

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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The Chairman: Senator Ferguson.

Senator Ferguson: Admiral, I have now before me the memorandum on your testimony before the Roberts Committee.

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Have you got it?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Referring to the bottom of page 12, "Statement by Captain T. S. Wilkinson, U. S. Navy, Director, Naval Intelligence Division."

Admiral Wilkinson: I beg your pardon. I haven't the Roberts Commission report itself.

Senator Ferguson: Will you just look at the testimony.

(Paper handed to Admiral Wilkinson.)

Senator Ferguson: The other part is in the record and I wanted to have you read this in. It is a very short memo.

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: What you gave to Admiral Stark is already in the record.

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir. This is headed "Precis of Testimony".

The Chairman: What do you call that?

Admiral Wilkinson: It is headed "Precis", -- p-r-e-c-i-s.

The Chairman: What does that mean?

Admiral Wilkinson: It means a brief, I think, or summary.

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The Chairman: That is not our language?

Admiral Wilkinson: I believe it is a French word meaning brief.

The Chairman: In other words it means a brief resume?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

The Chairman: A summary of whatever it is dealing with?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

The Chairman: All right.

Admiral Wilkinson: The heading is "Precis of Testimony Given Before the President's Investigating Commission". Statements by Admiral Stark and several others.

Turning to the part that Senator Ferguson has spoken of:

"Statement by Captain T. S. Wilkinson, U. S. Navy, Director, Naval Intelligence Division.

"In replies to questions, the witness described naval avenues of intelligence, including naval attaches and additional naval observers and consular shipping advisers who had been maintained in the Far East. Frequent reports were received from these officers. The witness mentioned other methods through which the Navy received secret information. Frequent exchange of dispatches had occurred between the Intelligence organization in Washington and in the field. In general, the sources reported their information to Washington, at the same time informing the Commanders in Chief of the Asiatic and the

Witness Wilkinson

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Pacific Fleets. Care was taken here to see that these two officers were kept fully advised as to developments.

"From the evidence available the Navy had concluded in November that the Japanese were contemplating an early attack. The witness considered that both Commanders in Chief had available to them the same information on which this conclusion was drawn here. Nevertheless, warning dispatches had been sent out.

"The witness gave information concerning the control of fishing boats in the vicinity of Hawaii, and described the delimitation of the spheres of activity of the naval and military intelligence services and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

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1 Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 "In April, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent  
3 out a dispatch indicating from past experience that the  
4 Axis could be expected to initiate new activities on Satur-  
5 days, Sundays, and national holidays. Steps were taken  
6 in March 1941, placing the Naval District intelligence  
7 organizations in an advanced state of readiness; coastal  
8 information sections were placed in an active status last  
9 May. District intelligence organizations were further  
10 extended in that month, and a complete state of readiness  
11 of the intelligence organizations was directed last July."

12 Senator Ferguson: Now, Admiral, were those the only  
13 questions that you had gone into before the Roberts Commis-  
14 sion?

15 Admiral Wilkinson: I should say so, sir. It was a  
16 brief hearing, a half-hour only, as I remember.

17 Senator Ferguson: That is the only time you testified?

18 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

19 Senator Ferguson: How do you account for the fact that  
20 there was a Presidential commission to find all of the facts  
21 and that is the only question they went into with you? Was  
22 there anything said why they were limiting your scope?

23 Admiral Wilkinson: I don't know, except that they were  
24 in a hurry to get out to Hawaii, I think, and you will note  
25 that this is a summary of the statements of Admiral Stark,

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1 Witness Wilkinson Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 Admiral Turner and myself, and I think on the same day  
3 they questioned me, they also had General Herron and General  
4 Miles.

5 Senator Ferguson: When they got back they didn't  
6 go into it any further, they didn't call you?

7 Admiral Wilkinson: Didn't call me at all, sir.

8 Senator Ferguson: You were here in the Intelligence  
9 Branch?

10 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

11 Senator Ferguson: Now, reading that, I think it is  
12 the second or third paragraph, about the knowledge that the  
13 Pacific Fleet and the Asiatic Fleet had, do you want to  
14 let that stand as your testimony, that they had the same  
15 amount as you had here in Washington, or to that effect?

16 Admiral Wilkinson: I think it is too broad a statement  
17 sir.

18 Senator Ferguson: It is too broad a statement?

19 Admiral Wilkinson: They had the same information by  
20 reason of their radio intelligence centers which they had  
21 there as to the movements of the Japanese vessels, and the  
22 position and location of the Japanese fleet; they had the  
23 same information as to those factors that we had. They  
24 did not have the same information as to the diplomatic  
25 negotiations, no, sir, nor as to some of the code messages.

1 Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 Senator Ferguson: And some of the other messages?

3 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

4 Senator Ferguson: So you would say that ought to be  
5 corrected?

6 Admiral Wilkinson: It should if it is to be narrowed  
7 down and my own statement, my own draft of memorandum for  
8 Admiral Stark, mentioned a number of points about the move-  
9 ment of ships, and I said they had that information.

10 Senator Ferguson: Now, on the Sundays and Saturdays,  
11 that is in the last paragraph, I wish you would clear up  
12 what they had asked you about that.

13 Admiral Wilkinson: Oh, that, I think, is in one of  
14 our exhibits, Senator.

15 Senator Ferguson: Was that your own or were you just  
16 telling what General Herron had said?

17 Admiral Wilkinson: I was telling what my office had  
18 done. It was Admiral Kirk's action on the preceding April.  
19 Let me have the exhibit.

20 Senator Ferguson: I notice they questioned both you  
21 and General Herron on that same subject.

22 Admiral Wilkinson: That dispatch is shown on page 1  
23 of Exhibit 37 counsel tells me.

24 Senator Ferguson: Page 1 of 37.

25 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes.

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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1  
2 Senator Ferguson: Will you just read that?

3 Admiral Wilkinson: (Reading)

4 "1 April 1941

5 "From: Chief of Operations" --

6 but I know this dispatch was initiated by Admiral Kirk.

7 "To: Commandants of all Naval Districts" --

8 which would, of course, include Manila and Hawaii.

9 "NY Wash Governors of Guam and Samoa.

10 "PERSONNEL OF YOUR NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE SHOULD BE  
11 ADVISED THAT BECAUSE OF THE FACT THAT FROM PAST EXPERIENCE  
12 SHOWS THE AXIS POWERS OFTEN BEGIN ACTIVITIES IN A PARTICULAR  
13 FIELD ON SATURDAYS AND SUNDAYS OR ON NATIONAL HOLIDAYS OF  
14 THE COUNTRY CONCERNED THEY SHOULD TAKE STEPS ON SUCH DAYS  
15 TO SEE THAT PROPER WATCHES AND PRECAUTIONS ARE IN EFFECT."

16 Senator Ferguson: And had that been called to your  
17 attention when you came in?

18 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

19 Senator Ferguson: And then you had that in mind while  
20 you were in the office?

21 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

22 Senator Ferguson: That would be true because of a  
23 relaxation on that day?

24 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir. I think the British  
25 and America, both countries, paid a good deal of attention

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2 to Saturdays and Sundays.

3 Senator Ferguson: The same would be true of civilians,  
4 the same thing would be true of civilians?

5 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

6 Senator Ferguson: If you were going to send a message  
7 on Sunday or Saturday, would you say that you would be more  
8 apt to get better attention from the civilian services or  
9 the Army and Navy?

10 Admiral Wilkinson: Purely as a matter of personal  
11 attention, I would say from the Army and Navy because we  
12 maintained a regular 24-hour watch. We don't relax  
13 established routines on communications on those days.

14 Senator Ferguson: Would you say then that any Army  
15 or Navy establishment that had been alerted, should be  
16 alerted on Saturdays and Sundays even more so than on other  
17 days, owing to what you stated in your report, or what was  
18 stated in this report?

19 Admiral Wilkinson: This dispatch, sir, was not as  
20 broad as perhaps would have been desirable for it to be.  
21 It was initiated by Admiral Kirk and sent out as applicable  
22 to the service over which he had authority, which is to say  
23 the Intelligence Service. This was not warning all the com-  
24 munications services, was not warning all the combat field.  
25 It was only applicable to intelligence service of itself,  
Shf fls which was Admiral Kirk's service and consequently my service.



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Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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2 Senator Ferguson: In other words, you were specially  
3 alerting the Intelligence services, - they were, - on Satur-  
4 days, Sundays and holidays?

5 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

6 Senator Ferguson: And I notice that when you gave your  
7 resume as to what you heard before the Commission you gave  
8 the -- this is already in the record but I want to call it  
9 to your attention -- the Commission asked if he considered  
10 Sunday morning the most lax time in the defenses and, con-  
11 sequently, the most advantageous time for an attack. He  
12 said that "with regards to the reserves Yes, because they  
13 were more likely to be on leave or other privileges, but  
14 with regards to the actual stations in the field he con-  
15 sidered that they should be as efficient and as fully manned  
16 on Sunday as on any other morning."

17 Admiral Wilkinson: I think I was quoting General Herron  
18 there, was I not, sir?

19 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

20 Admiral Wilkinson: All right, sir.

21 Senator Ferguson: Now, he personally made many dawn  
22 inspections on Sunday to check on and insure their readi-  
23 ness."

24 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir. I had seen him on his  
25 return from at least one of those.

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

Senator Ferguson: Now, he was a General in the Army. What would you say about that in relation to the Navy at Hawaii?

Admiral Wilkinson: I would not like to express an opinion on that, Senator.

Senator Ferguson: Well, you had been there Saturdays and Sundays and holidays?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now, what is your opinion?

Admiral Wilkinson: Well, I think stations which were required to be manned would be manned very definitely just as much on Sunday morning or Saturday afternoon as on any other week day or any other day. There were established watches on all the ships and those watches were maintained regularly regardless of the calendar day or the day of the week or the holiday.

The ships were placed on certain conditions of readiness, of which I think you are already aware. Condition 1 was all battle stations manned; condition 2, half the batteries manned; and condition 3 was a somewhat smaller element of the battery.

Condition 3, as I recall, was the standard condition in which we would be when in port. That would require a certain number of gunns manned and I believe from what I have

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Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 heard that that was the case on Sunday morning, that all the  
3 ships were manned in that condition.

4 Senator Ferguson: That is, No. 3?

5 Admiral Wilkinson: I would say they would be equally  
6 manned on Sunday morning or Tuesday morning or Monday after-  
7 noon, in that same rotation I mean, that they would be just  
8 as carefully manned then as at any other time.

9 Senator Ferguson: So, then, you don't think it made any  
10 difference?

11 Admiral Wilkinson: It did make this difference that in  
12 the normal work on the ships they would be having a drill  
13 for all hands and all officers in the forenoon, say, of Thurs-  
14 day or Friday and they would be having inspections on Satur-  
15 day. All officers and all men would be required back aboard.

16 Now, on a Sunday morning, as a matter of a holiday there  
17 would not be these drills and inspections and some officers  
18 might be allowed to return late; some few others, - I think  
19 there was a limitation to those who might stay away, - some  
20 few others might be allowed to stay away all day Sunday, so  
21 there would be that slight difference in that instead of  
22 probably being aboard for the work of the day some few might  
23 have been excused because there was no work of that day.

24 Senator Ferguson: That is all.

25 Mr. Gearhart: Mr. Chairman.

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

The Chairman: Congressman Gearhart.

Mr. Gearhart: Admiral Wilkinson, despite the schedule of organizations which is dated 23 October 1940, which requires the Office of Naval Intelligence in both Foreign Intelligence and Domestic Intelligence to evaluate the information collected and disseminate as advisable; despite Admiral Stark's reply to Admiral Kimmel's letter of the 22nd of March 1941 which reads as follows:

"With reference to your postscript on the subject of Japanese trade routes and responsibility for the furnishing of secret information to CINCUS, Kirk informs me that ONI is fully aware of its responsibility in keeping you adequately informed concerning foreign nations, activities of these nations and disloyal elements within the United States. He further says that information concerning the location of all Japanese merchant vessels is forwarded by airmail weekly to you and that, if you wish, this information can be issued more frequently, or sent by despatch";

and despite Admiral Kirk's memorandum of 11 March 1941, his memorandum reading:

"4. The Division of Naval Intelligence is fully aware that it is the responsibility of this Division to keep the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet adequately

Witness Wilkinson

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1 informed concerning foreign nations, activities of these  
2 nations and disloyal elements within the United States",  
3 you testified in June of 1945 before Admiral Hewitt's Special  
4 Investigation on the order of the Secretary of the Navy in  
5 response to Mr. Sonnet's questions that I will read:  
6

7 "Would it be an accurate summary then, Admiral, to  
8 state that information in the possession of the Office  
9 of Naval Intelligence concerning Japanese movements, for  
10 example, would be disseminated by ONI but the evaluation  
11 of Japanese plans or deductions to be drawn from these  
12 movements would be the function of War Plans or Chief  
13 Naval Operations?"

14 Your answer being: "The latter part of your question  
15 'Yes.' The first part, the day by day information of  
16 Japanese movements would not according to my then and pre-  
17 sent understanding be sent out by Intelligence but, rather,  
18 by Operations after their evaluation."

19 My statement to this point is correct, is it not?

20 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

21 Mr. Gearhart: Now, I believe that in the closing por-  
22 tion of my examination of you the other day you explained the  
23 discrepancies between the schedule of organizations of 23  
24 October 1940 and your conception of your duties by pointing  
25 out that you had received verbal orders from someone which

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Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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2 changed your responsibility?

3 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

4 Mr. Gearhart: I forgot to inquire then as to who gave  
5 you those verbal orders?

6 Admiral Wilkinson: I think I stated that I was official-  
7 ly informed by my predecessor as part of my relieving him  
8 that he had been orally directed by Admiral Stark to that ef-  
9 fect in the presence of Admiral Ingersoll and Admiral Turner  
10 as well, and that I myself had received verbal instructions  
11 from Admiral Ingersoll and the authoritative assista nt to  
12 Admiral Ingersoll.

13 Mr. Gearhart: Has that schedule of organization order  
14 ever been changed?

15 Admiral Wilkinson: I do not know, sir.

16 Mr. Gearhart: So far as you know it is still in effect?

17 Admiral Wilkinson: I do not know, sir. I know that fre-  
18 quently papers of that sort are drawn up and modified from  
19 time to time and there is no machinery, perhaps, in existence  
20 to make sure that each particular modificatinn, such as I  
21 said with respect to removing the public relations department  
22 from the Office of Naval Intelligence, that there is no ma-  
23 chinery set up to keep up these instructions in writing to  
24 date.

25 Mr. Gearhart: As long as you were the Director in the

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2 Division of Naval Intelligence you never received from any  
3 source a written order changing the schedule of organization  
4 to which I have just referred?

5 Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir. I did not feel it was  
6 necessary.

7 Mr. Gearhart: Who was it that issued the written order  
8 Schedule of Organizations?

9 Admiral Wilkinson: I am not sure when Admiral Stark  
10 assumed office. It was either he or his predecessor, whoever  
11 was Chief of Naval Operations.

12 Mr. Gearhart: Could it have been --

13 Mr. Gesell: I can answer that question for you, Con-  
14 gressman Gearhart.

15 Mr. Gearhart: I would appreciate it if you would.

16 Mr. Gesell: Because I have the original memorandum.  
17 It was approved by H. R. Stark October 23, 1940.

18 Mr. Gearhart: October 23, 1940?

19 Mr. Gesell: Yes.

20 Mr. Gearhart: And did Admiral Stark tell you person-  
21 ally that he had changed that order?

22 Admiral Wilkinson: No. I was satisfied to receive  
23 that information from my official predecessor and to receive  
24 it from his authoritative assistant.

25 Mr. Gearhart: Now, drawing upon your experience as a

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2 naval officer, if Admiral Stark desired to change that order  
3 he would do it himself, naturally, by another and succeeding  
4 written order, wouldn't he?

5 Admiral Wilkinson: I do not think so, sir. I think he  
6 would tell the man that had charge of it to act otherwise  
7 than as was laid out under the written order. I do not think  
8 Admiral Stark attached perhaps very great importance to the  
9 existence of this series of long documents outlining for  
10 their guidance the duties of the respective divisions. I  
11 think he felt free to add to them or change them orally from  
12 time to time as he saw fit.

13 Mr. Gearhart: Both Admiral Ingersoll and Admiral Kirk  
14 were of lesser rank than that of Admiral Stark, were they  
15 not?

16 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

17 Mr. Gearhart: As a matter of fact, Admiral Stark was  
18 their commanding officer, wasn't he?

19 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, and mine as well.

20 Mr. Gearhart: And yours as well.

21 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes.

22 Mr. Gearhart: It was not then possible for either Admi-  
23 ral Ingersoll or Admiral Kirk to have issued an order contra-  
24 vening an order of a higher ranking officer in writing, was  
25 it?



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2 Admiral Wilkinson: For Admiral Kirk, no, sir. For Ad-  
3 miral Ingersoll ,yes, if he were acting in his stead.

4 Mr. Gearhart: But he could only do that while acting  
5 in the name of Admiral Stark?

6 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

7 Mr. Gearhart: When people or other officers, associates  
8 of yours, come to you and tell you that written orders that  
9 are plain on their face in respect to import and meaning,-  
10 tell you that verbal orders have been issued setting them to  
11 one side, do you not at once feel that you are on inquiry,  
12 that you should make inquiries at the source as to whether  
13 or not that has been done?

14 Admiral Wilkinson: Not necessarily, sir. If I were  
15 relieving an officer of rank and responsibility in command of  
16 a ship and there were general orders extant and he said that  
17 he had received certain particular orders in variance to  
18 those orders, I would accept his statement unless I felt  
19 there was something distinctly wrong with them, which I did  
20 not in this case.

21 Mr. Gearhart: And despite the fact that you had before  
22 you a written order for your guidance, despite the fact that  
23 you had been advised orally that you were not supposed to do  
24 the evaluating and not supposed to do the disseminating, you  
25 did continue as long as you were the head of the ONI to

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2 evaluate and to disseminate, didn't you?

3 Admiral Wilkinson: I had the orders which were appli-  
4 cable except as they were modified. They had been modified  
5 in a brief, in a limited way. I continued to evaluate and  
6 by "evaluation" I mean determining the accuracy, the authen-  
7 ticity and the consistency of information. I do not mean  
8 by that the deduction of enemy intentions. I continued to  
9 evaluate all information in that sense and for my own satis-  
10 faction I attempted to figure out what the enemy intentions  
11 were but I did not spread that out because I was ordered not  
12 to.

13 I continued to disseminate in every respect, including  
14 a number of papers and articles and publications which I  
15 have mentioned, but I did not disseminate information which  
16 would immediately affect the operations of the Fleet until  
17 I had consulted with the War Plans Department about it, be-  
18 cause those were the limitations that I felt had been placed  
19 upon me.

20 Mr. Gearhart: Insofar as the receipt of these inter-  
21 cepts, you disseminated them through the agency of your cour-  
22 ser, Captain Kramer, did you not?

23 Admiral Wilkinson: Within the limited distribution that  
24 was turned over to me to be carried out.

25 Mr. Gearhart: And he delivered them in most instances

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2 to the White House, to the Secretary of War, the Secretary of  
3 Navy and the Secretary of State and to the two Chiefs of Staff?

4 Admiral Wilkinson: They were delivered to those offi-  
5 cers, sir. He did not deliver them himself to them, to all  
6 of those you mentioned. He delivered them to the Secretary  
7 of the Navy, to the White House and to the Chief of Naval  
8 Operations, but not to the Secretary of War, the Secretary  
9 of State, or the Chief of Staff. That was an Army distribu-  
10 tion on that side.

11 Mr. Gearhart: The Army took care of the Army side?

12 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir, and to the Secretary of  
13 State.

14 Mr. Gearhart: That is all.

15 Mr. Keefe: Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?

16 Mr. Gearhart: First I would like to make a request, if  
17 you will yield the floor.

18 Mr. Keefe: Yes.

19 Mr. Gearhart: First I would like to make a request of  
20 counsel.

21 Counsel will recall that I called to the attention of  
22 the committee that I had received letters from enlisted men  
23 who were serving at Hickam Field, who had reported to me that  
24 on the 1st day of December 1941 a formal all-out air alert  
25 was ordered, an all-out alert was invoked which required all

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2 battle stations to be manned, all men to be in full battle  
3 regalia, the mounting of machine guns and the mounting of  
4 antiaircraft guns, and I asked you at that time to furnish  
5 me with the copies of the orders establishing that alert and  
6 the copies of the orders calling off that alert on the after-  
7 noon of Saturday, December 6th.

8 Since that time I have received letters from far separ-  
9 ated parts of the United States, from other enlisted men ad-  
10 vising me that the alert was not confined to Hickam Field  
11 but that there was a general all-out alert at other bases  
12 in the island. Is there a Wright Field?

13 Mr. Keefe: Wheeler Field.

14 Mr. Gearhart: Yes, it is Wheeler Field, which is the  
15 combat air field, or was at that time, in the islands; that  
16 an all-out air alert was called on or about December 1st re-  
17 quiring the same activities at Wheeler Field that I have de-  
18 scribed at Hickam Field, and that that air alert was called  
19 off by an order of the afternoon of December 6th, 1941, the  
20 suspension of the all-out alert, which required the taking  
21 down of the machine guns and the antiaircraft guns and the  
22 packing of them away in grease and the return of ammunition  
23 to the arsenals; and I would like to have copies of the orders  
24 establishing the alert at Wheeler and a copy of the orders  
25 calling off that alert at the same base, together with any

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2 similar orders that were issued at about the same times, cre-  
3 ating an air alert upon other bases in the islands and also  
4 any orders, if there be any, calling off the alert at those  
5 other bases.

6 Mr. Gesell: We will ask the Army to broaden their re-  
7 quest. I might report, Congressman, that at the time you  
8 made that inquiry, that initial request, it was necessary  
9 for the War Department to direct the inquiry to Hawaii where  
10 those orders are if there are any, and they have not yet  
11 received a reply from Hawaii.

12 Mr. Gearhart: Yes.

13 Mr. Gesell: We are already at work on that subject.

14 Mr. Gearhart: I appreciate that. And there is one  
15 other thing. If these field orders at Wheeler and Hickam  
16 were purely field orders, I would like to have that fact  
17 certified. If those orders were inspired from higher au-  
18 thority, I would like to know the history of their issuance.

19 The Chairman: Mr. Keefe, do you want to ask a further  
20 question?

21 Mr. Keefe: Admiral Wilkinson, I have before me now  
22 the original log of the aircraft carrier Enterprise and the  
23 photostatic copy of the log of the aircraft carrier Lexing-  
24 ton.

25 The log of the Enterprise dates from Monday, November

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2 24, 1941 to December 15, 1941 and the photostatic copy of the  
3 Lexington log is for the period 5 December 1941 to December  
4 8, 1941.

5 Now, purely for information in order to be able to  
6 evaluate and understand the language appearing in these logs  
7 I ask you as an expert on naval affairs, a log such as that  
8 which I have does not show the action or battle action re-  
9 port, does it, normally?

10 Admiral Wilkinson: I think it would normally, not a  
11 full report but it would state whether the ship was engaged  
12 or when she had sighted the enemy and what had happened at  
13 once. There would be a separate action report in greater  
14 detail.

15 Mr. Keefe: There would be a separate action report?

16 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

17 Mr. Keefe: All right. Now, I find language in this log  
18 which I have some difficulty, due to my inexperience in deal-  
19 ing with those matters, to understand.

20 For instance, on the 30th of November at 12:45 appears  
21 the language: "Sounded flight quarters." What does that  
22 mean?

23 Admiral Wilkinson: That on a bugle they sounded call  
24 to flight quarters, which is to say "stand by the planes, we  
25 are ready to launch planes" or "get ready to launch planes"

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2 or perhaps "get ready to recover planes." That is to stand  
3 by for flight operations of planes, in other words.

4 Mr. Keefe: That would mean the planes were either go-  
5 ing to take off or land, would it not?

6 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir. Calling the men to their  
7 stations in connection with that operation, that was the pur-  
8 pose.

9 Mr. Keefe: Yes. Now, I find this: On December 1st,  
10 1941, as near as I can make out, the Enterprise at this time  
11 was proceeding westward. It left Honolulu a few days before.  
12 It was carrying planes to Midway or to Wake, counsel, do you  
13 recall? I think they were going to Midway and perhaps the  
14 Lexington was going to Wake at this time. Well, all it  
15 says --

16 Admiral Wilkinson: Excuse me one minute. Senator  
17 Ferguson, do you remember what page that was on, that refer-  
18 ence to Admiral Newton?

19 Mr. Murphy: 430.

20 Admiral Wilkinson: 430? That would give us a clue.

21 Mr. Keefe: There appears information of this charac-  
22 ter, Admiral, as of December 1st.

23 Admiral Wilkinson: You are speaking now of the Lexing-  
24 ton or the Enterprise?

25 Mr. Keefe: I am speaking now of the Enterprise.

1 Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 Admiral Wilkinson: She had been with Admiral Halsey.

3 Mr. Keefe: Yes.

4 Admiral Wilkinson: Because the Lexington was with Ad-  
5 miral Newton.

6 Mr. Keefe: With Admiral Newton?

7 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes.

8 Mr. Keefe: There appears this: "1716 darkened ship;  
9 out in the de-Gaussing gear for half hour test. 1746, se-  
10 cured the de-Gaussing girdle."

11 What does that mean?

12 Admiral Wilkinson: "Darkened ship" means turn out all  
13 lights so the ship cannot be seen after dark. It is usually  
14 done at sunset so that there will be ample time to check,  
15 probably, before the actual dark sets in and lights could be  
16 seen.

17 Mr. Keefe: Is that a normal operation?

18 Admiral Wilkinson: That is a normal operation when  
19 cruising at sea and at any times, - certainly at any times of  
20 danger or crisis and often just for maneuvers.

21 In the de-Gaussing process that you mentioned, magnetic  
22 mines were used to some extent early in this war and the  
23 answer to it was found to be putting a magnetic girle or  
24 belt around a ship and when you were in mineable waters, that  
25 is to say, where you were not too deep for mines to be er-



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1  
2 ployed, the ship would normally cut in the current on this  
3 de-Gaussing girde so that that would counter-act the magnetism  
4 of the ship and defeat the magnetic mines which otherwise  
5 would be affected by the magnetism of the ship.

6 Mr. Keefe: I understand that. So that, then, the order  
7 to darken ship was either a precautionary measure, to be in-  
8 dulged in by the commander of the ship in the event they were  
9 in waters where there might lurk some danger, is that it?

10 Admiral Wilkinson: I think we were doing it regularly  
11 for some time because of the possibility of an attack from  
12 Japanese submarines and, of course, if we were showing lights  
13 it would be an open invitation to discovery.

14 Mr. Keefe: That is just exactly what I thought.

15 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes.

16 Mr. Keefe: That you would darken a ship because you  
17 had knowledge or thought, at least, there might be an attack  
18 by Japanese submarines and this ship going out there is pre-  
19 paring itself against that particular attack by darkening the  
20 ship?

21 Admiral Wilkinson: I think they had been doing that for  
22 some time, sir, in fact.

23 Mr. Keefe: For some particular time prior to December  
24 1st?

25 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, the darkening of ships at night.

1 Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 Mr. Keefe: All right. Now, then, it says: "Set con-  
3 dition of readiness 3, ship control and fire control."

4 What does "set condition No. 3" mean?

5 Admiral Wilkinson: Number 3 is to characterize a condi-  
6 tion wherein a certain number of guns are manned but a cer-  
7 tain number of others are not manned, so that the crews in  
8 rotation can get some rest; roughly about one-third of the  
9 guns.

10 Mr. Keefe: That means they are manning the guns?

11 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir, or the guns were manned at  
12 all times against a surprise submarine attack when at sea.

13 Mr. Keefe: Is that the highest condition of readiness?

14 Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir. The highest condition is  
15 all hands at the battle stations, which is condition 1. Con-  
16 dition 2 is about half the battery and condition 3 is from  
17 one-third to one-fourth, depending upon the ship.

18 Mr. Keefe: So that I am to understand that when the log  
19 says, "Set condition of readiness No. 3, ship control and  
20 fire control", that that means that at least a part of the  
21 guns of that ship were manned and ready for action?

22 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

23 Mr. Keefe: And what does "ship control" mean and "fire  
24 control", what does that mean?

25 Admiral Wilkinson: Fire control is to say -- fire control

1 Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 has to do with the guns. Ship control has to do with the  
3 readiness to counter-act any damage incurred to the ship and  
4 that would mean that they should have certain damage control  
5 parties on at the time, nucleus damage controls. Of course, if  
6 all hands were at the battle stations they would have full dam-  
7 age control. This would be smaller and fewer damage control  
8 stations but enough to take action in the event of a surprise  
9 attack.

10 Mr. Keefe: I do not want to appear so naive as my ques-  
11 tions might appear, Admiral, but I want this for the purpose of  
12 the record.

13 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir. Well, I admit they are  
14 very technical terms as well.

15 Mr. Keefe: Yes. All of these things that you have de-  
16 scribed are conditions of alerting this vessel to prepare it  
17 for any possible surprise attack that might be made upon it?

18 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

19 Mr. Keefe: Isn't that true?

20 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

21 Mr. Keefe: So that so far as the Enterprise is concerned,  
22 in accordance with the log, this ship as it was proceeding out  
23 toward Midway, at least in these days for which the record ap-  
24 pears in this log, the commanding officer of that ship was  
25 preparing against the possibility of a surprise attack?

1 Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir, and doubtless on orders from  
3 Admiral Halsey, the Commander of that detachment, who had  
4 probably had similar practices in all other ships of that  
5 detachment.

6 Mr. Keefe: Now, I find also that planes were constantly  
7 being launched into the air for patrol. That would be for  
8 the same purpose, wouldn't it?

9 Admiral Wilkinson: To ascertain if there were any sub-  
10 marines in the path of the ship, yes, sir.

11 Mr. Keefe: Yes. And then I find as they steamed on that  
12 on December 3, 1941 appears for the first time this language:

13 "1015 commenced zig-zagging according to plan No. 11."

14 What does that mean? What was that plan No. 11?

15 Admiral Wilkinson: One of several plans. In order to  
16 have a variety of plans available so that no enemy could de-  
17 termine that we had one single method of zig-zagging, we would  
18 have a number of plans wherein at different intervals of time  
19 we would make different changes of course. Plan No. 11 was  
20 just one of those plans. Which one that was I do not know.

21 Mr. Keefe: Well, in any event if the ship on December  
22 3, 1941 adopted plan No. 11 and commenced zig-zagging, it would  
23 be quite safe to assume that that action was prompted by the  
24 fact that they were in waters where they expected the possi-  
25 bility of submarine attack, isn't that true?

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1  
2           Admiral Wilkinson: It might, of course -- that is very  
3 true. It might, of course, have been for a drill that morn-  
4 ing as well but it might well be -- if it were a drill only  
5 it would be indicated by an entry afterward that they ceased  
6 zig-zagging an hour or two later.

7           Mr. Keefe: Well, now, I am glad you said that because  
8 right in the next entry, 1216, appears this:

9                   " Changed course to 314 degrees T. and commenced zig-  
10 zagging in accordance with plan No. 2.

11           Would that indicate that it was a drill or a maneuver?

12           Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir. That would indicate they  
13 intended to do it all day.

14           Mr. Keefe: I beg your pardon?

15           Admiral Wilkinson: It would indicate they intended to  
16 do it all day. They have to stop every ship to change courses  
17 and then all ships would resume together and then they would  
18 begin zig-zagging apparently on another plan.

19           Mr. Keefe: Yes. Now, the next entry contains this  
20 language: "1748 commenced zig-zagging according to plan No.  
21 2."

22           What is plan No. 2? Just another one of these zig-zag  
23 plans?

24           Admiral Wilkinson: Just another one. I think we had  
25 about twenty at that time.

1 Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 Mr. Keefe: That is a different type of zig zag?

3 Admiral Wilkinson: Slightly different.

4 Mr. Keefe: Then I find on December 4th the same  
5 language, "Zig-zagging."

6 Admiral Wilkinson: The ship's course was west of the  
7 Hawaiian Islands and we had had reports of strange submarines  
8 being sighted, I think, in the past few months and the ship  
9 was taking no chances, obviously.

10 Mr. Keefe: Then all of this language that all ships in  
11 the task force are steaming darkened, maintaining condition of  
12 readiness No. 3, in ship control, fire control, ships zig-  
13 zagging according to plan No. 11 or plan No. 2 or some other  
14 plan, indicated that so far as Admiral Halsey was concerned  
15 in going west from Honolulu in this period between, I think,  
16 November 26th, when he left Honolulu, and the time when he got  
17 out to Midway, he was taking the precaution that would nor-  
18 mally be taken by the commander of a task force and the com-  
19 mander of this aircraft carrier Enterprise against a possi-  
20 bility of submarine attack, isn't that true?

21 Admiral Wilkinson: It certainly appears so, sir, and I  
22 believe he is to be here and he can further testify directly,  
23 but I would certainly say yes.

24 Mr. Keefe: And if they manned the antiaircraft guns and  
25 were in readiness at their stations at the antiaircraft guns

2923

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1 you would consider that that was a precaution and a safety  
2 measure against the possibility of a sudden air attack,  
3 wouldn't you?  
4

5 Admiral Wilkinson: What time was that entry about con-  
6 dition 3, sir? If it was at night he might be standing off  
7 a night submarine attack, but the guns could be used, of  
8 course, against both submarines and airplanes, the anti-air-  
9 craft guns. Some other guns cannot be used against airplanes.

10 Mr. Keefe: In your opinion, Admiral, as an expert of  
11 forty years in the Navy, with these entries appearing in this  
12 log and also similar entries in the log of the Lexington, and  
13 I shall not burden the record with putting them all in at  
14 this time, it would appear that so far as the commanders of  
15 those two task forces were concerned, Admiral Halsey on the  
16 one hand and Admiral Newton on the other, that in carrying  
17 out the task assigned to them, which was to deliver planes  
18 to Midway and Wake and return. they were doing it under the  
19 principle that they might be attacked by Japan either by sub-  
20 marine or by air attack? Isn't that a fair conclusion for  
21 me to draw?

22 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir. I think that the situation  
23 was certainly strained and they were not neglecting any pre-  
24 cautions. They may not have been expecting it but they were  
25 taking precautions against surprise.

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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Mr. Keefe: Yes. Well, you say they may not have been expecting it?

3

4

Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir, but they were taking precautions against surprise.

5

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9

Mr. Keefe: Do you think they might have had the same idea which you have expressed so frequently here, that you did not think there was any probability of any such attack being made?

10

11

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13

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir. If I was in a similar situation I would not have expected a probable attack but I certainly would have done the same thing with regard to my ships.

14

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Mr. Keefe: You would be ready for it if it came?

Admiral Wilkinson: I would.

Mr. Keefe: Is that right?

Admiral Wilkinson: And I believe I would have done what they did.

Mr. Keefe: All right. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, in order to clear the record in connection with the questions that have been asked, I would like to read from page 578 --

The Chairman: Is that a question?

Mr. Murphy: It is an official record and answers the questions of the gentleman from Wisconsin.



1 Witness Wilkinson

2 Mr. Keefe: Mr. Chairman, may I state that the gentleman  
3 from Pennsylvania is repeatedly referring to a book that has  
4 not been offered here, entitled, "Narrative Statement of  
5 Evidence of Pearl Harbor Investigations", which I have a  
6 copy of, but which I do not understand has been offered in  
7 evidence, is not part of the record in this case and I under-  
8 stand it has a sort of nebulous character from what I have  
9 been able to hear about it, and until such time as the full  
10 character and background of that instrument has been produced  
11 and it appears as part of the record in this case I do not  
12 intend to be interrupted, nor do I want to be interrupted by  
13 reading from something that is not in the record and may or  
14 may not state the facts as they may ultimately develop.

15 So I do not accept anything that appears in this state-  
16 ment as being of verity nor do I think it will assist me in  
17 clarifying anything that I may think in regard to it until  
18 it is properly identified.

19 The Chairman: I think the chair explained the other day  
20 when these documents were furnished that they were prepared  
21 by the Navy Department at the request of the Committee on  
22 Naval Affairs, possibly before this hearing started, I am not  
23 certain about that, but that upon the completion of this nar-  
24 rative story they turned them over to the chairman of the  
25 committee on Naval Affairs and he turned them over to me for

1 Witness Wilkinson

2 distribution to the members of the committee, for the in-  
3 formation of the committee.

4 I do not think they were made part of the record or  
5 filed as exhibits, but for whatever they might be worth in  
6 giving the committee and to the individual members a running  
7 story of this Pearl Harbor situation. They are not yet of-  
8 ficially parts of the record as the chair understands it and  
9 were not offered for that purpose; that is, not at that time.  
10 They might be so made, but have not as yet been made part of  
11 the record or filed as exhibits.

12 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, I did not mean to interrupt  
13 the gentleman. I understood he had concluded.

14 I want to read from a part of the Hart report, made by  
15 Admiral Hart, now Senator Hart, and reported on page 578 of  
16 Volume 2, precisely along the line of the questions put to  
17 the witness and if the questions are pertinent, this is cer-  
18 tainly pertinent.

19 The Chairman: The chair has inquired whether this was  
20 a further inquiry of Admiral Wilkinson? If the committee  
21 are through with the Admiral, unless there are some further  
22 questions from him, we might excuse him.

23 Mr. Murphy: Let me just say this, Mr. Chairman: I  
24 was about to read into the record the explanation by Admiral  
25 Newton as to why he zig-zagged, in answer to the question of



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Sen. Brewster

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Certainly the state of tension in Washington and the knowledge of the situation indicated that this was very different from any of the preceding crises that had arisen.

What would be your comment as to the lessons which we all might derive from that experience, looking to the future?

Shel--  
Shack  
fls

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

Shack (4) pm  
follows  
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Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Senator Brewster

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Admiral Wilkinson: I do not recall, sir, that there were very many alarms sent out there. Up to the time I left in May there had not been an excessive number. We knew that Japan was restless on the other side of the ocean, we knew that difficulties might ensue, and from then on until the actual attack I do not know that very many were sent. I think perhaps the Department refrained from sending an excessive number for that very reason, that they did not want to add up, to produce a wolf-wolf situation.

In answer to your question, I do not believe that there was an allayment or subsidence, you might say, of apprehension because of having received too many warnings.

Senator Brewster: You do not think that the alert they had sent out in June of 1940, when they really put them on the alert -- was that about the date?

Admiral Wilkinson: That was the date, I understand.

Senator Brewster: -- and the earlier episode in keeping the Fleet there that Admiral Richardson testified about, his visits and his concern, and then in the winter and spring, 1941, when certain indications were given and the situation was very tense, you felt all of those were not sufficient to in any sense put them to sleep?

Admiral Wilkinson: I do not think so, sir. The Navy, for instance, was not disturbed or concerned in the summer

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Senator Brewster

1  
2 alert of 1940. The Fleet remained out there in the eyes of  
3 most of the officers, and it was an idea that it was a good  
4 operating ground, good climate, and of course it had the  
5 supposed effect upon the Japanese.

6  
7 Senator Brewster: I think you are not familiar with the  
8 testimony on that point. Admiral Richardson testified he  
9 was very much concerned about that alert, and he came on to  
10 find out whether it was simply an exercise. At first he was  
11 told it was an exercise and later he was told it was really  
12 a war warning.

13  
14 Admiral Wilkinson: I thought you were speaking about  
15 the effect on the Fleet as a whole. Concerning the effect  
16 on the commanders, I could not say. Admiral Richardson was  
17 concerned in that, but the general effect on the Fleet was  
18 little, if anything.

19  
20 Senator Brewster: I am thinking now in terms of the  
21 command and what their appraisal would be of these warnings.  
22 I think that is one of the questions which demands most  
23 consideration, concerning the effect upon these men.

24  
25 One other question. I think you testified about wanting  
certain additional legislation to take care of espionage in  
Hawaii. Did you speak about that yesterday?

(5)  
Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir. I said, I think, that  
the Department had asked for legislation to prohibit the

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Senator Brewster

1  
2 photographing of a naval reservation at Pearl Harbor, and  
3 that that legislation, I believe, was introduced by the Navy  
4 Department but was not enacted. I mean it was requested by  
5 the Navy Department.

6  
7 Senator Brewster: Question has also been raised about  
8 these something over 200 -- I now have the figure before me --  
9 200 consular agents of the Japanese there. I quote now from  
0 the Roberts Report as it seems to have pertinence:

10 "In the summer of 1941 there were more than 200 consular  
11 agents acting under the Japanese Consul, who was stationed  
12 in Honolulu, territory of Hawaii. The Naval District Intelli-  
13 gence Office raised a question with the Federal Bureau of  
14 Investigation, and with the Intelligence Officer of the  
15 Hawaiian Department of the Army, whether these agents should  
16 not be arrested for failing to register as agents of a foreign  
17 principal as required by statutes of the United States. In  
18 conferences respecting this question, the Commanding General,  
19 Hawaiian Department, objected to the arrest of any such persons  
20 at least until they had been given notice and an opportunity  
21 to register, asserting that their arrest would tend to thwart  
22 the effort which the Army had made to create friendly sentiment  
23 toward the United States on the part of Japanese aliens resident  
24 in Hawaii and American citizens of Japanese descent resident  
25 in Hawaii and create unnecessary bad feeling. No action was

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Senator Brewster  
Senator Ferguson

1  
2 taken against the agents.

3 "It was believed that the center of Japanese espionage  
4 in Hawaii was the Japanese Consulate at Honolulu."

5 You were familiar with that, were you?

6 Admiral Wilkinson: Very. We discussed it, General Miles,  
7 Mr. Hoover and myself, in one or more of our weekly conferences  
8 and we were all concerned about it, and the Department was  
9 endeavoring to secure authority or action on that subject.  
10 But the Army, the War Department, on the recommendation of the  
11 Commanding General out there, took the action, or requested  
12 the action that he had set, that it would be delayed and they  
13 would be given an opportunity to register, in order not to  
14 disturb the feeling of loyalty which they were trying to  
15 build up among the Japanese.

16 Senator Brewster: That is as far as that phase of it  
17 was concerned, but there was no need for additional legislation,  
18 was there? You had all the legal authority that was needed?

19 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, indeed.

20 Senator Brewster: That is all.

21 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question  
22 in relation to the one Senator Brewster just asked?

23 The Chairman: Yes, sir.

24 Senator Ferguson: I want to read to you, Admiral from  
25 page 127 some questions and answers from the Army Pearl Harbor



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Senator Ferguson.

1  
2 Board record. Your opposite in the Army was General Miles?

3 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

4 Senator Ferguson: I want to read from his testimony:

5 "General Grunert: Did so many things go out at one time  
6 that the 'low side' might have considered themselves as being  
7 informed to such a point of saturation that they did not pay  
8 much attention to the information they were getting? In  
9 other words, 'crying wolf! wolf!' so that they became confused,  
10 or 'fed up'?

11 "General Miles: That could have been, sir.

12 "General Grunert: Do you think that the G-2 message --  
13 we call it 'the G-2 message' of November 27 -- and the sabotage  
14 message -- we call that the 'Arnold message', of the 28th,  
15 which was sent out under the Adjutant General's signature --  
16 did you consider whether or not they might be taken by the  
17 command 'down below' as modifying or changing the Chief of  
18 Staff's instructions of November 27?

19 "General Miles: No, sir; I did not. The Chief of Staff's  
20 message of November 27 was a war warning message, in my mind,  
21 all inclusive so far as different forms of attack or dangers  
22 might be considered, and my message of the same date in regard  
23 to sabotage was simply inviting the attention of the G-2, who  
24 was particularly charged with that, in each corps area and  
25 overseas department, to that particular form of danger.

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Senator Ferguson  
The Chairman

1  
2  
3 "General Grunert: There was no report from the recipients  
4 required?

5 "General Miles: There was no report required."

6  
7 Were you familiar with those messages that went out to  
8 the Army?

9  
10 Admiral Wilkinson: I was not familiar with the Army  
11 message. I think I knew General Miles' message as to sabotage,  
12 and I knew that the Army had sent a parallel message to our  
13 war-warning message, although I was not familiar with its  
14 language.

15  
16 Senator Ferguson: Would you agree with General Miles  
17 there on that one question, No. 135, asked by General Grunert:

18  
19 "Did so many things go out at one time that the 'low  
20 side' might have considered themselves as being informed to  
21 such a point of saturation that they did not pay much attention  
22 to the information they were getting? In other words, 'crying  
23 wolf! wolf!' so that they became confused, or 'fed up'?

24  
25 "General Miles: That could have been, sir."

26  
27 Admiral Wilkinson: I could not say as to the Army, sir.  
28 I do not think that situation arose in the Navy. I think the  
29 Chief of Operations Office was careful not to send too many  
30 for that reason.

31  
32 The Chairman: In other words, taking the alert in the  
33 summer of 1940 and the other alerts along in the winter of

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

1  
2 1941, even in the summer of 1941, up to the 27th of August,  
3 1941, they did not constitute a sufficient number of alerts  
4 as to create the "wolf" sign in the minds of the commanders  
5 in the field, so that they would abandon or disregard them  
6 as just one more repetition of something which had already  
7 happened?

8 Admiral Wilkinson: Not in the Navy, sir. I do not  
9 think so, sir. I cannot speak for the Army.

10 The Chairman: Anything further?

11 Mr. Gesell: There are two small points that ought to  
12 be clarified, Mr. Chairman. It will just take a second.

13 Admiral, I understood you to state the code designation  
14 did not appear on the Japanese intercepted messages. That  
15 was an error. The code designation did appear on the top  
16 under the name of the sender and addressee.

17 Admiral Wilkinson: Speaking of what message?

18 Mr. Gesell: Of the intercepted messages appearing in  
19 Exhibits 1 and 2 here, these diplomatic and other messages.  
20 They do not appear on our copies of the exhibit because, as  
21 we advised the committee, we had stricken them off.

22 Admiral Wilkinson: That is what I was referring to.

23 Mr. Gesell: That may have misled you?

24 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes.

25 Mr. Gesell: I think the evidence is and the record ought

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell 5063

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to show that those code designations did appear.

Admiral Wilkinson: On the original draft, yes.

Mr. Gesell: Also I think we neglected to ask you whether or not your December 1 summary was sent to Admiral Kimmel.

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell: That is all.

The Chairman: The committee thanks you, Admiral, for your cooperation in eliciting the facts in this inquiry. We appreciate your forthright replies to all questions asked.

Admiral Wilkinson: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the committee for the courtesy they have shown me.

The Chairman: Who is the next witness, Counsel?

Mr. Mitchell: Admiral Turner.

The Chairman: You may be excused, Admiral Wilkinson.

Admiral Wilkinson: Thank you, sir.

The Chairman: Admiral Turner.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL RICHMOND KELLY TURNER

(Having been duly sworn by the Chairman)

Mr. Mitchell: Will you state your present rank, Admiral, and station?

Admiral Turner: My rank is Admiral. My name is Richmond Kelly Turner.

Hook follows

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

1 Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

2 Mr. Mitchell: You were Chief of the War Plans Section  
3 in the Office of Chief of Naval Operations at one time,  
4 were you not?

5 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir, from October 24, 1940,  
6 until June 13, 1942.

7 Mr. Mitchell: Will you state briefly what your service  
8 has been since you left that post?

9 Admiral Turner: I left Washington on June 13, 1942;  
10 proceeded to the West Coast; had ten days leave; went to  
11 the South Pacific by air; took command of the Amphibious  
12 Force, South Pacific, later the Third Amphibious Force;  
13 landed troops at Guadalcanal on August 7, 1942, and then  
14 continued in command of the operations at Guadalcanal for  
15 several months, taking troops and supplies back and forth.

16 In February of 1943, after Guadalcanal had been secured,  
17 we engaged in the occupation of the Russells Islands as  
18 a preparatory move for the capture of New Georgia.

19 On June 30 of 1943, we made the landings at Rendova,  
20 and other parts of New Georgia Islands.

21 On June 15, I was relieved by Rear Admiral Wilkinson.  
22 I proceeded to the Central Pacific on August 24, 1943,  
23 assumed command of the Fifth Amphibious Force, which was  
24 a new force.

25 We then engaged in the capture of the Gilbert Islands

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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2 in November, and in the Marshalls in February of 1944.

3 In about the end of March I was promoted to Vice  
4 Admiral, and about that same time was given command of the  
5 Amphibious Forces, Pacific Fleet, which then comprised only  
6 the Fifth Amphibious Force.

7 In the late spring the Third Amphibious Force was  
8 added to the Amphibious Forces, Pacific Fleet.

9 In June we began the capture of the Marianas Islands,  
10 and after that I returned to Pearl Harbor and turned over  
11 all my ships to the commanders of the Third and Seventh  
12 Amphibious Forces, which were in the Southwest Pacific  
13 under Admiral Kincaid, who was under General MacArthur's  
14 command.

15 In February of 1945, we made the capture of Iwo Jima,  
16 and the 1st of April, 1945 began the campaign against Okinawa,  
17 and I remained at Okinawa for about seven weeks and then  
18 went to Guam and the Philippines to prepare for the Kyushu  
19 invasion.

20 At that time, the 7th Amphibious Force was made avail-  
21 able for use in the invasion.

22 I was relieved as the Fifth Amphibious Force Commander,  
23 which I held in addition to the office of Commander, Amphi-  
24 bious Forces, Pacific Fleet, by Vice Admiral Hill, in May, and  
25 then on August 15, the 7th Amphibious Force was added to the

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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1  
2 Amphibious Forces, Pacific Fleet, as an administrative  
3 organization, which then comprised the Third, Fifth and  
4 Seventh Amphibious Forces.

5 I organized the movement of ships and troops into  
6 Japan for the occupation, and on November 14 of this year,  
7 I was relieved and came to shore duty. I was promoted to  
8 Admiral on May 14, of 1945.

9 My present duty, to which I have just been assigned,  
10 is the representative of the Chief of Naval Operations on  
11 the military staff committee of the United Nations Organiza-  
12 tion.

13 Mr. Mitchell: When do you have to leave for that job?

14 Admiral Turner: About the 29th or 30th of this month.

15 Mr. Mitchell: If you are finished here?

16 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

17 Mr. Mitchell: Will you state, Admiral, what were  
18 the functions of the War Plans Division, and War Plans  
19 Director in 1941 when you were there?

20 Admiral Turner: May I quote from the pamphlet which  
21 I turned in to the committee?

22 Mr. Mitchell: I offer in the record at this time, and  
23 ask to have it transcribed in the daily transcript, as  
24 Exhibit 88, those sections in the document heretofore  
25 described as "Organization of the Office of Chief of Naval



Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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1  
2 Operations, October 23, 1940," which relates to the War  
3 Plans Division. The committee has already had as Exhibit  
4 82 those sections that prescribed the duties of the Intelli-  
5 gence Division.

6  
7 The Chairman: It will be ordered printed as part  
8 of the transcript. That is Exhibit 88.

9  
10 (The document referred to was  
11 marked Exhibit 88.)

12 Admiral Turner: (Reading)

13 "WAR PLANS DIVISION (OP 12)

14 "12-1. DUTIES:

15 (a) Policy and Projects Section:

16 (1) Development of policies and projects in  
17 support of war plans.

18 (2) Collaboration with the War Department in  
19 preparation of current plans for joint action of  
20 the Army and Navy, and in the solution of current  
21 problems.

22 (3) Collaboration with other Government de-  
23 partments on policies and projects affecting  
24 national defense.

25 (4) Study of subjects referred to the War  
Plans Division by the Chief of Naval Operations.

(5) Action in advisory capacity in current

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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1  
2 administrative matters referred to the War Plans  
3 Division.

4 (b) Plans Section:

- 5 (1) Direction of war planning.  
6  
7 (2) Preparation of designated war plans.  
8  
9 (3) Review of Operating Plans and Principal  
10 Contributory Plans.  
11  
12 (4) Collaboration with the War Department  
13 in preparation of Joint Basic War Plans.  
14  
15 (5) Collaboration with other Government de-  
16 partments on plans affecting national defense.

17 "12-2. The Director of the War Plans Division is a member of  
18 the Joint Board (General Order No. 7).

19 "12-3. The War Plans Division has membership on the following  
20 committees:

- 21 Joint Board.  
22 Joint Planning Committee.  
23 Joint Aeronautical Board.  
24 Joint Air Advisory Committee.  
25 Shore Station Development Board.

"12-4. The War Plans Division is non-administrative.

(OP 12)"

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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1  
2 Also in addition to that, shortly after this order  
3 was issued, we established Section (c), which was the  
4 Pan American Defense Section.

5 That section had liaison with the military personnel  
6 of the other American countries except Canada, and with  
7 other agencies of the Government, and War Department, who  
8 were interested in the war-making powers and plans of  
9 Pan America.

10 Also in addition to that, and at just about this  
11 time, the War Plans Division had membership with two members  
12 in the Joint U.S.-Canadian Defense Committee, which had been  
13 established by the President, I think, in July of 1940.

14 Mr. Mitchell: Admiral, there is one phase of your  
15 work that especially interests me, and that is to try and  
16 find the line of demarcation between the Office of Naval  
17 Intelligence, and Office of War Plans, on the subject of  
18 evaluating intelligence information and disseminating it  
19 to the field commanders.

20 Maybe I can approach the thing better by saying we  
21 have gone into that subject with the Army, the General Staff  
22 and the impression we have is that General Gerow, head of  
23 War Plans, who was your apparent opposite in the Army,  
24 War Department, did not issue and was not called upon to  
25 issue messages or directions to field commanders unless

1 Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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2 they involved some operations.

3 If it was a mere question of dissemination and evalua-  
4 tion of information about enemy affairs that did not require  
5 any operational order or directive, then it was a G-2 function  
6 to do that.

7 Was the situation in the Navy precisely parallel to  
8 that, in the Navy Department?

9 Admiral Turner: So far as war plans were concerned,  
10 I think that both the War Department and Navy Department  
11 War Plans Division actually operated in exactly the same  
12 way. I have heard General Gerow's testimony, and if you  
13 will recall, he said it was his business to issue major  
14 evaluations of strategic situations. Those were not his  
15 exact words.

16 It was his business to keep the responsible commanders  
17 in the field informed as to prospective operations.

18 Mr. Mitchell: You mean enemy operations or our opera-  
19 tions?

20 Admiral Turner: Both. That was exactly the same as  
21 we had in the War Plans Division. The only difference in  
22 practice that I know of is that in the Army, the MID, the  
23 G-2, makes the enemy estimate of the situation, which is an  
24 over-all estimate of capabilities and probable actions, and  
25 keeps that current. In the Navy that is the function of the  
War Plans Division, to make and keep current the estimate as  
to the enemy, as well as to our own probable future actions.

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Witness Turner

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2 I have heard the testimony here in regard to this subject  
3 and I will say now that there was no change ever at any time  
4 to my knowledge made in the duties of the Office of Naval  
5 Intelligence as set down in the pamphlet. There was an  
6 interpretation made before, I think it was during the first  
7 part of Captain James' tenure of the Office of Naval Intelli-  
8 gence.

9 I conceived it to be the duty of War Plans to be con-  
10 sulted on and to have major advice on the general and major  
11 strategic situation of the country and of all other countries.

12 About that time estimates as to probable actions by  
13 foreign powers then at war or not at war started to go in  
14 from the Office of Naval Intelligence to the Chief of Naval  
15 Operations not routed by me and giving estimates as to what  
16 was going to happen. I was shown some of these by the Chief  
17 of Naval Operations and I disagreed with them very much.

18 So that I talked to Captain James and I later talked  
19 to then Captain Kirk on this subject and said that when they  
20 prepared any evaluations as to strategic matters to send to  
21 the Chief of Naval Operations I would like to have them  
22 consult me in advance or if not convenient at least they  
23 should be routed by my office so that I could make a comment  
24 on them because that was my function, to give major strategic  
25 advice.

Witness Turner

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2  
3 We had in our Division officers who were experienced  
4 in matters of that character and more experienced than the  
5 officers in the Office of Naval Intelligence, who, generally,  
6 were more junior, and were trained rather for the collection  
7 and dissemination of information, rather than its application  
8 to a strategic situation.

9 Now, there apparently became a misunderstanding of that  
10 situation, through, probably, the use of the word "evaluation".  
11 There are several kinds of evaluation of information. One  
12 is as to its authenticity, its probability, its probable effect  
13 on the future in general terms, the trends which it may indi-  
14 cate. That evaluation was assigned to the Office of Naval  
15 Intelligence and is perfectly properly assigned.

16 If you will look at the letter -- I don't know whether  
17 it has been introduced in evidence or not -- of December 12,  
18 1940, from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Director of  
19 Naval Intelligence, which was prepared by myself, directing  
20 that the fortnightly bulletins with fresh information be  
21 issued, you will find in there nothing that differs in the  
22 slightest degree from the duties of the Office of Naval  
23 Intelligence as laid down in the rules.

24 Frequently they would put in their estimates as to what  
25 the meaning of certain types of movements or certain actions  
by political or military members of foreign governments mean.

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 They would put in that and it was perfectly proper.

3 My function was to give the major strategic over-all  
4 picture for the use of my superiors and disseminate that. I  
5 had no responsibility whatsoever for disseminating information  
6 as such and never did at any time, although from time to time  
7 I would suggest that the Office of Naval Intelligence should  
8 put out certain types of information. But I never initiated  
9 anything of that sort. It was not within my function.

10 Mr. Mitchell: Admiral, please refer now to this document  
11 marked Exhibit 88, covering the functions and duties of the  
12 War Plans Division, and point out any provision in it which  
13 calls upon the War Plans Division to get out these over-all  
14 strategic estimates of the situation.

15 Which one is it that you say covers that?

16 Admiral Turner: Under the "Plans Section". "Direction  
17 of War Planning".

18 Mr. Mitchell: "Direction of War Planning"?

19 Admiral Turner: That is correct. The War Planning is a  
20 very widespread and complicated matter. One of the important  
21 parts of any plan, major operating plan, or a basic plan,  
22 is the strategic estimate that goes along with it and forms  
23 a part of it.

24 Mr. Mitchell: Well, of course, these strategic estimates  
25 weren't always related to the War Plans, were they? That is,

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 you weren't limiting your strategic estimates to cases where  
3 you were developing a war plan. Didn't you make those  
4 regularly whether your plans were settled or not?

5 Admiral Turner: We kept running estimates. We made a  
6 basic national policy estimate shortly after I came in the  
7 Division which supplanted a long estimate that had been used  
8 in the preparation of the Rainbow war plans and from time to  
9 time memoranda, letters, and so forth, memoranda, were sent  
10 to the Chief of Naval Operations, letters were sent to the  
11 Secretary and to the Commanders in Chief, in development, and  
12 so on, of that plan.

13 Our basic plans were founded on those estimates. They  
14 were part of it. You had to make the estimate in order to  
15 make the plan.

16 Mr. Mitchell: Well, of course, if you had your plans,  
17 basic plans made, and then from day to day you were watching  
18 the situation around the world and making estimates of the  
19 probable operations and strategic intentions of possible enemy  
20 nations, you weren't doing that with a view to changing the  
21 plan, were you?

22 Admiral Turner: If necessary, to keep the plan alive.  
23 We tried to have a realistic plan.

24 Mr. Mitchell: I am talking more about the question of  
25 getting information out to the field commander. You wouldn't



Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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Have to send them to the field commanders to use those estimates for the basic information, your office, War Plans?

Admiral Turner: I sent no information to any field commander at any time.

Mr. Mitchell: Well, I am anticipating a little bit, but we are getting down to a specific case here, where on November 27, 1941, what was called a war warning was sent out to the Commander of the Pacific Fleet at Hawaii which warned him that diplomatic relations had been broken, or words to that effect, that a hostile attack might be expected by the Japanese in any direction at any time, and so on.

Now, was it your function to have any part in the drafting of this kind of a document?

Admiral Turner: I drew that document up. That was my conception and the conception of the Chief of Naval Operations and Assistant Chief, that that was exactly the type of thing the War Plans was responsible for preparing.

Hook follows

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 Mr. Mitchell: Well, didn't that include information  
3 about --

4 Admiral Turner: Only in connection with the change  
5 in the strategic situation.

6 Mr. Mitchell: Did that warning contain any kind of  
7 a directive for action?

8 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

9 Mr. Mitchell: What was that?

10 Admiral Turner: That was putting into effect prepara-  
11 tory measures for the Rainbow-5 War Plan which was then  
12 extant.

13 Mr. Mitchell: Well, we have in that message first  
14 a warning that this is a war warning, second a statement  
15 of the information on the diplomatic situation, negotiations  
16 with Japan have ceased, another warning that a strategic  
17 estimate may be that an aggressive move by Japan is expected  
18 within the next three days, and finally an order to do  
19 something, to wit, to execute an appropriate defensive  
20 deployment preparatory to carrying out of the task assigned  
21 in WPL-46. There was all sorts of things in there, wasn't  
22 there?

23 Admiral Turner: That is a preparatory order with  
24 necessary parts showing reasons for the officers addressed  
25 to get ready to execute WPL-46 from a defensive situation.

1 Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

h2 2 Mr. Mitchell: Well, was it because that message of  
3 that date contained an order or directive to take appro-  
4 priate defensive action that you came into it?

5 Admiral Turner: No, sir. I would have come into it  
6 in sending out an over-all picture of the strategic situa-  
7 tion.

8 Mr. Mitchell: Well, turning to the part of this Naval  
9 regulation which has been labelled Exhibit 82, which deals  
10 with the Intelligence Division, it says:

11 "Secure all classes of pertinent information concerning  
12 foreign countries, especially that affecting naval and  
13 maritime matters, with particular attention to the strength,  
14 disposition and probable intentions of foreign naval forces,  
15 evaluate the information collected, and disseminate it as  
16 advisable."

17 Now, will you explain to us just what you understand  
18 that required of the Intelligence Division?

19 Didn't it require everything that you had in your  
20 message of the 27th except the order to take appropriate  
21 defensive deployment?

22 Admiral Turner: No, sir, I think not. This says  
23 "Secure all classes of pertinent information." It does not  
24 say to prepare a strategic estimate of the situation, and to  
25 give a strategic estimate to the forces in the field. It

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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1  
2 says "from pertinent information of all foreign countries,"  
3 and that comes in from time to time.

4 One of the usual ways of distributing such information  
5 was through the fortnightly summary and to evaluate the  
6 matter with respect to what effect that information has on  
7 future intentions. Those are minor matters. If at any  
8 time the Office of Naval Intelligence wanted to send out  
9 a long estimate, as a matter of fact which they did in a  
10 Russian section of the fortnightly bulletin late in 1941,  
11 why, that is perfectly all right for them to do that, pro-  
12 vided it goes by the War Plans Division so that the Chief  
13 of Naval Operations can be given ultimate advice from the  
14 War Plans Division as to the strategic situation.

15 Mr. Mitchell: Then your idea is, as I hope I under-  
16 stand it, is that there were certain things the Intelligence  
17 Branch was supposed to do, but that you felt that owing to  
18 your broader field of operation, and the chance that your  
19 strategic estimates and theirs might conflict, you brought  
20 about an arrangement by which the intelligence estimates  
21 on their way to the Chief of Naval Operations passed  
22 through your office, so that you could make your comment and  
23 they wouldn't be confused; is that it?

24 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

25 Mr. Mitchell: But, there really was a duplication of

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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1  
2 function there in a way, was there not?

3 Admiral Turner: No, sir.

4 Mr. Mitchell: Let me ask you this question:

5 a.l says:

6 "Intelligence Branch. Secure all classes of pertinent  
7 information with particular attention to the strength, dis-  
8 position, and probable intention of foreign naval forces."

9 Do you mean that they were to get the information that  
10 might bear on the probable intentions, but not state what  
11 the intention was, is that it?

12 Admiral Turner: No, sir. They could do exactly as  
13 that is there, if it referred to a major situation, but  
14 an over-all picture, then it had to go through War Plans.

15 Mr. Mitchell: Why wasn't there an over-lap then?  
16 I don't understand. They could do it, but merely had to  
17 route it through you? Why wouldn't there be both functions  
18 performed by both of these divisions with a check-up  
19 through your division?

20 Admiral Turner: The War Plans Division collected no  
21 information whatsoever. We had no agent. We were not an  
22 administrative organization. We depended on the Office  
23 of Naval Intelligence and through them on the military  
24 intelligence department of the Army for all of the informa-  
25 tion that we got with one or two exceptions.

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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For example, we got information as to diplomatic activities through Captain Schierman of the Central Division. We got information as to the future activities of the British, the United Kingdom, through the British Admiralty delegation which was set up here during the spring of 1941.

We got information as to Canadian activities, and plans directly from the Naval Attache, or through the Naval Attache at Ottawa.

We got a great deal of information from the newspapers.

That all went into our thinking. But the collection of the information and its effect, general effect, of any particular kind of information was up to ONI.

WARD &amp; PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Mr. Mitchell: Was up to what?

Admiral Turner: Office of Naval Intelligence. It was not their function, and I see nothing in there to show it, to maintain a general estimate of the situation. That was up to War Plans.

Mr. Mitchell: When it says in subdivision 2, after saying the Intelligence Division is to collect information relating to the strength, disposition and probable intention of the foreign naval forces, in the next sentence when it says "evaluate the information collected", that is evaluate it, the information, as to the strength, disposition and probable intentions of foreign nations, and disseminate as advisable, do you feel that that does not place upon them any share of the responsibility or duty of making any evaluation available to Intelligence and dissemination of it, which gives anybody in the field any idea of the probable intentions of the possible enemy forces?

Admiral Turner: If their evaluation affects the general situation or affects our view as to the general situation then before they put it out it was customary, and nearly always done, that it was cleared through War Plans. If we objected, why, we would come to an agreement.

Now, they would send their information out weekly or periodically, or something of that sort, and they would collect

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 certain information, certain classes of information, and  
3 as to this class, this one little pigeon hole that they would  
4 collect, why, they would give their estimate of what the effect  
5 of that particular thing had on the general situation.

6  
7 Mr. Mitchell: We have arrived at the hour of adjournment.  
8 Do you think you could confer with Admiral Wilkinson over the  
9 evening and possibly prepare for the committee a very condensed  
10 and short statement of the relative functions that you two  
11 would agree on under this order?

12 Admiral Wilkinson: I can't give anything more, Mr.  
13 Counsel, than we have here.

14 Mr. Mitchell: Well, I am pinning myself right down on  
15 some written document and wondering what the words mean.  
16 A lawyer would construe them to mean something. I haven't  
17 a clear idea. But if you can't do that, all right.

18 The Chairman: Think it over, Admiral, and see if you  
19 can give more specific answers to the questions.

20 We will suspend until 10:00 o'clock tomorrow morning.

21 The committee and counsel will remain for a brief session.

22 (Whereupon, at 4:00 o'clock p.m., the hearing was  
23 adjourned until 10:00 o'clock a.m., Thursday, December 20,  
24 1945.)  
25