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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 an enemy effort in the form of either a raid or a more seri-  
3 ous attack.

4 Mr. Mitchell: Well, these reports of Admiral Bloch and  
5 the Martin-Bellinger reports and all these other documents  
6 we have in evidence dealt very heavily with the question of  
7 reconnaissance. The general tenor of them was the conclusion  
8 that if you wanted a complete, sure defense against a carrier  
9 borne air attack you should have a reconnaissance the evening  
10 before and catch the carriers at dusk before they started  
11 their night run, and with the alternative if that was not  
12 done, was to try to get the planes out and break up the at-  
13 tack after the carrier planes left the carriers the next  
14 morning, which was not so certain.

15 Now, the studies that were presented there that we have  
16 been offering and considering this morning indicate that a  
17 pretty large number of patrol planes would be needed for the  
18 long reconnaissance and then a very large number of bombing  
19 planes would be needed to go out and smash the carriers after  
20 they were discovered and I notice that in the recommendation  
21 of General Martin made in his study of the air situation in  
22 Hawaii under date of August 20, 1941, exhibit 13, which we  
23 referred to this morning, he made this recommendation:

24 (Reading)

25 "It is recommended that the War Department give

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2 immediate consideration to the allotment of 180 B-17D  
3 type airplanes or other four-engine bombers with equal  
4 or better performance and operating range and 36 long-  
5 range torpedocarrying medium bombers to the Hawaiian  
6 Air Force for the performance of search and attack mis-  
7 sions in an area bounded by a circle whose radius is  
8 833 nautical miles and center is Oahu, as follows:

9 "72 for daily search missions.

10 "36 for attack missions (these airplanes will be in  
11 readiness daily, fully armed and loaded with bombs,  
12 for a mission).

13 "72 for maintenance and reserve from which 36 may  
14 be used to augment the attack force.

15 "180 total B-17D's.

16 "36 torpedo-carrying medium bombers of the B-26 or  
17 other suitable type."

18 Now, his report shows that he was considering a 360 de-  
19 gree reconnaissance, all around the circle and which was the  
20 extreme requirement for a perfect defense against any attack  
21 from any direction.

22 Now, there are other figures in his report as to re-  
23 connaissance over limited arcs.

24 Now, compared with what Martin recommended on August  
25 20th for a complete security there against air attack we had

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a very slim equipment, did we not?

General Marshall: Well, I stated, if you recall, we had a serious shortage in four engine bombers. We only had twelve.

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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Mr. Mitchell: As an aid to Navy PBY air reconnaissance, that was practically nothing, wasn't it, or almost nothing?

General Marshall: A little more than that, sir. Not only a small supplement to the Navy reconnaissance, but it left no striking force.

Mr. Mitchell: That is it. After you located them, you had not any bombers to sink the carriers?

General Marshall: No, sir.

Mr. Mitchell: It seems to be the fact, according to these figures, and your judgment is, isn't it, that as far as security by long distance reconnaissance and bombing the carriers the night before the proposed air attack is concerned, the equipment was quite inadequate?

General Marshall: Was deficient.

Mr. Mitchell: What would be the result of that? That they would have to confine their long-distance reconnaissance to the limited sector that you stated, or what could they do under those circumstances?

General Marshall: The provision of General Martin there is for complete and perfect reconnaissance. That is all right. That certainly is to be done, if you can provide the planes. I might, incidentally, say even at the top of our production, we were never able to give Hawaii, in 1943 and 1944, what the Commander of Hawaii wanted, any more than

Witness Marshall .

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 we were able to give any commander all he wanted. That  
3 was an unavoidable situation always, in a war of the char-  
4 acter we were involved in. However, there were ways to  
5 improve the situation by increased viligence, by the opera-  
6 tion of the attack planes, the interceptor planes, in every  
7 way we could in that fashion.

8 There was also this to be considered, which we always  
9 had in mind, and that is the great hazard the enemy under-  
10 took in sending his people so far from home. A surprise  
11 is either a triumph or a catastrophe. If it proved to be  
12 a catastrophe, the entire Japanese campaign was ruined, and  
13 advance into Malasia, and advance into the East Indies would  
14 have been out of the question.

15 Singapore would not have been captured, the Burma Road  
16 would not be cut off, and the attack on New Guinea probably  
17 would not have occurred. So you have an enemy hazarding a  
18 great risk in this stroke. Therefore you measure somewhat  
19 your means of defense against the hazard he is accepting  
20 in doing it.

21 I agree with General Martin that if the planes were  
22 available that was a very appropriate assignment. It was  
23 on the side of conservatism which is certainly a good side  
24 to take in the defense of a fortress such as Hawaii, and  
25 the Fleet more than the fortress against air attack. Does

1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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2 that explain my point of view?

3 Mr. Mitchell: Yes. Your answer deals with two problems:  
4 One is the question whether you expected an attack and the  
5 other one, what position you were in to defeat it.

6 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

7 Mr. Mitchell: I was intending to confine my first ques-  
8 tion to this proposition: Assuming the attack is made, to  
9 what extent, under the circumstances, and with the material  
10 they had available, would you conclude that they had ade-  
11 quate means for either breaking up the attack at sea, or on  
12 the carriers, or else destroying it, mitigating it the next  
13 morning.

14 General Marshall: I think they had at least the means  
15 to so have broken up that attack that it could do limited  
16 harm.

17 The Vice Chairman: What was your last answer?

18 General Marshall: I think they had sufficient means  
19 to sufficiently break up the attack so it could only have  
20 done limited harm.

21 Mr. Mitchell: By that, you mean if everybody had been  
22 on the alert and the radar operating and reporting planes  
23 at distances of 130 to 150 miles, and every pilot was in  
24 the seat, the motor going, everybody on the alert, and the  
25 antiaircraft men with ammunition, with that amount of

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Questions by Mr. Mitchell

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1  
2 warning that you could get from that sort of reconnaissance,  
3 you could have mitigated the attack: :

4 General Marshall: Roughly, sir. I would not say every  
5 pilot in his seat, but in a condition of alert.

6  
7 Mr. Mitchell: Your idea is with the forces available,  
8 they could have broken up the Jap planes in the air to  
9 an extent?

10 General Marshall: It would have greatly lessened the  
11 damage done.

12 Mr. Mitchell: These reports which you had and considered  
13 laid a great deal of emphasis on the need for an aerial re-  
14 connaissance, did they not?

15 General Marshall: Yes, sir. I might add at this time  
16 the question was the availability of materiel. I think at  
17 that time we had about 148 B-17's of which an appreciable  
18 number were of the old model, without leak-proof tanks and  
19 with other deficiencies of equipment; we had 12 B-24's al-  
20 together.

21 Mr. Mitchell: You do not mean in Hawaii, do you?

22 General Marshall: I mean all together.

23 Mr. Mitchell: The whole army?

24 General Marshall: The United States Army. We had four  
25 in Panama; we had 35 in the Philippines; we had 12 in Hawaii;  
26 we had a few on the West Coast, and we had 50 or 60 to

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2 develop the pilots for the production of planes then in  
3 prospect.

4 Mr. Mitchell; Did you know here in Washington at that  
5 time, or keep track of the number of bombers that were in  
6 commission and those that were not?

7 General Marshall; Yes, sir. That was a continual  
8 check with us, because we had so few, and everybody wanted  
9 them.

10 I might add there again in connection with this, that  
11 the greatest trouble was we had to have crews prepared to  
12 fly these planes as they came off the production line which,  
13 as I say, was then approaching the full quantity production.  
14 That demanded planes that had to be in the air almost con-  
15 stantly, and tremendous maintenance, while at this time we  
16 only had about 50 or 60 altogether to produce crews for the  
17 flow of planes then in prospect.

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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2 Mr. Mitchell: The first days of our hearing we had  
3 figures introduced by Colonel Thielen and Admiral Inglis as  
4 to the types of planes, both Naval and Army planes, in Hawaii  
5 on December 7, and how many were in commission and how many  
6 were out. It is given by fields there in that data, but we  
7 attempted to total it, and while our compilation may not be  
8 absolutely correct, the way we calculated it it means the  
9 Navy had available on the Hawaiian Islands on December 7 the  
10 following: Patrol planes, many of which were not in full  
11 condition for use, but I am giving you the total planes and  
12 some of them were out of commission, they had 54 PBV-5, 27  
13 PBV-3 and 8 PBV-1, or a total of 89. And on that day there  
14 were in addition I think 7 fighter Naval planes left by  
15 carrier.

16 On the same day the Army had 50 bombers of various types.  
17 B-17's they had a total of 12, and only 6 in commission. That  
18 is the 4-engine bomber. Then the B-18, what is that?

19 General Marshall: That is a 2-engine bomber of an earlier  
20 type.

21 Mr. Mitchell: Fit for reconnaissance work?

22 General Marshall: They are good for reconnaissance, not  
23 because of great range but they are a sturdy, reliable plane.

24 Mr. Mitchell: There were a total of 33 there, of which  
25 21 were in commission. The A-20, what type is that?

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General Marshall: That is a fighter or interceptor plane.

Mr. Mitchell: What is the B-12?

General Marshall: That is a rather obsolete bomber type.

Mr. Mitchell: Well, they had in addition 152 fighters of various types, of which less than 100 were in full readiness for use, I mean fit to fly.

General Marshall: For operation.

Mr. Mitchell: Yes, for operation. So there was a great shortage of both fighters and bomber planes.

(4)

Now the Jap attack was made with six carriers, and I ought to remember but I think there were two or three hundred planes, which would greatly outnumber anything in the way of fighting planes that existed at Hawaii.

Is it your idea that with that very large power of the Japs in the air, with our limited fighter forces at Hawaii we could have mitigated the attack very considerably or only partially?

General Marshall: I think so. They could not stop it, but they could have greatly lessened the damage that was done. They could disorganize it, taken it off its targets.

Mr. Mitchell: You say you had to weigh the situation there and the risk by considering not only the materiel that

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 you had but the probability or possibility of the Japs risk-  
3 ing an attack. Your idea, as you stated it, as I understand,  
4 was it would be a risky performance for the Japs and they  
5 might not have hazarded a considerable part of their carrier  
6 fleet for such an enterprise.

7 General Marshall: It was accepting a hazard to do that,  
8 for several reasons: One was the effect in bombing by a few  
9 planes on carriers. It does not take very many hits to do  
10 grievous harm. The other was the action of our shipping that  
11 was not damaged in the fight.

12 Mr. Mitchell: It might turn out in a chase and sink  
13 the Jap task force?

14 General Marshall: We had some carriers in the Hawaiian  
15 District.

16 Mr. Mitchell: Well, with the Japs planning an attack  
17 down along the Asiatic Coast as their main venture, the smart  
18 officers over there would feel, would they not, that it would  
19 be a great stroke to protect their flanks and give them more  
20 time if they made a surprise attack that is temporary but  
21 at least it would cripple the United States Fleet at Hawaii?

22 General Marshall: That was the whole purpose of it.  
23 It was a subsidiary raid in order to protect the Japanese  
24 operations in the south against any action by our Fleet.

25 Mr. Mitchell: That would be an objective that any smart

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1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

2 officer would think about as a thing to be attained, if he  
3 could, wasn't it? In other words, the Japs, in their plan  
4 of attack, stick that up as number one. Their proposal was  
5 to cripple the American Fleet at Hawaii, if they could.

6  
7 General Marshall: The distances in their advance south  
8 towards Singapore were very great. If there was an effective  
9 fleet on their flank their hazard would have been greater.

10 Mr. Mitchell: Would your judgment as to the probability  
11 of the Jap attempt by air attack be affected by the knowledge  
12 that the Japs had an espionage system in Hawaii which made  
13 them completely familiar with our whole situation there, our  
14 forces, our movements, their habits and non-alertness, non-  
15 reconnaissance, and that they had, up to an hour of that  
16 attack, free use of commercial cables and other international  
17 means of communication to report that situation to their  
18 home country, would not that have encouraged them very con-  
19 siderably to take the risk that you spoke of?

20 General Marshall: It could have. My own reactions,  
21 as nearly as I recall them, which is extremely difficult, to  
22 disassociate with the back sight, is that that specific oper-  
23 ation was not visualized by me. I was more inclined to feel  
24 that the hazards were too great and that they would not risk  
25 it, which would mean that in their movement to the south they  
would have to proceed somewhat conservatively rather than

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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2 dash in to great distances, as they actually did, once our  
3 Fleet was crippled. I think that is, as nearly as I can give  
4 it, a fair estimate of my thinking at the time.

5 Mr. Mitchell: In other words, you were 2,000 miles away  
6 and you might not visualize or be conscious of the local  
7 conditions, and you would expect your local commanders to be  
8 conscious of the local conditions?

9 General Marshall: No, sir, I do not mean that. I mean  
10 regardless of the distance from here to Hawaii my thinking,  
11 as nearly as I can recreate it now, was that the hazard of  
12 coming in there, with the sizable Naval force, was so great,  
13 in my opinion, that they would not risk it, but would rather  
14 proceed on a more conservative basis of actual operations to  
15 the southward, to the China Sea, towards Malaysia. As it  
16 was, they went without regard to any fears, and went out on  
17 the end of the plank through all of Malaysia, Indonesia and  
18 the New Guinea District.

19 Mr. Mitchell: Well, if they knew exactly what the con-  
20 ditions were at Hawaii, the lack of reconnaissance and alert-  
21 ness and all that during the few days in December, their risk  
22 would not appear to them to be quite so great.

23 General Marshall: You have to take into consideration  
24 the length of time involved in that movement, and of course  
25 it could be recalled at any time by radio message, and the

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2 great change that had been effected if active offensive-  
3 defensive measures had been taken, as to what would happen to  
4 their air force, as to the loss of one or two carriers alone.

5 They knew we had other planes. Whether or not they knew  
6 they were enroute there, whether or not they knew they were  
7 only passing through there, all those are factors to be con-  
8 sidered.

9 As a matter of fact, as you know, the reinforcement planes  
10 from MacArthur, that finally took off after the delay due to  
11 adverse winds, arrived during the middle of the attack. All  
12 those were considerations that the Japanese General Staff,  
13 the Japanese Naval Staff, would have to take into considera-  
14 tion themselves, and they could have made quite a difference  
15 in the result.

16 Mr. Mitchell: Well, all the time, I think the record  
17 shows or will show, they had complete data of the conditions  
18 right down to December 6.

19 General Marshall: No question about that at all.

20 Mr. Mitchell: And they could have recalled their flight  
21 at the time if they got information that an alert really had  
22 been made?

23 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

24 Mr. Mitchell: Were you aware of the fact that the  
25 merchant shipping had been diverted from the northern ship

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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2 lanes and sent down to the Torres Strait area in October  
3 and that left a wide swath of the ocean without any traffic  
4 in it?

5 General Marshall: Yes, sir, I was aware of that situation,  
6 and the reasons for it.

7 Mr. Mitchell: Did you know that during the end of  
8 November and the first week in December the Navy, particularly  
9 its direction-finding system in the Pacific, for a week prior  
10 to Pearl Harbor had lost complete track of all but one division  
11 of the Japanese carriers?

12 General Marshall: I have a faint recollection that I  
13 did not know all the time where all the Japanese ships were.  
14 I do not recall being aware of the fact that it was the  
15 carrier divisions that were the missing ones. It may be I  
16 knew it, but I do not recall.

17 Mr. Mitchell: Did you have anything to do with the de-  
18 cision to shift the merchant fleet, merchant vessels into the  
19 Torres Strait area, or was that purely a Naval matter?

20 General Marshall: I do not recall. It may have been  
21 discussed with me, and it probably was, but I have no re-  
22 collection. I do recall the shift.

23 Mr. Mitchell: The shift?

24 General Marshall: Yes.

25 Mr. Mitchell: Was it a safety measure, to prevent the

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 loss of the merchant shipping?

3 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

4 Mr. Mitchell: From Jap attack?

5 General Marshall: Yes, sir. Admiral Stark of course  
6 can give you more direct information on that, but that was the  
7 reason. It was a more secure voyage, in the light of the  
8 developing situation.

9 Mr. Mitchell: You used the words "merchant shipping".  
10 I think technically it would be more correct to say the slow  
11 boats.

12 General Marshall: The slow boats?

13 Mr. Mitchell: The slow boats.

14 General Marshall: It was those that made something  
15 around, probably, I will say, under 12 knots, maybe under 10  
16 knots. The faster ships, like the Dollar Lines, went straight  
17 through to the north of Guam.

18 Mr. Mitchell: During the last week or two in November  
19 and early in December did you have frequent conferences with  
20 the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, Admiral  
21 Stark, and possibly the President about the situation?

22 General Marshall: I had practically daily conversations  
23 with Admiral Stark over the phone or personally, and the same  
24 with the Secretary of War personally, and very frequently  
25 with the Secretary of State, during which, I think on



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 practically every occasion, the Secretary of the Navy was  
3 present, and usually Admiral Stark, when I was present.

4 Mr. Mitchell: What did those discussions relate to?  
5 In other words, did they have anything to do with the imminence  
6 of war and prospects of an attack by the Japanese?

7 General Marshall: Yes, sir. They had to do with the  
8 measures to be taken diplomatically, on a high Government level,  
9 towards Japan. They had to do with the military situation,  
10 as Admiral Stark and I viewed it. They had very specifically  
11 to do with our hope that action, war action in the Pacific,  
12 could be delayed as long as possible.

13 Mr. Mitchell: I will offer in evidence at this time  
14 as Exhibit 58 a document labelled as follows:

15 "1. List taken from President Roosevelt's  
16 appointment book specifying his engagements with  
17 the Secretaries of State, War and Navy, General  
18 Marshall and Admiral Stark, for period October 1  
19 to December 7, 1941.

20 "2. Telephone calls made from outside through  
21 White House switchboard on December 6, 1941 and  
22 December 7, 1941, as compiled from operators notes  
23 available."

24 I understand that means calls from outside through the  
25 White House switchboard with persons outside of the White

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Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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2 House, not messages to people in the White House.

3 "3. List of dinner guests at White House Saturday  
4 evening, December 6, 1941.

5 "4. List showing the President's appointments  
6 Saturday, December 6, 1941.

7 "5. List showing the President's appointments  
8 Sunday, December 7, 1941."

9 The Chairman: That is all Exhibit 58?

10 Mr. Mitchell: All that is Exhibit 58.

11 The Chairman: That will be filed.

12 (The document referred to was  
13 marked Exhibit 58.)

14 Mr. Mitchell: During these conversations you say they  
15 related quite often to the question of postponing Japanese  
16 attack, if possible, until you could get better prepared.

17 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

18 Mr. Mitchell: Was the situation at Hawaii discussed  
19 specifically in any of those conversations or conferences?

20 General Marshall: I think so. We covered the whole  
21 Pacific: Alaska, Hawaii, the Philippines, Guam, Wake Island.

22 Mr. Mitchell: Will you tell us in your own way just  
23 what, if anything, you can remember about the conversations  
24 at those discussions?

25 General Marshall: From a purely military side Admiral

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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2 Stark and I together endeavored to put forward the policy  
3 of the necessity of taking every measure that we could think  
4 of, politically or diplomatically, to carry along the situation  
5 in the Pacific without disruption, at least until we had an  
6 opportunity to prepare the forces there. The first considera-  
7 tion at that time in the matter of preparation was in relation  
8 to the Philippines, which up until April, 1941, had literally  
9 nothing in terms of numbers and equipment. As early as  
10 February we had taken the women and children out.

11 I had gotten authority to double the number of Philippine  
12 scouts from 6,000 to 12,000, and then I issued an order which  
13 stopped the return of men who only had two years, who had  
14 completed their two-year tour, which I believe possibly was  
15 illegal, I do not recall now. In order to provide experienced  
16 people to assist General MacArthur -- or to assist General  
17 Grunert at that time, in the development of additional scout  
18 organizations and also in the development of a Philippine  
19 Army, basic training, we also had to have the time to collect  
20 the shipping, to go through the lengthy procedure of withdraw-  
21 ing these ships from South American runs, against which there  
22 was very serious opposition from all sides virtually, and  
23 to obtain troops sufficiently trained at that time to be  
24 sent out there.

25 We were then in the process, beginning roughly the 1st

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2 of August, of receiving the first of real quantity production,  
3 and we were trying to rush that through to the Philippines  
4 primarily, until we gave them sufficient reinforcements to  
5 make it dangerous for the Japanese to make any movement either  
6 against the Philippines or, more particularly, to the south  
7 of the Philippines, leaving them free to be attacked on the  
8 flank.

9 We needed time for this. It was estimated that the  
10 principal reinforcements and materiel could be gotten out  
11 there by about the 5th of December. Of course there were  
12 the delays in obtaining the ships, there were the delays in  
13 delivering the planes, and there were the delays produced  
14 by adverse head winds to that then difficult and considered  
15 dangerous flight by a B-17 in that period from the West  
16 Coast to Hawaii.

17 On the Naval side, Admiral Stark of course can speak  
18 for himself, but I recall very specifically he was struggling  
19 to get a delay until about the 1st of February, in order that  
20 the Fleet could be outfitted. I believe the Fleet training  
21 was the main consideration. That I cannot testify to with  
22 any authority. I refer to most of the items that pertain  
23 to the Army side of the affair.

24 Now in all these discussions we analyzed the situation  
25 as it changed from week to week, as delays developed which

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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2 would not permit us to reach the stage of defensive security  
3 that we had hoped by the limiting date that had been suggested,  
4 sometime in December, and a discussion of the measures that  
5 might be taken appropriately by the Government towards the  
6 Japanese which would at least maintain the status quo until  
7 we were in better shape.

8 Of course in those matters I was not a factor, you  
9 might say, in the discussions, except where it had a military  
10 implication, although there was complete freedom for ex-  
11 pression if I cared to inject myself into the diplomatic  
12 statement in the communications proposed.

13 But of course it was more appropriate for me to confine  
14 my observations to the phases of the discussion or the  
15 documents that had a direct military implication.

16 Does that give you a fair idea, sir?

17 Mr. Mitchell: That gives me a fair idea. You were  
18 kept informed, I suppose, of the diplomatic developments.

19 General Marshall: I think in the main I knew about all  
20 that was going on, because I not only sat in on a great many  
21 of the discussions personally, but in addition to that Mr.  
22 Stimson would always talk to me when he returned from any  
23 of his discussions with Mr. Hull.

24 Mr. Mitchell: Do you remember whether, in that latter  
25 period, the latter part of November and early December of 1941,

Witness Marshall

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2 in any of these discussions the question was raised about the  
3 security of the Fleet at Pearl Harbor, or whether, because  
4 of lack of preparedness and the chances out there something  
5 ought to be done with the Fleet, that it either put to sea  
6 or move back towards the coast? Was there any discussion of  
7 that kind?

8 General Marshall: I do not recall discussions of that  
9 kind once the Fleet was in Hawaii. I have a very faint  
10 recollection -- a very definite recollection, as a matter of  
11 fact, of a long series of discussions regarding the location  
12 of the Fleet before it went out to Hawaii.

13 Mr. Mitchell: That was in 1940?

14 General Marshall: Well, at the time it went out there.  
15 I must admit that I have forgotten a good many of the pros and  
16 cons that were being discussed at the time.

17 Mr. Mitchell: Those discussions related to the suitability  
18 of Pearl Harbor as a training place for the ships. They  
19 did not have any question at that time, prior to December,  
20 1940, after the Fleet had gone out there, as to the question  
21 of the security of the Fleet in port. I am wondering whether  
22 in any of these conversations, as you approached December 7,  
23 you or Admiral Stark in your presence, or the Secretaries of  
24 War or Navy raised any question about the dangers to the  
25 Fleet in Pearl Harbor at that time, and the question whether,

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Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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2 if air attacks were at all possible and you were not in  
3 perfect defense, you should do something about it?

4 General Marshall: I do not recall that specifically,  
5 sir.

6  
7 Mr. Mitchell: Do you remember with whom you had your  
8 discussions in 1940 about the question of basing the Fleet  
9 originally at Pearl Harbor in the spring of 1940?

10 General Marshall: I think they were with Admiral Stark,  
11 with the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and  
12 I believe the President, although I do not know whether the  
13 discussion was with him directly or whether I got the result  
14 of his statement and then we made the presentations, I do not  
15 recall.

16 Mr. Mitchell: Do you remember yourself what objections  
17 were made or advanced at that time towards putting the Fleet  
18 at Pearl Harbor?

19 General Marshall: As I said a little previously, I am  
20 sorry to have to state to you that I do not recall the details  
21 well. I do not recall the argument between the Atlantic and  
22 the Pacific, which at that time was a great issue, as to how  
23 much of the Fleet would be in the Atlantic, how much would  
24 be in the Pacific. We had a tremendous problem then of the  
25 sea lanes across the Atlantic, the deficiency of the British  
in guarding the convoys, and the hazardous position of the

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 British Isles during that period.

3 Now I do not recall exactly, as I say, the pros and cons  
4 of that, but I know it was going on at that time and I was  
5 in the middle of it.

6 Mr. Mitchell: Well, now, we come up to this question  
7 of the modus vivendi. You and Admiral Stark had been working  
8 for more time. Were you aware that on November 20th the Japs  
9 had made a proposal to the United States that involved practi-  
10 cally our termination of aid to China and our opening up of  
11 the freezing regulations and furnishing the Japs with oil?

12 General Marshall: I have no definite recollection, but  
13 I am quite certain there was.

14 Mr. Mitchell: Did you have access to these diplomatic  
15 intercepts during that period, that is the decoded Japanese  
16 messages to and from Tokyo and Washington?

17 General Marshall: Yes, sir. The majority of them went  
18 over my desk, those that were supposed to be critical.

19 Mr. Mitchell: Do you remember seeing any of those in  
20 which the Japs instructed their Ambassadors here to get an  
21 affirmative agreement first by the 25th of November and later  
22 at least by the 29th?

23 General Marshall: I remember that very well, sir.

24 Mr. Mitchell: Do you remember those messages which said  
25 if they did not get it signed, sealed and delivered on that



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 date something automatically would happen?

3 General Marshall: Yes, sir, I remember that.

4 Mr. Mitchell: Well, then, when the modus vivendi came  
5 up -- what date was it, do you remember? Around the 25th  
6 or 26th?

7 General Marshall: I think it was earlier than that.  
8 About the 21st, was it not?

9 Mr. Mitchell: The 21st?

10 General Marshall: Yes.

11 Mr. Mitchell: What part did you have in that discussion?

12 General Marshall: I was absent on that particular day  
13 on an inspection trip, as I recall, and I learned of the  
14 matter on my return from General Gerow. I believe there  
15 was a memorandum from him to me. He had attended the meeting  
16 with Admiral Stark and he had expressed a view in regard  
17 to the outcome.

18 Mr. Mitchell: That is right.

19 General Marshall: And he submitted the memorandum to  
20 me describing the conditions and giving me the data.

21 Mr. Mitchell: Did you agree with General Gerow's position?

22 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

23 Mr. Mitchell: Which he reported in that memo?

24 General Marshall: Yes, sir, particularly that portion  
25 where he states that he informed Admiral Stark verbally that

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 he regretted the reference to Army Forces in the Navy comments  
3 on proposition A-1. He felt that no restrictions should be  
4 placed on the Army's preparations to make the Philippines  
5 secure.

6 The point was we had almost nothing there, we had every-  
7 thing to put there, and if we did not do anything we were  
8 helpless, and we continued helpless if the thing broke.

9 Mr. Mitchell: You learned that that proposal had been  
10 dropped?

11 General Marshall: Yes, sir, I learned that.

12 Mr. Mitchell: Did you learn at that time of the fact  
13 that Mr. Churchill had wired him about it and that it was  
14 sent back for the Chinese, and did you know about Chaing  
15 Kai-Shek's protest in which he said the Chinese Army would  
16 collapse if anything like that occurred?

17 General Marshall: I have no recollection of seeing  
18 Mr. Churchill's message, but I have a very clear recollection  
19 of Mr. Hull describing the Generalissimo's reaction. Whether  
20 or not I read his message I do not know, but I know I was  
21 clearly aware of his very energetic opposition to the pro-  
22 posal.

23 Mr. Mitchell: In the light of what you just said and  
24 what you knew, were you reconciled to the Secretary's decision  
25 not to attempt the modus vivendi proposal?

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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General Marshall: I think I was, sir. I recall this, that we were very much disappointed that we could not get this through, because it looked like a very slender hope of delaying matters to give us more time, and as I also recall, and the records will show, we had movements on the ocean at that time that were very critical, Marines coming out of Shanghai, and hazard to some movement, a more serious one was a group I think of four vessels of fair speed that were moving to the north of Guam straight into the Philippines and a large convoy of slow vessels that was moving south towards Torres Strait.

Mr. Mitchell: Now did you know, in advance of its submission to the Japanese, the contents of Mr. Hull's statement to them of November 26, 1941?

General Marshall: No, sir, I did not.

Mr. Mitchell: Were you consulted about that?

General Marshall: I do not think I was, sir.

Mr. Mitchell: To go back shortly to something I omitted, I call your attention to a document called "Aid de Memoirs Defense of Hawaii". It is a photostat. It seems to have some writing at the head of it. Do you know whose handwriting that is?

General Marshall: I do not think that is mine. The writing at the bottom is distinctly mine.

Larry follows

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 Mr. Mitchell That is a memorandum you gave to the  
3 President, is it, at or about the time that it is dated,  
4 5-3-41?

5 General Marshall: I am told -- this is purely hearsay --  
6 I am told that I was called to that conference at the White  
7 House to discuss -- I have forgotten what the issue was, it  
8 did have a relation -- I think it was the movement of the  
9 fleet -- and I made a hurried call -- this was sent me, and  
10 I made these notes on the face of it, and gave copies to  
11 the President. I made this note at the bottom of the page.

12 Mr. Mitchell: I am told, and it will appear later,  
13 that this handwriting at the top is --

14 Mr. Gesell: General Watson's, the Military Aide to  
15 the White House.

16 Mr. Mitchell: We will offer this in evidence as  
17 Exhibit 59.

18 The Chairman: Let it be identified and filed as  
19 Exhibit 59.

20 (The document referred to was  
21 marked Exhibit No. 59.)

22 Mr. Mitchell Would you mind reading it for us,  
23 General?

24 General Marshall: (Reading)  
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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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## "AIDE MEMOIRE

## "Defense of Hawaii

"The Island of Oahu, due to its fortification, its garrison, and its physical characteristics, is believed to be the strongest fortress in the world.

"To reduce Oahu the enemy must transport overseas an expeditionary force capable of executing a forced landing against a garrison of approximately 35,000 men, manning 127 fixed coast defense guns, 211 antiaircraft weapons, and more than 3,000 artillery pieces and automatic weapons available for beach defense.

"Air Defense. With adequate air defense, enemy carriers, naval escorts and transports will begin to come under air attack at a distance of approximately 750 miles. This attack will increase in intensity until when within 200 miles of the objective, the enemy forces will be subject to attack by all types of bombardment closely supported by our most modern pursuit.

"Hawaiian Air Defense. Including the movement of aviation now in progress Hawaii will be defended by 35 of our most modern flying fortresses, 35 medium range bombers, 13 light bombers, 150 pursuit of which 105 are of our most modern type. In addition Hawaii is capable of reinforcement by heavy bombers from the mainland by air. With this force

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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1  
2 available a major attack against Oahu is considered impracti-  
3 cable.

4 "In point of sequence, sabotage is first to be expected  
5 and may, within a very limited time, cause great damage.  
6 On this account, and in order to assure strong control,  
7 it would be highly desirable to set up a military control  
8 of the islands prior to the likelihood of our involvement  
9 in the Far East."

10 Now, the footnote refers back to the paragraph, "Hawaiian  
11 Air Defense," which reads as follows:

12 "Including the movement of aviation now in progress,  
13 Hawaii will be defended by 35 of our most modern flying  
14 fortresses \* \* \*"

15 "Due to make a mass flight from mainland to Hawaii  
16 May 20. A number of this type of plane could be dispatched  
17 immediately if the situation grew critical."

18 Mr. Mitchell: Well, that number of the most modern  
19 flying fortresses that you visualized in May, did they  
20 arrive at Hawaii?

21 General Marshall: They did not, sir.

22 Mr. Mitchell: So this estimate was made then on the  
23 supposition --

24 General Marshall: As to the prospective delivery of  
25 planes.

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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2 Mr. Mitchell: Which couldn't be made?

3 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

4 Mr. Mitchell: Do you remember how you happened to give  
5 that memorandum to President Roosevelt? What was the oc-  
6 casion of it?

7 General Marshall: That was what I was trying to re-  
8 call. I have forgotten at the moment just exactly what  
9 the discussion was. I will try to stir up my memory. There  
10 was some definite thing that was under discussion. I have  
11 forgotten what it was. Rather, a definite consideration  
12 under discussion.

13 Mr. Mitchell: General Watson has in his handwriting  
14 at the top:

15 "Modern Planes have completely changed the situation as  
16 to defensibility."

17 Was that a subject of discussion on your part, that  
18 memorandum by him?

19 General Marshall: I had no discussion with General  
20 Watson at all that I can recall. I have a vague recollec-  
21 tion there was something about the capability of Hawaii to  
22 defend itself without the presence of the Fleet, but I  
23 will check up on that and try to refresh my memory.

24 Mr. Mitchell: I notice in the paragraph in the memoran-  
25 dum entitled "Air Defense," you assume here that "enemy

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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2 carriers, naval escorts, and transports will come under air  
3 attack at a distance of approximately 750 miles." That  
4 visualized a sufficiently adequate patrol force at Hawaii,  
5 air reconnaissance to detect the enemy carriers at that  
6 distance?

7 General Marshall: It visualized the available recon-  
8 naissance force and also the available striking force.

9 Mr. Mitchell: To hit them after they were discovered?

10 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

11 Mr. Mitchell: That is pretty nearly the limit of the  
12 Martin-Bellinger requirement, isn't it?

13 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

14 Mr. Mitchell: There is a reference in that memorandum  
15 to "sabotage is first to be expected and may, within a very  
16 limited time, cause great damage."

17 Was that your point of view in May, 1941, that sabotage  
18 would be a greater peril than any other kind of an attack  
19 on Pearl Harbor?

20 General Marshall: Not a greater peril, but it was, as  
21 expressed here, the first in sequence, because sabotage was  
22 always one of the difficult points, the disposing of troops  
23 to meet it without unduly exciting everybody, and the main-  
24 tenance of them in that dispersed condition to control it.  
25 And, of course, military control of the Islands would have  
exercised a very great restraint on all of the people, which



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 would have lessened the hazard decidedly, just as was done  
3 when we got on a war basis.

4 Mr. Mitchell: In this "Aide Memoire" you also assume  
5 a state of alertness and the best use of the equipment at  
6 Pearl Harbor, a state of alertness against air attack?

7 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

8 Mr. Mitchell: We have, General, a memorandum for the  
9 President on the subject of ground forces, submitted to  
10 him by the Chief of Staff. It is undated. It does not seem  
11 to have so much to do with air attacks as the furnishing of  
12 additional ground forces far distant installations, and  
13 outposts. Have you a copy of it before you?

14 General Marshall: Yes, sir, in skeleton form.

15 Mr. Mitchell: The only thing it says about Hawaii is  
16 on page 3. In the first full paragraph, it says:

17 "Hawaii. Authorized and present 41,000. Naval instal-  
18 lation (Kaneohe Bay) being expanded requiring additional  
19 defenses. Presence of Fleet reduces threat of major attack.  
20 Reinforcements can be deferred as long as Fleet remains in  
21 Pacific. Reinforcements must be available in the United  
22 States to give Fleet freedom of action."

23 Did that paragraph refer wholly to the ground forces in  
24 Hawaii as distinguished from -- when I say ground forces I  
25 mean forces to defend against landing attacks -- or did it

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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2 General Marshall: It is a resume of the entire ground  
3 forces. The idea was to so build up that command in  
4 Hawaii that it required no naval assistance; that a secure  
5 base was maintained, with the task of defense resting in  
6 the hands of the Army.

7 Mr. Mitchell: In the margin of the paragraph I read  
8 about Hawaii, are the words "O.K. Leave as is." It will  
9 later appear that that is in the President's handwriting.

10 The Chairman: Is that made an exhibit?

11 Mr. Mitchell: We will make it one now. Exhibit 60 is  
12 the memorandum to the President, subject "Ground Forces"  
13 just referred to.

14 The Chairman: It will be filed as No. 60.

15 (The document referred to was  
16 marked Exhibit No. 60.)

17 Senator Ferguson: Has the date of that been fixed  
18 yet? Could counsel place the date?

19 Mr. Mitchell: I can't. It is a document we obtained  
20 from the White House files, but it is undated.

21 General Marshall: We have been unable to find any  
22 record of it in the War Department.

23 The Vice Chairman: This was a memorandum from General  
24 Marshall to the President?

25 Mr. Mitchell: That is right, on the subject of ground

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 forces in all areas, a great many places.

3 The Vice Chairman: Does the General have any idea  
4 what time it was submitted?

5 Mr. Mitchell: Do you happen to have any idea yourself,  
6 General?

7 General Marshall: I have no recollection of it at all.  
8 It doesn't show here on this copy that I even signed it.  
9 Sometimes it was the case, and it may have been here, that  
10 the President would call me to appear very quickly to discuss  
11 a certain subject, on which I had no notes at all, and they  
12 would give me some papers that pertained to it and I would  
13 do the best I could with those papers.

14 There may have been something of that sort here. I don't  
15 know.

16 Mr. Mitchell: General Marshall, we have here a trans-  
17 cript of proceedings before the Army Pearl Harbor Board,  
18 Volume 35, as of Tuesday, September 26, 1944, and on page  
19 4050 there is testimony given by Mr. Stimson about a statu-  
20 tory war council meeting in the Department.

21 Secretary Stimson said:

22 "General Marshall read a long letter from General  
23 MacArthur in the Philippines, telling us of the progress  
24 of the reorganization of the Philippine Army and the con-  
25 struction of airports throughout the Islands."

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 Then again -- I think Mr. Stimson was reading from  
3 his own diary here.

4 Well, I started too soon. I meant to start with  
5 November 25, 1941. He read:

6 "At 9:30 Knox and I met in Hull's office for our  
7 meeting of three. Hull showed us the proposal for a  
8 three-months' truce which he was going to lay before the  
9 Japanese today or tomorrow. It adequately safeguarded  
10 all of our interests, I thought, as we read it, but I  
11 don't think there is any chance of the Japanese accepting  
12 it because it was so drastic."

13 "Then we had a long talk over the general situation  
14 there which I remember."

15 Then he quotes from his diary:

16 "We were an hour and a half with Hull, and then I  
17 went back to the Department, and I got hold of Marshall.  
18 At 12 o'clock I went to the White House where we were  
19 until nearly half past one."

20 He says:

21 "That's an hour and a half."

22 Then the diary proceeds as follows:

23 "At the meeting were Hull, Knox, Marshall, Stark, and  
24 myself. There the President brought up the relations  
25 with the Japanese. He brought up the event that we were

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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likely to be attacked perhaps as soon as -- perhaps next Monday for the Japs are notorious for making an attack without warning, and the question was what we should do.

"We conferred on the general problem."

The diary continues:

"When I got back to the Department I found news from G-2 that a Japanese had started. Five divisions had come down from Shantung and Shansi to Shanghai, and there they had embarked on ships, 30, 40, or 50 ships and have been sighted south of Formosa. I at once called up Hull and told him about it and sent copies to him and to the President, of the message."

Do you remember that conference?

General Marshall: I have no detailed recollection of the conversations back and forth, but I have a very distinct recollection of the situation that was developing at that particular moment in the China Sea.

Mr. Mitchell: Have you any recollection of this beyond the statement of President Roosevelt, have you any memory of that?

General Marshall: I don't remember, sir.

Mr. Mitchell: That was on the 25th.

Now, I call your attention to this message that was sent to General Short over your signature on November 27. Were you in the city on the 27th?

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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General Marshall: I was not, sir.

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Mr. Mitchell: Where were you?

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General Marshall: I was in North Carolina.

5

Mr. Mitchell: What was going on there?

6

7

General Marshall: General McNair was having a very large maneuver, I imagine about 300,000 troops, or thereabouts. It was a vital day, and I flew down on the afternoon of the 26th to see the operations on the 27th, and flew back late that evening, so that I appeared on the office on the early morning of the 28th.

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Mr. Mitchell: Before you left on the 26th, had this proposal to send a warning message out to the overseas outposts been discussed with you?

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General Marshall: Yes, sir. My recollection of it, which is rather confirmed by the memorandum of General Gerow under date of the 27th, I believe that we had a considerable discussion on the joint board on the morning of the 26th, at which it was decided that an alert should be drafted and dispatched immediately.

21

22

23

24

25

General Gerow had the task of drafting the alert. Whether or not he had a draft copy with him at the time or whether he was to prepare it after he returned to the War Plans Division I do not recall. I left in the afternoon following this meeting of the Joint Board in the

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 morning. Present at the meeting was Admiral Stark,  
3 myself, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, General  
4 Bryden, General Gerow, and I believe at that time the  
5 officers of the Air Corps, and their opposites were pre-  
6 sent from the Navy.

7 Mr. Mitchell: The message was sent over your name  
8 then while you were away?

9 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

10 Mr. Mitchell: When did you see the draft after you  
11 returned?

12 General Marshall: I saw it, the actual message, as  
13 it was sent, I think, the moment I reached my desk on the  
14 morning of the 28th.

15 Mr. Mitchell: This memorandum referred to by General  
16 Gerow of November 27 is the one in which he states "The  
17 Secretary of War sent for me about 9:30 a. m. November 27,  
18 1941." That is the one you refer to, is it?

19 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

20 Mr. Mitchell: When you saw the message of the 27th  
21 to General Short after you returned from maneuvers, what  
22 was your reaction as to its contents and sufficiency?

23 General Marshall: I concurred in the message and the  
24 manner in which it was drawn.

25 Mr. Mitchell: Did you see at the same time the

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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h13 identical message sent to the Commander on the West Coast?

General Marshall: I saw the message --

Mr. Mitchell: To all the commanders?

General Marshall: Pacific commanders.

Mr. Mitchell: Did you see General Short's response and the responses of the other commanders to the warning message that had been sent to them?

General Marshall: I assume I did. I find in looking at the copy I did not initial it. I assume I must have seen it.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1 Mr. Mitchell: Have you seen this photostat?

2 General Marshall: Well, I saw the actual --

3 Mr. Mitchell: The original of it?

4 General Marshall: The original of it.

5  
6 Mr. Mitchell: The photostat showing the report of  
7 General MacArthur of November 28 and the report of General  
8 Short on November 28.

9 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

10 Mr. Mitchell: It is our Exhibit 46.

11 You are not relying on your present recollection but  
12 on the existence of this document?

13 General Marshall: In what respect?

14 Mr. Mitchell: To know whether you received it or not?

15 General Marshall: Well, I know I received this because  
16 there is my own reference of that to the Secretary of War  
17 and my initials on the copy, and the two were clipped together.

18 Mr. Mitchell: You remember that they were both clipped  
19 together?

20 General Marshall: No, I don't remember the clipping  
21 together. When I checked back to find out about the thing  
22 I found them clipped together and noticed I had not initialed  
23 the under copy but I assumed that I saw it.

24 Mr. Mitchell: How did you happen to route it to the  
25 Secretary of War?

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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General Marshall: Because I thought it was very important that he should see this particular message. It had been my custom always when there was anything up that was out of the ordinary that he might miss I always initialed it for him and had it taken directly to his room.

Mr. Mitchell: The fact that he participated in your absence in the drafting of the message to which these were responses, did that have anything to do with your sending it to him?

General Marshall: It might have; I don't recall, sir.

Mr. Mitchell: What do you remember now about your appraisal of or reaction to General Short's message of the 28th?

General Marshall: I have not a clearout recollection at all because shortly after the attack, I presume about an hour and a half, I was in conversation with Colonel Bundy in regard to the measures we were then taking to reestablish ourselves on the West Coast, to get the convoys straightened out, and see what other measures we had to take throughout the United States for security, and he mentioned this message, which he apparently had reexamined, and referred to the sabotage factor in it, and also referred to the implication he had gotten from the liaison with the Navy which is included in the message.

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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2 He did that while he was standing at my desk just before  
3 his departure from my room, when we concluded the other part  
4 of the conversation, which was the virtual redeployment of  
5 all our military sources to meet the situation as it developed.

6 Mr. Mitchell: What was the date of that talk with  
7 Colonel Bundy?

8 General Marshall: I would say that that was an hour  
9 and a half or an hour, thereabouts, after the news of the  
10 attack on Pearl Harbor.

11 Mr. Mitchell: On December 7?

12 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

13 Mr. Mitchell: Well then, at that time Colonel Bundy  
14 brought up with you the question of Short's report of November  
15 28?

16 General Marshall: My recollection of it is that when  
17 we finished this business I had him in there for, he being  
18 the officer in immediate charge of all details relating to  
19 the Pacific, that was his subsection of the War Plans Division,  
20 or the section of the War Plans Division, he would be in  
21 charge, and so I was doing business with him direct as to  
22 what we were to do to reestablish the situation, and when we  
23 finished that, as I recall the incident he was leaving the  
24 room and stopped about half-way out of the room and made a  
25 reference to the message, which he evidently had looked back

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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on it to see what was going on, and referred to this sabotage clause, and I have forgotten just what his reference to it was. I recall his reference to liaison with the Navy. He referred to that. They had gone ahead with the procedure.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

2 Now, my difficulty in answering your question was it  
3 is very hard for me to associate myself with the statement  
4 about what came next because from that instant on I was com-  
5 pletely involved in the most active period during the war that  
6 next six weeks.

7 Mr. Mitchell: Well, I was referring more especially  
8 to your appraisal of or reactions to this message of  
9 Short's on November 28th when it was shown to you, or you saw  
10 it on the 28th?

11 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

12 Mr. Mitchell: Did you notice the brevity of it or the  
13 difference in contents --

14 General Marshall: I have no recollection regarding it  
15 at all.

16 Mr. Mitchell: (Continuing) by comparison with any of  
17 the other reports that you received?

18 General Marshall: I have no recollection regarding it  
19 at all, other than the fact that I find the two messages to-  
20 gether and that I signed the upper one.

21 Mr. Mitchell: In the ordinary course of operations in  
22 the department of the General Staff where would the messages  
23 have gone for consideration?

24 General Marshall: It would have gone to the War Plans  
25 Division and by the Executive officer there they would have

1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

2 been routed to the particular section that had that, which  
3 was Colonel Bundy's section.

4 Mr. Mitchell: At no time between November 28th and the  
5 7th of December did anybody ever come back to you and men-  
6 tion the Short report or question its sufficiency or anything  
7 of that kind?

8 General Marshall: I have no recollection of any comment.

9 Mr. Mitchell: Had you any information that after the  
10 warning message was sent there was no air reconnaissance being  
11 conducted at Hawaii for any distance, any considerable dis-  
12 tance?

13 General Marshall: No, sir, I had no intimation of that.

14 Mr. Mitchell: Well, did you after November 27th, when  
15 this warning was sent out, make any inquiry as to what measures  
16 were being taken at Hawaii?

17 General Marshall: None that I recall.

18 Mr. Mitchell: Did you make any inquiry, any further in-  
19 quiry about what measures were being taken at these other  
20 posts where the warning message had been received, or one like  
21 it?

22 General Marshall: None that I recall. We were deeply  
23 engaged in the business of trying to get our materiel re-  
24 routed to General MacArthur as rapidly as we possibly could  
25 and we had, as you will see in Magic, picked up the fact of the

1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

2 report that he was unloading at night. I learned that from  
3 the Japanese. I did not learn that from MacArthur.

4 Mr. Mitchell: To make my question clear, I was talking  
5 of the period between November 28th and December 7th, as to  
6 what information, if any, you had about the stage of the alert  
7 or what steps were being taken in Hawaii for defense against --

8 General Marshall: I said as to Hawaii I had no informa-  
9 tion and I thought you then asked me about the other places.

10 Mr. Mitchell: Yes.

11 General Marshall: And I said there, I think, that I  
12 had nothing regarding the alert but we had information regard-  
13 ing what was going on which we obtained through Magic, as re-  
14 lated to the Philippines. I have forgotten the date of the  
15 Magic but it is in the record, as to unloading and rushing  
16 of supplies ashore being carried out at night so that the  
17 Japanese could not see exactly what was going on.

18 Mr. Mitchell: Well, I take it then that your recollec-  
19 tion about Short's reply of November 28th in the very brief  
20 examination you made of it you are not in a position now to  
21 remember and to state what your reactions were to it?

22 General Marshall: I cannot state any reactions that I  
23 had to it. It came through the office.

24 Mr. Mitchell: Was there any consideration given in the  
25 War Department that you had knowledge of after November 28th

1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

2 and before December 7th of sending any additional warnings to  
3 General Short or any other commander?

4 General Marshall: I had no recollection of such.

5 Mr. Mitchell: What was the liaison committee?

6  
7 General Marshall: The liaison committee was a group  
8 consisting of the Under Secretary of State, representatives  
9 of the War Department, - usually two would go over, - the same  
10 from the Navy Department, which met in the office of the Under  
11 Secretary of State and discussed matters pertaining to all  
12 three departments, largely attache details, equipment for  
13 South American and Latin-American countries, sometimes Chinese  
14 matters, and it developed during the period after I became  
15 Chief of Staff and before the outbreak of the war for us into  
16 many larger considerations but in the early stages it was en-  
17 gaged mostly in minor details regarding requests of Ambassadors  
18 and the desires of the State Department that affected the  
19 Army and Navy, particularly as to materiel and equipment to  
20 Latin-American countries. Eventually the larger matters were  
21 discussed.

22 Mr. Mitchell: I think you told us that you currently  
23 saw these decoded intercepts of the Jap diplomatic messages.

24 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

25 Mr. Mitchell: Did you also see these decoded intercepts  
of Jap messages relating to military installations and ship



1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

2 movements?

3 General Marshall: I would assume I would, yes, the same  
4 as the diplomatic.

5 Mr. Mitchell: I think the record shows, I think General  
6 Miles said that at a certain date about that time, in the  
7 summer or early fall of 1941, you ordered not only the G-2  
8 evaluations of those messages but the raw material or original  
9 copies of dispatches should be shown to you.

10 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

11 Mr. Mitchell: Do you remember that at that time?

12 General Marshall: I have a recollection of that.

13 Mr. Mitchell: He said it was commencing August 5, 1941.

14 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

15 Mr. Mitchell: How did they come to you? Were copies  
16 delivered and kept in your files?

17 General Marshall: I beg pardon, sir?

18 Mr. Mitchell: Were copies delivered and kept in your  
19 files?

20 General Marshall: At first they came in somewhat of a  
21 loose leaf arrangement and they were all returned and I  
22 stopped that and required that they be put in a locked pouch  
23 because I found in the various offices there was inevitable  
24 carelessness and also I felt inevitably the fact that we were  
25 doing this would leak out.

1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

2 I had been told when I became Chief of Staff that my  
3 predecessor, General Craig, was very guarded in the matter,  
4 primarily because he thought it was illegal and that, there-  
5 fore, if we were to continue we would have to be exceedingly  
6 careful. That factor, of course, more or less vanished from  
7 consideration and was replaced entirely by the urgent neces-  
8 sity, from our point of view, of guarding the secret.

9 Mr. Keefe: Mr. Chairman, I am not sure that I understood  
10 that last statement of General Marshall. You mentioned the  
11 fact that your predecessor, General Craig, considered the prac-  
12 tice, some practice as being illegal?

13 General Marshall: The intercepting of these messages.

14 Mr. Keefe: The intercepting of these foreign messages?

15 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

16 Mr. Keefe: As being illegal?

17 General Marshall: Yes, sir; contrary to the Espionage  
18 Act, I believe.

19 Mr. Keefe: I wanted to be sure that I understood you.

20 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

21 Mr. Mitchell: Did you happen to know at that time of  
22 the provision in the Federal Communications Act which forbids  
23 the interception of communications?

24 General Marshall: What is that?

25 Mr. Mitchell: Did you know anything about it then?

1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

2 General Marshall: I think that is the Act I should have  
3 referred to. When I said the Espionage Act I should have  
4 said the Federal Communications Act.

5 Mr. Mitchell: And that the Supreme Court held before  
6 December 1941 some time that that applied to government In-  
7 telligence or police authorities as well as to private per-  
8 sons?

9 General Marshall: I think I knew that, sir.

10 Mr. Mitchell: Were you aware of the fact that at Hawaii,  
11 for instance, there wasn't any legal way up to December 7th,  
12 when the attack occurred, of obtaining copies of the Jap mes-  
13 sages that the Japs sent from Hawaii to Tokyo or that Tokyo  
14 sent back to their spies in Hawaii that came over commercial  
15 cables?

16 General Marshall: Yes, sir, I was aware of that, par-  
17 ticularly because, as I recall, Mr. Stinson was very much  
18 concerned in his desire to obtain that information.

19 Mr. Mitchell: But afterwards you were concerned with  
20 the question of security?

21 General Marshall: When you say "afterwards", I am not  
22 referring to December 7th. I am referring to about a year  
23 back before that.

24 Mr. Mitchell: Prior to that day.

25 General Marshall: Prior to that day.

1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

2 Mr. Mitchell: I mean after the remark had first been  
3 made to you about the matter.

4 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

5 Mr. Mitchell: And the fear of war became apparent.

6 General Marshall: The minute the danger of war to  
7 America became apparent our intense concern was the secrecy  
8 of the source because its value was quite evident.

9 Mr. Mitchell: Was there any regulation in the War De-  
10 partment that you established or knew about that forbade the  
11 people in the War Department, such as G-2 and War Plans Di-  
12 vision, from sending to Hawaii not the text of any inter-  
13 cepted messages, nor a paraphrase of it, nor the fact that  
14 they had decoded it, but the substance of the information  
15 that they had derived by the intercept?

16 General Marshall: I am unaware of any regulation on  
17 that subject. As a matter of fact practically everything  
18 concerning Magic was oral rather than written, in my recollec-  
19 tion.

20 Mr. Mitchell: Did you know that G-2 was not sending  
21 out the gist of those intercepted messages in all cases?

22 General Marshall: Was not sending out the gist?

23 Mr. Mitchell: Not sending out the gist. General Miles  
24 testified that he never, of course, sent a copy of a message,  
25

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 of an intercepted Jap decoded message to Hawaii and he would  
3 not send a paraphrase of it and he did not want to let them  
4 know at Hawaii that he was cracking the code and he went  
5 further, I understand, and I think said that the information  
6 derived in that way could not in a covered up way be passed  
7 on to Hawaii. Was that your understanding of the practice?

8 General Marshall: I do not know as I got that under-  
9 standing but I know that the G-2 of the War Department, who-  
10 ever he was, General Miles, General Strong, General McCabe  
11 or Colonel McCabe, General Lee and later General Bissell, al-  
12 ways were emphatic in their safeguarding of the source and  
13 not advertising anything that was done, to hazard the source.

14 The extent to which they might transmit the information  
15 was one that I am not familiar with, just what they did, be-  
16 cause there was a continual passage of data from the G-2 of  
17 the War Department in the performance of his mission to the  
18 G-2's of the various overseas divisions and as the security  
19 factor was always ever present in the mind of the Assistant  
20 Chief of Staff, G-2 of the Army, that thought that he would  
21 be reckless had never occurred to me. His fear was that I  
22 would be reckless.

23 Mr. Mitchell: Do you remember of ever seeing these  
24 intercepted Jap messages relating to dividing Pearl Harbor  
25 into area A, B, C, D and E and locating the --

1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

2 General Marshall: I do not recall the message. I know  
3 the one you are referring to.

4 Mr. Mitchell: You have examined the book?

5 General Marshall: Yes, sir. I saw it in the book.

6 Mr. Mitchell: And you have no recollection of ever see-  
7 ing it?

8 General Marshall: I have no recollection of that.

9 Mr. Mitchell: Are you familiar with the decoded Jap  
10 message of November 19th, translated November 28th, which ap-  
11 pears in the book of diplomatic intercepts at page 154, which  
12 set up an emergency system of communication between the Japs  
13 and their foreign representatives by the use of certain words  
14 and weather broadcasts?

15 General Marshall: I remember seeing this wind's message  
16 at the time it came through. This is the wind's message, I  
17 believe.

18 Mr. Mitchell: That is the message that established the  
19 code, the one on page 154. It is in Japanese there.

20 General Marshall: Oh, I see. I do not remember exactly  
21 that. I am familiar with that specific wind's message which  
22 would utilize this code, I believe, would it not?

23 Mr. Mitchell: Well, there are two. There is this mes-  
24 sage which came in on the 19th of November and was translated  
25 on November 28th, it says here, in which the Japs said to

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1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

2 their Washington diplomatic representatives:

3 "Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an  
4 emergency."

5 General Marshall: I think I can say now specifically  
6 I did see it.

7 Mr. Mitchell: Do you remember then that after that mes-  
8 sages was received that any attempt was made to alert monitor-  
9 ing stations to listen in to the Japanese weather broadcasts  
10 to see whether what we call an implementing message was later  
11 sent out?

12 General Marshall: I do not know whether I knew just what  
13 it was then but I know now what instructions were given by  
14 G-2, so whether I knew it then or not I am not prepared to  
15 say.

16 Mr. Mitchell: Did you ever see or know of any second  
17 message, an implementing message by which the Japs in the  
18 weather broadcast said the "East wind - rain" or "North  
19 wind - cloudy", indicating war with the United States?

20 General Marshall: I have no recollection of such a  
21 message or such data, rather.

22 Mr. Mitchell: How?

23 General Marshall: I have no recollection of such data.

24 Mr. Mitchell: The FCC, the Federal Communications Com-  
25 mission monitoring station which had been alerted to listen

1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

2 for this implementing weather broadcast report shows that on  
3 December 7th, after the Pearl Harbor attack, they did inter-  
4 cept an implementing message weather broadcast which contained  
5 not the expression "East wind - rain", which meant trouble  
6 with the United States, but "West wind - clear", which meant  
7 trouble with Great Britain. That was after the Japanese at-  
8 tack. Did you ever hear or know of that?

9 General Marshall: No, sir, I do not know anything about  
10 that.

11 Mr. Mitchell: What were your usual office hours during  
12 the first week in December 1941?

13 General Marshall: Well, at that period of short days  
14 and cold it was my custom to arrive at the War Department  
15 about 7:30 and to leave the Department somewhere between 4:30  
16 and 5 and then ride in the evening from 7 to 9. On Sunday,  
17 which brings into question December 7th, it was my habit to  
18 have breakfast about eight and then ride after that and then  
19 go to the War Department.

20 Mr. Mitchell: Then go to the War Department?

21 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

22 Mr. Mitchell: Do you remember this diplomatic message  
23 from Tokyo to their Ambassadors here, what we call for short  
24 the fourteen part message and the one P.M. message?

25 General Marshall: Yes, sir.



1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

2 Mr. Mitchell: Will you state in your own way just when  
3 you first knew about that and under what circumstances?

4 General Marshall: I first was aware of this message  
5 when I reached the --

6 The Chairman: I suggest, General, it is now practically  
7 four o'clock.

8 Mr. Mitchell: Yes, it is four o'clock.

9 The Chairman: Unless the General wishes to go on the  
10 committee might wait until tomorrow.

11 General Marshall: What is your pleasure?

12 The Chairman: We have been adjourning at four o'clock.  
13 We will stand in recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow.

14  
15 (Whereupon, at 4 o'clock P.M., December 6, 1945,  
16 an adjournment was taken until 10 o'clock A. M.,  
17 Friday, December 7, 1945.)

18 - - -