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
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
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*The French Revolution*  
*AND*  
*Modern French Socialism*

BY  
*JESSICA BLANCHE PEIXOTTO*







THE  
FRENCH REVOLUTION  
AND  
MODERN FRENCH SOCIALISM

*A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE PRINCIPLES  
OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND THE  
DOCTRINES OF MODERN FRENCH SOCIALISM*

Thesis presented to the Faculty of the College of Social Sciences  
of the University of California for the Degree  
of Doctor of Philosophy

BY

JESSICA BLANCHE PEIXOTTO



NEW YORK  
THOMAS Y. CROWELL & COMPANY  
PUBLISHERS

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TO  
PROFESSOR BERNARD MOSES  
IN  
GRATEFUL ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF INSPIRATION AND  
GUIDANCE.

Very sincerely yours,

Jessie B. Smith.





## PREFACE.

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A LITTLE more than a hundred years ago, there were in France groups of men radically opposed to the society they saw about them. These men were, moreover, passionately eager to impose upon the nation to which they belonged a new social order which they advocated. Although, strictly speaking, they had no formulated system for social reorganization, these revolutionists of '93 were fairly agreed upon a certain set of theories which have commonly been called the Principles of the French Revolution. The defenders of these principles were the French Irreconcilables of the last century.

In France to-day there is a party numbering nearly two million voters. This party sends to the Chamber of Deputies some eighty representatives; it claims to have a municipal majority in Paris, in about thirty of the other large cities, and in twelve hundred of the smaller cities of France; seventy-eight or more among the daily and weekly journals of the nation are said to be devoted to its interests. Persons belonging to this party profess a political creed sharply criticising the established social order, which they stigmatize as retrograde in its influence on society, and enslaving to the individual. The party offers certain principles by which society, established on a new basis, shall accom-

plish its true mission. In the future order they plan, "progress shall engender only progress; that is, prosperity, health, education and equal intellectual development for all." The creed of the party goes by the name of Socialism. The persons who indorse its ideals are chief among the Irreconcilables of France of to-day.

The problem undertaken in this study is this: To find the immediate influences which formed each of these two important schools of Irreconcilables and the doctrines that each eventually advanced; to find further how far the two theories involved the same and how far they represent divergent principles, and finally, to suggest any conclusions which such a comparison may seem to justify. The investigation was not begun with a view of finding whether or no there was any socialism in the French Revolution. Opinion is usually agreed, and recent investigation has shown ably and conclusively<sup>1</sup> that, even though, during the Revolution, men often acted and talked in accordance with socialistic theory, there was not, until 1795, any really conscious socialism. To set about an inquiry concerning the socialism of the Revolution would be, then, at this date, to undertake a superfluous task. The aim here has only been one of statement and comparison. It seemed worth while to ascertain how far doctrines, reputed to be essentially opposed, bore any likeness to each other. To define the immediate influences behind the Principles of the Revolution and to state their fundamental character; to outline in a similar way the

<sup>1</sup> See notably, "Le Socialisme et la Révolution française." Etude sur les idées socialistes en France de 1789 à 1796, par André Lichtenberger, Paris, 1899.

growth of the nineteenth century French Socialism and to give the doctrine it has most recently laid down, and then to compare and contrast these two sets of principles: this is a work of investigation which, so far as the writer is aware, has not yet been done, except in a partisan spirit. Such investigation, made impartially, seemed to have in it something of value.

The results of the comparison were to the writer, at least, somewhat unexpected. It would seem that, in their views regarding the individual and his rights, and in particular his right to happiness, and in the general lines of their political doctrine, the French Revolutionists of '93 and the French Socialists of 1900 are scarcely separated in opinion. The immediate issue in both theories is a political issue, and the science of economics has been called in at the end of the nineteenth century to play the same rôle which the thesis of Natural Rights played at the end of the eighteenth century. The fallacy of surplus value seems to have as its parallel in the revolutionary theory, the fallacy of Natural Rights. Each is the war-cry for a political fight made in the name of a social injustice. The older agitation posited a man, happy in a primeval time, but thrust out from contentment and now badly in need of an enlightened government, to restore him to his birth-right. The agitation of to-day starts from the conception of a man, kept a long time from his just independence, but slowly pushing forward in spite of unremitting opposition, and separated now from his rights by nothing but a machine and its owner, whom a sycophant government protects. In either case, the *deus ex machina* must be the state.

On the other hand, there is a real and interesting separation in the social philosophy of the two doctrines. The later theory asks that an additional right be assured to the individual, and therefore that government assume one new function, and it bases its claim for these changes on an idea of social progress different from that of the Revolutionists.

The following pages aim to demonstrate these likenesses and differences. If the matter they present appears insufficient or the result of immature judgment, it is hoped it will, in any event, be an inspiration for some stronger work along lines which, it seems to the writer, cannot but be helpful in adding to a better understanding of latter-day problems.

The bibliography which is included in these pages does not claim to be in any sense exhaustive. It is rather indicative of the ground that has been covered before reaching the conclusions here set down.



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
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**PART I.**  
**THE PRINCIPLES OF THE FRENCH**  
**REVOLUTION.**





**CHAPTER I.**

**THE CULTURAL INFLUENCES MAKING  
FOR NEW IDEALS.**





## CHAPTER I.

### THE CULTURAL INFLUENCES MAKING FOR NEW IDEALS.

- I. THE GENERAL CHARACTER OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.
- II. THE NEW IDEA OF HAPPINESS.
- III. DOCTRINE OF LIBERTY.
- IV. THEORIES OF EQUALITY AND PROPERTY.
- V. THE RELATIVE INFLUENCE OF THESE THEORIES.

#### I.

AN analysis of any epoch in the intellectual life of a given society seems clearly to show two kinds of agencies at work during the process of development — the one a series of cultural influences reshaping the fundamentals of men's thoughts; the other, certain social facts which make way among the masses for the new thoughts which have previously been developed. The century of French history about to be discussed shows plainly this double line of development. France, during the eighteenth century, lived through a severe and interesting social crisis, and the close of the century saw opinion settle upon new theories, because, at the later period, two potent agents for change had finally completed their work. The teachings of a new philosophy on the one hand, and, on the other, certain conditions of the national life combined to develop radical alterations in the social creeds. The origin and nature of the principles of the French Revolution, the first objective point of this study, will then be best explained by reviewing the leading principles of the eighteenth

century philosophy and stating certain facts in the social growth of the nation.

The character and influence of the new philosophy that developed in France during the eighteenth century has been so often and so ably discussed, during the present century, that the subject seems threadbare for one who comes to an examination of it at the end of that century. French thinking got so undoubtedly to the center of the stage during the last century, even though trained to its part by English thought, that all later study, in whatever quest, seems bound to take account of it and to start from it.

The surprisingly wide reach of subject and the well-defined purpose which marked the literary activity of the eighteenth century will then be readily recalled. It will be remembered how, even before the seventeenth century closed, the somewhat euphuistic, formal and moralistic literature of Louis XIV's reign lost its complacent tone and became more vigorous as it became more conscious of a purpose. Men left classic subjects where abstract principles were the chief interest and their own pompous civilization the only background they knew how to give their embodied principles. Disgusted, slowly but surely with the formal reality, they substituted first an ancient or pastoral mode of life and set their *Durantes* and *Valères*<sup>1</sup> moralizing there. By

<sup>1</sup> Compare "*Télémaque*" of Fénelon, the "*Histoire de Sévèrambes*," by Vairasse d'Alais (published 1677), and their numerous prototypes. (See an interesting discussion of this class of writing in Lichtenberger, *Le Socialisme au XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle*, chap. ii, pp. 36-63, ed. 1895.) See also, in same connection, the novels of Marivaux, especially *La Vie de Marianne*, *Le Paysan Parvenu*; also, the dramas of Delisle; in particular,

the end of the Grand Monarch's reign, the literature is openly critical<sup>2</sup> of the age which Louis loved to hear called the "Golden." Racine dies of the chagrin caused by Louis' angry rejection of his plan for social reform;<sup>3</sup> Molière finds it hard to keep out of trouble because of his unconquerable desire to take a fling at manner which he despises, and to say a scathing word about institutions which seem to him shallow and ridiculous;<sup>4</sup> Boileau sneers<sup>5</sup> at the morals of his time; La Bruyère<sup>6</sup> pities and scorns. To read Vauban<sup>7</sup> and Boisguillebert<sup>8</sup> is to know how convinced men were that the times were out of joint, and to understand that literature was becoming largely a humanitarian criticism of social conditions.

During the eighteenth century, what at the end of the previous century had been tendencies now became pronounced characteristics. During this period, philosophic thought altered its tone; scientific learning took new life; social theory as such was practically born

"Arlequin Sauvage" (1721), or "Timon le Misanthrope" (1722).

<sup>2</sup> For example Saint Pierre, whose philanthropic sentiment was so remarkable for his time that he is credited by Voltaire with having introduced even the word "bienfaisance" into the language. (Comp. Voltaire, Discours sur l'homme, VII.)

<sup>3</sup> Martin, Histoire de France, XIV, p. 343.

<sup>4</sup> Compare, for example, the attack upon religion which is expressed in "Tartuffe" in the character of Orgon.

<sup>5</sup> Compare the "Satires."

<sup>6</sup> In the "Caractères." See e. g., "Des Grands."

<sup>7</sup> See, in "Projet de Dime Royal," the demand for a tax which should include all citizens and throw the burden of government support upon those persons whose possessions enabled them to enjoy the luxuries of life.

<sup>8</sup> "Détail de la France sous Louis XIV."

to French literature. It is true the "philosophes" were chiefly of the school of Helvetius, d'Holbach, or Raynal; true, they represent the narrow view of the materialist, but their vigorous presentation of a somewhat dishonest doubt, none the less marks a definite epoch in the history of the thought of their nation. The litterateurs of the time, Voltaire, Montesquieu, Rousseau, Diderot, Condillac, D'Alembert, vied with the pure scientists, with Lavoisier, Réaumur, Laplace, Buffon, or Linnæus, in showing a keen interest in science and taking an active part in the scientific investigations of the age. With Quesnay, Mercier, Dupont de Nemours, and Turgot, economic science escaped from its swaddling-clothes. The most noteworthy stir, however, was in political theory. Almost every man who took up a pen during the eighteenth century, was moved to surmise about and to pronounce upon social conditions. Here the list includes the greater part of the writers already mentioned; there are in addition, Meslier, Morelly, Mably, Necker, Linguet, names for the social reformer of our day to conjure by; and all of these are but a few among the many who were struck with the difficult situation of the nation and tried to suggest a way to better it. Purely imaginative writing may be said almost to have disappeared. Prose or poetry, scientific research, philosophy, little was put into writing that had not the study and representation of society in view and the instruction and reformation of the reader as its aim.

In all branches of literature, rhetorical correctness survived. Whether it was Montesquieu or Diderot, Voltaire or Rousseau, or those lesser men whom facts



of temperament, character or immediate surroundings made the innovators of the time, each and all were masters of the instrument of language. Though the eighteenth century was essentially the time when a new faith was put forward, it is not too much to say that the capacity of the advocates of this new thinking to put their creed before the world in the brilliant and convincing fashion in which they did it, had a notable part in the result which followed their writings. Voltaire, Rousseau, Diderot and the Encyclopedists said, what they and all their world were beginning to feel, in a way that reached the emotions. The very inconsistencies of their teachings were hidden by the deftness of their word-painting. Theirs was the success which usually follows when the artist espouses a social cause. The tempest that none of them foresaw or desired, the tempest from which the few who survived to see it fled in sorrow or disgust,<sup>9</sup> may safely be said to have been inspired by the untiring pen-warfare which so many of the literary men of the eighteenth century waged with unparalleled courage and brilliancy.

At the period when this new type of literature began to appear, the most conspicuous fact in French national life was that decay which is as much a necessity to progress as is the growth which the word habitually conveys. A certain set of theories which had arisen in a time long past and had then been vigorous, life-giving principles, were still clinging, in a state of unlively decrepitude, about an empty and evil society.

<sup>9</sup> For example, Grimm's emigration in disgust at the time of the Revolution, or Raynal's published disavowal of it.

The militant theological despotism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had been carefully woven about with a protecting armor of principles, and these principles now remained like an empty shell from which all that is vital had long since departed.

The new philosophy was first of all an effort to escape from the trammels of the bigoted and shallow system out of which it had itself developed. In the present discussion, that which was new in the thought of France in the eighteenth century is the prime interest; but the power of this same philosophy as a destructive agent making way for new thought is not to be forgotten. The alteration in opinion which so insensibly crept into all circles of French society during the eighteenth century, is due before everything else to the vigorous onslaughts which a number of able writers made upon the earlier creeds. The new philosophy took shape during the progress of a bitter fight with the decaying theological despotism. Young men who had grown up under the hampering influence of the worn-out traditions which the ruling minority imposed upon them; young men who gradually came to see the worthlessness of these traditions, finally rose in a literary rebellion against them.

But in the progress of this rebellion, these younger minds offered, as well, a constructive doctrine; and it is this latter which is here of first interest. "Children of their times,"<sup>10</sup> these men became the fathers of a new set of national principles. They had looked abroad; they had looked at home, and from both directions, they

<sup>10</sup> Von Holst, French Revolution, I, p. 142.

found inspiration to ask that things outworn be replaced by institutions which seemed to them less uncouth and out of fashion. To make a brief review of the doctrines they advanced is an indispensable first step in a study of the development of the principles of the French Revolution.

## II.

The one fact which includes all others concerning the principles of the eighteenth century is this, that they represent a denial of authority in the interests of individual judgment. The writing of the time passed rapidly from wholesale condemnation of existing institutions to a broad claim for reconstruction upon a basis furnished by the reason. Organized authority was discredited. In its place arose an energetic demand for the civil and even political liberty of the individual; a demand for a recognition of the truth that all men are of common clay with equal rights to enjoy life. A new idea of happiness and of the means for society to insure happiness to each person took an increasingly strong hold upon the cultivated intellects of the time.

The new conceptions were the fruits of adopting what was called the rational method. A rising revolt against the dogmas of the Church speedily divided intellectual France into those who denied authority based upon revelation and those who continued to support it. While it was still the minority who set up the doctrine that reason was the sole trustworthy guide to teach men the answer to the problems of existence, that minority rapidly gained precedence. The Church unintentionally

paved the way. It awkwardly showed men that its religious fervor in persecution was after all state policy;<sup>11</sup> that it too, more often than not, followed the promptings of reason rather than those of revelation. The brilliant, witty society of the time, enamored of fine writing and adopting generalization as an etiquette, quickly accepted the theory that reason is man's infallible guide. Pascal's age called it "foolish reason;" the eighteenth century proclaimed it to be the indisputable arbiter for all questions metaphysical and practical.

The thought of the age may be said to have begun and ended in things terrestrial. Things unseen got for the most part a careless shrug of the shoulders; interest centered about watching and pronouncing upon the social turmoil. Skepticism and atheism were common enough. In the natural course of things, the decay of the old standards, with the accompanying artificiality and insincerity of much of the life, made materialism a part, and not an unimportant part, of the eighteenth century doctrines. But the leaders of thought were, or thought themselves, deists. There were the deists who did little more than posit a creator and grant him ill-defined, supreme and somewhat capricious powers of superintendence;<sup>12</sup> there were those

<sup>11</sup> When, for example, it became known that the ostentatious burning of heretical writings in front of the Palais de Justice was, more often than not, a burning of waste paper, because the clergy kept the original works for their own reading. Comp. Rocquain, *L'Esprit révolutionnaire avant la Révolution*, ed. Plon et Cie., Paris, 1878, p. 271.

<sup>12</sup> Comp. Montesquieu, especially, *Esprit des Lois*, Bk. I, ch. i; Voltaire, *Discours sur l'Homme*.



who only "felt" the Creator, and this latter class had the really controlling influence. Rousseau's deism, truly enough a "rag of metaphysics floating in the sunshine of sentimentalism,"<sup>13</sup> none the less took powerful hold upon a society sick to death of formalism. Here was a worship which rang with scorn of formulæ, theological or philosophical. Hearts long dulled by lip-service responded to that scorn. Here was a worship whose claim of being founded upon love of common sense (*bon sens*) and love of truth,<sup>14</sup> appealed directly to the intellectual pride of the age. All the religious impulse contained in the new philosophy is probably best summed up in the Savoyard vicar's simple, purely emotional deism which sneers not only at Catholic cults but also at philosophers' dissertations.<sup>15</sup> The new philosophy may be thought to have said, "Do you want a guide as to how you shall direct your own conduct and what shall be your relation to your fellows? Take a heart with you and go to a study of Nature."

This doctrine is well defined and interestingly distinctive on the question of the end of existence. Most opinion that carried weight at the time agreed that personal happiness here on earth was the goal to be striven for. On every hand, there is rebellion against what the ages have made of the Christian doctrine; against the interpretation of life that had prevailed up to and through the previous century — a conception

<sup>13</sup> Morley, Rousseau, II, p. 277.

<sup>14</sup> Comp. especially Profession de foi du vicaire savoyard, Emile, Bk. IV.

<sup>15</sup> Emile, Bk. IV (Vol. VII, p. 17, ed. 1782), "Je ne suis pas un grand philosophe et je me souci peu de l'être."

that regarded misery as a necessary part of life and self-abnegation as a desirable rule for personal conduct. The right to happiness was now proclaimed. The word happiness might and did, as will be shown in a moment, convey various meanings to the minds of those who used it, but the right to some kind of happiness was unanimously demanded as the birthright of every individual. Men might differ as to whether instinct or reason had prompted association, but they all agreed that the society eventually developed was intended to bring happiness to every human being. The whole literature of the time, consisting as it does largely of protests against the needlessness and the abstract wrong of human misery, infers where it does not state it in set terms, that the right to happiness is obvious. From Saint Pierre to Mably, there is little or no change in this point of view. All the forceful thought of the century united to believe that, in the natural and right order of existence, not endurance and unrest, but enjoyment and peace, would be each man's portion.

It is the abstraction of a natural man that is the chief support of this new idea of happiness, and this abstraction is worked out by the simplest process. Humanity is put under the microscope. It is taken for granted that, as a rule, all men are alike; personality in any real sense is altogether neglected. It is Man, the genus, that is carefully examined. After the examination, the philosophy gravely tells us that all men are essentially similar, capable of the same amount of joy and sorrow, possessed of nearly the same endowments and subject to needs which differ but lit-

tle.<sup>16</sup> Except Montesquieu,<sup>17</sup> Voltaire<sup>18</sup> and Turgot, all the leading thinkers of the century cut man away from history and environment, and so resolved out the "Natural Man" by that mathematical process which the age put so much faith in. Rousseau, Diderot and the men less known to-day, who were influences in their time, all based their later conclusions upon this primary conclusion of a natural man.<sup>19</sup> It is usual for the prevailing theory of the time to found society, as the Physiocrats did,<sup>20</sup> on three primary instincts,—those of well-being, of sociability and of justice,—and to insist that each human being could find, if he would seek it, the guidance of these instincts which had made a primitive man happy. It was believed that if men would now use their intelligence wisely and listen to the dictates of these instincts, they could find the laws of

<sup>16</sup> This is the idea at the basis of Jean Meslier's "Testament;" in Morelly's "Code de la Nature," the same doctrine is to be found; in Mably's works, more particularly the "Entretien de Phocion," it is equally the beginning of all the doctrines put forward.

<sup>17</sup> Montesquieu is not generally ranked as one who recognized progress in history. He certainly never stated the principle in so many words, but his chief works advance a theory which really connotes the doctrine. The fact that he did not state the principle is, probably, a result of the generally unscientific form of all his writings.

<sup>18</sup> Voltaire, like Montesquieu, felt only instinctively an evolutionary process in society, but the very impulse that led him to write the "Essai sur les Mœurs" is evidence enough that he recognized progress, and therefore did not believe in a primevally happy man.

<sup>19</sup> Rousseau preaches the natural man with most enthusiasm in the "Discours sur l'origine et les fondements de l'inégalité," etc., and in "Emile."

<sup>20</sup> Comp. Collection des Economistes, II, p. 435 (cited in Lichtenberger, op. cit. p. 278).



Natural Justice which are inherent in the universe, "laws that derive from truth alone and not from authority."

When the theorists whose influence meant so much to the generation that came after, had introduced their natural man into society, the usual tendency was to make him a creature of circumstance. Man was good or bad, he remained in a state of primitive perfection or became perverted, according to his opportunities. Those opportunities, society furnished him. Goodness and evil-doing came to be regarded as variable social attributes of man; morality was held to be a relative term. Montesquieu's scientific exposition of the relativity of all laws is only the most orderly and least exaggerated expression of that which was, in relation to ethics, the current thinking of his time. In most cases, the thought did not go very far. It did not assert, in so many words, as Montesquieu did, the necessary and desirable variations in the moral and positive laws of nations. The discussion usually concerned itself with standards of personal conduct. Again and again it was repeated that there was and could be no absolute and fixed law for all; there was no single and rigid rule of moral behavior which must eternally regulate the acts of men. In particular, the code of ethics then exacted by the Church was said to be in direct contradiction to the dictates of nature and reason. It is even claimed that under the teachings of the unworthy theology of their time, current thinking had actually come to a point where vices were held to be virtues and vice versa. The new creed boldly asserted that the natural

and vigor-giving tendencies of men's natures had been cramped and distorted by a fallacious ethical discipline. In answer to the profound and widespread antipathy to the prevailing forms, the intellectual opinions of the time took up, and preached with cumulative force, the doctrine that man is not justifiably asked to live a life of self-denial and suffering; that earth and its bounties are for man's enjoyment, and that the natural order of things prescribes free play for man's emotional and intellectual life.

It became then a leading principle of the eighteenth century that Nature was the only trustworthy guide. Rightly consulted and recognized, the "code" of nature would teach men how to live and how to associate with each other. Not renunciation, but a proper attention to the demands of one's nature, would show men the true means for useful living. This creed, which later became little more than the glorification of the passions under the cloak of sentiment and energy, was now announced as the right to happiness.

There are interesting and noteworthy differences as to what is the meaning of the term happiness, what the way to bring it about and what the social state which each conception of it implies. Three groups can be easily distinguished. There are first, those who held happiness to be conditioned by a vigorous and active industrial society where the state guaranteed perfect civil liberty; secondly, those who, on the contrary, saw happiness in a frank acceptance of the conditions to which one was born; and finally, those who thought

that happiness consisted in a virtue<sup>21</sup> which might be maintained for the individual or the state only by the exclusion of luxury.

The Economists are the best representatives of the first of these groups. For all of this school, happiness meant wealth. Ridding the term wealth of that narrow interpretation which up to this time had made it coincide with money, these economic philosophers gave it all but a modern interpretation. Wealth was everything that had exchange value, and it was such wealth that was the supreme good. When man should know how to create the greatest possible amount of such wealth, individual and national happiness would be insured. If the Physiocrats held to a notion of value which denied real value to anything but agricultural product, it was because in their conception this form of product alone meant real and evident addition to the goods that were capable of increasing the strength and power of society, and so the only real addition to men's happiness. Increase of product meant to them increased wealth, and in their conception wealth was the only certain means to increased happiness. The Physiocrats ardently urged that knowledge should be made more general; that the sciences and arts should aim directly to serve the needs of man, and that education should strive to lift more and more of humanity above the lower levels of existence; but all of this was, in the eyes of most of the school, merely so many means to an all-important end. The doctrine is now promul-

<sup>21</sup> Virtue never came to mean anything more specific than the observance of the virtues of justice, temperance, courage and the like.

gated which economists and socialists alike have since been wont to urge as the essential truth which shall guide all social action, the doctrine that the final end of human activity is a full understanding of the use of the products of Nature. The Physiocrats believed that when such knowledge shall have been acquired and wealth shall have increased, then and not until then, a greater happiness might be expected; then the beneficent intentions of the Natural Law that properly rules all matter and all mind would be fulfilled. Since the name of the Physiocrats is connected for all time with the doctrine of "Laisser faire"<sup>22</sup> it is hardly necessary to state that they stand in the front ranks of those who advocated entire individual freedom as a further measure to insure happiness. If some of the school desired an enlightened despotism, it was only because these held it to be the best means for guarding the individual initiative, which they counted as the condition to the kind of production that would make happiness certain for all. It would seem then, that this plan for bringing about a general happiness, a plan acceptable to so many influential men of the period,<sup>23</sup> was a project for increasing the natural wealth of the

<sup>22</sup> On origin of the term, comp. Higgs, *The Physiocrats*, p. 67.

<sup>23</sup> The Economists included men in every walk of life, as a list of the names of the more important among them will show. Léon Say, citing Dupont de Nemours, gives the chief members of the school, as follows: (1) Quesnay, with Mirabeau, Abeille, Fourquex, Bertin, Dupont de Nemours, Abbé Roubaud, Mercier de la Rivière and Abbé Baudeau; and (2) Gournay with Malesherbes, Morellet, Trudaine de Montigny, le Cardinal de Boisgelin, Abbé Cice and Turgot. Comp. Léon Say, *Turgot*, p. 58, ed. Hachette, Paris, 1891.



country to the highest limit — all in the expectation that every increase of the natural product would add to the possibilities of general happiness, especially if men were left entirely unhampered to appropriate, to re-distribute and to consume the increasing supply.<sup>24</sup>

“The nations surround themselves with the luxury of wealth and the luxury of minds, and men too often lack bread and common sense. In order to assure to them all, the bread, the good sense and the virtues that are necessary to them, there is but one means: it is necessary to enlighten greatly both peoples and governments.”<sup>25</sup> Thus Montesquieu,<sup>26</sup> the influence behind all the sober liberalism of the age, and with him, Voltaire, reputed chief iconoclast and scoffer of the eighteenth century. In matters of political and social theory, Voltaire, as well as Montesquieu, was really a conservative; he, as well as the greater political theorist, believed in accepting life as he found it. Therefore on the question of means to secure happiness, both held happiness to be quite independent of station in life.<sup>27</sup> Happiness meant freedom in the sphere to which one was born; meant peace and power to satisfy unmolested,

<sup>24</sup> It will be interesting to remember, when the socialists of the nineteenth century come under discussion, how they, consciously or not, took the keynote of their doctrine from the Physiocrats who popularized the *laissez faire* principle so hateful to all socialists.

<sup>25</sup> Garat, *Mémoires historique sur le XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle et sur M. Suard*, p. 302, cited in Lichtenberger, *op. cit.* p. 93.

<sup>26</sup> The general tenor of the “*Considérations sur les Causes de la Grandeur et de la Décadence des Romains*,” and of the “*Esprit des Lois*,” is taken to be an entire verification of Montesquieu’s point of view in this matter.

<sup>27</sup> Comp. e. g. “*Essai sur les Mœurs*,” ch. xcvi, and many passages in the “*Lettres sur les Anglais*.”

inclinations purely intellectual. All men need not have the advantages of wealth nor even the opportunities for special culture; they need only be free from the insistent intrusions of a dogmatic church and a self-seeking state. According to their view, happiness was to be found wherever men were left alone to enjoy that which their situation in life had given them. Wherever humanity was free to live peacefully without being forced to subscribe to a code of superstition and ignorance, or to feel itself at the mercy of a capricious law, there men might and should be happy. A nation might hope to be made up of contented persons if its laws made civil and intellectual liberty certain. This, the view of conservative materialism in every age, was not only that of Montesquieu and Voltaire, but was one shared as well by a great majority of that numerous and all inclusive group, the Encyclopedists.<sup>28</sup>

Very different from this easy acceptance of the necessary differences of station and possession, this transfer of the seat of happiness to the subjective life, is the idea of happiness that characterizes the last group to be discussed here. In the idea of writers like Saint Pierre, Meslier and Morelly, of Rousseau and some of his most enthusiastic followers like Mercier de la

<sup>28</sup> Diderot, in particular. Mably expresses perfectly the glittering generality with which the majority at the period in question charmed itself into hopefulness when he said that all social evils have come about because "on a attaché le bonheur à la possession des richesses, au lieu de se souvenir qu'il était en nous, plus que dans les objets qui nous environnent, et que celui des nations, comme celui des particuliers, était attaché à une bonne morale." Mably, *Principes de morale*, Œuvres, tom. x., p. 305 (cited in Lichtenberger, *op. cit.*, p. 228).

Rivière or Rétif de la Bretonne, happiness meant virtue, virtue being interpreted to mean primarily a keen sense of social justice. Here happiness still depends upon liberty; but this latter really rests upon equality, and both will fail to be efficient if there is not to be found in the community a certain sense of fraternity. This ideal of happiness is evident enough in Saint Pierre<sup>29</sup> and in Meslier, though it is hard to find a word in the various projects of the one or the "Testament" of the other which precisely states this view. In D'Argenson, this idea of happiness is the one always implied.<sup>30</sup> But it was Rousseau and his followers who did most to popularize such a conception of happiness; it was they who industriously preached it, along with the additional thought that if all persons would adopt a simple rural life and a strict suppression of all luxuries there would then be sufficient subsistence to supply the needs of all, and so every one would be enabled to enjoy the real blessings which Nature provides for each of her children. Exactly in opposition to the view of the Physiocrats, this group held that abstinence and a careful management of consumption were of far more importance than an increase of product. "Emile", "La Nouvelle Héloïse", "L'An 2440" of Mercier, "Le Paysan Perversi" and "L'Ecole des

<sup>29</sup> Comp., however, Saint Pierre, Œuvres, tom. xiii, p. 12. "Je suppose que si, dans la société, les hommes étaient très justes et très bienfaisants les uns vers les autres, ils seraient en cette vie, incomparablement plus heureux qu'ils ne sont." (Cited in Lichtenberger, op. cit. p. 71.) For example, he says: "Quand nous savons resserrer nos besoins, nous devenons semblable aux dieux." Mémoires, ed. Rathery, I, p. xxiii, cited in Lichtenberger, op. cit. p. 96.

<sup>30</sup> See e. g. the passages cited from him in Lichtenberger, op. cit., pp. 95-97.



Pères" of Rétif de la Bretonne are so many ideal pictures which aim to point the value of a life of rural simplicity, to accent the happiness which such a life offers, and to show the unhappiness which results from abandoning it for the vicious atmosphere of a city.<sup>31</sup> In the minds of this group, happiness summed up as a sentimental demand for social justice to be realized by rural life and simple tastes.

It will be noted that, on certain points, all these theories agree. All contend that happiness is "our being's end and aim,"<sup>32</sup> and all hold that a certain social arrangement could bring about such happiness. Chief interest centers about the second point.

The problem which was after all of first interest to all the writers of this century was the discovery of the social system which would give men the happiness that should be theirs. Public opinion in France had always permitted absolute authority to the state, and had also accepted the idea that undivided responsibility for social well-being rested with that state. The new philosophy did not contradict this idea. When it set up the notion of a universal right to happiness, it again brought forward the state as the only means to bring about those conditions which would realize happiness for each individual. That "each has the right to demand that society render his situation more advantageous than it is in a state of nature"<sup>33</sup> was a thought

<sup>31</sup> See especially "Paysan Perversi" and "Nouvelle Héloïse."

<sup>32</sup> Pope's "Essay on Man" was the inspiration for much of the theory of the time.

<sup>33</sup> Mably, *Droits et Devoirs*, XI, p. 271.

which, by the time Mably wrote it in the second half of the century, had come to be a commonplace to cultivated men.

Difference of opinion appears now, as in all time, when the new theories undertake to define the exact way in which the state was to further the happiness of the individual. The idea varies according to the underlying notion concerning the relation between the individual and the state; but whether they aimed to alter and widen much or little the sphere of the individual, the reformers looked almost invariably to the state for any real amelioration of social conditions. The majority held that, to carry out its function properly, the state must secure to its subjects liberty of thought and person.<sup>34</sup> Others held that a universal equality was the only means to secure to each individual the liberty that was necessary and proper.<sup>35</sup> There were a few who asked that the state bend all its energies to developing a fraternal spirit; for they believed that the promptings of this fraternal spirit would lead men to desire a general equality of rank and possession, and so finally insure real liberty to all.<sup>36</sup> Among these new

<sup>34</sup> Montesquieu, Voltaire, Diderot and most of the other Encyclopedists are of this group.

<sup>35</sup> The more important representatives of this group are Morelly, Necker and, in a qualified way, Mably.

<sup>36</sup> This last view of liberty by way of fraternity, a theory of our own time, now put forward by the Nationalist and Christian socialists, had least vogue in just this specific form, though it has been shown that there were an appreciable group of lesser writers whose ideas centered about this doctrine of fraternity. (See Lichtenberger, *op. cit.*, pp. 348-355.) The real idea of Rousseau and such of his disciples as Raynal and Rétif de la Brétoune, is very nearly this one of fraternity.

principles, we hear most of a much-needed liberty and a highly desirable equality.

## III.

It has already been suggested that when the less popular but more forceful literature of the first half of the century is turned over, a new note is evident in all of it; that when one puts aside the carefully-expressed but often lifeless sentences and utterly unreal tales of those writers who, like Crébillon, Dufresny or J. B. Rousseau, made the belles-lettres of the time, and opens the social philosophers, the difference in quality and tenor of thought is striking, and most striking is the sharp reaction from the rule of authority.

The idea of happiness now being put forward, involved as has been shown, the idea of liberty. The doctrine that the individual must be free, the doctrine of individual liberty, was that most generally and positively urged during the eighteenth century. When it is remembered how repressive measures limited men's acts at every turn, this seems only natural. Almost of necessity, there came a rebound from the narrow formalism which, in the seventeenth century, had largely controlled art and letters, government and manners. The age of artificial dress, manners and speech survived well into the succeeding century, but thinking by rule went out long before. Reasoned in a narrow and conventional way though much of it be, there is now a universal call for independence.

This demand for the extension of the sphere of the individual may, in a loose way, be said to have gone

through three phases. It moves, from Meslier's first emotional expression of it,<sup>37</sup> to Montesquieu's carefully weighed, almost Machiavellian statement of its value, and then goes boldly on from Montesquieu to Rousseau. In the earlier period, aggressive thought had scarcely gone beyond the regrets and palliatives of such as Saint Pierre or the fears and reproaches of court frequenters like D'Argenson. Occasionally, the

<sup>37</sup>The "Testament" of Jean Meslier contains the most unequivocal demand for liberty to be found in the literature of the first half of the century. Meslier was possessed by an extreme loathing for the traditional legal and social institutions under which he lived. What he voices in his book is little more than bitter rebellion against a church and state absolutism which he thinks exists only in order to exploit and degrade the mass of the nation. Men should be free; they could be free; let them free themselves by a vigorous onslaught upon the church and state who are the chief sinners against the liberties of men. This is the whole tenor of the "Testament;" it is an emotional arraignment of a fixed authority over thought and act, rather than any defined and rational analysis of the pros and cons of the matter. There seems no precise idea as to what freedom, when gained, should consist in. The work is noteworthy as the first passionate expression of a feeling that later in the century became reasoned conviction. It had no political influence, for Meslier was hardly known to his own time, except as a religious writer (Comp. Lichtenberger, *op. cit.*, p. 75), and his demand for liberty was counted among the revolts against the tyranny of the Church. Though his book really asks for a liberty that is far more wide-reaching than this, his influence upon his time can scarcely have been any but an anti-clerical one. The title of his book is an interesting revelation of its tenor. In full, it runs as follows: "Mémoires des pensées et des sentiments de Jean Meslier, curé d'Étrepigny et de But, sur une partie des abus et des erreurs de la conduite et du gouvernement des hommes, où l'on voit des démonstrations claires et évidentes de la vanité et la fausseté de toutes les divinités et de toutes les religions du monde, pour être adressé à ses paroissiens après sa mort et pour leur servir de témoignage de vérité à eux et à tous leurs semblables."



imaginative literature expresses this revolt against the cramping system and the false manners that prevailed.<sup>38</sup> But the increasing unrest due to home and foreign influences gradually made for additional clearness concerning the change desired. As impatience with the insincerity and capriciousness of the traditional authority grew, the conception of liberty became better defined. By the middle of the century, for the first time in the history of French thought, the idea of civil liberty had become a doctrine of political theory; the absence of civil liberty from French institutions was pointed out with increasing vehemence. By the close of the century, this demand for liberty had become a bold fight in the name of a "Natural right;" it had grown gradually into the glittering fallacy which took liberty out of the sphere of government and made it something which man possessed anterior to society.

In this clamor for institutions which should insure liberty to the individual, every one asks for liberty of thought and speech, but there are different ideas as to how much civil and political liberty will best secure such intellectual freedom. There are in these opinions, as usual, two extremes and a mean. Two remarkable minds, Montesquieu and Voltaire, while sharing to a degree in the fallacies of the time, while accepting "natural law" as the basis of society, yet take a different view in regard to the laws of society. These laws, whether pertaining to liberty or to other less fundamental social relations, are held to be historical and

<sup>38</sup> Comp. e. g. the works of Lesage or the novels and dramas of Marivaux.

variable, changing as men grow to fuller self-control and greater capacity for freedom. The state is always the empirical means by which the greatest possible liberty for self-development is to be secured to each individual. Liberty, political or civil, is, under this conception, "the power to do that which the laws permit";<sup>39</sup> it is a great good toward which men grow, but a possession which can work them infinite evil if they be too early permitted to enjoy it. Of the two extreme doctrines, one extreme is best represented by the Economists. Starting with the creed that laws need not be made by the government, for they will declare themselves if given any chance, they ask that the individual be left free to work out his own existence in his own way. The state, regarded as the means to prevent any single individual from interfering with the free action of his neighbor, is preferably to be a strong and undivided force, able to act surely and swiftly in the interests of each individual. Thus this class of thinkers lays great stress upon civil liberty and none upon political liberty. The other extreme, best represented by Rousseau and his followers, rests all hope for an equitable relation between men upon unqualified political liberty. In the opinion of the group who urged this claim, organized association starts from the rational act of each member of society, and so, in striking contrast to the idea of the Economists, the theory now runs that these separate wills must act together as a collective will whenever there is to be an alteration in the form of government; the doctrine of government

<sup>39</sup> Montesquieu, *Esprit des Lois*, Bk. XI, ch. iii.

by consent of the governed is theoretically proclaimed and demonstrated. The collective will of man is the power and the only power that justly checks the entire freedom of the individual. Such a powerful light is made to play upon this great and inalienable possession of each individual, this birthright to a share in the social control, that political liberty comes to have undue prominence, and a just estimate of the true balance between political and civil liberty does not appear.

It need hardly be said that the representative demand for intellectual freedom was that made by Voltaire. For François Marie Arouet de Voltaire, the mocker, the man whom succeeding generations have called the "elect of God"<sup>40</sup> or proven to be descended directly from his satanic majesty,<sup>41</sup> liberty meant first of all liberty of thought. Voltaire is guilty of having put into the great mass he wrote, much matter which shows a doubtful comprehension of the topic he had in hand; but whether it was philosophical dictionary or history, scientific essay, novel or drama, one aggressive idea, scorn of legal or social trammels to thought, penetrated everything he wrote and made it important. No fetters to thought is the doctrine which pulses through all his vibrant French. Blind to the claims of the peasant, Voltaire was emphatically the mouthpiece and partisan of the bourgeois. Every act of his long and world-faring life, as the best work of his pen, gives evidence of this narrowness in his humanity. Voltaire

<sup>40</sup> Laurent, *La Révolution française*, I, p. 264.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid*, I, p. 8. Laurent cites M. de Segur.



likewise taught little or no sense of social responsibility; his demand for intellectual liberty was, on the whole, self-regarding. Candide's "Il faut cultiver son jardin" does not phrase the principle of *laissez faire* dogmatically; but it conveys, with all the additional force of a work of art, the same "let-alone" teaching. It is also true that the philosopher of Ferney had only a literary man's perception of civil liberty; and though he was as deeply impressed with the value of such liberty as the peculiar character of his mind permitted him to be impressed with anything so fundamental; though he saw plainly enough the value of the English security of person and property and did much to spread that appreciation of it which formed so marked a part of later public opinion;<sup>42</sup> though he can be found asking that all civil laws, even the marriage laws,<sup>43</sup> be secularized and made the same for all, yet he never seriously pressed the subject of liberty, civil or political, beyond the point where it concerned freedom of thought and speech. He really desired liberty only in so far as it meant immunity from systematic repression of thought. He was above all possessed with this one idea of winning intellectual liberty for France, and his alternate sneering and upbraiding can hardly be said to have made an effective demand for anything else. But just because he thus narrowed life to the intellectual life of the individual, both his career and his writings ask for intellectual liberty as no other has asked for it. Though every writer of the century included in his de-

<sup>42</sup> *Comp. Lettres sur les Anglais.*

<sup>43</sup> *Dictionnaire philosophique*, II, 68-70; III, 625; IV, 29.

mand for liberty a demand for intellectual freedom, Voltaire made that specific plea so much his special aim that the whole movement in favor of it is summed up in the work of his facile pen.

The rising demand for civil liberty gets its best and most rational expression in the works of Montesquieu. Civil liberty is the central point of Montesquieu's system; from it he starts his ideals; by it he gauges the development of the governments he studies; toward it he believes that all governments will tend if rightly directed. In the interests of a civil liberty for which he holds his own country and others similarly advanced to be fitted, Montesquieu attacks dueling,<sup>44</sup> and all forms of slavery;<sup>45</sup> advocates divorce<sup>46</sup> and pronounces for the social freedom of women.<sup>47</sup> Because this most dispassionate among the representatives of the new spirit is possessed by a keen appreciation of the necessity of civil liberty, he classifies as tyrannies all governments which hinder freedom of person or thought.<sup>48</sup> It is again in the interests of this same principle that Montesquieu opposes a standing army,<sup>49</sup> interest,<sup>50</sup> and a public debt<sup>51</sup> and advocates a stable currency.<sup>52</sup> When he criticises the penal laws<sup>53</sup> and

<sup>44</sup> *Lettres Persanes*, LXI; also, *Esprit des Lois*, Bk. XXVIII, ch. xvi.

<sup>45</sup> *Esprit des Lois*, Bk. XV, ch. i.

<sup>46</sup> *Lettres Persanes*, XVI.

<sup>47</sup> *Lettres Persanes*, XXVIII; also, *Esprit des Lois*, Bk. XVI, ch. ii.

<sup>48</sup> *Esprit des Lois*, Bk. XIX, ch. iii.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid*, Bk. XIII, ch. xvii.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid*, Bk. XXII, ch. xvi.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid*, Bk. XXII, ch. xvi.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid*, Bk. XXII, ch. iii.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid*, Bk. VI; Bk. XXIV, ch. xv; also *Considerations*, ch. xv.

the current methods of taxation, recommending instead a progressive tax and stringent sumptuary laws;<sup>54</sup> when he deprecates laws of primogeniture<sup>55</sup> or admits that inheritance has only a legal, not a moral sanction,<sup>56</sup> he has always in view a better and more real civil liberty. In truth Montesquieu's epoch-making work taught little that did not accent the value of civil liberty<sup>57</sup> as the direct cause of social growth and the means to permanent national happiness.

In the doctrine of Montesquieu, there was a reservation in regard to civil liberty. Not all nations were fit for it; it was not certain that all men had once had civil liberty or must always have it in order to insure their best happiness. Montesquieu taught civil liberty with qualifications that favored gradual development toward it; a school followed him which preached it without any reservations. In the second half of the century, the doctrine of civil liberty finally assumed the unqualified form where it is asserted that civil liberty is an indispensable necessity for men in all ages and in all positions of life.

It will be remembered how the social philosophy

<sup>54</sup> *Esprit des Lois*, Bk. VIII, ch. vii.

<sup>55</sup> *Lettres Persanes*, CXIX.

<sup>56</sup> *Esprit des Lois*, Bk. XXVI, ch. vi.

<sup>57</sup> Montesquieu's careful elaboration of the English Constitution aimed to show that the most real liberty yet achieved by modern Europeans was, probably, to be brought about by distributing partly elective and partly hereditary powers after the manner of the English government, but he does not set up the government of England nor that of any other country as a model. Here, too, his chief object is to show the relative superiority of a government which secures civil liberty to its subjects.

of the Economists led them to deduce this idea of civil liberty. In explaining their doctrine of what happiness was and how it was to be secured, it was shown how they believed that all social well-being was finally conditioned by an entire government recognition of the principle of civil liberty. Their theory, unlike that of Voltaire or Montesquieu, argues, not the expediency, but the justice of civil liberty, and bases the claim upon "Natural Law", readily discernible if the trustworthy instincts inherent in each individual be regarded. The doctrine of Natural Rights follows from this claim, and the doctrine of Natural Rights is only an unqualified demand for complete civil and industrial freedom. This is the conception of liberty which asks that the state remain only the watchman, the arbiter. Although most of those who are of this way of thinking believe in enlightened despotism, the sole purpose for which they would put a despot in charge of the nation is to secure certain and stable liberty to each individual. This type of contention in the name of liberty was really part of a contention in favor of free production; since civil liberty was an additional means to aid a better output of national wealth, therefore it was held valuable as a means to social progress. By the end of the eighteenth century, this doctrine had developed numerous and well-defined statements to prove that entire civil liberty was the *sine qua non* for individual and social happiness, and so the inherent right of every member of the community.

The dictum that every individual had an inherent right to say how and by whom he should be ruled



grew up more slowly in France than the doctrine of civil rights, but it none the less gathered force as the eighteenth century progressed. A careful reading of the most important claims for it, makes it evident that not even Rousseau, who gave it most place in his writings and dangled its charms in most attractive guise before men's minds,—not even Rousseau held the doctrine to be universally and immediately practicable.<sup>58</sup> As a theory, however, certain men<sup>59</sup> during the century present entire political liberty as the end and means to all successful association of men. Put forward in an uncertain way from the beginning of the century, the idea culminates in its most forceful form in the "Contrat Social" of Rousseau. Many writers, as for instance, Meslier, Morelly or Mably, asserted, without very much attempt at proof, that each member of the community has rightfully a share in the control of the polity of the community. Rousseau aims to prove this assertion. It was Rousseau who made it current doctrine that every individual, by the fact of being a part of the association, was a part of the source of power, and that therefore political liberty was his inherent and eternal right.

Rousseau's theory of an original social contract,<sup>60</sup> which was believed to be a demonstration of this principle, is too well known to need more than briefest

<sup>58</sup> Comp. *Contrat Social*, ch. iii-v.

<sup>59</sup> Meslier, D'Argenson, Mably and Rousseau. It is interesting to note that a man of the world like D'Argenson belongs more nearly to this group than to any other. Comp. *Considérations sur le gouvernement de France*.

<sup>60</sup> It is, of course, recognized that Rousseau's theory of a social contract is little more than an interpretation of Hobbes and Locke, but Rousseau gave it to France as England had

statement. According to the terms of this doctrine, society derives from the free will of each individual who entered into a primitive contract.<sup>61</sup> This contract, consciously made by each and every one of the several parties to it, created society. By that contract, each individual became sovereign as well as subject.<sup>62</sup> Thus political liberty was the very base of all association, the only inalienable, imprescriptible right. The very terms of the contract involved a certain surrender of a part of all the other natural rights.<sup>63</sup> Liberty of person and of thought, the rights of equality and property, became in a way gifts of the collective will. What Rousseau adopts as a principle is, after all, the doctrine of the despotism of the majority; but in planning for this rule of the majority, he does not deny true political liberty to each member of society. The opinion of every one of the separate persons who together form a community must, in justice and reason, says the doctrine, go to make up the collective will, even though all these opinions cannot prevail.

All the communistic writers, then, and the volcanic rhetoric of Rousseau most of all, treated political liberty as the first axiom of political theory. Human association connoted it; any institution that imperiled given it to him. See the interesting outline of the history of the doctrine of the social contract in Morley, Rousseau, II, pp. 146-148, ed. Macmillan & Co., 1888.

<sup>61</sup> Contrat Social, Bk. I, ch. v.

<sup>62</sup> "A l'instant, au lieu de la personne particulière de chaque contractant, cet acte d'association produit un corps moral et collectif," etc. Contrat Social, Bk. I, ch. vi.

<sup>63</sup> Contrat Social, Bk. I, ch. ix. "Car l'état à l'égard de ses membres est maître," etc. It is always to be remembered that Rousseau, unlike many of his disciples, regarded democracy as an ideal form of government. Cf. Contrat Social, Bk. III, ch. iv.

it by so doing vitiated the whole social structure; it was the mainspring to the happiness and development of man. The conception might and generally did go along with notions directly contrary to any real civil liberty,<sup>64</sup> and so the sum of this theory set the pyramid upon its apex. But the doctrine of political liberty, as a right, was none the less definitely proclaimed.

These men were the only absolute adherents of the doctrine of unreserved political liberty. It is hardly necessary to state that the Economists had no sympathy with political liberty. Clearly as they saw the need of civil liberty, it is doubtful if any of the Physiocrats attached any particular value to the right of suffrage. For those of them who favored an enlightened despotism, even the conception of political liberty was distasteful. Likewise, this notion of an indivisible, imprescriptible sovereignty primevally residing in each individual, and so entitling him to political liberty, was

<sup>64</sup> Rousseau, the sentimentalist, undoubtedly sets great store by the freedom of the individual; Rousseau the political theorist almost loses sight of it in his enthusiasm for the rights of the whole body politic. It is true that in his "Emile," and in the "Nouvelle Héloïse" Rousseau makes the individual and his development the supreme fact of existence, and counts a certain isolation from society as of first importance to the child, in order that he may develop that individuality so desirable in the man; it is true, he often infers even where he does not state, that kind of civil liberty which means the individual's right to immunity from interference with his personal affairs. But the most characteristic and influential part of Rousseau's writings puts so much accent upon political liberty that the sum of his teaching comes dangerously near to sacrificing the civil rights to the political right. Of Morelly, this is true without qualification. (See e. g., such regulations as would make each citizen "homme public" and force him to contribute to the general needs. Code de la Nature, especially pp. 188-190.)



no part of the doctrine of Montesquieu and Voltaire. In the theory of each of these men, the whole nation was not necessarily or even preferably the state. It is doubtful if either writer thought that complete political liberty was even the end of all political progress. Montesquieu was by no means an enthusiast for democracy; on the contrary, he had a wholesome appreciation of the superior intelligence of the minority. General and unreserved political liberty he deprecated in any but small governments, where the laws aimed at mediocrity and conservatism. The same is true of Voltaire. With no particular sympathy for the masses, but rather a great impatience for the idea of intrusting any political power to them, Voltaire naturally believed that the "vulgar" had small capacity for intellectual or political usefulness. The "Lettres sur les Anglais" or the "Idées Républicains" best bear witness that he shared the ideas of Montesquieu. It was then Rousseau and the group who followed him, who sent abroad the theory of unreserved political rights. The doctrine that the state and the nation are one, the doctrine that became so great a power in shaping opinion at the end of the century because men who had been accustomed to give much responsibility to the state now aimed to give the will of the majority a like absolute power in guiding the creeds and acts of every individual,—this doctrine must be chiefly attributed to Jean Jacques Rousseau.

## IV.

Among the theories which gained ground during the eighteenth century, the idea of equality follows in

popularity upon the principle of liberty. Inequality of condition early came to be regarded by certain thinkers as the root cause of social evils. The "poor eighteenth century" had not learned, as the merest beginner has learned to-day, to look upon social problems as relative to particular variations of race and tradition. Most men sought out one series of social facts and gave them undue prominence. Since the glaring inequality of rank and opportunity was probably the fact most striking to one who superficially observed the eighteenth century French life, many persons settled upon these inequalities as the real impediments to a vigorous national life. Although only a minority felt that equality was anything beyond an ideal, almost every speculative thinker of the time lent a more or less ready ear to the notion that equality of rights and possession was perhaps the only way to secure the social fabric against unhappiness and degradation. Majority opinion agreed that equality would be most desirable in the relations between men; it differed only as to the possibility of finding any social arrangement which could maintain such a relation. The general theory of the time sums up in the assertion that in a far-distant past, men had been capable of the life and social relation necessary for equality, but that the long-continued period during which he had been ruled by false theories and vicious laws had so warped his nature that he was no longer fit for it. Many of the writers of the century roused a passion for equality by putting a new ideal before men's eyes, rather than by any active claim they made to have equality set up

in the relations of modern life. A single writer and his satellites gave the idea most force, first by implanting in many minds a deep hatred of such social distinctions as were based on birth or holding, and then by teaching the proud self-respect which is the first essential for any active belief in equality.

The reasons for the general prejudice of the century in favor of the ideal of equality are easily traceable. In addition to the conditions of the national life which will need a special discussion, certain special influences tended at this time to make the idea of equality seem particularly attractive as a remedial measure. It will be remembered that, at the end of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth century, missionaries began to return to France from the far East and the new West, and that they brought with them the usual enthusiasm of the pioneer for the life he has been able to lead in a new country. The tales these men told filled the many who heard them with a romantic enthusiasm for the peace and simplicity of the primitive life. The literature, more particularly the romance and drama of the time, took up this dream of pastoral life with its simple equality; the "bon sauvage" became the pet ideal in the fiction of the century. Most of the imaginative writings delighted to depict his contentment in his native wilds or to bring the simple child of nature to Europe by some fortuitous circumstance, and there, introducing him into the society of the time, to point the contrast between his artless truth and simple tastes and the prejudices, insincerities and lux-

urious tendencies of the times. It is interesting to remember that this admiration for simplicity and frankness really crept into sentiments and manners even before the Revolution came to force the feeling in favor of equality over the line which separates rhetorical enthusiasm from practical application. The accredited method of reasoning supplemented the stimulus to the belief in equality given by these tales of travel and the romances. When, as was the way of this new method, men were considered as so many similar beings, the natural man, who was thus evolved, was a powerful argument for the ideal of equality. When, on the other hand, the paradisial conception began to lose its force; when the idea of a state of nature replaced the idea of Paradise and an eternal fall on account of divine chastisement was discredited in favor of a fall caused by the wrong route that men had chosen, the feeling became general that inequality was the chief plague resulting from man's failure to discover how to conduct a commonwealth. When society, using the word in its narrower sense, was arraigned, when forms and ceremonies as well as institutions were held to hinder all Nature's intentions by training men in a stupid imitation, one of the other and making them mere "machines who do not think at all,"<sup>65</sup> then, by such a theory, the ultimate equality of all men was at least implied. To account, then, for the general tolerance of the conception of equality and the conspicuous tendency to give the idea logical completeness in a commonwealth which rested upon the principle, it seems

<sup>65</sup> Rousseau, *La Nouvelle Héloïse*, Lettre XVI.



only necessary to remember that, along with the growing comprehension of the rottenness and weakness of the government and the love of abstract reasoning, a newly-developed love of nature had caught speculative minds.

But to believe in equality as an ideal is not necessarily to advocate its immediate adoption as a principle of government. It does not follow that there was a general demand for laws which should establish equality because there are to be found in the writings of the century plenty of isolated phrases by which it would be possible to class many of those who were contributing toward the new way of thinking as adherents of an absolute equality of rank and possession. Because even Montesquieu, most conservative of the advanced thinkers, may be shown to have pointed the value of communism,<sup>66</sup> it is not to be argued that he advocated it as an applied form of government. When he spoke in favor of such a social order, he was careful to point out at the same time that it could properly exist only when other facts of social development were in harmony with this form of association. For him, as for most of his contemporaries, equality was a golden dream rather than a possibility. After all, only two among the writers of the time, only Meslier and Morelly, can safely be said to have believed without qualification in a social régime where strict equality was the fundamental principle of legislation.<sup>67</sup>

<sup>66</sup> *Considérations sur la Grandeur*, etc., ch. iv.

<sup>67</sup> *Comp. Meslier, Testament*, II, p. 210; also III, p. 387. Morelly's entire plan for a commonwealth rests upon the idea of absolute equality. See such passages as those which, in "Code de la Nature," arrange for the distribution of political power and of labor. *Code de la Nature*, pp. 188-193.

The others sang a sort of requiem to an equality long since vanished, and aimed to teach resignation to the inevitable lack of this much-to-be-desired social relation.

The Economists, for instance, took small account of equality, except such as they believed would result from a freed industry. The modern clamor about "inequality of opportunity" would have expressed their demand very well, except that they interpreted the phrase in an opposite sense. Exactly that which modern radicalism holds to be most at variance with equality of opportunity, that is, complete freedom in the industrial domain, the Economists felt to be the only real means for securing a just and desirable equality. Such equality of opportunity as they believed in and aimed at, they thought might be secured through laws maintaining the inviolability of private property, a proportional tax and complete liberty in the national industrial and commercial life. Mably believed equality to be the key to social content,<sup>68</sup> but, with mild pessimism, he declared it was hopeless to try to maintain it after primitive conditions had disappeared. Equality, he said, is the ideal, but it is neither possible nor expedient to make it a part of social institutions. "No human power can to-day re-establish equality

<sup>68</sup> Mably, *Entretien de Phocion*, X, p. 143. There are many passages where equality is championed with as little qualification as in the following: "L'égalité doit produire tous les biens, parceque, elle unit les hommes, leur élève l'âme et les prépare à des sentimens mutuels de bienveillance et d'amitié; j'en conclus que l'inégalité produit tous les maux, parcequ'elle les dégrade, les humilie et sème entre eux la division et la haine." *Législation*, t. I, p. 50; also pp. 49 and 67. (Cited in Lichtenberger, *op. cit.*, p. 227.)



without causing greater disorders than those it desires to avoid.”<sup>69</sup> Voltaire and the Encyclopedists treat the matter with even less reverence. Holding that happiness is independent of status or possession, they see no connection between equality and social well-being. Voltaire took his turn at depicting the beauties of simple life and equality;<sup>70</sup> but his most positive writings always accent, in definite terms, those necessary differences in men from which social inequalities must and should follow.<sup>71</sup> He even goes so far as to state that not only inequalities, but inequalities on the basis of property-holding, are inevitable. “It is impossible in our unhappy societies,” he says, “that men living in society should be divided into two classes, the one rich to command, the other poor to serve.”<sup>72</sup> Diderot, like the rest, let his imagination dwell upon the charms of primitive life;<sup>73</sup> but his judgment, otherwise so changeable in matters pertaining to social institutions, seems to have been always consistent on this point of equality. He too, admits a necessary inequality in men associated together; social classes, he says, are necessary, but need not be based upon possession; let the antagonism, if there must be one, be at least a competition of intellects.<sup>74</sup>

<sup>69</sup> Doutes adressé \* \* \* aux Economistes, p. 74.

<sup>70</sup> For example in “L’Ingénue.”

<sup>71</sup> Essai sur les Mœurs, ch. xcvi.

<sup>72</sup> Discours sur l’homme, VII.

<sup>73</sup> See e. g., “Court essai sur le caractère de l’homme sauvage.” Œuvres. Vol. VI, p. 450; also Supplément au Voyage de M. de Bougainville. Vol. II, p. 193.

<sup>74</sup> Comp. articles on Homme, Laboureur, Hôpital, Luxe, in Encyclopédie, Œuvres, Vols. XIV, XV, XVI.

In connection with the influences which made for new ideals, Rousseau's doctrine of equality needs special discussion. The great sentimentalist was so full of contradictions that, according to the part of his work which is consulted, he can be shown to have supported or deprecated the idea of equality. Even if his discourse on the origin of inequality be omitted,<sup>75</sup> there still remain many passages in Rousseau's imaginative writings<sup>76</sup> and in the more mature political works, which aim to show that equality of the Spartan kind was after all the only certain means to a stable and real social happiness.<sup>77</sup> On the other hand, we find him recognizing the desirability of classes<sup>78</sup> and asserting that a government in which social status was not fixed was one of questionable stability.<sup>79</sup> One who provokingly changes his point of view in all matters of applied politics; one who is consistent only in his sympathy for the poor, his scorn of the luxurious and artificial social life he saw about him, in his firm belief in the social contract and the sovereignty of the people, can scarcely be expected to hold to a fixed doctrine regard-

<sup>75</sup> The "Discours" might be neglected in a study of Rousseau the political theorist, since it might, with some justice, be urged that the essay was only a *tour de force*, undertaken in a spirit of paradox rather than an expression of Rousseau's positive doctrine.

<sup>76</sup> See e. g. *Nouvelle Héloïse*, II, Lettres XVI, XXI.

<sup>77</sup> Comp. *Discours sur L'Economie politique*," *Œuvres*, I, p. 303. "Si les enfants sont élevés en commun dans le sein de l'égalité," etc.

<sup>78</sup> See *Nouvelle Héloïse*. This book, among other lessons, strives to show the place and the use of the right-minded man of wealth. See in particular, Lettre X.

<sup>79</sup> *Econ. pol.*, Vol. I, p. 309. "Rien n'est plus funeste aux mœurs et à la république, que les changements continuels d'état et de fortune entre les citoyens," etc.

ing the largely emotional question of equality. It is not then surprising that, according to the temper in which Rousseau is approached, one may find the principles that make for either an individualistic or a communistic commonwealth.<sup>80</sup> Perhaps it is fairest to say that it is on the whole doubtful whether Rousseau himself was ever quite clear as to the kind of equality a right-thinking majority ought to make public law.

Yet even though Rousseau's own point of view in regard to equality is open to question, the general tenor of his best-known works undoubtedly made for one kind of sentiment.<sup>81</sup> Though Rousseau advocated equality with far less precision or conviction than Morelly or even Mably, he put into men's minds a sensitiveness with regard to the rights of others, gave them ideals of simplicity of life and of self-respect, which almost of necessity developed in them a feeling concerning social and political equality that he himself never insisted upon without qualification. Few can read of the sovereignty of the people as he explained it, or of a purely democratic government as he outlined it, without unconsciously adopting convictions in favor of equality. The great stress he lays upon the sanctity of the rights of the individual is only a firm belief in

<sup>80</sup> It is easily proven that the teachings of Rousseau had this dual effect, and that the fiercest advocates of individual liberty which means equality in the political order only (such e. g. as Madame de Staël or any of the "doctrinaires") were as much the ardent disciples of Rousseau as those who, like Louis Blanc, hold that his teachings warrant serious inroads upon the individual freedom in the name of a general right to equality.

<sup>81</sup> *Contrat Social*, Bk. II, ch. xi.

equality, social and political, expressed in an indirect way. In short, it might be said that Rousseau, more than any other, stirred in each man who read him those sentiments which predispose to sympathy with the idea of equality. The strong disposition in favor of equality which played so prominent a part in the doctrine of the Revolution, undoubtedly drew some of its inspiration from the feeling of contempt and outraged justice which the arbitrary and selfish government steadily fanned into open revolt. Men begin to feel themselves equal to those who are supposed to be above them when they have learned to despise them. But the feeling that later expressed itself in the declaration that "all men are born free and equal" was developed quite as much by the fervid, if sentimental, humanity of Rousseau as by the political facts of the time.

Before closing this brief review of the leading principles of the eighteenth century, a word seems desirable as to the views of the time regarding the institution of property.

The eighteenth-century doctrine of property falls into about the same general classes as the views on liberty and equality. There are the orthodox, the liberal and the iconoclastic theories to be reckoned with. The first may be quickly dismissed. It is enough to recall the fact that, at the time in question, orthodox opinion held that the state was possessor under a polity where the king alone was the state.

Liberal thought of the period made no serious attack upon this theory. Those whom our age is wont to consider the chief reformers of the time, Mon-



tesquieu, Voltaire and the Encyclopedists, made no attack upon the received doctrine of property. Montesquieu<sup>82</sup> and Voltaire<sup>83</sup> held property to be a legal right, and only asked that the ruling powers respect the privilege they themselves had given to their subjects. None of the Encyclopedists will, I think, be found to have doubted the necessity of private property as a fundamental social institution. As has been repeated too often perhaps, these Encyclopedists made no attack upon any of the received political institutions of their time. It was absolutism, obscurantism and formalism that they opposed; they never came near enough to reality to trace any connection between the false prejudices they hated and the fundamental political institutions of the society they knew. The whole tendency of their teaching was to give prominence to the individual and to his right to think and act as he pleased, and whatever political influence they exerted was therefore in favor of an individualistic system where the property-right rested on law made by a beneficent sovereign.

During the century, two important theories oppose themselves to this conservative doctrine. On the one hand, there was a strong and important group that claimed the property-right as an inherent individual right and held that the recognition of this right by the state conditioned the effectiveness of each member of

<sup>82</sup> For example, see *Esprit des Lois*, Bk. XXVI, ch. v.

<sup>83</sup> Compare among other examples, *Dictionnaire philosophique*, art. Propriété, Vol. 54, ed. 1785.



society; under this theory, the state was the guarantor of the property-right. On the other hand, there developed an uncertain doctrine which continued to think of property as a possession of the state, but state in most cases, no longer meant a monarch; it meant the whole nation. This theory looked upon private property as a somewhat regrettable but probably inevitable adjunct to each individual life.

The Physiocrats are of course the representatives of the first group. In their idea, property was a "natural right." Without property, liberty they said, was an illusion. Property was the cause of all positive law and the root of all progress. The whole duty of the ruler who constituted the state was to secure each individual in the peaceful possession of whatever he could win by his own effort. The greater the number of property-holders, the more real and general was the national prosperity likely to be. They agreed with Montesquieu and Voltaire that individual property was the basis of a successful national life, and that to secure the absolute sanctity of the right was the first means to establish an effective and stable government; they differed from both in that they made the right to property a natural not a legal right.

On the other hand, evidences of an intention to dispute the accepted laws concerning property are to be found from the beginning of the century. Meslier, probably because he had been bred in the old teaching which took property to be a purely legal right and the king the sole legal possessor, urged that the best remedy for the undue and inequitable exercise of rights



in property would be found in transferring all such rights to the commonwealth.<sup>84</sup> D'Argenson declared that<sup>85</sup> the key to all social disorders was the unequal holding of property, and said plainly that the only way to remedy the matter was to put the lands at the disposal of those who cultivated them; he even specifically attacked productive property in the hands of private persons, and suggested that the lands of the wealthy be brought together and put at the disposal of the nation.<sup>86</sup> A prejudice against individual ownership of land runs through a great part of the literature of the second half of the century. The usual attitude is not so much communistic or socialistic as merely negative of the private property-right.<sup>87</sup> Leaders of opinion, however, were divided between the ideal of communistic holding and that of state control. It is safe to say that no one of the more important of the later writers who desired communism of some kind, neither Morelly<sup>88</sup>

<sup>84</sup> Testament, III, p. 387.

<sup>85</sup> "Le mot de l'énigme de nos maux est la propriété des fonds, d'où est venu l'avarice," ed. D'Argenson, Vol. V, p. 139. (Cited in Lichtenberger, *op. cit.*, p. 96.)

<sup>86</sup> "Qu'on mobilize les fonds des particuliers, et il y point de mal à cela," VII, p. 337. (Cited in Lichtenberger.)

<sup>87</sup> *Comp. Lichtenberger*, who gives an interesting account of these lesser writings, *op. cit.*, pp. 383-388.

<sup>88</sup> "Ces lois, je ne cesse de le répéter et on ne saurait trop le redire, en établissant un partage monstrueux des productions de la terre et des éléments mêmes, en divisant ce qui devait rester dans son entier ou y être remis, si quelque accident l'avait divisé, ont aide et favorisé la ruine de toute sociabilité. Sans aliterer dis-je la totalité des choses immobiles, elle devait ne s'attachait qu'à régler non la propriété, mais l'usage et la distribution de celles qui ne sont pas stables. Code de la

nor Mably<sup>89</sup> nor Necker<sup>90</sup> really felt their idea to be practicable or even desirable under modern conditions, any more than Meslier or D'Argenson had really expected to see the mobilization of all property under a centralized democratic government.

It is then one of the interesting contradictions of the eighteenth century, that although much of the thought of the period regarded private property as the reason for the formation of society, and although almost all held it to be fundamental to society's conservation, yet a conspicuous number of persons looked upon the property-right uneasily as a regrettable necessity and the cause of much social misery. Rousseau is largely responsible for this, as for other contradictions of the times. Though Rousseau said enough to make it quite possible to quote him as the defender of private property, the greater part of his influence went in the direction of discrediting an individual property-right. In spite of his frequent outbursts regarding the sanctity of property, the sum of Rousseau's teaching creates no respect for property in the hands of the individual; rather it arouses the opposite feeling. Recalling for a moment the leading principles of his doctrine, the reason for this becomes evident. Rousseau laid greatest

Nature, pp. 77, 78. Comp. many similar passages in this and in the *Basiliade*.

<sup>89</sup> "Mais nous qui voyons les maux qui sont sorti de cette boîte funeste de Pandore, si le moindre d'espérance frappait notre raison, ne devrions nous pas aspirer à cette heureuse communauté de biens, tant louée, tant regrettée par les poètes \* \* \* et qui, grace à la dépravation des mœurs ne peut être qu'un chimère dans le monde." *Œuvres*, XII, p. 380.

<sup>90</sup> See Lichtenberger, *op. cit.*, pp. 304-314.

stress upon a state of nature, where each and all had been happy; upon an inevitable social contract, one of whose unavoidable results had been property, and upon the errors of an artificial feudal society which practically rested upon the property-right that derived from the social contract. Such doctrines, written with force and emotional conviction, are hardly calculated to teach any real deference for the property-right, even though their author writes at times in a different strain. In vain Rousseau says that the property-right was a natural and individual right, and that the state might touch it only by tax or inheritance laws;<sup>91</sup> he had said too often, and in his most convincing fashion, that rational man, uniting with his fellows, was perfectly able to alter any of the disagreeable conditions which limited social happiness, and he had said too, that property was after all the beginning of the present discontent.<sup>92</sup> The great sentimentalist's real influence in this regard made for strengthening that dubious attitude toward property which is to be found so often in the imaginative and political writings of his time. The sum of Rousseau's teachings only voiced, with deeper feeling and in less uncertain terms, the doubt, widespread at the time, regarding the expediency or justice of private property. The eighteenth century seems to have been far from clear that the property-right was necessarily an individual and inviolable right.

The leading principles of the new thought of the eighteenth century are now substantially reviewed.

<sup>91</sup> *Comp. Emile*, II, pp. 181-187; *Econ. pol.*, I, p. 307, ed. 1782.

<sup>92</sup> *Discours sur l'origine*, etc.

During the progress of this hundred years, men come to have a new conception of the individual man, another ideal concerning his existence here, and a new feeling with regard to the state and its relation to the individual. Most pronounced of all is the altered conception of the sphere of the individual. All this change expresses itself in these new conceptions of happiness, of liberty and equality, which have now been briefly explained.

In pointing the application of these new theories, old political and social prejudices came constantly under the fire of criticism. There arose frequent protests against legislation which failed to prevent poverty by allowing large private holding, and sumptuary laws, inheritance laws and the like were generally and warmly advocated. The new ideas of liberty and equality developed also a growing unwillingness to accept the old class lines, and there appeared the tendency, later so universal, to separate society into rich and poor, rather than to recognize the four classes which past development had given to the nation. The logical consequence of this, the increasing exaltation of labor by way of attack upon privilege, is also plainly evident. The same notions of liberty and equality lead to a new appreciation of the desirability of universal education. Boldly expressed though these more concrete conceptions were, they were only so many varying consequences of the fundamental doctrines. To have a well-defined idea of the leading theories concerning happiness, liberty, equality and property is to know sufficiently well the influences which were molding a new social ideal.



## V.

As to the effect of these several principles, the story of how they made the "revolution in thought" of which the later revolution was only the outer expression, is well known. It is possibly dangerous to generalize about the relation of the several writers to this later rebellion, and yet it seems almost certain that when the Revolution came, there was a certain cast of thought which dominated. Voltaire and the Encyclopedists swept the ground clear; they tore away the veil which hid the rottenness of the old doctrines. Rousseau's writings gave men most of what they had to put in place of the principles the others had discredited.

Montesquieu's word reached only a cultured circle, of whom but a few took any share in state affairs. In the face of the storm others raised, his eminently sound political teachings were for a time practically forgotten. Voltaire and the Encyclopedists sowed the wind by anathematizing the established institutions which they claimed sought to impose as religion and ethics, an ugly and outworn mass of superstition, and so tried to cramp men's thinking into set lines. It was they who roused the "beneficent demon of doubt." Theirs was the message which upset men's standards; but it did not fill them with a missionary spirit, it did not make them eager to be active agents for change. So with the doctrines of the Physiocrats, though in a less degree. The teachings of this school undoubtedly carried great weight, but the persons whom they influenced did not get political power until the whirl of revolution was over. Great as was the share of the Physiocrats in



popularizing the idea of Natural Rights and certain important doctrines of administrative government, they did not include among the rights they recognized the right to a share in controlling the form of government, and that doctrine was the one most influential in revolutionary times. Their theories, falling in with the growing passion for speculative politics and with the prevailing desire to find some remedy for social regulations growing more irksome, took deep hold on many minds and made an impression that outlasted the heat of revolution — an impression which, in fact, gave the sharply individualistic stamp to the theory, and particularly the economic theory, of our own century.

It was the fervid teachings of Rousseau that gave greatest impulse to the doctrines of the Revolution, for Rousseau's teaching was predominately constructive, and his was the deep and intense emotional conviction which makes the fanatic in a cause. Rousseau's conception of an inherent right to political liberty, founded upon a primitive and rational contract, this doctrine that held to the old notion of the beneficent and determining influence of the body politic, but now made the state and nation synonymous, was one which made a deeper and more lasting impression upon contemporary thought than the vigorous empirical discussion of civil liberty and the sound notion of equality which Montesquieu had so ably presented, or the economic arguments for civil liberty and equality which the Physiocrats had advanced. If when the Revolution came, the understanding of civil liberty was somewhat obscure and the few who comprehended its worth and struggled

for it went to the wall before the feverish claim for universal political liberty, it is perhaps because Rousseau's was the most passionate and impelling influence of the time; and Rousseau had not taught, because he himself had not understood, the value of civil liberty as the basis of any real and lasting political liberty. Rousseau's sentiment spread the idea of a primevally happy man, and his doctrine of simplicity of life fostered the idea of equality. Rousseau's spirit of paradox developed the uncertain notion of property; it popularized as well the idea of the injustice of unequal possessions. It will not do to lose a sense of proportion, — to give Rousseau more than his share of influence. It is true that the revolutionary principles were not one doctrine; they were the composite of many, but Rousseau's theory was undoubtedly that one among the intellectual influences of the eighteenth century which gave a particular trend to the revolutionary theory.

The eighteenth century principles were then the seeds of the principles of the Revolution. That these seeds bore fruits is not due alone to the warmth and attractiveness which Rousseau breathed upon the wealth of new ideas which the century scattered over France. To grow, seed must find favorable soil. That soil was furnished by certain facts of the national life of France, facts that made men in increasing numbers search for new standards. The statement of the immediate causes of the principles of the Revolution requires that, along with the new principles of the century, these social facts, which contributed to give them root and strength to grow, should be summed up.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR CHAPTER I.

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
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**CHAPTER II.**

**THE SOCIAL FACTS WHICH SHAPED AND  
DEVELOPED THE NEW IDEALS.**



## CHAPTER II.

### THE SOCIAL FACTS WHICH SHAPED AND DEVELOPED THE NEW IDEALS.

- I. THE PART PLAYED BY THE OLD INSTITUTIONS.
- II. THE MIDDLE CLASS AND ITS RELATION TO THE NEW PRINCIPLES.
- III. PARIS AS AN ORGANIZING AND CONCENTRATING INFLUENCE.
- IV. THE FINAL FOCUSING OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE REVOLUTION.

THE rest of the forward movement of which the appearance of a new philosophy marks the first stage, is a story of how new ideals gained ground and took on a specific character as social conditions created a need for them. The revolutionary principles are, in a sense, a concentrated selection of the doctrines of the eighteenth century, and it is necessary to inquire with some care how and why such a concentration and selection took place.

The agents which, during the eighteenth century, negatively or positively co-operated to develop the principles of the Revolution from the ideas of the philosophers, may in a general way be classified as follows: First in importance is the character of the old régime. The conditions of the reign of Louis XV promoted a well-announced dissatisfaction and rebellion, and so led the rising generation to adopt new theories as against accepted ones, while the vacillating policy of his successor and certain circumstances in the life of other nations, together served still further to strengthen and con-

firm the desire for other institutions. In addition must be considered an awakened middle class, a peculiarly influential metropolis and a faction pledged to radical completeness. In other words, the new faith spread and grew because misgovernment fostered discontent; the new faith got practical expression because the Third Estate roused to a new notion regarding its proper relation to the state and awoke to the fact of its actual political impotence; the new faith concentrated to one dominant set of principles, because the social life and thought which centered in the capital of the nation greatly helped to organize and propagate the new opinion; and, lastly, this new faith acquired an ultra tone, because doctrinaires, leading the disaffected and the vagabonds whom the old régime had provided, were able to change a spirit of reform to one of insurrection, and thus to express finally the principles of Revolution in the constitution of '93.

## I.

The history of the internal affairs of France during the hundred years preceding the French Revolution gives repeated evidence that the time for passive service and suffering had passed by early in the century. If it is possible to find in D'Argenson, before 1750, pictures of frequent street risings and to hear the pitiful echo of cries for bread coming from starving men and women, evidently revolution is in the making.<sup>1</sup> The

<sup>1</sup> Rocquain, *L'Esprit révolutionnaire avant la Révolution*, pp. 122, 136, 137.

4th of October, 1789, seems to have been only the most effective of a series of lesser marches of the women and the rabble to government centers. From the early half of the century, there were those to repeat with increasing conviction, "Revolution is certain in this state; it falls to pieces from the very foundations; there is nothing to do but to break away from one's country and to pass under other masters and some other form of government (*forme de jour*)."<sup>2</sup> This spirit of revolt which a neglectful and repressive government excited is the fact of chief moment. The decadent character of the reigns of the Regent and of Louis XV bred that contempt for the selfish government which has aptly been called the "sense of negative equality,"<sup>3</sup> a contempt from which the idea of positive equality took courage to push itself into national institutions. The political and class degeneracy and the consequent social disintegration stand as direct antecedents to a rising demand for a social reordering. The rotting-out of the old institutions of church and state and the misery all this caused, is the accompaniment to the rise of that widespread distrust and rebellion which is the surest spur to the adoption of new principles.

The blind admiration for the state which had so notably characterized the earlier part of the reign of Louis XIV, had dwindled greatly before the old king died. It was all gone by the end of the reign of Louis XV — gone, because dreary tawdriness and grossness had replaced the dazzling splendor which the best years of

<sup>2</sup> D'Argenson. Mémoires.

<sup>3</sup> Martin, Histoire de France. Tome XV, p. 348; see also Rocquain, *op. cit.*, pp. 5-7.



the age of the Grand Monarch had thrown about social institutions.

Political and social decay undoubtedly began in the reign of Louis XIV. Devastating and fruitless wars and a short-sighted internal administration, which is after all what the reign of the Grand Monarch reduces to, had done their work. The strong and, on the whole, beneficent government of Richelieu and Mazarin slowly became an empty pageant resting upon hypocrisy, intolerance and despotism; the glad acclamations of a nation hailing a young monarch who was to lead them to national glory died away in the half-smothered groans of a plundered and neglected commonwealth. Every thoughtful memoir of the times describes the ruthless exploitation and degradation of a nation, tells of a king growing yearly more selfish, fanatical and short-sighted, and of a court going by way of pompous etiquette to an enforced piety and finally to boredom.

Those who followed seemed bent on completing a work of destruction. While other European powers, great and small, awakened to a new sense of duty and the nations surrounding France might almost be said to have suffered from too much care by enlightened despots, who under the guidance of French philosophers reformed everything, France herself bowed under the reign of selfish neglect and exploitation.

Louis XV's reign deepened the growing disdain of every accepted national institution. During that period, Church, state and nobles, to whom the preservation of the national life had been intrusted, were all alike false to their trust. Instead of a dignified church with a

Bossuet to represent it, the eighteenth century knew a rapacious and worldly hierarchy with a Dubois at its head; in place of a stately and powerful monarch, who had at least been the central figure of the national life, the King of France was now one whose life was given to brutish and ignoble dissoluteness, while at his court and under his influence, the gay, luxurious, yet honorable nobility of the previous reign had degenerated into a crowd of courtiers, for the most part profligate, rationalistic and selfish. The result of all this was that king, clergy and nobility had come to merit and to receive a deep and general contempt. As the century progressed, all three reaped the harvest of a growing national discredit.

It is small wonder that the Church was first to rouse disdain and distrust. Religion and its practices are ever nearest men's emotions. Those who stand pledged to preach and teach such practices cannot lead lives entirely at variance with what they preach and maintain their leadership very long. Catholicism stood for simplicity of life and aim, for faith in the revealed truth, for a single and united church. The Gallican Church of the eighteenth century did not really respect any one of these standards. In worldliness, it outdid the degenerate Anglican Church of the same period; it was intolerant, not for spiritual but for temporal reasons; it was rent with internal dissensions. Preaching a broad humanity and the equality of individuals, the heads of the church maintained a glaring inequality of benefice within the church, and, toward the world, an attitude of haughty and despotic superiority. Where could

men find respect in their hearts for prelates, many of whom were notoriously licentious in their lives; most of whom strove more for the church's wealth and power than for the salvation of their own or their parishioners' souls; few of whom gave any real support to the dogmas they were ordained to teach.<sup>4</sup> If worldliness and skepticism had not been sufficient, schism was there too, to play its part in weakening the church's power. The quarrel of the Jesuits and Jansenists, lasting almost one hundred years, gave to the world an exhibition of pettiness, superstition and tyranny scarcely calculated to edify or to keep alive the respect necessary to any church which would control its adherents. It was as much in consequence of these facts as by reason of the growing influence of the new philosophy, that by the end of the century, men all over the country had only contempt or active opposition to offer a degenerate hierarchy. So many proofs of bad organization and corruption had not failed to bring a deserved derision and neglect to the established protectors of religion.

The effect of this newly-aroused feeling was as far-reaching as the influence of the Church had once been wide and real. The effect upon the state, for instance, was important. When faith in the established Church died out, faith in the established government failed too. It was on the authority of the Church that men had accepted the absolute monarchy under which they lived. When the Church that sanctioned it no longer

<sup>4</sup> Compare Taine. *L'Ancien régime*. Vol. I, ch. iv; Rocquain, *op. cit.*, pp. 99 et seq.; Morse-Stephens, *French Revolution*, Vol. I, p. 295 et seq.

commanded respect, the government quickly became in danger of a like fate. The fall of political absolutism followed almost necessarily upon that of spiritual absolutism. And this, not only because the spirit of Bossuet, proclaiming that "Kings are gods and their power is divine," was gone, but because the monarchy which could give any semblance of truth to such a doctrine was also gone. Whatever act of egotism, bigotry, double-dealing or persecution the Gallican Church of the eighteenth century omitted to perform, its protector, the state, seemed bent on doing for it. Men had given a willing allegiance to absolutism when, by a haughty foreign policy and noble protection of letters, it had at least brought fame and glory to France; but they now grew rebellious when the same despotic powers were chiefly used for the ruthless exploitation of a starving nation, in order to satisfy brutish passions or to furnish the means for an ignoble patronage.

Had the state policy of Louis XV been deliberately planned to sow and cultivate the seeds of revolt, it must have been pronounced one of the great successes of modern times. After Fleury's ineffective, if well-intentioned ministry, the function of government seemed to become an organized war on the exercise of free thought, a shameless patronage of rank and privilege. The law courts became so many agencies to spread disaffection, for the criminal and civil laws were merely arbitrary rules pliant to the purse and position of the parties in the quarrel. Men may endure capricious administration of the civil laws; they may for a long time stand the repression of free thought; but



when to these miseries are added an irregular and burdensome tax which puts not only the intellectual life, but the mere physical life as well, in jeopardy, then revolt is not far. Every student of the "revolutionary spirit before the Revolution" agrees that the inequality of the tax-levy and the ill-advised methods of collecting the state revenues did more than any other single line of policy to corrupt and disaffect the nation. The management of the public finance was the crowning folly of a deplorable reign. Louis XV's habit of wasteful and lavish expenditure completed whatever work of alienation the other abuses of the century had begun. A well-known epigram tells how the country which had been bled by one cardinal and purged by another, was now being put on diet by a third. Nature, too, was not kind during the century, and at certain periods, through famine and storm, the misery in many sections of the country was extreme. The shocking falling-off in the population of many districts was, in the time of Louis XV, as much a result of distress as of war.<sup>5</sup> Yet the government itself maintained a continued policy of magnificence and extortion; it supported the clergy and nobles in using their customary right to extort from the people the innumerable duties and tolls which the surviving feudal privileges enabled these upper classes to exact; it urged ruthlessly its own claims to the *taille*, the *gabelle*, the *corvée*, the *aides* and the countless other internal and customs duties. It will be remembered, too, that although the lower classes were in this way made to pay about eighty-two per cent. of the taxes,

<sup>5</sup> Compare Martin, *op. cit.*, Vol. XIV, Bk. lxxxix; D'Argenson, *Mémoires*, pp. 301-306, ed. Barère.



this was not all their trouble. An increasing difficulty of finding employment was added to the heavy burden of paying the tax, and it gradually came to be understood that this decreasing demand for labor was directly traceable to the same government which enforced so heavy a contribution for the support of those it favored and for itself. For, with respect to every kind of industry, Louis XV's government pursued a policy of ill-advised and special legislation. The vicious system of the régime is nowhere better evidenced than in the way it discouraged home manufactures by granting a system of monopolies, sometimes to cities, sometimes to individuals, while it almost destroyed commerce by an extortionate tariff and heavy export duties. Whether by taxes unequally levied between different industries and various districts; whether through state monopoly or private monopolies under state protection, by some kind of legislation in regard to every form of industry, the state was forever beside the individual, impeding his activity and demanding an enormous share of his profit. A tottering government defeated its own ends and made for its own destruction.

In relation to the reign of Louis XVI, a story of good intentions and narrow morality, of ignorance of governmental methods and failure to comprehend the true needs of the situation, is to be set over against the record of a generation beginning to believe that the new ideals might possibly be realized, and growing always more deeply incensed at the vacillating government under which it found itself. To show how Louis XVI added to the ferment of radicalism, it needs not to tell

a tale of selfish living and gross extravagance, all at the expense of a nation becoming rebellious under persecution. The story is now one which describes the pitiful efforts of a well-meaning but weak monarch to make amends for a century of misrule; it must tell how he instituted a policy as uncertain as that of his predecessors — a policy differing, however, in this important point, that it aimed at public wellbeing, even though it ultimately failed to carry out its intentions. Unrest and desire for change came to the definite point of outbreak during the fifteen years that Louis XVI was on the throne of France, more because he filled the nation with the insupportable emotion of hope deferred, than by reason of any great misery or persecution for which his government was responsible.

In the France Louis XVI came to rule, the institutional, not the national life was decaying. The vigorous literature of the century is proof of the nation's intellectual force. The enormous sums which the government managed to extort from the nation prove what, in spite of abuses, its monetary strength must have been, and these sums paid in tax were not the real evidence of the wealth of the country, for the rich bourgeois managed to buy off the farmer-general and the peasants affected poverty in order to evade the demands of his agents. There is plenty to show that, during Louis XVI's reign, men grew fairly prosperous.<sup>6</sup> If the government, aiming to help, had not hindered

<sup>6</sup> See in particular, on this point, Babeau. *Le village sous l'ancien régime*, and *La vie rurale sous l'ancien régime*. Also, Brunetière. *Le Paysan sous l'Ancien Régime*, in *Histoire et Littérature*. Paris, 1893.

instead; if it had adopted and carried out any single policy meeting the more urgent claims for reform, the revolutionary principles might never have been formulated.

The government did no such thing. The king and his advisers acknowledged the need of reforms, but they could not agree upon a settled policy. The administration only succeeded in keeping up an intermittent expectation of better things. At the end of the eighteenth century, discontent with the old régime deepened and finally turned to active agitation for new theories, because the whole legislation of the period in question consisted in taking the burdens from the shoulders of an oppressed people and then putting them on again;<sup>7</sup> because ephemeral and ill-advised efforts at reform, instead of calming the national impatience, only added to the popular agitation.

The story of Turgot's brief effort to do for France that which he had done for Limousin, and how it was frustrated by the queen and the court faction who got the ear of the irresolute king, is the best known example of how those in power taught the nation what might be. But the provincial assemblies, though less often cited, are an example even more noteworthy. These provincial assemblies remain for history the most marked evidence of how Louis and his ministers, aiding in their own overthrow, made positively for the

<sup>7</sup> Comp. Bailly. *Mémoires*, I, p. 42; see, also, Von Holst, *op. cit.*, I, p. 98; De Tocqueville, *L'Ancien Régime et la Révolution*, p. 47 and p. 214. ed. Michel Lévy, 1857; Jobez, *La France sous Louis XVI*, Vol. I, *passim*.

progress of new thought and helped to determine its character.

The king set up in each parish of his kingdom assemblies constituted so as to recognize partially the principle of representation, and intrusted them with measurably-large executive powers. When a monarch does this, he fosters, knowingly or not, the desire for self-government. Moreover, when the government, through such assemblies, permits a fair representation of the nation to apportion the tax, to direct public works and to oversee local affairs, by that act it gives to the people most likely to control the minds of others, the chance to see clearly into the structure and methods of the existing administration. If this be done when government is in severe straits, and is, though against its conscience, forced to adopt an unjust and arbitrary tax system, there follows a national participation in ugly administrative secrets which is, to say the least, undesirable. Through these provincial assemblies, the central government under Louis XVI made just such a revelation of weakness and uncertainty to influential representatives of each class of the nation. Before this policy, like all the rest, was reversed, men had learned that representative local government was not a chimera.<sup>8</sup>

The history of the statutory law during the reign in question show similarly how fees, fines and taxes were remitted and then enforced again; how courts were reorganized and then restored to their old status; how industries and cities were freed from old

<sup>8</sup> On the provincial assemblies, see Lavergne, *Les Assemblées provinciales sous Louis XVI*,



restraints, only shortly after to have them reimposed. But the assemblies are the best example of how Louis the Good educated his people as to what might be, and at the same time showed them what must be for a long time if the old political order continued. The consequence of all this legislative tinkering was the same. Every man who cared to know was convinced by the vacillating law-making that even the government, if it were not afraid of self-destruction, would be willing to pronounce for political liberty, equal justice and a fair and equal tax. The hope of seeing such institutions as should make these principles part of the social life rose high as the weakness and indecision of government grew more apparent, and with that hope, faith grew also in the doctrines that prompted the hope.

This same shilly-shally policy may be said to have had a notable part in making, not merely new principles, but the revolutionary character of the new principles. The letter-patent of December 27, 1788,<sup>9</sup> which arranged the preliminaries of a States-general may almost be said to have made revolutionary acts inevitable. The Third Estate was encouraged to hope that the popular wishes were to be recognized, for it was given double representation; the meeting was called at Versailles, close to that Paris which was known to be in a ferment of radicalism; finally voters in the bailages were instructed to bestow full and sufficient powers upon their representatives, the implication being that their representatives were to undertake a work of legislation. To realize how these provisions made for

<sup>9</sup> Cherest. *La Chute de l'Ancien Régime*. II, p. 241.



revolution, it is only necessary to recall how government weakly left the orders themselves to struggle over the question of representation until the *Serment de Jeu de Paume*<sup>10</sup> settled the controversy of vote par ordre or vote par tête; to remember how well Paris availed itself of the nearness of Versailles, in order finally to force the government to act under its eye and voice, and to recollect how the great bitterness of the struggle between king and Assembly grew out of the king's fixed belief that, letters-patent notwithstanding, states-generals were called together, not to redress administrative abuses, but to devise means for filling a depleted treasury. Because government refused to recognize the logical conclusions of its own rulings, it finally sent the mob to the Bastille in a dream of ending famine and misery by a symbolic demolition of the instrument of tyranny that had stood so long at the city gates. From July 14th, the misunderstanding between the government and the nation was complete. From that time to the end, Louis XVI was the shuttle-cock of contending factions.<sup>11</sup> The

<sup>10</sup> The resolutions are to be found in full in the *Moniteur* for June 20, 1789, or in Bailly, *Mémoires*, Vol. I, p. 190.

<sup>11</sup> It cannot be too often accented how lamentable a picture Louis XVI presents in the light of the events which make up the two years during which the Constituent Assembly met. If it were not so pitiful, the picture would be laughable. It is quite usual to see the Assembly doing as it will, taking from the king all that had been his ancient right, and the sanction of his rule, and then, as on the night of August 4th, hastening to send him by a deputation (see e. g., *Moniteur*, I, p. 293), "its acknowledgments" for what had been done in spite of his wish, and to "congratulate him that he has to command a nation so generous." (See, also, Mirabeau's remarks quoted in Bailly, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 393.) At each point in the making of the new law, Louis' ineffectual efforts

consciousness of utter separation of view, and the spirit of daring necessary to give an extreme character to the new principle, had been successfully awakened by a series of government blunders hard to match in history.

Along with the wearying uncertainty with which Louis XVI's government filled the nation, an outside influence came directly to strengthen into a new faith, the longings which were stirring. Since the revolution of 1688, English individualism, by its thought and by the social institutions it had slowly developed, had gradually come to have an appreciable influence upon many able thinkers of France. The days of the Regency saw men aping the English dress and amusements; the end of the century saw them eager to imitate the more serious practices of their neighbor. The many men of letters whom persecution or desire for travel led to England<sup>12</sup> during the eighteenth century returned enthusiastic, to put before Frenchmen, not merely the social forms, but the political methods, the political theories and the philosophical doctrine they had learned in that foreign atmosphere. English philosophy, as Bacon, Newton, Hobbes and Locke had taught it; English deism, as Shaftesbury, Bolingbroke and Pope were spreading it; English institutions, as the rapidly developing political life of the time showed them,— all these

to block or to change the character of the legislation, his fatal temporizing with all factions, what might be called his painstaking uncertainty, soon left him inevitably shorn of all real power. Less than a year after the meeting of the States-General, the king stood outside the Assembly, "the hostage of the ancient régime in the hands of a nation" (Lamartine, *Histoire des Girondins*, I, p. 17), playing as sorry a rôle of indecision and impotence as it was ever given king to enact.

<sup>12</sup> Comp. Morley. Voltaire, p. 52, ed. 1872.

aspects of English national life deeply impressed men like Montesquieu, Voltaire and Raynal, and through them, the lesser writers of the age. It has been seen how the chief propositions of the English philosophy, the denial of innate ideas and the limitation of all knowledge to that which the senses can affirm, crept into French philosophy as counter-propositions to the dogmas of a theology and philosophy now becoming generally despised. The leading principles of English political philosophy were that very Law of Nature and that theory of Natural Rights which, through the Physiocrats and Rousseau, became so many starting-points for the French political theorists. English civil liberty and English constitutional law gave the jurists or the administrative reformer his cue, when he appealed from the present to a more desirable governmental form.

English civil liberty, English philosophy, English civilization, were then a potent force in shaping revolutionary ideas; but it was an English colony separating from its mother country which, at this later time, acted as direct encouragement to the spread of new principles. The American struggle for independence was, in relation to the revolutionary principles, an important fact of the reign of Louis XVI. American colonial life had been the background for the poetic characters in the French literature of the first part of the century. When the struggle of the English colony for its liberty began, on the basis of a declaration of independence formulated by men whose leading spirit was an ardent disciple of Rousseau, the conflict and what it stood for at once caught the imagination of the French. The interest thus aroused presently influenced

to acts. The imperturbable Franklin was among them to answer with a hopeful "*ça ira*,"<sup>13</sup> the many eager questions as to the probable outcome of a contest which seemed likely to decide the possible application of the new "rights of man." Brave men of their own nation were constantly returning from the scene of the contest to tell, as only allies and converts can, of the new democracy and its successful beginnings. Naturally, what had seemed to be abstract ideas now rapidly took on the appearance of concrete and living facts. The many prefer imitation to invention. The idea of doing what another nation has already done now appealed to liberal men in France, who would have hesitated to enter upon an absolutely new governmental experiment. There seems little doubt that the American war of Independence and the events which followed it had a large share in shaping popular opinion to a definite ideal of government. Because it fed the growing hopes of change and gave to France republican leaders like Lafayette and Lally, because it put a modern democracy before the imagination of men already possessed by an intense admiration for the theory of democracy and the concrete democracy of antiquity, this fight in the name of the right of the governed aided to hurry the nation forward to a concrete expression of revolutionary principles.

One factor in working this change in the national temper, which was to bring about a new theory, needs considerable emphasis. It has been said that all the

<sup>13</sup> Note the story of the De Goncourts concerning Franklin's responsibility for the introduction of the phrase into revolutionary parlance. *La société française pendant la Révolution*, p. 62.



French institutions which stood for the preservation of the national morality and security, falling away from their purpose by reason of weakness or worse, had bred a national distrust and contempt. It has been further explained that the rising national revolt was based upon a new hope, resting upon a new ideal and strengthened by another nation's example, but the exact nature of the medium which was to express this new spirit is yet to be indicated. It is now time to direct the attention to this medium, the so-called *Tiers-Etat* of France, for the new principles would never have taken the character they did assume had they not been the principles of the Third Estate.

## II.

To clear the stage for the agent most active in setting up the new theories of social life, a few preliminary words seem desirable to show why the new ideals could have no effective support from the clergy, the nobles or the peasantry.<sup>14</sup>

The clergy of 1789 could never have led France in a movement to establish any new system. This is true, not only because the religion whose vicars they were, bound them to conserve the old principles. Of itself, this fact

<sup>14</sup> The numerical strength of the Third Estate would not in itself be reason enough. Although the privileged classes scarcely numbered together 300,000, in a population of 26,000,000 (see Taine, note at the end of I, *op. cit.*, ed., Hachette, 1899), with their power, social and economic, they might, other things being equal, have controlled the affairs of the nation. On the other hand, the peasants, though they made the half of the population (Boiteau, *Etat de la France en 1789*), could not compensate by mere numbers for other deficiencies.



might not have been an impediment, for, as has been seen, during the century many of the clergy fell away from any real support of the church creeds and might have been willing to discredit old doctrines. The reason for the unfitness of the class was rather social than theological. Even when touched, as they often were, by the new currents of opinion, the clergy were too much divided among themselves, and the influential part of the class had too much to lose and too little to gain by change to be likely to become effective partisans of the new philosophy. The clergy drew its personnel from all the other classes and thus, in a certain sense, it included in its ranks elements naturally predisposed to innovating doctrines, but the persons radically disposed rarely made their way to positions of influence. The few poor and lowly men who, like Dubois, did rise to high places, lost on the way any democratic leanings they might have had. On the whole, it was the rule to find cures and their aids of bourgeois or peasant extraction; it was the exception to find any but noblesse controlling the affairs of the Church.<sup>15</sup> Following prejudices common to the society at large, the hierarchical distinctions within the caste corresponds to the same dividing lines which made the other three classes in the kingdom.

The clergy was then divided within itself, and this too not only on questions of theory. The interests and

<sup>15</sup> The court power over the Church was such that, of the one hundred and thirty-one archbishops and bishops of France, only five were men of roturier birth, and these five were the poorest of all. See Morse-Stephens, *French Revolution*, I, p. 34, ed. Scribner's Sons, 1886.

sympathies of its influential members bade them wish to preserve the old order; the interests of the lower clergy dictated just the opposite policy. Time had made for increasing the bond between church and state; a system of endowments and emoluments had gradually given the upper clergy much profit and much privilege. The curé, as ruthlessly exploited and as poor in resource as the bourgeois or peasant whose spiritual life he ministered to, might be, and generally was, in accord with his parishioners. But for that very reason he was at odds with the upper clergy and the court party. Radicalism might then have a following in the Church;<sup>16</sup> the most radical principles of the century might come as they did, from the curés who dwelt in distant corners of the nation; but, as a class, no strong movement could be expected from the clergy. Bound to conservatism by its most deeply-rooted prejudices, disagreeing within itself upon social questions, the clerical class as a whole, democratic though much of it was, could hardly be expected to make an effective fight for radical innovations.

The nobility was not, like the clergy, a class divided within itself. In a general way, something like harmony may be said to have obtained among the nobles. In the first place, the very nature of the class argued for some solidarity; its origin and prejudices made for a predominating unity of opinion within its ranks. While the clergy might increase by appointment or voluntary association, nobility came with birth only. A

<sup>16</sup> As final evidence of this radical drift among the clergy, it is only necessary to refer to the so-called "insurrection of the curés."

man might come into the class from one of the others by patent-right but, until two generations of such nobility were behind him, he was only "petite noblesse."

The order, deriving its status from the feudal system, was a land-owning class and a permanent class, since it only recognized as qualified members of itself those whose claims to enter the class rested upon heredity. A sense of perfect equality thus held among the persons of this class, an equality shaded only by difference of occupation; noblesse d'épée, noblesse de robe, court or provincial noblesse,—no matter the particular interest, any member of the order was a noble first of all. The class stood stoutly together, supporting unanimously a special code of morals and manners, a particular privilege of culture for mere culture's sake, and a general right to as much as possible of the joys of life and as little as might be of its cares.

But unity of opinion, while it is a formidable force, is not enough in itself to make the nucleus of a political party with strength sufficient to forward new opinions. Among the class in question there was a certain concensus of opinion, but there was nothing beside, that was of practical value for leadership. From the twelfth century the nobility had been steadily losing any real political power, and at the time under discussion, the class was without any but a self-seeking interest in politics.<sup>17</sup> Louis XIV had given the final blow to any political control the nobles had managed to have up to that time, and now, under Louis XVI they no longer

<sup>17</sup> Thierry. *Essai sur la formation et le progrès du Tiers-Etat.* ed. Furne, 1868, p. 103.

took any real part in the affairs of the government.<sup>18</sup> The second estate might direct the armies<sup>19</sup> and take a certain share in the counsels of the king; but the entire administration of the national life, that is, the real control of the government, had passed into other hands. As a class these "gentilhommes" of the nation lived in a more or less unavoidable leisure, pleasure-seeking or somewhat superficially literary if at the capital,<sup>20</sup> restless and useless if in the provinces.<sup>21</sup> The dazzle of privilege which the noblesse still enjoyed to the full blinded them to their loss of power, though it was clear to any dispassionate observer that this power was passing away, both actually and in men's minds. The class was growing poorer too, because, beyond the product of their lands, they had no means of adding to their incomes; their prejudices shut them out from the commerce that was making the bourgeois wealthy; the same prejudice forbade intermarriage, the only remaining expedient by which the one class could have profited by the gains of the other. On the other hand, the growing wealth of the bourgeoisie constrained the nobles to an ill-afforded expenditure in order to maintain that

<sup>18</sup> Comp. Taine, *Les Origines de la France contemporaine*, p. 99 et seq.; also pp. 175 et seq. Elsewhere he says they were "aussi étrangers aux affaires de France qu'à celles du Japon." ed. Hachette, 1899.

<sup>19</sup> Comp. De Tocqueville. "En apparence la tête d'une armée, en réalité un corps d'officiers sans soldats." *L'Ancien Régime et la Révolution*. ed. Michel Levy, 1857, p. 334.

<sup>20</sup> Taine, *op. cit.* ed. Hachette, 1880, I, p. 366, says that philosophize for the sake of philosophy, not for its application to reality. Comp. De Tocqueville, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 103-105.

<sup>21</sup> Arthur Young. *Travels in France*. ed. George Bell & Sons, 1890, p. 70.



prestige for elegance and splendor which had always belonged to their class. To escape the debt this expenditure involved, the nobles were driven to draw heavily on their only source of revenue. To swell their income they used their privileges, and the unscrupulous exercise of this right of privilege did, perhaps, more than anything else to discredit the nobility in the eyes of the masses.<sup>22</sup> Some one has well said that a true aristocracy rests on wealth, knowledge and birth. Of these three elements, the nobility of France could, at the end of the eighteenth century, claim only birth to justify its privilege; to offset this one positive qualification, it had a dozen negative attributes springing from the many small vices and mistaken notions which the tenets of their rank had made class characteristics.

It is not then surprising to find that, at the close of the century, the noblesse was a caste holding to glamour without substance; a caste whose opinions make for a reactionary policy or at best a strong conservatism. The exigencies of the life of the noble rarely brought him into contact with his tenants, and he was, therefore, usually entirely ignorant concerning the condition of the mass of the nation. The new literary movement of the day seemed to the members of this doomed class, subject for an amused patronage or polite ridicule; they appear to have had little idea that it was really a menace to the advantages which they, as a class, enjoyed. Between pride and prejudice, frivolity and harshness, the class as a whole aided blindly in its own ruin. All

<sup>22</sup> See De Tocqueville, art. on "France before the Revolution," in "Memoires and Remains," ed. 1862. Comp. also Taine, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 416-418, ed. 1880.



its history developed a certain solidarity among the noblesse, but a solidarity making for a class separatism that argued strongly against the class, as such, taking any active share in a national effort for the adoption of new principles.

As to the peasant and artisan class, those whom later terminology calls the Fourth Estate, their condition, as much as that of the clergy and nobility, precluded them from any initiative part in rebellion. But, while in the clergy, disorganization, and in the noblesse, conservatism, each made for opinion only weakly leaning toward revolutionary principles, it might rather be said that the peasant could not father revolutionary ideas, because, as a class, he had scarcely come to have any idea. The peasant was rather "the inert mass on which those who made the Revolution worked."<sup>23</sup> Although the agricultural classes often had real enough grounds for actively seconding the movement which others started, they rarely did it from any reasoned motive. It seems certain that the tendency has been to overestimate the misery of the whole peasantry, because of the undoubted oppression of certain sections of the country,<sup>24</sup> but the degradation of the class was in any

<sup>23</sup> Belloc. *Life of Danton*, p. 18, ed. Charles Scribner's Sons, 1899.

<sup>24</sup> *Comp. on peasant, proving his misery*, Taine, *op. cit.*, II, bk. v, ed. 1899; on the exaggeration of this misery, see Babeau, *Le Village sous l'ancien Régime*; and *La vie rurale dans l'ancienne France*, by the same author; also, Brunetière. *Le Paysan sous L'Ancien Régime*, in *Histoire et Littérature*. Arthur Young gives suggestions for both sides; Dr. Rigby's *Letters* paint a rural prosperity, which is very far from the current notion concerning the condition of the peasant under the old régime.

case bad enough. As has been said, many among the people were reduced to a pitiable and often vicious condition, by reason of the tax system, the neglect and harshness of the land-holders and the wretched pittance they could earn. In 1789 the peasant was, at best, entirely ignorant and superstitious and completely incapable of political action; in many sections of the country his highly inflammable temperament made him ready to adopt any theory which seemed to promise change. Frequently, too, the social depravity, reaching down to the bottom, had changed the tiller of the soil to brigand, contraband or beggar; and this mere brute force, to which circumstances were adding daily, stood ready to combine with any movement which promised a way to bread and immunity from an annoying surveillance.<sup>25</sup> Those of the agricultural class, and they were not a few, who already possessed the small holdings which have so often mistakenly been accredited entirely to the Revolution, caught most readily at the new philosophy.<sup>26</sup> The more fortunate peasant was, perhaps, most ready to rebel, because the new principle of revolution promised to free him from the noble who menaced crops, profits, labor-time and even the very consumption of the small living which might finally be left to him. However, as a class, neither outcast nor well-to-do peasant had any defined principles on the basis of which he rebelled. The peasantry then, along with the artisans,<sup>27</sup> had come to active discontent, but

<sup>25</sup> Taine, *op. cit.*, II, bk. v.

<sup>26</sup> De Tocqueville, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

<sup>27</sup> The artisans were a comparatively small part of the nation, and, Paris and Lyons possibly excepted, held a position so little different from that of the peasant that they can safely be classed with them.

the class had only a partial comprehension of the political movement; it represents an accented readiness for the harshest and swiftest methods of change.<sup>28</sup> The peasant felt instinctively ready to join a radical movement whenever it might be set going, but his training and character did not fit him to reason or to lead. Only at the last the "people" learned the principles for which they revolted; those principles the Third Estate taught them.

At the period in question, the Third Estate<sup>29</sup> had grown to the position necessary to insure leadership, both because of certain native traits and because certain social prejudices existing prior to 1789 became at that later time the special means for rousing these native tendencies and driving them to expression. The Third Estate seems always to have developed along lines which were to make it the direct instrument for the formulation of a new social theory. It is not too much to say that the Principles of the Revolution are practically the expression of the traditional ideals and aspirations of the Third Estate of France.

The whole history of France after the twelfth century shows the class making a persistent effort for political supremacy,<sup>30</sup> making this effort, too, on the basis of theories which ran counter to those accepted by the government under which they lived. Always, the class

<sup>28</sup> Belloc, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-22.

<sup>29</sup> There is no special work on the Third Estate known to the writer, except Thierry's *Essai sur la formation et progrès du Tiers-Etat*. All the larger histories have much matter, however, bearing upon the subject.

<sup>30</sup> Thierry, *op. cit.*, ch. iii and iv.

seems to have been the radical element of the nation. From its earliest appearance in French history, the Third Estate was an active influence for change; as an order, it strove insistently for the right of self-government. Sagely supporting the king against the nobles, it grew in strength and power.<sup>31</sup> It first becomes distinct as a class after the feudal régime is well developed. It is then that we first hear the burghers rising against the two forms of despotism which feudalism had created, the domain rule of the nobility and the parish rule of the clergy. By the twelfth century, the monarchical power had so united itself with these hardy advocates of personal liberty and the rights of industry that the king was thus enabled to control the nobles. It was not long before the burghers had managed to win bourgeois rights, and so to shift the worst inequalities of the feudal régime to the serf or peasant class.<sup>32</sup> Bourgeois rights at first included the population of privileged cities only, but soon such rights came to apply to all the inhabitants of villages and communes who had civil rights.<sup>33</sup> Thus the class gained strength by addition of numbers, and from this time grows to be numerically the largest of the three upper classes. During the next two centuries, the Third Estate seems always to have had a definite purpose in its struggle for self-assertion; it asks always for change in the direction

<sup>31</sup> De Tocqueville, *op. cit.*, p. 106.

<sup>32</sup> Thierry, *op. cit.*, pp. 36, 37.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.* p. 46. \* \* \* Thus the contention of Boiteau (*Etat de la France en 1789*, p. 225), and the socialists, who claim that the Third Estate and the Bourgeoisie are not the same thing, hardly seems supported by fact.



of larger individual liberty and greater national unity. At times mere class spirit, such as controlled their acts in the States-General of 1484, prompts their demands. Again, the reforms the class asks for, as for instance when Etienne Marcel, Jean de Troyes or Michel de l'Hopital represented them, are actuated by humanitarian and wide-reaching motives. In every period, however, whether they strove for the aggrandizement of their own order only or for the general welfare, the Third Estate is always a class active for innovation.

Likewise it rapidly shows itself to be a class striving for political, intellectual and social precedence. When Louis XII established parlement; when succeeding kings encouraged commerce, so that as industrial life broadened, the merchant was added to the craftsman to be again supplemented by the financier and the farmer-general; when religious wars broke down other social distinctions for a time, and the Renaissance created a world of letters where there were no classes, the bourgeoisie seized upon each of these events as entering wedges for their own advancement. Judicial power and financial power, the two kinds of influence which after all count most in determining the character of the modern nation, soon came to be entirely the possession of the Third Estate.<sup>34</sup> The Cahier of the States-General last (1614) preceding that of 1789, bears evidence to the growing jealousy of the noblesse who begin to perceive this rising power of the Third Estate.

After the discontinuance of the States-General, the corporate political power of the bourgeoisie narrows to

<sup>34</sup> Thierry, *op. cit.*, p. 106.



such social control as it can exert through parlement, yet the class continues to grow as a vigorous social force. By the end of the sixteenth century, promotion or purchase had won for the bourgeoisie the highest administrative posts in the kingdom. Saint Simon called the reign of Louis XIV a reign of low bourgeoisie, (“*règne de vile bourgeoisie*”) so great did he conceive the influence of the class to be at that time. The class strove for education, and from among its numbers came the best writers of the age of Louis XIV; but most often knowledge, too, was sought as a means to social power. Just as to-day, so after the sixteenth century, sons of the poorer bourgeoisie might be seen crowding to the universities, eagerly striving for the degree these gave, not so much for the love of learning as for the economic or social position it might bring.<sup>35</sup> Thus, whatever they undertook, whether the law, the industrial life or that purely intellectual, the bourgeoisie sought to make it a means to political power.

It remains to describe, in a few words, the position of the class from the reign of Louis XIV up to the time of the Revolution. Most of the social innovations of the seventeenth century, whether in religion, in art, in letters or in industry, were begun or, at any rate, most warmly supported by the bourgeoisie. It was they who fathered and fostered Jansenism, a doctrine stimulating to reconstruction by its very narrowness. Descartes, Pascal, Corneille — in brief, all the great names among the literary celebrities at the end of the seventeenth century, excepting only La Rochefoucauld and

<sup>35</sup> Thierry, p. 107.

Madame de Sévigny, belonged to the middle class. Nearly every financial enterprise had a bourgeois for its sponsor; and the commerce and manufacture of the country was practically in their hands, except, perhaps, during the Regency, when the financial successes made possible for a time by Law's schemes, drew noble, bourgeois and serving-man alike into the vortex of speculation. When the centralization of the administrative government had reached its height, when Law could write that "this kingdom is governed by thirty intendants: \* \* \* on whom depend the happiness or discomfort of these provinces, their abundance or their sterility,"<sup>36</sup> it is interesting to remember that these intendants were almost all of the bourgeoisie.<sup>37</sup>

However, during the first half of the eighteenth century, the mass of the Third Estate had dropped into a stolid indifference with regard to their political rights. Only parlement and Jansenism express in deeds the old-time objection of the class to absolutism. The philosophers are a small circle within the order — a circle dreaming of a well-ordered logical sort of government, where all men should come to a bourgeois level. Throughout the century, the class grows rich;<sup>38</sup> up to the Revolution it continues to hold the majority of places, but it contents itself with administrative power, and for eighty years consents to purchase its rights,—

<sup>36</sup> Lavergne. *Les Assemblées provinciales sous Louis XIV.*, p. 5.

<sup>37</sup> The same held true as well fifty years later as at the beginning of the century. The governors were nobles, but all the power and political prestige belonged to the Intendants. *Comp. Taine, op. cit.*, I, p. 100 et seq., ed. 1899.

<sup>38</sup> *Taine, op. cit.*, I, pp. 402-404, ed.

such, for example, as its municipal rights,—over and over again from each successive sovereign.<sup>39</sup> As a class the Tiers-Etat seems absorbed in acquiring wealth or in striving after place in the government or among the petty noblesse.

The result of this ambition was a rise of the class in place and prestige. The actual power of the Third Estate grew to be undoubted; its pride grew likewise; but certain social conditions, which must of necessity chafe that pride, did not change. The manners of a régime are possibly a small thing; but when men have wealth and influence, when they have the judicial and administrative control of the nation, when they are as cultured as any class in the kingdom,<sup>40</sup> a social code, which refuses to recognize their true position, is a serious irritant. An “etiquette as rigorous as a religion”<sup>41</sup> shut the bourgeoisie from equality with the noble and clergy. The petty and purely arbitrary character of the barrier which kept the Third Estate subordinate, made the distinction the less endurable. If the bourgeoisie became eager for change and the chief factor in revolution, it is not too much to say that the fact that government continued to countenance and justify the arbitrary and humiliating distinctions of this social code gave much of the impetus necessary to drive the class to such a position. The bourgeoisie were undoubtedly irritated by the instability and uncertainty of the tax; but their prosperity was great, and they might

<sup>39</sup> Thierry, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

<sup>40</sup> Von Holst puts it well. “Differences of rank continue to be embroidered on coats, but they more and more cease to be engraved on the thought and feeling.” *op. cit.*, I, p. 57.

<sup>41</sup> Belloc. *Life of Danton*, p. 16, ed. 1899.

have stood the tinkering with the tax system for a longer time had the government shown any disposition to recognize their social position. The logic of Rousseau and the Physiocrats gave the last spur to pride already stung past endurance by regulations which prohibited men of brains and wealth from being army officers, church prelates or provincial governors. The Third Estate rose to ask for abolition of privilege and liberty of thought, because government refused to recognize any laws which would change the distasteful situation.

To sum up this brief estimate of the relation of the Third Estate to the revolutionary principles. The revolutionary spirit of the bourgeoisie drew much inspiration from a fierce impatience of the slights put upon them by and in the name of the nobility. It was the outraged pride thus aroused which strengthened the rising contempt for an ineffective government and finally made the bourgeoisie the spokesmen for the new doctrines of the philosophers. Social conditions now argued for the desirability of principles which, in a less pressing time, might have seemed to most of the class mere abstract reasoning. When, by the latter part of the eighteenth century, a certain amount of prosperity had made the hatred of meaningless class distinctions sufficiently pronounced; when impatience with the uncertain and heavy tax system stirred once more the desire for the old right to a part in adjusting the tax levy, then, and not until then, the new philosophy which innovators of the class had been eagerly preaching, came to be the voice of the class itself. The eighteenth century principles which a section



of the Third Estate had fathered were then sifted out and adopted by the whole Third Estate. The republics of Sparta and Rome and the new social and political philosophy of their own land took on new and formerly undreamed of possibilities when men began to feel keenly the cramping character of the institutions under which they lived. Principles of reform which chamber politicians had formulated were now enthusiastically embraced, because the instincts and present interests of the whole class fell into line with those principles. It was — and the contradiction is by no means a unique one in history — because the Third Estate aimed at social and political supremacy that they became converts to and partisans of theories which held that no man had special rights to such social supremacy. A class rousing with renewed vigor to strive for its political liberty, was now ready to make a supreme struggle to gain the goal toward which it had always been instinctively aiming.

### III.

Before they can become the positive rules for the conduct of a given society, new principles must have more than a hope to ground on, a bitter grievance as motive and a social class to stand sponsor for them. To give the doctrines which they have adopted an effective political form, it is necessary that the class which supports these new doctrines should find means to concentrate and organize their ideas, and should have been able to win emotional support from an effective part of the nation. The principles of the Revolution found the necessary concentration, organization and popularization in the



conditions of Paris life and thought. A brief sketch of the more important social influences in the capital of France must then be added to the tale of the various influences which made for the realization of the new radical doctrine.

It may or may not be true that, as Arthur Young asserted,<sup>42</sup> Paris was the head and front of the revolutionary movement even in 1789. It is, however, undoubted that Paris made the Revolution of '93.<sup>43</sup> Paris, with its many and interesting aspects of social life, furnished the final arguments that did away with hesitating opinions. In the great metropolis, already the center of European art and manners, men found the courage which comes from a sense of convictions shared. The various phases of social life which the city included, were so many agencies cooperating to create that consensus of opinion which, organized finally into the turbulent sections of '93, brought a new ethical and political system into France. The salons, the clubs, the cafés of Paris, the theaters, the newspapers, the very streets, became so many mediums for that association between man and man, by which exchange of ideas gives to each one a new certainty as to the soundness of his own theories or brings wavering minds into the camp of strong conviction.

So much has been written concerning the French salons that they need little more than mention. For a century or more the salons had been the "talent factories" of the intellectual world of France. To the

<sup>42</sup> Arthur Young, *op. cit.*, p. 229.

<sup>43</sup> *Comp. Cherest. La Chute de l'ancien Régime, 1.*

salons of the eighteenth century men had brought their new ideas for discussion, for criticism or for applause; in the salons of that age along with flirtation or worse, the broadest thinking and the most brilliant literature of the century had found expression. But the salons in 1789, while presenting, like their predecessors, the same general character of gilded chambers and cultured women, were none the less intrinsically different; the salons of '89 had become consciously political. Canons of literary art, questions of abstract right and wrong, were put aside, and debate now turned eagerly on the possibilities of a social reorganization on the basis of certain principles.

This political character of the salons of 1789 is easily recognizable when the leading drawing-rooms of the day are recalled.<sup>44</sup> If one passes by such reunions as those at Madame de Chambras or Madame de Sabran, where the reactionaries gathered, and puts aside the salons of Madame Necker, where conservatism tried to keep alive after conservatism had become impossible, then it is not only politics but radical politics which hold the floor in all the other prominent salons. In the rooms of Madame de Beauharnais, Madame Helvétius, Madame de Genlis, Madame Talma or Mlle. de Méricourt, each hostess had in her own way taken eagerly to politics and to the notion of the Revolution, and the deputies and their satellites, who were to be the active instruments in the formulation of the principles of revolution, found a welcome at one or the other of

<sup>44</sup> De Goncourt. *Histoire de la Société française pendant la Révolution*, pp. 10-12; pp. 13-14.

these drawing-rooms. Talent and originality frequented Madame de Beauharnais; opportunists and demagogues found the rooms of that "*bavarde de la morale*," Madame de Genlis most to their liking; the "artistic" politician went to Madame Talma's quaint room, and the bohemians all took a turn at Mlle. de Méricourt's. But no matter which lady was favored, the talk at any one of these salons was politics; in all cases the result was to feed high the new hope and to increase the certainty that the old institutions must give way to a new era.

Thus in a certain way, the salons all served an important purpose; they emphasized the drift of opinion and helped to concentrate it. A place where men can air their beliefs, and, by force of defense of them, grow strong in them at the same time that they convince others, is no mean aid to the spread of the new doctrine; and the salons of '89 were just that sort of aid. A visitor was never more interesting in a Parisian drawing-room of that time than when recounting the most recent occurrences in the Assembly or telling of the probable program for the morrow. The talk turned on little else. To be the lion of one of these drawing-rooms it needed only to be able to set forth in good style the Rights of Man and the wrongs of the French nation. When it is remembered that it became quite customary for young men to recite to an eager and admiring circle the motion or speech which they were to give in the Assembly the next day, it is easily credible that some of these gatherings really were "the nucleus of the national assembly, the nucleus whence came the

germs which, made fruitful by public opinion, have produced liberty."<sup>45</sup> Everything goes to prove that the salons were an important factor in kindling enthusiasm for new doctrines and winning allegiance to them.

The clubs of Paris were not, like the salons, an old and recognized institution of social life; they may fairly be said to have been born of the new philosophy. Not until late in the century, when a new sense of interest in practical political problems caught and held them, did Frenchmen begin to draw together in small coteries for the discussion of such problems. Even in their origin the clubs were an expression of the new spirit. In the beginning the existing ordinances forced those who desired to gather together to discuss political problems, to put on the appearance of groups of persons assembling in reading-rooms or attending purely philosophical or literary gatherings in private homes. Soon all over the country there were such reunions, ostensibly social, but in reality political or revolutionary to a greater or less degree.<sup>46</sup>

These clubs gave a new and vigorous impulse to the revolutionary movement. On the one hand they served as training-schools for political leaders, who up to that time had been unaccustomed to anything but academic oratory; on the other, they were the means by which

<sup>45</sup> "L'œuf de l'assemblée nationale, l'œuf d'où sont sortis les germes qui, fécondés par l'opinion publique, ont produit les fruits de la liberté." (De Goncourt, *op. cit.*, p. 12.)

<sup>46</sup> *Comp. De Goncourt, op. cit.*, p. 15; *Bailly, op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 10; *Michelet, Histoire de la Révolution française*, II, p. 248.



these leaders were finally able to play upon the discontent of the Paris masses and turn it to account.

To get convincing evidence of how the clubs gave the leaders of the Revolution not only their first lessons in politics but their final opinions as well, it needs only to turn over the reports of the greatest society of them all, the reports of the Jacobin Club.<sup>47</sup> The gradual alteration in the character of the speeches which were given there, evidences strikingly the development which took place among the speakers. The "conferences" change from philosophic exposition of the Rights of Man and of the Social Contract and become well-rounded political orations or fiery outbursts of specious mob oratory. And this club represents the true center where the revolutionary principles developed. For what though the Feuillants, the Cordeliers and the Cercle Social were each in a way forceful, they were the extremes; the center and sum of the revolutionary theory was at the Jacobin Club. From the Jacobins came the protesting voice which swept away old forms and the convincing principles which guided them to new; it was the Jacobin Society which provided the arm that reached out to crush all impediment to change. The history of the Jacobin Society is the history of the Revolution in miniature — the history of the Revolution in its most interesting, that is, its intellectual aspect. The story of this club is, in short, the last page in the history of the revolutionary principles. The chronicle of the Jacobin Club tells of

<sup>47</sup> The most inclusive work on the Jacobins known to the author is Aulard's *La Société des Jacobins*. Paris, 1889-1898. 6 vols.



men slowly gaining positive ideas by virtue of long nightly debates, of men gradually finding at the club the capacity to move others, and then going out to become the leaders in a parliamentary struggle for the ideas they had acquired. When the speeches at the Jacobins' for any given time are set alongside those of the parliamentary records for the same time, an interesting fact becomes clear. What the leaders said in the assemblies they had usually repeated at the Jacobin Club. It was then, as they became sure of the support of the hundreds who each night crowded the large library of the Jacobin monastery in the little rue Saint-Hyacinthe, that the leaders of the Revolution developed the daring and force which changed them from social reformers to busy politicians. From this gray store-room of the recorded thought of men, now changed to an auditorium, daily growing more and more tumultuous, a new thought-life was sent vibrating through France.

When it is question of the clubs as to the means to get the ear of the masses, the Jacobins shares the honors with the Cordeliers and the Cercle Social. At the Jacobins, Mirabeau, Barnave, Vergniaud, Robespierre, came one after the other "to lead men by the ears," but all the clubs did a conspicuous work of propaganda. Nightly, at the Cordelier, Danton's voice rang out, driving home a new patriotism and a new courage to the heart and brain of every small workman and fiery student who heard him. Nightly, Claude Fauchet preached Rousseau or communism to hysterical men and women at the Cercle Social, and fostered that extreme wing of revolution which culminated in Babouvism. Besides

-serving as a means to define the politician's point of view, the clubs were then so many means to spread discontent and a new creed among the already alienated lower classes. At the clubs, the Paris masses added the will to do, to their recently acquired will to think for themselves.

Perhaps no one of these clubs made for revolution as directly as did the "Club des Enragés," the name often given to the gatherings at the Palais Royal. If the more organized societies fed the will to do, the hand to strike for the new principles was found at the Club des Enragés. Here Camille Desmoulins and his friends won the cooperation of all that was disaffected in Paris; here, when revolt began, those whom famine had nearly maddened or the weak municipality had stupidly incensed, the hungry, the vicious, the resentful, all empty-pocketed and burning with mere physical smart, heard a story to their liking. No fee or form of enrolment kept this most factious part of the city population from loitering in and listening with uproarious approval as men, mounted on chairs, criticised the acts of the king and the Assembly, laughed at the new mayor or decried Lafayette. Most unclub-like of clubs, this was the strongest agent for inoculating the masses with ideas of democracy — or ochlocracy; and it was here that a power was roused which presently became a driving-force for the leaders themselves.

The Club des Enragés is a composite which, when analyzed, resolves into a number of cafés fronting on a large and beautiful court. Each of these cafés by itself, along with many others scattered about the big

city, came conspicuously into the foreground as a debating place, where revolutionary principles were knocked about in a tempest of opinion.

The cafés were an influence more directly emotional than either salon or club proper, yet emphatically an influence aiding the selection and organization of the new theories. At all times during the past two hundred years or more, the café has been the chief loitering-place in France. Here, in ordinary times, as they sip their coffee or stronger drink, chat with an acquaintance or watch the street life drifting past them, Frenchmen catch the current social idea, and thus modify and make socially effective their individual opinions. In 1789, the social idea was everywhere asking for a hearing with an insistence which gave it a marked determinative force. In face of the swelling revolt, the café of 1789 changed its whole character in a brief period.

The swift transformation of the café from a peaceable loitering-place to a more or less strongly organized party stronghold is one of the entertaining stories of the Revolution. How the cafés had been severely supervised up to 1789, so that no political discussions were permitted in them, is as well known as the way in which, when that surveillance ceased during Necker's administration, these same cafés became "public schools of democracy and insurrection."<sup>48</sup> The non-partisan café was not even tolerated, as the few learned who, in these troublous times, sought, at the Café Flore, a place where they might peaceably have no opinions;

<sup>48</sup> Sallier. *Annales françaises*, p. 241. Quoted in Cherest, *op. cit.*, Vol, II, p. 218,

they soon found themselves forced to take a share in public affairs or to disband.<sup>49</sup> The café, as an element of social life, made way for the café become the most lively exponent of the political situation.

In the clubs, the debate centered about principles of ethics and government; in the cafés, the fight had rather to do with small differences of opinion and the relative merit of party leaders. One pictures the applause as the habitués of these cafés heard their own sentiments voiced by the orators who were regularly established at most of them. It is easy to guess how the audience got new courage for their convictions, as they listened to the stimulating speakers mounted on table-tops; how their opinions strengthened as they aided to draw up hastily improvised resolutions, and how some must have learned what they were fighting for, as they danced about the nightly bonfires which kept their enthusiasm at gala-day pitch. The daily challenges which the five o'clock "deliberative clubs" sent from Zoppi's or the Café des Arts, the Café du Bourbon or the Café de Mirabeau (Tonneau), the money summarily collected from the frequenters of these places and sent to the militia for arms, were each in a way so many indications of a newly-born idea of concerted action in order to the political end. The hot debates, the bluster and stir which made the Café de Foy,<sup>50</sup> the portico of the Revolution, the very center of sedition and uproar, where old institutions were satirized and reforms tumultuously advocated, are for the present

<sup>49</sup> De Goncourt, *op. cit.*, pp. 207-209.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid*, p. 202.



study less a picture of daily collision between royalist and republican than a scene which evidences the growth of strong political feeling and a final boiling-over of discontent. It seems impossible to overestimate the part of the café in the work of disseminating the new opinion by way of shouting it, while at the same time ridiculing the old.

A word here with regard to the theaters, whose influence was of a kind similar to that of the cafés. It is a fact old in the history of changes in national thought, that the play's the thing, by which to spread the contagion of a new idea and nurse a young enthusiasm to the point of action. In 1789, as at any time in French history, the Paris playhouse did its full share in voicing public opinion and playing upon the emotions of the masses. From the time that "*Figaro*,"<sup>51</sup> after four years of struggle with censorship, set Paris covertly mocking at the old régime and the inconsistencies it presented between men's thoughts and acts, the stage was used more and more boldly to scout the tottering system. When it is recalled that, of the thirty-five theaters which nightly during the Revolution opened their doors to Parisians of all classes, only four were royalists, it is not hard to guess the direction which the opinions of the theater-goers were likely to take. How "*Charles IX*"<sup>52</sup> set the example for countless "*pièces de circonstances*" of less literary value, but perhaps as much immediate influence, is a bit

<sup>51</sup> First produced in 1784.

<sup>52</sup> M. J. Chenier; produced first on November 4, 1789. The De Goncourts call it "*le drapeau de la Révolution*." Cf., *op. cit.*, pp. 48-53.



of history which always goes along with the description of how these plays taught lessons of patriotism and hatred of tyranny and roused or gratified the passions of the day. As the clubs and political bodies came to a clearer understanding of what they were working for, the stage took up their opinions, and by means of the brilliant costumes and stirring events of a past or present time, put club harangues into a poetic form which sent the ideas these advocated, no longer to the intellects of the hearers, but directly to their hearts. The drama's share in giving form to the revolutionary principles is then by no means to be forgotten.

The newspapers of the time took a conspicuous part in the work of propaganda. The average man reads for one or both of two reasons; he either seeks to find his opinions, put definitely and in a way he himself is incapable of putting them, or he wants to feel a sense of comradeship in his ideas. If, then, in a time of revolt, there is a greedy grasping for daily literature of a radical kind, it is because men are become eager to see their own longings for change worded by those who are less voiceless than they, or because they are keen to know how much and how widely their half-confessed iconoclastic ideas are the general opinion. Similarly, when certain temperaments are possessed by a new ideal which they desire to make current, they find putting it into a brief and popular form the easiest and most suggestive means for spreading such an ideal. The newspaper and pamphlet are then likely to be most prolific and the best indication of public feeling in times of social storm and stress; the remarkable popu-

larity of the newspaper as well as the countless number published during the revolutionary period seems thus to be accounted for.

As facts of practical life, the French newspaper and the notion of democracy came to France at about the same time.<sup>53</sup> The French journal came full grown to an eager public. By this novel means, clever men, most of whom posited democracy as the prerequisite to any successful social life, ably joined, in the preaching and teaching of the new theories. At any period of its history, nothing more partisan than the French newspaper can be conceived of, and the pioneers of '89 were the hardest partisans of their race. It is easy to imagine how flagging sympathies must have been stirred to energetic alliance by the feverish calls to liberty and equality which the "Révolutions de France et de Brabant," the "Révolutions de Paris," "L'Ami de Peuple," "Père Duchesne," and the dozen similar publications sent out daily to a listening Paris. The small circulation and uncertain existence of the court papers, such as the "Actes des Apôtres" or the "Apocalypse" leave little doubt that early in the struggle, majority opinion in Paris had gone over to the notion of revolt. History, telling of the eagerness with which these daily publications were bought and read, and of the sacrifices which men and women made in order to buy them, proves the increasing popularity of the democracy they preached and the extending reach of their influence. It is clear enough that the journals swiftly became "the

<sup>53</sup> De Goncourt, *op. cit.*, p. 252. "Fils de '89, le journal n'a pas d'enfance." Comp. also, Blanc. *La Révolution Française*, III, p. 115.

cry of war, the provocation, the attack, the defense; the national assembly where everyone speaks and replies, and which furnishes the theme of the other national assembly; \* \* \* tribune of paper, more listened to, more ringing, more reigning, than the tribune where Mirabeau apostrophized or Maury replied."<sup>54</sup>

The influence of the pamphlet fell short of that of the newspaper in so far as the public who reads long articles is made up of fewer persons than that which reads publications more brief and abstract in tenor. The sudden appearance of the astonishing number of pamphlets has been called "a particular crisis in the midst of a general crisis."<sup>55</sup> Men still marvel at the enormous output of pamphletary literature,<sup>56</sup> and, turning over the five thousand and more specimens of them, which remain to represent this type of revolutionary writings, they marvel also at the unanimity of opinion, the boldness and simplicity of idea which characterizes most of them. Usually the pamphlet was the voice of the noblemen or clergymen, who represented the revolutionary minority in the upper classes. The most moderate asked for immediate and complete abolition of many social abuses; the radical sort asked for an entire alteration in social organization.

The brochures most frequently read were popular expositions of the ideas of the eighteenth century phil-

<sup>54</sup> De Goncourt, *op. cit.*, chap. x, p. 252.

<sup>55</sup> Cherest, *op. cit.*, II, p. 248.

<sup>56</sup> The publication of the pamphlets began with the call for the Assembly of the Notables; in the last month of 1788 there were 2,500 collected. For a good study of pamphlets, with regard to the theory they contain, see Lichtenberger, *Le Socialisme et La Révolution Française*, pp. 31-54.

osophers, with additional suggestions, as how to apply those ideas directly to existing conditions. In a word, the pamphlets were the final literary presentation of those principles which the thought of the century had developed.

Some of these pamphlets taught to the masses what the "Contrat Social" had taught their leaders. Whoever reads the bold demand for the rights of the Third Estate framed in the pamphlet, whose very title "What is the Third Estate?" ("Qu'est ce que le Tiers-Etat?") stirred a long-forgotten question, reads Rousseau, as well as Sièyes. The cool assertion of the rights of the Third Estate, the daring elevation of the caste to the first place in the realm, the positive proofs which its history is said to furnish that it is right and necessary for the Third Estate to hold first place in the legislation, these are the important facts which the pamphlet carries for our purpose. And when others<sup>57</sup> go to greater lengths, one picturing France strong and grand before the world, though deprived by fortuitous circumstances of her clergy and nobles,<sup>58</sup> another even openly discussing a French republic,<sup>59</sup> it is evident that the pamphlet was not far behind the journal in expressing a claim for new theories, all tending in one direction.

The "almanachs" of this time are so numerous and so characteristic that they merit a word in passing.

<sup>57</sup> Condorcet, Volney, Target, Bergasse, Mounier, Servan, Rabaud de St. Etienne, are the most important writers of pamphlets.

<sup>58</sup> Rabaud de St. Etienne; note the resemblance of this idea to that of St. Simon in his "Parabola."

<sup>59</sup> Camille Desmoulins, in his "France Libre."



These curious and distinctively French publications played the not altogether admirable part of the low comedian, whose jokes reach the gallery where the intellectual didactics of the leading personages fail of effect. Their share in the work must not be neglected. Particularly in France, where to ridicule is to kill socially, the low comedian has no despicable rôle, and it is probable that the almanac played a significant part in the work of reshaping public opinion. The cheap prose and cheaper poetry of the "Almanach des Républicains," of the "Calendrier des Bons Citoyens" of Collot d'Herbois; the popular "Almanach du Père Gérard," or the other more royalist publications of a similar nature,<sup>60</sup> are dull enough reading now; but their absurd, even offensive commonplace had much vogue at the time it was edited. The whole tenor of these publications was to belittle the past, to cry aloud the gifts which the present had ready for the future — above all to exalt a future that was to be shaped by the inspired theories with which the Revolution was blessing men. Though empty of meaning, unless read in the light of the events which produced them, the almanacs take their place along with newspaper and pamphlet as a medium to catch and hold the possibly unsettled mind of the reading public.<sup>61</sup>

To these more institutional phases of Paris life add

<sup>60</sup> L'Almanach de l'Abbé Maury, Les Almanachs des Emigrés, L'Almanach historique et critique des députés," are especially noteworthy. Comp. Welschinger, Les Almanachs de la Révolution. Paris, 1884.

<sup>61</sup> For a good study of the content and influence of the almanac, the reader is referred to Welschinger's readable little book.



now the gradual changes which the Revolution slowly brought about. When the new ideas of equality and liberty strive to become applied doctrine, Paris still leads in stimulating to active discontent or in making for solidarity of opinion. When the militia organized and all classes thus came shoulder to shoulder in an entirely new service of citizenship; when titles were banished, and armorial bearings were removed from houses where they had been for centuries; when simple and similar dress went along with newly-awakened sensibilities concerning a neighbor's rights, each change came to act as another plea for a widespread and entire acceptance of principles completely revolutionary. When, on the other hand, Paris streets surged daily with thousands of beggars and unemployed,<sup>62</sup> come footsore and in haste to the fount of freedom in order to get a share in the new liberty, that element of blind force arrived which-completed the probability of swift and entire alteration in the social institutions. By 1793, Paris inclosed within her walls all that was necessary to give power to the radical reformer.

## IV.

We have almost reached the period in French history when the radical rationalism which is the subject of this study took precedence, if only for a brief time, of all other theory, both in the mouths of men and in social institutions. One more group of social facts needs to be noted as a determining influence, not so much now, an influence for the expression of revolu-

<sup>62</sup> There were 119,000 in 1791. Von Holst, *op. cit.*, 1, p. 47.

tionary principles as one which decided the final color to be given those principles. In addition to the new culture, the national disintegration and the class awakening which were essential preliminaries of a time when new doctrines actually displaced the old; in addition to the elements of Paris life, which aided to concentrate and strengthen the doctrine, the events which decided their entirely radical character need to be noted. The dramatic period which includes the meeting of the first two legislative bodies of France and a small part of the history of the third, also includes the final change, which for a short, yet notable period, made the democratic sentiments of a few doctrinaires and their allies the announced principles of the French nation. During this period passionate debates finally wrought a change in the whole political system of the nation. At the end of the period, uncompromising advocates of a logical and complete alteration in the social theory of the time had, with the aid of the Paris mob, won their fight, and for a short while the Principles of Revolution were promulgated as the law of France.

This closing period may be divided into three stages. The first is that during which the Constituent Assembly begins a definite statement of the principles of revolution, and then, with a lingering respect for the old doctrine, compromises on the reforms expressed in the Constitution of '91. The next is that period when revolutionary principles were vigorously demanded, but social anarchy and a struggle of factions chilled those who held political control so that they hesitated to further the final enumeration of these principles.

Finally there came the time when a group of opportunists got control, and, promulgating the Constitution of '93, completed the record of the immediate causes of the revolutionary principles.

The Constituent Assembly represents a struggle between abstract philosophy and the doctrines of applied politics; it is the place where the practical men make their last effective protest against the despotism of logic. But the rationalistic type of mind had first place even in this earliest legislative body. For the most part, the Constituent Assembly was made up of young, convent-bred men, who had little or no knowledge of practical politics<sup>63</sup>—men who, under Paris influences, were daily growing more liberty-mad. Recalling this fact, it is not surprising that the deputies of '89 forgot the many important administrative duties which they had come to perform, and spent months in a wrangle over logical principles which, in the eyes of these enthusiasts, seemed the right and necessary basis of the new government they were to inaugurate. Called to make constitutional and administrative law, to alter and codify civil law, to devise means of support for a bankrupt government and eventually to plan for an ecclesiastic and educational system—in a word, to serve at once as legislators and legislature, to make law and to administer the law, they did neither until they had first drawn up the Rights of Man! A spirit of reform rather than of revolution may have later

<sup>63</sup> For one of the best résumés of the character of the Assembly, see Taine, *op. cit.*, Vol. 11, chap. 1, pp. 154–178. Arthur Young and Dumont (*Mémoires de Mirabeau*) also bear the same testimony on this point.

regained control of the Assembly,<sup>64</sup> because Mirabeau's strong statesmanship fairly dominated that body even against its will;—none the less this same Assembly sent forth the Rights of Man to France and these Rights of Man were the fundamental doctrine in the revolutionary principles. The stress which the Assembly laid upon this series of abstractions spread and deepened the revolution in men's minds.

The remaining work of the Assembly was the Constitution of '91. This body of rules for the government of France is a futile effort to reconcile the principles of monarchy and democracy. It created as executive, a king, whose legislative power consisted in a suspensive veto which gave the monarch a very considerable power to block legislation, and so seemed to make constant friction with the legislative almost certain. As to the legislative, its democratic and radical character seemed assured. It is true that its members were required to have somewhat high property qualifications and were chosen by indirect election, but the legislative body was to be unicameral, and was to change every two years. In consideration of the average of human nature, a plan for a legislature of one chamber, which changed its personnel so often, was one which seemed to make factional and ineffective government inevitable. Most important of all, this instrument of government disputed the very terms of the Declaration of Rights which had proudly been placed at its head; for, on a basis of money distinctions, it separated the nation into active and passive citizens. The Constitution of '91 is, then, the recorded evidence of the

<sup>64</sup> See e. g., art. 16, where the principle of the separation of powers is laid down.



momentary compromise between the incompatible elements contending in the Assembly. It is the close of the reform movement as against the revolutionary movement; or, to look at it from another point of view, it is the last dyke which the less radical element of the nation managed to erect for a brief time in face of the rising flood of revolutionary opinion.

It is a curious fact in the political affairs of humanity — a fact that of course holds good for other than French history — that it is an energetic minority which usually holds and carries with it the more or less unwilling majority. Nowhere in history is this better evidenced than in the successive assemblies of the French Revolution. If conservatism partly controlled the constituent, it was because Mirabeau's voice, raised in warning against the despotism of mobs, checked the majority in their growing passion of eagerness to realize political equality at once. If the Legislative Assembly moved steadily to the extreme democracy which the Convention ultimately sanctioned, it was because within these legislative bodies a small group of energetic Parisians drove opinion in that direction. True, outside the halls of state, this minority itself was driven; but so far as the legislative assemblies are in question, it seems certain that throughout the Revolution, the majority at Center, swayed to Right or Left, alternately the captive of one or the other of the contending minorities.

The formidable ally of this minority, the power behind the throne which may be said to have finally ruled France and given it the principles of revolution, was



of course the Parisian populace. The people of the great metropolis were, at the last, the means to enforce the proclamation of those fundamental laws that gave legal sanction to the Declaration of Rights, and so completed the Declaration of the Revolutionary principles. Acting through the Commune and the sections, the Paris masses were the real minority which as early as 1789 began to shape French political thinking. Even in the Constituent Assembly, monarchical ideas grew weak and retired in face of the fierce invective and angry demands of the hungry, excited spectators, who daily crowded the tribunes; even at that time, selfish or patriotic reasons impelled men to think and talk after the way of those "sans-culottes," who acted as chorus to all the proceedings of the Assembly. Later, the rumble of opinion which the clubs, cafés and newspapers sent from outside had no inconspicuous share in molding parliamentary opinion. When club members, frequenters of cafés, and the motley united to make more or less forcible entrance into the hall where the Assembly met, bringing almost daily, by delegations or impromptu personal speeches, insistent protests against half measures, the bulk of the legislative opinion was frequently caught by sheer force of suggestion. The Parisians soon learned to reject any laws which did not entirely recognize the principles laid down in the Declaration of Rights; they likewise learned their power as against that of the Assembly. The continual disorder in Paris and the highly nervous temperament of the Parisian together constituted the last straw which precipitated the nation into absolute democracy.

In times of social disorganization, political power usually falls to that group of persons within the nation which is sufficiently in accord as to purpose, sufficiently strong in organization, and sufficiently pliant in regard to methods of domination. Such a group rarely fails to appear in human societies; it did not fail to appear at the period of French history here under discussion. The dramatic seizure of government by the Jacobins is one of the narratives which history dwells oftenest upon.

It will not do to ascribe the Jacobin control to the weakness of the Constitution of '91; nor is it solely attributable to the royalist invasion which gave the Jacobins the chord of patriotism to play upon. Each of these facts aided the Jacobins, but their rise to power and the consequent adoption of the principles they advocated was due first of all to this: in a time of extreme anarchy, a few able men to whom youth gave the courage to dare, caught the temper of the Paris mob, won its support and held it. The successive stages of their struggle to victory — a struggle wherein king, conservative and liberal went down making a hard fight against opinion whose bulwark was the Rights of Man — need only be recalled. Mirabeau-Tonneau and D'Esprémenil were forced to retire before the moderates, who asked for enlightened monarchy; the Malouets and Lallys went to the wall when Sièyes, St. Etienne, Talleyrand or La Rochefoucauld put forward the elective principle; these, in their turn, came to seem conservative as Mirabeau, ready for almost any lengths, in order to control and bring stability to the government, played upon the sympathies of the people

with his oratory,<sup>65</sup> and for a time became their idol. These changes of faction are the successive phases of the struggle between the majority of the parliamentary body and the Mountain, the minority who represented the commune; they need not be dwelt upon. For our purpose, the interest centers about the moment when two powers finally stood face to face. When men present in the legislative body from the first, had joined their interests with those of the commonalty which stood roaring outside, the last stage was reached preliminary to formulating the principles of revolution.

If the Jacobins, with the aid of the Paris clubs and the Paris sections, came to rule France, it was because the first gift of the Revolution to the provinces was an anarchy that left them the easy prey to a central despotism, and because, in Paris, the Girondins, the party who represented the whole parliamentary opposition to the Jacobins, could give, in these days of '93 which asked for so much more, nothing but a theoretical acquiescence in the revolutionary principles.

Between 1789 and '91, the national life had been shaken to its foundations. Custom and tradition had been arraigned and men had been told that they had a right to question both; custom and tradition had been declared at fault in the light of the Rights of Man; and this idea had, above all others, been persistently popularized. Anarchy was practically the first result of the proclamation of these rights. The nation was left without a guide, for the new rulers, in

<sup>65</sup> Compare Von Holst, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, *passim*.

their inexperience, could not both make constitutions and supervise local administration. Each provincial governor followed his own notion of government; in many cases he had no clear idea on the subject, and thus, presently, the communes legislated each one for itself. Demagogues, preaching the new creed, spread over the country, bringing with them the news of the doings in Paris, telling how the people had captured the Bastille and taken their king to Paris; how the People were now to rule France and have their rights. Scarcity of work and scarcity of food are first-rate assistants for the political orator who wishes to decry an old civilization and proclaim a new order, and neither aid failed at this time. When wayfarers and paupers, homeless and half-starved, heard of the Rights of Man, these rights became at once the rights of the needy and hungry; having nothing to lose, none were more ready than they to rally to the new order. Not only the oppressed, but the outcast and destitute fall in with the rebellion against any but democratic law. Soon all over the country it had become common to refuse to pay any taxes at all; a new levy had not been made, and to pay the old feudal burdens had been declared at variance with the Rights of Man. The military caught the new enthusiasm, and, in most of the provinces, recruits and old soldiers alike became unreliable in view of their new-found right to individual judgment. The noble who had not already gone to raise a foreign army against his country was at best alienated from any share in the national life, for he had been abruptly and opprobriously shorn



of everything which he had most prized, and was, besides, in many of the provinces, the object of a more and more vindictive hatred. Worst of all, the clergy in many parts of the country were greatly disaffected. No part of this story of the spread of anarchy is so pitiable and terrible as the story of the struggle between the constitutional and the non-juror priests; nowhere more than in the districts in which this form of dissension prevailed was the quarrel so bitter or the factional division so fatal to life and property. With the appropriation of the church lands and the civil constitution of the clergy, the baneful element of religious difference, than which there is nothing more terrible between man and man, added a note of bitterness to the noisy anarchy of the nation.

And that anarchy, as has been said, was the opportunity of the Paris commune and its leaders. It was because the country was all divided between the disheartened, the disaffected, and the lawless, that the Jacobin society was able to spread its network over France and make, for a time, the despotism of a Paris faction, a national despotism. When the nation is in the throes of a complete upheaval; when the cry for food comes from thousands of starving men and women, and the call for democracy is raised by more than a hundred newspapers urging their demands as a demand of the nation; when 745 men, for the most part keyed up to believe in an imminent millennium incident to the legalization of new-found principles, are called, most of them from advocates' desks, to direct a heaving, uncertain national life, a strong and able faction finds its opportunity. Strengthened be-



cause France was uneasy and discordant, and Paris yet more restless, hungry and dissentient, the Jacobins, and chief among them, the deputies of the communes of the Paris clubs, faced and vanquished the Girondins, their last surviving competitors in the race to give France a pure democracy.

The history of the Gironde<sup>66</sup> will always move the imagination. The sharp contrast between the beginning and the end of the party's existence is an episode whose dramatic pathos can never be overlooked. A group of young, enthusiastic, talented men controlled the majority in the Assembly for almost a year, predominated in the ministry, counted one of their number mayor of Paris, and the press and public, their enthusiastic allies. Then, with a swift turn in the tide of opinion, this Gironde fell from a favor which they made no unworthy fight to retain, and finally became fugitives from mob-law or went to the guillotine singing the Marseillaise. In no part of the parliamentary records are there to be found orations more perfect in form and more able in thought than those of Vergniaud and Guadet; no fire and passion stir one in the reading as does that which vibrates in the speeches of Isnard; no subtlety of argument, and sage, clear reasoning in the whole revolutionary period quite equals that of Gensonné or Condorcet; no picture of stolid, painstaking patriotism can surpass the one for which Roland

<sup>66</sup> On the Girondins, beside Lamartine, who is too partisan to be of real value, see Vatel, *Charlotte Corday et les Girondins*; J. Guadet, *Les Girondins*; and the admirable chapter on the fall of the Girondins in Morse-Stephens, *op. cit.* See, also, the *Memoirs of Madame Roland*, Dumouriez, *Barbaroux* and *Louvet*.

stands as the original. It thus happens that, in the esthetic emotion which these facts arouse, the conspicuous weakness of the Gironde as a political party is often forgotten. It is one thing to put forward, in a brilliant style, a doctrine of progress, the principle of the sovereignty of the people, the dream of a classic republic; it is another to be willing to put those doctrines into law and to be able to make such law effective. The philosopher may be permitted to outline principles without pointing the method for applying them; such a course is fatal to a politician. In spite of their undoubted abilities, the speculative quality of mind which distinguished most of the Girondists made them, as a party, badly disciplined and without any precise program. The consequent uncertainty of their action made their failure inevitable. Failure is not a crime, and the Gironde would not, of necessity, be discredited because they went down before the Jacobins; but, stripped of its perfect literary form, little that they advocated can be regarded as sound doctrine. However, it was not because of the unsoundness of their theories that the Jacobins turned against them. The Jacobins had little fault to find with the principles advocated by their rivals; what they attacked was their lukewarm support of them. The want of unity among the Girondins was the opportunity of the Jacobins.

Unlike the Girondists, the Montagnards were first of all tacticians; they were strongly organized and ready, each and all, to use any means which came to hand. The Jacobin party spoke the language of the

people; they played with the ideals of equality of possession and of position; they winked at violence, even when they did not join in it. There was more of scholarship among them than their enemies will allow; more real patriotism than madness or sedition in their aims. They were thoroughly in earnest and not too scrupulous as to the means they were willing to employ in order to secure that public weal for which, it seems fair to think, most of them were sincerely striving. When the Girondins opposed the September massacres, because of their illegal aspects, the Jacobins urged that if these were illegal, then the fall of the Bastille, many of the acts of the States-General, the overthrow of royalty,—in fact, the whole revolution, was also illegal.<sup>67</sup> While the Girondins saw in the Revolutionary Tribunal and the Committee of Public Safety, deplorable tendencies to high-handed and despotic acts of government, and in any laws which seemed coercive in relation to trade or money, so many unjustifiable interferences with individual liberty, the Jacobins unswervingly proposed and carried out these measures as the only immediate means to the well-being of the majority. The general method of the Revolution was attack upon established institutions, upon the emigrés,<sup>68</sup> upon the priests,<sup>69</sup> upon the king. Up to this point in the offensive war upon old institutions, the Gironde was ready to follow or even to lead the Jacobins; but after the tenth of August, the Gironde called a halt. The Jacobins, on the contrary,

<sup>67</sup> See Thiers. *Histoire de la Révolution*, III, p. 99.

<sup>68</sup> Decree of November 9, 1791.

<sup>69</sup> Decree of September, 1792.

went the whole length. It was these Jacobins who prepared for pitiless war on all who were not ready to accept the equality of condition as well as the new religion and the form of government which the class newly come to power proposed to establish. It was the Jacobins who, goaded by the foreign war, and starting from the principle of "making royalists afraid," went almost unintentionally, by way of the prison-massacres, into the Reign of Terror. And what is most to the present purpose, it was the Jacobins who, with the aid of the revolutionary committees of Paris, and backed by the martial power of the Commune, secured the overthrow of the Girondins, and then, in the space of eight days, drew up the Constitution of '93.

The Jacobin constitution of '93, which had waited almost a year to be put together, and was then hastily formulated in a burst of democratic enthusiasm, marks the complete development of the revolutionary doctrine. This "most popular constitution ever given to men,"<sup>70</sup> is, in a sense, the epitome of the principles of the Revolution. The Constitution of '93 has been the objective point in this search after the facts connected with the immediate cause for the development of the principles of revolution, because in that instrument men aimed to give legal sanction to the new theories of liberty, equality and fraternity. After the date of its publication, the public policy was

<sup>70</sup> Héroult de Sechelles. Séance of June 10, 1793. *Moniteur*, XVI, p. 616. It will be remembered that the Constitution of '93 was only put before men's imagination; it was never used as the basis of government.



marked by methods increasingly at variance with the revolutionary doctrines. With the fall of the Gironde and the development of the policy of terror, the principles which instigated revolution lose their meaning and are constantly disputed by practice. Tyranny in order to liberty is not a principle of revolution but a practice; when that practice was inaugurated, the revolutionary principles had been finally expressed and the reaction had set in.

The social growth which characterized France during the century preceding the Revolution has now been reviewed, in an attempt to show an unfolding-process that developed a new social theory. The facts in summary are these: Two important influences of the eighteenth century collaborated in the growth of a new type of social thought: On the one hand, a new philosophy gradually penetrated the current opinion; on the other hand, an unqualified need of a material reordering of the national life came to give a final character and emphasis to the intellectual change. A group of thinkers raised a literary revolt against much that was held to be unalterable usage; their ideas became the first mediums to disseminate a new sentiment. The complete break-up of the machinery of government and the incapacity of the single hand to which, at the end of the century, the guidance of the political machine was left, cleared the way by which the disciples of this new critical philosophy were able to give popularity to their creed. The vital fact at the end of the century was the important rôle played by one class of the nation, a class whose development seems always to have influenced the growth of the whole nation. At the



close of the eighteenth century, the whole energies of the Third Estate seemed to center finally on an irrepressible struggle for political independence. Certain peculiarities of life and manners in the metropolis of the nation determined and precipitated the action of this class, and of that still disfranchised class whose aid it managed to secure. Finally, certain factions within this class met in a struggle, a struggle which ended in the domination of that section of the Third Estate which held the most extreme views. Thus general and particular influences developed and modified social thinking, until it effectually settled upon the principles of the Revolution.

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**CHAPTER III.**

**THE PRINCIPLES OF THE REVOLUTION.**





## CHAPTER III.

### THE PRINCIPLES OF THE REVOLUTION.

#### I. THE INCLUSIVE CHARACTER OF THE REVOLUTIONARY PRINCIPLES.

#### II. FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTIONS.

#### III. THE RIGHTS OF MAN.

#### IV. THE STATE AND THE INDIVIDUAL.

##### I.

WITH regard to the theories whose immediate causes have now been considered, it is plain, first of all, that they are principles put forward in a spirit of vital and radical change. The disposition of mind, now generally called the Voltairean, growing through the eighteenth century, penetrated deep and with cumulative force into the social mind; by the end of the century nothing was sacred. It was not merely question of changing the form of government. The attack struck at the very fundamentals of national thought. The religious doctrine impugned, men asked over again and sought replies to questions which, it had been supposed, religion had settled finally. During the progress of the Revolution, as during the preceding century, all the problems of life were turned over and new theories were advanced concerning the origin of man, and the reasons for his existence, both as an individual and as a member of society; above all, concerning the question underlying all others, the question as to what is the end of both man and society, and what is the pur-

pose of the universe. From the weightiest problems which can present themselves to human thinking, down to the most trivial queries of every-day life, all aspects of social existence were called into question and pronounced upon. The principles of the Revolution are synonymous with an attempt to reorder, not merely the positive law of the country, but the positive morality which slowly works changes in positive law. The French Revolution was a remarkable instance where a number of men dreamed of taking upon themselves the gigantic task of modifying by concerted action, finally and certainly, both the positive morality and the code of laws; they planned to rebuild not only the social structure but also the foundation upon which it stood.

The absence of economic theory in the principles of the Revolution scarcely needs more than assertion. The crisis was a political crisis, and, if there was an economic cause at the bottom, nobody discerned it. It is safe to say that wherever economic principles played any part in the French Revolution, such principles were the philosophical theories of the Physiocrats. If wealth was desired, it was in order to an increased happiness; if production, more especially agriculture was to be encouraged, it was because this was held to be the means, and the only means, to add to the national wealth. And all this is the physiocratic doctrine. As for the relation of government in industry, the principle of *laissez-faire*, another principle made current by the Physiocrats, theoretically dominated the Revolution. All these notions can hardly be called principles of political economy; they are rather philosophy and politics in a jumble. Reading, at the

various legislative bodies and at the clubs, those speeches which touched upon questions of practical finance and taxation, a doubt occurs as to whether there was, in the minds of the speakers, any particular appreciation of the existence of a special set of problems called economic. The question turned rather upon the state policy in relation to the individual as an agent in industrial life. It would almost be affectation to try to formulate any theory of economics from the passing phrases which might be found here and there. The Revolution was a political movement, and its fundamental principles form a political philosophy.

The special character of these principles of the Revolution will then be sufficiently defined if the hypothesis concerning the ultimate nature of the universe, and the theories with regard to man and society be stated, along with the most fundamental of the political principles. The Law of Nature (*Loi naturel*), the doctrine of the social contract, the theory of Natural Rights (*Droits naturels*) and such derivative political principles as the doctrine of popular sovereignty, the right of social supremacy in conducting the affairs of the national life, make up the essential parts of the political and social faith of the time; these principles have, therefore, been selected for exposition.

## II.

One important fact needs emphasis in regard to the primary conceptions of the Revolution. Throughout the period the fundamental notions did not change. In 1789 the theories of man and of society are the



same as those of 1793. Clermont-Tonnerre, Sièyes, Mirabeau, Vergniaud, Saint Just, Marat, each held a fundamental hypothesis which differed but slightly. All, consciously or instinctively, started from the notion of a divine plan, whose end was human happiness; all were equally loyal to the Rights of Man and the Social Contract. As will be seen, it is the application of these conceptions, it is those ideas belonging most specifically to the theory of politics which are not the same during the period in question. The principle of republicanism is not the dominant idea in '89 — far from it. A more or less recognized spirit of compromise, a sense of the value of gradual change checked legislative reform at constitutional monarchy in '91, but that theory of government went down altogether before the rage for democracy which gave power to the constitution-makers of '93. However, the temperate politician of '91 and the frenzied democrat of '93 held to the same fundamental conceptions. One set of primary notions controlled the whole movement. It is these conceptions which are now to be stated.

\* The principles of the Revolution were, as a whole, theories having to do with the conditions of a mundane existence; they were a new code of morality and politics, not metaphysical or religious principles in any real sense. The whole doctrine implies faith in the power of the untrammelled human will to bring about permanently harmonious social relations. Like the eighteenth century philosophy which bred it, the revolutionary theory posited the individual will but took small account of its possible beginnings. Yet

there was some attempt at an explanation of final causes. The foundation of the revolutionary faith was flimsy, but there was such a foundation — the doctrine of natural or rational religion. No longer willing to listen to theologians, no longer recognizing an external authority, the revolutionists appealed from a ruling church or a self-revealing God, to an inner conscience which stood ready to tell the same truth to each man who looked within himself. The revolutionists of '89 and '93 turned to Nature as the only positive authority, and set at naught deductions based upon customs or upon principles framed by any constituted power.

In studying the debates of the period, it is at first difficult to find any real denial of the old principles which recognized the infallible dogma of a dominant church. In the Constituent Assembly, a somewhat sophisticated desire to preserve the Catholic cult,<sup>1</sup> strip-

<sup>1</sup> It is of interest to remember the attitude of the Assembly in regard to Catholicism. One scene will serve as type of any of the earlier ones. At the séance of April 13, 1791 (*Choix de Rapports* II, p. 102), Dom Gerle proposed to decree the Catholic religion as the state religion; a heated debate followed, in which some of the good Bishops and Abbés lost their tempers, and Mirabeau cited the Saint Bartholomew massacre with crushing effect. The assembly eventually agreed upon this decree: "Whereas, the Assembly has not, nor ever can have, any power over consciences or religious opinions; whereas, the majesty of religion and the profound respect due to it, does not permit that it become subject of deliberation; whereas, the attachment of the National Assembly to the Catholic cult could not be doubted at a moment when this cult was being placed by it in first rank of public expenses; and, whereas, a unanimous movement of respect has expressed opinion in the only manner which can comport with the dignity of the religion and the character of the Assembly," etc. *Comp. also, Moniteur, séance of February 14, 1790, III, p.*

ping it of its temporal power only, is plainly evident. In the later assemblies, there was, of course, a candidly avowed intention to do away with all Christian cults.<sup>2</sup> But whether the speaker was outward conformist or philosopher, the notion of final causes which each entertain really differed but slightly.

What may be called the first principle in all the revolutionary philosophy defined a plan and purpose underlying the universe. The revolutionary theory started from the belief in an absolute and directed tendency in phenomena. Perhaps the majority continued to believe that the universe was the work of an anthropomorphic divinity surrounded by a host of worshipful satellites; the philosophy of that minority who worked the change in the social organization began more and more avowedly with the idea of a beneficent First Cause, God or Nature,<sup>3</sup> concerning whose origin and personality it would be futile to wonder. The prevailing attitude among the leaders was that which Pope expresses when he apostrophizes a

“Great First Cause, least understood,  
Who all my sense combined,  
To know but this, that Thou art good  
And that myself am blind.”

Even in '93 and '94 deity was officially recognized.<sup>4</sup> Translated and popularized by Voltaire, the Deism of

363. Comp. also, Camus, séance of June 1, 1790. “Nous pouvons changer la religion, mais nous ne voulons pas.”

<sup>2</sup> Comp. Aulard, *Le Culte de la Raison et le Culte de l'Être Suprême*.

<sup>3</sup> Nature is used in the widest sense, as the underlying principle at the root of all time and space phenomena.

<sup>4</sup> As for example, when Barère, in August, 1793, in his report on the state of the republic, speaks of the statue of the

Pope and Bolingbroke had come to ask first place as a national religion.

On the question of a cosmogony, the difference of opinion between the older cults and the doctrine of the Revolution is not vital. In both cases, the original power was thought of as having conceived and ordained upon an unalterable plan and in a spirit of extreme beneficence, a vast scheme of inorganic and organic life; all believed that this great creative work had been done solely to promote the well-being of man. In both cases, the original Cause was believed to have remained entirely outside the creation which was his work. God or Nature had made the universe, had fixed its workings, had set man at the head of it; man himself must discover the proper use of it. Christian prelates or Deists, conformists or disciples of Natural religion in any of its forms, each and all alike rendered homage to a power external to the earth they inhabited,—a Power which had given them being and endowed them with the right and duty to make the best possible use of the land and its bounties.

The revolutionary deism set out then with the same primary idea as did orthodoxy; but, following the lead of the philosophers, it soon definitely rejected external authority as the sanction to personal or social conduct, and opposed a belief in earthly happiness to the Church's idea of waiting patiently for the joys of the hereafter. First, as to the separation of opinion re-

public, which is to be created, "Sous les regards du Législateur Eternal." Morse-Stephens. Orators of the Revolution, II, p. ii. Compare also Aulard, *Le Culte de la Raison et le Culte de l'Être Suprême*, chapters iii, iv, vii and viii.



garding the origin of man's knowledge concerning fundamental truth.

Throughout the eighteenth century orthodox doctrine had rested or professed to rest on revelation. Men had believed that, if they knew the purpose of the universe, it was because at some time there had been direct communication between the prime Cause of all things and some favored few among the dwellers upon earth, and they held that the whole law contained in such communication had been vested in an organized ecclesiastical authority which had the sole right to form and to watch over men's consciences and acts. The doctrine of the Revolution, on the contrary, rejected all revelation as a "harmful creed" (*croyance funeste*).<sup>5</sup> For these rationalists, the truths which men arrived at by reason were the only "revelation;" absolute knowledge with regard to the secrets of the universe was accessible to the reason and to the reason alone. Faith in rational principles almost entirely took the place of faith in mystic notions or in canons of theology; the final criterion, whether for personal or social conduct, was the human intelligence. The final authority — and before it revealed religion and popish infallibility had no force — was the instinct which Nature had given each man, and which his reason alone could interpret.

As to the existence possible during an earthly career, the difference is likewise radical. The doctrine of

<sup>5</sup> Comp. Volney. *Catéchisme de citoyen français* (published 1793), p. 177. See also, Bonneville and Blanchard, whose ideas are given in Laurent. *La Révolution française*, II, pp. 492-498,



revelation conceived of post-mundane life as the only consolation for the vexations and miseries of an earthly life. The new creed, thrilling with the idea of an original earthly paradise, believed it was perfectly possible for the concerted action of man to restore those happy conditions which had originally been arranged for the first human inhabitants of this planet, and it believed that it was eminently necessary to do this. Whether the supporters of the new thinking expressed their theory by a worship of the supernatural, the natural or the combination of these two which he conceived man to be; whether the divinity was a Supreme Being, Nature or Man, the avowed or tacit conception from which all later principles derived, was this one of a purpose in the universe, and that purpose the ultimate contentment of all humanity. Since Providence, or more usually Nature, had arranged by immutable and unerring though not inscrutable laws, a contented existence for man, the wise man was he who studied to discover these laws and so to insure the fulfillment of the original plan. The first duty of the philosopher, and yet more of the legislator, was to seek out what had been the normal conditions, and then to restore those conditions to a world which had been disastrously deprived of them. It rested altogether within man's competence to do this; the affairs of this world were entirely subject to the free will of the individual. If man respected the leading principles which his reason could make clear to him, an end to all unhappiness here below might confidently be expected. By the highway of reason, with virtue as guide, it was possible to discover and realize terrestrial



happiness.<sup>6</sup> All social unrest, it was believed, was the result of misunderstanding this truth. When legislators could be taught to keep this doctrine permanently and intelligently before them, social happiness might soon be expected. Men now combined the utilitarian doctrine of the Encyclopedists and the Physiocrats with the sentimental teachings of Rousseau, and proclaimed the happiness of humanity to be the end of all association.

This, the doctrine of Natural Law, was the current and admired theory all through the Revolutionary period. It was this theory which, accepted in its full meaning, altered the whole complexion of social activity. When it was denied that life here below was merely a preparation for another world; when it was declared that, on the contrary, it was a strictly mundane business, having to do with the best possible arrangement of individual and social relations here, revolutionary action received its inspiration and justification.

All other ideas of the Revolution rested upon this belief in a Natural Law making for terrestrial content. The first principles of the revolutionary philosophy center about the faith in a propensity in all creation, a propensity which was believed to tend always to the happiness of man.

When we come to the question of the original condition of man and the beginnings of society, we do

<sup>6</sup> Comp. Boissy d'Anglas — Voulez-vous détruire le fanatisme et la superstition? Offrez à l'homme des lumières. Voulez-vous le disposer à recevoir des lumières. Sachez le rendre heureux et libre. Cited in Laurent, *op. cit.*, II, p. 457.

not find the same unity of opinion that prevailed concerning the Law of Nature. On this point there is an evident separation of theory. Two conceptions are current: the one, that idea of the providentially happy original man, which Rousseau had popularized; the other, the idea of an original savage. Both theories of the primitive man had a certain support among those leaders who, in a sense, forced the new principles upon the nation.

It is certain that during the Revolution, and for a long time after, the idea of a "natural man" had precedence as a popular notion. Probably the majority of the lawmakers of the Revolution started their civil and political code with the image from which our own time has by no means entirely freed itself — the image of an ideal primeval man, free from prejudices, free from vicious desires, or unhealthy notions of self-denial which he miscalled virtues. Over and over in the three successive legislatures, it is implied or stated that, in a primitive period of terrestrial life, man lived in greatest happiness because he had complete liberty.<sup>7</sup> Each man came from the hands of a beneficent Nature endowed with entire freedom; his sole duty, the pursuit of happiness; his only law, the preservation of his being. Moreover, each man was endowed by Nature with the right to precisely the same amount of pleasure as any

<sup>7</sup> Comp. Robespierre's speech on property, Séance of April 24, 1793. Vergniaud, speech of Oct. 25, 1791, on the Emigrés; Claude Fauchet, in Blanc, *Histoire de la Révolution française*, V, p. 121: Jeanbon de Saint André, "Je sais qu'il y a dans le cœur de l'homme une tendance à la vérité," etc., séance May 8, 1793. *Choix de Rapports*, XI, 295-296.

other man; each was equal to his fellow.<sup>8</sup> That each man had the natural and inalienable right to come and go as he pleased; to enjoy whatever he could make his own and to remain in unmolested possession of it, were so many corollaries of the original proposition of a free and happy primitive man.<sup>9</sup> Anterior to society, there had only been faultless human beings, each having the eternal right to liberty, to equality, and to the possession of his own goods; and this natural man, free and contented, was the ideal for the social man to strive after.

In opposition to this notion of a "natural" man stood the idea of a primeval savage, who depended for his development upon that which association with others brought to him. Even among the leaders of radicalism, there were men who energetically rejected the idea made current by Rousseau's love of paradox. In parliamentary debates, the primeval savage, painfully and unceasingly struggling for his daily nutriment, plays a less prominent, but none the less a frequent part, in discussions. An appreciable number of persons, whose ideas got a following among the stronger men of the time, held to the theory of social development suggested by Turgot, and made current during the Revolution by Condorcet<sup>10</sup> and many of the Gironde.

<sup>8</sup> Comp. Declaration of Rights of '93, art. 3.

<sup>9</sup> Comp. Declaration of Rights of '89. Especially art. 2, title I, of Constitution of 1791; and arts. 2-7 and 18 of the Declaration of '93.

<sup>10</sup> *Esquisse d'Un Tableau Historique des progrès de l'Esprit Humain*. Published 1793. Volney (*Catéchisme de Citoyen*



One debate might be cited<sup>11</sup> to show how the difference of opinion on the matter stood. The question turned upon the first article of the Declaration of Rights. As first given out, the article read thus: "The natural, civil and political rights of men are liberty, equality, security, property, the social guarantee and resistance to oppression." A deputy<sup>12</sup> at once arose and protested. "I don't well understand what the Committee desired to say by these words, natural right. In the state of pure nature, no rights exist unless those of force; in the state of nature, man has a right to that which he may get at, and this right is only limited by possibility; this right he abandons from the moment that he enters into society," etc. Another<sup>13</sup> follows him with a protest that man is innately social, that "the social state is the veritable natural state of man." Vergniaud proposed a compromise, and, the majority of the Convention consenting, the article is changed so that it reads, "The Rights of Man in society."<sup>14</sup> Thus, although there had been a committee who held to the theory of a natural man, with his inalienable natural rights, it is clear that by 1793 the dominant opinion in the legislative body recognized only the Rights of Man in society, and thus denied the "bon sauvage."

However, whether founded on the doctrine of a natural or a social man, whether held to originate anterior to society or to begin with social organization, the français) scouts the idea of the original happy savage (bon sauvage).

<sup>11</sup> Séance of April 17, 1793.

<sup>12</sup> Lasource.

<sup>13</sup> Garran-Coulon.

<sup>14</sup> Choix de Rapports, XII, pp. 286 et sq.

theory of inalienable individual rights was universally accredited during the Revolution. The later opinion, just instanced, resulted from an enlarged conception of the social right as against the individual right; it did not, any more than the theory it opposed, deny certain "natural" and reserved rights to each individual. The conception of Natural Rights and of their relation to the association of men played then a most important part in this new political theory. Men differed in regard to the social guarantee of these rights; they rarely denied their real and important political bearing. The theory was too good a weapon against the old authorities for it to have been neglected by the practical men of the Revolution, even though some of them may have had little faith in its philosophical truth. The doctrine of "Droits naturels" usually derived from the metaphysical conception of a Law of Nature — a conception that, in its turn, has been seen to be practically the appeal from an organized social sanction to an individual power and right of judgment — is the conspicuous principle in the new creed.

Before explaining how the more notable Natural Rights in society were regarded during the Revolution, it remains, in this summary explanation of basic conceptions, to show how the revolutionists imagined political society to have originated. The revolutionists for the most part adopted Rousseau's fallacy of the Social Contract, by which Rights were conceived to have been protected by a partial surrender of most of them.

Under the prevailing notions of the Revolution, as under those of the eighteenth century, all association was the result of a conscious act, an act which had

been instigated by the purely self-interested and utilitarian motive of a more comfortable conservation of natural rights. Current theory held that, in a non-social state, each man would seek his own happiness, irrespective of that of others; that, in an irregular association of man with his fellows, a condition of things so intolerable had come about that the necessity for some device by which peace might be attained, had grown always more apparent to each man, and so in every instance, agreement to a social arrangement of some sort had become imperative. A compact voluntarily entered upon by all members of the association had been the fundamental fact of organized association. The same utter blindness to psychological differences in men which characterized the thought of the century, continues to be the mode during the Revolution. Only a minority, and these not the leaders, recognized that association began in the necessities of man's instinct and the fact of individual usurpation;<sup>15</sup> men who realized that differences of endowment and strength make leaders of some, and more or less willing followers of others, were not those whose opinion carried weight at this time. The fundamental dogma concerning the origin of society, most popular at the time now under discussion held that, at some period antecedent to the existence of society,<sup>16</sup> men had come together, and, in order to have

<sup>15</sup> There was an appreciable minority who, like Volney, took this position.

<sup>16</sup> Or again at any given period of social change. When the Convention was called, the idea was stated in so many words. Couthon rises to declare that the deputies had been

peace and the means for fullest enjoyment, had by a voluntary act resigned a certain part of their individual will in favor of the general will.

Men were supposed to have entered into the Social Contract for reasons purely egotistical; but the revolutionists, as Rousseau had done, laid most emphasis upon the idea that, in the interests of that peace for which the contract was made, men must be ready to make a personal submission to a general will. It was usual to urge that what though the original reason for giving up the full exercise of the individual will had been purely utilitarian, it was now a moral duty so to submit the particular to the general will.<sup>17</sup> The end in which the social contract was made, could only be accomplished when each should fulfill this sacred duty. By the terms of the social contract then, men recognized that it was necessarily the primary duty of society "to disarm the oppression which might follow from the play of natural inequality."<sup>18</sup> The end of association is to oppose to the possible tyranny of the one, the force which results from the association of all. Thus, under the ideas which grew out of the notion of the social contract, the sovereignty of the individual becomes the sovereignty of the whole association — a

"called together from all parts of the empire to draw up a plan of social contract." (Moniteur, XIV, p. 6.)

<sup>17</sup> Comp. resolutions of the Duc d'Aiguillon and the Duc de Noailles on the night of August 4, 1789.—"L'Assemblée Nationale considérant que le premier et le plus sacré de ses devoirs est de faire céder les intérêts particuliers et personnels à l'intérêt générale," etc. (Moniteur, I, p. 280.)

<sup>18</sup> The reasoning is Robespierre's (comp. Blanc, *op. cit.*, VII, p. 265); comp. also Declaration of '89, art. 1-2; also Vergniaud in speech on Emigrés, October 25, 1791.



sovereignty in which each separate will has the undisputed right to express itself freely, but the equally certain duty of finally submitting to the will of the majority.

The idea that government derives from this voluntary social organization, was as much the ruling idea of the Revolution as it had been a prominent part of the radical thought of the preceding century. Social control, it was said, cannot be exercised except by means of certain prearranged forms, whence government, "a set of determined instruments for the exercise of this force," is a necessity.<sup>19</sup> The direction for the affairs of the whole society must, by an act of the general will, be placed in the hands of some organized power. Polity arises in the course of human association from the necessity for the protection of the interests of all, against the private interests of each.

Political Society then was held to be a voluntary act deriving from a voluntary resignation made by each member of the body politic. Polity rests on, and is always subject, both for its existence and its form, to the same consent which was the original source of the association. Thus, always, as the final pivot on which the equilibrium of the social structure depends, we have the individual will of the several members of the body politic. Under the doctrine of the Revolution, the individual is at once the governor and the governed. Whichever rôle he plays, he is held to play it by his voluntary act.

<sup>19</sup> Robespierre in *Lettres à ses Commettants*. (Blanc, *op. cit.*, Vol. VII, p. 265.)

The social contract is in fact the final term of a series of principles having to do with man and society, a series of principles whose sum is a genuine apotheosis of the individual. All social life, its beginning, its character and its conclusion, rests upon the free will of man. The world is for man's enjoyment, and the duty and right of each individual is to partake of its gifts. Each man, as man, has an equal right to the sum of pleasures which the original plan massed up in the universe. Each man had become a member of society with these rights as his original possession, along with the gift of his existence. Whatever subtraction he had made from these rights, had been made by a voluntary act. Political society is the invention of man. Free will and the instinct for peace and happiness are the original terms of a proposition whose conclusion is the social contract.

This general character of the revolutionary philosophy has been admirably summarized by a recent French writer. "The Revolution, Cartesian, and optimist," says M. Michel, "has exalted the human will and proclaimed the supreme power of method. The arrangement of political power seemed a problem of mechanics or of algebra. To state this problem well, to treat it according to correct methods, was to make certain of solving it. Know how to take thyself, the Revolution had said to man. Weigh with care the terms of the contract to which you subscribe, to which your fellow-citizens like yourself subscribe, and you will infallibly form a state where all will be for the best, where justice and virtue will rule. You are by

your very essence free and reasonable; you possess rights anterior to all convention, anterior to the social state itself. Society could not have other aim than to guarantee to all its members the exercise of their rights. Leave the past, which is dead. Occupy yourself with the future, which germinates in the present. Trust in your thought and the creative force which belongs to it."<sup>21</sup> The whole responsibility for social well-being rested finally, in theory at least, upon the individual act. Every preconception of the Revolution made for the encouragement of a revolt against organized thought. All the primary conceptions of the time, the Law of Nature, the idea of Natural Rights and the doctrine of the Social Contract, were built upon this positive belief in the validity and sanctity of individual judgment.

### III.

It has been said that, in the two phases of the Revolution, there was no change in primary conceptions; the same cannot be said of the doctrine of Natural Rights; the alteration lay in the theory of applied politics, and this because what happened in the first years of the Revolution produce a change in men's minds.

The swift rush of events which hurried France from the despotism of a well-intentioned if incapable monarch and his advisers to the despotism of a self-interested and theory-mad faction, and so worked the transition from absolutism to ochlocracy, had, as direct

<sup>20-21</sup> *L'Idée de l'Etat.* p. 166.

cause, a psychological change. As the years moved on, an appreciable number of men, who began their effort for social reconstruction in the belief that liberty, equality and fraternity were ideals to be slowly striven for, were encouraged by the progress of events to feel a feverish certainty that the ideal might at once be made the real. A conviction that the highest ideal of which they could dream was capable of formal and immediate expression, seized those in power, and history has therefore, now, as always, to record a revolution and a reaction. That the thoughts of the individual can readily outstrip the social thought, is one of those great truths which the wisest of men realize slowly, and men of narrow, or little-developed minds, not at all. Indifference to this truth is at the bottom of all social convulsions with their doubtful benefits. That a reign of terror resulted from the principles of revolution is at least partly attributable to this ill-advised faith of a comparatively small number of persons in the possibility of a complete and instantaneous social reconstruction.

As a consequence of the rapid transition to radicalism, two very distinct periods are discernible in the theories which have to do with the application of the theory of Rights of Man to the conditions of political society. The idea had not the same force, or at least, the same interpretation, in '93 that it had up to '91. No theory took such hold of the early revolutionists as did the idea of the Natural Rights of the individual. The individualistic current swept France with a greater and more lasting intensity, because



the minds of men had been for so long the slaves of a theological and monarchic polity which took no account of persons. In '89, the talk was of individual rights and the state as guarantor of such individual rights. In '93, it is rational social rights, rather than natural individual rights, which get defense and guarantee in the laws.<sup>22</sup> Although the rights of the citizen are proclaimed in '89, it is the Rights of Man that are of first importance during the second period. At this latter time, a state determined to defend the rights of all men makes singular inroads upon the rights of each man; even the rights of Man are talked of far less than the rights of the poor and the unfortunate. However, although opinions did alter as to how far the voluntarily created social right finally took precedence of the original individual right, the doctrine of the natural rights of each individual was never specifically denied throughout the whole time in question.

To draw up a declaration of rights was the first desire of an overwrought assembly.<sup>23</sup> The idea of putting the Rights of Man into an instrument of positive law may have been directly inspired by Lafayette and the others who had fought in America and returned full of enthusiasm for the legal document by which a

<sup>22</sup> The two phases of the Revolution may be separated thus: The first, from '89 to '91; the second, corresponding roughly with the flight of the king to Varennes and finishing with the fall of Robespierre.

<sup>23</sup> See *Moniteur*, I, pp. 143-148. When Lafayette brings forward his plans for a declaration, he claims that they "renferme les premiers principes de toute constitution, les premiers éléments de toute législation." Comp. also Bailly. *Mémoires*, I, p. 304.

new democracy proclaimed its independence. Possibly, the idea of giving them legal form was taken from the Cahiers, in which a demand for the declaration of rights can be found.<sup>24</sup> However suggested, whether the result of either or both of these influences, the notion of such a declaration took precedence of all others in the Assembly, and for weeks men who had the nation's well-being in charge busied themselves with drawing up a purely theoretical preface to the constitutional law.

The fact is often forgotten that a certain minority opposed drawing up a declaration of rights. Prominent men like Malouet, Grandin, the Bishop of Langres and of Auxerre, objected to making a set of metaphysical principles into positive law. The act they argued "was useless," and "apt to mislead the ignorant, because abstract and one-sided."<sup>25</sup> In a remarkably sane speech, whose general tenor was to urge that the constitution be framed first, and the rights later, Malouet pleads that the laws were only the "result and expression of natural rights and duties," and that there was "no natural right which did not find itself modified by natural law; therefore, if you indicate no restriction, why present to men in all their plenitude rights which they may only use with just limitations?"<sup>26</sup> The same speaker further objects that always, and of necessity, metaphysical discussions consume much time,

<sup>24</sup> See e. g. the Cahiers of the nobles at Nantes, of the Third Estate of Rennes, and those of Paris, both noblesse and Third (Cherest, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 466 et seq.).

<sup>25</sup> *Moniteur*, I, pp. 257 et seq.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 263.

and begs that, in the present case, the greatest possible haste be used in getting to the actual law making.<sup>27</sup> The minority were even sufficiently sane to object that however much reason dictated a declaration of rights, prudence suggested that to formulate such rights was to put a heavy strain upon the controlling power of government, since these rights "were of no use without force;" and how would it be, they asked, if the people rose to use force in order to realize them entirely?

In spite of this clear-headed minority, who understood the danger involved in the formal presentation of a series of natural rights to a nation entirely inexperienced in self-government, it was decreed to draw up the declaration. The desirability of the form had caught the imagination of the majority. When such leaders as Mirabeau,<sup>28</sup> Chénier, Target,<sup>29</sup> de Castellane, Barnave, and even Malouet, resigning himself to the

<sup>27</sup> *Moniteur*, Vol. I, p. 263. Bailly in his *Mémoires*, Vol. I, pp. 300-301, is of this opinion. While he avows that the idea of expressing these rights was "une idée très belle et très philosophique", he says "ces idées métaphysiques égarent plus qu'elles n'éclairaient la multitude."

<sup>28</sup> Mirabeau was on the whole reluctant to have the rights formulated until the constitution had been framed and accepted, (*Choix de Rapports*, I, p. 230.) but he yielded to the weight of opinion, and put the force of his arguments on the side of the declaration. He was one of the committee of five who drew it up. How completely he finally indorsed the idea can be judged from his words in reporting the plans of the committee. The rights are to be simple and popular, he said, "c'est ainsi que les Américains ont fait leur déclaration des droits; ils en ont à dessein écarté la science; ils ont présenté les vérités politiques qu'il s'agissait de fixer sous une forme qui put devenir facilement celle du peuple, à qui seul la liberté importe et qui seul peut la maintenir."

<sup>29</sup> See his enthusiastic and interesting speech in *Choix de Rapports*, I, p. 223 et seq.

current of opinion, all in the same meeting spoke in favor of the declaration as preface to the constitution, a few counter arguments, were they ever so wise, were not likely to prevail. The majority echoed and applauded the statement that "the rights of man in society are eternal," and that "no sanction is necessary to recognize them \* \* \* they are invariable as justice, eternal as reason; applicable to all ages and to all countries."<sup>30</sup> If thirty years later men could still write as Cousin did, that the "*Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen*" were "the greatest, the most holy, the most beneficial which have appeared since the *Evan-gele*," it is not astonishing that, filled with apostolic enthusiasm, the men of '89 felt that the formulation of these new-found rights was of first importance.

Many urged that there be a careful statement of them as a preventive measure, as a lasting safeguard against tyranny. To declare the Rights of Man, said one, the Comte d'Estraigne, is, for Frenchmen, "indispensable, in order that should Heaven again visit them with the punishment of despotism, they might at least be able to show to the tyrant the injustice of his pretensions, his duties, and the rights of the people."<sup>31</sup> Or again,<sup>32</sup> it was shown that the Declaration of Rights would guide the mind as the complement of the legislation about to be undertaken. Legislators could not foresee all cases; the Rights of Man would serve as the National Catechism. Extremists went so far as to propose to call

<sup>30</sup>Speech of Duc de Montmorency, August 1, 1889. *Moniteur*, I, p. 26.

<sup>31</sup>Blanc, *op. cit.*, III, p. 42.

<sup>32</sup>Barnave. *Moniteur*, I, p. 262.



these articles the constitution. It was contended that the constitution of the people was the "establishment of those natural and imprescriptible rights anterior to laws, which latter establish only relative and positive rights. All nations have then the same constitution, since they all have the same rights." Modern constitutions, it was objected, confounded constitutions with the institutions which were created by the laws based on the fundamental constitution. The constitution gave existence to the political bodies; the institutions arranged for their preservation; whence the Declaration of Rights was the true constitution.<sup>33</sup> This discourse, "covered with plaudits" says the *Moniteur*, is but one example of many such speeches, so many successive proofs of how enthusiasm for theory completely overshadowed the statesmanlike anxiety of a few to get to the formulation of such law as might bring order out of the daily increasing anarchy. The whole assembly, as is well known, finally adopted a Declaration of Rights presented by Mirabeau, in the name of the sixth bureau<sup>34</sup>—a declaration which, the spokesman said, was intended to recall to the people, "not what they had studied in books, nor in abstract meditation, but what they themselves had felt, so that it \* \* \* might rather be the language which they would use had they the habit of expressing their ideas."<sup>35</sup>

<sup>33</sup> See whole speech by Crenières, in *Moniteur*, I, pp. 259, 260.

<sup>34</sup> The first committee to prepare a draft of the declaration was appointed July 14, 1789; it was not until August 26, 1789, that the final draft was received and accepted.

<sup>35</sup> Many other reports had been offered and the strongly Rousseauist character of the Assembly is nowhere better evi-

As for the Declaration of Rights which heads the constitution of '93, the Convention demanded it, because of the "incoherence and inconsistency of the declaration of '89."<sup>36</sup> The plan for it, drawn up by Hérault de Sechelles, who, like Mirabeau and the Convention of '89, aimed "to imitate the simplicity and clearness of the Americans,"<sup>37</sup> was read amid the applause of the Convention. After two or three seasons for discussion, the draft was adopted with little alteration. The marked changes from the declaration of '89 will appear in what follows. The general difference lies in a greater directness of style and a greater single-ness of purpose. The idea of individual right comes forward more clearly. Though the state is less accented, its powers and duties are larger and more inclusive than in the earlier document. There is, too, a tendency to break over national borders and to proclaim a world polity rather than one merely national.

All this makes it clear that, though there was a vigorous protest against the intrusion of the abstract into positive law, metaphysical thought and phraseology had come to be a predominant part of the general sentiment. The majority held it to be of first importance to legalize the new creed of individual right.

denced than in some of them. See especially those of Lafayette, Sièyes, Mounier and the declaration presented by Servan (*Moniteur*, I, p. 243), which read like abstracts from the "Contrat Social."

<sup>36</sup> See Barère's speech, in which he says the declaration of '89, "a le mérite bien reconnu d'être concise; mais aussi elle a le vice également reconnu d'être incohérente" (*Choix de Rapports*, XII, p. 286).

<sup>37</sup> *Moniteur*, XVII, p. 728. Séance June 26, 1793.

For this reason, the Rights of Man found their way into the positive law of France as portentous preface to the constitution of '91 and that of '93. In these two declarations, and in each additional testimony as is furnished by the Cahiers of the States-General, and the debates, which in the Assembly and at the Jacobin Club, made these questions their chief concern, the revolutionary opinions concerning these rights can be gathered.

The chief interest of the eighteenth century, as has been seen, was to prove the freedom of the individual, to break the shackles which bound the physical, and, more particularly, the intellectual man. The first, most important of rights, was liberty. No more barriers to progress, no more check upon religious or secular opinion; civil, political, religious liberty was the single aim to which all others were accessory; all action of government should be in the end of making the sanctity of the sphere of the individual, certain and complete.

This is particularly the spirit of the first half of the Revolution. The Constituent Assembly has often been called a gathering of men liberty-mad, so entirely did the accent fall upon this individual right; but though the succeeding years saw the sphere of the individual narrowed because of a more pronounced idea of the greater claim of collective well-being, as against individual well-being, the theoretical idea of liberty changed less during the Revolution than did the idea concerning any other right. From the beginning, liberty was held to be the power which belongs to man to do all

that which does not injure the rights of others.<sup>38</sup> Later, the same idea gets an important addition. Though Nature, it is said, is the principle of liberty, yet justice is its rule, and law is made in order to protect the liberty of all; the maxim, "do not do to another that which you would not wish him to do to you," is the moral limitation of the right of liberty.<sup>39</sup> Here is a notable alteration which makes all liberty referable to that of others in a sense which asks for a fraternal spirit of self-denial. Of course, all parties alike held liberty to be a "natural right." "The law," it was said, "is not a master who accords his benefits gratuitously; of itself, liberty embraces all that which does not belong to others; the law is only there to prevent it from losing its way; it is only a protective institution formed by the same liberty which is anterior to all, and for which all in the social order exists."<sup>40</sup> But the law must "prevent it from losing its way." In association, "liberty supposes discipline,"<sup>41</sup> and each under the social contract loses a certain liberty by his voluntary act. With only this reservation, that the law must "mark in the natural free actions of each individual the point beyond which they (these actions) become hurtful to the rights of others,"<sup>42</sup> all men were held to be always free.

Freedom of person was to be insured first. No man might deprive himself, much less be deprived, of his

<sup>38</sup> Art. 4, Declaration of '89; art. 6, Declaration of '93.

<sup>39</sup> See art. 6, Declaration of '93.

<sup>40</sup> Sièyes in speech on the liberty of the press. *Choix de Rapports*, II, pp. 351 et seq.

<sup>41</sup> Mirabeau. *Moniteur*, I, p. 42.

<sup>42</sup> Sièyes. *Choix de Rapports*, II, p. 352.



personal freedom;<sup>43</sup> this was mandatory. Liberty to come and go, freedom from arrest, except for a stated cause expressed by a law previously made;<sup>44</sup> the right to assemble peaceably<sup>45</sup> and to employ one's labor power in whatsoever form of labor, commerce or culture was considered desirable;<sup>46</sup> these were so many corollaries to the original propositions that liberty was a primeval right of man, and that the conservation of this liberty of action was a necessity for the development and well-being of social man.

Following on the liberty of act was the liberty of thought, "the most sacred of all rights," a right which "escapes the empire of men."<sup>47</sup> Each of those particular rights which sum up under the general head of liberty of thought, that is, the right to express one's opinion as one may desire, whether by spoken or written words, whether publicly or privately; the liberty to worship whatever God in whatever manner one pleased; each of these rights was striven for as resolutely in the Assembly as in the Convention. But, in 1789, they are laid down with qualifications; they are absolutely guaranteed in the Declaration of '93.<sup>48</sup> "I do not come to preach tolerance," says Mirabeau, in the Constituent Assembly;<sup>49</sup> "the most unlimited liberty of religion is in my eyes a right so sacred that the word tolerance,

<sup>43</sup> Art. 18, Dec. of '93.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid*, arts. 10, 11, 12 and 14.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid*, art. 7.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid*, art. 17.

<sup>47</sup> Rabaud de St. Etienne. *Choix de Rapports*, I, pp. 241 et seq.

<sup>48</sup> Dec. of '93, art. 7.

<sup>49</sup> *Choix de Rapports*, I, p. 238.

which would wish to express it, seems to me in some sort itself tyrannical, since the existence of authority which has the power to tolerate, menaces liberty of thought just in this, that it tolerates, and that thus it might not tolerate." In Mirabeau's idea,—and in the Assembly, his was the controlling one,—the law should be absolutely silent with regard to religion. Rulings concerning man's relation with God had no place among the laws of men. "As well," he cried, "decree that the sun was the only sun which they would accept for light as decree that the Catholic religion was the law of the land."<sup>50</sup> This was the characteristic attitude of all the leaders of the Revolution up to the period when tyranny, in order to liberty, became the unfortunate practice. Equally unqualified are the arguments in favor of liberty of the press. "The public expresses itself badly," says Sièyes, "when it asks for a law to give freedom of the press. It is not in virtue of the law that the citizens think, speak, write and publish their thoughts; it is in virtue of their natural rights which men brought into the association, and for the maintenance of which they have established the law itself and all the public methods which serve them."<sup>51</sup> "There is no law," says another, "to be made on the liberty of the press; this means of communicating one's thought can no more be enchained than the thought itself."<sup>52</sup> Even when the Convention framed the decrees which punished the writing of seditious pamphlets with death, the debates which prefaced these decrees

<sup>50</sup> *Choix de Rapports*, Vol. I, p. 238 et seq.

<sup>51</sup> *Choix de Rapports*, II, p. 251.

<sup>52</sup> Speech of Chapelier. *Choix de Rapports*, V, p. 219.

were so many glowing tributes to the eternal and inalienable liberty of the press.<sup>53</sup>

To sum up, in the earlier period, it was held that society should have no direct share in looking after the individual interest, nor in shaping the morality of the nation. The regulation of his private tastes and occupations, and the practice of his religion was to be left entirely to each individual. The duty of society was to protect all individuals and all cults equally. Liberty of person and of thought was to be reserved by the law to each member of society, with only the limitation respecting the same rights in others. But passionate as was the love for liberty and the desire for personal freedom during the Revolution, the principle that the well-being of the whole social body took precedence of the individual well-being, gradually got the upper hand. Even in theory, the idea of liberty for each went swiftly to the wall after '91, as against the struggle for a certain kind of liberty for all. After '92, only one part of the individual natural right remained in full possession to each individual. The right of each to express his will in the affairs of the nation, a right affirmed, but not granted, in '89, and both affirmed and granted in '93, remains a natural and inalienable right, though in practice, at least, that also disappears after '93. However, it was in the name of the theory of the sovereignty of the nation that individual rights were overshadowed and a tyranny was finally set up, than which modern history tells of few greater.

<sup>53</sup> In *Choix de Rapports*, Vol. XI, pp. 303, 304, the reader will find interesting evidence of how far these Conventionnels were checked by their own theories when those who attacked them were to be dealt with.

The enthusiasm for the idea of liberty had only slight precedence over the enthusiasm for that of equality.<sup>54</sup> Even before the two higher Estates had yielded to the Third and the Constituent Assembly had been actually organized, these two rights, now so intimately associated with the Revolution, were demanded together, as the imperative need of the time.<sup>55</sup> It is a prevailing thought that "liberty and equality are the supreme possession" of the French people, that equality must be "the base of the Constitution."<sup>56</sup>

Equality is a broad term, and carries with it different concepts, according to the development of the man who uses it. As a principle of government, it has covered all manner of ideals. On the one hand, those who preach equality have in view carefully supervised communities where groups of men are to be brought up to eat, dress, act and think alike, using unequal powers for the single end of the general well-being, and taking no special account of personal enjoyment; on the other hand, there is that conception of equality which interprets the word to mean equal freedom from impediments in a race where the spoils shall be to the nimblest.

During the first part of the Revolution, the claims for equality were really put forward under the influence of this latter, the physiocratic, idea of equality. Mere

<sup>54</sup> *La liberté et l'égalité sont leurs biens suprêmes; il sacrifieront tout pour les conserver.* Roland. Séance of September 23, 1793. *Choix de Rapports*, X, p. 24.

<sup>55</sup> See, in particular, Mirabeau's famous speech of June 15, 1789, in *Moniteur*, I, p. 351.

<sup>56</sup> Speech of Charles de Lameth, June 19, 1790. *Choix de Rapports*, II, p. 115.



liberty of opportunity, the principle of laissez-faire, was all the equality asked or desired. Mirabeau slurringly spoke of any other idea of equality as "only a violent fit of revolutionary fever,"<sup>57</sup> which, because of the inborn vanity of man, could not endure. Each speech of the early days in the Assembly begins and ends with the claim for every man's right to an equal chance in the struggle for existence; that is, for the right to equal legislation, and equal territorial rights in each administrative unit in the kingdom, as well as for the abolition of all special privilege.<sup>58</sup> It was usually asserted that this sort of equality was dependent upon an equal protection of each individual by the state, and could only be insured by laws alike for all.<sup>59</sup> The successive assemblies delegated to make the laws concerning "the establishment, the formation, the organization, the functions, the mode of acting, the limits of all social power,"<sup>60</sup> aimed first of all at securing liberty and equality to the nation; they strove valiantly toward equality by abolishing all heredity in office, or all long tenure of office, on the ground which later experience has shown to be so debatable—the ground that no man was specially endowed to serve his country, but that all were equally able to conduct the simple duties of government. The same theory, of course, was behind the law making which decreed that each citizen was eligible to any place under the government. All

<sup>57</sup> Correspondence with La Marck, I, p. 351.

<sup>58</sup> See speech on Duc d'Aiguillon, Moniteur, Vol. I, p. 279.

<sup>59</sup> Blanc, *op. cit.*, III, p. 407.

<sup>60</sup> Condorcet in report on the projected Constitution of '93, one of the most political speeches of the Revolution. *Choix de Rapports*, XII, p. 279.

men were made equal before the common law, when feudal privilege was destroyed and the Church reduced to a civil institution; when the contributions for the state support were drawn equally from all men and from all sections of the country. The political and civil laws of the Revolution had always in view the provincial, municipal and personal equalization of the national life.

After 1791, when visionaries held the reins of government, and the lawmakers were in such desperate haste to realize the rational, there was a distinct difference in the interpretation of the right of equality. Although the principle is couched in about the same terms, although equality was still demanded, in order that each "shall enjoy the same rights,"<sup>61</sup> in reality the principle is changed. Equality comes to be a doctrine making for the leveling-down of all to a certain standard. The notion of equality now takes legal form as a demand for the support of the poor by the rich. There are distinct governmental efforts to bring about a more equal division of fortunes by making the superfluous useless to him who possesses it, or by turning it to the advantage of him who is without it, and thus, in either case, ordering it to the profit of society at large.<sup>62</sup> The idea of equality comes to take precedence of the idea of liberty. The earlier notion was absolute liberty and the greatest possible equality; the later doctrine was

<sup>61</sup> Dec. of April, '93. *Choix de Rapports*, XII.

<sup>62</sup> See *Chronique de Paris* No. 19, January, 1793. (Cited in *Sudre. Histoire de Communisme*, p. 258.) Comp. also *Sagnac. La Législation Civile de la Révolution Française*, especially pp. 246-276.

more nearly absolute equality, to the end of the greatest possible liberty. The dream of solving for all time the problem of alimentation by limiting or equalizing consumption, all to the end of bringing about social justice, got the upper hand, and the doctrine of equality came to sound like something very near to communistic similarity.

The principle of equality, then, like the doctrine of liberty, changed its aspect during the Revolution. Although it is the individualistic interpretation of equality which has been handed on with most persistence, as having been a principle of Revolution, the communistic idea of equality had undoubted currency for a considerable period. The equality which in later French history has been announced as the "revolutionary principle of equality," has meant equal right to protection from the government, and otherwise equal freedom to follow where individual interests might lead; but under the most distinctive period of the Revolution, equality meant the nearest possible approach to similarity of possession, of habits and of opportunities for culture and enjoyment.

Because of the wholesale appropriation of property which went on during its course, the whole revolution has sometimes been called a socialistic movement, under the interpretation of socialism which takes the theory to include all social movements made in favor of state action directed toward the equalization of property-holding.<sup>63</sup> Whenever modern political theorists

<sup>63</sup> See e. g. Espinas — *La Philosophie Sociale, au XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle et la Révolution.*

so interpret the property doctrine of the Revolution, they then hold that the revolutionary theory of property-right started with the idea of state as possessor. On the other hand, because of what is contained in both declarations of rights, others have asserted that the principle which controlled the whole revolutionary thinking concerning property was that individualistic theory which holds the state to be the only guarantor of an original and inalienable natural right. Probably it is most correct to say that, so far as practice was concerned, the principle which was behind the acts of legislation was what has been recently called the "appropriationist"<sup>64</sup> principle, a principle by which one "expropriates first and then apports again to the best of one's ability." Throughout the Revolution the idea was not so much to discredit the right of individual land-holding as it was to establish the state's right to regulate the character of that holding.

Two currents of opinion are plainly discernible when account is taken of those principles concerning private holding which the leaders of the new movement laid down in the course of the frequent debates upon questions of property that took place during the four years under discussion. The prevailing opinions group under two heads: There was one theory which contended that property was a right anterior to society, a right resting on labor, and that the state was only the

<sup>64</sup> E. Faguet in *La Grande Revue* for May, 1899. Art. "Le Socialisme dans la Révolution Française," p. 371. The French verb "appropriier," it will be remembered, means to apportion, requiring the reflexive form before it gets our meaning of "appropriate."



guardian of that right; there was another which regarded personal holdings as a right deriving from society. In the latter view, society was held to be the depositary of all rights, and thus, by the terms of an original arrangement, had always the final power to decide upon the right of each and all to retain personal possession. It seems to have been pretty generally admitted by all factions, until 1791, that the natural man needed property in order to fulfill his destiny of earthly happiness, and, in the interests of such a need, had retained that right on entering society. After 1791, it was not usual to hear any one of the leaders urge that a primitive right took precedence of a social claim at least to arbitrate upon all property, but the idea of the state as the protector of all personal property had preference during the first half of the Revolution.<sup>65</sup>

In support of the theory of absolute individual control of all possessions, it was contended that property rests on a law anterior to all constitutions. "Each enters into the social compact, bringing with him his property, and the protection of his possessions is the sole object of the social contract; therefore, it is sacred, unless the nation should dispose of it for the general good, and in return for a just and preliminary indemnity."<sup>66</sup> All those who stand for inviolability of property admit this final qualifying clause,<sup>67</sup> but men of all

<sup>65</sup> So prominent a man as Mirabeau was, however, a dissenter from it.

<sup>66</sup> Lasource in the Convention. *Moniteur*, XVI, p. 7.

<sup>67</sup> See the debates of August 4, 1789 (*Moniteur*, I, pp. 279 et seq.), and other debates on property cited elsewhere.

factions, Constitutionalists, Monarchists, Feuillants and Girondists agreed that, unless the right deriving from the condition antecedent to society was to be protected and preserved by society, the right should not be surrendered. It was held that unless the individual property-right was respected, "liberty itself would disappear \* \* \* industry would be made tributary to stupidity, activity to laziness, economy to dissipation; over the laborious, intelligent and economic man, the tyranny of ignorance, idleness and debauchery would be set up."<sup>68</sup> Even opportunists like Danton<sup>69</sup> demanded that the laws should declare "all properties, territorial, individual and industrial, eternally inviolable."<sup>70</sup> Though his motion received the applause of the majority, it was criticised by Cambon, who reminded the Assembly that property, like everything else, was subject to the will of the people. Here is the keynote of the other theory which holds property to be a social right, not one inherent in the individual.

The right of property, as deriving from the consent of the whole nation, which is thus made the original possessor, was the theory of property which, surviving from the century preceding, chiefly influenced the thought and act of the Revolution. The most interesting and best-known exponent of this theory is Mirabeau, who, it is well known, held property to be a social, not

<sup>68</sup> Vergniaud on property, cited in Sudre, *op. cit.*, pp. 263, 264.

<sup>69</sup> The word "opportunist" is here taken to mean nothing derogatory. It implies one who is ready to use any means which he believes will bring about the well-being of the country he holds dear.

<sup>70</sup> *Moniteur*, XVI, p. 7.

a natural right, and the proprietor simply a government official. "I know but three ways of existing in society," says Mirabeau; "one must be beggar, thief or wage-earner (*salarié*)." The proprietor is himself only the first of wage-earners; that which is vulgarly called property is nothing but the price which society pays to its proprietors for the distribution which he is charged to make to the other individuals by his consumption and his expenses. "Les propriétaires sont les agents, les économistes de corps social;"<sup>71</sup> and when circumstances make it necessary for state to assert this property-right, proprietors cannot justly deny the pre-eminent right of society to claim its own. Mirabeau was not alone in this opinion. Not so often in the conventions of state, perhaps, but in all the club reunions and in the papers and pamphlets of the time, this doctrine finds untiring support.<sup>72</sup> Sometimes, it goes along with the suggestion of communism,<sup>73</sup> but no one seriously broached the idea of communistic or collectivist property-holding.<sup>74</sup> It is true that, pursuant to

<sup>71</sup> See the whole very suggestive speech in séance of August 10, 1789. *Moniteur*, I, p. 327; comp. also his speech on succession in direct line, "la société qui avait créé le droit de propriété, pouvait à son gré lui limiter." (Comp. also Tronchet and Camus; speeches on occasion of debates on the inheritance laws, April, 1791.)

<sup>72</sup> Comp. Robespierre on property, *Moniteur*, XVI, p. 213. Dubois de Crancé, discours, February, 1793 (cited in Lichtenberger, *Le Socialisme et la Révolution Française*, p. 117); also the major part of the speeches of Chabot, Billaud-Varennes, Fauchet. The most important debates on property were those of August 4, 1789, and the day or two succeeding; the month of August, 1790; the 3-6 of July, 1791, and August 14, 1792.

<sup>73</sup> As, for instance in the doctrines of Père Duchesne and Claude Fauchet.

<sup>74</sup> Communistic ideals had no real force in the Revolution.

this right, it was considered the duty of the representatives of the sovereign to decide whether in the last resort an individual was entitled to possess property,<sup>75</sup> and also to determine what amount each should possess.<sup>76</sup> Thus property might be appropriated on grounds of crimes against the sovereign people; the popular will should assert itself, on the question of how much a man might bequeath to his heirs and what part the amount of his property should play in determining his share of the contribution to state support. The corollaries of the principle of the state's final right to property were thus laws of confiscation — laws limiting the size of fortunes, inheritance laws, and a progressive tax. But however much such laws may smack of communistic or socialistic theories, they did not result in a social system which resembled any type of socialistic society; not even when the idea behind such interference with the personal right was the con-

Although the Convention listened with attention to a discourse (Carra. Séance of 25 February, '93. *Choix de Rapports*, XI, p. 304 et seq.) in which the question of appropriating fortunes gained in an illicit fashion was discussed, and it was pleaded that such appropriation be decreed, because "partout où le peuple retrouve son bien, il a le droit de le prendre; c'est un axiome incontestable, non seulement de sa souveraineté, mais de la justice, de la raison et de la politique universelle," the motion was rejected as tending to encourage a popular expectation of an agrarian law. On motion of Barère, arch time-server, the Convention voted "la peine de mort contre quiconque proposera une loi agraire ou toute autre, subversive des propriétés territoriales, commerciales et industrielles." (*Choix de Rapports*, XI, p. 318.)

<sup>75</sup> See laws on confiscation of goods of the aristocrats e. g. in act establishing Revolutionary Tribunal, *Choix de Rapports*, XII.

<sup>76</sup> See laws on limitation of large fortune. Sagnac, *op. cit.*, pp. 217-243.



ception of state as rightful possessor of all the sources and means of production.

The reason for this is important and not far to seek. The root principle behind either idea of property was one entirely individualistic. It was believed, that in order to fulfill the end for which the greater number had been given the controlling power, that is, in order to best further the common happiness by means of individual freedom, the state must proceed by way of the segregation, not the aggregation, of possessions. The social duty, from which the social right over property derived, was the equitable division of property, in order to insure his share of happiness to each member of society. Even when it was held that the state had the right to take away from one citizen, it was only desired that it should do so in order that it might carry out completely its service of giving to another who was more deserving of possession. In all cases, the ideal was only state control of the partition of property, not state ownership of property. If the sovereign sequestered, whether on the grounds of being the real possessor, as was sometimes urged, or on the grounds of social utility, it was not in order to retain control of the property, but in order to an immediate redistribution on a basis which it conceived to be more nearly in consonance with those principles of freedom and equity that it had been created to preserve. During the Revolution, this theory that the state finally controlled property expressed itself in a minute partition of the land, because it went along with, and was in a sense secondary to, a theory that the individual was, by natural

law, free, and was best left free to seek the satisfaction of his own wants for himself. The whole aim of the Revolution was a new distribution of political power; the new distribution of property came in the minds of the revolutionary parties merely as a necessary measure in the course of such a repartition of the government control. When the power of the Church was to be diminished; when the defection of the nobles was to be punished and the ecclesiastical and manorial properties were expropriated by the state, the grounds of such confiscation were oftenest that it was the state duty to appropriate property wherever the individual had failed in his duty to the state. The estates of the guilds, of the suspects, of persons condemned to the death penalty, these and any of the quasi-public or private domains which were eventually alienated, were always adjudged to the state on grounds of public utility, whether state right or state duty was the final argument which sanctioned the appropriation.

To sum up, the theory of property current during the Revolution shows an interesting separation of opinion as to the right of property. Along with the doctrine of the sacredness and inviolability of individual property on grounds of a natural right, deriving from labor, it gave conspicuous importance to the principle that the final and real proprietor was always the state. Both parties were, however, so influenced by a belief in the intimate connection between the development of the individual and his inherent right to seek and hold any means he deemed most needful for his personal happiness, that there was no tendency to talk

of state ownership of land. In regard to property, the principle which emerges most positively from the Revolution is the idea of the state as arbiter concerning all questions of property. State appropriations were always made on grounds of social utility, whether in the name of a state right or a state duty. Whenever such appropriations were made, the public necessity was always urged, in accordance with the requirements of the articles of both declarations,<sup>77</sup> even when the "indemnity" they also provided for was not forthcoming. The ideas of property prevailing during the Revolution may be said to have focused; not so much to a unity of opinion concerning the source of the right of property, but rather to a uniformity of opinion which served greatly to widen the sphere of state activity.

One important general fact derives from this review of the revolutionary opinion concerning natural rights. It must have been observed that, whether in regard to the physical or mental freedom of the individual, his social status, or his property, always the revolutionary tendency was to accent increasingly the state's right to arbitrate concerning the share of each individual in such rights. While it is never to be forgotten that, in the eyes of the revolutionists, social institutions were only conceived to exist for the sake of the individual, just because the individual interests were held to need social institutions, this problem of the state and its duties grew to be of increasing importance. The whole political problem really resolved finally into this one of

<sup>77</sup> Declaration of '89, art. XVII; Declaration of '93, arts. XVI and XIX.

finding an answer for the question as to what were the powers and duties of the state. Here, as at later periods, the question was, how far collective action must aid moral and physical well-being; in a word, what was the relation of the state to the individual? To find the reply which the Revolution gave to this question is to find the revolutionary answer to the pivotal political problem of that or any time. In this summary statement of the revolutionary principles, it remains then to discuss the position of the revolutionists on two fundamental political principles. It must be clearly understood what the state, or sovereign, was conceived to be, and what was supposed to be the relation of the sovereign to each individual in the nation. The least skilled of political theorists who remembers that the spirit of '93 was one of logical completeness, can work out the Constitution of '93, if the revolutionary idea of sovereignty and of relation between the state and the individual is made clear.

#### IV.

Under the influence of the prevailing moral and social ideas, the theory concerning the source of political power took an entirely new aspect during the Revolution. A political philosophy that had grown in general favor was now applied to practical politics. The sovereignty which had been so long held to be vested in one person, whose power derived from a providential source, now became the whole nation whose right could be traced to the will of man. The revolutionary doctrine replaced the absolute monarchy by the abso-



lute majority. Supreme political power was now given as unreservedly to the Nation as it had formerly been given to a single man.<sup>78</sup> "Sovereignty resides in the people," says the declaration of '93;<sup>79</sup> "it is one, indivisible, imprescriptible and inalienable," and this theory, stated plainly in the previous declaration, and held to be axiomatic in the Cahiers, has been the most lasting dogma which the Revolution has bequeathed to later political theory.

It was, of course, the theory of the social contract by which it was proven that the general will was to control the particular will.<sup>80</sup> Rousseau's contention that the original voluntary contract had finally given the ultimate right of decision to the majority, reappears without reservation. "A first, unanimous consent, founded upon the evidence of an absolute necessity, submits the minority of the citizens to the desires of the majority, and the will of the greatest number becomes really the will of all."<sup>81</sup> "Each part of society is subject; the sovereignty resides only in all parts united," says a man so conservative as Lally-Tollendal.<sup>82</sup> There is practically no dissent from the assertion that since, by Natural Law, power derives from

<sup>78</sup> Comp. Robespierre's demand for universal suffrage, Aug. 9, 1792, cited in Blanc, *La Révolution française*, VII, p. 36.

<sup>79</sup> Art. 25; comp. also art. 1, Dec. of '89.

<sup>80</sup> "Toute espèce de puissance individuelle qui tendrait à restreindre les droits du peuple et blesserait les principes de l'égalité" are to be condemned. "Jurons tous la souveraineté du peuple, sa souveraineté entière". (Couthon on duty of Convention. *Moniteur*, XIV, p. 6.)

<sup>81</sup> Condorcet. Séance of Aug. 9, 1792. *Choix de Rapports*, IX, p. 281.

<sup>82</sup> *Moniteur*, I, p. 132. Comp. also almost any one of Robespierre's speeches; for e. g. that on the abolition of capi-

the consent of the greater part of those persons who entered into a social relation, it necessarily follows that absolutely free and equal share in the law making and the law-administering belongs to each member of the social body, for it is only in this way that the social man can remain his own master. Social happiness was held to depend upon the universal recognition of this principle that the law, "a just and useful intention expressed by a supreme will,"<sup>83</sup> should be always the "free and solemn expression of the general will."<sup>84</sup>

Right of resistance, which played such a noteworthy part in the revolutionary theory, means nothing more than the right to insist upon and to preserve this interpretation of sovereignty. The much-vaunted right of resistance was only the sanction to the theory of popular sovereignty. Any attempt to alter the principle which vested social control in the general will was to be regarded as a betrayal of the terms of association. Whosoever, by an attempt to make his individual will the controlling will, dared to menace the principle of popular sovereignty, merited immediate death at the hands of the general association.<sup>85</sup> For it was contended that the association not only bound itself

tal punishment: comp. Vergniaud, *Moniteur*, Vol. XV, p. 11. S<sup>é</sup>ance of Dec. 31st, 1791.

<sup>83</sup> Malouet. *Moniteur*, I, p. 77.

<sup>84</sup> First clause of art. 4, Dec. of '93; comp. also Boyer-Fonfrede, "J'ai le cœur trop haut; j'ai l'âme trop fière pour reconnaître d'autre souveraine que le peuple." *Choix de Rapports*, XXII, p. 18.

<sup>85</sup> See Vergniaud. Speech on the Emigrés, Oct. 26, 1791. "Je consens d'être puni de mort si j'attente à la votre" (surété). Comp. also speech of St. Just on the Constitution of '93. *Choix de Rapports*, XII, pp. 269 et seq.

to permit each person to exercise his will as much as was compatible with the freedom of the other members of the nation; it likewise contracted to protect the right of all against the possible encroachment of each. Every member of the association had the right of insurrection if the association failed to perform this service. The doctrine meant not so much right of resistance to the popular will as a right to resist the illegal acts of the organs of that will. When this right of resistance was said to be the most sacred of all rights,<sup>86</sup> what was meant was resistance to incursions upon the right of the sovereign people, not resistance to that final sovereignty. Where there was oppression of a single member such that the sovereignty of all was threatened, resistance became at once a right and a duty.<sup>87</sup>

It is interesting, if a little beside the point, to note how this interpretation of sovereignty finally got expression in the fundamental law. When the question of committing political powers into the hands of deputies came up for discussion, it was generally agreed that as little power as possible must be unreservedly delegated, lest the servant become the master. Not only were the most limited powers to be intrusted to a portion of the nation, but also, whatever power was delegated, was to be divided as little as might be. By '93 there was no more of that enthusiastic support of the principle of the separation of powers which had been one of the pet theories in '89. In place of the Con-

<sup>86</sup> Dec. of '93, arts. 33, 34 and 35.

<sup>87</sup> Comp. Robespierre's speech (Moniteur, I, p. 182). "Y-a-t il rien de plus légitime que de se soulever contre une conjuration horrible formée pour perdre la nation?"

stitutionalists and Feuillants, who put so much stress upon the principle; instead of Mirabeau defending "cette grande locution des trois pouvoirs,"<sup>88</sup> and a majority eagerly advocating a separate executive, legislative and judiciary, as the "powers which concur in the establishment of the society,"<sup>89</sup> there is an entirely different point of view. In '89, the Declaration of Rights consecrated the separation of powers as the sole valid guarantee of individual rights.<sup>90</sup> In the Convention, the majority went with Ducos, who called the notion of the distribution of powers "that chimera accredited by the example of England, and by the authority of several writers otherwise very estimable."<sup>91</sup> It was held that a true democracy did not divide power; it chose a few representatives to plan and to act for it, and reserved for itself all rights of final decision. The desire to have the active consent of the whole people in all matters of law making, led the Jacobins to draw up a constitution which it is permissible to believe could never have been worked. But that constitution<sup>92</sup> remains as the proof of the political ideal of the Revolution. The constitution provided for manhood suffrage and for the most democratic principle of representation;<sup>93</sup> arranged for an obligatory referen-

<sup>88</sup> *Moniteur*, I, p. 76.

<sup>89</sup> De Virieu. *Choix de Rapports*, I, p. 62; comp. also Vergniaud (séance Dec 30, 1793), who declaims against "cette cumulation de pouvoirs \* \* \* est si effrayante que \* \* \* si elle se reproduit, elle nous conduirait avec rapidité à la tyrannie." *Moniteur*, Vol. XV, p. 11.

<sup>90</sup> Dec. of '89, art. 16.

<sup>91</sup> See séance of April 17, 1793. *Choix de Rapports*, XII, p. 285.

<sup>92</sup> Con. of '93, art. 4.

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid*, arts. 22, 23, 24 and 27.



dum,<sup>94</sup> and placed the delegated power thus limited in the hands of one legislative body,<sup>95</sup> which held for only a year and had only administrative power<sup>96</sup> to be actually exercised by means of an executive council which was little more than a sort of ministry.<sup>97</sup> Such a constitution certainly renders unqualified homage to the idea of a Sovereign Nation; its provisions demonstrate the will to vest all political power in the people, the desire to make them the state and to constitute all deputies as mere functionaries of the popular authority. All but ordinance-making power was reserved to the people;<sup>98</sup> thus, the nation was to be, in fact as in theory, the final depository of political power. The Constitution of '93 stands as the monument of how the Revolution tried to give immediate reality to the new dream of absolute popular sovereignty.

It has been seen how the theory of Natural Rights defined certain limitations upon the ruling power, since that theory outlined a sphere of activity as large as possible to be reserved to the individual. It has also been seen that the doctrine of the Revolution stood for the absolute sovereignty of the People, the supreme political right which was held to belong to the majority of the nation, exclusive of persons feminine, aristocratic, in service or criminal.<sup>99</sup> Thus, in a sense, the theory with regard to the relation between state and

<sup>94</sup> Constitution of '93, arts. 56, 57, 58.

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid*, art. 39.

<sup>96</sup> Arts. 55 and 59.

<sup>97</sup> Art. 62.

<sup>98</sup> Arts. 56, 57, 58 and 115.

<sup>99</sup> Art. 4; Con. of '93.

individual has been implied. But, in order to complete the statement of the important principles of the Revolution, it seems desirable to define explicitly the theory that prevailed concerning the relation between the collective society and the individual.

If one is predisposed to accept the idea still generally received, that the political principles of the Revolution were predominantly individualistic, the results of a study of the current conceptions concerning the functions of the state are somewhat surprising. The absolutely individualistic point of view, that attitude which limits all concerted action to the exercise of such power as shall enable functionaries of the sovereign to insure the peace and to collect the means to carry on the administration, has no sanction in the law nor in the arguments of any person whose opinions had an appreciable influence. Throughout the Revolution, the twofold function of the government, government as protector, and government as public philanthropist and educator, is fully developed in theory; later doctrine came to lay formidable stress upon the second aspect of this function.

The doctrine of government as protector is, of course, universally accented and indorsed. In the Declaration of Rights, and in the constitutions, government is undoubtedly conceived of, in the first instance, as an institution, or rather a set of persons into whose hands the sovereign intrusts the function of maintaining order in the nation.<sup>1</sup> The definition of the several rights of equality, liberty and property clearly pre-

<sup>1</sup> Dec. of '89, art. 2; Dec. of '93, art. 1.

scribe that the sovereign depute this service to government.<sup>2</sup> Whatever the exact character of the organs of control created by the sovereign, the primary reason for giving such organs power is to insure order and stability to the whole association.<sup>3</sup> The duty of the envoys of the sovereign, that is, the duty of government, was first of all to clear the way so that each individual might have the fullest possible exercise of his rights. In 1789, the Declaration of Rights included a demand that government be supplied with a force sufficient to carry out this important service. Of course, government was to "reign by the laws" not "over the laws."<sup>4</sup> All fundamental law was to be made by the sovereign, and government was held to be the watch-dog of this constitutional law, as well as the creator of such additional law as should make the observation of the primary law certain.

As to the further function of government it was not, as has sometimes been stated, solely the practice of the Jacobin government which introduced the idea of a state activity wider than that of mere guardianship. As has already been seen, the assembly, when discussing natural rights, upheld the ideal of state as final arbiter. The very idea of popular sovereignty includes the notion of a collective will acting as a powerful, undivided force, which in the last resort shall decide upon

<sup>2</sup> See beside art. already cited, the interesting definition in the Declaration decreed April, '93, and afterwards abrogated in favor of the June Declaration. Note especially arts. 2, 5, 9, 17, 18, 24.

<sup>3</sup> Comp. e. g. Condorcet, plan of Constitution, séance 15th of Feb., '93. *Choix de Rapports*, XII, p. 228.

<sup>4</sup> Abbé Grégoire. *Choix de Rapports*, I, p. 37.

all rights of the individual. Government was to secure to each man "the free and entire exercise of his faculties, physical and moral,"<sup>5</sup> and a yet wider sphere is suggested in Title I of the Constitution of '91. It was in reply to the appeal of leaders like Target,<sup>6</sup> Malouet,<sup>7</sup> Servan, and perhaps more than half the leaders of the Assembly,<sup>8</sup> that this title contained the clauses creating establishments for public charity, for foundlings, for the infirm poor, and for furnishing work for those who are unable to find it; it was this same title which made government the power to organize free public instruction. The difference between these provisions and those of '93 is a difference in position of the doctrine<sup>9</sup> and in the manner of utterance.<sup>10</sup> It would be to press the point under discussion too far to insist that the idea of state activity was quite the same in both periods. No doubt the dominant note of the Assembly was government as the power to maintain liberty; admittedly the guiding rule of the Convention was government as the medium for the maintenance of social justice. However, in the whole period there was an undoubted undercurrent of similarity when it is question of the work to be undertaken by the state. In 1791, as in 1793, Robespierre

<sup>5</sup> Mounier. Séance of July 27, 1789. Comp. art. 2 of the Dec. of 1789.

<sup>6</sup> Séance of Aug. 3, 1789. Cited in Michel. *L'Idée de l'Etat*, p. 91.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>8</sup> Comp. also the projects of Declarations by Thouriet, Rabaud de St. Etienne, Sièyes, etc., already noted.

<sup>9</sup> In the theories of '93, the same clauses have been placed among the Rights.

<sup>10</sup> Note the fervent mention of the "dette sacrée" which society, according to the Dec. of '93, owes to each unfortunate or sufferer. See arts. 21 and 22, Dec., '93.



held that the duty of the legislator was to preserve and to form the public morals, source of all liberty and of all social happiness<sup>11</sup> and to provide each person who could not procure himself work with the necessities of life.<sup>12</sup> Reading the debates of the first months of the Constituent Assembly, and then those of the Convention,<sup>13</sup> one gets convincing evidence that this doctrine of Robespierre was the general belief during the whole Revolution.<sup>14</sup> If the practice of '93 and thereafter seemed to put most weight upon the second part of the state duty, it was rather because special events gave power to a few fanatic young men, like Robespierre, Saint Just and Couthon, who were bent on realizing immediately and for all time their dreams of a centralized republic. Yet even these extremists were not at odds with the general theory of the period; they only expressed it more fervidly and believed more unhesitatingly that it might be realized. At all periods, the revolutionary theorists put their whole faith in the rationality of the Sovereign People, and its power to become the active political agent to social progress.

<sup>11</sup> Robespierre. Speech of May 30, 1791.

<sup>12</sup> *Choix de Rapports*, XII, p. 393. Though he was far from practicing it, Robespierre's idea of the end of government is a very fair expression of the revolutionary ideal on the same subject. The problem of government, he says, is solved by giving it such force that it shall bring the "individual to obey the general will and yet deprive it of the means to itself subjugate the individual." The whole service expected of government is to protect the weak against the strong. (See *Lettre à ses Commétants*. Blanc, *op. cit.*, VII, pp. 264-266.)

<sup>13</sup> Especially during the months of April and June, 1793.

<sup>14</sup> See e. g. Talleyrand's remarks in his speech on Church Property. *Choix de Rapports*, I, pp. 90 et seq. In this he contends at length for the final power of the state to adjust the social conditions which shall surround the individual.

In urging that it was the duty of the government to secure and aid the many against the few, the leaders of the Assembly Convention were only returning to the same principle of the relation of the state to the individual, which has always controlled the political theory of France. The various more or less enlightened despotisms which had gone along with the growth of the French nation had deeply rooted in the French temperament the idea of paternalism, as we now call state control. Neither in the eighteenth century nor in the Revolution, or in modern times has France really abandoned this principle. The idea that the final right and duty of the state is to shape the individual and collective life of a nation, had held throughout French history, and it was not abandoned during the Revolution. However much the revolutionists rooted out the old institutions, they did not get away from the doctrine that the state was the rehabilitating and developing agent. The notion as to where the final power rested, had changed; the mastership was clearly and definitely transferred to the people; this was the new principle which the Revolution brought. That exaggerated belief in the value and sanctity of each individual, which developed the still-surviving insistence upon the theory that government may only proceed by way of restriction and injunction, is a belief which came later. This dogma, purporting also to derive from Rousseau, is, so far as the writer is able to see, not discernible in the political principles of the Revolution, nor in those political writings of Rousseau which inspired the Revolution. As has been shown, the revolutionary principles stood for the final right of individual judgment, and the

whole Revolution was made in the name of that principle. Yet, after all, it was only the individual judgment united to that of his fellows, it was only the judgment of the social will (*moi commun*) which was ever really recognized by the political principles of the Revolution. There is no evidence that any of the revolutionists realized that the logical conclusion of the doctrine of individual rights was the theory of anarchy. The idea of absence of government played no real part in the revolutionary principles. On the contrary, all truly revolutionary principles advocated a strong and widespread manifestation of the activity of the collective will in order to the best interests of the individual and the general well-being.

In fact, the strong national predisposition for centralization is never better evidenced than during the Revolution. Not only did the accepted idea of state make it both the right and duty of the government to act for the moral as well as the physical protection of the community; it was held, moreover, that in order to fulfill this double service, the government must be independent and dominant. Neither church nor privileged classes,<sup>15</sup> neither small nor large groups within the nation<sup>16</sup> were to have any but an entirely subordinate and equal relation to the government. Spiritual authority was to play no part in social control;<sup>17</sup> the state was ethical, not theological and permitted of neither direction nor cooperation from any theological or lesser organization.

<sup>15</sup> Decrees of Aug. 4, 1789; of Nov. 5, 1789. (Cited in Sagnac, *La Législation civile de la Révolution française*, p. 38.)

<sup>16</sup> Decrees of Sept. 11, 1790; June 17, 1791.

<sup>17</sup> Established by Civil Constitution of the Clergy, Dec. 26, 1790. Enforced by decree against non-juror priests, Nov. 29, 1791.

All citizens, all territorial divisions held equal relation to the state; for all citizens in all parts of the nation, the will of the state was the law against which there was no appeal.

During the entire epoch, the men most eager to create absolutely new institutions never got away from the traditional notion that the state, the real and final power for individual and social progress, must have dominant control. The statutes of the Convention came to be so many witnesses to this theory of government. When legislation comes to be chiefly laws for the regulation of social customs and even opinions, these acts prove how an historic tendency will survive in face of an imported theory which found currency because it had immediate usefulness. The belief in a centralized and controlling government outlasts the newly discovered sanctity and political value of the individual.

In conclusion, it may be said that the most important contributions of the Revolution to the political theory of the new century were the popularization of the doctrine of Natural Rights and the clear formulation of the idea of popular sovereignty. These conceptions suggest a certain antinomy between state and individual. On the one hand, revolutionary theory maintained the sanctity of the sphere of individual activity and judgment; on the other, it stood for the validity and force of the general will, when expressed in government. The general will was to serve as the final arbiter, and was to decide how much free play might be given to the particular will. The idea of the individual implied an independent, self-sufficing unit in society, blessed with innate and inalienable capacities for happiness and good



judgment, able to be the personification of self-help, if only the state will see to it that every one else stands aside and gives him a fair chance at the possibilities of civilized life. The idea of the sovereign throughout the Revolution was, in the last analysis, that of a final and independent power, acting alone and unchecked by any intermediary force for the direct benefit and protection of each and every member of the community. The present has not yet rid itself of this contradiction which was the most notable contribution of the revolutionary period to our time.

The statement of the more important principles of the Revolution is now completed. These principles were first of all principles of revolt, designed to establish what seemed a social order more propitious than that which had been conducted by the long-established but now discredited authorities. Their guiding principles were not deductions from the history of man, but from reason. Reason discerned a divine plan whose end was an eternal tendency to harmony. This same reason, an internal authority against which there was no tangible standard of argument, made out society and the social order to have been formed by a voluntary act and in self-protection; it held that both society and a given social order might justly continue only where it was fully recognized that each member of the association had a natural and equal share in the privileges of association. By the terms of association it was held to be the duty of the associated will to protect all members of society against some few whose physical or mental make-up might lead them to infringe upon the natural rights of others in a selfish seeking after a fuller satis-

faction of their own desires. Thus the individual had always to do with the predominant and infallible majority voice, and the fact that he lived in society and had the advantages of such a life made it obligatory upon each individual to renounce his personal rights whenever that majority voice believed that these encroached upon the rights of the greatest number. The revolutionary principles stood for national freedom; they sought to give to each individual the largest possible measure of political justice, to insure as complete a share as possible of peace, security, freedom and property to every member of the nation. But in spite of the keen appreciation of the existence and equal value of each individual, the whole tenor of the revolutionary doctrine and practice was less to stimulate an individualistic movement than to arouse a sentiment in favor of a sense of social duty, a sense of fraternity.<sup>18</sup> The theory laid down clearly enough that society was for man, not man for society; but the revolutionary principle also held to the right of the majority as the pre-eminent right, and in so doing neglected man for Man. Having adopted the doctrine of majority rule, with their usual logical completeness French theorists subordinated the right of the individual to the right of the greatest number of individuals; they tended toward the theory which deprecates individual progress wherever this acted as a check upon social progress. After all

<sup>18</sup> The doctrine of fraternity was never preached in precise terms except at the Cercle Social, and in the "Bouche de Fer," the organ of that club; but the idea of social duties came up in the Assembly (Séance Aug. 14, 1789. *Moniteur*, Vol. I, p. 277), and Robespierre and his followers always preached it in an international spirit. *Comp. Moniteur*, Vol. XVI, p. 214. "Les hommes de tous les pays sont frères," etc.

then, it would seem that the revolutionary principles underlie a movement which holds that the single individual must give place to the united social will. The Rights of Man, the individualistic part of the theory, was the cry of revolt, the weapon of demolition; the idea of popular sovereignty and its corollary of the rule of the majority was the constructive part of the new doctrine and was the principle which persisted with most force in the doctrines of a later time. The revolutionary theory on the whole, does not assert any doctrine of progress; but, arguing on the ground of rational sanction, it sets up, as basic principles for organized society, the doctrine of centralized democracy, of a civil and political liberty as complete as the well-being of the whole community will permit, and the creed of entire individual freedom in the industrial domain.

The first part of the research here undertaken is now completed. It has been briefly shown how Frenchmen of the eighteenth century came to be at odds with the creeds of an old social order, and how this quarrel with the old institutions bred a new set of theories which came to be counted fundamental truths; finally, the general character of these new beliefs has been described. The discussion must now pass to the next century, there to follow another series of progressive changes resulting in another body of principles leveled against the accepted social order. The second part of this study undertakes to show those immediate influences which have developed French Socialism to a specific doctrine, and to state the character of that doctrine at the present time.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR CHAPTER III.


The bibliography of Chapter II, of course, furnishes in part the material for Chapter III, but in addition the following books are of value:

*Aulard*. La Société des Jacobins, Paris, 1889-98; Le Culte de la Raison et le Culte de l'Être Suprême. ed. Félix Alcan, Paris, 1892.—*Buchez et Roux*. Histoire parlementaire de la Révolution française. Picard et fils, Paris, 1834-1838.—*Choix de Rapports, Opinions et Discours*. Ed. Eymery, Paris, 1823.—*Condorcet*. Esquisse d'une histoire des progrès de l'esprit humain. ed. Paris, 1795.—*Lichtenberger*. Le Socialisme et la Révolution française. Félix Alcan, Paris, 1899.—*Moniteur*. Reprint by Plon & Cie., Paris, 1870.—*Morse-Stephens*. Orators of the Revolution. ed. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1892.—*Mirabeau*. Œuvres. ed. Didier, Paris, 1835.—*Sagnac*. La Législation civile de la Révolution française. Ed. Hachette et Cie., Paris, 1898.—*Volney*. Œuvres. ed. Wahlen, Bruxelles, 1822.



PART II.

THE DOCTRINES OF MODERN FRENCH  
SOCIALISM.



**CHAPTER IV.**

**THE IMMEDIATE ANTECEDENTS OF  
MODERN FRENCH SOCIALISM.**





## CHAPTER IV.

### THE IMMEDIATE ANTECEDENTS OF MODERN FRENCH SOCIALISM.

- I. THE BEGINNINGS OF MODERN FRENCH SOCIALISM.
- II. IDEAS WHICH FRENCH IDEALISTIC SOCIALISM HAD IN COMMON WITH ALL SOCIALISTIC THINKING.
- III. CHARACTERISTICS OF THIS EARLY SOCIALISM WHICH ARE NEW TO SOCIALISTIC THEORY.
- IV. INFLUENCE OF THE FRENCH IDEALISTIC GROUP.

#### I.

WHEN, in ages to come, men shall write the philosophical history of the nineteenth century, the final development of the idea of nationality will perhaps be accounted the most striking fact of political history. And yet, the story of the century's growth must also include the tale of discoveries which have given to each social group, growing more and more well-defined within its borders, the means for an intercourse swifter and more important than any hitherto known to men. It must tell that, in spite of the fact that national pride and national distinctions have, in the nineteenth century, grown greater than ever before, certain important social movements have been notably international.

This fact is particularly true of socialism. Since the incoming of the century, the socialistic movement has been a marked phenomenon in all the most civilized nations of Europe, and since the second half of the century it has been a movement essentially international. France, England, Germany, Italy have each one in turn

seen the rise of factions urging in some way the principle of association as a theory of government.

The growth and development of the theory in France is here the only socialistic movement in question. Neither the specifically economic rising for self-assertion among the English wage-earners nor the metaphysical and political movement in Germany is to be taken into account, except as each concerns the development of modern French socialism.

The socialistic movement as such began in France, and has steadily grown there as the result of specific influences. Modern French socialism represents, as did the principles of the Revolution, the latest stage in a process which has been made up of the progress of a radical social philosophy and certain social facts acting to give that philosophy a particular character. First of the influences upon the character of the French socialism of our day is a certain type of social philosophy which early acquired the name of socialism.<sup>1</sup> Certain aspects of the national growth of France modified that philosophy, and became in a way the final and determining influence upon the doctrine.

The history of the theory of socialism in France<sup>2</sup> during the nineteenth century separates into two sharply distinguished periods, during one of which the doctrine

<sup>1</sup>The origin of the word socialism is variously given. French authorities attribute it either to Reybaud (so does Ely, *French and German Socialism*, p. 29) or say that Leroux invented it and Reybaud vulgarized it. (see e. g. Villey, *Le Socialisme Contemporain*, p. I, Pref.) Kirkup (*History of Socialism*, p. 1) claims an English origin for it.

<sup>2</sup>The same is true of course elsewhere, but it is always to be remembered that it is only French socialism which is here the subject of discussion.

is entirely French, is idealistic and evangelical and usually ready to compromise with the prevailing social institutions. During the other period, the theories become predominately foreign and scientific, propagandist and uncompromising in regard to the social order.

The socialism of the first period expressed itself in a series of somewhat revolutionary movements, each stimulated by men who had been greatly influenced by the strictly Rousseau side of the Revolution. The names and the doctrines of those who represent this Idealistic socialism in France, are, most of them, familiar to every student of socialism. More or less careful studies of Babeuf, Cabet,<sup>3</sup> Proudhon,<sup>4</sup> Saint Simon, Fourier and Louis Blanc appear in every history of socialism. Pec-

<sup>3</sup> Cabet and his "Icaria" had little lasting influence. Cabet's theory aspires toward individual comfort and luxury; but although he thus theoretically recognizes the rights of the individual, Cabet's paramount object is an uncompromising equality leading to a strictly communal life. The liberty of the individual to develop depends upon the liberty of all to develop; there shall be enjoyment, but only equal enjoyment. Liberty is said to be supremely desirable, but, under a definition which makes liberty "the right to do everything which is not forbidden by nature, reason and society, and to abstain from everything which is not ordered by them" (*Voyage en Icarie*, p. 404), the customary idea of liberty may fairly be said to be lost. With Cabet, the state is to think, act and desire; the individual is to obey, to serve and enjoy what is justly his. All of this is the social principle at the root of communism; Cabet with his "Vrai Christianisme" and his "*Voyage en Icarie*" is rather a successor to Plato, to Ramsay, to Mably, than a predecessor of Rénard or Deville.

<sup>4</sup> Proudhon's place among the predecessors of Modern Socialism may be and has been subject to question; yet it would seem that, rightly understood, Proudhon's "anarchy" is very like later French Socialism. Proudhon's state disappears in an industrial organization exactly as does that of Deville or

queur and Vidal, Buchez and Leroux are less commonly discussed by English writers. The relation of each of these socialists to the latest form of the doctrine they preached differs in degree, yet all alike had some share in stimulating the movement and shaping its principles. Interpreting variously the principles of the Revolution, differing sharply among themselves on questions of metaphysics and administration, they yet so far agreed on certain general lines that it is quite possible to find a number of similar doctrines which might be called the leading principles of the French idealistic socialists. Taken together, these principles constitute the first and most lasting literary influences behind the present socialistic doctrine in France.

These early socialists are called idealistic socialists because each of them had an ideal of social harmony, and protested against the social order as an erroneous social arrangement which did not express this harmony. They all believed also that, through a wise social supervision, an association of men was possible where justice could prevail and each man be insured happiness. Each one felt that the immediate way to transform an unpropitious social order to one which might represent peace and justice, was to begin an active social movement for a general education which should better men's moral standards and then teach them the necessity of leaving all productive property to the control of society. Then too, unlike those who

his master, Marx. On fundamental questions, the difference between Proudhon and these later reformers lies in the closer reasoning and greater precision of statement of the Marxists rather than in any real difference of doctrine.



wove ideals similar to these into utopian commonwealths which they never expected to see realized, every one of these agitators set out with a fierce determination to conquer the reality to their aims. Each one of them appealed to facts of the existence they knew, in order to justify their claim. In fact, all may be said to have had a practical aim and to have tried to adopt a scientific method. All preached, in a more or less defined way, the doctrine of progress, and asserted that the change in institutions which they desired was in the direct line of social progress. All had very nearly the same objections to the industrial organization they knew, and in general lines asked for the same first steps toward final remedy.

Some of these characteristics of the group, for example, their ideal of social harmony, their belief in individual happiness and social justice, their accent upon the value of education as means to reform and their attack upon accepted property forms, are doctrines which have been those of all utopian and communistic thinkers since Plato wrote his Republic or the clerical and Anabaptist societies of Germany or Holland drew away into little groups.

On the other hand, the practical and scientific method which these idealistic socialists try to put into their doctrines, their idea of progress and the important social bearing they attach to the relation between the state and industry are the contributions of this earlier socialism to modern socialistic thinking. These characteristics, old and new, of the Idealistic French socialism, are of sufficient interest to require that each of them be stated with some precision.

## II.

A pessimistic view of the present is the first essential to the making of a socialist, but this alone will not suffice. This spirit will produce the man who dreams of "Cities of the Sun," but it will not lead him to expect to see them realized. To be a socialist, a second characteristic is equally essential. Along with a pessimistic attitude in regard to the present, there must go an unquenchable hopefulness in regard to some better future to be realized here on earth. Such hopefulness seems to have been a special privilege of our time. It has been well said that the main trend of thought in our age has been the conscious pursuit of social well-being.<sup>5</sup> This is undoubtedly true. It is probable that, during this century, more persons than ever before have advanced theories which set out to solve the essential problem of social philosophy and develop rapidly a reign of justice. The writers now under discussion express this appeal for a better and more nearly perfect order with a vigor and positiveness new to this particular kind of crusade against the social order. The utopist, the communist, is gone. The socialistic thinker, such as Mably or Morelly, is equally a thing of the past. The socialist, as such, begins to write.

The socialistic writings under discussion, as all socialistic writing from Grecian to modern, express a shadowy preconception of a fore-ordained plan which arranged an eternal harmony for nature and man. These modern critics of society were chiefly interested, of course, to find the way to realize the prearranged ter-

<sup>5</sup> Reybaud. *Etudes sur les Réformateurs contemporains ou Socialisme moderne.*

restrial harmony. Men do not necessarily renounce the idea of a supreme happiness transcending the possibilities of human happiness because they believe that harmony and content could and should be the order here; and these socialists, as well as another, often nursed their "larger hope."

It is an important distinguishing characteristic of these idealistic socialists that, although each touches but lightly upon metaphysical or religious doctrine, none of them is dogmatically materialistic or insistently rationalistic. There is a current use of the word God, employed in the deistic or pantheistic rather than in the theological interpretation. However, it is so much their chief interest to point the many evident divergences in reality from the prearranged plan discerned that, where the name of Deity is used, it is as an accepted premise and not as a matter of debate. They were content to hold the metaphysical subordinate and to center all their interest upon social problems.

Fourier's point of view in this regard is fairly indicative of that common to all the group. After a somewhat elaborate exposition of a cosmogony where a beneficent Deity was to conduct to an ultimate harmony, a world of which he was at once essence and director; a cosmogony where both the past and the extreme future life of this planet are determined and the most remote plans of the Deity discerned; where the fate of the soul before and after death is elaborated from a standpoint which makes its real happiness dependent upon a rounded personal existence for both incarnated soul and planetary soul, Fourier exclaims, "But what matter are these accessories to the question of chief importance,

which is the art of organizing combined industry whence will be born the quadruple product, good morals, accord of the three classes, rich, middle and poor; forgetfulness of the quarrels of parties, the cessation of pests, of revolution, of fiscal penury; and universal unity.”<sup>6</sup> Saint Simon, perhaps, accepts Christianity, especially when he hoped to further his schemes by winning the suffrage of its supporters;<sup>7</sup> Proudhon is full of reproaches to a God who has failed to do his duty;<sup>8</sup> Louis Blanc is a deist of the school of Rousseau,<sup>9</sup> but all are alike in this; they content themselves with some personally worked-out or authoritatively accepted theory of first causes, and hurry on to the mundane arrangements which seem to them of first importance.

<sup>6</sup> Fourier completely lost his bearings and wasted his best talent in the elaboration of a psychology of men and nations, a theory which led him to rest his final hope of social regeneration upon the “law of passional attraction” which this study revealed. Fourier held that when fully understood and made the moral basis of society, this law which he believed himself to have discovered was to give equilibrium to the rational world as the law of gravitation keeps the forces of Nature in just poise. Undoubtedly, this earnest and sincere thinker, who looked upon himself as a modern Columbus discovering a new social world for a skeptical and ungrateful public, set himself apart by this “law” in a niche where originality is the only virtue for which honor is due him. Yet mixed with the faulty psychology on which he himself lays so much regrettable stress, there is a scheme for social reform which includes many of the elements of modern socialism. On Fourier, comp. Michel (a most interesting study), *op. cit.*, pp. 375 et seq.; Reybaud, *op. cit.*, Vol. I; Godin, *Social Solutions*.

<sup>7</sup> Saint Simon. *Œuvres*, (Du Système Industriel), XXII, p. 232, ed. Dentu.

<sup>8</sup> See notably many phrases in *Systèmes des Contradiction économiques*.

<sup>9</sup> Note for e. g. in *Histoire de la Révolution française*, I, 388 et seq.



As to the world about us, these socialists begin, as all socialists do, with a courageous denial of necessary evil. Society and the individual are inherently good, not bad. Taking their cue from the eighteenth century philosophy, the French socialists of the first half of the nineteenth century are optimists with regard to the natural propensities of mankind. Therefore, they deny that egotism is a normal instinct of human nature; they assert, on the contrary, the innate goodness and unselfishness of the individual. This socialism begins that exaltation of the individual which is the distinctive characteristic of the nineteenth century socialism. No longer a plan for the service of humanity in general, most socialism becomes a special remedial movement with the development and happiness of the individual as its ultimate aim.

Also, this class of thinkers generally believe that men, though by nature well-meaning, are dependent upon guidance. This is, in fact, the controlling idea of these socialists and of all socialists — the idea that individual virtue is finally dependent upon the direction and inspiration of society. Social creeds make or mar men; social direction develops them from brutes or degrades them to something worse than beasts. It is the generic principle of socialistic philosophy as opposed to individualistic, that the social guarantee is finally the making and salvation of the individual. Arguing thus, it is but natural that, for such thinkers, it seems of first importance to find a social organization which shall justify itself by securing to every individual happiness and the means to develop.

The doctrine of Rights promulgated during the Revolution is clearly and universally reasserted by all of these radical writers. We are told, as we were told by the Revolutionists, that men have a natural right to happiness and to liberty and equality,<sup>10</sup> in order that they may develop, but we are also told that this right to happiness and development is not without its limits. Like the men who made the Declaration of Rights, these men believe that the individual may have only the greatest possible happiness, and like these predecessors they find the limit to that happiness in the happiness of others. They repeat with conviction that doctrine of the rights of the majority which the Convention practiced.

Only Babeuf pushed this doctrine of the rights of the greatest number to logical completeness. The conspiracy of "Les Egaux" was really the culmination of the feverish demand for equality, which, in certain circles, grew to be a fixed idea during the years of the Convention.<sup>11</sup> The idea of social uniformity is a fundamental note of Babouvism. It represents a dream of establishing content by way of a state control which should arbitrarily eliminate all inequalities of capacity and of hold-

<sup>10</sup> Saint Simon in this, as in many other things, is an exception. He states plainly that rights do not derive from natural claims, but from expediency. "Les droits de chaque associé ne peuvent être fondés que sur les facultés qu'il possède, pour concourir au but commun." *Œuvres*, (Système Industriel) Vol. XXII, p. 193; also in *Œuvres*, (L'Organisateur) XX, p. 145.

<sup>11</sup> Note how the "Conspiracy" indorsed the Constitution of '93 and the doctrines concerning the natural right of equality which had so much vogue during 1793 and 1794. The Conspiracy, as has been before suggested, is to be traced to Claude Fauchet and the Cercle Social rather than to the Jacobins.

ing — a dream that has no part among the beliefs of the most influential thinkers along modern socialistic lines. Babouvism asks for a society where laws, democratically made, it is true, shall maintain a strict level in culture and pleasure, in possession and the use of such possessions. Equality, as understood by Babeuf rests upon principles which involve an absolute neglect of the facts of individual dissimilarity and a complete subordination of the individual to the state. When Babouvism prescribes a set of arbitrary measures to eliminate and prevent all personal differences of temperament or capacity, it thus separates itself entirely from all the more important predecessors of modern French socialism. For this reason, notwithstanding its creed of democracy and its practical and nationalistic character, Babouvism is to be counted of secondary importance among the antecedents of the current French socialism.<sup>12</sup>

It has been said that, contending for the individual's rights, these socialists no longer grant the thesis that the individual is to merge his personality in society. The belief that the end is social growth, irrespective of the destiny of the particular members of society, is not usual. Buchez and Leroux, the one teaching a religion of progress, the other, a religion of humanity, are the noteworthy exceptions. They represent the extreme idealization of society as opposed to the many who, at the time, neglected society to take account of the individual man alone.

<sup>12</sup> There is a most interesting study of Babeuf in Espinas. *La Philosophie Sociale au XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle et la Révolution*, pp. 195-412; comp. also Reybaud, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 358-387.

According to Buchez or Leroux, it is the individual who is made by and for society, not society which is the result of individual activity.<sup>13</sup> For both, the single aim, whether of the individual, the nation or of humanity, was the establishment of the moral law as revelation shows it to man; for both, the individual is always subordinate to humanity,<sup>14</sup> and the duties of the individual take precedence of any particular claim for the individual right. Under the theory of modern socialism, society in the last resort is for the service of the individual, and whatever sacrifice of personal tastes the individual must make is only in the end of an ultimate fuller personal satisfaction; there is no idea of any but a utilitarian and finally egotistical self-denial. With this real and constant inconsistency of all specifically socialistic teaching of our day, neither Buchez nor Leroux have anything in common. The ideal of each is happiness by way of poverty, simplicity of wants, sacrifice and devotion to humanity;<sup>15</sup> the individual disap-

<sup>13</sup> Buchez. *Traité de Politique*, t. I, pp. 360, 361 (cited in Michel, p. 217). Leroux. *De l'Humanité*, I, p. 18, and Malthus et les Economistes, p. 136. (Comp. Michel, op. cit., p. 223.)

<sup>14</sup> Buchez. *Traité de politique*, I, p. 61. "L'homme considéré individuellement, n'a lui-même de valeur que par le but qui l'anime." See, also, *Hist. parlementaire*, Vol. XXIII, pref., p. xv. For Leroux on the same point, see *De l'Humanité*, Vol. I, p. 248. (Cited in Michel, p. 222.)

<sup>15</sup> Comp. Buchez, "Le premier en dignité social sera celui qui aura voulu être le dernier en jouissance matérielles" (cited in Michel, p. 216). See, also, *Hist. parlementaire*, Vol. XXIII, pref., p. xx, where he declares that when "la pauvreté sera en haut et la richesse en bas," then only will the French Revolution really be accomplished. Leroux. See "De l'Egalité, 2e partie, chap. iv (cited in Michel, p. 223). The doctrines of Leroux, especially in this connection, get an artistic and fervid expression in the work of George Sand. See



pears before society; the ideal of charity is replaced by that of solidarity as a duty.<sup>16</sup> Add to this, that Buchez and Leroux advocated a policy which, in fundamentals at least, represents a despotic central control that absorbs and modifies the individual initiative in a fashion entirely outside the aims of any modern socialistic scheme, and it will be evident that, while they may have done something to strengthen the modern socialist's idea of the organic relation between society and the individual, they had no wide influence on the general doctrines of modern collectivism.

The term "social justice" best describes the idea of justice which prompts the doctrine of rights urged by most of the French idealistic socialists. Justice was not with any of them an absolute conception; the word, on the contrary, was used as a relative term and waited the decision of society for its content.<sup>17</sup> The aim of any social organization is the realization of social justice where social justice is taken to mean the expression in institutions of the desires and needs of the major part of society.

What is claimed to be the moral justification of this conception of justice runs somewhat as follows. Individual happiness, both as a means and as an end, means

e. g. "Compagnon du tour de France" or of the "Lettre de Philon à Ignace Joseph Martinowicz" at the end of the "Comtesse de Rudolstadt."

<sup>16</sup> Buchez. *Hist. parlementaire*, t. XL, pref., p. vi (cited in Michel, op. cit., p. 215). Leroux. *De l'Humanité*, t. I, pp. 189-191. (Cited in Michel, p. 224.)

<sup>17</sup> See e. g. Proudhon. *What is property?* p. 234, 1st mem., Eng. ed.; *Idée générale de la Révolution au XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle*, p. 274. Saint Simon. *Œuvres (De l'Industrie)*, XIX, p. 30 et seq. Louis Blanc. *Questions d'aujourd'hui et de demain*, Vol. III, pp. 144 et seq.

freedom. If there is to be any hope of individual perfection, there must be absolutely free play of the natural propensities of man. The passions, it was said, are the justifiable regulators of individual acts and only need full and equal exercise in order that a perfectly harmonious individual development may result; the intellectual life is only the increment of the physical life, and the quality and effectiveness of that intellectual life depend upon the kind of physical development which the individual has been able to get. The happiness of man is secured when he is given the greatest possible freedom in the matter of physical and mental development. Saint Simon's rule, "Fais chacun aussi libre que tu veux être; voici toute la morale" expressed his idea and that of all the others. Since happiness is a necessity of man's being and he depends for such happiness upon his complete physical development, every man must of course be as far as possible free to develop, that he may in the sum of social activity be best able to bring his special capacities to the general social work.<sup>18</sup> But the physical and mental inequalities among men are such that, unless some power be found to equalize these differences, certain members of society will be able to prey upon others and no one will be really happy. The conquerors, few in number, get false notions of happiness born of the vices which their unjust domination breeds and the dominated grow increasingly and infinitely miserable. There is evidently no real well-being until the desires of all or of the greatest possible number are equally satisfied. In the eyes

<sup>18</sup> Œuvres, XXIII, p. 81.

of this group of socialistic thinkers— though they are not usually conscious of it—the real end for which society is established seems to be social, not individual well-being.

But in the minds of the idealistic socialists, individual happiness does not really wait upon an entirely realized social happiness. Nothing better demonstrates the strongly idealistic bent of these men than their belief that the individual must and will find his real happiness in the happiness of all. In this way they believe it possible to obviate the seeming inconsistency between the idea of complete individual happiness and that of social happiness. Most of them have faith in what later times calls the altruistic tendencies of human nature,<sup>19</sup> and thus they reconcile the ideal of complete individual happiness with that of social justice. As has been said, every theory in question posits the notion that the developed man is never entirely egotistical and argue from this that those more fully endowed whether in mental or material possessions, will always find happiness in putting some of their larger holding at the disposal of the less capable or the less wealthy. The universal tendency among these writers to regulate society for the benefit of the laboring-classes does not begin only in the desire to exalt labor,— though this plays a noteworthy part in forming that idea. The tendency resulted rather from a profound conviction that talent and capital should and will, in response to

<sup>19</sup>This is particularly true of Fourier and Louis Blanc. Comp. the whole "passional" doctrine of the former in the "Théorie des Quatre Mouvements" and the Révolution française of the other; in particular, I, pp. 9, 10; II, p. 492.

the best impulses of human nature, abdicate some of their privileges in favor of their poorer fellows. Recognizing fully the rights of the whole race to enjoyment, it is believed that it will always be the impulse of higher thinking to recognize and strive for the rights of the poor.<sup>20</sup> When the few, wisely taught, shall be willing to abdicate their superfluity for the benefit of the many, when they shall know that they will find a better individual happiness in such abdication, social justice will be synonymous with abstract justice. It is again to be repeated that, with the exceptions already noted, no one of these idealistic socialists specifically taught self-abnegation; no one of them ever failed to urge the just precedence of the individual right, but all of them ask for a certain renunciation on the part of those who have, in the name of what might be called a higher egotism.

A universal happiness is then the real objective point of all this group. Individual happiness is the end and social leadership the means. Wherever such individual happiness is not, there, in their idea, social direction stands convicted of bad faith or incapacity. The first and most imperative duty of society is to secure social content,<sup>21</sup> not in the interests of its own well-being nor as a matter of expediency, but strictly in the performance of the function for which it was originally established. Per contra, all blame for social discon-

<sup>20</sup> Least evident in Proudhon.

<sup>21</sup> Saint Simon's words express the general sentiment. "L'objet capital des travaux des publicistes doit être aujourd'hui de fixer les idées sur la direction de prospérité et de la déterminer à prendre cette direction." Œuvres (L'Organisateur), XX, p. 191.



tent necessarily rests upon society. Whatever is wrong in the individual is due to certain conditions for which society is responsible. It does not seem to have occurred to these socialists as it does to many who read them, that the social significance of the individual is seriously doubted if it be contended that society, and not the members of it, is answerable for the existing social unrest, for the doctrine often goes the step farther where the individual becomes the victim and his personal responsibility for wrong-doing is akin to that of a child whose parent neglects his duty.

That the idealistic socialists did not see this inconsistency in their doctrine is not surprising. They were deeply impressed with two principles which they had not learned to reconcile, the principle of association and the principle of individualism. On the one hand, most of them cherished an ideal of association resting on one form or another of the eighteenth century doctrine concerning a central authority and its power for good; on the other hand, they all shared the revolutionary respect for the intrinsic value of each individual. They had not learned, for we have scarcely learned yet, how different are the benefits deriving from an associated effort which is the result of the voluntary acts of individuals as compared with that which is enforced by a central authority however democratically constituted. Having most of them adopted the idea of law as the more or less directly expressed will of the majority of the nation, they felt secure of the state's power to maintain the individual's rights and

constituted without fear some form of extreme social control.

As to the duties of society, since all the theorists in question hold that the innate nature of man is good, they logically define it as the first duty of society in the performance of its function as director, to develop the natural right-mindedness of its members. Probably all socialistic thought up to the present time, including the writers now under discussion, felt that the first, most valuable, social service was education. When by means of able and enlightened teachers, there had been duly disseminated a correct appreciation of where the evil in the socialistic organization lay, and the young had been taught how social misery might be remedied, a valuable and fruitful alteration in public morality might, it was thought, be expected. Like all socialistic philosophy that preceded theirs, this radical writing at the beginning of the nineteenth century expresses a belief that the permanence and reality of any reform depended upon some fundamental change in the methods and subject matter of education. The curriculum which was to accomplish the moral uplift varied from Saint Simon's idea of a training chiefly scientific and industrial<sup>22</sup> to that recommended by Louis Blanc of a purely latitudinarian nature; but the end is always the same. The social regeneration was to be worked out by way of a social reconciliation which education alone could effect. Through a true culture of each and all of the community, the individual is to awaken to the realization of his higher self and to

<sup>22</sup> Saint Simon's claim is best expressed in the *Système Industriel* (*Œuvres*, XXII, p. 215 et seq.) and in the *Parabola*.

his larger duties which include the preservation of society as well as self-preservation.

As to the definite evils which the state should be recommended to do away with, there is of course a divergence of opinion. One social institution, however, comes under the ban now, as it always has come under the ban of him who seeks a cure-all for social misery. There arises again in this early nineteenth century doctrine, the old question as to the merits of the institution of property. These early socialists continue to regard it as inimical to social contentment. The relation of the sexes, the family and family life, the commercial relations of individuals, and religious creeds are all differently regarded and all or some one of these social interests are likewise assailed; but howsoever the other social facts are looked upon, there is always some objection to property-forms. The socialistic movement of our time has this in common with all utopian and communistic movements that go before; it has as a basis for active reform some scheme to alter the social creed concerning property. Each movement led by some one of the French idealistic group was primarily an effort to solve the problem of alimentation by some arbitrary separation of the individual from the soil. The old tone which ascribes every moral and physical evil to facts of property-holding is not entirely gone; there are still echoes, more or less conscious, of the bitter cries of the Mesliers and Morellys of the eighteenth century, but on the whole, the nineteenth century has seen socialistic theory leave mere moralistic complaining about the evil effects of a wrong interpretation of

the relation between the individual and the sources of production. Ethical objections to property fall into the background. Property is now most often defined as a political abuse. Personal control of productive property is now as it has always been by this class of radicals, criticised because it is held that such control interferes in a specific way with the largest possible enjoyment, but the attack upon private property is now more specifically an attack upon private ownership of the sources and means of production. The objection to all forms of personal property gives way to a criticism of the prevailing methods of production and distribution,<sup>24</sup> and that criticism ends in the doctrine that nothing better than the present social order can be ex-

<sup>23-24</sup> Proudhon, despite his "property is robbery", is less of an exception to this conclusion than is generally supposed. The bitterness and unqualified character of Proudhon's attack upon property make him in seeming the most positive opponent of the institution of property in whatsoever form, but even he admits that "the right to product is exclusive; the right to means is common." (*Qu'est ce que la Propriété?* 1st memoir, p. 107, Eng. ed.). Though Louis Blanc held to the Revolutionary idea of '93, and so contended that the right of each was subordinate to the right of the community to everything (comp. *Histoire de Dix Ans*, II, pp. 173, 181, 182 [foot-note]), yet he never thought of acknowledging an equality which checked the personal appropriation of consumption property. Saint Simon and Fourier posited productive property in the hands of society, but undoubtedly admitted personal property. (Comp. *St. Simon. Œuvres (L'Industrie)*, XIX, pp. 82-89. Fourier, Pecquer and Vidal clearly distinguished that it was only such collective capital as could be used collectively that ought to be collective holding. (See Pecquer, *Théorie Nouvelle*, pp. 554, 555; Vidal, *De la répartition des richesse*, pp. 390 et seq., cited in Michel.) In one form or another with varying insistence as the subject formed a major part of their theory, all of the early socialists held the control of productive property to be the real objective point of state administration. Babeuf, of course,



pected until all productive property is held collectively and is subject to state control. In fine, it may be said that, in relation to property, the idealistic school does not exactly desire its elimination. Rather, the purpose is to redistribute private property, reserving always the final direction of it to society, that is, to the sum of the individual wills of the community. To effect such a redistribution as soon as possible is the very essence of their reform movement.

In brief summary then, the interests of these early French Socialists, as of all socialists at any time, center about the affairs of this world rather than those of another, in most cases exclusively, in all cases at least chiefly. As to this world, the group under discussion are emphatically certain that it is possible for every individual to be happy here on earth and that strife can and will ultimately disappear from all social relations. Finally, without exception, these men rest their hope for the consummation of their ideals upon the efficacy of social control and contend that a social guarantee of well-being to each individual is the first law of social organization. The means to bring about the desired social content and the way to maintain it when secured, is in general held to be a liberal education which an enlightened society can and should furnish to its members. The prevailing social order is usually called a glaring error,<sup>25</sup> and the fundamental miscon-

counts property as the key to social and individual misery and looks to government to do away first of all with this "curse of society." (Comp. art. 6 of the "Déclaration des Principes.")

<sup>25</sup> Saint Simon of course excepted.

ception is said to be the theory concerning private property. All social morality in any absolute sense of the word is made to depend upon the final eradication of the present property laws from the social scheme.

It is in the plans that they offer for a redistribution of property that the doctrines of these men take on a really distinctive character, for their doctrines have a distinctive character. The early French socialists did more than repeat, with certain variations, sentiments which have been those of the socialistic temperament at all periods of history. They ingrafted beside upon socialistic thought some theories new to it, and these represent their real contribution to later socialistic thinking.

### III.

First among such characteristics is the well-defined intention already suggested to leave speculative moral philosophy and to create a social and political movement. Earlier writers show a tendency to cope with reality, but it is rarely more than a tendency. Not until the Revolution was past did the influence of the new hopeful spirit become strong enough directly to affect socialistic theory. The undoubted share of the Revolution in working this change in socialistic doctrine needs no accent. The dramatic incidents of the Revolution and the swift sweep of its many changes has been the inspiration for many revolutionary socialistic movements since they created the "Conspiration des Egaux." Babeuf was only the first among many whom the Revolution has tempted to dream of a radical and

instantaneous social reorganization. He was first to bring into the theory of social reform that note of practicability which is so distinguishing a mark of the modern doctrine; he abandons moralizing for action and leaves the idea of communal experiment for that of national reorganization. Babeuf lived during the Revolution. Thus it is the beginning of the century which marks the socialist's transition from the philosopher's study to the uneasy and stirring life of the politician. The writers here in question were idealists because they worked from somewhat fixed preconceptions, called the received social order an error, and carefully defined that which the future ought to develop. They were however, less idealistic than the radical writers who had preceded them, for every one of them was bent on accomplishing practical results. Unlike most of the eighteenth century writers, each of these men acted as well as wrote; most of them tried to take an active part in the political and social life of the nation. All the French socialistic theory of the first part of the century is in the end of proving not only that a social reform is needed, but that a given social reform can and should be carried out immediately. With the incoming of the present century, the kind of speculation now in question seems, in its dominant form at least, to be definitely passing from that type which lays the whole stress upon the ultimate end and altogether neglects the means, to become the type of an opposite character where the means are of first importance though the end continues to be carefully outlined. The early French socialists were one and all firmly con-

vinced that they had found an entirely practicable short cut to the solution of the problem of evil, and they were eagerly bent upon leading humanity at once along their newly-discovered road.

There is another fact evidently distinctive of the whole group. Their doctrine as we get it in the nineteenth century, seeks to prove its case, not by abstract reasoning, but by at least a pretense at scientific methods. All the writers here taken into account claim that the principles they lay down are derived from a study of terrestrial conditions rather than from the dictates of their inner consciousness. The influence of the century of scientific beginnings which lay behind them is plainly evident. It has now become at least the aim, even though not yet in reality the practice, to count as valid only such conclusions as were derived from the study of the facts of Nature, of history, and of the character of man. Though this last is taken into account least of all, though the variations of race and the facts of historical development are really much neglected, yet in a way, the philosophers who, at the beginning of the nineteenth century were seeking to reform the association of men, did get beyond the philosophical generalizations which had satisfied their predecessors. In all the thinking under discussion, practice to the contrary notwithstanding, the phrase runs, "from the real to the ideal." These early socialists seek to prove that the philosophical doctrine they advance is not mere abstract reasoning, not the dictates of the moral sense alone, but is above all a demonstrable, positive doctrine derived from a just analysis of the



physical and mental traits of men and a careful appreciation of causal social data.

It need hardly be said that the scientific method for which so much was claimed, was on the whole, mere pretension. No one of these writers really held to a scientific method, though all alike coquetted with the idea of so doing. Any one of them argued his propositions from the facts of society and then coordinated his data with a show of scientific accuracy, but when they went to collect these facts, one and all really desired to prove preconceptions. Every one of the group was looking for evidence to support theories which the temperament of each had led him to adopt; no one of them has a real claim to be classified as a scientific student of social progress.

Saint Simon<sup>26</sup> comes nearest to being really scientific. At the hands of his school, the doctrine of this remarkable man underwent modifications so radical that the original doctrine is not always rightly understood. The Saint Simonians, more particularly d'Enfantin and his section, introduced into the doctrine Saint Simon bequeathed to them, a sensual and humanitarian communism of which there is little or no trace in the master's work. There is no communism in Saint Simon — on the contrary, there is a very decided socialism; there is little humanitarianism, rather an uncertain deism. There is none of the passionate and evan-

<sup>26</sup> On Saint Simon, see in addition to general studies, Janet. *St. Simon et St. Simonisme*; Booth, *St. Simon and the St. Simonians*; Michel, *L'Idée de L'Etat*, pp. 172-212; Reybaud, *Les Réformateurs contemporains*, I, and an interesting chapter in Louis Blanc's *Histoire de Dix Ans*.

gelical character which the Saint Simonians gave to his doctrine, but instead, the philosophy of Saint Simon is an attempt to apply to social conditions, philosophical deductions which their author claimed to have verified by data collected dispassionately.<sup>27</sup> Little as he succeeded in his aim, it is none the less true that Saint Simon set out to employ scientific method in carrying out the task he set himself, the task of finding a solution to the problem of social organization. When modern socialism works on scientific lines, it only follows the route which Saint Simon never wearied of indicating as the only road to truth.

Out of this tentative use of the scientific method much that is radically new comes into the theory of the writers now under discussion. First of all, the group adopts the conception of movement in history. The idea of progress, deduced from that scientific view of history which was slowly coming to regard the life of men and of societies as a process, comes to be an accepted doctrine with them. Man is no longer regarded as perfect nor yet as fallen from perfection, but as developing toward an individual perfection which is the whole end of existence.

The idea of social progress was elaborated though not originated by one of the socialists under discussion. He

<sup>27</sup> He says of his system (*Œuvres, Nouveau Christianisme*, XXIII, p. 175) that "il se trouve appuyé maintenant à la fois sur des considérations philosophiques de l'ordre des sciences, des beaux-arts et de l'industrie, et sur le sentiment religieux répandu dans le monde civilisé." He calls it "un resultat forcé de la marche que civilization a suivie depuis sept à huit siècles; compare also *Œuvres (L'Organisateur)*, XX, p. 63.

adopted and adapted to his principles, the theory that Voltaire dimly saw, that Turgot and Condorcet clearly announced, the theory that the mental and moral growth of society underlies and in a sense originates its outward expression in institutions. It was Saint Simon<sup>28</sup> who first developed the idea to which Auguste Comte afterwards gave such additional force, the idea that there was social progress and that such progress is by way of stages, alternately negative and positive.

In fact, what is now called the materialistic doctrine of history is all but completed by Saint Simon. The idea that all forward movement of society is by way of alternate negative and positive periods, and that each social system holds in itself the germ of another,<sup>29</sup> the decay of the one system keeping pace with the growth of the other, all this is very definitely set forth by Saint Simon. It is Saint Simon who explains and even elaborates the principle that history is in spite of man's will, not a result of it;<sup>30</sup> that the course of history is a process of necessary social growth;<sup>31</sup> that social growth rests upon a development of the physical and mental faculties of man in a process where the ma-

<sup>28</sup> Saint Simon can in fact hardly be called an idealistic socialist if the word idealistic be given the meaning which socialists now usually attach to it, if it be taken to mean one who appealed from a social order which he considered an error to another which his moral sense told him was better. The really original part of Saint Simon's doctrine is neither idealistic nor communistic; it is socialistic in a modern sense.

<sup>29</sup> Œuvres (L'Organisateur), XX, p. 80; also Œuvres (L'Industrie), XIX, pp. 22-27.

<sup>30</sup> Comp. Du système Industriel in Œuvres, XXI, pp. 87, 88.

<sup>31</sup> See Œuvres (L'Organisateur) Vol. XX, p. 73.

terial development underlies the mental,<sup>32</sup> although the quality of the mental development determines the stage of social growth.<sup>33</sup> This is certainly the later doctrine as the more distinctively French branch of the present socialism in France now advances it; it only needs to put some more dialectic into it and make economic conditions causal to all other institutions in order for it to be the Marxian theory of social growth. When all that he has written is considered, it seems right to believe that Saint Simon held to the theory that the social movement has a moral end and moves forward in accordance with the psychological development of man,<sup>34</sup> but he can be found asserting, as Marxian socialism does, that the initiative force in social progress is not the individual, but "the law of progress."<sup>35</sup> The theory

<sup>32</sup> See *Œuvres (L'Organisateur)*, XX, p. 192. "On ne saurait trop le répéter, il n'y a d'action utile exercée par l'homme que celle de l'homme sur les choses. L'action de l'homme sur l'homme est toujours nuisible à l'espèce," etc.

<sup>33</sup> *Œuvres (L'Organisateur)*, XX, p. 182; also *Œuvres (L'Industrie)*, XIX, p. 23. "Que tout régime social est une application d'un système et que, par conséquent, il est impossible d'instituer un régime nouveau, sans avoir auparavant établi le nouveau système philosophique auquel il doit correspondre."

<sup>34</sup> *Œuvres (L'Industrie)*, XIX, p. 30. "La politique n'est autre chose que la science de celle entre ces règles de la morale qui sont assez importantes pour qu'il soit utile de les organiser et en même temps assez claires, assez universellement adoptées, pour que l'organisation en soit possible."

<sup>35</sup> "La loi supérieure des progrès de l'esprit humain entraîne et domine tout; les hommes ne sont pour elle que des instruments. Quoique cette force dérive de nous, il n'est pas plus en notre pouvoir de nous soustraire à son influence ou de maîtriser son action que de changer à notre gré, l'impulsion primitive qui fait circuler notre planète autour du soleil." *Œuvres (L'Organisateur)*, XX, p. 119; also, in *Œuvres (Du Système Industriel)*, XXII, pp. 226-237. "Il n'y a qu'une impulsion à donner; le reste l'effectuera de soi-même par la seule force des choses."



of Saint Simon does not merge the individual into society, but it reduces the opposition between the two to a minimum and puts the responsibility for individual development upon the social organization. The Saint Simonian interpretation of history not only set moving most of those "positivist" and "scientific" interpretations of history which men not socialists, offer as philosophies of history at the present day; it was the inspiration to the modern socialistic arguments for a social reorganization which should insure individual happiness.

It is Saint Simon who first points out that social regeneration is being prepared by a painful negative period,—it is thus he calls his own time,—a period wherein the principle of growth is antagonism.<sup>36</sup> The others took up the idea but in the spirit of criticism, not of analysis, declaring the period of antagonism in which they lived to be one peculiarly unfortunate and unnecessary. They pronounce against it because of what their moral sense tells them. Though most of them adopt the terminology of Saint Simon<sup>37</sup> they do not use his more dispassionate method.

This notion of a social evolution where struggle is the basis of all movement, was however sharply marked off from the theory of the later half of the century, by the fact that each of the writers under discussion, Pécquer and Vidal possibly excepted, looked to a system

<sup>36</sup> *Euvres*. (Du Système Industriel), XXII, pp. 60 et seq.)

<sup>37</sup> Comp. Fourier. *Théories des Quatre Mouvements*, p. 94 (cited in Michel, *op. cit.*, p. 382); Louis Blanc means the same thing when he says, "Trois grands principes se partagent le monde et l'histoire; l'autorité, l'individualisme et la fraternité," etc. Comp. *Révolution française*, I, p. 9.

which he proposed, as a means to terminate finally the unfortunate disharmony which separated men and stimulated their worst impulses. In this, the idealistic character of the school shows itself. Unconsciously or consciously, Saint Simon, Proudhon or any of the other writers in question, dreamed of an end to social disharmony, a social equilibrium secured by the measure they so ardently worked for.

The adoption of the idea of progress led to the doctrine which refused to believe in simple life as means to happiness. On the contrary, these reformers all declared for a highly organized society<sup>38</sup> as the best means for individual development and content. Saint Simon says first, and all the others may be found saying or implying the same thing, that the true economy of a state "does not consist in spending little, but in spending well."<sup>39</sup> It was decided early that all progress rests upon industrial progress, and so the economic conditions of the present society—conditions which did not seem to them to insure such progress,—became the real subject of attack. It is since the beginning of the century that the industrial side of civilization becomes the central point of discussion for socialists. Saint Simon was only the first who put all his faith in the power of science socially expressed as Industrialism, to banish the present unrest; the others took up and urged a like claim. He is first to state with precision that only a new

<sup>38</sup> Fourier, it is true, scorned civilization as he interpreted the word, but the "garantisme" (see *Théorie des Quatre Mouvements*), which he wished to substitute, was a more complex social order, and thus corresponds to our idea of civilization, which covers everything not primitive life.

<sup>39</sup> Saint Simon. *Œuvres* (*Système Industriel*), XXII, p. 171.

economic arrangement of society can work improvement in deplorable conditions, but afterwards all the others are as specific concerning the causes of the social evils. It is with these men that things not men become the object of reproach.<sup>40</sup> While all, from Saint Simon to Blanc, look on property as the key-stone to the quality and strength of the social structure, they yet have in mind that kind of property which is used as a factor in production. All are of Saint Simon's opinion that exploitation of the globe by associated effort is the only true means to the fullest physical and mental development. In fact, the works of two of these writers, Pecquer and Vidal,<sup>41</sup> are little more than a critical discussion of this one question. Both Pecquer and Vidal discuss only the current economic doctrines regarding industry; they are solely concerned with what they regard as the mistaken ideas regarding the methods of production and distribution; they are chiefly interested in pointing the weakness of the "laissez-faire" doctrine. They make the same distinction between the capitalist and Capital which the latest socialists do, and expatiate upon the value of the one and the uselessness of the other. In order that theirs should be the doctrine of the latest French socialism, there is nothing lacking to their arguments concerning the capitalist except the idea of historical movement which makes the present theory regard him as transitional, a medium to the time when a general association of workers shall

<sup>40</sup> Comp. Louis Blanc. "The fault is not in men, but in things." *History of Ten Years*, II, p. 652. (Eng. edition.)

<sup>41</sup> On Pecquer, see Michel, *op. cit.*, pp. 242-245; also, Malon, *Précis de Socialisme*, ch. xi. On Vidal, comp. Michel, *op. cit.*, pp. 245-248; also, Malon, *op. cit.*, ch. xi.

control capital. Though they ask for this associated production in the name of a moral claim rather than as an historical necessity, Pecquer and Vidal make a specific demand for a government which shall control industrial operations, and thus kill forever all competitive production.

As sequel to this point of view regarding the cause of present discontent, class lines are now drawn not according to status but according to possession. Differences between men are attributed to badly-adjusted industrial relations.<sup>42</sup> All that later theory has defined concerning the theory of class-struggle is noted and accented, though not so logically stated, by each of these theorists. For Saint Simon, the classes are the producers and the non-producers;<sup>43</sup> Proudhon<sup>44</sup> has found the modern terms of *proletaire* and the *bourgeois*; Louis Blanc's "peuple"<sup>45</sup> is only another word for *proletaire*, and his "*bourgeoisie*" is an economically as well as a politically triumphant class.

The result of this insistent criticism of the industrial organization and of industrial methods is an attack upon the art of government as taught by the controlling economic theory. Government methods because they omit to take account of and to control the indus-

<sup>42</sup> Proudhon's statement is typical. He defines the Revolution as "the substitution of real right for personal right; that is to say, in the days of feudalism, the value of property depended upon the standing of the proprietor, while, after the Revolution, the regard for the man was proportional to his property." *Comp. What is property? Second Mem.*, p. 357. (Eng. ed., Tuckerman.)

<sup>43</sup> *Cœuvres (L'Industrie)*, XIX, p. 74.

<sup>44</sup> *Contradictions des systèmes économiques*, *passim*.

<sup>45</sup> *History of Ten Years*, II, p. 648.



trial operations of every member of society<sup>46</sup> are held to be wrong and unsuccessful. What is specifically attacked is the doctrine of non-interference; free competition gets no quarter. It is held to be responsible for all the moral and material misery of society. Having laid it down repeatedly that society depends for its progress on the greatest possible production, competition is shown to check such production. It is argued that social contentment depends upon bringing the physical and mental powers of each unit of society into the best possible relation to nature and to each other. No one intellect, it is said can find the way if left free, and unguided by anything but the instinct of self-preservation; the united ingenuity of the most developed members of society is needed for effective leadership. Therefore, instead of that combat of individual interests which the doctrine holds competition to be, a social consensus of opinion is asked for as the first requisite to intelligent and successful production. Thus the principle of association is opposed to that of competition. On the other hand, the doctrine exalts socially-conducted industry where division of labor recognizes special capacity in each member of the community and gives to each capacity its best opportunity; on the other, it execrates an industrial organization where industry has a false relation to the

<sup>46</sup> No special citations seem requisite here. It will only be necessary to turn over the pages of Saint Simon's "Système Industrielle," Fourier's "Théorie des Quatre Mouvements," Proudhon's "Systèmes des Contradictions Economiques" or Blanc's "Questions d'aujourd'hui et de demain" in order to find ample verification of the above statements.

state because it is free from state interference instead of being the first and most important subject of the laws.

The essence of the special theory these thinkers represent is involved in this doctrine of association. It is the root principle of their constructive theory that men are to associate themselves together if they would attain their best development. Theirs is not yet the theory later developed which holds all men to be parts of a great social organism and believes that immutable laws make it necessary that they work together in some cooperative way.<sup>47</sup> The theory they advance is rather that individualistic one which takes society to be the aggregate of all the individuals who compose it and, making the wants of these individuals the final gauge of social progress, declares that men are to associate in order to the best possible industrial activity. As a result of associated effort they look to see the needs of all the community satisfied and the best and most general could, by some sort of association, get the fullest opportunity to labor, a large product would insure a larger enjoyment and thus the desired end, the most universal happiness, would be obtained. It is further argued that it is absurd to think that the wants of the whole community could not be supplied. Every one of these socialists plans some kind of organization by which all society shall become a cooperating army of laborers, and each one believes that, if realized, the organization he suggests would make it perfectly possible to supply all needs. In every case, whatever the detail of the

<sup>47</sup> The exception of Buchez and Leroux has been noted.

plan, two general changes are urged; labor must be properly respected and the whole social body must control all labor.

It is claimed that, under any of the industrial organizations which these early socialists propose, the position of labor would be no longer the ignoble rôle it plays under the competitive system. From Babeuf to Louis Blanc, the doctrine of the right to labor and of the duty of the state to enforce such a right was more and more positively put forward, and labor of body and mind is exalted as the developing force. As has been said, any one of the theories sharply divides society into two classes, the rich and the poor, where the poor means the laboring-class, and all of dignity and worth is attached to the workers. Their misery and deprivation is a constant theme for pity and sympathy, but they have meanwhile the supreme respect of these socialists who are confident that social salvation will come through their efforts.<sup>48</sup> Hearts go out to the poor in this period just as they did in Rousseau's time, but, since these later writers scoffed at returning to a simple life, they see other ways than those suggested by Rousseau for diminishing the miseries of persons they pity. Two things are pointed out as at present interfering with the happiness of the poor. In the first place, the odium which attaches to labor, and in the second place, the lack of a proper return to that labor. The remedy for both evils is always held to lie in making every one labor. In that way, the odium which

<sup>48</sup> Compare Saint Simon. Addressing the "Industriels," he says, "Sans doute, messieurs, les forces temporelles et permanente de la société résident en vous, uniquement en vous." *Œuvres (Système Industriel)*, XXII, p. 16.

now attaches to all industrial pursuits would disappear and, as all the available productive force of the community is gradually made use of, a proper production would insure enough to make a satisfactory distribution.

What is urged in relation to the working class is an argument at once moralistic and utilitarian. On the one hand, it is claimed that it is society's undoubted duty to see that all the community are occupied in industry; it is, on the other hand, suggested that it is also expedient that all should be so employed. The poor, when employed, will be lifted from their enforced and at present inevitable degradation; the poor, if employed, will be able to add to every one's enjoyment as well as to their own and all will be enabled to satisfy wants that need not be limited. It is expected that, if the state, controlling industrial operations, shall enforce the substitution of the associated effort of the entire community for competitive labor, the shame and the burden of the poverty-stricken will disappear. The laborer is held to be the real means to economic advancement and so the actual savior of society. Thus these early socialists begin that earnest fight for the position of the laborer, that eager claim for the right and dignity of the proletariat which is the most notable characteristic of the later movement.

The details concerning the way in which the state shall conduct industry differ, but the general plan of political organization is about the same in all the theories. The principles of democracy are so universally adopted that they are usually treated as though axiomatic. All the plans ask for some kind of social re-



organization on an economic basis; all except the plans of Saint Simon, nay even his at times, as for political decentralization and a highly centralized industrial system. Saint Simon with his strong historic sense, leaned to entirely centralized methods of government, but most of the others, under the influence of the individualistic sentiment so strong in their time, advocated a series of communes with large powers of local government, small associations to be banded together and usually to be made subject to a central control whose chief concern should be overseeing production. No matter what particular distribution of power was advocated, the idea holds throughout that the chief object of the central administration was to be the industrial activity of the community.

In summary, it is evident that the doctrines which represent the progress of the theoretical socialistic movement in France up to 1848, show a marked development in socialism, both as to the expansion of the ideal it involves and with regard to the increase in the intensity and reach of its aims. While the movement remained idealistic in theory, it yet looked to make its ideals present realities. A tendency to scientific method and a set intention to point means as well as end, marks a change of method. As to theory, the idea of a social evolution, even the term itself is now first introduced into socialistic doctrine and thus individual happiness is to be looked for at a point farther on in human history rather than in a return to any primevally perfect past. Civilization, made synonymous with a highly developed economic society, is now the *sine qua non* for man's development, instead of being

regarded as it formerly had been as a curse to him, and, in civilized association, the greatest possible liberty is said to be the means to that individual development which is the end of all social activity. In their criticism of existing society, all agree that the impediment to social harmony is misdirected production with its inevitable struggle between rich and poor, between idlers and producers, a struggle bred of the false industrial relations which mistaken economic principles encourage. Some form of social control of productive wealth is generally urged as the immediate means to ameliorate the social conditions. Larger material enjoyment, following upon a more equitable distribution of labor and the fruits of that labor, is expected to give higher and better living for all. Though moral regeneration is still the primary aim, the idea of the means has altered; it is now shown that in order to make men morally better, the end of all education as of all legislation, must be to teach them how to bring about a better production. In this philosophy which lays such stress upon the economic facts of social life as the key to social harmony, we find naturally enough, a new appreciation of the rôle of the worker. The tendency is to exalt the laborer and the class to which he belongs, as one who plays the really determinative part in the affairs of humanity. Finally, we are told that, when social control of industry shall have secured an association where all men shall be properly graded for purposes of production and distribution, then there will result a greater output of industrial product, the poor as such will disappear and all will be assured an increased enjoyment of the pleasures and intellectual opportunities of life.

## IV.

This new and subversive theory which, in the progress of the years, came to play a more and more active part in the civil and political life of France had no immediate practical effect. No alteration in institutions came from the several movements which these doctrines set on foot in the end of establishing the rights of the down-trodden. Until 1848, the various social leaders and their small number of adherents never took any really active part in the political movements of the national life. The pitiful, almost disgraceful finale of the little group at Menilmontant who called themselves Saint Simonians, seemed to end completely the movement to make reality of Saint Simon's theory. Fourierism, in spite of the valiant efforts of such able advocates Considérant, Godin and others, never got beyond a communal existence and a growing discredit. Buchez and Leroux were early read out of socialism because of their mysticism; Proudhon came in chiefly for obloquy, both from the government and other sects of socialists; Pecqueur and Vidal played a small political rôle in the Revolution of 1848, and along with Louis Blanc, they are identified with those National Workshops which are synonymous in socialistic history with failure. This revolution of 1848, with its complete fiasco in the Napoleonic empire a few years later, seemed altogether to discredit everything that the socialism of the time had held to be most practicable and helpful. The failure of the National workshops was taken to be the negation of the much praised and valued Right to labor which had been the very core of

the socialistic agitation, and with that defeat, an end seemed to have come momentarily to socialistic endeavor.

But though the labor and enthusiasm of these men were empty of palpable results in institutions, there seems little question that theirs was a notable work of stimulation in quarters best adapted to give real force to their revolt against accepted forms. The work of arousing men to the conception of the rights of the poor, of deepening the breach between economic classes and discrediting an individualistic state was begun at the Jacobins and at the Cercle Social, but only in the mouths of these socialists of the nineteenth century did this effort take a defined and broadly political rather than a merely factional tone. Though the doctrines which have been set down, got only a sectional following, they all aimed at a national regeneration by way of a national enlightenment; their appeal was to the whole community. It is certain that if social conditions took on no different aspect because of what these men preached, their doctrine did none the less stimulate men of a certain temperament to convey to another period such ideas as were distinctive of the theories now reviewed. They served to arouse many persons to the fact that there was a social question clamoring for solution, a question in which the happiness of the greater part of the nation seemed involved.

It is probable however that the most tangible result of the idealistic movement was its effect upon the working classes. The group of writers whose leading principles have here been explained seem certainly to have done an important work in awakening to self-conscious-



ness, the class that is coming more and more to be called the Fourth Estate. The steady defense by all the group of the poor against the rich, their unremitting claims for reforms that should relieve the undervalued workers, may have been without practical result; but they had at least one effect; the Fourth Estate aroused to a conception of itself as a class with a class struggle to be fought out on political lines. For the general reader, the chief note in the socialism just examined, was after all, and still is, a more or less heated attack upon a selfish government said to be carried on in the interests of a single class, the bourgeoisie, and this way of thinking accented by contrast, the position of that other class whose oppression was supposed to give social supremacy to the bourgeoisie. Undoubtedly, as is presently to be shown, the Fourth Estate came to a new notion of itself and its rights when machinery, displacing labor, brought at certain intervals inevitable and tragic transition-periods of misery and want; when free competition and a factory-system played curiously cruel pranks with the happiness of the many. Industrialism gave the laboring classes actual demonstration of larger possibilities and of their own limited opportunity; the idealistic socialists gave the out-of-pocket and the unemployed a point of attack and a language for expressing that attack. Without doubt, the agitation of this group is greatly responsible for the present unfortunate habit of the working-classes to consider their interests as apart from those of their employers. The steady repetition by each of those writers, of the belief that the rich exploited the poor, aroused to rebellion that poor whose condition was

really improving, else it would not have come to this point of self-assertion. Much of the most popular fiction of the first half of the century fell in with some form of the socialistic theory, more particularly in this regard.<sup>49</sup> There seems every reason to believe that, while such circumstances as the growth of science, the greater economic opportunity, the suffrage-right, in short, those social facts which are to be the subject of the next chapter, aided to develop the laborer beyond the merely brute stage of inert endurance, these facts did not give the whole impetus. The teachings of the idealistic socialists, first stirred the laborer's emotions and then taught him to think. The easy and simple formulæ which he has since written upon the banners of his party, he first learned from the writings of the ancestors of modern French socialism.

Thus it would seem that the chief results of the French idealistic socialism are psychological not tangible changes. The French idealistic movement may be said to have awakened France to the fact of a new sort of social question to be worked out by changes in social institutions. On the one hand, the movement taught

<sup>49</sup>This cooperation, which the best known of the novelists of the day gave to the current socialism, might be added to the more definite causes of the progress of socialism. When George Sand attacked state and social institutions in her romances, or when in her inimitable pastorals she pleaded the cause of the peasant to a public which up to that time only knew him in the generalizations of Rousseau and his imitators, she was aiding the cause of the proletaire in a way that neither Saint Simon nor Proudhon could do it. Eugene Sue's brilliant powers of invention, which caught and held the reader's interest, centered that interest upon the proletarian, and what, though his ponderous studies of "le peuple" repel, rather than attract, to-day, their influence upon the imagination of the time was certainly as great as, if not greater than, that of Fourier, whose disciple he was.

many of the upper classes that all demands for radical social reforms had not been satisfied by the Revolution, and on the other, it had a pronounced share in the final and complete awakening of the working classes to a social and political consciousness.

It is not however, only because idealistic socialists were slowly but surely able to find some following for their social teaching, that we have a militant socialist doctrine to-day. A theoretical lineage is not, as has been said, sufficient explanation for the character and social force of any doctrine. Circumstances of social growth aided to shape the theories just explained and helped to make way for them; they have beside had much to do with making modern French socialism what it now is, an active materialistic claim for place as the practicable basis on which to conduct society. The more conspicuous of these social facts require some discussion in this statement of the determining causes of the present socialistic theory in France.

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**CHAPTER V.**

**THE SOCIAL FACTS WHICH HAVE  
SHAPED AND DEVELOPED MODERN  
FRENCH SOCIALISM.**



## CHAPTER V.

### THE SOCIAL FACTS WHICH HAVE SHAPED AND DEVELOPED MODERN FRENCH SOCIALISM.

- I. THE ALTERED STANDING OF SOCIALISM IN FRANCE TO-DAY.
- II. ALTERATIONS IN GENERAL STANDARDS WHICH HAVE AFFECTED THE DOCTRINE AND POSITION OF PRESENT-DAY SOCIALISM.
- III. ECONOMIC CHANGES AID TO DEVELOP A FOURTH ESTATE.
- IV. THE FINAL INFLUENCE WHICH DEFINED THE CHARACTER OF THE PRESENT FRENCH SOCIALISM.

#### I.

SOCIALISM is to-day a prominent social question in France. Nowhere more than in that country has the change during this century in regard to the indorsement of the socialistic theory been more rapid and more noteworthy. In place of the support of a few enthusiasts which was all that it could get in the early part of the century, French socialism is to-day the ethical and political law, almost the religion, of a very respectable number of persons who are active sharers in the political and economic life of the nation.

Nothing is more marked in the recent development of the socialistic movement in France, than the pronounced difference in the attitude of scholars and politicians toward it. A scholastic world which once scoffed and smiled at the doctrine, has come to treat it with an attention which varies from the apprehensive to the sympathetic; a practical world has passed from regarding it as an aberration of a few exalted minds to

recognizing that the theory is that of a militant and conspicuous party. When, some years ago, men of letters not adherents of the party made studies of socialism, the ideas which its advocates put forward were treated with scorn or at best, with regret.<sup>1</sup> The aims of the movement were looked upon as something very like the chimera of a sick brain; the kindest critics stopped at a genial recognition of the good intentions which lay behind the movement. To-day, even the least sympathetic recognize that the subject is to be taken seriously.<sup>2</sup> Rancorous attack has largely disappeared, and the theory gets a considerate even sympathetic exposition from many of the leaders of the orthodox thought of the day.<sup>3</sup> Professors and littérateurs alike watch the movement with increasing interest. So in politics, liberal and radical politicians have come to making overtures to the party; at present, one of its number is a member of the ministry of France;<sup>4</sup> its speakers in the Chamber are listened to with growing respect; the newspaper which represents its interests,<sup>5</sup> increases its circulation. In fine, it may be said that for any well-informed student at the present time, the word socialism suggests a social movement entirely rid of the utopian or catastrophic characteristics which

<sup>1</sup> Comp. e. g. Sudre, *op. cit.*, or Reybaud. *Etudes sur les Réformateurs contemporains.*

<sup>2</sup> As for example, in the two books of M. Paul Leroy-Beaulieu. "Le Collectivisme" and "La Répartition de la Richesse."

<sup>3</sup> See e. g. Janet: *Les Origines du socialisme contemporain*; Espinas, *La philosophie sociale du XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle et la révolution*; or, Lichtenberger, *Le Socialisme avant la Révolution*; *Le Socialisme et la Révolution française.*

<sup>4</sup> Millerand.

<sup>5</sup> *La Petite République.*



were wont to cling about it in early appreciations of it. Whether they regard its principles with hopefulness or apprehension, scholars and statesmen alike recognize the doctrines of socialism as something worthy of respectful attention. Socialism has secured for itself at the hands of chair and tribune, a growing respect which saves it from social ostracism and sometimes wins support for it in unexpected quarters.

This tolerance however is of slight importance to the movement compared with the increased suffrage it continues to gain from the nation, and this support is chiefly the support of the workingman. There are many small officials in the movement; there is even a certain sprinkling of university men, but the rank and file of the party comes from the working-classes. It is the operative in the manufacturing districts and in the cities, who has given 27 municipalities to socialistic direction and by the strength of his vote has made the party so formidable an opponent to the Progressive Republicans. In France to-day, socialism is a militant party whose spokesmen are men of letters or disaffected politicians, but whose backbone is the working-class.

Certain facts of modern French life and institutions seem to have made this progress of the doctrine possible, while at the same time they have given it the particular aspect it now assumes in France.

It has been shown that, in the eighteenth century, the revolutionary principles were the result of the gradual focusing of doctrines which, arising in a disorganized way as new social theories, finally found in the

society whence they arose, the necessary impulse which made them effective principles. It was seen that dissatisfaction with a weak government which failed to recognize the new claims, gradually fanned a popular discontent; it was noted that a powerful class in the nation, adopting new ideas and rebelling against an arbitrary government grew to another conception of its rights; and lastly, it was shown that these claims got undue force and bitterness because government neglected or opposed the claims that this class urged in the name of the nation.

It will not do to press too far the parallel between the eighteenth century influences and those of the nineteenth, but when the chief changes in French social life during the nineteenth century are considered, it seems possible to find a certain similarity of causes. In view of the earnest attention which it has just been shown is now accorded the socialist theory, recollecting the increased respect now paid to its adherents, the neglect of claims long urged may be dismissed from among the influences bearing upon the development of modern French socialism. Otherwise, in general, the facts are not dissimilar. In the nineteenth century, as in the eighteenth, there can be noted in French life the rise and spread of new standards, more particularly the development of a new method of investigation, of a new ideal of government and of a widened sense of social responsibility. There can be seen too, in this century as in the last, an unstable government which neither absolutely suppresses nor yet upholds these new ideals; there can also be found altered social con-

ditions which, along with the changed standards, have made more directly for the rise of another class, again impressed with its false position in society, again filled with a new appreciation of its own value and a new and pronounced desire for a better standard of living. Each of these influences seems to have played a determinative part in developing the character and enlarging the reach of modern French socialism.

## II.

To begin with the change of opinion in regard to fundamental theories, and first of all with the new attitude toward scientific research.

To make anything beyond a general statement concerning the innovations in thought which science has effected, would be singularly unnecessary at the close of a century wherein an almost complete thought-revolution has taken place because of what scientific research has revealed. To-day science has practically won its fight. Carried into the present age by the same wave of superficial materialism which swept the doctrines of the French Revolution into the century, the right of scientific research is now keenly respected in France, in spite of contending creeds and dogmas, superstitions and ignorant conservatism. To-day, the nation pays a new reverence to the old object of its admiration, the laws of nature, now finally understood to be revealed by scientific research and only by scientific research. Positivism has made a deep impression in France, even though it has not been entirely ac-

cepted there. The school of philosophy founded by Auguste Comte, the school which, whatever its faults, has undoubtedly been the inspiration for all modern study of history and society, has deeply influenced all the strongest thinkers in the nation which saw its beginnings; the positivism of Comte may be said to have had a share in shaping the national thought. Every department of letters gives evidence that men are appreciating more and more the value of the patient research which slowly but surely makes clear the relation between the parts of inorganic and organic life, the relation of each of these to the other and of man to both. The most accredited French theory to-day recognizes the great truth that any law, social or political, in order to have real value, must rest, not on the sanction of innate consciousness, nor the abstract deductions of any one mind, but upon the certainty of scientific demonstration. With the rest of the enlightened world, France has practically adopted the empirical method as the safest guide to the study of the problems of man and society. Every branch of national literature shows the influence of this new sentiment which holds that the validity of any law is relative to its possibilities for verification by some of the facts of reality.

The new popularity of science has everywhere effected an important modification in socialistic theory. The changed position of science has made an even more marked alteration in the dogmas of the latest French socialism. Because scientific method has now come so entirely into favor, we have in France a new kind of



socialism and a greater readiness to listen to the doctrines it preaches.

When regarded as the particular influence which has reacted upon the latest socialistic thought, science has had results not altogether beneficial perhaps. Under the influence of the new method that science teaches, that which in the past was predominately an evangelical and idealistic philosophy has now become uncompromising and materialistic. Catching at the nearest teachings of science, many French socialists became "scientifically convinced" materialists. The first effect of scientific research even in the eighteenth century was to bring about a sharp reaction against theology. The mass of doctrine which had been put forward by all Christian cults as so much final and revealed truth, was rejected in toto by extremists when some of it stood disproved by the positive demonstration of science.

In this first reaction, theology went so completely to the wall, that whatever it contained of truth went with it. Since by his very nature, the socialist is before any other an extremist, he most of all, threw over the old beliefs; whether an apostle or disciple, it was he who took most kindly to a creed which some scientists were putting forward. Soon, socialists were first among those who denied any existence other than that of this world. Though they disavowed the doctrine of another life and the other tenets of the old creed with as much narrowness as the theologians had formerly asserted them, they called their theories of first causes "scientific." If French socialism has in great part

adopted a materialistic tone, it is because it believes it can prove its hypotheses scientifically.

On the other hand, if the socialism under discussion has ceased to neglect history and has come to take account of a physiological and psychological variation in men, it is as well because of its newly-acquired respect for the findings of science. Science has made socialism materialistic, but it has also brought it out of utopia to at least a partial appreciation of the facts of reality.

Lastly, it can easily be seen how the spread of a scientific spirit has probably aided socialism to find disciples. Socialism, as has been said, has taught society a new method and has taught it materialism, and these new characteristics go for much in convincing many who have come to respect everything "scientific," that there is a reality worthy of attention in the doctrines of socialism. The development of a critical and scientific spirit likewise aided to discredit that habit of the past which left education in the hands of the theologians vowed to a revealed cosmogony. The way was thus made easy for the introduction of the new ideas during the educational period of men's lives. Under the growing spirit of tolerance, bred by the scientific spirit, socialism has made its way even into scholastic teaching; in academic circles, this subversive theory of society has found a hearing and has not always been rejected. It is, too, the indirect influence of science which enables the French radical to prove as he was never before able to prove, his long-cherished creed that, by the exercise of their natural gifts, men can reshape the universe so as to secure for themselves the greatest possible happi-

ness. Socialists can now point to the countless mechanical contrivances which scientific knowledge has made part of our daily life and by these can demonstrate how swift and important changes in possession and position can be accomplished. And the lesson they thus teach is no mean ally for winning disciples to socialism. Again, new methods of transportation and communication, brought about by the teaching of science, now make it possible for a new idea to present itself daily through the press to men in every walk in life. So, too, some of these gifts of science enable teachers of a new theory to travel about with a rapidity inconceivable to a past generation, while, by wire and rapid post, they can keep up a concerted and united effort among themselves. The French socialist has not been behind other teachers and preachers in taking advantage of and reaping results from these new opportunities; he, as well as another, nay in France better than any other, has learned to print his pamphlets and send them to the most remote corners of the nation, to establish his central committee and spread his network of propagandists all over the country, even while, with post and wire, he keeps them a compact group acting with a definitely arranged plan.

It may then be said that science has not only materially altered the character of socialistic theory, but even more than this, making as it does for a social sanction to freedom of thought or for the swift and constant spread of that thought by means of telegraph, newspaper, pamphlet or the rapid transfer of the lecturer from point to point, it has indirectly prepared the way for the spread of socialism.

Even more vital to the subject of investigation is the part played in French life and institutions by the doctrine of democracy. It seems fairly demonstrable that socialism has found such ready acceptance in France and assumed whatever specific character it has acquired there, because the social dissatisfaction in that country is political and ethical rather than economic. The syllogistic arguments in the economic theory of the controlling socialism would have had little weight if they were not after all merely so many proofs that a change of government is desirable. French national life all through the century has been greatly modified because of the popularity of the cherished, century-old ideal of pure democracy. It is because democracy as a method of government has been the insistent demand of an appreciable and powerful part of the nation that nineteenth-century history in France is notable for the lack of a political concensus and for a general faith in revolutionary methods as a means to social change. To this instability of government and this consequent readiness to undertake radical changes in the fundamental law, add the natural predisposition of the nation to a highly-organized administrative government and the pronounced tendency since the Revolution to a doctrine of intervention in the behalf of other nations, and it is easy to see how these facts have shaped and supplemented the old arguments of socialism and laid the chief stress of the agitation in France upon political changes.

In its action upon any society, democracy may be said to affect radically the character of each of the social interests. Whether political, humanitarian, esthetic, religious or economic, each social institution is modified as



the democratic idea gradually develops. When it is socially agreed that government is for the benefit of the governed; that government is only the agent and representative of the governed who are the final power from which all social rule derives, then political institutions become, at least in men's minds, the direct organ for carrying out the will of the nation. So too, when the idea presses always to the front that externals are a false gauge of the real value of the individual, art and letters are slowly penetrated with the consciousness that all men have rights, and that, in capacity for suffering and happiness, all men are on a level. When this idea that each and all are equally valuable and equally able to battle for life and happiness if only left free to do it, is accepted without qualification, even theology rejects the idea of an external force as final arbiter of man's fate, and substitutes for it one altogether subjective. Lastly, when democracy seeks to sweep aside all forms and ceremonies, all distinctions of dress and privilege, and leaves no line of demarcation except that one which begins and ends in men's capacity to wrest their well-being from Nature, then democracy makes for reducing all the various separations of men's interests to one separation upon purely economic lines. Democracy, carrying with it these results, has in a way penetrated into each of the institutions of French life. To-day, in spite of her Latin law and her traditions of paternalism, France pleases herself with the thought that she has been the apostle of democracy for modern Europe. And in a sense this is true.

The service of France to the modern world, a service whose benefits are open to discussion, has been the

formulation of the ideal of democracy. While in the England of the eighteenth century, the individualistic instinct of the Anglo-Saxon race was stubbornly maintaining that the rights of the government rested upon the rights of the governed, and in particular insisting upon the right of the governed to control the tax; while public opinion was doggedly pressing the right to a system of justice separate from the powers of government, and the right to absolute publicity for all judicial acts along with the universal use of jury trial; and all this, with very little talk of democracy and much accent upon the "divine right of kings," a very different kind of democratic feeling, as has been seen, took hold of France. It has been noted that Frenchmen of the eighteenth century derived their enthusiasm for the ideal of democracy from an admiring study of the governments of that nature which the history of Greece and Rome had preserved for them; as a theory of applied politics, they copied it from an Anglo-Saxon people. The wave of democratic opinion which brought in the American republic and swept onward as the French Revolution, also made democracy a political ideal for modern France and modern Europe. Though the government it tried to set up disappeared as soon as it was formulated, crushed down by the Terrorists and the Bonapartist despotism, the dramatic entrance of the principle of democracy into French politics was none the less the first enunciation of a principle which has since stood for much. The ideas inspired by democracy have given the impetus which many times during the century has stirred a goodly quota of French citizens to something very near madness; finally, it has

predisposed them to regard favorably any theory which rests upon the democratic ideal.

Thus, in France, the socialistic movement<sup>6</sup> is first of all a democratic movement, both in answer to the quality of mind of the agitator in that country and because of the temperamental propensities of those who are to be aroused. The great popularity of the democratic ideal of government has both done a conspicuous work in giving a somewhat special form to the doctrine of modern French socialism and increased the chances of the doctrine for getting a hearing in a nation predisposed to democracy. It will be remembered that the French socialism of the early part of the century was first among the theories of the time to indorse without qualification this conception of political relations which has since grown to be the leading social and political ideal of the century.

French socialism stands now as always for democracy, and adopts each of the social prejudices which deduce from it; it has unfalteringly maintained the idea of personal right both in relation to government and to all accessory social interests, and the most French form of it still maintains the idea of personal duty and self-abnegation in relation to social control. This point of view of the socialist is an open sesame in many quarters in a nation where the dream of pure democracy by way of Lib-

<sup>6</sup> Socialism is, of course, not everywhere primarily democratic. In Germany, the accent falls much more upon economic questions; possible government forms barely come into the foreground. In England, it is progressive administrative measures which have chief place as remedy for present grievances; it is unusual to find an exact ideal of government set down.

erty, Equality and Fraternity still carries great force. To that part of France which has been bred in a sort of worship of the Revolution and is to-day alive to the glaring disparity between the presence of the revolutionary motto upon the public buildings and the absence of it in the civil law of the land, socialism offers a new hope for the realization of the old shibboleth. The idea of solidarity stands for fraternity; equality figures as equality of opportunity in a reorganized industrial state, and together, this equality of opportunity and solidarity are the means to insure real liberty, which is economic liberty.

Again, the democratic ideal, modifying the character of the French government, has stamped a particular tone upon French socialistic doctrine in relation to the idea of a change of government and the desirability of immediate change.

Throughout the century, the lack of political consensus in France has been so pronounced that, except at brief intervals, what has been happily called a "state of permanent instability"<sup>7</sup> has characterized the government. The weak and changeable character of the administration, consequent upon a continuous disagreement among the ruling factions, has greatly discredited the parliamentary republic, and, what is more to the point, has greatly increased the number of malcontents. Now, the first note in socialistic theory, as the first requisite for conversion to socialism, is discontent. Because of the well-defined disappointment in the present

<sup>7</sup> Lowell, *Governments and Parties in Continental Europe*, I, p. 84.



form of government, socialism, a social philosophy which arraigns that government, finds a greater tolerance and a larger support than it could otherwise have hoped for.

Finally, these democratic ideals have brought the frequent changes of government which this century has seen. The French malcontent is almost always a radical, or at any rate malcontents who look to radical change make themselves numerically as well as dramatically more evident in France than elsewhere. The history of the past century has accented this predisposition. A nation which has looked on at four radical changes of government in a century, certainly offers a fair field for propagating the teachings of a mildly revolutionary movement. There are to-day in France many persons who listen with a tolerance almost impossible for the Anglo-Saxon to the socialistic idea of an imminent and complete re-ordering of society. Evolutionary socialism has come to France by way of revolutionary socialism and the notion of revolution is rather reluctantly relinquished.<sup>8</sup> There can be little doubt that the trust in revolutionary methods which temperament and tradition have bequeathed to the Frenchman, has played no inconspicuous part in giving a certain special character to French socialism, as it has also added to the ranks of the socialistic party.

Thus, in answer to the question as to the direct influence of the democratic ideas upon the theory and progress of French socialism, it seems evident that the

<sup>8</sup> See e. g. Deville. *Principes Socialistes*, pp. 1-91; also, Jaurès, *Evolution ou Révolution*.

influence was important and extended. Every part of socialistic theory will be found to take some color from the doctrine of democracy, and the wide popularity of the democratic doctrines has in turn been a further argument for the progress of socialism.

Finally nothing among prevailing notions of political theory helped better to shape and give vogue to the socialistic dogma, than the national predisposition to demand the very increase of government initiative and to preach the same universalistic trend which socialism has always implied.

Just as tradition speaks to the present generation in favor of a theory which suggests rapid and radical changes, such as those by which they believe themselves to have profited in the past, so French history accredits the socialistic notion of a more highly centralized government. As has already been pointed out, Frenchmen have always looked to government for the initiative; they have always welcomed a strong and far-reaching administrative interference in their affairs. In spite of the individualistic theory of government which was imported into their country during the last century, their system rests to-day upon the lines of the bureaucratic and paternal government of Napoleon I, and that very government is especially dear to many of the French, particularly those of the peasant class. It will be remembered that this idea of the need for a centralized power which directs society appears in the theory of the early socialists. All the glory of the past of France rests upon periods of highly-organized central administration. The additional government interfer-

ence which socialism suggests, instead of shocking the native tendencies of Frenchmen, falls rather in line with the personal inclination and national propensities of many among them. By instinct and training, the Frenchman is much more of a socialist than he is a particularist.<sup>9</sup> So too, since the revolutionists declared themselves the apostles of liberty for all Europe, it has been the fashion for all French radicalism to believe in a universal bond between nations, and to stand for the right and duty of mutual relief and aid. French radicalism is thus "international" in spirit, even when it is not avowedly socialistic, and the "internationalism"<sup>10</sup> of modern socialism seems at once a natural result of a revolutionary theory and an answer to a sentiment dear to many Frenchmen.

Democratic institutions have aided to emphasize the political doctrine of socialism and to give it popularity. The same democratic institutions have given added force to that sense of responsibility for the well-being of society which has already been shown to have been always the first cause of socialistic thinking.

Democratic institutions are first the effect of the individualistic instinct, and in turn become the cause of the spread of that instinct. Where the spirit of self-assertion has not innate strength, there democracy can find no stable footing; where the presence of such a spirit gives democracy a permanent share in the social growth of the nation, there the very spirit of self-asser-

<sup>9</sup> Compare the somewhat pessimistic, but interesting, book of M. Edmond Demolins. *A quoi tient la supériorité anglo-saxonne.*

<sup>10</sup> See *infra*, p. 281, foot-note.

tion which created democracy now keeps alive and develops to an additional force that same particularistic trait from which it springs. In this way, democracy makes for the development of an effective self-consciousness, and in turn this same consciousness of self comes to expand into a consciousness of a duty toward others. For under democratic institutions, the individual is taught to submit to the will of the majority; to look upon his neighbor as one whose rights are identical with his own; to understand that an integral part of his duty is to help maintain a general well-being. Thus democracy teaches men to include in a resolute insistence upon personal well-being, an additional claim for social well-being; it obliges them to put alongside their strengthened individual consciousness, a gradually developing social consciousness. Some such alteration in the notions of individual and social duty has come about in France and has had a share in furthering the spread of socialistic doctrine.

A broadened idea of what constitutes personal duty has with the progress of the past two centuries slowly but certainly developed a wider social consciousness. Two centuries ago, French philosophy tended to awaken only an individual consciousness. Descartes and Pascal put such accent upon the individual responsibility that the teaching of their individualism almost entirely lost sight of the social duty of each person; but in the next century, as has been seen, Rousseau aroused that sense of personal duty which includes not only individual but social well-being. The idea that social duties were involved in individual rights has been supported since



the introduction of democracy. In the early days of the Constituent Assembly, when the formulation of the Declaration of Rights was under discussion, it was proposed<sup>11</sup> that the articles about to be drawn up be called a Declaration of Rights and Duties.<sup>12</sup> It was urged that "The word citizen announces a correlation with other citizens and this correlation engenders duties,"<sup>13</sup> and that it was essentially necessary "to make a declaration of Duties in order to retain them (the citizens) within the limits of their rights." Although Mirabeau dismissed the whole debate as "arguties peu digne d'une assemblée politique," the idea came up often, and the duty as well as the right of citizenship was accented throughout the Revolution.<sup>14</sup> During our own century, whether in theological or laic theory, the same idea has strengthened and gone abroad. The spirit of the age is as strong in France as elsewhere. Many have come to see their relations to each other in a new light. Not only the prevailing political principles but the ethical call as well, has, throughout the century, more and more insistently asked for something besides a per-

<sup>11</sup> Séance of August 4. *Moniteur*, Vol. I, p. 277.

<sup>12</sup> Grégoire makes the plea. See his remarkable speech; also, that of the Bishop of Chartres who prophetically says that, without a statement of duties, "On court risque d'éveiller l'égoïsme et l'orgueil."

<sup>13</sup> Clermont-Ladève — *Choix de Rapports*, Vol. I, p. 228.

<sup>14</sup> See, for instance, Robespierre's remarks when the committee of '93, on a Declaration of Rights, brought in its report (*Moniteur*, Vol. XVI, p. 214), or Vergniaud, "Prétendre que la nation seule doit s'obliger envers la nation, c'est ériger en principe l'ingratitude et l'injustice." He declares that society rests on the idea of mutual obligations and that the duties of the individual toward society are "non moins respectable que les droits de l'homme" (Speech on "Emigrés").

sonal struggle toward higher things. Modern social theories of all sorts, modern political principles, as well as modern ethics, whether in the name of happiness or perfection, ask that each take an effective share in a concerted social struggle toward a higher social harmony.

In addition to the stimulus which democracy and ethical teaching have given to the development of social consciousness, two other important facts of social growth, the reawakening of a strong national feeling and an increased importance of town life have influenced in the same direction. It need hardly be insisted that the consciousness of a national bond draws men closer to one another; the spirit of patriotism lives only so long as a certain social consciousness is alive in each member of the community. In spite of the many and formidable tumults, to which their national life has been subjected, the French love of country has remained a conspicuous fact of their history during the century. In this century, too, France, like the other nations of the world, has seen the development of its towns, and, along with less happy results, town-life has, in France as elsewhere, had an appreciable influence in widening and deepening fellow-feeling and increasing the sense of a personal responsibility for the general happiness. Especially among the working-classes, town-life has made for a growing consciousness of the needs of all and for impressing upon each the value of mutual aid in the struggle for a living.

Thus, under the stimulus of cultural instruction or social conditions, there has grown up what, in the hap-

pily situated is called the spirit of philanthropy, and what in those who must wrestle with circumstances, might be called the consciousness of the need of each other. This sentiment, in either case, is a form of social consciousness which has had a marked influence in the development of social theory.

This social consciousness is, and has always been, fundamental to socialism and to the making of a socialist. Socialism is only philanthropy, armed with a philosophy and a political system calculated to cure all social diseases. Socialists are only philanthropists who think they have found a way to root out the causes of social misery. The philanthropists, they sneeringly assert, are stupidly wasting their time tinkering at effects which the same causes, still left uneradicated, will continue to produce. Given then, along with the radical temperament, which is the first requisite to a socialist, this increasing social consciousness, and socialism as a doctrine gets a new impulse and a greatly improved chance for a hearing.

On the whole, it may fairly be urged that in France, whether in lettered or political circles, it has been these ethical and political causes, rather than economic unrest, which have predisposed so many persons to socialism. It is not so much the hope of socializing industry which attracts adherents to the new cause as it is the hope of a better political order. But the hope of socializing industry is in France, as in other countries, coming to denote the content of the idea of a better political order; and this hope, steadily planted and nourished, is now no mean second to the dream of a democratic government and a democratic society.

## III.

It has been said that the political doctrine of socialism means more to the Frenchmen than do its economic arguments. This is not, however, to say that there have not been important economic changes in French life, and that these have not brought appreciable and important results. It is true mechanical production in France is in no such advanced state as it is in England, or even in Germany. The French economic situation is materially modified by the natural predisposition of the laborer to individualistic production. The French workman, by temperament, shuns the life of the factoryhand. Excepting, perhaps, the Parisians and the Lyonnese, who are each *sui generis*, Frenchmen of the working class are easily contented, have comparatively modest ideas concerning their economic and political rights, are slow to organize, and give themselves reluctantly to highly-organized industrial enterprises.<sup>15</sup> A future which promises the position of an *entrepreneur*, or membership in a corporation, has small charms for the typical French laborer, as compared with the independence and ease which the position of small master or small shopkeeper suggests to him as the reward for a youth of labor. In a word, industrialism, in practice and idea, is in a slightly backward condition in France.

Yet even though that remarkable growth and alteration of economic activity which have characterized the century, has touched France and French workmen in a lesser degree than some other nations, French life has, by no means, failed to experience the results

<sup>15</sup> See Belloc, Danton, p. 19.



of contemporary changes in mechanical production. Even though, in a slightly less advanced stage than England, or perhaps even Germany, industrialism has come to France as to all progressive nations, to increase the interdependence of the elements of labor, to develop a more compact organization among the workers and to stir in the whole nation an unrest born of a more pronounced desire for material possessions.

At the root of the economic evolution, which is the characteristic fact of the nineteenth century in every progressive country of the world, is the prodigious alteration in the magnitude and methods of production, a change which came with relative swiftness, as men discovered how to make the forces of Nature replace human effort. The beginnings of mechanical production belong to the second half of the eighteenth century; the development and results of such method of production go to make the most original contribution of the nineteenth century to the history of civilization. Mechanical production, the gift of the eighteenth to the nineteenth, has come to be the social influence from which most of what is distinctive of the nineteenth century takes its rise. What the slow work of the hands did a century ago, the swift forces of Nature, guided by human thought, are in great part doing to-day.

Before everything else the machine, wherever it has been introduced, has brought a complete revolution in the life of the individual worker. It is common knowledge that, in relation to each laborer, the marked economic fact of the century has been the transfer of the center of social production from the household to

the factory. The peasant workman, whose industrial labors were carried on along with his agricultural and even household duties, and who, himself, brought his wares to market, is fast disappearing before the operative or farmhand who brings for exchange, not the product of his labor, but the labor itself. The contrast has often been drawn between the artisan of the past, who used hand and implement as his own intellectual development dictated, and the operative of to-day who watches a wheel or adjusts a crank; the sharp dissimilarity in the two pictures has as often excited the most opposite commentaries. We owe it to the machine that the artisan has almost entirely given way to the operative, and that the separation of function in the work of production has become always greater. Not only does the subdivision of trades regularly increase, not only has the separation of tasks within each of these trades grown continuously more minute; in each trade and all trades a general division, as of an industrial arm, has come about. Capitalist, captain of industry, and the descending grades of those who form the mass in the work of the production, separate to-day into something like regiments. Each graded group is doing a distinct and limited work. Under the influence of the new methods of production, the cleavage in industrial society is rather vertical than horizontal. In short, before there can be produced any one of the countless articles which the world's market sets forth to-day, the division in quantity and quality of labor, which has gone before, is almost as infinite as the quantity produced. In regard to the more important departments of pro-

ductive effort, the factory has replaced the older methods of manufacture, with the result of organizing the greater part of industrial activity upon a large scale and markedly specializing the occupation of each worker.

That this specialization and extended and intensified organization has, of necessity, tremendously increased the interdependence of the various factors in this industrial domain, is patent enough at first glance. The workman, *entrepreneur* or capitalist, each by himself, is practically impotent to complete the production of any article. Also, it needs no proof that the more specialized the kind of labor which the worker brings to the work of production, the more dependent he is upon finding a place ready for himself in order that he may earn his living. Labor takes on varying grades of dependence and interdependence, according to the kind of work done and the relation of the laborer to the machine; according to the social condition prevailing in the country in which laborers find themselves, or according to their own standard of comfort. But no matter what the variation of other conditions, the fact is undoubted that, with only a difference in intensity, there has been a universally increasing interdependence of all the factors in production.

As machinery has developed and altered the productive power of each community, and increased the interdependence of each individual and each group, so it is machinery which has made production international and added thus to the interdependence of workers and the interdependence of nations. Nations are to-day

special agents for the production of special commodities in the world-market, as, in times past, the individual performed the like function for a national demand. More and more fully mastered, steam and electricity have given us those means for swift transportation which have made the Indies and America, Australia and England, as near each other for purposes of communication as the city of Boston was to that of Philadelphia a century ago. Commercial expansion has been the means of more efficient, cheaper and greater individual and national production, has helped to increase and vary the supply in each market, and, what is most to the point, has made the character of all national production closely dependent upon a fairly unobstructed international exchange. It is due to the power of machinery that men are now accustomed to expect that the gifts of Nature be shifted about from the various parts of the world to that place where they find their highest social efficiency. It is due to this progress of mechanical production that all great nations suffer to a certain extent when famine or war strikes any one of them.

This increased dependence and interdependence in economic activity is to the point here, not so much because it is one of the important results of mechanical production, but because it is the fact upon which socialism dwells most in its argument for an economic organization of society. If the dissatisfied workmen and their leaders insist that now the whole heritage of the laborer is to be "Lord of his Hands," and that, in order to the use of even this slight inheritance, he is largely



at the mercy of a shifting market and the law of supply and demand; it is because, in the tenets of socialism, the many are held to have become dependent upon the few, through this great alteration in production. Socialism of to-day, in France, as in other countries, begins its attack upon prevailing institutions by accenting the dependence and interdependence which the machine has certainly brought to the elements of labor; the whole socialistic agitation concerning equality of opportunity begins with this interdependence for which the machine is responsible. The advent of mechanical production has changed the socialistic attack upon society from a generalized moralistic complaining to a special, direct onslaught upon mechanical production.

Along with an additional interdependence among workers, mechanical production has brought a closer organization, and thus a more real and effective solidarity, among the laboring classes, and this solidarity has been very nearly as powerful a weapon for the French socialists as it has been for socialists in other countries.

The trades-union shows best how the laborer has learned to believe in organized effort and organized production. Trades-union history in France differs from that in England only in that trades-unionism in the former country has been even less successful. There have been, however, for more than a half century, regular organizations of workers, which have offered a more or less able resistance to the capitalist. In France, as in other countries, the workman's sense of dependence has developed the modern trades-union; the recent failure of these unions to cope with the great monopolies

has made the workers more amenable to socialistic arguments. A few words to expand this idea.

It is a fact, applicable to every nation, that whatever bitterness the artisan once felt for the machine has now been transferred, as a general fact, to the owner of the machine. The progress of the century has seen the intelligent workman, in France as elsewhere, change from the bitter enemy of mechanical contrivances to the most ardent advocate of highly-developed forms of mechanical production. Because they realize the superior value of using the forces of Nature, the laboring classes now aim to get the full benefit which the use of those forces gives to society. Almost instinctively, workmen banded together for this end, and through the trades-unions thus developed, the laboring-classes have learned the value of organizing themselves on democratic principles in order to strive for the best interests of each workman. From this growing comprehension of the value of collective action, the laborer, along with a new hope, got a new idea of his relation to his fellow.

It may be said that trades-unions, established, have given the workmen a new kind of class feeling. The self-respecting operative, eagerly aiming at the uplift of his class, is the new type of mechanic which our times has developed. Even in France, the best workmen of the day is usually the trades-unionist, who, generally speaking, is far less anxious to enter another industrial grade than he is to make secure the full strength of his class as a party in a bargaining process, where capital buys and labor sells. The final dream of the most radical wage-earner, who is not a Socialist,

is to regulate the conditions surrounding the bargain he seeks to make, so that certain fixed ideas with regard to the worker shall limit the blind play of the "higgling of the market." If this is the case, if workmen are not so much eager to escape from the class to which they belong as they are anxious to establish a right adjustment of the relation between that class and the class on which they depend for employment, it is by reason of what the history of trades-unions teaches them. The present solidarity of the workman, in all manufacturing centers, less accented in France than in England, yet clearly evident there too, begins with a belief in the necessity of concerted class action. Trades-unionism has been an educational medium which has taught him how valuable such action is, as a means to limit the power which may act against his interests. The French workman of a century ago was part of a heterogeneous mass; the trades-unions, slowly establishing themselves in spite of his prejudices,<sup>16</sup> have given him the conception of the power that comes from the consciousness of numbers and unity of opinion.

To see how this new feeling of solidarity and a new conception of its worth as a defensive weapon might help socialistic theory, it is only necessary to recall what the actual economic results of trades-unionism have been. In the progress of the century these societies have often been able to oppose to the capitalist a power as strong as his own, both in monetary equipment and in singleness of purpose. But on the whole, the strongest trades-unions of France have not been able to cope with a strong capitalistic monopoly; and now

<sup>16</sup> See "*Compagnon du Tour de France*," of George Sand.

the frequent failure of the greatest trades-unions of England, when face to face with the big trusts or a railroad system, is making a formidable argument for socialistic propaganda. Trade-unionists, even when not entirely successful, have learned to believe in the idea which prompts the unions. They have learned to pin all their hopes for a decent living wage upon the power that a class can exert by acting collectively. When the form of collective action on which they depend leads to nothing, they listen more readily to schemes which propose as immediate policy nothing more than the extension of their particular methods of action to the whole of the economic field, and promise finally to remove entirely all necessity for any defensive movement. In this way, even in France, where they have had least force, it seems fair to argue that trades-unions have indirectly been an effective aid to socialism. Mechanical production, making for the necessity of trades-unionism, has developed a solidarity of the working classes and an appreciation of the expediency of solidarity, out of which socialism has not been slow to make capital.<sup>17</sup> In France, increasing numbers of trades-unionists, who are usually last of all workmen to become at odds with the social order, are yearly going over to the socialistic party.<sup>18</sup>

The last fact to be accented in this attempt to trace the relation between the development of mechanical production and the character and progress of socialistic theory in France, is the psychological result of changed industrial conditions. Beside increasing the dependence

<sup>17</sup> Comp. Deville, *op. cit.* pp. 187 et seq.

<sup>18</sup> Comp. Coubertin: *France under the Third Republic*, p. 398, and pp. 400-402.



of the laborer and making him more conscious of that dependence, industrialism has aided to develop the unrest which is prerequisite to socialism, while at the same time it has altered the ideal of socialists.

In France, as in the rest of the civilized world, the saving and division of labor, which the machine has made possible, is a parallel fact to the gigantic increase in the power of production which it has also brought; as a result of mechanical production we have to-day a world-market, teeming with what seems to be an unlimited supply of consumption goods. It is a striking proof of the social force of the machine that the nineteenth century is the age of production on a large scale, with a consequent increase in the numerical output of each kind of product and the enormously developed power for stimulating the social desire. And it is this intensified social desire which is here the important point.

It is of first importance, in tracing the material causes of socialism in France, to note the effect of an enlarged supply upon the individual and social demand. Wherever it has become part of the national life of a country, the machine, with its remarkable consequences, has not only enabled producers to supply a demand more readily; what is most to the point, it has enabled them to create a demand. New methods of production have intensified and extended the needs of each and every member of society. Each of those additional wares which the market now offers has created a want as often as it has supplied one. The word necessities includes more and finer things than it did in the days when Montesquieu and Rousseau used it. The frame of mind

which comes to count these necessities essential to contentment is one which, under the influence of a democratic environment, reaches daily to wider and wider circles. What has been aptly called the "principle of conspicuous waste"<sup>19</sup> has, during the century, had fuller play than ever before. And the influence has been all along the line. No fact is more striking to the economist than the extension in the scale of wants, not only in the wants of the well-to-do, but more particularly in those of the laboring classes. New conceptions of comfort, new desires, have awakened in the laborer as in the rest of the world. The workman or his family at the present time needs only to pass the shop-windows or to glance at the newspaper, filled with flaring promises of cheap and varied commodities, in order to have new desires start to life. When one recalls the additional possibilities for development which modern life offers even in the working classes; when it is remembered how easy is the access to what the rostrum, literature and even travel may teach, it is not surprising that the worker, as well as the leisured member of society, has come to have, if not a higher, at any rate a different standard of life. The complete alteration in the extent and intensity of demand which have resulted from the change in mechanical production seems undoubted.

This widened demand has undoubtedly tended to add to the individual and social unrest. France, like other nations, represents to-day a people of more pronounced materialistic ideals than those of the generation which preceded it; and in France, as elsewhere, old activities

<sup>19</sup> Veblin: *Theory of the Leisure Classes*, ed. Macmillan, 1899, ch iv, especially pp. 97 et seq.

have given place to new. Since Louis Philippe's reign brought power into the hands of the bourgeoisie, a commercial spirit, and all it brings with it, has become part of the general sentiment. On account of the native conservatism of the provincial Frenchman, the conviction that many utilities formerly undreamed of are essential to a refined or even respectable life, has not penetrated so swiftly into the mass of French life as it has in some other countries, but in France too, men have now come to strive towards ideals different from those which prompted the efforts of the past. The national ideal of glory increased by conquest and accession of territory slowly but surely yields place to the ideal of commercial supremacy, just as the individual idea of honor by way of birth and territorial possession has so often given place to the desire to amass vast fortunes and play a prominent part in the manipulation of the money market. A certain class of Frenchmen cling fondly to the "art ideal" and to past notions of honor and conscience, but the spirit of the age has in no way left France untouched. The Frenchman is "industrially awakened" in spite of his temperament. The struggle for mere existence, whether in its purely brute aspect, or in its military phase, has long since given place to the struggle to shape existence on a given plane of physical ease and enjoyment, and that plane, under modifying influences, is steadily moving upward to a higher level. It may safely be asserted that in France, as in other parts of Europe, more and more persons have learned to count earthly possessions as the means to position and happiness, and thus to make the sum of living an unending and ugly fight for such holdings.

The conceptions which go along with the word "happiness" have everywhere, during this century, come to be more and more dependent upon a large material holding.

In the necessities of human nature, some must fail to find satisfaction for this newly awakened and multi-form desire. Because of incapacity, physical or mental, because of misfortune, environment, or any other of the numerous checks which come to prevent the equal development and activity of each member of a community, there are many for whom the new possibilities mean only a widened sense of deprivation or an accented discontent consequent to non-possession. On the other hand, because of the permanence of the temperament which is particularly sensitive to the idea of equity, a temperament always especially evident in France, the larger enjoyment of the successful seems to make deeper and darker the gulf into which the laggard or the unfortunate has fallen. The increased product made possible by mechanical improvements has brought about a marked social unrest by way of a widened and intensified belief in the power of material things to bring happiness. The result of this has been to increase the feeling of the discontented and to intensify the acrimony of those who believe in social equality. Either one of these results has had an effect and has argued for the acceptance of the doctrines of socialism.

In the first place, socialistic theories always get their inspiration from times of social unrest. An appreciable socialistic movement is, in a way, conditioned by some sort of social discontent. If it be true that mechanical production has been able in France, as elsewhere, to discredit the old standard which held that a man



should not strive for what he has not; if mechanical production has taught men to scout those who deprecate as mistaken all such efforts as would lift the clod above the soil on which he was born, then mechanical production, like democracy, has certainly made for the growth of socialistic theory in some form. So, too, if industrialism has centered the general opinion upon the idea of larger possessions as a prerequisite to happiness, it has made for ideals which count happiness to be conditioned by material possessions, and this is the point of view that modern French Socialism has adopted under the direct influence of industrialism.

Industrialism has been then a real influence in putting a distinctive character upon the nineteenth century standards, even in France, where the keen interest in political theory and practice, and the natural tendency to be "doctrinaire" has modified its influence in comparison with other countries. Because of the labor relations it has created, because of the stronger class-feeling it has engendered and the keener desire for worldly prosperity it has stimulated, industrialism has sensibly changed the character of public opinion. It has evidently most directly affected the working-classes, whom it has made more conscious of their economic dependence, more alive to the power they might have if they could become entirely united among themselves, and has finally made them more eager to win entire political power in order that they may enjoy that vastly increased store of commodities which the productive facilities of the nation can now supply.

Reviewing thus rapidly, the leading facts of the century's history in France, we find that a new sentiment in regard to all existence arose in response to the impulse given by the new place accorded to science and its teachings; that the political ideal of democracy bequeathed by an earlier theory has both acted as a stimulus to rebellion against the established and somewhat ineffective methods of government, and has made for a readiness to catch at other plans for government which, though in line with the ideal, are yet in a radical, not a reactionary spirit, opposed to the existing government. We note further that the economic evolution has touched France, too, with a Midas touch, and that there has arisen in response to it a class of which an appreciable portion asks, in no unequivocal terms, for a radical alteration in social relations. Finally these changes in social institutions and in general standards have helped to give a specific character to modern French socialism and to prepare many minds for the reception and propagation of its doctrines.

#### IV.

The final impulse, which developed and strengthened these early socialistic theories, that were fostered by facts of social growth, came from another country than France. In this résumé of the facts of social life, which have had a bearing upon the character of socialism in France, a word must be said regarding the well-known fact of an international movement led by men who were remarkable politicians as well as strong thinkers.

After the Revolution of 1848, in face of the failure of the national workshops and the severe legislation which, for many years, Napoleon III directed against all social agitation, socialism as an active movement drops out of sight in France. The theory as well seemed of so little importance, that Gambetta considered himself to be stating a truth when he declared that in the France of his time there was no social question. When, however, the amnesty of 1879 permitted the banished communists to return, it was found that socialism had gathered a force greater than ever before. No longer a philosophy or a cult upheld by a few enthusiasts, who, in the hope of realizing their ideal, formed themselves into small communities or, at best, had joined in the political fight of the most radical party of the times, socialism had rapidly become a political party standing by itself, a party whose aims were grounded upon a combative social philosophy. And this was true largely because the banished communists had come home full of enthusiasm for the tenets of Marxism.

If the fact most distinctive of the later history of nineteenth century socialism all over the world is a swift and steady growth toward unity of aim and action, accompanied by an appreciable increase in the number of adherents to the doctrine, this fact is fairly attributable to the men who first inspired the modern German movement. The history of the rise and fall of the International and of the development of those workingmen's congresses, which, meeting every few years since 1847, have taken on an increasingly socialistic and corporative character, is really the tale of the

gradual spread of a single social theory, not entirely new by any means, but given an altered form by two men, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. The slow, but sure, acceptance of the doctrine first put forward by these able tacticians, who rapidly became the chiefs of an international movement, marks the turning-point of all modern socialistic theory and practice. It is due in great part to the brains and strategic capacity of Marx and Engels<sup>20</sup> that the spirit of revolt against the accepted social order is no longer in any country, at least as regards its more pronounced forms, a segregated communal movement, but is rather a political organization which sends out its branches to the four corners of the earth. Marxism, for so the theory adopted under the influence of these two men is generally called, has been well named the centripetal force of socialistic theory.<sup>21</sup> Whatever of disrepute may justly, and with cumulatively convincing evidence have fallen upon the social philosophy and especially upon the economic theory of Marx, the history of socialism during the past fifty years has established beyond dispute his force and capacity as a leader of men. As a

<sup>20</sup> It seems certain that Ferdinand Lassalle, influential for the cause of socialism though he was in his own country, has had little or no influence in France. Lassalle led a national, not an international, movement; the real aim of his life and teachings was the political emancipation of the German artisan. (Comp. Russell, *German Social Democracy*, ed. 1897, p. 41 et seq.) His writings have, therefore, a sectional and special bearing, and to-day get comparatively no notice from the French Marxists. For this reason, Lassalle's name is omitted here; not because his share in the beginnings of the German movement is forgotten or underestimated.

<sup>21</sup> Werner-Sombart. *Le Socialisme et le Mouvement social au XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle*, p. 83, ed. Paris, 1898.



power to concentrate and organize an international socialistic movement, the writings of Marx have been of first importance.

Above everything else, the Marxian movement was characterized by an unswerving effort in a single direction. After the first statement of their creed in the celebrated Manifesto of 1847, Marx and Engels always held firmly to one theory, a theory that subordinates the national claim and elevates the individual and class right to first place; and this fact, taken together with their masterly appreciation of the value of dialectic, and their capacity to adapt the older socialistic moral philosophy with cleverness and dispatch to the scientific methods adopted in their time, has been the chief reason why they have meant so much to their cause. Both men use their brilliant powers as writers and their undoubted talent in argument to draw from the facts of reality such data as would seem to prove the most popular of the propositions of the early French socialists, and though they claim much for dispassionate analytic method, neither logic nor positive fact has been so strictly observed but that a bitter indignation at existing circumstances and a passionate espousal of the cause of the proletarian, makes itself plain for those to whom such feelings mean more than syllogism or scientific data. This firm support of a single theory and clear appreciation of the power of class-feeling as against national feeling, together with an ardent sympathy for the laborer and the unemployed, have undoubtedly been the distinctive qualities which have won and kept for Marx and Engels the place they hold today among most classes of socialists. From these two

men came the movement which has strengthened socialism by way of unifying it.

If, then, French socialism has taken on an undoubtedly militant aspect, the fact is in great part directly due to the rise and spread of the doctrines of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Nowhere, outside its native land, has the "dazzling scientific pathos" of the Marxian theory found wider or more entire acceptance than in modern France. This is the case with so little qualification that the most effective branch of the French socialistic movement of the day, calls itself impartially "Scientific Socialism" or "Marxism," and the theory that it puts forward in polemic and pamphlet is only Marx diluted and popularized. Though a section of French socialism, as will presently be shown, follows in method and theory, the line of French tradition, the more prominent part of the current doctrine claims to be only an exposition of the principles of Marx and Engels. At the hands of French disciples, these theories undergo certain modifications, but, in intention at least, much of French socialism is to-day imported doctrine. The exact character of the theory which Marxism seeks to imitate need not be discussed to any extent here; it would be beside the point to give the doctrines of Karl Marx, except as they are interpreted in France. In this connection, it is only of moment to remember that the French movement derives whatever of political activity it represents to-day in great part from the international movement led by Marx and Engels.

Finally, a few words regarding the present political organization of the party. It is the custom in French socialistic circles to date the beginnings of the

latest movement in France, the so-called "proletarian movement," from March, 1871, the date of that memorable and bloody encounter known as the rise of the Paris Commune, an uprising so variously reported by the several political factions of France. But though this may be the date at which the numbers holding to socialistic theory again demonstrated themselves, the movement did not become a real political organization until several years later. The third French republic was fairly established before the new socialism began to make itself evident as a factor of French political life.

In 1879, the socialists effected a political organization, and contemporary French socialism became a fixed doctrine.<sup>22</sup> In that year, two enthusiastic Marxists, Paul Lafargue and Jules Guesde, presented a collectivist Program to the Workingman's Congress which met at Marseilles. After a bitter contest, which, however, concluded in a vote of 73 to 27, the Congress accepted the Program, which has since, with slight variation, been that of the party.<sup>23</sup>

Since 1879, each succeeding congress has seen some subdivision of the party into factions, which take issue with certain articles of the program. The differences seem to be for the most part on questions of tactics. In 1880, the separation was into two factions, the "Possibilists," and the "Guesdists" or "Parti Ouvrier So-

<sup>22</sup> It was not until 1893 that the French socialists became a distinct political party. Comp. Coubertin. France under the third Republic, p. 396.

<sup>23</sup> For a Chronological history of the movement, see "Le socialisme et le mouvement social au XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle," Werner-Sombart, p. 168 et seq. Paris, 1898.

cialiste Révolutionnaire;” in 1881, at the Congress of St. Etienne, the Possibilists again split into the Broussists, Marxists, Blanquists and the Allemanists. At present<sup>24</sup> the sections of the party are “la Confédération des Socialistes Indépendants,” of whom Jaurès, Labusquière and De Pressensé are the best known among the leaders; “la Fédération des travailleurs socialistes de France,” who recognize Paul Brousse as Director; the Parti Ouvrier français, with Guesde and Gabriel Bertrand at its head; “the Parti ouvrier socialiste révolutionnaire,” of whom Allemane is still the accredited chief, and the “Parti Socialiste révolutionnaire,” of whom Vaillant is the most conspicuous representative. The names of the groups suggest the character of their separation; all, except the “Socialistes Indépendants,” are practically agreed as to the fundamental Marxian principles, and may, without inaccuracy, be comprehended under the name of scientific socialists.

The so-called “Integral Socialism,” which is the kind advocated by the “Socialistes Indépendants,” dates from 1885, when Benoît Malon founded the “Société d’Économie Sociale,” a society that at once became the center of Independent or Integral socialism. The association formulated a program which professed to broaden and humanize Marx. The pretension of the group gave great offense to the rest of the party, and the new society was, for a long time, the cause of much contention. By the Scientific Socialists, Integral Socialism was brushed aside as good enough for Freemasons and spiritualists; it is even yet sometimes as-

<sup>24</sup> March 19, 1899. See “La Petite République,” of that date.



serted more energetically than elegantly, that, in aspiring to found a school to perfect Marxism, Malon "a voulu éternuer plus haut que le nez."<sup>25</sup> But, as has been said, the two schools are not now politically antagonistic. The Independent Socialists know how to forget domestic differences in face of an opposing political majority; and to-day, it may safely be said, that, separated though they may be on questions of fundamental theory, these two groups are willing to work harmoniously for a party program which fairly embodies the immediate aims of all.

The party program of the present day stands, on the whole, for peaceful measures, but for unswerving political and propagandist activity in the pursuit of their ends. The socialism that the party advocates is said to be evolutionary; it is only revolutionary under a definition which holds revolution to be "the characteristic crisis that terminates effectively a period of evolution;" it is "a rupture with the established order."<sup>26</sup> Although the distinction between this and ordinary definitions of revolt is a little hard to make out, it seems that the present intentions are really pacific. It is believed that the social movement must progress to its goal by a period of conscious preparation. This means that there is to be a political struggle, and those who make the struggle are, above all, to organize the lower classes for mutual enlightenment as to the end of the agitation they are making, and the best means for attaining that end. This effort is called developing the

<sup>25</sup> Comp. Deville, *op. cit.* p. xxiv (Preface), where, in the pages that follow, the objections of the Marxists to Malon are pretty well summed up.

<sup>26</sup> Deville. *Principes Socialistes*, pp. 73, 74.

spirit of "solidarity," and one of the chief aids to the growth of this necessary sentiment is said to be internationalism.<sup>27</sup> The "political machine" is indicated as the first object for attack, and the aim is to get possession of it as soon as legitimate means will permit. The "mot d'ordre" is "political expropriation in order to economic expropriation."<sup>28</sup> According to the party program it has been resolved "energetically to maintain legality within the nation and peace without, but just as energetically is it decided not to tolerate the least deviation from the present situation."<sup>29</sup> The party has settled upon the following demands, which, gradually obtained for a public growing steadily more intelligent, shall on the one hand do away with the old order, and on the other, inaugurate the new. The articles are separated into political and economic demands.

Political changes asked for at once, include demands for fuller individual rights,<sup>30</sup> for the disavowal of re-

<sup>27</sup> It is always insisted that Internationalism does not mean anti-nationalism (Comp. e. g. Jaurès, *Patriotisme et Internationalisme*, passim; also, Deville, op. cit. pp. 79-81). Internationalism is held to mean peace and concurrence of effort between nations, not the disappearance of nations. Internationalism is counted as an important means for a general cooperation of the productive classes. One socialist (Renard, "Régime socialiste," in *Revue socialiste*, tome 26, p. 524) defines four kinds of Internationalism, making either negatively or positively for socialism: (1) Black internationalism, or that of the priesthood; (2) Red internationalism, or that of the proletaire; (3) Yellow internationalism, or that of financiers; (4) White internationalism, or that of intellect.

<sup>28</sup> Program du Parti Ouvrier, 1894.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid. See, also, Deville.

<sup>30</sup> Perfect freedom of the press; freedom of association; greater mobility of labor with which the *livret* and necessity of reference is now said to interfere; perfect equality before the law, not only for men, but the same law for men and women.

ligion by the state,<sup>31</sup> for state seizure of church lands,<sup>32</sup> for the abolition of the public debt,<sup>33</sup> and for the inauguration of local self-government.<sup>34</sup> Under the head of economic changes, there is a long list of moderately radical articles. Immediate legislation is asked for concerning labor-time,<sup>35</sup> child-labor,<sup>36</sup> wages,<sup>37</sup> obligatory provisions for minors,<sup>38</sup> and for all the old and incapable. Legislation to protect the interests of the working classes is, of course, of particular moment. For instance, it is asked that a law be at once enacted by which employers shall be made responsible for accidents to workmen, and that, as surety against such accidents, each employer shall be obliged to place in the workmen's bank, a deposit proportionate to the number of workmen he employs and to the dangers which the industry represents. Finally a new tax law is asked for, which shall make provision for the abolition of all indi-

<sup>31</sup> The state religion is to be abolished; the excuse for the budget of cults is said to have long since passed away.

<sup>32</sup> This is the first step, it is said, to the appropriation of capital.

<sup>33</sup> The public debt is said to give unproductive wealth the power to grow without undergoing the risks and difficulties inseparable from its industrial use, and hence it should be abolished.

<sup>34</sup> It is asked that each commune be made entirely mistress of its administration and its police.

<sup>35</sup> Law to interdict more than six days' labor per week, and to establish an eight-hour labor day.

<sup>36</sup> Children under fourteen to be forbidden to labor, and minors between fourteen and sixteen to be allowed to labor only six hours.

<sup>37</sup> Asks for an annual commission of labor statistics, to determine the legal minimum wage, and, further, that the law forbid the employment of foreign labor at a salary below that given to French workmen; law to insure to all laborers, irrespective of sex, equal salary for equal labor.

<sup>38</sup> Scientific and professional training free for all minors.

rect taxes and the transformation of all direct taxes to a progressive income tax on incomes over 20,000 francs. In sum, the program presents little variation from the programs of the German<sup>39</sup> or any other of the national Socialistic parties.

According to the latest election returns, the party now numbers two millions, but two million votes will not secure the majority in the legislative body, and to win such a majority all the strategic energy of the socialist leaders is turned to-day. But the same agrarian question which puzzles the Germans at present blocks in an even more formidable way the progress of the French movement. It so happens that the conquest of the peasant is the chief interest of contemporary French Socialism, and to win this peasant is not an easy task.

The Frenchman who represents the agricultural interests of the nation is aggressively individualistic, especially in his well-known eagerness for a personal holding of even a tiny piece of land. His general indifference to politics has been a thorn in the side of the whole republican movement; his education, or lack of it, inclines him to a timid conservatism; except in face of great misery, he is content to go mildly about his daily labors on his tiny holding with what often seems a brutish cheeriness. The thrift that makes him the object of general admiration at the same time narrows his ambition to a dream of the "comfortable," and the idea of what that word comfortable means includes even to-day, in the majority of cases, an astonishingly modest scale of wants. Proverbially the most

<sup>39</sup> Comp. Protokoll über die Verhandlungen des Parteitages der sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands, Oct. 1896.



well-to-do of European peasants, there is little to rouse him at present from his stolid content in his small holding and limited earnings but undoubted savings. The socialistic movement then meets with a difficult problem when it seeks to increase its following beyond the factory towns. In the eyes of those who believe that all compromise with the "petite industrie" is a menace to the proletarian movement, the French peasant now really stands in the way of the movement. The numerical strength of the ballot is in the agricultural districts, where the small farmer and the artisan, as distinguished from the factory-hand, are still the dominant types of industrial life. Now the success of the social movement requires the vote of these persons; and yet, before they will give to the movement any sympathy such as will insure the suffrage, the very compromise in the doctrine of property-holding, which has been so much dreaded, has been found necessary and has been made. Instead of an uncompromising demand for collective ownership of land, French Socialists now make a careful distinction and ask, not for the unqualified collective ownership of land, but for "such collective holding of land as shall insure to the collectivity whatever property can be used only in groups."<sup>40</sup> The discussions that go along with these modifications drop the Marxian point of view in relation to the development of production on a large scale, and suggest that only industry, and not agriculture, follows the law of concentration of capital, and that small farm lands are not, therefore, to be socialized. The socialistic party hope

<sup>40</sup> See the Programme du Parti ouvrier, p. 89, ed. Lille, 1894, Cf., also Coubertin, *op. cit.*, p. 401.

thus gradually to win the peasant to the proletarian movement, as he sees held out to him, along with the possibility of continuing to hold his small plot of land, the prospect of a more direct and wide-reaching share in the direction of communal affairs and an increased probability of personal enjoyment.

The fact that the present socialistic movement is so well developed as a political party, makes the principles which are behind the socialistic agitation take on a more definite interest. As has been said, there are two schools to be discussed, the Marxian or Scientific Socialists, and the Independent or Integral Socialists. The group which adheres to "scientific socialism" asserts that the Marxian doctrine is the "correct interpretation of social life, regarded in its material foundations and in the diversity of its manifestations without neglecting any one of them."<sup>41</sup> Marxism is said to be "the only socialism which counts."<sup>42</sup> Though the fact of a well-recognized group of socialists who reject Marx hardly justifies this pretension at supremacy on the part of the Marxists, the greatest force of agitation undoubtedly comes from them, and it is the principles of their party which are possibly the best known. However, notwithstanding the superior capacity of the Marxists for making a noise in the world, the doctrines of the other, the Integral Socialists, have a greater interest, for they are more truly French and less baldly materialistic. In the chapter which follows, more attention has, therefore, been given to Integral Socialism, even though the predominating political force of Marxism is recognized.

<sup>41</sup> Déville. *Principes socialistes*, pref. p. xiii, ed. Paris, 1896.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, pref. p. viii.

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**CHAPTER VI.**  
**THE PRINCIPLES OF MODERN FRENCH**  
**SOCIALISM.**

19



## CHAPTER VI.

### THE PRINCIPLES OF MODERN FRENCH SOCIALISM.

#### I. SCIENTIFIC SOCIALISM.

#### II. INTEGRAL SOCIALISM.

#### III. SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE TWO SCHOOLS.

##### I.

THE so-called "Scientific Socialism" is a type of socialistic theory entirely contemporary with the second half of this century. Up to the present time, socialism was never a system, so much as a dream of one or a few persons; a voice or a few voices raised against the world from time to time in accents of criticism or indignation; voices which urged remedies often inconsistent and fantastic, based on conceptions of men as pure spirits and of society entirely cut away from history or the soil on which it stood. Now, on the contrary, socialism lays claim to be a social system deduced from truths revealed by that kind of search into social conditions which science demands as the guarantee of sound doctrine. Socialism now claims to be "an historic discovery." This "Scientific Socialism," or "Marxism," might be called an attempt to give a materialistic answer to the perpetually and universally debated problem of evil. In the eyes of the party who makes its principles their platform, the new French socialism is not a social philosophy, not a reform movement. "Socialism is not a system of any reformer whatever," writes Lafargue; "it is the doctrine of those who believe that the existing system is on the eve of fatal economic evolution, which will establish collective ownership of

land in the hands of organizations of workers instead of the individual ownership of capital. Socialism is in the character of an historical discovery."<sup>1</sup> Says another, "Socialism is the theoretic expression of the present economic phase of human evolution."<sup>2</sup>

This pretension at being positive theory, the doctrine fails to carry out. It has already been noted that in spite of its announced disdain for sentiment and its claim to be non-partisan, scientific theory, compassion and wrath at the condition of the working classes, and a hope of clearing the way to a fundamental cure of all social misery, was at once the impetus that shaped the movement and the reason for the enthusiastic support it still receives. Marxism means unbounded faith in pure democracy; that is, faith in the rule of the absolute majority and the right of the individual to develop by way of liberty; as it is usually interpreted, it represents a dream of an ultimate social harmony as much as any other socialistic scheme for the reorganization of society.<sup>3</sup> But "Scientific Socialism" is so much more scientific in its method, so much less impassioned in its style than any preceding socialism, and it has beside, an aim so much more practical, that, even though it is an interpretation of history worked out under the undoubted influence of preconceptions, it is yet relatively at least, nearer to being a scientific socialism than

<sup>1</sup> In "Figaro," 1896, cf.; also, Jaurès, *Socialisme et Paysan*, p. 116.

<sup>2</sup> Deville. *Principes Socialistes*, p. 1, ed. 1896.

<sup>3</sup> Marx himself may not be justly accused of promising more than the amelioration of the present condition of the working classes. However, no such uncertainty as to the final solution of the problem of social discontent is to be found in the French Marxism.



any theory of its kind that has ever been put forward. In comparison with any socialism antecedent to it, there is some justification for the great stress which all its adherents put upon the scientific character of the present movement; it is when the theory is taken by itself, that the claim can hardly be said to rest upon fact.

The doctrines of Scientific Socialism reduce to two of chief importance, the one, usually called the materialistic conception of history, with its important deduction of class struggle as the primary cause of social progress; and the other, that interpretation of the present social order, which holds it to be essentially an age of capitalistic production with its inevitable accompaniment, surplus labor or surplus value. The arguments that support these two theories make clear all that is essential to a fair understanding of the doctrine.

In relation to the materialistic conception of history, it must be noted, first of all, that with their Gallic love of logic and completeness, the French have made the doctrine of Marx more assailable. It is no longer as in Marx<sup>4</sup> only the progress of society, which sums up in a series of class struggles, each conditioned by the economic background. In the Scientific Socialism the theory is, logically enough, transferred to the subjective life and man's development, as well as society's, is de-

<sup>4</sup> Labriola. *Essai sur la Conception Matérialiste de l'histoire*, Paris, 1897, seems to be held by French socialists to be the most complete statement of the doctrine of progress. This author only pretends to be a popular version of Marx, but the additions noted in the text are in his essays. The same theory can be found in briefer form, in the pamphlets of Deville, Guesde and Lafargue,

pendent upon the material conditions which he finds about him. Thus, the fundamental postulate of Scientific Socialism holds that all matter and mind develop by a necessary evolutionary process where the principle of conflict is the cause of the successive phases of growth. Using this postulate and applying it to history, Marxism discerns that man is the direct agent to the development of society, but man is dependent for his development upon matter; therefore, society and man alike are finally forced to wait on the development of material conditions before either can progress. Proof of the three propositions into which this statement can be divided, runs somewhat as follows.

First to prove that man is dependent upon matter for his development, it is argued that Nature, "one, free and sovereign," is at once "matter and spirit;"<sup>5</sup> she is the necessity that is behind all that is material, and there is nothing but that which is material. Thus man is said to be primarily a non-intellectual being, and his intelligence depends for its growth upon his surroundings, since no man can develop psychologically until his surroundings can satisfy his animal needs. "The mind has the power to elaborate the elements drawn from the environment just as the digestive apparatus has the faculty of digesting;"<sup>6</sup> but unless man is free to get at these elements, his mind can no more thrive than his stomach can get along without food. The individual moves from the animal to the intellectual condition only so fast as his environment frees

<sup>5</sup> Comp. *Le second commandement de la Nature divine*; also, Lafargue, in "*Idéalisme et Matérialisme*."

<sup>6</sup> Deville, *op. cit.*, p. 167.

him from the physiological necessity of a fierce struggle for existence. "The substratum of will and action is the co-ordination and subordination of needs."<sup>7</sup> When the imperative necessity that forces a man to devote all of life to supplying his physical wants is removed, then and then only, it is argued, can his true cerebral development begin.<sup>8</sup> The character and development of the individual are held to be finally conditioned by his relation to the forces of Nature about him.

Second, to show that social development is conditioned by man's development, it is posited that society only begins in the necessity for man to satisfy his imperative physical needs, and that society only progresses to a state properly so-called as these needs are increasingly ministered to. The cause of society is the "cerebral activity exercising itself upon the materials furnished by the external surroundings and developing itself in proportion as it exercises itself, and the materials at its disposition are more numerous and more complex."<sup>9</sup> Thus it is held to be fairly proved, and it is proved, if the first proposition be granted, that the beginnings of society depend upon the development of man.

Finally, to prove that all social progress is, in the last instance, unalterably dependent upon the economic environment, it needs only to recall that it is held to be proven that man's development is conditioned by his economic environment, and that social development depends upon man's development; thus it necessarily fol-

<sup>7</sup> Labriola, *op. cit.*, p. 121, ed. 1897.

<sup>8</sup> Deville, *op. cit.*, p. 166.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 166, 167.

lows that social development depends upon the economic environment. It is a watchword of Scientific Socialism that "the inventions and not the intentions of men have been the cause of progress."<sup>10</sup> Social growth is made out to be a necessary evolutionary process in which the changes are wrought out and determined primarily by changes in the economic categories.

This necessary historical movement is said to express itself in a succession of class struggles which work out on the basis of various kinds of property-holding; each property form is, at any given period, the final determinant of a characteristic economic order. It is not socialists alone who have thought to solve social problems by an unnecessary and undesirable isolation of the economic phenomena and have treated man as though he were always and only a creature of economic impulses. It is, however, only the socialists, and they are never tired of saying so, who have looked upon all history as summed up in the progress of this class of phenomena. The argument by which French socialists undertake to prove this doubtful theory is only that of Marx, and is too well-known to need more than a brief statement.

Accepting the formula of evolutionary science which derives all forward movement from the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest, Scientific Socialism holds that society also is subject to such a blind evolutionary process, and claims that in society the necessary conflict is not an individual, but a class struggle. A conflict in one social order, it is said, produces the movement that, by developing another, goes to make

<sup>10</sup> Deville, *op. cit.*, p. 169.



history; "the history of man is the history of class struggle, generated by economic conditions."<sup>11</sup> All human history is discerned to be a movement in which each phase presents, as a dual aspect, a tendency to decay and a tendency to develop. These two tendencies are always expressed in social life by two sharply-defined classes which constantly clash one with the other, to the final extermination of the one and the ultimate supremacy of the other as a causal factor in a new social arrangement.

In the theory under discussion, as has been noted, the struggle of classes is not thought of as a primary cause; it is itself looked upon as an effect of given economic conditions, chief among which is the property form required by the economic order. The Scientific Socialist undertakes to sketch out a history of property which makes communal property coincident with tribal life, individual property the expression of the manner of satisfying wants in the feudal times, and what is called "corporative property," the type of land-holding which belongs to the present era.<sup>12</sup> These property forms are held to come about, not as a result of any particular

<sup>11</sup> Deville, p. 172. Comp. Marx. *Misère de la Philosophie*, p. 114; *Manifesto*, p. 7.

<sup>12</sup> It is to be noted that this conception of history includes all the ideas of Saint Simon, with regard to the relativity of historical periods and their germinal relation, one to the other; repeats the Saint Simonian doctrine of the relativity of social conditions to certain basic institutions of the society, but differs to the advantage of Saint Simon, at the very foundation, in the idea concerning the source of development. For Saint Simon, the "law of progress," acting upon men, and not upon economic or any other material conditions, is at the bottom of the sequence of events that make history, and it is the thought stages, not economic phases, which are the real tests of change.

ruling theory in regard to the property right, but because of the mere necessities that arise from the successive methods of satisfying wants.<sup>13</sup> The French exponents of the Marxian theory are not altogether free from the old tendencies to show how the individualistic form of property-holding is at the root of the manifestation of the worst passions of human nature;<sup>14</sup> the most approved custom is, however, to treat the subject as Mark himself did.<sup>15</sup> Thus it is not the habit to call individualistic or corporative property, as the early socialist writers did, or as the Integral Socialists still do, a deplorable mistake, to be consciously rectified when men shall come to understand the true answer to the difficult problem involved in the word justice. Scientific Socialism fully recognizes that individual property rights are legal rights. The school teaches, however, that a given form of property right,<sup>16</sup> as well as the state that creates the right, derives from an historical process, in which the manner of appropriating material things is the final determinant of all the rest, and holds that no one form is always best and most efficient.

The character of the relation of the laborer to the employer is likewise shown to represent a series of historical phases where the laborer has always given a great and scarcely diminishing share of his labor in quota return for a diminishing share of subsistence. This quantity of labor which the workman gives, Scientific

<sup>13</sup> Comp. Deville, *op. cit.*, pp. 160-165.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 166.

<sup>15</sup> Marx's idea is best expressed in "*Misère de la Philosophie*," pp. 214 et seq., ed. Paris, 1896.

<sup>16</sup> Deville, *op. cit.*, p. 163; also, pp. 181-183.

Socialism calls "Surplus labor," and the theory seeks to show that "Surplus labor" is a permanent fact in the relation between employed and employer. It is energetically insisted that this "surplus labor" is, like all other economic conditions, an historical category; it "was not invented by the capitalist" nor by the socialist.<sup>17</sup> It is asserted that in the ancient times, a certain portion of work was given in return for food, clothing and housing, so that at that time, too, there was really a subsistence wage. Under serfage, the distinction between the two kinds of labor is said to be clear; but in modern industry, the form effaces all trace of demarcation between paid and unpaid labor. The change that takes place during the progress of society is not the disappearance of the fact itself. The difference lies in this, that in each successive era, surplus labor grows increasingly hard to discern.

The materialistic conception of history sums up then as a doctrine which sees in social growth a necessary development of society, a development conditioned by changes in the economic environment and carried forward by means of a series of class struggles.

Regarded as a sociological theory, the Marxian doctrine is certainly at fault. Since the school purports to be a social science, not a social philosophy, it has erred first of all in method; for, when it sets up the doctrine of necessity, it has aimed to answer problems behind social laws of causation, problems behind all material phenomena, inorganic, organic or social. It has thus set up a social philosophy, not a social science. Unless upon the authority of faith, a perfectly justifi-

<sup>17</sup> Deville, *op. cit.*, pp. 121-123.

able, but not scientific ground, it can certainly not be asserted with authority that the laws of nature and society must of necessity follow the course they now seem to take. The scientist can state with certainty that the laws pertaining to terrestrial conditions act and react as he has observed them to do, but he knows nothing to prove that they must act in that way. To posit necessity as the undoubted power which controls all things here below is to start from a preconception quite as unscientific as that of a divine plan. It is to leave the scientific altogether. Thus in supporting the doctrine of necessity, Márxism loses the right to claim for itself the position of a scientific socialism.

The other proposition, that economic institutions determine the character of all other social institutions, undoubtedly involves an interesting point of view to which many facts of history seem to bear witness. There are, however, a number of marked social changes in which no economic question can be said to have played a motive part.<sup>18</sup> Alterations in the habit of thought of a social group seem a necessary antecedent to changes in all social phenomena, and the cause of such changes of thought cannot, even in primary phases of existence, fairly be regarded as solely economic. If man were not a social animal, a political animal and a speaking animal, as well as a tool-making animal, the economic impulse might be regarded as the single and primary cause of social progress. But even the tool-

<sup>18</sup> The Civil War in the U. S. may be noted as one example; feudalism fell before the idea of equality rather than because of economic causes; the determining power of the Catholic church waned when it became an economic rather than an ethical influence. It was only in the latter role that it acted as a factor for progress.



making process is the result of changes in habits of thought. Social changes have undoubtedly been brought about by economic changes, but sympathy, invention, intelligence, imitative faculties and power of reasoning are the primary instincts which, acting in the primitive man, drive him to association, enlarge the horizon of his desires and wants, and finally develop economic changes and economic society. Even without undertaking to refute absolutely the doctrine of progress by way of economic changes, it seems perfectly justifiable to insist that, in isolating the economic categories and making them the unique basis of movement in history, Marxism has been betrayed into one of those generalizations so tempting to the thinker, but so rarely justified by the facts of reality. The generalization in question is at best not proved. Viewed in the light of any dispassionate survey of history, it seems to give an unwarranted predominance to one among the complicated factors of social progress, while at the same time it neglects unwarrantably the determinative part taken by the instincts of men in any and every phase of social growth.

The philosophy of history which has just been given was really worked out to answer a question in the minds of men who rebelled against the social order they saw about them. This theory, which makes all historical movement depend upon a single current and limits its source to the appetites of men, is really a philosophy in the interests of the "most numerous and most oppressed class" exactly as were the philosophies discussed in a previous chapter. And this is only natural,

for, though they are not ready to admit it, though they try to exclude justice and replace it by necessity, Marxists, like all other reformers, saw first of all a social arrangement that went against their sense of justice, and their first effort was to find an explanation for the present which would demonstrate this inequitable relation between man and man, and between man and those material things on which their theory based his well-being. The conception of history which has just been given was worked out to aid in answering this problem.

But oddly enough, and, of course, without intention, the logical teaching of the materialistic conception of history as applied to action is something dangerously near to Quietism. When all social relations are shown to be the result of the unconscious action of "impersonal active forces" and man is regarded as the almost impassive recipient of the play of these forces,<sup>19</sup> the natural impulse of one who adopted the theory would be to let the necessary course of things work itself out; the part of the individual would be to watch the struggle with hope and await the moment when he was caught by the forward movement. In reality, however, Marx and his followers are far from believing in any such inaction; the writers of that burning Manifesto aimed at rousing and stimulating active effort. Neither is there quietism in French Marxism, but rather something more nearly resembling a revolutionary spirit.

<sup>19</sup> See e. g. Marx. *Le dix-huit Brumaire de Louis Bonaparte*, ed. Lille, 1891, p. 11. "Les hommes font leur propre histoire, mais ils ne la font pas d'après leur arbitre dans des circonstances choisis par eux," etc. Comp. Deville, op. cit., p. 168.

Consciously or unconsciously, the Marxian reformer is most of all bent on showing the oppressed part of society the direction of the social current so that those interested may not offer an unintentional opposition which shall delay the desired progress of events. It is in this end that scientific socialists have so carefully analyzed present social conditions. The laborer is "scientifically" shown his wrongs; is, also, "scientifically," shown how these very wrongs are bringing him a better future and finally it is demonstrated to him how he can help to prepare for that future. The teaching of all Marxian doctrine, especially when directed to interpreting our own time, seeks always to add to the unrest of the laborer and to give him a hope which shall change that unrest to active and organized agitation. While the fatality that is pushing toward the next social stage is always recognized, it is none the less carefully pointed out to the workman, that by making himself the conscious ally of this fatality, he can aid and even hasten the transition.<sup>20</sup>

The analysis of the present society as given in the French teaching of Marxism, scarcely shows even such slight variation from the original theory as was to be found in that part of the theory just given. The statement of present conditions, as the French Marxists give it, is only a repetition of the now well-known fallacies of Marx and Engels. In the French statement, more

<sup>20</sup> All the French arguments in this connection seem based on the argument as Engels gives it in "Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang der Klassischen deutschen Philosophie." Comp. e. g. Deville, *op. cit.*, p. 168, and Lafargue in "Idéalisme et Matérialisme," ed. 1895, Paris.

of bitterness and less of statistic marks the difference between the temperament of the master and that of his disciples. In the political speeches of the public, as one catches them in pamphlet or newspaper, whether they are addresses in the chamber or "conférences" at the sections, dispassionate exposition often disappears in vituperative attack upon current institutions; most often it is expressed in anti-clericalism, anti-functionarism and the like. However, the few books that attempt a complete statement of the doctrine, if quite unoriginal in principle and as entirely vitiated by false reasoning as is the German theory, at least offer their critical study of the present in a spirit that is comparatively unemotional.

Since, in the Marxist conception, history shows that all progress is by way of fundamental economic changes, it is, of course, only in its economic aspect that the present era is considered.<sup>21</sup> All other institutions are looked upon as so many accessories to this fundamental social activity. The present society, as all society, is discerned to derive from the economic activity of man and the present social development, like all social growth which history can show, has had as final cause, the gradual change of economic conditions. Political changes, changes in manner and religion, are said to be now as always, only so many results of the alteration in industrial operations. Following this line of argument, Marxists name the present, the era of Capitalistic Production, and, looking for the characteristic disharmony which their theory attaches to each economic

<sup>21</sup> Deville, *op. cit.*, pp. 24, 25; also, p. 216.



period, they find that it centers at present about "corporate" or productive property. Because a minor part of the community, the Capitalists, stand possessed of the "social capital," that is, the source and means of production, the other economic class, the proletariat, cannot, they say, except on most unsatisfactory terms, gain access to such capital. The capitalist thus gets an advantage, and he gets it because the progress of mechanical science has made the industrial appliances of the present day both too costly and too cumbrous to be owned or used individually. Thus social development has brought it about that a few individuals who control the productive wealth of the community. have the proletaire, the man who brings only his hands and his brains to market, at a complete disadvantage. Possessed of a labor-force which distinguishes itself from its function, labor, "as the power of walking distinguishes itself from its function, walking," the laborer is forced, if he would not starve, to accept the hard bargain which capital drives. The utter impotence of the proletaire to get at productive wealth enables the capitalist to buy labor-power in the open market at a price often below, and rarely above, the actual cost of maintaining labor-force, and to secure in return the full time of the laborer.

Now, the situation, it is held, might not bring about a social conflict, if it were not true, that this labor which the privileged few, by reason of the facts already described, have been able to get from the proletarian, is, after all, that element of production which makes all commodities marketable. There might not be this misery if the capitalist were not able to force the prole-

taire's labor from him at a mere subsistence price and then appropriate to himself all but a tiny portion of the value that labor creates.<sup>22</sup> French Marxism spends no time in elaboration of this labor-value theory; it rather asserts than argues it, with a faith in it, which is possibly all the greater because the terms of the argument are not expanded.<sup>23</sup> That labor is value is held to be the fundamental reason why the proletaire has an undoubted claim to a share in the profits of which an ill-ordered society now deprives him.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>22</sup> Comp. Deville, p. 104 et seq., op. cit.

<sup>23</sup> Marx, it will be remembered, asserted that all commodities are primarily manufactured to satisfy a need; but in this connection, as use-values, he contends that commodities are non-social facts. He holds it to follow that utility has nothing to do with true value, which is value in exchange. Exchange only arises with the idea of equating non-use values to each other. (*Das Kapital*, p. 76.) And it is as quantitative, not as qualitative, objects that goods are said to be put upon the exchange market. Now their value in that market is determined by the labor they have involved; for, since a commodity represents a utility, plus labor, and since utility plays no part in exchanges, it must be the only remaining attribute, that is, labor, that gives exchange value to it. The value of a commodity then is the "Objective form of the social labor expended in its production" (*Kapital*, p. 545), and the measure of that value is the labor time socially necessary for its production.

<sup>24</sup> The question of what is value, is a rock on which political economists will split so long as value, or any other of the principles of economic theory, is held to be a purely logical category, capable of being isolated from other social institutions, and logically and for all time determined. Value can certainly not be regarded as a constant. In order to any successful analysis of it, value must be looked upon as a variable, into which changing factors enter as the conditions of society alter. It is then easy to assert the falsity of the Marxian formula, which errs first of all in making labor metaphysically and eternally the source of value and is beside even under any given economic order, a formula worked out

Scientific Socialism finds, by this sort of analysis of value, a clue to the deprivation of the proletariat; it regards rent, profit, interest and wages darkly, as so many delusive names for that surplus labor which is surplus value, retained because the capitalist makes an outrageous use of his opportunities. The proletarian is thus shown that he has good cause for a fierce class-struggle; by the surplus value theory, it is made evident to him that he is caught at a disadvantage and then robbed of all but a bare subsistence. But the law of Concentration of Capital is given to him as the rock of his salvation.

In the French statement of Marxism, there is only a somewhat nebulous assertion of this theory of the concentration of capital, a theory that formed a pivotal part of Marx's doctrine. The principle is, however, used as the basis by which to demonstrate, with plenty of elaboration, that the capitalistic era is developing the essential elements of its own overthrow. In spite of, in fact because of, the seeming triumph of the system, the capitalistic order is said to be in an advanced

by the arbitrary and utterly unjustifiable omission of the part utility plays in any exchange. It is not so easy to set down finally and for all time what value is. Under present economic conditions, it can, however, be readily proven that labor is ordinarily only a lesser element of value, and desirability and scarcity usually play a larger part than labor in determining the market value of a commodity. If labor is not value, then the surplus value theory is likewise discredited, for it rests partly on this formula of labor as value, and partly on an equally fallacious doctrine, the "iron law of wages." It has been again and again proven that only under special conditions is labor forced to remain at a bare subsistence wage; the "iron law of wages" is, at most, a particular, never a universal, law.

stage of its existence. Capital is represented as the "character which the means of production have assumed under determined social conditions which these can lose without being the least in the world harmed by their existence,"<sup>25</sup> and capital itself is said to be generating the elements which will annihilate it. It is held demonstrated that economic conditions are to-day developing the forces which shall annihilate individual property just as economic processes in the past created that form of property. The theory would show that Capitalistic production progresses by way of the law of concentration of capital, sometimes called the law of socialization of capital, and that by the immutable working of this law, the capitalists grow fewer and the ranks of the proletariat larger. The increase of corporations and trusts is taken to be evidence that the proprietary class is disappearing. What is nominally private property has already passed chiefly into the hands of shareholders; the capitalistic class, properly so-called, becomes always less numerous, more disintegrated and more superfluous. On the other hand, the number of proletarians is said to be increasing and to be developing a tendency to concentrated and fraternal action as a result of that necessary co-operation which identity of interests creates. It is pointed out that division of labor, adding to the skill of the few, really creates an identity of misery for the many, and in both cases heightens the class feeling. Collectively, the class be-

<sup>25</sup> Deville, p. 177. The full statement of this doctrine can be found in any of the books of the party. See e. g. Deville, *op. cit.*, pp. 28-31; Programme du parti ouvrier, pp. 14-16; Guesde, *Problème et Solution*, p. 11 et seq.



comes more and more conscious of its power and position. Capitalists, it is said, are inclined to retire to mere enjoyment of their gains; the direction of enterprises is thus left to the workers. An intellectual élite is so developed whose strength, yearly increasing, will mean the final overthrow of the capitalist.<sup>26</sup> The law of concentration of capital, diminishing the proprietary class in numbers and oppressing it with the weight of its enormous gains, will finally force the proprietor to yield up the means of production which he now holds to the undoing of the laborer.<sup>27</sup>

Thus Marxism asserts that the present society represents an advanced stage in the struggle of classes. It is held to be easily discernible that class differences are everywhere narrowing to the class antagonism of two strongly opposed economic factions. A terrible, though partially hidden contest is said to be going on between the ruling and the ruled in the economic order, and government, in the Marxian interpretation of the term,

<sup>26</sup> As to the basis in fact of this idea of the necessary socialization of all capital, it has been noted already (see *supra*, p. 285) that French Marxists have themselves admitted it is not an universal fact. Even while its dogma continues to assert the unqualified Marxian law, the school has recognized in its political tactics that agriculture is not likely to be subject to this law. They have been forced to see that which Marx did not see, that while the history of the century has indisputably shown a steadily-increasing concentration of capital in all mechanical industry, wherever agriculture is carried on in highly organized centers, the work of production has as yet shown little tendency to socialize. Nowhere better than in France is it demonstrable that intensity of cultivation demands a limitation in the extension of a cultivation, such that the possibility or advisability of agriculture on a large scale diminishes, rather than increases.

<sup>27</sup> See Guesde. *Catéchisme Socialiste*, pp. 72-79; also Lecot, André, "Qu'est-ce que Dieu?"

is at present only an accessory to the continued domination of the controlling minority. The salvation of the oppressed majority is at hand if they will only comprehend and aid, not oppose, the march of progress. If the consciousness of their wrongs penetrates as it should, the whole of the oppressed class, a moment is triumphantly prophesied when, unable to cope with the organized force of the majority, the minority will have to give way and the new synthesis will appear.

As to the other social interests, devotional, sexual, esthetic, the prevailing conceptions concerning each of these are usually sneered at; they are held to be only so many false notions resting on a primary misconception; when that unstable foundation is removed the wrong prejudices regarding these other social institutions are also expected to disappear. Religion as it is now understood, is shown to be only an aid to the domination of the militant state; the family and present ideas of sex relations only so many concomitants of the present property laws.<sup>28</sup> The social principle bred by the present order, stigmatized as essentially a hideous spirit of distrust, the painful imperviousness to the beauties of Nature and the generally false standards of art that accompany this leading principle — these, it is affirmed, are all derived from the system which rests upon down-trodden routine lives for the mass of humanity.

Finally, the present political form of society is held to be as ephemeral as are the other aspects. French Marxists deny the name of state to society politically

<sup>28</sup> Guesde. "Le Collectivisme au Collège de France," p. 47 et seq.

organized. They rest their doctrine that state is nothing but the government, the deputed power, on bare assertion, but firmly hold to it.<sup>29</sup> The state is therefore defined as "the public power for coercion, which division of classes creates and maintains, and which, disposing of the force, makes the laws and levies the taxes."<sup>30</sup> Further, there is a general tendency to insist that even this sort of state will eventually disappear entirely. There may be those who are ready to recognize the inevitable continuity of some kind of organized power<sup>31</sup> properly to be called the state, but the general position is that cited, a position possibly taken with a view of meeting the prejudices of anarchists and "mutualists." The state is usually called the police force, and in this capacity it is held to be only a temporary necessity which will disappear with the vanishing of the classes that have successively created some form of it for self-protection. Quite oblivious to the inconsistency of suggesting the possibility of an association of men in which some kind of coercive force is not present, forgetting that social organization connotes coercion of some sort, the socialists of France assert and reassert the imminent disappearance of state as they define it. In fact,

<sup>29</sup> Thus the present state is said to be the creation, organ and sanction of the proprietary class. Comp. on this whole subject of the socialist's view of the state, Deville, *op. cit.*, pp. 151-173.

<sup>30</sup> Deville, p. 153, *op. cit.*

<sup>31</sup> See e. g. Guesde, who, in a long speech in the Chamber of Deputies, says, "Je ne sais pas ce que c'est l'Etat; l'Etat, c'était Louis XIV au dix-septième siècle; l'Etat, c'est vous aujourd'hui; l'Etat, ce sera autre chose demain." Double Réponse de Jules Guesde à MM. De Mun et Paul Deschanel, Séance des 15 et 24 Juin, 1896, p. 14.

in the eyes of the most of the socialists of France, there is nothing more to be desired than this disappearance of the "state." As has already been shown, the program of the party insists that the existing state is the chief impediment to that change in social conditions which they so much desire. Unequal property rights, religious intolerance, matrimonial slavery, perverted social instincts and stunted senses, all these abnormal facts must continue to exist so long as the present state which fosters them exists. The solution of the whole trouble will come when the proletariat shall get social control.

This stated somewhat summarily, is the Scientific Socialist's analysis of the present social order. In regard to the materialistic conception of history, the claim that the doctrine is a dispassionate examination of history might almost be admitted, but when the study of present social conditions is in question, it is certainly mere pretension. Suspected of being so before, "Scientific Socialism" seems without doubt partisan when its statements with regard to existing moral and political institutions are considered. This class-struggle, which is mixed up with property forms and rests upon them and surplus value, has not really been derived, as it is claimed, only from the facts of human existence. After a consideration of the Scientific Socialist's analysis of modern society, the dangerously simple half-truths advanced by Marxism are plainly the result of a desire to make clear the injustice to which it is thought the society of to-day subjects the laborer. As economic theory, Marxism becomes a protest against the



distributive justice of the present society and a claim for another kind of justice said to be proven valid by a sound study of social growth. But unfortunately the protest and the claim have staked their demand for a better distributive justice upon a false theory of value and an exaggeration of the spread and necessity of production on a large scale.

In fact, while it has seemed proper to suggest in a cursory way some of the more striking weaknesses of the doctrine of Scientific Socialism, it must be confessed that, after all, the very groundwork of the theory being false, it is not at all necessary to dwell upon the rest. Marxism fails to win acceptance first of all, because it represents a narrow and partial view of social progress, an unfortunate blending of truth and untruth. Any theory that offers a single remedy for social diseases, any theory that neglects the countless variations of subjective and objective influences in favor of any one particular influence and holds that a single alteration in society is the key to a permanent solution of social destitution and misery, discredits itself at the outset by so doing. Add to this, that the theory by its doctrine of necessity destroys for the ordinary mind the idea of human responsibility; add too, that it preaches association and talks of its merits as against competition, yet asks men to associate in a struggle where hate is the social motive and self-interest the individual motive. A theory which talks about community of interests and co-operation for the common good, yet seeks to attain these ends by stirring men's meanest passions and reducing all aims to those that end in self, is barely consistent and certainly not in-

spiring to that better, wider sympathy which is at the root of all social progress. Students of social conditions grow increasingly certain that it needs perhaps much that the Marxists claim, but much more beside and some of the other things first, before any change in undoubtedly deplorable conditions can be hoped for. While the best informed seem justified in believing that there is less, not more, misery now than in the past, no one doubts there is misery and poverty, plenty and to spare, and that men are certainly only too often driven by circumstances over the border-line which separates the poor from the destitute, but it is permissible to believe that he who expects, by any change in social arrangements, to do away with regrettable social conditions is one who has forgotten that astounding variable, man, and the all-powerful rôle which his passions and habits play in shaping the quality of the social fabric.

Such an expectation is, however, as has been seen, back of the doctrines of Scientific Socialism now explained. With even more of hopefulness, but in a different spirit, the Integral Socialists also look to a certain fundamental change to bring all other changes in its train.

## II.

It has already been noted that the militant French socialism of the day represents the partial fusion of two distinct schools of thought. The two theories exist side by side in a sort of tolerance one of the other;<sup>32</sup> except for political purposes, they have not united on a common doctrine. A real divergence from the theory

<sup>32</sup> At present (Oct., 1900) the newspapers reporting the Congress at Paris, report serious rupture between the two groups.

of the Marxists, makes a separate statement of the doctrine of the Integral Socialists seem necessary even though that statement may involve some repetition.

As compared to the school whose doctrine has just been given, the most striking fact with regard to the Integral theory is its return, in formula at least, to the individualistic thesis. The individual is restored to a directing rôle in determining the trend of society. No longer held to be merely an atomic part of a great and necessary evolution that is primarily economic, each person is now held to be a social unit, upon whose complete opportunity to develop the movement and direction of social progress depend.

From the very beginning of theoretical statement, at the point of definition, this separation between the schools is clear. Socialism is not now defined as "The theoretic expression of the present phase of economic evolution;"<sup>33</sup> it is, instead, said to be "a state of superior civilization, where, except for an easy task, all men will have the advantages of life by the practice of solidarity,"<sup>34</sup> or again, socialism is "humanity marching toward a superior civilization and carrying in the vast folds of its starry mantle, with all the hopes of liberation and justice for the oppressed and the exploited, all the high mental and esthetic aspirations of the soul."<sup>35</sup> These definitions show at once the character of the difference between the two schools and how radical it is.

<sup>33</sup> Deville, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

<sup>34</sup> Bertrand. *Qu'est ce que le socialisme?* p. 2.

<sup>35</sup> Malon. *Précis de Socialisme*, p. 178, ed. Felix Alcan, Paris, 1892.

When there is talk of the aspirations of the soul and of the superior state of civilization the new social order is to bring, it is evident, not only that all pretense of being a scientific study of society has been abandoned, but that a materialistic socialist philosophy is discredited for one that recognizes ideals.

And this is, in fact, the fundamental difference between the two schools. Integral Socialism denies that nothing exists except that of which the senses can take account; that all that exists and happens, exists and happens necessarily, and that the leading principle of all organic being, whether purely brute or human, is self-preservation in a struggle for existence which is generated by the unavoidable desire for the satisfaction of hunger, thirst and the sexual instinct. Socialism, say the Independent Socialists, "is not necessary, as Marxists contend, but it is just." Holding, without any particular elaboration of the fact, to an animistic theory of creation, holding often to the old idea of a plan which arranged this world as a means for the development of perfectible human nature,<sup>36</sup> Integral Socialism regards the future happiness of man as dependent upon the correct comprehension of the right ideal, rather than upon a just interpretation of the past or present. It is declared that Marxism is wrong

<sup>36</sup> For an exact repetition of the old theory, see an interesting pamphlet called "Le Second Commandement de la Nature Divine ou le Travail Obligatoire," par un Travailleur (A la Bibliothèque Socialiste populaire, Paris), which contains such statements as "Le problème social consiste à mettre les lois humaines en harmonie avec les droits que nous tenons d'elle (la nature) et avec les devoirs qu'elle nous impose."



“to project the past into the future and wish to regulate what will be by what has been.”<sup>37</sup> Integral Socialism believes that not the past, but the ideal which the mind of man can formulate is to be the guide in a conscious struggle for the well-being of humanity. The only way to determine the future they say, is to order the present carefully on the basis of a sound ideal. Consequently, the whole aim of this social philosophy is to rouse, not class hatred, but a strong moral sentiment, that shall finally demand an arrangement of society on the lines of the social philosophy which the school advocates. Legitimate inheritors of the radical thinking of their own country in the past generation, we find this school of socialists, repeating in terms of the present time, the old faith in the power of an ideal to insure the moral development and thus the social happiness of man.<sup>38</sup> The doctrine thus proves the superiority of its ethics to that of Marxism; at least it takes human nature into its calculations, realizing the power of ideals as stimulus and uplift; recognizing that thoughts underlie things and men, institutions.

It is hardly necessary to say that the theorists of the school center their inquiry about social problems. The origin and aim of society, and the relation between society and the individual, more particularly as that relation concerns the political and economic interests —

<sup>37</sup> Malon, *op. cit.*, p. 142.

<sup>38</sup> “Montrer l'idéale, c'est d'abord créer une tendance à le réaliser; c'est fournir à ceux dont la poussière de combat peut troubler et gêner la vision, le seul moyen pratique de discerner si telle ou telle mesure proposée est bien orienter dans le sens de l'avenir.” Renard, *Le Régime socialiste*, p. 23 (in “*Revue Socialiste*,” Tome 27).

these are the all-important problems that the school undertakes to solve. To explain fully their point of view in regard to these two undoubtedly vital questions, will give sufficient insight into the doctrine of the party.<sup>39</sup>

The theory of Integral Socialism, concerning the origin and aim of society, runs fairly parallel with the more generally accepted contemporary theories of social growth. In insisting that social progress, in a causal sequence, is a self-evident truth,<sup>40</sup> the theory seems to fall in with the Marxian doctrine. But social progress, as the Independent Socialists understand it, is different, for it rests not upon "necessity," but upon a "desire for the realization of justice." The first requisite to progress is said to be the psychological development of man; and this development, it is contended, is an inherent necessity of man's being. Economic conditions, like other conditions, are only the result and affirmation of the ideas which are the motive forces to all facts of reality past and present. Integral Socialism holds, with most of the received opinion of the day, that "one cannot transform manners and laws radically, without first changing minds and

<sup>39</sup> While the works of Malon, Jaurès, Bertrand and most of those who write for the "Revue Socialiste" stand for the Integral rather than the purely Marxian theory, the most recent exposition of the doctrine under discussion, as given by M. Georges Renard, seems so much the most orderly and complete statement of this most characteristically French part of the modern socialistic theory, that the succeeding pages have been chiefly based upon the works of M. Renard, professor at Lausanne and an ardent disciple of Malon.

<sup>40</sup> Renard, p. 657, *op. cit.*, *Revue Socialiste*, Tome 26, "La société future existe à l'état embryonnaire au sein de la société présente."

hearts, while waiting till in their turn, these shall again be modified by the new social order."<sup>41</sup> Along with most social science of the time, Integral Socialism offers the conclusion that social development rests upon man's psychological development. They only depart from the strictly scientific point of view when they assert, as a positive fact, that this social development and psychological development are both the result of an inherent need in each individual for the realization of the ideal of social justice. Thus, the idea of necessity, if it has any place in the Integral theory, finds shape as the inherent necessity for the realization of justice which, along with other instincts, has led men to come together in organized groups. Man, it is asserted, was not only created that he might attain a high degree of physical development; he is here for the complete and harmonious development of all his faculties, physical, mental and moral. Whatever the creative force is held to be, it is usually counted as entirely apart from any participation in the work of development. Society is looked upon as the means for finally bringing about universal social harmony. Defined as the "ensemble solidaire de tous les individus qui la composent,"<sup>42</sup> it is made the condition and means to man's development. In sum, the cause of society is thought to be the nature of man, who is a "social being;" that is, "one who lives in society and is obliged so to live,"<sup>43</sup> and those same instincts which the Physiocrats gave their "Natural Man," the instincts of

<sup>41</sup> Renard. Programme de la Revue Socialiste, 1896.

<sup>42</sup> Renard, *op. cit.*, p. 399, Tome 26.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 387.

well-being and of sociability, now severally called the instinct for the "satisfaction of the individual needs" and the "sexual instinct," again come forward as the forces that draw men together.

The doctrine is plainly that which holds society to be an organism and the individual only an organic part, and, in a sense, a product of that organism. Great stress is laid upon two principles, "the struggle for existence and the coalition for existence,"<sup>44</sup> principles which, generated by the instincts of man, become the motive forces behind all true association. The first, the struggle for existence, is defined as that struggle for existence among individuals which grows out of the innate need for personal development; it is competition, the stimulant to energy, to individual initiative and self-culture. The second, the coalition for existence, grows out of the individual need for protection and sympathy; it is the result of man's instinctive perception of the fact that an easier and fuller satisfaction of his wants comes from cooperation of effort and division of labor. This second principle makes for solidarity, and solidarity is the sole means by which individual happiness can finally be secured. According to this theory, social forces, generated by the slow organization of human effort, represent the really dominating influence in individual development. All the weight of argument goes to show the creative power of the distinctly social instincts,<sup>45</sup> and the individual is regarded as a complex of the social facts these in-

<sup>44</sup> Renard, *op. cit.*, p. 388.

<sup>45</sup> Jaurès. *Idéalisme et Matérialisme*, p. 9.



instincts finally generate. Though it is admitted that man himself is a moral being, who can consciously direct and shape the further character of the social forces, yet, man, as he finds himself on coming to self-consciousness, is held to be essentially a social product, the result of certain continually developing forces of organized society.

Society is then the medium to individual development; all association is in this end. Society is always for the service of the individual. If, in the end of the best possible social organization, each person is called upon to make a certain subtraction from his entire liberty and content, all such denial is pointed out to be in the end of an enlightened self-interest. If the leadership of society is to be desired, it is because it is held to be the surest means to an end, that end not individual liberty, but individual development.<sup>46</sup> Pamphletary exposition of what is said to be the truly social régime, usually accents the greater individual liberty to be expected under that régime, and leaves the idea of social authority as much as possible in abeyance, but the best studies in Integral Socialism make no such concession to popular prejudice; it is clear to them, and they are interested to show, that the end is the best possible development of each individual in society. Since society is held to be the determining force, it is believed that the difficult and vital point to be settled is the relation between the social authority and the individual autonomy.<sup>47</sup>

<sup>46</sup> Comp. Renard, *op. cit.*, chap. 1, *passim*.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 392.

Whatever of weakness and inconsistency there is in Integral Socialism stands out most clearly when the terms of the solution they offer to the difficult problem of the relation between the Individual and the State are understood. The first principles of their social philosophy are scarcely assailable. The doctrine recognizes that the mainsprings of society are not things but men; that in the scale of human destiny, brain not brawn is the final determinant, and it likewise recognizes that the character and growth of each individual life does and always will determine the whole social growth; and that, therefore, a sense of his own significance, a sense of duty to his kind and of personal responsibility for the advancement of all social life, is a necessity to social well-being. It accepts and states clearly the doctrine that Progress is the strengthening of the social bond, and in all this it may be said to have adopted the best teachings of our time. But the same can hardly be said of the polity proposed by the doctrine.

First of all, viewed as a political theory, the method of the doctrine seems open to criticism. Even while the school condemns the earlier methods of abstract reasoning, even while they seem to realize that the problems of politics can least of all be answered by mere rational deduction, they have, none the less, set out with a system of logical demonstration and have almost entirely neglected the empirical method. Integral Socialists, just as Morelly or Rousseau did,<sup>48</sup> pose

<sup>48</sup> Comp. Code de la Nature, p. 14. "Trouver une situation dans laquelle il soit presque impossible que l'homme soit dépravé ou méchant;" also Rousseau, (Contrat Social, Bk. I,

the social question as follows: "To find a social organization such that each human being may develop as completely as possible, without harming and even while aiding the development of others."<sup>49</sup> This is clearly to adopt an *à priori* method for the solution of political problems, and it is this method which dominates throughout the theory. It remains to show the difficulties which result from following such a course.

The theory has in view the protection of the individual initiative, and its first aim, therefore, is to formulate the rights of the individual. These rights of man are not put forward as Natural Rights, though it might be said, without injustice, that they are really so regarded.<sup>50</sup> It is laid down that men are alike in kind but different in development, and that, therefore, any organization formed with justice as the end, will give each member of the community opportunity to develop integrally; that is, unequally.<sup>51</sup> Transferring the basis of argument from the realization of justice to that of general utility, it is asserted that even in the ends of a successful social life, any social organization must seek to insure to each member of the collectivity the greatest possible liberty, so that as many individuals as may be, shall be enabled to satisfy their wants and develop integrally. It sounds like Herbert Spencer,

ch. vi), "Trouver une forme d'association qui défende et qui protège de toute la force commune, la personne et les biens de chaque associé et par laquelle chacun s'unissant à tous, n'obeir pourtant qu'à lui-même."

<sup>49</sup> Renard, p. 392.

<sup>50</sup> Comp. discussion of rights, Renard, op. cit., pp. 400-482, Tome 26.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid, pp. 380-391.

rather than a socialistic theory, to find it laid down that the ultimate aim of all organization is "the progressive substitution of individual autonomy for all regulation imposed from without."<sup>52</sup> Independent Socialists reiterate always that the end of association is individual development, and, to that end, the fullest possible liberty is necessary. When, however, liberty is defined as "the rights reserved to the individual by the law,"<sup>53</sup> and it is further said that each person is to have as much liberty as is consonant with the rights of others, it is evident that these definitions, and even the formulation of rights that follows, give nothing beyond a very general suggestion of the amount and character of liberty to be expected under a socialistic régime. After all, the test of the individual rights is held to be that very elastic term, the well-being of society.<sup>54</sup> The socialistic idea of social justice is a widely different thing from the idea of justice that usually goes along with the idea of individual rights, for it includes the conception of entire socialistic control of industrial life. It seems almost farcical to elaborate a declaration of individual rights and then make such a social justice the ultimate and final arbiter concerning how much right to develop shall be accorded to each individual within the association.

In fairness, it must be said of the Integral theory, that the intention, if not their perception of practical truths, seems honest enough. The love of personal liberty is strong in the Independent Socialist, and the rights which he categorically claims as inalienably

<sup>52</sup> Renard, *op. cit.*, p. 403.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 394.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 518.



those of every member of society, are even more numerous than those an individualistic society asks for. The Integral Socialists claim that the individual should have reserved to him as his right,<sup>55</sup> perfect freedom in the domain of conscience; right to fair play, to justice; right to choose his own country;<sup>56</sup> right to security of life, person and property; right to free expression of opinion, whether by voice or by pen; right to physical development and education; right to free choice of a mate and to perfect freedom in sexual relations except in the case of a family.<sup>57</sup> Here are undoubtedly rights enough, more than any system of positive law has ever been able to grant. But, as has been said, to enumerate a series of rights is one thing; to find a government which can insure them is quite another. To debate the advisability of an unqualified adoption of the whole bill of rights formulated above would be beside the point. What is here

<sup>55</sup> For the discussion of the whole subject of rights, see Renard, *op. cit.*, pp. cit., pp. 400-417; also pp. 513-517.

<sup>56</sup> The demand for this kind of freedom is evidently a result of the new international or anti-national feeling so prevalent in current socialism.

<sup>57</sup> The only reservation to the unqualified enjoyment of this right is said to be the right of society to fix the age of nubility. After that, men and women shall be allowed to control their own destinies. Laws may only forbid marriage of too close relationship and register the free contract undertaken by two persons desiring to form a family. The only reason which the family has for existence is the development of the child. When society, doing its duty, shall replace the parent in the care of the young of the community, the family will have no further reason for existence. Thus Integral Socialism indorses the short-sighted objections to the marriage contract and the family which have been the regularly recurring weakness of all radicals of their class. (See the idealistic but interesting discussion in Renard, *op. cit.*, pp. 515-517, *Revue Socialiste*, Tome 26.)

in question is a study of the principles of Integral Socialism. It is sufficient to find how far the system of social organization, mapped out by Integral Socialists, seems calculated to insure any such extended liberty as their own fundamental principles claim as the right of each individual. Before answering this question, it is of first moment, in justice to the reader and to the school itself, to state the carefully worked-out theory regarding the functions of state, especially as these concern the relation between the state and the individual.

In order that the rights of each member of society shall be respected as fully as possible, Integral Socialists conceive that, as a general proposition, social authority must be much occupied. All of the functions usually assigned to the state<sup>58</sup> are conceived to belong to it; it is the state that must attend to the establishment and regulation of public defenses, the maintenance of public order, the regulation of the relations with foreign nations and the organization of public education.

The Integral Socialist's view concerning the nature of these, the functions of state that give security to person and property, evidence each one, a certain appreciation of the essential weaknesses of society at the present time, and a consuming desire to see them all done away with. Social authority is thought of as arbiter and stimulator, the peacemaker and educator for the individual who creates such authority. There is no part of the social fabric in which the state is not

<sup>58</sup> The state is always called society, in pursuit of an evidently fixed intention to avoid the word state, which is such a bugbear in the eyes of all socialists.

believed to have of right an interest.<sup>59</sup> Integral Socialists, in spite of their "individualism," are entirely socialists in this, that wherever they discern social evils they look to remedying them by means of social intervention. The state, as head of the public defenses, is gradually to abolish militarism, for armies are regarded as an evil to be dispensed with as soon as possible. It follows that arbitration is the ideal for diplomatic relations. All discussions which threaten to bring about quarrels between nations are to be settled by courts of arbitration.<sup>60</sup> The state, as preserver of the internal peace of the nation, is to make justice swift and sure; codes of law and judicial procedure are to be simplified and the execution of the law is to aim at preventive even more than curative measures. Penologists, for instance, are recommended to guide themselves by such enlightened maxims as that one which describes the criminal as a "dangerous sick person," against whom it is necessary to protect the rest of society, but whom it is above all requisite to cure if possible by enlightening his intelligence and strengthening his will."<sup>61</sup> The extreme importance and difficulty of the state function as public educator is fully recognized, and the general plan<sup>62</sup> aims most of all at establishing freedom of opin-

<sup>59</sup> Best statement of the socialistic view of the function of society is to be found in Renard, *op. cit.*, pp. 517-542, *Revue Socialiste*, Tome 26.

<sup>60</sup> Renard, *op. cit.*, pp. 528, 529.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 533.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 535. The following are put forward as leading principles for an educational system. Every child is to have a similar training in the elements of education, and all education is to be free. To meet the undoubted inequity of an entirely free higher education supported by the whole state,

ion and fullest opportunity for the special development of each particular kind of capacity and talent.

These suggestive general principles might be of real value, for they are those of any enlightened social theory, if only Integral Socialists were better able to bridge that difficult and treacherous gulf between general truths and specific laws. If Integral Socialism were a philosophy, not a political theory asking for the earliest possible application, there would be only applause for these principles which it advocates, but the doctrine asks for the nearly instantaneous and universal

a plan that seems really to increase the inequality of the present method is proposed. Higher education is not only to be unpaid for, but every minor is to be supported by the government throughout the period of education, so that none may lose the advantages of enlightenment on account of economic disability. When it is reflected how the present system of free higher education is of doubtful equity because the poor must give toward the support of schools of which only the well-to-do as a class get the advantages, it scarcely seems a solution of the question to make the government give not only free education but support as well to all persons desiring higher education. Unless human intelligence shall change markedly, it will be the majority who will pay and the minority who will reap the advantage. As to the character of the higher education, society is to see that each and every kind of doctrine has free field; that each student be free to place himself under whomsoever he please and at examination shall never be judged by the doctrines he advances, but only by his manner of presenting them. Departing thus widely from many previous socialistic schemes for education, the plan is arranged in the end of extreme tolerance of all opinions, and the hope for public well-being is not, as in the past, based upon the general dissemination of any one set of doctrines (comp. schemes of Morelly, Babeuf, and even Louis Blanc), but upon a belief of the broadening and strengthening influences of fraternity and widest culture. For full explanation of the educational ideas, see Renard, *op. cit.*, pp. 535-542; also Paul Robin, *Une manuel d'éducation Integral*, *Revue Socialiste*, Oct., 1895; or Boulard, *Philosophie et pratique du Socialisme Integral*, pp. 137, 138.



realization of a pure democracy, which, in addition to the powers already noted as those belonging to the central authority, shall have as first and most important service the duty of controlling the economic affairs of the community.

It is held to be axiomatic that each individual should be part of the sovereign body which makes the fundamental law and so determines the character of all association. In theory, the political autonomy of the individual is regarded as entire, and in practice it is to be as great as possible, for it is argued that the full expansion of the individual character can only be brought about by a polity which recognizes this truth. The system aims to give every member of the nation an equal share in government, and it is, therefore, based upon universal suffrage, by which is meant a suffrage irrespective of sex. The political form by which Integral Socialism expects to accomplish its ends may be briefly described as a democratic federation where there is no administrative centralization except for the purpose of organizing industry.<sup>63</sup> Like most French radicals of the century, like most contemporary socialists, they declare that the watchword is political decentralization.<sup>64</sup> The country is to be divided into small local units; these are to be coordinated and federated and are to be practically autonomous except, as

<sup>63</sup> The political system of the Integral Socialists, as outlined by M. Renard, is in the *Régime Socialiste*, pp. 646-652, *Revue Socialiste*, Tome 26. It closely follows Malon. See e. g. *Précis de Socialisme*, chaps. XXIX and XXX, ed. 1892.

<sup>64</sup> Comp. e. g. the idea of the least partisan of English socialists as expressed in the *Fabian Essays*, pp. 189 et seq.; also pp. 231, 232, Am. ed. 1891.



has been said, for matters concerning the industrial activity of the nation, cooperating otherwise only when it is necessary to make the fundamental national law. Government as an institution gets the same interpretation that Rousseau gave to it; it is mere executive. The functionaries who are to compose it are to be selected by direct election, and need to have no qualification beyond being native born and twenty-one years of age, unless the office asks for special equipment, when there is to be a competitive examination. Representative government is frowned upon exactly as Rousseau frowned upon it; it is called "a wretched expedient which makes the happiness of the nation dependent upon the strength of a few men."<sup>65</sup> It is to be done away with as soon as possible. Meanwhile, as long as the "expedient" continues necessary, men should at least seek to establish a representative government according to principles, not according to personality. A trust in the rationality of men and the probity of party leaders scarcely warranted by anything that party politics can show in the past or present, impels these theorists to propose that, in order to commence the better order of things, it would be best to begin by voting on programs put forward by contending parties, leaving to the persons supporting each program the selection of the men who will most effectively represent the successful program. Men are to vote "less and less concerning men and more and more concerning things." The whole scheme rests upon unlimited faith in the educational power of the franchise. It is believed that a general and frequent participation of each

<sup>65</sup> Cf. Rousseau. *Contrat Social*, Bk. III, ch. i.

individual in the law-making power, by means of a constant use of the referendum and popular initiative for everything except local ordinances, will finally make the social authority what it really should be, "the organ charged to assure to all members of society, liberty, security and the satisfaction of economic needs."

Integral Socialism seems thus to rest in plain terms, as Marxism does by inference, upon an entire acceptance of the unqualified and universal value of democracy. Now, democracy starts with the belief that the rule of the general will is always for the benefit of each and every individual. Men who are ready to commit to the collective will the control of their standard of comfort, and thus the development of their esthetic and intellectual life must have great faith in human nature, and especially in the efficacy of its collective expression. They must believe that the general will is at any given time the best guide for the conduct of social affairs; that the general will can be counted upon to express itself; that it is always able to express itself, and that when that general will is expressed, it can and will be always carried out by the functionaries deputed to execute it. They must believe that in most men there is a permanently active desire to see justice realized not only in regard to themselves, but in regard to others, whence it follows that each individual is thought to be really ready to work toward a more general content by sacrificing a share of his individual well-being whenever such abnegation seems necessary for the good of his neighbor. It has been too often and too overwhelmingly shown, in the mass of accu-

culated experience, that the contrary of all this is more likely to be the fact. Ochlocracy has usually resulted wherever the theory of pure and decentralized democracy has found a sanction in the laws of any nation whose life is at all complex. Thoughtful persons thus hesitate to see applied politics rest upon an unreserved acceptance of the entire validity of popular judgment and the undoubted efficacy of its control. Modern French socialists, however, as their general principle of a universally applied pure democracy makes clear, do believe in the soundness of such entire faith in human unselfishness and judgment, and the theory they advance is then, in so far, idealistic, rather than scientific. Likewise, in that the concept of pure democracy is a logical rather than an historical or practicable form of government, Integral Socialism, when it advocates that form, seems thus again to represent a reversion to an idealistic social philosophy. Upholding an ideal of government that is looked upon as fit for all peoples; failing to recognize the value of that form of government which natural propensities and traditions have developed in a given nation, Integral Socialism supports a movement for the universal adoption of one single type of government, and thus lays itself open to the challenge of having neglected the fundamental principle of any well-grounded political theory.

It is not the intention to deny that democracy, under specific conditions, might be practicable and advisable. The contention is that, as the means to conduct a large highly-organized national life, such as In-



tegral Socialism suggests, pure democracy with the accent on local government seems utterly impracticable in the light of all human experience. Pure democracy, with a popular initiative and referendum used as proposed, would always make for a slowness of legislation and an uncertainty of policy that would militate greatly against any general well-being, not to mention the constant interference with personal pursuits which would be increasingly inevitable and irksome under the frequent necessity of taking a hand in lawmaking. It is an interesting question how far the complete political freedom that is implied in the entire use of the referendum and initiative, is consonant with a general social freedom. The greatly increased leisure of each member of society that is promised under the socialist régime seems, on any serious thought, much in jeopardy in consideration of the numerous political services which would be entailed by the conscientious performance of the civic duties it would impose. If it be argued that under the democratic system which the school advances, it is not intended to leave large areas to democratic control; that by accenting the communal life the intention is to reduce the political unit to the size traditionally held necessary for the successful conduct of democratic government, it might then be fairly replied that the whole success of highly-developed civilized life, such as large cities have, rightly or wrongly, taught men to consider necessary for their best development and enjoyment; that is, a civilized life such as Integral Socialism itself indorses, requires communal units which shall be composed of not less than 500,000 per-

sons. Unless the separate groups be of at least this size, the pecuniary support which advance civilization must ask of each individual in the interests of the sanitary and moral efficiency of a collective life, would bear too heavily upon each individual. Modern communities demand then that which, relative to the question in hand, is a large number of persons; large groups of persons have never yet been successfully controlled on purely democratic lines, such as the Integral scheme demands, nor does the outlook seem to promise anything different in any near future. Unless then, along with an alteration in political institutions, the new social theory can promise to give to Man, not some men, the as yet unrealized power to see and act swiftly for the general good, unless it can promise to give to collective man the power to resist his apparently innate tendency to fall under personal leadership, and finally can pledge itself to give him the willingness to be unselfishly first and almost absorbingly a citizen, unless this scarcely thinkable psychological change can be effected throughout the social fabric, it does not seem probable that a decentralized democracy, such as Integral Socialism plans, can get a permanent place as a reliable and helpful medium for such social direction and cooperation as is necessary for any highly organized society.

It would seem then that the political form at which Integral Socialism aims, by no means makes absolutely certain those individual rights which the system intends to protect and foster. On the contrary, there seems attendant upon the plan the real danger of a constant and fretting uncertainty as to the national

policy and a wearing interference with personal pursuits, along with an all-pervading danger of an insufficient or an arbitrary and despotic social control, which can do so much to weaken or degenerate the individual character, and to oppress in no uncertain way an appreciable part of the community. This is true with additional force when the plea for vesting in society the control of the industrial life is considered.

The immediate aim of this social philosophy is of course to invest society with the controlling power in relation to the industrial domain. It is this function of society which, being held at once most important and most novel, gets most attention and most justification. Integral Socialists recognize that their plan for the economic organization of society rests upon some principles which represent an important separation from recognized theory. They know that they are making assertions which are at least open to argument when they hold that it is just and beneficial for society to own all its productive property; when they contend that each man must give of his labor where he can, and must receive the support of society where he is incapable of earning his own living; or when, finally, they assert that the labor which each man gives toward social production is that which at once gives value to the article he creates and establishes the measure of his share in the whole product. It is these three propositions which are chief in the eyes of the school; these established, they believe the social direction of the industrial domain to be justified both from the ethical and the utilitarian point of view.

But there is one thing they feel called upon to do preliminary to proving the validity of these claims. Since Integral Socialists have it most at heart to demonstrate the equity of their aims, it is of first interest to them to show why society and not the individual has the right to the deciding voice in the adjustment of all economic relations.

Integral philosophy says truly enough that the individual comes into the world with an enormous debt to past ages, a debt accumulated for him in the mass of stored-up knowledge which society puts at his disposal, especially the knowledge of how to satisfy his wants readily. His original share in knowing how to produce or in the actual work of production is said to be infinitesimal compared to the share of society; his right to the initiative in question of production is therefore held to be comparatively small. The fact is altogether rejected that such arguments apply with additional force to the political sphere. The debt of the individual to society is indisputable, but surely no other debt is secondary to that which he owes the public authority that has given him the security without which there could have been no development of the productive facilities whereby he has benefited so much. Following this argument of the Integral school, the individual could as well be denied his initiative in political affairs as in those purely economic. If social interference with absolute economic freedom could find no better argument than this, it would surely have no right to be rationally considered.

However, Integral Socialism, as has been shown,



leaves the individual entirely free in the political domain, but bravely contends with no sounder argument than the one just given, that in his industrial activity, justice demands that he be denied a position of independence. The right and duty of social control in the economic domain is taken as a premise of the whole Integral Socialistic theory. The school next undertakes to show how, in order to fulfill effectively its function of directing industrial activity, society must hold all land and other fixed means of production.

Clearly realizing that, in assuming collective control of land and the other means of production, they are assuming that which needs defense, M. Renard and those who agree with him are at great pains to prove that social ownership of the source and means of production is both "just and beneficial" for the individual.<sup>66</sup> The arguments advanced are not new in the socialistic theory. There is less than the wonted modern tendency to treat the question of property as a purely economic question instead of keeping it where it rightly belongs in the legal or ethical field. Integral Socialists are above all anxious to prove that it is just for society to hold property, and on this point the grounds of the arguments adopted are entirely ethical; there is, however, a weak additional claim for the beneficial results of such property-holding where beneficial is meant in an economic sense.

<sup>66</sup> The problem of property is discussed in full by Renard, in "Le Régime Socialiste," p. 396 and pp. 405-417, *Revue Socialiste*, Tome 26. Comp. also an article *Propriété individuelle et Propriété sociale* by De Potter in the *Revue Socialiste*, Jan., 1898, p. 70.

To show the justice of making productive property collective, the arguments start from the "fruits of labor" axiom. It is held proven, as it has been contended by socialists for a century, that what a man earns by his own labor belongs to him, but that that which is made by no man, as land, or that which is the result of social effort, as productive capital, can rightfully belong to none but the collectivity. Under modern conditions it is asserted, all labor is of necessity collective labor; and this, connoting collective means of labor, connotes as well social ownership of everything but consumption goods. More, it is insisted that men have only a right to whatever they may earn during their lifetime, for it is considered plain that individual property becomes collective property whenever it ceases to be the result of individual earnings. It is besides urged, as it has often been before, that in leaving to society whatever they may have amassed, men are only paying to society a portion of the debt they owe it for their own development. The state is then held to be the only rightful owner and inheritor of collective property. The old hope stirs again to do away with the "domination of money, one of the greatest slaveries that ever existed," and this change is looked for when the ownership of productive property is where it ought to be, in the hands of the collectivity.

All of this might be ethically sound enough if the right to the fruits of labor was as axiomatic as it is taken to be. Independent Socialists themselves say, that right rests with the law; that it is the law made by society that constitutes social justice. Where then, does

a "right to the fruits of labor" come from until society has made it? Why a right to fruits of labor any more than a right to unlimited leisure or the like? If there be fundamental rights external to society which can intrude as subversive to a given social order, the supreme value of social control seems doubtful. If all rights exist only as society grants them, then the "right to the fruits of labor" must be socially consented to, before it can be "just" that it shall become the basis for a new partition of property. Wherever society shall, by modern methods of concurrence, consent to such an arrangement, it is probable that it will come about; it will then certainly be just. Until such a time the "right to the fruits of labor" seems an uncertain foundation for an ethical or legal plea.

It is curious, that while M. Renard and the rest of the school assert the injustice of the present private property form, they recognize national property. It is certain that national property is usually derived from spoliation or usurpation. Is that just for society which is inequitable for the individual? Unless the force which gained national territory be called labor, which, of course, subverts the whole theory, national property seems as iniquitous as private property. To an ordinary mind, there seems as little justification for asking the individual who holds large shares of collective capital to give it up, as there would be to ask the American nation to move off and give up the land to the aborigines who were certainly rather forcibly dispossessed of it.

Integral Socialists are possibly uncertain themselves regarding the soundness of their purely "just" claims,

for they are at even greater pains to show that, just or unjust, as a mere question of better production of wealth, it is at present best for the community to hold all production property. The various arguments<sup>67</sup> that are brought forward to show how much more effective social production would be under this form of land-holding, all aim to demonstrate that this method of conducting production would not impair the quality and usefulness of the individual initiative whose influence on the final results of industrial activity is not denied. Men are supposed to have sufficient spur to self-interested activity when they can foresee as they are said to be able to foresee under the system proposed, that the act, and so the greater the sum of pleasures which will larger their personal effort, the greater will be the product for each member of society. On the other hand, it is believed that no diminution in product will really result from a possibly diminished interest in gain, whether that interest has been an egotistic or an altruistic one. If it has been the egotist who has made money, it has also been the egotist who has wasted that which he has never made. Under the land tenure proposed, it is expected that the equilibrium will be restored by making both kinds of persons work. Or, again, if men have labored for their children, those children, benefited thus beyond their deserts or their higher real need, have not been as helpful to the community as they would be under a social arrangement that would equip them for a life-work and then make them masters of their own fate. Thus again, an equilibrium would be established; if the parent's labor be

<sup>67</sup> Compare Renard, *op. cit.*, pp. 406-409.



diminished, that of the child will perforce increase, and each will really be benefited. "The social evil comes above all from the hereditary transmission of unlimited property, a result which the triumph of individualism produces and perpetrates,"<sup>68</sup> and the benefits which will accrue from the abolition of private bequests are thought to be tenfold greater than those which the individual or society now gains from the perpetuation of the custom in any of its forms.

It is not only the Integral Socialist who has recognized the evils of unrestrained accumulation of productive property, and the contention that a certain social interference with the right of bequest is beneficial and necessary, has not waited until now for recognition. But there is a great distinction between the gradual checking of an unwarranted accumulation of wealth, with the power for good or ill that it brings, and the immediate and entire concentration of all productive property in the hands of society. Even granting the highly improbable supposition that the individual can escape the baneful results of the administrative awkwardness and political corruption which almost of necessity are, one or both, attendant upon a democratic government, there remains to be considered, as against the benefits detailed, the probable check to the development of the individual which would come of necessity, when all social service was consciously turned over to the state. A consciousness of social efficiency, a knowledge of the duty of actually working for others,

<sup>68</sup> Alaville. *De la liberté individuelle par le collectivisme. Revue Socialiste, Tome 26, p. 442.*

has also a determining part in shaping the final results of a nation's industry. The sort of individual initiative which might remain effective even when the stimulant to the satisfaction of the animal wants was removed, is not the only kind of initiative that counts, even in the purely economic sense. Economists as well as others, recognize that the greed for wealth is not in itself the only impulse to an effective share in production, and so, even granting that the primitive spur to action be left unimpaired or counterbalanced, the social benefits of common holding do not seem entirely proven. To abruptly and entirely separate the individual from all productive property and to give to society a scarcely limited responsibility for the material well-being of the nation, would be to destroy the individual's sense of personal responsibility, to check too suddenly the spur to that development of his sympathetic impulses which results from a voluntary service rendered to society, or a part of society. Without this means to highest culture, men are cut away from the chief source of individual benevolence and self-sacrifice, and such an arrangement would menace the social well-being in a way that would probably diminish even the social product. All past experiment in common land-holding suggests an effect upon human nature which is anything but "beneficial," whether the term have reference to the ethical or economic character of the community. If in that past, such social arrangements have ended in stunting character, there seems much reason for weighing carefully before adopting such a form of land tenure in the future. There is no intention to deny that

with the progress of the race, a wider social control of property may not come about as a higher expression of the property idea; the objection is rather to an arbitrary and wholesale arrangement of all contemporary society under any such system. To make social control of productive property the means to individual development seems unjustifiable; to count it as a possible property-form which shall develop as the ultimate result of an altered and elevated type of the individual and society, is undertaking a work of forecasting that is outside the province of the sociologist, and need not therefore be debated. It can fairly be asserted that this plan for the summary appropriation of all productive property by the state, with the expectation of thus establishing a better means for the development of the individuals of the community, seems a plan which, in view of the existing facts regarding the psychological development of the peoples of the earth, would be directly contrary to the very ends it has in view.

Those who aim at a new social régime, to be brought about as soon as possible, are so certain that the state functioning as a controlling influence in the economic domain will be of the greatest immediate benefit, that the most desirable method of exercising that office is outlined with some detail and much hopefulness. On the question of property, it has been seen that there is a real inconsistency in the plans of the socialists. The failing continues throughout the system.

It has been said that the new social régime beside asking as a general principle for the collective holding of productive property, would ask also for a universal

obligation to labor.<sup>69</sup> We are not informed as to whether this word universal, when applied here, means, as in relation to suffrage, a universality irrespective of sex; it is only insisted that it is just and beneficial that each adult member of the community give a share of labor toward the satisfaction of his own and the whole Social Demand. This obligation to labor is not conceded to be in any way a menace to the independent action of each individual. Individual freedom, it is contended, is no more threatened by an obligatory labor service than it is by jury duty or military duty, and the duty of labor has beside, it is argued, this advantage of a direct personal return and a larger satisfaction of personal tastes, since each man is to be free to follow his own inclination. The socialistic phrases of the past are not wanting. We are told that when idlers and parasites, whether rich or poor, shall be forced to work, there will be an increased product, a more equal effort, and a larger enjoyment for the greatest number. There is so little that is new in this idea of imposing a duty of labor upon every member of society and the weaknesses of the principle have so often been pointed out, that it would need only a passing mention did it not underlie a somewhat novel plan for carrying on the work of production. The whole aim of the régime proposed, it is to be remembered, is a better development of the individual, and therefore the desire for changes in present industrial relations. To give the outlines of the plan will be enough to suggest how little

<sup>69</sup> Comp. Renard, *op. cit.*, p. 401, Tome 26, *Revue Socialiste*; also pp. 664 et seq.



the changes desired seem really calculated to accomplish what is intended. In brief, the scheme for furthering a larger individual development is as follows:<sup>70</sup>

The nation, for purposes of production and distribution, is to be suffered to divide itself according to personal inclination, into three economic groups, corporate groups, semi-corporate and semi-administrative groups, and finally, a Bureau of Statistics. By corporate groups are really meant a series of trades-unions, which shall organize autonomously, except where their interests touch those of all society; the semi-corporative, semi-administrative groups are to be made up of persons who are to carry out the public will. As has been already noted, these public functionaries are to be chosen first by competitive examination and then by general election from the list of those who have successfully passed such examination. The members of the Bureau of Statistics receive office in the same way. The duty of this bureau is to collect all necessary data from the records of the various trades and to be able to render to the nation an annual account of the social revenue; to control the allotment of tasks and to determine from the whole product the personal revenue of each workman. Passing over the numerous objections that might occur to any practical mind, the doubt as to the likelihood that the unions could organize automatically or as to the particular permanent value of the proposed method of choosing public functionaries, the question arises as to how the equilibrium in the various trades is to be preserved.

<sup>70</sup> This plan for the organization of production will be found in Renard, *op. cit.*, pp. 648-666.

Those who advocate this plan of economic organization meet fairly the argument that under the entire freedom in the choice of kind of labor implied by the scheme, tastes might drift predominately in one direction, and certain trades be entirely neglected.<sup>71</sup> It is conceded that there is a variation in the agreeableness and intensity of all labor such that, if no arrangement to the contrary is made, certain trades would be over-filled and others left empty. To offset this and to arrange for a certain automatic equilibrium in the supply of each trade on lines which recognize individual initiative, it is to be provided that in each occupation the amount of work to be done shall be divided by the number of workers applying, and the quotient thus obtained shall be used as a coefficient to modify the normal labor-time of each laborer. It is then believed that since, in much sought-after trades, there will be less work per capita and the remuneration therefore less, young persons entering the labor field, naturally apt to want high returns, will be likely to enter the less crowded professions. Continued progress in mechanical appliances, coupled with the higher education of the workman, will, it is thought, make for the greatest possible mobility of labor, so that, if changes of profession be necessary, such changes will bring no misery, as they do to-day. In the liberal professions, whenever it becomes necessary to equilibrate the supply and demand, it will only be requisite to raise the standard of requirements. As to certain trades whose offices no one might wish to perform, these, it is suggested,

<sup>71</sup> Renard, *op. cit.*, pp. 10-16 (in *Revue Socialiste*, Tome 27).

could perhaps be made attractive by special remuneration which would tempt offers of service, or else regulations similar to those which now enforce military or jury duty could arrange that such tasks be equitably distributed.<sup>72</sup> With the exception of the last provision, which hardly meets the general intention of an increased independence of choice, the different types of labor, the variety of service necessary to supply a social demand seem somewhat ingeniously arranged for. But after all, equilibrating the labor supply is a secondary consideration. In an economic organization which aims at the development of the individual by way of the greatest possible liberty, the vital economic question is the manner in which the individual's wants are to be satisfied. It is then this part of the Integral scheme which it is of first interest to understand.

The method suggested is of the simplest.<sup>73</sup> The Statistical Bureau, as has been noted, is to collect all necessary figures for the calculation of the individual and social need. In this regard, its work is to consist in making up a budget of the labor that must be done in order to satisfy all real wants. It is not, however, the Statistical Bureau that determines the "Social Desires." It is the whole society, acting on information furnished by the Statistical Bureau, that will settle what social needs shall be satisfied by the Social Labor.

<sup>72</sup> What a store of altruism one must have ready when summoned to take one's turn at carting the city refuse, or serving as a stoker!

<sup>73</sup> The plan is given in full in Renard, *op. cit.*, pp. 669-678; also pp. 13-16, Tome 27, *Revue Socialiste*.

Starting with the classification of wants as relative and absolute wants, both as regards the individual and the social want, reckoning absolute wants of the individual as food, clothing, certain furnishings and heating; and social necessities as those means required for maintaining public service, those required to maintain the social capital, and certain additional moneys necessary for national exchange, the sum of these personal and social wants is said to be that whole Social Desire which it is imperative to supply annually. The theorist who advances this view of needs, seems oblivious to the fact that either the individual or the social wants as stated are capable of extension in each category named, until they cover pretty well everything called luxuries, and that, therefore, in restricting the classification of wants after this fashion, nothing very real has been said. The supposition, on the contrary, seems to be that the problem of necessary wants has been settled. These absolute wants of society and the individual, a sum of social labor must annually supply. All additional wants are to be supplied at the will of the collectivity, which shall vote an increase in the scale of wants as fast as it desires, possibly, Renard suggests, by formulating a "New Declaration of the Political and Economic Rights of Man and of the Citizen."<sup>74</sup>

Perhaps the most remarkable point in this social system, which sets out to arrange for a larger individual freedom, enjoyment and development for each member of society is the fact that it creates a regulated Social Desire. To regulate by a majority vote the satisfaction

<sup>74</sup> Comp. Renard, *op. cit.*, p. 21, *Revue Socialiste*, Tome 27.



of the social, and thus of the individual desire, seems curiously at odds with any justified expectation of an individual development by way of complete individual freedom. This new régime intends that each individual must wait upon the pleasure of the community before he can be supplied with much beyond the necessaries of life. According to their own theory, the quality and strength of men's lives are said to wait upon the quality and quantity of the supply of commodities, and the way in which these commodities are distributed. Yet under the plan proposed, the individual will be able to satisfy these higher needs only as fast as the majority voice of the community shall permit. The immediate satisfaction of the real wants of the greatest number may perhaps be expected from such an arrangement, but the integral development of each and all seems doubtful. Thus without actively opposing intellectual superiority, even though aiming to encourage it, this plan of social organization seems certain to militate against it both because of the leveling probabilities just suggested, and for another reason. A daily quota of effort is to be exacted from each member of the collectivity; but if machines are certain to be provided, and the laws of the industrial organization arrange that each one knows for a certainty that a place will be found for him, it seems more than probable that all this will of necessity reduce to zero what little intellectual effort is now necessary to carry on mechanical production. The lot of most persons must be the mere tending of a machine, and that lot has little to be said for it as a means to intellectual development. The road to intel-

lectual growth seems always to have been by way of the stimulus that comes from necessity for struggle. Remove this impetus to effort and there seems every likelihood that a serious impediment would arise to that very integral development which Integral Socialism is so eager to maintain as the prime end of all social organization. This fact has not seemed to strike Integral socialists at all, and this because what they have in reality at heart is not the individual's interest, but rather the interests of the greatest number. Although claiming so much for the individual, it is really social justice that Integral socialistic theory seeks to establish. The disharmony between a conception of social justice which would control even the play of personal tastes, and any real integral development of the individual, seems obvious. Nothing that either past or present can show suggests that the idea of social justice means much more than the liberty of the greatest number to force their will upon the minority, and nothing in the past or present seems to warrant the expectation that the individual or society can develop unless society leave to the individual the spur of some strong personal incentive to effort, unless it leaves to him the sense of a personal responsibility for his own and the community's well-being. It is precisely this vital force to progress that the plan of the Integral socialist seems seriously to menace.

This scheme for the "integral development of the individual" has a final argument to be noted. It aims to make the labor hour the unit of value both for distribution of product and as a medium of exchange.

The method by which to determine the share of the Social Product belonging to each individual is of the simplest. The general formula for distribution runs "to each according to his labor; to each according to his needs."<sup>75</sup> The whole number of hours required to satisfy the social desire having been divided by the number of laborers offering themselves, the average number of hours required of each laborer will be determined. Since the average Labor Hour is regarded as the unit of value,<sup>76</sup> the average number of hours required of each laborer can be used both as the determinant of the share of labor he owes to the collectivity and as the measure of his share of the reward. To apportion the separate shares in the whole product, the Statistical Bureau has only to go through a simple process of addition and subtraction. After the whole product is gathered together, in order to give to each laborer the just share of the return which is the whole aim of the economic part of the system, calculation is to be made of the social revenue in agriculture and manufactures. From this total the dividends of each person can be computed. Before calculating the dividends of the individual, a subtraction is to be made of (1) a quantity of product to belong to the nation and to be set aside in case of drought, famine, etc.; (2) a certain quantity of product to be reserved for international exchange; (3) a certain amount of product to be devoted to the support of persons unable to work, to the maintenance of children and of persons whose labors produce no

<sup>75</sup> Comp. the formulæ of Saint Simon and Blanc.

<sup>76</sup> See *infra*, p. 357.

measurable result.<sup>77</sup> Such deduction made, it will only be necessary to divide the remaining sum of products by the sums of hours which was required to produce them, and the average dividend of each individual will be found.<sup>78</sup>

As to the question of the manner of exchanging the product which shall have been created by the collectivity, M. Renard passes it over lightly, as a question so relative that it may largely be left to the future. It is, however, held to be probable that exchange will be effected by means of social shares corresponding to the number of the shares apportioned to each laborer. These shares, non-transferable and good for a lifetime only, will serve as the money necessary to purchase that which the individual may desire. Such commodities as he may wish for will be found in large national and communal storehouses, like the department store of the present day.

As must be evident, the whole claim for the equity of this plan of distribution, according to labor time, rests upon the theory that Labor is Value. It is, of course, the Labor Value theory which the Integral Socialists, as well as the Marxists, advance, but the argument is not quite the same as that of the Scientific

<sup>77</sup> Officials, artists, scientists and the like are thus to be under public protection. Compare Renard, *op. cit.*, p. 670.

<sup>78</sup> Renard, *op. cit.*, p. 660. M. Renard is careful to anticipate any criticism that might arise concerning the probable small share which such a progress of distribution would give to each member of society. He points out with some elaboration that the personal revenue of each member of the collectivity will be of two kinds: (1) a sum of collective enjoyments furnished by the collectivity; (2) a sum of personal enjoyment, the result of his own efforts, and that, therefore, the second category need not represent a very large amount.



Socialist.<sup>79</sup> In the argument of the school under discussion, utility is not excluded from value, when value as the result of a personal transaction is in question. It is admitted that to have value a thing must satisfy a desire, that is, it must have utility as well as be the result of a certain amount of labor. Value is said to be "the relation between two variable quantities, the intensity of desire and the sum of labor necessary to satisfy it."<sup>80</sup> Value always functions as need of the consumer, and as labor of the producer. In a word, Integral socialism reasons soundly enough and recognizes that value in an exchange between persons is a fact of distribution rather than one of production. However, the school makes a sharp distinction between value in a bargain between two persons and the value of an article produced and marketed by associated workers. The measure in society, it is said, cannot be furnished by the individual taste. The value of a commodity in society is claimed to be the "Social average which results from the different valuations and conditions between buyer and seller, and it is therefore argued that to measure value, it must first be socialized."<sup>81</sup> When this has been done, it is found that social desire and social labor continue to be the opposing elements of value. But social desire will be a constant, because under the new régime, it is to be determined; it can thus be excluded and Social Labor will be left as the only real determinant of Social value. The sum of so-

<sup>79</sup> Discussion of the Value theory is in Renard, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-16, *Revue Socialiste*, Tome 27.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 3.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 5.

cial labor, "valuable according to the progress of agriculture and of industrial appliances, in its turn makes value vary, and so permits that value to be measured." Intensity of labor being only indirectly measurable, it is not held to be a reliable basis for measurement, and so the other element of labor, the time, is taken as a measure of value. Thus the method to be followed by the Statistical Bureau of totalizing the number of hours required to produce a given quantity of similar things and dividing this number of things produced, will, it is said, give a quotient which is the equitable reward accruing to each laborer who has had a share in the creation of the values. In this way, it is claimed that a given commodity may equitably be said to be worth so many hours of social labor. For this reason, the average labor hour is the unit of value, and all distribution and exchange will take place on the basis of such a unit of value.

In view of reasoning just set down, the difference between this and the Marxian argument will at once appear. When the doctrine of labor as value starts from a special industrial system, arbitrarily controlled by the collective will, the reasoning is sound enough. It is entirely possible under a controlled demand to make value a fact of production, and the value of an article equal to its cost of production. Given a monopoly product and the social desire annually determined by the authorities and the rest might easily follow. It is difficult to follow the intricacies of calculation necessary for estimating justly the whole social labor involved in production. All the social forces cooperating

to a given product, those indirect agents for the security that permits production, as well as the direct and multiform industrial factors, ought in justice to be severally reckoned, yet it seems doubtful if in the new régime they could or would be taken into account. There seems a further and evident injustice both to the individual and to society in neglecting to consider the difference in intensity and quality of labor. The plan seems then full of pitfalls for him who, like the Integral socialists, aims first of all at entire justice; but if this consideration be set aside, there is nothing to prevent value becoming, under the system proposed, a fact of production and being measured by the Social labor time, where this latter means the social cost of production.

With regard to the Integral School then, the question does not turn upon the validity of their theory of value, which, be it noted in passing, is not used here in the way the Marxists use it, as a means to stir rancor, but only as a justification for the new scheme of distribution. Instead of discussing their theory of value, a theory which could only hold good if a different kind of economic organization were established, it is rather of interest to discuss the advisability and consistency of the whole system. Such a system as has been seen, asks for two noteworthy and arbitrary alterations in accepted social arrangements, the collective control of land and other means of production and a regulated social desire. It has been sufficiently pointed out how contrary these plans seem to the end in view. This scheme for distribution which rests upon absolute democracy, which

deprives the individual of a deciding voice in the supply of his economic wants, which makes a given quota of labor obligatory and neglects in that labor its quality to give precedence to its mere quantity, seems one which at every point menaces the stimulus to individual capacity which is so inseparable from any real progress, individual or social. Every one of the important propositions of the scheme would seem to obstruct seriously that which the leading principle of the plan aims to preserve, protect and foster most carefully. It is hardly disputable that a democratic industrial organization such as the one planned by the Integral socialists would at best threaten each man with a slavery to society greater than ever, a slavery both in his political service and his personal needs, and would be more than likely to do away with a fruitful source of that inventiveness and individual energy which all thinkers agree are at the root of the growth of society. As time works its mysterious changes, it may be that the essential quality of such changes will bring a greater social control over certain departments of individual life. After each member of society has, up to the point where it becomes instinct, slowly learned the lesson of his direct responsibility for the social institutions under which he lives, just as he now knows instinctively his responsibility for the best possible individual and domestic well-being, he may be able to act oftener on a collective rather than a purely personal initiative. Men may slowly come to work as instinctively for a sound social life, as they now do for the best preservation of themselves and their families, but scarce the first pages of



the lesson have as yet been learned. Perhaps through the stumbling and mistakes attendant upon experiment in institutions, the new type of individual is to be developed; but it seems eminently desirable that the experiment shall not, for a long time, at any rate, be in the direction toward which Integral socialism would lead.

### III.

In this study of the principles of modern French Socialism, it remains to sum up briefly the general character of that doctrine.

When all is said the chief differences between the independent school and the Marxists is a philosophical one, but that difference is so fundamental to all others that it gives an altered tone to the whole doctrine. Independent Socialists have adopted a strong and admirable theory of social progress. They express as nearly as we know them, what seem to be fundamental truths concerning the relation of man to man and man to society. They do not deny that man is "master of his fate;" they would only show his extreme dependence upon society for his development and mental force. They do not reduce all aims to those that end in self, nor do they make a bitter class struggle the sole means to progress. Theirs is a socialism which seeks to increase cooperation and community of interests, sympathy and growth of the individual by sympathy. Their schemes for social reform aim to give to both the hand and the brain of every member of the community a noble and fitting work, and to both a larger share than heretofore in the wealth they must together create.

It would be to decry the best teachings of our day to criticise the Independent Socialist in his doctrine of social progress, but it would be a fundamental mistake to say that because his primary principles are sound, his whole doctrine is therefore valid. The school fails when it seeks to apply its principles, when it tries to cope with reality. When it would probe too far into the future, and would demonstrate what a just and beneficial régime should be, it falls short, as has been sufficiently shown.

In summary, it is interesting to note that after all it is only on this doctrine of progress that the two schools separate. Both schools stand clearly for the idea of progress, differing only as to whether such progress is the result of physiological or psychological causes. Both stand without separation of doctrine for individual rights, for decentralized and unqualified democracy, and for that interpretation of economic freedom which holds it necessary that each individual be socially controlled in his industrial activity exactly as he must, for the general well-being, be checked in the entire exercise of his civil and political liberty. These then are the fundamental principles of modern French Socialism.

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**PART III.**  
**COMPARATIVE REVIEW OF THE TWO**  
**DOCTRINES.**



## COMPARATIVE REVIEW OF TWO DOCTRINES.

### COMPARISON OF THE TWO THEORIES.

Two sets of principles, their origin and general character, have been the subject of this study. It has been explained how the eighteenth-century philosophy and the material conditions in the France of that time, developed new social principles, and the more important of those principles have been stated. It has further been shown how certain conceptions of social reform in the nineteenth century, taking impulse from certain radical alterations in social conditions, have given rise to a militant political program which is called Socialism. It remains in closing, to bring the two doctrines more nearly together, to show briefly how far the aims and the social and political principles of each are similar and where they diverge, and to make evident whatever is additional in the later doctrine.

These two theories which have grown up almost one hundred years apart, are strikingly alike in their general character. With only an occasional change of terminology, much of one doctrine is almost a repetition of the other. They represent two strong and well-defined pleas for the right of happiness, for association as the general means to that happiness, and pure democracy as the specific means. They differ scarcely at all in their aim or their political theory; it is their theory of man and society which marks them as separate doctrines.

Compare first the idea of a right to happiness. Both theories hold that there is such a right, but differ as to its origin. The right to happiness under the later theory does not derive, as it does in the dominant thinking of the Revolution, from a natural right, but is deduced from a conception of progress that makes man's development, for which read increasing power of enjoyment, the condition to any sound social evolution, but both theories affirm a universal right to happiness. The whole difference between them lies in the more clearly-defined notion of the modern theory as to what happiness is and whence it derives.

As has been seen, modern French Socialism seems to have adopted the revolutionary idea of happiness with a greater narrowing of the content of the word until it seems to start, as it did with the Physiocrats, from the possession of wealth. It is the dogma of modern French Socialism, more or less frankly expressed, that happiness for man depends upon the unchecked satisfaction of the needs of his physical being, and the theory attempts to show that all the higher needs of man are mere increments of these material needs. The whole well-being, and so the contented existence of any man, is held to be unavoidably dependent upon the material conditions which surround him. Men are perfected and thus made happier, as their opportunities for the enjoyment of the products of economic activity increase. All this, it will be remembered, was, in less set terms, also the revolutionary idea of happiness. In the modern doctrine the idea is merely more unequivocally stated.



Happiness, by way of completest liberty to enjoy, was the demand of the Revolutionist at the end of the eighteenth century, as it is the demand of the socialist at the close of the nineteenth. But the later doctrine makes more clear the entirely materialistic note in both. The more characteristic French Socialism, Independent Socialism, has included in the idea of individual happiness, a claim that, since social life gives abounding proof of the complete dependence of each on all, no true happiness ought to include the consciousness of the unhappiness of others. Therefore this socialism asks that each man's demand for happiness shall be a claim not merely personal, but universal. The idea is wider and broader than that which the particularism of the first half of our century called the revolutionary doctrine, that is, the dictum that, if every man looked after his own happiness, it would follow that all would be happy. A need have no concern as to B's happiness; he had only to see to it that he and his were provided for, and it would follow that if each was happy, all would be happy. The individual right being respected, the rest was to be left to the citizen. But neither the Revolution nor modern French Socialism countenanced this kind of individualism. Both were individualistic, if that word describes one who believes that A must be free to secure his own happiness, but both urged beside that A must not be merely content to be happy himself. What the Revolution called fraternity and socialists call solidarity, was to be the check upon a merely self-regarding idea of happiness. On the other hand, neither socialism nor the Revolutionary principles countenanced the idea that A's business was solely to

look after B. Both concluded that A's first duty is toward himself, but he must realize, and the accent on this point is heaviest in modern socialism, he must first realize that, if he would get the highest development of which he is capable, he must aid in securing the happiness of all.

It will be remembered that even Marxism asserts that because economic conditions have bred class differences and class differences have bred class antagonisms, therefore the individual, in order to save his own skin, must join his fellows in a struggle for a more general happiness. Marxism lays bare the fact that the whole fight is of necessity self-regarding; that it is merely a spirit of self-preservation which, impelling men to strive for the best they can get, bids them unite with those of similar interests, since organized effort is most likely to bring the desired result. Marxism, then, as well as Integral Socialism, affirms a universal right to happiness, and, except that it makes the motive more coldly self-regarding, it teaches the value of association in order to such happiness, just as the Revolutionary principles or Integral Socialism teaches it.

The revolutionists, in spite of their faith in fraternity, had not quite escaped from the eighteenth century's dubious attitude toward society; they were often inclined to think social life an inevitable but doubtful situation; the socialist unhesitatingly acknowledges it as the means, and the only means, to intellectual life and progress. In the Revolutionary theory, association was most often held to originate in a contract deliberately undertaken at a period preceding society properly so-called, a period that had succeeded one wherein men

had been rather happier than they ever could be in the unrest of civilized life. The theory of French socialists has unanimously adopted the biological and historical theory of the origin of society. But both Revolutionist and Socialist agree that society, whether a necessary evil or a great good, is to-day the prerequisite to man's satisfactory existence. Both agree, in fact, that the vital conditions to an association which shall justify itself in the happiness of its members, is some kind of social organization to be governed by a body of rules which shall maintain for the feeble the opportunity which Nature unfairly puts into the hands of the strong.

Beside asking then for a happiness more general than that they see about them, a happiness to be obtained by a greater association, or as the phrases severally go by a greater fraternity or solidarity, both doctrines believe that the greatest possible individual freedom is an absolute necessity in order to accomplish this end. Both theories posit the general principle of democracy; both hold that all organized power should rest on the active participation in public affairs of all self-supporting, law-abiding persons. Both contend that there is no function of government so imperative and important as that of establishing law to insure each individual in the free exercise of rights which give him the opportunity to develop. These propositions are the basis on which the remainder of the political theory rests. It will be remembered how nearly the theories concerning the structure of government resemble each other, and how it is on the question of function of government, not form of government, that they diverge.

In both theories, the right of the state takes precedence of individual right, for, in both cases, the "state" represents the organized means for maintaining social justice. Neither doctrine puts faith in the justice which a cultured and disinterested minority might formulate, nor does either to any extent take account of any absolute standard of justice. Both agree that the purpose for which organization exists is the maintenance of the prevalent common-sense morality.

Government, according to both theories, is a mere expedient; in both doctrines the present limitation of man's intelligence is the chief reason, practically the only reason why part of the nation is given power to supervise the rest. An established group of persons, empowered to regulate the association of men is not in either theory exactly desirable or necessary so much as, for the present at least, expedient in order to an advisable peace and justice in the relations of men. Whether, as the Revolutionists claim, the weaknesses of men are the result of improper social influences, or whether, as according to modern socialism, they are held to be the surviving instincts of the primitive brute, in either case, government which is to hold those weaknesses in check, is regarded as only an historical, not a logical and permanent, category of human association. Either theory holds that the controlling power in the community is the mere envoy of the whole sovereignty, the executive medium by which the too cumbrous legislative, that is, the sovereign nation, carries out its will. The idea of popular sovereignty to be expressed by pure democracy, was the ideal and aim of the Revolution,



as it is that of modern socialism. Each theory recognizes with equal emphasis the right of the individual to a directing share in the affairs of organized association. The separation of opinion, if any, on this point of rights, concerns the origin of the individual right. The revolutionary doctrine is most often accredited with the claim for natural rights; socialism admits that individual rights are legal, not natural, rights. Since, however, as has been seen, an appreciable body of doctrine at the time of the Revolution denied natural rights, and since, on the other hand, there is a pronounced tendency in the most characteristic form of French Socialism, the Independent Socialism, to treat certain rights as axiomatic, it seems justifiable to say, that even upon this point, there is practically a coincidence of opinion.

As has been said, the real and tangible line of separation between the two political theories is on the question of administration of government. On the borderline between the theory and the practice of politics, when deciding what measures the state shall adopt to maintain social justice, the two doctrines part company.

The state, under the socialistic theory, is given a widened sphere of action, such as the revolutionary theory never conceded to the collective will. The socialist would wish to extend the functions of state until they should include the entire superintendence of the industrial activity of the nation. The Revolutionists, on the contrary, held to the theory of *laissez-faire* in all matters of industry. Socialism adds to the other rights of the individual, "the right to the satisfaction

of his economic wants," and so imposes upon collective action the duty of organizing and controlling the economic system. The marked distinction between the Revolutionist's and the Socialist's political doctrine appears when the former says that true freedom is secured to each individual if he have political equality, while the other urges that not merely political equality but economic equality before the law is imperative in order to secure to each individual his free development. Socialism denies that a really equal distribution of political power can exist until there be social control of production. Socialism contends that the Revolutionist, and every other who argues with the Revolutionist, is wrong to think that men are really politically free until they are economically free.

This view, of course, involves first of all a separation on the question of property, although it must be evident from what has gone before, that, in their views concerning the origin of wealth in the hands of some possessor, the two theories are not so far apart as it is usual to suppose. It is in the application of the doctrine of property, that the difference occurs in the prevailing sum of opinion on each side. It has been seen that the Revolution recognized, as controlling doctrines, first those which derive property from labor and make it a strictly personal affair, toward which the state acted the same protecting part that it acted toward other natural rights; and, secondly, those which held the state to be the possessor for all time and the individual only the deputed agent who, if he fail to use his privileges properly, could at any time be justifiably

deprived of them. It will be recalled too, that the latter doctrine was the one most often advocated during the Revolution. It will be further remembered that Modern Socialism, in spite of its different way of wording its theory, holds only that which the greater part of the Revolutionary theory also held, namely, that it is both just and expedient to consider all property as ultimately subject to state control. The fundamental principle regarding property seems then to be the same in both theories; as has been said, it is the application of this principle which marks the difference between the two doctrines. It is true that, like modern French Socialism, the Revolutionary theories started with the assumption that the source of power was the real possessor of all property, a principle derived from the dominant theory, and practice of all the preceding national life of France. The Revolutionists did not however advocate state administration of property; French Socialists make their most characteristic claim for this very thing. At the time of the Revolution, theories more fundamental than the idea of property held that social utility argued against state control of property. The Revolutionist, believing in individual initiative never went in theory beyond an active state supervision of property and industry. The aim was to exercise a minimum check upon production, but there was little thought of controlling distribution.<sup>1</sup> Modern French Socialism believes that public well-being, and so individual well-being, is really best sub-

<sup>1</sup> Laws enacted during the Terror are not here taken into account.

served when collective action obtains a controlling influence upon the distribution of wealth. Thus, although the Revolutionary theory usually agreed with Modern Socialism as to the fundamental relation of the state to property, though it held, as the contemporary socialism of France does, that the state was possessor, yet the sharp divergence on a determining point of social theory made for a different conclusion. The theory of the Revolution held that the state should use its right to appropriate, only as a means to a new apportionment. Socialism, on the other hand, would exercise the right to appropriation, but would wish to see it followed by state retention in order to a state direction which should insure to every individual his right to the economic satisfaction of his wants. Nowhere is it more evident than in the character of this separation upon the property question, that the determining character of Modern Socialism does not really rest upon a theory of property-holding, but upon some principle behind the theory.

The Revolutionary theory that predominated decided to eliminate the state wherever the satisfaction of specifically material wants was involved; socialism holds that the state, that is, organized society, should have the deciding voice, as in the other activities of social life.

The specific part of the doctrine of socialism proves to be its belief that in order to true individual happiness, organized society must exercise an equalizing influence on the production and distribution of wealth; that the individual is no more justifiably free from a



certain state supervision as industrial agent than he is in any other rôle. Both theories expect much from associated action; both theories exact that the state secure the well-being of every individual in the community; neither regards organized society as a mere protector. But under socialism, organized society is to preserve, protect and cultivate the individual to a far greater degree than the earlier theory required or wished. It is the real claim of the socialist that each man has a right to expect from the state, not only the mere existence which the Revolutionary theory would guarantee him, but also and most of all, a right to have provided for him the means for an enlightened existence. Society acting collectively, that is, the state, should see that each member of society has always the possibility for intellectual growth during his existence. Socialism is then a theory which would insist that each man should by right be freed through state intervention from the necessity of a struggle for existence and thus be enabled to undertake a personal struggle to enjoy existence. Neglectful of the well-recognized truth that man's well-being is essentially menaced if the right to enjoy be given him too freely or too abruptly, socialistic theory asks that the state insure just this gift to each man at the earliest practicable time. It is this which makes it at once a new theory and a weak theory.

Scarcely new in its general principles, rather the lineal descendant of a long line of thought, socialism yet differs so far from the Revolutionary or any previous radicalism in method and in a determining prin-

principle of politics, that it brings many minds to a new point of view in regard to an old claim in the name of humanity. Its power lies here. Any thoughtful mind lends itself with sympathy and interest to the general claims of the school. There are many socialists to-day, if to be a socialist is to hope that the generations of the future will learn the concerted unselfishness that will frown with the force of legalized public opinion upon our system of distributing and permitting to remain distributed among the few, privileges which act as a dead hand upon later generations. The end of the century is largely socialistic, if it be socialistic to regard as morally hideous the selfish accumulation of money extorted by tricks of combination and speculation. But modern French Socialism, as all socialism, is something more than moral indignation; it is a political system based upon a philosophy which denies individual responsibility and puts the onus of public and private well-being upon collective action. The weakness of a system that starts from such a principle has perhaps been sufficiently accented.

Even though the Independent Socialism be taken as the typical French Socialism, and so the objections to a materialistic and one-sided conception of history be waived, even then both doctrines are weaker than the Revolutionary theory, for they would wish to create a social system which depends, at every point in its construction, upon the individual's unselfishness and sense of personal responsibility, yet they argue from premises which almost entirely neglect the significance of the individual. The doctrine is weak in that, claim-

ing to aim at the elevation and development of individual capacity, it rests its strongest hope, not upon universal education, although it indorses this, not upon a larger and freer use of political privilege, though it urges the desirability of this, but chiefly and primarily upon an increased physical energy to be gained for each individual by a more or less arbitrary distribution of the national product. It is weakest in that it centers men's aims upon the raising of their standard of life, while it likewise throws the whole responsibility for physical and moral weakness upon a social system. To teach men that systems make human nature and not human nature systems, is to belittle the effectiveness of each individual in a way which seriously menaces any society, most of all a society which is to be cast in the democratic mold. The Revolutionary principles were scarcely guilty of this inconsistency. They can hardly be accused of dulling men's spiritual life by making it seem bound up in the mere satisfaction of physical needs; they counted the significance of the individual so high that their first immediate influence was to make that individual almost a fetich.

Socialism itself has aided us to understand the fault of the mere particularism which was one interpretation of the revolutionary doctrine just as sound individualism has aided toward the understanding of a more valuable truth than that taught by this socialistic doctrine. It seems to-day undeniable that the individual and society are inextricably parts of a whole, each dependent for life and character upon the other, but the social forces which are so vital to

the life of the individual are in a last analysis dependent upon the instincts and capacities which each member of the community brings to that association. The content of a given subjective life to-day may be largely the accumulation of social experiences; but those social experiences, those social facts are the garnered legacy of the thoughts of individuals. Each of the doctrines discussed has a value and a meaning. The one taught by its very over-accenting of "rational sanction," the value of the individual; the other, in attributing so much to the connection between the collective action and the individual well-being has surely pointed for all of us the moral obligation to recognize more fully the value and duty of associated action.

It is not improbable that the future is bringing a time when we shall demonstrate in institutions greater socialized effort. But any organized experiment, based upon conscious social service, will depend for its success upon the stage of development reached by that fundamental and decisive factor, the individual. Past experiences of social growth have had to do with a mass of humanity, of whom the greater part knew only elementary subjective life. If Protestantism, regarded as a method of training, rather than as a religion, together with the public school and universal suffrage, shall develop a new type of man and citizen, who can say what will be the results of collective action, when in the future it directs its attention to industry, as it has in the past aided to foster the growth of other social institutions? But such state superintendence must come about strictly in the line of historical develop-



ment, and not as an agitation fanned to an unnatural heat by ill-advised enthusiasts. Society must grow slowly to the exercise of the new functions; there must be the gradual alteration in the atoms which make up a body before that body itself can successfully assume and keep a new form. If, instead of being set up in advance, as the means of individual development, collective action shall come about as the result of a real growth in individuality, who will deny its possibilities as a means to better and more vigorous life?



APPENDIX.





## APPENDIX

### TABULAR COMPARISON OF THE TWO THEORIES.

#### SOCIAL THEORY.

##### MODERN FRENCH SOCIALISM.

###### *End of Association.*

Individual development by way of greatest possible liberty and equality.

Means to end: Solidarity.

###### *Origin of Association.*

*Sc. Soc.*—Innate need of man for physical development, by means of fuller satisfaction of wants.

*Int. Soc.*—Innate need of man for physical, mental and moral development; thus, the demand of man's nature, as a "social being."

###### *Result of Association.*

*Sc. Soc.*—Physiological development until environment frees him from fierce struggle for existence; then cerebral development, whence Social Progress.

*Int. Soc.*—Realization of justice by the physiological and psychological development of man.

###### *Vital Conditions for any Social Order to Fulfill its end.*

Social organization which shall insure economic, as well as political, equality to each individual in order to his free development.

##### FRENCH REVOLUTION.

###### *End of Association.*

General happiness.

Means to end: Individual freedom.

###### *Origin of Association.*

Instinct of man, or, again and most frequently, the desire of man for peace.

###### *Result of Association.*

Loss of individual independence, but gain of justice and morality.

###### *Vital Conditions for any Social Order to Fulfill its end.*

Political organization which shall insure to each individual equal freedom to seek his own happiness.

## POLITICAL THEORY.

## MODERN FRENCH SOCIALISM.

*Origin of Polity.*

Individual property-holding.

*General Principles for Maintaining Equality.*

Control by collectivity of all that which in civilization is clearly social, therefore, collective holding of land and all social means of production. Thus, collective, not individual, action necessary to insure social well-being.

*End of Government*

Well-being of collectivity.

*Form of Government.*

Democracy.

*Principle of Democracy.*

Government rest on active participation in public affairs of all self-supporting law-abiding persons, whence Popular Sovereignty.

*Laws Necessary to Preserve Democracy.*

I. Legal Recognition of Natural Rights and exercise of Social Duties.

*Individual Rights.*—Freedom of thought, right to justice, to choose one's country, to security of life and property, to free expression of opinion, to freedom of sexual relations, except in case of a family, to the satisfaction of economic wants.

## FRENCH REVOLUTION.

*Origin of Polity.*

Individual property-holding.

*General Principles for Maintaining Equality.*

Simplicity of wants; small holdings and production on a small scale, to be insured by Legislation, whence government the final means to social content.

*End of Government.*

To insure liberty, equality and fraternity to individuals.

*Form of Government.*

Democracy.

*Principle of Democracy.*

General will is the only just sanction to authority, whence Sovereignty of the People, one and indivisible.

*Laws Necessary to Preserve Democracy.*

I. Legal Recognition of Natural Rights and exercise of Social Duties.

*Individual Rights.*—Liberty, security, property, public debt, religious freedom, right of general education, of public assistance, of liberty of press, of assembly, of petition, of participation in affairs of government, right of insurrection.

MODERN FRENCH SOCIALISM.

*Social Duties.*

*Social Duties.*—1. To organize economic system.

2. To establish and regulate public defense.

3. To regulate foreign relations.

4. To maintain public order by means of civil and penal justice.

5. To maintain a system of Public education.

II. Popular Power for Legislation.

Universal Suffrage, irrespective of sex;

Ballot, *Ballotage*, Majority Decisions to insure that the general will be expressed.

Popular Initiative and Referendum to be constantly used in order to the nearest possible approach to Direct Legislation by the people.

*Government Planned under these Principles.*

*Legislative.*—People to be the Legislative.

No Parliamentary government, all representative government a regrettable expedient to disappear with the advent of Socialism.

FRENCH REVOLUTION.

*Social Duties.*

*Social Duties.*—1. To maintain national honor at home and abroad.

2. To maintain public order and the rights of man, by civil and penal laws, and courts to interpret these laws.

3. To maintain a system of Public Education.

II. Popular Power for Legislation.

Universal, direct Suffrage as Basis of Legislation;

*Ballotage* and Decisions by absolute majority.

Popular Initiative granted for Constitutional Amendment on demand of one-tenth of Regular Primary Assemblies in majority of Departments. Obligatory Referendum.

If forty days from time of promulgation, in majority of depts., one-tenth of primaries have not protested, bill becomes a law; thus veto with the people.

*Government Planned under these Principles.*

*Legislative.*—Deputies.

*Principles of Rep.*—Population (1 to 40,000).

*Qualifications.*—Citizenship.

*Term.*—One year.

## MODERN FRENCH SOCIALISM.

*Legislative.**Executive and Judicial.*

Functionaries to be appointed to exercise these powers.

*Source.*—Always universal, direct elections. Voting to be always on programs, not on persons.

*Principles of Representation.*—Territorial.

*Qualifications.*—Citizenship, except where special mental powers are required; then an examination.

*Terms.*—Brief.

*Powers.*—Minimum always; clearly defined and always checked.

A uniform Civil and Penal Code.

## FRENCH REVOLUTION.

*Legislative.*

*Powers.*—All residual legislative and executive power.

*International Organization.*  
—Session of a year (in 2 periods). Public sessions. Quorum, 1/2 members plus one. Decision by absolute majority.

*Executive and Judicial.*

Executive Council, a sort of minority; 24 members.

*Source.*—Legislative Body chosen from a list sent by dep'ts.

*Qualifications.*—Citizenship.

*Term.*—One year, changing by halves.

*Rights.*—Right to speak in Legislature.

*Duties.*—Responsible to Legislative.

*Powers.*—Management and supervision of administration, under control of Legislative.

A uniform Civil and Penal Code.

*Tenure.*—Direct or indirect vote of people.

*Judiciary.*

Justices of Peace, direct.  
Higher Courts, indirect.



**MODERN FRENCH SOCIALISM.**

*General Principles of Administration.*

No standing army. Administrative law to favor political decentralization. Country to be divided into small, co-ordinated sections, independent for deliberative purposes.

**FRENCH REVOLUTION.**

*General Principles of Administration.*

No standing army.

Aim—Political Decentralization, but all departments primarily controlled by Legislative. Officials of Departments, district and commune locally elected, but finally controlled by Legislative.





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