

Exhibit 2946

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Def. Doc. No. 1401-T-2

From Nomura to Tōgō
23 November 1941
No. 1161

In reference to my telegram No. 1160:

The essence of the conversation of the evening of the 22nd was that Japanese-American trade will gradually be restored if Japan adopts a policy of peace. As to the cooperation of the Powers concerned, the Secretary of State told me that he had already the day before conferred fully on the matter with the representatives of those Powers, and that as they would communicate with their respective governments by Monday, he would confer further with them thereafter. Besides, he said nothing more than that could be expected, as there was a limit to his abilities. He was aware of the reasons that Tokyo was pressing for an answer, yet he seemed to believe that there was no reason that Japan could not wait a few more days. It is also reported that Hu Shih, who had been ill abed, made an appearance at the conference yesterday toward its close.

The Secretary has no intention of using his good offices now in restoring peace between Japan and China, and considers it difficult to suspend aid to Chiang Kai-shek. But he appears to think that America's present aid to Chiang Kai-shek is not of much importance, and that the matter will develop as the peace policy progresses. He seems to intend to leave the China question until later. However, according to a reliable report Hull is of opinion that the stationing of troops for such period as may be necessary is in effect indefinite stationing; that there is no objection if the duration is set for four or five years, providing that the further decision be made in accordance with the situation at the end of that period; but that the indefinite stationing is contradictory to the principles of non-annexation and respect for sovereignty. (He repeatedly expressed his regret that the negotiations had been interrupted in July by the Japanese advance into French Indo-China, and warned me indirectly lest action of a similar nature be repeated.)

With reference to the proposed transportation of Japanese troops from southern to northern French Indo-China, Hull maintained that it would have no effect in relieving the present tension of the Southwestern Pacific, and that the countries concerned would be diverted by the Japanese forces therein and their forces frozen no less than they are today. I explained thereupon that, in my strategic judgment, this was a great concession contributing much to the amelioration of the tense situation in the Southwestern Pacific. The Secretary pointed out, however, that he alone was responsible for the contents of the conversations, and that no other person was allowed to interfere in them (though he told me later that he was going to consult with one or two influential Senators), and that he did not understand strategic questions well.

I showed him the preamble of Proposal "B", and tried to obtain his definite opinion article by article. It seemed that the Secretary felt that Proposal "B" was a demand made upon the American Government, and he looked very much displeased and declared that there was no reason that demands should be made upon the United States by the Japanese Government, and that he was much "discouraged" at my pressing him to answer "yes" or "no", entirely disregarding all his efforts.

We are negotiating with calmness and never get excited. So are the Americans. The Secretary said that the United States is taking the middle road of peace and is negotiating on that ground, and that it was hoped that Japan would respond to the American policy of peace.