struature* of which *forme*, it
 is incident to handle the parts thereof, which are
Propositions,

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Propositions, and the parts of *Propositions*, which are *Simple Words*. And this is that part of *Logicke*, which is comprehended in the *Analytiques*.

The second Method of Doctrine, was introduced for expedite vse, and assurance sake; discovering the more subtile formes of *Sophismes*, and *Ilhaqueations*, with their *redargutions*, which is that which is tearmed *Elenches*. For although in the more grosse sortes of Fallacies it happeneth (as *Seneca* maketh the comparison well) as in iugling feates, which though wee know not how they are done; yet wee know well it is not, as it seemeth to bee: yet the more subtile sort of them doth not onely put a man besides his answere, but doth many time, abuse his Iudgement.

This part concerning *Elenches*, is excellently handled by *Aristotle* in *Precept*, but more excellently by *Plato* in *Example*: not onely in the persons of the *Sophists*, but euen in *Socrates* himselfe, who professing to affirme nothing, but to infirme that which was affirmed by another, hath exactly expressed all the formes of obiection, fallace and redargution. And although wee haue said that the vse of this Doctrine is for *Redargution*: yet it is manifest, the degenerate and corrupt vse is for *Caption* and *Contradiction*, which passeth for a great facultie, and no doubt, is of verie great advantage; though the difference bee good which was made betweene Orators and Sophisters, that the one is as the Greyhound, which hath his advantage

age in the race, and the other as the Hate, which hath her aduantage in the turne, so as it is the aduantage of the weaker creature.

But yet further, this Doctrin of *Elenches*, hath a more ample latitude and extent, than is perceiued: namely vnto diuers parts of Knowledge: whereof some are laboured, and other omitted. For first, I conceiue (though it may seeme at first somewhat strange) that that part which is variably referred, sometimes to *Logicke*, sometimes to *Metaphysicke*, touching the *Common adiuncts of Essences*, is but an *Elenche*: for the great *Sophisme of all Sophismes*, being *Equiuocation* or *Ambiguitie of Words and Phrase*, specially of such wordes as are most generall and interuene in euerie Enquirie: It seemeth to me that the true & fruitfull vses, (leauing vaine subtilities, and speculations) of the Enquirie of *Maioritie, Minoritie, Prioritie, Posterioritie, Identitie, Diuersitie, Possibilitie, Act, Totalitie, Parts, Existence, Priuation*, and the like, are but wise Cautions against Ambiguities of Speech. So againe, the distribution of things into certaine Tribes, which we call *Categories* or *Predicaments*, are but Cautions against the confusion of *Definitions* and *Diuisions*.

Secondly, there is a seducement that worketh by the strength of the Impression, and not by the subtiltie of the Illaqueation, not so much perplexing the Reason, as ouer-ruling it by power of the *Imagination*. But this part I thinke

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more proper to handle, when I shall speake of *Rhetoricke*.

But lastly, there is yet a much more important and profound kinde of Fallacies in the Minde of Man, which I finde not obserued or enquired at all, and thinke good to place here, as that which of all others appertaineth most to rectifie *Judgement*. The force whereof is such, as it doth not dazle, or snare the vnderstanding in some particulars, but doth more generally, and inwardly infect and corrupt the state thereof. For the minde of Man is farr from the Nature of a cleare and equill glasse, wherein the beames of things should reflect according to their true incidence, Nay, it is rather like an enchanted glasse, full of superstition and Imposture, if it bee not deliuered and reduced. For this purpose, let vs consider the false appearances, that are imposed vpon vs by the generall Nature of the minde, beholding them in an example or two, as first in the instance which is the roote of all superstition: Namely, *That to the Nature of the Minde of all Men it is consonant for the Affirmative, or Active to affect, more than the negative or Priuative*. So that a few times hitting, or presence, counteruailes oft-times failing, or absence, as was well answered by *Diagoras*, to him that shewed him in *Neptunes Temple*, the great number of pictures, of such as had escaped Shippe wracke, and had paide their Vowes to *Neptune*, saying: *Aduise nowe, you that thinke in*
fol

folly to invoke Neptune in tempest: Yea, but (saith Diagoras) where are they painted that are drowned? Let vs behold it in another instance, namely, That the spirit of man, being of an equall and uniforme substance, doth usually suppose and faine in Nature a greater equalitie and uniformitie, than is in truth; Hence it commeth, that the Mathematicians cannot satisfie themselves, except they reduce the Motions of the Celestiall bodies; to perfect Circles, reiecting spirall lines, and labouring to be discharged of Eccentriques. Hence it commeth, that whereas there are many things in Nature, as it were *Monodica sui iuris*; Yet the cogitations of Man, doe faine vnto them *Relatiues, Paralleles, and Coniungates*, whereas no such thing is; as they haue fained an Element of fire to keepe square with Earth, Water, and Ayre, and the like; Nay, it is not credible, till it bee opened, what a number of fictions and fantasies, the similitude of humane Actions, and Arts, together with the making of Man *Communis Mensura*, haue brought into naturall Philosophie: not much better, than the Heresie of the *Anthropomorphites* bred in the Celles of grosse and solitarie Monkes, and the opinion of *Epicurius*, answerable to the same in heathenisme, who supposed the Gods to bee of humane Shape. And therefore *Velleius* the Epicurian needed not to haue asked, why God should haue adorned the Heauens with Starres, as if he had beene an *Edilis*: One that should haue

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set forth some magnificent shewes or plaies : for if that great Worke-master had beene of an Humane disposition, hee would haue cast the starres into some pleasant and beautifull workes, and orders, like the frettes in the Roofes of Houses, whereas one can scarce finde a Posture in square, or triangle, or streight line amongst such an infinite number; so differing an Harmonie, there is betweene the Spirit of Man, and the Spirit of Nature.

Let vs consider againe, the false appearances imposed vpon vs by euerie Mans owne indiuiduall Nature and Custome in that fained supposition, that *Plato* maketh of the *Caue* : for certainly, if a childe were continued in in a Grotte or *Caue*, vnder the Earth, vntill maturitie of age, and came suddainely abroade, hee would haue strange and absurd Imaginations; So in like manner, although our persons liue in the view of Heauen, yet our spirits are included in the *Caues* of our owne complexions and Customes : which minister vnto vs infinite Errors and vaine opinions, if they bee not recalled to examination. But hercof wee haue giuen many examples in one of the Errors, or peccant humours, which wee ranne briefly ouer in our first Booke.

And lastly, let vs consider the false appearances, that are imposed vpon vs by words, which are framed, and applied according to the conceit, and capacities of the Vulgar sorte : And although

wee thinke wee gouerne our wordes, and pre-
 scribe it well. *Loquendum ut Vulgus, sentiendum ut*
sapientes: Yet certaine it is, that wordes, as a
Trotars Bowe, doe shoote backe vpon the vn-
 derstanding of the wisest, and mightily entangle,
 and peruert the Iudgement. So as it is almost
 necessarie in all controuersies and disputations, to
 imitate the wisdome of the *Mathematicians*, in
 setting downe in the verie beginning, the definiti-
 ons of our words and tearmes, that others may
 know how wee accept and vnderstand them, and
 whether they concurre with vs or no. For it com-
 meth to passe for want of this, that wee are sure
 to end there where we ought to haue begun, which
 is in questions and differences about words. To
 conclude therefore, it must be confessed that it is
 not possible to diuorce our selues frō these fallacies
 and false appearances, because they are inseparable
 from our Nature and Condition of life; So yer
 neuerthelesse the Caution of them (for all *Elenches*
 as was said, are but Cautions) doth extremely
 import the true conduct of Humane Iudge-
 ment. The particular *Elenches* or *Cautions* against
 these three false appearances, I finde altogether de-
 ficient.

*Elenchi
 magni, sive
 de Idolis a-
 nimi humani,
 naturis & ad-
 uentitijs.*

There remaineth one part of Iudgement of
 great excellencie, which to mine vnderstanding is
 so sleightly touched, as I may report that also de-
 ficient, which is the application of the differing
 kinds of Prooves, to the differing kindes of Sub-

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jects: for there being but foure kindes of demonstrations, that is by the immediate Consent of the *Minde* or *Sense*; by *Induction*; by *Syllogisms*; and by *Congruitie*, which is that which *Aristotle* calleth *Demonstration in Orbe*, or *Circle*, and not a *Notioribus*, euerie of these hath certaine Subjects in the Matter of Sciences, in which respectiuey they haue chiefeſt vſe; and certaine other, from which respectiuey they ought to be excluded, and the rigour, and curioſitie, in requiring the more ſeuere Prooſes in ſome things, and chiefly the facilitie in contenting our ſelues, with the more remiſſe Prooſes in others hath bene amongſt the greateſt cauſes of detriment and hinderance to Knowledge. The diſtributions and aſſignations of demonstrations, according to the Analogie of Sciences, I note as deficient.

De Analogia Demonstrationum.

The Custodie or retaining of Knowledge, is either in *Writing* or *Memorie*; whereof *Writing*, hath two parts; The Nature of the *Character*; and the order of the *Entrie*: for the Art of *Characters*, or other viſible notes of Words or things, it hath neereſt coniugation with *Grammar*, and therefore I referre it to the due place; for the *Disposition* and *Collocation* of that Knowledge which wee preſerue in *Writing*; It conſiſteth in a good *Digeſt* of *Common Places*, wherein I am not ignorant of the prejudice impured to the vſe of *Common-place Bookes*; as cauſing

a retardation of Reading, and some sloth or relaxation of Memorie. But because it is but a counterfeit thing in Knowledges to bee forward and pregnant, except a man bee deepe and full; I hold the Entrie of Common places, to bee a matter of great vse and essence in studying, as that which assureth copie of Invention, and contracteth Iudgement to a strength. But this is true, that of the *Methodes of Common places*, that I haue seen, there is none of any sufficient woorth, all of them carying meerely the face of a *Schoole*, and not of a *World*, and referring to vulgar matters, and Pedanticall Diuisions without all life, or respect to Action.

For the other Principall Part of the Custodie of Knowledge, which is *Memorie*; I finde that facultie in my Iudgement weakely inquired of; An Art there is extant of it; But it seemeth to me that there are better Precepts, than that Art; and better practises of that Art, than those receiued. It is certaine, the Art (as it is) may bee raised to points of ostentation prodigious: But in vse (as it is now mannaged) it is barren, not burdensome, nor dangerous to Naturall Memorie, as is imagined, but barren, that is, not dexterous to be applied to the serious vse of businesse and occasions. And therefore I make no more estimation of repeating a great number of Names or Wordes vpon once hearing; or the powring forth of a number of Verses or Rimes *ex tempore*; or the making of a
Satyricall

Satyricall Simile of euerie thing, or the turning of euerie thing to a jest, or the falsifying or contradicting of euerie thing by Cauill, or the like (whereof in the faculties of the Minde, there is great Copie, and such, as by deuise and practise may be exalted to an extreame begree of wonder;) than I doe of the trickes of *Tumblers, Funambuloes, Eadadynes*; the one being the same in the *Minde*, that the other is in the bodie; Matters of strangenesse without worthynesse.

This Art of *Memorie*, is but built vpon two Intentions: The one *Pranotion*; the other *Emblem: Pranotion*, dischargeth the Indefinite seeking of that we would remember, and directeth vs to seeke in a narrowe Compasse: that is, somewhat that hath Congruitie with our *Place of Memorie: Embleme* reduceth conceits intellectuall to Images sensible; which strike the *Memorie* more; out of which *Axiomes* may bee drawne much better Practique, than that in vse; and besides which *Axiomes*, there are diuers moe, touching helpe of *Memorie*, not inferior to them. But I did in the beginning distinguish, not to report those things deficient, which are but onely ill Managed.

There remaineth the fourth kinde of *Rational Knowledge*, which is transitiue, concerning the *expressing* or *transferring* our Knowledge to others, which I will tearme by the generall name of *Tradition* or *Delinerie*. *Tradition* hath three partes: the first concerning the *Organe of Tradistion*: the second,

cond, concerning the *Method of Tradition*: And the third, concerning the *Illustration of Tradition*.

For the *Organe of Tradition*, it is either *Speech or Writing*: for *Aristotle* saith well: *Words are the Images of Cogitations, and Letters are the Images of Words*: But yet is not of necessitie, that *Cogitations* bee expressed by the *Medium of Words*. For *whatsoever is capable of sufficient differences, and those perceptible by the sense; is in Nature competent to expresse Cogitations*: And therefore wee see in the *Commerce of barbarous People*, that vnderstand not one anothers language, and in the practise of diuers that are dumbe and deafe, that mens minds are expresse'd in gestures though not exactly, yet to serue the turne. And wee vnderstand further, that it is the vse of *Chyna*, and the Kingdomes of the *High Leuant*, to write in *Characters reall*, which expresse neither *Letters, nor words in grosse*, but *Things or Notions*: in so much as *Countreys and Prouinces*, which vnderstand not one anothers language, can neuerthelesse read one anothers Writings, because the *Characters* are accepted more geaerally, than the *Languages* doe extend; and therefore they haue a vast multitude of *Characters*, as many (I suppose,) as *Radicall words*.

These *Notes of Cogitations* are of two sortes; The one when the Note hath some *Similitude, or Congruitie with the Notion*; The other *Ad Pla-*

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citum, having force onely by *Contract* or *Acceptation*. Of the former sort are *Hieroglyphickes*, and *Gestures*. For as to *Hieroglyphickes*, (things of Ancient vse, and embraced chiefly by the *Egyptians*, one of the most ancient Nations) they are but as continued *Impresses* and *Emblemes*. And as for *Gestures*, they are as *Transitorie Hieroglyphickes*, and are to *Hieroglyphickes*, as *Words spoken* are to *Wordes written*; in that they abide not, but they haue euermore as well, as the other an affinity with the things signified: as *Periander* being consulted with how to preserve a tyrannie newly vsurped, bid the Messenger attend, and report what hee saw him doe, and went into his Garden, and topped all the highest flowers: signifying that it consisted in the cutting off, and keeping low of the Nobilitie and *Grandes*; *Ad Placitum*, are the *Characters* reall before mentioned, and *Words*: although some haue beene willing by Curious Enquire; or rather by apt faining, to haue deriued imposition of Names, from Reason and Intendment: a speculation elegant, and by reason it searcheth into *Antiquitie* reuerent: but sparingly mixt with truth, and of small fruite. This portion of knowledge, touching the *Notes of things*, and *Cogitations* in generall, I finde not enquired, but deficient. And although it may seeme of no great vse, considering that *Words*, and *Writings by letters*, doe far excell all the other wayes: yet because this part concerneth, as it were the Mint of knowledge

*De Notis
Rerum.*

ledge (for words, are the tokens currant and accepted for conceits, as Moneies are for values, and that it is fit men bee not ignorant, that Moneys may bee of another kinde, than gold and silver) I thought good to propound it to better Enquire.

Concerning *Speech* and *Words*, the Consideration of them hath produced the Science of *Grammar*: for Man still striueth to reintegrate himselfe in those benedictions, from which by his fault hee hath bene deprived; And as hee hath striuen against the first generall Curse, by the Invention of all other Arts: So hath hee sought to come forth of the second generall Curse, (which was the confusion of Tongues) by the Art of *Grammar*; whereof the vse in mother tongue is small: In a forraine tongue more: but most in such Forraine Tongues, as haue ceased to bee *Vulgar Tongues*, and are turned onely to *learned tongues*. The dutie of it is of two Natures: The one *Popular*, which is for the speedie, and perfect attaining Languages, as well for intercourse of Speech, as for vnderstanding of Authors: The other *Philosophicall*, examining the power and Nature of Words, as they are the foot-steps and prints of Reason: which kinde of *Analogie* betweene *Words*, and *Reason* is handled *Sparsim*, brokenly, though not intirely: and therefore I cannot reporte it deficient, though I thinke it is verie worthy to be reduced into a Science by it selfe.

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Vnto *Grammar* also belongeth, as an Appendix, the consideration of the Accidents of Words, which are Measure, sound, and Eleuation, or Accent, and the sweetnesse and harshnesse of them: whence hath issued some curious obseruations in *Rhetoricke*, but chiefly *Poesie*, as wee consider it, in respect of the verse, and not of the Argument: wherein though men in learned Tongues, doe tye themselves to the Ancient Measures, yet in moderne Languages, it seemeth to me, as free to make new Measures of Verses, as of Daunces: For a Daunce is a measured peece, as a Verse is a measured Speech. In these things the Sense is better Iudge, than the Art.

*Cæna fercula nostra;
Mallem conuinis, quam placuisse Cocis.*

And of the seruile expressing *Antiquitie* in an vnlike and an vnfit Subiect, it is well said, *Quod tempore antiquum videtur, id incongruitate est maxime nouum.*

For *Cyphars*, they are commonly in Letters or Alphabets, but may bee in Words. The kinds of *Cyphars*, (besides the *Simple Cyphars* with Changes, and intermixtures of Nulles, and *Non-significants*) are many, according to the Nature or Rule of the infoulding: *Wheele-cyphers*, *Key-cyphers*, *Doubles*, &c. But the vertues of them, whereby they are to bee preferred, are three; that they

they bee not laborious to write and reade; that they bee impossible to discipher; and in some cases, that they bee without suspition. The highest Degree whereof, is to write *Omnia per omnia*; which is vndoubtedly possible, with a proportion Quintuple at most, of the writing inuoulding, to the writing inuoulded, and no other restraints whatsoeuer. This Arte of *Ciphering*, hath for Relative, an Arte of *Disciphering*; by supposition vnprofitable; but, as things are, of great vse. For suppose that *Ciphers* were well mannaged, there bee Multitudes of them which exclude the *Discipherer*. But in regarde of the rawnesse and vn-skilfulnesse of the handes, through which they passe, the greatest Matter are many times carried in the weakest *Ciphers*.

In the Enumeration of these priuate and retyred Artes it may bee thought I seeke to make a great Muster-Rowle of Sciences; naming them for shew and ostentation, and to little other purpose. But let those which are skillfull in them iudge, whether I bring them onely for apparance; or whether in that which I speake of them (though in few Markes) there bee not some seede of proficiencie. And this must bee remembered, that as there bee many of great account in their Countreys and Prouinces, which when they come vp to the Seate of the Estate, are but of meane Ranke and scarcely regarded: So these Arts being here placed with the principall, and supreme

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preame Sciences, seeme petty things : yet to such as haue chosen them to spend their labours studies in them, they seeme great Matters.

For the *Method of tradition*, I see it hath moued a Controuersie in our time. But as in Ciuile businesse, if there bee a meeting and men fall at Wordes, there is commonly an end of the Matter for that time, and no proceeding at all : So in Learning, where there is much controuersie, there is many times little Enquirie. For this part of knowledge of *Method* seemeth to mee so weakely enquired, as I shall report de it ficient.

Method hath bene placed, and that not amisse in *Logicke* as a part of *Iudgement*; For as the Doctrin of *Sillogismes* comprehendeth the rules of *Iudgement* vpon that which is *invented*; So the Doctrin of *Method* containeth the rules of *Iudgement* vpon that which is to bee deliuered, for *Iudgement* precedeth *Deliuerie*, as it followeth *Inuention*. Neither is the *Method*, or the *Nature of the Tradition* materiall onely to the *Vse* of Knowledge, but likewise to the *Progression* of Knowledge : for since the labour and life of one man, cannot attaine to perfection of Knowledge; the *Wisdom* of the *Tradition*, is that which inspireth the felicitie of continuance, and proceeding.

And therefore the most reall diuersitie of *Method*, is of *Method* referred to *vse*, and *Method* referred to *Progression*, whereof the one may bee termed

Magistrall,

Magistrall, and the other of Probation.

The later whereof seemeth to bee *Via deserta & interclusa*. For as Knowledges are now deliuered, there is a kinde of Contract of Errour, betweene the Deliuerer, and the Receiuer: for he that deliuereth knowledge, desireth to deliuer it in such forme, as may be best beleeued; and not as may be best examined: and hee that receiueth knowledge, desireth rather present satisfaction, than expectant Enquirie, and so rather not to doubt, than not to erre: glorie making the Author not to lay open his weaknesse, and sloth making the Disciple not to know his strength.

But knowledge, that is deliuered as a thread, to bee spunne on, ought to bee deliuered and intimated, if it were possible, *In the same Methode wherein it was inuented*; and so is it possible of knowledge induced. But in this same anticipated and preuented knowledge; no man knoweth how hee came to the knowledge which hee hath obtained. But yet neuerthelesse *Secundum maius & minus*, a man may reuifite, and descend vnto the foundations of his Knowledge and Consent: and so transplant it into another, as it grewe in his owne Minde. For it is in Knowledges, as it is in Plantes; if you meane to vse the Plant, it is no matter for the Rootes: But if you meane to remooue it to growe, then it is more assured to rest vpon rootes, than Slippes: So the diliuerie of Knowleges (as it is now vsed) is as of faire
bodies

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*De Methodo
sincera, sine
ad filios Sci-
entiarum.*

bodies of Trees without the Rootes: good for the Carpenter, but not for the Planter. But if you will haue Sciences grow; it is lesse matter for the shafte, or bodie of the Tree, so you looke well to the taking vp of the Rootes. Of which kinde of deliuerie the *Method* of the *Mathematicques*, in that Subiect, hath some shadow; but generally I see it neither put in vre, nor put in Inquisition: and therefore note it for deficient.

Another diuersitie of *Method* there is, which hath some affinitie with the former, vsed in some cases, by the discretion of Auncients; but disgraced since by the Impostures of many vaine persons, who haue made it as a false light for their counterfeite Merchandizes; and that is Enigmaticall and Disclosed. The pretence whereof, is to remooue the vulgar Capacitie from being admitted to the secretes of Knowledges, and to reserue them to selected Auditors: or wittes of such sharpenesse as can peirce the veile.

Another diuersitie of *Method*, whereof the consequence is great, is the deliuerie of knowledge in *Aphorismes*, or in *Methodes*; wherein wee may obserue, that it hath bene too much taken into Custome, out of a few *Axiomes* or Obseruations, vpon any Subiect, to make a solemne, and formall Art; filling it with some Discourses, and illustrating it with exmples; and digesting

ing it into a sensible *Method*: But the writing in *Aphorismes*, hath many excellent vertues, where-
to the writing in *Method* doth not approach.

For first, it trieth the Writer, whether hee bee superficiall or solide: For *Aphorismes*, except they should bee ridiculous, cannot bee made but of the pyth and heart of Sciences: for discourse of illustration is cut off, Recitales of examples are cut off: Discourse of Connexion, and order is cut off; Descriptions of practize, are cut off; So there remaineth nothing to fill the *Aphorismes*, but some good quantitie of Obseruation: And therefore no man can suffice, nor in reason will attempt to write *Aphorismes*, but hee that is found and grounded. But in *Methodes*.

*Tantum Series iuncturaque Pollet,
Tantum de Medio sumptis, accedit honoris:*

As a Man shall make a great shew of an Art, which if it were disioynted, would come to little. Secondly, *Methodes* are more fit to winne Consent, or beleefe; but lesse fit to point to Action; for they carrie a kinde of Demonstration in Orbe or Circle, one part illuminating another; and therefore satisfie. But particulars being dispersed, doe best agree with dispersed directions. And lastly *Aphorismes*, representing a knowledge

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broken,

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broken, doe inuite men to inquire further; whereas *Methodes* carrying the shew of a Totall, doe secure men; as if they were at furthest.

Another Diuersitie of *Methodes*, which is likewise of great weight, is, The handling of knowledge by *Assertions*, and *their Prooves*, or by *Questions*, and *their Determinations*: The latter kinde whereof, if it bee immoderately followed, is as prejudiciall to the proceeding of Learning; as it is to the proceeding of an Armie, to goe about to besiege euerie little Forte, or Holde. For if the Field bee kept, and the summe of the Enterprize pursued, those smaller things will come in of themselves; Indeede a Man would not leaue some important peece Enemie at his backe. In like manner, the vse of Confutation in the deliuerie of Sciences ought to dee verie sparing, and to serue to remooue strong Preoccupations and Preiudgements, and not to minister and excite Disputations and doubts.

Another Diuersitie of *Methodes*, is, *According to the Subiect or Matter, which is handled*. For there is a great difference in Deliuerie of the *Mathematiques*, which are the most abstracted of knowledges, and *Policie*, which is the most immersed; And howsoeuer contention hath bene moued, touching an *uniformitie* of *Methodes* in *Multiformitie* of matter: Yet wee see how that opinion, besides the weakenesse of it, hath bene
of

of ill desert, towards Learning, as that which taketh the way, to reduce Learning to certaine emp'ie and barren Generalities; being but the verie Huskes, and Shales of Sciences, all the kernell being forced out, and expulsed, with the torture and presse of the *Method*: And therefore as I did allow well of *particular tropiques* for *Invention*: so I doe allow likewise of *particular Methodes of Tradition*,

Another Diverfitie of *Judgement* in the deliuerie and teaching of knowledge, is, *According unto the light and presuppositions of that which is deliuered*: For that knowledge, which is new and forreine from opinions receiued, is to bee deliuered in another forme, than that that is agreeable and familiar; And therefore *Aristotle*, when he thinkes to taxe *Democritus*, doth in truth, commend him; where hee saith: *If we shall indeede dispute, and nos followe after Similitudes, &c.* For those, whose conceites are seated in popular opinions neede onely but to proue or dispute: but those, whose Conceites are beyonde popular opinions, haue a double labour; the one to make themselues conceiued, and the other to prouue and demonstrate. So that it is of necessitie with them to haue recourse to similitudes, and translations, to expresse themselues. And therefore in the Infancie of Learning, and in rude times, when those Conceits, which are now triuiall, were then new, the World was full of *Parables* and *Similitudes*; for else would

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men either haue passed ouer without Marke, or else reiected for Paradoxes, that which was offered; before they had vnderstood or iudged. So, in Diuine Learning, wee see how frequent *Parables* and *Tropes* are; For it is a Rule, *That whatsoever Science is not consonant to presuppositions, must pray in ayde of Similitudes.*

There be also other Diuersities of *Methodes* vulgar and receiued: as that of *Resolution*, or *Analysis*, of *Constitution*, or *Systasis*, of *Concealment*, or *Cryptique*, &c. which I doe allow well of; though I haue stood vpon those which are least handled & obserued. All which I haue remembered to this purpose, because I would erect and constitute one generall Enquirie (which seemes to mee deficient) touching the *Wisedome of Tradition.*

*De prudentia
Traditionis.*

But vnto this part of Knowledge, concerning *Methodes*, doth further belong; not onely the *Architecture* of the whole frame of a Worke, but also the seuerall beames and Columns thereof; not as to their stuffe, but as to their quantitie, and figure: And therefore, *Methodes* considereth, not onely the disposition of the *Argument* or *Subiect*; but likewise the *Propositions*: not as to their *Truth* or *Matter*, but as to their *Limitation* and *Manner*. For herein *Ramus* merited better a great deale, in reuiuing the good Rules of *Propositions*, *καθόλου ἁπάντων κατὰ πάντας* &c. than he did in introducing the Canker of *Epitomes*: And yet, (as it is the Condition of Humane things that according

to the ancient Fables, *The most pretious things have the most pernicious Keepers*). It was so, that the attempt of the one, made him fall vpon the other. For hee had neede be well conducted, that should designe to make *Axiomes Conuertible*: If he make them not withall *Circular*, and *Non-promouent*, or *Incurring into themselues*: but yet the Intention was excellent.

The other Considerations of *Method*, concerning *Propositions*, are chiefly touching the utmost Propositions, which limit the Dimensions of Sciences: for euerie Knowledge may be fitly said, besides the *Profunditie* (which is the truth and substance of it, that makes it *solide*) to haue a *Longitude*; and a *Latitude*: accounting the latitude towards other Sciences: and the Longitude towards *Action*: that is, from the greatest *Generallitie*, to the most particular Precept: The one giueth Rule how farre one knowledge ought to intermeddle within the Province of another, which is the Rule they call *Καθ'αυτην*. The other giueth Rule, vnto what degree of particularitie, a knowledge should descend: which latter I finde passed over in silence; being in my Iudgement, the more materiall. For certainly, there must bee somewhat left to practise; but how much is worthy the Enquire: wee see remote and superficiall Generalities, doe but offer Knowledge, to some of practisall men: and are no more ayding to practise, than an *Ortelius* vniuersall Mapped, is to direct the

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*De Pro-
ductione Ax-
iomatum.*

way betweene *London* and *Yorke*. The better sort of *Rules*, haue beene not vnfairly compared to glasses of Steele vnpolished; where you may see the Images of things, but first they must be filed: So the *Rules* will helpe, if they bee laboured and polished by practise. But how *Christalline* they may bee made at the first and how farre forth they may bee polished afore-hand, is the question; the Enquirie whereof, seemeth to me deficient.

There hath beene also laboured, and put in practise a *Method*, which is not a lawfull *Method*, but a *Method* of *Imposture*; which is to deliuer knowledges in such manner, as men may speedily come to make shewe of Learning, who haue it not; such was the trauaile of *Raymundus Lullius*, in making that *Art*, which beares his name; not vnlike to some Bookes of *Typocofmy*, which haue beene made since; being nothing but a Masse of words of all Arts; to giue men countenance, that those which vse the tearmes; might bee thought to vnderstand the Art; which Collections are much like a Frippers or Brokers Shoppe; that hath ends of euerie thing, but nothing of worth.

Now wee descend to that part, which concerneth the *Illustration of Tradition*, comprehended in that Science which wee call *Rhetoricke*; or *Art of Eloquence*; A Science excellent; and excellently well laboured. For although in true value, it is inferiour to Wisedome, as it is said by God to
Moses,

Moses, when he disabled himselfe, for want of this Facultie; *in Aaron shall bee thy speaker, and thou shalt bee to him as God.* Yet with people it is the more mightie; For so *Salomon* saith: *Sapientis Corde appellabitur Prudens, sed dulcis Eloquio Maiora reperiet.* Signifying that profoundesse of Wisdome, will helpe a Man to a Name or Admiration; but that it is Eloquence, that prevaileth in an active life; And as to the labouring of it, the Emulation of *Aristotle*, with the *Rhetoricians* of his time, and the experience of *Cicero*, hath made them in their Works of *Rhetorickes*, exceede themselves. Againe, the excellencie of examples of Eloquence, in the Orations of *Demosthenes* and *Cicero*, added to the perfection of the Precepts of Eloquence, hath doubled the progression in this Art. And therefore, the Deficiencies which I shall note, will rather bee in some Collections, which may as Hand-maides attend the Art, than in the Rules, or use of the Art itselfe.

Notwithstanding, to stirre the Earth a little about the Rootes of this Science, as wee haue done of the rest; The dutie and Office of *Rhetoricke* is, To apply Reason to Imagination, for the better moouing of the will; For wee see Reason is disturbed in the Administration thereof by three meanes; by *Illaguation*, or *Sophisme*, which pertaines to *Logicke*; by *Imagination* or *Impression*, which pertaines to *Rhetoricke*; and by *Passion* or *Affection*, which pertaines to *Moralitie*. And as in Negotiation with others,

men

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men are wrought by cunning, by Importunitie, and by vehemencie; So in this *Negotiation* within our selves; men are vndermined by *Inconsequences*; solicited and importuned, by *Impressions* or *Observations*; and transported by *Passions*: Neither is the Nature of Man so vnfortunately built, as that those Powers and Arts should haue force to disturbe Reason, and not to establish and aduance it: For the end of *Logicke*, is to teach a forme of Argument, to secure Reason, and not to entrappe it. The end of *Moralitie*, is to procure the Affections to obey Reason, and not to inuade it: The end of *Rhetoricke*, is to fill the Imagination to second Reason, and not to oppresse it: for these abuses of Arts come in, but *Exobliquo*, for Caution.

And therefore it was great Iniustice in *Plato*, though springing out of a iust hatred of the *Rhetoricians* of his time, to esteeme of *Rhetoricke*, but as a voluptuarie Arte, resembling it to *Cookerie*, that did marre wholesome Meates, and helpe vnwholesome by varietie of sawces, to the pleasure of the taste. For wee see that speech is much more conuerfant in adorning that which is good, than in colouring that which is euill: for there is no man but speaketh more honestly, than he can doe or thinke; And it was excellently noted by *Thucidides* in *Cleon*, that because he vsed to hold on the bad side in Causes of estate, therefore hee was euer inueying against Eloquence, and good speech; knowing that no man can speake faire of Courses sordide

dide and base. And therefore as *Plato* said elegantly: *That vertue, if shee could bee seene, would moouue great loue and affection*: So seeing that she cannot bee shewed to the *Sense*, by corporall shape, the next degree is, to shew her to the *Imagination* in liuely representation: for to shew her to *Reason*, onely in subtilitie of Argument, was a thing euer derided in *Chrysippus*, and many of the *Stoykes*, who thought to thrust vertue vpon men by sharpe disputations and Conclusions, which haue no Sympathy with the will of Man.

Againe, if the affections in themselues were pliant and obedient to Reason, it were true, there should bee no great vse of perswasions and insinuations to the will, more than of naked proposition and proofes: but in regard of the continuall Mutinies and Seditious of the Affections:

Video meliora, Proboque; Deteriora sequor;

Reason would become Captiue and seruile, if *Eloquence of perswasions*, did not practise and winne the *Imagination*, from the *affections* part, and contract a Confederacie betweene the *Reason* and *Imagination*, against the *Affections*: For the Affections themselues, carrie euer an appetite to good as Reason doth: The difference is, *That the Affection beholdeth meereley the present; Reason beholdeth the future, and summe of time*. And therefore, the *Present*, filling the *Imagination* more; Reason is

Ff

commonly

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commonly vaquished; But after that force of *Eloquence* and *perswasion*, hath made things *future*, and *remote*, appear as *present*, than vpon the reuolt of the *Imagination*, Reason preuaileth.

Wee conclude therefore, that *Rhetoricke* can bee no more charg'd, with the colouring of the worse part, than *Logicke* with *Sophistrie*, or *Moralitie* with *Vice*. For wee know the *Doctrines* of *Contraries* are the same, though the use be opposite: It appeareth also, that *Logicke* differeth from *Rhetoricke*, not onely as the *frist*, from the *payme*, the one close, the other at large; but much more in this, that *Logicke* handleth Reason exact, and in truth; and *Rhetoricke* handleth it, as it is planted in popular opinions and Manners: And therefore *Aristotle* doth wisely place *Rhetoricke*, as betweene *Logicke* on the one side, and *Morall* or *Ciuile Knowledge* on the other, as participating of both: for the *Proofes* and *Demonstrations* of *Logicke*, are toward all men indifferent, and the same: But the *Proofes* and *perswasions* of *Rhetoricke*, ought to differ according to the *Auditors*.

Orpheus in Syluis, inter Delphinas Arion;

Which application, in perfection of *Idea*, ought to extend so farre: that if a Man should speake of the same thing to seuerall persons: he should speake to them all respectiuely and seuerall wayes: though
this

this *Politique part of Eloquence in private Speech*, it is easie for the greatest Orators to want: whilst by the obseruing their well graced formes of speech, they leese the volubilitie of Application: and therefore, it shall not bee amisse to recommend this to better enquirie, not being curious, whether we place it here, or in that part which concerneth Policie.

*De pre dentis
sermonis
privati.*

Now therefore will I descend to the deficiencies, which (as I said) are but Attendances: and first, I doe not finde the Wisedome and diligence of *Aristotle* well pursued, who began to make a Collection of the popular signes and colours of good and euill, both simple and comparatiue, which are as the *Sophismes* of *Rhetoricke*, (as I touched before.) For Example.

*Colores boni
& mali, sim-
plicis & com-
parati.*

SOPHISMA.

Quod laudatur, bonum: Quod vituperatur, malum:

REDARGVTIO.

Laudat vanales, qui vult extrudere merces.

Malum est, Malum est (inquit Emptor) sed cum receperit, tum gloriabitur. The defects in the labour of *Aristotle* are three: One, that there be but a few of many: another, that their *Elenches* are not annexed; and the third, that hee conceiued but a part of the vse of them: for their vse is not onely in pro-

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bation, but much more in Impression. For many formes are equall in *Signification*, which are differing in *Impression*: as the difference is great in the piercing of that which is sharpe, and that which is flat, though the strength of the percussioe bee the same: for there is no man, but will be a little more raised by hearing it said: *Your enemies will be glad of this,*

Hoc Ithacus velit, & magno mercentur Atrida,

than by hearing it said onely, *This is euill for you.*

Secondly, I doe resume also, that which I mentioed before, touching *Proxision* or *Praparatorie store*, for the Furniture of speech, and readinesse of Inuention; which appeareth to be of two sorts; The one in resemblance to a shoppe of peeces vnmade vp; the other to a shoppe of things ready made vp, both to be applied to that which is frequent, and most in request; The former of these I will call *Antitheta*, and the latter *Formula*.

Antitheta rerum.

Antitheta are *Theses* argued, *pro & contra* where-in men may be more large and laborious; but (in such as are able to doe it) to auoyd prolixity of entry, I wish the seedes of the seuerall arguments to be cast vp into some briefe and acute sentences: not to be cited: but to bee as Skaines or Bottomes of thread, to bee vnwinded at large, when they come to be vsed: supplying authorities, and Examples by reference.

Pro

Pro verbis legis.

*Nō est interpretatio, sed diuinatio, qua recedit a littera,
Cum receditur a littera Iudex transit in Legislatorem,*

Pro sententia Legis.

Ex omnibus verbis est eliciendus sensus, qui interpretatur singula:

Formulae are but decent and apt passages or conueinences of speech, which may serue indifferently for differing subiects, as of Preface, Conclusion, Digression, Transition, Excusation, &c. For as in buildings there is great pleasure and vse in the well casting of the staire cases, entries, doores, windows, and the like, so in speech, the conueinences and passages are of speciall ornament and effect.

A conclusion in a Deliberative.

So may we redeeme the faults passed and prevent the inconueniences future.

There remaine two Appendices touching the tradition of knowledge, The one *Criticall*, The other *Pedanticall*. For all knowledges is either deliuered by Teachers; or attained by mens proper endeavors: And therefore as the principall part of Tradition of knowledge concerneth chiefly in *writing of Bookes*; So the Relatiue part thereof concerneth *reading of Bookes*. Whereunto appertaine incident-

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ly these considerations. The first is concerning the true Correction and edition of Authors, wherein neuerthelesse rash diligence hath done great preiudice. For these *Critiques* haue often presumed that that which the y vnderstand not, is false set downe; As the Priest, that where he found it written of *S. Paul*, *Demissus est per sportam*, mended his booke, and made it *Demissus est per portam* because, *Sporta* was an hard word, and out of his reading; and surely their errors, though they be not so palpable and ridiculous, yet are of the same kinde. And therefore as it hath beene wisely noted, the most corrected copies are commonly the least correct.

The second is concerning the exposition and explication of Authors, which resteth in Annotations and Commentaries, wherein it is ouer vsuall to blaunch the obscure places, and discourse vpon the plaine.

The third is concerning the times, which in many cases giue great light to true Interpretations.

The fourth is concerning some brieft Censure and iudgement of the Authors, that men thereby may make some election vnto themselues, what Bookes to reade.

And the fift is concerning the Syntax and disposition of studies, that men may know in what order or pursuite to reade.

For *Pedanticall* knowledge, it containeth that difference of *Tradition* which is proper for youth: Whereunto appertaine diuers considerations of great fruit. As

As first the tyning and seasoning of knowledges, as with what to initiate them, and from what for a time to refraine them.

Secondly, the consideration where to begin with the easiest, and so proceede to the more difficult, And in what courses to presse the more difficult, and then to turne them to the more easie: for it is one Methode to practise swimming with bladders, and another to practise dauncing with heavy shooes.

A third is the application of learning according vnto the propriety of the witts; for there is no defect in the faculties intellectual, but seemeth to haue a proper cure contained in some studies; As for example, If a Child be Bird-witted, that is, hath not the facultie of attention, the Mathematiques giueth a remedy thereunto; for in them, if the wit bee caught away but a moment, one is new to begin: And as sciences haue a propriety towards faculties for Cure and helpe; So faculties or powers haue a Sympathy towards Sciences for excellency or speedy profiting: And therefore it is an enquiry of great wisdom, what kinds of wits and Natures are most apt and proper for what sciences.

Fourthly, the ordering of exercises is matter of great consequence to hurt or helpe; For as is well obserued by *Cicero*, men in exercising their faculties if they be not well aduised doe exercise their faults and get ill habits as well as good; so as there is a great iudgement to be had in the continuance and intermission

intermission of Exercises. It were too long to particularize a number of other considerations of this nature, things but of meane appearance, but of singular efficacy. For as the wronging or cherishing of seeds or young plants, is that, that is most important to their thriving. And as it was noted, that the first six kings, being in truth as Tutors of the State of Rome in the infancy thereof, was the principall cause of the immense greatnesse of that state which followed. So the culture and manurance of Minds in youth, hath such a forcible (though vnseene) operation, as hardly any length of time or contention of labour can counteruaile it afterwards. And it is not amisse to obserue also, how small and meane faculties gotten by Education, yet when they fall into great men or great matters, doe worke great and important effectis : whereof we see a notable example in *Tacitus* of two Stage-plaiers, *Percennius* and *Vibulenus*, who by their facultie of playing, put the *Pannonian* armies into an extreame tumult and combustion. For there arising a mutinie amongst them, vpon the death of *Augustus Caesar*, *Blasius* the lieutenant had committed some of the Mutiners which were suddenly rescued : whereupon *Vibulenus* got to bee heard speake, which he did in this manner, *These poore innocent wretches appointed to cruell death, you haue restored to behold the light. But who shall restore my brother to me, or life vnto my brother ? that was sent hitber in message from the legions of Germany, to treat*
of

of the common Cause, and he hath murdered him this last night by some of his fencers and ruffians, that he hath about him for his executioners upon Souldiours: Answer Blasius, what is done with his bodie: The mortallest Enemies doe not deny buriall: when I have performed my last duties to the Corpes with kisses, with teares, command me to be staine besides him, so that these my fellowes for our good meaning, and our true hearts to the Legions may have leaue to bury vs. With which speech he put the army into an infinite fury and vprore, whereas truth was hee had no brother, neither was there any such matter, but he plaide it meerely as if he had beene vpon the stage.

But to returne, we are now come to a period of *Rationall Knowledges*, wherein if I haue made the *diuisions* other than those that are receiued, yet would I not be thought to disallow all those diuisions, which I doe not vse. For there is a double necessity imposed vpon me of altering the diuisions. The one, because it differeth in end and purpose, to sort together those things which are next in Nature, and those things which are next in vse. For if a secretary of Estate, should sort his papers, it is like in his study, or generall Cabinet, he would sort together things of a Nature, as Treaties, Instructions, &c. But in his Boxes, or particular Cabinet, hee would sort together those that he were like to vse together, though of seuerall Natures: So in this generall Cabynct of knowledge, it was necessary

cessary for me to follow the diuisions of the Nature of things, whereas if my selfe had beene to handle any particular knowledge, I would haue respected the *Diuisions fittest for use*. The other, because the bringing in of the *Deficiencies* did by Consequence alter the *Partitions* of the rest. For let the knowledge extant (for demonstration sake) be 15. Let the knowledge with the *Deficiencies* be 20. the parts of 15. are not the parts of 20. for the parts of 15. are 3. and 5. the parts of 20. are 2. 4. 5. and 10. So as these things are without Contradiction, and could not otherwise be.

WE proceed now to that knowledge which considereth of the *Appetite and Will of Man*, whereof *Salomon saith, Ante omnia sibi custodi cor tuum, nam inde procedunt actiones vite*. In the handling of this science, those which haue written seeme to me to haue done as if a man that professed to teach to write, did onely exhibit faise copies of *Alphabets*, and letters ioyned, without giuing any precepts or directions, for the cariage of the hand and framing of the letters. So haue they made good and faire *Exemplars* and coppies, carrying the draughts and pourtraitures of *Good, Vertue, Duesy, Felicity*, propounding them well described as the true objects and scopes of mans will and desires. But how to attaine these excellent marks, and how to frame and subdue the will of man to become true and conformable

to these pursuities, they passe it ouer altogether, or slightly, and vnprofitably. For it is not the disputing: That morall vertues are in the Minde of man by habite and not by nature: or the distinguishing, That generous spirits are wonne by doctrines and perswasions, and the vulgar sort by reward and punishment, and the like scattered glances and touches, that can excuse the absence of this part.

The reason of this omission I suppose to be that hidden Rocke, whereupon both this and many other Barques of knowledge haue bene cast away; which is, that men haue despised to be conuersant in ordinary and common matters, the iudicious direction whereof neuerthelesse is the wisest doctrine: (for life consisteth not in nouelties nor subtilities) but contrariwise they haue compounded Sciences chiefly of a certaine resplendent or lustrous masse of matter, chosen to giue glory either to the subtilty of disputations, or to the eloquence of discourses. But *Seneca*; giueth an excellent check to eloquence, *Nocet illis eloquentia, quibus non rerum cupiditatem facit sed sui*, doctrine, should be such as should make men in loue with the Lesson, and not with the Teacher, being directed to the Auditors benefite, and not to the Authors commendation: And therefore those are of the right kinde which may be concluded as *Demosthenes* concludes his counsell, *Quae si feceritis non Oratorum duntaxat in praesentia laudabitis, sed vosmetipsos etiam non ita multo post statu rerum uestrarum meliores*

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Neither needed men of so excellent parts to haue despai red of a Fortune, (which the Poet *Virgil* promised himselfe, and indeed obtained) who got as much glory of eloquence, wit, and learning in the expressing of the obseruations of husbandry, as of the heroicall acts of *Aeneas*.

*Nec sum animi dubius verbis ea vincere magnum.
Quam sit & angustis his addere rebus honorem.*

And surely if the purpose be in good earnest not to write at leasure that which men may read at leasure, but really to instruct and suborne A&ion and actiue life, these Georgickes of the minde concerning the husbandry & tillage thereof, are no lesse worthy then the heroicall descriptions of *vertue*, *duty*, and *felicity*; wherefore the maine and primitiue diuision of *Morall* knowledge seemeth to be into the *Exemplar* or *Platforme of Good*, and the *Regiment* or *Culture of the Minde*; The one describing the nature of Good, the other prescribing rules how to subdue, apply and accomodate the will of man thereunto.

The Doctrine touching the *Platforme* or *nature of Good* considereth it either *Simple* or *Compared*, either the kindes of Good or the degrees of Good: In the later whereof those infinite disputations, which were touching the supreme degree thereof, which they terme *Felicity*, *Beatitude*, or the highest Good, the doctrines concerning which were as the heathen *Diuinity*, are by the
christian

christian faith discharged. And as *Aristotle* saith, *That yong men may be happy, but not otherwise, but by Hope*; So we must all acknowledge our Minority, & embrace the felicity, which is by hope of the future world.

Freed therefore, and deliuered from this doctrine of the Philosophers heauen, wherety they fained an higher eleuation of Mans Nature, then was; For we see in what an height of stile *Seneca* writeth, *Vere Magnū, habere fragilitatem hominis, securitatē Dei.*) We may with more sobriety & trueth receiue the rest of their Enquiries, and labors, wherein for the *Nature of Good Possiue, or simple*, they haue set it downe excellently, in describing the formes of *vertue & Duty*, with their situatiōs & postures, in distributing them into their kinds, parts, Prouinces, *Actions*, & *Administrations*, and the like; Nay further, they haue commended them to Mans Nature, and spirit, with great quicknesse of Argument, & beauty of perswasions, yea, and fortified and entrenched them (as much as discourse can doe) against corrupt and popular opinions. Againe, *for the degrees, and Comparatiue Nature of Good*, they haue also excellently handled it in their triplicity of *Good*; in the comparisōns betweene a *Contemplatiue* and an *actiue* life, in the distinction between *vertue with reluctance*, & *vertue seduced*; in their encounters between *honesty & profit*, in their ballancing of *vertue with vertue*, and the like; so as this part deserueth to bee reported for excellently laboured.

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Notwithstanding, if before they had come to the popular and received Notions of vertue and vice, pleasure and paine, and the rest, they had staid a little longer ypon the Enquiry, concerning the Rootes of Good and euill, and the Strings of those Rootes, they had giuen in my opinion, a great light to that which followed, & specially if they had consulted with Nature, they had made their doctrines lesse prolix, and more profound; which being by them in part omitted, and in part handled with much Confusion, we will in deasour to resume, and open in a more cleare Manner.

There is formed in euery thing a double Nature of Good; the one, as euery thing is a Totall or substantiue in it selfe; the other, as it is a part or Member of a greater Bodie; whereof the later is in degree the greater, and the worthier, because it tendeth to the conseruation of a more generall forme. Therefore we see, the Iron in particular sympathy, moueth to the Loadstone; But yet if it exceed a certaine quantity, it forsakerh the affection to the *Loadstone*, and like a good patriot moueth to the *Earth*, which is the Region and Countrey of *Massie Bodies*; so may we goe forward, and see that *water & Massie bodies* moue to the center of the earth, But rather then to suffer a diuision in the continuance of Nature, they will moue vpwards from the Center of the Earth; forsaking their dutie to the *Earth* in regard of their duty to the *World*. This double nature of Good, and the comparatiue there-

of is much more engrauen vpon man, if he degene-
rate not: vnto who the conseruation of fidelity to the
publike ought to be much more precious then the
conseruation of life & being: according to that me-
morable speech of *Rampius Magnus*, when being in
commission of purueiance for a tamine at Rome, &
being dissuaded with great vehemence & instance
by his friends, that he should not hazard himselfe to
Sea in an extremity of weather, he said only to the;
Necessesse est ut eam non ut uiuam. But it may be truly
affirmed that there was neuer any Philosophy, Reli-
gion, or other discipline, which did so plainly and
highly exalt the good which is *Communicatiue*, and
depreesse the good which is private and particular;
as the Hbly faith: wel declaring, that it was the same
God, that gaue the Christian law to men, who gaue
those Lawes of nature, to inanimate Creatures, that
wee spoke of before; for wee read that the elected
Saints of God haue withed themselves in a themati-
ze, and rezed out of the booke of life, in an extasie
of Charitie, and infinite feeling of *Communione* ad
- This being set downe, and strongly planted, doth
iudge and determine most of the Controuerfies
wherein *morall Philosophy* is conuerted: For first
it decideth the question touching the preferment
of the Contemplatiue or active life, and decideth
against *Aristotle*. For all the reasons which he brings
for the Contemplatiue are private, and respecting
the pleasure and dignitie of a mans selfe: (in which
respects no question the contemplatiue life hath the
- has pre-

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preheminance) not much vnlike to that Compari-
 son, which *Pythagoras* made for the gracing and
 magnifying of Philosophy, & Contemplation, who
 being asked what he was, answered: *That if Hiero*
were euer at the Olympian games, he knew the manner,
that some came to trie their fortune for the Prizes, and
some came as Merchants to vtter their commodities,
and some came to make good cheere, and meete their
friends, and some came to looke on, and that he was one
of them that came to looke on. But men must know,
 that in this Theater of Mans life, it is reserued one-
 ly for God and Angels to be lookers on: Neyther
 could the like question euer haue beene receiued in
 the Church, notwithstanding their (*Pretiosa in ocu-*
lis Domini mors sanctorum eius) by which place they
 would exalt their Ciuile death, and regular pro-
 fessions, but vpon this defence, that the Monasticall
 life is not simply Contemplatiue, but performeth
 the duty either of incessant prayers and supplicati-
 ons which hath been truly esteemed as an office in
 the church, or else of writing or taking instructi-
 ons for writing concerning the law of God, as *Mo-*
ses did, when he abode so long in the Mount. And so
 we see *Henoch* the 7. from *Adam*, who was the first
 Contemplatiue and walked with God, yet did also
 endow the Church with prophesy which *Saint*
Iude citeth. But for contemplation which should be
 finished in it selfe without casting beames vpon so-
 ciety, assuredly diuinity knoweth it not.

It decideth also the controuersies betweene *Zeno*
 and

and *Socrates*, and their Schooles and successions on the one side, who placed felicitie in vertue simply or attended: the actions and exercises whereof doe chiefly imbrace and concerne society; and on the other side, the *Cirenaiques* and *Epicureans*, who placed it in pleasure, and made vertue, (as it is vsed in some comedies of Errors, wherein the Mistres and the Maide change habits) to be but as a seruant, without which, pleasure cannot be serued and attended, and the reformed schoole of the *Epicureans*, which placed it in serenity of minde and freedom from perturbation: as if they would haue deposed *Iupiter* againe, and restored *Saturne*, and the first age, when there was no summer nor winter, spring nor Autumne, but all after one aire & season. And *Herillus*, which placed felicity in extinguishment of the disputes of the minde; making no fixed nature of Good and Euill, esteeming things according to the cleernesse of the desires, or the reuolution: which opinion was reuiued in the heresy of the *Anabaptists*, measuring things according to the motions of the spirit, & the constancy or wauering of beleeffe, all which are manifest to tend to priuate repose & contentment, and not to point of society. It censureth also the philosophy of *Epicetus* which persupposeth that felicity must bee placed in those things which are in our power, lest we be liable to fortune, and disturbance: as if it were not a thing much more happy to faile in good & vertuous ends for the publike, then to obtaine all that we can with

to our selues in our proper fortune: as *Consaluo* saith to his souldiers, shewing them *Naples* & protesting, he had rather die one foot forwards, then to haue his life secured for long, by one foot of retrayt: Whereunto the wisdome of that heavenly Leader hath signed, who hath affirmed that *A good Conscience is a continuall Feast*, shewing plainly that the conscience of good intentions howsoever succeeding, is a more continuall ioy to nature, then all the prouision which can be made for security & repose.

It confureth likewise that abuse of Philosophy, which grew generall about the time of *Epietetus*, in conuerting it into an occupation or profession: as if the purpose had been, not to resist and extinguish perturbations, but to flie and auoid the causes of them, and to shape a particular kind & course of life to that end, introducing such an health of mind, as was that health of body, of which *Aristotle* speaketh of *Herodicus*, who did nothing all his life long, but intend his health, whereas if men refer themselues to duties of Society; as that health of Body is best, which is ablest to endure all alterations & extremities, So likewise that health of Mind is most proper, which can goe through the greatest temptations and perturbations. So as *Diogenes* opinion is to be accepted, who commended not them which abstained, but them which sustained, and could refraine their Mind in *Precipitio*; and could giue vnto the mind (as is vsed in hor(manship)) the shortest stop or turne.

Lastly

Lastly, it censureth the Tendernesse and want of application in some of the most ancient and reuerend Philosophers and Philosophicall men, that did retyre too easily from Ciuile businesse, for auoyding of Indignities and perturbations, whereas the resolution of men truly Moral, ought to be such, as the same *Consuluo* said, the honor of a souldier should be *Etela Crassiore*, and not so fine, as that euery thing should catch in it, and endanger it.

To resume *private* or *particular good*, it fallerh into the diuision of *Good Actiue* and *Passiue*; For this difference of *Good*, (not vnlike to that which amongst the Romans was expressed in the familiar or household terms of *Promus*, and *Condus*;) is formed also in all things; and is best disclosed in the two seuerall Appetites in creatures; the one to preserue or continue themselues; and the other to dilate or multiply themselues; whereof the later seemeth to be the worthier; For in Nature the heavens, which are the more worthy, are the *Agent*; and the earth, which is the lesse worthy is the *Patient*. In the pleasures of liuing creatures, that of generation is greater then that of food. In diuine Doctrine, *Beatius est dare quam accipere*. And in life there is no mans spirit so lost, but esteemeth the effecting of somewhat that he hath fixed in his desire, more then sensuality; which priority of the *Actiue Good*, is much vpheld by the Consideration of our estate to be mortall and exposed to fortune: for, if wee might haue a perpetuity and Certainty in our pleasures,

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fures, the *State* of them would advance their price. But when we see it is but *Magni aestimamus Morum traditus*, and *Ne gloriaris de crastino, Nescis Partem dici* it maketh vs to desire to haue somewhat secured, and exempted from Time, which are onely our deedes & works; as it is said *Opera eorum sequuntur eos*. The preheminance likewise of this actiue good is vpheld by the affection which is naturall in man towards variety and proceeding, which in the pleasures of the sense, which is the principall part of *Passiue* good, can haue no great latitude. *Cogita quamdiu eadem feceris Cibus, Somnus, Ludus per hunc Circulum curritur, mori velle non tantum fortis aut miser. aut prudens, sed etiam fastidiosus potest*. But in enterprises, pursuities & purposes of life, there is much variety, whereof men are sensible with pleasure in their inceptions, progressions, recoiles, reintegrations, approaches and attainings to their ends. So as it was well said: *Vita sine proposito languida & vaga est*. Neither hath this Actiue good any Identity with the good of Society though, in some case, it hath an incidence into it: For although it do many times bring forth Acts of *Beneuolence*, yet it is with a respect private to a mans owne power, glory, amplification, continuance: as appeareth plainly when it findeth a contrary Subiect. For that Gygantine state of mind which possesseth the troublers of the world, such as was *Lucius Sylla* & infinite other in smaller model who would haue all men happy or vnhappy as they were their friends or Enemies, & would giue forme

to the world according to their owne humors
 (which is the true *Theomachy*) pretendeth & aspireth
 to Actiue good, though it recedeth furthest from
 good of Society, which we haue determined to the
 greater.

To resume *Passiue Good*, it receiueth a subdiuision
 of *Conseruatiue* and *Perfectiue*. For let vs take a brief
 Review of that which we haue said, we haue spoken
 first of the Good of Society, the intention whereof
 embraceth the Forme of Humane Nature, whereof
 we are members & Portions: and not our own pro-
 per & Indiuiduall forme: we haue spoken of Actiue
 good and supposed it as a part of Priuate & particu-
 lar good. And rightly: For there is impressed vpon
 all things a triple desire or appetite proceeding from
 loue to themselves, one of *preseruing* and *continuing*
 their forme, another of *Aduancing* & *Perfiring* their
 forme, and a third of *Multiplying* & extending their
 forme vpon other things: whereof the multiplying
 or signature of it vpon other things, is that which we
 handled by the name of Actiue good. So as there re-
 maineth the conseruing of it and perfiring or raising
 of it: which later is the highest degree of Passiue
 good. For to preferue in state is the lesse, to preferue
 with aduancement is the greater. So in man.

Igneus est illis vigor, & celestis origo. His approach
 or Assumption to diuine or Angelicall Nature, is
 the perfection: of his forme: the error or false
 Imitation of which good is that which is the tem-
 pest of humane life while man vpon the instinct

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of an advancement *Formall*, and *Essentiall* is carried to seeke an advancement *Locall*. For as those which are sicke, and finde no remedy, doe tumble vp and downe and change place, as if by a Remoue *Locall*, they could obtaine a Remoue *Internall*: So is it with men in ambition, when failing of the meane to exalt their *Nature*, they are in a perpetuall estuation to exalt their *Place*. So then *passive Good*, is, as was said, either *Conseruative* or *Perfektive*. To resume the good of *Conseruation de Comfurs*, which consisteth in the fruition of that which is agreeable to our *Natures*, it seemeth to be the most pure and *Naturall* of pleasures, but yet the softest and the lowest. And this also receiueth a difference, which hath neither beene well iudged of, nor well inquired. For the good of fruition or contentment, is placed either in the *Sincerenesse* of the fruition, or in the *quickness* and *vigor* of it, the one superinduced by *Equality*, the other by *Vicissitudes*: the one hauing lesse mixture of *Euill*, the other more impression of *Good*. Whether of these is the greater good, is a question controuerted, but whether mans nature may bee capable of both, is a question not inquired.

The former question being debated between *Socrates*, and a *Sophist*, *Socrates* placing felicity in an equall and constant peace of mind, and the *Sophist* in much desiring, and much enjoying: they fell from Argument to ill words: The *Sophist* saying that *Socrates* felicity, was the felicity of a blocke or stone,

and *Socrates* saying that the *Sophists* felicity, was the felicity of one that had the itch, who did nothing but itch and scratch. And both these opinions doe not want their supports. For the opinion of *Socrates* is much upheld by the generall consent, euen of the *Epicures* themselues, that vertue beareth a great part in felicity : and if so, certaine it is, that vertue hath no more vse in clearing perturbations, then in compassing desires. The *Sophists* opinion is much fauoured, by the Assertion we last speake of, that good of *Aduancement*, is greater then good of *simple Preseruation* : because, euery obtaining a desire, hath a shew of aduancement, as motion though in a Circle, hath a shew of progression.

But the second question, decided the true way, maketh the former superfluous. For, can it be doubted, but that there are some, who take more pleasure in enjoying pleasures, then some other; and yet neuerthelesse, are lesse troubled with the losse or leauing of them : So as this same, *Non uti, ut non appetas : Non appetere, ut non metuas sunt animi pusilli & diffidentis*. And it seemeth to me, that most of the doctrines of the Philosophers are more fearefull and cautionary then the Nature of things requireth. So haue they encreased the feare of death, in offering to cure it. For when they would haue a mans whole life, to bee but a discipline or preparation to dye : they must needes make men thinke, that it is a terrible Enemy, against whom there is no end of preparing. Better saith the Poet,

Qui

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Qui finem vite extremum inter Muneraponat

Naturæ:

So haue

they sought to make mens minds too vniforme and harmonickall, by not breaking them sufficiently to contrary Motions: the reason whercof, I suppose to be, because they themselues were men dedicated, to a private, free, and vnappplied course of life. For, as we see, vpon the lute, or like Instrument, a *Ground*, though it be sweet, and haue shew of many changes, yet breaketh not the hand to such strange and hard stoppes and passages, as a *Set song*; or *Voluntary*: much after the same Manner was the diuersity betweene a Philosophicall and a ciuile life. And therefore men are to imitate the wisdome of Iewellers, who, if there be a graine, or a cloud, or an ise which may be ground forth, without taking too much of the stone, they help it: but, if it should lessen and abate the stone too much, they will not meddle with it: So ought men, so to procure *Seruity*, as they destroy not magnanimity.

Having therefore deduced the *Good of Man*, which is *private and particular*, as far as seemeth fit: wee will now returne to that *Good of man*, which *respecteth and beholdeth Society*, which we may tearme *Duty*; because the tearme of duty is more proper to a minde well framed and disposed towards others, as the tearme of vertue is applyed to a mind well formed and composed in it selfe, though neither can a man vnderstand vertue without some relation to *Society*, nor duty without

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an inward disposition, This part may seeme at first to pertaine to Science Ciuile and Politike: but not if it be well obserued, For it concerneth the Regiment and gouernment of euery man, ouer himselfe, and not ouer others. And as in architecture, the direction framing the posts, beames & other parts of building, is not the same with the manner of ioyning them, & erecting the building: And in mechanicalls, the direction how to frame an Instrument or Engine, is not the same with the manner of setting it on worke and imploying it: and yet neuertheless in expressing of the one, you incidently expresse the Aptnesse towards the other: So the doctrine of Coniugation of men in Society, differeth from that of their conformity thereunto.

This part of Duty is subdiuided into two parts: the common duty of euery man, as a Man or member of a State: The other the respectiue or speciall duty of euery man in his profession, vocation and place: The first of these, is extant and well laboured, as hath been said. The second likewise I may report rather dispersed then deficient: which manner of dispersed writing in this kinde of Argument, I acknowledge to be best. For who can take vpon him to write of the proper duty, vertue, challenge & right, of euery seuerall vocation, profession, & place. For although sometimes a Looker on may see more then a gamester & there be a Pouerb more arrogant then sound *That the wale best discovereth the*

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bill: yet there is small doubt but that men can write best and most really and materially in their owne professions: and that the writing of Speculatiue men of Actiue Matter, for the most part doth seeme to men of Experience as *Phormiões* Argument of the warrs seemed to *Hannibal*, to be but dreames and dotage. Onely there is one vice which accompanieth them, that write in their owne professions, that they magnify them in excesse. But generally it were to be wished, (as that which would make learning indeed solide and fruitefull) that Actiue men would or could become writers.

In which kinde I cannot but mention *Honoris causa* your Miesties excellent booke touching the duty of a king: a worke richly compounded of *Discretion, Morality and Policy*, with great asperision of all other artes: and being in mine opinion one of the most sound and healthfull writings that I haue read: not distempered in the heat of inuention, nor in the Couldnes of negligence: nor sick of Businesse as those are who leese themselves in their order: nor of Convulsions as those which Crampe in maters impertinent: nor fauoring of perfumes and paintings as those doe who seeke to please the Reader more then Nature beareth; and chiefly well disposed in the spirits thereof, being agreeable to truth and apt for actions: and farre removed from that Naturall infirmity, whereunto I noted those, that write in their owne professions to bee subiect, which is, that they exalt it aboue measure.

For

For your Maieſty hath truly deſcribed, not a king of Aſſyria, or Perſia, in their externe glory; but a *Moses*, or a *David*, Paſtors of their people. Neither can I euer leeſe out of my remembrance, what I heard your Maieſty, in the ſame ſacred ſpirit of Government, deliver, in a great cauſe of Iudicature, which was *That Kings ruled by their laws, as God did by the lawes of Nature, and ought as rarely to put in uſe their ſupreme Prerogatiue, as God doth his power of working Miracles.* And yet notwithstanding, in your booke of a true Monarchy, you doe well giue men to vnderſtand, that you know the plenitude of the power and right of a King, as well as the Circle of his office and duty. Thus haue I preſumed to alledge this excellent writing of your Maieſty, as a prime or eminent example of *Traſtates*, concerning ſpeciall and reſpectiue duties: wherein I ſhould haue ſaid as much, if it had beene written a thouſand yeares ſince: Neither am I moued with certaine Courtly decencies, which eſteeme it flattery to praife in preſence. No, it is flattery to praife in abſence: that is, when either the vertue is abſent, or the occaſion is abſent: and ſo the praife is not Naturall, but forced, either in truth, or in time. But let *Cicero* be read in his *Oration pro Marcello*, which is nothing but an excellent Table of *Ceſars* vertue, and made to *his face*; beſides the example of many other excellent perſons, wiſer a great deale then ſuch obſeruers: and we will neuer doubt, vpon a full occaſion, to giue juſt praifes to preſent or abſent.

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But to returne, there belongeth further, to the handling of this part touching the duties of professions and vocations, a *Relative or opposite*: touching the frauds, cautels, impostures, and vices of euery profession, which hath been likewise handled. But how? rather in a Satyre & Cinically, then seriously and wisely: for men haue rather sought by wit to deride and traduce much of that which is good in professions, then with Iudgement to discouer and seuer that which is corrupt. For as Salomon saith, He that cometh to seeke after knowledge with a minde to scorne and censure, shall be sure to finde matter for his humor, but no matter for his Instruction. *Quærenti derisori Scientiam, ipsa se abscondit: sed Studiofis obuiam.* But the managing of this argument with integrity & truth, which I note as deficient, seemeth to me to be one of the best fortifications for honesty & vertue that can be planted. For, as the fable goeth of the *Basiliske*, that if he see you first you die for it: but if you see him first, he dieth. So is it with deceits and euill arts: which if they be first espied, they leese their life, but if they preuent, they indanger. So that we are much beholden to *Maccianell* & others that write what men doe, and not what they ought to do. For it is not possible to ioyne serpentine wisdom with the Columbine Innocency, except men know exactly all the conditions of the *Serpens*: his basenesse and going ypon his bellie, his volubility and lubricity, his enuy and sting, and the rest, that is, all formes and Natures of euill. For without this, ver-

the lieth open and vnfenced. Nay an honest man can doe no good vpon those that are wicked to reclaime them, without the helpe of the knowledge of euill. For men of corrupted mindes presuppose that honesty groweth out of Simplicity of manners, & beleeuing of Preachers, schoolmasters, and Mens exterior language. So as, except you can make them perceiue, that you know the vtmost reaches of their owne corrupt opinions, they despise all morality, *Non recipit stultus verba prudentia, nisi ea dixeris, quae versantur in Corde eius.*

Vnto this part touching *Respectiue duty*, doth also appertaine the duties betweene husband and wife, parent and childe, Master and Seruant: So likewise, the lawes of friendship and Gratitude, the ciuile bond of Companies, Colledges, and Politike bodies, of nighbourhood, and all other proportionate duties: not as they are parts of Government and Society, but as to the framing of the minde of particular persons.

The knowledge concerning *good respecting Society* doth handle it also not *simply* alone, but *Cōparatiuely*, whereunto belongeth the weighing of duties, betweene person and person, Case and Case, particular and publike: As we see in the proceeding of *Lucius Brutus*, against his owne Sonnes, which was so much extolled; yet what was said?

Infelix, utcunq; ferent casata Minores.

So the case was doubtfull, and had opinion on both sides: Againe, we see, when *M. Brutus* and

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Cassius invited to a supper certaine, whose opinions they meant to feele, whether they were fit to be made their Associates, and cast forth the question touching the *Killing of a Tyrant* being an vsurper; they were devided in opinion, some holding, that Seruitude was the Extreame of Euils; and others that Tyranny was better then a Ciuill war: and a number of the like cases there are, of comparatiue duty. Amongst which, that of all others, is the most frequent, where the question is of a great deale of good to ensue of a small Iniustice. Which *Iason of Thessalia* determined against the truth; *Aliqua sunt iniuste facienda, ut multa iuste fieri possint.* But the reply is good; *Authorem presentis Iustitia habes sponsem futura non habes;* Men must pursue things which are iust in present, and leaue the future to the diuine prouidence: So then we passe on from this generall part touching the Exemplar and description of Good.

Now therefore, that we haue spoken of this fruit of life, it remaineth to speake of the Husbandry that belongeth thereunto, without which part, the former seemeth to be no better then a faire Image, or *statua*, which is beautifull to contemplate, but is without life and motion: whereunto *Aristotle* himselfe subscribeth in these words: *Necesse est scilicet de virtute dicere, & quid sit, & ex quibus gignatur. Inutile enim fere fuerit, virtutem quidem nosse, acquirenda autem eius modos & vias ignorare. Non enim de virtute tantum, qua specie sit, quaerendum est, sed*

*De cultura
Animi.*

sed & quomodo sui copiam faciat, utrunq. enim volumus, et rem ipsam nosse & eius compotes fieri: Hoc autem ex voto non succedet, nisi sciamus & ex quibus & quo modo. In such full words and with such iteration doth he inculcate this part: So saith Cicero in great Commendation of Cato the second, that hee had applied himselfe to Philosophy, *Non ita disputandi causa, sed ita viuendi.* And although the neglect of our times wherein few men doe holde any Consultations touching the reformation of their life (as Seneca excellently saith *De partibus vite quisque deliberat, de summa nemo*) may make this part seeme superfluous: yet I must conclude with that Aphorism of Hypocrates, *Qui graui morbo correpti dolores non sentiunt, ijs mens egrotat.* They need medicine not onely to assuage the disease but to awake the sense. And if it be said, that the cure of mens Mindes belongeth to sacred diuinity, it is most true: But yet Morall Philosophy may be preferred vnto her as a wile seruant, and humble handmaide. For as the Psalme saith, *That the eyes of the handmaide looke perpetually towards the Mistresse,* and yet no doubt many things are left to the discretion of the handmaide, to discern of the mistresse will: So ought Morall Philosophy to giue a constant attention to the doctrines of Diuinity, and yet so as it may yeeld of her selfe (within due limits) many found and profitable directions.

This Part therefore, because of the excellency thereof, I cannot but find exceeding strange, that it is not reduced

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reduced to written enquiry, the rather because it consisteth of much matter, wherein both speech & action is often conuersant, and such wherein the common talke of men: (which is rare, but yet commeth sometimes to passe) is wiser then their Bookes: It is reasonable therefore that we propound it in the more particularity, both for the worthinesse, and because we may acquite our selues for reporting it deficient, which seemeth almost incredible, and is otherwise conceived and presupposed by those themselves, that haue written. We will therefore enumerate some heads or Points therof, that it may appeare the better what it is, and whether it be extant.

First therefore in this, as in all things, which are practicall, we ought to cast vp our account, what is in our power, and what not: for the one may be dealt with by way of alteration, but the other by way of application onely. The husbandman cannot command, neither the Nature of the Earth, nor the seasons of the weather: no more can the Physitian the constitution of the patient, nor the variety of Accidents. So in the Culture and Cure of the minde of Man, two things are without our command: Points of Nature, and points of Fortune. For to the Basis of the one, and the Conditions of the other, our worke is limited and tied. In these things therefore, it is left vnto vs, to proceed by application,

Vincenda est omnis fortuna ferendo:
and so likewise

Vincenda

Vincenda est omnis Natura ferendo.

But, when that we speake of suffering, we doe not speake of a dull, and neglected suffering, but of a wise and industrious suffering, which draweth, and contriued vse and aduantage out of that which seemeth aduerse and contrary, which is that properly which we call, Accomodating or Applying. Now the wisdom of Application resteth principally in the exact and distinct knowledge of the precedent state, or disposition, vnto which we doe apply: for we cannot fit a garment, except we first take measure of the Body.

So then the first Article of this knowledge is to see downe sound and true distributions and descriptions of the severall Characters and tempers of mens Natures and dispositions; specially having regard to those differences which are most radicall in being the fountaines and Causes of the rest, or most frequent in Concurrence or Commixture; wherein it is not the handling of a few of them in passage, the better to describe the Mediocrities of vertues, that can satisfie this intention; for if it deserue to be considered, *That there are minds which are proportioned to great matters, and others so small,* (Which Aristotle handleth or ought to haue handled by the name of Magnanimity) doth it not deserue as well to be considered, *That there are minds proportioned to intend many matters, & others so few?* So that some can diuide themselues, others can perchance doe exactly well, but it must be but

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in few things at once; And so there commeth to bee a *Narrownesse of mind* as well as a *Pusillanimity*. And againe, *That some minds are proportioned to that which may bee dispatched at once or within a short returne of time: others to that which begins afarre off, and is to be won with length of pursuite;*

———— *Iam tum senditque fouetque;*

So that there may be fitly said to be a longanimity, which is commonly also ascribed to God as a *Magnanimity*. So further deserued it to be considered, by Aristotle, *That there is a disposition in Conuersation* (supposing it in things which doe in no sort touch or concerne a mans selfe) to soothe and please; and a disposition contrary to contradict and crosse: And deserueth it not much better to be considered, *That there is a disposition, not in conuersation or talke, but in matter of more serious Nature* (and supposing it still in things meerly indifferent) to take pleasure in the good of another and a disposition contrariwise, to take distast at the good of another; which is that properly, which wee call good nature, or ill nature, benigne or malignitie: And therefore I cannot sufficiently maruell, that this part of knowledge touching the severall Characters of natures and dispositions, should bee omitted both in Morallitie and Politie, considering it is of so great ministry and suppeditation to them both. A man shall finde in the traditions of Astrologie, some pretty and apt divisions of mens natures; according to the predominances of the Planets, *lovers of Quiet, lovers of Action, lovers*

of Victory, lovers of Honour, lovers of Pleasure, lovers of Arts, lovers of Change, and so forth. A man shall find in the wisest sort of these Relations which the Italians make touching *Conclaves*, the natures of the severall Cardinalls, handsomly and liuely painted forth: a man shall meet with in every daies Conference, the denominations of *Sensitivae, dry, formall, reall, humorous, certaine, Homo di prima impressione, Homo di ultima impressione*, and the like: and yet neuertheless this kinde of observations wandreth in words, but as not fixed in Enquiry. For the distinctions are found (many of them) but wee conclude no precepts vpon them; wherein our fault is the greater, because both History, Poesie, and daily Experience are as goodly fields where these Observations grow, whereof wee make a few Poesies, to hold in our hands, but no man bringeth them to the Confectionary; that Receipts might be made of them for vse of life.

Of much like kinde are those impressions of Nature, which are imposed vpon the minde by the Sex, by the Age, by the Region, by health, and sicknesse, by beauty and deformitie, and the like, which are inherent, and not externe: and againe, those which are caused by externe fortune: as *Soueraigntie, Nobility, obscure birth, riches, want, magistracie, privatenesse, prosperitie, aduersitie, constant fortune, variable fortune, rising per saltum, per gradus*, and the like. And therefore we see that *Plautus* maketh it a wonder, to see an old man beneficent; *Benignitas huius, ut adol-*

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tescentulibest. Saint Paul concludeth that severitie of discipline was to be vsed to the Cretans, *Increpa eos dure*, vpon the disposition of their Country, *Cretenses semper mendaces, mala Bestia, ventres pigri.* Salust noteth, that it is vsuall with Kings to desire Contradictories, *sed plerunque Regia voluntates, ut vehementes sunt, sic mobiles, saepeq; ipsa sibi aduersa.* Tacitus obserueth how rarely raising of the fortune mendeth the disposition, *solus Vespasianus mutatus in melius.* Pindarius maketh an obseruation, that great and suddaine fortune for the most part defea- teth men, *Qui magnam felicitatem conquire non possunt*: So the Psalme sheweth it is more easie to keepe a measure in the enioying of fortune, then in the increase of fortune, *Divitie si affluant, nolite Cor apponere*: These obseruations and the like, I deny not, but are touched a little by Aristotle as in passage in his Rhetoricks, and are handled in some scattered discourses, but they were neuer incor- porate into Morall Philosophy, to which they doe essentially appertaine: as the knowledge of the di- versity of grounds and Moulds doth to Agri- culture, and the knowledge of the diversity of Complexions and Constitutions doth to the Phy- sician; except we meane to follow the indiscretion of Emperiques, which minister the same medicines to all patients.

Another Article of this knowledge is the Inqui- rie touching the affections: for as in Medicining of the body, it is in order first to know the diuers

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Complexions and Constitutions; secondly the diseases, and lastly the cures: So in medicin^g of the Minde, after knowledge of the diuers characters of mens natures, it followeth in order to know the diseases and infirmities of the minde, which are no other then the perturbations and distempers of the affections. For as the ancient Politiques in popular Estates, were wont to compare the people to the Sea, and the Orators to the windes; because as the sea would of it selfe be calme and quiet, if the winds did not moue and trouble it; so the people would be peaceable and tractable if the seditious orators did not set them in working and agitation. So it may be fitly said, that the minde in the nature thereof would be temperate and stayed, if the affections as winds, did not put it into tumult and perturbation. And here againe I finde strange, as before, that *Aristotle* should haue written diuers volumes of Ethiques, and neuer handled the affections, which is the principall subiect thereof, and yet in his Rhetoricks where they are considered but collaterally, & in a second degree, (*as they may be moued by speech*) he finds place for them, & handleth them well for the quantity, but where their true place is, hee pretermitteth them. For it is not his disputations about pleasure and paine that can satisfie this enquire, no more then hee that should generally handle the nature of light, can be said to handle the nature of Colours: for pleasure and paine are to the particular affections as light is to particular colours: Better tra-

uels I suppose had the *Stoicks* taken in this argument, as far as I can gather by that which wee haue at second hand : But yet it is like, it was after their manner rather in subtilty of definitions, (which in a subiect of this nature are but curiosities) then in actiue and ample descriptions and obseruations : so likewise I finde some particular writings of an elegant nature touching some of the affections, as of *Anger*, of *Comfort vpon aduerse accidents*, of *Tendernesse of countenance*, and other. But the Poets and writers of Histories are the best Doctors of this knowledge, where we may finde painted forth with great life, How affections are kindled and incited : and how pacified and refrained : and how againe contained from act, and further degree : how they disclose themselues, how they worke, how they vary, how they gather and fortifie, how they are in-wrapped one within another, and how they doe fight and encounter one with another, and other the like particularities. Amongst the which this last is of speciall vse in Morall and Ciuile matters : how I say to set affection against affection, and to master one by another, euen as wee vse to hunt beaſt with beaſt, and flie bird with bird, which otherwise percase wee could not so easily recouer : vpon which foundation is erected that excellent vse of *Premium* and *pæna*, whereby Ciuile States consist, imploying the predominant affections of *fear* and *hope*, for the suppressing and brideling the rest. For as in the gouernement of states, it is sometimes
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necessary to bridle one faction with another, so it is in the government within.

Now come we to those points which are within our owne command, and haue force and operation vpon the minde, to affect the will and appetite, and to alter manners: wherein they ought to haue handled custome, exercise, habit, education, example, imitation, emulation, company, friends, praise, reproofe, exhortation, fame, lawes, bookes, studies: these as they haue determinate vse in moralities, from these the minde suffereth, and of these are such receipts and regiments compounded and described, as may serue to recouer or preserue the health and good estate of the minde, as far as pertaineth to humane medicine: of which number wee will insist vpon some one or two, as an example of the rest, because it were too long to prosecute all; and therefore we doe resume Custome and Habit to speake of.

The opinion of *Aristotle* seemeth to mee a negligent opinion, That of those things which consist by Nature, nothing can be changed by Custome, vsing for example; That if a stone be throwne ten thousand times vp, it will not learne to ascend, and that by often seeing or hearing, we doe not learne to see or heare the better. For though this principle be true in things wherein Nature is *peremptory* (the reason whereof we cannot now stand to discusse) yet it is otherwise in things wherein nature admitteth a *latitude*. For hee might see that a strait gloue will come more easily on with vse; and that a wand will
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by vse bend otherwise then it grew; and that by vse of the voyce we speake louder and stronger; & that by vse of enduring heate and cold, we endure it the better, and the like: which latter sort haue a nearer resemblance vnto that subiect of manners he handleth, then those instances which he alledgeth; But allowing his Conclusion *that vertues and vices consist in habit*, he ought so much the more to haue taught the manner of superinducing that habite: for there be many precepts of the wise ordering the exercises of the minde, as there is of ordering the exercises of the body, whereof we will recite a few.

The first shall be, that we beware wee take not at the first either too *High* a straine or too *weake*: for if too *High* in a diffident nature you discourage, in confident nature, you breed an opinion of facility, and so a sloth, and in all natures you breed a further expectation then can hold out, and so an insatisfaction in the end; if too *weake* of the other side: you may not looke to performe and ouercome any great taske.

Another precept is to practise all things chiefly at two seuerall times, the one when the mind is best disposed, the other when it is *worst disposed*: that by the one you may giue a great step, by the other you may worke out the knots and stondes of the minde, and makethe middle times the more easie and pleasant.

Another precept is, that which *Aristotle* mentioneth by the way, which is to beare euer towards the

the contrary extreame of that whereunto we are by Nature inclined: like vnto the Rowing against the streame, or making a wand straight by binding him contrary to his naturall crookednesse.

Another precept is, that the minde is brought to any thing better and with more sweetnesse and happinesse, if that whereunto you pretend, be not first in the intention, but *Tanquam aliud agendo*, because of the Naturall hatred of the minde against necessity and constraint. Many other Axiomes there are touching the managing of *Exercise* and *custome*: which being so conducted, doth proue indeed another nature: but being governed by chance, doth commonly proue but an ape of nature, and bringeth forth that which is lame and counterfer.

So if we should handle *bookes* and *studies* and what influence and operation they haue vpon manners, are there not diuers precepts of great caution and direction appertaining thereunto? did not one of the fathers in great indignation call *Poesy*, *vinū Demonum*, because it increaseth temptations, perturbations and vaine opinions? Is not the opinion of *Aristotle* worthy to be regarded wherein he saith, That young men are no fit auditors of *Morall Philosophy*, because they are not settled from the boyling heate of their affections, nor attempered with *Time* and experience? and doth it not hereof come that those excellent books and discourses, of the ancient writers, (whereby they haue perswaded vnto *vertue* most effectually, representing her in *state* and *Majesty*, and *popular opinions* against *vertue*

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in their *Parasites Coates*, fit to be scorned and derided,) are of so little effect towards honesty of life, because they are not read, and reuolued by men in their mature and settled yeares, but confined almost to boyes and beginners? But is it not true also, that much lesse, young men are fit auditors of Matters of Policy, till they haue beene thoroughly seasoned in religion and Morality, least their Iudgements be corrupted, and made apt to thinke that there are no true Differences of things, but according to *utility* and *fortune*, as the verse describes it. *Prosperum et Fœlix scelus virtus vocatur*: And againe, *Ille crucem pretium sceleris tulit, Hic diadema*: which the Poets doe speake satyrically & in indignation on vertues behalfe: But bookes of pollicie doe speake it seriously, and positiuely, for so it pleaseth *Machiavel* to say, *That if Caesar had beene overthrowne, hee would haue beene more odious then euer was Cætiline*, as if there had beene no difference but in fortune, betweene a very fury of lust and blood, and the most excellent spirit (his ambition reserved) of the world: Againe is there not a Caution likewise to be giuen of the doctrines of Moralities themselves (some kinds of them) lest they make men too precise, arrogant, incompatible, as *Cicero* saith of *Cato* in *Marco Catone*. *Hæc bona quæ videmus diuina & egregia ipsius scitote esse propria: quæ nonnunquam requirimus, ea, sunt omnia, non a natura sed a Magistro*: Many other Axio mes and aduises there are touching those proprieties & effects, which studies doe instill into maners: And so likewise is there touch-

ing the vse of all those other points of Company, same, lawes and the rest, which we recited in the beginning in the doctrine of Morality.

But there is a kinde of *Culture* of the *Minde*; that seemeth yet more accurate and elaborate then the rest, and is built upon this ground: That the minds of all men are some times in a state more perfect, and at other times in a state more deprived. The purpose therefore of this practise, is to fixe and cherish the good howers of the mind, & to obliterate and take forth the Euill: The fixing of the good hath beene practised by two meanes, vowes or constant resolutions, and obseruances, or exercises, which are not to be regarded so much in themselves, as because they keepe the minde in continuall obedience. The obliteration of the Euill hath beene practised by two Meanes, some kinde of Redemption or expiation of that which is past, and an Inception or account *de Nono*, for the time to come: but this part seemeth sacred and religious, and iustly: for all good Morall Philosophy (as was said,) is but an handmaide to Religion.

Wherefore we will conclude with that last point which is of all other meanes the most compendious and summary, & againe, the most noble and effectual to the reducing of the minde vnto vertue and goodestate: which is the electing and propounding vnto a mans selfe good and vertuous ends of his life, such as may be in a reasonable sort within his compasse to attaine. For if these two things bee

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supposed: that a man set before him honest and good ends, and againe that he be resolute, constant, and true vnto them; it will follow that hee shall mould himselfe into all vertue at once: and this is indeede like the worke of nature, whereas the other course, is like the worke of the hand. For as when a caruer makes an image; he shapes onely that part whereupon hee worketh, as if he be vpon *the face*, that part which shall be *the body* is but a rude stone still, till such time as hee comes to it. But contrariwise when Nature makes a *flower* or *living creature*, she formeth rudiments of all the parts at one time; so in obtaining vertue by *habite*, while a man practiseth Temperance, he doth not profite much to fortitude, nor the like; But when he dedicateth and applieth himselfe to *good ends*, looke what vertue soeuer the pursuite & passage towards those ends doth commend vnto him, he is inuested of a precedent disposition to conforme himselfe thereunto: which state of mind *Aristotle* doth excellently expresse himselfe, that it ought not to be called *vertuous*, but *Diuine*: his words are these; *Inmanitati autē consentaneum est, opponere eam, quae supra humanitatem est, heroicam siue diuinam virtutem.* And a little after; *Nam vi fera, neque vitium, neque virtus est, sic neque Dei. Sed hic quidem status alius quiddam virtute est, ille aliud quiddam a vitio.* And therefore we may see what *Celsitude* of honor *Plinius secundus* attributeth to *Traianus* in his fune-
rall oration, where he said, *That men needed to make*
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no other prayers to the gods, but that they would continue as good Lords to them, as Traiane had beene: as if he had not beene onely an Imitation of diuine nature, but a patterne of it. But these be heathen and prophane passages, hauing but a shadow of that diuine state of minde, which Religion and the holy faith doth conduct men vnto; by imprinting vpon their soules *Charity* which is excellently called the bond of *Perfection*: because it comprehendeth and fastneth all vertues together. And as it is elegantly said by *Menander* of vaine loue, which is but a false Imitation of diuine loue, *Amor melior Sophista, Laus ad humanam vitam*, that Loue teacheth a man to carry himselfe better, then the *Sophist* or *Preceptor*, which he calleth *Left handed*, because with all his rules and preceptions he cannot forme a man so *Dexteriously*; nor with that facility to prize himselfe and gouerne himselfe as loue can doe: So certainly if a mans minde be truly inflamed with charity, it doth worke him sodainly into greater perfection the all the Doctrine of morality can do, which is but a *Sophist* in comparison of the other. Nay further as *Xenophon* obserued truely, that all other affections though they raise the minde, yet they doe it by distorting, and vncomlineffe of extasies or excesses; but onely Loue doth exalt the minde, and neuerthelesse, at the same instant doth settle and compose it. So in all other excellencies, though they aduance nature, yet they are subiect to excess. Onely *Charity* admitteth no *excesse*; for so wee

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see, aspiring to be like God in power, the Angells transgressed and fell: *Ascendam, & ero similis altissimo*: By aspiring to be like God in knowledge, man transgressed and fell, *Eritis sicut Dij scientes bonum & malum*; But by aspiring to a similitude of God in goodnesse or loue; neither Man nor Angell euer transgressed or shall transgresse. For vnto that imitation we are called; *Diligite inimicos vestros, Benefacite eis qui oderunt vos, & orate pro persequentibus & calumniantibus vos, ut sitis filij patris vestri qui in calis est, qui solem suum oriri facit super bonos & malos, & pluit super iustos & iniustos*. So in the first platforme of the diuine Nature it selfe, the heathen Religion speaketh thus, *Optimus Maximus*, and the sacred scriptures thus, *Misericordia eius super omnia opera eius*.

Wherefore I doe conclude this part of Morall knowledge concerning *the Culture and Regiment of the Mind*, wherein if any man considering the parts thereof, which I haue enumerated, do iudge, that may labor is but to Collect into an *Art or Science*, that which hath beene pretermitted by others, as matter of common *Sense and experience*, he iudgeth well: But as *Philocrates* (ported with *Demosthenes*): you may not maruaile (*Athenians*) that *Demesthenes* and I doe differ, for he drinketh water, and I drinke wine: and like as we read of an ancient parable of *the two gates of sleepe*;

Sunt gemina somni porta, quarum altera fertur

Cornea,

*Cornea, qua veris facilis datur exitus umbris :
 Altera Candenti perfecta nitens Elephanto,
 Sed falsa ad cælum mittunt insomnia manes.*

So if wee put on sobriety and attention, we shall find it a sure Maxime in knowledge : that the more pleasant Liquor (of Wine) is the more vaporous, and the brauer gate of Ivory, sendeth forth the falser dreames.

But we haue now concluded *That generall part of Humane Philosophie, which contemplateth man segragate, and as hee consisteth of bodie and spirit;* Wherein wee may further note, that there seemeth to be a Relation or Conformity between the good of the minde, and the good of the Body. For as wee diuided the good of the body into *Health, Beauty, strength, and Pleasure,* so the good of the minde inquired in Rationall and Morall knowledges, tendeth to this, to make the minde sound, without perturbation, *Beautifull* and graced with decencie : and *Strong* and *Agill* for all duties of life. These three as in the body, so in the minde seldome meete, and commonly seuer : For it is easie to obserue, that many haue Strength of wit and Courage, but haue neither Health from perturbations, nor any Beauty or decencie in their doings : some againe haue an Elegancy and finenesse of Carriage, which haue neither soundnesse of honestie, nor substance of sufficiency : And some againe haue honest and reformed Mindes that can neither become them-

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themselves, nor manage Business; and sometimes two of them meet, and rarely all three: As for pleasure, wee haue likewise determined, that the minde ought not to bee reduced to stupide, but to retaine pleasure: Confined rather in the subiect of it, then in the strength and vigor of it.

C*iuile Knowledge* is conuersant about a subiect which of all others is most immersed in matter, and hardliest reduced to Axiome. Neuerthelesse, as *Cato* the Censor said, *That the Romanes were like sheepe, for that a man were better drive a flock of them, then one of them; For in a flocke, if you could get but some few goe right, the rest would follow:* So in that respect *Morall Philosophie* is more difficile then *Pollicie*. Againe, *morall Philosophy* propoundeth to it selfe the framing of Internall goodnesse: But *ciuile knowledge* requireth onely an External goodnes: for that as to society sufficeth. And therefore it commeth oft to passe that there be *Euill Times* in good governments: for so we finde in the holy story, when the kings were good, yet it is added, *Sed adhuc populus non dixerat cor suum ad dominum Deum patrum suorum.* Againe, *States* as great *Engines* moue slowly, and are not so soone put out of frame: for as in *Egypt* the seauen good years sustained the seauen bad: So governments for a time well grounded, doe beate out errors following. But the resolution of particular persons is more
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sodainly subuerted. These respects doe somewhat qualifie the extreame difficulty of ciuile knowledge.

This knowledge hath three parts, according to the three summary Actions of society, which are, Conuersation, Negotiation, and Government. For man seeketh in society, comfort, vse and protection: and they be three wisdomes of diuers natures, which doe often seuer: wisdom of the behauiour; wisdom of businesse; and wisdom of state.

The wisdom of conuersation ought not to be ouer-much affected, but much lesse despised: for it hath not onely an honour in it selfe, but an influence also into businesse and government; The poet saith.

Nec vultu destrue verba tuo. A man may destroy the force of his words with his countenance: so may hee of his deeds saith *Cicero*, recommending to his brother affability and easie access,

Nil interest habere ostium apertum, vultum clausum.

It is nothing wonne to admit men with an open doore, and to receiue them with a shut and reserued countenance. So we see *Atticus*, before the first interuiue betweene *Cesar* and *Cicero*, the warre depending, did seriously aduise *Cicero* touching the composing and ordering of his countenance and gesture. And if the government of the countenance bee of such effect, much more is that of the

speech, and other carriage appertaining to conuersation; the true modell whereof seemeth to me well expressed by *Linie*, though not meant for this purpose; *Ne aut arrogans videar, aut obnoxius, quorum alterum est alienæ libertatis obliti, alterum suæ:* The summe of behauiour is to retaine a mans owne dignity, without intruding vpon the liberty of others: on the other side, if behauiour and outward carriage bee intended to do much, first it may passe into affectation, and then *Quid deformius quam Scenam in vitam transferre*, to act a mans life? But although it proceede not to that extreame, yet it consumeth time, and imployeth the minde too much. And therefore as we vse to aduise young students from company keeping, by saying, *Amici, fures Temporis*: So certainly the Intending of the discretion of behauiour is a great Theft of Meditation: Againe, such as are accomplished in that forme of vrbanity, please themselves in it, and seldome aspire to higher vertue: whereas those that haue defect in it, doe seeke Comelinesse by Reputation: for where reputation is, almost euery thing becometh: But where that is not, it must be supplied by *Puntos* and Complements: Againe, there is no greater impediment of Action, then an ouer-curious obseruance of decency, and the guide of decency, which is Time and season. For as *Salomon* saith, *Qui respicit ad ventos, non seminat, & qui respicit ad nubes, non metet*: A man must make his opportunity, as oft as finde it. To conclude; Behauiour seemeth

seemeth to me as a Garment of the Minde, and to have the Conditions of a Garment. For it ought to bee made in fashion : it ought not to bee too curious : It ought to be shaped so, as to set forth any good making of the mind : and hide any deformity; and aboue all, it ought not to be too straight, or restrained for exercise or motion. But this part of Ciuile knowledge hath bene elegantly handled, and therefore I cannot report it for deficient.

The wisdome touching Negotiation or busines hath not been hitherto collected into writing to the great derogation of learning, and the professors of learning. For from this roote springeth chiefly that note or opinion which by vs is expressed in Adage, to this effect : That there is no great concurrence betweene learning and Wisdome. For of the three wisdomes which wee haue set downe to pertaine to ciuile life, for wisdome of Behaviour, it is by learned men for the most part despised, as an Inferiour to Vertue, and an Enemy to Meditation; for wisdom of Governement they acquite themselves well when they are called to it, but that happeneth to few. But for the wisdome of Businesse wherein mans life is most conuersant, there bee no Bookes of it, except some few scattered aduertisements, that haue no proportion to the magnitude of this subiect. For if bookes were written of this, as the other, I doubt not but learned men with meane experience, would farre excell men of long experience, without learning,

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and outshoot them in their owne bowe.

Neither needeth it at all to be doubted, that this knowledge should bee so variable as it falleth not vnder precept; for it is much lesse infinite then science of Government, which wee see is laboured and in some part reduced. Of this wisdomē it seemeth some of the ancient Romanes in the saddest and wisest times were professors: for *Cicero* reporteth, that it was then in vse for Senators that had name and opinion for generall wise men, as *Coruncanius*, *Curius*, *Laelius*, and many others; to walke at certaine houres in the *Place*, and to giue audience to those that would vse their aduise, and that the particular Citizens would resort vnto them, and consult with them of the marriage of a daughter, or of the imploying of a sonne, or of a purchase or bargaine, or of an accusation, and euery other occasion incident to mans life: so as there is a wisdomē of Counsell and aduise euen in private Causes, arising out of an vniuersall iusight into the affairs of the world, which is vsed indeed vpon particular causes propounded, but is gathered by generall obseruation of causes of like nature. For so wee see in the Booke which *Q. Cicero* writeth to his brother *De petitione consultatus*; (being the onely booke of businesse that I know written by the ancients) although it concerned a particular action then on foote, yet the substance thereof consisteth of many wise and politique Axioms, which containe not a temporary, but a perpetuall direction in the case of

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popular Elections; But chiefly we may see in those Aphorismes which have place amongst Diuine writings composed by *Salomon* the King, of whom the scriptures testify that his heart was as the sands of the sea, incompassing the world and all worldly matters; we see I say, not a few profound and excellent cautions, precepts, positions, extending to much varietie of occasions; whereuponi we will stay a while, offering to consideration some number of Examples.

Sed & cunctis sermonibus qui dicuntur, ne accommodes aurem tuam, nè forte audias seruum tuum maledicentem tibi. Here is commended the prouident stay of enquiry of that which we would be loath to finde: as it was iudged great wisdom in *Pompeius Magnus* that the burned *Sertorius* papers vnperused,

Vir sapiens si cum stulto contenderit, siue irascatur, siuerideat, non inueniet requiem. Here is described the great disadvantage which a wise man hath in vndertaking a lighter person then himselfe, which is such an ingagement, as whether a man turne the matter to ieast, or turne it to heat, or howsoeuer he change copy, hee can no waies quit himselfe well of it.

Qui delicate à pueritia nutrit seruum suum, postea sentiet eum contumacem. Here is signified that if a man beginne too high a pitch in his fauours, it doth commonly end in vnkindnesse, and vnthankfulnesse.

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Vidisti virum velocem in opere suo, coram regibus stabit, nec erit inter ignobiles. Here is obserued that of all vertues for rising to honour, quicknesse of dispatch is the best; for superiours many times loue not to haue those they imploy, too deep, or too sufficient, but ready and diligent.

Vidi cunctos viuentes, qui ambulant sub sole cum adolescente secundo qui consurgit pro eo. Here is expressed that which was noted by *Sylla* first, and after him by *Tiberius*; *Plures adorant solem orientem, quam occidentem vel meridianum.*

Si spiritus potestatem habentis ascenderit super te, locum tuum ne dimiseris, quia curatio faciet cessare peccata maxima. Here caution is giuen that vpon displeasure, retiring is of all courses the vsfittest; for a man leaueth things at worst, and deprieth himselfe of meanes to make them better.

Erat Ciuitas parua & pauci in ea viri, venit contra eam rex magnus, & vadauit eam, instruxitque munitiones per Gyrum, & perfecta est obsidio, inuentusque est in ea vir pauper & sapiens, & liberauit eam per sapientiam suam, & nullus deinceps recordatus est hominis illius pauperis; Here the corruption of states is set forth; that esteeme not vertue or merit longer then they haue vse of it.

Mollis responsio frangit iram. Here is noted that silence or rough Answer, exasperateth: but an answer present and temperate pacifieth.

Iter pigrorum, quasi sepes spinarum. Here is liuely represented how laborious sloth proueth in the end;

end; for when things are deferred till the last instant, and nothing prepared before hand, euery step findeth a Brier or an impedimenter, which catcheth or stoppeth.

Melior est finis orationis quam principium. Here is taxed the vanitie of formall speakers, that study more about prefaces and inducements, then vpon the conclusions and issues of speech.

Qui cognoscit in iudicio faciem, non bene facit, iste et pro buccella panis deseret veritatem. Here is noted that a iudge were better be a briber, then a respecter of persons: for a corrupt Iudge offendeth not so highly as a facile.

Vir pauper calumniatus pauperes, similis est imbro vehementi, in quo paratur fames; here is expressed the extremitie of necessitous extortions, figured in the ancient fable of the full and hungry horse-leech.

Fons turbatus pede, & vena corrupta, est iustus cadens coram impio. Here is noted that one iudiciall & exemplar iniquity in the face of the world, doth trouble the fountaines of Iustice more, then many particular Iniuries passed ouer by conuience.

Qui subtrahit aliquid a patre & a matre, & dicit hoc non esse peccatum, particeps est homicidij; Here is noted that whereas men in wronging their best friends, vse to extenuat their fault, as if they might presume or be bold vpon them, it doth contrariwise indeed aggravate their fault, and turneth it from Iniury to impiety.

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Noli esse amicus homini iracundo, nec ambulato cum homine furioso; Here caution is giuen that in the election of our friends wee doe principally auoide those which are impatient, as those that will espouse vs to many factions and quarels.

Qui conturbat domum suam possedit ventum: Here is noted that in domesticall separations and breaches, men doe promise to themselues quieting of their minde and contentment, but still they are deceiued of their expectation, and it turneth to winde.

Filius sapiens laetificat patrem, filius vero stultus mæstitia est matri sue. Here is distinguished that fathers haue most comfort of the good prooffe of their sonnes; but mothers haue most discomfort of their ill prooffe, because women haue little discerning of vertue, but of fortune.

Qui celat delictum, querit amicitiam, sed qui altero sermone repetit, seperat fœderatos; Here caution is giuen that reconcilement is better managed by an *Amnesty* and passing ouer that which is past, then by *Apologies* and excusations.

In omni opere bono erit abundantia, ubi autem verba sunt plurima, ibi frequenter egestas: here is noted that words and discourse abound most, where there is idleneffe and want.

Primus in sua causa iustus, sed venit altera pars, & inquit in eum; Here is obserued that in all causes the first tale possesseth much; in such sort, that the prejudice thereby wrought will bee hardly removed

ued, except some abuse or falsitie in the Information be detected.

Verba linguis quasi simplicia, & ipsa perueniunt ad interiora ventris; there is distinguished that flattery and insinuation which seemeth set and artificiall, sinketh not farre, but that entereth deepe, which hath shew of nature, libertie, and simplicity.

Qui eradit deri sorem, ipse sibi iniuriam facit; & qui arguit Impium sibi maculam generat, Here caution is giuen how wee tender reprehension to arrogant and scornfull natures, whose manner is to esteeme it for contumely, and accordingly to returne it.

Da sapienti occasionem & addetur ei sapientia, Here is distinguished the wisdom brought into habit, and that which is but verball and swimming onely in conceit: for the one vpon occasion presented is quickned and redoubled: the other is amazed and confused.

Quomodo in aquis resplendent vultus prospicientium, sic corda hominum manifesta sunt prudentibus.

Here the mind of a wise man is compared to a glasse; wherein the Images of all diuersitie of Natures and Customs are represented, from which representation proceedeth that application,

Qui sapit innumeris moribus aptus erit.

Thus haue I staied somewhat longer vpon these sentences politike of *Salomon*, then is agreeable to the proportion of an example: ledde with a desire to giue authority to this part of knowledge, which

Inoted as deficient by so excellent a president : and haue also attended them with briefe obseruations, such as to my vnderstanding, offer no violence to the sense, though I know they may bee applied to a more diuine vse : But it is allowed euen in diuinity, that some interpretations, yea and some writings, haue more of the *Eagle*, then others : But taking them as Instructions for life, they might haue receined large discourse, if I would haue broken them and illustrated them by diducements and examples.

Neither was this in vse onely with the Hebrews, But it is generally to be found in the wisdom of the more ancient Times : that as men found out any obseruation that they thought was good for life, they would gather it and expresse it in parable, or Aphorisme, or fable. But for fables they were vicegerents and supplies, where Examples failed : Now that the times abound with historie, the aime is better when the markè is aliue. And therefore the forme of writing which of all others is fittest for this variable argument of Negotiation and occasions, is that which *Machiauel* chose wisely and aptly for Government : *namely discourse vpon Histories or Examples.* For knowledge drawne freshly and in our view out of particulars, knoweth the way best to particulars againe. And it hath much greater life for practise, when the discourse attendeth vpon the Example, then when the example attendeth vpon the discourse. For this is no point of order as

it seemeth at first, but of substance. For when the Example is the ground, being set downe in an history at large, it is set downe with all circumstances : which may sometimes controule the discourse thereupon made, and sometimes supply it; as a verie patterne for action, whereas the Examples alledged for the discourses sake, are cited succinctly, and without particularity, and carry a seruile aspect towards the discourse, which they are brought in to make good.

But this difference is not amisse to bee remembered, that as history of *Times* is the best ground for discourse of Government, such as *Machiavel* handleth; so Histories of *Liues* is the most proper; for discourse of businesse is more conuerfant in priuate Actions. Nay, there is a ground of discourse for this purpose, fitter then them both, which is *discourse upon letters*, such as are wise and weightie, as many are of *Cicero ad Atticum*, and others. For letters haue a great and more particular representation of businesse, then either *Chronicles* or *Lines*. Thus haue wee spoken both of the matter end forme of this part of Ciuile knowledge touching Negotiation, which wee note to be deficient.

But yet there is another part of this part, which differeth as much from that whereof we haue spoken, as *sapere*, and *sibi Sapere*: the one mouing as it were to the circumference, the other to the center: for there is a wisdom of counsell, and againe there

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is a wisdom of pressing a mans owne fortune; and they doe sometimes meet, and often seuer. For many are wise in their owne waies, that are weake for government or Counsell, like Ants which is a wise creature for it selfe, but very hurtfull for the garden. This wisdom the Romanes did take much knowledge of, *Nam pol sapiens* (saith the Comickall Poet) *singit fortunam sibi*, and it grew to an adage, *Faber quisque fortuna proprie*: and *Linie* attributeth it to *Cato* the first, *in hoc viro tanta vis animi & ingenij inerat, ut quocunq; loco natus esset, sibi ipse fortunam facturum videretur.*

This conceit or position if it bee too much declared and professed, hath beene thought a thing impolitique and vnlucky, as was obserued in *Timothew* the Athenian: who hauing done many great seruices to the Estate in his government and giuing and account thereof to the people as the manner was, did conclude euery particular with this Clause, *And in this fortune had no part.* And it came so to passe that hee neuer prospered in any thing hee tooke in hand afterwards: for this is too high and too arrogant saouering of that which *Ezechiel* saith of *Pharao*: *Dicis: fluuus est meus & ego feci memet ipsum*: or of that which another Prophet speaketh: That men offer Sacrifices to their nets and snares, and that which the Poet expresseth, *Dextra mihi Deus, & telum quod missile libra*.

Nunc ad finem.
 For these confidences were euer unhallowed,
 and

and vnbleſſed. And therefore thoſe that were great Politiques indeed euer aſcribed their ſucceſſes to their felicitie: and not to their ſkill or vertue. For ſo Sylla ſurnamed himſelfe *Felix*, not *Magnus*. So *Ceſar* ſaid to the Maſter of the ſhip, *Ceſarem portas & fortunam eius*.

But yet neuertheleſſe theſe Poſitions *Faber quiſq; fortune ſuae, Sapiens dominabitur aſtris: In via virtuti nulla eſt via*, and the like, being taken and vied as ſpurs to induſtry, and not as ſtirops to inſolency, rather for reſolution then for preſumption or outward declaration, haue been euer thought ſound and good, and are (no queſtion) imprinted in the greateſt mindes: who are ſo ſenſible of this opinion, as they can ſcarce containe it within. As we ſee in *Auguſtus Ceſar* (who was rather diuerſe from his vnclē, then inferior in vertue) how when he died, he deſired his friends about him to giue him a *Plaudite*, as if hee were conſcient to himſelfe that he had plaied his part well vpon the ſtage. This part of knowledge wee doe report alſo as deficient: not but that it is practiſed too much, but it hath not beene reduced to writing. And therefore leſt it ſhould ſeeme to any that it is not comprehenſible by Axiome, it is requiſite as we did in the former, that we ſet downe ſome heads or paſſages of it.

Wherein it may appeare at the firſt a new and vnwonted Argument to teach men how to raile and make their fortune, a doctrine wherein euery man perchance will be ready to yeeld himſelſe a diſciple

Faber Fortuna ſine de Ambitione vita

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till he seeth difficultie : for fortune layeth as heavy impositions as *vertue*, and it is as hard and severe a thing to be a true *Politique*, as to be truly *morall*. But the handling hereof, concerneth learning greatly, both in honour and in substance : In honour, because pragmaticall men may not goe away with an opinion that learning is like a Larke that can mount, and sing, and please her selfe, and nothing else; but may know that shee holdeth as well of the Hauke that can soare aloft, and can also descend and strike vpon the prey. In substance, because it is the perfect law of enquiry of truth, *That nothing be in the globe of matter, which should not be likewise in the globe of Chrystall, or Forme*, that is, that there be not any thing in being and action, w^{ch} should not be drawne and collected into contemplation and doctrine : Neither doth learning admire or esteeme of this Architecture of fortune, otherwise then as of an inferior worke; For no mans fortune can be an end worthy of his being, & many times the worthiest men do abandon their fortune willingly for better respects; but neuertheless fortune as an organ of vertue and merit deserueth the consideration.

First therefore the precept which I conceiue to be most summarie, towards the preuailing in fortune; is to obtaine that window which *MOMVS* did require, who seeing in the frame of mans heart, such angles and recesses, found fault there was not a window to looke into them : that is, to procure good informations of particulars touching persons, their

their natures, their desires and ends, their customes and fashions, their helpes and aduantages, and whereby they chiefly stand; so againe their weakenesses and disaduantages, and where they lye most open and obnoxious, their friends, factions, and dependances: and againe their opposites, enuiers, competitors, their moods and times, *Sola viri molles aditus, & tempora noras*; their principles, rules, and obseruations, and the like; And this not onely of persons, but of actions: what are on foot from time to time: and how they are condued, fauoured, opposed; and how they import: and the like. For the knowledge of present Actions, is not onely materiall in it selfe, but without it also, the knowledge of persons is very erroneous: for men change with the actions; and whiles they are in pursuite, they are one, and when they returne to their Nature, they are another. These Informations of particulars, touching persons and actions, are as the *minor* propositions in euery actiue syllogisme, for no excellency of obseruations (which are the *maior* propositions) can suffice to ground a conclusion, if there be error and mistaking in the minors:

That this knowledge is possible, *Salomon* is our surety who saith, *Consilium in corde viri tanquam aqua profunda, sed vir prudens exhauriet illud*: And although the knowledge it selfe falleth not vnder precept, because it is of Indiuiduals, yet the instructions for the obtaining of it may.

Wee will begin therefore with this precept, according

cording to the ancient opinion, that the Sinewes of
 wisdom, are slownesse of beliefe and distrust :
 That more trust bee giuen to Countenances and
 Deedes, then to words : and in words, rather to
 suddaine passages, and surprized words, then to
 set and purposed words : Neither let that bee feared
 which is said, *fronti nulla fides*, which is meant of a
 generall outward behauiour, and not of the priuate
 and subtile motions and labours of the countenance
 and gesture, which as *Q. Cicero* elegantly saith, is *A-*
nimi Ianua, the gate of the Minde : None more close
 then *Tyberius*, and yet *Tacitus* saith of *Gallus*, *Ete-*
nim vultu offensionem coniectauerat. So againe no-
 ting the differing Character and manner of his
 commending *Germanicus* and *Drusus* in the Senate;
 he saith, touching his fashion wherein he carried his
 speech of *Germanicus*, thus : *Magis in speciem ad-*
natis verbis, quam ut penitus sentire crederetur, but
 of *Drusus* thus, *Paucioribus sed insentior, & fida ora-*
tione : and in another place speaking of this chara-
 cter of speech, when he did any thing that was gra-
 tious and popular, he saith, That in other things he
 was *velat eluebantium verborum* : but then againe,
Solutius loquebatur quando subueniret. So that there
 is no such artificer of dissimulation : nor no such
 commanded countenance (*vultus iussus*) that can
 feuer from a fained tale, some of these fashions, ei-
 ther a more sleight and carelesse fashion, or more set
 and formall, or more tedious and wandring, or com-
 ming from a man more drily and hardly.

Neither

Neither are *Deedes* such assured pledges, as that they may be trusted without a iudicious consideration of their magnitude and nature; *Frans sibi in parais fidem praestruit, ut maiore emolumento fallat*: and the Italian thinketh himselfe vpon the point to be bought and sold, when he is better vsed then he he was wont to be without manifest cause. For small fauours, they doe but lull men a sleepe, both as to *Caution*, and as to *Industry*, and are as *Demosthenes* calleth them, *Alimenta socordia*. So againe we see, how false the nature of some *deeds* are in that particular, which *Mutianus* praised vpon *Antonius Primus*, vpon that hollow & vnfaithfull reconcilement; which was made betweene them: wherupon *Mutianus* aduanced many of the friends of *Antonius*: *Simul amicis eius praefecturas & tribunatus largitur*: wherein vnder pretence to strengthen him, he did desolate him, and won from him his dependances.

As for *words* (though they be like waters to Physicians, full of flattery and vncertainty) yet they are not to be despised, specially with the aduantage of passion and affection. For so we see *Tyberius* vpon a stinging and incensing speech of *Agrippina*, came a step forth of his dissimulation when he said, *You are hurt, because you do not raigne*; of which *Tacitus* saith, *Audita hac, raram oculi pectoris vocem elicere: correptamque Græco versu admonuit: ideo ladi quia non regnaret*. And therefore the Poet doth elegantly call passions, tortures, that vrge men to confesse their secrets.

Vino torsus & ira.

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And

And experience sheweth, there are few men so true to themselves, and so settled; but that sometimes vpon heate, sometimes vpon bravery, somtimes vpon kindenesse, sometimes vpon trouble of minde and weaknesse, they open themselves; specially if they be put to it with a counter-dissimulation, according to the prouerb of Spain, *Di mentira, y sacaras verdad: Tell a lye, and find a truth.*

As for the knowing of men, which is at second hand from Reports: mens weaknesse and faults are best knowne from their Enemies; their vertues, and abilities from their friends; their customes and Times from their seruants: their conceits and opinions from their familiar friends, with whom they discourse most: Generall fame is light, and the opinions conceived by superiors or equals are deceitfull: for to such, men are more masked, *Perior fama è domesticis emanat.*

But the soundest disclosing and expounding of men is, by their natures and ends, wherein the weakest sort of men are best interpreted by their Natures, and the wisest by their ends. For it was both pleasantly and wisely said (though I thinke very vnruly) by a Nuntio of the Pope, returning from a cerraine Nation, where hee serued as *Lidger*: whose opinion being asked touching the appointment of one to goe in his place, hee wished that in any case they did not send one that was too wise: because no very wise man would euer imagine, what they in that country were like to doe:

doe: And certainly, it is an error frequent; for men to shoot ouer, and to suppose deeper ends, and more compasse reaches then are: the Italian pro- uerbe being elegant, and for the most part true.

Di danari, di senno, e di fede,

C'n è manco che non credi:

There is commonly lesse mony, lesse wisdom, and lesse good faith; then men doe accompt vpon:

But Princes vpon a farre other reason are best interpreted by their natures, and private persons by their ends: For Princes being at the toppe of humane desires, they haue for the most part no particular ends, whereto they aspire: by distance from which a man might take measure and scale of the rest of their actions and desires: which is one of the causes that maketh their hearts more inscrutable: Neither is it sufficient to informe our selues in mens ends and natures of the variety of them onely, but also of the predominancy what humour reigneth most, and what end is principally fought. For so we see, when *Tigellinus* saw himselfe out stripped by *Petronius Turpilianus* in *Neroes* humours of pleasures, *Metus eius rimatur*; he wrought vpon *Neroes* fears, whereby he bracke the other neck.

But to all this part of Enquirie, the most compendious way resteth in three things: The first to haue generall acquaintance and inwardnesse with

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those which haue generall acquaintance, and looke most into the world : and specially according to the diuersitie of Businesse, and the diuersity of persons, to haue priuacie and conuersation with some one friend at least which is perfit and well intelligenced in euery seuerall kinde. The second is to keepe a good mediocrity in libertie of speech, and secrecy: in most things liberty, secrecy where it importeth: for liberty of speech inuitheth and prouoketh liberty to bee vled againe: and so bringeth much to a mans knowledge: and secrecie on the other side induceth trust and inwardnesse. The last is the reducing of a mans selfe to this watchfull and ferene habite, as to make accompt and purpose in euery conference and action, aswell to obserue as to act. For as *Epictetus* would haue a Philosopher in euery particular action to say to himselfe, *Et hoc volo; & etiam institutum seruare*: so a politique man in euery thing should say to himselfe, *Et hoc volo, ac etiam aliquid addiscere*. I haue staied the longer vpon this precept of obtaining good information, because it is a maine part by it selfe, which answereth to all the rest. But aboue all things, Caution must be taken, that men haue a good stay and hold of themselves, and that this much knowing doe not draw on much meddling: For nothing is more vnfortunate then light and rash intermeddling in many matters. So that this variety of knowledge tendeth in conclusion but onely to this, to make a better and freer choise of those actions, which may concern vs, and

to condu& them with the lesse error and the more dexterity.

The second precept concerning this knowledge is for men to take good information touching their owne persons and well to vnderstand themselues: knowing that as *S. James* saith, though men looke oft in a glasse, yet they doe sodainly forget themselues, wherein as the diuine glasse is the word of God, so the politique glasse is the state of the world, or times wherein we liue. In the which we are to behold our selues.

For men ought to take an vpartiall view of their owne abilities and vertues: & againe of their wants and impediments; accounting these with the most, and those other with the least, and from this view and examination to frame the considerations following.

First to consider how the constitution of their nature sorteth with the generall state of the times: which if they finde agreeable and fit, then in all things to giue themselues more scope and liberty, but if differing and dissonant, then in the whole course of their life to be more close, retired and reserved: as we see in *Tyberius*, who was never seene at a play: and came not into the Senate in 12. of his last yeares: whereas *Augustus Caesar* liued euer in mens eyes, which *Tacitus* obserueth.

Alia Tyberio morum via.

Secondly to consider how their Nature sorteth with professions and courses of life, & accordingly

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to make electiō if they be free, & if ingaged, to make the departure at the first opportunity: as wee see was done by Duke *Valentine*, that was designed by his father to a sacerdotall profession, but quitted it soone after in regard of his parts and inclination, being such neuerthelesse, as a man cannot tell well whether they were worse for a Prince or for a Priest.

Thirdly to consider how they sort with those whom they are like to haue Competitors and Concurrents, and to take that course wherein there is most solitude, and themselues like to be most eminent: as *Casar Iulius* did, who at first was an Orator or Pleader, but when hee saw the excellencie of *Cicero*, *Hortensius*, *Catulus*, and others for eloquence, and saw there was no man of reputation for the warres but *Pompeius*, vpon whom the State was forced to relie; he forsooke his course begun toward a ciuile and popular greatnesse; and transferred his designes to a marshall greatnesse.

Fourthly in the choise of their friends, and dependances, to proceed according to the Composition of their owne nature, as we may see in *Casar*, all whose friends & followers were men actiue and effectuall, but not solemne or of reputation.

Fiftly to take speciall heed how they guide themselues by examples, in thinking they can doe as they see others doe: whereas perhaps their natures and carriages are farre differing; in which Error, it seemeth *Pompey* was, of whom *Cicero* saith, that hee

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was wont often to say: *Sylla potuit; Ego non poterō* wherein he was much abused, the natures and proceedings of himselfe and his example; being the vnlikest in the world, the one being feirce, violent, and pressing the fact; the other solemne, and full of Maiesty and circumstance, and therefore the lesse effectuall.

But this precept touching the politicke knowledge of our selues, hath many other branches whereupon we cannot insift.

Next to the well vnderstanding & discerning of a mans selfe, there followeth the well opening and reuealing a mans selfe, wherein we see nothing more vsuall then for the more able man to make the lesse shew. For there is a great aduantage in the well setting forth of a mans vertues; fortunes, merits, and againe in the artificiall covering of a mans weaknesse, defects, disgraces, staying vpon the one; sliding from the other, cherishing the one by circumstances; gracing the other by exposition, and the like; wherein wee see what *Tacitus* saith of *Mutianus*, who was the greatest politique of his time, *Ominum que dixerat feceratque, arte quadam ostentator*: which requireth indeed some arte, least it turne tedious and arrogant; but yet so, as ostentation (though it be to the first degree of vanity) seemeth to me rather a vice in Manners, then in Policy; for as it is said, *Audacter calumniare, sēper aliquid habes*, So except it be in a ridiculous degree of deformity *Audacter te vendis: sēper aliquid habes*. For it will
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sticke with the more ignerant and inferiour sort of men, though men of wisdom and ranke doe smile at it and despise it, and yet the authority wonne with many, doth countervaille the disdain of a few. But if it be carried with decency and government, as with a naturall pleasant and ingenious fashion, or at times when it is mixt with some perill and vn-safety, (as in Military persons) or at times when others are most enuied; or with easie and carelesse passage to it and from it, without dwelling too long, or being too serious: or with an equall freedom of taxing a mans selfe, aswell as gracing himselfe, or by occasion of repelling or putting downe others inurie or insolencie: It doth greatly adde to reputation; and surely not a few solide natures, that want this ventosity, and cannot faile in the height of the windes, are not without some prejudice and disadvantage by their moderation.

But for these flourishes and inhanments of vertue, as they are not perchance vnecessary: So it is at least, necessary that vertue be not disvaled and imbasd vnder the iust price: which is done in three manners; By offering, and obtruding a mans selfe; wherein men thinke he is rewarded when hee is accepted. By doing too much, which will not giue that which is well done leaue to settle; and in the end induceth satiety: and by finding too soone the fruit of a mans vertue, in commendation, applause, honour, fauour, wherein if a man be pleased with a little, let him heare what is truly said, *Cane-*

*ne insuetus rebus maioribus videaris, si hac te res par-
na sicuti magna delectat.*

But the couering of defects is of no lesse impor-
tance, then the valuing of good parts, which may
be done likewise in three manners, by *Caution*, by
Colour, and by *Confidence*. *Caution* is, when men doe
ingeniously and discreetly avoyd to bee put into
those things for which they are not proper: where-
as contrariwise bold and vnquiet spirits will thrust
themselues into matters without difference, and so
publish and proclaime all their wants; *Colour* is
when men make a way for themselues, to haue a
construction made of their faults, or wants: as
proceeding from a better cause, or intended for
some other purpose: for of the one, it is well
said;

Sape latet vitium proximitate boni.

And therefore whatsoever want a man hath, he must
see, that hee pretend the vertue that shadoweth it,
as if he be *Dull*, he must affect *Gravitie*, if a *Coward*,
Mildnesse, and so the rest: for the second, a man
must frame some probable cause why he should not
doe his best, and why he should dissemble his abili-
ties: and for that purpose must vse to dissemble
those abilities, which are notorious in him to giue
colour that his true wants are but industries and dis-
simulations: for *Confidence* it is the last, but su-
rest remedie: namely to de presse and seeme to de-

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spite whatsoever a man cannot attaine, obseruing the good principle of the Merchants, who endeauor to raise the price of their owne commodities, and to beate down the price of others. But there is a confidence that passeth this other: which is to face out a mans owne defects, in seeming to conceiue that he is best in those things wherein he is failing; and to helpe that againe, to seeme on the other side that he hath least opinion of himselfe, in those things wherein he is best; like as we shall see it commonly in Poets, that if they shew their verses, and you except to any, they will say *That that lync cost them more labor then any of the rest;* and presently wil seem to dislike, and suspect rather *some other lync,* which they know wel enough to be the best in the number. But aboue all, in this righting and helping of a mans selfe in his own carriage, he must take heed he shew not himselfe dismantled and exposed to scorne and iniury, by too much dulcenesse, goodnesse, and facility of nature, but shew some sparkles of liberty, spirit, and edge. Which kind of fortified carriage with a ready refusing of a mans selfe from scornes, is sometimes of necessity imposed vpon men by somewhat in their person or fortune, but it euer succeedeth with good felicity.

Another precept of this knowledge is by all possible endeauour, to frame the minde to bee pliant, and obedient to occasion; for nothing hindereth men in fortunes so much as this. *Idem manebat, neque idem decebat;* Men are where they were, when occasions

occasions turne, and therefore to *Cato*, whom *Linus* makech such an Architect of fortune, he addeth, that hee had *Versatile Ingenium* & and thereof it cometh, that these grave solemn wits which must be like themselves, and cannot make departures, haue more dignitie then foelicity. But in some it is nature to be somewhat viscous and inwrapped, and not easie to turne: In some it is a conceit that is almost a nature, which is that men can hardly make themselves beleue that they ought to change their course, when they haue found good by it in former experience. For *Maccianel* noteth wisely how *Fabius Maximus* would haue bene temporizing still, according to his old biasse, when the nature of the war was altered, and required hot pursuit; In some other it is want of point and penetration in their iudgement, that they doe not discern when things haue a period, but come in, too late after the occasion. As *Demosthenes* compareth the people of *Athens* to countrey fellowes, when they play in a fence-schoole, that if they haue a blow then they remoue their weapon to that ward, and not before: In some other it is a loathnesse to leese labours passed, and a conceit that they can bring about occasions to their plie, & yet in the end, whe they see no other remedy, they come to it with disadvantage, as *Tarquinius* that gaue for the third part of *Sibylles* books the treble price, whe he might at first haue had all three for the simple. But from whatsoever root or cause this Restituent of

mind proceedeth, it is a thing most preiudicial, & nothing it more politike thē to make the wheels of our mind cōcentrike & voluble wth the wheels of fortune.

Another precept of this knowledge, which hath some affinity with that we last spake of, but with difference, is that which is well expressed, *satis accede Deisq.*, that men doe not only turne with the occasions, but also runne with the occasions, and not strain their credit or strength to ouer hard or extreame points: but choose in their actions that which is passable: for this wil preferue mē from foile, nor occupy them too much about one matter, win opinion of moderation, please the most, and make a shew of a perpetuall foelicitie in all they vndertake, which cannot but mightily increase reputation.

Another part of this knowledge seemeth to haue some repugnancy with the former two, but not as I vnderstand it, and it is that which *Demosthenes* vitereth in high tearmes: *Et quemadmodum receptum est, ut exeritum ducat Imperator: sic & a cordatis viris res ipse ducenda, ut quae ipsis videntur, ea gerantur, & non ipsi euentus persequi cogantur.* For if wee obserue, we shall finde two differing kinds of sufficiency, in managing of businesse: some can make vse of occasions aptly and dexterously, but plot little: some can vrge and pursue their owne plots well, but cannot accomodate nor take in: either of which is very vnperfite without the other.

Another part of this knowledge is the obseruing a good mediocrity in the declaring, or not declaring

a mans selfe, for although depth of secrecy, and making way (*qualis est via nauis in Mari*, which the French calleth *Sourdes Menees*, when men let things in worke without opening themselues at all) be sometimes both prosperous and admirable: yet many times *Disimulatio errores parit, qui dissimulatorem ipsum illaqueant*. And therefore we see the greatest politiques haue in a naturall and free manner professed their desires rather then beene reserved, and disguised in them. For so wee see that *Lucius Sylla* made a kinde of profession, *That hee wished all men happy or unhappy, as they stood his friends or enemies*. So *Cesar*, when hee went first into *Gaul*, made no scruple to professe, *That he had rather be first in a village, then second at Rome*. So againe as soone as he had begunne the warre, wee see what *Cicero* saith of him, *Alter* (meaning of *Cesar*) *non recusat, sed quodam modo postulat, ut (ut est) sic appelletur Tyrannus*. So wee may see in a Letter of *Cicero* to *Atticus*, that *Augustus Caesar* in his very entrance into affaires, when hee was a dearling of the Senate, yet in his haranges to the People, would sweare, *Ita parentis honores consequi liceat*, (which was no lesse then the Tyranny) saue that to helpe it, hee would stretch foorth his hand towards a Statua of *Cesars*, the which was erected in the same plice: whereat many men laughed and wondred and said, *Is it possible? or, Did you euer heare the like to this? and yet thought hee meant no hurt, hee did it so hand-*

somely and ingeniously, and all these were prosperous, whereas *Pompey* who tended to the same ends, but in a more darke and dissembling manner, as *Tacitus* saith of him, *Occultior non melior*, wherein *Salust* concurrerth, *ore probo, animo inuerecundo*, made it his designe by infinite secret Engines, to cast the state into an absolute Anarchy and confusion, that the state might cast it selfe into his Armes for necessity and protection, and so the soueraigne power bee put vpon him, and hee neuer seene in it: and when hee had brought it (as he thought) to that point, when hee was chosen *Consull*, alone; as neuer any was; yet hee could make no great matter of it, because men vnderstood him not: but was faine in the end, to goe the beaten tracke of getting Armes into his hands, by colour of the doubt of *Caesars* designs: so tedious, casuall, and vnfortunate are these deepe dissimulations, whereof it seemeth *Tacitus* made this iudgement, that they were a cunning of an inferiour forme in regard of true policy, attributing the one to *Augustus*, the other to *Tiberius*, where speaking of *Li-
nia*, he saith: *Et cum artibus mariti simulatione filij bene composita*; for surely the continuall habite of dissimulation is but a weak and sluggish cunning, and not greatly politique.

Another precept of this Architecture of Fortune, is, to accustome our minds to iudge of the proportion or valew of things, as they conduce, and are materiall to our particular ends, and that to doe
sub-

substantially and not superficially. For wee shall finde the Logically part (as I may terme it) of some mens mindes good, but the Mathematicall part erroneous, that is; they can well iudge of consequences, but not of proportions and comparison, preferring things of thew and sence before things of substance and effect. So some fall in loue with accessse to Princes, others with popular fame and applause; supposing they are things of great purchase, when in many Cases they are but matters of Enuy, perill, and Impediment.

So some measure things according to the labour and difficulty, or assiduity, which are spent about them; and thinke if they bee euer mouing, that they must needs aduance and proceede; as *Cesar* saith in a despising manner of *Cato* the second, when hee describeth how laborious and indefatigable he was to no great purpose: *Hæc omnia magis studio agebat*. So in most things men are ready to abuse themselves in thinking the greatest means to be best, when it should be the Fittest.

As for the true marshalling of mens perfites towards their fortune, as they are more or lesse materiall, I hold them to stand thus; First the amendment of their owne Minds. For the Remoue of the Impediments of the mind will sooner cleare the passages of fortune, then the obtaining fortune will remoue the Impediments of the mind. In second place I set downe wealth and meanes, which I know most men would haue placed first because
of

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or the generall vse which it beareth towards all varieties of occasions. But that opinion I may condemne with like reason as *Machiavel* doth that others that monies were the sinews of the warres, whereas (saith he) the sinews of the warres are the sinews of mens Armes, that is, a valiant, populous and Military Nation: and he voucheth aptly the authority of *Solon*, who when *Cresus* shewed him his treasury of gold, said to him, that if another came that had better Iron, he would be Maister of his Gold; In like manner it may be truly affirmed, that it is not monies that are the sinewes of fortune, but it is the sinewes and Steele of mens Mindes, Wit, Courage, Audacity, Resolution, Temper, Industry, and the like: In third place I set downe Reputation, because of the peremptory Tides & Currants it hath, which if they bee not taken in their due time, are seldome recouered, it being extreame hard to plaie an after-game of reputation. And lastly, I place honour, which is more easily wonne by any of the other three, much more by all, then any of them can bee purchased by honour. To conclude this precept, as there is order and priority in Matter, so is there in Time, the preposterous placing whereof is one of the commonest Errors: while men fly to their ends when they should intend their beginnings: and doe not take things in order of time as they come on, but marshall them according to greatnesse, and not according to instance, nor observing the good precept *Quod nunc instat agamus,*

Another

Another precept of this knowledge, is not to imbrace any matters, which doe occupie too great a quantity of time, but to haue that sounding in a mans eares,

Sed fugit interea, fugit irreparabile tempus, and that is the cause why those which take their course of rising by professions of Burden, as Lawiers, Orators, painefull Diuines, and the like, are not commonly so polirique for their owne fortunes, otherwise then in their ordinary way, because they want time to learne particulars, to wait occasions, and to deuise plots.

Another precept of this knowledge is to imitate nature which doth nothing in vaine, which surely a man may doe, if he doe well interlace his businesse, and bend not his mind too much vpon that which he principally intendeth. For a man ought in every particular action, so to carry the motions of his mind, & so to haue one thing vnder another, as if he cannot haue that he secketh in the best degree, yet to haue it in a second, or so in a third, & if he can haue no part of that which he purposed, yet to turne the vse of it to somewhat else, & if he cannot make any thing of it for the present, yet to make it as a seed of somewhat in time to come, & if he can contriue no effect or substāce from it, yet to win some good opinion by it, or the like: so that he should exact account of himselfe of euery action, to reape somewhat, and not to stand amazed & confused if he faile of that he chiefly meant: for nothing is more impolitike then

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to

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to mind actions wholly one by one. For he that doth so, leeseeth infinite occasions which interuene, and are many times more proper and propitious for somewhat, that he shall neede afterwards, then for that which he vrgeth for the present; and therefore men must be perfit in that rule: *Hac oportet facere, & illa non omittere.*

Another precept of this knowledge is, not to engage a mans selfe peremptorily in any thing, though it seeme not liable to accident, but euer to haue a window to flie out at, or a way to retyre; following the wisdom in the ancient fable, of the two frogs, which consulted when their plash was drie, whether they should goe: and the one moued to goe downe into a pit because it was not likely the water would dry there, but the other answered; *True, but if it doe, how shall we get out againe?*

Another precept of this knowledge, is, that ancient precept of *Bias*, construed not to any point of perfidiousnesse, but onely to caution and moderation, *Et ama tanquam inimicus futurus, & odi tanquam amaturus*: For it vtterly betraieeth all vility, for men to imbarque themselues too far into vnfortunate friendships, troublesome spleens, and childish and humorous enuies or æmulations.

But I continue this beyond the measure of an example, led, because I would not haue such knowledges which I note as *deficient*, to be thought things Imaginatiue, or in the aire, or an obseruation or two, much made of, but things of bulke and masse:
whercof

whereof an end is hardlier made, thē a beginning. It must bee likewise conceiued that in these points which I mention and set downe, they are farre from complete tractates of them : but onely as small peeces for patternes : And lastly, no man I suppose will thinke, that I meane fortunes are not obtained without all this adoe; For I know they come tumbling into some mens lappes, and a number obtaine good fortunes by diligence, in a plaine way: Little intermedling : and keeping themselues from grosse errors.

But as *Cicero* when he setteth downe an *Idea* of a perfitt Orator, doth not meane that euery pleader should be such; and so likewise, when a Prince or a *Courtier* hath been described by such as haue handled those subiects, the mould hath vsed to be made according to the perfection of the *Arte*, and not according to common practise: So I vnderstād it, that it ought to be done in the description of a *Politique* man : I meane politique for his owne fortune.

But it must be remembered all this while, that the precepts which we haue set downe, are of that kind which may be counted and called *Bona Artes*, as for euill arts, if a man would set downe for himselfe that principle of *Machianell* : *That a man seek not to attaine vertue in selfe: But the appearance only thereof, because the credit of vertue is a helpe, but the use of it is cumber:* or that other of his principles. *That he presuppose, that men are not sily to be wrought otherwise but by feare, & therefore shal he seek to haue euery*

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man obnoxious, low, & in streight, which the Italians call *seminar spine*, to sowe thornes: or that other principle contained in the verse which Cicero citeth *cadant amici, dummodo inimici intercedant*, as the *Trium-virs* which sold euery one to other the liues of their friends for the deaths of their enemies: or that other protestation of *L. Catilina* to set on fire and trouble states, to the end to fish in droumy waters, and to vnwrap their fortunes. *Ego si quid in fortunis meis excitatum sit incendium, id non aqua sed ruina restinguam*, or that other principle of *Ly-sander*, That children are to be deceiued with comfits, & men with othes, and the like euill and corrupt positions, whereof (as in all things) there are more in number then of the good: Certainly with these dispensations from the lawes of charity and integrity, the pressing of a mans fortune, may be more hasty and compendious: But it is in life, as it is in waies, The shortest way is commonly the fowlest, & surely the fairer way is not much about.

But men if they be in their owne power, and doe beare and sustaine themselves, and bee not caried away with a whirle winde or tempest of ambition: ought in the pursuite of their owne fortune, to see before their eyes, not only that generall Map of the world, That all things are vanity & vexation of spirit, but many other more particular Cards & directions, chiefly that, That Being without well being, is a curse, and the greater being, the greater curse: And that all vertue is most rewarded, and all wickedness

kednesse most punished in it selfe: according as the Poet saith excellently;

*Quæ vobis quæ digna viri, pro laudibus istis, et
Præmia posse rear solui & pulcherrima primum*

Dij moresque dabunt vestri:

And so of the contrary: And secondly they ought to looke vp to the eternall prouidence and diuine iudgement, which often subuerteth the wildome of euill plots and imaginations, according to that Scripture, *He hath conceiued mischiefe, and shall bring forth a vaine thing.* And although men should refraine themselues from iniury and euill artes, yet this incessant and Sabbathlesse pursuite of a mans fortune leaueth not tribute which we owe to God of our time, who (we see) demandeth a tenth of our substance, and a leuenth, which is more strict, of our time: & it is to finall purpose to haue an erected face towards heauen, & a perpetuall groueling spirit vpon earth, eating dust, as doth the serpent, *Argue affligit homo Diuine particulam auræ:* And if any man flatter himselfe that he will imploy his fortune well, though he should obtaine it ill, as was said concerning *Aug. Cesar,* and after of *Septimius Seuerus;* *That either they should neuer haue bene borne, or else they should neuer haue died;* they did to much mischief in the pursuite & ascent of their greatnes, and so much good when they were established; yet these compensations and satisfactions, are good to be vsed, but neuer good to be purposed: And lastly, it is not amisse for men in their race toward their fortune, to

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coole themselues a little with that conceit which is elegantly expressed by the Emperour, *Charles the 5.* in his instructions to the King his sonne, *That fortune hath somewhat of the nature of a woman, that if shee be too much wooed, she is the farther off.* But this last is but a remedy for those, whose Tasts are corrupted: let men rather build vpon that foundation which is as a corner-stone of Diuinity and Philosophy, wherein they ioyne close, namely, that same *Primum quarite*. For diuinitie saith, *primum quarite regnum Dei, & ista omnia adijciuntur vobis:* and Philosophy saith, *quarite bona animi, cetera aut aderunt, aut non oberunt.* And although the humane foundation hath somewhat of the sands, as wee see in *M. Brutus* when he brake forth into that speech;

— *Te colui (Virtus) ut rem: ast tu nomen inane es;*

Yet the diuine foundation is vpon the Rocke. But this may serue for a Taste of that knowledge which I noted as deficient:

Concerning government, it is a part of knowledge, secret and retyred in both these respects, in which things are deemed secret: for some things are secret, because they are hard to know, and some because they are not fit to vtter: we see all governments are obscure and inuisible.

— *Totamque infusa per artus,
Mens agitat molem, & magno corpore miscet.*

Such

Such is the description of governments; we see the government of God ouer the world is hidden, inso-
 much as it seemeth to participate of much irregula-
 rity and confusion; The government of the Soule
 in mouing the Body is inward and profound, and
 the passages thereof hardly to be reduced to demon-
 stration. Againe, the wisdom of Antiquity (the
 shadowes whereof are in the Poets) in the descri-
 tion of torments and paines; next vnto the crime of
 Rebellion which was the Giants offence, doth de-
 test the offence of futilitie: as in *Syphis* and *Tan-
 talus*. But this was meant of particulars; Neuerthe-
 lesse euen vnto the generall rules and discourses of
 pollicy, and government, there is due a reuerent and
 reserued handling.

But contrariwise in the gouernours toward the
 gouerned, all things ought as far as the frailtie of
 Man permitteth, to be manifest, and reuealed. For
 so it is expressed in the Scriptures touching the go-
 uernment of God; that this globe which seemeth to
 vs a darke and shady body, is in the view of God, as
 Christall, *Et in conspectu sedis tanquam mare vitre-
 um simile Christallo*. So vnto Princes and States, spe-
 cially towards wise Senates and Councils, the na-
 tures & dispositions of the people, their conditions,
 and necessities, their factions, and combinations,
 their animosities and discontents ought to bee in re-
 gard of the varietie of their Intelligences, the wise-
 dome of their obseruations, and the height of their
 station, where they keepe Centinell, in great part
 cleare

clear and transparent; wherefore, considering that I write to a King that is a maister of this Science, and is so well assisted; I thinke it decent to passe over this part in silence; as willing to obtaine the certificate which one of the ancient Philosophers aspired vnto, who being silent; when others contended to make demonstration of their abilities by speech, desired it might be certified for his part, *that there was one that knew how to hold his peace.*

Notwithstanding for the more publike part of Governement, which is Lawes, I thinke good to note onely one deficiency, which is, that all those which haue written of Lawes, haue written either as Philosophers, or as Lawyers, and none as States-men. As for the Philosophers, they make imaginary Lawes for imaginary commonwealths, and their discourses are as the Stars, which giue little light because they are so high. For the Lawyers, they write according to the States where they liue, what is receiued Law, and not what ought to be Law; For the wisdom of a Law-maker is one, and of a Lawyer is another. For there are in Nature certaine fountaines of Iustice; whence all Ciuill Lawes are deriued; but as streames; and like as waters doe take tinctures and tastes from the soyles through which they run; so doe ciuill Lawes vary according to the Regions and governments where they are planted; though they proceed from the same fountaines. Again; the wisdom of a Lawmaker consisteth not onely in a plat-forme of Iustice; but in the application thereof, ta-
king

king in consideration, by that meanes Lawes may be made certaine, and what are the causes and remedies of the doubtfullnesse and *incertaintie* of Law, by what meanes Lawes may bee made apt and easie to be executed, and what are the impediments, and remedies in the *execution* of lawes, what influence lawes touching private right of *Accum & Tuum*, haue into the publike state, and how they may bee made apt and agreeable, how lawes are to be *penned* and *deliuered*, whether in *Texts* or in *Acts*, *briefe* or *large*, with *perambles*, or *without*; how they are to be *pruned* and *reformed* from time to time, and what is the best meanes to keep them from being too *vast in volumes*, or too full of *multiplicitie* and *crofnesse*, how they are to be expunded, When *upon causes emergent*, and iudicially discussed, and when *upon responses* and *conferences* touching generall points or questions, how they are to be *pressed*, rigorously, or tenderly, how they are to be *mitigated* by equity, and good conscience, and whether discretion and strict Law is to be *mingled in the same Courts*; or *kept apart in severall Courts*; Againe, how the *practise*, *profession*, and *erudition* of Law is to be censured and gouerned, and many other points touching the administration, and (as I may tearme it) *animation* of Lawes. Vpon which I insist the lesse, because I purpose, (if God giue me leaue) hauing begun a worke of this Nature, in Aphorismes, to *propound* it hereafter, noting it in the meane time for *deficient*.

*De prudentia
legislatoria.
suis in somnibus
suis Inuisa*

R r

And

And for your Maiesties Lawes of England, I could say much of their dignitie, and somewhat of their defect: But they cannot but excell the ciuill Lawes in fitnesse for the government: for the ciuill Law was, *non hoc quaesitum munus in usus*: It was not made for the Countries which it gouerneth: hereof I cease to speake, because I will not interminge matter of Action, with matter of generall Learning.

Thus haue I concluded this portion of learning touching *Ciuill knowledge*, and with *Ciuill knowledge* haue concluded *Humane Philosophie*, and with *Humane Philosophie*, *Philosophie in Generall*; and being now at some pause, looking backe into that I haue passed through: This writing seemeth to mee (*Si nunquam fallit Imago*) as far as a man can iudge of his owne worke, not much better then that noyse or sound which Musicians make while they are tuning their Instruments, which is nothing pleasant to heare, but yet is a cause why the Musique is sweeter afterwards. So haue I beene content to tune the Instruments of the Muses, that they may play; that haue better hands. And surely when I set before me the condition of these times, in which learning hath made her third visitation, or circuit in all the qualities thereof: as the excellencie and viuacitie of the wits of this age; The noble helpes and lights which wee haue by the traualles of ancient writers: The Art of Printing, which communiceth

teth Bookes to men of all fortunes. The opennesse of the world by Navigation, which hath disclosed multitudes of experiments, and a Masse of Naturall History: The leasure wherewith these times abound, not employing men so generally in civill businesse, as the States of *Gracia* did, in respect of their popularitie, and the State of *Rome* in respect of the greatnesse of their Monarchie: The present disposition of these times at this instant to peace: The consumption of all that ever can be said in controuersies of Religion, which haue so much diuerted men from other Sciences: The perfection of your Majesties learning, which as a *Phœnix* may call whole volies of wits to follow you: and the inseparable propriety of Time, which is ever more and more to disclose truth: I cannot but be raised to this persuasion that this third period of time will farre surpass that of the *Gracian* and *Romane* Learning: Onely if men will know their owne strength, and their owne weaknesse both: and take one from the other, light of inuention, and not fire of contradiction, and esteem of the Inquisition of truth, as of an enterprise, and not as of a qualitie or ornament, and imploy wit and magnificence to things of worth and excellencie, and not to things vulgar, and of popular estimation. As for my labours, if any man shall please himselfe, or others in the reprehension of them, they shall make that ancient and patient request, *verbera, sed audi.* Let men reprehend them so they obserue and weigh them: For the Appeale is lawfull (though it

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may be, it shall not be needfull) from the first cogitations of men to their second, and from the nearer times, to the times further off. Now let vs come to that learning, which both the former times were not so blessed as to know, *Sacred and inspired Diuinitie*, the Sabbath and port of all mens labours, and perogriantions.

THe prerogatiue of God extendeth as well to the reason, as to the will of Man; So that as wee are we to obey his Law though wee finde a reluctation in our will; So wee are to beleue his word, though we finde a reluctation in our reason: For if we beleue onely that which is agreeable to our sense, we giue consent to the matter, and not to the Author, which is no more then wee would doe towards a suspected and discredited witness: But that faith which was accounted to *Abraham* for righteousnesse, was of such a point, as whereat *Sarah* laughed, who therein was an Image of *Naturall Reason*.

Howbeit (if wee will truely consider it) more worthy it is to beleue, then to know as wee now know; For in knowledge mans mind suffereth from sense, but in beleife it suffereth from Spirit, such one as it holdeth for more authorized then it selfe, & so suffereth from the worthier Agent; otherwise it is of the state of man glorified; for then faith shall cease, and we shall know as we are knowne.

Wherefore we conclude, that sacred *Theologie* which

(which in our Idiome we call Diuinitie) is grounded onely vpon the word and oracle of God, and not vpon the light of nature : for it is written, *Celi enarrant gloriam Dei*: But it is not written *Celi enarrant voluntatem Dei*: But of that it is said, *Ad legem & testimonium si non fecerint secundum verbum istud &c.* This holdeth not onely in those points of faith, which concerne the great mysteries of the Deitie, of the Creation, of the Redemption, but likewise those which concerne the law Morall truly interpreted; *Loue your Enemies, doe good to them that hate you. Be liketo your heauenly father, that suffereth his raine to fall vpon the Iust and Pniust.* To this it ought to be applauded, *Nec vox hominem sonat*, It is a voice beyond the light of Nature: So we see the heathen Poets when they fall vpon a libertine passion, doe still expostulate with laws and Moralities, as if they were opposite and malignant to Nature: *Et quod natura remittit inuida Iura negant*: So said *Dendamis* the *Indian* vnto *Alexanders* Messengers: That he had heard somewhat of *Pythagoras*, and some other of the wise men of *Gracia*, and that he held them for excellent Men: But that they had a fault, which was that they had in too great reuerence and veneration a thing they called Law and Manners: So it must be confessed that a great part of the Law Morall is of that perfection, whereunto the light of Nature cannot aspire: how then is it, that man is said to haue by the light and Law of Nature some Notions, and conceits of ver-

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true and vice, iustice and wrong, good and euill? Thus, because the light of Nature is vsed in two leuerall senses: The one, that which springeth from Reason, Sense, Induction, Argument, according to the Lawes of heauen and earth: The other that which is imprinted vpon the spirit of Man by an inward Instinct, according to the Law of conscience, which is a sparkle of the puritie of his first Estate. In which later sense onely, he is participant of some light, and discerning, touching the perfection of the Morall Law, but how? sufficient to check the vice, but not to informe the dutie. So then the doctrine of Religion, as well Morall as Mysticall, is not to be attained, but by inspiration and reuelation from God.

The vice notwithstanding of Reason in Spirituall things, and the latitude thereof, is very great and general: for it is, not for nothing, that the Apostle calleth Religion *our reasonable seruice of God*, in so much as the verie Ceremonies and Figures of the old Law were full of reason and signification, much more then the ceremonies of Idolatrie and Magicke, that are full of *Non significants* and *Surd Characters*; But most specially the Christian faith, as in all things, so in this deserueth to be highly magnified, holding and preserving the golden Mediocritie in this point, betweene the Law of the *Heathen*, and the Law of *Mahumet*, which haue embraced the two extremes. For the Religion of the *Heathen* had no constant belief or confession, but

left

left all to the liberie of argument; and the Religion of *Mahomet* on the other side, interdicteth argument altogether; the one having the verie face of Error; and the other of Imposture; whereas the Faith doth both admit and reiect Disputation with difference.

The vse of Humane Reason in Religion, is of two sorts: The former in the conception and apprehension of the Mysteries of God, to vs revealed; The other, in the inferring and deriving of Doctrine and direction thereupon: The former extendeth to the Mysteries themselves: but how? by way of Illustration, and not by way of argument. The later consisteth indeed of Probation and Argument. In the former wee see God vouchsafeth to descend to our capacitie, in the expressing of his mysteries in sort as may bee sensible unto vs; and doth grift his Revelations and holy doctrine, vpon the Notions of our reason, and applicth his Inspirations to open our vnderstanding, as the forme of the key, to the ward of the locke; for the later, there is allowed vs an vse of Reason, and argument, secundarie and respectiue; although not originall and absolute: For after the Articles and principles of Religion are placed and exempted from examination of reason; it is then permitted unto vs to make deuiations and inferences from, and according to the Analogie of them, for our better direction. In Nature this holdeth not; for both the principles are examinable by Induction, though not by a

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Medium or *Syllogisme*: and besides, those principles or first positions, have no discordance with that reason, which draweth downe and diducth the inferior positions. But yet it holdeth not in Religion alone, but in many knowledges both of greater and smaller Nature, namely wherein there are not only *Posita* but *Placita*, for in such there can be no vie of absolute reason, we see it familiarly in games of wit, as Chess, or the like; The Draughts and first Laws of the Game are positive; but how & meereley *ad placitum*, and not examinable by reason; But then how to direct our play thereupon with best advantage to winne the game, is artificiall and rationally. So in Humane Laws, there be many grounds and *Maximes*, which are *Placita iuris*, *Positive* vpon authority and not vpon reason; and therefore not to be disputed: But what is most iust, not absolutely, but relatively, and according to those *Maximes*, that affordeth a long field of disputation. Such therefore is that secundarie reason, which hath place in diuinitie, which is grounded vpon the *Placets* of God.

*De usu legi-
cimo rationis
humanae in di-
uinis.*

Here therefore I note this deficiency, that there hath not beene to my vnderstanding sufficiently enquired and handled, *The true limits and vse of reason in spirituall things*: as a kinde of diuine *Dialectique*, which for that it is not done, it seemeth to me a thing vsuall, by pretext of true conceiuing that, which is reuealed, to search and mine into that which is not reuealed; and by pretext of enucleating inferences

ambigibilib

and

and contradictories, to examine that which is positive: The one sort falling into the Error of *Nicodemus*, demanding to have things made more sensible then it pleaseth God to reueale them; *Quomodo possit homo nasci cum sit senex*: The other sort into the Error of the Disciples, which were scandalized at a shew of contradiction: *Quid est hoc quod dicit nobis, modicum, & non videbitis me, & iterum modicum, & videbitis me &c,*

Vpon this I haue insisted the more, in regard of the great and blessed vse thereof, for this point well laboured and defined of, would in my iudgement be an *Opiate* to staie and bridle not onely the vanitie of curious speculations, wherewith the schooles labour, but the furie of controuersies, wherewith the church laboureth. For it cannot but open mens eyes to see that many controuersies do meerey pertaine to that which is either not reuealed, or positive, and that many others doe grow vpon weake and obscure Inferences or deriuations: which latter sort of men would reuiue the blessed stile of that great Doctor of the Gentiles, would be carryed thus: *Ego non Dominus*, and againe, *Secundum consilium meum*, in Opinions and counsells, and not in positions and oppositions. But Men are now ouer readie vsurpe the stile, *Non Ego, sed Dominus*, and not so onely, but to bind it with the thunder and denuciation of *Curses*, and *Anathemae*s, to the terror of those which haue not sufficiently learned out of *Salomon*, that *The causelesse Curse shall not come.*

St

Diuinitie

Diuinitie hath two principall parts: The matter informed or reuealed: and the nature of the Information or Reuelation: and with the later wee will beginne: because it hath most coherence with that which wee haue now last handled. The nature of the information consisteth of three branches: The limits of the information; the sufficiencie of the information; and the acquiring or obtaining the information. Vnto the limits of the information belong these considerations: how farre forth particular persons continue to bee inspired: how farre forth the Church is inspired: and how farre forth reason may be vsed; the last point whereof I haue noted as deficient. Vnto the sufficiencie of the information belong two considerations, what points of Religion are fundamentall, and what perfectiue, being matter of further building & perfectiō vpon one and the same foundation: & againe, how the gradations of light according to the dispensatiō of times, are materiall to the sufficiencie of beleefe.

*De gradibus
unitatis in
Cinitate Dei.*

Here againe I may rather giue it in aduise, then note it as deficient, that the points fundamentall, and the points of further perfection onely ought to be with piety and wisdom distinguished: a subject tēding to much like end, as that I noted before: for as that other were likely to abate the number of controuersies: So this is like to abate the heat of many of them. Wee see *Moses* when hee saw the *Israelites* and the *Egyptians* fight, hee did not say, *Why stricke you,* but drew his sword, and slew the

the *Egyptian*: But when hee saw the two *Israelites* fight, hee said, *You are brethren, why strike you?* If the point of doctrine be an *Egyptian*, it must bee slaine by the sword of the spirit, and not reconciled. But if it be an *Israelite*, though in the wrong: then *Why strike you?* Wee see of the fundamentall points, our Sauiour penneth the league thus, *Hee that is not with vs is against vs*, but of points not fundamental, thus, *Hee that is not against vs, is with vs*. So wee see the Coate of our Sauiour was entire without seame, and so is the Doctrine of the Scriptures in it selfe: But the garment of the Church was of diuers colours, and yet not diuided: wee see the chaffe may and ought to be seuered from the corne in the Eare: But the Tares may not be pulled vp from the corne in the field: So as it is a thing of great vse well to define, what, and of what latitude those points are, which doe make men meereely aliens and disincorporate from the Church of God.

For the obtaining of the information, it resteth vpon the true & sound Interpretation of the Scriptures, which are the fountaines of the water of life. The Interpretations of the Scriptures are of two sorts: Methodicall, and Solute, or at large, for this diuine water which excelleth so much that of *Jacobs Well*, is drawne forth much in the same kinde, as Naturall Water vseth to bee out of Wells and Fountaines: either it is first forced vp into a Cesterne, and from thence fetcht and deriued for vse: or else it is drawne and receiued in Buckets and

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Vessels immediately where it springeth. The former sort whereof though it seeme to bee the more readie, yet in my iudgement is more subiect to corrupt. This is that Method which hath exhibited, vnto vs the scholasticall diuinity, whereby diuinity hath bin reduced into an Art, as into a Cesterne, & the streames of doctrine or positions fetcht and deriued from thence.

In this, Men haue sought three things, a summarie breuitie, a compacted strength, and a complete perfection: whereof the two first they faile to finde, and the last they ought not to seeke. For as to breuitie, wee see in all summarie Methods, while men purpose to abridge, they giue cause to dilate. For the summe or abridgement by contraction becommeth obscure, the obscuritie requireth exposition, and the exposition is diduced into large commentaries, or into common places, and titles, which grow to be more vast then the originall writings, whence the summe was at first extracted. So we see the volumes of the schoole-men are greater much then the first writings of the fathers, whence the Master of the sentēces made his summe or collection. So in like manner the volumes of the modern Doctors of the Ciuil Law exceed those of the ancient Iurisconsults, of which *Tribonian* compiled the *Digest*. So as this course of summes and commentaries is that which doth infallibly make the body of Sciences more immense in quantitie, & more base in substance.

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And for strength, it is true, that knowledges reduced into exact Methodes haue a shew of strength, in that each part seemeth to support and sustaine the other; but this is more satisfactorie then substantiall, like vnto buildings, who stand by Architecture and compaction, which are more subiect to ruine, then those which are built more strong in their seuerall parts, though lesse compacted. But it is plaine, that the more you recede from your grounds, the weaker doe you conclude; and as in nature, the more you remoue your selfe from particulars, the greater perill of Errour you doe incurre: So, much more in Diuinitie, the more you recede from the Scriptures by inferences & consequences, the more weak & dilute are your positions.

And as for perfection, or compleatnesse in Diuinitie, it is not to be sought, which makes this course of Artificiall diuinitie the more suspect: For hee that will reduce a knowledge into an Art, will make it round and vniforme: But in Diuinity many things must be left abrupt and concluded with this: *O altitudo Sapientiae & scientiae Dei, quae incomprehensibilia sunt iudicia eius, & non inuestigabiles viae eius?* So againe the Apostle saith, *Ex parte scimus*, and to haue the forme of a totall, where there is but matter for a part, cannot bee without supplies by supposition and presumption. And therefore I conclude, that the true vse of these Summes and Methods hath place in Institutions or Introductions, preparatorie vnto knowledge: but in them, or by di-

§ 3

ducement

ducement from them, to handle the maine bodie and substance of a knowledge, is in all Sciences prejudiciall, and in Diuinitie dangerous.

As to the Interpretation of the Scriptures solute and at large, there haue beene diuers kindes introduced and deuised, some of them rather curious and vn safe, then sober and warranted. Notwithstanding thus much must be confessed, that the Scriptures being giuen by inspiration, and not by humane reason, doe differ from all other books in the Author: which by consequence doth drawe on some difference to be vsed by the Expositor. For the Inditer of them did know foure things which no man attaines to know, which are, the mysteries of the kingdome of glorie: the perfection of the Lawes of Nature: the secrets of the heart of Man; and the future succession of all ages. For as to the first, it is said. *He that presseth into the light, shall be oppressed of the Glorie.* And againe, *No man shall see my face and liue.* To the second, *When he prepared the heauens I was present, when by law and compasse he enclosed the deepe.* To the third, *Neither was it needfull that any should beare witnesse to him of Man, for hee knew well what was in Man.* And to the last, *From the beginning are knowne to the Lord all his workes.*

From the former of these two haue beene drawn certaine senses and expositions of Scriptures, which had need be contained within the bounds of sobrietic: The one *Anagogicall*, and the other *Philosophicall*. But as to the former, Man is not to prevent his
time;

time; *Videmus nunc per speculum in Enigmate, tunc autem facie ad faciem*, wherein neuerthelesse there seemeth to be a libertie granted, as farre forth as the polishing of this glasse, or some moderate explanation of this *Enigma*. But to presse too far into it cannot but cause a dissolution and ouerthrow of the spirit of man. For in the body there are three degrees of that we receiue into it: *Aliment, Medicine* and *Poyson*; whereof *Aliment* is that which the Nature of man can perfectly alter and ouercome: *Medicine* is that which is partly conuerted by Nature, and partly conuerteth nature: and *Poyson* is that which worketh wholly vpon Nature, without that, that nature can in any part worke vpon it. So in the minde whatsoeuer knowledge reason cannot at all worke vpon and conuert, is a meere intoxication, and indangereth a dissolution of the mind and vnderstanding.

But for the latter, it hath bene extreamply set on foot of late time by the Schoole of *Paracelsus*, and some others, that haue pretended to finde the truth of all naturall Philosophy in the Scriptures; scandalizing and traducing all other Philosophy: as Heathenish and Prophane: But there is no such enmity betweene Gods word, and his workes. Neither doe they giue honour to the Scripture, as they suppose, but much imbase them. For to seeke heauen and earth in the word of God, whereof it is saide, *Heauen and Earth shall passe, but my word shall not passe*, is to seeke temporarie things amongst eternall

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eternall; And as to seeke Diuinitie in Philosophy, is to seeke the liuing amongst the dead; so to seeke Philosophy in Diuinitie is to seeke the dead amongst the liuing; Neither are the *Pots* or *Lauers*, whose place was in the outward part of the Temple to bee sought in the holiest place of all, where the Arke of the testimonie was seated. And againe, the scope or purpose of the spirit of God is not to expresse matters of Nature in the Scriptures, otherwise then in passage, and for application to mans capacitie and to matters Morall or Diuine. And it is a true Rule, *Authoris aliud agentis parua autoritas*. For it were a strange conclusion, if a man should vse a similitude for ornament or illustration sake, borrowed from Nature or historie, according to vulgar conceit, as of a *Basliske*, an *Vnicorne*, a *Centaure*, a *Briareus*, an *Hydra*, or the like, that therefore he must needs bee thought to affirme the matter thereof positiuely to be true; To conclude therefore these two Interpretations, the one by reduction or *Ænigmaticall*, the other Philosophicall or Physicall, which haue bene receiued and pursued in imitation of the *Rabbins* and *Cabalists*, are to be confined with a *Noli altum sapere, sed time*.

But the two latter points knowne to God, and vnknowne to Man; *touching the secrets of the hearts, and the successions of time*, doth make a iust and sound difference betweene the manner of the exposition of the Scriptures: and all other bookes. For it is an excellent obseruation which hath bene made

made vpon the answers of our Sauiour Christ to many of the questions which were propounded to him, how that they are impertinent to the state of the question demanded, the reason whereof is, because not being like man, which knowes mans thoughts by his words, but knowing mans thoughts immediately, hee neuer answered their words, but their thoughts: much in the like manner it is with the Scriptures, which being written to the thoughts of men, and to the succession of all ages, with a foresight of all heresies, contradictions, differing estates of the Church, yea, and particularly of the elect, are not to be interpreted only according to the latitude of the proper sense of the place, and respectiuely towards that present occasion, whereupon the words were vttered; or in precise congruities or contexture with the words before or after, or in contemplation of the principall scope of the place, but haue in themselues not onely totally, or collectiuely, but distributiuely in clauses and words infinite springs and streames of doctrine to water the Church in euerie part, and therefore as the literall sense is as it were the maine streame or Riuer: So the Morall sense chiefly, and sometimes the *Allegoricall* or *Typicall* are they whereof the Church hath most vse: not that I wish men to be bold in *Allegories*, or *indulgent* or light in Allusions: but that I doe much condemne that Interpretation of the Scripture, which is onely after the manner as Men vse to interpret a prophane booke.

In this part touching the exposition of the Scrip-

tures, I can report no deficiency; but by way of remembrance this I will adde, In perusing bookes of Diuinitie, I finde many Bookes of controuersies, and many of common places and treatises, a masse of positive Diuinitie, as it is made an Art: a number of Sermons and Lectures, and many prolix commentaries vpon the Scriptures, with harmonies and concordances: but that forme of writing in Diuinitie, which in my iudgement is of all others most rich and precious, is positive Diuinitie collected vpon particular Texts of Scriptures in brieft obseruations, not dilated into common places: not chafing after controuersies, not reduced into Method of Art, a thing abounding in Sermons, which will vanish, but decrease in bookes which will remaine, and a thing wherein this age excelleth. For I am perswaded, and I may speake it, with an *Absit invidia verba*, and no wayes in derogation of Antiquitie, but as in a good emulation betweene the vine and the oliue, That if the choyse, and best of those obseruations vpon Texts of Scriptures which haue beene made dispersedly in Sermons within this your Maiesties Island of *Brittanie* by the space of these forty yeares and more (leauing out the largeness of exhortations and applications thereupon) had been set downe in a continuance, it had bene the best worke in Diuinitie, which had bene written since the Apostles times.

The matter informed by Diuinity, is of two kinds, matter of beliefe, and truth of opinion: and matter

of seruice, and adoration; which is also iudged and directed by the former: The one being as the inter-nall soule of Religion, and the other as the externall body thereof: and therefore the heathen Religion was not onely a worship of Idols, but the whole Religion was an Idoll in it selfe, for it had no soule, that is, no certaintie of beliefe or confession, as a man may well thinke, considering the chiefe Doctors of their Church, were the Poets, and the reason was, because the heathen Gods were no Iealous Gods, but were glad to be admitted into part, as they had reason. Neither did they respect the purenesse of heart, so they might haue externall honor and rites.

But out of these two doe result and issue foure maine branches of Diuinitie: *Faith, Manners, Ly-turgie, and Government*: *Faith* containeth the Do-ctrine of the Nature of God, of the attributes of God, and of the workes of God; The nature of God consisteth of three persons in vnitie of God-head; The attributes of God are either common to the Deitie, or respectiue to the persons; The workes of God summarie are two, that of the *Creation*, and that of the *Redemption*; And both these workes, as in Totall they appertaine to the vnitie of the God-head: So in their parts they referre to the three persons: That of the *Creation* in the Masse of the Matter to the father, in the disposition of the forme to the Sonne, and in the continuance and conseruation of the being to the Holy Spirit: So that of the *Redemption*, in the election and counsell to the

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Father, in the whole Act and consummation, to the Sonne : and in the application to the Holy spirit : for by the Holy Ghost was Christ conceiued in flesh, and by the Holy Ghost are the elect regenerate in spirit. This work likewise we consider either effectually in the Elect, or priuately in the reprobate, or according to apparence in the visible Church.

For manners, the Doctrine thereof is contained in the law, which discloseth sinne. The law it selfe is diuided according to the edition thereof, into the law of Nature, the law Morall, and the law Positiue; and according to the stile, into Negatiue and Affirmatiue, Prohibitions and Commandements. Sinne in the matter and subiect thereof, is diuided according to the Commandements, in the forme thereof it referreth to the three persons in deitie. Sinnes of infirmitie against the father, whose more speciall attribute is Power : Sinnes of Ignorance against the Sonne,, whose attribute is Wisedome : and sinnes of Malice against the Holy Ghost, whose attribute is Grace or Loue. In the motions of it, it either moueth to the right hand, or to the left, either to blinde deuotion, or to prophane and libertine transgression, either in imposing restraint where God granteth libertie, or in taking libertie where God imposeth restraint. In the degrees & progresse of it, it diuideth it selfe into thought, word, or Act. And in this part I commend much the didueing of the Law God to cases of conscience, for that I take indeede to bee a breaking, and not exhibiting whole

whole of the bread of life. But that which quick-
neth both these Doctrines of faith and Manners is
the elevation and consent of the heart, whereunto
appertaine bookes of exhortation, holy meditati-
on, Christian resolution, and the like.

For the Lyrurgie or seruice, it consisteth of the
reciprocall Acts betweene God and Man, which
on the part of God are the Preaching of the word
and the Sacraments, which are seales to the cou-
nant, or as the visible word: and on the part of
Man, Inuocation of the name of God: and vnder
the Law, Sacrifices, which were as visible prayers
or confessions, but now the adoration being in *spi-
ritu & veritate* there remaineth onely *vituli labio-
rum*, although the vse of holy vowes of thanke ful-
nesse and retribution, may be accounted also as seal-
ed petitions.

And for the Government of the Church, it con-
sisteth of the patrimonie of the church, the fran-
chises of the Church, and the offices, and iurisdic-
tions of the Church, and the Lawes of the Church
directing the whole: All which haue two consi-
derations; the one in themselves: the other how
they stand compatible and agreeable to the Ciuill
Estate.

This matter of Diuinitie is handled either in
forme of instruction of truth: or in forme of con-
futation of falshood. The declinations from Re-
ligion, besides the priuatiue, which is Atheisme, and
the Branches thereof, are three; *Heresies, Idolatrie,*

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and *Witch-craft, Heresies*, when we serue the true God with a false worship. *Idolatrie*, when wee worship false Gods, supposing them to bee true: and *Witch-craft*, when wee adore false Gods, knowing them to be wicked and false. For so your Maiestie doth excellently well obserue, that *Witch-craft* is the height of *Idolatrie*. And yet wee see though these bee true degrees, *Samuel* teacheth vs that they are all of a nature, when there is once a receding from the word of God, for so hee saith, *Quasi Peccatum ariolandi est repugnare, & quasi scelus Idolatria nolite acquiescere.*

These things I haue passed ouer so briefly because I can report no deficiency concerning them: For I can finde no space or ground that lieth vacant and vnfowne in the matter of Diuinitie, so diligent haue men beene, either in sowing of good seede, or in sowing of Tares.

Thus haue I made as it were a small Globe of the Intellectuall world, as truly and faithfully as I could discouer, with a note and description of those parts which seeme to me, not constantly occupate, or not well conuerted by the labour of Man. In which, if I haue in any point receded from that which is commonly receiued, it hath beene with a purpose of proceeding in *melius*, and not in *aliud*: a minde of amendment and proficiencie; and not of change and difference. For I could not be true and constant to the argument I handle, if I were not willing to goe beyond others, but yet not more willing,

willing, then to haue others goe beyond me againe, which may the better appeare by this, that I haue propounded my opinions naked and vnarmed, not seeking to preoccupate the libertie of mens iudgements by cōfutatiōs. For in any thing which is well set down, I am in good hope, that if the first reading moue an obiection, the second reading will make an answer. And in those things wherein I haue erred, I am sure I haue not preiudiced the right by litigious arguments; which certainly haue this contrarie effect and operation, that they adde authoritie to error, and destroy the authoritie of that which is well inuented. For question is an honour and preferment to falshood, as on the other side it is a repulse to truth. But the errors I claime and challenge to my selfe as mine owne. The good, if any bee, is due *Tanquam ad ept sacrificij*, to be incensed to the honour first of the diuine Maiestie, and next of your Maiestie, to whom on earth I am most bounden.

In the first part of the book, the author discusses the nature of the human mind and its faculties. He argues that the mind is not a passive receiver of information, but an active participant in the process of knowledge. He also discusses the importance of education and the role of the teacher in shaping the student's mind.

The author then turns to the question of the soul and its immortality. He argues that the soul is a simple, indivisible substance that is not subject to the laws of matter. He also discusses the relationship between the soul and the body, and the nature of the afterlife.

In the final part of the book, the author discusses the nature of God and the universe. He argues that God is a simple, eternal, and necessary being who is the cause of all things. He also discusses the nature of the universe and the role of human beings in it.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 10th inst. and in reply to inform you that the same has been forwarded to the proper authorities for their consideration. I am, Sir, very respectfully,
 Your obedient servant,
 J. M. Smith

judg^t by Syllogisme commended. 128-124.
Socratical way of disputing, q. et unde. 100.
Diagoras said. Wher^e are many painted that
were drowned. 103.

Common-pleasing commended. 106. 107.

Artificial memory no enemy to Natural. 107.

A character real, q. 109. wher^e used. ibi.

Of Ramondus Lullius's Method. 122.

5th end of Rhetoric is to apply reason
to imagination. 123. quare 125.

Of Hieroglyphics. 210.

If y^e power & nature of words, as the footsteps
& prints of reason. 211. v. Quare B^r Wilkins.

Of the Exact. of syllogism 296 / Of Method. 214.

Ramondus Lullius dispraised. 222.

5th Office of Rhetoric. q. 223. 225.

pedants not contemptible. 16.





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