Def. Doc. # 1913-16-B

Not used

CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, who occupy the post of the Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Concerning the stoppage of buying Indian Cotton" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (Foreign Office).

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 4th day of August, 1947

/S/ HAYASHI, Kaoru (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place,
on this same date

Witness: /S/ URABE, Katsuma (seal)

not used

Def. Doc. # 1918

Appendix 1

Excerpt from "World Economic Survey 1931 - 1932"

(ix) International Finance and Economic Nationalism.

If the analysis contained in the preceding sections of this chapter could be summed up in a single statement, it would be that the post-war world as a whole had failed to realise and provide for the necessities of an economic, and more particularly a financial, system that was international in its obligations and commitments. The extent of international economic development can easily be overstated. Indeed, the problems of maladjustment arise largely from the fact that, while some parts of the economic, and still more the financial, mechanism are thoroughly international and even cosmopolitan, other important sections of it are still organised and planned on a national basis. (p. 43)

Throughout 1931 and the first half of 1932, Europe held the centre of the stage, with only occasional attention diverted to the United States. But the financial situation of the rest of the world for the most part grew steadily worse also. Japan affords a good example of the strain. Prices fell in that country from 228 in January 1929 and 201 in January

1930 to 159 in January 1931 and 147 in November 1931, after which Japan left the gold standard. Exports fell off from Yen 2,218 million in 1929 to Yen 1,179 million in 1931, while imports were virtually halved also. In the invisible trade a surplus of Yen 220 million in 1928 had become a deficit of Yen 15 million by 1931. Earnings fell practically 10 per cent in 1931 and employment declined in approximately the same degree. In the first eleven months of 1931, Japan lost almost 40 per cent of her gold reserves, and this after she had lost 25 per cent in 1930. Her reserve, which had been Yen 1,087 million on January 18th, 1930, fell to Yen 521 million on December 5th, 1931. (p. 81)

(ii) The Growth of Economic Nationalism.

In the first chapter of this Survey, reference was made to some of the ways in which the war of 1914 - 1918 disturbed economic organization. It is difficult to measure with any exactitude the extent to which international trade was reduced. The available statistics are complicated by varying degrees of currency inflation, and the movement of war materials is difficult to separate from normal trade, which, indeed, could hardly be said to exist in the abnormal circumstances. Virtually all interchange between the belligerent groups ceased, neutrals were affected by blockades and controls, and, despite

the stimulus given to production and trade in areas outside Europe, the bulk of world trade declined heavily.

Apart from the general decline and the very considerable shifts in the relative positions of the various countries in this respect, there were other special factors which rendered commercial policy both complex and unstable at this period. One result of the peace treaties had been the creation of many new States in Europe and considerable alteration of frontiers. In this way, not only were new Customs barriers erected, but new industrial and commercial groupings cut across existing organization. The revenues needed by States at this period of financial exhaustion reinforced the strong pressure for protection of the new economic units.

The war had left many legacies of trade restrictions and governmental practices which operated as interferences with trade. Requisitions, controls, priority systems, prohibitions of import or export, price fixation, Government monopolies and enterprise all reinforced the effect of tariff barriers. But probably the greatest hindrance to trade arose from the disordered state of the various currencies. Inflation in various degrees, continually changing and increasing taxation, exchange rates that fluctuated not only from day to day but from hour to hour demoralized the contradtual basis of regular trade.

It was for this reason that Governments, acting in concert

with the international organisation of the League of Nations and through diplomatic conferences, devoted their first efforts at reconstruction to financial and currency problems. The success of these concerted efforts was encouraging. Agreements, particularly at the Brussels Conference (1920), on the principles of currency and financial administration [1] were quickly followed by efforts to balance national budgets, which ultimately put an end to inflation. Provisional agreement on reparation questions, concerted effort to stabilise the financial situation of certain European countries and a general measure of recovery from the depression of 1921 had restored world production and trade to the pre-war level by 1925 and had also paved the way for further recovery in Europe, which still lagged behind the rest of the world.

The lower level of prices ruling after 1921 had aggravated the effect of tariff barriers by increasing the real burden of the wide ranges of specific duties which had been imposed at a time when prices were higher. The addition of many new tariff barriers, the raising of their levels and the survival of many irritating and restrictive prohibitions and controls imposed during the war also pointed to restrictive commercial policies as an outstanding obstacle to the renewal of international economic co-operation.

The World Economic Conference which met in May 1927 surveyed the whole field of trade restrictions and was practically

1 Report of Brussels Financial Conference, 1920 (Document C.10.M. 7.1923).

unanimous regarding the necessity for their removal. The Conference made, in fact, a categorical declaration that "the time has come to put a stop to the growth of Customs tariffs and to reverse the direction of the movement". Three possible lines of action were envisaged -- individual action by States with regard to their own tariffs; bilateral action through the conclusion of suitable commercial treaties; and collective action by the negotiation of multilateral agreements. The Conference was important, therefore, mainly as a demonstration of the widespread recognition of the importance of international economic co-operation. Its discussions, resolutions and reports form what is virtually a manifesto of a movement towards free trade conceived not on national but on international lines. The validity of this general programme has been many times reasserted; but action in such matters is the prerogative of national Governments and, as succeeding events will show, the forces of economic nationalism have overwhelmed them. The course of events has, almost without exception, been away from freer co-operation, so that, in 1932, international trade is, in fact, far more restricted than it was five years earlier when the World Economic Conference unanimously affirmed the value and necessity of freer world trade.

Apart from the survival of many war-time prohibitions restrictions and hampering regulations, there had been, as soon

as the war ended, a remarkable exhibition of nationalist economic policies. In part, they were designed to protect the new industries and channels of trade that had been opened up during the war period. There was fear also of exchange dumping and of renewed competition from Germany. The chemical industries in particular were regarded as vital for military reasons. The heavy industries, like iron and steel, and many so-called key industries were protected also. Great Britain, France and Italy all imposed protective tariffs in the years 1920 and 1921. The newer European States also hastily erected tariff barriers to protect and foster their industrial development. Up till about 1925, therefore, there was a general upward movement of tariffs, particularly marked in relation to industrial products. The memorandum on Tariff Level Indices, prepared for the World Economic Conference, shows also that, in many overseas countries such as Australia and India, there had been a marked rise in the tariffs imposed upon manufactured articles.[1]

When the World Economic Conference met in 1927, the tariff situation, however, still remained fairly open. With the comparative settlement of currency disorders and the general recovery of production and trade after 1924 - 25, it was possible, and even necessary in a great many countries, to consider the consolidation and stabilisation of tariff and Customs arrangements

---

[1] Tariff Level Indices (document C.E.I.37). See also A. Loveday, Britain and World Trade. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1931, pages 35--46.

that had been devised as temporary measures in the previous years of wide price fluctuations. The whole period 1921 - 1926 was characterised by great activity in regard to tariff and Customs legislation, and many important commercial treaties and bilateral agreements were concluded. These, however, were mostly for very short periods of a year or less and, in 1927, there still remained the possibility of negotiated concessions and adjustment.

The Economic Consultative Committee set up by the World Economic Conference was able to report at its first meeting in 1928 that "the effect of the Conference has already substantially checked the upward movement of tariffs, which was in full swing in May 1927". The bases for this statement were mainly the abandonment by certain States of tariff increases that had been contemplated, the negotiation of several bilateral agreements which contained tariff reductions, a marked tendency to consolidate and stabilise tariff schedules, and the negotiation of the first multilateral agreement aiming at the abolition of import and export prohibitions and restrictions which had survived from the war period. An outstanding example of the more co-operative attitude of leading countries was the commercial treaty between France and Germany which was finally agreed upon in August 1927 after negotiations which had extended over three years.

Some progress was being made, therefore, along all three lines which the Conference had laid down -- unilateral tariff action, bilateral treaties and multilateral conventions. In addition, a beginning was made with the examination of various forms of administrative protectionism and similar hindrances to the free flow of world trade.

The impetus thus derived from the World Economic Conference was, however, both limited and temporary in its effects. In regard to unilateral tariff action, the most that could be claimed was that, for some months after May 1927, there appeared to be a halt in the imposition of higher duties. The Economic Consultative Committee, in its second report (May 1929), recognis that, while "the check to the forces which are continuously being exerted in every country in favour of greater protection has persisted", there was, even in 1928, little sign of "a move in the opposite direction". On the contrary, there were many signs that the protectionist current was setting in more strongly than ever. By the beginning of 1929, there was no longer any doubt of this tendency.

The forces making for higher or lower tariff policies thus seem to have been evenly poised for a few months; but the international outlook faded as the agricultural States of the world began in 1928-29 to feel the first stringency which precede the depression. In 1928, Persia and China introduced their first autonomous tariffs, while Spain, Peru and Chile made

general revisions. In Europe, particularly in Germany and Sweden, there were revisions and eliminations, mostly of a downward character except in regard to the agricultural protection mentioned below. The Economic Consultative Committee at this time recognised that the issue, a drawn battle in 1927-28, would be decided by the character of the new tariffs under consideration in 1929 by Brazil, Egypt, Finland, Mexico, Portugal, Roumania, Spain, Turkey and the United States.

The development of agricultural protection in Europe, however, proved to be decisive. The continuous raising of tariff duties on industrial products in so many States, during the period 1921-1925, had left what the agricultural producers regarded as an invidious and unbalanced tariff situation. As long as food imports were needed in post-war Europe, agricultural prices remained relatively satisfactory; but the new German tariff law of 1925, which reimposed higher duties on food imports, proved to be the beginning of a strong upward movement of agricultural tariffs designed to protect home agricultural markets. In protecting its agriculturists, Germany had progressively to close its markets to the producers of other countries. In so doing, it became necessary to denounce the commercial treaties with Holland, Finland and Sweden, in so far as they related to imports of agricultural products. Moreover, the original restoration of food duties in 1925 had imposed the "middle

rates" of 1902, but successive revisions raised these rates until, in 1929, a new and much more drastic range of duties was imposed, only to be replaced in April 1930 by even more prohibitive rates which, as the depression deepened, were supplemented by the variety of administrative measures discussed later.[1]

These developments were paralleled in many other European States, and the agricultural countries of Central and Eastern Europe, crushed between the strong competition from the large-scale cereal and meat producers of the newer lands such as Canada, Australia and the Argentine, and the progressive closing of their neighbouring markets, were themselves forced into high protection and other restrictive measures. As the depression developed, the free markets, particularly for grain, constantly narrowed. Italy, France and Germany erected higher tariff barriers and supplemented them with administrative measures; in Norway, Sweden, Czechoslovakia and Switzerland, State controls or monopolies govern the markets. Milling regulations, quotas, import licences further protect the home growers. In Roumania, on the other hand, there is a direct export bounty, and in Hungary a tax on flour consumption, while in Germany, Poland, France, Czechoslovakia and Austria, the export of cereals is encouraged by the issue of "import

---

[1] See section (iv).

bonds" to exporters of grain.

It was this pressure for agricultural protection which destroyed the movement towards freer trade in the years 1927 and 1928. The plight of the agricultural countries of Central and Eastern Europe illustrates very well the fundamental maladjustments that created the depression. The agricultural producers in these countries are faced with heavy competition from overseas exporters, burdened with over-borrowing, their migration restricted, their trade outlets closed. Despite repeated efforts to discover some method of economic co-operation, they are in 1932 forced back, in self-defense, to increasing measures of import restriction, financial difficulties, and lowered standards of living.

Alarmed at the prospects of a new tariff war, of which the signs were clearly visible in 1929, the meeting of the Assembly in September 1929 had given favourable attention to the proposals made for a "tariff truce" to last for two or three years, during which time negotiations might be undertaken for a more permanent settlement. The immediate effect of the proposed truce was to accelerate action on the part of many States which deemed their tariffs too low, or desired to gain a more advantageous bargaining position. A new impulse was given, therefore, to the already powerful forces making for higher protection. The later development of the proposal for a tariff truce is more conveniently considered below.

From the middle of 1929, the steady deepening of depression, particularly in the raw-material-producing countries, greatly reinforced the pressure for higher tariffs. At this period, there appeared the additional motive of reducing imports in order to provide a strong favourable or active export balance from which the heavy overseas financial commitments of these countries might be met. From this time forward, therefore, the usual protectionist and revenue agruments for higher tariffs were reinforced and quickly overshadowed by the necessity for securing an active "balance of trade".

The whole movement was undoubtedly accentuated both by the alarm and resentment felt in many countries as the discussions of the new Hawley-Smoot tariff dragged on in the United States Congress from May 1929 to June 1930, and by the real effects of that tariff when it went into operation. It was followed quickly by new tariffs in many other countries, among others, Canada, Cuba, Mexico, France, Italy, Spain, Australia, New Zealand. In the case of the British Dominions, higher general tariffs were accompanied by an increased measure of imperial preference, and the general idea of a more extensive system of preferential duties with the British Empire was appreciably advanced.

It is obvious, therefore, that by the end of 1930 the protectionist current was running at full tide. The unilateral action of the various States mentioned above had brought into

existence tariffs that were appreciably higher all round. The deepening of the economic depression throughout the year made still more strongly for economic nationalism and, in the scramble for national security, the international aspects of tariff alterations did not weigh heavily.

When the financial crisis supervened in the spring of 1931, the imposition of restrictions upon commerce took on panic proportions. No country was immune, as the difficulty of transferring foreign exchange spread from debtors to creditors. The rapid succession of tariff changes, exchange controls, contingent systems, clearing arrangements is a confusing story that cannot be treated in detail, but the inevitable results in further restricting the volume of trade, raising the costs and complicating the machinery of trade regulation are only too clear.

Even the briefest record of the details of the almost univers movement towards higher tariffs would be impossible in this Survey, but reference should be made to the outstanding case of Great Britain. For more than ninety years, since Sir Robert Peel introduced the budget of 1842, Great Britain had been a free-trade country. Indeed, the movement towards freer trade began much earlier. The length and strength of this free-trade position render its abandonment the more notable. Temporary war restrictions and controls, followed by safeguarding duties for the protection of key industries immediately after the war, had made breaches in the free-trade system; but the reversal

of general policy in 1931-32 was more thorough-going and complete. The first step in this reversal of policy was the imposition of temporary duties of 50 per cent. on a long list of commodities the importation of which was held to be abnormal in quantity. A further list of agricultural, horticultural and garden imports was met with similar treatment, in this case by the imposition of duties approximating 33 1/3 per cent, but devised, in some cases, on a sliding scale designed to combat the import of early fruit and vegetables. These measures, imposed in November and December 1931, were followed in the early months of 1932 by legislation establishing a wheat quota, and, finally, by a general tariff. The latter was entrusted to a specially constituted permanent committee which in April recommended an extensive list of duties.[1] The range of duties recommended was from 10 per cent to 33 1/3 per cent, the main grouping being at the lower rates. Imports from the British Empire of commodities subject to the new duties are exempt pending negotiations with the Dominions. The commodities

---

1 Import Duties. Recommendations of the Import Duties Advisory Committee and Additional Import Duties (No. 1) Order, 1932. Cmd. 4066.

Also "British Tariff Policy 1932" prepared for the Fifth Conference of Institutions for the Scientific Study of International Relations, by Members of a Joint Study Group of the Royal Institute of International Affairs and the London School of Economics and Political Science.

covered by the new duties represent a substantial proportion of the total imports of Great Britain. Calculations based upon the trade returns of 1930 show a free list of approximately only a-third of the total imports, while about 40 per cent of the total (excluding 10 per cent, the produce of the Empire) is subject to the new duties. Great Britain, therefore, must now be placed among the countries which have at least a medium-range protective tariff system.

In recommending the first general tariff in April 1932, the Advisory Committee announced its intention not to recommend any lowering of duties for at least a year. Since the tariff as recommended was adopted by Parliament with few major amendments and the power of interim revision is delegated to the Advisory Committee, the use of the tariff for bargaining purposes is somewhat restricted by this pledge. Negotiations are actively under way also with the self-governing Dominions, and an Imperial Conference will meet at Ottawa in July 1932 to discuss the imperial aspects of the new regime. Both in the departure of Great Britain from its free-trade tradition and in the prospect of closer tariff relations within the British Empire, these developments change significantly the whole atmosphere of international discussions on tariffs and trade.

(iii) Bilateral and Multilateral Negotiations.

If attention is turned to the bilateral treaties which multiplied after 1927, the story is much the same. The method of bilateral negotiation for the reduction of tariff charges was one of the most hopeful avenues of progress envisaged by the World Economic Conference. This was particularly the case when the treaties included clauses for "most-favoured-nation treatment", since successive reductions of duties accrued, not only to the contracting parties, but also to all those countries which had bargained for most-favoured-nation treatment with them.

Numerous treaties were negotiated in 1927 and succeeding years, and it was evident that they held promise, not only of gradual tariff reductions, but also of agreements concerning veterinary controls, Customs formalities and many other measures of administrative protection. The period for which most of them were negotiated was, however, very short, in most cases a year only, and the contracting parties therefore retained liberty of action. As the tide of protectionism rose during the depression, such bilateral agreements became instruments for negotiation on a higher tariff level rather than means for a gradual approach to an all-round reduction of trade restrictions.

As the depression deepened, there were two distinct but related developments of this method of negotiation, particularly among the European countries. There was much discussion of

regional agreements, and on December 22nd, 1930, a Convention was signed at Oslo by the representatives of Denmark, Norway, Holland, Sweden and Belgium which provided a permanent basis for their tariff relations and established a procedure of notification among them in regard to tariff changes.

Other discussions relating to the possibility of regional agreements, particularly among the Central and Eastern European countries, were complicated both by political considerations and by the financial difficulties of those States. Successive conferences of the agricultural countries of Eastern Europe were held at Warsaw (August 1930), Bucharest (October 1930), Belgrade (November 1930) and Warsaw (November 1930). The eight countries represented at these conferences [1] were concerned primarily with the depressed condition of agriculture and particularly of cereal-growing. They contemplated the institution of national controls for the sale and export of these products, but also asked preferential treatment in regard to them from the importing countries of Western Europe. Such preferential treatment, in certain case, would have cut across the most-favoured-nation clauses of existing treaties, but was strongly advocated as a temporary measure affecting only a comparatively small volume of produce on the ground that agriculture was the fundamental economic basis of the States concerned. This whole discussion was complicated in March 1931 by the announcement

1 Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Roumania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.

of a projected Austro-German Customs Union, a project which was later withdrawn by its proposers.

Bilateral negotiations, extended to the discussion of region agreements, therefore, led back again directly to the international aspects of trade restriction and regulation. It is convenient at this point to take up the story of the first effort at multilateral negotiations. The World Economic Conference had recommended this as the third method of approach to freer trade, and in the course of 1928, as has already been stated, a Convention was negotiated for the abolition of import and expor prohibitions and restrictions. This Convention was to come into force if eighteen ratifications had veen received by September 30th, 1929. At that date, however, only seventeen States had ratified it, and a new conference was called in December 1929 which again failed to secure the necessary agreement.

Another conference held from November 5th to December 5th, 1929, to discuss a Convention giving greater liberty to foreign resident traders, also broke down on the refusal of certa States to change their existing legislation.

The first meeting called to consider concerted economic action in general tariff matters was that convened to take up the proposal advocated at the Assembly in September 1929 for a tariff truce. It met under unfavourable circumstances in Februar 1930, after the failure of the conferences mentioned above and after it was clear that the new United States tariff would be

strongly protectionist. Moreover, the economic depression was now well advanced, and the proposal for a tariff truce was therefore replaced by a commercial Convention of March 24th, 1930, prolonging existing commercial agreements till April 1st, 1931, and setting up a given procedure of consultation to be followed when duties were increased. At the same time, a protocol was signed opening the way to further negotiations of a more permanent character.

It was at this point that the regional discussions in Eastern Europe, and particularly the situation of the Dominion countries, were related once again to the general discussions. The need for financial assistance to these countries was recognised, but stron objections were raised to the granting of preference on cereal products.

The Assembly devoted some atention in 1930 also to this problem. Even stronger objections to the preferential proposals were voiced by the representatives of various non-European agricultural countries. A new turn was given to the whole discussion, however, by the memorandum presented to the Assembly by M.Briand, on behalf of the French Government, proposing the constitution of a Commission of Enquiry for European Union.

Before taking up the account of this Commission's work, however, it is necessary to record the continuation of the efforts to find some basis for concerted economic action in general

while deferring for a time consideration of rye and oats. A committee was also set up to consider the problem of disposing of the surplus from future harvests. Later meetings of the commission of Enquiry were occupied largely with the discussion of a pact of economic non-aggression proposed by the Soviet Union, but the Eastern European countries have maintained their request for preferential treatment of their cereals.

In 1931, however, the whole problem was submerged in the financial difficulties and particularly the controls of foreign exchanges necessitated by the severity of the crisis. Discussions continued both in the Economic Committee of the League and in the Commission of Enquiry for European Union. A draft project for an International Agricultural Credit Association was signed by sixteen States in May 1931, but has not been brought into existence. Various proposals for the alleviation of unemployment and for the facilitating of long-term investments have been mooted. Committees have considered the market situation of special products such as hops, tobacco, etc. But the shadow of the depression has been over all such proposals financial provision has been wanting, and international economic co-operation has proved impossible, while national Governments have been faced with economic insecurity within their own borders.

(iv) The Control of Exchange.

The regulation and restriction of international trade, already gravely complicated by the almost universal raising of tariff barriers and the failure of multilateral negotiations, took on a new aspect in the latter part of 1931, when one debtor country after another was forced to institute drastic controls of the foreign exchanges in order to safeguard the stability of its currency and to provide, as far as possible, the means for meeting its external financial obligations. Exchange controls were unfortunately not altogether a new phenomenon in the post-war world. During the period of currency inflation, the pegging of exchange had been practised by many countries in one way or another. When drastic efforts became necessary to reorganise and stabilise the currencies which had broken down after severe inflation, these exchange controls were rigidly exercised. With the movement back to the gold standard after 1925, howev the most restrictive of the controls were gradually removed.

Though there were signs of difficulty, for example in Germa in the summer of 1930, the severe financial phase of the economi depression may be dated from May 1931, when the Creditanstalt difficulties involved the National Bank and the Government of Austria. The weak financial situation that was then revealed, cupled with the effect of the depression upon agricultural prices and therefore upon export values, made in more than ever necessa

to provide for larger export balances, while at the same time conserving the exchange parities of the local currencies in order to avoid increasing the burden of external debt, which was already heavily increased by the fall in gold prices. The provision of such an active trade balance might be maximised by encouraging exports or by discouraging imports, or both. The encouragement of exports was a policy that had very definite limits set both by domestic production and consumption and by the capacity and willingness of the international market to absorb increased quantities of the raw materials and foodstuffs, which were the main resources of most of these debtor countries.

Moreover, the protectionist movement had set in so strongly by the middle of 1931 that markets were increasingly restricted. The higher United States tariff of 1930 had been followed by many other tariff systems; both France and Belgium introduced a system of licensing imports in the third quarter of 1931, Czechoslovakia did the same in July, and Sweden introduced a wheat monopoly in June. These and other systems of import contr it should be remembered, were added to constantly higher tariff barriers, many of them being reprisals against the tariff barriers of other countries. By the end of 1931, licences had led to quota or contingent systems, many countries had left the gold standard, others had thereupon reintroduced additional

exchange-dumping duties, commercial treaties were being denounced, and cumulative restrictions were being placed in the w of international trade. A summary list of the main measures adopted will indicate both the universality and the complexity of trade restrictions.

The first type consisted in the control of foreign exchange transactions to check any flight of capital and to conserve the available exchange resources for the most essential national requirements. Such controls were in force in Austria, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Yugoslavia, Argentine, Brazil, Chile and India, while in Norway the banks exercised unofficial control. During the early months of 1932, Denmark and Roumania introduced control systems, but Finland abandoned such restrictions on December 31st, 1931.

More direct reduction of imports was achieved in 1931 by the introduction of quotas (Czechoslovakia, France, Italy, Lat. Netherlands and Turkey); by prohibitions (Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Estonia, Poland, Turkey and Colombia); by State monopolies (Estonia and Sweden); by new inport duties (Great Britain by increased duties (Austria, Argentine, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Denmark, France, India, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Poland, the Union of South Africa and Swizerland); and by Customs surtaxes for depreciated exchange (Canada and France).

In addition, the abandonment of the gold standard by Argentine, Australia, Brazil, Denmark, Finland, Great Britain, India, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal and Sweden had considerably hampered imports into those markets. In addition to these countries, Bolivia, Chile, Greece, Siam and Peru abandoned the gold standard in the early months of 1932. In many other countries, its maintenance was more nominal than real, and it was a truer representation of the facts to say that in some half-dozen countries only was the gold standard maintained without special restrictions.

Such a recital of the progressive and cumulative imposition of restrictions in so many countries sufficiently explains the manner in which currency disorganization in recent months has caused a creeping paralysis of international trade.

There are many other ways, besides the direct effect of higher duties, in which this complication of regulations embarrasses international trade. Formalities have multiplied and become both hampering and costly; licences, if granted for the year, cause gluts and then scarcities, or, if granted monthly, prevent an orderly development of trade. Contingents or quotas cut across most-favoured-nation arrangements and, moreover, dislocate the relations of supply and demand. Decisions taken by civil servants in the "national interest" differ considerably from those dictated by the normal relations of consumer and

producer. As a particular important instance of this may be cited the importance attached in the various systems of exchange controls to the service of debt as distinct from the import needs of the country. The world is becoming enmeshed in a network of temporary ad hoc regulations which will be extremely difficult to disentangle.

In an effort to cope with certain of these evils, different countries have negotiated bilateral "clearing agreements", by which imports and exports are balanced as between the two countries concerned. There are, however, very great difficulties, in practice, in maintaining such agreements. International trade is rarely bilateral, and the effort to balance the import and export relations of two particular countries involves the dislocation of the normal many-cornered trade that has been built up by decades of international co-operation. Essentially, such clearing agreements are temporary and unsatisfactory devices to meet an impossible situation.

It is impossible in any brief summary to make anything like a complete statement of all the various devices brought into use to restrict trade. Especially after the abandonment of the gold standard by Great Britain in September 1931, there has been a veritable panic, which has piled new tariffs on old, turned licensing systems into prohibitions, monopolies and contingents; denounced existing commercial agreements; created more and

more rigid exchange controls issuing in debt moratoria and paralysed trade; and substituted a slight and temporary framework of clearing agreements for previously existing treaties. The bankers or civil servants have had thrust on them the duty of regulating commercial intercourse, and merchants have been so hemmed in by regulations that freedom of trade has almost ceased to exist.

It would be invidious to take the case of particular countries as anything more than illustrative of general situations. Many of the debtor countries are virtually at a standstill with rigid exchange controls, debt moratoria, and ever-increasing governmental control of economic life. The great creditor countries are almost equally affected. The United States, since its tariff action in 1930, has not added further barriers to trade, but Great Britain, in November and December 1931, placed duties of 50 per cent on three long lists of imports, and followed these lists with two others relating to agricultural imports subjected to duties based on an average of $33^1/_3$ per cent, besides passing an Act providing for a wheat quota and finally introducing a general tariff.[1] Holland, another traditional free-trade country, raised its tariff barriers in November and, in the following month, introduced a system of "contingents". France and Germany, from the middle of 1931, have striven to protect their agriculture

1 See section (ii).

never been paralleled in duration, universality or intensity. It has brought into challenge the whole of organised economic and political life.

The international conception of developing world unity was by no means widely accepted even before the war. Years of war and post-war struggle and propaganda were hardly likely to establish it, even though the fact of economic development pointed to increasing interdependence. The great bulk of social life and education is still organised on national bases, the prese vation of which is regarded as the primary duty of citizenship. There is much that is wholesome and valid in this conception of national life, and it is natural that the advent of a disastrous crisis should evoke a strong impulse to ensure stability in natior affairs.

Yet the events of recent years, and more especially of recer months, have demonstrated how large a part international relations have come to play even in national life and affairs. Interdependence, especially in the financial and economic sphere has been proved, even in the process of endeavouring to secure national sufficiency. The task of synthesis remains. What is valuable and useful for the welfare of the people in national organisation must be reconciled with the fact that every nation is now dependent upon every other.

It is noteworthy, therefore, that, throughout the crisis,

international negotiations have been maintained, even in many of the processes of unilateral action. There have been tariff wars before, never perhaps on such a desperate scale, but, on the other hand, never before conducted internationally. The "habit of conference" has persisted, the multilateral aspect of negotiations has been maintained, even when they have issued in drastic unilateral action. The process may have failed but the machinery is not destroyed.

Moreover, this is the first great economic crisis in which the necessity of international economic co-operation has been steadily maintained, not only as an ideal, but as a practical working solution. Successive official and unofficial conferences have endorsed the recommendations of the World Economic Conference of 1927. Despite national actions to the contrary, even national representatives assembled in international conference have admitted and upheld the validity of this international program.

There is, therefore, a solid and growing body of support for the view that the way out of the crisis is by an increasing rather than a decreasing measure of international economic co-operation. Action follows upon conviction and conviction waits often upon the exhaustion of other possibilities. Moreover, action in such a vast field cannot be simple. Financial, monetary, commercial and other economic aspects of the problem are interlinked and all depend to some extent upon political settlement

Def. Doc. # 1918

and appeasement. The downward slope of the crisis has seen reversion to the more primitive forms of economic nationalism in unprecedented degree; the upward slope awaits and will itself facilitate a return to the realities of interdependence.

(P.P. 276-291)

---

not used

弁護側文書第一九一八号附錄一

(九)國際金融と経済的國家主義

「世界経済概觀一九三一―三二年」抜萃

本章前節に述べてある所を一言にして綜合することが出來るとすれば次の通りとなろう。

戰後の世界は全体として其の制約が國際的である経済上の特に財政上の体系の必要とする所を認識せず又之に対処することに失敗した國際経済発達の程度は何もすれば言い過ぎとなるものである。調整の失敗は経済の或る部門更に進んだ程度で金融の機構は全く國際的であり世界的であるが経済の他の重要の部門はなお國家的基礎の下に組織せられ且つ計画せられていると云う事実から主として生ずるのである

（四三頁）

× × × ×

一九三一年及び一九三二年の前半を通じ欧洲は舞台の中心となり注意

は合衆國に時々向けられたのに過ぎない。然し世界の他の國の財政金融狀態も亦大部分の惡化を續けたのである日本は弱迫のよい實例である日本では物價は一九二九年一月の二二八から一九三〇年一月には二〇[illegible]に一九三一年一月には一五九に而して一九三一年十一月には一四七に下落した

その後日本は金本位を離脱したのである輸出は一九二九年の二十二億二千百八十万円から一九三一年には十一億七千九百万円に減少し輸入も亦大体半分になつた。貿易外收支も一九二八年には二億二千万円の黒字超過であつたが一九三一年には千五百万円の支拂超過となつた所得も一九三一年には実際上一割低下し就業も略同程度に減少した一九三一年の始めの十一ヵ月間に日本はその金準備の約四割を失つたが之は一九三〇年に二割五分を失つた後のことである一九三〇年一月十八日に十億八千七百万円であつた日本の金準備は一九三一年十二月五日には五億二千[illegible]万円に下がつた

×　×　×　×

D.D. 1918,

(二)経済的國家主義の発生

×　×　×　×

戦争は貿易制限と貿易に干渉した政府の措置を遺した徹廢、管理、優先制度、輸入又は輸出の禁止、價格の公定、政府の独占と企業等此等は総て関税障壁の効果を強化した然し多分貿易の大の障害は諸國貨幣の混乱から生じたのである程度を異にするインフレーションは課税を絶えず変更し日々刻々変動する爲替率は正常貿易の契約の基礎を不安としたのである

×　×　×　×

一九二一年以後の物價の下落は物價の高かつたときに課せられていた廣汎に亘る従量税が事実上負担を増加させることとなり関税障壁の悪影響を大ならしめた多くの新関税障壁の追加、関税率の引上及び戦争中に始められた面倒な制限的の禁止及び管理の氣りも亦國際経済協力の更新に顕著な障害となつて制限的通商政策へと指向させたのであつた

D.D.1918

一九二七年五月開催せられた世界経済会議は通商制限の全域に亘つて非議し制限撤廃の必要につき事実上全会一致であつた実際会議は「関税の増加を終止しその動向を再検すべき時は來た」との明白な宣言をしたのであつた

× × × ×

戦時中の禁止、制限及び阻止的規則が多く廃されたことは著く置き戦争が終了するや各国家主義的経済政策が顕著に展示された右は一部は新工業と戦時中に開かれた通商路を保護せんとするものであつたなお爲替ダンピング及び紙幣の更新せる恐怖もあつた

× × × ×

然し一九二七年世界経済会議が開催せられたときは関税の狀態はまだかなり見込があつた貿易の混乱も相当に落ちつき一九二四―二五年後生産及び貿易は一般的に回復し且つ又多数の國では前の廣きに亘り價格の變動の甚しかつた年に臨時的措置として定められた関税率及び関税上の

諸措置を安定させる必要もあつたのである一九二一—二六年の全期間は関税率及び関税の立法が盛んに行われたときで多数の重要な通商條約と二國間條約が締結された然し此等は大低一年又はそれ以下の非常に短い期間に対するもので交渉に依る譲歩及び調査の可能性はなお残されていた

世界経済会議に依り設置された経済諮問委員会は一九二八年の第一回会合で「会議の結果一九二七年五月に盛んであつた関税引上は既に相当に阻止せられた」と報告することが出來た

× × × ×

然し、世界経済会議の齎したかかる刺戟はその効果は局限せられ又一時的のものであつた各國独目の関税措置について言い得ることは精々一九二七年五月以後数カ月間関税引上が止つた様に見えたと云うに過ぎない

経済諮問委員会は第二回報告（一九二九年五月）で各國において更に大なる保護の為絶えず行われおる力を阻止せんとすることは続いている

D.D.1918

が「一九二八年でさへ「反対の方向への動き」は殆んどないと云うことを認めている却て保護主義の力が以前より一層強くなりつつあると云う多数の徴候があつた一九二九年の始めまでにはもはや此の傾向につき何等の疑はなかつた

× × × ×

不況の進展に伴い自由市場特に欧洲の市場は絶えず狭隘となつてきた伊太利、佛蘭西及び独逸は関税障壁を高め且つ之を補うに行政的措置をもつてした。諸國、瑞典、チエツコスロヴァキア及び瑞西では國家管理又は独占が市場を支配した製粉規則、割当、輸入許可が更に國内の生産者を保護した

× × × ×

新興戦の徴候は一九二九年には明らかに認取せらるる様になつたがその見透しに於いて一九二九年九月連盟総会は二三年続く関税休戦の提案に好意ある注意を拂つた此の期間中にもつと恒久性のある解決の為交渉しようと云うのである休戦提議の直ちに齎したものは自國の関税率が

低きに過ぎると考え又は懸引上もつと有利な地位を獲得せんとする多數國の行爲の速度を加えたことであつたその爲に保護を高めようとしていた既に力強い勢力に刺戟を與えることとなつた

× × × ×

一九二九年の中頃から次第に深まり行く不況は特に原料生産國で著しかつたが関税を高めようとする圧力を強化した此の時に当り大なる輸出超過を得ん爲輸入を減少させようとする新動機が加わつた此の輸出超過に依つて此等の國の負う大なる海外支拂は賄われるのであるそれで此の時以來関税引上げの爲普通に行われる保護及び收入からの主張は輸出超過を確保することの必要に依つて更に強化せらるることとなり間もなく此の必要の方が保護や收入よりも強調されることとなつた

此の全般的動きは北米合衆國の議会で一九二九年五月から一九三〇年六月に亘り新ホーレー・スムート関税率の討議が行われたとき多数の國で感じられた警戒と憤慨とによりなお又同税率の実施されたとき実際に受

D.D.1918

けた影響に依つて促進せられたことは疑のない所である米國の新関税率法に引続き間もなく加奈陀、墨瑪、メキシコ、フランス、伊太利、西班牙、蘭洲、新西蘭等多数の國で新関税率を定めた英國の自治領では一般税率の引上に伴い英帝國特惠手段は増大せられ英帝國との特惠税率を更に拡大せんとする一般的の考を相当に進めたものであつた

それで一九三〇年末までに保護貿易の流れが満ちていたことは明らかである。前記諸國のとつた措置は全般的に関税をかなり引上げたものである一九三〇年を通じ経済不況が深刻化を加えたことは更に経済的國家主義を促進することとなり國家の保護の爲と云うことで関税率改正の國際的部面は直接せられたかつた

一九三一年春計畫的為替管理が併行したとき通商に対する制限は恐慌的に行われた外國爲替送金の困難は債務者から債權者へと及んで行つたから何れの國も之から免れなかつた関税、外國爲替管理、割当制度、清算取極は迅速に次々と実行せられ之は詳述することの不可能な混雑したもので

あつた然し貿易量を更に制限したこと、生産費を増加したこと、貿易を規律する爲の機構を複雜にしたことに依り生ずる避けることの出來ない結果は明瞭である

始んど世界的であつた関税引上の詳細を此の概説で記すことは不可能であるが英國の顕著な例を挙げなければならない、××××戰爭中の臨時的制限及び管理は戰爭直後重要産業保護の爲の保護税に依つて引きつがれたが之は自由貿易制度に反するものである然し一九三一―三二年の一般政策の轉換はもつと徹底的で完全なものであつた××××英帝國から輸入せらるる新課税品は自治領との商議まで之を免除せられた新税の採せらるる物品は英帝國全輸入の大きな割合を占めた、一九三〇年の貿易統計を基礎として計算すると無税品は全輸入の約三割に過ぎず全輸入品一一割のもの及び英帝國産品を除く）の約四割は新税を賦課せられるのである、それで英國はもう少く共中程度の保護関税制度を有つ國の中に入れなければならない

D.D.1918

英國が自由貿易の傳統から離れたことと英帝國内で一層緊密な関税関係を設定すると云う見透しは関税及び貿易に関する國際的論議の全体の雰囲氣を大に變化させた

×　×　×　×

(三)二國間及多數國間の商議

一九二七年以來增加した二國間條約に注意して見ると其の經過は大いに似通つて居る。關稅賦課の軽減の爲の二國間商議の方法は世界經濟会議に依つて予想せられた進歩への最も有望な通路であつた、條約が最惠國待遇の約款を包含し從て締約國のみならず此等の國と最惠國待遇を約定して居る一切の諸國に対し關稅の連續的低下を齎らした場合には殊にそうであつた。

一九二七年及其の以後の年に於て多數の條約が商議せられ、此等の條約は關稅の漸減のみならず、家畜統制、關稅手續及其の他多くの行政的保護の手段に関する取極をも期待せしめた、然しながら此等條約の多くのものの商議せられた期間は極めて短く、多くの場合僅かに一年で締約國はすぐに行動の自由を恢復した經濟不況の間、保護政策の風潮が起つた爲めに新くの如き二國間協定は貿易制限の全般的減少へ漸次接近せしめる方法たるよりも寧ろ關稅率引上げ商議への手段たるに至つた。

QD.1918

×　×　×

地域的協定の討議に拡張せられた二國間商議は斯くて再び貿易制限及規整の國際的標相に復帰した、此点に付ては多數國間商議の最初の努力の沿革を取上げるのが便宜である世界經済会議は自由貿易への接近の第三の方法として之を推奨したそして前にも述べた如く一九二八年に輸出入禁止制限の撤廃の爲めに一の國際條約が商議せられた此の條約は若し一九二九年九月三十日までに十八ヶ國の批准が得られたならば効力を発生する筈であつた、しかし同期日までに十七ヶ國のみが批准した、それで一九二九年十二月に新しく國際会議が招集せられたがこれも又必要な取極めを確保することに失敗した。

一九二九年十一月五日から同十二月五日まで開かれた他の國際会議に於て外國に居住する貿易業者に從來よりも一層の自由を與うることを目的とする條約が討議せられたが數多の國が現行の法制を變更することを拒絶した爲め失敗に終つた。

×　×　×

D.D.1918

しかしながら一九三一年には此等一切の諸問題は財政的困難殊に苛烈な恐慌の爲めの必要に基く外國爲替の管理問題の中に其の姿を沒してしまつた、討議は國際聯盟の經濟委員会及び欧洲同盟審議委員会の双方に於て繼續せられた、國際農業信用協会設立の草案は一九三一年五月、十六ケ國に依つて署名せられたが之は効力を発生しなかつた、失業の緩和及び長期投資の簡易化に関する各種の提案が討議せられた、諸委員会はホップ煙草等の特別の生産物の市況を研究した、しかしながら經濟不況の陰影は此等一切の提案を慈い金融的準備は欠如し且つ各國政府は自國の領域内に於て經濟不安に直面した爲めに國際的經濟協力は不可能となつた。

(四)爲替管理

関税障壁の一般的引上げ、及び多數國間商議の失敗に依り複雑化せられた國際貿易の規整及び制限は一九三一年の後半に至つて新なる樣相を呈するに至つた即ち当時各債務國は自國の通貨の安定を保持し且つ出來得

D.D.1918

る限り対外債務を支弁する手段を準備する爲めに漸次外國爲替の嚴重なる管理を実施するの止むを得ざる狀況にあつたのである。

× × ×

更らに保護主義の運動が一九三一年中頃頗る強力に開始せられた其の爲めに市場は漸次制限せられた、米國の一九三〇年の高関税は他の関税制度の手本となつた、即ち佛、白両國は一九三一年第三四半期に輸入許可制度を採用しチエコスロヴァキアは同年七月同様の制度を設け瑞典は同年六月小麦の專賣制を施いた此等の輸入制限の制度に加えて更らに高い関税障壁が多くの場合他國の高関税に対する報復手段として絶えず設定されたことを想起せねばならぬ一九三一年末頃には許可制度は割当制度に移行し又多くの國は金本位制度を離脱し他の諸國は通商條約を廃棄して爲替ダンピング税を附加し漸くして國際貿易に対する各種の制限は益々累積した当時採用せられた主なる輸入制限方式の概略はよく貿易制限の一般性と複雜性との双方を示すであろう。

D.D.1918

×　×　×

如何なる概慨書を以てしても國際貿易を制限する爲めに用いられたる百般の措置を完全に記述するが如きことは不可能ことに屬する特に一九三一年九月英國の金本位離脱の後は眞の恐慌が來たのである其の結果新関税率は旧税率の上に累積せられ許可制度は禁止取賣及び割当に移行せられ現行通商協定は廃棄せられ債務支拂延期の発令に依り爲替管理制度は益々厳重とせられ國際貿易は麻痺せしめられ簡單且つ短期の支拂協定の背後を以て現存條約に代わらしめた、銀行家或は官吏が商業取引を規整することを自己の責任と感じ商人は規則に甚しく拘束せられたので貿易の自由は殆んど失われたのである。

×　×　×

(五)貿易規整の國際的樣相

恐慌の年の貿易規整及び制限の全体を通じ本章第一節に簡單に述べた樣に經濟的社会的觀念に明らかな衝突がある実行の場面では國家主義的な勢力と制度とが完全に支配的であつた、國際的行動の提議は殆んど成

P.D. 1918

功を齎さなかつた之は諒解に難くない世界が經驗した而して今尚經驗して居る恐慌は其の期間に於ても普辺的なことでも將又其の强度に於ても未曾有のものである。此の恐慌は組織せられた經濟的政治的生活の全体に対し挑戰するものであつた。

× × ×

それで恐慌から脱する途は國際的經濟協力手段を減ずるに非ずして増進せしむるにあるとの見解を支持する堅実にして発達しつつある団体がある行動は確信に從つて行われるものである而して確信は屢々他の手段が益きて生ずるのである、のみならず斯くの如き廣大な局面に於ける行動は簡單ではあり得ない、本問題の財政的、貨幣的、商業的及び其の他の經濟的問題は相互に関聯を有し且つ或る程度政治的解決と緩和に依存するのである恐慌の深刻化は前例なき程もつと原始的な形態の經濟的國家主義に移らしめた恐慌の回復は相互依存の実現えの復帰を待ち且つ之を促進するであろう。

（二七六頁―二九一頁）

DEF. DOC. #1913 Appendix I

not used

Certificate

Statement of Authenticity

I, who occupy the post of the Chief of the Archives Section of Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of 328 pages and 3 attached maps and entitled "World Economic Survey 1931-2" is a document compiled and published by the League of Nations and in the custody of Japanese Foreign Office.

certified at Tokyo

on this 2nd day of August, 1947.

/s/ HAYASHI, Kaoru
(seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

Witness: /s/ ABE, Katsuma
(seal)

not used

Def. Doc 1918 Appendix 1

文書成立ニ關スル證明書

自分ハ外務省文書課長ノ職ニ居ル者ナル處、茲ニ添付セル英語ニ成リ印刷セラレ三二八頁及附圖地圖三葉ヨリ成ル "WORLD ECONOMIC SURVEY 1931-2" ト題スル印刷物ハ國際聯盟事務局ノ編纂發行ニ係ル文書ノ一ニシテ日本政府ハ外務省ノ保管スルモノナルコトヲ證明ス

昭和二十二年八月二日　於東京　林　審

右署名捺印ハ自分ノ面前ニ於テ爲サレタルモノナルコトヲ證明ス

同日於同所　立會人　浦部勝馬

not used

DEF. DOC. #1918

Appendix 2

Excerpt from

MONETARY AND ECONOMIC CONFERENCE

DRAFT ANNOTATED AGENDA

P.P 5-6

A. INTRODUCTION.

The Preparatory Commission of Experts has been given the task of preparing a draft annotated agenda for the forthcoming Monetary and Economic Conference. In undertaking this task, we have been guided by the terms of reference transmitted to us by the Council of the League of Nations, and by certain preliminar discussions recorded in the Final Act of the Lausanne Conference. This Conference, having arrived at far-reaching decisions with regard to the pressing problem of reparations payments, invited the League of Nations to convoke a World Conference "to decide upon the measures to solve the other economic and financial difficulties which are responsible for, and may prolong, the present world crisis". In this message from Lausanne, we have found the clearest indication of our general mandate.

Before setting forth the problems which require solution, we wish to call attention to the gravity of the situation with which the world is confronted.

Unemployment has recently been estimated by the International Labour Office as involving at least thirty million workers. Even this huge total, which does not include the workers' families or other dependants, is probably

an underestimate. The burden of suffering and demoralisation resulting from unemployment of such proportions is appalling.

Wholesale commodity prices---expressed in gold---have declined since October 1929 by roughly a third; raw material prices on the average by 50 to 60 per cent. In the middle of December, at Winnipeg, the price of wheat fell to the lowest level recorded in any primary market for wheat during the past four centuries. Such price-declines have produced profound disturbances in the economic system. They have thrown completely out of adjustment prevailing costs of the various factors of production, have made business enterprise generally unremunerative, and have seriously disorganised practically all the world markets.

World stocks of agricultural products and of other raw materials continue to accumulate. The index of world stocks for 1932 was double that for 1925. Huge accumulations thus overhang some of the principal markets and burden the processes of orderly price readjustment.

Industrial production has been drastically curtailed, particularly in those trades producing capital equipment. The depths which have been reached in some instances are illustrated by the position of the United States steel industry, which, at the close of 1932, was operating at only 10 per cent of capacity.

The international flow of goods, hindered by currency disorders and restricted by a multiplicity of new governmental interventions, has been reduced to incredibly low levels. The total value of world trade in the

third quarter of 1932 was only about one-third of that in the corresponding period of 1929. The fall during the three-year period was continuous.

Moreover, the quantum of goods in foreign trade appears to have fallen by at least 25 per cent; by far the largest fall on record.

As a result of price-declines and the fall in the volume of production and trade, national incomes in many countries have fallen, it is estimated, by more than 40 per cent. The revenues of Governments, as a consequence, have suffered sharp reductions, while expenditures have shown no corresponding decline. The inevitable result has been a series of budget deficits which, in some cases, have reached unprecedented proportions.

Only a handful of countries now retain free and uncontrolled gold-standard currency systems. Almost half the countries of the world are off the gold standard, and, in some forty countries, exchange restrictions have been imposed.

Currency disorganisation, price-declines, curtailment of trade have thrown into sharp relief the vast and difficult problems of indebtedness with which many, if not most, countries are confronted. As matters now stand, there are countries the total value of whose export trade has fallen below the sums required for external debt service alone.

Facts such as these indicate the extremities to which the forces of disintegration have already carried the economic and financial world. Further losses of ground cannot be contemplated without the gravest forebodings. Happily, in some quarters, there have recently been certain auguries of

improvement. Thus security markets in almost every country have for several months past shown some resistance, despite discouragements. In the set-back which followed the slight revival after Lausanne, the security markets, unlike the commodity markets, did not lose all the gains that had been made. It is evident that more favourable monetary conditions, technical economic readjustments and reviving confidence are being currently interpreted by those who assume the risks of investment as affording the possibility of a genuine change for the better in the economic situation.

Nevertheless, recovery will be halting and restricted if unaccompanied by broad measures of reconstruction. Three years of world-wide dislocation have generated a vast network of restraints upon the normal conduct of business. In the field of international trade, prohibitions, quotas, clearing agreements, exchange restrictions---to mention only some of the most widely employed forms of regulation---throttle business enterprise and individual initiative. Defensively intended, and in many instances forced by unavoidable monetary and financial emergencies, these measures have developed into a state of virtual economic warfare. It is not only in the field of trade that this tension exists. In the difficult sphere of international monetary and currency relations and in the world capital markets, free international co-operations has given place to complex and harassing regulations designed to safeguard national interests. If a full and durable recovery is to be effected, this prevailing conflict of national economics must be resolved.

Def Doc No. 1918 Appendix 2

CERTIFICATE OF AUTHENTICITY

I, who occupy the post of The Chief of the Archieves of Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, printed in Japanese consisting of 38 pages and entitled "League of Nations Monetary and Economic Conference Draft Annotated Agenda Submitted by the Preparatory Commission of Experts" is a document compiled and issued by the office of League of Nation and in the custody of Japanese Government (Foreign Office).

certified at Tokyo,

on this 2 day of July, 1947

HAYASHI, Kaoru (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

at the same place,

on the same date

Witness: URABE, Katsuma (seal)

DEF. DOC. #1918

The measures to be adopted to this end constitute the problem which the Governments must shortly face in London. In essence, the necessary programme is one of economic disarmament. In the movement towards economic reconciliation, the armistice was signed at Lausanne; the London Conference must draft the Treaty of Peace. Failure in this critical undertaking threatens a world-wide adoption of ideals of national selfsufficiency which cut unmistakably athwart the lines of economic development. Such a choice would shake the whole system of international finance to its foundations, standards of living would be lowered and the social system as we know it could hardly survive. These developments, if they occur, will be the result, not of any inevitable natural law, but of the failure of human will and intelligence to devise the necessary guarantees of political and economic international order. The responsibility of Governments is clear and inescapable.

not used

Appendix 2
DEFDOC-1918

國際貿易經濟會議註釋附議題案

三一七頁　抜萃

A、緒言

專門家準備委員會ハ來ルベキ貿易經濟會議ノ爲註釋附議題案ヲ作成スルノ任務ヲ與ヘラレタリ右任務ノ遂行ニ當リ我等ハ國際聯盟理事會ヨリ送達セラレタル委託ノ條項及「ローザンヌ」會議最終議定書ニ記載セラレタル或ル豫備的討議ヲ指針トセリ「ローザンヌ」會議ハ賠償金支拂ノ緊急問題ニ關シ徹底的ノ決定ヲ爲シタル後國際聯盟ニ對シ「現在ノ世界恐慌ノ原因ニシテ之ヲ長引カシムルコトアルヘキ他ノ經濟的及財政的困難ヲ解決スベキ措置ヲ決定スベキ」國際會議ヲ招請センコトヲ要請シタリ「ローザンヌ」ヨリノ右「メッセージ」ニ於テ我等ハ其ノ一般的受任事項ニ付最モ明瞭ナル指示ヲ認識セリ

我等ハ解決ヲ要スル問題ヲ敍述スルニ先チ世界ノ當面セル事態ノ重大ナルコトニ付注意ヲ喚起セントス

失業ハ最近國際勞働事務局ニ依リ少ク共三千萬ノ勞働者ニ達スト見積

Appendix 2
DEFDOC-1918

ラレタリ右巨大ノ数字（勞働者ノ家族又ハ被扶養者ヲ包含セズ）サヘモ恐ラクハ見積リ過少ナルベシ右ノ如キ割合ノ失業者ヨリ生スベキ苦息及德性敗壞ハ恐ルベキモノナリ

卸賣物價（金ニテ表示セラレタル）ハ一九二九年十月以來約三分ノ一低落セリ原料品ノ價格ハ平均五割乃至六割低落セリ十二月中旬「ウイニペッグ」ニ於テ小麥ノ價格ハ過去四世紀間未ダ嘗テ何レノ市場ニ於テモ記錄セラレタルコトナキ最低價格ニ低落セリ右ノ如キ物價下落ハ經濟機構ニ深甚ナル混亂ヲ招來シ各種ノ生産要素ノ費用ノ調整ヲ全ク不可能トシ、企業ヲ一般的ニ收益ナキモノトシ事實上一切ノ世界市場ヲ著シク攪乱シタリ

農産物及他ノ原料品ノ世界貯藏量ハ依然増大シツツアリ一九三二年ノ世界貯藏量ノ指數ハ一九二五年ノ二倍ナリキ巨額ノ貯藏量ハ新クノ如ク主要市場ノ或ルモノヲ壓迫シ正常ナル物價ノ調整ヲ困難ナラシメツツアリ

Appendix 2
DEFDOC-1918

工業生産ハ著シク減退シ特ニ資本設備ヲ生産スル産業ニ於テ甚シ一九三二年末製造能力ノ僅ニ一割ヲ運轉シツツアリタル米國鐵鋼業ノ狀態ハ或ル事例ニ於ケル減退ノ深度ヲ示スモノナリ

貿易ノ國際的流通ハ貨幣ノ混乱ニ依リ妨害セラレ、政府ノ新ナル干渉ノ增加ニ依リ制限セラレテ信ジ難キ程ニ減少セリ一九三二年第三「四半期」ニ於ケル世界貿易ノ總價額ハ一九二九年同期ノ額ノ約三分ノ一ニ過ギズ最近三年間ノ減退ハ壊滅的ナリキ

加之外國貿易品ノ數量モ少ク共二割五分減少シタルモノノ如シ右ハ未會有ノ減少ナリ

物價ノ下落並ニ生産額及貿易額ノ減少ノ結果トシテ多數國ニ於テ國民所得減少シ其ノ割合四割ヲ超過スト見積ラル其ノ結果政府ノ歳入モ激減シタルガ他方歳出ハ之ニ相應ジテ減少ヲ示スコトナシ其ノ必然ノ結果トシテ豫算ノ不足繼續シ或ル場合ニ於テハ未會有ノ割合ニ達セリ

現在自由ニシテ管理ナキ金本位貨幣制度ヲ維持スルモノハ僅少ナリ殆

ンド世界ノ半數ノ國ハ金本位ヲ離脱シ約四十國ニ於テハ爲替ノ制限實施セラレタリ

通貨ノ混亂、物價ノ低落及貿易ノ減少ハ多數ノ國ヘ大部分ニ非ズトスルモノ當面セル廣汎且困難ナル債務ノ問題ヲ激化セリ現狀ヲ以テシテハ其ノ輸出貿易ノ總額ガ對外債務支拂ノミニ要スル金額ニサヘモ足ラザル國アリ

敍上ノ事實ハ經濟財政界ガ如何ナル崩壞狀態ニ達セルカヲ示スモノナリ更ニ事態ノ惡化アリトセバ憂慮禁ズル能ハザルモノアリ幸ニシテ或ル方面ニ於テハ最近改善ノ或ル暗光ヲ示スニ至レリ卽チ殆ンド何レノ國ニ於テモ證券市場ハ惡材料アルニモ拘ハラズ過去數ケ月間ニ於テ或ル程度迄堅實ナリキ「ローザンヌ」會議後ノ多少ノ恢復ニ次デ退歩アリタルトキニ於テモ證券市場ハ商品市場トハ異リ其ノ獲得シタル地歩ノ全部ヲ失フコト無カリキ右ハ投資ノ危險ヲ負擔スル人々ガ一般ニ貨幣狀態ノ改善、經濟ノ技術的調整及信頼ノ回復ニ依リ經濟界ノ眞ノ好

Appendix 2
DEFDOC-1918

導ガ可能トナルベシト忍考シツツアルコトヲ示スモノナリ
然レ共回復ハ断乎タル措置ヲ講ジ復興ヲ計ルニ非ザレバ埋ク且狭小タ
ルベシ三年ニ亘ル世界的混乱ハ正常取引ニ対スル廣汎ナル制限網ヲ作
レリ国際通商界ニ於テ禁止、輸入割當、清算協定為替制限ヘ最モ廣ク
採用セラル制限ノ或ルモノヲ挙グルニ過ギズ）ハ事業計劃及個人ノ進
取心ヲ阻害ス防衛ヲ目的トシ及多クノ場合ニ於テハ避ク可カラザル賞
幣及財政ノ緊急ノ必要ニヨリ執ラレタル此等ノ措置ハ事實上経済戦争
ノ状態ニ發展シタリ右緊迫ノ存在スルハ貿易界ノミニ非ズ困難ナル国
際賞幣關係ニ於テモ將又世界資本市場ニ於テモ自由ナル国際協力ハ廢
レテ専然的利益ヲ保護セントスル複雑ニシテ面倒ナル制限之ニ代レリ
充分ニシテ永續スベキ回復ヲ實現セント欲セバ混沌ヲ極ムル諸国民経
済間ノ抗争ハ解決セラレザルベカラズ
右目的達成ノ為採用セントスル措置ハ諸国政府ガ倫敦ニ於テ處理セン
トスル問題ナリ之ヲ嘗約スレバ必要ナル「プログラム」ハ経済的宜備

Appendix 2
DEFDOC-1918

撤廃ナリ経済的和平ニ向フ運動トシテ休戦條約ハ「ローザンヌ」ニ於テ調印セラレタリ倫敦會議ハ平和條約ヲ起草スルコトヲ要ス此ノ決定的企畫ニシテ失敗センカ国家自給自足主義ノ世界的採用ヲ見ルベク経済ノ發達ノ阻止セラルベキコト必然ナルベシ右ノ如キコトアラバ國際財政ノ全機構ハ根底ヨリ動搖スベク生活程度ハ低下スベク我等ノ見ルガ如キ社會組織ハ殆ンド存續スルコトヲ得ザルベシ若シ右事態ノ發生スルコトアラバ其ハ不可避ノ自然法則ノ結果ニ非ズシテ政治的及經済的國際秩序ヲ必要ナル保障ヲ考案セントスル人類ノ意思及智慮ノ失敗ノ結果ナリ政府ノ責任ハ明白ニシテ免ルルコト能ハズ。

Appendix 2
DEFDOC-1918

文書成立ニ關スル證明書

自分ハ外務省文書課最ノ職ニ居ル者ナル處、茲ニ添付セル英語ニ依リ印刷セラレ三十八頁ヨリ成ル

LEAGUE OF NATIONS
Monetary and Economic Conference
DRAFT ANOTATED AGENDA
Submitted by the Preparatory Commission of Experts

7

ト題スル印刷物ハ國際聯盟事務局ノ編纂發行ニ係ル文書ノ一ニシテ日本政府（外務省）ノ保管スルモノナルコトヲ證明ス

昭和二十二年七月二日　於東京

林　馨

右署名拇印ハ自分ノ面前ニ於テ爲サレタルモノナルコトヲ證明ス

同日於同所　立會人　浦部勝馬

not used

DEF. DOC. 1918

APPENDIX 3-A

EXCERPT FROM "ECONOMIC STATISTICS OF JAPAN 1935" PP. 74

Exports and Imports of Merchandise

(In thousands of Yen)

Year & Month	Japan Proper & Karafuto			Whole Country (Taiwan & Chosen included)		
SHOWA	Exports	Imports	Excess of Exports or Imports(*)	Exports	Imports	Excess of Exports or Imports(*)
3.(1928)..	1,971,955	2,196,314	* 224,359	2,038,094	2,372,999	* 334,904
4.(1929)..	2,148,618	2,216,238	* 67,619	2,217,658	2,389,175	* 171,517
5.(1930)..	1,469,852	1,546,070	* 76,218	1,518,573	1,680,314	* 161,740
6.(1931)..	1,146,981	1,235,672	* 88,691	1,179,211	1,319,405	* 140,194
7.(1932)..	1,409,991	1,431,461	* 21,469	1,457,295	1,524,521	* 67,225

昭和十年本邦貿易統計（日本銀行調査局發行）抜萃第十四表

（大藏省調）

年月中	貨物輸出入					
	内地及樺太			全國		
	輸出	輸入	出超（△）	輸出	輸入	出超（△）
昭和三年（一九二八）	一、九二一、九三五	二、一九六、三二四	△三四三、三九	三、〇三六、〇九四	三、三七三、九九	△三三四、九〇四
昭和四年（一九二九）	二、一四六、六一八	二、二一、六二三八	△六七、六一九	二、二一、七六四八	二、四六、一七四	△一七、四一四
昭和五年（一九三〇）	一、四六、九六三	一、三四六、〇七〇	△七六、二一八	一、四一、八三七三	一、六八〇、三一四	△一六一、七四〇
昭和六年（一九三一）	一、一四六、九八一	一、二三四、六七二	△八八、六九一	一、一七六、二二一	一、三一、六四〇四	△一四〇、一九四
昭和七年（一九三二）	一、四〇九、九九一	一、四三一、四六一	△二一、四六九	一、四三七、二六四	一、三二、四四二	△六七、二二四

not used

Def. Doc. No. 1918 Appendix A, B, C, D

CERTIFICATE OF AUTHENTICITY

I, who occupy the post of the Chief Investigator, Bank of Japan, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, printed in Japanese consisting of 145 pages and entitled "Japan Economical Statistics, 10th of Showa" is a document compiled and issued by the year (1935) Investigation Branch, Bank of Japan.

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 29 day of July, 1947

YAMADA, Seichi (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place,

on the same date

Witness: AKASHI, Kageaki (seal)

not used

Def. Doc 1918 Appendix-3 A,B,C,D

文書成立ニ關スル證明書

自分ハ日本銀行調査局長ノ職ニ居ル者ナル處、茲ニ添付セル日本語ニ依リ印刷セラレ百四拾五頁ヨリ成ル昭和十年本邦經濟統計ト題スル印刷物ハ日本銀行調査局ノ編纂發行ニ係ル文書ノ一ナルコトヲ證明ス

昭和二十二年七月二十九日　於東京

日本銀行調査局長　山田精一

右署名捺印ハ自分ノ面前ニ於テ爲サレタルモノナルコトヲ證明ス。

同日於同所

立會人　日本銀行調査局　明石景明

not used 6-B-1

DEF.DOC# 1918

Appendix 3-B

Excerpt from ""Economic Statistics of Japan 1935"

P,P. 75

(In thousands of Yen)

Exports and Imports of Gold

Year & Month	Japan Proper & Karafuto			Whole Country (Taiwan & Chosen included)		
	Exports	Imports	Excess of Exports or Imports(*)	Exports	Imports	Excess of Exports or Imports(*)
Showa 3.(1928)	--	409	* 409	--	443	* 443
.(1929)	--	462	* 462	--	547	* 547
5.(1930)	308,634	9,042	299,591	308,634	21,884	286,750
6.(1931)	419,834	9,054	410,779	419,856	31,661	388,195
7.(1932)	112,700	5	112,695	112,700	642	112,058

昭和十年本邦經濟統計（日本銀行調査局發行）抜萃　第七五頁

金輸出入（大藏省調）

年月中	内地及樺太 輸出	内地及樺太 輸入	内地及樺太 出超入超（△）	全國 輸出	全國 輸入	全國 出超入超（△）
	千圓	千圓	千圓	千圓	千圓	千圓
昭和三年（一九二八）		四〇九	△四〇九		四四三	△四四三
昭和四年（一九二九）		四六二	△四六二		五四七	△五四七
昭和五年（一九三〇）	三〇八、六三四	九〇四二	二九九、五九一	三〇八、六三四	二一、八八四	二八六、七五〇
昭和六年（一九三一）	四一九、八三四	九〇五、四	四一〇、七七九	四一九、八五六	三一、六六一	三八八、一九五
昭和七年（一九三二）	一一二、七〇〇	五	一一二、六九五	一一二、七〇〇	六四二	一一二、〇五八

Def. Doc. No. 1918 Appendix A, B, C, D

CERTIFICATE OF AUTHENTICITY

I, who occupy the post of the Chief Investigator, Bank of Japan, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, printed in Japanese consisting of 145 pages and entitled "Japan Economical Statistics, 10th of Showa" is a document compiled and issued by the year (1935) Investigation Branch, Bank of Japan.

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 29 day of July, 1947

YAMADA, Seichi (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place,

on the same date

Witness: AKASHI, Kageaki (seal)

not used

Def. Doc 1918 Appendix-3 A,B,C,D

文書成立ニ關スル證明書

自分ハ日本銀行調査局長ノ職ニ居ル者ナル旨、茲ニ添付セル日本語ニ依リ印刷セラレ百四拾五頁ヨリ成ル昭和十年本邦經濟統計ト題スル印刷物ハ日本銀行調査局ノ編纂發行ニ係ル文書ノ一ナルコトヲ證明ス

昭和二十二年七月二十九日　於東京

日本銀行調査局長

山田精一

右署名捺印ハ自分ノ面前ニ於テ爲サレタルモノナルコトヲ證明ス。

同日於同所

立會人　日本銀行調査局

明石景明

not used

Def. Doc. # 1918

APPENDIX 3-C

EXCERPT FROM "ECONOMIC STATISTICS OF JAPAN 1935" PP. 99

PRICES OF COMMODITIES

Index Numbers of Wholesale Prices in Tokyo Table I (by Months)

Based on Prices of 56 Commodities

October, 1900=100

Year	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	AV.
SHOWA 3.(1928)..	224.1	223.9	223.9	224.5	226.9	223.5	223.2	225.0	229.8	229.7	229.1	229.8	226.1
4.(1929)..	227.9	226.2	226.2	225.1	223.0	221.7	219.6	218.4	217.5	216.2	211.1	205.0	219.8
5.(1930)..	201.4	199.8	195.9	192.8	189.4	181.2	176.6	175.6	171.4	164.6	162.2	160.8	181.0
6.(1931)..	158.5	158.0	158.3	157.9	154.0	150.7	152.8	151.8	149.6	146.9	147.0	151.0	153.0
7.(1932)..	159.5	161.4	158.5	154.1	150.3	146.4	147.7	155.8	167.4	169.1	177.9	184.6	161.1

昭和十年本邦産業統計（日本銀行調査局發行）抜萃第九九頁

物價

東京卸賣物價指數　第一（月別）

明治三十三年十月基準（五十六品目ノ平均）

年次	一月	二月	三月	四月	五月	六月	七月	八月	九月	十月	十一月	十二月	年平均
昭和八年	三四一	三三六	三三九	三四五	三六九	三三五	三三三	三三〇	三三八	三三九	三三六	三三六	三三六
昭和九年	三三九	三三八	三三八	三三一	三三〇	三二七	三二六	三二八	三二五	三二八	三二一	三〇五	三二六
昭和十年	二〇一四	一九六	一九五九	一九八	一八九	一八一三	一七六	一七五六	一七一四	一六四六	一六三	一六〇八	一八一〇
昭和十一年	一五八五	一五八〇	一五八三	一五七九	一五四〇	一五〇七	一四三八	一四一八	一四九六	一四八九	一四七〇	一四一〇	一四三〇
昭和十二年	一五九五	一六一四	一五八七	一五四一	一五〇三	一四六四	一四七七	一四五八	一六七四	一六九	一七七九	一八四六	一六一一

Doc. Doc. 1918 Appendix 3-C

Natural

not used

Def. Doc. No. 1918 Appendix 3A, B, C, D

CERTIFICATE OF AUTHENTICITY

I, who occupy the post of the Chief Investigator, Bank of Japan, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, printed in Japanese consisting of 145 pages and entitled "Japan Economical Statistics, 10th of Showa" is a document compiled and issued by the year (1935) Investigation Branch, Bank of Japan.

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 29 day of July, 1947

YAMADA, Seichi (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place,

on the same date

Witness: AKASHI, Kageaki (seal)

not used

Def. Doc 1918 Appendix-3 A,B,C,D

文書成立ニ關スル證明書

自分ハ日本銀行調査局ノ職ニ居ル者ナル處、茲ニ添付セル日本語ニ依リ印刷セラレ百四拾五頁ヨリ成ル昭和十年本邦經濟統計ト題スル印刷物ハ日本銀行調査局ノ編纂發行ニ係ル文書ノ一ナルコトヲ證明ス

昭和二十二年七月二十九日　於東京

日本銀行調査局長

山田精一

右署名捺印ハ自分ノ面前ニ於テ爲サレタルモノナルコトヲ證明ス。

同日於同所

立會人　日本銀行調査局

明石景明

Def. Doc. # 1918 not used

Appendix 3-D

Excerpt from "Economic Statistics of Japan 1935"

p.p. 135

LABOUR

Number of Workpeople in Factories, Mines, etc. (Japan proper

End of		Factories	
		Private Management	
		Under Factory Law	
		Male	Female
Showa			
2.(1927)	6....	679,016	895,032
	12....	715,115	850,471
3.(1928)	6....	730,045	854,149
	12....	825,164	861,540
4.(1929)	6....	752,633	890,115
	12....	775,058	887,579
5.(1930)	6....	721,814	864,839
	12....	719,473	826,678
6.(1931)	6....	684,488	840,626
	12....	688,813	804,019
7.(1932)	6....	674,166	773,503
	12....	720,730	816,278

Def. Doc. # 1918

Appendix -3 -D

End of		Mines	
		Male	Female
SHOWA			
2.(1927)	6....	226,637	69,378
	12....	228,678	64,237
3.(1928)	6....	228,937	69,116
	12....	233,818	61,783
4.(1929)	6....	194,037	52,750
	12....	225,325	52,768
5.(1930)	6....	203,427	44,774
	12....	191,539	34,323
6,(1931)	6....	175,882	26,044
	12....	171,264	24,247
7,(1932)	6....	166,133	22,179
	12....	171,575	19,596

昭和十年本邦經濟統計（日本銀行調査局發行）拔萃第一三五頁

勞働

工場鑛山等ニ於ケル勞働者總數（内地）

年月末	工場勞働者（内務省調）	民營 工場法適用		
		男	女	
昭和二年（一九二七）二月末	六七七一七九、〇一〇一四一六人	六七七二三五、〇一四一四五六人	八八八八八八八八八八八八人	
昭和三年（一九二八）二月末	七七八二七五、二三〇五、一一一一人	七七八一二七、二六一四八七人	八八八八八八八八八八八八人	
昭和四年（一九二九）二月末	七七七八八七、二六〇一、一五一四〇人	七七七八八七、二六〇一、一五一四〇人	八八八八八八八八八八八八人	
昭和五年（一九三〇）二月末	七七七七七七、五八八四、九一、八四七人	七七七七七七、五八八四、九一、八四七人	八八八八八八八八八八八八人	
昭和六年（一九三一）二月末	六六六七七七、七八八四、一八七一三人	六六六七七七、七八八四、一八七一三人	八八八八八八八八八八八八人	
昭和七年（一九三二）二月末	六七七八八八、二七一〇、一五三四〇人	六七七八八八、二七一〇、一五三四〇人	八八八八八八八八八八八八人	

NO. D 28

Def. Doc. #1918 Appendix 3-D

年	月末	鑛山勞働者 男	鑛山勞働者 女
昭和二年	一九二七年一二月末	二二二二人	六六九四人
昭和三年	一九二八年一二月末	二二三八人	六六三七人
昭和四年	一九二九年一二月末	二一二九人	五五二一人
昭和五年	一九三〇年一二月末	二〇一三人	四四二七人
昭和六年	一九三一年一二月末	一七七七人	二二四六人
昭和七年	一九三二年一二月末	一一六七人	六六二四人

not used

Def. Doc. No. 1918 Appendix 3 A, B, C, D

CERTIFICATE OF AUTHENTICITY

I, who occupy the post of the Chief Investigator, Bank of Japan, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, printed in Japanese consisting of 145 pages and entitled "Japan Economical Statistics, 10th of Showa" is a document compiled and issued by the year (1935) Investigation Branch, Bank of Japan.

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 29 day of July, 1947

YAMADA, Seichi (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place,

on the same date

Witness: AKASHI, Kageaki (seal)

Def. Doc 1918 Appendix-3 A,B,C,D

文書成立ニ關スル證明書

自分ハ日本銀行調査局長ノ職ニ居ル者ナル處、茲ニ添付セル日本語ニ依リ印刷セラレ百四拾五頁ヨリ成ル昭和十年本邦經濟統計ト題スル印刷物ハ日本銀行調査局ノ編纂發行ニ係ル文書ノ一ナルコトヲ證明ス

昭和二十二年七月二十九日　於東京

日本銀行調査局長

山田精一

右署名捺印ハ自分ノ面前ニ於テ爲サレタルモノナルコトヲ證明ス。

同日於同所

立會人　日本銀行調査局

明石景明

not used

DEF. DOC. #1918 Appendix No.4

Important Dates on Currencies

Countries	Gold Standard Suspended (1)	Foreign Exchanges Controlled (2)	Gold Currencies Devalued (3) Remarks
Union of S.A.	Mar. 28, 1932	-----	Jan. 1933
Albania	-----	-----	-----
Germany	-----	July 13, 1931	-----
Argentine	Mar. 16, 1929	Oct. 19, 1931	Nov. 1929
Australia	Dec. 17, 1929	-----	Mar. 1930
Austria	Apr. 5, 1933	Oct. 9, 1931	Sept.1931

Since April 6, 1933 all exchange transactions are made by open market rates and by official rates Devaluation of the parity was made on April 30, 1934. Exchange control is greatly related since June, 1935.

Belginm	March 30, 1935	Mar. 18, 1935	-----

Devalued March 31, 1935
Exchange control is greatly relaxed since April 10, 1935

Bolivia	Sept. 25, 1931	Oct. 3, 1931	1930
Brazil	-----	May. 18, 1931	Dec. 1929
Bulgaria	-----	Oct. 15, 1931	-----
Canada	Oct. 19, 1931	-----	Sept. 1931
Chili	Apr. 20, 1932	July.30, 1931	Apr. 1932
China	-----	Sept. 9, 1934	-----

Silver Standard. On Nov. 4, 1935 national ownership of silver was decided and proclaimed and the export of silver was banned (see the appendix 3 and the Remarks 2).

Columbia	Sept. 21, 1931	Sept. 21, 1931	Jan. 1932

DEF. DOC. #1918 Appendix No. 4

Costa Rica	-----		Jan. 1932

Since the world war no gold standard was instituted legally. Since Feb. 27, 1935 the exchange control was withdrawn.

Denmark	Sept. 29, 1931	Nov. 18, 1931	Sept. 1931
Danzig (Free city)	May 2, 1935	-----	May 1935

Devalued May 2, 1935.

Egypt	Sept. 21, 1931	-----	Sept. 1931
Equador	Feb. 9, 1932	Apr. 30, 1932	June 1932

Exchange control war relaxed since October, 1935.

Spain	-----	May 18, 1931	1920

Dollar exchange standard.

Estonia	June 28, 1933	Nov. 18, 1931	June, 28, 1933
U. S. A.	March 6, 1933	March 6, 1933	Apr. 19, 1933

There is no monetary system of its own in Cuba, Dominica, Haiti and Panama, American dollar being in use. Devalued on Jan. 31, 1934. Exchange control was greatly relaxed since Nov. 12, 1934.

Finland	Oct. 12, 1931	-----	Oct. 1931
France	-----	-----	-----
Greece	Apr. 26, 1932	Sept. 28, 1931	Apr. 1932
Guatemala	-----	-----	April 1933

Since the world war no gold standard system was set up legally.

Honduras			Apr. 1933
Hungary	-----	July 17, 1931	-----

Since December, 1932 exporters of certain agricultural products get ~~money~~ in full face value against documents delivered at the National Bank and they also get a 3--15% premium.

DFF. DOC. #1918 Appendix No. 4

India	Sept. 21, 1931	-----	Sept. 1931
Dutch East India	-----	-----	-----
Irland (Free State)	Sept. 26, 1931	-----	Sept. 1931
Italy	-----	May 26, 1934	March 1934
Japan	Dec. 13, 1931	July 1, 1932	Dec. 1931
Latvia	-----	Oct. 8, 1931	-----
Lithuania	-----	Oct. 1, 1935	-----
British Malaya	Sept. 21, 1931	-----	Sept. 1931
Mexico	July 25, 1931	-----	Aug. 1931
Nicaragua	-----	Nov. 13, 1931	Jan. 1932
Norway	Sept. 29, 1931	-----	Sept. 1931
NewZealand	Sept. 21, 1931	-----	Apr. 1930

Since the world war the gold standard is not restored legally but as a matter of practice the gold parity is restored.

Palastine	Sept. 21, 1931	-----	Sept. 1931
Panama			

There is no perfect monetary system. American dollar is in use.

Paraguay		August 1932	Nov. 1929

Argentine exchange standard.

Holland	-----	-----	-----
Peru	May 18, 1932	-----	May 1932
Iran			Mar. 1932

Silver standard until March, 1932. Since them legally the parity is in use.

DEF. DOC. #1918 Appendix No.4

Philippines			Apr. 1933
Dollar exchange standard.			
Poland	-----	-----	-----
Portugal	Dec. 31, 1931	Oct. 21, 1922	Oct. 1931
Roumania	-----	May 17, 1932	July 1935
Great Britain	Sept. 21, 1931	-----	Sept. 21, 1931
Salvador	Oct. 8, 1931		Oct. 1931
Siam	May 11, 1932	-----	June 1932
Sweden	Sept. 29, 1931	-----	Sept. 1931
Swiss	-----	-----	-----
Zcheco Slovakia	Sc.	Sept. 26, 1931	Feb. 1934
Devalued Feb. 17, 1934.			
Turkey		Feb. 26, 1930	1915
Since the world war the gold standard had not been the reinstituted.			
Soviet Russia			
Exchange transactions are done by the state.			
Uruguay	Dec. 1929	Sept. 7, 1931	Apr. 1929
Since the World War the gold standard remains unrestored, but in practice the gold parity is in use.			
Venezuela		-----	Sept. 1930
Official exchange rates at home are being maintained at points near the gold parity. But since Oct. 17, 1932 the National Bank has instituted a premium to all exchange transactions which is now fixed at 28,5 percent.			
Yugo Slavia		Oct. 7, 1931	July 1932

not used

DofDoC#1918—4

辯護側書證第一九一八號ー四

「昭和十一年版各國通商の動向と日本」拔萃二八五頁ー二八八頁

通貨に關する重要日附一覽表（一九三六年二月現在）

國名	金本位停止（1）	外國爲替管理（2）	金に對する減價（3）	備考
南阿聯邦	一九三二年二月八日		一九三三年一月	
アルバニア				
ドイツ		一九三一年七月三日		
アルゼンチン	一九二九年二月六日	一九三一年一〇月一〇日	一九二九年一月	
オーストラリア	一九二九年二月七日		一九三〇年三月	
オーストリア	（一九三三年五月五日）	一九三一年一〇月九日	一九三一年九月	
ベルギー	一九三五年三月三〇日	一九三五年三月八日		一九三五年三月二一日平價切下げる。
ボリヴィア	一九三一年九月五日	一九三一年一〇月三日	一九三〇年	
ブラジル		一九三一年五月一八日	一九二九年二月	一九三五年四月末以來爲替管理著しく緩和さる。
ブルガリア		一九三一年一〇月一五日		
カナダ	一九三一年一〇月一九日		一九三一年九月	一九三四年四月三〇日平價切下げ場に據ることとなし。一九三五年六月以來爲替管理著しく緩和さる。一九三五年四月末以來爲替管理は自由市場率を以て行はれ公定相引

チリー	一九三三年四月二〇日	一九三一年七月二〇日	一九三二年四月	銀本位。但し一九三五年十一月四日以降銀國有令を實施し現銀の輸出禁止を行へり。尚附錄(三)備考(三)參照。
支那	—	一九三四年九月九日		
コロンビア	一九三一年九月二一日	一九三一年九月二二日	一九三二年一月	大戰以來法律的に金本位を設定せず。
コスタ・リカ		—		
デンマーク	一九三一年九月二九日	一九三一年二月一八日	一九三一年九月	
ダンチツヒ	一九三五年五月二日	—	一九三五年五月	
エヂプト	一九三一年九月二二日	—	一九三一年九月	
エクアドル	一九三二年二月九日	一九三二年四月三〇日	一九三二年六月	一九三五年一〇月以來爲替管理緩和。
スペイン	—	一九三一年五月一八日	一九二〇年	大戰以來法律的に金本位を設定せず。
エストニア	一九三三年六月二八日	一九三一年一一月一八日	一九三三年六月二八日	キユーバ、ドミニカ共和國、ハイチ及パナマは各自國に完全なる爲替制度を有せず、米弗を使用す。一九三四年一月三日平價切下。
米國	一九三三年三月六日	一九三三年三月六日	一九三三年四月一九日	一九三四年一月三日以來爲替管理緩和
フインランド	一九三一年一〇月二二日	—	一九三一年一〇月	
フランス		—		
ギリシア	一九三二年四月六日	一九三一年九月二八日	一九三二年四月	弗爲替本位。
グアテマラ	—	—	一九三三年四月	一九三二年三月以降或種農産品輸出業者は國立銀行に引渡せる外國爲替のペング本位に相當するものの外に、
ホンデユラス			一九三三年四月	

ハンガリー	一九三一年七月七日		一九三一年九月	三乃至一五%のプレミアムを受け居り、又輸入業者は爲替平價を超ゆる三乃至二〇%の附加稅を支拂ふことを要す。
印度	一九三一年九月二日		一九三一年九月	
蘭領東印度				
アイルランド自由國	一九三一年九月二六日		一九三一年九月	
イタリー		一九三四年五月二六日	一九三四年三月	
日本	一九三一年二月二三日	一九三二年七月一日	一九三一年二月	
ラトヴィア		一九三一年一〇月八日		
リツアニア		一九三五年一〇月一日		
英領マレー	一九三一年九月二一日		一九三一年九月	
メキシコ	一九三一年七月二五日		一九三一年八月	
ニカラグア		一九三一年一一月二三日	一九三二年一月	
ノールウエー	一九三一年九月二九日		一九三一年九月	
ニユーシーランド	一九三一年九月二一日		一九三〇年四月	
パレスタイン	一九三一年九月二一日		一九三一年九月	
パナマ				
パラグアイ				
オランダ		一九三二年八月	一九三九年二月	大戰以來法律的に金本位を設定せざるも事實上金平價に復歸し居りたり。 完全な貨幣制度を有せず米弗を使用す。 アルゼンチン・ペソ爲替本位。

ペルー	一九三二年五月八日	—	一九三二年五月	一九三二年五月
イラン			一九三三年四月	一九三三年三月
フィリッピン	—	—		
ポーランド				
ポルトガル	一九三一年三月三一日	一九三二年一〇月三一日	一九三一年一〇月	一九三五年七月
ルーマニア	—	一九三二年五月一七日		
英國	一九三一年九月二一日	—	一九三一年九月三〇日	
サルヴァドル	一九三一年一〇月八日		一九三一年一〇月	
シャム	一九三二年五月一一日	—	一九三二年六月	
スエーデン	一九三一年九月一九日	—	一九三一年九月	
スキス		—		
チェッコスロヴァキア		一九三一年九月二六日	一九三四年二月	
トルコ		一九三〇年二月二六日	一九一五年	
ソヴィエト聯邦				
ウルグアイ	一九二九年二月	一九三一年九月七日	一九二九年四月	
ヴェネズエラ		—	一九三〇年九月	
ユーゴースラヴィア		一九三一年一〇月七日	一九三二年七月	

(註) (1)若くは金輸出禁止。(2)非公的制限は之を度外視せり。(3)平價より二%以上の下落。

(一九三一年三月迄銀本位、以後法律的に金平價を採用せり。弗爲替本位。

一九三四年二月七日平價切下。

大戰以來法律的に金本位を設定せず。

外國爲替取引は國營。

(大戰以來法律的に金本位を設定せざるも事實上金平價に復歸し居りたり。

(國内公定相場は金平價に近接して維持さるも然れ共一九三二年一〇月一七日以來凡ゆる爲替取引に對して國立銀行はプレミアムを設定せり。此のプレミアムは現今六・五%に定められる。

2

Def. Doc. # 1918

Appendix 5 - A

Excerpt from "Convention for the Abolition of import and export Prohibitions and Restrictions.
p.p 7 - 11

Article 1.

The provisions of the present Convention shall apply to prohibitions and restrictions imposed on the importation into the territories of any High Contracting Party of goods the produce or manufacture of the territories of any other High Contracting Party, and to prohibitions and restrictions imposed on the exportation of goods from the territories of any High Contracting Party to the territories of any other High Contracting Party.

Article 2.

Subject to the exceptions provided for in the following articles, the High Contracting Parties undertake to abolish within a period of six months from the date of the coming into force of the present Convention, in so far as the respective territories of each of them are concerned, all import and export prohibitions or restrictions, and not thereafter to impose any such prohibitions or restrictions. During this period each of the High Contracting Parties will adopt all appropriate measures in order to reduce existing prohibitions and

restrictions to a minimum and will refrain from imposing any new prohibitions or restrictions.

Further, the High Contracting Parties undertake to adopt the necessary measures to ensure that the provisions of the present Convention are strictly observed by all authorities, central or local, and that no regulation is issued in contravention thereof.

Article 3.

Should the High Contracting Parties, in pursuance of their legislation, subject the importation or exportation of goods to certain regulations in respect of the manner, form or place of importation or exportation, or the imposition of marks, or to other formalities or conditions, they undertake that such regulations shall not be made a means of disguised prohibition or arbitrary restriction.

Article 4.

The following classès of prohibitions and restrictions are not prohibited by the present Convention, on condition, however, that they are not applied in such a manner as to constitut a means of arbitrary discrimination between foreign countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade:

1. Prohibitions or restrictions relating to public security.

2. Prohibitions or restrictions imposed on moral or humanitarian grounds.

3. Prohibitions or restrictions regarding traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war, or, in exceptional circumstances, all other military supplies.

4. Prohibitions or restrictions imposed for the protection of public health or for the protection of animals or plants against disease, insects and harmful parasites.

5. Export prohibitions or restrictions issued for the protection of national treasures of artistic, historic or archeological value.

6. Prohibitions or restrictions applicable to gold, silver, coins, currency notes, banknotes or securities.

7. Prohibitions or restrictions designed to extend to foreign products the regime established within the country in respect of the production of, trade in, and transport and consumption of native products of the same kind.

8. Prohibitions or restrictions applied to products which, as regards production or trade, are or may in future be subject within the country to State monopoly or to monopolies exercised under State control.

Article 5.

Nothing in this Convention shall affect the right of any High Contracting Party to adopt measures prohibiting or restricting importation or exportation for the purpose of protecting, in extraordinary and abnormal circumstances, the vital interests of the country.

Should measures of this character be adopted, they shall be applied in such a manner as not to lead to any arbitrary discrimination against any other High Contracting Party. Their duration shall be restricted to that of the causes or circumstances from which they arise.

Article 6.

1. The High Contracting Parties, recognising that there exist in the case of certain of them situations of fact or of law which prevent the latter from immediately undertaking, as regards certain specified products, the engagements entered into under the previous articles, have deemed it equitable to authorise these High Contracting Parties to make a reservation in regard to certain temporary exceptions, which the latter undertake to withdraw as soon as the circumstances from which they arise cease to exist.

2. Moreover, the High Contracting Parties, recognising that the abolition of certain import or export prohibitions or restrictions applied by some of them would involve the

latter in grave difficulties, and that, moreover, these prohibitions or restrictions do not prejudicially affect the trade of other countries, have also deemed it equitable to authorise these High Contracting Parties to make a reservation in regard to these exceptions.

3. The Annex to the present Convention sets forth the exceptions coming within the provisions of the two preceding paragraphs, which have been agreed to on this day's date in favour of the High Contracting Parties who are mentioned by name in the Annex and who have signed the Convention on that date.

4. Exceptions which the High Contracting Parties may desire to claim subsequently to that date shall be dealt with in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Protocol to the present Convention.

Article 7.

Should one of the High Contracting Parties be obliged to adopt any measure of prohibition or restriction against products of any foreign country, whether the Convention be applicable to that country or not, he shall frame the measure in such a way as to cause the least possible injury to the trade of the other High Contracting Parties.

not used

輸入及輸出ノ禁止及制限ノ撤廢ノ爲ノ國際條約ヨリ拔萃　九一三頁

第一條　本條約ノ規定ハ締約國ノ領域ノ生產物又ハ製造品タル貨物ノ他ノ締約國ノ領域ヘノ輸入ニ對シ課セラルル禁止及制限ニ適用セラルベシ

第二條　以下諸條ニ規定セラルル例外ハ之ヲ留保シ締約國ハ各自ノ領域ノ關スル限リニ於テ本條約ノ實施セラルル日ヨリ六月ノ期間內ニ輸入及輸出ノ一切ノ禁止及制限ヲ撤廢シ且爾後右禁止又ハ制限ヲ課セザルコトヲ約ス右期間內ニ於テ締約國ハ現存ノ禁止及制限ヲ最少限度ニ減少セシムル爲一切ノ適當ナル措置ヲ執ルベク且新ナル禁止又ハ制限ヲ課セザルベシ

（並ニ締約國ノ領域ヨリ他ノ締約國ノ領域ヘノ貨物ノ輸出ニ關スル禁止及制限）

右ノ外締約國ハ本條約ノ規定ガ中央又ハ地方ノ一切ノ官憲ニ依リ嚴守セラルルコト及右規定ニ違反シテ規則ガ發セラレザルコトヲ確保スルニ必要ナル措置ヲ執ルコトヲ約ス

第三條　締約國ガ自國ノ法令ニ從ヒ貨物ノ輸入又ハ輸出ヲ、輸入若ハ輸出ノ方法

形式若ハ場所又ハ記號ノ押捺ニ關スル或規則又ハ他ノ手續若ハ條件ニ從ハシムル場合ニ於テハ締約國ハ之ヲ以テ變裝セル禁止又ハ專斷ナル制限ノ手段タラシメザルコトヲ約ス

第四條

左ノ種類ノ禁止及制限ハ該禁止及制限ガ同一條件ノ下ニ在ル外國間ニ於ケル專斷ナル差別ノ手段又ハ國際貿易上ノ變裝セル制限ト成ルガ如キ方法ニ於テ適用セラレザル限リ本條約ニ依リ禁止セラルルコトナシ

一 公ノ安全ニ關スル禁止又ハ制限

二 道德上又ハ人道上ノ理由ニ依リ課セラルル禁止又ハ制限

三 兵器、彈藥及軍用材料又ハ例外ノ場合ニ於テハ他ノ一切ノ軍需品ノ取引ニ關スル禁止又ハ制限

四 公共衞生ノ保護ノ爲又ハ病疫、蟲類及有害ナル寄生物ニ對スル動物若ハ植物ノ保護ノ爲ニ課セラルル禁止又ハ制限

五 美術上、歷史上又ハ考古學上價値アル國寶ノ保護ノ爲ノ輸出ノ禁止又ハ制限

六　金、銀、貨幣、紙幣、銀行券又ハ有價證券ニ適用セラルル禁止又ハ制限

七　外國產物ニ之ト同種ノ內國產物ノ製產、取引、運送及消費ニ付國內ニ於テ設定セラレタル禁止及制限ヲ及ボスコトヲ目的トスル禁止又ハ制限

八　製產又ハ取引ニ付國內ニ於テ國ノ獨占專業又ハ國ノ監督ノ下ニ行ハルル獨占專業ニ屬シ又ハ將來屬スルコトアルベキ產物ニ對シ適用セラルル禁止又ハ制限

第五條

本條約ハ締約國ガ非常且變則ノ場合ニ於テ國ノ緊切ナル利益ヲ保護スル爲輸入又ハ輸出ヲ禁止又ハ制限スル措置ヲ執ルノ權利ニ毫モ影響スルコトナカルベシ

右性質ノ措置ガ執ラルル場合ニ於テハ右措置ハ他ノ締約國ニ對シ何等ノ專斷ナル差別待遇ト爲ラザル樣適用セラルベシ右措置ノ繼續期間ハ起因タル事由又ハ情況ノ繼續期間ニ限定セラルベシ

第六條

一　締約國ハ其ノ或國ガ前諸條ニ依リ負擔セル約束ヲ或特定ノ產物ニ關シ直ニ引受クルコトヲ妨グル事實上又ハ法律上ノ事態ノ右或國ニ存在スルコトヲ認メ右或國ガ起因タル情況ノ存在セザルニ至レルトキ直ニ撤回スルコトヲ約スル或一時的除外例ニ關シ留保ヲ爲スコトヲ右或國ニ對シ承認スルコト平ナリト思考セリ

二　更ニ締約國ハ其ノ或國ニ依リ適用セラルル或輸入又ハ輸出ノ禁止又ハ制限ノ撤廢ガ右或國ヲシテ重大ナル困難ニ陷ラシムルコトアルベキコト且又禁止又ハ制限ガ他ノ諸國ノ貿易ニ損害ヲ及ボサザルコトヲ認メ此等ノ除外例ニ關シ留保ヲ爲スコトヲ右或國ニ對シ承認スルコト又衡平ナリト思考セリ

三　本條約ノ附屬書中ニ國名ヲ掲ゲラレ且本日ヲ以テ本條約ニ署名シタル締約國ノ利益ノ爲ニ本日附ヲ以テ同意セラレタル除外例ニシテ前二項ノ規定ノ範圍內ニ屬スルモノヲ記載ス

四　締約國ガ本日後ニ於テ要求セントト欲スルコトアルベキ除外例ハ本條

約ノ議定書ニ定ムル手續ニ從ヒ處理セラルベシ

第七條

締約國ノ一ガ何レカノ外國ノ產物ニ對シ該國ノ本條約ノ適用セラルル國タルト否トヲ問ハズ禁止又ハ制限ノ措置ヲ執ルノ已ムナキニ至リタル場合ニ於テハ右締約國ノ貿易ニ對スル損害ヲ成ルベク少カラシムル樣右措置ヲ定ムベシ

not used

DFF. DOC. #1918 Appendix No.5A

CERTIFICATE OF AUTHENTICITY

I, who occupy the post of Chief of the Archives Section Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, printed in Japanese, English and French consisting of 281 pages and entitled "Convention for the abolition of import and export prohibitions and restrictions" is a document compiled and issued by the Japanese Government (Foreign).

certified at Tokyo,

on this 1 day of Aug. 1947

/S/ HAYASHI Kaoru
(seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

at the same place,

on the same date

Witness: /S/ URABE Katsuma
(seal)

（五號）

文書成立ニ關スル證明書

自分ハ外務省文書課長ノ職ニ居ル者ナル處、茲ニ添付セル日本語英語及ビ佛語ニ依リ印刷セラレ二八一頁ヨリ成ル（輸入及輸出ノ禁止及制限ノ撤廢ノ爲ノ國際條約及同條約補足協定ト題スル印刷物ハ日本政府（外務省）ノ編纂發行ニ係ル文書ノ一ナルコトヲ證明ス

昭和二十二年八月一日　於東京

林　髞

右署名捺印ハ自分ノ面前ニ於テ爲サレタルモノナルコトヲ證明ス

同日　於同所

立會人　清　部　勝　馬