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may, however, be necessary for us at the same time to make some concessions in our position--as, for example, on the level of industry--if we are to achieve agreement with the other FEC Powers. Efforts on our part to win their support in connection with resumption of Japanese activities in technical organizations such as the ITU and the UPU have not to date been successful. It is evident that to be successful our efforts to win support for our position will have to be more intensive and far-reaching.

It is also to be kept in mind that in negotiations among the FEC Powers without the USSR and China our friends may feel greater freedom in opposing our wishes than they would in the presence of a common opponent.

The whole question of reaching agreement between our views and those of the other FEC Powers would clearly have to be fully explored through diplomatic channels before negotiations in a conference could be undertaken.

IV. Reference to the UN

The US acting under Article 14 of the Charter of the United Nations might bring the failure to reach a peace settlement with Japan to the attention of the General Assembly as a situation likely to impair friendly relations among nations. The US might at the same time submit a draft

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resolution declaring that the reaching of a peace settlement with Japan in the near future was essential to the peace of the Pacific area and recommending that the concerned FEC Powers (together with other Powers which we might suggest) make renewed efforts toward reaching a peace settlement with Japan, along the lines of a working formula which we might specify. Such a procedure would be roughly analagous to that followed in the case of Korea.

Legal Situation

Article 107 of the Charter of the UN provides as follows:

"Nothing in the present Charter shall invalidate or preclude action, in relation to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory to the present Charter, taken or authorized as a result of that war by the Governments having responsibility for such action."

A strict interpretation of this Article would not preclude our bringing before the UN the question of inaction--as contrasted with action--with regard to Japan. There appears, however, to have been an informal understanding at San Francisco that matters relating to the handling of enemy countries would be excluded from consideration by the UN until such time as the victorious Powers concerned determined to transfer such questions to the Organization. The exact extent

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extent of this understanding has been variously reported by persons present at the San Francisco Conference. On the existence of the understanding, however, there would seem to be general agreement.

Advantages and Disadvantages

Referring the matter to the UN would offer the following advantages:

- (1) If general support for this course of action could be obtained, it would provide a generally agreed legal basis for a new start on the Japanese peace settlement question.
- (2) We might obtain a wider measure of support in the General Assembly for our approach to the Japanese treaty problem than in the CFM or other small body.
- (3) Japan would obtain the advantages of the conclusion of a peace settlement discussed above.

On the other hand, the procedure might be open to the following disadvantages:

- (1) As indicated in the discussion of the legal situation, several countries would probably be reluctant to have problems relating to the peace settlement referred to the UN. The USSR would undoubtedly charge a breach of obligation on our part if we made such a proposal. If, however, the GA supported the proposal the validity of the legal objections would become less consequential. The USSR might disassociate itself from any procedure for peacemaking adopted by the GA and we might meet accordingly some of the disadvantages discussed above in connection with negotiations among the FEC nations without the USSR.
- (2) If the procedure were discussed in the General Assembly an effort might be made to associate in the

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peace treaty procedure all countries at war with Japan. It is believed that we would fare as well in negotiations in this larger body as in negotiations among the FSC or CFM group of states. At the recent International Telegraph and Telephone Conference of the International Telecommunications Union at Paris in June of this year a US proposal that Japan be admitted to the conference as an independent delegation was rejected by a vote of 24 to 23 with 7 abstentions. It is believed, however, that this proposal does not constitute a ~~clear-cut test~~ of the support which our policy toward Japan might receive in a UN forum because a number of states which had through diplomatic channels indicated that they were favorably disposed toward the US proposal either failed to instruct their delegation in Paris in time or failed to be represented at the conference. In general the Latin American and Arab states have shown themselves favorably disposed toward bringing Japan back into international trade relationships. In a larger body, of course, it would, however, probably be more difficult to retain the veto power.

V. Parallel Bilateral Treaties

The US and other friendly Powers might conclude bilateral treaties in lieu of a general peace settlement on a multilateral basis. Under this procedure no general peace settlement would be required, questions of the veto would not arise, and the USSR would be free to conclude a similar treaty if it so desired. These bilateral treaties might be followed by a base agreement between the US and Japan if such were required.

Legal Situation

The legal situation with regard to the conclusion of separate bilateral treaties with Japan has been studied by
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the Legal Adviser's office in memoranda of March 23 and April 1, 1949. In these memoranda reference is made to the agreements and understandings concluded during the war among the Allied Powers with regard to cooperation. It is found that these documents did not involve an obligation not to conclude a separate peace "regardless of the impossibility of concluding a joint United Nations peace with each enemy". At the same time it is found that the US would not be legally justified in abandoning all efforts to cooperate in the peace and working unilaterally for the attainment of its own objectives. It was pointed out also that the treaty would leave unresolved numerous and vital issues, but that, "except for our commitment to unity of purpose and action in the peace, there appear to be no legal complications necessarily incident to a separate peace excepting those due to our participation in the regime of control set up to administer the occupation of Japan by the Allied Powers". It was added, however, that it was within our undoubted power to effect for practical purposes a drastic change in the present system of occupation in Japan. We could not in theory, however, terminate that system.

The memorandum of March 23 concluded as follows:

"7. The opinion given above is, of course, subject to modification for all sorts of possible variants of

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the proposition put. It is quite possible, for instance, that so many of the 'friendly FEC countries' notified of the substance of our proposed treaty, would go along with it, in the conclusion of similar treaties, as to make it a matter of general agreement. It is possible that our bilateral treaty would contain provisions for a continuance of the occupation until the other countries had individually concluded their treaties with Japan. It is quite impossible to judge as to the legality of all possible variants of the situation without knowing the terms of the proposed US-Japan Treaty of Peace."

It is accordingly clear that this approach would be considered only if all reasonable efforts to reach a peace settlement through multipartite negotiations had proved futile and it was evident that a general peace settlement could not be reached by such means.

Question might be raised concerning Japan's competence to enter into bilateral treaties of this type without express authorization from the FEC--authorization which it is to be assumed would not be forthcoming under present circumstances. The basic documents relating to the occupation of Japan do not appear to provide a clear-cut answer to the question whether control of Japan's foreign relations rests primarily with SCAP or with the FEC. The issuance of the SCAPIN's in 1945 concerning Japan's foreign relations would seem to indicate that SCAP had control of foreign relations at least in the absence of any contrary decision by the FEC. Subsequently, however, some FEC states have questioned this view
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and have held that authorization by the FEC was necessary. Recently the US Government submitted to the FEC a proposed policy under which the FEC would decide that SCAP, subject to his discretion and continued control, should permit Japan to participate in such international relations as Japan might be invited to enter into or as SCAP should consider to be in the best interests of the occupation. Even if this policy statement were adopted, however, some room might be left for argument that the conclusion of political treaties was not included within the scope of the policy statement.

It is believed, however, that a case could be made for Japan's capacity to enter into bipartite political treaties with SCAP's consent. The strength of this case would depend in part upon the degree of support received from other concerned FEC Powers and from other Powers at war with Japan. If the procedure of parallel bipartite treaties is to be followed, such support would clearly have to be forthcoming. We would probably wish to discuss the proposal informally with several other concerned Powers so as to reach a reasonable adjustment of views before undertaking to conclude the treaties.

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Content of the Treaties

Some problems would arise in connection with the content of the treaties. Provision for the reestablishment of diplomatic and consular relations could, of course, be made. In connection with a provision for the termination of the war, however, it would have to be kept in mind that under the general principles of international law questions not specifically treated at the time of the reestablishment of peace would remain as at the conclusion of the peace. Accordingly all matters, the present status of which we desire to see altered, should be specifically dealt with in the bilateral agreements or reserved for future settlement. Some of the subjects normally included within the terms of a peace treaty are not susceptible to settlement on a bilateral basis. This difficulty might be obviated by providing in the bilateral treaties that the contracting parties agree that a specific question should be settled in a specific manner. For example, the US and Japan, not themselves having the right to dispose finally of territorial questions, could, however, agree that Japan gives up its rights to Korea and certain islands. In the case of the islands, the two countries could also agree that the islands should be under the sovereignty of a state (which would be named in the agreement). If a considerable number of bilateral treaties between Japan and states at war contain

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this same provision the effect would be to all intents and purposes the same as a provision in a general settlement. This technique for making bilateral disposition of rights of general interest was followed in connection with the relinquishment of extraterritorial rights in China by various Powers during and after the war.

The regime of control would present special problems in connection with bilateral procedure. It is believed that in view of the specific provision in the basic documents requiring FEC consent to any basic change in the regime of control, the bipartite agreements would probably have either specifically or by inference to continue the present regime of control unless we were prepared to fracture the basic understandings now in force. Of course, as a practical matter a number of measures could be taken gradually by this Government which would substantially alter the existing regime of control and for which no treaty provision would be required. The situation with regard to SCAP would create problems.

A possible precedent, indicating that termination of the state of war is not inconsistent with continuation of an occupation or even of control authorities, is to be found in the British notification of September 16, 1947, declaring terminated the formal state of war between the UK and Austria.

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Austria, of course, as far as the US is concerned, has been regarded as a liberated state and we did not declare war upon Austria.

Under the Treaty of Versailles a part of Germany was to be occupied for a period of years as a guarantee for the execution of the treaty.

If it is concluded that no fundamental change in the existing regime of control could be legally effected through parallel bilateral agreements unless the required FRC Powers including the USSR were party thereto, the necessity for a separate bases agreement by the US and Japan would be reduced. The US would merely remain in occupation of desired bases through the powers now vested in SCAP.

Advantages and Disadvantages

Assuming that all reasonable efforts to conclude a settlement on a multipartite basis have proved fruitless, the procedure of parallel bilateral negotiations might have the following advantages:

- (1) It might offer a practical means of making progress. Arguments over the states which should be invited to a conference, voting procedures, and other details would be obviated. The USSR would not be pointedly excluded for that country would be free to conclude a treaty like the others.
- (2) If pressures for a peace treaty increase in Japan and among the other FRC Powers it may become essential to find some means of reaching a settlement rapidly.

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- (3) Such a procedure might help to orientate Japanese feeling more strongly toward the West, for it would be clear that we and other friendly Powers were working for a peace settlement for Japan.
- (4) Some of the benefits resulting from a peace settlement--both for Japan, the US, and other Powers generally--would result from such a procedure.

On the other hand, such a procedure might have the following disadvantages:

- (1) The legality of the procedure might be questioned with results similar to those discussed above in connection with the conclusion of a treaty without the USSR.
- (2) The success of the procedure would depend upon the cooperation of a number of other friendly Powers. Such cooperation might be difficult to obtain. A vigorous campaign on our part to educate, with a view to converting, the other friendly Powers to the need for adopting such procedure would have to be undertaken. If the reparations question is settled through discussions in the FPC there would be greater hope for success. The other friendly Powers would probably not object to measures which we might propose with regard to territorial settlements, property matters, reestablishment of relations, et cetera, or to the continuance of the occupation in drastically reorganized form for a period of years. The question of the level of industry might create a matter of contention. The problem of SCAP might also be difficult to solve both on legal and practical grounds.

VI. Continuance of the Occupation Drastically Reorganized

If it should be found that negotiations on a multipar-tite basis were impracticable or undesirable at the present time, consideration might be given to continuing the present occupation on a drastically reorganized basis.

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Legal Situation

Within the framework of the basic documents relating to the occupation, there is considerable leeway for substantially accomplishing many of our objectives with respect to Japan without additional FEC policy decisions.

With regard to territorial provisions, we are now in military occupation of the Ryukyus, the Bonins, Volcanos, and Marcus Island. We could continue to remain in occupation of these areas, could institute a civilian form of government in the islands, establish bases or take similar steps which would give clear indication of our intention that the islands shall remain under US control. We could not, of course, take any steps with respect to the permanent disposition of the Kuriles or Formosa.

In so far as our occupation forces are concerned, the occupation of Japan is now carried almost exclusively by American forces. We could gradually reduce these occupation forces by withdrawing them from the main islands or stationing them on Okinawa or other appropriate location outside the main islands of Japan. A skeleton force would probably have to be retained in Japan, in view of the provision in the Potsdam Declaration that until a new order is established in Japan and there is convincing proof that Japan's war-making power is destroyed--matters which it is believed the FEC

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would have to determine--"points in Japanese territory to be designated by the Allies shall be occupied to secure the achievement" of our basic objectives. It is understood that the "points" to be occupied have been selected by SCAP and he could accordingly reduce the number of points to be occupied and could occupy them with a purely token force. Similarly, SCAP headquarters could be reduced so that only a very limited staff would remain in an advisory and supervisory capacity while the Japanese authorities themselves assumed practically complete responsibility for governmental functions.

In so far as foreign relations are concerned, as has been indicated above, the basic documents are not clear on the question whether a paramount authority to control Japan's foreign relations rests with SCAP or with the FEC. If the policy paper which we recently submitted to the FEC is approved this question would be cleared up to a degree. Its terms, however, are susceptible of various interpretations and controversy would still remain with regard to foreign relations not believed to be covered by the policy statement. SCAP could, however, probably permit Japan to enter into consular and possibly limited diplomatic relations with other countries desiring to carry on such relations and to enter into agreements relating to trade and technical matters.

Japanese

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Japanese disarmament is now virtually completed. In the absence of a peace settlement SCAP could conduct whatever inspections might be necessary to ensure that Japan remained disarmed and demilitarized. Under existing FEC policy decisions the civil police force may be armed only with small arms and the coast guard is limited both as to armament and as to speed of vessel. These restrictions would probably create problems. Under existing FEC policy decisions also the Japanese could not operate civil aircraft for essential domestic purposes.

The US policy with regard to reparations has already been announced. It is still too early to predict what settlement of the reparations problem will be reached. In any case, under recent US directives to SCAP, reparations removals will be halted.

The economic and political reform programs will have to continue within the framework of FEC policy decisions. SCAP's freedom of action in connection with economic and political matters is accordingly limited to a very considerable extent by these decisions. SCAP need not, however, initiate new reform measures, nor press Japanese authorities to implement existing measures.

SCAP

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SCAP could, however, operate increasingly in an advisory or supervisory capacity, leaving the implementation of the decisions to the Japanese authorities.

Advantages and Disadvantages

If we should decide to continue with the occupation in a drastically reorganized form, the following advantages might result:

- (1) We should be in position to continue our influence in Japan, encourage Japan to continue along the forward-looking path which it has adopted, and prevent untoward developments to a greater degree than would be possible if the occupation were terminated and some form of Allied supervision substituted.
- (2) Such a procedure would correct many of the operational defects of the occupation as now constituted.
- (3) We would be increasing Japan's responsibility and to a degree at least reducing the extent of our financial commitments. Japan would be able gradually to assume the attributes of a sovereign state to a large measure. It would at the same time enjoy the advantages of association with the US at a time when it needs protection both against internal disorders and possible infiltration from without.

On the other hand, a continuance of the occupation, even in drastically reorganized form might be expected to have the following disadvantages:

- (1) The advantages resulting from a peace settlement as described earlier would not be enjoyed by Japan, the US, or the other concerned Powers.
- (2) The situation of SCAP and the occupation generally may be expected to become increasingly difficult as time goes on. Even if all US forces were withdrawn from Japan, the US as practically the sole occupying

Power

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Power would retain a very large measure of legal responsibility. If disorders in Japan follow the reduction of our forces and if the police force were unable to handle the situation, we would, of course, have to intervene with attendant complications.

- (3) Pressures both within Japan, among other FEC Powers, and on the part of the USSR for the conclusion of a peace settlement may increase so that we would have as a political matter to seek some other solution. We might be in better position to seek that solution at a time of our choosing rather than in response to outside pressure.

VII. Joint Resolution of the Congress Terminating the War and Deferring Settlement of Main Questions until a General Treaty

If the prospect of obtaining a general peace settlement for Japan appears remote, we might wish to give consideration to terminating the state of war between the US and Japan by joint resolution of the Congress.

Legal Situation

At the end of the First World War the US helped negotiate and sign the Treaty of Versailles but did not ratify the treaty. On July 2, 1921, the President approved a joint resolution of the Congress which resolved that the state of war between Germany and the US "is hereby declared at an end; that in making this declaration there were expressly reserved to the US and its nationals, any and all rights, privileges, indemnities, reparations or advantages together with the right to enforce the same, to which they have become entitled

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under the Armistice of November 11, 1918 or which were acquired by the US by reason of its participation in the war or to which its nationals have thereby become rightfully entitled or which under the Treaty of Versailles have been stipulated for their benefit or to which the US is entitled as one of the principal Allied and Associated Powers or is entitled by virtue of an act or acts of Congress or otherwise." Also included within the resolution were certain stipulations concerning German property in the US, et cetera. On August 24, 1921, a treaty between the US and Germany was signed and entered into force upon exchange of ratifications on November 11, 1921.

The Chinese Government, which did not sign the Versailles Treaty, terminated the state of war with Germany by similar means.

In both these cases, however, a multilateral treaty-- the Treaty of Versailles--had already been signed which constituted a standard of treatment for American and Chinese interests as well. In this case, however, it would probably be necessary to reserve our rights in connection with matters which we do not wish to remain permanently in the status of the time of termination of the war.

The British Government on September 16, 1947, sent a communication to the Austrian Government informing that

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Government that the British Government had determined "that without prejudice to the provisions of the said Declaration regarding the Surrender of the German Reich, or of the Agreement of the 28th June, 1946 relating to the Control Machinery for Austria, or to the decision of questions the settlement of which must await the conclusion of a Treaty, the formal state of war between the United Kingdom and Austria shall be immediately terminated and the relations between themselves and the Austrian Government forthwith brought into conformity with the amity which existed between them before the above mentioned incorporation of Austria into the German Reich."

Advantages and Disadvantages

Use of this procedure might offer the following

advantages:

- (1) It would show that we were not merely willing but eager to bring about a termination of Japan's enemy status and to move toward a settlement in the Pacific. It might accordingly be useful both with respect to Japan and with respect to countering possible Soviet propaganda.
- (2) Such a step would pave the way for the resumption--as rapidly as our relations with the FEC might permit--of diplomatic as well as consular relations with Japan. While not bringing all the benefits of a general peace settlement, it would nevertheless give hope to the Japanese.
- (3) By showing that we intended to improve Japan's status by such means as were open to us, it might make other countries more willing to attempt a reasonable attitude which might make possible a general peace settlement.

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On the other hand, such a procedure might have the following disadvantages:

- (1) Important matters bearing on Japan's future status would be left unsettled.
- (2) The argument might be raised that since we have terminated the state of war with Japan we should not be entitled to participate in negotiations among belligerents looking toward a general peace settlement. While states friendly to us would probably not press this argument, it might nevertheless constitute a complicating factor in efforts to reach a generally agreed settlement.

Separate Bases Agreement.

In connection with the question of safeguarding Japan's security, consideration might be given to the possibility of negotiating a bases agreement between the US and Japan separate from and subsequent to the general settlement.

If, for example, it should prove that our minimum strategic requirements with respect to Japan necessitate the retention by the US of bases or other facilities on the main islands of Japan and if it is clear also that general agreement could not be obtained to our possessing such facilities, consideration might be given to concluding a separate US-Japan agreement on bases after the conclusion of the multipartite negotiations. If the Japanese Government remains upon a pacifist course and if the over-all international situation continues as troubled as at present, the Japanese Government might be disposed to conclude such an agreement.

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It would of course be necessary to ensure that the general settlement contained no provisions which would operate as a bar to such a subsequent bilateral arrangement.

On the other hand, other friendly Powers are likely to be concerned in connection with the general peace settlement over providing for Japan's security and unless informed of our intentions might feel that some security measures on an international basis which would conflict with our strategic requirements should be included. If we explained our intentions the information might easily become generally known within a short time. If we did not explain our intentions and a general settlement were nonetheless concluded we might be open to a charge of bad faith or at least of unfriendliness in not having disclosed our intentions on a point of such direct general interest. The USSR, if included in the multipartite negotiations, might be expected to take care that the general settlement was so drafted that we could not obtain bases or facilities subsequently from Japan. If the USSR was not successful in this effort or was not included in the multipartite negotiations and the US obtained base rights in Japan on a bipartite basis, the USSR might also attempt to obtain equivalent rights from Japan. If our disposable forces in the area were sizable and the USSR did not wish to provoke an open crisis over this issue, the USSR

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
might not go to the extent of taking direct countermeasures, such as occupying bases for itself, in the event of a Japanese refusal. It might nonetheless find numerous ways of making the position of Japan as a member of the family of nations difficult and of retarding its efforts to recover economically.

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
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
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TOP SECRETADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF
INDEFINITELY CONTINUED OCCUPATION OR
CONCLUSION OF A PEACE SETTLEMENT

The underlying paper is a section from a larger study in preparation in NA, and is only a rough and preliminary draft of that section.

It is noted in the paper that a multilateral agreement, bilateral agreements, or both, guaranteeing Japan's security from external attack and promoting the security of the Pacific area as a whole should be concluded simultaneously with or following a peace treaty with Japan. It is also stated that the treaty should not prohibit Japan from entering into bilateral or multilateral base and defense agreements with other states. No attempt is made in this section of the ~~paper~~^{overall study,} however, to describe just what sort of multilateral or bilateral agreements should be included in the interests of U.S. security, Japanese security, and general Far Eastern security. The thought is that these security agreements would be discussed as companion parts accompanying discussion with friendly powers of the proposed treaty with Japan, and would ~~thereby~~ serve to meet the requirements of our Far Eastern Allies regarding security in the Pacific and fear of possible revival of the Japanese military threat. ~~These security arrangements would thereby enable other~~^{If their security requirements are thus met,} powers such as the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, the U.K. and the Netherlands ~~to~~^{could be expected to} accept without too great modification the non-punitive, liberal treaty which we would wish to propose.

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TOP SECRETADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF
INDEFINITELY CONTINUED OCCUPATION OR
CONCLUSION OF A PEACE SETTLEMENTI. Indefinite Continuation of the Occupation

Under this course the United States would publicly announce that it planned to remain in occupation in Japan until Japanese security could be effectively ensured, by the UN or by other means, without our presence. A drastic reorganization of the occupation, along the lines of NSC 13/3 but carried further, would be instituted in light of this decision. Necessary U.S. economic aid would be continued. Expansion of Japanese foreign trade, including trade with Communist-dominated areas subject to minimum security safeguards, would be encouraged and assisted. When it became apparent that continuation of direct U.S. control in Japan was no longer necessary--effective UN security forces having been established, Japan being firmly "on our side", or the U.S.-USSR struggle having sufficiently eased--we would again consider the desirability of a peace settlement.

Advantages

The advantages of this course would be as follows:

1. The United States would remain in actual control throughout Japan, in a legal position enabling it to ensure Japanese security from external or internal aggression, providing we were prepared to commit whatever forces might be necessary, and to take any other measures in Japan dictated by U.S. security needs *in the Far Eastern area.*

2. It is likely that stronger justification could be made before Congress for necessary future relief and rehabilitation aid for Japan if Japan remains under U.S. occupation than if it regains an independent, sovereign status.

Japan

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Japan will continue to require U.S. economic aid for an indefinite period if U.S. objectives in that country are not to be sacrificed. Justification for provision of this aid will probably seem considerably greater in Congress if U.S. troops are still in occupation there than if they have been withdrawn and Japan exists merely as one of a number of countries important to U.S. security on the Soviet periphery.

Disadvantages

1. The strong natural desire in Japan for a peace treaty would be thwarted, with the blame attaching mainly to the U.S. in Japanese eyes.

Virtually all elements of the Japanese population would continue to desire a peace treaty and full autonomy, even though much of what they hope to achieve through a peace settlement might have been affected by reorganization of the occupation. Popular resentment against the occupation could be expected to grow, with the possibility that the present small degree of hostility toward the United States, already increasing according to some reports, would be magnified. If the occupation once "turned the corner" from obedience to resistance, the situation could quickly become unmanageable. It might become steadily more questionable, as we were compelled to adopt counter-measures, whether we could count on the Japanese to side with us in a U.S.-USSR conflict, notwithstanding our continued economic aid.

2. The Japanese would fail to develop requisite responsibility and initiative for the solution of the difficult problems with which their country is faced.

The Japanese, even following the occupation reorganization, would still not be entirely their own masters and, as a result, might be little, if any, more willing to assume responsibility

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responsibility and devote themselves wholeheartedly to the solution of their country's problems than they are today. Their freedom of action to solve these problems in their own way would continue to be restricted, even if in reduced degree. The tendency of many Japanese governmental leaders to hide behind the occupation and transfer the blame for unpopular measures to it could be expected to remain.

3. Japan would continue to be denied international recognition and status.

Other countries have shown that they are unwilling to receive Japan back as a member of the community of nations in the absence of a peace settlement. If this attitude is maintained under continued occupation, as seems probable, it will constitute an important obstacle to Japan's political reformation and to the revival of Japanese foreign trade.

4. Increasing dissatisfaction with our failure to proceed with a treaty and continued virtually exclusive control in Japan could be expected from at least some of our Allies.

Recent months have witnessed renewed interest in a peace treaty not only by the Soviets but also by the British, Australians and other of our Allies, who have shown increasing dissatisfaction with what they regard as U.S. unilateralism under the present regime of control for Japan. Perpetuation of this regime throughout an indefinitely continued occupation would probably be opposed by our Allies, but no plan for its alteration could be expected to win majority acceptance including the four veto powers. Disappearance of Nationalist China would further complicate our problems. Although most friendly FEC nations would probably end by accommodating themselves to our position, ill-feeling would be unavoidable

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unless we were prepared to accord them a far greater role, outside the FEC, in policy-making for Japan than we have been willing to do thus far.

Evaluation

It might be said on balance that this first alternative course should be followed only if security considerations and justification of necessary future aid appropriations require. As to ~~the first~~, ^{security,} it can be strongly argued that the basic U.S. military objective in Japan--to ensure that in the event of a U.S.-USSR conflict Japan is "on our side" with its resources available to us and denied to the Soviets--is more likely to be achieved through a peace settlement of the type described below than through continued occupation. The second of the above two considerations, although important, is not the type of consideration ^{which should be a basic determinant of U.S. policy.} ~~on which U.S. policy should basically rest.~~ In all other respects this first course would appear clearly contrary to U.S. policy interests for Japan.

II. Conclusion of a Peace Settlement

Under this course the United States would undertake to conclude a peace treaty with Japan participated in by as many nations at war with Japan as would accept our minimum desiderata.

The United States would first discuss the content and procedures of a treaty with the Governments of the ten other FEC nations, explaining our position on the major issues in a manner and to a degree appropriate to each nation. If assurances were forthcoming from at least six of these nations (not necessarily including the Soviet Union and China) that they would sign a peace treaty which we felt embodied our minimum desiderata, we would convene a conference of these FEC nations to draft the treaty, which would subsequently be submitted to the other nations at war with Japan. The U.S. would decide before convening the
conference

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conference whether it was necessary in view of the assurances received for the U.S. to insist on veto voting rights. If the requisite assurances were not forthcoming from at least six FEC nations the U.S. would draft a treaty and obtain the concurrence to it of as many countries at war with Japan as possible.

Our position on the major points of content in a treaty during the diplomatic discussions with the FEC nations and other nations would be (1) that the treaty be brief and general; (2) that it contain a statement of general principles, possibly patterned on the principles of the United Nations Charter, to which all parties would subscribe; (3) that it ^{include appropriate territorial} ~~provide for~~ ^{settlements, including} detachment of the Ryukyus below 29° N. Lat.; ~~and other appropriate international territorial settlements;~~ (4) that it provide for the settlement of outstanding property claims or for general principles governing this subject, leaving details for later individual negotiation; (5) that it record the fulfillment by Japan of its industrial reparations obligations; (6) that it obligate Japan to grant all rights to foreign nationals in Japan reciprocally granted to ^{Japanese nationals} Japan by other states; (7) that it not prohibit the establishment of defense forces by Japan, nor restrict Japanese industrial capacity or production; (8) that it not provide for any post-treaty controls in Japan; (9) and that it not prohibit Japan from entering into bilateral or ^{multilateral} base and defense agreements with other states.

It would also be the U.S. position that a ^{in the diplomatic discussions} multilateral agreement, bilateral agreements, or both, which would guarantee Japan's security from external attack and promote the security of the Pacific area as a whole should be concluded simultaneously with or following the peace treaty with Japan.

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Advantages

The advantages of such a peace settlement would be as follows:

1. The Japanese Government and people would recover an independent status with full control over and responsibility for their own affairs. In this position they could be expected to work toward a solution of their nation's problems with a determination and singleness of purpose which they have never exhibited, and are not likely to exhibit, under occupation, but which are essential if these problems are to be met. The Japanese can do much better in making the best of the bad situation with which they are faced than we can possibly do for them.

2. The present small degree of hostility toward the United States in Japan could be expected not to increase and might diminish as a consequence of U.S. initiative for the conclusion of a peace settlement and opposition to "unequal" provisions in that settlement. There is strong reason to believe that Japan's alignment "on our side" could be more effectively ensured through a peace settlement of the type described above than by continued occupation. Japanese friendship and willingness to fight on our side cannot be compelled by the presence of occupation forces but must arise from the feelings and considered interests of the people.

3. Japan's recovery of a normal status in the community of nations, assuming that treaty arrangements were concluded with a large number of nations, would assist its development as a peaceful and democratic state and better enable it to revive its foreign trade to speed the day of self-support. War bitterness

would

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would tend to disappear more quickly through the re-establishment of normal international contacts. The Japanese must be permitted to reach out economically and socially as an equal, self-respecting member of the community of nations or they will eventually break out militarily as the ally of a professedly sympathetic and powerful neighbor.

4. The settlement would ^{reduce} ~~reduce~~ present U.S. military costs in Japan. Even if security forces were retained in U.S. bases in Japan, they would presumably be on a more economic basis than at present, and the whole SCAP machinery would be eliminated. The burden of continued U.S. economic aid to Japan could be expected to be reduced and eliminated at an earlier date than would otherwise be possible, due to the improved economic performance of an independent and responsible Japan.

Disadvantages

1. The United States would no longer be in actual control throughout Japan, and would be restricted in its freedom of action to ensure Japanese security from external or internal aggression and to take other measures in Japan which might be dictated by U.S. security interests *in the Far East.*

This disadvantage might be considerably mitigated if permission were granted the Japanese to build up defense forces, and if a U.S. base or bases were established in Japan either by international agreement or through a bilateral agreement between the U.S. and Japan.

2. Justification for necessary future relief and rehabilitation aid for Japan might not appear as strong to Congress after Japan has regained an independent, sovereign status as under continued U.S. occupation.

3. There

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3. There is danger that a U.S. decision to conclude a peace settlement with Japan participated in only by those FEC and other nations at war with Japan as are willing to accept our minimum desiderata might result in the conclusion of a treaty not participated in by countries having direct and vital interests in Japan, to the detriment of our relations with those countries and unity in the treatment of Japan.

Although this possibility exists, present indications are that most if not all the FEC nations except the Soviet Union and Communist China would follow our lead.

Evaluation

It appears on balance that this second alternative course would be more likely to ensure the central objective of a Japan aligned with the U.S. in the event of war with the Soviet Union than would an indefinitely continued occupation. This course appears clearly preferable to the first from the point of view of the attainment of United States political, economic and social policy objectives in Japan.

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Although this possibility exists, present indications are that most if not all the FEC nations except the Soviet Union and Communist China would follow our lead.

Evaluation

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
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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : NA - Mr. ~~Hond~~
FROM : NA - Mr. Green *mg*
SUBJECT: Tokyo's 450 of July 11, 1949

DATE: August 11, 1949



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file

With reference to the Soviet charges of "police brutality" in handling the Tokyo Assembly demonstrations on May 30-31, POLAD encloses an official summary of a detailed investigation of the incidents. Police specialists of SCAP's Public Safety Division who witnessed the demonstrations are only critical that the Japanese police were too lenient in handling the demonstration. Witnesses attest that there was no brutality or use of unnecessary coercion.

Comment

This material was used in part in refuting the Soviet member's charges before the FEC last month. I am attaching an appraisal stressing the importance of continuing to receive similar information on "incidents" likely to be the subject of Soviet charges.

(sent to FR 8/12/49)
mg.

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THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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JUL 27 1949

United States Political Adviser
for Japan

REC'D
JULY 25

No. 450

Appraisal sheet request made to Poland for similar info on further incidents me 8/11/49.

Tokyo, July 11, 1949.

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Subject: Police Action in Labor Demonstrations of
May 30-31, 1949.

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to this Mission's despatch no. 385 of June 14, 1949, concerning the protest made by the Soviet Member, Allied Council for Japan, over alleged police brutalities in connection with riotous labor demonstrations before the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly on May 30-31, 1949, and to transmit copies of three official Japanese reports on the riots obtained through the Military Intelligence Section, General Headquarters.

1/2/3

Enclosure 1 is a series of reports made by the Guard and Traffic Section, Tokyo Metropolitan Police, giving an hourly account of developments on May 30, which resulted in the death of HASHIMOTO Kinji, one of the demonstrators.

Enclosure 2 is another report of the Guard and Traffic Section, covering events of May 31 which led to serious clashes between police and demonstrators, sixty-six of whom were arrested.

Enclosure 3 is a summary of the investigation made into the death of Hashimoto by the Tokyo District Procurator's Office, which was released to the Japanese press on June 6, 1949. The complete report of this investigation covers several hundred pages of close Japanese handwriting, with sketches, building plans, and photographs. It is available for translation in the files of the Public Safety Division, General

Headquarters

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Tokyo's Despatch No.
450, July 11, 1949.

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

Headquarters. The results of this investigation, according to the Tokyo District Procurator's office, lead to the conclusion that Hashimoto's death was not the result of criminal action but was accidental and incidental to the general melee and confusion during the riot on the evening of May 30. He apparently died from injuries received when trampled upon by the crowds milling about the building.

Police specialists of the Public Safety Division of General Headquarters who witnessed the methods employed by the Japanese police in dealing with these demonstrations are of the opinion that any criticism of police action is inappropriate except that the police were too lenient in handling the demonstration. According to these witnesses, there is no indication of police brutality or the use of unnecessary force.

A General Headquarters summary of the incident was sent by telegram to the Department of the Army only July 4, 1949 (WAR C-511198).

Respectfully yours,

Cloyce K. Huston
Charge d'Affaires ad interim

Enclosures: *att*

1. Series of reports made by Guard and Traffic Section, Tokyo Metropolitan Police.
2. Report of Guard and Traffic Section covering events of May 31.
3. Summary of investigation into death of Mr. Hashimoto made by Tokyo District Procurator's Office.

Parchment Mat to Department.

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8/13/49

Enclosure no. 1 to Despatch
no. 450 dated July 11, 1949
from the United States Political
Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, on
the subject "Police Action in
Labor Demonstrations of May 30-31,
1949".

(COPY)

MPD DAILY REPORT
FILE: Kei Ko Ri
30 May 1949

To: Whom it may concern
From: Director, Guard and Traffic Section
Subj: Filibuster at Metropolitan Assembly

Sirs:

With reference to the above subject, which occurred today, I beg to report the outline thereof hereunder.

The Metropolitan Assembly now in session was slated to be convened at 1300 hours today. However, disturbed by the representatives of the "Public Safety Ordinance Opposition Rally" of the Metropolitan Workers Union and about 200 free laborers who assembled at the square in the compound of the Metropolitan Office, the Assembly barely convened the session at 1645 hours. It was obliged to go into recess some ten minutes later. This was due to the confusion which was brought about by members of unions belonging to the Metropolitan Workers Union and free lancers, three hundred in all, who suddenly demanded to attend sittings of the Assembly. Since the majority of the objectors except about forty of those members of the Tokyo Traffic Workers Union and students retired from the seats later, the speaker ordered the remaining ones to leave the seats at about 1800 hours. None of them obeyed the order.

On the other hand, free lancers who gathered at the square in front of the assembly hall were demanding an interview with the Governor. Complying with the request of the Speaker, the Marunouchi Police Station, the competent police, sent forty policemen to the scene to provide against emergency. The people who remained there as of 1930 hours were 120 in the seats for the public, 20 or 30 in the corridor, and about 20 outside the building.

As for the Metropolitan Assembly, under the anticipation that the objectors might filibuster, the policy was decided (1) to convene the session after declaring that the objectors should listen quietly, and in case they should filibuster they should be removed from the seats, and (2) in case they should refuse to leave, they should be referred to the police. The policy was agreed upon with the competent police.

About

Enclosure no. 1 to
Tokyo's Despatch No. 450,
July 11, 1949.

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About 1950 hours (twenty minutes later) the number of filibusters increased to about 200 in the public seats, about 300 in the corridors, and from 300 to 400 (all students) outside. So, on the request of the Maunouchi Police for assistance by two companies of reserves, the Guard Section dispatched a company of police to the scene.

The later state of affairs was as follows:

1. About 2030 hours, members of the Communist Party in the jurisdiction of the Honden Police Station and a group of students from a gathering at the Kyoritsu Hall, Kanda, appeared to assist. The total number of people massed at the Metropolitan Office reached 800, and they made a great noise in the corridors and outside the hall.
2. At about 2100 hours, the session was convened after the declaration of warnings by the speaker in accordance with the policy decided before. In view, however, of the bills to be introduced at the session, since not a small interruption might be expected, we dispatched a company of police from the Central Reserve Unit and a company from the Southern Reserve Unit. This was at 2140 hours and was based on the request of the competent police station plus the judgment of the situation by this Hq.
3. About 2145 hours, though the inside of the hall was very calm, the people in the corridor and outside were uproariously singing the song of revolution and others, and showed a state to filibuster. The Governor ordered them to withdraw from the place but they did not obey him. At 2152 hours the Governor again issued an order to the same effect, and at the same time posted a written notice to convince them of his order. However they not only ignored the order but became more uproarious. As a result the Governor ordered the police to use force. Hereupon the police used force and advanced to the mass, who interrupted the police action by lining up in a scrumage formation. At about 2050 hours the police succeeded in ousting the mass out of the compound. However, the people of labor unions who were expelled became more and more uproarious.
4. At 2237 hours all companies of the Southern and Eastern Reserve Units were ordered mobilized, and at the same time Atago, Tsukiji, Kanda, Kyobashi, Nihonbashi, Kojimachi, Akasaka, and Yotsuya Police Stations were ordered to call up their police for emergency duty and to assist the Marunouchi Station.
5. At 2300 hours the Assembly was closed and the students outside the hall, knowing this fact, began to disperse and return home.
6. At

Closure no. 1 to
No. 450,
11, 1949.

-3-

6. At about 2330 hours, most of the mass left the scene, but the information was received from Marunouchi Police Station that there was fear that some of them might attack MPD Hq and the Marunouchi Police Station. So the Guard Section issued orders to withdraw one or two companies from the scene in order to meet the expected emergency.

7. At about 2355 hours a group of demonstrators (10 persons) who neglected to report the demonstration march, arrived in front of the entrance to the MPD Hq. They failed to enter the building because the entrance was strongly guarded, so they withdrew in the direction of the Imperial Palace Plaza. The Guard Section reported the fact at once to the MPD Hq and at the same time prepared to control the demonstration.

8. At about 0010 hours (31 May 1949) five companies of police had been mobilized, but no control was necessary as the marchers had disbanded in front of the Imperial Palace. By this time no demonstrators were left outside the Metropolitan Office, so the guard was dismissed.

9. Earlier in the evening, at about 2205 hours, HAMAMOTO, Kinji (street car conductor), age 25, who was said to have been showing his spirit in the hallway of the third floor of the Assembly Hall, fell to the ground. He was taken to the hospital, but died soon after. The case was reported by the Marunouchi Police Station and is under investigation. It was also reported that two policemen received incapacitating injuries and fourteen other police were injured in various parts of their bodies.

Enclosure No. 2 to Tokyo's
Despatch No. 450 dated July 11,
1949 from the Office of the
Political Adviser for Japan,
Tokyo, on the subject, "Police
Action in Labor Demonstrations
of May 30-31, 1949.

(COPY)

MPD DAILY REPORT
FILE: Kei Ko Bi
31 May 1949

TO: Whom it may concern
FROM: Chief, Guard and Traffic Division, MPD
SUBJ: Details of the Meeting at Tokyo Metropolitan
Office to Demonstrate Opposition to Public
Safety Ordinance Bill

Sirs:

We beg to report about the above meeting held
on May 31.

1. Date and time: 11:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., May 31.
2. Sponsor: Federation of Tokyo Municipal Workers'
Unions (TO-ROREN)
3. Objective: Demonstrating opposition to Public
Safety Ordinance Bill.
4. Attendants: About 10,000 workers.
5. Details of the meeting: While the meeting was
scheduled as stated above, about 2,000 members of
Federation of Tokyo Municipal Workers' Unions (TO-ROREN),
All-Japan Newspapermen Union (ZEN-SHIMBUN), All-Japan
Metal Industry Workers' Union (ZEN-KINZOKU), All-Japan
Pressmen Union (ZEN-INSATSU), General Federation of
Private Railroad Workers' Union (SHITETSU-SOREN), All
Japan Government and Municipal Workers' Union (ZEN-KANKO),
and Electric Industry Workers' Union (DEN-SAN), assembled
about noon and held a meeting in considerably high spirits
to demonstrate their opposition to Public Safety Ordinance
Bill and about the poor HASHIMOTO, Kinji, of Tokyo
Street-car Workers' Union (TOKO) injured to death at the
meeting held on May 30, and the meeting adjourned at 2:25
p.m. Some of the attendants who refused to disperse rushed
into a section where no traffic was permitted to inspect
the scene of the above stated Hashimoto case, and provoked
the watchmen of the scene. In a scurrage formation they
started to sing the "International" in chorus, the rest
of the attendants set to demonstrate in the square of the
Metropolitan Office without previously reporting, and
as the circumstances gradually became confused the demon-
strators rushed to the Metropolitan Assembly Hall to
interfere with the assembly which was slated to be held

in the

Enclosure no. 2 to
Tokyo's Despatch no. 450,
July 11, 1949.

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in the afternoon. The reinforced demonstrators amounted to about 3,000 at about 3:00 p.m. in a state of disorder.

6. Proclamation of adjournment, arrest and other matters: At 4:10 p.m. Chief of Marunouchi station ordered all the demonstrators to be dispersed on the grounds that such demonstration without permission was illegal and that seriously disquieting state disturbed public peace and showed the proclamation written in big letters to drive them away. But the disobedience of the demonstrators and the more confused state of demonstration had the police chief disperse them by force, ordering his men and the MPD reserve force to take action, and the police was compelled to arrest some of the demonstrators who interfered with the execution of official business. About 4:50 p.m. all the demonstrators were dispersed and peace was almost recovered.

7. Guard Action:

1. At 9:30 Marunouchi police authorities threw its police cordon with 199 personnel of its own in conformity with the experience in the last meeting and various circumstances. And at 11:00 a.m. a company of reserve force was dispatched to respond to the request.

2. Around 1500 persons gathered at the meeting place at 11:30 a.m. However, there was a sign that the participants were increasing in number, so, three companies were dispatched in response to the request.

3. All members of each squad of the East and South District were mobilized at 11:30 a.m. to join the Central District squad and prepared for emergency.

4. At 11:30 a.m., an order was issued to alert the day duty men of each police station, members of the Guard and Traffic Division, the Criminal Affairs Division and the Police Affairs Division to stand by for emergency.

5. Anticipating mass arrest of participants, the MPD Hqs. instructed the following police stations to have cells available:

Marunouchi	Takanawa
Kyobashi	Otsuka
Kojimachi	Azabu
Hisamatsu	Kuramae
Kanda	Akasaka
Manseibashi	Atago
Yotsuga	Tomisaka
Tsukiji	Kagurazaka
Motifuji	Mita
Nihonbashi	Waseda

6. At 3:00

Enclosure no. 2 to
Tokyo's Despatch no. 450,
July 11, 1949.

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6. At 3:00 p.m., four companies were dispatched by the request of the police station.

7. Five companies were dispatched again, because the meeting place was in an uproar at 3:30 p.m. and because the circumstances were that it needed order for disbandment at 4:00 p.m.

8. In view of the circumstances at that time, MPD Hqs. gave instructions to each chief of police stations and told that all men on duty should wait for emergency call.

9. At 4:40 p.m., the situation was known to each chief of police stations. At the same time, it was anticipated that the rally participants who were dispersing under the pressure of policemen who used force, might launch a demonstration march without permit again, so the instructions were given regarding the steps to be taken to control such movement.s

10. At 4:50 p.m., the instructions were given to the following police stations to mobilize day-time duty members to the middle court of MPD Hqs.

11. At 4:50 p.m. the above-mentioned day time duty members were mobilized together at the inner court of MPD Hqs. and prepare for emergency.

12. As all participants withdrew from the meeting place at about 5:00 p.m., MPD Hqs. ordered each police station to make day-duty policemen who waited for order back to each police station concerned and wait for emergency at their own police stations.

13. At 9:30 p.m., the meeting place recovered peace so, MPD Hqs. ordered each chief of police stations, each member for emergency of the Guard and Traffic Division, Criminal Affairs Division and the Police Affairs Division to demobilize them and at the same time instructed them to collect various information and to prepare for any emergency call as the caution was still thought necessary.

14. At 9:30 p.m., EPD Hqs. dispatched one company of the reserved corps to the Marunouchi Police Station for emergency and made them stay there until next day.

8. Number of persons arrested and the detention houses:

66 persons

Kojimachi (17 persons)
Marunouchi (15 persons)
Atago (8 persons)

Azabu

Enclosure no. 2 to
Tokyo's Despatch no. 450,
July 11, 1949.

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Azabu	(7 persons)
Mita	(5 persons)
Kanda	(14 persons)

9. Other items.

1. About 5:50 p.m., three hundred students who withdrew from the above-mentioned Tokyo-to office began to gather at the plaza in front of the Imperial Palace and intended to hold a rally. Captain Burns of the Tokyo MP Hqs. gave instruction that the rally would be immediately disbanded. This instruction was told soon to the students, so they disbanded and no rally was held there.

2. At 8:20 p.m., a rally was being held at the Kanda Kyoritsu Auditorium by the National Communications Workers' Union with 2,000 persons attended. An information was received, then, that the participants would march against the Tokyo-to office with the close of the rally, but no such action was seen and they dispersed quietly.

3. Injured persons among the policemen: Sixty-six policemen were slightly injured as the demonstrators did not obey the order for disbandment and as they committed violence resisting against policemen.

Enclosure no. 3 to Despatch
no. 450 dated July 11, 1949
from the United States Political
Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, on
the subject "Police Action in
Labor Demonstrations of May 30-31,
1949".

(COPY)

SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION OF THE DEATH OF Kinji HASHIMOTO
AT THE TOKYO METROPOLITAN OFFICE

(Press release of the Tokyo District Procurator's Office)

6 June 1949

Concerning the death case of Kinji HASHIMOTO, an employee of the Traffic Bureau of the Tokyo Metropolitan Office, who was injured on the evening of 30 May 1949 in the compound of the Metropolitan Office, and died on the same night. An assertion that he was precipitated from the second or third floor of the Metropolitan Assembly Building by police officers was being made. The Procurator's Office found it necessary to investigate the case carefully.

So, deeming the incident as a case of bodily injury resulting in death by unknown suspects, the prosecution authorities made efforts to clarify the actual facts of the case in such way as sending a procurator on immediate night duty to the scene to hold an inquest over the corpse; entrusting the Legal-Medicine Room of the Tokyo University with the judgment of the cause of death. Verification of the corpse and scene was made by procurators' train, and the state of the night was heard from 26 police personnel, more than fifty participants at the night, and ten other miscellaneous witnesses. As a result, the matters made clear to date were as follows:

1. The cause of Hashimoto's death was believed to be internal haemorrhage due to rupture of liver, but the medical examination did not show the rupture of the liver. However as far as the coroner's inquest and verification of the corpse were concerned, there was no fracture of bone, no sign of bruise, no by internal bleeding, etc., which are commonly believed to take place in the case of fall from height.

2. According to the statement made by the janitor, two rooms are on the third floor of the Metropolitan Assembly Hall on the side of the building where it was said that Hashimoto had fallen. One room is occupied by the Arable Land Unit of the Farm Land Section, and the other by the Tokyo Metropolitan Arable Association. Both floors were locked that day, and nobody was found to have entered the rooms.

3. According

Enclosure no. 3 to
Despatch no. 450,
July 11, 1949.

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3. According to the statements made by witness OHIKU, Juichi (clerk of the meeting for the Chairmen of the Prefectural Assembly) and SUGANUMA Tokuzo (police officer), nobody was found to have entered the reception room for Assembly Members which occupies the second floor on the concerned side of the building.

4. Moreover, according to the statement made by TOYAMA Hiroshi (of the Tokyo Metropolitan Traffic Union), he was standing on the window of the lavatory which is situated in the first floor on the concerned side of the hall. Consequently, it is not acknowledged that Hashimoto fell from this window.

5. The above TOYAMA, ISHIZAKI Shigeru (Metropolitan Teachers Union), and MIYAO, Kiichi (same union) made statements enough to suspect that he might have fallen from a high place, but they did not see the falling. Their statements were nothing but to say that they touched clothing falling from above, or the posture of the sufferer seemed like one which fell. However these statements are not sufficient as testimony of a fall.

6. There is not evidence enough to testify the fact that someone gave a severe blow or kick to Hashimoto's right back or abdomen which would cause rupture of his liver around the scene where he fell.

7. In consideration of the statements made by

ISHIHARA Goro (Tokyo Metropolitan Traffic Union)
MIYAO Kiichi (Tokyo Teachers Union)
ABE Seiichi (Police officer)
KATO Ichizo (Police officer)
URABE Isaku (Traffic Union)
HARUYAMA Kazuo (Traffic Union)
NOZAKI Hoji (Traffic Union)
KOSUGI Kan (Police Officer)

and others, when the police tried to oust the mass of people in the hall of the Metropolitan Assembly from its back door, there occurred a hustle and bustle between the police and people who tried to stay inside or enter from outside. Just at this time Hashimoto fell down on the place about three meters westward from the back door and such fact is acknowledged that he was trodden on by many people before getting up. Consequently it is guessed that at this time his liver was ruptured together with scratches on the face. It would have been impossible for people to restrain from trampling the sufferer's body in such confusion, and it is not acknowledged that some one person killed him by accident.

According to the above-mentioned reason, it is not acknowledged that the death of Hashimoto was caused by some one's criminal act.



THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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Action Assigned to NA
Action Taken no action

Office of the United States
Political Adviser for Japan

Tokyo, July 13, 1949.

No. 455

DIVISION OF
NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS

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JUL 20 1949

Name of Officer W. Brown
Direction to DC/R file

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Subject: Japanese Opinion Poll concerning Basic Attitudes toward Foreign Countries.

The Chargé d'Affaires ad interim has the honor to enclose five copies of a report dated June 23, 1949, prepared by the Civil Information and Education Section of Headquarters on the basis of a survey conducted by the Jiji News Agency. The survey consisted of a nationwide sampling of opinion in which 8,000 adults were asked two direct questions: "What foreign country do you like the most?" and "What foreign country do you dislike the most?" America is according to the poll the country liked most and Russia the country disliked most, in each case by a substantial margin.

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Enclosure: att'

Five copies of a report dated June 23, 1949, entitled "Basic Attitudes toward Foreign Countries".

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Enclosure to Despatch No. 455 dated July 13, 1949, from USFOLAD, Tokyo, subject: "Japanese Opinion Poll concerning Basic Attitudes toward Foreign Countries."

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Civil Information and Education Section



SURVEY SERIES

23 June 1949

BASIC ATTITUDES TOWARD
FOREIGN COUNTRIES

PUBLIC OPINION AND
SOCIOLOGICAL RESEARCH
DIVISION



FOREWORD

This report is an analysis of the results of two questions asked during a survey conducted by the Jiji News Agency Public Opinion Room. It is one of a series of brief analyses of surveys conducted by Japanese agencies of the attitudes of the Japanese people toward significant current issues. These analyses of surveys conducted by Japanese public opinion agencies do not constitute either an indorsement of the agency or approval of its findings.

Basic Attitudes Toward Foreign Countries

INTRODUCTION

During the first four days of May 1949, the Jiji News Agency Public Opinion Room -- during the course of a survey on tax problems -- asked a nationwide sample of 8,011 adults¹ two direct questions: "What foreign country do you like the most?" and "What foreign country do you dislike the most?" This direct technique, although incapable of revealing nuances of meaning, or of examining the assumptions upon which people made their selections, nevertheless did reveal a polarization of attitudes toward the United States and the Soviet Union which is considered to be of considerable significance.

Several limitations of the survey should be noted. First, the proper interpretation of "like"² was left up to the respondent. He could construe it to mean "I would like to live in that country," "I think that country has a good government, a fine way of life, an ideologically sound political organization, or a commendable foreign policy," "I like the people and the culture of that country," etc. Similar interpretations could be made for "dislike"³ as well.

Secondly, respondents were not offered the opportunity to state second choices. If this had been done, a more accurate interpretation might have been made of some of the first choices. Third, the facts that the survey was conducted in a country under American occupation, and that outstanding and fundamental differences in viewpoints exist between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. undoubtedly had some influence over the selection of favored and nonfavored foreign countries. Some persons who liked Russia might have hesitated to say so openly to an interviewer, and the same (or other) persons might similarly have been disinclined to state a dislike for the United States. However, even if (as noted below) the percentages liking America and disliking Russia are taken as maximum and minimum figures, respectively, they indicate a very substantial amount of favorable public opinion toward America, and, indirectly, they provide a useful index of the success of the Occupation in fostering an interest in and an approval of democracy and the democratic way of life.

-
1. See APPENDIX for an explanation of this number and a brief description of the sampling method used.
 2. Suki -- to like
 3. Kirau -- to dislike

FINDINGS

A majority of the Japanese people
like America and dislike Russia

Sixty-two percent of all respondents stated that they liked America more than any other foreign country, and 53 percent that they disliked Russia more than any other. Other countries were mentioned as being either liked or disliked by relatively small percentages.

It should be noted that because of the dynamics of the testing situation (see Introduction), the percentages favoring America and disliking Russia are probably maximum figures, while the percentages disliking America and favoring Russia are probably minimum figures. Furthermore, some of the relatively large number of people who stated that they disliked no country (34 percent) might have given this answer because of a disinclination to state a dislike for America.

Question: What foreign country do you like the most?

America	62%
Great Britain	4
Switzerland	2
France	1
China	1
Russia	1
Others	3
None	<u>26</u>
	100%

Number of
respondents: 8,011

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SURVEY SERIES

Question: What foreign country do you dislike the most?

Russia	53%
China	7
Korea	3
America	1
Great Britain	1
Others	1
None	<u>34</u>

100%

Number of
respondents: 8,011People who like either America or
Russia tend to dislike the other

There is a very high degree of correlation between liking America and disliking Russia, and between liking Russia and disliking America. Of the small number of people who liked Russia, however, the percentage who stated that they disliked no country was double the percentage who disliked no country and liked America, which suggests again that some Japanese are reluctant to state a dislike for America. The small number of cases involved (85) makes these percentages subject to a rather large margin of error.

<u>Countries disliked</u>	<u>Countries liked</u>	
	<u>America</u>	<u>Russia</u>
America	X	30%
Great Britain	0*%	2
Russia	68	X
France	0*	2
China	8	21
Others	4	4
None	<u>20</u>	<u>41</u>
	100%	100%

Number of
respondents: 5,003

Number of
respondents: 85

* Less than 0.5 percent

Basic Attitudes Toward Foreign Countries

3

People who like Great Britain, France, and China also tend to dislike Russia

In addition to the correlations noted above, there is a substantial correlation between liking Great Britain, France, and China, and disliking Russia. Although only a small number of respondents stated that they liked Great Britain more than any other foreign country (four percent), 61 percent of this group disliked Russia. The responses of people liking China are more evenly divided with respect to dislikes, as the interviewers did not note whether preferences were for Nationalist or Communist China. However, given the assumption that persons liking Nationalist China would tend to dislike Russia, and its corollary, that persons liking Communist China would tend to dislike America, the correlations shown below suggest that the preference for Nationalist China is thrice that of the preference for Communist China. However, the relatively large percentage of people liking China and disliking no country (32 percent) suggests again a disinclination to state a dislike for America. The small number of cases involved (108) makes these percentages subject to a rather large margin of error.

<u>Countries disliked</u>	<u>Countries liked</u>		
	<u>Great Britain</u>	<u>France</u>	<u>China</u>
America	1%	8%	12%
Great Britain	X	1	7
Russia	61	49	36
France	1	X	2
China	14	10	X
Others	5	10	11
None	<u>18</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>32</u>
	100%	100%	100%
	No. of re- spondents: 286	No. of re- spondents: 112	No. of re- spondents: 108

There are some differences in attitude between various groups in the population

In addition to the findings noted above, it was also found that in comparison with the entire population:

- Older men and women tended to state more often that they liked America and disliked Russia.
- Older women tended to state more often that they liked or disliked no country.

Also:

- Higher percentages of farmers, fishermen, businessmen, and managers than housewives and the nonemployed liked America and disliked Russia.
- Higher percentages of men than women liked America and disliked Russia.

Question: What foreign country do you dislike the most?

Category	Russia	China	Korea	America	Great Britain	Others	None	Total	Number responde
TOTAL	53% (80)#	7	3	1	1	1	34	100%	6,001
Urban	51% (77)	8	4	2	1	1	30	100%	2,923
Rural	52% (80)	7	3	1	1	1	35	100%	5,088
By sex and age									
Men, 21-30	57% (76)	9	3	2	1	1	27	100%	966
Men, 31-40	53% (79)	7	4	2	1	1	29	100%	1,009
Men, 41-50	60% (81)	7	4	1	1	1	26	100%	1,052
Men, over 50	61% (88)	5	2	1	0*	0*	31	100%	1,226
Total men	59% (82)	7	3	1	1	1	28	100%	4,253
Women, 21-30	52% (76)	12	2	1	1	0*	32	100%	1,051
Women, 31-40	42% (74)	9	3	1	1	1	43	100%	872
Women, 41-50	40% (73)	8	6	1	0	0*	45	100%	877
Women, over 50	38% (84)	5	2	0*	0	0*	55	100%	1,148
Total women	43% (77)	9	3	1	0*	0*	44	100%	3,758
By occupation									
Farming, forestry, fishing	55% (85)	6	2	1	1	0*	35	100%	1,558
Business owners and managers	50% (82)	6	4	1	1	1	27	100%	1,561
Salaried workers and professionals	56% (79)	7	4	2	1	1	29	100%	2,241
Housewives and nonemployed	46% (77)	9	3	1	0*	1	40	100%	2,651

The figures in parentheses represent the percentage of all respondents giving a positive answer who stated "Russia." It was calculated by excluding the "none" responses.

* Less than 0.5 percent.

Question: What foreign country do you dislike the most?

Category	Russia	China	Korea	America	Great Britain	Others	None	Total	Number of respondents
	53% (80)#	7	3	1	1	1	34	100%	8,001
	51% (77)	8	4	2	1	1	30	100%	2,923
	52% (80)	7	3	1	1	1	35	100%	5,088
Sex and age									
21-30	57% (76)	9	3	2	1	1	27	100%	966
31-40	53% (79)	7	4	2	1	1	29	100%	1,009
41-50	60% (81)	7	4	1	1	1	26	100%	1,052
over 50	61% (88)	5	2	1	0*	0*	31	100%	1,226
All men	59% (82)	7	3	1	1	1	28	100%	4,253
Men, 21-30	52% (76)	12	2	1	1	0*	32	100%	1,051
Men, 31-40	42% (74)	9	3	1	1	1	43	100%	872
Men, 41-50	40% (73)	8	6	1	0	0*	45	100%	877
Men, over 50	38% (84)	5	2	0*	0	0*	55	100%	1,148
All women	43% (77)	9	3	1	0*	0*	44	100%	3,758
Occupation									
Farming, forestry, fishing	55% (85)	6	2	1	1	0*	35	100%	1,558
Business owners and managers	50% (82)	6	4	1	1	1	27	100%	1,561
Skilled workers and professionals	56% (79)	7	4	2	1	1	29	100%	2,241
Unemployed, widows and nonemployed	46% (77)	9	3	1	0*	1	40	100%	2,651

figures in parentheses represent the percentage of all respondents giving a positive answer who stated "Russia." It was calculated by excluding the "none" responses. * less than 0.5 percent.

Question: What foreign country do you like the most?

Category	America	Great Britain	Switzerland	France	China	Russia	Others	None	Total	Number of responses
TOTAL	52% (84)#	4	2	1	1	1	3	26	100%	3,7
Urban	61% (30)	5	3	2	1	1	3	24	100%	2,5
Rural	63% (36)	3	2	1	1	1	2	27	100%	5,0
By sex and age										
Men, 21-30	50% (77)	3	4	2	1	4	4	22	100%	9
Men, 31-40	63% (78)	5	4	1	2	2	4	19	100%	1,0
Men, 41-50	67% (84)	5	2	1	2	1	2	20	100%	1,0
Men, over 50	67% (88)	4	1	1	1	0*	2	24	100%	1,2
Total men	66% (84)	4	2	1	2	1	3	21	100%	4,2
Women, 21-30	63% (30)	4	4	4	1	1	2	21	100%	1,0
Women, 31-40	58% (35)	2	1	3	1	1	2	32	100%	3
Women, 41-50	57% (39)	3	1	1	0*	0*	2	36	100%	8
Women, over 50	50% (93)	1	1	0*	1	0*	1	46	100%	1,1
Total women	57% (85)	2	2	2	1	1	2	33	100%	3,7
By occupation										
Farming, forestry, fishing	67% (91)	2	1	0*	1	0*	3	26	100%	1,5
Business owners and managers	65% (31)	5	3	1	2	1	3	20	100%	1,5
Salaried workers and professionals	61% (78)	5	3	2	2	2	3	22	100%	2,2
Housewives and nonemployed	58% (84)	3	2	2	1	1	2	31	100%	2,6

The figures in parentheses represent the percentage of all respondents giving a positive answer who stated "America." It was calculated by excluding the "none" responses.

* Less than 0.5 percent.

What foreign country do you like the most?

	America	Great Britain	Switzerland	France	China	Russia	Others	None	Total	Number of respondents
	62% (84)†	4	2	1	1	1	3	26	100%	3,001
	61% (80)	5	3	2	1	1	3	24	100%	2,923
	63% (86)	3	2	1	1	1	2	27	100%	5,066
	60% (77)	3	4	2	1	4	4	22	100%	966
	63% (78)	5	4	1	2	2	4	19	100%	1,009
	67% (84)	5	2	1	2	1	2	20	100%	1,052
	67% (88)	4	1	1	1	0*	2	24	100%	1,226
	66% (84)	4	2	1	2	1	3	21	100%	4,253
	63% (80)	4	4	4	1	1	2	21	100%	1,051
	58% (85)	2	1	3	1	1	2	32	100%	672
	57% (89)	3	1	1	0*	0*	2	36	100%	877
	50% (93)	1	1	0*	1	0*	1	46	100%	1,148
	57% (85)	2	2	2	1	1	2	33	100%	3,758
Country,	67% (91)	2	1	0*	1	0*	3	26	100%	1,558
ers	65% (81)	5	3	1	2	1	3	20	100%	1,561
ers	61% (78)	5	3	2	2	2	3	22	100%	2,241
dionals	58% (84)	3	2	2	1	1	2	31	100%	2,651

† Figures in parentheses represent the percentage of all respondents giving a positive answer who like "America." It was calculated by excluding the "none" responses.

5 percent.

APPENDIX

The Survey Method

A total of 5,998 respondents were interviewed during the period 1-4 May 1949. The sample was drawn from those persons in the Japanese population over 20 years of age, and is a cross section of that group. Since rural areas are so large, adequate sampling can be obtained by using fewer cases than is possible in urban areas. Therefore, the ratios used were one respondent to every 5,000 persons of this age group in cities, and one respondent to every 10,000 persons in rural areas. The number of interviews made in rural areas was not in proportion to the population of Japan, so a standard statistical weighting system was used. The weighted sample numbered 8,011, and all references to "number of respondents" in the text of this analysis refer to the weighted sample.

The sample was constructed by using the "1948 Ration Ledger Census of Nonmigrant Persons" as a base. The area-random-sampling-method was utilized in selecting respondents. A total of 316 sample points was used: 124 cities (including Tokyo), 86 towns, and 106 villages.

CURRENT JAPANESE PUBLIC OPINION SURVEYS


Attitudes of Tokyo Residents toward the Ashida Cabinet	29 May 1948
Attitudes in Kyoto toward Coeducation in the New Lower Secondary Schools	5 June 1948
Attitudes toward the Ashida Cabinet and Related Political Matters	12 June 1948
Attitudes of Union Members in the Tokyo Area	28 June 1948
Attitudes in Osaka toward Current Political Problems	30 June 1948
Attitudes in Tokyo toward the New Lower Secondary Schools	17 July 1948
A National Survey of Attitudes toward the Ashida Cabinet	9 August 1948
Attitudes of Tokyo and Kyoto Residents toward Strikes of Government Workers	10 August 1948
Attitudes of Osaka Consumers toward Vegetable Rationing	11 August 1948
Attitudes in the Kansai District toward Democratization of Securities	26 August 1948
Attitudes toward the Inflation Problem	3 September 1948
Attitudes toward the Emperor System	18 September 1948
Attitudes toward Higher Denomination Currency	21 September 1948
Attitudes of Resettlers toward the Land Reclamation Program	27 September 1948
Attitudes on the Democratization of Japan	25 October 1948
Japanese Reactions in an International Survey	11 January 1949
Political Trends Through October 1948	11 January 1949
Attitudes of the Urban Consumer toward Food Problems	19 February 1949
Urban Consumer Problems: Housing, Clothing, Sanitation, and Medical Care	17 March 1949

SURVEY SERIES

Some Aspects of the Fishery Right System in Selected Japanese Fishing Communities	November 1948
Reactions to a Traffic Safety Week Leaflet	22 January 1949
Attitudes toward the Labor Movement	31 January 1949
Problems of Working Women in Tokyo	26 March 1949
Attitudes of Farmers toward Rural Problems	20 May 1949
Basic Attitudes toward Foreign Countries	23 June 1949

ACTION

is assigned to



THE FOREIGN SERVICE

Action Assigned to NA OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Action Taken [Shown to Mr. Rusk]

United States Political Adviser for Japan

Tokyo, July 19, 1949.

No. 467
Office Symbol NA

Name of Officer M. Green
SECRET (For Department Use Only)
Direction to DC/R file

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

*no dist Ref
DC/R - not processed*

Subject: Threats Against the Lives of General MacArthur and Prime Minister Yoshida.

7/25/49

*①
XR 894.002
811.221*

The Honorable
Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that I have learned on the best possible authority that Lieutenant Colonel C. C. CANADA, General MacARTHUR's physician, was a few days ago under urgent instructions from General MacArthur to obtain immediately samples of Prime Minister YOSHIDA's blood in preparation for possible transfusions in the case of an attack on the Prime Minister's life. The Prime Minister has recently received so many threatening letters in connection with current personnel reduction and labor unrest (please see my confidential despatch no. 451 of July 11, 1949) that these extraordinary measures were considered desirable.

The same source states that, as a result of threats received by General MacArthur, he was urged by his advisers to double or treble his escort, but has manifested his disdain for personal danger of this sort by eliminating entirely the escort which has heretofore accompanied him on his daily trips between his residence and office.

Respectfully yours,

Cloyce K. Huston
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim

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1949 JUL 25 AM 8 31

DC/R
RECORDS BRANCH

S 040

CKHuston:gmd

In triplicate to the Department

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Q1313

*copy sent Int. Files
1 copy detached from NA*

*cc
cl. sheet*

SEP 19 1949

SEP 19 1949

SECRET FILE FILED

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COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS
TELEGRAPH BRANCH

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
COMMUNICATING TELEGRAM
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17

Action: OLI
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Rec'd July 25, 1949
2 a.m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ACQUISITION AND DISTRIBUTION
DIVISION
DISTRIBUTION BRANCH

JUL 25 1949

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Secretary of State
NO: C 51579. July 23 (Army Message)

JOINT WEEKA NO. 42

Action Assigned to Yardstick
Action Taken Noted

Date of Action 8/29/49
Action Office Symbol 1A2
Name of Officer Quinn
Direction to DC/R File

894.00 / 7-2349

SECRET

AUG 30 1949
FILED

SECRET FILE HH

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MESSAGE

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

SECRET

PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED

From: CINCFE Tokyo Japan

To: Dept of Army for CSGID; pass to USAF

Nr: C-51579

WEEKA 42

23 Jul 49

Subject is Joint Army-Air WEEKA number 42.

Japan. Political:

(A). Important changes or contemplated changes in government: Dismissal of surplus employees of government railways practically completed without serious disorders. Many Communist leaders discharged resulting in disorganization of leadership of government railway workers union, and rise of moderate democratization league within union. Two Communist ex-employees arrested in connection with Mitaka disaster, in which empty, unmanned electric train ran away, killing 8 and wounding many more 15th Jul. Communist party repeatedly denies any connection with unsolved Shimoyama murder or Mitaka incident, issues formal warning to government 19th Jul that workers cannot be responsible for future acts of sabotage. Visit of Japanese diet members to US (CINCFE rad WEEKA number 39, 1st Jul) indefinitely postponed.

Economic:

(A). Economic changes: Currency issue lowest since Oct 48, stands at 285 billion yen as of 20th Jul. Crop prospects considered excellent.

South Korea:

Military:

(A). Changes or contemplated changes in policy: Rerad AMILAT Seoul 150900Z 16th Jul 49 pertaining National Assemblys passage Military Service Act.

CM IN 16538

(23 Jul 49)

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Nr: C-51579

WEEKA 42

Page 2

Comment:

President Rhee probably will sign bill and promulgate law since he is strong advocate of large army. North Korea's radio Pyongyang and South Korean Communists probably will berate measure despite fact conscription of sorts exists in North Korea. Measure provides ready means for expanding army on short notice.

(B). Major changes or contemplated changes in command and strength: Rerad AMILAT Seoul 150900Z 16th Jul 49 pertaining armed forces strength.

Comment:

Korean army will reach authorized strength of 100,000 before 15th Aug 49 if it continues present rate of expansion. Overall armed forces strength has increased more than 15,000 since US troop withdrawal. All of increase has occurred in army and army reserve corps.

(C). Troop movements and concentrations, incidents and operations: Rerad AMILAT Seoul 150900Z 16th Jul 49 pertaining reduction guerrilla activity Cheju Island.

Comment:

Reduction guerrilla activity Cheju Island attributed largely to Col Yu Jai Hung, who was sent Cheju 2nd Mar 49 as overall task force commander armed forces on island. First Separate Infantry Battalion, which replaces Second Regiment, is subordinate to Capital Division. Army plans to bring Separate Battalion up to strength by recruiting Cheju Island natives.

North Korea:

Military:

CM IN 16538

(23 Jul 49)

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Nr: C-51579

WEEKA 42

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(C). Troop concentrations, incidents, operations: Additional reports concerning Chinese Communists in North Korea state leaders platoons or larger units sent 38th parallel areas are CCF personnel.

Comment:

Logical that some CCF troops present in North Korea but reports too fragmentary to permit estimate of number. If above report true, assigning presumably combat experienced leaders to 38th parallel units should definitely improve combat potential such units.

Headquarters and Second Battalion of Second Regiment, First Division, Peoples Army reported at Sariwon (3830-12544) on 18th May.

Comment:

Previous unconfirmed report mentioned movement First Division Headquarters and elements Second Regiment from Pyongyang to Sariwon.

2. New Peoples Navy guard boats launched at Chinnampo (3844-12524) during period Mar-May 49. Vessels of 200 ton displacement, 600 horsepower.

Comment:

Ship building at Chinnampo for Peoples Navy reported previously. Believed that Chinnampo Shipyard construction capacity limited to 300 ton steel, 500 ton wooden vessels.

Psychological:

Personnel of South Korean units which defected to North Korea 5th May (see FEC daily intell summary 2433)

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were incorporated into Peoples Army 11th Jul, according to radio Pyongyang. Minister National Defense Kim Tong Hun officiated at induction ceremony.

Comment:

Information on disposition and use of these former Korean Army troops not yet available. Publicizing their induction into Peoples Army apparently designed solely for propaganda purposes. This is first report that Kim Tong Hun is Minister National Defense, replacing Tchei Yung Gun.

Philippines:

Political:

(C). Reactions to important events: Mixed reactions in Philippines to Quirino-Chiang Kai-Shek talks continue, as additional details forthcoming. Senatorial candidate Claro M Recto leads minority group denunciation of talks as prelude to Philippines involvement in Chinese War. Congress labor organizations and Philippine Communist party leaders responsible for leftist castigation Quirino, Chiang, Rhee as US Charlie McCarthys. Public opinion still generally split over value of meeting. Acting Senate President Mariano Cuenco, Senator Melekio Arranz, other members Quirino wing apprehensive over meeting. They indicate presentation to senate for ratification any treaty, pact between Philippines, China will be voted down. This contention strengthened by quick survey among available senators, although many indicate they will support Pacific Pact provided Philippines not committed support Chiang with arms, dollars. Avelino group withholding statement until public opinion gauged.

Comment:

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WEEKA 42

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Quirino-Chiang-Rhee axis furthers mutual aims, individual ambitions. Has aspect of possibly forcing US hand, but could establish framework for desirable anti-Communist front against communist China.

Major political party leaders allegedly recruiting thugs and using strong-arm tactics to control votes in provinces, particularly Avelino followers in Visayas and Mindanao. Central Luzon Huks promise violence to pro-Quirinists. Quirino propaganda to date based largely promises cash and job awards.

Military:

(C). Troop movements and concentrations: Huk situation passive. Provinces Nueva Ecija, Nueva Vizcaya, Pagsinan, Pampanga remain focal point anti-Huk operations. Delayed rainy season give dissidents further opportunity forage supplies prior seasonal retreat mountain hideouts. Manila law enforcement agencies unable confirm report (ref CINCPAC WEEKA 41, 16th Jul 49) that Manila Huk strength doubled.

Subversive:

Manila Police Department (MPD) investigation confirm marked increase Chinese Communist activities Manila and environs. Public incensed over Chinese smuggling rings following arrests Chinese dope and arms peddlers. Cases allegedly involve top Chinese and Filipino leaders. Agents on cases fear top-level political interference block further proceedings. MPD claims concrete evidence involvement Quezon Province Governor Gregorio Santayana recent Tan Ham smuggling case. Promises investigations will expose Malacanan executive office employee as leader smuggling ring and Huk supporter.

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(23 Jul 49)

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WEEKA 42

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RYCOM:

Political:

(C). Reaction to important events: Resident CIC agent in Amami Oshima (2819-12925) reports political situation northern Ryukyus growing steadily worse. Governor, vice-governor, and department heads provisional civil government reportedly have prepared resignations for submission to military government. Anti-US feeling in Naze reported to be increasing.

Source comment:

Reason for above action by civil officials is their inability cope with deteriorating economy. Reliable informant states people certain areas actually suffering hunger as result of food shortage caused by unseasonable rains and typhoon Della.

Comment:

Report concerning political situation and anti-American feeling may be exaggerated. G-2 RYCOM is making personal investigation of situation. Results will be forwarded.

Military:

(C). Incidents and operations: Japanese PW escaped Apr 45 surrendered recently to military police, stating he had lived in hills Onnadake, Kunigawi (2726-12843) with 2 other escaped PWs. PW states companions still hiding and possess rifles, bayonets, pistols. Subject has volunteered to lead military police to hideout.

Air:

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(23 Jul 49)

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Nr: C-51579

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(Reported by FEAF).

Korea:

Approximately 1235 hours, 10th Jul 49, 1 North Korea reconnaissance type aircraft (Japanese) reportedly violated 38th parallel at point near Yesong River east of Paekchon (3800-12618).

Aircraft, twin-engine, dark green, reported flying at altitude approximately 650 feet. Plane returned North Korea and shortly thereafter was observed dropping North Korean pamphlets over Paekchon area. Aircraft then returned North Korea. Full details and contents pamphlets presently unknown but efforts being made secure samples.

Philippines:

Subversive:

In addition reported PC killing 121 alleged Huks between 10th and 15th Jul, 25 more reportedly killed in Candaba swamps east of Clark Field during PC operation "Tampol".

Approximately 100 Huks reportedly raided San Juan, Sta. Ana, Pampanga (1505-12046). One Huk hospital reportedly discovered in San Isidro, San Luis, Pampanga (1502-12049), with ample medicinal supplies and equipment.

During recent raid on small Barrio (village) near Clark Field, small children were allegedly observed being carried off to hills by Huks.

Huk conference held early Jul. Believed Huk leaders have gone to respective "spheres of influence" to inform

CM IN 16538

(23 Jul 49)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

Nr: C-51579

WEEKA 42

Page 8

Huk members of agreements reached. Huk offensive is reportedly expected outcome this conference.

Manila Mayor De La Fuente reportedly in receipt 2 reports, 1 allegedly revealing meeting place of Chinese Communists and Huks at Rizal Avenue extension, the other identity of master-mind in Quezon ambush.

Huk training school, "Stalin University" reportedly located near Laur, Nueva Ecija province (1540-12112). School included hospital unit, classrooms, barracks of typical native construction. Installation reportedly destroyed during PC operation "supercharge" in early June.

Guam:

Subversive:

One red flare reportedly sighted 300 degrees bearing from Orote control tower (1326-14438) 11th Jul 49 at 0229Z. Flight control 19th Bomb Wing dispatched aircraft with negative results as to source flares. Search patrols established for different periods over area. Navy ONI denied responsibility for flares.

Note: Time Rec'd 230727Z
Time filed DA Crypto Center 230923Z
Time Rec'd SCO 231053Z

Note: 39 is CM IN 12609 (2 Jul 49), ID.
150900Z is CM IN 15117 (16 Jul 49), ID.
41 is CM IN 15300 (17 Jul 49), ID.

ACTION: ID

INFO: AF, NAVY, PO, STATE

CM IN 16538

(23 Jul 49) DTG: 230727Z fmb/1

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF THE
NORTH AND SOUTH AMERICAN AFFAIRS
AUG 23 1949
8/26/49

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AUG 17

ACTION
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No. 530

Tokyo, August 5, 1949.

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INFO
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Subject: Recent Developments in the Democratization League.

3

The Acting Political Adviser has the honor to transmit a memorandum prepared by Mrs. J. M. ALDEN June 15, 1949 concerning recent developments in the Democratization League (Mingha Shu, Mei, or Mindo).

The League was organized in 1947 within the National Congress of Industrial Unions by union leaders who were opposed to communist domination of the NCIU and the authoritarian manner of communist control. A number of former Communist Party members have joined the League, and its activities since the general election of January 23, 1949, have become more aggressive. The League appears to be the only non-communist element in the labor movement which is capable of combatting the Communists on their own ground and with their own choice of weapons.

Since the last general election the League has become closely affiliated with the Socialist Party. Mindo elements gave a considerable display of strength and influence at the last congress of the Socialist Party (March 15-17, 1949) as a result of which labor has achieved a much larger voice in party affairs (this Mission's despatch no. 242 of April 21, 1949).

While the Democratization League has gained remarkably in strength since the first of the year, its leadership apparently realizes its limitations. Except in a few unions, the League does not as yet have a commanding position, and its close affiliation with the Socialist Party is still in the nature of an experiment. The League hopes to take over eventually the leadership of the Socialists and mould the party into a real labor party, but Mindo is determined not to be used by the Socialist Party as an agency to give the party a convenient new basis for strength in the non-communist sectors of the labor movement. The League has become affiliated with the Socialist Party primarily because it is the only party it

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RETURN TO DO/R FILES WITHIN 14 DAYS, WITH A NOTATION OF ACTION TAKEN.

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...hope to convert into a true labor party. If this experiment fails, the only remaining alternative would be to attempt to organize another labor party. The preferable choice, however, is to take over an already-established organization.

It is too early to determine how successfully the Democratization League will operate as a propellant force within the Socialist Party. Mindo's record to date in the labor movement, however, indicates that its leaders have a dynamic, aggressive character which has heretofore been conspicuously lacking outside the communist fold.

Enclosure: *all*

Recent Developments in the Democratization League, a memorandum prepared by Jane M. Alden, June 15, 1949.

Parchment Mat to Department.

530

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Despatch No. 530 dated
 1949 from the United
 States Political Adviser for Japan,
 Tokyo, on the subject, "Recent
 Developments in the Democratization
 League".

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MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Recent Developments in the Democratization
 League.

Since the 1949 general election the Democratization League (Minshu Shugi Domei, or Mindo) has been increasingly active in trade unions and its leaders have signified their intention to participate in political activity through the medium of the Socialist Party. The affiliation of many Mindo leaders with the Socialist Party, the withdrawal of many local and regional unions from the National Congress of Industrial Unions (Sanbetsu), and the growing strength of the Mindo groups still within the Sanbetsu-affiliated unions are significant developments in the reconstruction of the Socialist Party and the checking of communist influence within the trade union movement.

Mindo was started within the Sanbetsu in 1947 by leaders who opposed Communist Party domination of the federation and the authoritarian control exercised by Sanbetsu leadership over the member unions. The growth of Mindo was steady but inconspicuous until early 1949 when the secessions from Sanbetsu unions began on a national scale. It is estimated that during 1949 Sanbetsu membership has been reduced from 1.2 million members to around 800,000 members. While this estimate may be exaggerated, it is apparent that Mindo has at least checked the growth of the Sanbetsu and is effectively competing with the communists for labor support.

Mindo has a national headquarters in Tokyo which functions primarily as an advisory and coordination agency. The core of the Mindo movement is in the local unions, and while there is cooperation among Mindo leaders, especially within a single industrial union, there is a minimum of centralized direction and virtually no top-heavy organizational structure. Plans for the organization of a preparatory committee for the formation of a national federation of Mindo unions, tentatively scheduled for this summer, are being held in abeyance pending a consolidation of Mindo strength within the local unions.

Tactics of Mindo

Mindo leaders are well versed in the tactics of boring from within, and have utilized these tactics in building up the Mindo movement. The Mindo group forms a

bloc

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bloc within the local union but its adherents remain members of the local. There is no formal Mindo organization on this level apart from the local union and Mindo collects no dues from its affiliates. The object of the Mindo group in the local union is to obtain a sufficient number of adherents to take over control of the local. After this is accomplished the Mindo-controlled local unions attempt to gain control over the national headquarters of the union and to withdraw the entire union from the Sanbetsu. Mindo has been relatively successful in avoiding splits between Mindo groups and local union leadership, except in cases where a dispute issue has forced the Mindo group to withdraw and set up a rival local, thus sacrificing the advantages of capturing the entire membership of the local. In the recent convention the Japanese Express Workers Union (Nittsu) the Mindo leadership was defeated on the vote to withdraw Nittsu from Sanbetsu by a vote of 175 to 160. Following the convention the Mindo leaders of the Kansai, Chugoku and Shikoku regional federations of Nittsu met to decide whether these regions would withdraw from Nittsu or whether they would remain within the national union and attempt to win over the entire union. Present indications are that these leaders have decided not to withdraw from Nittsu but to call a special Nittsu convention in July for the purpose of re-submitting the resolution to withdraw from Sanbetsu. The Mindo leaders think that by July they may be in a position to carry the special convention and bring about the withdrawal of the entire union from Sanbetsu.

In general, Mindo leaders have shown a remarkable willingness to defer any attempt to split off from local and national unions until such time as they can carry the bulk of the union membership with them, unless, of course, circumstances force their hand. This policy has assured the Mindo groups that when they do withdraw from the national union they are sufficiently strong to stand as an independent union until such time as they can join with other Mindo-led unions in a national federation.

While the Mindo movement was started within Sanbetsu-affiliated unions it has spread in recent months to independent unions, both local and national. When the Mindo federation is organized it is anticipated that some of these independent unions will join the federation.

Mindo in Osaka.

Osaka has been one of the principal centers of the Mindo movement and at the present time the activities of Mindo are coordinated by the Osaka Regional Democratization League of Labor Unions. This League includes not only the Osaka Mindo leaders but also representatives of the Japan Federation of Labor (Sodomei). (A list of the leaders of this League is attached). The Mindo leaders in Osaka are experienced in trade union work, and many of them are well versed in Communist techniques of

organization.

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All of the Mindo leaders are active in their respective unions, in contrast to some Japanese labor leaders who have long since graduated to positions far removed from actual trade union work. For the most part these Mindo leaders are products of the post-war period, in so far as assuming positions of responsibility is concerned, and they have had little if any experience in politics. They represent therefore primarily the interest of the trade union movement, perhaps in its narrower sense. They take the position, however, that the growth of a healthy, and politically conscious union movement will contribute to the natural welfare, although they are concerned first and foremost with the problems of labor.

The Sanbetsu affiliated unions in Osaka had a membership of about 70,000 as of December 1948. The National Communications Workers Union (Zentei) with about 20,000 members is the nucleus of Sanbetsu in this area. About 3,000 of the Zentei members are also members of Mindo, according to MITSUMURA Jinsuke, the leader of Mindo in Zentei. Mitsumura also pointed out that in addition to this Mindo group within Zentei, a number of locals in Osaka have recently withdrawn from Zentei, although they have no yet joined Mindo.

Another important union formerly affiliated with Sanbetsu and now in the Mindo group is the Railway Rolling Stock Workers Union (Sharyo Kumai) led by HIRAYAMA Haruo. Sharyo was formed as a result of a split in Kinzoku, a Sanbetsu affiliated amalgamated metal workers union. At the time Kinzoku was formed, by the amalgamation of three industrial unions, 8,000 members left Kinzoku and formed Sharyo under Mindo leadership. The Osaka branch of Nittsu is controlled by Mindo leaders and this branch is active in present plans to bring about the withdrawal of Nittsu from Sanbetsu.

Two of the large Osaka unions affiliated with the national chemical union of Sanbetsu have recently withdrawn from the national union. One of these locals is now affiliated with Mindo.

In addition, to the Sanbetsu-affiliated unions, Mindo has made considerable progress within independent unions in Osaka. The Kansai Federation of Private Railway Workers Unions, with 50,000 members has a Mindo group of 13,000. In this union the name Mindo is not used, instead the group comparable to Mindo is called the League for Protection of Union Autonomy. The reason behind the use of a different name for the Mindo group in this union apparently stems from the union's desire not to commit itself to joining any federation, but its leader, YAMAGUCHI Jotaro is cooperating with Mindo leaders.

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In the coming election of union officers in the 26 locals it is expected that 65 to 70% of the newly elected officers will be from the League, 10 to 15% will be Communist or Communist inclined and 10 to 15% will be neutrals.

The Osaka Chapter of the Seamen's Union with 6,000 to 7,000 members is controlled by Mindo. The Osaka Federation of Self-Government Organizations with 20,000 members has a Mindo group of 14,000 to 15,000 members. Mindo also claims 40% of the 8,000 members of the Osaka Municipal Employees Union while the remaining membership in this union is divided between opponents of Mindo and neutrals.

There are 84,000 members of the Government Railway Workers Union (Kokutetsu) in Osaka, who are about equally divided among Mindo adherents, communists and neutrals. In the Fire Workers Union in Osaka Mindo has not made any progress and this union continues to be under the influence of the Communists who form the only organized group within the union.

Mindo Affiliation with the Socialist Party in Osaka.

Since the general election a number of Mindo leaders in Osaka have joined the Socialist Party. These leaders state quite frankly that it is their intention to reconstruct the party as a representative of the non-communist labor movement in politics, and that they are opposed to the domination of the unions by the Socialist Party. This determination to have a political voice is especially strong among the Mindo leaders of unions, such as Zentei, that fall under the provisions of the National Public Service Law which deny to government workers' unions the rights of collective bargaining. On the other hand, there are Mindo leaders in Osaka who have not joined the Socialist Party. Some of these leaders are opposed in principle to the linking of their unions with any political party, and others are reluctant to enter into any relationship with the Socialists which might lead to party domination of the union.

The attitude of Mindo leaders toward political party-labor union relations is understandable in view of the fact that some of the Mindo leaders are former Communists, and that all of them have had experience in Communist Party controlled labor unions. The majority of these leaders are aware of the benefits that can be obtained by labor through political action, but they are also aware of the disadvantages from the union point of view if a political party controls the union and subverts union interests to broader considerations of party politics and other interested groups. The Mindo leaders in Osaka also view the Socialist party with considerable skepticism. They have joined the party because it is virtually the only party they can hope to convert into a labor party. Their only other alternative is to organize a new party of their own which would mean that they would be confronted

simultaneously

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Despatch no. 300
August 5, 1948

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simultaneously with the organizational problems of a labor federation and a political party. In addition, Mindo leadership, at least in Osaka, does not include any individuals with sufficient practical experience in the political field to organize a major party and of course any newly-organized Mindo political party would not have representation in the present House of Representatives. Mindo affiliation with the Socialists is therefore largely a matter of expediency. They are well aware of the fact that within the Socialist Party in Osaka they will be competing for party leadership with a strong, well entrenched right-wing element which will resist any inroads on its leadership.

The Socialist Party on the other hand is preoccupied at the present time with rebuilding its strength in Osaka. The Mindo movement is the best and quickest means to this end and the Socialists have been careful to refrain from antagonizing Mindo leaders by raising the issue of party vs. union. Discussions with Socialist Party leaders did bring out the point that the party leaders are not contemplating the dominations of the Osaka branch of the party by the labor elements. These party leaders pointed out that the Socialist Party in Osaka is composed not only of representatives of labor but also of farmers, small businessmen and the intelligentsia, and it is their belief that these various elements can share party leadership. The real test of this will come when there is a clash of interests among the components of the leadership group. Mindo leaders at the present time seem determined not to permit labor's interests to be subverted within the Socialist Party, and have indicated that if this does not happen the Mindo group will withdraw from the Party.

National Council of Labor Unions.

The National Council of Labor Unions (Zenro Kaigi) was organized by the leaders of Sanbetsu Mindo, Kokutetsu Mindo and the left-wing leaders of the Sodomei. Leaders of independent national unions have expressed an interest in Zenro Kaigi and have from time to time participated in its meetings, but to date these leaders have been reluctant to officially join the organization.

Zenro Kaigi is comparable to the National Liaison Council of Labor Unions (Zenroren), the communist-controlled council composed of Sanbetsu and independent national unions such as Kokutetsu. Pending the organization of the Mindo unions into a federation which will be comparable to Sodomei, the plans for the formal organization of Zenro Kaigi have not gone much beyond the paper stage.

Until the present time neither the Socialist Party nor the right wing of the Sodomei have taken much interest in the Zenro Kaigi and the leadership of Zenro Kaigi

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will oppose any attempts by the Socialists to dominate the Council. Although the organization of Zenro Kaigi is still in a formative stage, it is a potential field of conflict between the Sodomei and the Mindo federation on the one hand, and between the leaders of these two federations and the Socialist Party on the other.

The Mindo unions will be organized into an industrial labor federation whose leaders will be affiliated with the Socialist Party. Within the party Mindo will be associated with left-wing party leaders which will strengthen this group vis-a-vis the right wing of the party. Sodomei is also an industrial labor federation with close ties to the Socialist Party but Sodomei is divided between right and left wing factions of which the right wing appears to be stronger. To date the leaders of Mindo and Sodomei have cooperated with each other and Mindo has refrained from working within Sodomei unions. In the formation of Zenro Kaigi the two federations will be in direct competition for leadership of the Council and this competition will be accentuated if Sodomei is controlled by its right wing. If the right wing in Sodomei succeeds in dominating that federation it is possible that not only the Sodomei but also the Socialist Party will split and the left wing of both party and federation would join with Mindo to form a new political group. Mindo leaders estimate now that this situation will not come to a head for about a year. Meanwhile, Mindo, working with the left-wing of the Sodomei, will attempt to reconstruct the Socialist Party as a political instrument of the non-communist labor movement using the same tactics of working from within the party organization as they are now using within the labor unions.

Jane M. Alden

Jane M. Alden

2EB 2-1348

Leaders of the Osaka Regional Democratization League
of Labor Unions.

Chairman: HASEGAWA Hideo (Government Railway
Workers Union)

Vice Chairman: OKANO Masao (Japan Seamen's Union)
NAKANASHI Kisaburo (Japan Federation
of Labor)
TSUBAKI Shigeo (Japan Federation of
Labor)

Executive Committee: TANAKA Ryoichi (Japan Aluminum Workers
Union)
TAKEUCHI Fumiyoshi (National Federation
of Textile Workers Unions)
MAKATA Kiyoshige (Printing Workers
Union)
TANAKA Toyoe (Osaka Municipal Office
Workers Union)
YAMAGUCHI Kikufiro (Osaka Transporta-
tion Workers Union)

SEP 7 - 1949

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : NA - Mr. Bond

FROM : NA - Mr. Green *mg.*

SUBJECT: Tokyo's 451 of July 11, 1949

DATE: August 9, 1949



NWB
FF/JMA
NA/TTM
HC
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Mr. Spinks comments on the current Communist danger in Japan. The Japanese no longer doubt that the series of violent episodes (including Railway President Shimoyama's presumed murder) is Communist organized and directed. The JCP is believed to have postponed any plans for an all-out general strike but to provoke continuous local incidents on a wide front, the accumulated effect of which has already led to more uncertainty and tension than has hitherto been experienced under the occupation. The railway workers suffering mass lay-offs have been the focus of JCP effort, with the local police often incapable of handling the organized Communists, as at Taira on June 30.

The objective of JCP promotion of violent outbursts may well be to provoke SCAP and the Japanese Government to take coercive measures to restore order, measures which will then be exploited by the JCP as evidence that SCAP is abusing the rights of the Japanese people. However, there is already a noteworthy moral revulsion in many Japanese quarters against the violence employed by the Communists, especially the assassination of Shimoyama.

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*Northwest
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Office of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
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Director
Department of State

PLAIN
DIVISION OF
EAST ASIAN AFFAIRS
AUG 10 1949
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Action Assigned to NA
Action Taken no action
Control 3899
Date of Action August 10, 1949
Rec'd August 10, 1949
Action Symbol NA
Name of Officer M. J. [unclear]
Direction to DC/R file

FROM: Moscow
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 2005, August 10

IZVESTIA August 9 prints third column Penyang Tass dispatch saying reports origination Japan show Hoshida government's allegation Simoana murdered by Communists is provocation since he driven suicide by feeling guilt for mass railroad dismissals.

Sent Department, repeated Tokyo 33.

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PERMANENT RECORD COPY: THIS COPY MUST BE RETURNED TO DC/R CENTRAL FILES WITH NOTATION OF ACTION TAKEN.

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THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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United States Political Adviser
for Japan

DIVISION OF

NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS

Tokyo, August 11, 1949.

No. 549

No action
AUG 25 1949
necessary file.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
G. W. H.

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INFO
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1

Subject: Factions in the Democratic Liberal Party.

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to transmit a copy of a memorandum entitled "Factions in the Democratic Liberal Party" prepared by Mrs. Jane M. ALDEN, and dated June 15, 1949, at that time on temporary assignment to this Mission from the Department. Transmission of the memorandum has been delayed due to pressure of work upon this Mission's stenographic personnel.

The information in this memorandum and the appended list of Democratic Liberal members of the House of Representatives indicating affiliation with intra-party factions were secured from a reliable Japanese source close to the Democratic Liberal Party. Due to the intangible character of factional affiliation as contrasted with party membership, it is necessary, however, to allow for some inaccuracies of classification.

Two significant points stand out from the enclosed memorandum. In spite of the rather sharp factional alignments within the Democratic Liberal Party and the friction this situation engenders, Prime Minister YOSHIDA has continued to strengthen his position; and, secondly, the power of the political bosses within the party has considerably declined. The success of the Prime Minister, who is not a professional politician, in strengthening his hold over the party which, by virtue of its commanding majority as a result of the last general election, is of rather unwieldy character, is the more remarkable in view of the necessity to compromise the party's campaign promises in formulating a balanced budget.

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RETURN TO DC/R FILES WITHIN 14 DAYS, WITH A NOTATION OF ACTION TAKEN.

Tokyo's Despatch no. 549,
August 11, 1949.

CONFIDENTIAL

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The rise of the Yoshida Faction, concomitant with the decline of the other party factions, is tending to draw attention to the problem of Mr. Yoshida's eventual successor as head of the Democratic Liberal Party. In replacing old-line politicians, some of whom have had potentialities for party leadership, Mr. Yoshida has brought into the party large numbers of new men many of whom at present lack sufficient political experience to qualify for effective party leadership. This situation might lead to difficult complications if Mr. Yoshida were forced to withdraw for health or other reasons. In view of the Prime Minister's advanced age and several recent illnesses such possibilities are creating some concern and speculation in political circles.

Respectfully yours,

W. J. Sebald

Enclosure: *att*

Memorandum dated June 15, 1949,
"Factions in the Democratic
Liberal Party", by Jane M. Alden.

Parchment Mat to Department.

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[Handwritten signature]

dated August 11, 1949 from the United States Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, on the subject, "Factions in the Democratic Liberal Party".

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

June 15, 1949.

Subject: Factions in the Democratic Liberal Party.

Attached is a list of Democratic Party (DLP members of the House of Representatives indicating affiliation with the intra-party factions as of May 1, 1949 and previous factional affiliations in cases where shifts have been made since March 31, 1949. This list was compiled by a reliable Japanese source close to the Democratic Liberal Party. It should be borne in mind, however, that any listing of factional affiliations is subject to some inaccuracies arising out of the intangible character of factional affiliations as contrasted to party membership.

This list of the members of the various intra-party factions in the DLP indicates two significant developments. First, Prime Minister YOSHIDA Shigeru is continuing to strengthen his position within the party despite the fact that he has been forced to compromise the party's campaign promises in formulating a balanced budget. Secondly, the power of the political bosses in the party is rapidly dwindling to insignificant oppositions. There remain within the party dissident factions opposed for various reasons to Yoshida, but these opposition factions are losing adherents and their positions have been considerably weakened.

This situation is further borne out by the fact that opposition within the DLP to the inclusion of Mr. INUKAI Ken and his Democratic Party faction in the DLP has been defeated and there appears to be little possibility that the inclusion of Inukai in the DLP will have any serious consequences on party unity. Yoshida, who has consistently supported the Inukai merger against strong opposition within his own party, has finally won out. Furthermore, he has succeeded in obtaining his party's approval to the proposal that the Ashida faction of the Democratic Party be invited to join the DLP. This invitation was extended not to Mr. Ashida, who is temporarily inactive pending the settlement of his indictment, but to Mr. TOMABECHI Gizo the present leader of the Ashida faction.

The increasing strength of Yoshida within the DLP in turn raises two problems of considerable importance to the party in the future. Will Yoshida succeed in developing new political leaders from among the ranks of his party, and secondly, who will succeed Yoshida as president of the party? Yoshida has been forced to gather around him men who are relatively new to politics, although these men in most instances have had considerable experience in government service or in business. In this sense Yoshida is bringing to the fore men new to party politics to replace the longtime politicians who have

attempted

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Enclosure to Tokyo's
549, August 11, 1949.

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attempted to continue their hold on the party either directly or through their proteges. The problem of who will succeed Yoshida as leader of the party, especially if in the near future he should be unable to continue actively in the party, is more than a question of the development of new leadership. Although there is within the party a number of able men who are potential party leaders, there appears at this time to be no suitable candidate who could qualify in terms of political experience or ability and who at the same time has sufficient political power to maintain party unity. Although Yoshida has succeeded in dominating the party and reducing the power of the opposition factions, his removal from the leadership of the party would be a signal for the reconstitution of many of the factional groups that are now relatively impotent. If, on the other hand, Yoshida continues as party leader for two or three years he would probably be able to develop a core of new experienced leadership capable of taking over the party.

The Yoshida Faction

At the present time this faction consists of about eighty-six members, as compared to twenty members prior to March 31, 1949. In addition to this core of close and fairly reliable supporters, Yoshida still draws considerable support from the so-called neutral members of the party, who remain outside factional groups primarily because they are new to party politics. The new members of the Yoshida group have come from all of the other factions, but primarily from the neutral group and from the Ono and Shidehara factions.

The adherence of former neutrals to the Yoshida Faction is not in itself of any special significance. These members were either newly elected, and therefore potentially Yoshida men, or were second or third term party members who were not necessarily opposed to Yoshida but were merely unwilling to commit themselves in terms of intra-party groups.

The addition of members of the Ono faction to Yoshida's group is, on the other hand, a reflection of the decline in power of the oldline party bosses, and indirectly of HATOYAMA Ichiro, the purged former president of the party, and represents a strengthening of Yoshida's party position that is out of proportion to the members of Ono men who have joined his group. Nineteen former members of the Ono faction are now considered to belong to Yoshida's group. Ono's connection with Hatoyama and other oldtime party leaders has been the source of his power within the DLP, as well as the fact that Yoshida in the early days of his party leadership needed the support of experienced politicians. Ono's indictment

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Enclosure to Tokyo's
549, August 11, 1949.

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and recent sentence to ten months in prison for accepting bribes has been an immediate cause for his decline in power within the party. Yoshida was at least relieved to have Ono out of a position of influence within the party, and while there is no evidence, despite the many rumors, that Yoshida exerted any pressure to bring about Ono's conviction, he did nothing to assist Ono in his trial.

The Ono Faction

The Ono faction has been the stronghold of the influence and power of prewar political leaders within the DLP. It was, prior to its recent decline, composed of oldtime political leaders still in public life, along with a few younger members who looked to the older politicians as their mentors. This group has been opposed to Yoshida as an interloper who instead of considering himself merely the temporary custodian of Hatoyama's power began to build up his own political power independent of Hatoyama, and gradually freed himself of dependence upon the Ono faction for support and advice. It was this group that strongly opposed the concessions Yoshida made in the formulation of the recent budget, the coalition cabinet with the Democrats, and the proposal that Inukai enter the DLP.

At the present the Ono faction consists of about ~~thirty-five members~~ as compared to forty-eight at the end of March. Although the decline in terms of numbers is not large, the group has been deprived of Ono's leadership and Yoshida has removed most of its members from positions of party responsibility thereby depriving them of their ability to control the policies of the party, which in turn weakens their position to attract new Diet and party members to their group.

The Yamazaki Faction

This group has many of the characteristics of the Ono faction and is in fact fairly close to the latter group on matters of party policy. Yamazaki and Yoshida have been on very bad terms since the attempt last fall by dissidents within the DLP and elements within the Democratic Party to nominate Yamazaki instead of Yoshida as Premier. Although Yamazaki resigned from the Diet to avoid being a candidate against Yoshida and stated publically that he was an innocent victim of the machinations of other groups, Yoshida has been unfriendly toward him ever since. Yamazaki's faction has gained four members since March, but he has lost the support of Mr. HOSHIJIMA Jiro, who, although still considered a member of this faction, is leaning more and more toward Yoshida.

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JTB AUGUST 11, 1949.

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The Shidehara Faction

This faction consisted of those former Democrats who joined the DLP in March 1948 after seceding from the Democratic Party over such issues as the coal bill and the formation of the Ashida Cabinet. The faction was primarily interested in assuring the former Democrats a position of influence in the DLP. With the elevation of Shidehara to the speakership of the House of Representatives, and with the gradual assimilation of the members of this faction into the DLP, the Shidehara faction is declining in importance and its members are drawing closer to Yoshida.

The Shukuto Faction

The Shukuto, or Party Cleaning Faction, presently consists of thirteen members as opposed to twenty-two members earlier this year. It is composed largely of younger Diet members who desire to reform the party by eliminating the control of the older politicians and giving the younger members an opportunity to hold influential positions. This group has been in opposition to Yoshida and has constituted a dissident element within the party on almost every issue. The decline of this group and the defection of some of its members to the Yoshida, Yamazaki and Ono factions is indicative of the mixed composition of the original group and also of its failure to attain any influence within the party.

The Neutral Group

This group is primarily composed of the newer Diet members who have not formed close political friendships and are generally inexperienced in party politics. Since the general election of January 23, 1949, the group has been reduced by some thirty-three members most of whom joined the Yoshida faction. In intra-party affairs the neutral group is not considered a faction. The name is merely a convenient designation for all party members who are not affiliated with the existing factions. The various factions seek the support of these neutral members to strengthen their intra-party positions, but the majority of the neutrals usually support the dominant group within the party, which is now the Yoshida faction.

Yoshida's Negotiations with the Democrats

Yoshida is continuing to strengthen his position within the party by drawing into its ranks the members of both factions of the Democratic Party. Initially he insisted on the formation of a coalition cabinet with Inukai and his Democratic party supporters. This effort failed, and more recently Yoshida has succeeded in winning the DLP over to accepting Inukai and his followers into the DLP. Originally the Ono, Yamazaki and Shukuto factions strongly opposed any merger with the coalition Democrats and it appeared that if Yoshida forced the issue he might precipitate a split in his

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Enclosure to Tokyo's
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own party. The decline of the opposition factions within the DLP, has resulted in a victory for Yoshida, although he has agreed that Inukai will not be given the vice-presidency of the DLP.

Yoshida is now trying to bring the opposition Democrats, or the Ashida faction, into the DLP. He has obtained the approval of the DLP members to extend an invitation to Tomabechi, leader of the Ashida Democrats. It is reliably reported that Tomabechi has agreed to join the DLP if and when he can persuade a large enough group of his associates to follow him. Failing this, Tomabechi will probably remain outside the DLP. Although it can be assumed that, in the event he is cleared of charges of accepting political bribes for which he is now awaiting trial, Ashida will not join or be welcomed in the DLP. The opposition Democrats are finding it increasingly difficult to obtain financial support, and this has probably been the motivating force behind the recent rapprochement between Tomabechi and Yoshida.

Jane M. Alden
Jane M. Alden

JMAlden:mhp

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Factional Affiliations of Diet Members of Democratic-Liberal Party as of May 1, 1949.

1. President Faction (86)

YOSHIDA Shigeru
 HASHIMOTO Ryugo
 IKEDA Hayato
 MASUDA Kanehichi
 FUKUDA Tokutai
 YOSHITAKE Keiichi
 HAYASHI Joji
 SHUTO Hideo
 SATO Eisaku
 NISHIMURA Naomi
 AMANO Kimiyoshi
 OKAZAKI Katsuo
 KONDO Tsuruyo
 TSUKAHARA Toshio
 WATANABE Yoshio
 ASO Takakichi
 MAEO Shigesaburo
 MAKINO Kansaku
 TAKAGI Akira
 EZAKI Masami
 HIROKAWA Kozen

KASHIWARA Yoshinori
 KAJI Ryosaku
 MIZUTA Mikio
 AOKI Takayoshi
 IWAMOTO Nobuyuki
 ISHIDA Hirohide
 OMURA Seiichi
 OKA Nobuemon
 MORI Kotaro
 OZAWA Saeki
 TOMABECHI Hidetoshi
 ARITA Jiro
 MASUTANI Shuji
 OGAWARA Masanobu
 KAWANISHI Kyoshi
 MATSUURA Tosuke
 ITO Goichi
 IIGAI Senzo
 SAKAMOTO Minoru

Former Members
 of the
 Ono Faction

SASAKI Hideo
 SENGA Koji
 KAWANO Homan
 NEMOTO Ryutaro
 YAGI Ichiro
 OKAMI Tsukasa
 YAMAMOTO Takeo
 IIZUKA Sadasuke
 OSAWA Kaeji
 HOMMA Shunichi
 MATSUMOTO Ichiro
 ONOSE Chubei
 AOYAGI Ichiro

Former Members
 of the
 Shidehara Faction

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President Faction (continued)

SAKATA Michita
 NAKAUCHI Kenji
 NOHARA Masakatsu

Former Members
 of the
 Shukuto Faction

FUKUNAGA Kenji
 MORI Satoru
 TAMAKI Shinichi
 OISHI Takeichi
 FUKUNAGA Ishhin

Former Neutrals

TAKAHASHI Eikichi
 SUZUKI Masafumi

Former Members
 of the
 Shukuto Faction

NAKANO Takeo
 SAKATA Hideichi
 TATSUNO Kiichiro
 MAEDA Iku
 SHINODA Kosaku
 SHIDA Yoshinobu
 NAKAMURA Kiyoshi
 NISHIMURA Hideichi
 OKADA Goro
 TAMURA Tetsuzo
 MINAMI Yoshio
 FUKUI Isamu
 NAKAMURA Kohachi
 TSUKADA Juichiro
 TANAKA Keiichi
 YAMAMOTO Hisao
 TAKAHASHI Hitoshi
 TOBISHIMA Shigeru
 MIYAHARA Kosaburo
 NAKAMURA Junichi
 KITAZAWA Naokichi
 ENDO Saburo

Former Neutrals

KOGANE Yoshiteru

Independent who
 recently joined
 the DLP.

2. Ono Faction (35)

KAMBAYASHIYAMA Eikichi
 YAMAMURA Shinjiro
 UEHARA Etsujiro
 OUCHI Ichiro
 OZEKI Giichi
 INATA Naomichi
 ISHIHARA Enkichi
 TANAMURA Shiro
 SENOJI Ichiro
 MATSUMOTO Hiroshi
 NIWA Hyokichi
 OGASAWARA Yasomi
 OIZUMI Kanzo
 NISHIMURA Hisayuki
 YAKUSHIJIN Iwataro
 KONISHI Hideo
 KATAOKA Isaburo
 HONDA Ichiro
 TAKAGI Matsuyoshi

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Ono Faction (continued)

MANABE Masaru
 MURAKAMI Isamu
 WATARI Shiro
 SHIMAMURA Ichiro
 SUZUKI Sempachi
 HIRAI Giichi
 NOMURA Sentaro
 ONO Bamboku
 KONO Kenzo

TANAKA Kakuei

Formerly Shidehara Faction.

KIKUCHI Yoshiro

Formerly Shukuto Faction.

YAMAGUCHI Kokuroji
 SHUTO Shimpachi
 TABUCHI Koichi
 NAGATA Setsu
 SASE Shozo

Formerly Neutrals.

3. Yamazaki Faction (13)

YAMAZAKI Takeshi
 HOSHIJIMA Jiro (Partly Yoshida)
 YAMAGUCHI Kikuichiro
 KANDA Hiroshi (Partly Yoshida)
 NAKAJIMA Moritoshi
 IWAMATSU Torao
 KURIYAMA Gorojiro
 YOSHIDA Yoshitaro
 SHIBUYA Yutaro

IMAMURA Chusuke
 KURAIISHI Tadao

Formerly Shukuto Faction

MATSUNO Raizo
 TSUMURAYA Mitsue

Formerly Neutrals.

4. Comrade Club (Doshi Kai) - Shidehara Faction (19)

SHIDEHARA Kijuro
 HIRASAWA Chokichi
 SAITO Takao
 MORISHIMA Goro
 FURUHATA Tokuya
 NIKAIDO Susumu
 INOUE Tomoharu
 KAWABATA Yoshio
 OZAKI Suekichi
 MATSUI Toyokichi
 TANAKA Manitsu
 NAGAO Tatsuo
 NAKAYAMA Masa
 YOSHIDA Shozo
 MUTO Kaichi
 KODAIRO Hisao
 SEKIYA Katsutoshi
 HARA Kensaburo
 SUZUKI Akira

5. Shukuto Faction (Party Cleaning Faction) (13)

SASAKI Morio
TADA Isamu
YAMAGUCHI Koichi
OKAMURA Rinemon
NATSUBORI Gensaburo
MURAKAMI Seiji
KATO Ryutaro
ISHIHARA Noboru
FURUSHIMA Giei
KAMINE Ryuta
KAKUTA Kokichi
TOMINAGA Kakugoro
TSUJI Kanichi

6. Neutral Group (99)

IDE Mitsuji
TAKASHIO Saburo
AOKI Tadashi
NARA Haruji
MATSUMOTO Zenju
KANKE Kiroku
TAKAKI Kichonosuke
KONISHI Toramatsu
MAEDA Masao
NAITO Takashi
KAWAMOTO Sueji
HATAKEYAMA Tsurukichi
SUZUKI Zenko
UTSUMI Yasukichi
IMAIZUMI Sedao
HIRASHIMA Ryoichi
FUJII Heiji
MIYAKE Noriyoshi
IYAHATA Yasushi
MARUYAMA Naotomo
OGAWA Heiji
WAKABAYASHI Yoshitaka
UDA Wataru
ONISHI Hiroshi
MIYAKE Nobu
KODAMA Haruyuki
FUCHI Michiyoshi
OKANO Kiyohide
HASHIMOTO Tomisaburo
SATO Chikahiro
HOSODA Eizo
FUJIEDA Sensuke
YANAGISAWA Yoshio
SHIOTA Kashiro
TAJIMA Yoshibumi
KIMBARA Shunji
HIRANO Saburo
TAKAHASHI Sadaichi
EDA Tomekichi
TANAKA Shigeya
OBUCHI Mitsuhei
TAKEO Hajime
TAGUCHI Chojiro

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SETOYAMA Mitsuo
TAKAMA Matsukichi
UNO Hidejiro
ABE Shungo
OWADA Yoshiei
MATSUNAGA Bukkotsu
KUROSAWA Tomijiro
OHASHI Takeo
FUNAKOSHI Hiroshi
TAMAKI Minoru
FUCHIGAMI Fusataro
KITAGAWA Sadamu
HARADA Yukimatsu
SATO Shigeto
CHUMAN Tatsui
KIMURA Kohei
MORISHITA Takashi
ODAKA Toshiro
TANAKA Hajime
MATSUDA Tetsuzo
IKEDA Masanosuke
KAWAHARA Isaburo
ADACHI Tokuro
KADOWAKI Katsutaro
IKUTA Wahei
NAGAI Eishu
SAKUMA Toru
MIURA Toranosuke
KAWAMURA Kihachiro
ASARI Saburo
KANO Hikokichi
SEKIUCHI Shoichi
MIZUTANI Noberu
OSHITANI Tomizo
IMAMURA Chotaro
OCHI Shigeru
KATSUKI Tamotsu
TSUBOUCHI Hachiro
FUKUDA Yoshiharu
KOGAMA Naganori
IWAKAWA Yosuke
HATAYA Senjiro
SHIMIZU Ipppei
SHIRAI Sakichi
TAKADA Yaichi
EBANA Shizuka
ASAKA Tadao
GOJIMA (GOTO), Hideji
TANAKA Shoji
FUKUDA Hajime
NAKAGAWA Shunji
IKEMI Shigetaka
OKANISHI Akisada
TSUCHIKURA Somei
MITSUO Kimisuke
KAZAMA Keikichi

SEP 1 1948
-6-7. Independents who Recently joined the party

ASAMI Hiroji
INOUE Shikio
TAKAHASHI Gonroku
OSE Hisaichi