

INTERR. OF KIDD (8 Feb. 46)

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INTERROGATION OF

(Marquis) KIDO, Koichi

(Continued)

DATE AND TIME: 8 February 1946, 1400 - 1600 hours

PLACE : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan

PRESENT : (Marquis) KIDO, Koichi
Mr. Henry R. Sackett, Interrogator
Lt. Fred F. Suzukawa, Interpreter
(Miss) S. M. Betar, Stenographer

Questions by: Mr. Sackett

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- Q Starting on August 28, 1933 in your diary, you have quite a lengthy entry with reference to the difficulty between the Lord Keeper and the Navy over the London Naval Conference. I think you touched on that once before. I wish you would explain to me just what that situation was that arose between the Lord Keeper and the Navy and how it came out into the open and how it was solved.
- A Concerning the London Treaty, Japan had reached the point where she had to accept it or refuse it.
- Q This was the Treaty that involved general reduction of armaments - world-wide - wasn't it?
- A It was the treaty that had to do with the Naval treaty.
- Q Yes, and involving reducing naval armament throughout the world. It was the 1930 London Naval Conference. Isn't that right?
- A Yes, the Chief of the Naval General Staff, Admiral KATO, was opposed to the Treaty. The then Navy Minister TAKARABE has been dispatched to London as Ambassador plenipotentiary and the then Premier HAMAGUCHI acted in behalf of the Navy Minister in his post during his absence. The Navy Chief of Staff, KATO,

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(CONT.)

A wanted to present the Navy's opinion to the Emperor and proceeded to go to the Palace and at that time the Grand Chamberlain SUZUKI happened to be the Chief of the Naval General Staff previous to KATO and he warned KATO like a good friend. Therefore, KATO changed his mind about seeing the Emperor. At the same time, HAMAGUCHI came up, seeking the audience of the Emperor in order to obtain the Emperor's directive to sign the London Treaty.

Q And when you say that SUZUKI warned his friend, KATO, what did he warn him of; that the Emperor was favorable to the Treaty?

A SUZUKI warned KATO that he should not pull up any opposition to the thing that the Government would normally do.

Q In other words, you mean that SUZUKI felt that the Treaty should be signed and KATO was opposing the Treaty and SUZUKI advised KATO he should not interfere but should let the Treaty be signed?

A SUZUKI only meant that KATO should not present his opinion to the Emperor previous to the Prime Minister's presentation of the Government's opinion.

Q I understand.

A I believe that SUZUKI did not criticise the policy.

Q It was a procedural question he was discussing - not whether it was right or wrong to sign the Treaty?

A And I believe that SUZUKI warned concerning the relationship between the Navy Minister and the Navy Chief of Staff. Consequently, the result was that KATO lost his opportunity to see the Emperor and HAMAGUCHI was able to see the Emperor instead.

Q Normally, wouldn't it have been perfectly proper for the Chief of Staff of the Navy to go to talk to the Emperor about a question of that type?

A Yes, that could be.

Q But would the usual procedure be to go after the Premier to talk to the Emperor instead of before?

- A Depending upon the matter, it can be either way, only KATO declined the Imperial audience on his own initiative at that time. Because Premier HAMAGUCHI was able to obtain permission for the signing of the London Treaty, a portion of the Navy vigorously opposed it and began to say that the Lord Keeper more or less obstructed the Naval General Staff, KATO, audience with the Emperor. That statement by the Navy circle is absolutely erroneous.
- Q Did the Lord Keeper have anything at all to do with the incident?
- A The Lord Keeper didn't know anything about it. The Naval Chief of Staff got his Imperial audience through the Aide-de-Camp and Premier HAMAGUCHI gets his audience through the Grand Chamberlain and the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal has no part whatsoever in that, and the Naval propoganda was to the effect that the Lord Keeper has obstructed the Imperial audience and it has been widely spread, and it even was criticized as violating the prerogatives of the Emperor.
- Q The truth of the matter was that the Lord Keeper did favor signing the Treaty. Isn't that right?
- A Yes.
- Q And the Navy was opposed to signing the Treaty and because of that friction, that aggravated this incident and the Navy took it upon itself to blame the Lord Keeper for it. Is that right?
- A Yes.
- Q They claimed that the Lord Keeper had interfered with the supreme prerogatives of the Navy and Naval affairs. Is that correct?
- A Yes, but it was absolutely false.
- Q That came out at one of the trials in connection with the May 15 incident. Someone that was on trial for the May 15 incident, brought that out in the opinion?
- A Yes.
- Q How was the matter finally settled or ironed out so as to get the Lord Keeper and the Navy Department back in good graces?

- A No solution was effected whatsoever and it even became the cause for the February 26 incident and at that time, the Grand Chamberlain and Lord Keeper were attacked.
- Q You think one reason they were included among those that were attacked on February 26 was due to this incident back in 1930?
- A Yes, and it became the impression that within the Imperial Household, there is an element which obstructed the military or the Navy.
- Q Well, the truth of the matter was that the Lord Keeper was generally opposed to this increase in the strength of the Army and Navy and he was outspoken on that point, wasn't he?
- A Even though the Lord Keeper does not voice his opinion, he has been well known to be in opposition.
- Q At least everyone knew that the advice he was giving the Emperor was to try to minimize the increase and power that was developing in the military?
- A Yes.
- Q This supreme prerogative we have mentioned several times, does that mean on a strictly naval question? For example, that the final decision is made by the Chief of Staff of the Navy rather than by the Cabinet?
- A On the matter of treaties, the Cabinet has the final word while on the matter of supply and naval armaments, the Naval Chief of Staff has the final word.
- Q By armaments, you mean the size of the Navy is determined by the Navy Chief of Staff and not in the Cabinet?
- A Yes.
- Q However, the Cabinet and the Diet have something to do with appropriations which have an indirect effect on the size of the Navy. Isn't that true?
- A Consequently, the Diet gets into difficulties on the matter of budget.

- Q In other words, the Chief of Staff of the Navy has the right to decide how large the Navy is going to be and the type of equipment it will have, etc., but it still has to go to the Diet to get money, so indirectly, the Diet can exercise some control over the Chief of Staff. Is that right?
- A The Government has the control of the budget but the Naval General Staff has the control as to how much they need and the Navy has the freedom of determining just how much it needs and she does not want any outsiders to interfere in the matter of how much she needs - not to have her needs determined by an outside source.
- Q Doesn't the Diet have the right to control that by appropriating money?
- A But its actual materialization is determined by the size of the budget.
- Q What does the Cabinet have to do with determining the size of the Navy or the amount of money that is to be appropriated for the Navy?
- A The Finance Minister contacts the Navy and determines the size of the Naval budget.
- Q And submits that to the Diet for approval?
- A Yes.
- Q When it comes down to a question of the declaration of war, who has the final say other than the Emperor, himself, as to whether war is declared or not?
- A The Cabinet requests an Imperial Rescript proclaiming war from the Emperor.
- Q In other words, it isn't a part of this supreme prerogative for the Army and Navy, themselves, that decide whether war is declared or not. It must be concurred in by the Cabinet.
- A That's right, the Cabinet has to be a part of it.

- Q Then, this supreme prerogative, really only pertains to the size of the Army and Navy, or in what matters is the prerogatives of the Navy and Army supreme?
- A The prerogatives is the power to order the movement of the Naval forces and the military forces.
- Q You mean that even though war hasn't been declared, they have the prerogative to determine where their forces shall be stationed, what strength, and things of that type?
- A Yes, that is entirely under the prerogatives of command and the Government has no part in it.
- Q In case the Army and Navy should agree that war should be declared, it cannot be declared unless the Cabinet concurs in it?
- A That is right, on proclamation of war, the Cabinet must do it.
- Q This would be very unusual but would it be possible for the Cabinet to declare war even though the Army and Navy didn't want it to be declared?
- A Actually, that cannot be done, because when war is to be declared, the Cabinet and Supreme Command have to agree. The actual operation is within the power of the supreme prerogative.
- Q Well, did there develop over a period of years quite an amount of friction between the office of the Lord Keeper and the Navy?
- A Because there is no direct contact, there would be no friction.
- Q I mean on account of this incident that happened, was there considerable hard feelings between the Office of the Lord Keeper and the Navy Chiefs of Staff?
- A There wasn't anything in particular and there wasn't any contact actually.
- Q Was there less contact between the Navy and the Lord Keeper's office after the 1930 incident than there was between the two offices before?
- A There wasn't any contact before.
- Q You think it was just sort of a personal attack of the Navy on the Lord Keeper with reference to this London Conference?

- A There were just personal feelings involved and actually KATO has given an injurious remark concerning the Lord Keeper.
- Q We have talked quite a bit about how this Manchurian Incident started and how it developed and spread in Manchuria. My information is that in December 1931, some few months after the incident itself in Manchuria, it was officially determined at a Cabinet meeting that it would be the policy of Japan to expand throughout four or five of the provinces of Manchuria and move its forces in there and take control. Do you have any recollection as to whether that was a Cabinet action? I am told it was.
- A I have no recollection.
- Q It was my understanding that ARAKI, War Minister in the latter part of December, proposed that Japan move into the main provinces of Manchuria; that it was brought up at the Cabinet meeting, discussed and decided upon as a matter of policy and thereafter carried out. Do you know whether that is true or not?
- A I have no recollection.
- Q That did happen. My point is whether that was discussed in advance of its happening or not.
- A There may have been such a thing but I don't know anything about it.
- Q Wouldn't you likely have heard such a decision by the Cabinet which involved moving into new territory on the part of Japan? It is rather an outstanding decision, is it not?
- A I have no recollection whatsoever. If such a critical decision has been made, I would have known something about it.
- Q It was more or less in line with what ARAKI, himself, was advocating in those days, wasn't it?
- A Yes.
- Q You think that the Cabinet, itself, did not favor what was taking place in Manchuria?
- A I believe that the WAKATSUKI Cabinet did not favor it. Because of Home Minister ADACHI's proposal to become more closely affiliated with the military, the WAKATSUKI Cabinet collapsed. I do not believe that such a radical policy has been adopted by the WAKATSUKI Cabinet. I have no recollection as to whether such a thing occurred in the following INUKAI Cabinet. May be it may have been done under the INUKAI Cabinet.

- Q Do you have any recollection of it being done under the INUKAI Cabinet?
- A No.
- Q Didn't the operation in Manchuria, by December, at least, long after the original incident, almost require the cooperation of the various ministers in the Cabinet in order to be accomplished? Because of the fact that appropriations were needed and financing was needed and in order to expand the Manchurian Incident as it was throughout all Manchuria, didn't that itself require cooperation on the part of all Cabinet members?
- A Yes, I believe that was necessary because if there were disagreement among the Cabinet members, the Cabinet would collapse.
- Q By that you mean that the Army in December of 1931 could not have carried out this program of moving into other provinces of Manchuria without the support of the Cabinet?
- A Yes, undoubtedly without the support of the Cabinet, they would not be able to operate because they wouldn't be able to get a budget.
- Q Had the Cabinet not supported what took place in Manchuria, it would have had to fall, wouldn't it?
- A And therefore Home Minister ADACHI, who wanted to join hands with the militarists and form a national unity cabinet and he wanted to include the Seiyukai also but WAKATSUKI disagreed and wanted to make it a Minseito Cabinet and INOUYE advocated the stand of WAKATSUKI at the home of KONOYE.
- Q I am thinking in terms of what happened after the INUKAI Cabinet came in, it taking office on December 13, 1931. That particular Cabinet supported the policy of War Minister ARAKI in Manchuria, didn't it?
- A I believe that after that, the Seiyukai became implicated with the military under ARAKI.
- Q There really was, in those days, a plan to expand the Manchurian Incident so that Japan would spread its military force throughout Manchuria and that plan was carried out. Isn't that right?
- A I never could understand that because previously INUKAI has even quoted to the extent he cannot recognize the establishment of Manchukuo.

Q But he permitted that expansion to take place when he was Premier, didn't he?

A That is why I cannot understand it.

Q Then, the only logical conclusion we can reach is that he cooperated in the expansion, otherwise, he would have had to resign and the Cabinet would have fallen. Isn't that correct?

A That is why I think that the changing phases and development of the situation has been carefully and skillfully explained to INUKAI and therefore he was swept away by the tide of events.

Q I might say that General ARAKI now states that in December 1931 he proposed that Japan expand into these four provinces of Manchuria; that he brought the matter up in a Cabinet meeting and it was unanimously approved that Japan do that sort of thing. Do you have any recollection of that?

A I do not know if such a thing has been decided upon. If it had, I most likely would have written it down here (indicating diary).

Q It would have been an important decision, wouldn't it?

A Very important.

Q Although that was more or less the policy of ARAKI, himself, insofar as your opinion is concerned?

A Yes.

Q On September 2 in your diary, Marquis, this Viscount KANEKO proposed the publishing of a book and in that book was involved a discussion of Imperial virtue. According to your diary, there seemed to be some concern about a treatise on Imperial virtue being published. What was the opposition to that and what was meant by "Imperial virtue"?

A The Imperial Household Minister said that before that matter could be published it would have to be investigated by him, and carefully, before publication and it doesn't mean he was in opposition to it.

Q What were they referring to when they discussed Imperial virtue? What does Imperial virtue mean?

A Imperial virtue is the situation such as that in which Emperor MEIJI found himself; that is, even during the Sino-Japanese War and Russo-Japanese War, Emperor Meiji did not fully agree in it. He always opposed it and finally after a unified Cabinet agreement to the effect of a war did Meiji acquiesce to it and for that reason it is known as Imperial virtue.

Q I still don't understand what Imperial virtue means.

A It means that always the Emperor is desiring peace.

Q Was it impossible in those days for somebody to write a book involving the subject of Imperial virtue without first getting consent to do so?

A Previously a book on this sort of thing has been published but the problem is whether or not the Imperial Household Ministry should publish it.

Q This man, being a Viscount, was in the Imperial Household?

A Yes.

Q We were talking a little yesterday about these proposed changes in the structural set-up of the Navy General Staff. Why was it, in your opinion that the Navy wanted to change its internal organization. What was it seeking to accomplish by this change?

A I do not know the details well but I believe that the Navy was beginning to take on the attitude of the Army more and more and it attempted to obtain supreme prerogatives from the Naval Ministry.

Q In other words, you think the Navy was becoming more aggressive minded?

A Yes.

Q And in order to better get itself in a position to participate in aggression, it wanted to reorganize its set-up?

A Because the Navy has taken on the attitude, following the London Naval Conference, that its naval ratio has become so much less than the others that it has to be made independent from the other branches and therefore be in a stronger position.

- Q Well, now, is it true that prior to the revision of this Navy set-up, the Navy Minister had the final say on Navy matters?
- A I believe that its scope of operation was much larger than that of the Army.
- Q In the case of the Army, the supreme prerogative rested with the Chief of Staff and not with the War Minister. Is that correct?
- A Yes.
- Q While in the case of the Navy prior to this revision, the supreme prerogative really rested with the Navy Minister?
- A Not entirely. I don't know the details.
- Q But the Navy Minister had much more to say on naval affairs than the War Minister in those days? Is that correct?
- A Yes.
- Q And the Navy was advocating that the Chief of Staff increase its prerogatives?
- A Yes.
- Q Who in the Navy was the outstanding advocate of the change? What man or men?
- A The Naval Vice Chief of Staff SUETSUGU was very active in that respect.
- Q Was SUETSUGU closely affiliated with the Army Chief of Staff in those days?
- A No.
- Q Would you say he was being influenced by the Army chief of Staff in this movement?
- A I don't believe so. Many of the ideas of the Navy resulted from the London Naval Conference.
- Q I notice from your entry of September 22 in your diary that the Emperor voiced some inquiries with reference to this proposed change. Can you find that? What was concerning the Emperor with reference to this change of organization in the Navy? You mention that the Emperor was concerned about the dispatch of war ships and the dispatch of troops overseas? What was that problem?

- A The Navy has always been dispatching its forces overseas while the military would not be able to dispatch forces overseas under the same circumstances and the transfer of prerogatives of supreme command of the Navy would make the dispatch of Naval forces overseas rather difficult and become quite involved.
- Q Why did it tend to complicate that problem? Why didn't it make it easier?
- A Because of the chain of orders that would have to be issued because during peace time hitherto the Navy Minister has had all the matters of naval dispatches.
- Q After this change, it would be up to the Chief of Staff to do that work. Is that right?
- A I believe that would make the situation difficult.
- Q I don't understand why it would make it more difficult. It just meant that a different person would have the right to decide.
- A It would mean that the Chief of Staff, who normally takes on such a function during war-time would be taking a similar function during peace-time and that has a rather grave significance.
- Q In other words, the Emperor was concerned about the Chief of Staff having so great a power over over-seas questions in peace-time? Is that right?
- A He felt that was bad.
- Q In other words, the Minister of the Navy in peace-time had a right to decide where the Navy went overseas? Is that right?
- A Yes.
- Q But the Minister of War or the Chief of Staff in the Army in peace-time couldn't make that decision. Is that correct?
- A The Army can dispatch forces overseas only during war-time, while the Navy in peace-time can dispatch its forces from Naval stations to Naval stations and the situation is entirely different.
- Q Was this change in the structure of the Navy finally accomplished so as to make the two branches of the military equal in administration?

- A Yes. I believe that was done and as a consequence, the Chief of General Staff took on the same name like that had by the Chief of the Army General Staff.
- Q You say that in peace-time, it is impossible for the Chief of Staff of the Army to dispatch troops overseas while after war has been declared, it is within the prerogative of the Chief of Staff to do so. Is that correct?
- A Yes.
- Q When the Manchurian Incident occurred in 1931, no formal declaration of war was ever made on China, was it but as a matter of fact weren't numerous troops dispatched into Manchuria?
- A Yes.
- Q How was that accomplished?
- A Because it was an incident and it is something like that of war so it could be done. Only during peace-time, the overseas shipment of troops cannot be done.
- Q Well, it is merely a matter of words whether war exists or war doesn't exist. Is it up to the Chief of Staff to determine whether times were peace-times or war times?
- A I believe there is a regulation that in the case of incidents, they can do such things.
- Q On September 26 you indicated you attended a meeting where there were present the Minister of Foreign Affairs and others and the Minister discussed the foreign policy of Japan with reference to Russia, United States, Great Britain and China. Do you recall who the Minister of Foreign Affairs was on that occasion? Was it SAITO, UCHIDA or HIROTA? My notes indicate that KOKI HIROTA became Foreign Minister in September 1933.
- A I have no recollection as to what sort of a story he gave.
- Q You don't recall who it was on that occasion, even?
- A I have no recollection. I don't believe his opinion had any significance because I hadn't made any further notations.
- Q Was there any opposition on the part of the Cabinet or the Government to changing the Navy set-up - Navy regulations?

- A The Government wasn't inquiring of its opinion, I suppose.
- Q In other words, the Cabinet wasn't consulted on that question of changing the Navy regulations?
- A I don't believe that problem was presented to the Cabinet at all.
- Q It was a matter that was submitted to the Emperor for a decision?
- A It is a prerogative of supreme command so I believe that the Navy Minister presented it to the Emperor.
- Q Would it require a law or an Imperial Rescript to accomplish?
- A I believe it is written in Naval regulations.
- Q But who authorizes the issuance of these regulations, the Emperor?
- A The Emperor issues it. It is something like an Imperial Order.
- Q In other words, the Cabinet or the Diet doesn't have anything to say as to how much power the Chief of Staff of the Navy has. It is purely a matter for the Emperor to determine that question, is it?
- A The Cabinet does not get involved in matters or prerogatives of command.
- Q The prerogatives of command are something that are granted to certain Chiefs of Staff or Ministers or other officials by the Emperor. Is that right?
- A Yes.
- Q In other words, the Emperor, in the final analysis really has the right to decide those questions but he delegates them to different officials in the Government?
- A Yes .
- Q So, on that occasion, he delegated to the Chief of Staff of the Navy the right to determine either in peace or war, whether ships were to be sent overseas?
- A Yes.
- Q I am reading from your diary as of September 30. Was there considerable friction between the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and the War Ministry over policy questions? Was that a source of friction in those days?

- A At that time, there wasn't much friction between the War Minister and the Chief of Staff. Only there was friction with the Cabinet.
- Q I see. What was the friction between the War Minister and the Chiefs of Staff on the one side and the Cabinet about?
- A Because from the start to the end of the Manchurian Incident there had been considerable disagreements between the War Ministry and the Cabinet because the Cabinet was always opposed to the development of the Manchurian Incident.
- Q And it was ARAKI and MASAKI, as I understand it, that were always pressing for the carrying out of the Manchurian Incident in those days?
- A Yes.
- Q On October 2, you mention a certain TERASHIMA, who was involved in the May 15 incident, had been placed on the Naval General Staff and that this was rather serious. What was the significance of this appointment?
- A This TERASHIMA was reputed to be in favor of the London Naval Treaty and was to be transferred to the Commanding Chief of the Training Fleet and consequently because of the ill feeling of the Navy circles, he was not able to assume that post and he was unfortunately merely attached to the Naval General Staff.
- Q In other words, it was a case where the Navy was, in effect, exercising some discipline on one of its members because that one particular member was in sympathy with the London Naval Conference. Is that right?
- A I believe this is an instance where the Naval discipline has been violated - where a superior officer has been prosecuted.
- Q Was it an instance where the Emperor expressed himself as to what had happened?
- A The Emperor inquired as to the reason for it, at which the Naval Minister became very much excited because he wasn't able to give an adequate reason.
- Q The Emperor, himself, being in favor of the Naval Treaty, didn't like to see a Navy man who was also in favor of it, disciplined for his attitude. Was it common for the Emperor to take such an active interest in personnel affairs of the Navy?

- A He makes an occasional inquiry into a great personnel matter like that.
- Q Was anything ever done about restoring this man to a higher rank or position.
- A No, the matter just rolled on, nothing was done about it.
- Q The Emperor didn't press the matter?
- A He didn't make any special request. The repercussion from the London Naval Treaty had great effect. In fact, all the men of the Naval Bureau were made to retire.
- Q I don't quite understand that. What was that incident? Tell me more about it.
- A Because the Naval General Staff was opposed to it while the Naval Bureau all favored it. Consequently, all the members of the Navy Bureau were persecuted and made to retire.
- Q Is the Bureau of Naval Affairs under the Naval Ministry?
- A Yes.
- Q They were forced to retire by the Chief of Staff. Is that right?
- A Rather than by the Chief of Staff, I believe they were persecuted by the opposition.
- Q Who were the opposition, for example?
- A KATO, SUETSUGU.
- Q KATO was Chief of Staff, wasn't he?
- A Yes.
- Q They were really forced to resign from the Bureau of Naval Affairs by the Chief of Staff then?
- A Actually so, although on the surface, it wasn't so.
- Q On October 12, what was it that War Minister ARAKI proposed to do in connection with granting amnesty to criminals?

- A Because ARAKI has always been sympathetic to the May 15 incident, and because he felt that public sentiment against them were becoming worse, he felt that it would be the best thing to pardon the criminals.
- Q He really proposed to pardon these men because they were carrying out his wishes in creating the May incident. Is that right?
- A Rather than say "public sentiment against him", I mean public sentiment didn't become any better.
- Q As a matter of fact, Premier INUKAI was opposed to this increase in power by the military and Premier INUKAI on May 15 was assassinated primarily because he was opposed to the military?
- A Yes.
- Q The perpetrators of this assassination and incident on that day were tried and convicted?
- A Yes.
- Q And ARAKI was always sympathetic with the assassination of INUKAI and what had taken place on May 15. That is correct, isn't it?
- A Yes.
- Q And now, when he realizes that these people were carrying out a program with which he sympathizes, were being convicted and put in jail, he proposes that they be set free. Is that right?
- A At that time, there were two thoughts prevalent in regard to these criminals. One was that since the criminals perpetrated the crime with the intent of bettering the country, on the other hand, they felt that the law must be carried out.
- Q But ARAKI's opinion was that these men had carried out a program he was advocating and he was trying to get them out of jail because they were doing his wish and desire. Is that correct?
- A And he felt that since they had good intentions, they ought to be released.

- Q In other words, ARAKI approved the assassination of anyone who opposed his program. Is that what it amounted to?
- A On the surface, it might be so.
- Q But his action in seeking to release these men and free them is certainly indicative of that position, isn't it?
- A Yes.
- Q Was he successful in getting these men freed from jail after their due conviction by the court?
- A I am not sure but I believe they were not able to release them.
- Q What plea did he make in favor of these men being free? What was his public expression on that point?
- A I believe that he stated it was the generosity of the Emperor and the good intention of the criminals.
- Q In other words, INUKAI was opposing the militarists and certain assassins who favored the military killed him. ARAKI, later on after the assassins had been convicted, while he was War Minister, publicly advocated that they be set free because in assassinating those who were opposed to the military, they were really benefitting the country. Is that his reasoning?
- A I don't believe such a conclusive statement can be made. It is not that the action of the Army or the military is wrong but that the person's spirit or intention has not been wrong.
- Q Well, ARAKI felt that these assassins in supporting the military were in good faith and therefore shouldn't be punished for it.
- A Yes.
- Q But the main reason, no doubt, he felt that way is because he was supporting the military himself. That faction of the Government or that class of people that were concerned about the increase in the power of the military did not favor the freeing of these assassins, did they?
- A No.
- Q On October 14, you had a talk with Prince SAIONJI with reference to several questions. The first one you mention by number was the way the Emperor handled the revision of the Navy regulations. Do you recall what Prince SAIONJI's reaction was to that?

- A The Genro did not agree to the revision of this sort. He felt that the political parties should handle such matters.
- Q I don't understand your answer. My question was what was the Prince's reaction as to how the Emperor handled the change in the regulations of the Navy Department?
- A Prince SAIONJI had a disagreement concerning that story. He felt that the Naval regulations should not be revised.
- Q Why did he feel that way? What was his reasoning?
- A It was because he wanted to have the administration centering around the Diet and through the political parties and because he was disagreeing with the many proposals whereby the military or Navy had their authorities enlarged.
- Q You also discussed with him this question of amnesty that was being advocated by ARAKI. What was his reaction and comments as to that?
- A I believe that the story was said to the effect that there were rumors saying that ARAKI, the War Minister, had great confidence of the Emperor but that the Navy Minister did not have such confidence.
- Q What I am referring to is some discussion you had with Prince SAIONJI with reference to this plan by the War Minister that the May 15 assassins be freed? I wondered what the Prince's reaction was to that.
- A SAIONJI was very much opposed to pardoning the criminals because he was advocating the adherence to the laws as much as possible.
- Q What did he have to say about ARAKI in that connection?
- A And as a consequence, Prince SAIONJI did not have any confidence in ARAKI. And Prince SAIONJI mentioned that rumors were prevalent that ARAKI has the confidence of the Emperor but he felt that is the propoganda issued by the younger military group and untrue.
- Q He felt that ARAKI's attitude was another indication of his program to increase the power of the military. Is that right?
- A Yes.

Certificate of Interpreter

I, Lt. Fred Suzukawa, 0-2030605
(name) (Serial Number)

being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of 19 pages, is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Fred J. Suzukawa
Lt. Fred

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 8 day of August, 1946.

J. W. Matthews

(Name and Rank)

Duty Detailed Investigating Officer,
International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP.

Certificate of Stenographer

I, S. M. Betar hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

S. M. Betar

Certificate of Interrogator.

I, (we) Henry Sackett, _____,
and _____,

certify that on 8 day of February, 1946, personally appeared before me (us) Marquis Koichi Kido, and according to Lt. Fred Suzukawa, interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

Tokyo, Japan
Place

8 August 1946
Date

J. W. Matthews
