

Doc. 2034

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Doc. #2034

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Vol. 34

Congress of the United States

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Joint Committee

on the

Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack

S. Con. Res. 27

January 4, 1945

Washington, D. C.

#1A2

Pages: 6142 to 6353

NATIONAL { 4266  
4267  
4268

WARD & PAUL  
(ELECTREPORTER, INC.)  
OFFICIAL REPORTERS  
1760 PENNSYLVANIA AVE., N. W.  
WASHINGTON 6, D. C.

S. Con. Res. 27

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Friday, January 4, 1946.

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Congress of the United States,  
Joint Committee on the Investigation  
of Pearl Harbor Attack,  
Washington, D. C.

The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at  
10:00 A.M., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office  
Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas,  
and Ferguson.

Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy,  
Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, General Counsel;  
Gerhard A. Gesell and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the  
joint committee.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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1 The Chairman: The committee will come to order.

2 Congressman Gearhart had not finished examining Admiral  
3 Stark.

4 TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL HAROLD R. STARK

5 (resumed)

6 Admiral Stark: May I say just a word before the exami-  
7 nation starts, sir?

8 The Chairman: Yes.

9 The committee will come to order.

10 Admiral Stark: It had reference to Senator Lucas' exami-  
11 nation yesterday, and I think perhaps it might be better to  
12 wait until he gets here. I didn't realize he wasn't present.

13 The Chairman: All right.

14 Go ahead, Congressman.

15 Mr. Gearhart: Admiral Stark, yesterday I asked you a  
16 few very brief questions about the flying orders under which  
17 then Flying Lieutenant Clarence Dickinson flew from Pearl  
18 Harbor to Wake, or Midway, whichever it was, on November 22,  
19 1941.

20 At that time you replied you did not know about the  
21 orders that he flew upon or anything about the incident.

22 Have you in the meantime discussed the subject with  
23 anybody connected with the Navy Department?

24 Admiral Stark: No, sir, I have not pursued it at all.

25 Mr. Gearhart: Mr. Chairman, I have referred to this

Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1  
2 incident time and time again during the course of these  
3 hearings. On the second or third day of these hearings I  
4 made the request that copies of those orders be supplied me  
5 and though six weeks have gone by they haven't been supplied  
6 to date.

7 May I inquire as to whether or not any effort has been  
8 made to locate those orders, and if so, whether or not they  
9 are not available?

10 Mr. Mitchell: Mr. Congressman, I beg your pardon, but  
11 I was looking at some papers and I didn't hear just what the  
12 orders were.

13 Mr. Gearhart: During the course of these hearings and  
14 at different times in my cross-examination of various witnesses  
15 I have referred to the flying orders under which then Flying  
16 Naval Lieutenant Clarence Dickinson flew from Pearl Harbor  
17 to Midway or Wake, whichever it was, I have forgotten, on  
18 November 22, 1941, three weeks before Pearl Harbor, and on  
19 the second or third day of these hearings when I first re-  
20 ferred to this incident I requested the orders, a copy of  
21 the orders under which now Commander Dickinson flew. I  
22 have not been supplied them. I was wondering why they have  
23 not been made available.

24 Mr. Mitchell: Would you let us report at 2:00 o'clock  
25 about that?

Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1  
2 Mr. Gearhart: I will be glad to do so.

3 Mr. Mitchell: He was in Halsey's command, was he not?

4 Mr. Gearhart: I think so.

5 Mr. Mitchell: My dim recollection is that I felt we  
6 didn't have any written orders and that when Halsey was on  
7 the stand we would be able to find out what orders he gave  
8 to his own people. He is lined up as a witness. I haven't  
9 asked him myself whether he has any orders, written orders,  
10 or if he knows what the oral orders were, but I will check  
11 during the noon hour and try to satisfy your interest there.

12 Mr. Gearhart: Commander Dickinson in his article which  
13 appeared in the Saturday Evening Post of October 2nd or  
14 October 9th, 1942, I am not precise as to the date, somebody  
15 has helped themselves to my copy of the article, and which  
16 is being replaced --

17 Mr. Mitchell: In that article does he say whether he  
18 had written or oral orders?

19 Mr. Gearhart: He doesn't say whether they were written  
20 or oral, but he definitely says what those orders were. He  
21 said he was flying under absolute war orders, period, under  
22 instructions to sink any Japanese ships that he encountered  
23 upon the sea and to shoot down any flying craft that he met  
24 in the air, and to keep his mission secret at all costs.

25 Now, if there were any such orders issued in the Pacific

Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart  
The Chairman

1  
2 prior to Pearl Harbor that is a fact, it is a fact of which  
3 the country should be informed. I do hope that those orders  
4 are furnished me if they are in writing, or if not in writing,  
5 a statement in respect to what the situation was.

6 I ask about it now because under the ruling of the  
7 committee yesterday we are going to proceed to the examination  
8 of Admiral Kimmel and General Short upon the conclusion of  
9 the testimony of the distinguished witness who now occupies  
10 the stand. I will want to examine those witnesses in respect  
11 to those orders.

12 The Chairman: Might the Chair ask Admiral Stark if  
13 those were orders, if there were any such orders, and if they  
14 were given by Admiral Halsey, would they appear as a matter  
15 of record in the Department here?

16 Admiral Stark: I think not, sir.

17 The Chairman: Well, Admiral Halsey is to be a witness,  
18 I believe, isn't he?

19 Mr. Mitchell: Yes.

20 The Chairman: And, of course, if there are no written  
21 orders in the Department, or in his files, he would be the  
22 best witness as to whether he gave any such oral orders.

23 Admiral Stark: I would think so, yes, sir.

24 Mr. Mitchell: We may get ahold of Admiral Halsey and  
25 if it was oral get his statement preliminary to his going on

Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1  
2 the stand and we can furnish it to the Congressman.

3 The Chairman: Yes. I imagine, in view of the very allur-  
4 ing picture of the Admiral in the paper this morning, you may  
5 have difficulty in locating him today. (Laughter)

6 Mr. Gearhart: That reminds me, we are going to get a  
7 chance to see that saddle? (Laughter)

8 There is one other matter. This was not a request of  
9 mine, Mr. Chairman, but the request was made by another member  
10 of the committee, that we be furnished with the copy of the  
11 Roberts Report as it was originally submitted to the White  
12 House, together with such changes, alterations, additions,  
13 subtractions, that were made.

(2) 14 I want to point out again, in view of the fact that we  
15 are going to have Admiral Kimmel and General Short before  
16 us shortly, that we ought to have that report before the  
17 committee at the earliest possible moment. The request for  
18 that report and interlineations, changes, additions and sub-  
19 tractions was made the earliest day of this hearing, and  
20 the request has been repeated by different members of this  
21 committee. Now we are right up against the guns. We are  
22 going to examine the witnesses concerning whom those changes  
23 and that report are going to be material.

24 I am constrained to inquire as to whether or not we  
25 are going to have the original Roberts Report with such



Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1  
2 information as would be important to this committee in  
3 respect to changes that were made in it.

4 Mr. Mitchell: The answer is that we have been searching  
5 in all of the Departments ever since then to try to find the  
6 original report, and have failed utterly, in the War, Navy,  
7 State, and every other Department, to find any such document.  
8 Two days ago I wrote to Justice Roberts and told him we had  
9 failed and that the committee wanted it and asked him if he  
10 could kindly give us any sort of relief as to where to find  
11 it and who had it. That is the best we have been able to do.

12 Mr. Gearhart: Thank you very much. Up to date the  
13 information is we have not been able to locate the original  
14 report?

15 Mr. Mitchell: Exactly; not because we haven't put an  
16 effort on it, either.

17 The Chairman: Proceed. Is that all of the preliminary  
18 matter?

19 Mr. Gearhart: That is all for the moment.

20 The Chairman: You may proceed.

21 Mr. Gearhart: Now, in your statement, Admiral Stark,  
22 you referred to a Presidential direction to prepare the Navy  
23 within 30 days for the capture and occupation of the Azore  
24 Islands?

25 Admiral Stark: That is correct, yes, sir.

Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1  
2 Mr. Gearhart: Will you tell me something more about  
3 the details of that direction you received from the President?

4 Admiral Stark: The basis for that directive was, I  
5 believe, our apprehension that possibly Germany might go down  
6 into Spain and Portugal. We often discussed what the effect  
7 of it might be, and particularly if Gibraltar should be taken  
8 at the same time. The Azores in non-friendly hands, or in  
9 Axis hands, would have been a very great threat to our  
10 communications on the sea, and the preparation to take the  
11 Azores, if necessary, was predicated on that possibility,  
12 namely, that Germany might go into Spain and into Portugal.

13 We had hoped ultimately, and ultimately we did get  
14 permission to go into the Azores and operate from there, and  
15 it was extremely advantageous, particularly with regard to  
16 patrolling the seas with long-range aircraft against sub-  
17 marines.

18 The President gave me that order and told me to be  
19 ready in 30 days.

20 Now, just why he gave it to me at that time and just  
21 why the 30 days, I don't recall. He gave me the direct order  
22 and right away I went to preparing the plans for it. It  
23 was a good thing, in any case, to have the plans ready.

24 For example, we likewise laid plans to take Martinique  
25 if necessary on the assumption that that Island might join

Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1  
2 the Vichy Government under circumstances which would be  
3 detrimental to our communications in the Caribbean.

4 Mr. Gearhart: You mentioned the Azores preparation in  
5 your letter to Admiral Kimmel of 24 May 1941 and stated that  
6 the President gave you that positive direction two days before.  
7 That would make the date upon which you received your in-  
8 structions from the President the 22nd day of May 1941; is  
9 that approximately correct?

10 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

11 Mr. Gearhart: It was because of action which the  
12 President was directing from day to day against the Germans  
13 the consequent exchange of fire with German submarines which  
14 resulted that caused you to state that we were at war in  
15 the Atlantic before Pearl Harbor?

16 Admiral Stark: That is correct, yes, sir.

17 Mr. Gearhart: Now, if you reached a conclusion sometime  
18 that we were at war in the Atlantic prior to Pearl Harbor,  
19 there must have been a time when that became fixed in your  
20 mind. I asked you the question yesterday but I think we  
21 became diverted and you didn't reply as to when you considered  
22 that the war in the Atlantic with Germany commenced.

23 Admiral Stark: Well, it commenced about the time of the  
24 shooting order, along after the President talked, I would  
25 say, in September. That is, his talk to the nation. And the

Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1  
2 actual shooting orders we gave in October.

3 I would invite attention, however, to the fact that  
4 when I say we were at war we were at war in effect so far as  
5 attacking German craft, sub-surface or surface, which crossed  
6 a line which we had defined, and which slid down the east  
7 coast of Iceland to the 26th Meridian and south on the 26th  
8 Meridian, and later there was a line drawn to the westward  
9 of the west coast of South America.

10 Technically, or from an international standpoint, we were  
11 not at war inasmuch as we did not have the right or belligerents  
12 because war had not been declared, but actually, so far as  
13 the forces operating under Admiral King in certain areas,  
14 it was war against any German craft that came inside that  
15 area. They were attacking us and we were attacking them.

16 (3) Mr. Gearhart: As a matter of fact, actually there was  
17 no difference between the situation which existed and which  
18 would have existed if a formal declaration of war had been  
19 declared by Congress?

20 Admiral Stark: Not as regard that particular phase.  
21 I might, however, read two dispatches, they are short, which  
22 I think will exemplify the differences which I have mentioned.

23 On 1 December 1941 I received a dispatch from our  
24 Special Naval Observer in London, Vice Admiral Ghormley,  
25 which reads as follows:

Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1  
2 "The Admiralty believes that the French merchant vessel,  
3 Pierrel D. Mas, of long cruising radius, has sailed for Europe  
4 or North Africa via Cape Horn about 25-27 November with cargo  
5 rubber for transshipment to Germany. One of German ships at  
6 Kobe believed preparing to sail for Europe carrying rubber  
7 and nationals about 1 December. Report has been received  
8 that Germans are planning to send ships to Europe monthly.  
9 The Admiralty asks if Navy Department will cooperate as in  
10 the Odenwald case and intercept these vessels off Cape San  
11 Roque. If so information will be available as at Bad Washn."

12 That is the British Admiralty detachment in Washington.

13 I replied to that dispatch the following day, 2 December,  
14 and the dispatch reads:

15 "U.S. not being at war does not enjoy full belligerent  
16 rights and Navy Department cannot be committed to interception  
17 referenced vessels in specific locations. Your 010922.  
18 Odenwald made mistake of flying American flag and crew  
19 abandoned ship thus becoming subject to boarding and salvage.  
20 Such American men-o-war as may be in the vicinity can operate  
21 only under directives contained in WPL-52 and current opera-  
22 tion orders of Commander in Chief Atlantic based thereon."

23 Mr. Gearhart: Despite the assertion there that we  
24 did not enjoy full belligerent rights because we were not  
25 legally at war, what belligerent right were we not exercising?

Shefner  
follows

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fls LaChar  
10:25 am

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Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1  
2 Admiral Stark: That is one, the belligerent right of  
3 what is known as visit and search.

4 Mr. Gearhart: Weren't we exercising that whenever the  
5 occasion arose?

6 Admiral Stark: No, sir.

7 Mr. Gearhart: The reason why we were not exercising it  
8 was simply because the Germans were using submarines and it  
9 was not practical to go aboard submarines, isn't that correct?

10 Admiral Stark: Well, any vessel, - a raider we likewise  
11 would have attacked. We laid out an area in which we told  
12 them to keep out and if they came into that we would attack  
13 them, that is, an Axis man-of-war.

14 Mr. Gearhart: Then by declaration we were already exer-  
15 cising the right of search and would have exercised it if the  
16 occasion arose because we told them that we would, is that not  
17 correct?

18 Admiral Stark: We told them we would attack. In this  
19 particular case of a merchant ship, we refused to intercept  
20 her. The Odenwald case, - I do not know whether you recall  
21 it, it was in the press at the time, - was loaded with a very  
22 valuable cargo for Germany. She was flying a flag, the Ameri-  
23 can flag, and one of our cruisers in the South Atlantic became  
24 suspicious of her and when the cruiser approached her the crew  
25 abandoned the vessel and as I recall, - I am not sure, - prior

Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1  
2 to that had dumped a good deal of the cargo. We took that  
3 vesseo into Puerto Rico, as I recall, and the subsequent action  
4 with regard to that vessel I think was predicated on inter-  
5 national law. I have forgotten for the moment just what hap-  
6 pened to it.

7 Mr. Gearhart: Well, on that one occasion that you point  
8 out we did exercise the right of search, didn't we?

9 Admiral Stark: But the vessel had been abandoned and she  
10 was flying, - she was operating under false colors. We did  
11 go aboard and put a crew aboard and take her and bring her  
12 into port.

13 Mr. Gearhart: Yes. She was abandoned because they ex-  
14 pected shells from the American contingent, didn't they?

15 Admiral Stark: I do not know.

16 Mr. Gearhart: Well, of course, as a reasonable individual  
17 you would expect that, you would accept that inference, wouldn't  
18 you?

19 Admiral Stark: Well, I don't know. I think if I had  
20 been skipper of that vessel I might have hunt on until an  
21 American visit and search party had come aboard, but she had  
22 made the mistake of flying false colors and that put her open  
23 to capture and she was captured after the crew had abandoned  
24 the vessel.

25 Mr. Gearhart: Yes. Well, now, there is no use quibbling.

Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1  
2 We were prepared to do anything that was necessary to end  
3 Hitlerism, is that not correct? That was the orders to the  
4 American Navy.

5 Admiral Stark: No, sir. The orders to the American Navy  
6 in certain areas was to insure the safety of communications and  
7 the delivery of the hundreds of millions of dollars worth of  
8 material which were being sent to Britain under the terms of  
9 the Lend-Lease. Congress having made the United States Treasury  
10 practically available to manufacture war material and to de-  
11 liver it, the President took steps to insure the delivery of  
12 that material so far as we could by escorting, guarding and  
13 covering our ships going across to the United Kingdom.

14 Mr. Gearhart: In insuring the delivery of American goods  
15 to England we were merely indirectly insuring the destruction  
16 of Hitlerism, were we not?

17 Admiral Stark: That is correct.

18 Mr. Gearhart: And that was our objective.

19 Admiral Stark: That was the objective of the Lend-Lease  
20 law, as I understand it.

21 Mr. Gearhart: And there was no limit upon your belliger-  
22 ent rights in so far as serving that objective, was there?

23 Admiral Stark: Our areas were limited. I gave them to  
24 you yesterday. They show what they were. For example, we  
25 were not sending anything into the Mediterranean to fight



Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1  
2 Italy allied with Germany, nor were we going outside of what  
3 I believe the President defined as our waters. It was not all-  
4 out. It was limited, but it was effective and it was war, to  
5 my mind, inside those limits.

6 Mr. Gearhart: Yes, but not considering what you were  
7 not doing but considering what you were doing, the things  
8 that the American Navy was doing was war, wasn't it?

9 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir. As I said yesterday, when you  
10 are shooting at the other fellow and he is shooting at you,  
11 it to all intents and purposes is war, even though of a re-  
12 stricted nature. We were not, for example, flying planes over  
13 Germany.

14 Mr. Gearhart: Now, to quote from President Roosevelt's  
15 inspiring speech of October 27, 1941, he says very bluntly  
16 here in effect that the objective of the United States military  
17 operation upon the high seas was to destroy Hitlerism, does  
18 he not, when he uses these words:

19 "The forward march of Hitlerism can be stopped --  
20 and it will be stopped and very simply and very bluntly --  
21 we are pledged to put our own oar into the destruction  
22 of Hitlerism."

23 That indicates very clearly what was in the mind of the  
24 President on the 27th day of October 1941, doesn't it?

25 Admiral Stark: I think there is no doubt about it and

Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1 I think there was no doubt about it before that. His speech  
2 in early September was likewise very clear.

3 Mr. Gearhart: In another part of his speech he says:

4 "Many American owned merchant ships have been sunk  
5 on the high seas. One American destroyer was attacked  
6 on September 4th. Another destroyer was attacked and hit  
7 on October 17th. Eleven brave and loyal American men of  
8 our Navy were killed by the Nazis."

9 That shows that they were making war on us, too, doesn't  
10 it?

11 Admiral Stark: Yes, it does. I am simply trying --

12 Mr. Gearhart: I know, you are trying to point out the  
13 legalistic differences.

14 Admiral Stark: Just the legal points. We had not gone  
15 all-out. We were not basing planes in England to fly against  
16 Germany, all those things that came into effect the minute war  
17 was legally declared. Legally we were, in our opinion, at war  
18 on the high seas so far as guaranteeing the safe transit of  
19 our vessels towards Iceland and continental Europe, or the  
20 United Kingdom would be better than continental Europe there.

21 Mr. Gearhart: Yes. Now, the activities of the American  
22 Navy that we have just referred to constitute, do they not,  
23 legally overt acts against the Axis?

24 Admiral Stark: I should say we were both making overt  
25

Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1  
2 acts against each other. I was asked with regard to that by,-  
3 I have forgotten which Congressional committee, I was appear-  
4 ing before a number of them regularly, - and I stated and it  
5 will undoubtedly be in the record somewhere, that in my opin-  
6 ion it did not make much difference what we did; that Hitler  
7 had every reason, if he wanted to exercise it so far as in-  
8 ternational law was concerned, to go to war with us at any  
9 time but that he would choose his own time and it would be  
10 a cold blooded decision with him as to when that time would be  
11 most effective.

12 Mr. Gearhart: Now, an overt act against Germany in  
13 1941 constituted an overt act against Japan in law, did it  
14 not?

15 Admiral Stark: No, sir, not in my opinion. We were not  
16 at war with Japan. Japan was not at war with anybody except  
17 the Chinese. We were endeavoring, - that is, the President  
18 and Mr. Hull were, in my opinion, and I was close to them, -  
19 not to precipitate a war in the Pacific.

20 Mr. Gearhart: Yes, but didn't it ever enter into your  
21 discussions as a member of the War Council consisting of the  
22 President, the three Secretaries and the two Chiefs of Staff,  
23 didn't it ever enter into your discussion as to whether or  
24 not an overt act of a military nature against Germany might  
25 constitute or also constituted an overt act against the Japan-

Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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Admiral Stark: I do not recall it. I had never thought of it until you just asked the question.

Mr. Gearhart: Well, let me direct your attention to page 84 in Peace and War. I will read you a paragraph:

"On September 27, 1940 Germany, Italy and Japan signed a far reaching treaty of alliance. In that treaty it was provided that Japan recognized and respected the leadership of Germany and Italy in the establishment of a new order in Europe; that Germany and Italy recognized and respected the leadership of Japan in the establishment of a new order in Greater Asia; and that the three countries would assist one another with all political, economic and military means when one of the powers was attacked by a power not then involved in the European war or in the Chinese-Japanese conflict."

Now, it would appear from that, would it not, that Japan became obligated to attack the United States under its agreement with Germany and Italy of September 27, 1940 upon the United States attacking Germany?

Admiral Stark: Yes, I think that is correct, although I believe that the State Department might testify to the fact that Japan in the last analysis would make her own decision as to carrying out that provision and she would or would not,

Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

according to whether or not it would be useful to her.

Mr. Gearhart: Well, do you agree with this conclusion which is drawn by the writer of this book, evidently with the approval of the Secretary of State of that day:

"The last of these provisions obviously was aimed directly at the United States."

Admiral Stark: Yes, I think that may be correct, sir. I think that they had us in mind.

Mr. Gearhart: Then it was the belief of the State Department and possibly of the War Council that Germany, Italy and Japan had in mind belligerent action on the part of the United States at the time they entered into that agreement?

Admiral Stark: I think so, as a possibility of it. I might add that for a long period our diplomatic effort was to pry Japan loose from that Axis setup or tripartite agreement.

Mr. Gearhart: Well, you were familiar with the intercepts, in one of which the Japanese in Washington, or, rather, in Tokyo informed Berlin of their steadfast adherence to the tripartite agreements?

Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: So far as anything that has ever been acquired along the line through any of the intercepts or through any of the discussions with the Japanese Ambassadors no progress was made towards separating the Japanese from their Axis

Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1  
2 obligations.

3 Admiral Stark: No, sir, we didn't get to first base on  
4 that.

5 Mr. Gearhart: Yes. And the intercepts told you all of  
6 the time that we were negotiating with them that the Japanese  
7 were adhering strictly to their Axis obligations?

8 Admiral Stark: I believe there was one intercept show-  
9 ing Germany's dissatisfaction with the fact that Japan was  
10 not doing more, at least one.

11 Mr. Gearhart: Well, I won't take the time.

12 The Chairman: The chair understands the Congressman is  
13 through.

14 Mr. Gearhart: I will announce to the chairman when I  
15 am through.

16 The Chairman: Well, you said you would not take time.

17 Mr. Gearhart: I would not take time to look up that  
18 intercept because it is already in evidence.

19 Now, getting back to the meeting of the War Council of  
20 November 25th, 1941. Now, according to the Army report there  
21 are three different kinds of informal organizations which  
22 have been referred to colloquially as the War Council.

23 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir. I was originally a little  
24 confused as to just which one they referred. I believe at  
25 one time Mr. Hull referred to his meetings with the Secretary

Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

of War and Secretary of State as a War Council -- or Secretary Stimson referred to it, but I do understand when you refer to it you mean the meetings of the Secretaries and the Chiefs of Staff with the President.

Mr. Gearhart: That is right.

Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: Now, there was a meeting in the morning of the smaller War Council, the three Secretaries, in which Mr. Hull explained to them what he was trying to do with the Japanese. According to the Army report he explained definitely the three months truce agreement and which has been referred to as the modus vivendi.

Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: And at that meeting Mr. Hull expressed doubt as to whether or not he would present it. To quote Secretary Stimson:

"Hull showed me the proposal for a three months truce which he was going to lay before the Japanese today or tomorrow," - which is on the 25th that this is. "It adequately safeguarded all our interests I thought and secured it but I did not think that there was any chance of the Japanese accepting it because it was so drastic."

Quoting further:

1S11

Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

"We are an hour and a half with Hull and then I went back to the Department and I got ahold of Marshall."

Now, that indicates quite clearly and it is the conclusion of the writers of the Army reports that the Secretary of War was very much concerned over the developing situation and very much worried as to what the result was to be.

Now, in the afternoon or, rather, at high noon there was a meeting of the full War Council, so-called, at the White House. You were there, were you not?

Admiral Stark: I was, yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: You met at 12 and those present were Hull, Knox, Marshall, Stimson and yourself.

Admiral Stark: That is right, yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: Now, did Secretary Stimson bring up the subject of the kind of an answer that Secretary Hull was contemplating delivering to Mr. Nomura the next day?

Admiral Stark: I do not recall. I do not remember just what occurred at that meeting. We unquestionably got together to go over the situation and I assume that it was discussed from all angles, but just what those discussions were I have been unable to recall.

Mr. Gearhart: Do you remember whether or not Mr. Hull said anything about being in doubt as to whether he would serve the three months truce statement or whether or not he



1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 would serve another one on them or whether or not he would  
3 just do nothing at all?

4 Admiral Stark: I do not remember. I think perhaps the  
5 best bit of evidence we have as to what Mr. Hull was think-  
6 ing of at that time is contained in, I think, a memorandum of  
7 the 27th when he mentioned, as I recall in effect, that on  
8 about the 25th, as early as the 25th he was considering  
9 abandoning the modus vivendi and on the 26th he did abandon  
10 it.

11 You recall the paper to which I refer, in which he was  
12 discussing the matter with one of the foreign diplomats. I  
13 have that paper, it is short, and I think that gives his  
14 viewpoint very clearly.

15 Mr. Gearhart: I am more interested in your memory of  
16 that proceeding than I am in any other witness who is not on  
17 the stand. I am talking to you about that.

18 Admiral Stark: Yes. I do not recall it.

19 Mr. Gearhart: Well, weren't you very, very much disturbed  
20 by the progress of that conference and wasn't General Marshall  
21 very much disturbed by the progress of that conference in the  
22 things that were said and the things that were being planned  
23 by Mr. Hull?

24 Admiral Stark: We were disturbed because we thought  
25 things were heading up so fast towards a show-down, if you

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 will, and we wanted more time and it began to look as though  
3 we were not going to get it.

4 I am sure with regard to the modus vivendi, - I do not  
5 know whether this thought has crossed your mind or not. If  
6 you read the modus vivendi in itself it is nothing like so  
7 drastic as the so-called ten point note which he handed to  
8 the Japs on the 26th, but it is my understanding that the ten  
9 points mentioned in the note on the 26th were the points  
10 which were going to be taken up, perhaps one at a time, under  
11 the modus vivendi and that the modus vivendi would provide a  
12 period of some weeks or three months to discuss these par-  
13 ticular points and that then the modus vivendi was thrown over-  
14 board and the points with which you are all familiar were  
15 handed to the Japanese.

16 Mr. Gearhart: It has been stated that the modus vivendi  
17 was abandoned because Chiang Kai-shek vigorously objected to  
18 it. Was any mention made of Chiang Kai-shek's attitude  
19 towards the modus vivendi in that meeting of the 25th?

20 Admiral Stark: I do not recall that it was. I have an  
21 extremely clear recollection of Mr. Hull telling me how he  
22 felt about the modus vivendi separate from that meeting of the  
23 25th.

24 Mr. Gearhart: Did you hear Mr. Stimson say at that meet-  
25 ing anything about whether he approved the three months truce,

Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1 the modus vivendi, or not?

2  
3 Admiral Stark: I have tried to reconstruct that meeting  
4 and what was said.

5 Mr. Gearhart: I am trying to help you reconstruct it  
6 now. That is why I am taking the time to talk around the  
7 question, hoping that I will bring to life something in your  
8 memory which you have for the moment passed by.

9 Admiral Stark: No, I do not recall. I remember the  
10 tense atmosphere and the discussions in general of the period,  
11 that is the thing which I am trying to reconstruct, and every  
12 time we have tried to reconstruct it for about three hours  
13 we just cannot do it. That is around the 25th, 26th and 27th.  
14 But as to what actually transpired at that meeting and what  
15 Mr. Hull may have said and Mr. Stimson may have said, I have  
16 been unable to recall.

17 Mr. Gearhart: But you do remember that the Japanese  
18 dead line intercept, which said that after the dead line had  
19 passed things were going to automatically begin to happen,  
20 that was discussed; you remember that, don't you?

21 Admiral Stark: I remember the message, I remember the  
22 despatch very clearly and whether at that particular time it  
23 was read or discussed I could not say. It very well may have  
24 been, probably was, but I do not recall the discussions at that  
25 meeting.

Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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Mr. Gearhart: You heard the President say in the course of that meeting, in substance or in effect, that we were likely to be attacked, perhaps as soon as, perhaps next Monday?

Admiral Stark: Yes, I recall that. I believe that -- I am not sure; I think I put that down in one of my letters. What I wrote and in which my statement abounds are factual, written at the time, but I do not recall the conversation at that time. Of course, it covered the seriousness of the situation. That was what the meeting was called for.

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Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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Mr. Gearhart: Do you remember that the President said that the Japanese were notorious for making an attack without warning and that the question was what should be done about it?

Admiral Stark: I assume he did. We at one time before had already mentioned that ourselves. Now the one thing that I do remember -- and I do not know that it is necessary to read again -- is my postscript to my letter of the 25th in which you will recall that I held up a letter for a day because of that meeting. I will read it again if you like. It is on the record. That is what I do remember.

Mr. Gearhart: How long is it, Admiral Stark?

Admiral Stark: It is short.

Mr. Gearhart: Read it in again. It will make it easier to follow.

Admiral Stark: "I held this up pending a meeting with the President and Mr. Hull today. I have been in constant touch with Mr. Hull and it was only after a long talk with him that I sent the message to you a day or two ago showing the gravity of the situation. He confirmed it all in today's meeting, as did the President. Neither would be surprised over a Japanese surprise attack. From many angles an attack on the Philippines would be the most embarrassing thing that could happen to us. There are some here who think it likely to occur. I do not give it the weight others do, but

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Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

I included it because of the strong feeling among some people. You know I have generally held that it was not time for the Japanese to proceed against Russia. I still do. Also I still rather look for an advance into Thailand, Indo-China, Burma Road area as most likely."

Then I went on to state I did not know what we would do, and the rest of the paragraph was meant to be prepared for anything.

Mr. Gearhart: This being surprised or not being surprised reminds me of "on again off again Finnegan". Why is this assertion made one moment that the President was surprised and the assertion made the next moment that he was not surprised?

Admiral Stark: I might say in regard to surprise, I was inferring last night, in regard to surprise and war warning, to get down to some simple statement which might show my feeling about it. For example, one takes a step or steps at times to avoid being hurt, even though he does not really expect to be hurt or he may regard it only as a possibility.

Now with the war warning our feeling was, except for taking the offensive, that the officers to whom that message was addressed would practically assume we were at war, so far as taking measures against surprise was concerned. I believe had we not been attacked at that time -- and I am

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 assuming this and you can verify it because I may be wrong --  
3 but had we not been attacked at that time but had Japan  
4 declared war against us, we would have started reconnaissance  
5 and those other measures in the outlying stations to guard  
6 against surprise.

7 I assumed when we stated the imminence of war that those  
8 measures would be put into effect.

9 For example, I doubt if anybody in Washington, or perhaps  
10 anybody in the Hawaiian area, in Oahu, Pearl Harbor, would  
11 have expected an attack in late 1944 or 1945 when we were  
12 knocking at the gates of Japan, nevertheless I dare say they  
13 were taking continuous 24-hour effective measures against  
14 being caught aback by any Japanese raid.

15 Mr. Gearhart: Well, to come back to the meeting of  
16 the 25th, the War Council --

17 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

18 Mr. Gearhart: Don't you have an impression now that  
19 you left that meeting disturbed by what Secretary Hull said  
20 he contemplated handing to the Japanese the next day?

21 Admiral Stark: I was disturbed before the meeting. As  
22 to what he was going to hand the Japanese the next day, I  
23 have no recollection of it. You can question Admiral  
24 Schuirmann on that who was daily at the State Department,  
25 and to the best of my knowledge and belief the Department

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Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1  
2 had no forewarning of the note of the 26th, nor did we know  
3 that it was not sent at that time, but it was sent later.

4 Mr. Gearhart: You do not mean to have me infer from  
5 that answer that Secretary Hull assumed the great responsi-  
6 bility personally of handing the 10-point note to the Japanese  
7 without informing the President and the War Council of his  
8 contemplated action?

9 Admiral Stark: I think he would not have done it with-  
10 out informing the President. He did do it, to the best of  
11 my knowledge and belief, without informing either the Army  
12 or the Navy.

13 Mr. Gearhart: Did not he inform you and General Marshall,  
14 and did not you and Marshall protest against the handing of  
15 the 10-point note to the Japanese?

16 Admiral Stark: Not to my knowledge or remembrance.  
17 The memorandum to the President by Mr. Hull, of which I have  
18 a photostatic copy, of November 26 states, if I may read it --

19 Mr. Gearhart: Yes, if it is not long.

20 Admiral Stark: "With reference to our two proposals  
21 prepared for submission to the Japanese Government" -- this  
22 is dated the 26th, the day after the meeting -- "1. A proposal  
23 in the way of a draft agreement for a broad, basic, peaceful  
24 settlement for the Pacific area which is henceforth to be  
25 made a part of the general conversations now going on, to be



Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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2 carried on if agreeable to both Governments with a view  
3 to a general agreement on this subject.

4 "2. The second proposal is really closely connected  
5 with the conversations looking towards a general agreement  
6 which is in the nature of a modus vivendi intended to make  
7 more feasible the continuance of the conversations. In view  
8 of the opposition of the Chinese Government and either the  
9 half-hearted support or the actual opposition of the British,  
10 the Netherlands and Australian Governments, and in view of  
11 the wide publicity of the opposition and of the additional  
12 opposition that will naturally follow through utter lack of  
13 an understanding of the vast importance and value otherwise  
14 of the modus vivendi, without in any way departing from my  
15 views about the wisdom and benefit of this step to all of  
16 the countries opposed to the aggressor nations who are  
17 interested in the Pacific area, I desire very earnestly to  
18 recommend that at this time I call in the Japanese Ambassador  
19 and hand to him a copy of the comprehensive basic proposal  
20 for a general peaceful settlement and at the same time  
21 withhold the modus vivendi proposal."

22 That is signed "Cordell Hull".

23 That was sent on the 26th to the President, and as I  
24 read it, asking the President's permission to take the course  
25 which he did take, and evidently one might infer from that,

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 although again I have no clear recollection of the November  
3 25 meeting, that he had not made such a request or possibly  
4 proposed it on the 25th.

5 I think there was boiling in Mr. Hull's mind the message  
6 from Chaing Kai-Shek and it jelled on the 26th.

7 Mr. Gearhart: Anyway you and General Marshall left that  
8 meeting feeling it was incumbent upon you to make a last  
9 minute appeal in writing to the President to do everything  
10 you could to gain time?

11 Admiral Stark: Whether the memorandum to the President  
12 started then or before I do not know. I would recall our  
13 message of the 24th showing my apprehension, and to which  
14 General Marshall agreed. In endeavoring to fix the date  
15 that that started, about the only one whom I have heard state  
16 anything about it, who fixes it rather clearly in his own  
17 mind and who was one of the drafters of it, was Admiral Turner,  
18 who believed it started about the 24th.

19 Mr. Gearhart: Now this meeting adjourned about 1:00  
20 o'clock, did it not?

21 Admiral Stark: That is correct, yes, sir.

22 Mr. Gearhart: You returned to your office then, did you not

23 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

24 Mr. Gearhart: At 1:54 you put in a call for General  
25 Marshall, did you not?

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 Admiral Stark: Well, if the record shows that, I  
3 probably did, yes, sir.

4 Mr. Gearhart: It does. To refresh your memory, wasn't  
5 it for the purpose of getting together with General Marshall  
6 immediately to prepare a written memorandum pleading with  
7 the President to do whatever he could do to gain time for  
8 the Army and Navy?

9 Admiral Stark: I do not recall, Mr. Gearhart. General  
10 Marshall and I were together on that proposition. Just when  
11 we started it I cannot say.

12 Mr. Gearhart: Then at 4:30 in the afternoon General  
13 Marshall called you on the phone, according to the record of  
14 White House calls. Now was not that call to further discuss  
15 the hastily prepared memorandum to the President?

16 Admiral Stark: That is going on five years ago, and  
17 when you ask me what we said over the telephone at a certain  
18 hour in the afternoon, I just cannot answer it.

(4) 19 Mr. Gearhart: Then I notice in the same report on the  
20 afternoon of November 25 at 5:00 p.m. you again called  
21 General Marshall. I will ask you, to refresh your memory,  
22 wasn't it for him to come over and put his signature on the  
23 document, or for you to send it to him where he could put  
24 his signature on it?

25 Admiral Stark: On the afternoon of the 25th?

Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1  
2 Mr. Gearhart: On the afternoon of the 25th.

3 Admiral Stark: The document shows the date of the 27th.

4 Mr. Gearhart: Yes, but you also heard the testimony of  
5 General Marshall that he was not in Washington on the 27th.

6 Admiral Stark: I knew that, sir.

7 Mr. Gearhart: Therefore he could not sign it on the  
8 date it bears, he had to sign it ahead of time.

9 Admiral Stark: Not necessarily. He thinks he signed  
10 it on the 28th. It might have been dated the 27th. It was  
11 dated the 27th for his signature and mine, and he being  
12 absent he could not sign it until he got back. You recall  
13 the Gerow memorandum in which he states, "The Secretaries  
14 were informed of the proposed memorandum" - this is Gerow  
15 to General Marshall - "you and Admiral Stark directed be  
16 prepared for the President. The Secretary of War wanted to  
17 be sure that the memorandum would not be construed as a  
18 recommendation to the President that he request Japan to  
19 reopen the conversations. He was reassured on that point.  
20 It was agreed that the memorandum would be shown to both  
21 Secretaries before dispatch. Both the message and the  
22 memorandum were shown to the Secretary of War. He suggested  
23 some minor changes in the memorandum that were made."

24 Now if the changes were made at that time it would  
25 not appear probable to me that Marshall would have signed it

Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1  
2 on the 25th, particularly as the memorandum bears the date  
3 of the 27th, and particularly also in view of this memorandum.

4 Mr. Gearhart: Then I note in the same White House record  
5 that on 10:30 a.m. you called General Marshall on the 26th.  
6 It is possible that he signed it on the 26th after the changes  
7 were made, is that not correct? Does not the telephone call  
8 pertain to that?

9 Admiral Stark: I do not know what that telephone call  
10 pertains to. Someone has suggested to me that I had something  
11 important that morning and wanted to delay the Joint Board  
12 Meeting a little bit, and that that call was for that purpose.  
13 Personally I do not recall.

14 Mr. Gearhart: The same White House record discloses  
15 that you called General Marshall at 1:25 p.m. on the 26th.  
16 Could it be possible you called with reference to that  
17 memorandum to the President, that you had determined with  
18 him to send to the Chief Executive?

19 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir, it could have been possible.

20 Mr. Gearhart: It could have been signed on the 26th?  
21 It was within the range of possibilities?

22 Admiral Stark: It was, yes, sir.

23 Mr. Gearhart: In view of the fact that the diary of  
24 Secretary Stimson shows that at the meeting of the 27th,  
25 when General Marshall was out of the city, the memorandum was

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

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C O N T E N T S

TESTIMONY OF:

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STARK, Admiral Harold R. (Resumed)

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Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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considered by the War Council, that would seem that it was signed before instead of after the 27th, would it not?

Admiral Stark: Not necessarily. I think the best testimony we have on that is from General Marshall himself.

Mr. Gearhart: I have here the testimony of Mr. Stimson which says "A draft memorandum from General Marshall and Admiral Stark to the President was examined and the question of need for further time was discussed."

Now, that is from the diary of Secretary Stimson, and his diary ought to be better evidence, ought it not, than the memory five years old of the Chief of Staff?

Do you not think so?

Admiral Stark: Yes, but I see nothing in there to show that General Marshall might have signed it on the 26th. That is a discussion of the draft of the memorandum, is it not?

Mr. Gearhart: Yes, presented to the War Council, and discussed by the War Council. Would it be presented to the War Council and discussed by them if it were not assented to by the Chief of Staff already?

Admiral Stark: May I see what you are reading from?

Mr. Gearhart: I am reading from the United States newsprint of the Army Report, reading from page 51, half down the second column.

Admiral Stark: That is this publication (indicating)?

1 Witness Stark Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 Mr. Gearhart: Page 51, the right-hand column.

3 Admiral Stark: About half down the right-hand column?

4 Mr. Gearhart: Yes. About one-third of the way down it  
5 says, "Witness what it says as of the morning of the 27th of  
6 November, 1941."

7 I have skipped down about three paragraphs.

8 Admiral Stark: Yes. As I read it, it says: "I then  
9 called up the President and talked with him about it."

10 That was not a War Council meeting, it was a conversation  
11 over the telephone if I have the right paragraph.

12 Mr. Gearhart: It is the next paragraph:

13 "He then took prompt action to confer with Secretary  
14 Knox, Admiral Stark, and with General Gerow, who appeared  
15 to be representing General Marshall in his absence at  
16 maneuvers. He was concerned with revising the draft  
17 radio of General Marshall, which became radio #472.

18 Also, as he says, 'a draft memorandum from General  
19 Marshall and Admiral Stark to the President was examined  
20 and the question of need for further time was discussed.'"

21 Admiral Stark: As I read that, the "he" refers not to  
22 the President but to Mr. Stimson.

23 Mr. Gearhart: You then called up the President and talked  
24 with him about it?

25 Admiral Stark: It says, "I then called up the President



1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 and talked with him about it."

3 "He then took prompt action to confer with Secretary  
4 Knox, Admiral Stark, and with General Gerow, who appeared to  
5 be representing General Marshall in his absence at maneuvers.  
6 He was concerned with revising the draft radio of General  
7 Marshall".

8 I think it refers to Secretary Stimson, as I read it.

9 Mr. Gearhart: Perhaps you are right. Do you remember  
10 the occasion?

11 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

12 Mr. Gearhart: Then, you remember whether it was the  
13 President who took it up with you people or whether it was  
14 taken up by Mr. Stimson.

15 Admiral Stark: It was Mr. Stimson, if I remember.

16 Mr. Gearhart: Where was the meeting held?

17 Admiral Stark: I think in Secretary Stimson's office.  
18 It was in Mr. Stimson's office, I recollect.

19 Going back to your record about my calls with General  
20 Marshall, there is a note here on my copy which we obtained  
21 that General Marshall was not in, so apparently we did not  
22 discuss anything. The message of 12:50 also has an "NM" on  
23 it, on the mimeographed sheet, from which I suppose you read.

24 Mr. Gearhart: What does that mean?

25 Admiral Stark: It means "No message". It did not get

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 hold of him.

3 Mr. Gearhart: Is that why you kept on trying?

4 Admiral Stark: Well, I tried to get him at that time  
5 and he was not there. He was there in the morning. Now, as  
6 regards the late afternoon message to which you referred, I  
7 do not see anything after that, after 12:50, which did not  
8 get through to Marshall.

9 Mr. Gearhart: Now, this is repetition, but when did you  
10 first hear of the 10-point message?

11 Admiral Stark: I may have heard of it on the 28th. It  
12 is not clear in my mind. I do not remember when I first heard  
13 of the 10-point message. Undoubtedly not later than the 28th.  
14 Possibly Mr. Stimson mentioned it. It is possible when he  
15 said Mr. Hull had thrown over the modus vivendi and was going  
16 to send a note, that I had the substance of it. I knew  
17 approximately what the substance of that note was, because,  
18 as I understand, those were the points that were going to be  
19 taken up during the period which the modus vivendi was designed  
20 to cover.

21 Mr. Gearhart: Well, to refresh your memory, I notice on  
22 this same record of White House calls that Secretary Hull  
23 called you and got through, it is marked with an "O.K." at  
24 1:15 p.m. on the 26th day of November, 1941. Does that  
25 remind you of the fact that Secretary Hull told you what he

point

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

that

1 Witness Stark Questions by: Mr. Gearhart  
2 had done previously that morning at 9 o'clock in reference to  
3 the Japanese?

4 Admiral Stark: No, sir. My remembrance, and my only  
5 remembrance, is Mr. Hull's feeling about the note, and sometime  
6 during that period I learned that he was throwing over the  
7 modus vivendi, and the flat statement that it was now up to  
8 the Army and Navy, which, to my mind, pointed clearly to the  
9 fact that he had no hope of reaching a satisfactory settle-  
10 ment in the Pacific through further negotiations. That we  
11 crystallized in our dispatch of the 27th.

12 Mr. Gearhart: Now, the making of a decision to abandon  
13 the modus vivendi and to serve upon the Japanese the 10-point  
14 document, that so many people call an ultimatum, was an  
15 important event in the minds of all the members of the War  
16 Council, was it not?

17 Admiral Stark: Well, when I learned of it I considered  
18 it very important, particularly, as we were playing for time.

19 Mr. Gearhart: It was so important that I am astonished  
20 that Admiral Stark should call you on the 'phone just after  
21 he had completed the delivery, to talk with you and not say  
22 anything about it.

23 Admiral Stark: You mean Mr. Hull?

24 Mr. Gearhart: Mr. Hull, yes, sir.

25 Admiral Stark: As I say, he may have told me at that

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 time about it being up to the Army and Navy. Just when I  
3 got that, whether it was the 26th or 27th, or I may have  
4 inferred it from his conversation on the 25th, I could not  
5 say, but I would again invite attention to the fact that it  
6 was on the 26th that he asked the President's permission to  
7 proceed on that line. What time the President got that and  
8 what time the President O.K.'d I do not know. I doubt that  
9 Mr. Hull would have told me he was going to do it prior to  
10 getting the President's permission. I think he delivered  
11 the note in the late afternoon, somewhere around 1800, as I  
12 recall, to the Japs. That can be ascertain from the records.

13 Mr. Gearhart: Are you sure as to that?

14 Admiral Stark: Not sure. I say it can be obtained from  
15 the records. I have that recollection. It is probably based  
16 on some appointment, or something, of Secretary Hull with the  
17 Japs.

18 Mr. Gearhart: But you have no memory of the Secretary  
19 mentioning anything to you in his telephone call at 1:25 p.m.  
20 concerning what kind of a message he was going to deliver to  
21 or had delivered to the Japanese?

22 Admiral Stark: I did not get the first part of that,  
23 Mr. Gearhart. I was looking for something to back up my  
24 statement about the late afternoon, and with your permission  
25 I would like to state that from the Washington Post of the 27th,

1 Witness Stark Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 Washington Post, November 27, page 4, it states, "Then came  
3 Hull to see the President. Hull left the White House and  
4 returned to the State Department to confer with Hornbeck,  
5 Maxwell, Hamilton and Ballenger, his Far East expert." That  
6 is the Washington Post, November 27, page 4.

7 "These officials were still with Hull and Kurusu when  
8 Kurusu and Nomura arrived at 5 p.m. The note was handed  
9 to Kurusu and Nomura at this conference which lasted until  
10 6:45 p.m."

11 Now, that is from the Washington Post, and I assume the  
12 State Department can verify it if such is desired.

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Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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2 Mr. Gearhart: What was the hour?

3 Admiral Stark: Sir?

4 Mr. Gearhart: What was the hour mentioned?

5 Admiral Stark: It states the note was handed to Kurusu  
6 and Nomura at this conference which lasted until 6:45 p.m.  
7 It also states the two Japanese diplomats arrived at 5:00 p.m.

8 Mr. Gearhart: Well, the record shows that at 2:35 p.m.  
9 you called Secretary Hull; refreshing your memory, did he  
10 say anything about what kind of a document he was planning  
11 to deliver to the Japanese later on in the day?

12 Admiral Stark: I don't recall, sir.

13 Mr. Gearhart: When did you first hear Secretary Hull  
14 quoted as saying that he had decided to kick the whole thing  
15 over and tell them that he had no other proposals at all?

16 Admiral Stark: That is what I have been trying to  
17 reconstruct. The Gerow memorandum shows that we had that in  
18 the conference on the morning of the 27th through Mr. Stimson.  
19 That is the one definite thing in writing which seems to  
20 set that date.

21 Mr. Gearhart: When did you hear for the first time that  
22 Secretary Hull had made the statement, as he put it:

23 "I have washed my hands of it and it is now in the hands  
24 of Stimson and Knox and the Army and Navy"?

25 Admiral Stark: Well, as I say, I heard it not later

Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1  
2 then the 27th and on the 27th. Now, whether Mr. Hull told  
3 me that as his feeling earlier I don't know, but he couldn't  
4 have made the definite statement, I would say, and, of course,  
5 Mr. Hull is available, prior to getting permission from the  
6 President, which was on his memorandum of the 26th.

7 Mr. Gearhart: I will ask you, Admiral Stark, in the  
8 light of all these facts and figures and telephone calls  
9 that I have called your attention to, is it not a fact that  
10 as a consequence of the meetings of the War Council of  
11 November 25 and of November 26 that you and Marshall were  
12 very, very much disturbed because of the anticipated and  
13 announced action of Secretary Hull and that you and he rushed  
14 to and did prepare a memorandum pleading with the President  
15 to do something which would make it possible to offset what  
16 Mr. Hull was contemplating and to gain time for the military  
17 forces of the United States to prepare for the inevitable  
18 conflict?

19 Admiral Stark: Well, the entire picture became serious  
20 around the 23rd and the 24th, as reflected in my dispatch  
21 of the 24th. Whether that memorandum was started on the 25th  
22 or the 26th or the 24th I am not sure. But, of course, we  
23 were disturbed. That is factual. We were playing for time.  
24 That is factual. And the memorandum bears the date of the 27th.

25 Mr. Gearhart: That is all.

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Witness Stark .

The Vice Chairman: Senator Ferguson of Michigan will inquire.

Admiral Stark: May I now -- I see Senator Lucas is here -- bring up the point which I started to bring up this morning and noting his absence did not bring up, with reference to yesterday?

The Vice Chairman: Yes, you may proceed with that.

Admiral Stark: Yesterday Senator Lucas in examining me asked if the damage done to the Fleet in Pearl Harbor was not largely due to torpedoes, that it was his opinion that it was, and in that I agreed. I was particularly thinking of my old command, which I put in commission as executive, and later commanded, the WEST VIRGINIA, whose damage was very extensive from torpedoes, and I think his statement may still stand as correct that the greater portion of the damage was caused by torpedoes, although the Department can give factual information on that.

However, not being too sure of my answer I checked up and I want to offer the following, which is taken from Item 15 of the Navy Folder which is before the committee, and without reading the entire thing I simply want to show the following in the record, which does show great damage probably done by bombs.

You have this Item 15 among your exhibits.



## Witness Stark

1

The ARIZONA was attacked by both torpedoes and bombs.

2

The CALIFORNIA was attacked by torpedoes and bombs.

3

The WEST VIRGINIA was attacked -- when I say attacked I mean hit -- by torpedoes and bombs.

5

The OKLAHOMA was hit only by torpedoes.

6

The NEVADA was hit by torpedoes and bombs.

7

The MARYLAND was hit by bombs only.

8

The PENNSYLVANIA was hit by bombs only.

9

The TENNESSEE was hit by bombs only.

10

The HELENA was hit by torpedoes only.

11

The HONOLULU was damaged by bombs only.

12

The RALEIGH, damaged by both torpedoes and bombs.

13

The SHAW, by bomb only.

14

The CASSIN and DOWNES, by bomb only.

15

That refers to the major combatant ships and there is further data with regard to what damage was suffered. I just touched on the attack.

17

18

The Vice Chairman: Does that complete your statement on that, Admiral?

19

20

Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

21

The Vice Chairman: Senator Ferguson of Michigan will inquire.

22

23

Senator Ferguson: Admiral Stark, you have now given the opinion to Senator Lucas, from the record there, on the

24

25

Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1  
2 ships. Did the Secretary of the Navy go out to Hawaii after  
3 the attack?

4 Admiral Stark: Very shortly after, yes, sir.

5 Senator Ferguson: And did he bring back a report?

6 Admiral Stark: He did.

7 Senator Ferguson: Did you examine that report with him?

8 Admiral Stark: The only report that I saw was the one  
9 which was made public; and, of course, he told us, in a  
10 long conference, a great deal of what happened, particularly  
11 items of interest, and of the wonderful behavior of our men,  
12 and of their wonderful spirit, et cetera, as he saw them  
13 in the hospital wards.

14 I was asked, and I didn't understand the question, in  
15 the previous investigation by the Navy, when I said I saw  
16 the report, I believe reference was made to a special report  
17 which he made to the President that I did not see.

18 Senator Ferguson: I understand you never saw the report  
19 that went to the President?

20 Admiral Stark: So far as I know I never saw that report.  
21 I don't recall it. I saw the report which was made public;  
22 and, of course, from conversations with him I got the picture.

23 Senator Ferguson: Isn't it true that the report that  
24 was made public was a different report than the one given  
25 to the President?

Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1  
2 Admiral Stark: I understood so since, but I have not  
3 seen it.

4 Senator Ferguson: How do you account for the fact that  
5 the Secretary of the Navy did not disclose to you the facts  
6 that he disclosed to the President, you being the highest Navy  
7 man under him?

8 Admiral Stark: I don't account for it.

9 Senator Ferguson: You don't account for it?

10 Admiral Stark: I don't. I don't recall any knowledge  
11 of it at the time.

12 Senator Ferguson: Well --

13 Admiral Stark: That he had made a special written report  
14 to the President, if he did, and I am assuming from your  
15 question that he did.

16 Senator Ferguson: And you indicated that you knew he had?

17 Admiral Stark: Well, I indicated to this extent, that  
18 when I was asked the question last summer, or a year ago last  
19 summer, I should say, if I had seen the report which Colonel  
20 Knox made, I replied yes, and I gathered later that the  
21 report -- the report I referred to was that which was published,  
22 that is what I understood the question was asked on, and I  
23 gained the understanding since that there was another report.

24 Senator Ferguson: Now, yesterday you made an answer to  
25 Mr. Gearhart that I want to ask you about. You said:

Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1  
2 "I have spent hours trying to recall what went on, on  
3 the 25th, 6th and 7th, as to time. I have discussed it  
4 with others. We come to an impasse as to any agreement every  
5 time we do it, and every time we start it we waste a couple  
6 of hours and get nowhere. I cannot recall the details of  
7 just when I got that information. I wish I could, but I  
8 just can't do it."

9 Do I understand from that answer that what you are con-  
10 veying to the committee is that you have sat down with various  
11 other officials and tried to arrive at an agreement as to  
12 what happened during this period, is that what I understand?

13 Admiral Stark: As to when it happened. My memory is  
14 clear as to certain things which did happen and not clear as  
15 to others. But when I try, for example, to fix in my own  
16 mind whether Mr. Hull told me about the Chaing Kai-Shek  
17 memorandum on the 25th or 26th, I can't do it. I have talked  
18 the matter over at length on different occasions with  
19 Admiral Schuirmann, who was in constant touch with the State  
20 Department, and as to what he knew.

21 Senator Ferguson: That is not what I am getting at.  
22 Do I understand that some of your answers here are because  
23 you have agreed with somebody that that is what happened and  
24 if you can't agree then you don't give your best answer?

25 Admiral Stark: No. I have given my best answer. That

Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1  
2 is not the inference to be drawn at all.

3 Senator Ferguson: That is what I wanted to straighten  
4 out on this answer.

5 Admiral Stark: No, that inference is not what I intended  
6 to convey. It is my effort to fix down to a date and a time  
7 as to just when I learned, for example, of Mr. Hull's sending  
8 the 10-point note of his conversation with Chaing Kai-Shek  
9 and the material of that sort.

10 Senator Ferguson: Now --

11 Admiral Stark: But --

12 Senator Ferguson: I will have to change the subject,  
13 because I was talking about another thing, but you bring up  
14 another thing which I will ask you about now, copy of the  
15 message transmitted to Secretary Stimson by Mr. T. V. Soong,  
16 under cover of a letter dated November 25.

17 Will you look at that and see whether that is the Chaing  
18 Kai-Shek message that you are talking about?

19 Admiral Stark: That is the message, or it certainly  
20 conveys the material which Mr. Hull talked to me about, yes, sir.

21 Senator Ferguson: Now, I understand that a copy of this  
22 memorandum to the Secretary of State was sent to the Secretary  
23 of War. Do you know whether or not a copy was sent to the  
24 Secretary of the Navy, and did it reach you in that manner?

25 Admiral Stark: It is my recollection, and again you can

Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1  
2 get factual data, that this message was not only sent to  
3 Mr. Hull but to a number of other officials in our Government.

4 Senator Ferguson: That is just it. Isn't it true that  
5 the Chinese Government not only went to the Secretary of State  
6 but they went to other agencies and Mr. Hull was upset about it?

7 Admiral Stark: Very much upset. I believe this was also  
8 made known to people in Congress at that time.

9 Senator Ferguson: So the substance of that letter not  
10 only came to you through Mr. Hull but it came from other sources,  
11 did it not?

12 Admiral Stark: I knew of the substance of it because I  
13 can recall Colonel Knox talking about people talking about  
14 this on the Hill.

15 Senator Ferguson: Now, when did you have a conversation --  
16 I realize how long it has been, I realize that there is much  
17 water gone over the dam, as we say, but I want to try and  
18 get the substance of some of these conversations because what  
19 this committee has to do is to try to get the best information  
20 they can so that we will get all the facts, and I hope that  
21 you will bear with me on some of these questions.

22 Admiral Stark: I will do my best to give you all I  
23 know and any information that I have that should be of  
24 assistance.

25 Senator Ferguson: I start out with the assumption, and

Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1  
2 I take it it is true, that you favor this hearing and you  
3 are willing to cooperate.

4 Admiral Stark: I am delighted that this hearing came  
5 before Congress where all parties would have the opportunity  
6 to tell you all they know about it.

7 Senator Ferguson: I am assuming that.

8 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

9 Senator Ferguson: Now, on this information that came  
10 from the Chinese Government in relation to this modus vivendi,  
11 it wasn't only given to the Secretary of State, but it was  
12 given to other agencies and even came up on the Hill, as we  
13 call the Congress; that is true, isn't it?

14 Admiral Stark: That is my understanding, and confirmed,  
15 without any question, by Mr. Hull's statement to me that  
16 they were crying appeasement on the Hill, another thing which  
17 greatly perturbed him.

18 Senator Ferguson: Now, -- do you want to take a moment  
19 to look at that?

20 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir. There is one paragraph here  
21 in Mr. Hull's statement which reads --

22 Mr. Mitchell: Is that the statement of November 29th?

23 Admiral Stark: No, of November 25:

24 "Subject: Opposition of Generalissimo Chaing Kai-Shek  
25 to modus vivendi.

Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1  
2 "Participants: Secretary Hull and Chinese Ambassador,  
3 Dr. Hu Shi."

4 And part of that reads:

5 "I said very recently that the Generalissimo and Madam  
6 Chaing Kai-Shek almost flooded Washington with strong and  
7 lengthy cables telling us how extremely dangerous the Japanese  
8 threat is of attack to the Burma Road, to Indo-China, and  
9 appealing loudly for aid, whereas practically the first thing  
10 this proposal of mine and the President's does is to require  
11 the Japanese troops to be taken out of Indo-China and thereby  
12 to protect the Burma Road from what Chaing Kai-Shek says is  
13 an imminent danger."

14 And so forth.

15 I remember very clearly how upset Mr. Hull was, of his  
16 telling me that even the Hill was crying appeasement, that  
17 the Chinese themselves should have supported him, because  
18 he was doing this in their behalf, and that apparently they  
19 didn't understand it.

20 Also in a previous dispatch, which I read, he pointed  
21 out that the British, he thought, were only half-way supporting  
22 it.

23 Senator Ferguson: Was it your understanding, or was it  
24 not your understanding, that to have entered into or to have  
25 sent the modus vivendi, or agreed on the modus vivendi, that



Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1  
2 thereby America would have been sacrificing her principles?

3 Admiral Stark: No. That is not my opinion. My under-  
4 standing of the modus vivendi was that it was to insure a  
5 period of three months to talk things over and that the  
6 material which was in the 10-point note were the items which  
7 they were going to talk over and resolve.

8 Senator Ferguson: But the modus vivendi would have  
9 given an extension of three months for negotiations and would  
10 have not, except for that period, let's say, sacrificed the  
11 American principles?

12 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir. I had no idea that Mr. Hull  
13 for one second considered sacrificing any principles or  
14 walking backward.

15 Senator Ferguson: You were the highest Naval authority  
16 in the United States?

17 Admiral Stark: I was.

18 Senator Ferguson: You were under the Secretary of the  
19 Navy but you were the highest authority?

20 Admiral Stark: By virtue of my office at that time I  
21 was.

22 Senator Ferguson: Therefore you were vitally interested  
23 in our diplomatic negotiations, because, as I understand it,  
24 you have to have your diplomatic negotiations tied in with  
25 your military authorities, because you have got to be able to

Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1  
2 back up what you do; isn't that the principle?

3 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

(4) 4 Senator Ferguson: Therefore you were vitally interested  
5 in this modus vivendi and the diplomatic negotiations; is that  
6 true?  
7

8 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

9 Senator Ferguson: Now, will you tell us why the modus  
10 vivendi was not sent. You were one of the top officials re-  
11 presenting the United States Navy, and, if I might, before you  
12 answer that, this would be a Naval war in the Pacific, would  
13 it not?

14 Admiral Stark: Largely, yes. I always looked on it as  
15 largely a Naval war.

16 Senator Ferguson: Therefore you would be very vitally  
17 interested in this question as to whether or not we had a  
18 three months period or whether or not we didn't take that  
19 period. Will you tell us why the modus vivendi was not sent?

20 Admiral Stark: May I add there that so was Marshall,  
21 because --

22 Senator Ferguson: Oh, yes.

23 Admiral Stark: -- because the defense of the Philippines,  
24 which was an Army problem, was one of the primary reasons  
25 for that extension.

26 Senator Ferguson: I don't mean to say that the Military,

Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1  
2 the Army, was not vitally interested also, but it would have  
3 been, to a greater extent, a Naval war?

4 Admiral Stark: Yes; but holding the Philippines was  
5 something I took up in the first meeting I ever had in the  
6 White House. There had always been a general feeling that  
7 we couldn't hold the Philippines, that we would have to  
8 abandon them. I was hoping that we would have time to take  
9 steps to make them secure. My desire for time was so that  
10 the Army could complete a project it had to greatly strengthen  
11 the Philippines, and in turn the Fleet could support them  
12 in the Philippines.

13 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

14 Now, coming back to my previous question, why did we  
15 not use the modus vivendi?

16 Admiral Stark: Well, I can give you my opinion as to  
17 that.

18 Senator Ferguson: I would like to have the substance  
19 of what was said first and then your opinion.

20 Admiral Stark: I gained the impression from Mr. Hull  
21 that the Chaing Kai-Shek note so disturbed him that -- along  
22 with other things which have been read -- that he seriously  
23 questioned, when he first informed me, the desirability of  
24 his going ahead with the modus vivendi. Subsequently he did  
25 not go ahead with it. Now, --

Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1  
2 Senator Ferguson: What were the other things?

3 Admiral Stark: The other items were those which have  
4 been mentioned, but, as I recall, the British and the Dutch  
5 appeared not too strongly with him; they were crying appease-  
6 ment on the Hill, as he stated to me, with regard to the  
7 course that he was taking.

8 Senator Ferguson: I believe that is the message that  
9 you referred to today and it reads something like this:

10 "They seemed to be thinking of the advantages to be  
11 derived without any particular thought of what we would pay  
12 for them, if anything. Finally, when I discovered that none  
13 of their Governments had given them instructions relative  
14 to this phase of the matter, except in the case of the  
15 Netherlands Minister, I remarked that each of their Govern-  
16 ments were more interested in the defense of that area of  
17 the world than this country and at the same time they expected  
18 this country, in case of a Japanese outbreak, to be ready  
19 to move in a military way and to take the lead in defending  
20 the entire area."

21 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir. And then there was his  
22 memorandum dated November 29, in which he refers to a con-  
23 ference: Participants, the Secretary of State, Hull, and  
24 the British Ambassador, Lord Halifax. That was the one I  
25 was thinking about.

Shefner fls  
LaChar  
11:50 am

6199

Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 Senator Ferguson: All right. Will you give me the sub-  
3 stance of that?

4 Admiral Stark: (Reading)

5 "The British Ambassador called at his request and  
6 I soon discovered that he had no special business except  
7 to check on the aftermath of the conversations between  
8 the President and myself and the Japanese with special  
9 reference to the question of the proposed modus vivendi.  
10 This caused me to remark in a preliminary way that the  
11 mechanics for the carrying on of diplomatic relations  
12 between the governments resisting aggressor nations are  
13 so complicated that it is nearly impossible to carry on  
14 such relations in a manner at all systematic and safe  
15 and sound. I referred to the fact that Chiang Kai-shek,  
16 for example, has sent numerous hysterical cable messages  
17 to different Cabinet officers and high officials in this  
18 Government other than the State Department, and sometimes  
19 even ignoring the President, intruding into a delicate  
20 and serious situation with no real idea of what the  
21 facts are."

22 There are about four or five pages to this. I  
23 do not know whether you want me to go ahead with the rest of it  
24 as a refresher or not.

25 Senator Ferguson: It is in, is it not?

Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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Mr. Mitchell: It is exhibit 18.

Senator Ferguson: Yes, it is in the record.

Admiral Stark: It is in the record, yes, sir. I might just add the next sentence. (Reading):

"I added that Chiang Kai-shek had his brother-in-law, located here in Washington, disseminate damaging reports at times to the press and others, apparently with no particular purpose in mind; that we have correspondents from London who interview different officials here, which is entirely their privilege to do, except that at times we all move too fast without fully understanding each other's views, et cetera, et cetera. I stated that this was well illustrated in the case of the recent outburst by Chiang Kai-shek. In referring to this I remarked that it would have been better if, when Churchill received Chiang Kai-shek's loud protest about our negotiations here with Japan, instead of passing the protest on to us without objection on his part, thereby qualifying and virtually killing what we knew were the individual views of the British Government toward these negotiations, he had sent a strong cable back to Chiang Kai-shek telling him to brace up and fight with the same zeal as the Japanese and the Germans are displaying instead of weakening and telling the Chinese people that

Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 all of the friendly countries were now striving primari-  
3 ly to protect themselves and to force an agreement be-  
4 tween China and Japan, every Chinese should understand  
5 from such a procedure that the best possible course was  
6 being pursued and that this calls for resolute fighting  
7 until the undertaking is consummated by peace negotiations  
8 which Japan in due course would be obliged to enter  
9 into with China."

10 And then it goes on. I think I have ready enough to  
11 show how Mr. Hull felt about it and which I got the impression  
12 from him in talking with him personally.

13 Senator Ferguson: Yes, all right. Did you feel the same  
14 way about it?

15 Admiral Stark: I felt the same way about the impropri-  
16 ety of flooding all of Washington in the manner in which Mr.  
17 Hull stated. I thought they should have gone about it to him  
18 with all of their troubles and not gone to the highways and  
19 byways.

20 Senator Ferguson: But after we are all through it is  
21 apparent by Mr. Hull, or is it apparent that Mr. Hull fol-  
22 lowed just what the Chinese wanted?

23 Admiral Stark: He did. He broke off so far as the modus  
24 vivendi is concerned.

25 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

Admiral Stark: And he gives extensive reasons there for it. Perhaps he may have agreed with some of Chiang Kai-shek's thoughts that even a leak that we were, - and I think it is in that letter, - a leak to the effect that the United States was going to let Japan have oil or other materials or ease up on the freezing might be such a blow to their morale as to make it impossible for them to continue. But we had all those things. He talked it over, I assume, with his Chief and he came to that conclusion. We were thinking that from the military standpoint to gain time.

Senator Ferguson: But, Admiral, isn't this true, that when you take what Mr. Hull said about Chiang Kai-shek, it indicated that he was not going to follow that route rather than that he was going to follow what he wanted; it was a criticism of it.

Admiral Stark: It was a criticism of Mr. Hull by the Chinese you mean?

Senator Ferguson: No, a criticism of the Chinese stand, was it not?

Admiral Stark: By Mr. Hull?

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

Admiral Stark: I do not know if he criticized so much, although he may have and did in some respects the Chinese understanding. That I would say could have been resolved and



Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 set straight between Mr. Hull and the Ambassador, but when it  
3 was broadcast, or the impression was gained or at least talked  
4 about and Mr. Hull gained the impression that even here at  
5 the capitol that he, Mr. Hull, was being guilty of appease-  
6 ment and that may also have influenced him in the action  
7 which he took.

8 Senator Ferguson: Now, wait. Do I understand then that  
9 the opinion that Mr. Hull was appeasing Japan may have had  
10 something to do with him throwing out the modus vivendi and  
11 putting in the note of the 26th?

12 Admiral Stark: Whether or not that criticism which was  
13 being leveled at him in official Washington had anything to  
14 do with his final decision only Mr. Hull could answer. I do  
15 know that it greatly annoyed him.

16 Senator Ferguson: Well, now, how do you account for this  
17 note on the 24th where he fully recognized what he is saying:

18 "I remarked that each of their Governments was more  
19 interested in the defense of that area of the world than  
20 this country, and at the same time they expected this  
21 country, in case of a Japanese outbreak, to be ready to  
22 move in a military way and take the lead in defending  
23 the entire area."

24 He fully recognized our position in the world when he  
25 said that, did he not?

Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir, he recognized that and I think  
2 that probably from the other governments is not unusual. It  
3 is a rather human weakness to have that sort of an opinion.  
4 Every fellow is thinking of himself first and perhaps some-  
5 times from thinking overmuch of himself loses sight of the  
6 broader picture. That is what I gather that he means.

7  
8 Senator Ferguson: Isn't that exactly what happened,  
9 just what Mr. Hull prophesied would happen, that we would have  
10 to defend the whole area and we would have to have the war for  
11 the whole area, isn't that what happened?

12 Admiral Stark: We would have the major role.

13 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

14 Admiral Stark: The Chinese had their role and, of  
15 course, the British also had their role and there were plans  
16 being laid.

17 Senator Ferguson: Now, that takes me to this: What was  
18 our role, what was our plan in case there was an attack upon  
19 the British possessions in that area? I am talking right from  
20 this memorandum of the 24th here:

21 "In case of a Japanese outbreak, to be ready to  
22 move in a military way and take the lead in defending  
23 the entire area",

24 which would include the British.

25 Now, what was our plan, what was our role if an attack

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 was made upon the British possessions in the Far East?

3 Admiral Stark: I do not know what it would have been.  
4 It would have been up to Congress in the last analysis had the  
5 President decided that it was time to make a recommendation  
6 to Congress. What recommendation he would have made, I do  
7 not know.

8 Senator Ferguson: Did you ever try to find out what would  
9 be your stand? You had to prepare for such an emergency, did  
10 you not?

11 Admiral Stark: We were preparing for it.

12 Senator Ferguson: And you could not wait until Congress  
13 acted to get at least prepared for such a situation?

14 Admiral Stark: No, sir.

15 Senator Ferguson: All right. Now, did you ever try to  
16 find out what our stand would be in that case?

17 Admiral Stark: Yes.

18 Senator Ferguson: Who did you try to find it out from?

19 Admiral Stark: I had asked the President.

20 Senator Ferguson: What did he tell you?

21 Admiral Stark: He could not answer the question and I  
22 believe that he was sincere in stating that he did not know.  
23 You will recall, and I have stated factually, this is not hind-  
24 sight, in answer to questions of this sort which Admiral  
25 Richardson asked me and that I had asked for the answers to

Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 those questions and could not get them, and I quote, - I be-  
3 lieve I stated that I thought that there was nobody on God's  
4 green earth who could answer them.

5 Senator Ferguson: All right. Now, you went to the  
6 President and you asked the specific question as to what we  
7 would do in that case if an attack was made on the British  
8 possessions, in which case I understand that he told you he  
9 did not know.

10 Admiral Stark: He did not answer the question.

11 Senator Ferguson: Well, what did he say or what did he  
12 do?

13 Admiral Stark: Just that he did not know; at least he  
14 said that he could not answer it. At one time I believe he  
15 said to me, "Don't ask me these questions," because I feel that  
16 he could not answer them, - I felt that he could not answer  
17 them. Now, as to what he would have done I do not know.

18 Senator Ferguson: Then, Admiral, how could you prepare  
19 for that situation? If you could not get an answer and, as  
20 you say, you knew the President could not answer it, how could  
21 you prepare for that?

22 Admiral Stark: I could work on the assumption that the  
23 worst might happen and that is what I did. For example --

24 Senator Ferguson: Did he tell you --

25 The Chairman: Let the witness complete his answer.

Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 Senator Ferguson: I will let him answer.

3 Admiral Stark: May I just give you an example? You will  
4 recall that on my own initiative, so far as getting the British  
5 over here in early 1941, we started hearings here with the  
6 British. When I asked them to come over initially I did not  
7 ask the President's permission or Colonel Knox. It was more  
8 or less -- there was some dynamite in the fact that it might  
9 be known that we were holding conversations with the British  
10 as to what we would do and how we would work with them in  
11 case of war.

12 I was asked the question one day on the Hill before one  
13 of the Senate committees, as to whether or not we were hold-  
14 ing conversations with the British with regards to participa-  
15 tion with them in the war and my answer was that I would like  
16 to put two or three questions up to the committee. And the  
17 first one was, Is there not some possibility of the United  
18 States being drawn into this war, remote though it may be and  
19 regardless of our endeavor to keep out? They agreed that such  
20 a possibility did exist in the world situation at that time.

21 I then asked, "Suppose that possibility develops, is  
22 there any question on which side we would fight?" Of course  
23 there was no question. It would be opposed to the Axis.

24 I then answered the question and stated, "The answer is  
25 in the affirmative" in answering you, but wouldn't I be utter-

Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 ly derelict in my duties if I did not prepare for the con-  
3 tingency so that if and when war did eventuate that there would  
4 be ample working plans, so far as possible, to dovetail and  
5 coordinate our effort?

6  
7 The questioning of me on that subject stopped and I never  
8 was asked about it during the course of months, during the  
9 course of those next couple of months work with the British.

10 Now, as regards the Far East, we did hold conversations  
11 out there in the A-D-B, none of which was approved, and final  
12 action, we put it up to Admiral Hart and to Admiral Phillips,  
13 the British Commander-in-Chief, to make their own plans as to  
14 how to work together if we both got in it. The directions  
15 were always against any political commitment. I have Hart's  
16 here, his despatch covering the recommendations with regard to  
17 that pulling together and I have our answer.

18 Senator Ferguson: Now, do I understand that at any time  
19 you discussed with the President the question as to not what  
20 we would do, but preparing for the eventuality that if they did  
21 attack the British that you would be prepared for this country  
22 to come in?

23 Admiral Stark: I stated, and he knew with regard to the  
24 particular conversations I have just mentioned, I informed him  
25 in January, after the committee was here, that I was going ahead  
with those conversations.

Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 Senator Ferguson: And what did he say about that?

3 Admiral Stark: I told him that I would prefer to be  
4 panned for not being ready rather than for being reproved  
5 when the time came and I was not ready, and he let it go at  
6 that.

7 Senator Ferguson: Well, what did he say? What was the  
8 substance of what he said?

9 Admiral Stark: Well, he did not pan me and after look-  
10 ing --

11 Senator Ferguson: You mean after the 7th he did not pan  
12 you?

13 Admiral Stark: Sir?

14 Senator Ferguson: You mean after the 7th of December or  
15 when?

16 Admiral Stark: No.

17 Senator Ferguson: At that time?

18 Admiral Stark: After I informed him of the conversations  
19 going on. Later on all those conversations, that is, the boil-  
20 down and the plans were shown to him.

21 Senator Ferguson: Now, do I understand then that on the  
22 7th day of December 1941 you as the head of the Navy had no  
23 plan to go into effect if the British were attacked and we were  
24 not attacked?

25 Admiral Stark: If the British were attacked and we were

Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

not attacked we had no plans to bring into being.

Senator Ferguson: Then I understand --

Admiral Stark: I say that we did not get any.

Senator Ferguson: That is right. Then I understand that the Winant note, the message sending the information that they were going to the Kra Peninsula on the 6th and that they would be there in some fourteen hours, and another note, the paraphrase of a secret message, - this is on page 5507 of this record, - received at the War Department at 4:29 December 6th, that is, 4:29 P.M. in the afternoon of December 6th (Reading):

"Brink advises that at one o'clock in the afternoon, following a course due west, were seen a battleship, five cruisers, seven destroyers and twenty-five merchant ships; these were seen at  $106^{\circ} 8' E.$ ,  $8^{\circ} N.$ ; this was the first report.

"The second report was that ten merchant ships, two cruisers and ten destroyers were seen following the same course at  $106^{\circ} 20' E.$ ,  $7^{\circ} 35' N.$

"Both of the above reports came from patrols of the Royal Air Force."

Now, I understand, Admiral, that those two messages then would not cause us to be alerted in and of themselves because we had no plan if they attacked the British and it was certainly not an attack of any of our possessions?



1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 Admiral Stark: If they had attacked the British and not  
3 us I would have taken no action except to continue to be alert  
4 against an attack by them, yes, sir.

5 Senator Ferguson: Now, do I understand that that could  
6 account for the fact that you were not alerted, your office  
7 was not alerted Saturday afternoon, Saturday night, Sunday  
8 morning up till the time of the attack?

9 Admiral Stark: I do not understand just what you mean by  
10 "not alerted". Our office was operating twenty-four hours a  
11 day.

12 Senator Ferguson: Well, Admiral, having those two mes-  
13 sages and no plan for us to take any part, were you alerted  
14 for war that afternoon and that morning, Sunday morning the  
15 7th?

16 Admiral Stark: You mean where, in Washington or in the  
17 field?

18 Senator Ferguson: No, Washington, right in your office.

19 Admiral Stark: Yes, we were. We were alerted. We were  
20 on duty at all times.

21 Senator Ferguson: Do I understand then that by being  
22 alerted you mean this, that at 10:30 on the day that war was  
23 to start that you would get down to your office at 10:30 if  
24 you were fully alerted and expecting a war to start?

25 Admiral Stark: If I had expected the war to start at

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 that time I would have come down. I did not know the war was  
3 going to start that morning.

4 Senator Ferguson: Did you know it was going to start as  
5 far as the British was concerned on the 7th?

6 Admiral Stark: No, sir.

7 Senator Ferguson: What about these two messages?

8 Admiral Stark: Well, this message from Hart to the  
9 British --

10 Senator Ferguson: And the Winant message.

11 Admiral Stark: And the Winant message, which is prac-  
12 tically the same as the one from Hart, gave the movement of  
13 that and we were trying to determine where they would hit.

14 Senator Ferguson: Well, now, they were going to cross  
15 the Gulf of Siam, were they not?

16 Admiral Stark: They were heading south, which is in that  
17 area.

18 Senator Ferguson: And that fleet and that convoy would  
19 not attack America's possessions?

20 Admiral Stark: No, but there might have been another at-  
21 tack on American possessions concurrently.

22 Senator Ferguson: Did you anticipate such?

23 Admiral Stark: Did I what, sir?

24 Senator Ferguson: Did you anticipate such another attack  
25 on American possessions?

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 Admiral Stark: We had mentioned that we could not pre-  
3 clude an attack elsewhere and we had specifically included  
4 the Philippines, which was on the flank, as a possibility in  
5 that connection and we had sent previous messages to the ef-  
6 fect that they might strike anywhere.

7 Senator Ferguson: Now, did you figure that when they  
8 would strike the British, which would be some time on Sunday,  
9 fourteen hours, in fact, from some time on Saturday noon, did  
10 you figure that they would attack American possessions?

11 Admiral Stark: We figured at that time, in view of the  
12 fact that they had destroyed their codes with us and with the  
13 Dutch that there certainly was a possibility, even a strong  
14 probability, - even a probability of their attacking all  
15 three of us. That was after the destruction of codes. It  
16 certainly was an indication and a rather clear indication of  
17 their enemies. They might simply have broken off diplomatic  
18 relations with us, we couldn't tell, but the presumption which  
19 we instilled into the despatch was war.

20 Senator Ferguson: Now, you say a strong probability  
21 was that they were going to attack us as well as the British?

22 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

23 Senator Ferguson: Then how do you account, Admiral, for  
24 the fact that you could not be reached Saturday night --

25 Admiral Stark: I would not want to --

Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

Senator Ferguson: Wait until I finish my question.

Admiral Stark: Pardon me.

Senator Ferguson: And that you did not get to your office and no one reached you until 10:30 that Sunday morning?

Admiral Stark: I would like to say as regards reaching me Saturday night, that I am still of the opinion that I was home. I am not sure from the testimony which has been given on that that I was called that night. There is room for doubt in the testimony that I have read of each of the parties concerned with calling me, that they might have been under the impression that the other had called and I have never been sure that I was called and I will continue to be in doubt unless this committee pins it down, the fact that I was definitely called by someone. It is not plain to me.

Senator Ferguson: Well, at least your own testimony is to the effect that you did not get down to your office until 10:30 that morning or around that time, isn't that correct?

Admiral Stark: My testimony is to the effect that it would be my recollection, after this lapse of time, that I was in general down there about half past ten on Sunday morning. Others stated that I was there earlier. That was just guess on my usual procedure that morning.

Senator Ferguson: Well, Admiral, this was of such importance that the President of the United States took from the

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 Supreme Court on leave Justice Roberts, named him as the head  
3 of a committee to investigate how this thing happened at Pearl  
4 Harbor. Isn't that true?

5 Admiral Stark: Yes.

6 Senator Ferguson: Now, did you, the head of the Navy,  
7 knowing that the President a few days afterwards thought it was  
8 of such importance that he named a Supreme Court Justice to do  
9 the job, did you make an investigation into your own office,  
10 into this office that you had control of here in Washington,  
11 as to what was known in Washington and how this thing could  
12 have happened?

13 Admiral Stark: No, I did not. I knew pretty well what  
14 had happened and what was coming in and I was then very much  
15 engaged in fighting the war.

16 Senator Ferguson: Yes, you were, but you were also inter-  
17 ested in knowing whether or not your office was efficiently  
18 equipped and manned in order that it could fight the war in  
19 the future, isn't that true?

20 Admiral Stark: That is true, yes, sir.

21 Senator Ferguson: Now, I want to leave that and I want  
22 to go to this report of the Secretary of the Navy. This is a  
23 report by the Secretary of the Navy to the President. The  
24 first sentence of it is:

25 "The Japanese air attack on the Island of Oahu on

Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

December the 7th was a complete surprise to both the Army and the Navy."

Now, the Army and the Navy would be all-inclusive, would it not, the way he has used it there, and I think a later sentence which I will read to you indicates that the Army and the Navy were completely surprised as far as the attack on Oahu is concerned.

Admiral Stark: That is what it says.

Senator Ferguson: That is just what it says?

Admiral Stark: Yes.

Senator Ferguson: Was that your understanding?

Admiral Stark: Well, I would not want to make a statement as sweeping as that, particularly with regard to the Army. I know that Marshall was surprised, I know that I was surprised and I believe my principal advisers have testified on the subject.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Stark

6217  
Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1  
2 Senator Ferguson: Now I want to go to the next sentence:  
3 "Its initial success, which included almost all the  
4 damage done, was due to a lack of a state of readiness against  
5 such an air attack by both branches of the service. This  
6 statement was made to me by both General Short and Admiral  
7 Kimmel and both agreed that it was entirely true. Neither  
8 Army nor Navy Command on Oahu regarded such an attack as  
9 at all likely because of the danger which such a carrier-borne  
10 attack would confront in view of the preparedness of the  
11 American Naval strength in Hawaiian waters. While the  
12 likelihood of an attack without warning by Japan was in the  
13 minds of both General Short and Admiral Kimmel, both felt  
14 certain that such an attack would take place nearer Japan's  
15 base of operations, that is, in the Far East."

16 Were you of the same opinion?

17 Admiral Stark: Yes, I thought the attack would take  
18 place in the Far East, from the evidence we had.

19 Senator Ferguson: You were then of the same opinion?

20 Admiral Stark: I was of that opinion as regards the  
21 most likely place of attack, but I did not preclude an attack  
22 elsewhere.

23 Senator Ferguson: You were very close, Admiral, to  
24 the Admiral in charge of plans, were you not, Admiral Turner?

25 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1  
2 Senator Ferguson: Did you know that his opinion was  
3 that there was a fifty-fifty chance for an attack on Pearl  
4 Harbor at that time?

5 Admiral Stark: I do not recall that fifty-fifty chance  
6 to which he has testified.

7 Senator Ferguson: Did you know that the State Department,  
8 Mr. Hornbeck, said that if he was a gambling man and was  
9 placing odds on the 27th day of November, 1941, that it would  
10 be 5-to-1 that there would be no attack before the 15th of  
11 December?

12 Admiral Stark: I do not recall that.

13 Senator Ferguson: Did you know that he had written  
14 such a memorandum?

15 Admiral Stark: I do not recall it.

16 Senator Ferguson: Was there disagreement between the  
17 Navy and the State Department on that question of whether or  
18 not there would be an attack or no attack as far as America  
19 was concerned?

20 Admiral Stark: Well, Mr. Hull stated that he would  
21 not be surprised at a surprise attack. I dealt more with  
22 him than with Hornbeck. Admiral Schuirmann dealt primarily  
23 with Dr. Hornbeck.

24 Senator Ferguson: Now reading from this report again,  
25 "Neither Short nor Kimmel at the time of the attack had any



Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1  
2 knowledge of the plain intimation of some surprise move made  
3 clear in Washington through the intercepts of Japanese in-  
4 structions to Nomura in which a surprise move of some kind  
5 was clearly indicated by the insistence upon the precise time  
6 of Nomura's reply to Hull at 1:00 o'clock on Sunday."

7 Did you ever discuss that matter with Secretary Knox?

8 Admiral Stark: Only in the case of hindsight. No one  
9 intimated to me that that 1:00 o'clock message meant an  
10 attack on Hawaii.

11 Senator Ferguson: Does not he indicate it in here?

12 Admiral Stark: He indicates it there but after the  
13 event. I can indicate it after the event.

14 Senator Ferguson: But it says here "made clear in  
15 Washington". It says "Neither Short nor Kimmel at the time  
16 of the attack had any knowledge of the plain intimation of  
17 some surprise move made clear in Washington through the  
18 intercepts of Japanese instructions to Nomura".

19 Admiral Stark: It is clear now. To my mind it was not  
20 clear then. Colonel Knox never intimated that to me prior  
21 to the attack, to the best of my recollection.

22 Senator Ferguson: Then he goes on, and I will read  
23 this sentence --

24 Mr. Keefe: Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?  
25 Are you reading from Knox' report?

Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1  
2 Senator Ferguson: Yes, I am reading from Knox' report.

3 Mr. Keefe: Is that the one he made public, or the one  
4 he made to the President?

5 Senator Ferguson: It is Secretary Knox' report to the  
6 President. That is indicated at the top.

7 Senator Lucas: Is this in evidence?

8 Senator Ferguson: No. Might I inquire from counsel  
9 as to where this paper was obtained from, whether from the  
10 Secretary of the Navy's office or the White House?

11 Mr. Mitchell: It came from the Navy Department.

12 Admiral Stark: I never have seen it.

13 Senator Ferguson: That is the reason I want to ask  
14 you some questions on the facts contained in it.

15 Senator Lucas: May I inquire how long we have had  
16 this document?

17 Mr. Mitchell: I was just going to ask that.

18 Senator Ferguson: I have had it a day.

19 Senator Lucas: It is not mimeographed and distributed  
20 to the members?

21 Mr. Mitchell: That is the only copy we have.

22 Senator Ferguson: So that all will get it, I will ask  
23 the Admiral to read it into the record. I think it is worth  
24 reading, because I want to ask some questions on it. It  
25 covers your question about the torpedoes, and that is the

Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1  
2 reason I started out on it.

3 Would you read it into the record?

4 Admiral Stark: Starting at the beginning?

5 Senator Ferguson: Yes, sir.

6  
7 Admiral Stark: "REPORT BY THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY TO  
8 THE PRESIDENT.

9 "The Japanese air attack on the Island of Oahu on  
10 December 7th was a complete surprise to both the Army and the  
11 Navy. Its initial success, which included almost all the  
12 damage done, was due to a lack of a state of readiness against  
13 such an air attack, by both branches of the service. This  
14 statement was made by me to both General Short and Admiral  
15 Kimmel, and both agreed that it was entirely true."

16 Mr. Mitchell: That is not right, is it? It should be  
17 "to me", should it not?

18 Admiral Stark: It says "by me". I think it probably  
19 means "by me".

20 Mr. Mitchell: I think that is right. If you read the  
21 rest of it.

22 Admiral Stark: Neither Army or Navy Commandants in Oahu  
23 regarded such an attack as at all likely, because of the  
24 danger which such a carrier-borne attack would confront in  
25 view of the preponderance of the American Naval strength  
in Hawaiian waters. While the likelihood of an attack without

## Witness Stark

1  
2 warning by Japan was in the minds of both General Short  
3 and Admiral Kimmel, both felt certain that such an attack  
4 would take place nearer Japan's base of operations, that is,  
5 in the Far East. Neither Short nor Kimmel, at the time of the  
6 attack, had any knowledge of the plain intimations of some  
7 surprise move, made clear in Washington, through the inter-  
8 ception of Japanese instructions to Nomura, in which a surprise  
9 move of some kind was clearly indicated by the insistence  
10 upon the precise time of Nomura's reply to Hull, at one  
11 o'clock on Sunday.

12 "A general warning had been sent out from the Navy De-  
13 partment on November 27th, to Admiral Kimmel. General Short  
14 told me that a message of warning sent from the War Department  
15 on Saturday night at midnight, before the attack, failed to  
16 reach him until four or five hours after the attack had been  
17 made.

18 "Both the Army and the Navy command at Oahu had prepared  
19 careful estimates covering their idea of the most likely  
20 and most imminent danger. General Short repeated to me  
21 several times that he felt the most imminent danger to the  
22 Army was the danger of sabotage, because of the known presence  
23 of large numbers of alien Japanese in Honolulu. Acting on  
24 this assumption, he took every possible measure to protect  
25 against this danger. This included, unfortunately, bunching

## Witness Stark

1  
2 the planes on the various fields on the Island, close  
3 together, so that they might be carefully guarded against  
4 possible subversive action by Japanese agents. This condi-  
5 tion, known as "SAbotage Alert" had been assumed because  
6 sabotage was considered as the most imminent danger to be  
7 guarded against. This bunching of planes, of course, made  
8 the Japanese air attack more effective. There was, to a  
9 lesser degree, the same lack of dispersal of planes on Navy  
10 stations, and although the possibility of sabotage was not  
11 given the same prominence in Naval minds, both arms of the  
12 service lost most of their planes on the ground in the initial  
13 attack by the enemy. There were no Army planes in the air  
14 at the time of the attack and no planes were warmed up in  
15 readiness to take the air.

16 "The Navy regarded the principal danger from a Japanese  
17 stroke without warning was a submarine attack, and conse-  
18 quently made all necessary provisions to cope with such  
19 an attack. As a matter of fact, a submarine attack did  
20 accompany the air attack and at least two Japanese submarines  
21 were sunk and a third one ran ashore and was captured. No  
22 losses were incurred by the Fleet from submarine attack.  
23 One small two man submarine penetrated into the harbor, having  
24 followed a vessel through the net, but because it broached  
25 in the shallow water it was immediately discovered by the

## Witness Stark

1  
2 CURTIS and was attacked and destroyed through the efforts of  
3 that vessel and those of the Destroyer Monaghan. This  
4 submarine fired her torpedoes which hit a shoal to the west  
5 of Ford Island.

6  
7 "The Navy took no specific measures of protection  
8 against an air attack, save only that the ships in the harbor  
9 were so dispersed as to provide a field of fire covering  
10 every approach from the air. The Navy morning patrol was  
11 sent out at dawn to the southward, where the Commander-in-  
12 Chief had reason to suspect an attack might come. This  
13 patrol consisted of ten patrol bombers who made no contacts  
14 with enemy craft. At least 90% of Officers and enlisted  
15 personnel were aboard ship when the attack came. The  
16 condition of readiness aboard ship was described as "Condition  
17 Three", which meant that about one-half of the broadside and  
18 anti-aircraft guns were manned, and all of the anti-aircraft  
19 guns were supplied with ammunition and were in readiness.

20 "The first intimation of enemy action came to the Navy  
21 shortly after seven a.m., when a Destroyer in the harbor  
22 entrance radioed that she had contacted a submarine and  
23 had (they believed) successfully depth charged it. Thus an  
24 attempted attack by submarine preceded the air attack by  
25 approximately a half hour. Quite a number of similar  
incidents, involving reports of submarine contact, had

## Witness Stark

1  
2 occurred in the recent past and too great credit was not  
3 given the Destroyer Commander's report. Subsequent investi-  
4 gation proved the report to be correct. Admiral Bloch  
5 received the report and weighed in his mind the possibility  
6 that it might be the start of action, but in view of sub-  
7 marine contacts in the past dismissed the thought.

8 "The Army carried out no dawn patrol on Sunday, December  
9 7th, the only air patrol being that sent to the southward  
10 by the Navy.

11 "The Radar equipment installed on shipboard, is  
12 practically useless when the ships are in Pearl Harbor because  
13 of the surrounding mountains. Reliance therefore of both  
14 branches of the service is chiefly upon three Army detector  
15 stations on the Island of Oahu. Until 7 December, it had  
16 been customary to operate three Radars for a large portion  
17 of the day. However, on 6 December, permission was requested  
18 and obtained from the Control Officer to, on 7 December,  
19 operate only from 4:00 a.m. to 7:00 a.m. Accordingly, on  
20 7 December, the stations were manned from before dawn until  
21 seven a.m. when they were closed officially. However, by  
22 pure chance one Army non-com officer remained at his post  
23 to practice on such planes as might take the air, and probably  
24 with no thought of enemy approach. At least a half hour  
25 before the attack was made this Officer's Radar indicator

Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1  
2 showed a concentration of planes to the northward, about  
3 130 miles distant. He reported this to the Air Craft  
4 Warning Information Center, which was the place from which  
5 it should have been reported to Headquarters. The officer  
6 there, a Second Lieutenant, took it upon his shoulders to  
7 pass it up, explaining that he had been told the ENTERPRISE  
8 was at Sea, and that the planes he had located were probably  
9 from that carrier."

10 Senator Ferguson: Might I interrupt you, Admiral,  
11 just one moment? Our information has been, has it not, and  
12 yours was the same, that he thought there were B-17's coming  
13 in? Is this the first time you ever heard he thought they  
14 were planes from the ENTERPRISE?

15 Admiral Stark: I think he said that, and also waited  
16 for a flight from the coast coming in at that time.

17 Mr. Murphy: Will the gentleman yield?

18 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

19 Mr. Murphy: In the previous hearing it was said there  
20 were three different sources that the planes might come from.

21 Senator Ferguson: I will ask the Admiral, had you any  
22 information as to where they thought the planes were coming  
23 from, other than what is in this message?

24 Admiral Stark: Since that event I knew of the flight  
25 from the coast to Oahu, which came in, I believe, during



Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1  
2 the attack, and I have some recollection, although it is  
3 a little hazy, about hearing also that he thought there might  
4 have been planes from a carrier.

5 Mr. Murphy: Will the gentleman yield to a question?

6 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

7 Mr. Murphy: In General Short's testimony he refers to  
8 an affidavit on that that covers three possible places where  
9 the planes might have been coming from.

10 The Vice Chairman: Go ahead, Admiral.

11 Admiral Stark: "No report of this discovery of an  
12 enemy air force approaching from the north reached either  
13 the Army or the Navy Commander. If this information had  
14 been properly handled, it would have given both Army and  
15 Navy sufficient warning to have been in a state of readiness,  
16 which at least would have prevented the major part of the  
17 damage done, and might easily have converted this successful  
18 air attack into a Japanese disaster.

1 Witness Stark.

2 "The Officer at the Radar station, I was advised, showed  
3 this air force on his instrument as they came in and plotted  
4 their approach. I have seen the radar plot, which also in-  
5 cluded a plot of the enemy air forces returning to the car-  
6 riers from which they had come to make the attack. This latter  
7 information did not reach the Navy until Tuesday, two days  
8 after the attack occurred, although many and varied reports  
9 as to various locations of radio bearings on the Japanese car-  
10 riers did come to the Navy Commander-in-Chief.

11 "The activities of Japanese fifth columnists immediately  
12 following the attack, took the form of spreading on the air by  
13 radio dozens of confusing and contradictory rumors concerning  
14 the direction in which the attacking planes had departed, as  
15 well as the presence in every direction of enemy ships. The  
16 Navy regarded the reports of concentration of enemy ships to  
17 the southward as most dependable and scouted at once in that  
18 direction. It is now believed that another unit of the  
19 Japanese force, using the call letters of their carriers, took  
20 station to the southward of Oahu and transmitted. Radio  
21 Direction Finder bearings on these transmittals aided in the  
22 false assumption that the enemy was to the southward. A force  
23 from the westward moved over from there in an attempt to  
24 intercept a Japanese force supposedly moving westward from a  
25 position south of Oahu. Subsequent information, based upon

1 Witness Stark.

2 a chart recovered from a Japanese plane which was shot down,  
3 indicated that the Japanese forces actually retired to the  
4 northward. In any event, they were not contacted by either of  
5 the task forces, one of which was too far to the westward to  
6 have established contact on 7 December.

7 "The Army anti-aircraft batteries were not manned when  
8 the attack was made and the mobile units were not in position.  
9 All Army personnel were in their quarters and the guns were  
10 not manned or in position for firing, save only those in fixed  
11 positions. Early anti-aircraft fire consisted almost exclusive-  
12 ly of fire from 50-caliber machine guns.

13 "The enemy attacked simultaneously on three Army fields,  
14 one Navy field, and at Pearl Harbor. This attack was sub-  
15 stantially unopposed except by very light and ineffective  
16 machine gun fire at the fields and stations. Generally speak-  
17 ing, the bombing attacks initially were directed at the air  
18 fields and the torpedo attacks at the ships in the harbor.  
19 The first return fire from the guns of the fleet began, it is  
20 estimated, about four minutes after the first torpedo was  
21 fired, and this fire grew rapidly in intensity.

22 "Three waves of enemy air force swept over Pearl Harbor  
23 during the assault. As above stated, the first was substan-  
24 tially unopposed. The torpedo planes, flying low, appeared  
25 first over the hills surrounding the harbor, and in probably

1 Witness Stark.

2 not more than sixty seconds were in a position to discharge  
3 their torpedoes. The second wave over the harbor was re-  
4 sisted with far greater fire power and a number of enemy planes  
5 were shot down. The third attack over the harbor was met by  
6 so intensive a barrage from the ships that it was driven off  
7 without getting the attack home, no effective hits being made  
8 in the harbor by this last assault.

9 "The Army succeeded in getting ten fighter planes in the  
10 air before the enemy made the third and final sweep, and in  
11 the combat that ensued they estimate eleven enemy craft were  
12 shot down by plane or anti-aircraft fire. The Navy claims  
13 twelve more were destroyed by gunfire from the ships, making  
14 a total enemy loss of twenty-three. To these twenty-three,  
15 eighteen more may be added with reasonable assurances, these  
16 eighteen being Japanese planes which found themselves without  
17 sufficient fuel to return to their carriers and who plunged  
18 into the sea. Conversation between the planes and the  
19 Japanese fleet, in plain language, received in Oahu, is the  
20 basis for this assumption. If true, it makes a total of  
21 forty-one planes lost by the Japanese.

22 "The estimate of the number of planes attacking varies.  
23 This variance lies between a minimum of three carriers,  
24 carrying about fifty planes each, and a maximum of six carriers.  
25 This would indicate an attacking force somewhere between

1 Witness Stark.

2 one hundred fifty and three hundred planes.

3 "From the crashed Japanese planes considerable information  
4 was obtained concerning their general character. Papers dis-  
5 covered on a Japanese plane which crashed indicate a striking  
6 force of six carriers, three heavy cruisers, and numerous  
7 auxiliary craft including destroyers and other vessels. It  
8 is interesting to note that the Japanese fighter planes were  
9 Model O-1, equipped with radial engines and built in early  
10 1941. None of the planes shot down and so far examined, was  
11 fitted with any armored protection for the pilot nor were  
12 any self-sealing gasoline tanks found in any plane. American  
13 radio and other American-built equipment was recovered from  
14 the wreckage. One plane was armed with a Lewis gun of the  
15 1920 vintage. Some observers believed that the planes carried  
16 an unusual number of rounds of ammunition and the use of  
17 explosive and incendiary 20-millimeter ammunition was a  
18 material factor in damaging planes and other objectives on the  
19 ground. The torpedo bombers were of an old type and used  
20 Whitehead torpedoes dating about 1906, equipped with large  
21 vanes on the stern to prevent the initial deep dive customary  
22 of torpedoes dropped by planes. It is pleasing to note that  
23 the attack has not disclosed any new or potent weapons. With  
24 this in mind, it was found that the armor-piercing bombs  
25 employed were 15-inch A.P. projectiles, fitted with tail

1 Witness Stark.

2 vanes.

3 "In actual combat when American planes were able to take  
4 the air, American fliers appear to have proved themselves con-  
5 siderably superior. One Army pilot alone is credited with  
6 shooting down four Japanese planes. All of the pilots who  
7 got in the air returned to the ground confident of their  
8 ability to handle Japanese air forces successfully in the  
9 future.

10 "At neither Army or Navy air fields were planes dispersed.  
11 At Kaneohe some VP planes were, however, moored in the water.  
12 They, too, were destroyed by machine gun fire, using incendi-  
13 ary bullets. Consequently, most of them were put out of  
14 action by the enemy in the initial sweep. Hangars on all of  
15 the fields were heavily bombed and many of them completely  
16 wrecked. At Hickam Field a very large barracks building was  
17 burned with heavy loss of life. The heaviest casualties in  
18 the Navy were incurred aboard ships subjected to torpedo  
19 attack. The bulk of the damage done to the fleet was done  
20 by torpedoes and not by bombs, some ships being hit by four  
21 or more torpedoes. With the sole exception of the Arizona,  
22 bombs proved ineffectual in causing serious damage.

23 "Many of the officers and men of the crews when their  
24 ships were set afire were compelled to take to the water. A  
25 very considerable number were trapped below decks aboard the

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1 Witness Stark.  
2 Oklahoma and the Utah, both of which capsized. By cutting  
3 through the bottom of these two vessels, while the attack was  
4 in progress, twenty-six additional men were rescued alive.  
5 Throughout the action, small boats from other ships and from  
6 the harbor swarmed over the harbor engaged in the rescue of  
7 men who were driven overboard from their ships. The rescue  
8 of men from drowning and the recovery and swift treatment of  
9 the wounded was carried on throughout the engagement by both  
10 service people and civilians with the greatest gallantry.  
11 Temporary hospital quarters were provided in half a dozen  
12 different places and the wounded were cared for promptly.  
13 Because of the huge number of unidentified dead, many being  
14 burned beyond recognition and a large number having been  
15 picked up in the harbor unrecognizable after several days in  
16 the water, several hundred were buried in a common grave on  
17 Government land adjoining the Navy Yard. While I was still  
18 there bodies were being recovered from the water, but all  
19 were in a condition which prevent identification. Disposi-  
20 tions made by the Commandant of the 14th Naval District  
21 (Admiral Block) were adequate and were efficiently carried out.  
22 "Of the eight battleships in Pearl Harbor when the  
23 attack was made on 7 December, three escaped serious damage  
24 and can put to sea in a matter of a few days. These are the  
25 Maryland, Pennsylvania, and the Tennessee. The Nevada can

1 Witness Stark.

2 be raised in a month, and will then require a complete over-  
3 haul. The California can be raised in two and one-half months,  
4 and then must be given temporary repairs in order to send her  
5 to the Pacific Coast for a year's overhaul. The West Virginia  
6 can be raised in three months, and will require a year and a  
7 half to two years for overhaul. The Oklahoma, which was  
8 overturned, it is estimated can be raised in four months.  
9 Whether she will be worth overhaul cannot be determined now.  
10 The Arizona is a total wreck, her forward magazine having  
11 exploded after she had been damaged by both torpedoes and  
12 bombs. The Colorado was on the Pacific coast for overhaul.

13 "There were six cruisers in the harbor at the time of the  
14 attack. The Detroit put to sea at once and is uninjured.  
15 The New Orleans and the San Francisco are now ready to go to  
16 sea. The Honolulu will be ready on December 20. The Helena  
17 was badly damaged and may require a new engine. She will  
18 be ready to go to the Pacific Coast for overhaul December 31.  
19 The Raleigh was flooded throughout her machinery spaces and  
20 seriously injured in other respects. It is estimated she will  
21 be ready for the trip to the Pacific Coast for overhaul on  
22 January 15.

23

24

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WLC

1 Witness Stark

2 "There were ten destroyers in the harbor at the time of  
3 the attack. Seven of these put to sea at once and were uninjured  
4 The Cassia and the Downes were in the same drydock with the  
5 Pennsylvania. Bombs designed for the Pennsylvania hit the two  
6 destroyers and totally wrecked both of them. Although both  
7 destroyers were badly burned, prompt fire fighting work saved  
8 the Pennsylvania from any danger. The destroyer Shaw was in  
9 the floating drydock at the time of the attack. All of this  
10 ship forward of No. 1 stack was seriously damaged or blown off.  
11 The afterpart of the ship is still intact and can be salvaged,  
12 and a new section can be built to replace that part of the  
13 ship now destroyed.

14 "The mine layer Oglala was lying moored outside the Helena,  
15 and received the impact of the torpedo attack designed for the  
16 cruiser. She is a total loss. The airplane tender Curtis,  
17 which was bombed and injured by fire started when a torpedo  
18 plane plunged into her crane, will be ready for service on  
19 December 17th. The Vestal, one of the ships of the train,  
20 which was damaged, will be ready to go to the Pacific coast  
21 on December 17th for overhaul. The old battleship Utah,  
22 which had been converted into a training ship for anti-aircraft  
23 instruction, is a total loss.

24 "General Observation:

25 "There was no attempt by either Admiral Kimmel or General

WARD &amp; PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

WLC2

1 Witness Stark

2 Short to alibi the lack of a state of readiness for the air  
3 attack. Both admitted they did not expect it, and had taken  
4 no adequate measures to meet one if it came. Both Kimmel  
5 and Short evidently regarded an air attack as extremely unlikely  
6 because of the great distance which the Japs would have to  
7 travel to make the attack, and the consequent exposure of such  
8 a task force to the superior gun power of the American fleet.  
9 Neither the Army nor the Navy Commander expected that an  
10 attack would be made by the Japanese while negotiations were  
11 still proceeding in Washington. Both felt that if any surprise  
12 attack was attempted it would be made in the Far East.

13 "Of course, the best means of defense against air attack  
14 consists of fighter planes. Lack of an adequate number of  
15 this type of aircraft available to the Army for the defense  
16 of the Island, is due to the diversion of this type before  
17 the outbreak of the war, to the British, the Chinese, the  
18 Dutch and the Russians.

19 "The next best weapon against air attack is adequate and  
20 well disposed anti-aircraft artillery. There is a dangerous  
21 shortage of guns of this type on the Island. This is through  
22 no fault of the Army Commander who has pressed consistently  
23 for these guns.

24 "There was evident in both Army and Navy only a very  
25 slight feeling of apprehension of any attack at all, and

WLC3

1 Witness Stark

2 neither Army nor Navy were in a position of readiness because  
3 of this feeling.

4 "It cannot be too strongly emphasized that there was avail-  
5 able to the enemy in Oahu probably the most efficient fifth  
6 column to be found anywhere in the American possessions, due  
7 to the presence of very large numbers of alien Japanese. The  
8 intelligence work done by this fifth column before the attack,  
9 provided the Japanese Navy with exact knowledge of all neces-  
10 sary details to plan the attack. This included exact charts  
11 showing customary position of ships when in Pearl Harbor, exact  
12 location of all defenses, gun power and numerous other details.  
13 Papers captured from the Japanese submarine that ran ashore  
14 indicated that the exact position of nearly every ship  
15 in the harbor was known and charted, and all the necessary  
16 data to facilitate a submarine attack was in Japanese posses-  
17 sion. It is an interesting fact that the Utah at the time of  
18 the attack occupied a berth normally used by an aircraft  
19 carrier, and she was sunk and is a total loss. The work of  
20 the fifth column artists in Hawaii has only been approached in  
21 this war by the success of a similar group in Norway.

22 "The fighting spirit of the crews aboard ship and ashore  
23 was superb. Gun crews remained at their station with their  
24 guns in action until they slid into the water from the  
25 Oklahoma's deck or were driven overboard by fires on other

WLC4

1 Witness Stark

2 ships. Men ashore manned every available small boat and carried  
3 on rescue work saving the lives of the men who were driven  
4 overboard while the heaviest fighting was going on. Some of  
5 the crew of the Utah, swept from the deck of the ship as  
6 she capsized, were rescued by destroyers leaving the harbor  
7 to engage in an attack on the enemy forces. Although clad  
8 only in their underclothes, they insisted on joining the crews  
9 of the destroyers which rescued them and went to sea.

10 "The evacuation of the wounded and the rescue of men  
11 from drowning was carried on with such superb courage and  
12 efficiency as to excite universal admiration, and additional  
13 hospital accommodations were quickly provided so that the  
14 wounded could be cared for as rapidly as they were brought  
15 ashore.

16 "The removal of the convalescent wounded to the mainland  
17 promptly is imperative. I recommend that the Solace should be  
18 loaded with these convalescent wounded at once and brought  
19 to the coast with or without escort.

20 "The reported attempted landing on the west coast of Oahu,  
21 near Lualualei was an effort on the part of the Japanese  
22 fifth columnists to direct the efforts of the U. S. task  
23 forces at sea and to lure these forces into a submarine  
24 trap. Fortunately, this fact was realized before certain  
25 light forces under Rear Admiral Draemel reached the vicinity