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Country Profile

South Korea

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY

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GENERAL SURVEY CHAPTERS

COUNTRY PROFILE integrated perspective of the subject country • Chronology • Area Brief • Summary Map

THE SOCIETY Social structure • Population • Employment • Living conditions • Social problems • Health • Religion • Education • Artistic expression • Public Information

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS Political evolution of the state • Governmental strength and stability • Structure and functioning of government • Political dynamics • National policies • Threats to stability • Internal security • The police • Countersubversion and counterinsurgency capabilities

THE ECONOMY Appraisal of the economy • Its structure—agriculture, fisheries, forestry, fuels and power, metals and minerals, manufacturing and construction • Domestic trade • Economic policy and development • Manpower • International economic relations

TRANSPORTATION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS Appraisal of systems • Strategic mobility • Railroads • Highways • Inland waterways • Pipelines • Ports • Merchant marine • Civil air • Airfields • The telecom system

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ARMED FORCES The defense establishment • Joint activities • Ground forces • Naval forces • Air forces • Paramilitary

INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY Structure of organizations concerned with internal security and foreign intelligence • Their responsibilities, professional standards, and interrelationships • Mission, organization, functions, effectiveness, and methods of operation of each service • Biographies of key officials

This General Survey supersedes the one dated July 1968, copies of which should be destroyed.

SOUTH KOREA

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
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A Protege's Progress

The "special relationship" that exists between the United States and South Korea (Republic of Korea—ROK) developed from the defeat of Japan in World War II, and particularly as a result of U.S. support in blood and treasure following the outbreak of the Korean war in June 1950. Since that time U.S. forces have remained in South Korea to bolster its defenses. In return, South Korea provides a base that enables the United States to maintain a forward defense position in the Far East. More recently, ROK troops stood alongside the U.S. forces in serving as South Vietnam's principal allies. South Korea, moreover, is becoming an increasingly significant trading partner and an attractive location for U.S. investment. (U/OU)

To Koreans, at least, this relationship is both more natural and has deeper roots than is generally realized by Americans. Throughout most of its more than thousand year history as a unified country, Korea was under Chinese protection, but when China declined and fell prey to European imperialism in the 19th century, Korea was left exposed to rival Japanese and Russian ambitions to gain control of the strategic Korean Peninsula. Like Japan, Korea had gone into seclusion

in the early 17th century and, as the "Hermit Kingdom," isolated itself from all foreign contacts, except those with China. This isolation was ended abruptly in 1876 when Japan, aping Commodore Perry, sent a military expedition to the port of Chemulp'o (now Inch'on)* and "opened the door" to Korea. Unable to protect Korea, China advised it to negotiate treaties with the Western powers in order to establish a body of foreign interests sufficiently extensive to thwart any dangerous expansion of Japanese influence. Beginning in 1882, therefore, Korea concluded a treaty of friendship and commerce with the United States and by 1886 had negotiated similar agreements with all major European powers. The United States secured the lead over the other Western powers because many Koreans, aware of American commercial interest in their country and often acquainted with American missionaries and educators, had come to feel that the United States did not have the territorial ambitions of Japan and the other great powers and thus might make an ideal successor to China as Korea's patron and defender. (U/OU)

*For diacritics on place names see the list of names on the apron of the Summary Map and the map itself.

The U.S.-Korean Treaty of 1882 seemed to meet both Korean and Chinese hopes because it included a clause that promised America's "good offices" in any difficulties Korea might have with a third nation. The Koreans were disillusioned, however, to discover that this clause remained a dead letter against persistent Japanese encroachment and, finally, annexation of their country in 1910. Korean hopes were dashed in 1919, when they found that President Wilson's principle of national self-determination was applied in Europe but not to Asia. Hope was not raised again until World War II when the Allied Powers promised at Cairo in 1943 to liberate Korea and make it a free and independent state "in due course" after Japan's defeat. Fulfillment of this promise was thwarted after Japan's collapse, however, when the United States and the U.S.S.R., becoming locked in the "cold war," were unable to agree on the form of a united Korean state. The result was that the arbitrary division of Korea at the 38th parallel—a temporary expedient adopted in 1945 for the sole purpose of accepting the surrender of Japanese forces then in the country—was frozen. By mid-1948 two separate states had emerged, the Republic of Korea in the south and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the north. (U/OU)

The partition disrupted the Korean economy because most of the mineral ores and most of the modern economic infrastructure that Japan had developed were in the north. Lacking an industrial base, the largely agricultural South needed massive foreign economic aid to survive. The South Koreans felt that the United States, having participated in the division of the country, was responsible for supporting them. The United States, therefore, was obliged to shoulder the burden of supporting the less naturally endowed but more populous South. After the ROK Government was established, the United States considered it had largely fulfilled its obligations and, after Soviet forces had been withdrawn from the North, withdrew all of its forces in mid-1949, leaving only an ongoing economic aid agreement and a small military advisory group. (U/OU)

In June 1950 Soviet-equipped North Korean forces launched a highly successful surprise attack across the

38th parallel and quickly overran most of the South. By September, U.N. forces under U.S. command had driven the North Koreans out of the South, but when they then drove on toward the Manchurian border Chinese "volunteers" entered the war in great strength. After much shifting back and forth, a military front was eventually stabilized along the 38th parallel and an armistice signed in July 1953. The war reduced South Korea to complete dependence on the United States, and even after the war massive infusions of U.S. aid were required for relief and reconstruction as well as for equipping and maintaining the army of 600,000 men that the South felt it needed to guard against renewed attack from the North. The extensive and continuing U.S. commitment can be gauged from the fact that economic aid to South Korea totaled \$5.6 billion during U.S. FY1946-72 and military aid \$5.7 billion during FY 1950-72. (U/OU)

In the 20 years since the armistice was signed at P'anmunjon, South Korea's economic dependence on the United States has been greatly reduced. It is a success story largely of the 1960's, during which the ROK Government under President Pak dedicated itself to a major effort to develop a viable economy, alleviate widespread poverty, and lessen dependence on foreign aid. Two successive and highly successful 5-year plans (1962-71) made it possible to virtually terminate U.S. grant aid by the end of the 1960's. In the military realm, South Korea is still heavily dependent on the United States for sophisticated weapons systems and modernization in general, but South Korea now shoulders a major portion of its defense burden. (U/OU)

Internationally, the Pak government has progressively broadened its contacts and role, normalizing relations with Korea's ancient foe, Japan, in 1965 and winning diplomatic recognition from a growing number of states (88 in mid-1973). A Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the United States in 1966 accorded South Korea a proud symbol of equality, and its military participation in South Vietnam was considered by Seoul to represent an important role in world affairs, as well as a measure of its continued close ties with the United States. (U/OU)


Since the birth of the republic, South Korea has taken on the character of a wayward ward rather than that of a puppet. Its venerable but wily and irascible first president, Syngman Rhee, was the undoing of many an American adviser and of some important U.S. policies, particularly during the Korean war. While the present President, who first came to power through a military coup in 1961, finally came around—in response to U.S. prodding and the pressure of public opinion—to the restoration of civilian government in 1963, a decade later he similarly demonstrated his independence of U.S. sensitivities by an abrupt abandonment of all but the most superficial trappings of democracy. (C)

An equally striking manifestation of Seoul's independent initiative was the opening of secret, high-level talks with North Korea in early 1972 looking

toward reunification of the peninsula. Pointing to the "delicacy" of his negotiations with the North, in late 1972 President Pak assumed almost complete dictatorial control by proclaiming martial law and carrying out a sweeping reorganization of the government. Whether or not such steps were necessary, ROK diplomacy since that time has moved more rapidly and flexibly than before. (U/OU)

Despite Seoul's new confidence in its ability to talk to P'yongyang, its moves on the domestic front could over time critically undermine the Pak regime. The great strides made in modernizing not only the military machine but also most aspects of material existence, which have encouraged Pak to venture upon reunification talks, may be brought to naught if domestic opinion becomes disaffected with the increasingly autocratic rule which he has imposed. (C)

A Shrimp Among Whales (u/cā)



When Allied victory in World War II freed the Koreans from almost 40 years of increasingly harsh control by Imperial Japan, they had anticipated finally winning the national self-determination that had been denied them after World War I through establishment of a free, independent, and united Korea. Instead, the country was sundered for the first time in a thousand years, and each of the truncated halves became in fact the ward of one of the two superpowers.

Wardship, however, is nothing new to Korea. The pattern of the "client-state" has prevailed throughout most of the peninsula's long history. China was the patron, and the relationship was specifically cast in Confucian terms of the mutual obligations of elder and younger brother. In practice, thus usually meant a fairly flexible relationship and considerable autonomy for the Korean protege. Although the Korean kings received their authority at the hands of the Chinese emperor and followed his lead in foreign policy, Korea largely retained control of its internal affairs. At times, particularly early in the history of the Korean monarchy and near its end, when China was weak, efforts were made to assert full independence from foreign rule, but for the most part Korea had to temper its course in deference to greater power on its frontiers.

This subservient role was forced on Korea by geography. In the history of East Asia, the Korean Peninsula has been a critical crossroads where larger and stronger powers have seesawed back and forth in centuries of struggle. The welfare and wishes of the Koreans, even after they had come to constitute a relatively sizable nation, were almost invariably ignored. The ambitions and quarrels of its larger neighbors have thus brought the unhappy peninsula more than its share of bridgeheads, battlefields, and buffer states.

Since prehistoric times nomads from Central Asia have collided with the more settled peoples on the eastern fringes of the Asian continent and invaded the Korean peninsula; some even pushed on and crossed the sea to Japan. Refugees from ancient dynastic struggles in China escaped to Korea, and were subsequently followed by invading Chinese armies. To hold the northern half of the peninsula, the Chinese planted

a flourishing colony in northwestern Korea which introduced the civilization of China to the Koreans and served as a buffer against the northern barbarians from approximately 100 B.C. to A.D. 300. From then until the late 19th century, the rulers of China usually retained paramount influence in Korea without any direct presence there. Since early in the Christian era the Japanese also sought intermittently to exert control over part or all of the peninsula—on occasion as a bridgehead and base for operations against China. In the late 19th century colossal Tsarist Russia came into the contest in its search for warm-water ports in the Far East. In two short wars around the turn of the 20th century Japan defeated both China and Russia, with hapless Korea as a battleground and the eventual victim. The peninsula's pivotal position has brought little but suffering to its people, who have a proverb, "When whales fight, the shrimp suffers."

In one sense, however, geography has helped the Koreans by providing clear natural frontiers within which a remarkably homogeneous population developed at an early date possessing a strong sense of separate identity. Deeply entrenched rivers and rough mountainous terrain along the peninsula's long northern base impede easy access from the Asian mainland. On the other three sides, Korea is separated from its neighbors by wide stretches of the Yellow and East China Seas and by the Sea of Japan. Except for sporadic raids from China and Japan in ancient and medieval times and a major Japanese invasion in the late 16th century, the encircling seas remained largely inviolate until the latter half of the 19th century, when French, U.S., and Japanese warships penetrated "Hermit Kingdom" waters.

Within the well-defined confines of their peninsula the ancient Koreans developed a distinct and remarkable uniformity of physique, language, and culture that clearly sets them apart from their neighbors. With few resident foreigners and no minorities, the Koreans, North and South, constitute perhaps the most homogeneous of the major ethnic groups possessing independent (if divided) statehood today. Numbering almost 50 million, the Koreans are the 13th largest ethnic group in the world today. The

Korean language, temperament, dress, and cuisine are distinct and contrast sharply with those of their neighbors. The proverbial quick temper and volatility of the Koreans contribute to that rebellious spirit which has won them the sobriquet, "the Irish of the East," and has helped preserve their independent identity in the face of foreign encroachment.

Although mountains and waters clearly demarcate the peninsula for its inhabitants, these natural features also produce more than a dozen topographic divisions in the South alone which make central control and communication difficult. The South is almost as mountainous as the North, with the major mountain chain running along the east coast and sending a spur southwestward down the middle of the peninsula. Hilly or mountainous terrain takes up at least three-fourths of the country's area. Offshore South Korea has more than 600 inhabited islands, several of them 60 miles or more at sea; the largest and most important of all is Cheju-do, a separate province in the East China Sea.

Despite such geographic diversity—or perhaps because of its potential threat to political unity—Korean rulers early imposed a remarkable measure of political and cultural homogeneity. Customs, behavior, dress, and even folklore have usually borne the standardized stamp of the capital as a result of the ruler's policy, which frequently included regular rotation or exile of court officials to all parts of the country. The basic belief of the North Asian population, shamanism—still widespread today—was carefully overlaid with higher religions from China, first Buddhism and then Confucianism, which were also used to support centralized control.

Although the systematic introduction of Confucianism as the court philosophy caused some friction with the vested interests of Buddhism when a new dynasty took power in the 14th century, it never led to any serious division of the country. Confucianism cultivated a uniform pattern of behavior and the sense of belonging to a homogeneous, if hierarchical, family of all Koreans. Many Buddhists continued to practice their faith in peace, as much later a small but rapidly increasing minority of Christians could, after an initial

period of fierce official persecution. As in China and Japan, the people of Korea have been generally tolerant of all religions except when they appeared to be linked to the political ambitions of foreign powers.

The Confucian code had the most profound impact of all the aspects of Chinese civilization borrowed by Korea. Not only did it serve to provide the pattern governing Korea's relations with China but it also produced the ethical foundation and the hierarchic framework for Korean society. Korean etiquette came to be rigidly molded along Confucian lines, helping to curb and control the boisterous ebullience and rebelliousness of the Korean temperament so that in most circumstances Koreans strove to maintain a staid sobriety or a patient stoicism. Above all, Confucianism served to buttress the claims of the state.

The need of a strong, central authority apparently became manifest very early in Korean history, well before the adoption of Confucianism. It arose from centuries of struggle between the small entities which first contested control of the central and southern parts of the Peninsula. Such contests soon invited the intervention of outside powers. About the third century A.D., three clans of tribal groups, known collectively as Han, shared control of the tip of the peninsula. Their name survives today in the official title taken by South Korea: *Taehan Minguk*, (Great Han People's Country). One of these clans had close ties to, and probably support from, Japan. It was eventually defeated and incorporated into a kingdom of Silla built up by its rival to the east. When Japanese influence shifted to a second kingdom in the southwest, Silla sought Chinese aid against that kingdom and a third one to the north. During the three centuries of this "Three Kingdom Era" it became clear to the Koreans that their internal rivalries were being exploited to aggrandize foreign powers, a lesson they have not yet forgotten. Silla managed to unify most of the peninsula in the late seventh century with Chinese aid, and then forced China to withdraw its armies, allowing Silla to become tributary but autonomous, a Confucian younger brother.

Silla's success inaugurated a golden age with a brilliant efflorescence of art and learning under

Chinese Buddhist influence. All Koreans look back with pride to this period, particularly the South Koreans who since 1950 see in the unification of the peninsula launched from Silla's original "Pusan perimeter" in the extreme southeast an auspicious augury for our day.

During the Silla dynasty (676-918), Korea was ruled by kings—and frequently by strong queens—assisted by a powerful hereditary nobility legitimized by a rigid system of ranks. The administrative system was organized mainly on the Chinese model, under which officials, military and civil, were chosen through highly rigorous civil service examinations. This system continued relatively unchanged throughout the two succeeding dynasties and has had a marked impact on Korean society. The Silla dynasty was overthrown in the 10th century by a general who established the Kingdom (and dynasty) of Koryo (918-1392), from which the name Korea is derived. Korea soon came to occupy much its present overall boundaries and the peninsula remained united for the next thousand years. It was not divided again into separate states until after World War II. The country, however, was not spared war and devastation during this long period. The later Koryo period was truly a time of troubles. The Mongols, expanding across Eurasia from the Danube to the Yalu, conquered China and invaded Korea. Koryo managed to resist for almost 30 years, but finally capitulated in 1250. Korean kings were married to Mongol princesses, and many court ladies were sent to Peking as hostages or members of the Mongol Emperor's harem. The Koreans were subjected to great cruelty and hardship, especially when they were obliged to assist the Mongols in their two unsuccessful attempts in the late 13th century to invade Japan. The Koreans sustained heavy losses in men, ships, and supplies when a typhoon (*Kamikaze*, the "heavenly wind") largely destroyed the Mongol armadas. The Mongols were diverted from another attempt on Japan by troubles in Indochina and elsewhere, but kept their yoke over Korea intact for nearly another century. Further suffering came to Korea when Chinese forces, rebelling against the Mongols' waning grip, raided across the Yalu, once

more laying waste the north. In addition, throughout this period, Japanese freebooters, who developed sea-raids as a way of life, kept up continuing attacks against the coasts of Korea, even raiding the island refuge where the Korean kings had long escaped the Mongols, and burning Hanyang (now Seoul) to the ground.

The Koryo dynasty did not long outlive the collapse of Mongol rule in China in 1368. An anti-Mongol Korean general, Yi Song-gye, set up his capital on the site of Seoul, overthrowing the Koryo king in 1392 and establishing the Yi dynasty, which reigned until the Japanese annexed Korea in 1910. The Yi revived the ancient name of Choson for Korea, which is the official name used by the North Koreans today. During the Yi dynasty, Confucianism replaced Buddhism as the state religion and Confucian political and social ideals became the national standard. As in China, good government was regarded as possible only under a virtuous, paternalistic ruler and his morally and intellectually excellent scholar-officials. As in the two earlier dynasties, the civil service was recruited on the Chinese pattern of rigorous competitive examinations. Successful candidates, known as *yangban*, entered either civil or military service. In theory, as in China, the examinations were open to all aspirants, but in the later Koryo and Yi dynasties they became limited in practice mainly to the affluent, who could afford the leisure to master the Confucian classics. The term *yangban* came generally to stand for the landed nobility, and today has become roughly synonymous with "gentleman."

This small elite group of scholar-officials set the pattern of administrative authoritarianism which has characterized so much of the Korean political experience. The claims of a rigid and increasingly sterile orthodoxy left little room for flexibility or mobility of any sort. Political struggle took the form of bureaucratic in-fighting, the most obvious form of the factionalism which seems to be endemic in all Korean activities.

Despite Korea's internal and external woes, the very high level of artistic expression achieved during the Silla dynasty was revived and developed in both the

Koryo and Yi eras, during which Korea made some noteworthy contributions to world culture. In ceramics, Korean artists elaborated on Chinese styles and techniques, passing them on to Japan, and made an original contribution to coloring in the blues and greens of Korea's unique celadon ware. In painting a similar development took place, with Korean artists-scholars carrying calligraphy in Chinese characters to a perfection unmatched—and widely admired—by their Chinese masters. Even where the Koreans did not add distinct contributions, they preserved and passed on to the modern age arts which died out in China, such as the ancient classical court music. In technology and learning there were also some remarkable achievements. Along with skill in metal casting came the use of movable metal type for printing well before it was known in the West. Shortly thereafter the Koreans invented a phonetic system of writing which, however, did not come into general use until modern times because the *yangban* wished to preserve their monopoly of learning in the much more complicated Chinese ideographic script. Despite such occasional blighting of native Korean innovations by the overwhelming prestige of Chinese civilization, the Koreans developed a rich, vigorous, and quite distinct culture of their own.

In the late 16th and early 17th centuries, Korea experienced renewed foreign invasions. In 1592 the Japanese launched a full-scale invasion as part of an ambitious plan to conquer China. The Koreans suffered great reverses and the country was ravaged, but Chinese aid and the death of the Japanese ruler, Hideyoshi, saved them. The war produced one of Korea's great national heroes, Admiral Yi Sun-sin, who defeated the Japanese fleet in an engagement in which he used the world's first iron-clad vessel, a tortoise-shaped warship. The abortive Japanese invasion was followed by the successful Manchu conquest of Korea in 1627 and of China in 1644. Korea was to remain a Chinese vassal state under the Manchu dynasty until the end of the 19th century when Russian and Japanese power displaced Chinese influence.

These great invasions reinforced the Koreans' long-standing desire to avoid all unnecessary foreign

contacts. Much earlier their kings had supplemented Korea's natural barriers by a small version of China's Great Wall across the peninsula's narrow neck near the 39th parallel. In the 17th century Korea preceded Japan in closing its door to foreigners, and it even discouraged commercial activity and the mining of precious metals to avoid arousing the avarice of foreign interests. Korea tried to remain the "Hermit Kingdom" even after Japan was forced to open its door to the West, but when Japan itself applied Perry's tactics, Korea succumbed and in 1876 signed a treaty opening Pusan, and subsequently two other ports to foreign trade. There ensued growing pressure from Western nations—especially from the United States, France, Russia, and Great Britain—which evoked considerable internal dissension over how much contact should be allowed, and with whom. Powerful and bitterly hostile factions aligned themselves either behind Korea's traditional patron and protector, China, or one of the rival neighbors, Russia or Japan. China hastened to have the Koreans open relations with other Western powers to offset Japanese predominance, at the same time seeing that China's suzerainty over Korea was recognized.

In 1894 an antforeign rebellion led to Chinese and Japanese intervention and subsequently to the Sino-Japanese war. Victorious Japan forced China to abandon any claim to a special position in Korea. Conservative, anti-Japanese forces within the country then turned to Russia for support, and helped the Russians gain concessions for raw materials in northern Korea. The Russians helped Korea reorganize its finances and its army and then moved to acquire naval bases on the southeastern and southwestern corners of the peninsula. Although the British and Japanese, fearing the establishment of Russian control of the Korea Strait and the entrance to the Yellow Sea, jointly blocked the Russian move, Russia continued to pursue its ambitions. The Japanese ultimately responded by launching a surprise attack in February 1904 on the Russian fleet. Engagements were fought off the Korean coasts and Japan made full use of Korea as a base of operations, despite Korea's declaration of neutrality. After Russia's defeat in 1905, Korea became

a Japanese protectorate, and in 1910 it was annexed and became part of the Japanese Empire.

To 20th century Koreans, their country's subjugation as a colony of Japan seemed the cruelest of the many blows Korea has suffered. The efforts of all prior governments to preserve Korean autonomy had failed. Korea lay supine and subject to harsh Japanese rule. Nevertheless, something remained of the past heritage and some gains were made under the Japanese. Japan did much to modernize Korea, even though this was done merely to integrate the area into the Japanese Empire and to make it a strong jumping-off point for the later Japanese invasions of Manchuria and China proper. While Korea served primarily as a source of raw materials for Japan, agriculture and irrigation were greatly improved, lands reclaimed, and roads, railroads and harbors were built. A modern infrastructure was begun, and Japanese rule brought unaccustomed efficiency and a stability that had not been known in the peninsula for almost a century.

Despite economic gains, heavy-handed Japanese rule and subordination of Korean interests to those of Japan produced a chronic discontent that gave birth to a modern nationalist movement. The high point of this largely peaceful movement was a massive demonstration of 1 March 1919—Samil Day—now a great national holiday, inspired by Woodrow Wilson's principle of national self-determination. It was brutally repressed, and henceforth opposition to Japanese rule was largely organized by Korean refugees in the United States, the Soviet Union, and China. One such

refugee, Dr. Syngman Rhee (Yi Sung-man), schooled both in the Korean classics and at Harvard and Princeton, became head of a Provisional Korean Government abroad in 1919. He finally returned to Korea in 1945 and became the first President of the Republic of (South) Korea in 1948 under a constitution establishing a strong presidential form of government. He seemed a natural choice as Korea's foremost patriot, being a descendant (distant) of the last reigning family and possessing the proper Confucian credentials.

Unfortunately for the fate of Korean democracy, Syngman Rhee fell too easily into the old monarchical pattern, and after the Korean war he grew increasingly despotic in advanced age. He was forced to resign in April 1960 after arbitrary and fraudulent elections had sparked a nationwide "student revolution" which the military quieted but refused to quell. A caretaker government produced a revised constitution for the "Second Republic" that changed the form of government from the presidential to the parliamentary type and carried through the most democratic elections in ROK history. Under Prime Minister Chang Myon (John M. Chang), the experiment in parliamentary democracy proved short lived. Chang was overturned in May 1961 by a cabal of "young colonels," and Maj. Gen. Pak Chong-hui became head of the junta's Supreme Council for National Reconstruction. In 1963 Pak was formally elected President of the "Third Republic," and South Korea reverted, in theory at least, to civilian, constitutional government.

Material Modernization: The "Miracle on the Han" (u/ou)



During the period of Japanese administration, the Korean economy was developed essentially as a complement to the Japanese economy. A substantial industrial complex developed in the northern part of the country based largely on local raw materials and power, but the southern part remained heavily agrarian in character and developed only a thin veneer of small-scale industry. The material benefits from such development, however, were largely monopolized by the Japanese. In manufacturing, for example, 90% of the capital and 80% of the skilled labor were Japanese; very few Koreans acquired any technical or managerial skills. With Japan's defeat in 1945, the Korean economy virtually collapsed, having already been drained to a very low level in the course of

Japan's long and increasingly desperate war effort; production fell 75% and 60% of the industrial labor force was unemployed. The division of the peninsula at the 38th parallel in 1945 was another great blow because the South found itself left with the best agricultural land, a surplus of unskilled labor, but little else. At the birth of the Republic in 1948, the standard of living in the country was actually lower than it had been in prewar days.

Less than 2 years later came the holocaust: all-out fratricidal war launched across the 38th parallel by the North Korean Communists, supported with Soviet material and, shortly thereafter, by massive Chinese intervention. During the war, nearly 1 million civilians were killed or wounded, and more than 5

million—about one-quarter of the population—were displaced. Property damage was estimated at between \$2 and \$3 billion. Following the war, the need to maintain one of the world's largest armies was far beyond the economy's capacity. As a result, through the 1950's the vicious cycle of poverty, inflation, and overwhelming dependence on U.S. and other foreign aid continued. Nevertheless, in several ways, the war and its results paved the way for solutions to South Korea's economic and social, if not its political, problems. Much of the old order was swept away, in some measure simplifying the social system. The traditional order was undermined by the weakening of the hold of the family on its members in the wartime chaos, by the influence of foreign troops and technicians, and by war-born urbanization.

Modernization was primarily the result of the creation of a modern and effective military force and extensive U.S. aid. The almost overnight build-up of South Korea's army during the Korean war brought with it rapid mobilization of the population. Thousands of farm boys were enlisted and exposed for the first time to modern organization and technology. Far beyond this, however, was the appearance of a huge subsociety—the military organization—something quite foreign to Korean tradition and general experience.

Prior to liberation in 1945, a small nucleus of Korean officers had been trained by the Japanese in Japan or Manchuria. A few others were trained in China or Russia and were engaged largely in guerrilla-type operations against the Japanese in Korea. During 1946-48, the U.S. forces in South Korea organized and trained a small constabulary from a variety of such elements. Its leaders were mostly bitter rivals because of the factionalism generated by their diverse backgrounds and experience. Following the establishment of the republic, this constabulary was converted with U.S. assistance into an army that had reached nearly 100,000 men by the outbreak of the Korean war. During the war, the army was expanded almost seven fold; the ROK Army today has over 500,000 men and is the fifth largest in the world.

U.S. military assistance has helped to make the ROK military forces by far the most modern entity in South Korea, possessed of technological and managerial skills still scarce in the society at large. The army replaced President Syngman Rhee's ubiquitous police as the dominant force in the land. It possesses a very different outlook and morale, having been exposed to concepts of national ideals and goals far above the limited loyalties of the police. Training in the United States, particularly of some of the senior officers of the postwar crop, has helped develop managerial skills of great potential value for South Korea's economy.

The cutting edge of this new force in Korean society is the officer class, both commissioned and noncommissioned. This class has come to constitute a social group rivaling in numbers the traditionally prestigious teaching profession, which has maintained its wonted precedence by also expanding rapidly, having presided over the educational explosion that has occurred since 1945. Both groups have their followers: the officers with their men; the teachers and intellectuals with great hordes of students, concentrated primarily in the capital where so many new educational institutions have sprung up. Both groups are far more modern in their outlook—though in different ways—than the society around them, and both became increasingly impatient with the stagnation and corruption during the 1950's under the Rhee regime. In sequence, they engineered a major generational change that brought Rhee's regime down and subsequently established a very different order.

Determined young officers saw economic development as a way both to end Korea's crushing poverty and its humiliating dependence upon the United States. A military coup was briefly forestalled by the student revolution, whose democratic leaders appeared to share the young officers' ideals, though not their authoritarian methods. When delay and indecision on the part of the hitherto untried and little understood democracy as established by Prime Minister Chang Myon seemed to offer little hope for the economic reforms that the young military officers wanted at once, they seized power in May 1961 and set up the

Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (SCNR), which thereupon undertook a military-led modernization of the whole country.

General Pak Chong-hui, one of the few older officers associated with the 1961 coup, headed the SCNR. He was elected President in 1963, when the government was "civilianized" under a revised constitution that returned government to the strong presidential type of Rhee's time. The constitution was further amended in 1969 and 1972 to give Pak even greater leeway. President Pak is a peasant's son whose military career was boosted by the prestigious prewar officer training he had undergone in Japan. His twin goals for Korea reflect his background as a peasant and as an officer: agricultural improvement and technological advancement. He is a good example of the modern, scientifically trained officer who nevertheless retains a deep bias against urban life and politicians. Democratic political values have been subordinated to economic considerations under Pak, as under the Japanese. In fact, in many ways Pak's Korea is reminiscent of the bureaucratic, economy-oriented, militarily efficient, depoliticized, and rigidly anti-communist regime under Japan. The great difference of course is that it is a strongly nationalistic government of, by, and for Koreans.

In any case, the Pak regime has reaped remarkable economic results. Under a series of 5-year plans, natural resources and manpower have been mobilized to achieve economic modernization. Although the Pak government has resorted to centralized planning, governmental direction and support, and even outright public ownership and operation, it has eschewed any reference to socialism and describes the country as a "capitalist showcase." By and large, the government has not been coercive and has carried out its economic plans pragmatically and with deft flexibility. The South Koreans like to look to West Germany as an example of the successful survival of a divided country; they point with pride to their own "Miracle on the Han." (The Han River is the "Korean Rhine" and the nation's main inland waterway.)

South Korea achieved an economic breakthrough in the mid-1960's which has basically altered the

economy. Sparked by an expansion of manufacturing, which about doubled its contribution to the gross national product (GNP) between 1961 and 1971, the real GNP grew at the extraordinarily high average rate of about 10% annually. During the decade, per capita GNP rose from \$100 to over \$250. The government has already set a goal to achieve a per capita GNP of \$1,000 by 1980; even half that in real terms would be a great jump. During the 1960's living standards improved, particularly in the cities. In the process, South Korea is becoming more urban than some of the industrialized countries of Europe; it is moving out of the less-developed category and may be considered a semideveloped country. In late 1972 the Director of the Economic Planning Board foresaw South Korea achieving a self-supporting economy in the 1980's.

In the meantime, however, South Korea remains heavily dependent on its ability to continue to reduce imports and expand exports, and on continued infusions of foreign capital, including aid as well as investment. In these respects, Seoul depends heavily on economic relations with the United States and Japan. These two countries account for about 70% of ROK exports, 67% of its imports, 90% of foreign private investment, and the bulk of official economic aid.

The most immediate economic problems facing the Pak regime include inflation, a lagging agricultural sector, inadequate housing and other largely urban ills, and the growing inequality of incomes making for large, depressed sectors of the population. Basic services are still unavailable to many, particularly in the urban slums. Poor sanitation, industrial pollution, and a high incidence of disease and delinquency plague many Korean poor and detract from the success of industrial progress. The Pak government, concerned with a population growth rate of nearly 3% between 1955 and 1965, has succeeded in cutting it down to about 2%, primarily through birth-control measures. Abortion has recently been legalized and the government's goal is to reduce the rate of growth to 1% by 1981. Social welfare is still largely in private hands, though the regime has talked about moving in a comprehensive way to meet the crying need for action in this field.

"Spiritual" Modernization (u/ou)



Proliferating universities are attended by nearly 200,000 students—including 50,000 coeds—almost a 2,000% increase since the end of World War II

The group of junior officers who brought Pak Chong-hui to power in 1961 had no political program other than to weed out corruption and accelerate economic modernization. They claimed they were only carrying through the unfinished business of the student revolution of the previous year to save Korean democracy from corrupt, inefficient, older-generation politicians. However, they felt the need for an ideology more attuned to the modern world but compatible with the Confucian heritage, with which Pak and most of his associates are still deeply imbued. They sought some systematic guide to action which would at least popularize their economic goals and help mobilize

public support. Because of passions aroused by the Korean war, anticommunism was a cardinal tenet for the military—as it was for most older Koreans. Nevertheless, anticommunism had been so abusively exploited by President Rhee that it could no longer have the vigor of a fresh appeal and could not arouse the fervor that the colonels required in order to rally popular support.

Democracy as an ideology also had drawbacks for the military. Rhee had consistently abused presidential powers, and his successor, Chang Myon, had been too indecisive and his supporters too beset by factionalism to win any wide support for his own hopeful democratic experiment. Nevertheless, Pak recognized the strong attachment to the democratic ideal of most articulate Koreans, as demonstrated by the students and intellectuals during the upheaval in 1960. He has professed his adherence to democratic principles but also has warned against a democracy "imported lock, stock, and barrel" from the United States, recommending instead a "Koreanized form of welfare democracy." Even today the Pak regime preserves the forms of constitutional democracy, however far it has departed from its spirit.

Because Korea has been subjected to such sweeping, kaleidoscopic changes in the space of just one generation, there are insistent demands for a new spiritual identity. Both the student revolution and the military coup were carried out by representatives of a younger, very different postwar generation. Its members had been more exposed to modern education and a variety of new influences and sources of information. They were the first generation to be broadly educated in the native script, *Hangul*, a truly more national means of self-expression than the Chinese writing system formerly prescribed. Thanks to the easier, popular script and the "educational explosion" of the postwar era, literacy has jumped from about 21% in 1945 to 88% in 1970. Literacy is no longer the privilege of a small, exclusive elite; its spread ended the elite's monopoly of power, weakened the authority of the family and of class distinctions, and brought rural areas into touch with the modern city and its life. Combined with the impact of the war-born urbanization, postwar educa-

tion developed a new, widespread consciousness of social and political affairs which could not be ignored.

At the same time, it was becoming clear that Korea would remain divided for some time to come. Rhee's strident calls for a "March North" were quietly dropped and a new national identity for the South was becoming acceptable. The government has sought to make this meaningful by stressing that reunification—still the cherished goal of all Koreans—would become possible through diligence and discipline, and by building up South Korea's economy until it left the North far behind in any kind of competition.

The emphasis on the program of economic development and modernization has lent a certain *elan* to the government's efforts, but it also has tended to obscure some of Pak's more arbitrary acts that contravene constitutional procedures and civil liberties. Yet something more than the dramatic success of the economic development program was needed. Nationalistic exhortations voiced in a suprapatriotic vein have reappeared and remain a perennial theme, but with diminishing effect. Memories of the Korean war are fading, particularly among the young, who might recall at most the discredited Rhee's abuse of the national defense theme. Shortly after they seized power in 1961, the military leaders promptly called for "spiritual" as well as economic modernization, incorporating these goals in an ambitious, if short-lived, National Reconstruction Movement that stressed austerity, diligence, and "national morality." After that particular program was phased out, President Pak elaborated a "National Renaissance: Social Reconstruction and the Remaking of Man" in Korea. He called for new ethics, stressing the deficiencies of his people in the pioneering or entrepreneurial spirit and in a sense of national honor.

A man of grim and austere mien, Pak has always displayed the puritanical streak that was characteristic of the young colonels who had organized the coup. Their suspicion of "corrupt politicians and capitalists" is reminiscent of attitudes held by young officers in prewar Japan, whose influence Pak undoubtedly felt in his formative years. Despite his interest in economic

modernization, Pak has a distrust of Western beliefs; at the time of the coup he had had less contact with Americans than most senior officers. He disparages Western liberalism and "Americanizing" influences, and the "Revitalizing Reforms" he has enacted since late 1972 include a reduction in the hours of English taught in the schools and the introduction of "national education" in Korean ethics and history. Western terms are to be replaced on shop signs and Western "pop" songs discouraged.

Ever since its earliest days, the present regime has made periodic efforts to "clean up" the cities, whose "debilitating" influence Pak deeply distrusts. Hundreds of hoodlums, petty criminals, and prostitutes have been apprehended and removed from the capital for varying periods of rustication. Shortly after the coup, coffee-drinking and nightclub dancing were banned for a time, and more recently, legislation has been directed against "decadent tendencies" such as miniskirts, long hair, and the like. To discourage the drift to cities and keep Koreans "down on the farm" a broad new program has been enacted to make the tax burden much less onerous for rural and small town inhabitants and to improve living conditions there.

Despite his evident dislike of foreign influences and the effects of urbanization, Pak likes to think of himself as playing a modernizing and westernizing role like that of Peter the Great of Russia, the Meiji emperor of Japan, or Ataturk of Turkey. His recent reforms, like the early National Reconstruction Movement, combine ethical exhortations with broad economic measures and call for a balance between the spiritual and the material, the East and the West. Some of the "Revitalizing Reforms" enforce Confucian strictures while others—more sumptuary in intent—curtail the practice of deeply engrained Confucian rites. In May 1973, "Mothers Day" was converted to "Parents' Day" to stress filial piety and respect for the aged. On the other hand, the new law on Family Ritual interferes with the traditionally strict observance of matrimonial and funeral ceremonies. June brides were scarce in 1973 as many couples rushed to the altar in May to beat the deadline that restricts expenditures on wedding ceremonies.



Some Confucian customs are receiving new stress, such as encouraging children to bow to their elders on New Year's Day

Such interference with the age-old traditions that are deeply held are part of the social engineering that Pak feels his people need. Although government spokesmen occasionally justify the reforms as being designed only at making the Koreans a more disciplined people, they also serve both to expand and demonstrate the regime's power and control. These features are evident in the accelerating *Sae Maul Undong* (New Community Movement), which now includes urban as well as rural restructuring. The Prime Minister recently hailed it as a program for improving "social discipline and . . . revitalizing the virtues of

diligence, self-help, and cooperation." It is too early to tell how much progress has been made in these directions. Corruption, for instance, still appears in high political quarters. Nevertheless, Pak's ability to subject so many aspects of Korean life to his reforms clearly buttresses his political control. In the dozen years he has dominated Korea, Pak has been concerned fundamentally with reviving some modern approximation of the old Confucian order that was the fabric of Korean life and the means whereby Korean rulers through the centuries presided over public mores and maintained highly centralized power.

“Revitalization” or Retrogression in Politics? (c)



President Pak, a peasant's son, keeps in touch with his "riceroots" by leading off in paddy planting on the anniversary of the 1961 coup

The revival of past patterns is perhaps clearest in Pak's approach to political "renovation." His style combines some modern political methods and forms with the age-old tradition of authoritarian rule. The President's autocratic proclivities, however, finally became painfully clear in 1972. In late 1971 he had proclaimed a state of national emergency, partly to prepare the country for talks with the North. Then in October 1972 came his sweeping "Revitalizing Reforms," along with martial law, rigid censorship,

and the arrest or harassment of those who might object. He justified these actions on the grounds that they were needed if he was to engage in a successful dialog with the North over the issue of Korean reunification.

Pak's move was no spur-of-the-moment improvisation. It had been long prepared in secret, though the precise timing was perhaps fortuitous. As early as November 1969, Pak proclaimed in a major speech that the 1970's would be a "decade of national revitalization." Moreover, the October reforms merely

complete the process of concentrating power in the President's hands, begun when Pak first assumed that office in 1963. In fact, the term "revitalization" subsumes all the goals of the original coup. In mid-May 1973, on the twelfth anniversary of the coup and the eve of the first session of the newly emasculated, hand-picked National Assembly, Pak stated that the spirit of the "Revitalizing Reforms" was "identical with the spiritual basis of the Military Revolution."

The early efforts at "spiritual mobilization" had been undertaken partly to prepare the way for the revolution in political life which some of the coup plotters had envisioned. In part, they also served as a substitute for the long-range political program that the military leaders were hardly prepared to provide. These leaders had no ready-made panacea beyond their strong commitment to economic development, and Pak has even yet to develop any systematic program of political organization or ideology. He has, rather, effectively improvised and gradually gathered all the threads of power into his own hands.

No direct attack has been mounted on the concept of popular, democratic government, and a facade of constitutional forms has been maintained. Despite the abuses of democratic forms under President Syngman Rhee, and the subsequent failure of Korea's closest approach to democracy under Rhee's immediate successor, the ideal of democratic government is not discredited. Korea's history and political experience, however, provide a poor base for nurturing democracy. The strong paternalistic and authoritarian traditions of Korean governments, continued by the Japanese and to a remarkable degree by Rhee, inculcated a master-servant relationship between people and government. There has been little or no opportunity for political parties or even interest groups to mature and compromise. Neither has there been any sizable middle class with the interest, training, and opportunity to participate in public affairs.

The "cold war" confrontation between the United States and the U.S.S.R., and the lingering affects of the Korean war played into the hands of the rightwing extremists, whose whole stock-in-trade was anticommunism. Even moderate opposition parties were

proscribed before they had any chance to leaven the political process. The government of Prime Minister Chang Myon was fatally handicapped by the barren conservatism and bitter factional bickering among the only political survivors of Rhee's practice of divide, destroy, and rule. The concept of a golden mean, or a middle-of-the-road approach, is totally missing in Korea.

Because the military leaders had no systematic ideology to substitute for democracy, they looked abroad to militarily-based regimes elsewhere in Asia. The plotting for the 1961 coup began shortly after army takeovers in Burma and Pakistan. After the coup, study missions were dispatched there, as well as to South Vietnam, Indonesia, and Taiwan. The example of Chiang Kai-shek's party, the *Kuomintang*, in particular, influenced the thinking of the junta leaders. Again, the recent "Revitalizing Reforms" followed hard on similar trends in Thailand and the Philippines.

Whatever Pak may have imported from abroad, however, his style is closest to Korean tradition. His "administrative democracy" is little more than the administrative authoritarianism of the past, plus modern methods and efficiency. There is precious little room for any expression of public opinion through political parties, the legislature, or the media, and little regard for the concept of an independent judiciary and the protection of individual freedoms. What the military has managed to exploit successfully, however, is the energy and modern training of a younger generation free of the trammels of tradition. The youthful military leaders were quick to enlist the force and enthusiasm of the new postwar generation released in the 1960 student revolution but not effectively channeled by the Chang Myon regime. In his first years of power, Pak coopted the almost puritanical zeal for reform of his youthful cohorts. The old, Japanese trained bureaucracy was replaced by younger, much more broadly educated recruits to provide a more effective, "revitalized" civil service.

Nevertheless, in the early days following the coup its leaders were so eager to get an economic program moving that many older, less-motivated types were also accepted. In time, the more enthusiastic young

reformers no longer set the tone. This trend was reinforced by the move to restore civilian government in 1963. Senior officers, donning mufti, managed to get the lion's share of important posts, largely due to their more extensive administrative experience. The zealous young colonels who had occupied the top posts in the SCNR lost out in the shuffle and this resulted in a general change of tone under the present "Third Republic."

This did not mean, however, that political reform was dead, but only that Pak was working with somewhat different means in the same general direction. The military leaders generally had been highly reluctant to honor their original pledge to restore a constitutional form of government, and did so only in response to a variety of pressures. U.S. prodding was perhaps the most important inasmuch as they were well aware of their dependence upon U.S. goodwill. A significant factor, too, was that there was still strong attachment to the principle of democracy despite the weakness of political parties. At least equally important, however, was division and mutual suspicion among the military leaders. Their infighting, combined with cases of ineptitude, left some room for democratic opinion to put pressure on Pak to restore civil government.

The dropping of the more radical junior officers from administrative posts of importance and the concession to civilian participation under a constitutional framework did not prevent the gradual growth after 1963 of the role of former military men in Pak's government. Even more significant, however, has been the growth of executive power concentrated increasingly in Pak's own hands. Particularly since 1968-69, when Pak pushed through a constitutional amendment enabling him to run for a third term, he has steadily increased his powers, most spectacularly since October 1972. Under the October reforms, the way is paved for Pak's lifetime presidency even more clearly than it was for Rhee in the mid-1950's.

This situation merely postpones the succession problem. The only constitutional succession that Korea has experienced was hardly a normal transition. President Rhee's forced resignation in April 1960 was

followed by drastic revision of the constitution in June and elections in August. The election victor, Chang Myon, became Prime Minister, but he was ignominiously turned out of office less than 9 months later by the military. Rhee had persistently eliminated any potentially strong successor as a threat to his power, and Pak appears to be pursuing his example here, too. He has played off the military factions against each other, and by occasional rustication abroad has kept his nephew-in-law, Kim Chong-p'il, first head of the South Korean Central Intelligence Agency and now Prime Minister, from becoming too powerful. The chief architect of the coup, Kim had quietly organized a sort of Trojan-horse Democratic Republican Party (DRP), which won Pak his first term, having had a head start when parties were permitted to reappear in 1963.

Suspicious of politics, Pak has kept all political parties, including the government's own DRP, from becoming strong forces which might support a challenge to his position. The DRP has helped to preserve the facade of democratic government, but its job has been purely electoral. Pak now calls for parties "on the American pattern—active only on the eve of an election," as he has put it. In fact, their role has been rigidly curtailed under the 1972-73 reforms. The DRP is confined largely to propaganda-peddling and training youthful supporters.


Pak's curbing of the DRP is in keeping with his careful control over all his former comrades-in-arms occupying positions of power. The military constitute the only force which could conceivably mount a successful threat to his authority under present conditions, and many ex-officers are well entrenched in office. Some of them have also built up private fortunes through bribery and corruption, thus flouting Pak's strictures. Officers on active duty are still prone to Korea's endemic factionalism. In early 1973 Pak cracked down by arresting one of his oldest associates, the commander of the Capital Security Command, who had been building up his own personal following and had broached the idea of expanding the military's role in running the nation by having it supplant the existing civilian political organizations. In Pak's reaction

there was little solicitude for the principle of civilian participation; his primary motive was doubtless to protect his own power from any possible threat and to demonstrate that he would tolerate suspicious activity by no one.

"Korean democracy" remains the name of the game. In reporting state policies at the opening of the new National Assembly in May 1973, Prime Minister Kim Chong-p'il announced that the ROK "had succeeded in surmounting the superficial imitation of

Western-style democracy . . . we have established our own democracy in accord with our traditions and history." This "revitalization" has, however, reduced the role of the parties and the legislature and curbed civil liberties to the point where domestic critics, primarily the intellectual and Christian communities, privately maintain that South Korea can no longer claim to be the "frontier of freedom," but instead is becoming a mirror image of the totalitarian regime in the North.

A House Stands Divided (c)



First session in Seoul of the North-South Red Cross talks; South Korean delegation on right

The rationale for Pak's assumption of autocratic powers in 1972 was the newly-opened dialog with P'yongyang. Whereas alarm at student demands for direct talks with North Korea had provided the immediate occasion for the coup in 1961, a decade later Pak had come to feel that the changed international situation required Seoul to take some initiative on the basic issue of Korean reunification. His first feeler was the August 1971 proposal for talks between the South and North Korean Red Cross societies, which led to secret high-level political talks that were not made public until 4 July 1972. These talks continue with

considerable caution and hesitation by both sides, but are kept alive by mutual self-interest and world trends, as well as by the fundamental longing of all Koreans for their historic unity.

National unity remains the ultimate goal. As a natural geographic and economic entity which ages ago produced a unique ethnic homogeneity, Korea was the least divisible of the postwar divided countries. The Korean people are ever-mindful of their 1,000-year-old history as a unified nation, contrasting, for example, with the long separatist history of the Germans. Today, though they have been separated for a

generation, all Koreans remain deeply motivated by the underlying desire for unity.

The problem of reunification has figured large in all postwar Korean governments, but it remained for the Pak regime specifically to replace Syngman Rhee's strident demand for a military "March North" with the present call for "peaceful competition for reunification of the fatherland." Seoul's 5-year plans have been dedicated to building up the South's economic strength so that it might become a "magnet" for the people of North Korea. Pak's recent reforms and constitutional revision specifically prescribe *ad infinitum* the fundamental goal of a universal effort to achieve national unity.

Following the Korean war, Seoul's official formula for Korean unification remained U.N.-supervised elections throughout the peninsula, a formula which P'yongyang has always rejected. North Korea has always refused to recognize any role for the United Nations in Korea. The development of an East-West detente and growing doubts about the permanence of a U.S. role in the ROK's defense largely determined Pak's decision to open the dialog with the North. Security conditions remain vital. Rhee had refused to sign the 1953 truce agreement ending the Korean war, thus leaving the two Koreas still officially at war, and huge opposing forces still stand constantly alert all along the Demilitarized Zone. P'yongyang has ceased its efforts to foment revolution in the South by infiltration and guerrilla raids, and Pak apparently desires to use the present dialog to involve P'yongyang in a relationship that may preclude further hostilities. Finally, in light of Korea's tragic history, both North and South have a common interest in solving their problems without foreign intervention.

Thus far, the talks have served to reduce tensions between the two Koreas, but at the same time they have shown each side how little it can influence the other. It is clear that there is little prospect of unification in the foreseeable future, but there may be steps toward some humanitarian, cultural, or economic ac-

commodation, as Seoul has proposed. P'yongyang professes to desire more far-reaching steps, particularly in the field of disarmament, but Seoul is certainly unlikely to concur in the North's demands for the withdrawal of U.S. troops. Seoul's anxieties stem from a long-standing sense of inferiority *vis-a-vis* the North. It wishes to postpone indefinitely the departure of American forces and to continue the U.S.-supported modernization of its own. It will resist the dissolution of the U.N. Command, though it has now acquiesced in the termination of the United Nation's political role in Korea, represented by the U.N. Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK), which actually has been moribund for some time. Since P'yongyang's recent successes in following the ROK's example of winning greater international recognition and respectability, Seoul has given up its rigid diplomatic refusal to be represented in any country or international organization where P'yongyang is present. Its new flexibility now extends to recognition, not of the North Korean regime, but at least of the *de facto* existence of two Koreas. This major policy switch, announced in June 1973, tacitly recognizes that the peninsula will remain divided for the foreseeable future. North Korea's President, Marshall Kim Il-song, so far rejects President Pak's proposal for dual representation in the United Nations as perpetuating the division of Korea, and calls for a "Confederal State of Koryo," named after the first Korean dynasty, to unify the entire peninsula. However, Kim has accepted observer status at the United Nations.

Pak's use of the unification issue to justify imposition of the most restrictive political controls the South has known since 1963 has its rationale in the fear that the talks with a seemingly less hostile North may weaken his people's resolve to keep up their guard. On the other hand, should it become apparent that the talks are getting nowhere, the Southerners' restiveness with these onerous controls might reintroduce the instability that delayed all progress under preceding regimes.

Chronology (u/ou)

1910

August

Korea is formally annexed by Japan, ending 500-year rule of Yi dynasty.

1943

December

China, the United Kingdom, and the United States assert in Cairo that "in due course Korea shall become free and independent."

1945

August

U.S.S.R. enters war against Japan. Allies order Japanese in Korea to surrender to Soviet forces north of 38th parallel and to U.S. forces south of it.

December

The United Kingdom, the U.S.S.R., and the United States agree at Moscow on "reestablishment of Korea as an independent state" following a period of trusteeship by the United States, the United Kingdom, the U.S.S.R., and China; China subsequently concurs.

1946

March

U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission is established to assist in forming a provisional Korean government; discussions lead to deadlock on major problems.

1948

May

U.N.-supervised elections are held in South Korea but rejected by Communists in North Korea.

August

Republic of Korea is established in the south, with Syngman Rhee (Yi Sung-man) as first President.

September

Democratic People's Republic of Korea is established in the north, with Kim Il-song as Premier.

December

U.N. General Assembly declares the Republic of Korea the legitimate government in South Korea.

Soviet troops are evacuated from North Korea.

1949

June

All U.S. troops are withdrawn from South Korea except for a small military training mission.

1950

June

North Korean forces invade South Korea.

October

U.N. forces cross 38th parallel in pursuit of North Korean forces; Chinese Communist forces intervene.

1953

July

Armistice agreement between U.N. Command and North Korean-Chinese Communist side signed at P'anmunjom.

October

United States-Korea Mutual Defense Treaty is signed.

1954

April-May

"Geneva principles," as basis for settlement of overall Korean question, formulated at Geneva Conference on Korea.

1955

May

Rhee reelected President for third term, but opposition leader Chang Myon (John M. Chang) defeats Rhee's running mate for vice presidency.

1960

March

President Rhee and Liberal Party gain sweeping victory by rigging elections.

April

Student demonstrations in Seoul against election rigging lead to violence and declaration of martial law; Rhee resigns and Foreign Minister Ho Chong becomes acting president.

June

National Assembly passes constitutional amendment adopting parliamentary form of government.

August

Yun Po-son becomes President and Chang Myon becomes Prime Minister of Second Republic, following Democratic Party victory in general elections.

1961

May

Military junta led by Maj. Gen. Pak Chong-hui and Col. Kim Chong-p'il seizes government in bloodless coup.

June

Supreme Council for National Reconstruction assumes all executive and legislative power.

1962**December**

Major constitutional changes ratified in national referendum.

1963**October**

General Pak wins narrow victory over former President Yun Po-son in presidential elections.

December

General Pak inaugurated as President of Third Republic.

1965**January**

National Assembly votes to send noncombat troops to South Vietnam.

August

National Assembly approves dispatch of first combat troops to South Vietnam.

August-December

South Korea-Japan normalization accords ratified and instruments of ratification exchanged.

1966**March**

National Assembly approves dispatch of additional combat troops to South Vietnam.

1967**February**

Korea-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement enters into force.

May

Pak Chong-hui is reelected for second term as President.

1968**January**

31-man North Korean commando squad tries to seize Blue House (presidential mansion) in Seoul.

1969**October**

Constitutional change to permit presidential third term ratified in national referendum.

1971**April**

Pak Chong-hui wins third term in close election by defeating Kim Tae-chung of the New Democratic Party.

August

Seoul proposes talks between North and South Korean Red Cross societies for purpose of reuniting families separated by the Korean war.

1971**September**

Informal talks between Red Cross societies start.

December

President Pak declares state of national emergency to tighten controls on the population in conjunction with the North-South talks.

1972**August**

Formal Red Cross talks between North and South Korea begin.

October

President Pak declares martial law and abrogates constitution preparatory to making major government changes.

November

Constitution rewritten to give the President sweeping new powers.

December

Pak Chong-hui elected to extended 6-year term.

1973**March**

Withdrawal of South Korean forces from South Vietnam completed.

Area Brief (u/ou)

LAND:

Size: 38,000 sq. mi.
Use: 23% arable, 10% urban and other, 67% forested
Land boundaries: 150 miles

WATER:

Limit of territorial waters (claimed): 20-200 n. mi.
Coastline: 1,500 mi. (excluding offshore islands)

PEOPLE:

Population: 32,377,000 (mid-1973)
Ethnic divisions: Homogeneous; small Chinese minority (approx. 20,000)
Religion: Strong Confucian and Buddhist tradition; pervasive folk religion (Shamanism); vigorous Christian minority (13% of the population); Chondokyo (religion of the heavenly way), eclectic religion with nationalist overtones founded in 19th century, estimated 718,000 members (1972)
Language: Korean
Labor force: 10.2 million (1971); agriculture, fishing, forestry, 48.5%; manufacturing and mining, 14.2%; transportation and communication, 3.6%; construction, 3.4%; commerce and other services, 30.3%
Organized labor: About 10% of nonagricultural labor force

GOVERNMENT:

Legal name: Republic of Korea
Type: Republic; power centralized in a strong executive
Capital: Seoul
Political subdivisions: 9 provinces, 2 special cities; heads centrally appointed
Legal system: Combines elements of continental European civil law systems, Anglo-American law, and Chinese classical thought; constitution approved late 1972; has not accepted compulsory ICJ jurisdiction
Branches: Executive, legislative (unicameral), judiciary, National Conference for Unification (NCU)
Government leaders: President Pak Chong-hui; Prime Minister Kim Chong-p'il
Suffrage: Universal over age 20
Elections: Presidential every 6 years indirectly by the NCU; last election December 1972. Two-thirds of the 219-member National Assembly is elected directly for the same period within 6 months of the presidential election, remaining one-third nominated by the President and elected by the NCU for a 3-year term. Last election February 1973: Revitalization Group, 73 seats; Democratic Republican Party (DRP), 73 seats; New Democratic Party (NDP), 52 seats; Democratic Unification Party, 2 seats; Independents, 19 seats

Political parties and leaders: Revitalization Group (appointed), chairman Pak Tu-chin; Democratic Republican Party (DRP), acting chairman Yi Hyo-sang; New Democratic Party (NDP), chairman Yu Chin-san; Democratic Unification Party (DUP), chairman Yong Il-tong

Voting strength: Popular vote in December 1972 election, 11,196,484; DRP 38.8%, NDP 32.8%, DUP 10.2%, Independents 18.1%, Invalid 0.1%

Communists: Communist activity banned by government
Other political or pressure groups: Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU); Korean Veterans' Association; large potentially volatile student population concentrated in Seoul
Member of: ADB, Colombo Plan, ECAFE, FAO, GATT, Geneva Conventions of 1949 for the protection of war victims, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, IDA, IFC, IHB, IMCO, IMF, INTELSAT, Inter-Parliamentary Union, INTERPOL, ITU, UNESCO, U.N. Special Fund, UPU, WHO, WMO, World Anti-Communist League (WACL); does not hold U.N. membership

ECONOMY:

GNP: US\$9.7 billion (1972 current prices); per capita GNP \$300 (1972)
Food: Not self-sufficient in foodgrains; grain imports reached 2.92 million tons in 1972
Electric power: Production 11.8 billion kw.-hr. (1972) or 370 kw.-hr. per capita; installed capacity 3,871,000 kw. (1972)
Major industries: Textiles and clothing, food processing, plywood, coal mining, fishing, cement, chemicals, and chemical fertilizers
Exports: \$1.6 billion (f.o.b., 1972); textiles and clothing; veneer and plywood; wigs; electrical equipment, fish, and raw silk
Imports: \$2.5 billion (c.i.f., 1972); machinery and transport equipment; foodgrains; chemicals; wood, petroleum, textiles, and iron and steel
Major trade partners (1972): Exports—U.S. 47%, Japan 25%; imports—U.S. 26%, Japan 41%
Exchange rate: Bank of Korea average annual exchange rate: 393 won per US\$1 (1972); rate fixed at 400 won per US\$1 at the end of 1972
Fiscal year: Same as calendar year

COMMUNICATIONS:

Railroads: 1,987 route miles; 1,910 miles 4'8" gage (325 miles double tracked); 77 miles 2'6" (narrow) gage; all government owned
Highways: About 25,650 miles; 1,845 miles concrete or bituminous surfaced (including bituminous surface treatment), 18,610 miles gravel, crushed stone, or stabilized soil, 3,200 miles improved earth roads; 1,995 miles unimproved earth roads

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Inland waterways: About 1,000 miles navigable; for most part use restricted to small native craft

Pipelines: 278 miles refined products

Ports: 10 major and 18 minor

Merchant marine: 126 ships 1,000 g.r.t. and over, totaling 934,323 g.r.t. or 1,543,053 d.w.t.; includes 81 dry cargo, 24 tankers, 12 bulk cargo, 2 combination passenger-cargo, 5 specialized carriers (October 1972)

Civil air: 19 major transports; 8 additional transports are leased by the Korean Air Lines

Airfields: 262 total, 126 usable; 50 have permanent-surfaced runways; 11 with runways 8,000-11,999 ft., 17 have runways 4,000-7,999 ft., 2 seaplane stations

Telecommunications: Domestic and international services satisfy country requirements; about 748,474 telephones; about 3.8 million radio receivers, 1.9 million wired-broadcast speakers, 1 million TV receivers; 67 (ROK), 17 (U.S. Armed Forces) AM stations; 6 (ROK), 3 (U.S. Armed Forces) FM stations; 12 (ROK), 7 (U.S. Armed Forces) TV stations; 1 submarine cable (not in operation); 2 troposcatter-links to Japan; 1 ROK International Satellite station, and 1 U.S. Armed Forces transportable satellite terminal for international military communications

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
ISTRY

Places and features referred to in this General Survey (u/ou)

	COORDINATES				COORDINATES		
	°	'N.	° E.		°	'N.	° E.
Andong.....	36	34	128 44	Osan.....	37	09	127 04
Ansöng-ch'ön (strm).....	36	54	126 54	Paengnyöng-do (isl).....	37	57	124 40
Changhang.....	36	01	126 42	Pangöjin-hang (harbar).....	35	29	129 26
Changhang-ni (lcty).....	35	38	126 55	P'anmunjönm, North Korea.....	37	59	126 40
Chang-san (mtn).....	35	12	129 09	P'aro-ho (reservoir).....	38	07	127 52
Chech'ön.....	37	08	128 12	P'ohang.....	36	02	129 22
Cheju.....	33	31	126 12	Pukp'yöng-ni.....	37	29	129 08
Cheju-do (isl).....	33	20	126 30	P'unggi.....	36	52	128 32
Chinhae.....	35	08	128 40	Pusan.....	35	06	129 03
Ch'önan.....	36	48	127 09	P'yönggang, North Korea.....	38	25	127 17
Chönggha-ri (lcty).....	37	26	129 11	P'yöngt'aek.....	36	59	127 05
Ch'öngju.....	36	38	127 30	P'yöngyang, North Korea.....	39	01	125 45
Ch'öngnyangni-dong.....	37	34	127 03	Sach'ön.....	35	05	128 06
Chönju.....	35	49	127 09	Samch'ök.....	37	27	129 10
Ch'örwön.....	38	15	127 13	Samch'önp'o.....	34	55	128 04
Chosa.....	35	11	127 24	Sammangjin.....	35	23	128 50
Chukpyön-ni (lcty).....	37	03	129 25	Seoul.....	37	34	127 00
Chumunjin.....	37	53	128 49	Sögwiri.....	33	14	126 34
Ch'unch'ön.....	37	52	127 44	Sokch'o.....	38	12	128 36
Chungang-myöji (anch).....	34	50	128 12	Sökp'o-dong.....	36	28	126 37
Chungjo.....	36	14	126 42	Sömjin-gang (strm).....	34	58	127 46
Ch'ungmu.....	34	51	128 26	Songhyön-ni (lcty).....	37	28	127 38
Chungnyöng-gul (railroad tunnel).....	36	56	128 26	Songjöng-ni.....	37	30	129 08
East China Sea.....	29	00	125 00	Songp'o (lcty).....	34	55	128 32
Hadong.....	35	04	127 45	Söngsan-ni.....	33	27	126 56
Haep'yöng.....	35	10	127 33	Soyang-gang (strm).....	37	52	127 40
Haeundae.....	35	09	129 10	Suwön.....	37	16	127 01
Halla-san (mt).....	33	22	126 32	Suyöng.....	35	10	129 07
Hamhüng, North Korea.....	39	54	127 32	Taeyöng.....	35	13	129 14
Hangeh'on.....	34	32	126 44	Taegu.....	35	52	128 36
Han-gang (strm).....	37	45	126 11	Tachüng-ni.....	35	53	127 02
Hoengsan-ni (lcty).....	38	07	126 59	Taëjön.....	36	20	127 26
Hong-do (isl).....	34	41	125 13	Taep'yöng-ni (lcty).....	36	28	127 16
Hüngnam, North Korea (rsta).....	39	50	127 38	Ulechin.....	36	59	129 24
Hup'o-ri (lcty).....	36	41	129 28	Ulsan.....	35	33	129 19
Hwangji-ri (lcty).....	37	10	128 59	Ulsan-man (bay).....	35	30	129 24
Hwangjöng.....	37	33	127 43	Waegwan-ni.....	35	59	128 23
Hyöngsan-gang (strm).....	36	01	129 23	Wölgon-ni (lcty).....	37	46	126 30
Imjin-gang (strm).....	37	47	126 40	Wönju.....	37	21	127 58
Inch'ön.....	37	28	126 38	Wönsan, North Korea.....	39	10	127 26
Iri.....	35	56	126 57	Wönwönjöng.....	36	59	126 50
Japan, Sea of.....	43	30	135 45	Yangp'yöngümae.....	37	29	127 30
Kaesöng, North Korea.....	37	58	126 33	Yellow Sea.....	36	00	124 00
Kamp'o.....	35	48	129 30	Yöju.....	37	18	127 38
Kanggu.....	36	22	129 24	Yöm-ha (strm).....	37	35	126 34
Kanggyöng.....	36	09	127 01	Yöngch'ön.....	35	58	128 56
Kangnüng.....	37	44	128 54	Yöngdong.....	36	10	127 47
Kimhae.....	35	14	128 53	Yöngdüngp'o-dong.....	37	31	126 54
Kimp'o.....	37	38	126 42	Yöngju.....	36	49	128 37
Kodubawi.....	37	09	128 50	Yöngsan (rsta).....	37	32	126 58
Kohan-ni (lcty).....	37	12	128 52	Yöngsan-gang (strm).....	34	54	126 32
Korangp'o-ri (lcty).....	37	59	126 50	Yöngwöl.....	37	11	128 28
Korea Strait.....	34	00	129 00	Yösu.....	34	44	127 44
Kün-gang (strm).....	36	00	126 40				
Künho-gang (strm).....	35	50	128 29				
Kunsan.....	35	59	126 43				
Kuryöngp'o-ri (lcty).....	35	59	129 34				
Kwangju.....	35	09	126 55				
Kyöngju.....	35	50	129 13				
Man'gyöng-gang (strm).....	35	53	126 40				
Masan.....	35	11	128 34				
Mokp'o.....	34	47	126 23				
Moraedüng.....	35	32	128 22				
Mosülp'o.....	33	13	126 15				
Mukhojin-ni (lcty).....	37	33	129 07				
Munsan-ni (lcty).....	37	51	126 47				
Muryong-san (mtn).....	35	35	129 24				
Naju.....	35	02	126 43				
Naktong-gang (strm).....	35	07	128 57				
Nonsan.....	36	12	127 05				
Önyang.....	35	34	129 07				

Selected airfields			
	°	'N.	° E.
A-511.....	36	58	127 02
Cheju International.....	33	30	126 30
Kangnung.....	37	45	128 57
Kimhae.....	35	11	128 56
Kimpo International.....	37	33	126 48
Kunsan AB.....	35	54	126 37
Kwangju.....	35	07	126 49
Osan AB.....	37	05	127 02
Pohang.....	35	59	129 08
Pusan International.....	35	10	129 08
R-813.....	35	08	128 42
Sachon.....	35	05	128 05
Samchok.....	37	30	129 08
Seoul AB.....	37	31	126 56
Suwon.....	37	14	127 01
Taegu International.....	35	53	128 40






Names and boundary representation are not necessarily authoritative

126

128

379 9-73




South Korea

- Internal administrative boundary
- ⊙ National capital
- ⊙ Pusan Internal administrative capital
- +— Railroad (4'8 1/2" gage)
- +— Railroad (2'6" gage)
- +— Expressway
- +— Road
- ✈ Airfield
- ⚓ Major port

- Populated places**
- ▨ 1,000,000 to 6,000,000
 - ⊙ 150,000 to 1,000,000
 - 50,000 to 150,000
 - Under 50,000
 - Seoul 6,000,000

Spot elevations in feet
Scale 1:1,425,000



Sea of Japan

Economic Activity


INDUSTRY

- | | |
|-------------------------|------------------------|
| Iron and steel | Plywood and veneer |
| Shipbuilding and repair | Smelter |
| Textiles | Automotive assembly |
| Food processing | Electronics |
| Chemical | Petroleum refining |
| Cement | Thermal electric power |
| Fertilizer | Hydroelectric power |


◀ Major fishing port


MINING

- | | |
|------------------------|-------------|
| Sn Tin | Fe Iron ore |
| W Tungsten | G Graphite |
| Cu Copper | Ka Kaolin |
| ▨ Anthracite coalfield | |



- Textiles
 - Food processing
 - Chemical
 - Cement
 - Fertilizer
 - Major fishing port
- MINING**
- Sn Tin
 - W Tungsten
 - Cu Copper
 - Anthracite





Vegetation and Land Utilization


CULTIVATED AREAS

- Paddy crops
- Dry crops

UNCULTIVATED AREAS

- Forest
- Scrub, brush and barren land

-38-



Economic Activity

INDUSTRY

- | | |
|-------------------------|------------------------|
| Iron and steel | Plywood and veneer |
| Shipbuilding and repair | Smelter |
| Textiles | Automotive assembly |
| Food processing | Electronics |
| Chemical | Petroleum refining |
| Cement | Thermal electric power |
| Fertilizer | Hydroelectric power |

Major fishing port

MINING

- | | |
|----------------------|-------------|
| Sn Tin | Fe Iron ore |
| W Tungsten | G Graphite |
| Cu Copper | Ka Kaolin |
| Anthracite coalfield | |

-36-

- Textiles
- Food processing
- Chemical
- Cement
- Fertilizer
- Automotive assembly
- Electronics
- Petroleum refining
- Thermal electric power
- Hydroelectric power

- ◀ Major fishing port
- MINING**
- | | |
|----------------------|-------------|
| Sn Tin | Fe Iron ore |
| W Tungsten | G Graphite |
| Cu Copper | Ka Kaolin |
| Anthracite coalfield | |

