

Dec. 1911

(160)

EVIDENTIARY DOCUMENT # 1911

This Document is not to be checked out.

Information contained in this document can
be located in case file and interrogation file.
Enclosed is paper listing interrogation by
original exhibit number and date.

EVIDENTIARY DOC.

HIROTA, Koki

Included in this folder are the following date

| | |
|-----------|---------|
| 29 Jan 46 | #1911 A |
| 4 Feb 46 | #1911 B |
| 7 Feb 46 | #1911 C |
| 9 Feb 46 | #1911 D |
| 13 Feb 46 | #1911 E |
| 16 Feb 46 | #1911 F |
| 5 Mar 46 | #1911 G |
| 8 Mar 46 | #1911 H |
| 23 Mar 46 | #1911 I |

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

DOC. NO. 1911

Date 17 June 46

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Interrogations and personal history
of HIROTA, Koki

Date: 1945-46 Original () Copy (X) Language: English

Has it been translated? Yes () No (X)

Has it been photostated? Yes () No (X)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL: (also Witness of applicable)
Doc. Div.

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: See our case File #212

PERSONS IMPLICATED: HIROTA, Koki et al

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

conspiracy of aggression, violation Nine Power Treaty, etc.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references);

File includes miscellaneous data on correspondence on
subjects personality

Analyst: W. H. Wagner

Doc. No. 1911

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No.

1911

Date

17 June 1986

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature:

History of HIROTA, Koki. *Interrogations and Personal*

Date:

1945-46

Original ()

Copy (X)

Language:

Has it been translated? Yes () No (X)

Has it been photostated? Yes () No (X)

English.

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable)

Document Division.

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL:

See our Case File 212

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

HIROTA, Koki et al.

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

Conspiracy of aggression, Violation

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Nine Power Treaty, etc.

File includes miscellaneous

data on correspondence on subject personality.

Analyst:

W. A. Wagner

Doc. No.

INTERROGATION OF

HIROTA Koki

Date and Time: 29 January 1946, 1415-1600 hours.

Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan.

Present : HIROTA Koki
Captain Calhoun W. J. Phelps, Interrogator
J. K. Sano, Interpreter
Miss Lucille C. Brunner, Stenographer

Questions by : Captain Phelps

- A. Among the answers I gave to you yesterday, at the time I was not able to give you the name of the Assistant Naval Attache at Washington. That man's name is Isoroku YAMAMOTO. Also you propounded a question to me on one YOSHIDA Shigeru. I know two YOSHIDA Shigeru. One of them is a person, I explain, is connected with the Foreign Ministry and now the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The other YOSHIDA Shigeru was the Chief of Planning and Research Bureau under the OKADA Cabinet. This same person remained in the same capacity in my Cabinet. I did not know which YOSHIDA you really meant and I want to clarify that. This latter YOSHIDA later became the Minister of the Ministry of Welfare in one of the later Cabinets. I don't think it was the TOJO Cabinet, but perhaps before the TOJO Cabinet. However, he might have held the same office again in a later Cabinet. I am not very clear on that point.
- Q. For the purposes of the record, there were two YOSHIDA Shigeru personages in your Cabinet?
- A. In my Cabinet one of the YOSHIDA was recommended to become Minister of Foreign Affairs, but due to the objection made by the War Department his appointment was not materialized.
- Q. Who in the War Department objected to his appointment?
- A. I think the War Department in group protested his appointment.
- Q. For what reason?
- A. For the reason that he was pro-American; at the same time he is a son-in-law of Count MAKINO.

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HIROTA Koki 1/29/46

- Q. At this time who was the Minister of War?
- A. This objection against YOSHIDA was raised at the time portfolio for my Cabinet was under discussion. At that time General TERAUCHI was slated to hold War Minister because YOSHIDA was pro-British and American. I wanted him to be appointed as Foreign Minister in my Cabinet.
- Q. But General TERAUCHI objected to his being appointed as Foreign Minister?
- A. Yes.
- Q. The other YOSHIDA Shigeru, who was Chief of the Planning and Research Bureau, was in what Department of the Government?
- A. That Planning and Research Bureau belonged directly under the Cabinet.
- Q. Under the Prime Minister, is that correct?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Last evening, Mr. HIROTA, you mentioned that when General TERAUCHI had been recommended to you as Minister of War, by whom was he recommended?
- A. First, when I was requested to form a Cabinet I asked who would be influential enough to reform the Army and the answer was that General TERAUCHI's past assignments had been away from Tokyo and naturally he is more neutral in his position to hold War Minister. In other words, he being outsider in so far as what is going on within the Army at the time he could exercise independent judgment in reforming the Army.
- Q. Mr. HIROTA, I asked you who recommended TERAUCHI to you and you answered that he was a neutral in thought.
- A. The person from whom I ascertained that opinion is General SUGIYAMA, Gen or Hajime. Of course, the information from General SUGIYAMA was the preliminary and confidential one. However, when any War Minister is officially recommended, then we consult the Army group officially whether he would be acceptable or not.
- Q. What was General SUGIYAMA's official position? Was he Chief of Staff?
- A. Although my recollection is not clear, I think he might have been the Assistant Chief of Staff, but I am reasonably sure that he was not Vice War Minister.

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- Q. So it is possible in the Japanese Government that the Chief of Staff may recommend or even appoint the War Minister, is that correct?
- A. At about that time the Chief of Staff was a member of the Imperial Household. However, the military personnel matter was handled by three high officials composed of Minister of War, Chief of Staff, and General Superintendent of Military Education. Those three held what is known as the Big Three Conference.
- Q. Was this called the MASAKI group?
- A. I don't think it could be called as a MASAKI group, but I don't know. However, that group is composed of three high-ranking officials.
- Q. So that General SUGIYAMA as Assistant Chief of Staff was acting for the Big Three group?
- A. The Chief of Staff was a member of the Imperial Household; the War Minister had already resigned, and the General Superintendent of Education were the ones who considered the future recommendation.
- Q. Who then was the Chief of Staff who was a part of the Imperial Household?
- A. It was Prince KAN-IN.
- Q. Then it became possible for Prince KAN-IN to exert influence on the Emperor the same as it would for the Keeper of the Privy Seal?
- A. In order to explain that situation I must tell you that there is a form we have to go through in connection with the appointment of Army and Navy Ministers. Under Army and Navy regulations their Ministers must be high-ranking officers of respective Departments. Therefore, whoever receives appointment for a ministerial office must as a matter of procedure ask the highest ranking officer in Navy or Army, respectively, to recommend them for the position.
- Q. That highest ranking officer will be the Chief of Staff of the Army or the Chief of Staff of the Navy, is that not correct?
- A. That is correct.
- Q. Do you know NAGANO, Osani?
- A. Yes. I know him. He came recommended as Navy Minister for my Cabinet.

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Q. So he is an Admiral?
A. Yes.

Q. What is his reputation for truth and honesty?
A. He is known to be very exact in doing things.

Q. Is it not true he is also known to have opposed the Washington Naval Limitations Conference?
A. As to that I do not know well enough.

Q. Do you know HAYASHI Raizburo?
A. Yes, I do. He became Minister of Justice in my Cabinet.

Q. What is his reputation for truth and honesty?
A. He was known to be a very honest man. At first Mr. Choku OHARA was recommended for Justice Minister, even by Prince KONOYE. I believe I was given a slip of paper indicating so, and I knew him because of my relationship with him in the OKADA Cabinet. He was an advocate of the Emperor's office as a compromise candidate, as a result of which Army side objected to his appointment, there being nothing else to do but to change appointment to Raizburo HAYASHI for Justice Minister.

(Mr. HIROTA states that the term Emperor is used by him to denote an organ of government and not as a religious symbol and he did not like to be quoted as one who is defining that term because even the constitutional lawyers in this country have not been able to clearly define his position.

Captain Phelps now states "Your interpretation is accepted by me for the duration of our discussions!")

Continuation of above answer:

For that reason, as I said, before Choku OHARA's appointment to the Justice Minister was objected to by the Army side. At the time his qualification for Minister of Justice was discussed. I believe he was Attorney General, but I am not very clear on that point. Mr. HAYASHI now is a member of the Privy Council.

Q. What was his reputation for truth and honesty?
A. He is considered quite honest.

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Q. Do you know Mr. Hachisaburo HIRAO?

A. Yes, I know him.

Q. What is his reputation for truth and honesty?

A. He is one of the leading businessmen and he was so devoted to the education of young people, even establishing a higher school. Because of his interest in education he was made a Minister of Education in my Cabinet.

Q. Do you know Toshio SHIMADA?

A. Yes, I know him.

Q. What is his reputation for truth and honesty?

A. He is a leading member of Seiyu-Kai Political Party; there were two members from said Party to occupy ministerial offices in my Cabinet, and he was one of them. He is a man well-versed in agricultural problems; therefore, he was appointed as a Minister for Agriculture and Forestry in my Cabinet.

Q. Do you know Field Marshal UEHARA?

A. I do not know him.

Q. Do you know him by reputation?

A. Yes, I know him by name.

Q. What is his reputation for truth and honesty?

A. He is a man who died quite some time ago.

Q. Do you know UEDA Shumichi?

A. I do not know him.

Q. Do you know him by reputation?

A. I do not know anyone by that name.

Q. He was not the Secretary to Prince KONOYE?

A. I can not recollect anyone by that name.

Q. Do you know KAWASAKI, Takukichi?

A. Yes, I know him.

Q. What is his reputation?

A. He was an influential member of Minsai-to, a political party. He came recommended by Prince KONOYE when I formed my Cabinet, and he became the Minister of Commerce and Industry.

Q. During the time General TERAUCHI was Minister of War in your Cabinet, did he or did he not attempt to influence you to

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- wage war on China?
- A. No.
- Q. On whom do you place responsibility for the outbreak of war in China during your term of office?
- A. During my term of office as Premier of my own Cabinet Chinese incidents were very few. At the same time major issues confronting Army was the reformation of Army itself.
- Q. Were you not Prime Minister on 7 July 1937 by Occidental calendar at the time when the "Okachio Bridge incident happened?
- A. I was not Premier at that time.
- Q. You were Foreign Minister?
- A. Yes.
- Q. In whose Cabinet, Prince KONOYE?
- A. Yes, his First Cabinet.
- Q. Do you know OGAWA, Gotaro?
- A. Yes, he also was an influential member of Minsei-to Political Party. When I formed my Cabinet one TANOMOGI and KAWASAKI joined us. Shortly afterwards KAWASAKI died. Then Gotaro OGAWA came to take his place in my Cabinet. He also was a member of the Minsei-to Political Party.
- Q. What is Mr. OGAWA's reputation for truth and honesty?
- A. He is quite honest. He was once Professor at Kyoto Imperial University.
- Q. What is Mr. TANOMOGI's reputation for truth and honesty?
- A. He also was a good man.
- Q. By good do you mean honest?
- A. He was thought to be honest.
- Q. Did you know MAEDA, Yonezo?
- A. Yes, I know him. He is also an influential member of the Seiyukai Political Party and he came recommended to us by Prince KONOYE.
- Q. At this particular time when you were Prime Minister you were elected by Genyosha?
- A. Yes, the fact of being a member of Genyosha goes back when I was a young man and when I became a diplomat I was again persuaded to join it.

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Q. You mean to become active again, not to rejoin, do you not?

A. Let me explain on that point: in my middle school days I ruined my health and in my neighborhood there was a Judo gymnasium close by our place. For a period of three years I attended the gymnasium for physical training. Thereafter, I came to Tokyo and attended schools, as I stated yesterday, and finally became a diplomat. Then staying in England for a period of over four years I returned to Japan. At that time I was requested to remain as a member of Genyosha because one who received Judo training at its gymnasium became diplomat.

Q. As an honorary member, do you mean?

A. Just an ordinary member.

Q. So you would be called a director?

A. I did not have any other connection than that of a member. The Genyosha is in Fukuoka Prefecture, and because of my assignment as diplomat student otherwise outside of the Prefecture I did not have any direct connection with its operation.

Capt. Phelps: I believe we will leave you now and return some other time.

CERTIFICATE OF INTERPRETER

I, J. K. Sano, being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of seven (7) pages, are true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 1st day of

February 1946.

Calhoun W. J. Phelps

Duly Detailed Investigating Officer
International Prosecution Sec. GHQ, SCAP

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Certificate of Stenographer

I, Lucille C. Brunner, hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Lucille C. Brunner
Stenographer

Certificate of Interrogator

I, Calhoun W. J. Phelps, Captain, JAGD, Serial No. O-904367, certify that on the twenty-ninth day of January, 1946, personally appeared before me HIROTA Koki, and according to J. K. Sano, Interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan

Calhoun W. J. Phelps
Captain, JAGD

1 February 1946
Date

INTERROGATION OF

Koki Hirota

Date and Time: 4 February 1946, 1000-1600 Hours

Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan

Present : Koki Hirota
Captain Calhoun W. J. Phelps, Interrogator
J. K. Sano, Interpreter
Ruth F. Anderson, Stenographer

Questions by : Captain Phelps

BY CAPTAIN PHELPS: Do you solemnly swear, by Almighty God, that you will truly and accurately interpret and translate from English into Japanese and from Japanese into English, as may be required of you, in this proceeding?

BY MR. SANO: I do.

Q. Mr. Hirota, what was the purpose of Genyosha?

A. I am wondering if the Genyosha was organized about the time of the Meiji - the tenth year of Meiji Incident. What is known as the Seigo Insurrection? That is before I was born. It appears that younger people who are descendants of the Old Samurai Clan who joined with forces of the Seigo who arose against the Shoshu Faction represented civil groups in the government then existing. This Seigo represented a group of people known as Sasshu Faction, the military faction, against a group of governmental officials who usurped for themselves the power of the government for their own selfish purposes, although the Meiji Restorations granted more liberal power to the people. To this faction, led by Seigo, were joined such statesmen as Taneomi SOEJIMA of Hizzen, particularly of Saga area, and Taisuke ITAGAKE of Tosa and Shimpei ETO. Together they rebelled against the government as a result of which civil disturbances arose in various parts of the country. The Seigo rebellion was the most noticeable one among them, and it later became known by the name of the Seigo Rebellion. When the Seigo group arose against the government, the young people, as I mentioned before, from the Fukuoka area, joined with them. As a result of that insurrection, older people of the Fukuoka Prefecture either died or were put to death and some committed suicide, leaving young people fifteen or sixteen years old. The way I understand the Genyosha came into being is briefly as I mentioned above. I did not know just for what purpose those people organized the Genyosha. In the constitution of the Genyosha were found three principles, and they were in substance, although I am not quoting verbatim: First, to respect and honor the Emperor, and I think what was meant by that is that some group of people instead of the Emperor was exercising governmental power. The second

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principle was immediately proceeding the Meiji Restoration a new doctrine was adopted for opening a country and becoming a more liberal nation and to foster the prosperity of Japan, because up to the Meiji Restoration, Japan closed her doors to the outside world. Thirdly, to expand the right of the people. After the Meiji Restoration, Emperor Meiji issued an Imperial rescript known as the Five Article Pledge of the Meiji Emperor, and in that Imperial rescript contained one old governmental function which will be carried out by first consulting public opinion. As a result of that provision in the Imperial pledge, people wanted to establish the Diet system. I have read these things I have mentioned herein in what is known to be the principles followed by the Genyosha. I think they were the principles adopted by this society.

- Q. Mr. Hirota, is it possible for you to confine your answers to a simple yes or no and then at the end of each day's interrogation, I will give you time to make such supplemental remarks as you wish to make.
- A. Yes.
- Q. That is agreeable with you?
- A. Yes.
- Q. In later years would you say the principle or the purpose of the Genyosha was to improve relations with China and to educate and train all Japanese persons to work harder for Japan?
- A. Partially yes and partially no.
- Q. Was the portion of which you would answer yes to educate and train all Japanese to work harder for Japan?
- A. I don't think that would be completely true, however, I believe they taught the Chinese language among their work.
- Q. You are answering the whole thing then, is that correct?
- A. As an educational program, they taught the Chinese language to twelve or thirteen of their members. More energy was expended in the physical development of their men.
- Q. How did they carry out their program? Other than teaching, did they use magazines or just what means were used?

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- A. I believe Chinese language instruction was given some of the members of the society who knew the language, however, for the last two or three years, I believe they issued a leaflet folded into two parts (indicating about 14 inches by about 16 inches long). In other words, the size of the leaflet was just about twice as large as this writing tablet, and I believe the society was sending those leaflets to their members.
- Q. Who published this leaflet?
- A. I don't know in detail, however, those leaflets must have been published by the staff members of the society at Fukuoka.
- Q. Genyosha was a national organization, was it not?
- A. No, it never was.
- Q. Do you know who were members of this organization?
- A. I do not know, because I haven't even seen the roster of the membership, but I presume some of the men with whom I received my physical training must no doubt remain as their members.
- Q. Name some of them.
- A. Quite a few of them passed away, but a man such as Tatsuma HAKODA, Shintaro SHINDO, Taketora OGATA, Kazuma SHINDO, Kokura YOSHIDA, who is much older a person than I am. You want some more?
- Q. Yes.
- A. Wasaburo YAMASAKI, these are the men whom I know rather well as members of the Genyosha.
- Q. Were the members of Genyosha of any specific type such as high government officials, business people, army people, influential people, or what?
- A. One of the most influential members of the Genyosha who has maintained a long relationship with it was Mitsuru TOYAMA, however, this man did not have anything to do with the government. If any one at all who had any relationship with the governments, perhaps I and Mr. Ogato would be the only one.
- Q. Your answer, then, is no specific type of people were members of the Genyosha?
- A. My answer is that those who attended the physical training at Genyosha are the ones who became the members, chiefly so. Shortly before I was brought over here, to Sugamo Prison, I was told that one Lieutenant

Interrogation of Koki Hirota

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General now in Reserve Service by the name of Hatsutaro HARAGUCHI also was a member of Genyosha.

- Q. Did Genyosha train young people by making them apprentices?
- A. No, they did not, absolutely. They taught principally the art of Judo and fencing.
- Q. Is the membership of the Genyosha secret?
- A. Genyosha is permitted by the government to function as an incorporated body to foster and to educate young people of the rural districts.
- Q. Is that all of Japan?
- A. It is of that particular district or area.
- Q. My question was, is membership in the organization secret?
- A. The membership in the Genyosha was not secret at all. I think it was not secret because it was an incorporated body recognized by the government.
- Q. Was TOYAMA an organizer of Genyosha?
- A. I believe perhaps he was.
- Q. In your opinion, did this organization formulate secret policies and force them upon the government?
- A. I believe as Genyosha, it did not have such inference. As I have explained before, this organization devoted itself to the education of young people but never had anything to do with politics. It is not a political organization.
- Q. So it never used terror in any manner at all?
- A. It is said fifty or sixty years ago they resorted to terror.
- Q. But not recently?
- A. Never.
- Q. Did General Doihara, as head of the Special Service Organization, - would he be in a position to know whether or not Genyosha had used terror in recent years?
- A. I do not know whether he would have or not.
- Q. Have you ever heard of Shimpeitai using terror to force policies on the government?

Interrogation of Koki Hirota

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- A. I read it in newspapers when they were arrested, - when the members of Shimpeitai were arrested.
- Q. When was that? Approximately?
- A. Although my recollection is not very clear, I think it was four or five years ago or maybe five or six years ago.
- Q. Were you not a member of TOYAMA's funeral committee in October of 1944?
- A. Yes, I was a member of the committee.
- Q. Was TOYAMA a member of the Black Dragon Society, Kokuryukai?
- A. I do not know.
- Q. Is it not true that representatives of TOYAMA went to the Premier on several occasions to tell him how to act in certain matters?
- A. I do not know clearly in what matters they did or if they did at all, however, I was told that TOYAMA in person made an approach to the government before the Japanese-Russo War.
- Q. Did that also happen prior to the Manchurian Incident?
- A. At about the time of the Manchurian Incident I was stationed in Russia, so I do not know that situation.
- Q. Did you ever receive letters from Mr. TOYAMA when you were in Russia?
- A. I never had any exchange of communication between myself and Mr. TOYAMA.
- Q. Yet you were raised in the TOYAMA household were you not?
- A. No.
- Q. Were you not adopted by Mr. TOYAMA, or did you not live in their home?
- A. Absolutely not.
- Q. Did you live in their home? You told me the other day when you came to the Imperial University you lived with Mr. TOYAMA, is that not correct?
- A. I did not. I mentioned, however, that I called on him once when I came to Tokyo after graduating from military school.
- Q. You were a member of Genyosha, is that correct?

Interrogation of Koki Hirota

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- A. As I said previously, upon return from England they asked me to join them for the sake of educating young people, so I became a member.
- Q. Do you know any members of the Kokuryukai?
- A. I don't know his first name, but I know one by the name of Kuzuo.
- Q. He was president of the organization, is that right?
- A. I don't know whether he was the president or not, but he was actually in charge.
- Q. Was he a member of the Army?
- A. I don't know, but perhaps he was not.
- Q. Was this organization a secret organization?
- A. I don't know real well whether it was or not, but their activities were so well known to the public and they were quite active before the Japanese-Russian war.
- Q. Did this organization take any part in formulating the policies of the attack on Manchuria?
- A. I do not know, because I was not in Japan then.
- Q. Did you ever hear of individuals of the Kokuryukai getting up in the Diet and telling the government how they should act?
- A. I don't know whether any member of Kokuryukai, the Black Dragon Society, was a member of the Diet.
- Q. Is it not true that this organization was the motivating force in the formation of the Ethiopian question conference?
- A. I have a faint recollection, although I do not know, just what they did, but they might have been connected with the Ethiopian conference.
- Q. Did they not work for assistance to Ethiopia as against Italy?
- A. My understanding is that discriminating acts against other nations is not good, therefore, I think they were against Italy.
- Q. Actually the Black Dragon Society was a militaristic and bureaucratic organization, was it not?
- A. If you observe them from outside, one could perhaps say that they were nationalistic, but I do not know whether they were militaristic or not.

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- Q. Is it not true that the Fascist movement in Japan was begun in this organization?
- A. My understanding of the Black Dragon Society is that they were opposed to Fascism and were behind the family system of Japan.
- Q. Imperial rule?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Did individuals of this organization ever get up and tell the government how to act in certain matters?
- A. I believe they advocated the popular election system which is based upon the family system of Japan.
- Q. In what ways did they advocate that system?
- A. I do not remember it well, but I think that the right to vote in a popular election would be given to the head of each family. I don't know for sure whether that was advocated, by Black Dragon Society specifically.
- Q. You don't know, then, who advocated such a vote?
- A. What I believe is that that movement was carried on by individuals who could be considered as a member of the Black Dragon Society as well as by people other than the members of the Black Dragon Society.
- Q. How do you know that the Black Dragon Society was interested in this popular suffrage?
- A. I feel that way because I have been receiving various pamphlets around that time.
- Q. Where was the headquarters for the Black Dragon Society?
- A. I don't know.
- Q. You don't know it was in Tokyo?
- A. Of course, it was in Tokyo.
- Q. When was this society organized?
- A. I don't know when it was organized, but the person who organized it is Ryohei USHIDA.

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- Q. Is he still living?
- A. He died. After he died the person who handled the affairs of the Black Dragon Society is Mr. Kuzuo.
- Q. Whose first name is what?
- A. Yoshihisa. I think perhaps it is so.
- Q. You were quite close to this society, were you not?
- A. No, sir.
- Q. Your name is carried on the roster of members of the Black Dragon Society?
- A. I don't know.
- Q. Well, you know it now.
- A. I still don't know because I never became a member.
- Q. Do you believe you were an honorary member on the Board of Directors?
- A. Not in any capacity at all.
- Q. To your knowledge?
- A. I firmly believe I was not.
- Q. Why do you firmly believe it?
- A. I never became a member of any and all societies, except retaining a membership in my own alumni association or in institutions where I trained myself in the art of Judo.
- Q. My statement was you might have been a member of the Board of Directors, an honorary member?
- A. I understand that, but I never was.
- Q. To your knowledge?
- A. That is right. From what I know I never was.
- Q. Did you ever hear that the principle of this organization was to serve Imperialism and to promote the Imperial rule which will include the six directions?

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A. Six directions?

Q. Heaven and Earth, North, South, East, and West?

A. I have never heard of anything like that, nor have I read or have I heard or seen anything like that.

Q. Were you friendly with Nakano SEIGO?

A. Yes. He came from the same place, and he was a member of the Diet, and I believe he was a member of Genyosha.

Q. He was also a member of the Black Dragon Society?

A. I don't know.

Q. Did he keep it a secret from you that he was a member of such society?

A. My relationship with him did not go that far, and he did not disclose it to me, therefore, I do not know. Not only that, Mr. Nakano followed the policy to fight against me.

Q. The membership in this organization was secret, was it not?

A. That I do not know.

Q. But you suspicion that since it was a large organization and you only know one member?

A. That I don't believe the membership was kept secret. I don't know for sure, and Mr. Kuzuo should know all about it.

Q. Was not this organization used by the War Ministry as a secret organization abroad?

A. That I don't know. I don't know absolutely.

Q. Do you know Mr. Toyataro OBATA?

A. I know him.

Q. Do you know if he was a member of the Black Dragon Society?

A. I believe he was a member.

Q. Do you know Hiroshi Ikeda?

A. Perhaps he was, because those people are followers of Masuzo YOSHIDA.

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- Q. Do you know Masuzo YOSHIDA?
- A. I know him.
- Q. Was he also a member?
- A. Perhaps he was.
- Q. Do you know Mr. Shin KOWATARI?
- A. I know him.
- Q. Is he a member of the same club?
- A. Perhaps he is a member of that club.
- Q. Do you know if he was a member of the Black Dragon Society?
- A. Perhaps he was, because he was close to Mr. Yoshida.
- Q. Do you know Mr. Iwao Saichi?
- A. There is some name similar to that. I don't know.
- Q. Do you know Mr. Rokusuke SAKAI?
- A. I don't know him.
- Q. Mr. Ichiro SUZUKI?
- A. I don't know him.
- Q. Shinichiro KAWAHARA?
- A. I don't believe I have heard his name.
- Q. Do you know Colonel Kingoro HASHIMOTO?
- A. I know his name.
- Q. Was he a member of the Black Dragon Society?
- A. I don't know.
- Q. Do you know Professor Genchi KATO?
- A. I don't know him.

Q. Do you know Mr. Toyasaburo KIKUCHI?

A. I don't know him. I believe there might have been a Minister of Education by that name.

Q. That is the one.

A. But I am not sure whether he is the one you have in mind.

Q. That is the one. Was he a member of the Black Dragon Society?

A. I don't know him at all personally.

Q. Do you know Kamakichi TAKAHASHI?

A. I know his name only.

Q. Do you know whether or not he was a member of the Black Dragon Society?

A. I don't know at all.

Q. Do you know Yoshihisa FUJII?

A. I don't know him.

Q. Taketora OGATA?

A. I know him.

Q. Do you know whether or not he was a member?

A. That I don't know.

Q. He was close to this same group, was he not?

A. I don't know as to that, however, he is a newspaper man.

Q. You don't know whether this society had any members in China spreading propaganda, do you?

A. I don't know.

Q. In your opinion, would their membership have been that large, that they may have members -

A. I don't know what they have been doing, nor do I know what size the membership was.

Q. What kind of propaganda did they have?

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- A. I don't know at all.
- Q. You never saw any?
- A. I have never seen or heard of it.
- Q. In your opinion, did this society have any connection with the 2.26 Incident?
- A. That I don't know. I can't even imagine they had.
- Q. You would not know whether or not Ikki KITA was a member of this society?
- A. I know Ikki KITA by name only, however, I do not know if he had any relationship with the society.
- Q. Although not a member of this society, were you close to the society?
- A. I didn't have anything to do with that, close or otherwise.
- Q. Were you close to Kuzuo, Ikeda, Yoshida, any of those men?
- A. No, except Mr. Yoshida who came from Fukuoka Prefecture and is a senior to me.
- Q. Senior to what?
- A. Senior citizen from Fukuoka Prefecture.
- Q. Did Mr. Yoshida ever attempt to force his policy on you either when you were Foreign Minister or Premier?
- A. I believe Mr. Yoshida was dead about the time I held office. Of that, of course, I am not clear as to the date, however, I do not have any recollection ever that he forced any policy on me.
- Q. Did any of these other friends of his attempt to influence you in any manner?
- A. They did not.
- Q. When you were in office, did you ever receive any threats from the Black Dragon Society?
- A. I don't believe I received any.
- Q. You would have known it if you had, would you not?
- A. Yes, that is right.

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- Q. And you did not? To the best of your recollection, you did not?
- A. No, sir, I did not.
- Q. Who was responsible as Foreign Minister for your passing upon your three principles in relation to China?
- A. The three principles, in dealing with China in a diplomatic way, was brought about as a result of a conference between the Foreign Ministry and the War Ministry.
- Q. Between yourself and whom?
- A. On the discussion of a policy in China, why, we who are of the Foreign Ministers Office and the military group get together and talk about it and present it to - members of that end present it to me as Foreign Minister.
- Q. Does the Foreign Minister alone formulate policies for foreign countries?
- A. Hardly ever.
- Q. Actually does not the Chief of Staff of the Army formulate your policy in dealing with foreign countries?
- A. I can't tell you whether it was from the Chief of Staff or from the War Minister, but they come from the military source.
- Q. You can tell me, can you not, who told you to put into effect these three principles in China?
- A. I can not tell.
- Q. You mean you do not remember?
- A. As I said before, a matter of that nature is discussed among the staff members, and then was brought up to me.
- Q. The War Minister in your Cabinet was ^{TERAUCHI *cut off*} TAROCHI, was it not?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Did he make you adopt this policy?
- A. When he referred to these three fundamental principles, - could you help me to the extent of giving a date?
- Q. It was at the time you were Foreign Minister and about 1935 in the Occidental calander. Late 1935 or early 1936.

A. ^{TERAUCHI *copy*}
TAROCHI was not War Minister in these years.

Q. Who was?

A. At the time of the February 26 Incident, the War Minister was General KAWASHIMA, who succeeded General Senjuro HAYASHI. When I presented my three fundamental principles in dealing with the China affair, I can not tell just which of these two War Ministers was in office.

Q. But it was probably KAWASHIMA, was it not?

A. Because of how many months General KAWASHIMA remained in office as the War Minister, I can not tell you definitely.

Q. But you knew or probably knew when you had to write these three principles that they did, in effect, reduce China to a Japanese colony should China accept those three principles?

A. There was no such a thing contemplated.

Q. That is, it was not contemplated by you?

A. I did not contemplate anything like that at all.

Q. But the Army may have contemplated it?

A. I wonder if my three fundamental principles - so-called my three fundamental principles - could be incorporated in that matter.

Q. By the Army?

A. By any one at all who heard my three principles.

Q. Was not a copy of these three principles delivered to the office of Mr. Grew here in Tokyo?

A. I don't know, and if he said he received one, he must have received it, but my three principles were not anything which should be kept away from him.

Q. We will see you after lunch.

1200 HOURS

1330 HOURS

Q. Before we go into the three principles, let's go back to these societies again. Did you belong to any society other than Genyosha?

A. I did not except Genyosha.

Q. So you were not a member of the Kokuikai at all?

A. I remember I was invited to join the Kokuikai once, but I am not sure whether I am a member of it or not.

Q. Were you invited there by Mr. Izawa?

A. Perhaps it was so.

Q. Or by Prince Konoye, might it have been?

A. I don't know just who extended to me the invitation, but when I returned from Russia, I was invited to attend one of their parties.

Q. You were not a member of the Sekiseika were you?

A. No, sir.

Q. Do you know anything about the organization?

A. My understanding is that Sekiseika was operated by Kingoro HASHIMOTO who maintained an office near my place. For that reason, I used to see him as I walked along the street.

Q. Do you know any of its members?

A. I don't know anything about that.

Q. Do you know the purpose of that organization?

A. That, too, I do not know, but all I remember is whoever they were wore uniforms.

Q. Do you know anything about the Kokuhonsha?

A. I don't know that either.

Q. Did you ever hear that Baron Hiranuma founded the Kokuhonsha?

A. Yes, I heard that part of it.

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Q. And it would have been founded about 1904 or 1905, is that about right?

A. I don't know anything about that at all.

Q. Who were some of its members?

A. I don't know any of the members, but I presume those who were close to Mr. Hiranuma could have been the members.

Q. Maybe General Hata Shingo?

A. I really don't know the individuals.

Q. Would you know the purpose of the organization?

A. I don't know who they were, because I wasn't paying any attention.

Q. Did any of your close friends belong to this organization?

A. As I said, I don't know any who belonged as a member, but any one who was close to Mr. Hiranuma could have been a member.

Q. What do you know about the Kochisha?

A. I don't know anything.

Q. What do you know of the Shimpeitai?

A. I read about it in the newspaper, but I really don't know what the true nature of that organization was.

Q. Would you remember whether it was organized before the 1932 Incident?

A. I know that people connected with Shimpeitai were arrested and are being tried in the court, but I don't know anything about it.

Q. Do you recall the names Tatsuo Amano and Torao MAEPA?

A. I remember this AMANO called on me once or twice at my residence, but as to the latter, I don't know anything about him.

Q. What was the nature of AMANO's visit to your residence?

A. Mr. AMANO was brought over to me by Seigo NAKANO. That was toward the end of the year before last.

Q. For what reason did he come to see you?

A. He was greatly concerned over the progress of the war and he was opposing the policy of Tojo.

Q. Is it not true that Mr. Amano is one of the founders of the Shimpeitai?

A. That I do not know.

Q. Did you ever hear that the purpose of the assassinations in 1932 were to assassinate the entire cabinet then in power.

A. That I don't know.

Q. Did you ever hear that the Shimpeitai wished to establish a new cabinet under Prince Seianga?

A. That I don't know.

Q. Did you ever hear that they desired to get rid of people who opposed the aggression in Manchuria?

A. I don't know about that. Most of these things, if they are true, occurred when I was in Russia, and I don't know.

Q. After your return from Russia, have you ever heard that the Shimpeitai tried to force its policy on the government by threats of assassination or otherwise?

A. As to that, I have no knowledge, nor have I heard about it. I have no knowledge about them at all.

Q. Did you ever hear that the Emperor was forced to publish a rescript declaring war at the point of a gun?

A. I don't know.

Q. Are you familiar with the Tokummu Kikan?

A. Are you referring to the activities in China or in Japan?

Q. Both.

A. I heard that Tokummu Kikan were functioning in China in various ways.

Q. Did you ever learn of any of its members?

A. I don't know anything about that.

Q. Did you ever know anything about that?

A. No.

Q. Did you ever hear that Tashio Shiratori was connected with this?

A. I am learning for the first time now. I don't know anything about him.

- Q. Do you know anything of the Ketsumeidan Jiken?
- A. I learned through the newspapers.
- Q. Do you know any of its members?
- A. I don't know.
- Q. What was the purpose of this organization?
- A. That, too, I do not know except that the case was tried in court.
- Q. What case do you refer to?
- A. The Ketsumeidan trial.
- Q. What do you know of Yoku Sei Kai?
- A. I only know the name.
- Q. Who organized this party?
- A. I don't know, but perhaps the politicalists then must have organized it.
- Q. It was organized was it not about April of 1942?
- A. I don't know as to that, but I think it must have been organized following the Yoku Sei Kai.
- Q. Did you ever hear that General Abe founded the Yoku Sei Kai?
- A. I heard General Abe became president of it, but I don't know whether he founded it or not.
- Q. This was an ultra-Nationalistic society, was it not?
- A. Membership in the Yoku Sei Kai embraced practically all members of the Diet and naturally there might have been a difference in individual opinions.
- Q. Were the generals, the elder statesmen, also members of this organization?
- A. While I haven't been paying much attention to that, and I don't remember it very well -
- Q. But you were a member of the elder statesmen, were you not?
- A. Yes, I was.

Q. Yet you were not a member of the Yoku Sei Kai?

A. No, sir.

Q. Was the purpose of the Yoku Sei Kai, in your opinion, to wage war?

A. I don't know because I had nothing to do with it.

Q. I asked for your opinion.

A. I don't know anything about it, therefore, I can't express an opinion concerning it.

Q. Would you have considered it the war party of Japan?

A. You mean to say war referring to this Pacific conflict that we had?

Q. Yes.

A. I won't be able to tell you because I don't know what they were doing.

Q. Would you say that Admiral Seizo KOBAYASHI was a member of the Yoku Sei Kai?

A. I am just wondering if Mr. KOBAYASHI became the head of it at one time.

Q. But as best you recall, he was a member?

A. I remember he became the president of the organization, but I don't know whether he was a member before he became a president of the organization.

Q. What do you know of Akita-Ken?

A. I don't know.

Q. Did you ever hear of Yuzonsha?

A. I don't know anything about it.

Q. You would not know whether Hasigawa, who was the Procurator of the Marioka District Court was a member or not?

A. I don't know that person either.

Q. Or whether Shumei OKAWA was a member?

A. I don't know him. I know his name, of course.

Q. Or whether Ikki Kita ^{enjo} was a member?

A. I don't know.

Q. What do you know of Sakura Kai?

A. I don't know.

Q. You don't know anything?

A. I don't know anything about Sakura Kai, the Cherry Club. The only knowledge I have of Sakura Kai is that that organization existed among the army officers and his name was mentioned about the time of the 2.26 Incident.

Q. Whose name was mentioned?

A. Sakura Kai.

Q. There are still boys clubs belonging to Sakura Kai, are there not?

A. I don't know anything about it at all.

Q. Do you know anything about Kozakura Kai?

A. I don't know anything about it.

Q. Do you know anything of Seyo Kai, the Stars and Ocean Club.

A. I don't know.

Q. Would you know whether or not navy men belonged to this organization?

A. I haven't heard anything about that.

Q. What do you know of the Thirty Six Club?

A. I don't know anything about it.

Q. Did you ever hear that Colonel KOBAYASHI formed the Thirty-Six Club?

A. I have a slight recollection that I have seen a small pamphlet with the title, "The Crisis of 1936 and 1937," referring to year.

Q. Was Colonel KOBAYASHI named on the pamphlet?

A. I don't remember.

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- Q. Going back to Kokuikai, was this organization founded from the Shin Kanryo?
- A. The Shin Kanryo or New Bureaucracy, - I can't tell whether it was solely organized by people connected with Shin Kanryo or not, but possibly it embraced people connected with politics as well as business men.
- Q. And army and navy personnel?
- A. I don't know as to that because I am not familiar with the inner organization.
- Q. Do you believe Mr. Izawa formed this organization after the Manchurian Incident of 1931?
- A. I don't know. I learned of this name Kokuikai upon return from Russia. Until that time I never heard of even the name.
- Q. Who was the leader of this organization at the time when you were invited to become a member?
- A. I don't know who was the leader, but a man such as Mr. Yuzawa was no doubt a leader.
- Q. That is Michio Yuzawa?
- A. I believe that is right, that name is right, but that is my vague recollection of his name.
- Q. But men like Mr. Masaatsu Yasuoka?
- A. Perhaps he was, I think.
- Q. Mr. Yasuoka was an associate of Mr. Okawa, was he not?
- A. I don't know about that.
- Q. Prince Konoye was a member of this organization, wasn't he?
- A. I don't remember clearly.
- Q. General Araki was a member, wasn't he?
- A. That, too, I don't know very definitely.
- Q. Fumio Goto was a member too, was he not?
- A. He could be, I think.

Cwp

- Q. Mr. Karasawa was a member, wasn't he?
- A. As to that, I have no clear-cut recollection, but perhaps so.
- Q. Mr. Hozaka, the Governor of Tokyo, was a member, was he not?
- A. As to him, I have no definite recollection, but he might have been.
- Q. Viscount Okabe was a member, was he not? His first name is Nagakage.
- A. I know him. He formerly was a career diplomat.
- Q. Was he a member of this organization?
- A. I am unable to say that he was a member.
- Q. Mr. Kawada Isao was a member, was he not?
- A. I don't know.
- Q. Mr. Kazuo Aoki was a member, was he not?
- A. I know him, but I don't know whether he was a member or not.
- Q. Mr. Tokuzo Aoki was a member, was he not?
- A. I know him, but I don't know whether he was a member or not?
- Q. Mr. Matsumoto Gato was a member too, was he not?
- A. I know him, but I don't know as to his membership in the organization.
- Q. Mr. Shigiro Yoshita who was not the cabinet member was also a member of this organization, was he not?
- A. There are two Shigiro Yoshitas, both served in the cabinet. One is now holding the office of Minister of Foreign Affairs and the other one held the office of Minister for the Department of Welfare. I think you mean that Welfare Department Minister.
- Q. Yes.
- A. As to him, I can not say definitely that he was a member, but he could be.
- Q. Count Sakai was a member, was he not?

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A. I think perhaps he was a member.

Q. General Abe was a member, was he not?

A. I don't know.

Q. Was Tomizo Abe a member?

A. Perhaps ~~he~~ was, I think.

Q. Was Inosuke TOMITA a member?

A. That name is not very familiar to me.

Q. Was Seinosuke Hashimoto a member?

A. I don't know any one by that name, but I am just wondering whether that name is given to me incorrectly?

Q. Could be. Was Mr. Tatsujro Oshima a member?

A. I know his name and perhaps he was a member.

Q. Was Mr. Tatsujro Machida a member?

A. Perhaps he was, I think.

Q. Did not this organization attract public notice in connection with the Kinkei Gakuin, the Academy of the Golden Pheasant?

A. I don't know whether they were connected with that organization or not, but I know there was such an institution in existence.

Q. Is it not true that you and Mr. Goto and Generak Araki were directors of this organization at one time, but resigned because of the stipulation of the charter of this organization that no officer could be a Minister in the government?

A. I don't remember any such a thing.

Q. Isn't it true that the party became most famous around July of 1934 when the Saito Cabinet fell, because of the Teijin ^{cup} Incident and the Okada Cabinet came into power?

A. I don't know much about that situation.

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Q. About which situation?

A. About that Teijin Incident.

Q. But it is true that when the Saito Cabinet fell and the Okada Cabinet came in that you and Mr. Goto and General Araki walked into that cabinet, is that not correct?

A. Yes, I think I did.

Q. And Mr. Fujii, Mr. Masanobu Fujii, also went into that cabinet as Finance Minister?

A. Yes.

Q. And isn't it also true that this party became more famous because General Nagada married the daughter of Mr. Goto?

A. I don't know as to General Nagada's relationship with Mr. Goto's daughter.

Q. But he was related to Mr. Goto, is that right?

A. I don't know anything about that relationship at all. This is the first time I heard about it here.

Q. Well, such a relationship between Major General Nagada would have made the people mistrust the cabinet, would it not?

A. I never felt that way, nor have I heard it presented in that way.

Q. Well, did not Kokuikai dissolve in about November of 1934?

A. That, too, I don't know.

Q. Weren't there about 100 members in this organization?

A. I don't know.

Q. Did not this organization attempt to collect various civilians who were experts and bring them into the government to put their services at the disposal of the army?

A. I did not have anything to do with Kokuikai, and I don't know anything about what they did.

- Q. As nearly as you remember it, was it not the chief organization to bring together the army and the government?
- A. As I said before, I have no knowledge of Kokuikai, and I don't know anything about it. As a diplomat, if it was anything pertaining to matters with foreign nations, I should know something about it, but any domestic situations, I have very little knowledge.
- Q. You told me this morning that the army brought to you these three points, the three principles, in dealing with China. If the army could do such to you as Foreign Minister, my question now is, could not an organization like Kokuikai try to bring the civilian population here into a firm relationship with the government so as to put the civilian heads of industry at the disposal of the army?
- A. From what I know about it myself in that connection, I have no knowledge whatsoever on this being true, and I meant I, as Foreign Minister, had not received any such recommendation or suggestions from outside sources.
- Q. When did you first become connected with the Imperial Rule Assistance Association?
- A. I never was a member of that organization.
- Q. Were you a member of the Political Rule Assistance Society?
- A. No, sir. I never was.
- Q. Was that organization organized by Prince Konoye?
- A. I believe that was organized while Prince Konoye was Premier.
- Q. Did Kokuryukai have anything to do with the organization of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association?
- A. I don't know whether there was any relationship between them, because I was not a member of either organization.
- Q. Did Mr. Kazuo have anything to do with the organization of the IRAA?
- A. I believe I learned through a newspaper that Kazuo had something to do with it.

- Q. As nearly as you remember, was not this organization founded about September of 1940?
- A. I have no memory as to that date.
- Q. In organizing this association, is it not true that members of the government and former heads of the government formed the nucleus around which the organization was built?
- A. I, myself, never had anything to do with it.
- Q. Do you know what its program was?
- A. What I have learned through reading the newspapers at that time.
- Q. As near as you remember, wasn't this association formed as the leaders of the country were preparing for war against the United States, Great Britain, or Russia?
- A. I can't even imagine what was the purpose, because I was not connected with the organization.
- Q. Do you know Mr. Ryoichi Sasagawa?
- A. I know his name only.
- Q. If he said that the leaders of the government were preparing for war, against the United States and Great Britain or Russia in 1940, would you believe that such were true?
- A. I wouldn't believe him because I don't know who is Mr. Sasagawa and I do not know what was the intention of this society.
- Q. But in 1940, you had retired from the government, had you not?
- A. Ever since 1938, I retired from the governmental service.
- Q. Was Mr. Ryoichi Sasagawa in a position in 1940 to know whether or not the leaders of the government were preparing for war against the United States or Russia?
- A. I don't know Mr. Sasagawa, and I don't know whether he was in such position.
- Q. Was the opinion of the Japanese people in 1940 that of hatred against the United States and Great Britain because of the aid which was going to China?

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A. Among some people in Japan, they held a view that the difficulty in settling the Chinese Incident was due to the support China was receiving from the United States and Great Britain.

Q. And those people were in power, were they not?

A. I can not make a clear statement in that regard.

Q. But your guess would be that that feeling was held by the War Minister in the Second Konoye Cabinet and such other members of Prince Konoye's Cabinet?

A. I could not make a clear statement, however, at the time the Second Konoye Cabinet was organized, Yosuke Matsuoka became Foreign Minister in his cabinet.

Q. What do you know of Kokusuikai?

A. I don't know anything at all about it.

Q. Would you call it a terrorist organization.

A. Although I do not know the true purpose of Kokusuikai, my understanding is that they are organized by a group of bosses, I might call them, among the common people of Osaka and neighborhood. That is the impression I received faintly through reading newspapers and other publications.

Q. Do you know any of its members?

A. I don't know.

Q. Would you call it a terrorist organization?

A. I don't know the character of the organization nor who belonged to it. I don't know whether I could call it a terrorist organization.

Q. What do you know of Makoto Musubi?

A. All I know is the title of that organization.

Q. Would you call it a terrorist organization?

A. It appears to be known to the people as such.

Q. Was its purpose ultra-nationalistic, would you say?

A. It could be imagined from the implication of the name of the society.

Q. Do you know whether or not Mr. Amano was a member of this organization?

A. I don't know anything about that.

Q. What do you know of Dai Nippon Seisento?

A. I heard that party was organized by Masuzo Yoshida, who is one of the followers of Ryohei Uchida in Osaka.

Q. This organization became the Dai Nippon Ishinkai after the introduction of the IRAA, did it not?

A. Yes, I heard something about changing of name of their organization through newspapers and so forth, and that new name though I understand was Ishinkai.

Q. What do you know of Shiunoso, the Purple Cloud Villa.

A. I know the name only.

Q. Was this a terrorist or trouble-maker organization?

A. I don't know what the purpose of that organization was.

Q. What do you know of Kokushi Domei? Nationalist Alliance?

A. I don't know.

Q. Do you know anything about the Dai Toa Senso Chosa Kai?

A. I don't know.

Q. Have you ever heard of this organization?

A. I don't remember ever hearing that name.

Q. Have you ever read a publication entitled "America's World Aggression" as published in the Japanese language in Tokyo about September 1944?

A. I have not read it.

Q. Have you ever heard of such a book or publication?

A. I haven't even heard of the name.

Q. What do you know of the Kokuhonsha? Society of the Foundations of the State?

A. Isn't it the one that I tried to explain this morning?

Q. It may be. Yes, it is. Would you say this organization supplied the brains to the Genyosha or to the Kokuryukai, the Black Dragon Society, while those societies actually did the work?

A. As to Genyosha, the relationship with Genyosha, I can positively say that there was no relationship such as you mention at all. Now, as to Kokuryukai, because of lack of sufficient knowledge of its functions, I can not tell their relationship with it, but my supposition is that neither of these organizations had anything to do with the Kokuhonsha.

Q. Would you have called the Kokuhonsha the organization of Super-Patriots of Japan?

A. Because I am not too familiar with the purpose of the Kokuhonsha, I can not tell you much about it, however, it could very well be a nationalistic organization.

Q. What do you know of Toa Keizai Chosa Kyoku, East Asia Economic Investigation Bureau?

A. I don't know anything of such organization, and I am wondering what sort of an organization it could be.

Q. Does the name tell you anything?

A. I don't think I can - I am wondering if it is one of the Bureaus of the government.

Q. Did you know Mr. Yoshiaki Hatta?

A. I know one by the name of Yoshiaki Hatta.

Q. That is the man.

A. I know him because he was the Railroad Minister.

Q. Do you know Mr. Muneichi Nakashima?

A. I don't know him.

Q. Do you know Mr. Kojio Sada?

A. I don't know him.

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Q. Mr. Takuo Okada?

A. No.

Q. Or Tomohiko Yamashita?

A. By name alone I can not locate him, by that name alone.

Q. Do you know Mr. Seiichiro DOKE?

A. I don't know him.

Q. Dr. Shumei OKAWA?

A. I know his name only.

Q. Are they financiers?

A. Shumei AKAWA is a scholar.

Q. A professor?

A. A professor.

Q. Then perhaps this board was set up, - this bureau was set up to see what economic interests there were in East Asia that Japan might be interested in? Is that possible?

A. That bureau being an organization which I do not know anything about, I can't answer that.

Q. Are you familiar with the Sekai Heiwa To?

A. No.

Q. Are you familiar with the Shuyo Dan?

A. I know it by name.

Q. Are you familiar with the Dai Nippon Kokusui Kai?

A. Kokusui Domei?

Q. No. Great Japan Nationalist Association.

A. I am just wondering if that organization is one and the same one as we had a little while ago.

Interrogation of Koki Hirota

4 Feb 1946

- Q. In this organization, Mr. Suzuki was the president and Mr. TAKAHASHI ^{Cap} Takashi the head.
- A. I don't know that organization at all.
- Q. Are you familiar with the Kokusuikai, the Society of the Spirit of Great Japan?
- A. I am again wondering if that is not one of the same group we discussed before noon.
- Q. Would you call that a gamblers' organization?
- A. That organization, the one that I tried to describe, was the one organized by many so-called bosses in the Osaka area.
- Q. Are you familiar with the Minrokai?
- A. I don't know.
- Q. Are there any things you now desire to tell us?
- A. Not particularly.
- Q. Anything at all about organizations or about anything?
- A. I don't think I have anything more because I have answered your questions by saying yes to things I know and no to the things I do not know.
- Q. Do you know if the Tanakan Memorial is actually a written document?
- A. I can not tell you definitely because I have not read it, although I have heard about it.
- Q. At what time did you hear about it?
- A. Perhaps I heard it while I was stationed in Holland. It was discussed as a world topic in newspapers in China and Japan.
- Q. This would have been about the time that General Tanaka held his meeting here in Tokyo and had his discussion with the Emperor, would it not?
- A. As to that, I haven't heard anything.

Interrogation of Koki Hirota

4 Feb 1946

Q. Do you know whether Mr. Fumio Goto later published a statement having about the same meaning as the Tanakan Memorial?

A. I don't know.

Q. To the best of your recollection, was not the Tanakan Memorial concerned with a plan of conquest of the world?

A. I don't know the contents of that memorial, therefore, I can not tell definitely about it, but at that time that matter was reported to the world as a big issue.

Q. Have you ever heard of the Nishisansuki?

A. No, I don't know him.

Q. It is an organization. Doesn't that mean five men in East Asia or Manchuria? It refers to Tojo and the other men who formulated the policy. It is a slang word for Tojo and the men in East Asia.

A. I don't remember ever hearing of that.

Q. As a forerunner for our discussion tomorrow, is it not true that after the 2.26 Incident the government adopted a stronger Foreign Policy to bring about closer relations with China.

A. I did not have that sort of impression, rather my memory serves me that there was not any difference.

Q. General Tojo made the statement in an interview that such was true.

A. Oh, is that so? Of course, I don't know what particular point he had in mind.

Q. Perhaps his is the army view while yours is the foreign affairs view? Could that be?

A. If the army is saying that their policy toward China became firmer, I don't know anything about that, however, I did not receive that sort of impression, however, during my cabinet the War Minister's chief concern was the reform of the army within itself.


Q. For any particular purpose?

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
- A. Yes, because for many years past, military cliques were known to be chief plotters for assassination of cabinet members and other important government officials and so forth, and the government's policy then established was to make a complete and thorough investigation of such attempt in behalf of army officers and to block out all dangers from that source. Utilizing the 2.26 Incident, the government attempted to impress them that their actions were not right and must be remedied forthwith before the government does anything else. About that time the Diet was to be opened and I tried to have an expression in the Imperial Rescript to be read in the opening of the Diet.
- Q. I think what you mean is I tried to get such an expression of the policy of the government in the rescript read before the Diet at the time at which it opened?
- A. Yes, at the time when the 2.26 Insurrection occurred, the Emperor was greatly angered by it and we wanted that feeling of the Emperor embodied in the rescript in the following words: "That Incident which occurred in Tokyo at this time is something which I regard as the most regrettable happening." And, incidentally, there never was in the history of Japan any expression such as "regrettable occurrence or incident" used by the Emperor and read at the opening message at the Diet. I remember when that Imperial message was read to the Diet, the entire membership of the Diet was so deeply impressed it created an atmosphere that this regrettable situation must be remedied. When I determined to plead with the Emperor to contain this statement in the message, - which amounted to sentencing the army that their action was not excusable, - it took far greater judgment and risk than I had. For my action in this, it took a great deal of courage and determination because the reaction of the army would be an unknown quality, but fortunately the army accepted the situation and the necessary investigation of the 2.26 Incident was made, and those army officers who were responsible for the Incident were punished and some were sentenced to death.

Certificate of Interpreter

I, J. K. Sano, a civilian, being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of thirty-three pages are true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.



Subscribed and sworn to before me this 6th day of February, 1946.



Captain Calhoun W. J. Phelps
Duly Detailed Investigating Officer
International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAI

Interrogation of Hoki Hirota

4 Feb 1946

Certificate of Stenographer

I, Ruth F. Anderson, hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Ruth F. Anderson

Certificate of Interrogator

I, Calhoun W. J. Phelps, Captain, ASN O-904367, certify that on the 4th day of February, 1946, personally appeared before me Koki Hirota, and according to J. K. Sano, Interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

Calhoun W. J. Phelps
Captain Calhoun W. J. Phelps

Tokyo, Japan

6th day of February 1946.

INTERROGATION OF

HIROTA, Koki

DATE: 7 February 1946

INTERROGATOR:

Captain Calhoun W. J. Phelps

EVID Doc # 1911-C

INTERROGATION OF

HIROTA, Koki

Date and Time: 7 February 1946, 1000-1200 hours

Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan

Present : HIROTA, Koki
: Captain Calhoun W. J. Phelps, Interrogator
: Mr. J. K. Sano, Interpreter
: Miss Edna Hickam, Stenographer

Questions by : Captain Calhoun W. J. Phelps

Oath of Interpreter: Administered by Captain Phelps:

Captain Phelps: Do you solemnly swear, by Almighty God, that you will truly and accurately interpret and translate from English into Japanese and from Japanese into English, as may be required of you in this proceeding?

Mr. Sano: I do.

Q. Mr. HIROTA, when you were Foreign Minister of the OKADA Cabinet, what were the three principles in dealing with China which you sent to the Chinese Government?

A. As you may know, a message was prepared in order to improve the Japanese-Chinese relationship which was estranged during the Manchurian incident which took place before the SAITO and OKADA Cabinets were formed. These three points in the message were to remedy or improve the Chinese-Japanese relationship.

Q. Do you remember the text of the three points specifically?

A. I believe I can give you the salient points of the memorandum.

Q. Will you state those three points, please?

A. First, the Manchurian incident became a cancer in the relationship between China and Japan, and it would be extremely difficult to remove that cancer. However, without touching the sore spot we thought that if we could make a satisfactory economic arrangement among Japan and China and Manchukuo (which was then established) it would serve the purpose. The reason for that is that in

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Japan there was a strong sentiment that in view of the fact that Manchukuo was already established we should attempt to have China recognize Manchukuo; but that problem presented considerable difficulty, because to ask China to recognize Manchukuo officially was not considered a proper request. However, in Manchuria there are produced large quantities of various grains which could be marketed in North China, and a similar situation existed in North China -- that is, some products could be sold to Manchukuo. Through such trade arrangement the relationship between Manchukuo and China could be improved. Generally speaking, that was the first point involved in that memorandum.

- Q. In relation to that one point, Mr. HIROTA, why wouldn't China recognize Manchukuo?
- A. I felt that China would be very reluctant to recognize the independence of Manchukuo because, as you know, of the way the Manchurian incident was started. That situation became an international issue and was discussed by the League of Nations.
- Q. Actually, Mr. HIROTA, was not Manchuria a part of China and therefore China would never accede to Japan's acquisition thereof?
- A. Yes. But what the Japanese had in mind at the time of the Manchurian incident was that instead of acquiring Manchuria for Japan, Japan wanted to make Manchuria a separate nation which would be governed by Manchurians.
- Q. But when Japan went into Manchuria, the Kwantung Army put Japanese into power in Manchuria, is that not correct?
- A. I maintain the same view, although I didn't have anything to do with it.
- Q. You said, Mr. HIROTA, that there was a strong sentiment in Japan for settling the Manchukuoan affair. Did that sentiment exist among those in power or among the common people of Japan?
- A. My guess on that point is, judging from what took place in order to establish Manchukuo, that the opinion was general in Japan.
- Q. Isn't it true that Japan wanted the economic production of Manchuria and North China at this time?
- A. I think there definitely was such demand insofar as Manchuria was concerned. I think it was a fact that Japan needed things produced in Manchuria, from the standpoint of food supplies.
- Q. She also needed the products of Manchuria in order to carry on a war, did she not?
- A. With what country or nation?

HIROTA, Koki

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- Q. Any nation Japan might have in mind.
- A. To those people who were war-minded what you said may have been true, but from my standpoint, acquisition of products from Manchuria to supply Japan with necessary food was absolutely essential.
- Q. You stated, Mr. HIROTA, that the people who were responsible for the Manchurian incident would know why that territory was necessary. Perhaps your view of that differs from mine. I would like your view as to how the Manchurian incident was started.
- A. If I may go into a fairly detailed story on that and delve into sort of an historical background --
- Q. Mr. HIROTA, would it be possible for you to now name for me the responsible parties in Japan, then at the summary of the interrogation this morning you may make your historical explanation? Is that agreeable with you?
- A. As far as names of responsible people are concerned, almost anyone who has been active in that incident should be responsible. However, I was not in Japan then, and the reason I suggested giving you a brief background of it was that perhaps I could give you a little clearer picture of the Manchurian incident.
- Q. Is it your opinion that General HONJO, who was Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army, was responsible for the Manchurian incident?
- A. What I know about General HONJO is what I heard after returning to Japan.
- Q. From Russia?
- A. From Russia. The way I understood General HONJO's position was that he was assigned to take command of the Kwantung Army without knowing what he was to accomplish there at the time when he was appointed, but later, so I was told, he found out what the Army wanted him to do.
- Q. But he would be called the responsible person for the Manchurian incident -- is that correct?
- A. I am not saying he is the one who promoted it, but he must be held responsible because he participated in it.
- Q. In your opinion, what was the position of General MINAMI in relation to the Manchurian incident?
- A. From the position of War Minister, which he held at the time of the Manchurian incident, it could reasonably be assumed that he would be the responsible party. I am drawing that conclusion from the view-point of the position he held.

HIROTA, Koki

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- Q. What was General MATSUI's position?
A. I don't know his relation with the Manchurian incident, because I don't know what position General MATSUI held.
- Q. But did you hear his name mentioned in connection with General HONJO's part and General MINAMI's part?
A. I do not remember that very well.
- Q. Did you hear Lt General KOISO's name mentioned in connection with this incident?
A. I do not remember clearly just what type of work General KOISO was doing. All those things I am telling you now are from my supposition, because I was not in this country then.
- Q. Do you recall having heard the part which Lt General TATEKAWA played in the Manchurian incident?
A. I can not tell you exactly what he was, but he could be called a very influential man in the Army.
- Q. Do you recall whether or not he took the stand for war or aggression at about that time?
A. I don't know.
- Q. What was the part which General TOJO played in this particular incident?
A. As I believe I mentioned the other day, I did not know TOJO at all. My first knowledge of him was when TOJO became Minister of War.
- Q. Do you recall having heard what part General ITAGAKI played in the Manchurian incident?
A. ITAGAKI also was a name that I learned later, but not so much at that time.
- Q. Are you familiar with the commission sent out by the League of Nations to investigate the Manchurian incident?
A. That being a very famous commission, I knew of it, but I was not in Japan at the time.
- Q. You do know, however, that it was called the Lytton Commission?
A. Yes.
- Q. Did you ever read the report made by the Lytton Commission?
A. Although I have a general idea about the report, from reading the newspapers, I have not read the report itself.

HIROTA, Koki

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Q. From what you now know of the Manchurian incident, is it your opinion that the Japanese government through its responsible officers of the Kwantung Army manufactured that incident in order to go into Manchuria for what economic supplies were needed?

A. About that particular point I want to make a little explanation. That was what I had reference to when I suggested giving you the background of the Manchurian incident.

Q. Shall we save it then until a little later?

A. That's quite satisfactory with me.

Q. Will you now enumerate the second principle in your three principles?

A. I don't know whether what I am going to say now is exactly the second provision of the memorandum, but the second point was that we had to see that the Chinese agitation against the Japanese would cease.

A third point was the economic cooperation between China and Japan.

Another thing, although it is not very clear in my mind now was the control of activities of the Communist Party.

Q. Might not the control of the Communist activities in China have been included under the second point which you have mentioned -- that Japan had to see that Chinese agitation against the Japanese would cease?

A. I think it is quite possible the latter was included in the second provision.

Q. Mr. HIROTA, just what forms did the Chinese agitation take?

A. Generally speaking, the Chinese system of education was to counter the Japanese oppressive measures. As a result of that type of education many unpleasant incidents arose everywhere in China, noticeably after the Manchurian incident.

Q. What were the oppressive measures of Japan against China, which China was attempting to educate her people for?

A. The most important was the Manchurian incident.

Q. What forms of oppression were the Japanese practicing in Manchuria?

A. I think by maintaining certain relationship with Chang Hsueh-liang of Manchuria.

HIROTA, Koki

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- Q. Do you refer to the Commanding General of the Chinese forces then in command or who had been in command in Manchuria?
- A. That's right.
- Q. Is it not true that Japan prior to this time had sent immigrants into China?
- A. You mean China including the Manchurian area?
- Q. Both Manchuria and North and South China, even down to Singapore?
- A. Yes, I think the Japanese population in those areas showed increase even before that time.
- Q. And these immigrants were also of Korean descent as well as Japanese descent?
- A. I believe a large number of Koreans must have settled in those areas.
- Q. But one of Korean descent would be called a Japanese National because of the treaty which had afforded to Japan the Korean peninsula? Is that not correct?
- A. That is so.
- Q. I believe you stated that your third principle was the economic cooperation between China and Japan. Do you not mean economic cooperation between China, Manchukuo and Japan?
- A. When I mentioned this a little while ago, I had in mind that better economic relationship between China and Japan.
- Q. On the premise that because Manchuria was already governed by Japanese peoples the influence of the Japanese government could be felt in Manchuria?
- A. The influence of the Japanese Army in Manchuria was very powerful and the Army even held control of the economic condition of Manchuria. The Japanese Army in Manchuria functioned through a Bureau in the Japanese Cabinet known as Manchurian Affairs Bureau.
- Q. Are you familiar with the fact that at Harbin and Mukden there were large quantities of opium manufactured during this time?
- A. Yes I heard of it, but I never saw the place.
- Q. Was this manufacture of opium conducted under the direction of the Army?
- A. I suspect it was so.

HIROTA, Koki

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- Q. Did you ever hear what markets this opium reached?
- A. I imagine, although I do not know, that it must have been marketed through China. My understanding is that some of the Koreans engaged in the handling of the opiums.
- Q. Is it your opinion that the sale of this opium in China may have been to weaken the resistance of the Chinese people in accordance with a plot by the Army heads?
- A. I can not say whether or not the Japanese Army had that type of scheme in mind. The control of opium in China had been the topic of discussion among civilized countries and it was discussed by the League of Nations -- for instance like Great Britain, they maintained an opium market even by resorting to war. That is too big an issue and I don't know whether the Japanese Army had that sort of thing in mind.
- Q. However, the Japanese Army would be informed of a large market in China and would know first that the sale of opium would be a way to finance a war of aggression, and secondly that the sale of opium would be a way to weaken the resistance of the Chinese nation. Isn't that correct?
- A. Whether I say so here or not, they had those effects. However, if you continue your investigation you may be able to arrive at a more definite conclusion than I am able to give you.
- Q. But you do believe such was possible?
- A. I can readily surmise that through the sale of opium the Army could raise a part of the necessary war funds. I don't know whether I could call it a war fund or not -- at least they could raise the money.
- Q. Do you ever recall hearing the name of General DOIHARA in connection with the sale of opium in China?
- A. I am not familiar with the opium situation and know no names of persons who might be connected with it.
- Q. To return to the problem in China, Mr. HIROTA, I believe you were entirely familiar with the terms of the Nine Power Treaty signed by Japan as a party in Washington in 1922.
- A. Yes, the general terms.
- Q. Was not that treaty in force at the time when you were Chief of the American and British Intelligence Bureau here in Tokyo?
- A. I don't believe that the Nine Power Treaty was in force when I was Chief of the American and European Bureau of the Foreign Office.

HIROTA, Koki

7 Feb 1946

- Q. What position did you hold in the government when this treaty was passed?
- A. I think that negotiations for the Nine Power Treaty started after I became the Chief of the Second Division of the Information Bureau of the Foreign Department.
- Q. I asked you what position you held at the time the Nine Power Treaty took effect.
- A. I don't know exactly as to the date, but I was Chief of the European-American Department.
- Q. You are familiar, are you not, with the fact that the Nine Power Treaty which Japan signed states that the powers signatory will not violate the sovereignty of China?
- A. Yes.
- Q. In view of that treaty, and with knowledge that in law a treaty is like a contract and can not be broken merely by the will of one of the parties, do you not agree that the Manchurian incident and even these three principles dealing with China, as stated by you, would violate the integrity of the Chinese Government?
- A. Judging from a general idea concerning the Nine Power Treaty and the three principles just mentioned, that conclusion could be reached.
- Q. And that also applies to the Manchurian incident, does it not?
- A. I am sure that it was the first step in violation of the Nine Power Treaty.
- Q. As a student of law, you will probably also agree that those persons who engineered these violations should be tried so that all nations might live together in harmony -- do you not?
- A. Yes I maintain the same view with you.
- Q. Suppose, Mr. HIROTA, that the situation of China and Japan were reversed from what it was in 1931 and that China had created an incident in Korea, what would the Japanese people have done regarding such an incident?
- A. I am sure Japan would have taken the same action as China did in the Manchurian incident.

HIROTA, Koki

7 Feb 1946

- Q. Mr. HIROTA, at the time you enunciated these three principles in dealing with China, did you know that it was a violation of the Nine Power Treaty?
- A. I always maintained, particularly at the time of the three principles enunciated, that the provisions of the Nine Power Treaty should be respected and held inviolate. And when the Manchurian incident took place and the relations between Japan and China became worse, then at that time, two or three years after the Manchurian incident I became the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

During my tenure of office and trying to right the situation between the two nations, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek sent his representative with the message that: The existing relationship of Japan and China could be illustrated as a river which heretofore had been flowing without any interruption and was all at once interrupted by sudden rocks emerging from it and thereby creating ripples around the rocks. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek suggested that if the rocks in the stream can not be removed, the better arrangement is to get around them and to continue the smooth flow of the stream. I answered that possibly the way to get around the rocks was by maintaining closer economic cooperation between Japan and China.

- Q. So you did know that it was a violation of the Nine Power Treaty. Is that correct?
- A. No, my idea was that by such procedure we could avoid infringement of the provisions of the Nine Power Treaty.
- Q. Mr. HIROTA, did you know that the Nine Power Treaty also provided for the open-door policy to take effect in China?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And would you not consider the type of cooperation which Japan desired in China also a violation of the open-door policy of the Nine Power Treaty?
- A. Whether economic cooperation would violate the Nine Power Treaty or not could only be determined by any specific act of any particular government. Now I want to make myself clear -- I do not know whether the term I used of "economic cooperation" is proper or not. At any rate, economic close relationship between Japan and China resulted in a harmful effect upon the interests of other nations signatory to the Nine Power Treaty, that would definitely be a violation of the treaty -- but as the result of any specific incident as mentioned, I do not know whether it could be determined as a violation of the Nine Power Treaty.

HIROTA, Koki

7 Feb 1946

Q. But you agree that all we have to go upon are the overt acts created by the Japanese Government when they did get into China, do you not?

A. You can generalize it in that way. However, we can not yet say that my three principles were the cause of the result. If you show me precisely what specific incident was there, then I may be able to answer whether it constituted a violation of the Nine Power Treaty or not.

Q. One more question, Mr. HIROTA. Is it not true in the Japanese Government that the Foreign Minister speaks for the will of the Cabinet?

A. Yes in any matter pertaining to the diplomatic affairs which had been decided upon by the Cabinet, the Minister for Foreign Affairs would act as spokesman.

Q. Have you anything now which you would like to tell us in addition to what you have already answered?

A. Ever since the Japanese-Russian War the Manchurian incident was the stumbling block. Theoretically Japan stepped into the picture of Russia, as a result of the Portsmouth Peace Treaty. And Japan was to take over the unexpired portion of the lease of the Kwangtung Peninsula. Japan thought by extending the term of the lease over the Kwangtung Peninsula the relationship between Japan and China could be improved and Ambassador Komei KATO, who was in England, took the matter up with Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Minister of Great Britain.

The preliminary conversation between KATO and Sir Edward Grey was successful, whereupon Ambassador KATO returned to Japan and became the Foreign Minister. When he became the Foreign Minister, Mr. KATO started the negotiation for the extension of the lease with China. At the same time Minister KATO secured an agreement whereby a Japanese subject could lease land in the interior of Manchuria. However, that agreement between Japan and China did not meet with the approval of Chang Hsueh-liang, whom I mentioned this morning, resulting in constant disagreement between the Japanese in Manchuria and General Chang Hsueh-liang. Thus among the Japanese some came to dislike him, and that trend of thought became worse until Chang Hsueh-liang was murdered.

Q. By whom?

A. I think by a Japanese Army man.

HIROTA, Koki

7 Feb 1946


Q. Is that all?

A. And when that situation became really bad, it was the Manchurian incident.

Q. Are you finished?

A. Yes.

I, J. K. Sano, being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English, respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of 11 pages, numbered 1 to 11, inclusive, is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.


Subscribed and sworn to before me this 9th day of February 1946.

Calhoun W. J. Phelps, Capt., T.A.G.-II.
(Name and Rank)
Duly Detailed Investigating Officer
International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP

I, Edna Hickam, hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Edna Hickam

I, Calhoun W. J. Phelps, Captain, ASN 0-904367, certify that on the 7th day of February 1946, personally appeared before me Koki HIROTA, and according to J. K. Sano, interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth herein.

Tokyo, Japan
9 Feb 1946

Calhoun W. J. Phelps

HIROTA DOCTRINE - Statement of Japanese policy re China presented to British Ambassador Sir Francis Lindley on 25 April 1934 following unofficial statement of policy by Mr. Eiji Amai, spokesman for Foreign Office on 17 April 1934:

1. Japan has not infringed upon China's independence or interests, nor has she the slightest intention to do so. In fact, she sincerely desires the preservation of territorial integrity of China and her unification and prosperity. These ends should, fundamentally speaking, be attained by China herself through her self awakening and voluntary efforts.

2. Japan has no intention to trespass upon the rights of other Powers in China. Their bona-fide financial and commercial activities will redound to the benefit of China which is quite welcome to Japan. She, of course, subscribes to the principles of the Open Door and Equal Opportunity in China. She is observing scrupulously all existing treaties and agreements concerning that country.

3. However, Japan cannot remain indifferent to anyone's taking action under any pretext, which is prejudicial to the maintenance of law and order in East Asia for which she, if only in view of her geographic position, has the most vital concern. Consequently, she cannot afford to have questions of China exploited by any third party for the execution of a selfish policy which does not take into consideration the above circumstances.

INTERROGATION OF

HIROTA, Koki

Date and Time: 9 February, 1946. 1000 -1145 hours
1315 -1600 hours

Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan.

PRESENT : HIROTA, Koki

Capt. Calhoun W. J. Phelps, Interrogator
Mr. J. K. Sano, Interpreter
Miss Dinah Braun, Stenographer

Oath of Interpreter, administered by
Capt. Phelps to Mr. Sano:

Capt. PHELPS : Do you solemnly swear, by Almighty God, that you will truly and accurately interpret and translate from English into Japanese and from Japanese into English as may be required of you, in this proceeding?

Mr. Sano : I do.

Questions by : CAPT. PHELPS.

Q. While you were ambassador to Russia, did you ever have any conversations with Col. DOIHARA?

A. When I was ambassador to Russia, Col. DOIHARA was not known to me.

Q. However, he was Chief of the Special Service Organization at Mukden or Harbin during the time you were ambassador to Russia, was he not?

A. I don't remember him at all in that capacity.

Q. What is your opinion as to the guilt or innocence of Col. DOIHARA in relation to the Manchurian Incident?

A. I really was not paying any attention to what was being done by a person known as Col. DOIHARA. I was not familiar with a person by that name at that time.

(HIROTA - Feb 9th cont'd)

- Q. Let me phrase it this way then. In your opinion, what would be the guilt or innocence of the Special Service Organization in relation to the Manchuria Incident?
- A. Truthfully, I do not know the activities of the Special Service Organization, because none of their activities were called to my attention. But, if the Special Service Organization were functioning then, no doubt they must be guilty. What I mean is, if the army was doing anything at all on the Manchuria Incident, that Special Service Organization must have taken a part in it. I was stationed in Holland for three years preceding my assignment in Russia so I am not familiar with the activities of the Special Service Organization.
- Q. It is your idea then, that the plan must have originated either through the Chief of Staff, or the War Minister, and that the plan would have been carried out by the Special Service Organization. Is that correct?
- A. It is very difficult for me to say one way or the other on that subject because it pertains to an organizational matter within the army - whether the War Minister or the Chief of Staff took the lead and used the Special Service Organization to accomplish what they sought.
- Q. From what you know of the working of the Japanese Government, Mr. Hirota, it is very likely that any plan originated with either the Chief of Staff, or the War Minister, or the Vice-War Minister, would be furthered by the forces in the field; is that not correct?
- A. It is a very difficult matter for an outsider to say anything about it. It takes some one really familiar with the inside working of the army. I believe hardly anyone outside of a military man would understand that point.
- Q. Do you know whether or not the commanding general of the Kwantung Army was given a free hand in matters in Manchuria?
- A. That also goes back to the organization of the military forces. The Kwantung Army was stationed in foreign soil. For that reason it naturally comes within the jurisdiction of the Chief of Staff, and, while the War Minister may have some control, the Chief of Staff really directed the activities of the Kwantung Army, I think. That is the way I can suppose the organization functioned. I am not saying whether it actually was so worked out.
- Q. You believe then that the War Minister might have stopped the Manchuria Incident if he so desired. Is that correct?
- A. I don't know for certain whether the War Minister had absolute authority to overrule the decision of the Chief of Staff or not because I don't know the rules or regulations within the War Ministry in that respect. If I may be allowed to say a few words

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here, that type of matter could readily be explained if you would investigate some military personnel who would be in a position to know that. For instance, there is a Bureau for Demobilization in Tokyo.

Q. How many years have you spent in the government, Mr. Hirota?
A. Slightly over thirty years in all.

Q. In that length of time, would you not become familiar with the chain of command within the army?

A. My line of work was first concerned with foreign affairs and I had very little to do with the military matters.

Q. But would you not say from your experience that it was possible for the Chief of Staff of the Army to determine the foreign policy of Japan?

A. While I held the position of Foreign Minister for about two and a half years - less than three years - for the first time I came in contact with the activities of the War Minister and when I became premier for a period of about ten months, less than a year, I became somewhat aware of their activities.

Q. Mr. Hirota, you have not answered my question. I want to know, whether in your opinion, it is not possible for the Chief of Staff of the Army to determine the foreign policy of the Japanese Government. Answer yes or no.

A. Fundamentally, the foreign policy of Japan was formulated by the foreign minister. However, if any matter pertained to the national defense, then certainly other people may have considerable influence in determining that foreign policy. In that event, the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Navy, and the War Minister, may have a voice in it. I further believe the policy concerning the national defense was decided upon by those four individuals.

Q. Mr. Hirota, you insult my intelligence. You have just told me that the Chief of Staff controlled the Kwantung Army while it was on Manchurian soil, and the other day I believe we agreed that the Kwantung army inspired the government in Manchuria and controlled it. With this thought in mind will you not now answer that the Chief of Staff of the Army can control the foreign policy of the Japanese Government?

A. When I say the foreign policy of Japan, that term implies ordinary and general foreign policy, in that sense, and not in the military sense. But when activities of the army become tense, then often the diplomatic policy is dragged along with it and brings great influence upon foreign policy. Especially it is true when the above named four organizations decided upon a particular course of action. Then the foreign minister is rendered almost powerless.

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- Q. What relation have these four organizations to the Supreme War Council?
- A. These four groups virtually constitute the Supreme War Council. They constitute themselves as members of the Supreme War Council, then the function becomes that of a conference body.
- Q. And they will then dictate the policy of the army in all matters in which the army may be interested, is that correct?
- A. That is true. That would become the policy of the armed forces.
- Q. Then let us state it another way. Since the Chief of Staff controls all armies on foreign soil, and since the KWANTUNG ARMY inspired the government of Manchuria, and further controlled it, is it not true that the army, through the Chief of Staff, controlled the foreign policy of Japan, especially in relation to Manchuria?
- A. Yes, it had a great influence upon the formulation of foreign policy in Manchuria.
- Q. After the Manchurian Incident of Sept 18, 1931, was there established in the Japanese Government a Manchurian Affairs Board?
- A. Yes, as I said before, there was established this Manchurian Board.
- Q. Under whom was this board placed for the purpose of control?
- A. It was directly under the Premier.
- Q. Was it later placed under the Minister of War?
- A. Perhaps it was. But I do not remember it very clearly.
- Q. Would you say there was a plan at this time for a "New Order" in East Asia?
- A. I don't know that because I was not in a position to know it well.
- Q. Upon reflection, from what you know in connection with the government after the year 1931, would you say that this was the first step in a plan to formulate a new order in East Asia?
- A. That is a problem which no outsider can guess, unless he belongs to the inner circle of the army and is in a position to know the workings of the inner circle and whether or not there was such a plan. I am not saying there was or there was not.
- Q. When you mention the words "inner circle" you do not mean the small group of men in the army who called themselves the inner circle, do you?
- A. That may be one element of the inner circle, but the inner circle would include the group of people who are in a position to know the inside workings within the army and navy. When I say I am not familiar with the workings of the inner circle, I mean the workings of the inner circle in a larger sense - and not any of the individuals who composed the first element.

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- Q. But you are familiar with the organization within the army called the Inner Circle?
- A. That I know through rumor and I can hardly say who were the members of the inner circle because I was not in a position to know.
- Q. However, you have heard that Baron General TANAKA was a member of that organization, have you not?
- A. That relates to a matter that happened some time ago when Baron TANAKA became Premier and at the same time held the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs. Through rumor I know he had, what I might call Continental Policy.
- Q. By "Continental Policy" do you mean an expansion policy or aggression policy?
- A. I was in Holland and what I know of the continental policy was learned through reading Japanese newspapers as well as the newspapers published in the foreign countries. I have not read of any of such plans myself.
- Q. What was your understanding then of this policy?
- A. I interpreted it as perhaps expansion into the continent.
- Q. Certainly the Japanese Government at this time was aware that they were party members to the Kellogg Briand Pact signed in 1928, were they not?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And it was also known, was it not, that as signatories to this pact they pledged peaceful settlement of all problems and pledged not to resort to war to settle such problems?
- A. Of course that is true as I said before.
- Q. Did you know that Field Marshal UEHARA was a member of this inner group of the army?
- A. I never met him but he was a high ranking man in the army, and no doubt he must have had influence. I don't know whether I could call him a member of the inner circle or not. I am saying this from my supposition.
- Q. However, it is pretty well known in Japan, is it not, that Field Marshal UEHARA arranged the so-called "CHOSAKU RIN JIKEN" incident?
- A. That I do not know.
- Q. This would have been at the time you were in Holland; is that correct?
- A. Perhaps it was so. When did it occur?
- Q. In September, 1929.
- A. Yes, I was still in Holland.

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- Q. However, you have heard that because of this incident, the TANAKA Cabinet was overthrown, is that not correct?
- A. Yes, I heard such a rumor.
- Q. Have you ever heard of Col. NAGATA being connected with this inner group?
- A. I really don't know. Officers of the rank of colonel were not very well known to me then. However, if he was a military man he could be called a member. But I am not saying whether he was or not.
- Q. Did you ever hear of Gen. OKAMURA being connected with members of the inner group?
- A. That I do not know.
- Q. Did you ever hear of Lt.Gen. ISOGAI being connected with that organization?
- A. I don't know. However, Gen. ISOGAI was known to be an expert on the China situation.
- Q. He was the former Governor of Hongkong, was he not?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Did you ever hear the name of Major Gen. KOISO as a member of this organization?
- A. I do not know.
- Q. Or Lt.Gen. TATEKAWA?
- A. That I do not know.
- Q. Was your conception of this inner group that it was an organization composed of younger military members?
- A. About that time I was told within the Japanese Army lower ranking officers controlled the higher ranking officers.
- Q. And the reason they had formed this organization was because they were dissatisfied with the army's policy at that time, is that correct?
- A. What you say could be one reason for it but at the same time I imagine that they thought that a younger group of officers should run the army which was under the control of older officers.
- Q. Why was this necessary? Were they preparing for war?
- A. I would not know whether that was part of a preparation for eventual war, but in the army naturally there were a large number of officers who were divided into various factions and each tried to develop their own views and their own destiny. This must have had something to do with it.

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- Q. It is pretty much agreed, is it not, that in a peacetime army, older men should rule because of their experience. Is that not your idea?
- A. Yes, that is so.
- Q. And is it not also agreed that if the younger men take the lead in the army that would be necessary only because of the rigors of battle?
- A. Yes. When a younger group of officers in the army controls the army there lies real danger.
- Q. Let us return to the three principles which you propounded for China when you were foreign minister in the OKADA Cabinet. Do you recall with whom you conferred in the army prior to publishing these three principles?
- A. As I said before I presented to the cabinet meeting the matters which one of my bureau chiefs, and a member of the Chief of Staff's office, and the War Ministry and Chief of the Army and Navy had prepared.
- Q. A representative of the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Navy and a representative of the War Department and a bureau chief - four in all?
- A. Yes, but they were supported by the necessary aides.
- Q. Was the name of your department head later representing you, ISHII?
- A. Yes, perhaps it was ISHII.
- Q. Let me ask you now, Mr. Hirota, whether or not either the Chief of Staff, or the War Minister did not impose upon you by order, the release of these three points?
- A. I don't remember that.
- Q. Do you assume full responsibility for the publication of these three points?
- A. I believe that in anything pertaining to diplomacy, the Minister of Foreign Affairs must assume responsibility, that being my principle.
- Q. And you realize that the publication of these three points was in violation of the Nine Power Treaty and the Kellogg-Briand Pact, both of which were in effect at that time?
- A. I do not believe that absolutely.
- Q. But if it is so adjudged - that they are violations of either one of these two treaties, you feel that you are the responsible person?
- A. On that score I would like to be informed just on what particular point this would constitute an infringement on either of the treaties.
- Q. I am putting this as a hypothetical question - an assumption.
- A. As a matter of principle for me, I am willing to abide by whatever result which I must assume. However, I do not like to be misjudged

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by anything for which I should not be held responsible.

- Q. It is your belief then, that the foreign minister speaks the will of the cabinet in relation to matters of diplomacy, is that correct?
- A. Yes, whatever the cabinet decided upon, the foreign minister acts as spokesman. However, after the Information Bureau was organized within the cabinet, that served as spokesman instead.
- Q. But, because one of the three principles concerned the settling of the Manchurian Affair, the Chief of Staff would have to assume responsibility for that portion, would he not?
- A. The matter pertaining to the Manchurian settlement was handled by the Manchurian Bureau which did not belong to the foreign ministry.
- Q. It was directly under the Prime Minister?
- A. Yes.
- Q. From September, 1933 to March 1936, how many incidents of violation would you say occurred in Manchuria, to the best of your recollection?
- A. I have no definite specific recollection of these incidents. Perhaps your records will be more complete.
- Q. However, you do recall that there was sporadic fighting in those years?
- A. I think there must have been in Manchuria.
- Q. You became Minister for Foreign Affairs on September 14, 1933 - or approximately at that time, did you not?
- A. I believe it was about that time.
- Q. And you remained as foreign minister in successive cabinets until the 9th day of March, 1936?
- A. It was so, I believe.
- Q. On the 9th day of March, 1936, you received an imperial order to form your cabinet, did you not?
- A. My recollection is not clear as to the date but I think it was in the month of March.
- Q. That was immediately following the 2.26 Incident, was it not?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And it took you about seven, eight, nine, or ten days to formulate your cabinet?
- A. Yes, it took a considerable number of days.
- Q. Why were the negotiations for the formation of your cabinet so difficult?
- A. At the beginning a message was conveyed to me indicating that I

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(a- continued)

would be asked to form a cabinet. As I said before, it was by Mr. YOSHIDA, who now is the foreign minister. Do you want me to go further into detail or will this be enough?

Q. I desire you to go further. You have not stated what the trouble was?
A. To this date, I am not aware why they asked me to form a new cabinet. The fact of the matter is that Prince KONOYE first received the order to form a new cabinet. However, he declined. When Prince KONOYE rejected then a message was sent to me. I do not know to this day why Prince KONOYE did not accept the imperial order.

Q. By whom was this messenger sent to you?
A. I don't know that either. But the messenger must have been sent to me by the upper class statesmen who were to name the candidates for premiership. I think that person must have been Prince SAIONJI.

Q. Do you remember the name of the messenger?
A. Mr. YOSHIDA, now foreign minister was the messenger.

Q. Continue, please.
A. Of course then I was merely a career diplomat. I was not familiar at all with the administration of domestic affairs. For that reason, I hesitated greatly to accept the order. The greatest issue in the country then was to make a satisfactory settlement of the 2.26 incident which took place among the younger military men. I felt unless I was able to secure a War Minister who could handle that situation satisfactorily, there was no hope of forming a new cabinet. For that reason, as I said before, I went about to feel the sentiment among the military men. Then I found out that General TERAUCHI was considered to be a neutral person. I thought that if such a suitable War Minister could be found that Prince KONOYE should properly form the new cabinet. I urged Prince KONOYE with that thought in my mind. Prince KONOYE then said that he could not on account of his health, present himself to the Emperor.

ADJOURNMENT FOR LUNCH.

AFTERNOON

The last eight questions and answers were read by the stenographer. Whereupon the interrogation continued.

Q. Now, if you will continue on in your own words.
A. In the meantime I received a telephone call at my office in the Foreign Affairs Ministry to appear in the Imperial Court. Simultaneously, Prince KONOYE wanted to see me. So first I went to call on Prince KONOYE. I talked with him again urging him to accept the imperial request. However, it was declined by him for the same reason.

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A.(cont'd) I decided then that there was nothing else I could do but to accept the imperial order. At that time Prince KONOYE showed me a paper on which was written the names of some of the proposed cabinet members. I believe I mentioned before the names on that memorandum.

Q. Do you mind telling them now?

A. BABA, Eichi, or YUKI, Toyotaro, for Finance Minister. OROHIRA, Choku, for Justice Minister. Perhaps that name Choku could be read as Tadashi. KAWASAKI, Takukichi, from MINSEITO, a political party, for liaison purposes, as a candidate for one of the ministeries. MAEDA, Yonezo, to maintain contact with SEIYUKAI, a political party, candidate for one of the cabinet ministeries. After having that conversation, I appeared before the Emperor and received the order to form the new cabinet. My reply to the Emperor was that I would further endeavor to form a new cabinet and if successful, I would report again with a definite answer to accept it or not. Then I returned to my official residence and started to work on the selection of cabinet members. I considered as a candidate TERAUCHI, for War Minister, Admiral OSAMI, Nagano, for Navy Minister. This man too was considered to be the one having the indorsement of the navy. Although these proposed candidates were considered by me, I personally visited the Chiefs of Staff of both the Navy and Army and asked them for names of candidates for each respective department. Eichi BABA for Finance Minister. Toyotaro YUKI was asked to become minister for "Overseas Affairs" for which Mr. NAGATA was finally nominated. An attempt was made to have OHARA appointed for Justice Minister but it met with disapproval by the army. The reason for that was given to you before. We tried to appoint FOSHIDA, Shigeru for foreign minister, but that too met with objections of the army. For that reason, the office of foreign minister was held by the Premier temporarily until such time as ARITA, Hachiro, Ambassador to China, returned to Japan. KAWASAKI, Takukichi, for Commerce and Industry Minister. He was a member of the MINSEITO Political Party. There was another member of the same party by the name of TANOMOGI, Keikichi who was made Minister of Communications. From the SEIYUKAI Political Party, MAEDA, Yonezo whose name I mentioned before, for minister of railroads. We also appointed SHIMADA, Toshio for agriculture and forestry. However, the army objected to having two members from each of the political parties for the ministry. In spite of all objections from the army to have two men from each of the political parties, I believed that the foundation of my cabinet should be composed based on political parties and I rejected the army's objections. The army further objected to my visiting the leaders of both parties in order to have two men representing each of the parties sit in my cabinet. At that time, the army objected to having these men who represented major political parties in the cabinet as it would weaken the army's influence in the cabinet.

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In other words, the army felt that if two representatives from each of the political parties were permitted to occupy cabinet positions, their political influence would over-shadow the influence of the army in the cabinet, thus weakening their influence, because the army was striving to weaken the power and influence of these major political parties in Japan. A little while before that time, I tried to appoint HIROSHI SHIMOMURA, then editor in chief of ASAHI SHIMBUN of Tokyo for communication minister but his nomination was objected to by the army because of his belief in liberalism. For Home Minister I decided to appoint USHIO, Keinosuke and HIRAO, Hachisaburo for educational ministry. Because of the army's objection to the appointment of OHARA, Chaku, I appointed HAYASHI, Raizaburu for Justice Minister. Thus, right along, the army constantly objected to my nominations and appointments of ministers of various offices in my cabinet and interfered with my attempt to form a new cabinet. I finally told the army that if they were going to cause so much trouble, I would decline once more to form a new cabinet. The army maintained that my policy of forming the new cabinet inclined too much toward liberalism. The army told me that was the objection they had against my cabinet. When I showed my frank determination to adhere to my original plan, then the army began to weaken their position and I was able to form my new cabinet. Thus, after considerable difficulty, I was able to select my own cabinet members and the names were presented to the Emperor for final appointment. Thus my new cabinet was formed.

- Q. So the real difficulty which you had in forming a cabinet was because the army feared a coalition between yourself and the MINSEITO and SEIYUKAI parties - is that correct?
- A. That is very true. But another important factor was their objection to what they considered my liberalistic ideas. Another reason was the army thought my idea in recommending YOSHIDA - who was known to be pro-British diplomat, for foreign ministry was not acceptable.
- Q. Why did the army want ARITA as foreign minister, do you know?
- A. ARITA was ambassador to China at that time and I recommended him for foreign ministry and not the army. ARITA is a career diplomat and at the time Japan was about to withdraw membership from the League of Nations, ARITA was Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs and he was not in accord with the withdrawal from the League of Nations. I held the same view with that of ARITA. For that reason I had confidence in him.
- Q. But is it not true that your first choice for minister of foreign affairs was Mr. YOSHIDA?
- A. Yes, I really wanted YOSHIDA to be appointed foreign minister. He was my first choice. However, when he met with objections of the army, I appointed ARITA who was my second choice.

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- Q. What was the army's opposition to YOSHIDA?
A. As I mentioned before, YOSHIDA is reputed to be a pro-British diplomat. Besides, he was known as the son-in-law of Count MAKINO. Count MAKINO is a veteran diplomat and he held the position of foreign minister and later became Keeper of the Privy Seal. He was constantly antagonized by the army. Count MAKINO was made a target of assassination at the time of the 2.26 incident barely escaping from becoming a victim. For these reasons, I judge the army objected to YOSHIDA's appointment.
- Q. Did you mentally oppose the appointment of Gen. TERAUCHI as war minister?
A. At that time I did not have the faintest idea of who would be the most suitable man for war minister, but I was informed that TERAUCHI would be a good man for the post so I simply appointed him. I did not have any objection for that reason.
- Q. Actually, is not the war minister picked by the Chief of Staff, Superintendent of Military Education and the War Minister?
A. I think actually that might have been the case.
- Q. It would not be the Supreme War Council that would pick the war minister, would it?
A. I think the Council of the "Big Three" rather than the Supreme War Council had anything to do with the appointment of war minister.
- Q. Was there any particular reason why you wanted to see Prince KONOYE before going to the imperial household?
A. No particular reason, except that he invited me to call on him. At the same time I had in my own mind that he should be once more urged to form a new cabinet.
- Q. So that you wanted to see him about forming this new cabinet before you were called into the Emperor's presence?
A. Yes, that is so.
- Q. Did you ever know that it was reported that the reason for your appointment as Premier seems to have been the fact that you had never been associated with any particular group such as political parties and the senior statesmen, and that you had a certain amount of influence with the army?
A. What was reported about me is true insofar as not having anything to do with any society or group or political party, but that applies to my connection with any military group too. But the real situation about my appointment, Mr. YOSHIDA would know more than I know. To this date I don't know why I was asked to form a new cabinet.

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- Q. During the time you were having the problem of forming a cabinet, did you not state that your views were not in disagreement with the army's views?
- A. That is, the army made a request upon me to make that declaration.
- Q. Who in the army requested you to make this declaration?
- A. I cannot say who made that demand. However, the man who came with the request was MUTO, Sho. I believe that was his name although I am not positive.
- Q. Is it your guess that he came from General ABE, Minami or HAYASHI, Tatekawa?
- A. Although I do not know definitely who sent Mr. MUTO to me, my best guess is he might have been sent by a group of younger officers.
- Q. Do you mean the inner group of the army?
- A. It is very difficult for me to say that because at the time when I was forming the new cabinet, there were seven or eight military men constantly at the official residence of the foreign ministry holding conferences.
- Q. Can you name those individuals?
- A. I knew they were there and that General TERAUCHI often visited them but I was really too busy in my work in connection with forming a cabinet. I did not visit them.
- Q. But you could pretty definitely say that they were members of the TOSEI HA Controllist Group, could you not?
- A. Really, within the military circle, who belonged to a particular faction or who did not is very difficult to know. That is the truth. I really did not know who they were or which faction they belonged to.
- Q. You never heard the name TOSEI HA in connection with this group who visited in your house?
- A. I never heard any reference made to them by that name.
- Q. But you are positive that they were not members of the KODO HA (Imperial Way Group)?
- A. That too, I am unable to say.
- Q. Upon completing your cabinet, did you now issue the following statement: (READING) "The current position of the Empire demands reform of past laxity in administration and positive and independent readjustment of national relations in order to tide over the emergency. As the present unfortunate incident is at the bottom connected with this, we must awaken and eradicate accumulated evils and realize an immutable national policy. There must be national unity without distinction among political parties, military circles

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and government officials. We expect to ^{carry} execute our policies with determination thus meeting the wishes of the Emperor and the people".

A. I would much rather be shown the Japanese version of this before I agree or care to comment on it but I remember issuing some statement while I was forming a cabinet.

Q. I will attempt to find it in the ASAHI, if such is possible. In the meantime Mr. Sano will translate to see if it does not accord with your views.

(Mr. Sano reads and translates above statement.
Mr. Hirata answers as follows:)

A. This, or a similar one to this was brought over to me by MUTO. Perhaps it was brought by him. I believe the statement was made during the formation of the cabinet and not afterwards.

Q. About that time?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you recall the first name of Mr. MUTO?

A. Sho.

Q. Is he still living?

A. Perhaps he is. I am not sure.

Q. Between March 9 1936, and July 7, 1937, what events do you consider brought about the China Incident?

A. Roughly speaking, that represented a period when I was Premier and there was no particular incident which could be considered as a direct cause of the China Incident.

Q. But would you not say that the policy of the army during this period was to settle the Manchurian Affair by the invasion of China proper?

A. In January of 1937, I resigned my premiership and the HAYASHI Cabinet was formed and his cabinet continued for about six months. Then the first KONOYE Cabinet was formed and I was then made foreign minister in his cabinet. The period during which I was premier was short and I am sure that no particular incident occurred during my cabinet.

Q. Did you resign the premiership in January or February of 1937?

A. I think it was in the month of January that I resigned. It was the latter part of January.

Q. My records show February 1st. Is that right?

A. Yes, maybe.

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- Q. And that HAYASHI cabinet was formed on the 2nd day of February?
A. I can account for that. I in fact had resigned before. However I was asked to remain in the post until a new cabinet was formed.
- Q. You were not the foreign minister then in the HAYASHI Cabinet?
A. No.
- Q. Let me refresh your memory now. Do you recall the strained relations with China about the 24th of August, 1936, at a time when two Japanese newspaper men were attacked in CHEN TU SZECHWAN Province, China?
A. My recollection is not clear as to the date. However, I remember the incident commonly known as the SEITO Incident, which, when written in Chinese may mean CHEN TU, in which a certain number of Japanese were killed. I don't know whether they were newspaper men or not. I was then busy as prime minister and if you refer to the foreign minister you could get that story in detail.
- Q. Do you recall the newspapers here at about this time, demanding a settlement of this particular incident, and a portion of the public also crying for the blood of the Chinese in order to settle the score for this particular incident?
A. I don't know whether Japan made extreme demands upon China or not, but I think public opinion in Japan was very much aroused.
- Q. Certainly the newspapers would take it up?
A. Yes.
- Q. Also, would it not be a good excuse for the Military to further their acquisition in China?
A. I cannot tell. I cannot tell what the army did. However, should newspapers carry strong stories on it, the army might take advantage of that. That kind of a situation could be possible.
- Q. At this particular time and because of the Manchurian Incident, did the army exercise censorship over the newspaper publications?
A. I don't remember whether there was a censorship or not over the newspapers; that is the reason I cannot tell you one way or the other.
- Q. However, at this time, was it not the prevalent view that trade with China was vital to Japan?
A. I don't know definitely whether just at this particular period or not the encouragement of trade relations with China was the popular sentiment in Japan. I do not know whether it was restricted to that particular period or not.
- Q. Did you feel at that time that trade with China was vital to Japan?
A. I thought trading with China was very important right along, especially

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when I was foreign minister and premier and I have worked toward that.

Q. At this particular time many Japanese emigrants were being sent to China, were they not?

A. I remember they went to Manchuria.

Q. At this time, you were working for closer agreement between Japan and Thailand, were you not?

A. I believe a considerable quantity of Japanese goods were being sent to Thailand. At the same time purchasing of rice from Thailand was encouraged.

Q. The rice problem was one of the biggest problems confronting your cabinet, was it not?

A. Fortunately, during my cabinet, the rice crop was plentiful and we did not have a rice problem at all.

Q. At this time were emigrants being sent from Japan to Thailand?

A. I don't remember.

Q. I ask you to recall November 25, 1936, when the Japanese-German agreement was signed?

A. I remember entering into the Anti COMINTERN Pact between Germany and Japan.

Q. Who in Japan was the motivating force behind this pact?

A. While I was foreign minister, it was desired by the Japanese army that closer relations between Germany and Japan be maintained.

Q. Do you know why?

A. There might be various reasons for that. The Japanese Army originally adopted the French system of training, but after the French-Prussian War, Japan recognized the strength of the German Army and many young officers were sent to Germany to receive their training. When the great European war broke out, many Japanese officers were sent to Germany to study modern improved warfare. About that time the treaty and alliance between Japan and England had already terminated and the British Army or Navy were reluctant to show the Japanese Army or Navy their armaments. In contrast to this British attitude, Germany had accorded every convenience possible for their study. Thus, naturally, in Japan the number of pro-German officers increased and this tended to put the Germans in a more favorable light. I think this was another reason why Japanese militarists maintained closer contact with Germany.

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- Q. Was it not recalled in Japan that Germany had lost in the first World War?
- A. I believe even though Germany lost the first World War, the weapons and armament they used were the most modern. During the First World War, we diplomats, as well as a large portion of the Japanese people believed that the British and the United States would win, even though some of the military men in Japan believed otherwise.
- Q. By the French-Prussian War, then you mean back in 1890?
- A. I mean the historical one which dates back about 1890.
- Q. Did not this anti COMINTERN Pact also call for a conference upon necessary measures of defense and for close cooperation in carrying out such measures between Japan and Germany?
- A. I don't think that type of provision was contained in the anti COMINTERN Pact. While I was foreign minister, no pact with that agreement was made. But after I became Premier, War Minister TERAUCHI and Foreign Minister ARITA came to me and wanted to enter into some sort of pact with Germany. Even before then I had heard of the desire on the part of the army to have a pact. When these two ministers came to me about the treaty with Germany, I made it very clear that even though they wanted to enter into any sort of a pact with Germany, it should never touch upon the subject of military matters because if we had that, it might involve Japan into war and that would not be good for her.
- Q. Did you ever see the original pact in Japanese?
- A. Yes, I have seen it.
- Q. Well, do you not recall the second proviso of that pact calling for mutual defense information?
- A. That proviso did not mean for the national defense in the ordinary sense, but it provided for defense against the activities of COMINTERN.
- Q. For what other type of activity - other than war - was it anticipated that the defense would be necessary?
- A. We were thinking about defense against COMINTERN propaganda.
- Q. Actually however, the army construed this to mean a possibility of aggressive activity on the part of Russia, did they not?
- A. The original intention of that treaty was never intended to be other than an anti COMINTERN pact. If the army put a different construction on it, I believe that was wrong.
- Q. In retrospect however, from that day on, the army dominance of the Japanese government was unchallenged, was it not?
- A. From that time on, some people, especially military groups,

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felt that the anti COMINTERN Pact was in effect meaningless, and during the HIRANUMA Cabinet, the Army proposed to change it into a military pact. But then Foreign Minister ARITA strenuously objected to that, claiming that the original intention of the pact should be adhered to.

Q. No change was made then until MATSUOKA was made foreign minister?
A. Yes.

Q. I believe you have stated, have you not, that Gen. TERAUCHI was the one in the army who requested this COMINTERN Pact?
A. Yes.

Q. Let me refresh your memory now. After the signing of this pact, all the so-called "Pro MAZAKI" generals were taken out of office, were they not?

A. I do not believe the removal from office of these officers said to be Pro*MAZAKI was due to the signing of the pact. It was rather a result of the 2.26 Incident. Five or six senior generals had resigned, assuming responsibility for lack of supervision over men under them.

Q. Yet all of these men who resigned were members of the KODO HA, were they not?

A. I would not know who the members of KODO HA were, but they were not all members of KODO HA.

Q. The six generals to whom you were referring were MAZAKI, ARAKI, YAMAGAWA --

A. (Interrupting) I do not know YAMAGAWA -

Q. (continued) OBATA, YAMAOKA, MATSUURA. They were within that group who resigned, were they not?

A. I do not know exactly whether they were the ones or not. It appears that the names of the generals you mention consist of two generals and four lieutenant generals.

Q. Was it ever known to you that General TERAUCHI was nothing but a pawn for the inner group?

A. I don't know anything about that relationship but I was told he was a neutral person in the army and I believed it.

Q. Let me ask you if you know whether or not General TERAUCHI's friends were among the following generals: MINAMI, ABE, MATSUI, KOISO, TATEKAWA, HAYASHI?

A. I have no personal knowledge of what the relationship of General TERAUCHI was with any of these generals, but he was the son of a Marshall TERAUCHI who led the CHO SHU clan among the army men, but at the same time he was known to be a person who maintained a neutral position. As I mentioned previously, General TERAUCHI

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d did not stay in Tokyo very much in the position of Chief of Staff, but instead he remained away from Tokyo and trained soldiers elsewhere, and he naturally was known as a man who did not have any connection with any group within the army.

Q. So you believe that he could not have been influenced by the younger group of officers, is that correct?

A. I felt he was a man who was straightforward, and a sincere soldier and he would be able to control all others in the army. He is a man who believed pushing forward in the things which he believed were right.

Q. So that if he felt war with China was right, he would accomplish that, regardless of any one?

A. I think he could be called that.

Q. Have you any statements you desire to add at this time?

A. I have no particular thing in mind.

INTERROGATION ADJOURNED.


(HIROTA- Feb 9, 1946 cont'd)

CERTIFICATE OF INTERPRETER

I, J. K. SANO, being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of nineteen (19) pages, are true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.


J. K. SANO

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 12th day of February, 1946.


Calhoun W. J. Phelps, Capt.
Duly Detailed Investigating Officer,
International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP.

CERTIFICATE OF STENOGRAPHER


I, DINAH BRAUN, hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.


DINAH BRAUN

CERTIFICATE OF INTERROGATOR

I, CALHOUN W. J. PHELPS, Capt. O-904367, certify that on the 9th day of February, 1946, personally appeared before me HIROTA, Koki, and according to J. K. SANO, interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

Tokyo
February 12th, 1946.


Calhoun W. J. Phelps, Capt.

INTERROGATION OF

HIROTA, Koki

Date and Place: 13 February, 1946. 1000-1200 hours
1300-1500 hours

Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan.

PRESENT : HIROTA, Koki

Capt. Calhoun W. J. Phelps, Interrogator
Mr. J. K. Sano Interpreter
Miss Dinah Braun Stenographer

Oath of Interpreter, administered by
Capt. Phelps to Mr. Sano:

Capt. PHELPS : Do you solemnly swear, by Almighty God, that
you will truly and accurately interpret and
translate from English into Japanese and from
Japanese into English as may be required of
you, in this proceeding?

MR. SANO : I do.

Questions by : Capt. PHELPS.

Q. In your opinion, Mr. Hirota, who promoted the Manchurian Incident?

A. If I really knew who promoted it, I would like to name him.
However, I was in Russia and I am not familiar with the real
situation connected with the Manchurian Incident. However, I
believe there must be someone who must have planned it.

Q. Have you ever heard, through rumor or otherwise, the name of
the person to be blamed for the Incident?

A. No, I have not heard any rumor pertaining to that. As I said
previously even Gen. HONJO, commander of the KWANTUNG ARMY did
not seem to know why he was assigned there.

Q. Actually you believe that the incident was maneuvered by the
Japanese government through the responsible officials of the
KWANTUNG ARMY, so as to get supplies needed for the war of aggression,
is that correct?

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(HIROTA Feb 13 cont'd)

- A. I cannot say anything about the real situation in that connection because I was not in Tokyo. Had I been in Tokyo, perhaps I would have known something about it.
- Q. Is it your belief however that that explanation is the real reason for the Manchurian Incident?
- A. Do you mean at the time of the Manchurian Incident, there was already the necessity of getting war supplies, therefore they went to Manchuria to get them?
- Q. What I want to know is, is it not your belief that the reason why the Japanese Government, through the KWANTUNG Army, went into Manchuria for supplies in order to acquire Manchuria, and for a plan to later acquire territory in China and possibly to carry on a war against Great Britain and the United States?
- A. The Japanese Cabinet at that time was consulted by perhaps MR. WAKATSUKI, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, MR. SHIDEHARA, now premier. Mr. SHIDEHARA was then foreign minister and I was appointed as Ambassador to Russia at that time. I, being in that situation in connection with diplomatic service, can hardly conceive that the government contemplated any such plan at that time.
- Q. But such may have been the plan, within the minds of the Military, is that correct?
- A. I cannot tell anything about this at all because I was not in a position to know what the militarists had in their mind. However, judging from what took place, it might be possible to say that they might have had some plan.
- Q. It was in your cabinet, I believe, in which an Imperial Order was passed requiring that the War Minister must be a general or a lieutenant general on active service, am I correct?
- A. Yes. That applied to both the army and navy minister.
- Q. Would you consider such a step vital to complete control of the government by the service ministers?
- A. I wonder if you would allow me to explain in detail the circumstances surrounding that change?
- Q. Yes, but name the individual who engineered this Imperial Order and all other influences brought to bear upon this change.

(HIROTA Feb 13 cont'd)

A. In Japan, Ministers of War and Navy were restricted to the men in service.

Q. Do you mean reserve officers?

A. It did not specify who they should be so long as they were members of armed forces. There was a situation wherein the necessity of appointing a reserve officer for the office of Minister in the Army and Navy Department arose, and it became necessary to qualify that appointment through proper governmental regulations. At that time when Admiral Zombai YAMAMOTO became premier, he wanted to appoint one KUZUNOSE whose first name I do not remember now and who was on the reserve list of the army. He was either a lieutenant general or a full general - I am not quite sure. A heated controversy took place on the question of appointing a retired army general for army minister, between Admiral YAMAMOTO who then headed his cabinet, and Marshal YAMAGATA who represented the military, over the issue of appointing a retired army general for War Minister. About that time, whether it was done through amendment to the regulations governing that appointment or not, I believe a change took place somehow whereby even a retired army or navy officer could become minister of either department. Although the change I have just mentioned took place following the argument between Admiral YAMAMOTO and Marshal YAMAGATA, in fact no one from the retired list was actually appointed for war or navy minister. When I became premier, my Minister of War, TERAUCHI, and the Navy Minister, Admiral NAGANO recommended to me that such an obsolete provision which had never been followed in the years past as appointing retired officers for Army and Navy Ministries, should be taken off the book. They therefore asked me to change the same regulations restricting appointment of respective ministers only to lieutenant generals or full generals of the army, and of equivalent rank in the navy, who were in active service. My reply to that recommendation was that it was within the jurisdiction of the premier to appoint anyone who, in his judgment, was qualified to be appointed to the navy and war ministries. For that reason, if we restricted the qualifications of the war and navy ministers to lieutenant general and general for both services, who were in active service, that in effect amounts to limiting the power of the Emperor to select his cabinet ministers. In other words, it narrows down to a restricted selection by the Emperor, by such a change in regulation. I remember General TERAUCHI explained the reason why such change was urged upon me - that unless we had that change, there would be a possibility of some of the army officers who had been removed from their office as a result of such incidents as the 2.26 as undesirable officers, returned to their power, and eventually possibly becoming war or navy ministers. I felt, judging from the condition of Japan as she was then, that it would be advisable to follow the advice of these people, so I agreed to such a change with them. At the same time, I made certain with

(HIROTA Feb 13 cont'd)

with both the war and navy ministries, the following point: Would such a change bring about a result which might hinder the selection of suitable ministers for both the army and navy departments in the future, because it would create added difficulty in selecting qualified men for those offices. In that case, I would be very reluctant to recommend such a change which might in the future serve as an obstacle in forming a cabinet when the Emperor ordered someone to form a cabinet. I wanted to make my position clear -I said "In approving your wishes for this change, whoever receives orders from the Emperor to form a new cabinet, should reserve the right to select anyone he chooses from the rank of lieutenant general or general of the army or navy, uninfluenced by anyone else, just as he would have the right to select any other member of his cabinet". To this reservation which I made, both TERAUCHI, War Minister, and NAGANO, Navy Minister, fully agreed.

- Q. As I understand you, Mr.Hirota, it would still be possible for the Prime Minister to name another individual as War Minister, and stop control of the navy by the military forces, is that correct?
- A. Customarily, whoever received the Imperial Order to form a cabinet was entitled to select for his ministers anyone who in his judgment was qualified for the various offices. However, insofar as the appointment of ministers for the Army and Navy was concerned, he was, as a matter of tradition, almost required to consult the army and navy.
- Q. Do you mean staff officers, such as superintendent of military education and others?
- A. That varies according to the premier. In my own case, I consulted with the chief of staff of the army, and the chief of naval operations. However, in some cases, the outgoing ministers of the cabinet would be consulted as to selection.

(Continuing with preceding answer):

But, I thought it would be better if I made such reservation in new regulations whereby the premier could appoint anyone he chooses without consulting anyone else, unless he wants to, as would be the case in the appointment of all other ministers.

- Q. Let us state it another way, Mr.Hirota. A firm prime minister, desirous of appointing an individual not on the active service list of the army of the rank of lieutenant general or full general, could stop, by such stand, the army control of the government. Am I correct?
- A. I think that is right. A firm minister can appoint his own war and navy ministers.

(HIROTA Feb 13 cont'd)

- Q. How many generals or lieutenant generals were in active service at the time this Imperial Order was passed?
- A. There must have been a considerable number of them, but I would not be able to give you any figures.
- Q. Have you any idea how large the standing army of Japan was at that time?
- A. That I do not remember.
- Q. Have you any idea of about how large it was?
- A. I have no idea as to the size, but perhaps there were fifteen or twenty divisions then.
- Q. Plus the troops in training?
- A. Really, I do not know much about the military organization.
- Q. With only fifteen or twenty divisions in existence, there could not be very many generals or lieutenant generals, could there?
- A. I still believe there must have been a considerable number of generals although I am not able to tell just how many.
- Q. But you could see that this situation of the ministership among those high ranking officers on active service, would very probably lead to war?
- A. On that point, traditionally generals who were in active service were in the War Minister's office.
- Q. But, in relation to the action of the younger officers in the 2.26 Incident, you would reach the aforementioned conclusion?
- A. I for one did not think in that light.
- Q. What do you now think?
- A. I believe the situation would be the same now as it all depends upon who is to be appointed for office - depending upon his responsibility.
- Q. But your own talk with Gen. TERAUCHI shows that ^{ever} that doubt existed in your mind even at that time, - by the word doubt, I mean possibility?

(HIROTA Feb 13 cont'd)

- A. I did not think in terms of war at all, but my thought was on the limitation of the Emperor's power to appoint the War or Navy Ministers.
- Q. The duty of the prime minister is to think in the terms of the greatest number of common people of Japan, and thus advise his Emperor, am I correct?
- A. That is correct.
- Q. You were aware of the turbulent situation in Manchuria at this time?
- A. Yes, I was.
- Q. Did it occur to you that if a general or lieutenant general who was of the opinion that Japan should war against Manchuria or any other nation, was appointed, that Japan would be thrown into a great conflict?
- A. I did not think in those terms. Anyone who is to appoint a minister, should determine the qualifications of the war minister on the basis of carrying out his cabinet policy.
- Q. You were not warned then by the 2.26 Incident, of the feeling within the army?
- A. Yes, because on the happening of the 2.26 Incident, I was selected to form a new cabinet to bring about a reform within the army.
- Q. Did you feel that the passage of this legislation at the time when you were premier, has a bearing on later incidents in Japan's history?
- A. I don't think that the change as advocated by me in that regulation had anything to do with bringing about our present situation.
- Q. Do you believe it made it easier for men like TOJO to assume the War Ministership?
- A. I believe the fault lies in the cabinet selecting TOJO, and not the fault of the change in legislation.
- Q. In Articles Three to Thirteen of the constitution of the Empire of Japan, the Emperor is empowered to determine the organization of the armed forces and to declare war and make peace. Is this correct?
- A. I believe that is so.

(HIROTA Feb 13 cont'd)

- Q. Is it correct that legislation also requests the Chiefs of the Army and Navy Staffs to request the Emperor's approval on "matters of grave importance"?
- A. Is that in the constitution or in other regulations?
- Q. Either - I asked "under legislation"?
- A. I do not know whether that type of provision is to be found in any legislation, but I know from common sense, that such a step should be taken when there are important matters under consideration.
- Q. Are rules of the cabinet considered legislation in Japan?
- A. The jurisdictional boundary of what the cabinet may legislate, and what other law-making bodies can do, is clearly defined, and what rules or regulations the cabinet may promulgate within its jurisdiction carries the same weight and authority as other nationally legislated law.
- Q. Let me read you from the 1889 rules of the cabinet, as may be found in the Nippon Zensho, Volume 22 (1889) at page 320): "With the exception of military and naval affairs of grave importance which, having been reported to the Sovereign, may have been referred by the Emperor for the consideration of the cabinet, the Ministers of Army and Navy shall report to the Prime Minister".
- A. My understanding of that point is, whether that is true or not, the army and navy have the privilege of direct access to the Emperor on any matter of grave importance militarily. That privilege was known to have existed for a long time and that is sometimes referred to as the Doctrine of Independence of the Sovereign. In other words, on matters of military importance, they can by-pass and go direct to the Emperor. As to the existence or non-existence of the provision you have just quoted, I cannot say one way or the other without referring to the original text.
- Q. Have you any idea of what are considered "matters of grave importance".
- A. That belongs to the military secrets, and to the outsider such things are extremely difficult to find out. They are kept as military secrets.
- Q. Certainly going to war would be considered a matter of grave importance?
- A. Yes, that is of the gravest importance.

(HIROTA Feb 13 cont'd)

- Q. And the Emperor would have to decide whether or not Japan went to war?
- A. No, not the Emperor, but the cabinet has to decide upon that.
- Q. The Emperor would have to give his sanction before war was declared?
- A. Yes, that is so.
- Q. So the Emperor is to blame for the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 8th, 1941?
- A. I still think that it is the responsibility of the cabinet and if I were the premier, I know I would feel that would be the responsibility of my cabinet.
- Q. The Emperor had to approve that attack?
- A. To us it is not clear whether the circumstances surrounding that attack were such as the Emperor was aware of it. Not only that, I believe in matters of importance in connection with military affairs, the responsibility lies on the shoulders of both chiefs, that is, the chief of the general staff, and chief of naval operations.
- Q. What part was played by Daisabura TSUGITA, the present minister without portfolio and chief secretary of the cabinet, in passing the legislation which called for lieutenant generals and generals to be war ministers?
- A. I believe that TSUGITA who was head of the legal department in my cabinet handled all matters pertaining to the effectuation of the change as desired by the army and navy ministries, as well as the negotiations, I think, until that revision was made a law.
- Q. Would you say he engineered this legislation?
- A. I think all he did was to handle the details of the change.
- Q. Is the wife of Mr. TSUGITA from the family of Teijo EGUCHI?
- A. I did not know that they were related.
- Q. Mr. TSUGITA is an important member of the MITSUBISHI concern, am I right?
- A. I believe he was one of the leading men connected with MITSUBISHI.

(HIROTA Feb 13 cont'd)

- Q. Mr. TSUGITA was once the head of the South Manchurian Railway Co. was he not?
- A. Perhaps he was.
- Q. Is it true that the MINSEITO party was supported by the MITSUBISHI Company?
- A. I heard that as a rumor but I cannot verify it.
- Q. Did you also hear that SEIYUKAI was supported by the MITSUI Interests?
- A. That was reputed to be so, but as to the truth, I would not be able to say.

ADJOURNED FOR LUNCH.

(Before the interrogation proceeded after adjournment for lunch, Mr. Hirota made the following statement):

MR. HIROTA: I would like to make clear that after the prime minister was forced by Imperial Legislation to obtain as war minister from the ranks of lieutenant general or general on active service, that, should he not find suitable timber for such a ministerial position on the active list, he might then search the inactive list of such officers and by recalling them to active service, have them appointed in the ministerial position. And I believe that was done. An actual example of such a case was the case of Admiral YONAI who was in the reserves. However, when he was wanted for navy minister, he was placed on active duty, and appointed minister of the navy. However, no civilian could be appointed to either of these two positions.

INTERROGATION CONTINUED:

- Q. Mr. Hirota, what would have happened to the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 8th, 1941, if the Emperor had refused to give his sanction for such an attack?
- A. I wonder if the Emperor ever had an opportunity to even say "no" at that time.
- Q. Assuming he had, but failed to sanction the attack, what would have happened?

(HIROTA Feb 13 cont'd)

- A. I am wondering if at that time already military action was taking place.
- Q. Do you mean that the fleet had been dispatched to a certain point in the Pacific?
- A. I cannot make mention of what military action was taking place, but I am wondering if they had not started on war action.
- Q. Do you infer that you heard a rumor on about the 25th of November of the dispatching of the fleet or certain army war orders?
- A. I am not certain whether it was on the 28th or 29th of November. All former premiers were requested to come to a meeting which was called by the then premier TOJO. We had been asked to come to a room in the Imperial Place. There we were told of the plan to wage war by Premier TOJO. After that, we were given luncheon by the Emperor. After that luncheon we went to another room where we were served tea, and after the tea, the Emperor asked us - meaning the former premiers present - various questions, to which some of us answered. There I expressed my view that there would be no necessity of waging war against America and was inclined to feel that all matters could be settled by diplomatic negotiations. But Premier TOJO maintained a view entirely opposing mine.
- Q. Did he so express that view at this meeting?
- A. Yes, he expressed his determination to wage the war.
- Q. Was he backed in this opinion by Marquis KIDO?
- A. That I do not know.
- Q. Was Marquis KIDO at this meeting?
- A. My recollection is that he was present.
- Q. Do you believe that Marquis KIDO is to blame for the present state of Japan?
- A. I would not say he was responsible, but he was in a position so close to the Emperor, advising him in all matters of importance, and he was one of the responsible advisors to the Emperor, so that he should be considered responsible for what happened because of his office.

(HIRODA Feb 13 cont'd)

- Q. You know General MAZAKI?
- A. I know him a little.
- Q. You are not friendly with him?
- A. No.
- Q. General MAZAKI has said (reading) "KIDO is to be blamed for the state Japan is in today. I have always had the feeling that if I met KIDO I would like to spit in his face". Do you agree with that view?
- A. Not necessarily so.
- Q. Are you familiar with General ARAKI?
- A. Yes, I know him because he was a member of the cabinet with me at one time.
- Q. You are very familiar with him?
- A. Not especially too close.
- Q. would you say he knows you very well?
- A. No, I think it must be about the same relationship.
- Q. General ARAKI has said (Reading) "I would say KIDO is the one most responsible for the war, but others such as HIRANUMA, OKADA and HIROTA, who were prime ministers, also many others (and he mentions (KONOYE and WAKASUKI) would have been able to influence the Emperor, as His Majesty was always willing to listen to words of advice. The Emperor believed that force should never be used, that treaties should be observed, and that the law must be obeyed".
- A. It is hard for me to understand why General ARAKI enumerated these names. However, even among the ones who are considered most favored and close to the Emperor, there are various degrees of confidence which the Emperor places in each of them. I personally feel that we are morally responsible for what happened to Japan despite the fact that the Emperor's wishes are as ARAKI stated. However, I cannot agree with his view that we are directly responsible for the condition of Japan in the sense that General ARAKI may be implying.

(HIROTA Feb 13 cont'd)

- Q. Is it possible that General ARAKI feels that you are to blame because you, as one of the ex-premiers, recommended TOJO for the new premier?
- A. The situation surrounding the formation of TOJO's cabinet should be explained or it will be a little difficult to understand.
- Q. A little later. It was pretty well known that if TOJO became premier, and the military took over the government, that war would break out between JAPAN and some other nation, is that correct?
- A. Absolutely no such thought was in my mind. That situation could be made understandable if I explained the atmosphere surrounding it.
- Q. Did you ever hear any of TOJO's radio speeches?
- A. Yes, I heard him occasionally.
- Q. So you definitely knew he was anti-American and anti-British?
- A. I don't know which radio broadcast you are referring to. What I meant was his radio talk after war had started.
- Q. What I mean is that you definitely knew that TOJO was anti-British and anti-American?
- A. TOJO was a person I did not know. When I first met him was when he explained about the Japan and German Military Alliance. It would be possible to imagine that he was not friendly toward the British and the United States because he negotiated the German-Japan Military Alliance.
- Q. You mean the tri-partite alliance, Germany, Italy and Japan? The pact which was signed about September 25, 1940?
- A. Yes. When that tri-partite treaty was entered into MATSUOKA, TOJO and Prince KONOYE, then premier of the second KONOYE Cabinet, made a report on the treaty to a gathering of the former premiers. At that meeting I raised the question as to why it was necessary that this type of treaty should be entered into. The details of that meeting are not asked by you now so I will omit them, but it was at that meeting that I first met TOJO. That was the first time I met him.
- Q. Normally were foreign relations discussed by the full cabinet in meetings?
- A. I believe it should be handled in that manner.

(HIROTA Feb 13 cont'd)

- Q. Actually however, was it not in a special cabinet meeting at which the Premier, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Minister of War, and the Minister of the Navy and Minister of Finance were present?
- A. Yes, that practice has been going on at one time.
- Q. Would the views of these five members of the cabinet be submitted to the Council of the "Big Three", the War Minister, Superintendent of Military Education, and the Chief of Staff?
- A. I would not know how the War Minister handled that kind of a situation. Any matters discussed among the five ministers were tentative, and they must be decided upon by submitting them to a full cabinet meeting.
- Q. So that views on matters of national policy would become unanimous?
- A. Yes.
- Q. But, it is possible that the views of the cabinet are submitted to the Council of the "Big Three", or perhaps to the Supreme War Council, is that correct?
- A. That procedure belongs to the Prime Minister, and the cabinet would not have anything to do with it.
- Q. Generally speaking, within the War Ministry, would you say that the Minister of War determines the policy, and the Chief of Staff draws up all orders to carry out that policy?
- A. I imagine, generally speaking, that would be the procedure.
- Q. Do you have any general knowledge of what part the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau would play within the War Ministry?
- A. I believe that the Bureau of Military Affairs within the War Ministry was one of the most important functions of that department.
- Q. After the cabinet had made certain decisions, would it be possible for the Privy Council to over-ride or negate such decisions?
- A. I imagine there might have been occasions when that was done, but if there were, it would be very rare. Generally speaking, they would sanction what the cabinet did.
- Q. Is the Emperor a member of the Privy Council?
- A. No, he is not.

(HIROTA Feb 13 cont'd)

- Q. Does he take any part in the meetings of the Privy Council?
- A. He does not participate in the meeting at all. However, he attends the meeting and listens.
- Q. He supplements the advice given him by the Keeper of the Privy Seal by attending such meetings of the Privy Council?
- A. That is very difficult for me to answer. However, if the Emperor is present and listens to the Privy Council, he might use it and he might not use it - it is very hard for me to say.
- Q. Generally speaking, he makes his own decisions?
- A. I think the Emperor listened to the men who were placed in responsible positions in each division of the ministry. That is the fundamental principle underlying the functioning of the government. In other words, each minister assigned to a particular task is to assume responsibility for aiding the Emperor in making his decision.
- Q. The other day you stated that when you were premier, there were very few Chinese incidents. Do you recall some of these incidents?
- A. As to that I do not have any clear recollection. If you can tell me some of the incidents, perhaps that will help me to remember them.
- Q. Do you recall any places at which these incidents occurred?
- A. My memory is not clear at all as to where or how any incidents occurred, if any did.
- Q. Your reference then was to possible border clashes between Manchuria and China, is that correct?
- A. Perhaps it could have been, but I have no clear recollection of it.
- Q. When you were foreign minister in the first KONOYE cabinet, you made a statement declaring that the policy of the Japanese had been one of local settlement and non-aggravation, and that the Japanese Government had exerted every effort to effect a speedy solution. You made that speech before the Diet on September 5, 1937.
- A. Yes, I made that declaration.
- Q. What did you mean by "local settlement".

(HIROTA) Feb 13 cont'd

- A. What I meant was a solution of the problem on the spot.
- Q. Make it clear. Do you mean the victory of the Japanese Army was a local settlement?
- A. It was not so and I did not mean that at all. What I meant was localizing the difficulties and settling them by negotiations on the spot, where the problem arose. "Victory" presupposes a fight and if it is a fight, it is not a settlement.
- Q. Up to that time however, it is true that Japan's efforts to effect a speedy solution amounted to merely dispatching troops and a speedy acquisition of the Chinese Army?
- A. I don't think it was so. At any rate dispatching the Japanese army to China involves a big problem. I have adhered to the policy of localized negotiated settlement in the locality where the trouble took place. When the army wanted to send forces to China, I told them that only on the ground of giving protection to the Japanese residents in the locality involved would it be permissible, but otherwise I would not sanction such troop movement. I have always maintained that speedy local negotiated settlement was the best solution without giving it an opportunity to spread to other sections.
- Q. In September, 1931, did not the army and navy secure Imperial sanction from the Emperor direct to dispatch forces into Manchuria under the guise of protecting Japanese nationals?
- A. I would not know that because I was in a foreign country and I was not in a position to know anything about it.
- Q. Even in 1937 when you were foreign minister, the war minister could have gone direct to the Emperor and secured permission to send troops over regardless of your attitude?
- A. As a matter of fundamental principle, the army could have done that, but in fact to send troops to foreign soil involves finance, and it is almost necessary for them to come through the cabinet.
- Q. Appropriations to the War and Navy Departments, if not approved by the Diet, automatically allow the preceding year's amount to be automatically appropriated, is that correct?
- A. That is true, as it is so provided in the constitution.
- Q. Would you now like to explain the background of the appointment of General TOJO as premier? Then we must leave.

(HIROTA Feb 13 cont'd)

A. When Prince KONOYE tendered his resignation, the former premiers were called to discuss the question of the new premier to form the succeeding cabinet. At that particular time, it was a known fact that relations between the United States and Japan were in extreme difficulties on the question of settling the China Incident. Therefore, a meeting of former premiers was considered very important. They were placed in a position where everyone of them must give very serious consideration to the problem. At that meeting, names of many different candidates for premiership were submitted, and the discussion did not progress very easily. I do not remember who it was, perhaps it was Baron HIRANUMA who said to the Keeper of the Privy Seal, Marquis KIDO: "Whom do you have in mind for premier". I do not remember the exact answer, but Marquis KIDO's answer was to the effect "General TOJO who has had the indorsement of Prince KONOYE." There, for the first time the name of TOJO was presented to the meeting. As I said before, I did not know who this TOJO was and I asked about him. Then Marquis KIDO said "I have had a talk with TOJO already, and if it is TOJO, I think he can handle the situation well." That is the reason why I did not object to his nomination.

Q. That would be the reason for the other prime ministers not objecting?


A. Generally speaking, it is so.

INTERROGATION ADJOURNED.


(HIROTA Feb 13 cont'd)

CERTIFICATE OF INTERPRETER

I, J. K. SANO, being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of sixteen (16) pages, are true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.


J. K. SANO

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 15th day of February, 1946.


CALHOUN W. J. PHELPS, CAPT.
Duly Detailed Investigating Officer
International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP.

CERTIFICATE OF STENOGRAPHER


I, DINAH BRAUN, do hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.


DINAH BRAUN

CERTIFICATE OF INTERROGATOR

I, CALHOUN W. J. PHELPS, CAPT. 0-904367, certify that on the 13th day of February, 1946, personally appeared before me HIROTA, Koki, and according to J.K.SANO, Interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

Tokyo
February 15th, 1946


CALHOUN W. J. PHELPS, Capt.

INTERROGATION OF

HIROTA, Koki

Date and Time: 16 February, 1946. 1345 - 1600 hours.

Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan.

PRESENT : HIROTA, Koki

Capt. Calhoun W. J. Phelps, Interrogator
Capt. Arthur A. Sandusky,
Mr. J. K. Sano, ^{Capt} Interpreter
Miss Dinah Braun Stenographer.

Phelps to Mr. Sano: Oath of Interpreter, administered by Capt.

CAPT. PHELPS : Do you solemnly swear, by Almighty God, that you will truly and accurately interpret and translate from English into Japanese and from Japanese into English as may be required of you, in this proceeding?

Mr. SANO : I do.

Questions by: Capt. PHELPS.

Q. Mr. Hirota, what was your position in the cabinet on 7 July, 1937?

A. I was Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Q. This was in the second KONOYE Cabinet?

A. No, it was in the first KONOYE Cabinet.

Q. Whom do you hold responsible for the attack made on the Marco Polo Bridge in Peking, China, on that date?

A. I was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs in Japan in 1937. This Lukoucaiao Bridge incident took place within less than one month after I became Foreign Minister. On that particular day, namely 7 July, 1937, I was in my summer home near the beach at KUGENUMA. On the night of

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(HIROTA Feb 16 cont'd)

July 7th, 1937. I received a telephone call from the foreign office in Tokyo, saying that just then Chinese troops had fired on Japanese and a battle between Japanese and Chinese forces was being waged near Peking. I was greatly surprised to receive that news. I had an automobile call for me from Tokyo and attended the cabinet meeting which was held in Tokyo the following morning. At that cabinet meeting War Minister SUGIYAMA explained the situation. He explained the seriousness of what was happening and he further said that something must be done at once to settle this. He further said that the number of Japanese forces there was not sufficient and we must dispatch some more soldiers there to protect the interests of Japanese residents. At any time when soldiers must be sent in a large number to foreign soil, it naturally involves a grave problem. I personally was against such movement. However, because of the seriousness of this matter discussion took place two or three days in succession.

- Q. Let me interrupt you, Mr. Hirota, to ask you to confine your answers to my questions, then, as we have done in the past, I will allow you time at the end of the day to make these observations. My question here is: Whom do you hold responsible for the attack?
- A. According to a statement made by the then War Minister, he told us that the Chinese were responsible.
- Q. Do you recall the name of the person from whom you received the telephone call when you were in your villa?
- A. I believe it was one of the secretaries of the foreign office on watch during that night. I do not remember his name just now.
- Q. Was it customary to have a secretary of the foreign office on night watch?
- A. Generally speaking, it had been the custom. Perhaps you can ascertain his name by making inquiry through the Vice-Minister who was in office then.
- Q. What was his name?
- A. Kensuke HORINOCHI.
- Q. Who was the War Minister in this cabinet?
- A. General SUGIYAMA.
- Q. Did you later read the report of the conference of the League of Nations pertaining to this incident which was published about 6 October, 1937?
- A. Perhaps I did read it, but I do not remember it distinctly.

(HIROTA Feb 16 cont'd)

- Q. Yet a communication from the League of Nations to the Japanese Government would have been sent to you as foreign minister, is that correct?
- A. Yes.
- Q. On the 11th of July, 1937, a tentative agreement for the settlement of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident was reached with the Chinese, was it not?
- A. Yes, I assume a "on the spot" agreement was entered into on that date.
- Q. But four days later, the Japanese Government sent reinforcements to the Japanese troops in the area of Peking?
- A. I remember a certain number of troops being sent from Korea Field to that area but none were sent from Japan proper.
- Q. Did this troop movement, reinforcing the Japanese Peking Garrison, require a vote on finance from the cabinet?
- A. Perhaps it was so but I do not remember clearly what took place on this at that time.
- Q. Can you give me an approximation of the amount of yen expended by the Japanese Government in 1937?
- A. I do not remember the figures of the amount expended for military purposes that year.
- Q. Can you give me a rough estimate?
- A. I do not have a very clear memory as to the amount. Perhaps the Secretary of the Treasury can furnish that information.
- Q. To the best of your recollection, however, was it a large amount?
- A. At first, the budget for the purpose was not so large, according to my memory. As the Incident grew worse, I believe they must have asked for more funds.
- Q. Do you recall the amount of yen spent for the China affair in any year prior to your retirement from office?
- A. I do not remember the figures, but at the end it must have reached a large sum of money.
- Q. Do you recall whether or not the funds were raised either in whole or in part from the sale of opium at Harbin or Mukden?

(HIROTA Feb 16 cont'd)

- A. I have not heard nor do I know anything about that. But perhaps the Army did. It pertains to military finance and I would not know in detail. That matter belongs to the internal financial management of the army, and I would not have any knowledge of it.
- Q. Would it have been managed by the commanding general of the forces in China or by the chief of staff of that army, or by the Special Service Organization?
- A. My best guess is that whatever troop movement was made officially the budget which the army secured through the cabinet would take care of it and if any funds were raised at all through such a medium, they must have been used for their secret expenditures.
- Q. And if they were secret expenditures, the Special Service Organization would then be in charge?
- A. What I am saying is it could be imagined that kind of a thing could go on, but I don't know who had charge of it or who actually handled the funds.
- Q. What part did General MATSUI play during the China affair?
- A. I don't know him very well. The first time I came in contact with him was when he was recalled to active duty from the reserves to be made a commander during the Shanghai Incident.
- Q. This is General Iwane MATSUI?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And you mean the Shanghai Affair of 1937?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Do you recall what part Col. HASHIMOTO played in the China Affair?
- A. This general too was not known to me. He was in the reserve and he was in command of troops in the area where boats of the foreign nations were attacked.
- Q. At Shanghai?
- A. Yes. During the Nanking attack on Yangtze River.