

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~/NODIS/XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford  
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State  
and Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant  
to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Friday, June 20, 1975

PLACE: The Oval Office  
The White House

Kissinger: [showing a map:] Peres threatened to resign over even this line. So I don't see how you can force an interim settlement on them.

[There was much discussion of the map lines].

You could tell Sadat you forced them back this far and he can probably get two more kilometers. Any more would force Cabinet resignations and there would be no progress at all. If that is not acceptable, there are the two options: An interim settlement or an overall plan. An interim agreement under these circumstances would cause an explosion as big as an overall agreement. If anything goes wrong with an interim, we are in the soup. But an overall is risky because we would have to ride that for a year and a half. They also want \$2.5 billion -- even for this line.

The President: Not from me.

Kissinger: They don't want a shuttle before the 13th.

Sadat has three options: To buy the Israeli option, so it would be settled by the middle of August. Or he rejects it and we impose an American interim or overall settlement. If you go to the interim you would have to say that get no aid bill until they accept. We would be stuck with all the consequences. And then the Syrians would demand equal American pressure for them.



CLASSIFIED BY Henry A. Kissinger  
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION  
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
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E.O. 12958, SEC. 2.5


NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, *State lev: ew 3/9/04*  
BY wh NARA DATE 5/20/04

I will get all the implications of our interim and overall solutions written up over the weekend. Rabin agree [almost] to put forward the cosmetic proposal on Golan as a unilateral one. If we could get that with a painless interim solution, you could then get through our elections and go for a settlement after the election. The Golan gesture could be about November. Then next year we could put out an overall proposal in general terms -- it wouldn't be enough, but it would get us by. That is my ideal scenario. The problem with the overall is what do you do next March. It would be popular right now with everyone but the Jews.

The President: But if we put forward an interim and it is turned down, we could then say we did our best.

Kissinger: Let's think these over over the weekend. I don't see any sense in putting forward an overall one unless you put on aid restrictions until they accept. Restrict them to previous levels -- \$700 million. Next year is not a good one for you to be in a brawl with the Jews. What Sadat has to understand is what is doable on any of the three options.

With Khaddam, don't put forward the overall idea so forcefully. Say we want progress; we don't want to split the Arabs. On Golan, I would say we won't agree to Israel keeping all the Golan. I have usually said that the Golan should be worked out in a settlement, and I assume Syria wouldn't agree to anything unacceptable. There probably, as a practical matter, will have to be a demilitarization arrangement.



1. 30 Hilo }  
2. 15 Filto }

✓ P/R 20 June 75

K. Peres threatened to resign over it even this time  
So I don't see how you can force an interim  
settlement then.

(Much discussion on my lines)  
You could tell Sadat you paid them back this  
(points) for + can get get 2 more hours. Any  
more would force cabinet resign + no pay at all.  
If that not acceptable then are 2 options: ~~the~~  
An interim settlement + overall plan. Interim  
under these circumstances would cause explosion  
as big as overall. If anything goes wrong w/ an  
interim, we are in a sorry. But an overall  
is risky because we would have to risk that  
for a year & a half.

They ~~to~~ also want 2.5 bil - even for this time.

P Not from me.

K They don't want shuttle before 13 <sup>th</sup>. But that is so

Sadat has 3 options: buy a F option, middle of Amg  
settled. Or he rejects + we negotiate over US interim  
or overall. If you go interim you would have  
to say no and hold till they accept. We would be stuck  
w/ ~~no~~ <sup>sell</sup> consequences. And then a Syrian would  
demand equal US pressure for them.

I will get all the implications for an interim +  
overall solutions written up over a weekend  
Rabin agreed (advised) to put forward a committee  
proposal on Golan as a unilateral one.



If we could get that w/a parallel interim solution you could then get them on election & go for settlement after election. The Golan problem could be about now. Then next year we could put out an overall proposal in general terms - it wouldn't be long but would get us by. That my ideal scenario. Part w/overall is what do you do next March. It would be popular right now as <sup>are but</sup> ~~everything~~ Jews.

P But if we put forward interim & it is turned down, we could then say we did our best.

K Let's think these over once more. I don't see any harm in putting forward an overall one unless you put on any restrictions until they accept. Restrict to previous levels (700 miles). Next year is not a good one for you to be in a brawl w/c Jews. What Sadat wants understood is what is do-able on any of 3 options.

W/Khaddam, don't put forward overall so forcefully. Say we can't pay, we don't want to split the Arabs. On Golan, I would say we won't agree to I hoping all the Golan. I had recently said that the Golan should be included in a settlement & you assume Syria wouldn't agree to anything unacceptable. There probably as a practical matter will have to be a ~~deal~~ <sup>deal</sup> ~~arrangement~~ <sup>arrangement</sup>.

