

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec 3(E) and 5(D) or (E) NNDG# 760050

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN)/11-145 -- 11-3045

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF CENTRAL SERVICES TELEGRAPH SECTION

ACTION: JA

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PLAIN

71

Tokyo via War

Dated November 1, 1945

Rec'd 11:40 a.m., 2nd

DCK

Secretary of State

Washington

81, November 1

Summary of press comment October 22 - 30.

This has been interesting period in Japanese press because of "revolt" of staffs of two leading * ASAHI and YOMIURI-HOCHI. ASAHI directors acceded to demand resignation and moderate liberalization evident. This is our 81 November 1 (ZA 8097). Refusal of similar demand on part of YOMIURI met with seizure of paper by junior staff allied with printing force and paper has become military liberal. MAINICHI remains conservative. All papers giving increased space to letters and other expression of views of public.

Primary topic editorial discussion was war responsibility, phases of which involved Zaibatsu, newspaper owners, and Konoye (who drew violent censure by reports of

his interview

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DIVISION OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS
 11/5/45 WTT
 NOV 5-1945
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

NOV 6

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 11-145

*11/6-1945
 (Japan) 11-145*

NOV 7 1945

PLAIN

72

-2- #81, November 1 from Tokyo via War

his interview with Associated Press). Other important subjects: Reform of Constitution and position of Emperor; and shortcomings of present Government. Common topics of letters newspapers: Malnutrition and starvation; insufficient rations and maldistribution; farmers profiteering at expense of city dwellers; complaints against Zaibatsu; suggestion that ill-gotten wealth of army officers be confiscated or heavily taxed. One letter advocated birth control.

Zaibatsu. ASAHI, 23rd: We cannot give whole-hearted support to Yoshida's views (regarding Zaibatsu expressed to foreign press on October 19). Old capitalists little different from new financial cliques. Undeniable fact that old, as well as new, gained huge profits through their munitions industries, banks and advances from Government. TIMES, 23rd: Some logic in Yoshida's views. Zaibatsu only accessories to the crime after the act. Indiscriminate cracking down will harm productive capacity, plunge nation back to feudalistic scale methods with reactionary results. TIMES, 24th: Government will do everything in its power without waiting for directive. Zaibatsu themselves cleaning house. Result should be satisfaction all parties.

Newspaper

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73

-3- #81, November 1 from Tokyo via War

Newspaper war guilt. ASAHI, 24th: We do not evade war responsibility of press. ASAHI resisted military Fascism in early period but followed Government after Konoye's new structure movement. Liquidation of past must be first step toward new Japan. YOMIURI, 25th (under control of staff) : Press served as catspaw of military, financial cliques and bureaucracy. Riddance of men responsible for war first requirement for democratization of Japan.

YOMIURI, 27th: Directors were collaborators Tojo military clique, determined editorial policy arbitrarily, thus refused enlightenment to His Majesty and deceived public.

War criminal. ASAHI, 22nd: Article by Diet member Mativura of former Tohokai blamed suicide of Seigo Nakano on "black market of politics" of Tojo. YOMIURI, 26th: There are notable few who though not charged by Allies should feel serious responsibility not only to Allies but to the Japanese people. Konoye's Cabinet started the China ~~Affair~~, carried out the new structure, dissolved the political parties, and concluded the tri-partite pact which led directly to the Pacific War. His evasive attempt to blame the military is typical of the man. TIMES, 28th: Jap people want drastic action. Apathy of Government misrepresenting their real feelings. War criminals are also criminals

PLAIN

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-4- #81, November 1 from Tokyo via War

also criminals against the Japanese people and should be punished by them.

Constitution and Emperor. ASAHI, 23rd: Konoye's reference to possible abdication is "thoughtless uttering on the future of the throne. He is desired to be more cautious in dealing with such an important issue". MAINICHI, 23rd: Faith in Emperor is popular religion which cannot be taken from people and is based on special tradition, older and deeper than abroad. Ties not political and will be unaffected by democratic progress. YOMIURI, 30th: "An unconstitutional march has been stolen by Kido and Konoye" (in taking initiative in drafting revision).

Present Cabinet. SANGYO KEIZAI, 22nd: Yoshida statement on Zaibatsu exposes character of Shidohara Cabinet which lacks ability to understand economic reconstruction needed or even intent of MacArthur directive. ASAHI, 22nd: Announced plan to halve present 300,000 Government personnel is good. But more important is reform administrative structure and renovation system of officialdom. Bureaucratic evils are selfishness and evasion of responsibility. TIMES, 25th: Present leaders not best but progress to democracy will take long. People still undeveloped

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-5 #81, November 1 from Tokyo via War
still undeveloped in political consciousness, cannot make
will prevail. YOMIURI, 30th; People already disappointed
in Shidehara Cabinet. Regulation for control mass move-
ment is reactionary. Protection of Zaibatsu has been
exposed. No passion for needed reforms and no capacity
for saving people from pressing needs. Political sense
of Shidehara too old-fashioned. Foreigners soon to decide.
Japan lacks ability to handle own reforms.

Miscellaneous. MAINICHI, 24th; Cannot but take keen
interest in development of European situation as well as
moves of powers in Asia. Present conflict of opinions
between Russia and United States. If Council desired
Russia established, MacArthur headquarters will be aux-
iliary organ. Conditions in Soviet controlled or occu-
pied areas must be clearly known. SANGYO KEIZEI, 26th;
Preference given Army Navy cadets changing to civilian
schools should be abolished. TIMES, 30th; Present
"intellectual strikes" (by newspapermen and students)
setting bad example and certain to influence labor. Strikes
breed contempt for authority, confusion of license with
liberty, lack of real understanding of democracy.

(We plan weekly telegram along these general lines.

Will appreciate

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-6- #81, November 1 from Tokyo via War

Will appreciate information whether Department receives
this material through other channels and suggestions).

ATCHESON

(*) Apparent omission

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PREPARING OFFICE WILL
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Charge Department:

Charge to



Department of State

Washington

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NOV 6 1945

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS,

TOKYO, (JAPAN).

^{90 SIXTH}
FOR ATCHESON, ACTING POLITICAL ADVISER.

Press summary in your 81 Nov 1 contains useful information not otherwise available. Dept would appreciate weekly general survey press comment and additional reports covering reaction to important developments.

Byrnes (JCS)

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no.	<i>246</i>
Re:	<i>B.F.V.G.</i>
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740.00119 CONTROL(JAPAN)/11-145

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DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICES

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN)

11-145

*740.00119 Control
(Japan) 11-145*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

73 DIVISION OF CENTRAL SERVICES TELEGRAPH SECTION

ACTION - EE - JA
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EK-703 -W

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SECRET)

Moscow via War

Dated November 1, 1945

Rec'd 2:20 p.m., 1st

Secretary of State,

Washington.

3726, November 1, 3 p.m.

In contrast to its openly critical attitude toward situation in Japan (EMBS 3701, October 30)

Soviet press continues to be remarkably reserved toward events in China. This reticence is not due to absence in Chinese scene of conditions susceptible of exploitation by Soviet propaganda. Soviet editors must be suffering acute adjectival frustration at spectacle of American intervention and Kuomintang--Jap military collaboration against what Soviet press has consistently described as democratic forces.

Self-control of Soviet propagandists requires explanation. (To Dept; repeated Chungking 199; London 552; Paris 402; Dept please repeat to Tokyo.)

Why does Soviet Govt withhold critical comment on situation in China?

Firstly, USSR is probably reluctant to intensify Soviet--American

SECRET

DIVISION OF CHINESE AFFAIRS
NOV 9 - 1945

DIVISION OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS
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DIVISION OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS
Tokyo
NOV 6 - 1945

NOV - 7 1945

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740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 11-145

NOV 15 1945
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-2-#3726, November 1, 3 p.m., from Moscow via War

Soviet--American tension on inflammable Chinese question at time when main Soviet--American issue appears to be Japan.

Secondly, insofar as treaty obligations influence Soviet decisions, Sino--Soviet treaty restrains USSR from criticizing Chinese Govt.

Thirdly, Soviet interests in Chinese situation would not be advanced at this juncture by verbal attacks on Kuomintang and open support of Chinese Communists. Chinese Communists appear to be strong enough to remain in being without external help.

Proceeding from foregoing it would seem that clever course for USSR is to do just what it is doing--remain nominally aloof, retain its diplomatic mobility and await outcome of Chinese internal struggle confident that if time in China is not on Soviet side it is at least not against USSR.

HARRIMAN

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Charge Department:

Charge to

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NOV - 7 1945
4 pm

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS,

TOKYO

91

FOR ATCHESON, ACTING POLITICAL ADVISER.

119 Central (Japan)

Following is text of Moscow's no. 3726,

November 1, ~~1945~~:

*Byrnes
(WIT)*

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / *(Japan) / 11-145*

11-10 Confidential File

(Code Room: please repeat Moscow's no. 3726, Nov. 1,
as Dept's

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NOV 7 1945

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF CENTRAL SERVICES TELEGRAPH SECTION

75

ACTION-JA

INFO:

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HEK-1975 -J
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SECRET)

Tokyo via War

Dated November 1, 1945

Rec'd 11:48 a.m., 5th.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

82, November 1

General Marshall, Deputy Chief of Staff, informs me that Yoshida did not call on (re our telegram 77, October 30) General MacArthur but in a conversation at Headquarters with himself (General Marshall) chiefly in regard to recent economic directive, he mentioned the question of the diplomatic archives but made no approach seeking a withdrawal or modification of the Supreme Commander's directive on that subject. It is our guess that the newspaper article quoted in translation in our reference telegram was inspired by the Foreign Office for face-saving home consumption.



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740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN)/11-145 Confidential File



TOP SECRET

THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE
WASHINGTON, D. C.



DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

Authority: JCS Memo 111114

By: DR 182 NARS, Date 10/24/77

SWN-3469

1 November 1945

DIVISION OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS
Instruction to
To MIO 6 Nov. 120.
NOV 6 - 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

Subject: Basic Directive for Post-Surrender Military Government in Japan Proper.

- References: a. SWNCC 52/4
- b. SWNCC 52/5
- c. Item 3, Minutes 27th Meeting

Reference is made to SWN-3293, dated 21 September 1945, which forwarded Copy Number 46 of SWNCC 52/4.

At its twenty-seventh meeting, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee approved Appendix "B" (Economic and Financial Parts) of SWNCC 52/5, as amended, and directed that the paper as approved be consolidated with the Enclosure to SWNCC 52/4 (General and Political Part) so as to constitute one paper.

The enclosure, a copy of the consolidated paper (SWNCC 52/7) supersedes SWNCC 52/4 and 52/5 and is forwarded for information, guidance and such implementation as deemed appropriate.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have been furnished a copy of the revised approved paper for transmittal to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

A similar memorandum has been forwarded to the Secretaries of War and the Navy, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

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H. Freeman Matthews
H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS,
Acting Chairman

Encl:
Cpy No. 46, SWNCC 52/7

Carbon Copies destroyed
7/42

TOP SECRET

Office of
Far Eastern
Affairs
Department of State
file

NOV 15 1945

Confidential File
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740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 11-145

Mr. Matthews

Mr. Acheson suggests that you and Mr. Vincent take a look at this, and, if you think helpful, you might discuss the Reuters angle with Mr. Kuhn.

B. Evans

TOP SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

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etc*

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By DR. BZ NARS, Date 10/24/74

1 November 1945

files

Office of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 1 - 1945
DIRECTOR
Department of State

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 11-1740.00119 Control (Japan) / 11-1740

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

My dear Mr. Secretary:

Attached is a message from General MacArthur concerning Reuters' attitude with respect to American politics in the Far East.

UNDER SECRETARY
NOV 1 - 1945
2
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[Signature]
Chief of Staff

Incl.
CM IN 14098 (31 Oct 45)

Dean: Can't we transmit this to Berlin?

DCR - EUR Unit
FOR VICTORY
BUY UNITED STATES WAR BONDS AND STAMPS

J.F.P.
NOV 14 1945

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TOP SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOP SECRET TOT

EYES ONLY

PRIORITY

**TOP
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EYES ONLY**

From: Advance Echelon General Headquarters, Army Forces,
Pacific, Tokyo, Japan

To: War Department

sey

Nr: CA 54137

31 October 1945

From CINCAFPAC Adv to WARCOS cite CA 54137 TOP SECRET
Eyes Only for Marshall.

The critical tone of Reuters towards American politics in the Far East has been noted during the past 2 months. This agency is apparently indulging in propaganda politics although avoiding such a charge by mythical references and quotations. As examples I quote 2 dispatches that have just reached my desk:

"1. According to Reuter London special correspondent of the Observer in Tokyo reports that in the press section persons who played a criminal role before and during the war are still in power and are being supported. It is doubtful whether MacArthur has a clear cut policy. MacArthur's Hqs are only democratic on the surface and the greater majority of people in Tokyo are under the impression that they are introducing a system in Japan that gives power to the old forces".

"2. According to Reuter Moscow the eminent Soviet critic Georgie Eugeniev stated in the paper Modern Times that in Japan no measures are being taken to remove militarism and the fact that Japan is still pursuing a militaristic goal endangers future peace".

CM IN 14098

(31 Oct 45)

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

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EYES ONLY

**TOP
SECRET**

Page 2

From: Advance Echelon General Headquarters, Army Forces,
Pacific, Tokyo, Japan

Nr: CA 54137

31 October 1945

With reference to the first one I invite attention to the fact that there is no special correspondent of the Observer in Tokyo and that the reference statement purporting to represent the views of the press is generally contrary to their actual opinion. The second reference is believed to be equally spurious.

I believe that this type of undermining should be brought to the attention of the British Government. Sgd MacArthur.

End

ACTION: Gen Hull

INFO : C of S

CM IN 14098

(31 Oct 45)

DTG 311133Z meo

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TOP SECRET

Charge Department:

Washington

TOP SECRET

Charge to

NO STENCILS - NO DISTRIBUTION

NOV - 9 1945

AMEMBASSY,

LONDON.

9836

This program is to be
communicated before
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to anyone.

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The War Department has brought to our attention a message

from General MacArthur to General Marshall which calls attention to the critical tone of Reuters towards American policies in Japan and cites two spurious dispatches which read in substance as follows:

(1) Reuters London refers to a report by the special correspondent of the Observer in Tokyo who states that in the press section (Japanese) persons who played a criminal role during and before the war are still being supported, that MacArthur's headquarters is democratic only on the surface, that a system is being introduced which gives power to the old forces, and that it is doubtful whether MacArthur has a clear-cut policy.

(2) Reuters Moscow refers to a statement by the Soviet critic Eugeniev that no measures are being taken in Japan to remove militarism and that future peace is endangered thereby.

General MacArthur comments with regard to (1) that there is no correspondent of the Observer in Tokyo and that the statements are contrary to actual opinion held by the press in Tokyo. He expresses the opinion that the second item is

equally spurious.

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740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 11-145

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MESSAGE:

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Department of State

Charge Department:

Washington

TOP SECRET

Charge to

-2-

Unless you perceive objection, it is suggested that you bring this matter informally to the attention of the Foreign Office, not in the form of a protest but for its information, pointing out what General MacArthur describes as the spurious character of the reports.

*By ones
la*

JCV.

FE:JCVincent:ALM
11-8-45

EUR
HW

*BVC
C-M. Cohen*

NOV 8 1945 P.M. 6:15

NOV 9 1945

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

No. *12*

To the
Acting United States Political Adviser to
The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers,
American Embassy Building,
Tokyo.

The Secretary of State encloses for the information of the Acting Political Adviser a copy of SWNCC 52/7 "BASIC DIRECTIVE FOR POST-SURRENDER MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN JAPAN PROPER" which was approved by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee at its twenty-seventh meeting. The enclosure supersedes SWNCC 52/4 and 52/5 and is forwarded for your information and guidance.

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN)/11-145

Enclosure:

SWNCC 52/7,
(Copy No. 43).

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
OCB NE Unit
[Handwritten signature]

JA:JZW Williams:MLory:mp

11-7-45

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NOV 8 1945 P.M.



WIT

8/11-1

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF CENTRAL SERVICES TELEGRAPH SECTION

ACTION-FA
INFO: HEC-1978 -G
FE This telegram must be
OFS closely paraphrased be-
FA fore being communicated
FBO to anyone. (SECRET)

Yokahama via War
Dated November 1, 1945
Rec'd 11:52 a.m., 5th

Control

DC/A

NOV - 7 1945
740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 11-145

Secretary of State
Washington

13, November 1

Please verify and repeat safe combination inventory number A 71 (your 5, October 29) 2 number apparently missing.

JOHNSON

WJF
SECRET

File
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Del. drafted
NOV - 6 1945
11/6/45 JASUMH
Chief, Division of Foreign Service Administration

CCR NE Unit
Anal. _____
Re. _____
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Dist. _____

NOV 13 1945

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Confidential File

8/11/45

NOV 2 1945

In reply refer to
TD

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My dear Mr. Atcheson:

Up-to-date information concerning Japanese cables and other cables in the Far East is needed in a submarine cable study which was initiated by the Special Committee on Communications. The question under consideration is whether the United States should take over some or all of these cables.

Would you please have the attached charts reviewed and, if necessary, corrected and completed, and returned to the Department immediately. The present information is at least a year old. As indicated in a telegram to you on the same subject, your comments and those by the Supreme Commander, particularly concerning need for such cable facilities and by whom, will be welcomed.

Sincerely yours,

DCR NE Unit	
na	md
R	md
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Francis Colt de Wolf
Chief
Telecommunications Division

✓ Pp. 23, 24, 25, Appendix III
& pp. 7, 8, 9, Appendix III-A-3
✓ Communications: D-8,
November 16, 1944.

Mr. George Atcheson, Jr.,
Acting United States Political Adviser to the
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers,
American Embassy Building,
Tokyo, Japan.

SECRET

TD:DRM [Signature]vey:reh 10/29/45

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 11-245 (Japan) / 11-245

Confidential File

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OCT 31 1945 P.M.
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE


INCOMING TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF CENTRAL SERVICES TELEGRAPH SECTION

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
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This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SECRET)

Moscow via War
Dated November 2, 1945
Rec'd 11 a.m., 2nd



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Secretary of State,
Washington.



US URGENT
3734, November 2, 2 a.m.

TOP SECRET
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM HARRIMAN

Molotov asked me to call tonight in order, he said, to clarify certain points of the proposals set forth in your 2234, ^{119 Cent Japan} October 26 and 2235, ^{119 FEAC/10-274} October 27 which were not clear to him and his associates. He said he was not (repeat not) prepared to state his govts position.

A. ALLIED MILITARY COUNCIL:

One. Where would be the seat of the Allied Military Council? I answered I was sure it was Tokyo. Please confirm.

Two. He pointed out that the document was headed "proposal concerning control machinery for Japan" but no where in the document was control machinery mentioned.

He asked

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740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 11-245
NOV 16 1945
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-2-#3734, November 2, 2 a.m. from Moscow via War

He asked whether the Allied Military Council was in fact the control machinery. I explained that the control machinery was the Supreme Commander in consultation with the Allied Military Council. He then specifically asked whether in some manner the word "control" could be inserted in paragraph one. I agreed to obtain an answer to this question.

THREE. With respect to the second sentence of paragraph three he asked a number of questions on the manner of consultation of the Supreme Commander with the Council. He seemed satisfied that the Supreme Commander should decide questions of an urgent character but appeared to have in his mind that on matters which were not urgent, if there were disagreement, the subject should be referred to the govts for agreement. He referred to the revised text of the Hungarian Control Commission to the effect that policy directives should be issued only after agreement. I pointed out that Stalin had agreed that the Supreme Commander should have the final voice and I was sure my Govt would not deviate from this position and also pointed out that the questions of policy would have been decided in the Far Eastern Commission which was not the case in Hungary.

He asked

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86
-3-#3734, November 2, 2 a.m. from Moscow. via War.

He asked whether MacArthur, in the event of disagreement on non-urgent matters, would refer the matter to his Govt and whether then these questions might be discussed on a govt level. He suggested as an example question of the composition of the Jap Govt. I told him that I had no information on this subject but agreed to ask for it.

Four. He asked whether it had been decided that the occupation forces would be all American. I told him that I knew there had been consideration of forces of the other Allies being included in the occupation on the basis that they would be under General MacArthur's command. I said I had no other information on this subject and did not know whether or not a decision had been reached. He made no further comment.

B. FAR EASTERN COMMISSION:

One. Molotov asked where the Commission would meet. I explained in Washington in the first instance but that it could meet in Tokyo or elsewhere later if the Commission so desired. The matter rested with the Commission.

Two. He asked what nations would be represented
on the

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-4-#3734, November 2, 2 a.m. from Moscow via War. 87

on the Commission. I told him the original list submitted and also India. He asked whether India had already been invited and I told him that I understood India was already participating. As he had been informed the British had requested India's inclusion and she had subsequently been invited. He made no further comment.

Three.

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-5-#3734, November 2, 2 a.m. from Moscow. via War.

.08

Three. He asked for an explanation of the relationship between the FEC (Far Eastern Commission) and the AMC (Allied Military Council). I read to him the information given in paragraph three of Dept's 2243, ^{FE} October 29. After considerable discussion he asked no further questions.

Four. He asked why there had been a change in the wording of II (A). I explained that this had been done as the present proposal contemplated that the Commission should be a decisive body rather than an advisory body and pointed out that it was now intended that the Commission should formulate policies rather than make recommendations on the formulation of policies. He made no further comment.

Five. He asked for clarification of the change in wording in II (A) specifically the words "as between the participating governments". After some discussion he did not appear fully satisfied and I agreed to request additional information on this subject.

Six. Molotov asked for information on the "policies already announced by the United States Government" referred to in II (C). He stated that his Govt should have full information of those policies before it could accept them as binding. I explained that these
and also

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-6-#3734, November 2, 2 a.m., from Moscow via War

99

and also the directives already sent to the Supreme Commander would no doubt be laid before the Commission now meeting in Washington and suggested that if the Soviet Govt agreed to send representative he would be fully informed. Molotov stated, however, that his Govt should be fully informed of these policies before he could accept this provision and asked for this information now. I agreed to refer his request to my Govt.

Seven. Molotov asked about the voting procedure. I explained that I understood that this procedure had been worked out as a result of a British proposal and that I would be glad to have any comments that he might wish to make. He suggested, speaking personally, that it might be better to have two instead of three of the principle Allies vote with the majority but that he had not given the matter full consideration.

Molotov gave me no impression as to what his Govt's attitude would be on the proposals but indicated that answers to the specific questions that I have set forth above would be necessary before his Govt could give a reply. I request, therefore, urgent answers to those points as explained above where I was unable to give a satisfactory reply to his questions.

HARRIMAN

MJF

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PREPARING OFFICE
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TELEGRAM SENT

This telegram must be
closed by 11:00 p.m. before
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Department of State

TOP SECRET

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TO BE TRANSMITTED

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AIRGRAM

Washington, TOP SECRET

US URGENT

AMEMBASSY

MOSCOW
2272

TOP SECRET
FROM THE SECRETARY FOR THE AMBASSADOR

-119 Control Japan/11-245

The following is in reply to your telegram 3734,

November 2.

Section A: 1. We confirm your answer.

2. Your explanation correct. We believe that, if other questions are satisfactorily disposed of, last words of paragraph one might be changed to read "implementation of the terms of surrender, and occupation and control of Japan and of directives supplementary thereto". For your information we cannot call this council a control council or derogate in any manner from MacArthur's full and final authority.

3. As paragraph one of Allied Military Council document provides the council consults with and advises the Supreme Commander on matters of implementation. Council members are free to consult their governments. As paragraph three provides his decisions are final. Of course the setting up of the military

Enciphered by _____
Sent by operator _____ M. _____ 19

TOP SECRET

NOV - 2 1945

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740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 11-245

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740.00119 Control Japan/11-245
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FOR - EUR UNIT

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Department of State

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Washington,

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-2-

council and the commission does not preclude discussions between the governments interested regarding matters of policy or implementation but we cannot tie the hands of the Supreme Commander pending such discussions. For your information and such use as you wish to make of it, Soviet Government has never accepted revised text of Hungarian Control Commission providing that policy directives should only be issued after "agreement", insisting that Russian word is closer to consultation. In any event you are quite correct that in Hungarian case there is nothing comparable to Far East Commission.

4. Our disposition, like that of Soviet Government, is to discourage use of other than US forces in occupation. This matter has, however, not yet been decided and further discussion with US Government and ^{after that discussion} with other Allies is still necessary.

Section B. 1, 2, 3, 4. We confirm your answers.

5. For your information, the language in question was suggested by British. We assume that it is intended to indicate that the right of the Supreme Commander to act when authorized by the Commission will not be questioned by the participating governments. We would be willing to consider some revision of

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Sent by operator M., 19.....

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Department of State

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 Night letter

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this.

6. Full set of policies and directives already issued are being furnished Soviet Embassy immediately. Intention of sentence was to provide that existing directives remain in force until changed in accordance with machinery set up. If present language presents difficulty we are prepared to alter sentence to read after first semicolon "and the Supreme Commander shall continue to act under directives which the United States has already sent to him unless and until the issuing authority shall have modified such directives in accordance with the provisions of this document."

7. Our cable 2264 of November 2 gives our views upon this paragraph.

Byrnes

(Code Room: Please supply number of cable)

U:DA:JGC

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

aa *BVC*
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John W. ...

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NOV - 2 1945



SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS,
TOKYO, (JAPAN).
FOR ARCHERSON, ACTING POLITICAL ADVISER.

Following for your information is editorial from
NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE Oct 31.

Please indicate extent of editorial comment from
American press available to you.

QUOTE Of all the absurd blunders made by America
in the Far East one of the worst is the selection of
Prince Fumimaro Konoye to draft Japan's new constitution.
It is the equivalent of choosing a gunman to devise rules
for a reform school. If the prince were in prison await-
ing trial as a war criminal there would be no reason to
object. His designation, with official American sanction,
as the man to write a democratic constitution for Japan
is the ultimate in absurdity.

Prince Konoye was Japan's Prime Minister in 1937,
when the Japanese attacked China and opened the second
world war. He served the militarists of Japan repeatedly
during their bloody aggression in the Far East. He
announced the INNERQUOTE New Order in East Asia END INNERQUOTE
and thus lent his tremendous prestige to Japan's vicious

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- 2 -

imperialistic program. It is true enough that he posed as a liberal and that he let it be known that he disliked some of the more reckless moves of the militarists. But there is nothing to indicate that anything but caution and intelligence led him, at widely spaced intervals, to try to restrain the Tojos and Koisos.

The evil oligarchy which ruled Japan so long is being strengthened by the use of Konoye to draft a constitution - just as the imperial institution is being strengthened by American use of the emperor to give INNERQUOTE commands END INNERQUOTE to his subjects. The many excellent moves of General MacArthur to encourage the development of democracy in Japan are being nullified by the general's acceptance of Konoye as the man to lead Japan to democracy. Konoye is one of those who used the old constitution as a tool to enslave the Japanese people at home and to enslave other peoples abroad. There is nothing in his record that shows he is fitted for his present

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present job. He is not the man to prepare a new constitution for Japan unless it can be said that Americans enjoyed the recent war and want to have another one just like it as soon as possible. UNQUOTE

*Byrnes
(JEP)*

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NOV 2 1945 P.M. *✓*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF CENTRAL SERVICES TELEGRAPH SECTION

ACTION: FA
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TW-368-0
This telegram must be paraphrased before being communicated to anyone other than a Government Agency. (RESTRICTED)

Tokyo via War
Dated November 2, 1945
Rec'd 12:35 p.m., 6th

Secretary of State,
Washington

86, November 2

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
File
H. M. G.
Chief, Division of Foreign Service Administration

Since arrival here, we have not received any of Department's information series, "State Department Bulletins", Foreign Service lists, et cetera.

We request these and revisions of "Policy Manual" be sent regularly. Also that Department forward by air, new books of importance on Japan and Far East generally, as well as significant magazine and IPR articles.

Also need Cheney Hyde's Internationallad.

We repeat request for pertinent policy papers on Japan as they are prepared. Even copies still in draft stage will be of valuable guidance.

ATTACHESON

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DEC 20 1945

Porter Safety Seal
order - P.O. 4097-46

Policy Manual
is being taken care of by Sec of State's office
11/9/45
Mr. Harry of State Dept will handle
11/10/45

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) 111-245

8/11-2

DEPARTMENT

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICES
TELEGRAPH SECTION

Moscow via War

Dated November 4, 1945

Rec'd 3 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

filed 11-8

DC/R

103

US URGENT

3757, November 4, 5 p.m.

TOP SECRET

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM HARRIMAN

Molotov received me last night at my request to discuss contents of Dept's 2272, November 2, 8 p.m. Most of the conversation lasting over an hour and a half related to the responsibilities of the Allied Military Council. Molotov showed his hand more clearly. He did not (repeat not) appear satisfied with Dept's suggestion as to use of the word "control" in paragraph one and asked whether it could not be included before "implementation", so that the last words would read "in regard to the control over the implementation of the terms of surrender, et cetera." He asked whether it was not appropriate for the Council to have such control. I explained that it was the Supreme Commander who had this control in consultation and with the advice of the

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104

-2- 3757, November 4, 5 p.m., from Moscow via War.

Allied Military Council.

Following some discussions in which he did not change his attitude we turned to paragraph III. After I had explained our position on this paragraph Molotov argued at length that on non-urgent questions of principle the consultation of the Supreme Commander with the Council should provide for agreement before action was taken by the Supreme Commander. He referred to what he termed the Potsdam agreement regarding the Hungarian Control Commission. He said that Stalin had stated to me that he was ready to accept the Hungarian and Rumanian formula. Molotov pointed out that since Potsdam this provided for agreement on questions of principle. I replied that Stalin in his conversation with me had stated that he was prepared to accept the Hungarian-Rumanian procedure which according to Stalin provided that the Supreme Commander had the "last voice". I explained that this was the principal which the Generalissimus had accepted and that his statement recognized that the Supreme Commander should have the final authority if agreement was not reached.

I pointed

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1053- #3757, November 4, 5 p.m., from Moscow via War.

I pointed out that the parallel with Hungary was in no sense similar to our proposals for Japan, emphasizing the functions of the Far Eastern Commission.

Molotov argued that in matters such as the character of the Jap Govt, when not urgent, it was desirable that the four principal Allies should agree on such fundamental questions. I explained that the situation in Japan was highly complicated and dangerous, that the Supreme Commander's hands should not be tied in taking action that might be necessary. In making this statement, however, I emphasized that we were making this proposal in good faith and that he could be assured that when there was time we wished to consult fully with our Allies and make every effort to come to agreement. We did not (repeat not) wish to take sole responsibility unless it was necessary. On the other hand it was a matter of judgment as to whether urgency existed and we wished the document to be quite clear that the Supreme Commander had the unquestioned authority to make decisions if he considered it necessary.

Molotov kept coming back to the Hungarian language and denied that the Soviet Govt had not (repeat not)

accepted

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-4- #3757 November 4 5 p m from Moscow via War

accepted the provisions as proposed at Potsdam I told him that the purpose of my visit was not to negotiate the wording of the proposal but to explain carefully the intent of my Govt therein so as to avoid any possible misunderstanding in the future.

We then turned to the Far Eastern Commission, I explained to Molotov that the language of II (A) one was still subject to review and revision if clarification were necessary. Molotov did not appear to desire further discussion and I let the matter drop particularly as I am not myself fully clear on the meaning of the language. The British Charge has told me that the British had in mind in making their suggestion that agreement should be reached between the participating govts on such questions as trade with Japan.

Molotov seemed satisfied when I told him that a full set of policies and directives already issued were being furnished the Soviet Embassy and appeared to prefer the revised language of II (C) as suggested in your message.

I told Molotov further that in general I had received confirmation of the other information I had given him in our last conversation and that I had a little more information

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-5--/3751 November 4, 5 p.m., from Moscow via War

information about the voting procedure if he cared to discuss this question. He replied that he thought this was perhaps the place in which there should be four power agreement as was the case of the United Nations Organization. He immediately added, however, that he was not in a position to state his Govt's position on this or any other matters in connection with our proposals. He told me he would consult his Govt and hoped to have an answer or proposals to make on Monday in which event he would get in touch with me.

I cannot (repeat not) give any indication of what Molotov's reply will be. There is no doubt that he personally is searching for some method by which the Soviet Govt's position can be strengthened in control of Japan particularly in relation to the future permanent Jap Govt. How far this is his own view or inspired by Stalin I cannot judge. I had previously emphasized the need for speed and Molotov's immediate attention to this matter indicates that he is equally anxious to come to prompt agreement.

HARRIMAN

MJF

TOP SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF CENTRAL SERVICES TELEGRAPH SECTION

108

ACTION: S
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ALH-264 -M
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (TOP SECRET)

Moscow via Army
Dated November 5, 1945
Rec'd 3 a.m., 6th

S
Dc/R

Secretary of State
Washington

File RR

US URGENT

3775, November 5, Midnight

TOP SECRET FOR THE SECRETARY

Molotov requested me to call this evening. He handed me documents in Russian language containing Soviet Govt's proposed amendments to and comments on the suggestions concerning control machinery for Japan and revision of original terms of reference for Far Eastern Commission (REOUR 3757, November 4). These follow herewith in paraphrased translation except when otherwise indicated:

XR
740.00119 FERC

SECTION I. Amendments to proposals of US Govt re control machinery for Japan.

It is considered necessary by the Soviet Govt to make following amendments to US Govt proposals on machinery of control for Japan.

One.

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740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 11-505 Confidential File

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-2- #3775, November 5, Midnight from Moscow via Army.

One. In Paragraph One instead of title "Allied Military Council" to say "Allied Control Council" or "Allied Control Commission".

Following consideration dictates this amendment. Basic character of work of control machinery should be expressed in title itself. Title "Allied Military Council" limits functions of the control body for Japan solely to military questions, whereas this body will deal with administrative, economic, cultural and political questions as well as military. Title "Allied Military Council" does not take into consideration this circumstance.

Two. In Paragraph One in addition to changing title of council, in place of words "for the purpose of consulting with and advising the Commander-in-Chief regarding implementation of surrender terms and occupation and control over Japan" insert the following: (text of Soviet amendment included in Paragraph One of immediately following telegram).

This amendment is evoked by the following considerations.

After the inclusion in Paragraph One of the
American

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-3- #3775, November 5, Midnight from Moscow via Army

American draft of the word "control" the meaning of the phrase "and the control of Japan" remains incomprehensible. This obscurity must be removed by indicating that the Allied Control Council (Allied Control Commission) is created for purposes of control over the fulfillment of the terms of Japanese surrender as is stated in proposed amendment.

Three. Following phrase should be added to point Two: (see Paragraph Two our immediately following telegram).

Four. In Paragraph Three, in place of words "he will consult *** shall be controlling" to state as follows: (see Paragraph Three our immediately following telegram).

Purpose of this amendment is to clarify cases when disagreements arise in Council between any member of Council and Supreme Commander on questions of principle. Proceeding from the right of every member of Council to appeal in such cases to his own govt, the present amendment is proposed, having in view that such disagreements should be settled by agreement between Govts or in the Far Eastern Commission; the decision of Supreme

Commander

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-4- #3775, November 5, Midnight from Moscow via Army

Commander being withheld until agreement on these questions is reached.

SECTION II. Amendment to US proposals re Far Eastern Commission.

Soviet Govt deems necessary following amendments to US proposal:

One. In Section I, to enumerate countries participating in FEC; to wit: USSR, USA, British Commonwealth of Nations, China, Australia, Philippines, New Zealand, Canada, Holland, France (in reply to my inquiry Molotov stated that India should be excluded).

Two. Section II-A (1) (repeat A (1)) to read as follows: (see Paragraph Four immediately following telegram).

This clause was set forth in US proposal of August 22 in this wording. Wording of this clause is more exact than wording of draft of October 30. Furthermore it does not contain vague phrase "and between the participating govts".

Three. Section II-C to be redrafted as follows: (see Paragraph Five immediately following telegram).

Remaining

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-5- #3775, November 5, Midnight from Moscow via Army

Remaining portion of text of this clause is to be eliminated.

Proposed amendment is explained by necessity of referring to newly organized Control Council for Japan in statutes of FEC.

With respect to final part of this clause, this part should be considered as nullified ("having fallen away") in connection with fact that American Govt has withdrawn from this wording by having proposed to replace it with a new draft, as stated in Ambassador Harriman's letter of November 3 (letter referred to does not propose but sets forth as possible alternate, if so desired by Russians, new reading of Paragraph II-C as explained in Paragraph Six of your 2272, November 2):

New American amendment is superfluous since it has to do with obligations of Supreme Commander and does not refer to functions of FEC.

Four. In Section III, Paragraph One in place of words "based on policy decisions of the Commission" to state "in accordance with the decisions of the Commission". Last sentence of this clause is to be eliminated since in statutes of the FEC there is no necessity of dealing

with

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-6- #3775, November 5, Midnight from Moscow via Army

with responsibilities of Supreme Commander.

Five. Section III, Paragraph Two to be eliminated. Elimination of this clause is explained by fact that this question is dealt with in proposals on control machinery for Japan (Paragraph Three).

Six. In Section V, Paragraph Two in place of words "including the representatives of three of the following powers" to say "including the representatives of the four following powers, US, UK, USSR and China". This amendment is necessary to secure unanimity of four Allies: US, UK, USSR and China.

Seven. In Section VI, first and second paragraphs should be eliminated and replaced by following words "Washington shall be the permanent headquarters of the FEC".

Eight. In Section VII, in place of words "including the representatives of three of the following powers" to state "including the representatives of the four following powers, the US, UK, USSR and China".

Comment: After some discussion in which I restated our position on some of the points contained in these

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documents,

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114

-7- #3775, November 5, Midnight from Moscow via Army

documents, I said I would, in accordance with Molotov's request, immediately forward the Soviet proposals and comments to my Govt. I will send you my observations in a subsequent message.

HARRIMAN

WFS

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PREPARING OFFICE WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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Department of State
NO PARAPHRASE
Washington
Sent

SECRET

NOV - 5 1945

10 pm

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
TOKYO, JAPAN

For Acheson, Acting Political Adviser

For Willoughby from Martin

Can you give any reaction there might be in Japan to decision to maintain base price of three dollars on silk imported to US from Japan? Free world price probably between six and eight.

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN)
/111-545

TR 611.94

By memo (per memo)

JK:EMMartin:lmc

10-81-45

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740.00119 Control (Japan) / 11-5-45

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Department of State
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NECESSARY
Washington
Secret

SECRET

NOV 13 1945
6 pm

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
TOKYO, JAPAN

For Atcheson, Acting Political Adviser

For Willoughby from Martin

REDEPTEL *740.00119 Control (Japan) / 11-545*
~~REURAD 87~~, NOV 5: Dispatched in error; no
action necessary.

Byrnes
(per [unclear])

JK:EMMartin:lmc 11-8-45

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740.00119 Control (Japan) / 11-545

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14 Nov

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

JCD

Herewith the letter
about which I spoke
It was in the Sec's office
Patterson is pressing
for an answer.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY
A - D
NOV 14 1945
MR. DUNN
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

H. F. W.

740.60119
Conrad
State (Patterson) 11-5-45

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WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

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11/17/45*

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By DR. 103 NARS, Date 10/21/74

118

5 November 1945

The Honorable

The Secretary of State

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Governmental policy which is the present basis for action by the War Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on matters connected with the use of Allied forces in the occupation of Japan is contained in SWNCC 70/5, approved by you 18 August 1945. It envisages participation of Allied forces, but not in such numbers as to prevent U. S. control of the implementation of policies regarding enforcement of the surrender terms. Based on this policy the Joint Chiefs of Staff have already accepted in principle British participation in the occupation of Japan and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek has already discussed with the Commanding General of the China Theater the provision of a Chinese Army of three divisions for Japan.

attached

It is understood from the remarks of the Secretary of State at the meeting of the Committee of Three on 30 October that there is now some question about the continued validity of the policy in SWNCC 70/5. If this expressed policy is no longer effective, it is requested that the Secretary of State inform the War Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the proposed revisions in this policy so that the proposals and commitments of the War Department for troop strength may be modified accordingly as soon as possible.

Sincerely yours,

RL & P P

Secretary of War


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117

November 17, 1945

TOP SECRET

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I have received your letter of November 5, 1945, in which you raise the question of a possible change in policy regarding the use of Allied forces in the occupation of Japan.

My feeling has been that in view of the delicacy of our current conversations with the USSR regarding control of Japan it was just as well to refrain for the time being from raising the question of Allied military participation in the occupation. However, in view of our firm commitments in the premises to our Allies and of the urgency of Australian representations regarding the dispatch of a British Commonwealth force to Japan, I am instructing our Embassy at Moscow to inform the Soviet authorities that we are discussing the details of a proposed British Commonwealth force in Japan and that we would be willing to receive in Japan a USSR force similar to the British Commonwealth force, to be integrated into the forces under the Supreme Commander.

Sincerely yours,

JAMES F. BYRNES

DCR NE Unit

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Dist.

[Handwritten initials]

The Honorable
Robert P. Patterson,
Secretary of War.

J.P. *J.C.V.*
FE:JMPenfield:hst
11-16-45

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A true copy of
the signed original.

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740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 11-545

Confidential File
11-5-

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PREPARING OFFICE
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Charge Department: **X**

Charge to

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Department of State

Washington

Secret

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NOV - 5 1945

10 pm

SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE ALLIED POWERS
TOKYO, JAPAN

For Atcheson, Acting Political Adviser

For Willoughby from Martin

A Mr. Bogdan, a former officer of J. Henry Schroeder Banking
Co. left today for a financial assignment on Gen. MacArthur's
staff. Would appreciate information on exact position he is given.

Byrnes (per [unclear])

JK:EM Martin:lmc 10-31-45

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN)
/11-545

Confidential File

*740.00119 Control
(Byrnes) / 11-545*

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W. J. ...

PREPARING OFFICE WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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Charge Department **WAR**

Charge to **DEPT.**

TELEGRAM SENT

NO NECESSARY

Department of State

Washington

Secret

78 PREPARING OFFICE WILL TYPE HERE CLEARLY THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE MESSAGE:

SECRET
NOV - 5 1945

8 pm *(initials)*

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
TOKYO, JAPAN

⁸⁵
For Atcheson, Acting Political Adviser

For Willoughby from Martin

Will you report what steps have been taken or are in immediate prospect for carrying out the provisions of the Economic and Financial Directives with respect to the removal from positions of responsibility of exponents of militant nationalism and aggression?

Byrnes (initials)

JK:EMM Martin:lmc 10-31-45

SENT

740.00119 CONTROL
(JAPAN) / 11-545

note to ...
which ...
was ...
...

CR
NOV 5 1945 P.M.

DCR NE Unit

Re: *...*

Dist. *...*

CODE ROOM
RELEASE DESK

NOV 5 PM 8 18

Confidential
CENTRAL SERVICES

740.00119 Control
(Japan) / 11-545

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF CENTRAL SERVICES TELEGRAPH SECTION

75

ACTION:FE

INFO:

S MG-1323 -K
U No paraphrase necessary
C (CONFIDENTIAL)

Tokyo

Dated November 5, 1945

Rec'd 4 p.m., 8th

EUR

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DC/L-D

ES

FC-9 Secretary of State


A-R

SA

Washington

89, November 5

REDEPTEL 53, ^{119 Central (Japan)} Oct 24, 3 p.m.



*DC/R
File*

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 11-545

While it is our understanding from Jap sources that the records in question are available there is reluctance on the part of headquarters to try to get possession of them without the Joint Chiefs of Staff issuing a directive.

Please refer to my letter of Nov 4 to Vincent.

JRL

ATCHESON

CONFIDENTIAL

MAY 22 1946

FILED

DCB NE Unit	
Anal.	<i>RM</i>
Re	<i>RM</i>
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740.00119 Control (Japan) / 11-545

No. 10

*Write in FBO
in future reference FBO*

~~AMERICAN CONSULATE~~

NOV 29 1945

FOREIGN BUILDINGS OPERATIONS
DEC 12 1945
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RECEIVED
NOV 30 1945

Yokohama Branch
Political Adviser's Office
Hdqs. 8th Army
Yokohama, Japan
November 5, 1945

*TIT
SFD
FA
FBO
DCA*

SUBJECT: Condition of and Repairs made to American Consulate Property, Yokohama.

1-1065 GPO

SPECIAL PROJECTS
DIVISION
DEC 3 1945
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

File 1 copy - FBO
FOREIGN BUILDINGS OPERATIONS
allotment form granting money dated 11-21-45
NOV 19 1945
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RECEIVED
DIVISION
CENTRAL SERVICES
THE HONORABLE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
SIR:
1945 NOV 16 P 12 10

RECORDS
BRANCH

WASHINGTON.

auth. by A-2, 11-28-45

740.00119 Control Japan

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 11-545

I have the honor to refer to my telegram No. 8 of October 20, 1945 and to the Department's telegram No. 6 in reply thereto with regard to a special allotment for repairs to the property of the American Consulate in this city.

The request contained in my telegram under reference for a special allotment was made without knowledge of the fact that the Department had requested a report on the property from the Army Engineers. Although it would now be an excellent opportunity to complete the rehabilitation of the building while it is only partially occupied and I feel that the work recommended would be adequately carried out the report of the Army Engineers will of course, be awaited before a special allotment is again requested.

With regard to the statement "Reference to work 'now being carried out without cost to Department' not understood" contained in the Department's telegram under reference it is regretted that a more adequate explanation was not contained in my telegram.

As the Department is aware I was instructed to proceed to Yokohama to reopen this office for limited consular functions but no allotment whatever for necessary incidental expenses to placing this building in operating condition was made, nor were any other instructions of any kind received. In this connection it must be mentioned that the tentative allotment of \$500 for repair, maintenance and operation requested in my telegram No. 1 of October 13 has not yet been received, and, therefore, up to the present time I apparently still have no authority to incur any expenditures whatever for the operation of this very large building. However, this was not of immediate importance as because of the almost complete destruction of all business enterprises in Yokohama, the taking over in one form or another of the remaining enterprises by the American forces, and the fact that the Armed Forces here are still operating under field conditions it is not possible to obtain goods and services in the normal manner. Considering it my obligation to place the property in as good condition as possible

XRI 25 9911

740.00119 Control Japan / 11-545

DOB - Unit

to permit the housing of myself and possible additional members of the staff and the opening of the office at the earliest possible moment, I utilized all available means to do so.

Although, as previously reported to the Department, the building is basically in very good condition the period of years during which it was unused except for one apartment occupied by the Swiss custodian and the deferring of normal maintenance, made necessary a thorough cleaning of the entire building and various minor repairs to place it in usable condition for office and living quarters.

Cleaning has been and is still being carried out by Japanese labor obtained from the Eighth Army under the supervision of an enlisted man. All stone flooring has been thoroughly washed with soap and brush and wood flooring has been cleaned and waxed. All windows and Venetian blinds have been washed. Through the courtesy of the master of a merchant vessel in port a supply of caustic soda was obtained and an officer of the vessel supervised and instructed the laborers in its use on painted surfaces so that all interior walls not requiring repainting are being thoroughly cleaned. All brass fittings throughout the building have also been polished and all office and household furniture cleaned.

The entire electrical system of the building was checked, all necessary minor repairs made, and approximately one hundred electric light bulbs installed. All call bells were checked and necessary repairs made and sixteen panes of window glass, said to have been broken by an explosion in the harbor in 1942 were replaced. All plumbing was checked and necessary minor repairs to valves, particularly the toilet flush valves corroded and frozen from lack of use, were made. This labor was all performed under the supervision of Army engineers by Japanese employed by the Army for similar work on Army billets.

Through the courtesy of the Naval shore establishment at Yokusuka and the chief engineer of a merchant vessel in the harbor, an electrical engineer and an engineer familiar with the type of heating installation in this building tested all the motors and electrical relays, replaced wiring to the oil burner motors damaged by moisture, repaired the relays and automatic ignition devices damaged by condensation of moisture, tested the boilers and circulating system and placed the system in operating condition. This was all done on an entirely personal basis and no payment was made or expected. Five hundred gallons of fuel oil have also been obtained from seized Japanese stocks for use in heating the building and for domestic hot water until such time as it is possible to complete formal arrangements for the supply of fuel.

Arrangements have also been made with an Army unit for the repair of the large refrigerator in the kitchen of the principal officer's apartment which is not in operating condition.


As stated in my telegram under reference it was found that there were several minor leaks in the roof resulting in seepage which was damaging the plastering and paint in portions of the building. The damage to the roof was apparently caused by the great heat from the fires surrounding this building during the great air raid on this city. The tiles had buckled at places and cracks opened in the tar underneath resulting in a slow seepage which only recently became apparent. As it was not possible to obtain qualified personnel from the Army for making the necessary repairs I succeeded in locating a qualified Japanese contractor who is now making emergency repairs so as to prevent further damage to the interior of the building. This work is being carried out on a day labor basis at the Army wage scale and when received will be paid from the normal allotment for this office as the cost should not exceed

\$100. It is realized that as yet there is no authority or allotment for this work but in view of the additional damage that the building would have sustained unless prompt action was taken it is hoped that the Department will approve this action.

To obtain the estimate submitted on the paint work obviously needed I consulted a Japanese painting contractor who has had long experience in the painting of large buildings, ships and similar projects and who had very satisfactorily carried out considerable work on the interior of officer's billets in Yokohama.

Considering the exceptional conditions prevailing here it is my belief that every proper measure has been taken to preserve and restore this valuable American Government property so as to permit the opening of this office at the earliest possible date. It is hoped that the Department will approve of the steps which have been taken for this purpose.

Respectfully yours,



U. Alexis Johnson
American Foreign Service Officer

UAJ/rew

125.1

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
ANN ARBOR
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS

DEC 18 1945

Monday, November 5, 1945.

file

DCR

Dear ES:

I have just written to Burton Tols putting a request before him which I wish to put before you also. I am at work on a paper for the American Economic Association on "Economic Reconstruction in the Far East." The title is not sure. I hope to deal with the economic situation and with the problems which seem to be critical in a period of say, five years.

I hope you will be willing to state what you consider the critical problems to be especially those that arise in connection with Japan and Korea. That is the most important part of my request. I want to put the situation as effectively as I can. This means that I must attempt to be inclusive and selective at the same time.

If in addition you can provide me with current information I will be greatly obliged. Has any statement of the damage in Japan as the result of the new New Model? The newspapers carry a statement that a reparations commission of fifteen persons is on its way to Japan. Is this true and does it represent real progress in the economic and political problems of Japanese reparations?

4R
740.00119 Central
(Morris)

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN)
/ 11-545

OSBY J

JAN 21 1946

DIVISION OF ASIAN AFFAIRS
DEC 14 1945
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

740.00119 Control
(Japan) / 11-545

- 2 -

Such detailed questions are also important than
you are adequate of the significant problems in
the economic field in the far East in the near
future.

Olson back had told me that you have been put in
charge of a new division dealing with Japan and
Korea in an office of Economic Security. I am glad
to hear this and I hope you will be able to find
time for a brief answer to this letter and that
you will send me whatever significant information
you can.

With the warmest personal regards, I am,

Sincerely yours
Earl Rivers

Mr. E. Martin
Office of Economic Security
State Department.

~~JK~~
DC/R

DEC 18 1945

In reply refer to
JK

Dear Dr. Remer:

I must apologize for my delay in replying to your letter of November 5. As you know, I was just about that time put in charge of a new division of Japanese and Korean economic affairs which took over the responsibility which the various economic divisions had had over Japanese policy, but gave me no personnel and no funds to procure personnel to carry on those responsibilities. Consequently I have been swamped.

As our information from Japan continues to be scanty, I am hopeful that when the Pauley Reparations Mission returns around the first of the year they will bring back a substantial amount of it. Meanwhile we exist on scraps and on the stories in the New York Times.

In so far as it is possible to see five years ahead now, I should say the principal economic problems with which we shall be faced in Japan and in Korea may be these:

1. The development of Korean personnel which can take over from the Japanese Korean economic life and will be able to operate the economy efficiently.
2. The development of sources of supply and of markets for Korean foreign trade which will leave that country dependent on Japan for no more than fifty percent of her trade, possibly less.

3. The

Dr. Carl Remer,
Department of Economics,
University of Michigan,
Ann Arbor, Michigan.

DCR - NE Unit

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740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN)
/11-545

740.00119 Control
(Japan) 11-545
CS/VJ

3. The prevention of undue influence by any other nation in the economic life of Korea. In other words the establishment of her economic independence as a reality.
4. The reconciliation of a program of disarmament for security reasons and of a reparations program designed to repay in part the losses caused by Japanese aggression with the prevention of starvation in Japan.
5. The development of a type of economic life in Japan which will contribute to a non-aggressive attitude on the part of her people and if possible to the development of more democratic institutions.
6. The elimination of Japanese influence in the economic life of China including Manchuria and Formosa.

I hope these bare outlines will be of some assistance to you. I am sure you can from your own experience and knowledge elaborate on them, as well if not better than I could. I shall look forward to seeing your paper.


Sincerely yours,

Edwin M. Martin, Chief
Division of Japanese and
Korean Economic Affairs

EMM
JK:EMMartin:lmc 12-12-45

GR
DEC 13 1945 P.M.
DEC 17 1945 P.M.

JAWK



NOV 29 1945

UNRESTRICTED

No.

To the

Officer in Charge of the Yokohama Branch,
Office of the United States Political Adviser,
Yokohama.

The Secretary of State refers to Despatch No. 10,
November 5, 1945, regarding the condition of the building
and the repairs made to the American Consulate property,
Yokohama.

Your resourceful and economical handling of these
initial repairs is commended.

The Funds requested by you have been authorized by
Airgram and authorization has been granted to expend
\$100.00 each for routine repairs to Government-owned house-
hold furniture and equipment and for purchase of new equip-
ment.

The funds for repainting and any other needed repairs
items will be considered upon receipt of reports from the
Army Engineers.

DCR NE Unit	
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Cal	<i>MS</i>
Dist.	

NOV 23

3:45 P.M.

740.00119 Control(Japan)/11-545

FBO:JJMcMahon:pta 11-23-45

A true copy of
the signed origi-
nal.

740.00119 CONTROL(JAPAN)/11-545

*740.00119 Control
(Japan)/11-545*

740.00119

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF CENTRAL SERVICES TELEGRAPH SECTION

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INPC:
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PLAIN
Tokyo via Army
Dated November 5, 1945
Rec'd 3 a.m., 7th

~~JA~~
DC/R

Secretary of State,
Washington.

90, Fifth

Reference Department's telegram 79, November 3-2

(ZA 8413)

(This is our No. 90, November 5)

Editorial comment from American press is available to us only in such telegrams or in such space as is devoted to them in Department's radio bulletin which is usually received by mail from Manila and is often incomplete or garbled.

ATCHESON

WMB

PLAIN

Office of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 13 1945
DIRECTOR
Department of State

Ans: _____
Rec: _____
Tel: _____
Dist: _____

NOV 19 1945
FILED

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 11-545

NOV 8 - 1945
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

740.00119 Control
(Japan) / 11-245
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DEPARTMENT JA

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HC-1602 - H
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SECRET)

INCOMING TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICES
TELEGRAPH SECTION

only this copy

JK

Tokyo via War

Dated November 6, 1945

Rec'd 11:47 a.m., 9th

DCR

Secretary of State

Washington

PRIORITY

98, November 6

DIVISION OF JAPANESE
NOV 13 1945
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
To JK file action

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 11-645

On basis informal discussions by Willoughby with appropriate military authorities this office perceives no objection to general substance draft paper of September 19 "Control of Japanese armament industry: report by the Department of State".

We feel certain, however, that relationship as set forth between proposed Technical Disarmament and Demilitarization Commission and SCAP (Supreme Commander Allied Powers) would be objectionable to latter. (See last sentence item 4 page 2 and item 4 page 8). We believe SCAP would consider control Japanese armament industries one of his major responsibilities and would want any commission such as proposed to be integral part of GHQ completely under his command.

Ju. 22 1949

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ATCHESON

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Confidential File

740.00119 Control (Japan) / 11-645

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF CENTRAL SERVICES TELEGRAPH SECTION

80

ACTION - TD
INFO:
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RKB-624-H
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SECRET)

Tokyo via War

Dated November 6, 1945

Rec'd 11:50 a.m., 13th

~~FD~~
~~TRC~~
~~DC/R~~

NOV 20 1945
DC/R

File
12-18-45

TELECOMMUNICATIONS DIVISION
NOV 11 1945
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

To drafted 11/29 asking expediting of info. DRM

Secretary of State

Washington

96, November 6

GHQ states information requested your 63, October 30, will be sent Washington shortly. Will consult further and make comments requested after receipt material by pouch.

British interest cable situation manifested by forthcoming visit H. L. Poulsen, General Manager Great Northern Telegraph Company, also representing Cable and Wireless Limited Shanghai, who will arrive near future to consult Japanese officials regarding rehabilitation cables. Permission for visit granted by SCAP at urgent request Admiral Mountbatten.

XR 894.73

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11-4-45
no list
DEC 1 4 1945
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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ATCHESON

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OFFICE OF TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS POLICY
DEC 4 1945
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DEC 18 1945
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740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN)/11-645

Confidential

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

77 DIVISION OF CENTRAL SERVICES TELEGRAPH SECTION

ACTION-S

INFO:

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ALH-252-H
No paraphrase necessary.
(SECRET)

Moscow via War
Dated November 6, 1945
Rec'd 1:30 a.m., 6th

File 14
S
DC/R

Secretary of State
Washington

US URGENT

3776, November 6, 1 a.m.

SECRET FOR THE SECRETARY

Close translation of Russian phraseology of paragraphs mentioned in my immediately preceding telegram is as follows:

74000119 Control Japan/11-545

XR
740.00119 P.W.

One. "For the purposes of control over the execution of the terms of surrender of Japan and for the purposes of consulting with and advising the Supreme Commander in relation to the implementation of terms of surrender and the occupation for Japan"

Two. "Each member of the Allied Control Council (Allied Control Commission) may be accompanied by an appropriate staff consisting of military and civilian representation".

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740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 11-64E

740.00119 Control Japan
Confidential File

SECRET

-2- #3776, November 6, 1 a.m. from Moscow via War

Three. "He will consult and advise with the Council upon orders involving questions of principle in advance of their issuance. If there is disagreement on the part of one of the members of the Council with the Supreme Commander (or his deputy) on questions of principle such as a question on a change in the regime of control over Japan or a question regarding a change in the composition of the Japanese Govt, regarding the dissolution of a Japanese Govt and replacement of it by another--the decision of the Supreme Commander on these questions shall be withheld from execution until agreement on these questions has been reached between Govts or in the FEC (Far Eastern Commission)".

Four. "The formulation of policies, principles and standards, in conformity with which the fulfillment by Japan of its obligations in correspondence with the surrender document may be defined".

Five. "The Commission in its activity will proceed from the fact that an Allied Control Council (Allied Control Commission) for Japan has been established and it will take into consideration the

existing

SECRET

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79

-3- #3776, November 6, 1 a.m. from Moscow via War
existing control machinery in Japan including the
entire chain of command from the Govt of the USA
to the Supreme Commander and the execution by the
Supreme Commander of command over the occupational
armed forces".

HARRIMAN

REP

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE ACTION-S INFO: S U C EUR-1 FE-1

INCOMING TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF CENTRAL SERVICES TELEGRAPH SECTION

118

JM-387 This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (TOP SECRET)

Moscow via War Dated November 6, 1945 Rec'd 1:05 p. m., 6th

5
↓
DO/A

Secretary of State, Washington,

DEPARTMENT OF STATE RECEIVED DEC 12 1945 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

US URGENT

3783, November 6, 3 p. m.

TOP SECRET FOR THE SECRETARY FROM HARRIMAN.

REEMBS 3775, Nov 5, midnight and 3776, Nov 6, 1 a.m.

In proposing his amendments to Allied Military Council and Far Eastern Commission Molotov has followed his customary tactics of increasing Soviet demands. He has placed an interpretation on Stalin's verbal agreement that the American Supreme Commander should have the last voice as qualified by Stalin's reference to the Hungarian and Rumanian precedents. He now contends that Stalin had in mind that the American Commander should have the last voice only to degree that was provided for in Soviet revision of Hungarian Control Commission formula offered at Potsdam. Stalin in his conversation with me made no such qualification although it is true that he did propose an Allied Control

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740-00119 FEAC

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 11-645 **FILED** Confidential File

NOV 13 1945

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TOP SECRET TOP SECRET

Commission

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TOP SECRET

-2-, #3783, November 6, 3 p.m., from Moscow via War

Commission along the lines of the Hungarian and Rumanian Commissions, pointing out that otherwise the Soviets in Japan would be in an inferior position to the British and Americans in the Balkans. In my conversations with Molotov and from his comments in connection with the amendments it would appear that the greatest concern of the Soviets is retention by them of a voice in eventual Govt of Japan and steps by which it evolves.

By the amendments of the two documents Molotov, however, seeks to obtain complete veto of all policies and interpretation of these policies and to tie our hands in such a way that the functioning of control of Japan would be impossible without Soviet approval.

I feel that the time has now come to present our final position to Stalin as coming from the President, thus giving me the opportunity to discuss the matter with him.

I recognize the seriousness of the situation since the Russians may well be in a mood to remain out of Japan unless they obtain a solution satisfactory to them. The terms we offer should therefore be terms that we are prepared to stand on before world opinion
as well as

TOP SECRET

120

TOP SECRET

-3- #3783, November 6, 3 p.m., from Moscow via War.

as well as the Russians. An impasse would have serious repercussions not only in the Far East but in Europe and on world collaboration generally.

With this in mind I believe that our proposal for both bodies should be reviewed in order to make our fundamental position absolutely clear in their provisions. This I understand to be that we are prepared to go to all reasonable lengths to consult with and to obtain the agreement of our Allies but that in the event of disagreement the United States must be free to make decisions. I suggest, therefore, that in the proposals for the Allied Military Council it be provided that in event of disagreement on questions of principle such as questions relative to character of Japanese Govt, etc, opportunity should be given for full consultation between governments or in FEC, making it clear, however, that US Supreme Commander is free to act pending results of such consultation and if it is found that no agreement can eventually be reached.

I believe

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

-4-, #3783, November 6, 3 p.m., from Moscow via War

I believe it would be easier to obtain Stalin's agreement to control machinery for Japan if the name "Allied Military Council" were changed preferably by accepting Stalin's original proposal of "Allied Control Commission" or at least some other title which eliminated word "military". It should, of course, be made clear that functions of the body are limited to consulting with and advising Supreme Commander.

I assume that there would be no objection to proposed Soviet addition of a sentence to effect that each member of the body may be accompanied by an appropriate military and civilian staff.

Turning to Far Eastern Commission, it may be easier to obtain agreement on Allied Military Council if we are prepared to accept the principle of agreement between four principal powers in voting procedure of FEC. In considering this question we should also bear in mind Soviet aversion to being voted down in anything. In any circumstances it must of course be provided that pending decisions US is free to issue directives to Supreme Commander.

Question of

TOP SECRET

122

TOP SECRET

-5-, #3783, November 6, 3 p.m., from Moscow via War

Question of India may be troublesome. Stalin in his statement to me was referring to India's participation in a peace conference for Europe. Although he was very firm in his attitude towards India, I can hardly believe that he would make this a breaking point. When I told Molotov last night that India was already participating in the discussions in Washington he stated they had been invited to attend the meetings of the Advisory Commission whereas the powers of the Commission had now been enlarged and it was inappropriate for India as a colony to participate in such a body.

HARRIMAN

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PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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
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TO BE TRANSMITTED

SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
RESTRICTED
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AIRGRAM

Collect { Full rate
Day letter
Night letter

Charge { Full rate
Day letter
Night letter



Department of State

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated
NO COUNCIL
SECRET

Washington,
November 7, 1945

TOP SECRET

AMEMBASSY,
MOSCOW, U.S.S.R.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY

After careful consideration of your 3775 of November 5 and 3776 of November 6, it seems plain what the essence of the Soviet proposals is and that these proposals are unacceptable. Passing matters of language, to which we shall return, the heart of the Soviet proposals is contained in their amendments to paragraph 3 of the Military Council document and to paragraphs III and V of the Far Eastern Commission document. By these changes the Soviet Government proposes that all action by the United States Government in giving directives to the Supreme Commander must be in accordance with decisions of the Commission, and that these decisions must be reached by the unanimous agreement of the four principal powers. The power of this Government to issue interim directives is taken away. Thus the United States Government would be paralyzed in issuing any directive to the Supreme Commander

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740.00119 FEAC

unless it could obtain the unanimous consent of the four powers and a majority of the Commission. But this is not
Anal. *ds*
Rev. *ds*
Enciphered by
Sent by operator M. 19

TOP SECRET

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740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 11-645 740.00119 Central (Japan) Confidential File 11-645

SENT

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED

Collect { Full rate
Day letter
Night letter

124

SECRET
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Charge Department:

Department of State

Washington,

Full rate
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all. The Supreme Commander in turn is forbidden to issue any order upon his own initiative "on questions of principle", should there be any disagreement on the part of any of the other members of the Council, until such question has been referred to the governments and there has been unanimous agreement among them. It thus appears that the United States Government, which has the responsibility for carrying out the surrender terms in Japan and the responsibility of enforcing those terms with its own military establishment, would be utterly unable either through the governmental machinery at Washington or through the decisions of the Supreme Commander in the field to fulfill this responsibility.

Such an attitude on the part of the Soviet Government seems to be a complete departure from Stalin's statement to you and Molotov's letter to the effect that that Government was willing to proceed along the general lines of the Rumanian model leaving to the Supreme Commander the "last word" and indicates a desire upon its part to impose in the control of Japan the same principles of unanimity which have produced such difficulty in the control of Germany. This Government has made clear from the outset that such a program is entirely

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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TO BE TRANSMITTED
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Collect { Full rate
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Night letter

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Department of State

Charge Department:

Full rate
Day letter
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Washington,

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unacceptable to it. In the case of the Balkan satellites, in view of the fact that the occupying forces were Soviet, the United States accepted the ultimate right of the commander-in-chief of those forces, acting on the instructions of his government, to have final decision in matters pertaining to the occupation of these countries. In Japan, the United States Government and the United States forces have on behalf of the United Nations occupied Japan and have the responsibility for carrying out the terms of surrender and the occupation of Japan. Neither this Government nor General MacArthur can be divested of nor share the responsibility for making and enforcing final decisions. It has been the desire of this Government to go to considerable lengths to bring about Allied participation in the making of basic decisions of policy through the Far Eastern Commission and to afford an opportunity to advise and consult upon the manner in which these policy decisions are carried into effect through the Allied Military Council. The practices and procedures which are proposed by this Government in the two documents under consideration are in our opinion a very considerable advance over the practices and procedures which

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

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have been followed in the Balkan commissions, particularly in regard to prior consultation. Thus in our opinion the counter suggestions which the Soviet Government has handed to you do not represent mere differences in wording or small matters about which adjustments could be reached, but represent a fundamental attack upon the whole principle of primary United States responsibility which we had understood had been accepted by both Stalin and Molotov.

Except for the suggestion contained in paragraph 2 of your tel 3776 providing that every member may be accompanied by an appropriate staff, which presents no difficulty, all of the other suggestions appear to be closely related to this fundamental issue bearing upon the nature and functions of both the Commission and the Council. If the Soviet Government is prepared to accept as we had hitherto believed it had done the prime responsibility of the United States Government and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, then many of the suggestions either fall away or present mere difficulties in language, otherwise they go to the heart of our position.

The foregoing is the official position of this Government for your guidance in your discussions with Soviet officials.

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19_____

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You may also wish to mention the fact that hitherto we have proceeded according to the advice contained in the last sentence of your tel 3623 of October 22 by keeping this discussion as an informal bilateral one with the Soviet Government. This has involved considerable effort in preventing the matter from coming before the Far Eastern Commission and thus becoming a public discussion. It is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain this position. We therefore believe that it is of the utmost importance that the Soviet Government accept the fundamental considerations noted above. For your guidance and such use as you deem advisable, these views mean that we cannot make any substantive changes in the provisions relating to the Allied Military Council. So far as the Commission is concerned we cannot accept any impairment of the right contained in III (2) to issue interim directives pending action by the Commission. The other matters raised, particularly voting procedure, may furnish some latitude for negotiation. We cannot see how the Soviet Government can have any legitimate worry that fundamental changes in the régime for the control of Japan or in the Japanese constitution can or would be brought about without full consultation since these are exactly the matters which would be

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considered fully in the Far Eastern Commission.

*Byrnes
AR*

*Approved by C/Cohen, S/Bohlen, FE/Vincent.
See attached list for Secretary's approval.
B.E.*

U DA:MA

BA CR
NOV 7 1945 P.M.

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

A-A

Donner
J.F.B.

OTP

November 7, 1945

DRAFT TELEGRAM

AMEMBASSY,

129

MOSCOW, U.S.S.R.

TOP SECRET FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY

After careful consideration of your 3775 of November 5 and 3776 of November 6, it seems plain what the essence of the Soviet proposals is and that these proposals are unacceptable. Passing matters of language, to which we shall return, the heart of the Soviet proposals is contained in their amendments to paragraph 3 of the Military Council document and to paragraphs III and V of the Far Eastern Commission document. By these changes the Soviet Government proposes that all action by the United States Government in giving directives to the Supreme Commander must be in accordance with decisions of the Commission, and that these decisions must be reached by the unanimous agreement of the four principal powers. The power of this Government to issue interim directives is taken away. Thus the United States Government would be paralyzed in issuing any directive to the Supreme Commander unless it could obtain the unanimous consent of the four powers and a majority of the Commission. But this is not all. The Supreme Commander in turn is forbidden to issue any order upon his own initiative "on questions of principle", should there be any disagreement on the part of any of the other members of the Council,

740.0119 Central (Japan) / 11-645

-2-

until such question has been referred to the governments and there has been unanimous agreement among them. It thus appears that the United States Government, which ~~at the present time~~ has the responsibility for carrying out the surrender terms in Japan and the responsibility of enforcing those terms with its own military establishment, would be utterly unable either through the governmental machinery at Washington or through the decisions of the Supreme Commander in the field to fulfill this responsibility.

Such an attitude on the part of the Soviet Government seems to be a complete departure from Stalin's statement to you and Molotov's letter to the effect that that Government was willing to proceed along the general lines of the Rumanian model leaving to the Supreme Commander the "last word" and indicates a desire upon its part to impose in the control of Japan the same principles of unanimity which have produced such difficulty in the control of Germany. This Government has made clear from the outset that such a program is entirely unacceptable to it. In the case of the Balkan satellites, in view of the fact that the occupying forces were Soviet, the United States accepted the ultimate right of the commander-in-chief of those forces, acting on the instructions of his government, to have final decision in matters pertaining to the occupation of these countries. ~~The situation in Japan, in our view, is an exact parallel in that~~ the United States Government

-3-

and the United States forces have on behalf of the United Nations occupied Japan and have the responsibility for carrying out the terms of surrender and the occupation of Japan. Neither this Government nor General MacArthur ^{be} can be divested of nor share the responsibility for making and enforcing final decisions. It has been the desire of this Government to go to considerable lengths to bring about Allied participation in the making of basic decisions of policy through the Far Eastern Commission and to afford an opportunity to advise and consult upon the manner in which these policy decisions are carried into effect through the Allied Military Council. The practices and procedures which are proposed by this Government in the two documents under consideration are in our opinion a very considerable advance over the practices and procedures which have been followed in the Balkan commissions, particularly in regard to prior consultation. Thus in our opinion the counter suggestions which the Soviet Government has handed to you do not represent mere differences in wording or small matters about which adjustments could be reached, but represent a fundamental attack upon the whole principle of primary United States responsibility which we had understood had been accepted by both Stalin and Molotov.

Except for the suggestion contained in paragraph 2 of your tel 3776 providing that every member may be

-4-

accompanied by an appropriate staff, which presents no difficulty, all of the other suggestions appear to be closely related to this fundamental issue bearing upon the nature and functions of both the Commission and the Council. If the Soviet Government is prepared to accept as we had hitherto believed it had done the prime responsibility of the United States Government and the Supreme Commander in Chief, then many of the suggestions either fall away or present mere difficulties in language, otherwise they go to the heart of our position.

U DA:MA

The foregoing is the official position of this Government for your guidance in your discussions with Soviet officials. You may also wish to mention the fact that hitherto we have proceeded according to the advice contained in the last sentence of your tel 3623 of October 22 by keeping this discussion as an informal bilateral one with the Soviet Government. This has involved considerable effort in preventing the matter from coming before the Far Eastern Commission and thus becoming a public discussion. It is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain this position. We therefore believe that it is of the utmost importance that the Soviet Government accept the fundamental considerations noted above. For your guidance and such use as you deem advisable, these views mean that we cannot make any substantive changes in the provisions relating to the Allied Military Council. So far as the Commission is concerned we cannot accept any impairment of the right contained in III (2) to issue interim directives pending action by the Commission. The other matters^{raised}, particularly voting procedure, may furnish some latitude for negotiation. We cannot see how the Soviet Government can have any legitimate worry that fundamental changes in the régime for the control of Japan or in the Japanese constitution can or would be brought about without full consultation since these are exactly the matters which would be considered fully in the Far Eastern Commission.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

81

INCOMING TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF CENTRAL SERVICES TELEGRAPH SECTION

ACTION: JA

INFO:

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ACM-816-W
No paraphrase necessary.
(SECRET)

JK:EMM:IL
10/14/45
Telegram to Tokyo

Tokyo via War

Dated November 6, 1945

Rec'd 12:06 p.m., 7th

Secretary of State

Washington

98, November 6.

On basis informal discussions by Willoughby with appropriate military authorities, this office perceives no objection to general substance draft paper of September 19 "control of Japanese armament industry: report by the Department of State. We feel certain, however, that relationship as set forth between proposed technical Disarmament and Demilitarization Commission and SCAP (Supreme Commander Allied Powers) would be objectionable to latter. (See last sentence item four, page two and item four, page eight). We believe SCAP would consider control Japanese armament industries one of his major responsibilities and would want any commission such as proposed to be integral part of GHQ completely under his command.

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
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CONFIDENTIAL

NOV 30 1945

5 p. m.

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED FORCES,

TOKYO.

170

FOR ATCHESON, ACTING POLITICAL ADVISOR

Efforts indicated your 96 November 6, much

appreciated. Situation developing rapidly, however, and would welcome any expediting you can do to speed information requested DEPTTEL 63 to Department as early meeting to be held to consider whole cable problem.

Byrnes (HSG)

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HPM

SUPREME COMMANDER ^{for} OF THE ALLIED POWERS,

TOKYO
147
FOR ATCHESON, ^{Acting} POLITICAL ADVISER ~~TO MACARTHUR~~
FOR WILLOUGHBY FROM MARTIN

Appreciate ~~your~~ ^{control} comments in URTEL 98/ of Nov 6. Amendments to armament industry paper are being made along lines you suggest. Thanks also for clipping with your first letter dated Nov. 2. Was first information on story.

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THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, November 6, 1945

CONFIDENTIAL

NO. 39

SUBJECT: Economic Personnel for General Headquarters, Supreme Command for Allied Powers.

RECEIVED
DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICES

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

Office of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 26 1945
DIRECTOR
Department of State

I have the honor to report that General MacArthur, in a recent conversation with Mr. Willoughby, Economic Adviser in this Office, asked Mr. Willoughby to do what he could to obtain the best possible men to work in General Headquarters on economic aspects of military control. He pointed out the great handicap under which he was working because of the fact that most of his men would be getting out of the army in the near future. General MacArthur had in mind men to occupy high ranking positions in the operating units of General Headquarters, and mentioned particularly the vacancy which will be left by Colonel R. C. Kramer, Chief of the Economic and Scientific Section, who is to go back to the States in December.

Referring to a telegram that he sent to Washington several weeks ago, citing among others Mr. Clayton and the Under-Secretary of the Treasury as men he would like to have, General MacArthur said that he hardly expected that they would come but named them as examples to indicate the caliber of men that he was looking for. General MacArthur indicated the highest regard for Mr. Clayton and expressed the hope that he would help him find men to assist in the very important economic work to be done in Japan. He agreed that it would be very difficult to get men of the type he wanted and went on to say that his high ranking officers should, if possible, have had previous army experience and be thoroughly familiar with army procedures.

The men that General MacArthur wants would be completely integrated into General Headquarters. If detailed from a civilian agency in Washington they would not be free to communicate directly with their agency but would be subject in all respects to the established line of command.

The Economic and Scientific Section has primary responsibility for, or participates in, most of the economic work in which General Headquarters is engaged. A full description of the broad functions of the Economic and Scientific Section is given in General Order No. 3, issued by General Headquarters October 2, 1945, a copy of which was enclosed in our despatch No. 21 of October 18, 1945. In this connection see also our telegram No. 12 of October 1.

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The effectiveness with which the economic work of the Political Adviser's office can operate will in large measure depend upon the willingness of the Economic and Scientific Section to cooperate. It would be highly advantageous if the Department could suggest, presumably through the War Department, the right man to take Colonel Kramer's place when he leaves.

There is unquestionably a critical need for competent men in grades below that of chief to work in the Economic and Scientific Section as well as other sections of General Headquarters. In considering any such men for recommendation, I trust, however, that the Department will keep in mind the desirability of recruiting men needed for economic reporting in this office. Reference is made in this connection to telegram No. 93 November 5, 1945 from this office.

Respectfully yours,

George Atcheson, Jr.
George Atcheson, Jr.

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Enclosures: *1 no enc.*

Original and duplicate, with reverse carbon, to Department.

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OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

78

Tokyo, Japan, November 6, 1945

CONFIDENTIAL

NO. 39

SUBJECT: Economic Personnel for General Headquarters, Supreme Command
for Allied Powers.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

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- 2 -

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Respectfully yours,

George Atcheson, Jr.

Enclosures:

Original and duplicate, with reverse carbon, to Department.

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WWilloughby:jrf

RESTRICTED

THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

WASHINGTON, D. C.

79



*Forward to FEAC as
FEAC #12*

SWN-3486
6 November 1945

NOV 11 1945
OFFICE OF
AFFAIRS
1945
Department of State

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

Subject: Control of Food and Agriculture in Japan

By informal action on 5 November 1945, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee approved SWNCC 98/1.

In approving SWNCC 98/1 the Committee agreed:

a. That this paper be transmitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to the State, War and Navy Departments for their guidance, and where appropriate for implementation;

b. That the "Conclusions" in paragraph 4 of the paper be communicated by the Department of State to the Governments of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, China, France, the Commonwealth of the Philippines, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the Netherlands;

c. That after having communicated with our Allies, according to the subparagraph above, the Department of State, at its discretion, release the "Conclusions" to the press; and

d. That this paper be classified "Restricted" until such time as it is released to the press by the State Department.

A copy of the approved paper, SWNCC 98/1, is forwarded for such action as deemed appropriate under subparagraphs a, b, c and d above.

A similar memorandum has been forwarded to the Secretaries of War, the Navy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

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Enclosure

H. Freeman Matthews
H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS
Acting Chairman

NOV 20 1945
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COPY NO. 56SWNCC 98/111 October 1945Pages 5 - 17, incl.STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEECONTROL OF FOOD AND AGRICULTURE IN JAPANReference: a. SWNCC 98Note by the Secretaries

1. The enclosure, a report by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East on reference a., is circulated for consideration by the Committee.

2. A copy of this paper has been forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment from a military point of view. The comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be circulated to the Committee upon receive thereof from the Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

CHARLES W. McCARTHY

ALVIN F. RICHARDSON

RAYMOND E. COX

Secretariat

SWNCC 98/1

RESTRICTEDE N C L O S U R ECONTROL OF FOOD AND AGRICULTURE IN JAPAN

Report by the
State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East

THE PROBLEM

1. To determine the policy of the United States with respect to food supply in Japan with particular relation to agricultural production.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. See Appendix "A".

DISCUSSION

3. See Appendix "B".

CONCLUSIONS

4. It is concluded that:

a. The responsibility with respect to formulating and executing food and agriculture programs should be placed on the appropriate Japanese authorities subject to the approval of the Supreme Commander.

b. Production of food crops should be maximized. However, tea and mulberry plantations should not be converted to food crops except for those areas whose trees or bushes are over age or for other reasons non-producing, and except for those areas which would be especially productive for food.

c. Supplies of fertilizers should be made available, particularly for this winter's crops. Night soil is an important source of fertilizer and its use should be continued. Surveys should be instituted of facilities and raw materials ^{available} for the production of fertilizer in Japan. The importation of fertilizer and of essential spare parts and raw materials for fertilizer plants is authorized to

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the extent required to meet deficiencies in local supply. Imports should be procured as far as possible from sources in proximity to Japan.

d. The production of farm tools and implements in short supply should be encouraged.

e. To the extent practicable, stock from the army remount depots should be distributed to areas most dependent on animal power.

f. Steps should be taken to insure an equitable distribution of farm produce. Such measures should include price control, rationing, control of black markets and such other measures as are directed toward full employment of resources, including labor. Attention should be given to the production and sale of such incentive goods as are in demand by food producers and can be produced locally.

g. The production of synthetic vitamins should be encouraged to supplement the probable inadequacies of diet during 1945-46, especially for the ill and for children and expectant and nursing mothers.

RECOMMENDATIONS

5. It is recommended that:

a. This report be forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment from the military point of view;

b. Upon the approval by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee of the conclusions in paragraph 4 above:

(1) this paper be transmitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to the State, War and Navy Departments for their guidance, and where appropriate for implementation;

(2) the "Conclusions" in paragraph 4 above be communicated by the Department of State to the Governments of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, China, France, the Commonwealth of the Philippines, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the Netherlands;

83

RESTRICTED

(3) after having communicated with our Allies according to subparagraph (2) above, the Department of State, at its discretion, release the "Conclusions" to the press, and

(4) this report be classified "Restricted" until such time as it is released according to paragraph 5 b (3) above.

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APPENDIX "A"

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. In the Economic Directive to the Supreme Commander it is stated (Part I, Paragraph 3) that:

"You will not assume any responsibility for the economic rehabilitation of Japan or the strengthening of the Japanese economy. You will make it clear to the Japanese people that:

a. You assume no obligations to maintain, or have maintained, any particular standard of living in Japan, and

b. That the standard of living will depend upon the thoroughness with which Japan redirects the use of its human and natural resources wholly and solely for purposes of peaceful living, administers adequate economic and financial controls, and cooperates with the occupying forces and the governments they represent.

It is not the policy of the United States to prevent the eventual achievement by Japanese working effort and resources of satisfactory conditions of living in Japan."

2. It is stated in Paragraph 9 that:

"The Japanese authorities will be expected to develop and effectively carry out programs of working activity that will enable them out of their own resources and labor to accomplish the following:

- (a) To avoid acute economic distress,
- (b) To assure just and impartial distribution of available supplies."

In the same section it is further stated that:

"The Japanese authorities will have to make the utmost effort to maximize production of agriculture and fishery products....."

RESTRICTED

3. Paragraph 11 provides that:

"The Japanese authorities shall be permitted on their own responsibility to establish and administer any controls over economic activities that are appropriate or necessary in order to achieve the economic ends specified in paragraph 9. Both the policy and the administration of these controls shall be subject to your approval and supervision....."

4. Paragraph 19 of Part II of the Economic Directive on "Civilian Supply and Relief" states:

"a. You will assure that all practicable economic and police measures are taken to achieve the maximum utilization of essential Japanese resources in order that imports into Japan may be strictly limited. Such measures will include production and price controls, rationing, control of black markets, fiscal and financial controls and other measures directed toward full employment of resources, facilities and means available in Japan.

"b. You will be responsible for providing imported supplies only to supplement local resources. Such imports will be confined to minimum quantities of food, fuel, medical and sanitary supplies and other essential items, including those which will enable local production of such supplies which you would otherwise have to import."

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