

Doc. 2593 Evid.

Folder 3

(174)

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 2593

15 August 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Collection of photostats of Japanese Government messages intercepted, decrypted, and translated by War and Navy Dept personnel. Certified as accurate and authenticated by Carter W. CLARKE, Col. G.S.C.

Date: 2 Jul 41- Original () Copy (x) Language: English
8 Dec 41

Has it been translated? Yes () No (x)

Has it been photostated? Yes () No (x)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: United States War Dept, General Staff, Intelligence Division

PERSONS IMPLICATED: NOMURA, Kichisaburo; TOYODA, Teijiro; OSHIMA, Hiroshi; TOGO, Shigenori

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Jap-American negotiations Relations with Germany and Italy

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS

2593 D-1 Item 1. 2 July; Circular 1390 re "Principal Points in Imperial Policy for Coping with Changing Situation" decided at conference held in Imperial presence. (In 2 parts) ✓

2593 C Item 2. 14 July; No. 255 re information from military officials to attaches in CANTON pertaining to plans for invading French Indo-China and crushing Anglo-American assistance in southern areas. ✓ 2

D-2 Item 3. 31 July; No. 433; 4 parts; re Imperial Govt policy and views especially concerning Germany and Russia. ✓ 9

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D-3 Item 4. 27 Sep; No. 865; 10 parts; Washington to Tokyo reporting progress of Jap-American negotiations and U.S. maintenance of her proposals of 21 June. ✓ 36

D-4 Item 5. 8 Oct; No. 907; parts 1 and 4 of four; Washington (NOMURA) to Tokyo re NOMURA's views of progress of Jap-American negotiations. 58

D-5 Item 6. 16 Oct; No. 671; TOKYO (TOYODA) to Washington re German demand that Jap Govt give U.S. notification of existence of belligerent situation if U.S. continues to attack Axis powers increasingly. 71

D-6 Item 7. 18 Oct; listed as "CA"; NOMURA to TOKYO re NOMURA's desire to return to Japan to report progress of Jap-American negotiations. 75

D-7 Item 8. 4 Nov; No. 725; 3 parts; TOKYO to Washington re counter-proposal for resumption of Jap-American negotiation. 92

D-8 Item 9. 4 Nov; No. 726; 4 parts; TOKYO to Washington re Proposal "A", the revised ultimatum to U.S. to meet as far as possible, American wishes based upon proposals of 25 Sep. 94

D-9 Item 10. 5 Nov; No. 735; TOKYO to Washington re submission of Proposal "A" and announcement that if this is declined, Proposal "B" will be submitted as final proposal. 95

D-10 Item 11. 5 Nov; No. 736; TOKYO to Washington setting 25 Nov as deadline for completing Jap-American negotiations. 100

D-11 Item 12. 11 Nov; No. 764; 3 parts; TOKYO to Washington re Jap-American negotiations and their relationship to Great Britain. 117

D-12 Item 13. 14 Nov; Circular 2319; TOKYO to HONGKONG re Japan's foreign policy as pertaining to CHINA if Jap-American negotiations fail. 126

D-13 Item 14. 14 Nov; No. 1090; NOMURA to TOKYO reporting that American policy in Pacific is to stop any further Japanese moves northward or southward. 127

D-14 Item 15. 16 Nov; Army 24878; TOKYO to Washington urging that NOMURA do his best to bring about immediate solution to Jap-American negotiations. 137

- 12-15 Item 16. 19 Nov; No. 1136; Washington to TOKYO, re three ways Empire might take re policy with U.S. 158
- 12-16 Item 17. No. 812; 22 Nov; TOKYO to Washington stating that deadline for completion of negotiations will be extended to 29 Nov. 165
- 12-17 Item 18. 22 Nov; No. 815; TOKYO to Washington stating that Anti-Comintern agreement will be extended 5 years. 166
- 12-18 Item 19. 25 Nov; No. 118; HANOI to TOKYO re Japanese advance into THAILAND if Jap-American negotiations fail. 174
- 12-19 Item 20. 26 Nov; No. 1180; NOMURA and KURUSU to TOKYO re proposal for exchange of wires between U.S. and Japan hoping for cooperation in Pacific. 180
- 12-20 Item 21. 26 Nov; No. 1190; NOMURA to TOKYO re discouraging aspect of Jap-American negotiations. 182
- 2593A Item 22. 29 Nov; No. 1393; BERLIN to TOKYO re meeting between Jap Ambassador and VON RIBBENTROP. 200
- 12-21 Item 23. 30 Nov; No. 985; TOKYO to BERLIN requesting that HITLER and VON RIBBENTROP be given a summary of Jap-American negotiations. 204
- 12-22 Item 24. 30 Nov; No. 986; TOKYO to BERLIN re Jap-America negotiations and stating that U.S. has decided to regard Japan along with Germany and Italy, as an enemy. 205
- 12-23 Item 25. 30 Nov; Telephone from Washington (KURUSU) to TOKYO (YAMAMOTO) re plans to see HULL and notification of ROOSEVELT's return to Washington. 206
- 12-24 Item 26. 30 Nov; No. 1222; NOMURA to TOKYO re publication in America of TOJO's speech of 30 Nov. 207
- 12-25 Item 27. 30 Nov; No. 866; TOKYO to Washington relating that TOJO made no speech on 30 Nov and that it actually was composed by Business Office of Asia Development League (KOA DOMEI) against whom measures will be taken.]
- 12-26 Item 28. 1 Dec; No. 865; TOKYO to Washington stating "to prevent U.S. from becoming unduly suspicious we have been 208

advising the press and others that though there are some wide differences, the negotiations are continuing".

10-27 Item 29. 1 Dec; No. 1226; Washington to TOKYO re belief of many in America that Japanese Govt will resort to strong measures.

10-28 Item 30. 1 Dec; No. 1227; Washington to TOKYO stating belief that U.S. wishes to continue negotiations.

10-29 Item 31. 1 Dec; No. 1230; Washington to TOKYO stating causes why American sentiment has been aroused against Japan and listing TOJO's speech as one of the causes.

10-30 Item 32. 2 Dec, Cir. 2445; TOKYO to HAVANA re immediate measures to be taken (burning of telegraph codes.)

10-31 Item 33. 2 Dec; No. 1232; NOMURA to TOKYO re events of interview with WELLES and expressing opinion U.S. is desirous of reaching a solution through negotiation.

10-32 Item 34. 2 Dec; No. 512; CANTON to TOKYO stating that preparations are ready if hostilities begin.

2593 B Item 35. 3 Dec; No. 985; ROME to TOKYO re meeting with MUSSOLINI and CIANO re development of Jap-U.S. negotiations.

10-33 Item 36. 3 Dec; No. 873; TOKYO to Washington re to ominous tone of U.S. newspaper and radio comments.

10-34 Item 37. 3 Dec; No. 1256; NOMURA to TOKYO re TOKYO to send a reply giving clearer impression of Japan's peaceful intentions.

10-35 Item 38. 4 Dec; No. 909; TOKYO to HANKING re steps MANCHUKUO will take if hostilities begin.

10-36 Item 39. 6 Dec; No. 899; TOJO to Washington stating that U.S. has "occupied" NETHERLANDS GUIANA and will no longer hesitate to use arms.

10-37 Item 40. 6 Dec; No. 1003; TOKYO to BERLIN stating Japan would like to avoid bringing about any situation likely to result in an armed clash with Soviet Russia "until strategic circumstances permit it".

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D-38 Item 41. 7 Dec; Cir. 2499; Parts 1 and 3 of three; ✓
re steps to be taken in China if international crisis
develops.

D-39 Item 42. 7 Dec; No. 907; TOKYO to Washington re ✓
Japanese reply to U.S. be submitted at 1:00 P.M., 7 Dec;
Washington time.

D-40 Item 43. 8 Dec 41; No. 1437; BERLIN to TOKYO stating ✓
that Jap Ambassador had called on RIBBENTROP at 1:00 P.M.,
8 Dec. requesting Germany and Italy to issue formal declara-
tion of war on America at once.

(A.N. Originals of most of the above may also be found in
IPS Doc. No. 906.)

9/25
D-41 Item 44 - Del. from Bangkok to
Tokyo, dated 25 Nov 41

#849 (in 2 parts, complete)

Analyst: 2d Lt Blumhagen

Doc. No. 2593
Page 5

(Item No. 23)

SECRET

From: Tokyo
To: Berlin
November 30, 1941.
Purple. (CA)

#985. (Part 1 of 3)^a

802
EXHIBIT NO. _____

Re my Circular #2387.^b

1. The conversation begun between Tokyo and Washington last April during the administration of the former cabinet, in spite of the sincere efforts of the Imperial Government, now stand ruptured -- broken. (I am sending you an outline of developments in separate message #986^c.) In the face of this, our Empire faces a grave situation and must act with determination. Will Your Honor, therefore, immediately interview Chancellor HITLER and Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP and confidentially communicate to them a summary of the developments. Say to them that lately England and the United States have taken a provocative attitude, both of them. Say that they are planning to move military forces into various places in East Asia and that we will inevitably have to counter by also moving troops. Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms and add that the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams.

a - Part 2 not available. For Part 3 see S.I.S. #25553.

b - Not available.

c - See S.I.S. #25554 and 25555

SECRET

25552

JD 6943

Trans. 12-1-41 (NR)

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361

(Item No. 23)

SECRET

From: Tokyo
To: Berlin
November 30, 1941.
Purple. (CA)

#985. (Part 3 of 3)

4. If, when you tell them this, the Germans and Italians question you about our attitude toward the Soviet, say that we have already clarified our attitude toward the Russians in our statement of last July. Say that by our present moves southward we do not mean to relax our pressure against the Soviet and that if Russia joins hands tighter with England and the United States and resists us with hostilities, we are ready to turn upon her with all our might; however, right now, it is to our advantage to stress the south and for the time being we would prefer to refrain from any direct moves in the north.

5. This message is important from a strategic point of view and must under all circumstances be held in the most absolute secrecy. This goes without saying. Therefore, will you please impress upon the Germans and Italians how important secrecy is.

6. As for Italy, after our Ambassador in Berlin has communicated this to the Germans, he will transmit a suitable translation to Premier MUSSOLINI and Foreign Minister CIANO. As soon as a date is set for a conference with the Germans and Italians, please let me know.

Will you please send this message also to Rome, together with the separate message.

25553

Trans. 12-1-41 (NR)

A TRUE COPY:

/s/ William J. Welsh, Jr.
William J. Welsh, Jr.
Captain, Inf.

SECRET

Doc. No. 2593 (Certificate)

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
WASHINGTON, 25, D.C.

24 July 1946

I hereby certify that the attached photostats of Japanese messages have been intercepted by electric or physical means, decrypted, and translated by trained personnel of the War and Navy Departments, and are accurate and authentic to the best of my knowledge and belief insofar as it is humanly possible for an occidental accurately to translate Japanese script.

/s/ Carter W. Clarke

CARTER W. CLARKE
Colonel, G.S.C.

Item 24

From: Tokyo
To: Berlin
November 30, 1941
Purple

#986 (Strictly Secret) (To be handled in Government Code) (Part 1 of 2)
(Secret outside the Department)

1. Japan-American negotiations were commenced the middle of April of this year. Over a period of half a year they have been continued. Within that period the Imperial Government adamantly stuck to the Tri-Partite Alliance as the cornerstone of its national policy regardless of the vicissitudes of the international situation. In the adjustment of diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States, she has based her hopes for a solution definitely within the scope of that alliance. With the intent of restraining the United States from participating in the war, she boldly assumed the attitude of carrying through these negotiations.

2. Therefore, the present cabinet, in line with your message, with the view of defending the Empire's existence and integrity on a just and equitable basis, has continued the negotiations carried on in the past. However, their views and ours on the question of the evacuation of troops, upon which the negotiations rested, (they demanded the evacuation of Imperial troops from China and French Indo-China), were completely in opposition to each other.

Judging from the course of the negotiations that have been going on, we first came to loggerheads when the United States, in keeping with its traditional ideological tendency of managing international relations, re-emphasized her fundamental reliance upon this traditional policy in the conversations carried on between the United States and England in the Atlantic Ocean. The motive of the United States in all this was brought out by her desire to prevent the establishment of a new order by Japan, Germany, and Italy in Europe and in the Far East, that is to say, the aims of the Tri-Partite Alliance. As long as the Empire of Japan was in alliance with Germany and Italy, there could be no maintenance of friendly relations between Japan and the United States was the stand they took. From this point of view, they began to demonstrate a tendency to demand the divorce of the Imperial Government from the Tri-Partite Alliance. This was brought out at the last meeting. That is to say that it has only been in the negotiations of the last few days that it has become gradually more and more clear that the Imperial Government could no longer continue negotiations with the United States. It became clear, too, that a continuation of negotiations would inevitably be detrimental to our cause.

ARMY

6944

2554

SECRET

Trans. 12/1/41 (NR)

TOP SECRET

-10

Doc. No. 2593D (22)

Page 2

Item 24

From: Tokyo
To: Berlin
November 30, 1941.
Purple.

#986. (Part 2 of 2)

3. The proposal presented by the United States on the 26th made this attitude of theirs clearer than ever. In it there is one insulting clause which says that no matter what treaty either party enters into with a third power it will not be interpreted as having any bearing upon the basic object of this treaty, namely the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. This means specifically the Three-Power Pact. It means that in case the United States enters the European war at any time the Japanese Empire will not be allowed to give assistance to Germany and Italy. It is clearly a trick. This clause alone, let alone others, makes it impossible to find any basis in the American proposal for negotiations. What is more, before the United States brought forth this plan, they conferred with England, Australia, the Netherlands, and China -- they do so repeatedly. Therefore, it is clear that the United States is now in collusion with those nations and has decided to regard Japan, along with Germany and Italy, as an enemy.

ARMY

6944

25555

SECRET

Trans. 12-1-41 (NR)

-2-

TOP SECRET

Doc. No. 2593B

EXHIBIT NO. 606
S E C R E T

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

24 July 1946

I hereby certify that the attached photostats of Japanese messages have been intercepted by electric or physical means, decrypted, and translated by trained personnel of the War and Navy Departments, and are accurate and authentic to the best of my knowledge and belief insofar as it is humanly possible for an occidental accurately to translate Japanese script.

/s/ Carter W. Clarke
CARTER W. CLARKE
Colonel, G.S.C.

S E C R E T

(Item No. 40)

SECRET

From: Tokyo
 To: Berlin
 December 6, 1941
 Purple (CA) (Urgent)

#1003

RETURN TO ROOM 361
 COPY FILE

Re 2 of your #1418^a.

1. From the standpoint given in 4 of my #985^b, we would like to avoid bringing about any situation likely to result in an armed clash with Soviet Russia until strategic circumstances permit it; and so get the German Government to understand this position of ours and negotiate with them so that at least for the present they would not insist upon exchanging diplomatic notes on this question.

In doing this, explain to them at considerable length that insofar as American materials being shipped to Soviet Russia through any point lying within the scope of our intelligence are concerned, they are neither of high quality nor of large quantity, and that in case we start our war with the United States we will capture all American ships destined for Soviet Russia. Please endeavor to come to an understanding on this line.

2. However, should Foreign Minister RIEBENTROP insist upon our giving a guarantee in this matter, since in that case we shall have no other recourse, make a statement to the effect that we would, as a matter of principle, prevent war materials from being shipped from the United States to Soviet Russia via the Japanese waters and get them to agree to a procedure permitting the addition of a statement to the effect that so long as strategic reasons continue to make it necessary for us to keep Soviet Russia from fighting Japan (what I mean is that we cannot capture Soviet ships), we cannot carry this out thoroughly.

3. In case the German Government refuses to agree with 1 and 2 and makes their approval of this question absolutely conditional upon our participation in the war and upon our concluding a treaty against making a separate peace, we have no way but to postpone the conclusion of such a treaty. This point is intended for you to bear in mind.

25925

ARLY

SECRET

(Item No. 40)

SECRET

4. Concerning our participation in the war and the question of our promising not to conclude a separate peace, I shall wire you later.

a - Not available.

b - Parts 1 and 3, S.I.S. Nos. 25552, 3. Part 2 not available. Tokyo informs Berlin that there is extreme danger of war suddenly breaking out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan and that if Russia joins hands with England and the United States against her, Japan will turn upon her with all her might.

25925

ARLY

Trans. 12/9/41 (NR)

SECRET

Doc. No. 2593 (Certificate)

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
WASHINGTON, 25, D.C.

24 July 1946

I hereby certify that the attached photostats of Japanese messages have been intercepted by electric or physical means, decrypted, and translated by trained personnel of the War and Navy Departments, and are accurate and authentic to the best of my knowledge and belief insofar as it is humanly possible for an occidental accurately to translate Japanese script.

/s/ Carter W. Clarke

CARTER W. CLARKE
Colonel, G.S.C.

Ex 641

25930-1

機密

發 廣東
宛 東京

一九四一年／昭和十六年／七月十四日

紫

第二五五號

部内機密

余ノ第二五三號Aニ關シ

一、今次ノ總帥員令ハ日本ノ自然的發展ヲ妨ゲン
 スル英米ノ援助ニ對シ「終止符ヲウタント」ル
 日本ノ不撤退ノ決意及出來得レバ極力ノ支援
 ノ下ニ、但シ必要ノ場合ハ協力ヲ以テ之ヲ遂行
 セントスル不偏不屈ノ意思ヲ表明シタルモノナ
 リ。出征軍ニ對シ正氣及復讐ニ對スル決別ノ
 挨拶ノ如キ形式的ナルコトハ嚴止セラレタリ。
 何トナレバ吾々ハ日本國民ノ感情ヲ甚ク刺戟
 スルヲ欲セズ且冷害ナル態度ヲ以ツテ此戰爭ニ
 臨マント欲スルガ故ナリ。

二、吾ガ領印度支那占領ノ當面ノ目的ハ右地域ニ

於テ吾ガ目的ヲ達成セントスルニアリ。更ラニ其目的トスル所ハ國際狀勢ノ適當ナル時期ヲ見テ同地ヨリ奇襲ヲ敢行スルコトナリ。如何ナル困難ヲ伴フトモ我等ハコノ舉ヲ決行スベシ。

吾々ハ最後迄佛領印度支那ヲ平和的ニ占領スルタメニ努力セン、シカシ萬一抵抗ガ試ミラレタル場合ニハ吾等ハ武力ヲ以テ之ヲ粉碎シ、之ヲ占領シ且戒嚴令ヲ施行スベシ。

佛領印度支那占領後吾々ノ次ノ予定ハ蘭領印度ニ對シ最後通牒ヲ發スルコトナリ。シンガポール / SHINGAPORE / ノ攻略ニハ海軍ガ主役ヲ演ズルナラン。

陸軍ニツイテハシンガポール / SINGAPORE / 攻略ニハ一箇師團、蘭領印度攻略ニハ二箇師團ノミテ事足ルベシ。

要スルニ、吾ガ航空兵力（貴市、スブラットリ / SPRATLEY / 諸島バララ / PARAO / 泰領 / THAI / ESE / シンハラ / SINGORA / 葡領チモール / PORTUG / DESE TIMOR / 並ニ佛領印度支那方面）並ニ吾ガ潜水艦隊（南洋委任群島、海南島並ニ佛領印度支那方面）~~日於ケル~~ノ活動ニ依リ吾々ハ英米ノ軍事力及ビ凡ユル反日的計畫ヲ支援セントスル

2593C-3

彼等ノ能力ヲ徹底的ニ粉碎セン

三、近ク係領印度支那ヲ占領セントスル部隊ハ第二十五軍團（一軍團ハ四ヶ師團ヨリ成ル）ト南支那部隊ヨリ成リ飛行機、戰車、曲射砲ヲ以ツテ特殊任務ヲ課セラルベキ第三十軍團トシテ再編成セラルベシ。飯田將軍（先ノ通報ニ於テ述ベタル飯田部隊ハ西村分遣隊ニ變更セラレタリ）ハ司令官ノ職ニ就クベシ。又軍總司令部ハ西貢ニ設置サルベシ。アラユル準備ハ完了セリ。備船料ハ支拂濟ニシテ本遠征ハ間モナク當地ヨリ發進セラルベシ。

J/US

併領印度支那ノ陸

N E I

A I 利用不可能

陸軍一九七三一紀

詳 七一一九一四一（五）

590 cert-1

證 明 書
「ワシントン」文書局 第 號
國 際 檢 察 部 第五九〇號

真據及び公正ニ關スル證明

余、タカハシ・ミチトシハ余ガ下記ノ資格ニ於テ、
即チ内閣書記官トシテ、日本政府ト公的關係ニ在ル
モノナルコト、竝ニ該官吏トシテ余ガ茲ニ添附セラ
レタル 頁ヨリ成ル、千九百四十五年ノ昭和二十
年ノ一月二十二日附、下記題名即チ官報ノ文書ノ保
管ニ任ジ居ルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス
余ハ頁ニ添附ノ記録及ビ文書ガ日本政府ノ公文書ナ
ルコト竝ニ右ガ下記名稱ノ省又ハ部局ノ公式書類及
ビ證ノ一部ナルコトヲ證明ス（若シアラバ證番號又
ハ引用、其ノ他公式書類又ハ證ニ於ケル該文書ノ成
規所在ノ公式名稱ヲモ特記スベシ）内閣官房

590 part-2

千九百四十六年 / 昭和二十一年 / 九月十七日

東京ニ於テ署名

菅野官吏署名欄 M・タカハシ(署名)

右ノ者ノ公的資格 内閣書記官(捺印)

證人 R・クリヤマ(署名)

公式入手ニ關スル證明

余、リチャード・H・ラーシハ余ガ聯合國最高指揮官總司令部ニ在リタルモナルコト並ニ上記署名ノ文暨ハ余ガ公務上日本政府ノ上記署名官吏ヨリ入手シタルモノナルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス

千九百四十六年 / 昭和二十一年 / 九月十七日

東京ニ於テ署名

氏名 欄 RICHARD・H・HARSH(署名)

右ノ者ノ公的資格 國際警察部門長官

證人 W・P・A・PROFF(署名)

SECRET

From: Canton
 To: Tokyo
 July 14, 1941.
 Purple.
 #255

To be kept secret within the Department.

Re my #253^a.

Subsequent information from military officials to the Attaches is as follows:

1. The recent general mobilization order expressed the irrevocable resolution of Japan to put an end to Anglo-American assistance in thwarting her natural expansion and her indomitable intention to carry this out, if possible, with the backing of the Axis but, if necessary, alone. Formalities, such as dining the expeditionary forces and saying farewell to them, have been dispensed with. That is because we did not wish to arouse greatly the feelings of the Japanese populace and because we wished to face this new war with a calm and cool attitude.

2. The immediate object of our occupation of French Indo-China will be achieve our purposes there. Secondly, its purpose is, when the international situation is suitable, to launch therefrom a rapid attack. This venture we will carry out in spite of any difficulties which may arise. We will endeavor to the last to occupy French Indo-China peacefully but, if resistance is offered, we will crush it by force, occupy the country and set up martial law. After the occupation of French Indo-China, next on our schedule is the sending of an ultimatum to the Netherlands Indies. In the seizing of Singapore the Navy will play the principal part. As for the Army, in seizing Singapore it will need only one division and in seizing the Netherlands Indies, only two. In the main, through the activities of our air arm (in you city, the Sprately Islands, Parao, Thaisee Singapore, Portuguese Timor and French Indo-China) and our submarine fleet (in the South Seas mandate islands, Hainan Island, and French Indo-China) we will once and for all crush Anglo-American military power and their ability to assist in any schemes against us.

3. The troops soon to occupy French Indo-China will be reorganized as the 25th Army Corps (one Army Corps consists of four divisions) and also the 30th Army Corps, consisting of the South China forces, which will be assigned

to special duty with airplanes, tanks, and howitzers. General IIDA (the IIDA Army mentioned in preceding telegrams has been changed to the Nishimura detachment) will be placed in command and general military headquarters will be set up in Saigon. All preparations have been made. The ship fees have been paid and the expedition will soon proceed from here.

T/US French-Indo-China, Army NEI

a-Not available.

EXHIBIT NO. 606

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11/19/01 BY 60322 UCBAW/STP

ARMY

19731

SECRET

Trans. 7-19-41 (5)

[Faint, mostly illegible handwritten text in Chinese characters, possibly a translation of the typed text above.]

No 1 EXHIBIT NO. 606 Doc 2593B

羅馬ヨリ

東京宛

一九四一年/昭和十六年/十二月三日

Purple - CA

第九八五號

伯林宛貴電九八五號ニ関ス

本日午前一時余ハ安藤ヲ滞留シ「ロウソク」ニ

MUSSOLINI / 首相ヲ訪問セリ「ケアノ」/ CIANO 外相ニ

同席セリ。余ハ伯林宛貴電九八五號**

ノ内容ニ隨ヒ日米交渉ノ進捗ヲ述ベテリ

「MUSOLINI」/ 本ハ初日米會談ノ

進展ヲ注意シテ見テ居ルヲ以テ貴下ノ報告ヲ受テ

ルモ「ソ」ニ敬告ス。トナシ。實際合衆ニ甚シキ頑固ト

「ロ」ズ。大統領ノ干渉好キ性質ヨリスルハ此成

行ハ夢想ニ通リノモノナリト言フコトヲ得ベシ。合衆

ノ目的ハ一ハ經濟上ノ見地ヨリ極度ヲ自存ノモノト

ナサズスルニ在リ。當初ヨリ余ハ米玉ノ意圖が日本

ヲ尖ブ樞軸ヨリ分離シ然ル後「ヨーロッパ」ニ干渉セン

TOPODO 1941

Doc 2593B

トスルニ在ラバ日本ノ忠ニシテ眞摯ナル性質ノタメニ
米玉ハ失敗スル運命ニ在ルコトヲ感知セリ。

閣下及閣下先任者ノ知ル如ク余ハ日本カ東亞ニ
新秩序ヲ建設セシムル政策ニ衷心ヨリ賛成シ居
ルモノナリ。コレハ過去ニ於テ眞ニ美ニシテ現在ニ於テ
モ眞ニ美デアリ。將來ニ於テモ亦然リ。余ハ日本カ大
東亞地域ノ指導者トナルベキ凡ユル權利ヲ有スルコトヲ
確ク信スル者ナリ。

余ハ語ヲ継ギ冒頭ニ於テ参照セル貴電ノ内容ヲ
彼ニ語リタリ(右電報ノ第三項ニ関シ余カ伯林駐在
日本大使ト「リフントロップ」/ RIBBENTROP / トノ間ニ若干ノ取
極ガ進メラシ居リシ趣ノ通報ヲ受ケシコトヲ語レリ。)

予ニ次ニ関シテハ「ムツソリーニ」ハ「戦争勃発ノ際ハ
 伊太利ハ出来得ル限り凡ル軍事的援助ヲ爲
 スベシ。即チ英皇海軍ヲ地中海ニ牽制スルヤウ
 凡ル場カヲ爲スベシ」ト云ヘリ。

「ムツソリーニ」曰ク「最近地中海ニ在ル英軍ヲ更ニ
 抑壓スルタメニ伊独兩國省ノ協カヲ一層又深固
 ニシ。伊独空軍團ヲ編成セントイフ案カ協議
 サレツツアリ。ユノ提案ニ對スル交換ハ五日調印
 ヲ見ントスル程交マデ進捗シ居レリ。」

再ビカニ次ニ関シテ亦使ハ日本ガ米英兩國ニ對シ
 宣戰ヲ布告セル場合ニ伊太利モ同様ニ直チニ
 宣戰ヲ布告スルヤヲ積ネタリ。「ムツソリーニ」答ヘテ
 曰ク「勿論、三國同盟ノ條項ニ從ヒ伊太利ハ斯ク
 スル義務アリ。独逸モ續イテ斯ク義務アルヲ
 以テ、ユノ兵ニ関シテ独逸ト協議スベシ」
 カニ次ニ関シ、貴電九八七号ノ佛蘭西原大ノ案
 トシテ提示シ、彼ハソレヲ別々ニスルヲ欲スルヤ又ハ
 共同ニテ為スヲ欲スルヤヲ彼ニ積ネタリ。彼答ヘテ

曰ク「ソレハ独逸ト同時ニ行フモノナル限リハ余ニハ
大シク差ハナイト思ハレル。共同ニテ行フ場合ニハ
一層強キ印象ヲ与フベシ。彼ハ「マケンゼン」大使ト
協議スベシト言ヘリ。

「ムツソリー」ニハ蘇聯問題ヲ持出サザルヲ以テ、コノ
問題ハ全然持出サレズニ終リタリ。

「翻譯者ノ注意。コノ英マテハ電文ハ Purple-CA
ノ中ニ在リ。次ノ句ハ CA ノ中ニ送電サレテ居ラズ
又本文ノ中ニモナシ」

第五八三三號 JD-1
コノ電文ノ最初ノ部分ノ「N-NKEN WA」ヲ「KINKENSHA WA」
ト直サレタシ

(D) 海軍解讀、一九四一年/昭和十六年/十一月六日

Doc. 2593B.

機密

陸軍省

陸軍省參謀本部

情報局

一九四六年七月二十四日

予ハ茲ニ左ノ通り證明ス。即チ

添附敬通ノ

日本大電報、複寫寫真ハ陸海軍兩省、熟練セル職員ヨリ電氣的或ハ物理的方法ニ依ッテ傍受セシ、解讀サレ而シテ翻譯セラレモ、
ニシテ予、知リ且ツ信ズル限り正確ニ日本文字ヲ翻譯スル為メ西洋人ニ
トリ人カ、可能ナル限度ニ於テ正確且ツ典據ノアルモノナリ。

參謀本部附大佐

カーター・ダグニクローク

Carter W. Clarke.

G. S. C.

Doc. No. 2593 (Certificate)

Doc. No. 2593 (Certificate)

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
WASHINGTON, 25, D.C.

24 July 1946

I hereby certify that the attached photostats of Japanese messages have been intercepted by electric or physical means, decrypted, and translated by trained personnel of the War and Navy Departments, and are accurate and authentic to the best of my knowledge and belief insofar as it is humanly possible for an occidental accurately to translate Japanese script.

/s/ Carter W. Clarke

CARTER W. CLARKE
Colonel, G.S.C.

"From: Rome

"To: Tokyo

"3 December 1941
(Purple-CA)

"#985

"Re your message #985* to Berlin.

"On this day, at 11 o'clock in the morning, I accompanied by Ando, called on Premier Mussolini, (Foreign Minister Ciano was also present). I described the developments in the Japanese-U. S. negotiations in accordance with the contents of your message #986** to Berlin.

"Mussolini: 'I have been carefully watching the progress of the Japanese-U. S. talks from the very beginning and therefore am not at all surprised to receive your report. As a matter of fact, in view of the utter bull-headedness of the United States and the meddlesome nature of President Roosevelt, I should say that the outcome was nothing but what should have been expected. One of the aims of the United States is to make the Far East her own, from an economic standpoint. I have felt from the beginning that if it was the intention of the United States to separate Japan from the Axis first and then intervene in Europe, the United States was doomed to fail because of Japan's loyal and sincere nature.'

"'As Your Excellency and Your Excellency's predecessor know, I wholeheartedly endorse Japan's policy of creating a New Order in East Asia. This has been true in the past, is true now and will be so in the future. I am one who is firmly convinced that Japan has every right to be the leader of the Great East Asia area.'

"I continued by relating to him the contents of your message referred to in the heading, (with regard to paragraph 3 of that message, I said that I had been advised that some arrangements were being made between our Ambassador in Berlin and Ribbentrop.)

"With regard to paragraph 2, Mussolini said that should war break out, Italy would give every military aid she had at her disposal, i.e., that she would make every effort to keep the British navy checked in the Mediterranean.

"Mussolini: 'Recently, the formation of an Italian-German air force bloc was discussed so as to afford closer cooperation between the two to apply further pressure on the British in the Mediterranean. The negotiations on this proposal have progressed to a point where it may be signed any day now.'

"Regarding paragraph 2 again, should Japan declare war on the United States and Great Britain, I asked, would Italy do likewise immediately? Mussolini replied: 'Of course. She is obligated to do so under the terms of the Tripartite Pact. Since Germany would also be obligated to follow suit, we would like to confer with Germany on this point.'

"With reference to paragraph 3, I submitted the French text of your message #987***, as one proposal, and asked him whether he preferred it to be separately or jointly. He replied that as long as it was done simultaneously with Germany it did not make much difference to him, but if it were done jointly he thought it would give the impression of more strength. He said he would confer with Ambassador MAKKENZEN.

"Mussolini failed to bring up the subject of Soviet Russia, so the matter was not brought up at all.

(Translator's note: Up to this point, message was in Purple-CA. The following paragraph was not encoded in the CA. Cannot find phrase referred to, in the text)

"In the first part of this message, please correct 'N-NKEN WA' to 'KINKENSHA WA.'

25833

JD-1:

(D) Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (W-T)

*JD-1: 6943 (S. I. S. #25552-53).

**JD-1: 6944 (S.I.S. #25554-55).

***Not available.

4603 ~~5~~

(Item 17)

TOP SECRET

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 22, 1941
Purple CA (Urgent)

#812

To both you Ambassadors.

It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my #736,^a as you know. However, I know you are working hard. The Imperial Government is maintaining its fixed policy and doing its very best, sparing no efforts to try to bring about the solution we desire. We desire by all means to prevent a breakdown^b in Japanese-American relations, but if within the next three or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; if the signing can be completed by the 29th;^c if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and the Netherlands through the exchange of notes and so forth; and in short if everything can be finished, despite difficulties unbelievably great, we (will?) make arrangements to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen. Please take this into your careful consideration and work as hard as you have in the past. This is for the information of you two Ambassadors alone.

a - See S.I.S. #24373. Tokyo wires Washington that because of the various circumstances it is absolutely necessary that arrangements for the signing of the agreement be completed by the 25th of this month.

b - HAKYOKU. c - Date repeated in code text for emphasis.

ARMY 25138

JD 6710

Trans. 11/22/41 (S)

TOP SECRET

Doc. No. 2593 (Certificate)

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
WASHINGTON, 25, D.C.

24 July 1946

I hereby certify that the attached photostats of Japanese messages have been intercepted by electric or physical means, decrypted, and translated by trained personnel of the War and Navy Departments, and are accurate and authentic to the best of my knowledge and belief insofar as it is humanly possible for an occidental accurately to translate Japanese script.

/s/ Carter W. Clarke

CARTER W. CLARKE
Colonel, G.S.C.

Ex 100

Doc. No. 2593D-2

Page 1

(Item No. 3)

SECRET

From: Tokyo (Foreign Minister)
To: Washington
July 31, 1941
Purple (CA)

#432 (Part 1 of 4) (Message to Berlin #708)

From time to time you have been sending us your various opinions about what we ought to do to help Germany who desires our assistance now that she is at war with Russia. After a conference with the military, at the risk of a certain amount of repetition which may cause you some ennui, I am wiring you the Imperial Government's policy and views. Hereafter, will you please act accordingly.

1. In a cabinet meeting during the forenoon of July 2, the broad outlines of our decision concerning our future policy were drawn. You were informed of it by Circular #1300. Ever since then the Government has been and is devoting every effort to bring about the materialization of that policy.

2. The China incident has already extended over a period of four years, and the Imperial Government's general trend, particularly its military trend, has hitherto been to expend the greater part of its energies in an endeavor to bring a conclusion to the incident, and now a new situation faces us from the north and from the south. In order to meet it, there is more reason than ever before for us to arm ourselves to the teeth for all-out war.

a - Not available.

NOTE: The system used in this message is considered to be of the highest type of secret classification used by the Japanese Foreign Office. It used the CA code transposed according to J-19 keys and the resulting transposed code was then enciphered in the purple machine. This is the first solution of such a system that has been effected.

ARMY

SECRET

Trans. 8/4/41 (NR)

FILE COPY

(Item No. 3)

SECRET

From: Tokyo (Foreign Minister)
To: Washington
July 31, 1941
Purple (CA)

#433 (Part 2 of 4) (Message to Berlin #708)

It seems that Germany also understands this position of ours fairly well. The German Embassy people here in Tokyo are already quite aware of it. And yet I fear that their homeland is not yet as well informed as they are on our position.

3. Commercial and economic relations between Japan and third countries, led by England and the United States are gradually becoming so horribly strained that we cannot endure it much longer. Consequently, our Empire, to save its very life, must take measures to secure the raw materials of the South Seas. Our Empire must immediately take steps to break asunder this ever-strengthening chain of encirclement which is being woven under the guidance and with the participation of England and the United States, acting like a cunning dragon seemingly asleep. That is why we decided to obtain military bases in French Indo-China and to have our troops occupy that territory.

That step in itself, I dare say, gave England and the United States, not to mention Russia, quite a set-back in the Pacific that ought to help Germany, and now Japanese-American relations are more rapidly than ever treading the evil road. This shows what a blow it has been to the United States.

Needless to say, the Russo-German war has given us an excellent opportunity to settle the northern question, and it is a fact that we are proceeding with our preparations to take advantage of this occasion. Not only will we have to prepare, however, but we must choose well our chance. In view of the real situation facing our Empire, this should be easily understood. If the Russo-German war proceeds too swiftly, our Empire would inevitably not have time to take any effective symmetrical action.

5. I know that the Germans are somewhat dissatisfied over our negotiations with the United States, but we wished at any cost to prevent the United States from getting into

(Item No. 3)

From: Tokyo (Foreign Minister)

To: Washington

July 31, 1941

Purple (CA)

#433 (Part 3 of 4) (Message to Berlin #708)

the war, and we wished to settle the Chinese incident. We were working toward those objectives. Let him who will gainsay the fact that as a result we have indelibly impressed upon the United States the profoundness of the determination of the Empire of Japan and restrained her from plunging into the conflict against Germany.

It should be understood that we started these talks at a time which seemed opportune to us, and on the assumption that there was complete trust between Japan and Germany. For that matter, did not Germany start a war with Russia because of her own military expediency when it was least desirable on our part? Now we have not only to settle the Chinese incident but have to meet a new challenge in the north as well as in the south, and this is quite inconvenient.

We are expending our best efforts to cooperate with Germany. She knows it and ought to understand our actions.

6. Well, the formula for cooperation between Tokyo and Berlin, in order to realize the fundamental spirit of the Tripartite Pact, should be for each country to have a certain flexibility in its conduct. What I mean to say is that each should understand that real cooperation does not necessarily mean complete symmetry of action. In other words, we should trust each other and while striving toward one general objective, each use our own discretion within the bounds of good judgment.

Thus, all measures which our Empire shall take will be based upon a determination to bring about the success of the objectives of the Tripartite Pact. That this is a fact is proven by the promulgation of an Imperial rescript. We are ever working toward the realization of those objectives, and now during this dire emergency is certainly no time to engage in any light unpremeditated or over-speedy action.

Please send to Rome. Have sent to Washington.

Doc. No. 2593 (Certificate)

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
WASHINGTON, 25, D.C.

24 July 1946

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/s/ Carter W. Clarke

CARTER W. CLARKE
Colonel, G.S.C.

FILE COPY
TO ROOM 351

秘

東京電 (外務大臣)

ワシントン宛

一九四一年/昭和十六年/七月三十一日

案 (O A)

第三三三號 (四ノ一)

(ベルリン宛發信第七〇八)

目下「ロシヤ」ト交戦シ居ル爲我方ノ援助ヲ希求セ
ル獨國ニ對シ我方ノトル可キ處置ニ付時折リ貴下ヨ
リ種々ナル意見ヲ申述シ來レリ。
幾度ノ反覆ヲ重ネ、爲メニ或ル程度ノ倦怠ヲ貴下ニ
與ヘル恐レアルモ軍部ト會議セル結果帝國政府ノ政
策及見解ヲ茲ニ披瀝スベシ、依ツテ今後共之レニヨ
リ行動サレ度シ

一七月二日午前ノ内閣々議ニ於テ我ニ今後ノ政策ニ
關スル決定ノ大略ガ採擇サレリ。

既ニ四號第一三九〇號ニテ通牒済ミナルモノソレ以
來政府ハ該政策實現ニアラユル努力ヲ拂ヒ今尙拂
ヒツ、アル。

ニ支那事變ハ既ニ四ヶ年ノ長期ニ亘リ、帝國政府ノ
一貫的傾向、特ニ軍部ノ傾向ハ是迄其ノ精力ノ大

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361

Ex 808

2593-D-2 - 1
(Item No. 3)

2593-D-2 -2
(Item. No. 3)

註

部分ヲ今專使ノ終結ニ委シ、且ツ努力サレリ、今
ヤ我々ハ南北ヨリノ新專使ニ直函セリ。之ニ對處
センガ爲メ總力戰ニ對スル我國ノ完全武装ハ重且
大ナル理由ガアル。

a 二〇七〇 入手不可能

コノ電報ニ用ヒラレタ組立法ハ日本外務省ニヨツ
テ用ヒラレテキル秘密組立法中ノ最高ノモノト思
ハレル、ソレハJ I 19ノ鍵ニヨツテO A符號ヲ
置キ換ヘソノ結果置キ換ヘラレタ符號ヲ次ニ紫色
機軸デ暗號ニ組立テタモノデアアル。
コノ様ナ組立法ガ効果的ニ解讀サレタノハコレガ
最初デアアル。

2593-D-2-3
(Item No. 3)

東京發（外務大臣）

ワシントン宛

一九四一年／昭和十六年／七月三十一日

崇（O A）

第四三三號（四ノ二）

（ベルリン宛密信第七〇八）

獨乙モ亦我方ノ此ノ立場ヲ充分了解シラル様ナリ
東京駐在獨乙大使館々員ハ此ノ事ヲ熟知セルモ
獨乙本國ハ彼等程我國ノ立場ヲ知悉シ居ラザルモノ
ト思フ

日本ト第三國トノ商業的經濟的關係ハ英米兩國ノ
主導ニ依リ漸次非難ナル急迫ヲ告ゲ我方トシテモ
モハヤ是以上我慢シ難ズ從ツテ帝國ハ自己生存ノ
爲南方ノ原料ヲ獲得スル處置ヲ採ル必要アリ、
我帝國ハ一見屈レルカノ如ク見セカケテキル様
ナル飛出ノ如ク行動セル米英ノ強導ト關係ニヨツ
テ續リナサレル處ノ關係ナク強化サレツ、アル包
圍ノ域ヲ切斷スベキ手段ヲ直チニ採用セザルベカ

2593-D-2-4
(Item No. 3)

ラズ。我方が領印度支那ニ領事差地ヲ獲得シ其
ノ領土ニ我軍ヲ進駐セシメタルハ此レガ故ナリ
敢テ申ス、此ノ處徑自ニガ。露國ハ云フニ及バズ
米英ヲシテ太平洋ニ於ケル退行ヲ余儀ナクセシメ
却ツテ獨乙ニ役立ツベキナリ、今ヤ日米關係ハ加
速度的ニ益々緊迫ヲ進リツ、アル。此レハ米國ニ
對シ如何ニ打撃ナルヤヲ示ス

2593-D-2-5
(Item No. 3)

秘

東京（外務大臣）後

ワシントン宛

一九四一年／昭和十六年／七月三十一日

崇（C.A.）

第四三三號

（四ノ第三部）

（ベルリン宛發信第七〇八

號）

勿論獨露戰爭ハ吾等ニ北方問題解決ノ絶好ノ
 機會ヲ與ヘタ。コノ事件ヲ利用スベク準備シ進メ
 テ居ルコトハ事實デアアル。併シ準備ノ必要アルノ
 ミナラズ、吾人ハワマク機會ヲ選バホナラヌ。
 我が帝國ノ直面セル現實ノ事態ニ鑑ミ、コレハ容
 易ニ理解セラルベシ、若シ獨露戰爭ガ余リニ迅速
 ニ進行スルナラバ、我帝國ハ必然的ニ、何等ノ有
 效ナル一致ノ行動ヲ取ル余裕ヲ有シナイデアラウ。
 5 本官ハ獨逸人ハ我國ニ交渉ニ臨カ不消ナルコ
 トヲ知レルモ、我等ハ是非英米國ヲ警戒セシメヌ
 豫希望シ、且支那事變ヲ解決センコトヲ希望シタ。
 コノ目標ニ向ヒ吾人ハ活動シテ居タ。其ノ結果吾
 等ハ日本帝國ノ決意ハ深刻ナリトノ消エ難キ印象
 ヲ與ヘ、米國ヲシテ獨逸國ニ突入ヲ抑止セル事

2593-D-2-6

(Item No. 3)

實ニ反動セントスル人ハ反動シテモ帶ハナイ。
吾等ニハ激熱セリト思ハレタル時ニ、且ツ日獨
同ニ完全ナル信頼アリトノ推定ノ下ニコノ會談ヲ
開始セルコトハ理解セラルベキデアル。コノ事ニ
關シテハ、當方ニハ最モ望マシカラヌ時ニ獨逸ハ
自身ノ軍事的都合カラ露國亞ト開戦シタノデハナ
イカ。今ヤ吾等ハ反動事變ヲ解決セ不バナラヌノ
ミナラズ、南方亞ビニ北方ノ新ラシキ戦線ニ道ハ
不バナラナイガ、コレハ全く不便ナルコトデアル。

2593-D-2-7
(Item No. 3)

秘

東京（外務大臣）發

ワシントン宛

一九四一年／昭和十六年／七月三十一日

紫（C.A.）

第四三三號（四ノ第四部）（ベルリン宛發信第七〇八號）

吾人ハ獨逸ト協力スベク最善ノ努力ヲ拂ヒツツアリ。獨逸ハコレヲ知り、吾人ノ行動ヲ理解スベキデアロ。

6、茲テ三國條約ノ根本精神實現ノタメ、東京ベルリン間ノ協力ノ形式ハ各國ソノ行動ニ於テ或程度ノ柔軟性ヲ有スベキデアロ。本官ノ言ハントスルトコロハ、眞ノ協力ハ必ズシモ行動ノ完全ナル一致ヲ意シナイコトヲ銘々諒解スベキダト云フコトデアロ。換言スルニ、吾人ハ相互ニ信頼スベキデアリ、一個ノ全体ノ目的ニ向ヒテ努力シ、モ、ヨキ判斷ノ範圍内テハ自己ノ自由裁量ヲ用フベキデアロ。

斯クノ如ク我帝國ノ採ル一切ノ方策ハ三國條約ノ目的ノ成功ヲ招來スベキ決意ニ基クベキデアロ。コレガ事實デアルト云フコトハ勅諭ノ發布ニヨリテモ證明セラレル。吾人ハ此ノ目的實現ノタメニ

2593-D-2-8
(Item No. 3)

活動シテ居ル。今ヤ現下ノ恐ルベキ緊急時ニ際シテ
ハ確カニ如何ナル輕卒、不用意或ハ早急ナル行動ニ
從事シテ居ルノ余裕ハナイノデアル。

ローマへ送信セラレタシ。

ワシントンへ送信セリ。

Doc. 2593 cert.

機密 陸軍省

陸軍省參謀本部

情報局

一九四六年七月二十四日

予ハ茲ニ左ノ通り證明ス。即チ、
添附數通ノ日本文電報ノ複寫寫眞ハ陸海軍兩省ノ熟
練セル職員ニ依リ電氣的或ハ物理的方法ニ依ツテ傍
受サレ、解讀セラレ而シテ翻譯セラレシモノニシテ
予ノ知り且信ズル限り正確ニ日本文字ヲ翻譯スル爲
メ西洋人ニトリ入力ノ可能ナル限度ニ於テ正確且ツ
典據ノアルモノナリ。

參謀本部付大佐

CARTER, W. CLARK
カーター・ダヴリウー・クラーク

EX 1144

Doc. No. 2593-D (4)

Page 1

(Item 5).

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
October 8, 1941
Purple

#907

(Part 1 of 4)^a

(To be handled in government code. Departmental Secret)
Re your #637 b.

I will tell you more about this after I interview the Secretary of State a little later on. However, my views at present are as follows:

(1) According to the American memorandum of the 1st, the Americans realize that there is unanimity on the various principles and fundamentals which they have stuck to. However, they are dissatisfied because you did not express a desire to go into a detailed discussion. The Americans believe in the four principles as the basis on which relations between the two countries must be adjusted. The Americans consider that it is necessary to achieve unanimity on the various questions which have been fundamentally explored by both nations in the unofficial talks held so far in order to settle the Pacific question. They have always felt that if conversations between the leaders of the two countries are to be realized immediately, it must be definitely understood that these principles are to be applied to the concrete problems in the Pacific, and they desire a further clarification of our views.

a - For Part 3 of 4, see S. I. S. #23293.

b - S. I. S. #23118 in which the Foreign Minister, TOYODA, asks Ambassador NOMURA to immediately clarify with the U. S. Government two points.

ARMY

23319

SECRET

Trans. 10/10/41 (1)

(Item 5).

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
October 8, 1941
Purple
#907

(Part 3 of 4)
(To be handled in government code.)

Judging by the impression I got from the above mentioned facts and my contacts with them so far, they figure on first bringing about unanimity on the fundamental questions on which our two countries have so far failed to see eye to eye, and then gradually to turn to the other matters. They evidently feel that so long as there is disagreement on the aforementioned points it would be vain and futile to discuss the various other problems, therefore, up to now the United States has done no more than express her opinions on the other matters in the proposal of June 11. (As I have wired you, some changes were made in the last clause.)

In their proposal of June 21, they made it evident that they were going to stick to this as the basis for negotiations. The latest reply of theirs shows, I am sure, that they are entirely disregarding our own proposal of the 25th. This shows that they are going to stick to their ideas as they stand; however, it will still be necessary for us to talk through certain matters concerning ,

A. The matter mentioned in the annex of the clause concerning the China incident. B. Discontinuing activities designed to help CHIANG. C. The stipulation concerning Nanking Treaty in the clause concerning the China incident (an agreement between Japan and China); joint mediation and the right of self-protection mentioned in the clause concerning our attitude toward the European war; the question

ARMY 23293

Page One

SECRET

(Item 5).

SECRET

of eliminating the annex to the clause concerning commerce
between the two nations.)

a - Parts 1 and 2 not available.

Doc. No. 2593 (Certificate)

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
WASHINGTON, 25, D.C.

24 July 1946

I hereby certify that the attached photostats of Japanese messages have been intercepted by electric or physical means, decrypted, and translated by trained personnel of the War and Navy Departments, and are accurate and authentic to the best of my knowledge and belief insofar as it is humanly possible for an occidental accurately to translate Japanese script.

/s/ Carter W. Clarke

CARTER W. CLARKE
Colonel, G.S.C.

WX 1144

Doc 2593D (4)

Item 5

發信 ワシントン (野村)
受信 東京

一九四一年十月八日 紫

第九〇七號 (四ノ一部) A

(政府暗號ニテ取扱ノコト、當該官廳秘密)
賞電六三七號 Bニ關シ

本件ニ就テハ後刻國務長官ト會見後更ニ通報スベシ。然シ現下ニ於ケル余ノ見解ハ左ノ通ナリ、
(一) 日附米國政府ノ覺書ニ依レバ米國ハソノ國執スル諸原則並ニ本質ニ就テ一致點アルコトヲ認識シ居レリ。然シ貴下ガ詳細ニ亙リ討議ノ希望ヲ表示セザリシ理由ヲ以テ彼等ハ不満足ヲ感ジ居レリ。米國政府ハ四ツノ原則ヲ基礎ニ兩國關係ヲ調整スベキコトヲ信ジ居ル次第ナリ。米國政府ハ太平洋問題解決ノ爲メコレ迄兩國ニ依ル非公式會談ニ於テ根本的ニ探究サレタル諸問題ニ就テ一致點ヲ見出ス必要アルモノト考ヘ居レリ。米國ハ兩國ノ指導者間ニ於テ交渉ガ速刻實現スルナラバ前述ノ四原則ヲ太平洋ノ具體的問題ニ適用スルコトヲ的確ニ理解シ且見解ヲ更ニ明確ニサレン希望ヲ常ニ抱キ來レリ。

Doc 2593 D (4)
Item 5

A、四ノ三部ハS、I、S、第二三二九三號参照
B、S I S 第二三一八號ニ於テ外相豊田ハ野村
大使ニ對シ米政府ニ二點ニ就テ直チニ鮮明ス
ルヤウ要求セリ
陸軍二三三一九 秘密 10 / 10 / 41

発信 ワシントン (野村)

受信 東京

一九四一年十月八日 紫

第九〇七號(四ノ三部) A

(政府譯送ニテ取扱ノコト)

前述ノ事實及是迄米國政府トノ接 渉ニヨリ得タ
余ノ印象カラ判断スレバ米國ハ今迄兩國ガ直視シ
得ナカツタ根本問題ニ就テ先ツ合致點ヲ發見シ、
ソレヨリ逐次他ノ問題ニ就ズベク考へ居レリ。
米國政府ハ前述ノ點ニ關シ一致ヲ見ザル限リ他ノ
諸問題ヲ討議スルハ無益ナリト痛感シ居ル次第ナ
リ。故ニ現在マデ米國ハ六月十一日ノ吾ガ提案中
ニ述ベタ他ノ問題ニ就テ自己ノ意見ヲ表示スル以
外ハ何等寫ス所ナカリキ。(貴下ニ對スル發電ノ
通り最後ノ條項ニ幾分ノ變更アリタリ)

Doc 2593D (4)

Item 5

六月二十一日附米國政府ノ提案ニハ米國ハ交渉
基礎トシテ右提案ヲ固執スルコトヲ明カニシタリ。
米國政府最近ノ回答ニ依レバ二十五日附ノ吾ガ提
案ヲ全々無視シ居レリ。コレハ米國政府ガ所持ス
ル理念ヲ固執スルコトヲ要ハスモノナリ。然シ吾
々ハ尙左記關係事項ニ就テ話シ合フ必要ヲ認ム。

即チ

(A) 支那要項ニ關スル附屬條項ニ記載セル要項

(B) 蔣介石援助ニ對スル計畫的活動ノ中止

(C) 支那要項ニ係ハル條項中南京條約ニ關スル協約

(日支條約) 歐洲戰爭ニ對スル吾ガ態度ニ就テ
記述セル共同仲談及自衛權、兩國家間ニ於ケル
貿易ニ關スル附帶要項ノ除去問題。

A、二ノ一部ハ取得不能

二三二九三

秘密

編譯

一九四六年十月十日

Doc 2593 cert.

機密 陸軍省

陸軍省參謀本部

情報局

一九四六年七月二十四日

予ハ茲ニ左ノ通り證明ス。即チ、
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メ西洋人ニトリ人力ノ可能ナル限度ニ於テ正確且ツ
典據ノアルモノナリ。

參謀本部付大佐

CARTER · W · CLARKE
カーター · ダヴリウ · クラーク

EX 1164

Doc. No. 2593-D (7)

Page 1

Item No. 8

SECRET

From: Tokyo
To: - Washington
November 4, 1941
Purple (CA) (Urgent)

725 (Part 1 of 3)

a
Concerning my #722 .

1. Well, relations between Japan and the United States have reached the edge, and our people are losing confidence in the possibility of ever adjusting them. In order to lucubrate on a fundamental national policy, the Cabinet has been meeting with the Imperial Headquarters for some days in succession. Conference has followed conference, and now we are at length able to bring forth a counter-proposal for the resumption of Japanese-American negotiations based upon the unanimous opinion of the Government and the military high command (ensuing Nos. 726 b and 727 b). This and other basic policies of our Empire await the sanction of the conference to be held on the morning of the 5th.

2. Conditions both within and without our Empire are so tense that no longer is procrastination possible, yet in our sincerity to maintain pacific relationships between the Empire of Japan and the United States of America, we have decided, as a result of these deliberations, to gamble once more on the continuance of the parleys, but this is our last effort. Both in name and spirit this counter-proposal of ours is, indeed, the last. I want you to know that. If through it we do not reach a quick accord, I am sorry to say the talks will certainly be ruptured. Then, indeed, will relations between our two nations be on the brink of chaos. I mean that the success or failure of the pending discussions will have an immense effect on the destiny of the Empire of Japan. In fact, we gambled the fate of our land on the throw of this die.

a - S.I.S. #24292 which states that meetings are being held with the Imperial Headquarters to consider a fundamental policy for improving relations between Japan and America and that a final decision is to be made on the morning of the 5th.

b - Not available.

SECRET

24330

Trans. 11/4/41 (S)

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 4, 1941
Purple (CA) (Urgent)

#725 (Part 2 of 3)

When the Japanese-American meetings began, who would have ever dreamt that they would drag out so long? Hoping that we could fast come to some understanding, we have already gone far out of our way and yielded and yielded. The United States does not appreciate this, but through thick and thin sticks to the self-same propositions she made to start with. Those of our people and of our officials who suspect the sincerity of the Americans are far from few. Bearing all kinds of humiliating things, our Government has repeatedly stated its sincerity and gone far, yes, too far, in giving in to them. There is just one reason why we do this--to maintain peace in the Pacific. There seem to be some Americans who think we would make a one-sided deal, but our temperance, I can tell you, has not come from weakness, and naturally there is an end to our long-suffering. Nay, when it comes to a question of our existence and our honor, when the time comes we will defend them without recking the cost. If the United States takes an attitude that overlooks or shuns this position of ours, there is not a whit of use in ever broaching the talks. This time we are showing the limit of our friendship; this time we are making our last possible bargain, and I hope that we can thus settle all our troubles with the United States peaceably.

Trans. 11/4/41 (S)

24331

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 4, 1941
Purple (CA) (Urgent)

#725 (Part 3 of 3)

3. It is to be hoped earnestly that looking forward to what may come at the end--at the last day of Japanese-American negotiations--the Government of the United States will think ever so soberly how much better it would be to make peace with us; how much better this would be for the whole world situation.

4. Your Honor will see from the considerations above how important is your mission. You are at a key post, and we place great hopes in your being able to do something good for our nation's destiny. Will you please think deeply on that and compose yourself and make up your mind to continue to do your best. I hope you will. Now just as soon as the conference is over, I will let you know immediately, and I want you to go and talk to President ROOSEVELT and Secretary HULL. I want you to tell them how determined we are and try to get them to foster a speedy understanding.

5. In view of the gravity of these talks, as you make contacts there, so I will make them here. I will talk to the American Ambassador here in Tokyo, and as soon as you have got the concensus of the American officials through talking with them, please wire me. Naturally, as these things develop, in case you take any new steps, I want you to let me know and get in contact with me. In this way we will avoid letting anything go astray. Furthermore, lest anything go away, I want you to follow my instructions to the letter. In my instructions, I want you to know there will be no room for personal interpretation.

Trans. 11/4/41 (S)

24332

Doc. No. 2593 (Certificate)

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
WASHINGTON, 25, D.C.

24 July 1946

I hereby certify that the attached photostats of Japanese messages have been intercepted by electric or physical means, decrypted, and translated by trained personnel of the War and Navy Departments, and are accurate and authentic to the best of my knowledge and belief insofar as it is humanly possible for an occidental accurately to translate Japanese script.

/s/ Carter W. Clarke

CARTER W. CLARKE
Colonel, G.S.C.

Ex 1164

Doc 2593 D (7)
Item 8

秘

東京ヨリ「ワシントン」へ

一九四一年十一月四日

紫(0A) (至急)

第七二五號(三ノ第一節)

往電第七二二號(註a)ニ應シテ

一 觀テ、日米關係ハ其ノ破綻ニ類シ、吾國民ハ國
 交調整ノ可能性ニ信ヲ置カザル様ニナリツツア
 リ。國策ノ根本方針ヲ審議スル爲、内閣ハ連日
 大本營連合會議ヲ繼續シ熱議ニ熱議ヲ重ネタル
 結果茲ニ政府及軍最高司令部一致ノ意見ニ基キ
 日米交渉再開ニ對スル反對提案ヲ擯却シ得ルニ
 至レリ(第七二六號/註b/及第七二七號/註
 b/ト續ク)。本政策並ニ帝國ノ他ノ諸政策ニ
 就テハ、五日午前閣會議定ナル會議ノ確認ヲ待
 ツモノナリ。

二 吾方帝國内外ノ事態ハ極メテ急迫ヲ告ゲ今ヤ延
 期ヲ許サザル狀態ニアルモ、日本帝國ト合衆國
 トノ平和的友好關係ヲ維持セントスル誠意ヨリ
 熱議ノ結果、今一度交渉繼續ヲ嗜ス事ニ決セリ。

2.

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Item 8

但本交渉ハ吾々最後ノ試ニシテ、名實共ニ此ノ
反對提案ハ、實ニ最後案ナリト御承知アリ度ク
此ヲ以テシテ尙急遽安結ニ到ラザルニ於テハ、
遺憾ナガラ會談ハ決烈ニ到ルノ外ナク、其ノ結
果兩國友好關係ハ實ニ渾沌ノ縁ニ臨ムノ已ムナ
キニ至ルモノナリ。即チ今次対衝ノ成否ハ帝國
國運ニ甚大ナル影響アリ。實際、吾々ハ此ノ散
子ノ一掃ニ吾ガ國土ノ運命ヲ賭セル次第ナリ。
註 a、日米關係改善ノ爲ノ根本方針考研ノ爲、大本
營トノ間ニ會合開催サルベキ旨及最後の決定
ハ五日午前ナサレル旨ヲ述べタル S・I・S
第二四二九二號ヲ指ス。
b 入手シ得ズ。

Doc 2593 D (7)
26. 8

東京ヨリ「ワシントン」へ

一九四一年十一月四日

紫(OA) (至急)

第七二五號 (三ノ第二部)

日米會議開始ノ際、誰レカ其會議ノ新ク永引クヲ夢想セン。吾々ハ急速安結ヲ訂ル爲、從來難キヲ忍ビテ讓歩ニ讓歩ヲ重ネ來リタルニ拘ラズ、合衆國ハ之ニ對應スル所ナク、終始當初ノ提案ヲ固執シ居ル現狀ニシテ我万朝野ニモ米國ノ誠意ニ疑惑ヲ感ズルモノ尠ラザル勢ナリ。我政府ハ凡ユル種類ノ屈辱的事柄ヲ忍ビ飽迄誠意ヲ披瀝シテ更ニ讓歩ヲ敢テセリ。然リ彼等ニ對シ屈服スル迄ニ讓歩セリ。

其ノ所以ノモノハ一ニ太平洋ノ平和維持ヲ願念スルニ出ヅルモノニシテ米側一部ニ於テハ吾万ガ一万的讓歩ヲナサント欲セルガ如ク考ヘルモノアル如ク見ユルモ、吾々ハ目前ハ弱氣ニ發スルニ非ズ、從ツテ吾万ノ隱忍ニモ自ラ限度アリ、吾々ノ存立ト權限トハ必要ニヨリテハ犧牲ノ如何ヲ問ハズ擁護セザルベカラザル次第ニシテ、合衆國ニシテ此ノ上吾國ノ立場ヲ無視シ、又ハ之ヲ避クルガ如キ態度ニ出ズルニ於テハ、交渉ヲ開始スルモ何等益ナキニシテ今ヤ

4.

Doc 2593 D (7)

Item 8

吾々ハ能フ限リノ友誼的精神ヲ發揮シ進デ能フ限リ
ノ讓歩ヲナシ以テ局面ノ平和的收拾ヲ計ラント欲ス
ルモノナリ。

Doc 2593 D (7)

Item 8

東京ヨリ「ワシントン」へ

一九四一年十一月四日

紫(OA) (至急)

第七二五號(三ノ第三部)

三 最後ノ日、即チ日米交渉ノ最後ノ日ニハ如何ナル事懸ノ生ズルカニ思フ致シ合衆國政府ニ於テハ吾万ト和平ヲ結ブコトノ如何ニ有效ナルヤヲ又之ガ全世界ノ情勢ニ如何程良キカヲ眞剣ニ考察サレル様衷心ヨリ要望スルヤ切ナリ。

四 如上ノ次第ニテ貴大使ノ使命ノ如何ニ重大ナルカヲ御承知セラレシ事ナラン。貴使ハ問題解決ノ鍵ヲ握ル重要ナル地位ニアリ、吾々ハ、吾ガ帝國國運進展ノ爲何事カ有效ナル事ヲ貴使ガナシ得ラルベシト大ナル希望ヲ囑シテ居ル次第ナリ。此上共右詰點寫ト御諒承ノ上沈着以テ改善ヲ盡シテ御努力ヲ、繼續スル決意ヲ致サレ度シ余ハ、貴下ガ然致サレンコトヲ希望スルモノナリ。望、會議終了次第其ノ旨貴方ニ通報致スベキニ付、其ノ上貴方ニ於テハ「フルーズベルト」大統領及ビ「ハル」國務長官ト會見シ我方ノ決意ヲ徹底セシメ極力交渉ノ急速妥結ヲ計ラルル

6.

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Item 8

様御努アリ度シ。

五

是等會談ノ重大任ニ歸シ、實地ノ折衝ト並行シ

余モ亦當地ニ於テ接衝スベシ。

余ハ在京米國大使ト會談ヲ行フ豫定ニ付實使ニ

於テハ米國官邊トノ會談ニヨリテ其ノ意見ノ趨

勢ヲ得次第當万ニ電報アリ度ク今後ノ交渉經過

ハ勿論實万ニ於テ新ナル措置ヲ取ル際ハ逐一報

告ノ上連絡ヲトラレ度シ。右様ノ關係上手違ヒ

ヲ避ケル爲ニモ當万訓令ハ飽クマデ嚴守アリ度

當万訓令ハ實万ニ於テ取捨選擇ノ餘地ナキコト

ト御承知アリ度シ。

Doc. 2593 cert.

機密 陸軍省

陸軍省參謀本部

情報局

一九四六年七月二十四日

予ハ茲ニ左ノ通り證明ス。即チ、
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メ西洋人ニトリ人力ノ可能ナル限度ニ於テ正確且ツ
典據ノアルモノナリ。

參謀本部付大佐

CARTER, W. CLARKE
カーター・ダヴリウー・クラーク

EX 1165

Doc. No. 2593-D (8)
Item No. 9

Page 1

SECRET

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington
November 4, 1941
Purple (CA) (Urgent)

#726

(Part 1 of 4.)

Proposal "A".

1. This proposal is our revised ultimatum made as a result of our attempts to meet, in so far as possible, the wishes of the Americans, clarified as a result of negotiations based on our proposals of September 25. We have toned down our insistence as follows:

(1) The question of non-discrimination in trade.

Should they appear not to accede to our proposal of September 25 in this respect, insert the following statement. "The Japanese Government is prepared to carry out this principle in the entire Pacific area; that is to say, China as well, providing the principles of non-discrimination are applied to the entire world."

(2) The question of our understanding and application of the Tripartite Alliance.

At the same time that you clarify to them that we intend no expansion of our sphere of self-defense, make clear, as has been repeatedly explained in the past, that we desire to avoid the expansion of Europe's war into the Pacific.

24334

Trans. 11/4/41 (S)

SECRET

SECRET

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 4, 1941
Purple (CA) (Urgent)

726

(Part 2 of 4.)

- (3) The question concerning the evacuation of troops.
We are toning down our stipulations in this connection

as follows:

(A) The stationing and evacuation of troops in China since the outbreak of the China Incident.

Japanese troops which have been sent to China will be stationed in North China, on the Mongolian border regions, and on the Island of Hainan after the establishment of peace between Japan and China, and will not be evacuated until the elapse of a suitable interval. The evacuation of other troops will be carried out by Japan and China at the same time that peace is established. In order to maintain peace and order, this will be carried out within a period of two years. (Note: Should the American authorities question you in regard to "the suitable period", answer vaguely that such a period should encompass 25 years.)

(B) The stationing and evacuation of troops in French Indo-China.

The Japanese Government respects the territorial integrity of the French possession, Indo-China. In the event that a just peace is established, or that the China Incident is brought to a successful conclusion, Japanese troops which have been dispatched to French Indo-China and are there now shall be evacuated.

(4) As a matter of principle, we are anxious to avoid having this inserted in the draft of the formal proposal reached between Japan and the United States (whether it is called an understanding proposal or some other sort of a statement.)

Trans. 11/4/41 (S)

24335

SECRET

SECRET

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 4, 1941
Purple (CA) (Urgent)

#726 (Part 3 of 4)

2. Explanation.

(1) Of course, there is the question of geographical proximity when we come to consider non-discrimination in commerce. However, we have revised our demands along this line hitherto and put the question of non-discrimination on a world-wide basis. In a memorandum of the American Government, they state in effect, however, that it might be feasible for either country within a certain specified area to adopt a given policy and for the other party within another specified area to adopt a complementary policy. Judging from this statement, I do not believe they will oppose this term. I think that we can easily reach an understanding on this matter.

(2) As for the question of the Three-Power Pact, your various messages lead me to believe that the United States is, in general, satisfied with our proposals, so if we make our position even more clear by saying that we will not randomly enlarge upon our interpretation of the right of self-defense, I feel sure that we will soon be mutually agreed on this point.

24336

Trans. 11/4/41 (S)

SECRET

SECRET

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 4, 1941.
Purple (CA) (Urgent)

#726 (Part 4 of 4)

(3) I think that in all probability the question of evacuation will be the hardest. However, in view of the fact that the United States is so much opposed to our stationing soldiers in undefined areas, our purpose is to shift the regions of occupation and our officials, thus attempting to dispel their suspicions. We will call it evacuation; but although it would please the United States for us to make occupation the exception rather than the rule, in the last analysis this would be out of the question. Furthermore, on the matter of duration of occupation, whenever pressed to give a clear statement we have hitherto couched our answers in vague terms. I want you in as indecisive yet as pleasant language as possible to euphemize and try to impart to them the effect that unlimited occupation does not mean perpetual occupation. Summing this up, Proposal A accepts completely America's demands on two of the three proposals mentioned in the other proposal, but when it comes to the last point concerning the stationing and evacuation of forces, we have already made our last possible concession. How hard, indeed, have we fought in China for four years! What tremendous sacrifices have we made! They must know this, so their demands in this connection must have been only "wishful thinking." In any case, our internal situation also makes it impossible for us to make any further compromise in this connection. As best you may, please endeavor to have the United States understand this, and I earnestly hope and pray that you can quickly bring about an understanding.

Trans. 11/4/41 (S)

24337

Doc. No. 2593 (Certificate)

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
WASHINGTON, 25, D.C.

24 July 1946

I hereby certify that the attached photostats of Japanese messages have been intercepted by electric or physical means, decrypted, and translated by trained personnel of the War and Navy Departments, and are accurate and authentic to the best of my knowledge and belief insofar as it is humanly possible for an occidental accurately to translate Japanese script.

/s/ Carter W. Clarke

CARTER W. CLARKE
Colonel, G.S.C.

1. Ex 1165

Doc 2593D (8)

Item 9

東京發

ワシントン宛

一九四一年 / 昭和十六年 / 十一月四日

紫色 (CA) (至急)

第七二六號 (四 / 第一部)

甲案

一 本案ハ九月二十五日ノ我方提案ヲ既往ノ交渉經過ヨリ判明セル米國側ノ希望ニ出不得ル限リ「ミート」スル意旨ヲ以テ修正セル最後案ニシテ我方主張ヲ左記ノ通り緩和セルモノナリ。

(一) 通商無差別問題

九月二十五日案ニテ到底妥結ノ見込ナキ際ハ、「日本國政府ハ無差別原則カ全世界ニ適用セララルモノナルニ於テハ太平洋全地域即チ支那ニ於テモ本原則ノ行ハルルコトヲ承認ス」ヲ挿入ス。

(二) 三國同盟ノ解釋及履行問題

我方ニ於テ自衛權ノ範圍ヲ擴大スル意圖ナキコトヲ更ニ明瞭ニスルト共ニ、從來屢々説明セル如ク我方ハ歐州戰爭ノ太平洋ヘノ擴大ヲ避ケ度キ希望ナル旨ヲ鮮明サレ度シ。

秘

208

東京發 華盛頓宛

秘

一九四一年十一月四日

紫色 (O.A.) (至急)

第七二六號

(四ノ第二部)

(三) 撤兵問題

本件ハ左ノ通り被和ス、

(A) 支那事變勃發以來中國ニ於ケル駐兵及ビ撤兵

中國ニ派遣セラレタル日本國軍隊ハ華北、蒙疆地域及海南島ニ關シテハ日華間平和成立後ニ、駐屯シ、適當期間ヲ經過スル迄撤退セザルベク、爾餘ノ軍隊ノ撤退ハ平和成立ト同時ニ日本及ビ中國ニヨリ實行セラレベシ。治安維持ノ爲、二箇年以内ニ實行セラレベシ。

(註「適當期間」ニ付米國當局ヨリ質問アリタル場合ハ、概ネ二十五年ヲ目途トスルモノナル旨ヲ以テ漠然ト願副スルモノトス

(B) 佛印ニ於ケル駐兵及撤兵

日本國政府ハ佛領印度支那ノ領土主權ヲ尊重ス、現ニ佛領印度支那ニ派遣セラレ居ル日本國軍隊ハ、公正ナル平和ノ確立スルカ、

Doc 2593 D (8)
Item 9

2.

3.

Doc. No. 102 (10)
Item 9

又ハ支那事變ニシテ解決スルニ於テハ之ヲ
撤去スベシ。

(四) 原則トシテハ之ヲ日米間ノ正式妥結事項(了
解案タルト又ハ其ノ他ノ聲明タルトヲ問ハズ)
中ニ包含セシムルコトハ極力回避スルモノト
ス。

和

東京發「ワシントン」宛一九四一年十一月四日

紫色 (O.A.) (至急)

第七二六號 (四ノ三部)

二、説明

- (I) 通商無差別原則ニ付テハ、勿論地理的近接ノ問題アルモ我方ハ從來ノ此ノ線ニ沿フ主張ハ之ヲ訂正シ、無差別原則問題ヲ世界的差盤ニ置キタルモノナルガ、米政府宛書中ニ何レカノ國ガ特定地域内ニ於テ所定ノ政策ヲ取り、他ノ一方ガ別ノ特定地域内ニ於テ補足的政策ヲ採ルコトハ實行シ易キコトナルベシトノ趣旨ノ記述アリ。右ニ徴スルモ何等反對ナカルヘク、從ツテ本件ニ付テハ之ニテ容易ニ合意成立スルモノト信ズ。
- (2) 三國同盟ノ問題ニ付テハ屢次貴電ニ依レバ

米口側ハ我方提案ニテ大体満足シ居ルヤノ
趣ナルニ付目録欄ノ解釋ヲ注ニ讀大スル意
圖ナキコトヲ一層明確ニスルニ於テハ、本
件モ妥結ヲ見ルベキモノト信ズ。

東京發華盛頓宛

一九四一年十一月四日

紫色 (OA) (至急)

第七二六號 (四ノ第四部)

(三) 撤兵問題ハ或ハ最モ困難ナル點トナルヤモ知
レサルモ、我方ハ米側ガ不確定地域ヘノ我ガ
駐兵ニ強ク反論スルニ鑒ミ、占領地域ヲ我ヘ
官吏ノ異動ヲナシ、以テ其ノ疑惑ヲ解カント
スルモノナリ。

我方ハ之ヲ撤兵ト稱ス。駐兵ヲ建前トスルヨ
リハ例外トスル方米側ノ希望ニ副フベキモ、
結局ノ所此ハ問題トナラザルベシ。駐兵期間
ニ關シテハ、明確ナル聲明ヲ懇願サレタル際
ハ、從來常ニ曖昧ナル言辭ヲ以テ表ハシ來リ
タル所貴使ニ於テハ出來得ル限り不徹底ニシ
テ然モ快道ナ言辭ニテ婉曲ニ述べ、無期限駐
兵ハ永久駐兵ニ非ル旨ヲ印象ツケル様御努力

Doc 50104 (8)
Item 9

和

41

Doc No 10 10 10
Item 7

述ヘラレタル三案中ノ二案ニ關シテハ全面的ニ米領主張ヲ受諾セルモノニテ、最後ノ一點タル駐兵及ヒ撤兵問題ニ付テモ最大限ノ讓歩ヲ爲セル次第ナリ。吾々ハ實ニ四年ノ間中國ニ於テ一心ニ戰ヒ來リ、甚大ナル犠牲ヲ拂ヒタリ。

彼等又之ヲ承知セリ、然レバ此ニ關連スル彼等ノ主張ハ單ナル「畏望スル意見」ナリシナルベシ。兎モ角此ノ點ニ關シ之以上ノ讓歩ハ國內的ニ不可能ナリ。彼テ精々御努力ノ上米側ヲシテ右ヲ諒解セシメ速ニ交渉妥結ニ導ク様切望ス

機密 陸軍省

陸軍省參謀本部

情報局

ワシントン、二十五、D O

一九四六年七月二十四日

予ハ茲ニ左ノ通り證明ス。即チ
添附取通ノ日本文電報ノ漢寫寫眞ハ陸海軍兩省ノ
熟練セル職員ニ依リ電氣的或ハ物理的方法ニ依ツ
テ傍受サレ、解讀セラレ而シテ翻譯セラレシモノ
ニシテ予ノ知り且信ズル限り正確ニ日本文字ヲ翻
譯スル爲メ西洋人ニトリ人力ノ可能ナル限度ニ於
テ正確且ツ典據ノアルモノナリ。

參謀本部附大佐

GARTNER W CLARKE

カーター・ダヴリユー・クラーク

Ex 1170

Doc. No. 2593-D (9)
Item No. 16

page 1

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
5 November 1941
(Purple-Cl)

#735

1. Our counter proposal in the Japanese-U.S. negotiations referred to in my message #725* was taken up at the Imperial Conference on this, the 5th, and was given approval. Therefore, will you please begin the talks along the lines given in my instructions.

2. We assume that it would meet with the U.S. approval, in view of past developments, if, for the time being, the 21 June proposal - 25 September's from our point of view - was used as a basis of these new talks. Subsequently, we feel that from the standpoint of the likelihood of reaching an early agreement, our Proposal A (contained in my message #726**) should be submitted for discussion. (As a matter of fact, there are a number of points in the form and in the expressions used in the U.S. proposal which do not meet with our complete approval. However, we feel that for convenience and speed's sake, Proposal A should be submitted first.) Please, therefore, explain these points to the United States and at the same time have them clearly understand the circumstances contained in my message #725*. Thereupon, do your utmost to have them accept that proposal in the shortest possible time.

3. If the United States expresses too many points of disapproval to Proposal A and if it becomes apparent that an agreement cannot be reached, we intend to submit our absolutely final proposal, Proposal B (contained in my message #727***). Please, therefore, ascertain the U.S. attitude to Proposal A as soon as possible, and advise this office. Be sure to advise this office before Proposal B is submitted to the United States.

4. As stated in my previous message, this is the Imperial Government's final step. Time is becoming exceedingly short and the situation very critical. Absolutely no delays can be permitted. Please bear this in mind and do your best. I wish to stress this point over and over.

5. We wish to avoid giving them the impression that there is a time limit or that this proposal is to be taken as an ultimatum. In a friendly manner, show them that we are very anxious to have them accept our proposal.

24387
JD-1:

6276

(continued) (D) Navy Trans. 11-5-41(S-TT)

(Although a "1" was placed at the beginning of the body of my message #727***, there was no need for it, so please delete it.

*JD-1: 6248.(SIS#24330-32)
**JD-1: 6249.(SIS#24334-37)
***JD-1: 6250.(SIS#24338)

24387

SECRET

JD-1: 6276

(d) Navy Trans. 11-5-41 (S-TT)

Doc. No. 2593 (Certificate)

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
WASHINGTON, 25, D.C.

24 July 1946

I hereby certify that the attached photostats of Japanese messages have been intercepted by electric or physical means, decrypted, and translated by trained personnel of the War and Navy Departments, and are accurate and authentic to the best of my knowledge and belief insofar as it is humanly possible for an occidental accurately to translate Japanese script.

/s/ Carter W. Clarke

CARTER W. CLARKE
Colonel, G.S.C.

EXHIBIT NO. 1170

Doc 2593 D (7)
Item 16

東京發

「ワシントン」宛

一九四一年／昭和十六年／十一月五日

(紫 I C A)

第七三五號

一往電第七二五號、日米交渉對案ハ本五日ノ御前會議ニ於テ決定ヲ見タリ。就テハ貴大使ハ前電訓令ノ趣旨ヲ体シ折衝ヲ開始サレ度シ。

ニ從來ノ經緯ニモ概ミ差當リ六月二十一日案、從ツテ我方ヨリ言ヘバ九月二十五日案ヲ新規會談ノ基礎トシ交渉ヲ進ムルコト、米國側ノ期待ニ副フモノト推察セラルルニヨリ交渉ヲ急速ニ取纏ムル見地ヨリシテ（往電第七二六號中ノ）我方甲案ヲ提示スルコト可然ト存セラル。〔當方トシテハ、實ハ米案形式、表現ニ就テモ面白カラズト認ムル點多多アルモ便宜上又進捗上、甲案ヲ先ヅ提示セントスルモノナリ。〕就テハ右ノ趣旨ヲ米側ニ對シ説明セラルルト同時ニ往電第七二五號ノ事情ヲ篤ト先方ニ納得セシメ、以テ最短期間内ニ同案ニヨリ妥結方極力御盡力アリ度シ。

ニ米側ニ於テ甲案ニ對シ餘リニ難色アリ。妥結不可能ナルコト明白トナリタル際ハ、後ノ局面打開策ヲ提示スル意

RETURN TO ROOM 361

Doc 2593 D (9)

Sta. 10

嚮ナルニヨリ、甲案ニ對スル米側態度ヲ大至急突
キ止メ本省宛御通知アリ度シ。尙乙案ヲ米側ニ提
示スル際ハ必ズ豫メ御通報アリ度シ。

四前電ニ申進メノ通り、是ハ帝國政府ノ最後案ナリ
時日極メテ短ク、事態頗ル切迫シ絶對ニ遷延ヲ許
サザルニ付、其ノ御含ミニテ御努力アリ度ク、此
ノ點重ネテ申進ス。

五尤モ「タイム・リミット」ヲ附シ若クハ最後通牒
的態度ヲ取ルガ如キ印象ハ之ヲ避ケタキニヨリ、
米側ニ於ケル本案ノ受諾ヲ切望シテ己マヌ旨友好
的態度ヲ以テ示サレ度シ。

（往電第七二七號本文冒頭ニ「一」ト記サレタル
及其ノ必要ナキニ付、削除サレ度シ）

註 *JDノ一、第六二四八號（SIS第二四三三〇一三二號）

**JDノ一、第六二四九號（SIS第二四三三三三三七號）

***JDノ一、第六二五〇號（SIS第二四三三三八號）

機密 陸軍省

陸軍省參謀本部

情報局

ワシントン、二十五、D O

一九四六年七月二十四日

予ハ茲ニ左ノ通り證明ス。即チ

添附數通ノ日本文電報ノ複寫寫眞ハ陸海軍兩省ノ
熟練セル職員ニ依リ電氣的或ハ物理的方法ニ依ツ
テ傍受サレ、解讀セラレ而シテ翻譯セラレシモノ
ニシテ予ノ知り且信ズル限り正確ニ日本文字ヲ翻譯
スル爲メ西洋人ニトリ人力ノ可能ナル限度ニ於
テ正確且ツ典據ノアルモノナリ。

參謀本部附大佐

CARRER W CLARKE

カーター・ダヴリユー・クラーク

Ex 1171

Doc. No. 2593D (10)

Ex

1171
page 1

Item 11

SECRET

From: Tokyo
To : Washington.
5 November 1941
(Purple-GA)

#736

(Of utmost secrecy).

Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month. I realize that this is a difficult order, but under the circumstances it is an unavoidable one. Please understand this thoroughly and tackle the problem of saving the Japanese U.S. relations from falling into a chaotic condition. Do so with great determination and with unstinted effort, I beg of you.

to yourself only.

This information is to be kept strictly

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361

24373
JD-1: 6254

(D) Navy Trans. 11-5-41 (S-TT)

SECRET

Doc. No. 2593 (Certificate)

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
WASHINGTON, 25, D.C.

24 July 1946

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/s/ Carter W. Clarke

CARTER W. CLARKE
Colonel, G.S.C.

Ex 1171

Doc 2545D (10)
Item 11

書類第二五九三號 D 一十

第十一番

自東京宛ワシントン

一九四一年(昭和十六年)十一月五日(紫色 I CA)

第七三六號 (極秘)

本協定ハ、證據ノ關係上、本月二十五日迄ニハ、
調印ノ萬般ノ手筈完了スルコト絶對ニ必要ナル處、
右ハ至難ヲ強ヒルガ如キモ、西國ノ狀勢上致方ナキ
儀ニ付、右篤ト御了承ノ上、日本國交ノ破綻ヲ救フ
ノ大決意ヲ以テ充全御努力アラムコトヲ懇願ス。

右儀ニ貴大臣限りノ御含ミ迄。

Doc 2593 (cert)

機密 陸軍省

陸軍省参謀本部

情報局

一九四六年七月二十四日

予ハ茲ニ左ノ通り證明ス。即チ
添附致通ノ日本文電報ノ復寫寫眞ハ陸海軍兩省ノ
熟練セル職員ニ依リ電氣的或ハ物理的方法ニ依ツ
テ傍受サレ、解讀セラレ而シテ翻譯セラレシモノ
ニシテ予ノ知り且信ズル限り正確ニ日本文字ヲ翻
譯スル爲メ西洋人ニトリ人力ノ可能ナル限度ニ於
テ正確且ツ典據ノアルモノナリ。

参謀本部附大佐

OARHER, W. OLARKH

カーター。ダヴリユー。クラーク

From: Tokyo.
To : Washington.
11 November 1941
(Purple)

#764 (In 3 parts, complete).

1. On the 11th, the British Ambassador, while calling on me on some other business, brought up the subject of the conversations. He advised me that he reported my talks of the other day (see contents of 2 of my message #723*) to his home government, to which his government replied along the following lines, he said:

"The British Government is not aware of the details of the conversations being conducted in Washington. Since its success would be of interest to Britain and Japan, it is fervently hoping for the success thereof. However, unless the basis of discussion is first settled upon, it would be useless to go ahead and enter into negotiations of the details. The British Government feels that discussions as to the basic principles could safely be left up to the U. S. Government. However, as soon as the real negotiations begin, the United States is to confer with Great Britain according to arrangement. Therefore, when that time arrives, negotiations will be carried on jointly with the United States and Japan."

2. I replied that in the matters being discussed between Japan and the United States there were some phases which greatly affected Great Britain. In the event of an agreement between Japan and the United States, Japan will simultaneously seek Britain's agreement. I wish to arrange matters so that the two agreements may be signed at exactly the same time. In view of the fact that to do the above is necessary, we have already requested the United States to give their approval to the terms, I said to the British Ambassador.

The British Ambassador said that he was not aware as to how much progress had been made between the United States and Japan, but he assumed that they were still in the preliminary stages.

I, therefore, replied that his assumption may have fitted in the past, but that at present they had already entered into the realm of the actual negotiations. Moreover, the Imperial Government has already submitted its final proposal, thus bringing the negotiations to the final phase. We have made this fact absolutely clear to the United States, I added.

I went on to say that I hear that the British Prime Minister made a speech at a luncheon given by the Mayor of London in which he stated that though he did not know the developments in the U.S.-Japanese negotiations, he would issue a warning to Japan. Would it not be more to the point, I challenged, if, instead of making threats without knowing of what he spoke, he were to try to more clearly understand the issues and to cooperate in an effort to clear them up? However, I said, with the U.S.-Japanese talks in the phase they are today, and in view of the fact that I realized that there were certain relationships between the United States and Great Britain, I have no intention of urging or opposing British participation in these talks at this time.

The Imperial Government has made the maximum concessions she can in drawing up its final proposal, I explained. We are of the opinion that the United States will find no objectionable points in it. I believe that it will be possible to sign the agreement within a week to ten days, I said. If, unfortunately, the United States refuses to accept those terms, it would be useless to continue the negotiations. Our domestic political situation will permit no further delays in reaching a decision.

I am making superhuman efforts at this time, I pointed out, in the attempt to ride out the crisis in the U.S.-Japanese and the British-Japanese relations. // There are factions in the country which insist that there is no need for negotiating and point out the uselessness of doing so. The negotiations are being continued only after these factions were checked.

For these reasons, it is absolutely impossible that there be any further delays.

A speedy settlement can be made depending entirely upon the attitude of Britain and the United States, I said, and suggested that his country give serious consideration to this, and cooperate in bringing about an early agreement.

In the above manner, I pointed out the criticalness of the situation. The Ambassador listened to what I said very attentively, giving indications that he was realizing for the first time how critical the situation was. He advised me that he would send his government a report of the above conversation and that he himself would do his best to bring about a speedy settlement.

3. Thus, there are indications that the United States Government is still under the impression that the negotiations are in the preliminary stages and that we are still merely

exchanging opinions. This is further supported by the words of President Roosevelt reported by you in your message #1070** (that part in which he says that he hopes that these preliminary discussions will lead to the basis of the real negotiations, etc.)

3) That the United States takes this lazy and easy going attitude in spite of the fact that as far as we are concerned, this is the final phase, is exceedingly unfortunate. Therefore, it is my fervent hope that Your Excellency will do everything in your power to make them realize this fact and bring about an agreement at the earliest possible moment.

*JD-1: 6228. (SIS #24293-94)

**Not available.

Doc. No. 2593 (Certificate)

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
WASHINGTON, 25, D.C.

24 July 1946

I hereby certify that the attached photostats of Japanese messages have been intercepted by electric or physical means, decrypted, and translated by trained personnel of the War and Navy Departments, and are accurate and authentic to the best of my knowledge and belief insofar as it is humanly possible for an occidental accurately to translate Japanese script.

/s/ Carter W. Clarke

CARTER W. CLARKE
Colonel, G.S.C.

Doc 2593 D (11)
Item 12

書類第二五九三號D一十一

第十二卷

東京發 華府宛

一九四一年(昭和十六年)十一月十一日

(案)

第七六四號(三部ニテ完結)

十一月一日、他用ヲ以テ來訪ノ際、英國大使ハ會談ノ件ヲ話題ニ出シ、適日ノ余ノ談話(往電米第七二三號第二ノ内容参照)ヲ、本國政府ニ報告セル處之ニ對シ同政府ハ左記趣旨ノ回答ヲ爲シタル旨、余ニ通告アリタリ。即チ曰ク

「英國政府ハ華府ニ於ケル話合ノ詳細ヲ承知セザルモ、右ノ成功ハ、英國及ビ日本ノ利益ナルニヨリ之ヲ熱望ス。然レドモ討議ノ基礎ガ先ヅ以テ成立セザレバ進テ交渉ニ入ルノ必要ヲ認メズ。

英國政府ハ、根本原則ニ關スル論議ハ、米國政府ニ委不達支ナシト考ヘ居レリ。尤モ現實ノ交渉可能トナラバ、米國政府ハ、直ニ英國政府ト協議スルコトトナリ居ルニ付、其ノ際ハ、日米政府ト共ニ協議スベシ。」

ニ依テ余ハ、日米間ニテ討議中ノ諸問題中ニハ、英國ニ重大利害關與アル事項アルヲ以テ日米間合意

661175

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Jan. 12

ノ成立ノ際ハ、日本ハ之ト同時ニ、英國側ノ合意ヲモ望ムベク、兩合意ヲ全ク同時ニ調印シ得ル様證般ノ手筈ヲ取テ度キ意圖ニシテ、右運ビノ必要ナルニ鑑ミ、既ニ米國ニ對シ右様取計方希望シ置キタリ、ト英國大使ニ同答シ置キタリ。

英國大使ハ、日米交渉ノ進歩程度ハ知ラザルモ、今在豫備的會談ノ域ヲ出デザルモノナリト了解シ居レリ、ト答ヘタリ。

依テ余ハ、過去ニ於テハ兎ニ角、現在ハ、既ニ、本格的交渉トナリ居リ、而モ今ヤ帝國政府ノ最後的對案提示ヲ以テ最後ノ段階ニ入りタル狀態ナリト答ヘ、尙右ノ次第ハ、米國側ニ完全ニ調明シ置ケリト附言セリ。

余ハ語ヲ續ケ英國首相ハ、ロンドン市長午餐會ノ演說ニテ、日米交渉ノ經過ニツキテハ、熟知セザルモ、日本ニ對シテ警告セントス、ト述べ居ル由ナルモ、氏トシテハ、其ノ論フ所ノ何タルカヲ知らズシテ脅迫ヲナスヨリモ、諸論點ヲ詳カニシテ、之ガ解決ニ協力スル方妥當ナラズヤ、ト難詰シ置キタリ。

但シ日米會談ハ今日ノ如キ段階ニ在ルヲ以テ、又米英間ニハ米英トシテノ關係アルニ鑑ミ、此ノ際、本會談ニ英國ノ參加ヲ慫慂シ、或ハ之ニ

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反對スル憲法ナシ、ト述ベ置ケリ。

帝國政府ハ、其ノ最終案起草ニ際シ是大限ノ議
歩ヲ取テシタル次第ナル旨説明シ、米國側ハ之ニ
反對ナカルベク、一週間乃至十日以内ニ、協定ノ
調印可能ナルベシ、ト述ベ置ケリ。不幸ニシテ米
國ガ其年俾理ノ受諾ヲ拒否セバ、交渉ヲ繼續スル
モ無益ナルベク、我ガ國內情勢ハ、妥結ニ、此ノ
上ノ遲延ヲ許サズ。

余ハ日米、日英關係ノ危局ヲ突發スル爲、目下
學生ノ努力ヲ傾注シ居ル旨指摘セリ。國內ニハ交
渉無用論アルモ、之ヲ制シテ漸ク交渉ハ繼續シツ
ツアリ。

是故ニ此上少シデモ遲延セシムル事ハ益ク不可
能ナリ。

美米ノ態度如何ニ依リテハ迅速妥結ノ方法モア
ル次第ナレバ、先方政府ニ於テモ此ノ邊ノ事情ヲ
充分ニ考慮シ交渉迅速成立ニ盡力アリ度シ、ト述
ベ置ケリ。

如上事案ノ急迫セル所以ヲ叙述シタルニ、同大使ハ
右ヲ傾聴シ初メテ事案ノ眞ニ逼迫セルヲ痛感セル
モノノ如ク、右ヲ早速政府ニ報告スベク、自分モ
迅速ナル妥結ノ爲、最善ノ努力ヲ試ミルベシ、ト

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述ヘタリ。

三 右ノ如ク米國政府ハ今猶交渉ハ、未ダ豫備的段階
ニアルヤニ考ヘ居ル節アル處右ハ貴電**第一〇七
〇號ヲ以テ貴使報告ノ「ルーズベルト」大統領ノ
言（此等豫備的會談ガ眞ノ交渉ノ基礎トナル事ヲ
望ム云々ノ部分）ニ徴スルモ明白ナリ。

我方ノ目スル限リ、此ハ最後の段階ナルニモ拘
ラズ、米側ガ依然トシテ新カル悠長緩慢ナル態度
ヲ持スルハ、誠ニ不幸ナリ。就テハ閣下ニ於テハ、
米側ヲ啓蒙シ、速ニ本件妥結ニ意ヲ決セシムル様
御奮闘アラシク專ヲ切望ス。

註* JDノ一第六二二八號

(S I S 「科學情報誌」第二四二九三—九四號)

** 入手シ得ズ

機密 陸軍省

陸軍省參謀本部

情報局

ワシントン、二十五、D O

一九四六年七月二十四日

予ハ茲ニ左ノ通り證明ス。即チ
添附取廻ノ日本文電報ノ複寫寫眞ハ陸海軍兩省ノ
熟練セル職員ニ依リ電氣的或ハ物理的方法ニ依ツ
テ傍受サレ、解讀セラレ而シテ翻譯セラレシモノ
ニシテ予ノ知り且信ズル限り正確ニ日本文字ヲ翻
譯スル爲メ西洋人ニトリ人力ノ可能ナル限度ニ於
テ正確且ツ典據ノアルモノナリ。

參謀本部附大佐

QARKER W CLARKE

カーター・ダヴリユー・クラーク

Ex. 1177

Doc. No. 2593-D (13)
Item No. 14

page 1

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
November 14, 1941
Purple

SECRET
FILE COPY

#1090 (Part 1 of 3)^a (Departmental Secret)
(To be handled in Government Code) TO ROOM 361

I am telling Your Excellency this for your own information only.

I believe that I will win out in the long run in these negotiations, and I will fight to the end. I will do my very best with infinite patience and then leave the outcome up to God Almighty. However, I must tell you the following:

1. As I told you in a number of messages, the policy of the American Government in the Pacific is to stop any further moves on our part either southward or northward. With every economic weapon at their command, they have attempted to achieve this objective, and now they are contriving by every possible means to prepare for actual warfare.

2. In short, they are making every military and every other kind of preparation to prevent us from a thrust northward or a thrust southward; they are conspiring most actively with the nations concerned and rather than yield on this fundamental political policy of theirs in which they believe so firmly, they would not hesitate, I am sure, to fight us. It is not their intention, I know, to repeat such a thing as the Munich conference which took place several years ago and which turned out to be such a failure. Already I think the apex of German victories has been passed. Soviet resistance persists, and the possibility of a separate peace has receded, and hereafter this trend will be more and more in evidence.

3. The United States is sealing over-friendlier relations with China, and insofar as possible she is assisting CHUNG. For the sake of peace in the Pacific, the United States would not favor us at the sacrifice of China. Therefore, the China problem might become the stumbling block to the pacification of the Pacific and as a result the possibility of the United States and Japan ever making up might vanish.

a - For Part 2, see S.I.S. #24857; Part 3 of 3 not available.

24877

Trans. 11/17/41 (2)

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
November 14, 1941
Purple (Urgent)

#1090 (Part 2 of 3)^a (Departmental Secret.) (To be handled in Government Code)

4. There is also the question of whether the officials of the Japanese Government are typing up very intimately with the Axis or not. We are regarded as having a very flexible policy, ready, nevertheless, in any case, to stab the United States right in the back. Lately the newspapers are writing in a manner to show how gradually we are typing up closer and closer with the Axis.

5. If we carry out a venture southward for the sake of our existence and our lives, it naturally follows that we will have to fight England and the United States, and chances are also great that the Soviet will participate. Furthermore, among the neutral nations, those of Central America are already the puppets of the United States, and as for those of South America, whether they like it or not, they are dependent for their economic existence on the United States and must maintain a neutrality partial thereto.

6. It is inevitable that this war will be long, and this little victory or that little victory, or this little defeat or that little defeat do not amount to much, and it is not hard to see that whoever can hold out till the end will be the victor.

7. It is true that the United States is gradually getting in deeper and deeper in the Atlantic, but this is merely a sort of convoy warfare, and as things now stand she might at any moment transfer her main strength to the Pacific.

a - Part 3 not available

SECRET

24857

JD 6553

Trans. 11/17/41 (7)

Doc. No. 2593 (Certificate)

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
WASHINGTON, 25, D.C.

24 July 1946

I hereby certify that the attached photostats of Japanese messages have been intercepted by electric or physical means, decrypted, and translated by trained personnel of the War and Navy Departments, and are accurate and authentic to the best of my knowledge and belief insofar as it is humanly possible for an occidental accurately to translate Japanese script.

/s/ Carter W. Clarke

CARTER W. CLARKE
Colonel, G.S.C.

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361

EXHIBIT NO. 1177

Doc 2075 D (13)
Item 14

華盛頓（野村）ヨリ

東京宛

一九四一年（昭和十六年）十一月十四日

紫

第一〇九〇號 △（三ノ第一部）（省外秘）

（政府暗號ニ依リ取扱ハルベシ）

本電閣下限リノ御含ミ迄申シ進ズ。

本交渉ニツイテハ、必勝ヲ確信シ、最後ノ最後

迄奮闘致スベク、其ノ上人專ヲ盡シテ天命ヲ待ツ

ノ心境ナリ。然ルニ、現下ノ状況左ノ通り観測ス。

一 己ニ累次報告ノ通り、米國政府ノ太平洋政策ハ、
日本ノ是以上ノ南進北進ヲ阻止スルニアリ。而シ
テ其ノ掌中ニアル凡ユル經濟的武器ヲ以テ、其ノ
目的ヲ達成セントスルモ、今ヤ實際戦争ニ對スル
準備ヲ著々進メ居レリ。

ニ 即チ、我々ガ北進又ハ南進スル場合ニ對シ、作
戰其ノ他萬般ノ準備ヲナシ、關係國トハ極力協力
シ、彼等ノ信託タル政治的根本原則ヲ譲リ妥協ス
ル位ナラバ、寧ロ戦争ヲ辭セザル覚悟ニシテ、今

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361

Doc 2593D (13)

Item 14

ノトコロ失敗ノ刻印ヲ押サレタル數年前ノ「ミユ
ンヘン」會談ノ如キコトヲ繰リ返ス意思アリト思
ハレズ。獨逸並立ノ時モ既ニ見エタリト認メラル。
「ソ」聯ノ戰意ハ今尙蒙存シ、單獨講和ノ危険モ
薄ラギタル今日、一層然ルモノアルベシト思料セ
ラル。

三 米國ハ餘リニモ親密ナル關係ヲ中國ニ確認シ專
情許ス限り將ノ援助ヲナシツ、アリ。太平洋安定
ノ爲ニ、中國ヲ犠牲ニシテ我方ニ厚意ヲ寄セルガ
如キハ米國ノナサザルトコロナルベシ。故ニ中國
問題ガ太平洋安定ノ「スタンプリング・ブロック」
トナリ、其ノ爲ニハ日米國交ノ調節モ亦不可能ト
ナリ得ル次第ナリ。

註 A 第二部ニ就テハ S・I・S 第二四八五七號
ヲ参照セラレ度シ、三ノ第三部ハ入手シ得ズ

二四八七

(福田)

Doc 2593 D (13)

Item 14

華盛頓（野村）ヨリ

東京宛

一九四一年（昭和十六年）十一月十四日
案（至急）

第一〇九〇號A（三ノ第二部）（省外秘）

（政府暗號ニ依リ取扱ハルベシ）

曰尙、日本政府當局ガ樞軸ト極メテ緊密一體トナ
リツツアリヤ否ヤノ問題ガアル。併シ乍ラ與スル
ニ形勢如何ニヨリテハ、直ニ背後ヨリ米國ヲ刺ス
ノ姿勢ニアルモノト認メ居リ、最近新聞ハ、漸次
我方ノ樞軸トノ緊密一體化ヲ認ムル様ノ言キ振リ
ナリ。

我我國ガ自存自活ノ爲南進ヲ敢行スル場合ニハ、
當然ノ結論トシテ對英米ノ戰トナリ、且「ソ」聯
モ参加スルニ至ルノ算多キモノト認メラル。又中
立國中、中米諸國ハ既ニ米國ノ傀儡タリ、南米ノ
中立諸國ハ、其ノ好ムト好マザルトヲ問ハズ、其
ノ經濟上ノ存在ヲ米國ニ依存シアリ、米國ニ有利
ナル中立ヲ保ツニ至ルベシ。

六此ノ戰爭ハ長期トナルコトハ必然ノ勢ニシテ、
一局部ノ成敗ハ、サホド大問題ニ非ズ、最後マデ
賭張リ得タルモノガ勝者タルコトモ略々豫想スル
ニ難カラズ。