

# INVESTIGATION OF THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY

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APPENDIX TO  
HEARINGS  
BEFORE THE  
SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS  
OF THE  
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS  
SECOND SESSION

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VOLUME X  
ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES AND ORGANIZATIONS  
LEE HARVEY OSWALD IN NEW ORLEANS  
CIA PLOTS AGAINST CASTRO  
ROSE CHERAMIE

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MARCH 1979

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Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Assassinations



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE  
WASHINGTON : 1979

43-944

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For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office  
Washington, D.C. 20402

Stock No. 052-070-04981-2

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
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ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVISTS AND ORGANIZATIONS  
AND  
LEE HARVEY OSWALD IN NEW ORLEANS

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Staff Report  
of the  
Select Committee on Assassinations  
U.S. House of Representatives  
Ninety-fifth Congress  
Second Session

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March 1979

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## INTRODUCTION

(1)\* Two primary factors prompted the committee's investigation of anti-Castro activists and organizations. First, the committee ascertained that as a consequence of the efforts, the failure and the eventual unwillingness of the Kennedy administration to liberate Cuba from Castro, these persons and organizations, acquired the means, motive, and opportunity to assassinate the President. Second, the committee believed that Lee Harvey Oswald's verified association with anti-Castro Cubans while living in New Orleans during 1963, together with his possible contacts with other anti-Castro activists, further enhanced the possibility of the involvement of anti-Castro elements in the assassination. For these reasons, the committee investigated numerous anti-Castro organizations and operatives and Oswald's activities while living in New Orleans to determine their connection, if any, to the assassination.

(2) The committee initiated its investigation by selecting the most active anti-Castro groups and their key leaders from among the more than 100 anti-Castro organizations in existence in November 1963. These groups included Alpha 66, Cuban Revolutionary Junta (JURE), Commandos L, the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantial (DRE), the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC), which includes the Frente Revolucionario Democrático (FRD), the Junta Gobierno de Cuba in Exilo (JGCE), the 30th of November, the International Penetration Forces (InterPen), Revolutionary Recovery Movement (MRR), and Ejército Invasor Cubano (EIC). Their selection evolved both from the committee's independent field investigation and the examination of the files and records maintained by the Federal and local agencies then monitoring Cuban exile activity, including local police departments, the FBI, the CIA, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (now the Drug Enforcement Administration, or DEA), the Customs Service, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Department of Defense.

(3) These "action groups" were the movements most active on both the military and propaganda fronts: the groups that not only talked about anti-Castro operations, but actually carried out infiltrations and raids into Cuba, conducted Castro assassination attempts, participated in a multiplicity of arms dealings and possessed the most vociferous and aggressive leaders. These groups and individuals, the target of the Kennedy administration's crackdown on anti-Castro operations following the Cuban missile crisis, were the bitterest and felt the most betrayed by President Kennedy's policies.

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\*Arabic numerals in parentheses at the beginning of paragraphs indicate the paragraph number for purposes of citation and referencing; italic numerals in parentheses in the middle or at the end of sentences indicate references which can be found at the end of each report or section.

(4) After selecting these groups, the committee focused its investigation on the key members in each group and concentrated on uncovering links to Lee Harvey Oswald. The committee found evidence or indications of contacts between Oswald and four individuals who were associated with anti-Castro groups. These persons were JURE member Silvia Odio, Alpha 66 leader Antonio Veciana, CRC designate Frank Bartes, and DRE member Carlos Bringuier. Oswald encountered both Bartes and Bringuier in New Orleans during the summer of 1963.

(5) The committee also focused its investigation on Oswald's activities while living in New Orleans from April to August 1963. Oswald apparently established some contacts with non-Cubans of anti-Castro sentiments who were not alined with any group, such as David Ferrie.

(6) This staff report reflects the nature of the committee's investigation of the anti-Castro and New Orleans areas. It does not, however, reflect all of the investigative work conducted, nor all of the staff analysis relating to the anti-Castro and New Orleans subject matters.

(7) Other areas that are not directly reflected in these reports include the statements of the "Clinton witnesses," seven persons who claim they saw Oswald together with David Ferrie and a New Orleans businessman, Clay Shaw, in Clinton, La., during late August or early September 1963.

(8) This report does not contain committee conclusions.



## I. THE INGREDIENTS OF AN ANTI-CASTRO CUBAN CONSPIRACY

(9) Was the John F. Kennedy assassination a conspiracy involving anti-Castro Cuban exiles? The committee found that it was not easy to answer that question years after the event, for two reasons. First, the Warren Commission decided not to investigate further the issue despite the urging of staff counsel involved with that evidence and the apparent fact that the anti-Castro Cuban exiles had the means, motivation, and opportunity to be involved in the assassination.

(10) In addition, the area of possible Cuban exile involvement was one in which the Warren Commission was not provided with an adequate investigative background. According to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence:

(11) Despite knowledge of Oswald's apparent interest in pro-Castro and anti-Castro activities and top level awareness of certain CIA assassination plots, the FBI . . . made no special investigative effort into questions of possible Cuban Government or Cuban exile involvement in the assassination independent of the Oswald investigation. There is no indication that the FBI or the CIA directed the interviewing of Cuban sources or of sources within the Cuban exile community. (1)

(12) Nevertheless, even from the paucity of evidence that was available to them in 1964, two staff attorneys for the Warren Commission speculated that Lee Harvey Oswald, despite his public posture as a Castro sympathizer, was actually an agent of anti-Castro exiles. Pressing for further investigation of that possibility, Assistant Counsel William Coleman and W. David Slawson wrote a memorandum to the Commission stating:

(13) The evidence here could lead to an anti-Castro involvement in the assassination on some sort of basis as this: Oswald could have become known to the Cubans as being strongly pro-Castro. He made no secret of his sympathies, and so the anti-Castro Cubans must have realized that law enforcement authorities were also aware of Oswald's feelings and that, therefore, if he got into trouble, the public would also learn of them . . . Second, someone in the anti-Castro organization might have been keen enough to sense that Oswald had a penchant for violence . . . On these facts, it is possible that some sort of deception was used to encourage Oswald to kill the President when he came to Dallas . . . The motive of this would, of course, be the expectation that after the President was killed Oswald would be caught or at least his identity ascertained, the law enforcement authorities and the public would then blame the assassination on

the Castro government and a call for its forceful overthrow would be irresistible. . . .(2)

(14) It is important in considering the possibility of anti-Castro Cuban involvement in the Kennedy assassination to recall the political and emotional conditions that affected the Cuban exile communities in Miami, New Orleans, and Dallas while Kennedy was President.

#### THE BACKGROUND: THE REGIME OF FIDEL CASTRO RUZ

(15) If it can be said to have a beginning, the anti-Castro Cuban exile movement was seeded in the early morning hours of New Year's Day 1959 when a DC-4 lifted from the fog-shrouded Camp Columbia airfield in Havana.(3) Aboard the plane was Fulgencio Batista, the military dictator of Cuba for the previous 6 years.(4) Batista was fleeing the country, his regime long beset by forces from within and without, now crumbling under pressure from rebel forces sweeping down from the mountains. When dawn came, the bells tolled in Havana and, 600 miles away, Fidel Castro Ruz began his triumphal march to the capital.(5) For seven days Castro and his 26th of July Movement rebels moved down Cuba's Central Highway while thousands cheered and threw flowers in their path.(6) Castro finally arrived in Havana on January 8 and characteristically gave a speech. Clad in his green fatigue uniform while three white doves, which someone had dramatically released, circled above him, Castro boldly proclaimed: "There is no longer an enemy!"(7)

(16) That was not true, of course, and he knew it. A hard core of Batistianos had fled the country early, many long before their leader, and were already concocting counter-revolutionary plots from their refuges in the United States, the Dominican Republic and elsewhere.(8)

(17) And it was not very long after Castro took power that a sense of betrayal began to grow among those who had once been his strongest supporters.(9) As each day went by it became more apparent that Castro's revolution was, as one chronicler noted, "leading inexorably toward an institutionalized dictatorship in which individuals were contemptuously shorn of their rights and dissenters were met with charges of treasonable conduct, counterrevolutionary activity or worse." (10) Then, too, there was a large number of public executions. Within 2 weeks of his reign, Castro shot 150 ex-Batista officials.(11) Within 3 months, there were at least 506 executions.(12)

(18) The disillusionment for many Cubans deepened when it became obvious that the form of Castro's rule was turning toward communism and that Castro's attitude toward the United States was engendering a hostile relationship. The publishing of Castro's Agrarian Reform Law in May 1959, was a significant sign.(13) It was far more radical than had been expected and was obviously designed to strip both Cuban and American-owned sugar firms of their immensely valuable cane lands.(14) A few weeks later the chief of Castro's air force, Maj. Pedro Diaz-Lanz, resigned, charging "\* \* \* there was Communist influence in the armed forces and Government."(15) Then, when Castro's own hand-picked president, Manuel Urrutia, announced at a press conference that he rejected the support of the Communists and said "I believe that any real Cuban revolutionary should reject it openly," Castro

immediately forced him to resign and accused him of actions "bordering on treason." (16)

(19) And so, after the broken pledges of free elections and a free press, the mass trials and executions, the assumption of unlimited power and the bellicose threats against the United States, it slowly became apparent to many Cubans that Fidel Castro was not the political savior they had expected. (17)

(20) Then, on October 19, 1959, there occurred an incident which precipitated the formation of the first organized anti-Castro opposition within Cuba. Maj. Huber Matos, one of Castro's highest ranking officers and considered by most Cubans to be one of the key heroes of the revolution, resigned from the Army in protest against the increasing favoritism shown to known Communists. (18) The next day Matos was arrested, charged with treason, subsequently tried and sentenced to 20 years in prison. Shortly afterward, Castro himself called a secret meeting of the National Agrarian Reform Institute managers at which he outlined a plan to communize Cuba within 3 years. (19) There the suspicions of Dr. Manuel Artime, the manager in Oriente Province, were confirmed. "I realized," Artime later said, "that I was a democratic infiltrator in a Communist government." (20)

(21) Artime returned to Oriente and began organizing students and peasants to fight against Castro and communism. By early November each province in Cuba had an element of Artime's new underground movement. It was called the Movimiento de Recuperación Revolucionaria (MRR). It was the first anti-Castro action group originating from within Castro's own ranks. (21)

(22) By the summer of 1960, it had become obvious both within and outside of Cuba that the foundation for an eventual confrontation between Castro and anti-Castro forces had been laid. The Eisenhower administration had canceled the Cuban sugar quota. (22) Soviet first deputy chairman, Anastas Mikoyan had visited Havana and Raul Castro had gone to Moscow. (23) Ernesto "Che" Guevara had proclaimed publicly that the revolution was on the road set by Marx, and Allen Dulles of the Central Intelligence Agency had said in a speech that communism had perverted Castro's revolution. (24) By then, Castro had seized more than \$700 million in U.S. property within Cuba. (25)

(23) On March 17, 1960, President Eisenhower authorized the CIA to organize, train and equip Cuban refugees as a guerrilla force to overthrow Castro. (26) Soon it became common knowledge within Cuba that a liberation army was being formed and that a political structure in exile had been created. (27) As the flight from Cuba increased in size and fervor, the exile community in the United States grew in spirit and confidence. One historian captured the special characteristics of the new arrivals:

They were new types of refugees. Instead of a home, they were seeking temporary asylum. They found it along the sandy beaches and curving coastline of Florida. They arrived by the thousands, in small fishing boats, in planes, chartered or stolen, and crowded into Miami. Along the boulevards, under the palms, and in hotel lobbies, they gathered and plotted their counterrevolution. Miami began to take on the air of a Cuban city. Even its voice was changing. Stores and cafes began advertising in Spanish and English \* \* \*. Everyone talked of home only 100 miles away. And every-

one talked about the great liberation army being formed in the secret camps somewhere far away. (28)

(24) By April 1961, the more than 100,000 Cubans who had fled Castro's revolution lived in anticipation of its overthrow. They had been buoyed in that hope by public pronouncements of support from the U.S. Government. In his state of the Union address, President Kennedy had spoken of "the Communist base established 90 miles from the United States," and said that "\* \* \* Communist domination in this hemisphere can never be negotiated." (29) In addition, the Cuban exiles had been organized, directed and almost totally funded by agencies of the U.S. Government, principally the CIA. (30)

(25) From an historical perspective, in light of its later radical change, the attitude of the Cuban exiles toward the U.S. Government prior to the Bay of Pigs is especially significant. Author Haynes Johnson who, in writing a history of the invasion, collaborated with the top Cuban leaders, including brigade civilian chief Manuel Artime, described that attitude in detail:

From the beginning, the Cuban counterrevolutionists viewed their new American friends with blind trust. Artime was no exception. He, and later virtually all of the Cubans involved, believed so much in the Americans—or wanted so desperately to believe—that they never questioned what was happening or expressed doubts about the plans. Looking back on it, they agree now that their naivete was partly genuine and partly reluctance to turn down any offer of help in liberating their country. In fact, they had little choice; there was no other place to turn. Some, of course, were driven by other motives: political power and personal ambition were involved. Even more important was the traditional Cuban attitude toward America and Americans. To Cubans the United States was more than the colossus of the north, for the two countries were bound closely by attitudes, by history, by geography and by economics. The United States was great and powerful, the master not only of the hemisphere but perhaps of the world, and it was Cuba's friend. One really didn't question such a belief. It was a fact; everyone knew it. And the mysterious, anonymous, ubiquitous American agents who dealt with the Cubans managed to strengthen that belief. (31)

(26) This "blind trust" by the Cuban exiles in the U.S. Government prior to the Bay of Pigs was specifically noted by the military commander of the 2506 Brigade, José (Pepe) Pérez San Román:

"Most of the Cubans were there," he said,

because they knew the whole operation was going to be conducted by the Americans, not by me or anyone else. They did not trust me or anyone else. They just trusted the Americans. So they were going to fight because the United States was backing them. (32)

(27) The debacle at the Bay of Pigs was not only a military tragedy for the anti-Castro Cuban exiles but also a painful shattering of their confidence in the U.S. Government. The exile leaders claimed that the failure of the invasion was a result of the lack of promised air

support, and for that they directly blamed President Kennedy. (33) Particularly galling to them was Kennedy's public declaration to Soviet Premier Khrushchev at the height of the invasion, when the Brigade was being slaughtered in the swamps of Bahia de Cochinos: ". . . I repeat now that the United States intends no armed intervention in Cuba." (34)

(28) Even those exile leaders who were willing to rationalize the extent of Kennedy's responsibility were dissuaded when Kennedy himself admitted the blame. Cuban Revolutionary Council leader Manuel Antonio de Varona, in his executive session testimony before the committee, told of the President gathering the Council members together at the White House when it became clear that the invasion was a disaster. Varona recalled:

We were not charging Mr. Kennedy with anything; we just wanted to clarify. We knew that he didn't have any direct knowledge of the problem, and we knew that he was not in charge of the military effects directly. Nevertheless, President Kennedy, to finish the talks, told us he was the one—the only one responsible. (35)

A few days after that meeting, the White House issued a public statement declaring that President Kennedy assumed "sole responsibility" for the U.S. role in the action against Cuba. (36)

(29) The acceptance of responsibility did not cut the bitter disappointment the Cuban exiles felt toward the U.S. Government and President Kennedy. Much later, captured and imprisoned by Castro, Brigade Commander San Román revealed the depth of his reaction at the failure of the invasion: "I hated the United States," he said, "and I felt that I had been betrayed. Every day it became worse and then I was getting madder and madder and I wanted to get a rifle and come and fight against the U.S." (37)

(30) Prominent Cuban attorney Mario Lazo wrote a book caustically titled *Dagger in the Heart*. (38) Lazo wrote:

The Bay of Pigs defeat was wholly self-inflicted in Washington. Kennedy told the truth when he publicly accepted responsibility . . . The heroism of the beleaguered Cuban Brigade had been rewarded by betrayal, defeat, death for many of them, long and cruel imprisonment for the rest. The Cuban people and the Latin American nations, bound to Cuba by thousands of subtle ties of race and culture, were left with feelings of astonishment and disillusionment, and in many cases despair. They had always admired the United States as strong, rich, generous—but where was its sense of honor and the capacity of its leaders?

The mistake of the Cuban fighters for liberation was that they thought too highly of the United States. They believed to the end that it would not let them down. But it did . . . (39)

(31) President Kennedy was well aware of the bitter legacy left him by the Bay of Pigs debacle. It is not now possible to document the changes in Kennedy's personal attitude brought about by the military defeat, but the firming of U.S. policy toward Cuba and the massive infusion of U.S. aid to clandestine anti-Castro operations in the wake of the Bay of Pigs was editorially characterized by Taylor

Branch and George Crile in Harper's magazine as "the Kennedy vendetta." (40).

(32) What can be documented is the pattern of U.S. policy between the period of the Bay of Pigs failure in April 1961 and the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962. That pattern, replete with both overt and covert maneuvers, had a significant effect on the reshaping of Cuban exile attitudes and, when it was abruptly reversed, could have provided the motivation for involvement in the assassination of President Kennedy.

(33) In retrospect, the period between the Bay of Pigs and the Cuban missile crisis can be considered the high-water mark of anti-Castro activity, almost every manifestation of the U.S. policy providing a reassurance of support of the Cuban exile cause. As a matter of fact, only a few days after the Bay of Pigs invasion, President Kennedy delivered a particularly hard-line address before the American Society of Newspaper Editors on the implications of communism in Cuba. "Cuba must not be abandoned to the Communists," he declared. In appealing for support from Latin America, he indicated that the United States would expect more from the nations of the hemisphere with regard to Cuba and asserted that the United States would not allow the doctrine of nonintervention to hinder its policy. Said Kennedy, "... our restraint is not inexhaustible." and spoke of Cuba in the context of the "new and deeper struggle." (41)

(34) When Castro, in a May Day speech, declared Cuba to be a socialist nation, the State Department retorted that Cuba was a full-fledged member of the Communist bloc. (42)

(35) Another U.S. response was the establishment of the Alliance for Progress, after years of relatively little attention to Latin America's economic and social needs. (43) President Kennedy gave the Alliance concept a memorable launching in a speech in March, 1961 when he called for vigorous promotion of social and economic development in Latin America through democratic means and, at the same time, pledged substantial financial and political support. (44)

(36) While the campaign to broaden its Cuban policy base was being pursued, the United States was proceeding on another course. In one of the first unilateral efforts to isolate Cuba from its allies, the United States in September 1961 announced it would stop assistance to any country that assisted Cuba. In December, Kennedy extended the denial of Cuba's sugar quota through the first half of 1962. (45)

(37) Meanwhile, the secret policy aimed at removing Castro through assassination continued as FBI chief J. Edgar Hoover informed Attorney General Robert Kennedy in May that the CIA had used the Mafia in "clandestine efforts" against Castro. (46) In that month, poison pills to be used in a plot to kill Castro were passed to a Cuban exile in Miami by a Mafia figure. (47) In November 1961, Operation Mongoose, designed to enlist 2,000 Cuban exiles and dissidents inside Cuba to overthrow Castro, was initiated. (48)

(38) Although the bitter aftertaste of the Bay of Pigs invasion lingered in the Cuban exile community, those who remained active in the fight against Castro came to realize that these subsequent actions of the Kennedy administration were manifestations of its determination to reverse the defeat. What Kennedy had euphemistically termed "a new and deeper struggle" became, in actuality, a secret war :

\* \* \* the new President apparently perceived the defeat as an affront to his pride. Within a matter of weeks he committed the United States to a secret war against Cuba that eventually required the services of several thousand men and cost as much as \$100 million a year \* \* \* Kennedy entrusted its direction to the CIA, which \* \* \* conducted an operation that could be described either as a large-scale vendetta or a small crusade. (49)

(39) The fact that the agency of the U.S. Government the anti-Castro exiles had dealt most with and relied on prior to the Bay of Pigs became, after the invasion failure, the controlling force of the "secret war" was another indication of the Cuban exiles that the Kennedy administration was, indeed, still sincere about overthrowing Castro.

Within a year of the Bay of Pigs, the CIA curiously and inexplicably began to grow, to branch out, to gather more and more responsibility for the "Cuban problem." The company was given authority to help monitor Cuba's wireless traffic; to observe its weather; to follow the Castro government's purchases abroad and its currency transactions; to move extraordinary numbers of clandestine field operatives in and out of Cuba; to acquire a support fleet of ships and aircraft in order to facilitate these secret agent movements; to advise, train, and help reorganize the police and security establishments of Latin countries which felt threatened by Castro guerrilla politics; to take a hand in U-2 overflights and sea-air Elint (Electronic Intelligence) operations aimed at tracing Cuban coastal defense communications on special devices; to pump \* \* \* vast sums into political operations thought to be helpful in containing Castro \* \* \*. (50)

(40) The nerve center of the United States "new and deeper struggle" against Castro was established in the heartland of exile activity, Miami. There, on a secluded, heavily wooded 1,571-acre tract that was part of the University of Miami's south campus, the CIA set up a front operation, an electronics firm called Zenith Technological Services. (51) Its code name was JM/WAVE and it soon became the largest CIA installation anywhere in the world outside of its headquarters in Langley, Va. (52)

(41) The JM/WAVE station had, at the height of its activities in 1962, a staff of more than 300 Americans, mostly case officers. (53) Each case officer employed from 4 to 10 Cuban "principal agents" who, in turn, would each be responsible for between 10 and 30 regular agents. (54) In addition, the CIA set up 54 front corporations—boat shops, real estate firms, detective agencies, travel companies, gun shops—to provide ostensible employment for the case officers and agents operating outside of JM/WAVE headquarters. (55) It also maintained hundreds of pieces of real estate, from small apartments to palatial homes, as "safe houses" in which to hold secret meetings. (56) As a result of its JM/WAVE operation, the CIA became one of Florida's largest employers. (57)

(42) It was the JM/WAVE station that monitored, more or less controlled, and in most cases funded the anti-Castro groups. (58) It was

responsible for the great upsurge in anti-Castro activity and the lifted spirits of the Cuban exiles as American arms and weapons flowed freely through the training camps and guerrilla bases spotted around south Florida.(59) Anti-Castro raiding parties that left from small secret islands in the Florida Keys were given the "green light" by agents of the JM/WAVE station.(60) The result of it all was that there grew in the Cuban exile community a renewed confidence in the U.S. Government's sincerity and loyalty to its cause.

(43) Then came the Cuban missile crisis. The more fervent Cuban exiles were initially elated by the possibility that the crisis might provoke a final showdown with Castro.(61) For several months there had been increasing pressure on President Kennedy to take strong measures against the buildup of the Soviet presence in Cuba, which was becoming daily more blatant. In a report issued at the end of March 1962, the State Department said that Cuba had received from the Soviet Union \$100 million in military aid for the training of Cuban pilots in Czechoslovakia and that the Soviet Union also had provided from 50 to 75 Mig fighters as well as tons of modern weapons for Cuba's ground forces.(62) Fortifying the Cuban exile's hope for action was the fact that the increasing amounts of Soviet weapons moving into Cuba became the dominant issue in the news in the succeeding months, leading to congressional calls for action and a series of hard-line responses from President Kennedy.(63) In September, Kennedy declared that the United States would use "whatever means may be necessary" to prevent Cuba from exporting "its aggressive purposes by force or threat of force" against "any part of the Western Hemisphere."(64)

(44) The fervent hope of the Cuban exiles—that the Cuban missile crisis would ultimately result in the United States smashing the Castro regime—was shattered by the manner in which President Kennedy resolved the crisis. Cuba itself was relegated to a minor role as tough negotiations took place between the United States and the Soviet Union, specifically through communication between President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev.(65) The crisis ended, when President Kennedy announced that all IL-28 bombers were being withdrawn by the Soviets and progress was being made on the withdrawal of offensive missiles and other weapons from Cuba. In return, Kennedy gave the Soviets and the Cubans a "no invasion" pledge.(66).

(45) If Kennedy's actions at the Bay of Pigs first raised doubts in the minds of the Cuban exiles about the President's sincerity and determination to bring about the fall of Castro, his handling of the missile crisis confirmed those doubts. Kennedy's agreement with Khrushchev was termed "a violation" of the pledge he had made 3 days after the Bay of Pigs invasion that the United States would never abandon Cuba to communism.(67) Wrote one prominent exile: "For the friendly Cuban people, allies of the United States, and for hundreds of thousands of exiles eager to stake their lives to liberate their native land, it was a soul-shattering blow."(68)

(46) The bitterness of the anti-Castro exiles was exacerbated by the actions the U.S. Government took to implement the President's "no invasion" pledge. Suddenly there was a crackdown on the very training camps and guerrilla bases which had been originally established and funded by the United States and the exile raids which once had the



Government's "green light" were now promptly disavowed and condemned.

(47) On March 31, 1963, a group of anti-Castro raiders were arrested by British police at a training site in the Bahamas. (69) The U.S. State Department admitted it had given the British the information about the existence of the camp. (70) That same night another exile raiding boat was seized in Miami Harbor. (71) On April 3, the Soviet Union charged that the United States "encourages and bears full responsibility" for two recent attacks on Soviet ships in Cuban ports by anti-Castro exile commandos. (72) The United States responded that it was "taking every step necessary to insure that such attacks are not launched, manned or equipped from U.S. territory." (73) On April 5, the Coast Guard announced it was throwing more planes, ships, and men into its efforts to police the straits of Florida against anti-Castro raiders. (74) As a result of the crackdown, Cuban exile sources declared that their movement to rid their homeland of communism had been dealt "a crippling blow" and that they had lost a vital supply link with anti-Castro fighters inside Cuba.

(48) There were numerous other indications of the U.S. crackdown on anti-Castro activity following the missile crisis. The Customs Service raided what had long been a secret training camp in the Florida Keys and arrested the anti-Castro force in training there. (75) The FBI seized a major cache of explosives at an anti-Castro camp in Louisiana. (76) Just weeks later, the U.S. Coast Guard in cooperation with the British Navy captured another group of Cuban exiles in the Bahamas. (77) In September, the Federal Aviation Administration issued "strong warnings" to six American civilian pilots who had been flying raids over Cuba. (78) Shortly afterward, the Secret Service arrested a prominent exile leader for conspiring to counterfeit Cuban currency destined for rebel forces inside Cuba. (79) In October, the Coast Guard seized 4 exile ships and arrested 22 anti-Castro raiders who claimed they were moving their operations out of the United States. (80)

(49) The feeling of betrayal by the Cuban exiles was given reinforcement by prominent sympathizers outside their community, as well as by Kennedy's political opponents. Capt. Eddie Rickenbacker, chairman of the Committee for the Monroe Doctrine, asserted: "The Kennedy administration has committed the final betrayal of Cuban hopes for freedom by its order to block the activities of exiled Cuban freedom fighters to liberate their nation from Communism." (81) Senator Barry Goldwater accused Kennedy of "doing everything in his power" to keep the flag of Cuban exiles "from ever flying over Cuba again." (82) Richard Nixon urged the end of what he called the "quarantine" of Cuban exiles. (83)

(50) Of course, the most strident reactions came from within the anti-Castro community itself. Following the U.S. Government's notification that it would discontinue its subsidy to the Cuban Revolutionary Council, its president, José Miró Cardona, announced his resignation from the council in protest against U.S. policy. (84) The Cuban exile leader accused President Kennedy of "breaking promises and agreements" to support another invasion of Cuba. (85) Miró Cardona said the change in American policy reflected the fact that Kennedy had become "the victim of a master play by the Russians." (86)

(51) The extent of the deterioration of relationships between the Cuban exiles and the Kennedy administration is indicated in the State Department's reply to Miró Cardona's charges. It labeled them "a gross distortion of recent history." (87)

(52) Against the pattern of U.S. crackdown on Cuban exile activity during this period, however, emerges a countergrain of incidents that may have some bearing on an examination of the Kennedy assassination. These incidents involve some extremely significant Cuban exile raids and anti-Castro operations which took place, despite the crackdown, between the time of the missile crisis and the assassination of the President. In fact, in the midst of the missile crisis, one of the most active Cuban groups, Alpha 66, announced that it made a successful raid on the Cuban port city of Isabela de Sagua, killing about 20 defenders, including Russians. (88) On October 15, the same group sank a Cuban patrol boat. (89) On October 31, the day after the blockade was lifted, it struck again. (90) Immediately after the crisis ended in November, a spokesman for the group pledged new raids. (91)

(53) During this period, other anti-Castro groups also remained active. In April, a group calling itself the Cuban Freedom Fighters reported bombing an oil refinery outside Havana. (92) In May, the Cuban Government confirmed that anti-Castro rebels had carried out a "pirate" raid on a militia camp near Havana despite U.S. promises "to take measures to prevent such attacks." (93) Later that month, the anti-Castro Internal Front of Revolutionary Unity reported it had formed a military junta in Cuba to serve as "provisional government of Cuba in arms." Shortly afterwards, a group of returning Cuban exile raiders claimed they had blown up a Cuban refinery, sank a gunboat and killed "many" of Castro's soldiers. (94) It is not known exactly how many incidents took place during this period, but in April 1963 one anti-Castro fighter asserted that, by then, the U.S. Government knew of 11 raids on Cuba since the missile crisis and did nothing. (95)

(54) One analyst, reviewing that period of United States-Cuban relations, noted: "The U.S. Government's policy toward the exiles was equivocal and inconsistent \* \* \*" (96)

(55) It cannot be determined to what extent, if any, the military activities of the anti-Castro exile groups were sanctioned or supported by the Kennedy administration or by the CIA or both. At a press conference in May 1963, in response to a question as to whether or not the United States was giving aid to exiles, President Kennedy was evasive: "We may well be \* \* \* well, none that I am familiar with \* \* \* I don't think as of today that we are." (97) And it is known that by June 1963, the U.S. Government was supporting at least one Cuban exile group, *Jure*, under what was termed an "autonomous operations" concept. (98)

(56) In retrospect, this much is clear: With or without U.S. Government support and whether or not in blatant defiance of Kennedy administration policy, there were a number of anti-Castro action groups which were determined to continue—and, in fact, did continue—their operations. The resignation of Miró Cardona actually split the Cuban Revolutionary Council down the middle and precipitated a bitter dispute among the exile factions. (99) The more moderate contended that without U.S. support there was little hope of ousting Castro and that the exiles should concentrate their efforts in mounting political pressure to reverse Washington's shift in policy. (100) Other exile

groups announced their determination to continue the war against Castro and, if necessary, to violently resist curtailment of their paramilitary activities in the Kennedy administration. (101) In New Orleans, for instance, Carlos Bringuier, the local leader of the Cuban Student Directorate (DRE) who, coincidentally, would later have a contact with Lee Harvey Oswald, proclaimed, in the wake of the Miró Cardona resignation, that his group "would continue efforts to liberate Cuba despite action by the United States to stop raids originating from U.S. soil." (102)

(57) The seeds of defiance of the Kennedy administration may have been planted with the exiles even prior to the Bay of Pigs invasion. In his history of the invasion, Haynes Johnson revealed that shortly before the invasion, "Frank Bender," the CIA director of the invasion preparations, assembled the exile leaders together at the CIA's Guatemala training camp:

It was now early in April and Artime was in the camp as the civilian representative of the Revolutionary Council. Frank called Pepe (San Roman) and (Erneido) Oliva again. This time he had startling information. There were forces in the administration trying to block the invasion, and Frank might be ordered to stop it. If he received such an order, he said he would secretly inform Pepe and Oliva. Pepe remembers Frank's next words this way:

"If this happens you come here and make some kind of show, as if you were putting us, the advisers, in prison, and you go ahead with the program as we have talked about it, and we will give you the whole plan, even if we are your prisoners." \* \* \* Frank then laughed and said: "In the end we will win." (103)

(58) That, then, is the context in which the committee approached the question of whether or not the John F. Kennedy assassination was a conspiracy involving anti-Castro Cuban exiles. It also considered the testimony of the CIA's chief of its Miami JM/WAVE station in 1963, who noted " 'assassination' was part of the ambience of that time." (104)

(59) This section of this staff report details the evidence developed in the committee's examination of some of the most active anti-Castro exile groups and their key leaders. These groups were specifically selected from the more than 100 exile organizations in existence at the time of the Kennedy assassination. (105) Their selection was the result of both independent field investigation by the committee and the committee's examination of the files and records maintained by those Federal and local agencies monitoring Cuban exile activity at the time. These agencies included local police departments, the FBI, the CIA, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (now the DEA), the Customs Service, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Department of Defense.

(60) The groups selected can be termed the "action groups." These were the ones most active on both the military and propaganda fronts, the ones that not only talked about anti-Castro operations, but actually planned and carried out infiltrations and raids into Cuba, conducted Castro assassination attempts, were involved in a multiplicity of arms dealings and had the most vociferous and aggressive leaders. These

were also the groups and individuals who took the brunt of the Kennedy administration's crackdown on anti-Castro operations when it came after the Cuban missile crisis. These were the ones who, in the end, were most bitter at President Kennedy, the ones who felt the most betrayed. Finally, these were the groups and individuals who had the means and motivation to be involved in the assassination of the President.

(61) The committee, however, found no specific evidence that any anti-Castro group or individual was involved in Kennedy's assassination. It did appear, however, that there were indications of association between Lee Harvey Oswald and individuals connected to at least some of the groups.

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## II. THE ODIIO INCIDENT

(62) In connection with the question of anti-Castro Cuban involvement in the Kennedy assassination, the committee examined one incident which, over the years, particularly intrigued critics of the Warren Commission's investigation. It became known as the "Odio incident" and involved a young Cuban exile, Silvia Odio. Here, in part, is how the Warren Commission detailed the incident and its conclusions in its final report:

(63) The Commission investigated [Mrs. Odio's] statements in connection with its consideration of the testimony of several witnesses suggesting that Oswald may have been seen in the company of unidentified persons of Cuban or Mexican background. Mrs. Odio was born in Havana in 1937 and remained in Cuba until 1960; it appears that both of her parents are political prisoners of the Castro regime. Mrs. Odio is a member of the Cuban Revolutionary Junta (JURE) an anti-Castro organization. She testified that late in September 1963, three men came to her apartment in Dallas and asked her to help them prepare a letter soliciting funds for JURE activities. She claimed that the men, who exhibited personal familiarity with her imprisoned father, asked her if she were "working in the underground," and she replied that she was not. She testified that two of the men appeared to be Cubans, although they also had some characteristics that she associated with Mexicans. Those two men did not state their full names, but identified themselves only by their fictitious underground "war names." Mrs. Odio remembered the name of one of the Cubans as "Leopoldo." The third man, an American, allegedly was introduced to Mrs. Odio as "Leon Oswald." and she was told that he was very much interested in the Cuban cause. Mrs. Odio said that the men told her that they had just come from New Orleans and that they were then about to leave on a trip. Mrs. Odio testified that next day Leopoldo called her on the telephone and told her that it was his idea to introduce the American into the underground "because he is great, he is kind of nuts." Leopoldo also said that the American had been in the Marine Corps and was an excellent shot, and that the American said the Cubans "don't have any guts \* \* \* because President Kennedy should have been assassinated after the Bay of Pigs, and some Cubans should have done that, because he was the one that was holding the freedom of Cuba actually."

(64) Although Mrs. Odio suggested doubts that the men were in fact members of JURE, she was certain that the American who was introduced to her as Leon Oswald was

Lee Harvey Oswald. Her sister, who was in the apartment at the time of the visit by the three men, and who stated that that she saw them briefly in the hallway when answering the door, also believed that the American was Lee Harvey Oswald. By referring to the date on which she moved from her former apartment, October 1, 1963, Mrs. Odio fixed the date of the alleged visit on the Thursday or Friday immediately preceding that date, i.e., September 26 or 27. She was positive that the visit occurred prior to October 1.

(65) During the course of its investigation, however, the Commission concluded that Oswald could not have been in Dallas on the evening of either September 26 or 27, 1963. It also developed considerable evidence that he was not in Dallas at any time between the beginning of September and October 3, 1963. \* \* \*

(66) In spite of the fact that it appeared almost certain that Oswald could not have been in Dallas at the time Mrs. Odio thought he was, the Commission requested the FBI to conduct further investigation to determine the validity of Mrs. Odio's testimony. The Commission considered the problems raised by that testimony as important in view of the possibility it raised that Oswald may have had companions on his trip to Mexico. The Commission specifically requested the FBI to attempt to locate and identify the two men who Mrs. Odio stated were with the man she thought was Oswald. \* \* \*

(67) On September 16, 1964, the FBI located Loran Eugene Hall in Johnsandale, Calif. Hall has been identified as a participant in numerous anti-Castro activities. He told the FBI that in September of 1963 he was in Dallas, soliciting aid in connection with anti-Castro activities. He said he had visited Mrs. Odio. He was accompanied by Lawrence Howard, a Mexican-American from East Los Angeles and one William Seymour from Arizona. He stated that Seymour is similar in appearance to Lee Harvey Oswald; he speaks only a few words of Spanish, as Mrs. Odio had testified one of the men who visited her did. While the FBI had not yet completed its investigation into this matter at the time the report went to press, the Commission has concluded that Lee Harvey Oswald was not at Mrs. Odio's apartment in September of 1963. (1)

(68) The evidence did not support the definitive character of the Warren Commission's conclusions. The Commission had based its conclusion on two points: the "considerable" evidence that Oswald could not have been in Dallas on the evening Mrs. Odio alleged she saw him; (2) the FBI's report of Loran Eugene Hall's speculation that Odio misidentified his companion, William Seymour, as Lee Harvey Oswald. (3) Although the Warren Commission Report stated that Odio "fixed" the date of the alleged Oswald visit on September 26 or September 27, she actually told the FBI that she was not at all positive about the exact date, (4) and that it might have been as early as September 25. (5)



(69) The Warren Commission asserted that Oswald left New Orleans by bus for Houston, on his way to Mexico, on September 25. (6) Yet there was no documentary evidence as substantiation, and neither the bus driver nor any passenger could recall seeing Oswald on that bus. (7) In fact, Warren Commission General Counsel J. Lee Rankin asked the FBI to investigate the possibility that Oswald left New Orleans on September 24, (8) when a neighbor saw him leaving his apartment carrying two suitcases. (9) Rankin pointed out in his letter to J. Edgar Hoover that:

Marina Oswald told the Commission that her husband told her he intended to leave New Orleans the very next day following her departure on September 23, 1963. She has also indicated that he told her an unemployment check would be forwarded to Mrs. Ruth Paine's address in Irving from his post office box in New Orleans. \* \* \* It also seems impossible to us that Oswald would have gone all the way back to the Winn-Dixie store at 4303 Magazine Street to cash the unemployment check which he supposedly picked up at the Lafayette Branch of the Post Office when he could have cashed it at Martin's Restaurant, where he had previously cashed many of his Reily checks and one unemployment check. That is particularly true if he received the check on September 25, 1963, as previously thought, and had left his apartment with his suitcases the evening before. (10)

(70) The FBI never came up with any evidence which resolved the questions raised in Rankin's request. In sum, the Warren Commission developed no hard evidence that could substantiate the fact that Oswald was or was not in Dallas during the time period Odio said she saw him.

(71) Although the Warren Commission stated that the FBI had not yet completed its investigation at the time its report went to press, (11) it was only 2 days after its September 16, 1964, interview of Loran Eugene Hall that the FBI interviewed William Seymour, who denied he ever had any contact with Silvia Odio and that he had been in Dallas with Hall in September 1963. (12) The FBI subsequently confirmed the fact that Seymour was working in Florida during September 1963. (13) On September 23, 1964, the FBI interviewed Loran Hall's other associate, Lawrence Howard. (14) Howard also denied he had ever contacted Silvia Odio. (15) The FBI then went back and re-interviewed Hall who then said that he had been accompanied on his trip to Dallas not by Seymour but by a Cuban friend he knew as "Wahito" and that he no longer recalled any contact with Odio. (16) The FBI determined that "Wahito" was Celio Sergio Castro (17) who, when interviewed, said he had never heard of or met Silvia Odio. (18) On October 1, 1964, the FBI showed Silvia Odio photographs of Loran Hall, William Seymour, Lawrence Howard and Celio Sergio Castro. (19) She examined the photographs and said that none of the individuals were identical to any of the three men who had come to her apartment door in Dallas. (20)

(72) In view of the premature character of the Warren Commission's conclusion based on the impeached Loran Hall allegation and

the unresolved question of Oswald's whereabouts at the time, the Odio incident remains one of the lingering enigmas in the original assassination investigation. Unfortunately, the nature of the incident makes it, from an investigative standpoint, particularly susceptible to the erosive effects of time. The canvassing, for instance, of both pro-Castro and anti-Castro groups in Dallas, New Orleans, and Miami in search of descriptive similarities to the men who visited Odio might have been fruitful at the time; today it is impractical. The construction of a composite sketch of the individuals when their features were still fresh in Odio's memory might have provided productive evidence 15 years ago; today it is of questionable value considering the natural adulteration of recall over that period of time. A search for the car that the men were driving might have been very productive at the time; today it is useless. The committee was, therefore handicapped by the limitations of the initial investigation and the paucity of evidence developed. The valid investigative approaches remaining were distressingly limited. Nevertheless, because of the potential significance of the Odio incident to a possible conspiracy in the Kennedy assassination, the committee decided that, in addition to pursuing any substantive leads it possibly could, it would also attempt to verify the record regarding Silvia Odio's credibility and the details of her allegations.

(73) Also of interest to the committee, of course, were the initial assertions of Loran Hall that he and two associates, William Seymour and Lawrence Howard, were the ones who had visited Odio in September. (21) All three had been actively involved in anti-Castro activity and were members of a group of soldiers of fortune called Interpen. (22) The group was arrested at No Name Key, Fla., in December 1962 as part of the Kennedy administration's crackdown on anti-Castro operations. (23) That policy, which highly incensed the anti-Castro and rightwing factions, was the result of an agreement Kennedy had made with Khrushchev and Castro. (24) Those factions considered the agreement a "betrayal." (25)

(74) Loran Hall provided sworn testimony to the committee at an executive session on October 5, 1977. The following passage is an excerpt from that testimony:

Q. Did there come a time when the FBI spoke to you about whether or not you visited Silvia Odio in September 1963?

HALL. Yes; there was.

Q. Who spoke to you?

HALL. An FBI agent.

Q. At that time were you advised why you were being questioned about Silvia Odio?

HALL. I really don't recall. He stated as I recall, he stated something to the effect that were you ever in Dallas, Tex., and I said yes. He said do you know a Mrs. Odio, and I said I don't recall knowing a Mrs. Odio. I think I knew a Professor Odio, who was a professor at Texas, some university in Texas, just outside of Dallas, as I recall. He asked me anyway about the apartment building on Magellan, and I said it is possible, I don't know. I said do you have a picture of her

and he said no; I do not have. And I said, it is possible I met her but I don't recall. He then asked me who was with me and I told him I was with Alba and Howard, and then it was like maybe a month or two.

Q. And you told him you were there with Howard and Alba?

HALL. Yes.

Q. On the first trip?

HALL. Yes. We both read the same FBI report. You know it is directly contradictory to what I am saying.

Q. So it is your testimony that at no time did you ever tell an FBI agent that you were in Dallas accompanied by Lawrence Howard and William Seymour, is that your testimony?

HALL. That is true.

Q. Were you ever directly or indirectly involved with Silvia Odio in acquiring military equipment for anti-Castro raids?

HALL. No; I was not. (26)

(75) The committee interviewed Lawrence Howard on May 23, 1978. Howard stated he has never met Silvia Odio. (27) The committee also interviewed William Seymour, who acknowledged his relationship with Hall and Howard but did not recall any details of a trip to Dallas, including meeting any Cubans there. (28)

(76) The committee believed it important in its investigation to examine in detail the substance of Silvia Odio's allegations as well as their credibility. One of the problems faced by the committee was Odio's negative attitude toward a governmental investigation of the Kennedy assassination. Her attitude, she said, was the result of her relationship with the Warren Commission. (29) She expressed sharp disillusionment with the Warren Commission and said that it was obvious to her that the Commission did not want to believe her story. (30) A committee investigator noted that her whole demeanor was "one of sharp distrust of the Government's motives. She claims she feels she was just used by the Warren Commission for their own ends and she does not want to be put in the same position." (31) Nevertheless, after contact was established by the committee, Odio's cooperation with the committee was excellent, and she voluntarily submitted to interviews and, subsequently, sworn testimony.

(77) Evidence indicated that Odio's story remained basically consistent with her Warren Commission testimony. There are, however, details concerning Odio, her background, and certain points of her story developed by the committee, which should be noted.

(78) Silvia Odio was one of 10 children of Amador and Sarah Odio who were sent out of Cuba when their parents began taking an active part in a counterrevolutionary movement shortly after Castro took power. (32) Amador Odio was among Cuba's wealthy aristocracy, the personal friend of diplomats and Ambassadors, including, during the last days of the U.S. presence there, American Ambassador Phillip Bonsal. (33) Odio was owner of the country's largest trucking business and was once described in Time magazine as the "transport tycoon" of Latin America. (34) Yet, from their youth, both he and his wife were active, frontline fighters against the succession of tyrants who ruled

Cuba. During the reign of Gen. Gerardo Machado in the 1930's, Sarah Odio was captured and beaten with a machete until her ribs were broken.(35) Twice during the dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista, the Odios were forced into exile for their revolutionary activity.(36) Amador Odio's trucks were the main supply line for the weapons and ammunition which kept Castro's hopes alive in the mountains. Yet when the Odios decided that Castro had "betrayed the revolution,"(37) they were among the founding members, with Manolo Ray, of one of the early, most aggressive anti-Castro groups, the Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo (MRP).(38)

(79) Amador and Sarah Odio were arrested by Castro on October 26, 1961.(39) Their arrest was the result of the capture of MRP national coordinator Reynald Gonzales in hiding on their country estate.(40) Ironically, the Odios had once hosted the wedding of one of Fidel Castro's sisters on the very estate, a large, resortlike retreat in El Caño, outside of Havana.(41) Later, Castro would turn it into a national women's prison and Sarah Odio would spend 8 years incarcerated there, while her husband was placed in a cell on Isla de Pinos.(42) Reynald Gonzales had been wanted in connection with his involvement in the assassination attempt on Castro that had been organized by Antonio Veciana.(43)

(80) Silvia was the oldest of the Odio's 10 children.(44) She had been sent for her early education to a private girls' school near Philadelphia and later returned to Cuba and attended law school there.(45)

(81) When her parents were arrested, Silvia Odio was 24 years old, living in Puerto Rico with her husband and four young children.(46) The next year her husband, sent to Germany by the chemical firm for which he was working, deserted her and her children.(47) Destitute and alone, she began having emotional problems.(48) By that time, Silva's younger sisters, Annie and Sarita, were settled in Dallas.(49) Sarita, a student at the University of Dallas, had become friendly with Mrs. Lucille Connell, the leader of a women's club at a local Episcopal church who had organized a club program to provide financial and social support to the Dallas Cuban Refugee Center.(50) Connell also happened to be very active in the Mental Health Association of Dallas and, since her son was a psychiatrist, had personally acquired an interest in mental health problems.(51) When Sarita told Connell of her sister Silva's plight, Connell made arrangements to have Silvia move to Dallas and to receive psychiatric treatment for her emotional problems at the Southwestern Medical School.(52)

(82) According to Connell, who for a period was Silvia's closest confidante, Silvia's emotional problems, brought on by her suddenly being left alone with four young children, her parents being imprisoned and her lifestyle abruptly changing from one of wealth to one of deep destitution, were manifested in attacks of total loss of consciousness "when reality got too painful to bear."(53) Connell said she personally witnessed Odio suffer these attacks in her home when she first arrived in Dallas, but with psychiatric treatment their frequency subsided and they subsequently ended, until the Kennedy assassination.(54)

(83) Silvia Odio had moved to Dallas in March 1963.(55) By September 1963 she was well established in the community, had a decent income from a good job, had her emotional problems under control and was doing well enough to be planning a move into a better apartment.(56) She was scheduled to make that move on October 1, 1963, a Monday.(57) The week before, she recalled, she had done some packing in preparation for the move and there were boxes scattered across her living room floor which she had to jump over to get to the door.(58) Her sister Annie, who was then 17, had come to the apartment to help her and babysit with her children.(59) When the doorbell rang early one evening in that last week of September, it was Annie who went to the door to answer it.(60)

(84) The complex in which Silvia Odio lived at 1084 Magellan Circle in Dallas was a series of garden-type rental apartments, two-story units with four apartments to each unit.(61) The two lower units had front doors that faced a common inner vestibule which, in turn, bordered a small, open cement porch elevated a few steps above the ground level.(62) Both the vestibule and porch had overhead lights.(63) Silvia Odio lived in apartment A of the 1084 unit, a first floor apartment.(64)

(85a) Annie Odio provided the committee with a sworn statement of her independent recollection.(65) She remembered the evening when three men came to the door of Silvia's apartment in Dallas.(66) One of the men asked to speak to Sarita.(67) He spoke English initially but when Annie answered him in Spanish he subsequently also spoke Spanish.(68) Annie told him that Sarita didn't live there.(69) Then, according to Annie's recollection:

He said something, I don't recall exactly what, perhaps something about her being married, which made me think that they really wanted my sister Sylvia. I recall putting the chain on the door after I told them to wait while I went to get Silvia. I don't exactly recall but they may have also said something about belonging to JURE, the anti-Castro movement.(70)

(85b) Annie also recalled that Silvia was initially reluctant to talk with the strange visitors because she was getting dressed to go out. But she remembered Silvia coming out in her bathrobe to go to the door.(71) Annie said that she could only recall what one of the two Latin men looked like, but it is not a specific recollection, only that he was heavy set, had dark shiny hair combed back and "looked Mexican."(72) She said "the one in the middle was American."(73)

(85c) In testimony to the committee, Silvia Odio also recalled that it was early evening and that she was getting dressed to go out when the three men came to the door.(74) She recalled that it was a weekday because she worked that day.(75) She said the men identified themselves as members of JURE, spoke of both its founder, Manola Rav, and her father, who had worked closely with Ray.(76) Odio said that almost all the conversation she had was with only one of the men, the one who identified himself as "Leopoldo." (77)

(85d) Odio was positive in her recollection of the name "Leopoldo" (78) but said that the men admitted to her they were giving her aliases or "war names." (79) She was less certain of the other Latin's name, but believed it might have been "Angelo" or "Angel." (80) She described him, as her sister did, as being stocky, with black hair and looking "more Mexican than anything else." (81) The third visitor, the "American," (82) was introduced to her as "Leon Oswald." (83) She said "Leon Oswald" acknowledged the introduction with a very brief reply, perhaps in idiomatic Spanish, (84) but she later concluded that he could not understand Spanish because of his lack of reaction to her Spanish conversation with "Leopoldo." (85)

(86) Silvia Odio was relatively consistent in her testimony to the Warren Commission and to the committee in her specific descriptions of the three visitors. (86) Her description of "Leopoldo" was especially noteworthy because he has certain very distinct features, including an unusual hairline that is sharply recessed on the sides. (87) Her description of "Leon Oswald" was similar to the characteristics of Lee Harvey Oswald. (88) There was absolutely no doubt in her own mind that her visitor was, in fact, Lee Harvey Oswald. (89) She pointed out that she did have ample opportunity to view him, her conversation with the three men lasting more than 20 minutes, her viewing distance being only about 3 feet and the light available more than adequate. (90) She also recalled but not very clearly, that "Leopoldo" may have told her that they had just come from New Orleans. (91)

(87) Odio told the committee, as she did the Warren Commission, (92) that the reason the men came to her was to get her help in soliciting funds in the name of JURE from local businessmen. (93) She said:

He (Leopoldo) told me that he would like for me to write them in English, very nice letters, and perhaps we could get some funds. (94)

That is consistent with the recollection of her sister Annie, who was in the apartment at the time the conversation was being conducted through the open door in the vestibule. She recalled that the men came because "they wanted something translated." (95)

(88) According to Silvia Odio, her conversation with "Leopoldo" ended without her giving him any commitment to do anything, but he gave her the impression he would contact her again. (96) The visit ended without "Leon" or "Angelo" having any conversation with her aside from a brief greeting word or two. (97) After the men left, Odio decided to go to the window and watch them. (98) She saw them get into a red car that was parked in the driveway in front of the apartment. (99) She said she could not see who was driving the car, but did see "Angelo" on the passenger side of the car. (100)

(89) The cloudiest part of Odio's recollection concerned the telephone call she later received from "Leopoldo." (101) It could have occurred, she said, the day after the visit or 2 days after the visit. (102) She thought it was in the afternoon, but she cannot remember. (103) She believed it was on a Saturday, when she was not working, but is not certain. (104) She was, however, relatively clear in her recollection of the gist of what "Leopoldo" told her when he called her on the telephone and that, too, was consistent with her testimony before the Warren Commission. (105) She said that "Leopoldo" told her that "the

Gringo" had been a Marine, that he was an expert marksman and that he was "kind of loco." (106) She recalled:

He said that the Cubans, we did not have any guts because we should have assassinated Kennedy after the Bay of Pigs. (107)

(90) On the day that President Kennedy was assassinated, Silvia Odio was coming back from lunch when she heard the news. (108) She recalled:

As soon as we got back to the office, everybody had their radios on and everybody was listening to it. By the time the news came that the President was dead, the president of the company told us that we could go home. I started going back to—I was very frightened and very upset \* \* \* I started moving across the warehouse toward the parking lot where we kept our cars \* \* \* I think next I had passed out. My mind was going around in circles \* \* \* (109)

(91) During her testimony before the committee, Odio was asked if, when she heard that Kennedy was assassinated, she thought of the three men who had visited her apartment almost 2 months prior. Her reply: "Oh, very definitely, very definitely." (110) She added: "I had put them out of my mind, but they came back that day." (111)

(92) The next thing she remembered after blacking out was regaining consciousness later in a hospital room. (112) She recalled that her sister Annie had just entered. (113) She remembered watching the first image of Oswald she saw coming across the television screen in the hospital room: "Annie and I sort of looked at one another and sort of gasped. She said, 'Do you recognize him?' I said yes, and I said, 'Do you recognize him?' She said, 'It is the same guy, isn't it?' I said, 'Yes, but do not say anything.'" (114)

(93) This excerpt from the independent sworn statement given to the committee by Annie Odio concerns the day of the assassination.

On the day of the assassination of President Kennedy I had gone with my girlfriend, Cherie Matlock, and some other friends to a place where we could see the President's motorcade pass by. I don't remember where it was, only that it was quite a distance from downtown Dallas and Dealey Plaza. After the motorcade passed by we went to a drive-in restaurant for some hamburgers. When we were coming out of the drive-in we heard that Kennedy was shot. When I first heard that Kennedy was shot I did not make any connection between the shooting and the men who came to Silvia's door. Later in the afternoon I was by myself in the Matlock home when I first saw Oswald on television. My first thought was, "My God, I know this guy and I don't know from where! But I'm not going to tell anybody because they're going to think I'm crazy." But I kept thinking, "Where have I seen this guy?" Then my sister Sarita called and told me that Silvia had fainted at work and that she was sending her boyfriend Jim, who is now her husband to pick me up and take me to the hospital to see Silvia. Sarita did not tell me then why Silvia had

fainted. I remember that it was getting dark when Jim picked me up and that we had to drive by Dealey Plaza. I don't remember Jim coming up to the room in the hospital with me when I saw Silvia. I don't remember anyone else in the room, but it was a very small room. Silvia was in bed. The first thing I remember when I walked into the room was that Silvia started crying and crying. I don't remember her saying anything. I think that I told her: "You know this guy on TV who shot President Kennedy? I think I know him." And she said: "You don't remember where you know him from?" I said: "No. I cannot recall, but I know I've seen him before." And then she told me: "Do you remember those three guys who came to the house?" And that's when I realized I had seen Oswald before. And then she told me everything, including the fact that one of the men had called back, that she had called him "Leon," that he said he wanted to be called "Leon," and that he said something like the Cubans should kill Kennedy because of what he did with the Bay of Pigs. Silvia also told me that when she first heard that President Kennedy was shot, she started saying: "Leon did it. Leon did it!" I remember that Silvia was very excited at the hospital and that she kept saying that she knew that Leon was going to do it. (115)

(94) Because they were extremely frightened, concerned for their brothers and sisters and their own safety, worried about their mother and father in prison in Cuba and terrifyingly bewildered about the meaning of the three men's visit, Silvia and Annie Odio decided not to reveal the incident. (116) It was, in fact, only circuitously that the FBI came to learn of it.

(95) According to Silvia Odio's close friend, Lucille Connell, she received a call from Silvia's sister Sarita who told her that Silvia had fainted and was in the hospital. (117) Sarita also told her why Silvia had fainted and the fact that Silvia had met Oswald and that he had come to her apartment. (118) Connell could not recall exactly when Sarita called; she said it was either the day of the assassination or the day after. (119) Connell said that Sunday, however, she was speaking on the telephone to a friend of hers, Mrs. Sanford Pick, then working as a receptionist in a Dallas law firm office, when they both saw Ruby shoot Oswald on their television sets. (120) Connell recalled: "And she said to me, 'Oh my goodness, Ruby was in our office last week and had power of attorney drawn for his sister.'" (121)

(96) Connell said that later that same day she happened to be speaking with another friend, Marcella Insua, the daughter of the head of the Dallas Cuban Relief Committee. Connell mentioned to Insua what her other friend had said about Ruby being in her law office. (122) Insua, Connell said, happened to have a class of American children to whom she was teaching Spanish. (123) In that class, she got into a discussion of the Kennedy assassination and mentioned that she knew someone who knew someone who had some dealings with Ruby. (124) It also happened that there was a son of a local FBI agent in Insua's class. (125) That was how the FBI subsequently came to contact Connell and learn about the Odio incident. (126)



(97) A factor in judging Odio's credibility was evidence that indicates that she told someone prior to the Kennedy assassination that three men visited her, that one of them was introduced to her as "Leon Oswald," and that she was told that this "Leon" had suggested assassinating President Kennedy.

(98) Silvio Odio told the committee that immediately after the visit of the three men, she wrote to her father in prison in Cuba to ask him if he knew who they were. (127) Amador Odio, who was released from prison in 1969 and is now living in Miami, told committee investigators that he received Silvia's letter and replied to it. (128) He did not recall when he received the letter, but his reply, dated December 19, 1963, indicated it was very likely in late October or early November 1963. (129) He wrote: "Tell me who this is who says he is my friend—be careful. I do not have any friend who might be here, through Dallas, so reject his friendship until you give me his name." (130)

(99) Silvia Odio told the committee she recalled, although her recollection was "not very strong," that she also told Lucille Connell prior to the Kennedy assassination that three men had visited her apartment. (131) She said it had to have been before the assassination because she did not see Connell after the assassination as the result of a falling out between them. (132) Prior to that, however, Odio said, she was frequently at Connell's house and she specifically recalled a dinner party, "which may have had something to do with the Mental Health Association or been given in honor of some doctor or psychiatrist," at which, during a conversation in the library, she mentioned the visit of the three men. (133) She said it would have been very likely that she told Connell because "she was the type who was a very curious person about the details of your life. She always asked a lot of questions about my life and what I was doing." (134)

(100) Lucille Connell told the committee she did not recall Silvia Odio specifically telling her about Oswald at any time, before or after the assassination. (135) She did not recall talking with Odio at a dinner party prior to the assassination, although, she said, she may have. (136) She said her contact with Silvia Odio had not been frequent within the months prior to the assassination. (137)

(101) In her recollection the one person that Silvia Odio was most positive of telling prior to the assassination about the visit of the three men was her psychiatrist at the time, Dr. Burton C. Einspruch. (138) At the time of the Kennedy assassination, Odio had been seeing Einspruch for about 7 months, (139) usually on a weekly basis and occasionally more frequently. (140) She was suffering from what Einspruch described as "a situational life problem. She had a large family, she was semi-impoverished, she was an immigrant, her parents were imprisoned \* \* \* she had all the difficulties one might anticipate a displaced person would have." (141)

(102) Both the FBI and the Warren Commission staff questioned Einspruch after the assassination. (142) The FBI report noted that Einspruch believed Odio "is telling the truth." (143) The Warren Commission staff report noted that "Dr. Einspruch stated that he had great faith in Miss Odio's story of having met Lee Harvey Oswald." (144) Neither report indicated that Einspruch had been questioned about the specific details of Odio's allegations, whether he had been

asked if Odio told him about the visit of the three men and, if she did, when she did. (145)

(103) In sworn testimony to the committee, Einspruch reiterated his judgment of Odio as a "truthful" person. (146) He said he no longer had any files available to document his recollection, but he believed that Odio's visits to him had been scheduled, at around the time of the assassination, on Wednesdays. (147)

(104) Einspruch specifically recalled that Odio had told him, during the normal course of the "format" of the sessions with her in which she related what happened during the previous week, (148) that she had been visited by three men. (149) He recalled that she told him of the visit prior to the assassination. (150) He was definite that she told him that two of the visitors were "Cubans or Latins" and that the third was an "Anglo." (151) He is not sure she mentioned the name "Leon" at his session with her prior to the assassination. (152) He did remember that when he telephoned Odio on the day of or the day after the assassination, she did mention "Leon" and she did "in a sort of histrionic way" connect the visit of the three men to the Kennedy assassination and did recognize one of those men as "Leon." (153) Einspruch could not recall, however, that Odio told him prior to the assassination that "Leopoldo" had telephoned her and spoke of "Leon" suggesting Kennedy be assassinated. (154)

(105) As noted earlier, the committee's ability to investigate the substance of Silvia Odio's allegations was severely restricted, not only by the time that has elapsed since they were originally made, but also by the lack of material available in the basic investigative files. Both the Warren Commission and the FBI failed to pursue adequately the investigation when several leads still held a potential for development. The description provided by Odio of at least one of the Latin visitors, for instance, was detailed enough to justify a thorough canvassing of both the anti-Castro and pro-Castro militant Cuban communities in Dallas, New Orleans, and Miami for individuals with similar striking characteristics. That, in conjunction with a search for the specifically described car the men were seen driving, might have been fruitful. Committee reviews of Warren Commission files and FBI reports revealed no such investigative approach. The focus, instead, was on attempting to determine the possibility of Oswald being in Dallas when Odio reported she saw him. That approach proved inconclusive.

(106) Nevertheless, there were other points that could be examined in attempting to determine the identity of the Silvia Odio visitors. The fact, for instance, that the men claimed to know her father and have knowledge of his activities appeared to be of possible investigatory significance. It was discovered, however, that a front page article in the Dallas News on May 5, 1962, could have provided a source of background information on Odio's parents. (155) The article featured a large photo of Annie and Sarita Odio and detailed the plight of their parents in prison as well as their backgrounds. (156) It also could be related to the fact that "Leopoldo" initially asked for Sarita when Annie Odio answered the door. (157)

(107) Although the committee considered the possibility that the Odio visitors were being deceptive in claiming an association with the anti-Castro organization JURE, it nevertheless attempted to determine if they were, in fact, members of that group. The committee

conducted extensive interviews with Amador Odio, (158) who was very active with JURE in Cuba prior to his imprisonment, and made an attempt to contact remaining members of the Dallas chapter of JURE. (159) Although the results of the committee's efforts must be viewed in terms of the lengthy period of time that had elapsed, no present recollection of JURE members active in 1963 who used the war names of "Leopoldo" or "Angelo" or fitted the descriptions provided by Silvia Odio could be found. (160)

(108) In addition, the committee also interviewed the founder and leader of JURE, Manolo Ray, now living in Puerto Rico. (161) Ray said he had been questioned by the FBI about the Odio incident some time after the Kennedy assassination, but he was asked only about Silvia Odio's reliability and credibility. (162) "They told me that she had met Oswald," Ray said. "I don't remember them telling me that the men who came to her said they were members of JURE \* \* \* (163) Ray told the committee that he knew of no members of JURE traveling through Dallas in September 1963 in search of money or arms. (164) He does not recall anyone by the name of "Leopoldo" or "Angelo" associated with JURE at the time. (165) He said he had no American contacts in Dallas, nor did he receive any major financial support from anyone there. (166)

(109) In addition to these attempts to identify the Odio visitors, the committee asked Silvia Odio to review some 300 photographs of Cuban activists, both pro-Castro and anti-Castro, and individuals who had or may have had some association with Lee Harvey Oswald and the Kennedy assassination. (167) She could not identify any of the individuals in the photographs as being the two who came to her apartment with "Leon Oswald."

(110) Finally, the committee requested the CIA to run a check on all individuals who used the "war names" of "Leopoldo" and "Angelo" during the period of interest. (168) The CIA response resulted in the photographs of three individuals who might have been in Dallas in September 1963. (169) The photographs were shown to Silvia Odio with negative results. (170)

#### CONCLUSIONS

(111) It appears that Silvia Odio's testimony is essentially credible. From the evidence provided in the sworn testimony of corroborating witnesses, there is no doubt that three men came to her apartment in Dallas prior to the Kennedy assassination and identified themselves as members of an anti-Castro Cuban organization. From a judgment of the credibility of both Silvia and Annie Odio, it must be concluded that there is a strong probability that one of the men was or appeared to be Lee Harvey Oswald. No conclusion about the significance of that visit could be reached. The possibilities were considered that Oswald actually had some association with JURE, the anti-Castro group headed by Manolo Ray, and that Oswald wanted it to appear that he had that association in order to implicate the group, politically a left-center Cuban organization, in the Kennedy assassination.

(112) Additionally, no definite conclusion on the specific date of the visit could be reached. The possibility that it could have been as early as September 24, the morning of which Oswald was seen in New Orleans, exists. The visit was more likely on September 25, 26, or 27. If it were, then Oswald, judging from evidence developed by both the

Warren Commission and this committee, had to have had access to private transportation to get to Dallas from New Orleans a situation that indicates possible conspiratorial involvement.

(113) The scope of its investigation in the Odio incident was limited as a result of the inadequate investigation performed by the FBI and the Warren Commission at the time. The lack of immediate recognition of the significance of the Odio incident produced a far from comprehensive investigation at the only time a comprehensive and, perhaps, fruitful investigation would have been possible.

Submitted by :

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*Investigator.*

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
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 (90) Id. at pp. 15, 21, 24.  
 (91) Id. at p. 60.  
 (92) See ref. 1, Warren Report, p. 324.  
 (93) See ref. 55, Odio deposition, p. 53.  
 (94) Ibid.  
 (95) See ref. 59, Annie Odio affidavit, p. 2.  
 (96) See ref. 55, Odio deposition, p. 53.  
 (97) Id. at p. 12.  
 (98) Id. at p. 28.  
 (99) Ibid.  
 (100) Ibid.  
 (101) Id. at p. 30.  
 (102) Ibid.  
 (103) Id. at p. 31.  
 (104) Id. at pp. 32, 50.  
 (105) See ref. 1, Warren Report, p. 324.  
 (106) See ref. 55, Odio deposition, p. 44.  
 (107) Ibid.  
 (108) Id. at p. 62.  
 (109) Ibid.  
 (110) Id. at p. 63.  
 (111) Ibid.  
 (112) Id. at p. 64.  
 (113) Ibid.  
 (114) Id. at pp. 65-66.  
 (115) See ref. 59, Annie Odio affidavit, pp. 2-4.  
 (116) Id. at p. 4.  
 (117) Contact report with Lucille Connell, May 15, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J. F. K. Document 013340).  
 (118) Ibid.; See also ref. 50, Connell interview, p. 2.  
 (119) Ibid., Connell interview.  
 (120) Ibid.  
 (121) Ibid.  
 (122) Ibid.  
 (123) Ibid.  
 (124) Ibid.  
 (125) Id. at p. 3.  
 (126) Ibid.; See also FBI Report DL 44-1639, Nov. 29, 1963. Note: It was not possible to resolve the inconsistency of the substance of this and certain related FBI reports. DL 44-1639 stated only that Connell said that Odio told her that she knew Oswald and that he had spoken to groups of refugees in Dallas. Nothing is noted about a visit of three men. Connell told a committee investigator (ref. 50, memorandum, p. 3) that she did not recall ever telling the FBI that. Neither did the FBI report of the Bureau's initial interview with Odio on Dec. 19, 1963 (Report DL 100-10461) mention that she had knowledge of Oswald speaking to refugee groups. Neither did the FBI interview with Connell note Connell's report of her conversation with her friend, Mrs. Sanford Pick, regarding Ruby's visiting the law firm where Pick worked. Connell said she is positive she told that to the FBI. The committee found that neither Pick nor the attorney who handled Ruby's case at the law firm were questioned by the FBI (ref. 50, memorandum, pp. 4-6). Because neither Pick nor the attorney, Graham R. E. Koch, could specifically recall Ruby requesting power of attorney for his sister, and because, according to Koch, his firm's records on the case were later routinely destroyed (ref. 50, memorandum), the committee was unable to pursue the possibility further.  
 (127) See ref. 55, Odio deposition, p. 43.  
 (128) See ref. 39, Amador Odio interview, p. 2.

- (129) Warren Commission Odio Exhibit No. 1, vol. XX, p. 690.  
 (130) *Ibid.*  
 (131) Contact report, May 17, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J. F. K. Document 013341).  
 (132) *Ibid.*  
 (133) *Ibid.*  
 (134) *Ibid.*  
 (135) See ref. 50, contact report, Lucille Connell.  
 (136) *Ibid.*  
 (137) *Ibid.*  
 (138) See ref. 55, Odio deposition, p. 40.  
 (139) Griffin memorandum to Slawson, May 16, 1964, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J. F. K. Document 002969).  
 (140) Deposition of Dr. Burton C. Einspruch, July 11, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 5 (J. F. K. Document 010069).  
 (141) *Id.* at p. 5.  
 (142) FBI Report DL 100-10461, Dec. 19, 1963; see also ref. 139, Griffin memorandum.  
 (143) *Ibid.*  
 (144) See ref. 139, Griffin memorandum.  
 (145) *Ibid.*  
 (146) See ref. 140, Einspruch deposition, p. 4.  
 (147) *Id.* at p. 6.  
 (148) *Id.* at p. 13.  
 (149) *Id.* at p. 9.  
 (150) *Id.* at p. 10.  
 (151) *Id.* at p. 9.  
 (152) *Ibid.*  
 (153) *Id.* at p. 17.  
 (154) *Id.* at pp. 14-15.  
 (155) See ref. 32, Dallas News.  
 (156) *Ibid.*  
 (157) See ref. 59, Annie Odio affidavit.  
 (158) See ref. 39, Odio interview, see ref. 33, Odio interview.  
 (159) Staff interview of Amador Odio re Tomas and Alentado, Aug. 26, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J. F. K. Document 013338).  
 (160) *Ibid.*  
 (161) Staff interview of Manolo Ray, June 28, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J. F. K. Document 013333).  
 (162) *Id.* at p. 8.  
 (163) *Ibid.*  
 (164) *Ibid.*  
 (165) *Ibid.*  
 (166) *Ibid.*  
 (167) See ref. 55, Odio deposition, pp. 91-103.  
 (168) Staff memorandum, Aug. 30, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J. F. K. Document 013332).  
 (169) *Ibid.*  
 (170) *Ibid.*





### III. ANTONIO VECIANA BLANCH

(114) On March 2, 1976, a staff investigator from the office of U.S. Senator Richard S. Schweiker (Republican of Pennsylvania) interviewed Antonio Veciana Blanch, the founder and former leader of Alpha 66, at his home in Miami.(1) At the time, Senator Schweiker was a member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and co-chairman of the Subcommittee on the John F. Kennedy Assassination.(2) The staff investigator told Veciana that he was interested in the relationships between U.S. Government agencies and Cuban exile groups; he did not specifically mention an interest in the Kennedy assassination.(3) During the course of that interview, Veciana revealed that from about mid-1960 through mid-1973 he had been directed and advised in his anti-Castro and anti-Communist activities by an American he knew as Maurice Bishop.(4) Veciana said that Bishop had guided him in planning assassination attempts on Premier Fidel Castro in Havana in 1961 and in Chile in 1971; that Bishop had directed him to organize Alpha 66 in 1962; and that Bishop, when breaking their relationship in 1973, had paid him \$253,000 in cash for his services over the years.(5)

(115) Veciana revealed further that at one meeting with Bishop in Dallas in late-August or September 1963, he saw with him a young man he later recognized as Lee Harvey Oswald.(6)

(116) Veciana told Senator Schweiker's investigator that he had not previously disclosed that information to anyone.(7)

(117) The committee took an intense interest in the Veciana allegations. From Senator Schweiker, it obtained the complete files of his office's investigation;(8) it also conducted additional interviews with Veciana and other witnesses who might have had knowledge of Veciana or Bishop. Further, on April 25 and 26, 1978, Veciana was questioned under oath before the committee in executive session.

(118) This effort developed the following general details of the relationship between Veciana and the American he knew only as Maurice Bishop:

(119) To the best of Veciana's recollection Maurice Bishop first approached him in Havana in the middle of 1960.(9) At the time, Veciana was employed in the Banco Financiero, owned by Julio Lobo, the "Sugar King" of Cuba.(10) Veciana himself was well known, however, as president of the professional accountant's association.(11)

(120) Veciana said Bishop introduced himself with a business card which indicated he was with a construction firm headquartered in Belgium.(12) Although Veciana initially assumed he was a new bank customer, Bishop's conversation with him soon focused on the Castro revolution. "He also made me aware of his concern regarding the Cuban Government leaning toward Communism and tried to impress on me the seriousness of the situation," Veciana recalled.(13)

(121) Bishop then invited Veciana to lunch and during that and

subsequent lunches convinced Veciana to work against the Castro government. Veciana admittedly did not need much convincing because he himself had concluded only 30 days after the revolution that Castro was a Communist. (14)

(122) Veciana said he did ask Bishop during their first meeting if he worked for the U.S. Government. "He told me at the time," Veciana testified, "that he was in no position to let me know for whom he was working or for which agency he was doing this." (15) Bishop also said he could not tell Veciana whether or not it was Julio Lobo who suggested he contact him. "Supposedly Julio Lobo had very important contacts with the U.S. Government," Veciana pointed out. (16) Veciana, however, later suspected that it might have been another very close friend, Rufo Lopez-Fresquet, who led Bishop to him. (17) Lopez-Fresquet, although then Castro's Minister of Finance, was a covert anti-Castroite. (18)

(123) Once Veciana agreed to work with Bishop on anti-Castro activity, he was put into a "training program." (19) Veciana described this as a "2 to 3 week" program which consisted of nightly lectures. He was the only one in the program, which was conducted by a man he knew only as "Mr. Melton." The lectures were held in an office in a building, which Veciana could recall as being on El Vedado, a commercial thoroughfare. He also remembered the building housed the offices of a mining company "with an American name" and, on the first floor, a branch of the Berlitz School of Languages. (20)

(124) Although Veciana said he was given some training in the use of explosives and sabotage techniques, most of the program consisted of lessons in propaganda and psychological warfare. "Bishop told me several times \* \* \* that psychological warfare could help more than hundreds of soldiers, thousands of soldiers," Veciana testified. (21) Veciana also said: "The main purpose was to train me to be an organizer so I was supposed to initiate a type of action and other people would be the ones who would really carry it out." (22)

(125) Following the training, Veciana worked with Bishop on several very effective psychological warfare operations, including a program that resulted in the destabilization of the Cuban currency and the creation of public distrust in its value. (23) Meanwhile, Veciana also became chief of sabotage for the Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo (MRP), an anti-Castro group head by Manuel Rav. (24)

(126) Before the American Embassy in Cuba was closed in January 1961, Bishop suggested to Veciana that he go there and contact certain officials for help in his anti-Castro activity. Veciana said the names suggested by Bishop were "Smith," "Sam Kail," and a CIA employee. Said Veciana: "Maurice Bishop suggested the names of these individuals because we needed specific weapons to carry out the jobs and he told me that these were the people that could help me." (25) Veciana, however, also said that Bishop asked him not to reveal his name to these people. (26)

(127) Veciana has never assumed that Maurice Bishop was a true name. At one of their early meetings in Havana, Veciana noticed a Belgian passport which Bishop had in his open briefcase. Examining it when Bishop left the room briefly, Veciana made a quick note

of it on a scrap of paper. Veciana kept that scrap of paper and showed it to Senator Schweiker's investigator. The name on the paper was "Frigault." (27)

(128) A few months after the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961, Bishop called Veciana to a meeting. According to Veciana: "At that time Bishop decided that the only thing left to be done was to have an attempt on Castro's life." (28) Although Veciana himself did not participate in the attempt, he recruited the action men and organized the operation, including renting the apartment from which the shot was to be fired. (29) The day before the actual attempt, however, Veciana escaped from Cuba by boat with his mother-in-law, in whose name the apartment had been rented. (30) His wife and children had left a few months prior. According to Veciana, it was Bishop who urged him to leave because, he said, Castro's agents were becoming suspicious of Veciana's activities. (31)

(129) Shortly after he settled in Miami, Veciana testified, Bishop again contacted him. (32) Veciana said it would have been easy for anyone to locate him in the close-knit Cuban exile community in Miami. (33) The result of their reestablishing contact eventually led to the founding of Alpha 66 which, according to Veciana, was Bishop's brainchild. "Bishop's main thesis was that Cuba had to be liberated by Cubans," Veciana testified. (34) Veciana established himself as the civilian chief and principal fundraiser for Alpha 66 and recruited the former head of the Second National Front of the Escambre (SNFE), Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, as the military chief. (35) Menoyo had a reputation among Cuban exiles of being socialistic and Bishop had some doubts about his loyalty, but Veciana insisted that Menoyo could be trusted. Besides, he said, "if he did not work out right we could get rid of him." (36) Veciana said that Menoyo was not aware of the existence of Maurice Bishop.

(130) Alpha 66 became one of the most active of the anti-Castro exile groups, buying guns and boats, recruiting and training commandos, and conducting numerous raids on Cuba. (37) At one point, Veciana proclaimed a war chest of \$100,000 and announced that all the major exile organizations were backing Alpha 66's efforts. He also said publicly that all the planning was being done by leaders "I don't even know." (38)

(131) According to Veciana, the man behind all of Alpha 66's strategy was Maurice Bishop. Over the 12-year period of their association, Veciana estimated he met with Bishop more than 100 times. (39) Veciana, however, claimed he had no way of getting in touch with Bishop and that all the meetings were instigated by Bishop, a procedure Bishop established early in their relationship. (40) To set up a meeting, Bishop would call Veciana by telephone, or, if Veciana was out of town, call a third person whom Veciana trusted, someone who always knew his location. (41) Veciana said that this third person never met Bishop but "knew that Bishop and I were partners in this fight because this person shared my anti-Communist feelings." (42)

(132) Besides contacts with Bishop in Havana and Miami, Veciana also had meetings with him in Dallas, Washington, Las Vegas, and Puerto Rico and in Caracas, Lima, and La Paz in South America. (43)

(133) Veciana specifically recalled some meetings with Bishop be-

cause of their special nature. For instance, shortly after reestablishing contact with him in Miami, Bishop took Veciana to an office in the Pan American Bank Building in the downtown section of the city. (44) Veciana did not recall the exact floor of the building nor if there was any name on the office door. (45) Bishop unlocked the office with a key and, in the presence of two men who were in the office, asked him to sign a piece of paper and take part in a "commitment" ceremony. (46) "It was like a pledge of my loyalty, a secret pledge," Veciana testified. "I think they wanted to impress on me my responsibility and my commitment to the cause." (47) Veciana could not identify the two men who were present with Bishop at this ceremony, nor did he recall if he was introduced to them. "They were like spectators," he said. (48) (134) From August 1968 until June 1972, Veciana worked in La Paz, Bolivia, as a banking adviser to Bolivia's Central Bank. (49) His contracts were financed by the U.S. Agency for International Development. (50) and his office was located in the passport division of the American Embassy. (51) Veciana believed that Bishop was instrumental in his getting the AID job, because he himself was surprised that the Agency would hire a known "terrorist" and anti-Castro activist. (52) The records indicated that Veciana was hired by the Agency even though his application was never signed. (53) (135) While supposedly employed as a banking adviser in Bolivia, Veciana actually did very little such work, but instead was engaged mostly in anti-Castro and anti-Communist activities with Bishop. (54) Among the operations instigated by Bishop at the time was an attempt to assassinate Castro in Chile in 1971. (55) (136) According to Veciana, that aborted assassination attempt eventually led to the dissolution of his relationship with Bishop. (56) Although Bishop directed the operation and provided Veciana with intelligence information, (57) Veciana himself recruited anti-Castro Cuban associates in Caracas to take part in the attempt. (58) Without his knowledge, Veciana said, these associates introduced a new element into the plan, a scheme to blame the assassination on certain Russian agents in Caracas. (59) The associates even produced phony documents and photographs. (60) When Bishop later found out about this unauthorized part of the scheme, he was extremely upset and accused Veciana of being part of it. (61) Although Veciana told Bishop he had no knowledge of it, Bishop apparently did not believe him and eventually suggested that their relationship be terminated. (62) (137) On July 26, 1973, Bishop arranged for Veciana to meet with him in the parking lot of the Flagler Dog Track in Miami. (63) When Veciana arrived, Bishop was waiting for him with two younger men in an automobile. (64) At that time Bishop gave Veciana a suitcase which, Veciana later ascertained, contained \$253,000 in cash. (65) Since, at the beginning of their relationship, Veciana had refused Bishop's offer to pay him for his work with him, the lump sum payment was meant as compensation for his efforts over the years. (66) (138) The committee's interest in the relationship between Antonio Veciana and Maurice Bishop is, of course, predicated on Veciana's contention that he saw Bishop with Lee Harvey Oswald in Dallas a few months before the assassination of John F. Kennedy. (139) Veciana could not specifically pinpoint the date of that meet-

ing with Bishop. He believed it was in late August 1962.(77) Over the years that he knew Bishop, Veciana had at least five meetings with him in Dallas.(68) The meeting at which Oswald was present took place in the lobby of a large office building in the downtown section of the city, perhaps a bank or an insurance building with a blue facade or lobby.(69) When Veciana arrived for the meeting, Bishop was there talking with Oswald. Veciana does not recall whether he was introduced to Oswald by name, but said he did not have any conversation with him.(70) Oswald remained with Bishop and Veciana only for a brief time as they walked toward a nearby coffee shop. Oswald then departed and Bishop and Veciana continued their meeting alone.(71) (140) Veciana testified that he recognized the young man with Bishop as Lee Harvey Oswald after seeing photographs of him following the Kennedy assassination.(72) There was absolutely no doubt in his mind that the man was Oswald, not just someone who resembled him. Veciana pointed out that he had been trained to remember the physical characteristics of people and that if it was not Oswald it was his "exact" double.(73)

(141) Veciana's next meeting with Bishop was in Miami about 2 months after the assassination of President Kennedy.(74) Although they discussed the assassination in general, Veciana did not specifically ask him about Oswald. "I was not going to make the mistake of getting myself involved in something that did not concern me," he testified.(75) Also, he said, "That was a very difficult situation because I was afraid. We both understood. I could guess that he knew that I was knowledgeable of that and I learned that the best way is not to know, not to get to know things that don't concern you, so I respected the rules and I didn't mention that ever."(76)

(142) Bishop himself, however, did suggest to Veciana the possibility of some involvement. At the time there were newspaper reports that Oswald had met with some Cubans during his visit to Mexico. Veciana said that Bishop was aware that he had a relative, Guillermo Ruiz, who was a high-ranking officer in Castro's intelligence service stationed in Mexico City.(77) Bishop told Veciana that if he could get in touch with Ruiz, he would pay Ruiz a large amount of money to say publicly that it was him and his wife who had met with Oswald.(78) Veciana agreed to make the attempt to contact Ruiz because, as he testified, "I knew that Ruiz would be tempted with money; he liked money."(79) Veciana, however, was never successful in contacting Ruiz, and when he mentioned it to Bishop a couple of months later, Bishop told him to forget it.(80) That was the last time Veciana ever spoke about the Kennedy assassination or Lee Harvey Oswald to Bishop, and, he testified, he never told anyone about seeing Oswald until questioned by Senator Schweiker's investigator.(81)

(143) In assessing Veciana's testimony, the committee made an attempt to evaluate his general credibility and, concurrently, take the necessary steps to determine if there was a Maurice Bishop or someone using that name and, if there was, with whom he was associated.

(144) The timing and circumstances of that initial interview with Veciana by Senator Schweiker's investigator is a factor in determining his credibility.(82) Two weeks prior to the interview, Veciana had been released from the Federal penitentiary in Atlanta after serving

27 months on a narcotics conspiracy conviction. (83) Veciana, although having served his time, insisted he was innocent, but claimed that the case against him was so well fabricated that the Federal prosecutor actually believed he was guilty. (84) According to Senator Schweiker's investigator, Veciana appeared confused and frightened by the situation in which he found himself, but said he believed that in some way his legal problems were related to his previous association with Bishop, although he did not know exactly how. (85) The investigator speculated that Veciana felt that by revealing his association with Bishop to an official representative of the U.S. Government, he would be providing himself with an element of security. (86) Much later, however, Veciana apparently changed his position and decided that Castro agents, not Bishop, were responsible for his drug arrest. (87) This charge was inconsistent with information provided to the committee by one of Veciana's closest associates, who said that Veciana told him that he thought the CIA framed him because he wanted to go ahead with another plot to kill Castro. (88) This associate, Prof. Rufo Lopez-Fresquet, Castro's former Minister of Finance, however, said he was not aware that Veciana had had any association with anyone like Maurice Bishop and that he, himself, could not identify Bishop. (89)

(145) The committee conducted numerous interviews of other key anti-Castro associates or former associates of Veciana, not only as part of its efforts to locate Bishop but also to further aid in assessing Veciana's credibility. Generally Veciana's reputation for honesty and integrity was excellent. A former associate, who worked with him when Veciana was chief of sabotage for the MRP in Havana, said "Veciana was the straightest, absolutely trustworthy, most honest person I ever met. I would trust him explicitly." (90) Still, not one of his associates—neither those who worked with him in anti-Castro activity in Cuba nor those who were associated with him in Alpha 66—said they were aware of any American directing Veciana or of anyone who had the characteristics of Maurice Bishop.

(146) Nevertheless, there were many aspects of Veciana's story that the evidence does corroborate. Veciana's claim, for instance, that he was the principal organizer of the attempt on Castro's life in Havana in October 1961, was documented in a Cuban newspaper report at the time. (91) Early in their relationship in Miami, Bishop asked Veciana to monitor the activities of an anti-Castro operation called "Cellula Fantasma." (92) Veciana said he attended a few meetings of the group and described the operation as a leaflet-dropping mission over Cuba which involved known soldier-of-fortune Frank Fiorini Sturgis. (93) Veciana said he did not know why Bishop would have been interested in the operation, but the committee reviewed files which confirmed the existence and mission of the group, and the involvement of Frank Fiorini Sturgis at the time. (94)

(147) While Veciana was still in Cuba, among those at the American Embassy Bishop suggested he contact for aid in anti-Castro operations was a Col. Sam Kail. (95) The committee ascertained that there was a Col. Samuel G. Kail at the American Embassy in Havana in 1960 at the time Veciana said he contacted him. Kail, now retired, was located and interviewed in Dallas.

(148) Colonel Kail served as the U.S. Army attaché at the U.S. Embassy in Havana from June 3, 1958, until the day the Embassy closed, January 4, 1961. (96) His primary mission as a military attaché was that of intelligence. (97) Later, in February 1962, he was transferred to Miami where he was in charge of the unit that debriefed newly arrived Cuban refugees. Although he reported directly to the Chief of Army Intelligence in Washington, Kail said he assumed his unit was actually functioning for the CIA. "I suspect they paid our bills," he said. (98)

(149) Kail said that prior to the American Embassy closing in Havana, there was a "constant stream" of Cubans coming through his office with anti-Castro schemes, including assassination plans, asking for American assistance in the form of weapons or guarantees of escaping. "We had hordes and hordes of people through there all the time," he said. For that reason, he said, he did not specifically remember Veciana visiting him. "I think it would be a miracle if I could recall him," he said, but does not discount the possibility that he did meet him. (99)

(150) Kail said, however, agents of the CIA would frequently use the names of other Embassy staff personnel in their outside contacts without notifying the staff individual it was being done. (100) It happened "a number of times"; he said that a Cuban would come in and ask to see Colonel Kail and, when introduced to him, tell him that he was not the Colonel Kail he had met outside the Embassy. (101) Kail said he would then have the Cuban point out the CIA agent who had used his name. (102)

(151) Kail said he was not familiar with a Maurice Bishop, nor had he ever heard of anyone using that name. (103)

(152) Another aspect of Veciana's story that the committee examined closely was his alleged involvement in the assassination attempt on Castro in Chile in 1971. In a report given to Senator George McGovern in 1975, Castro provided information detailing the plot and accused "counterrevolutionaries from Alpha 66" as coconspirators. (104) Veciana himself, however, was not specifically mentioned. Nevertheless, the committee probed the anti-Castro Cuban community in Miami and found that Veciana's involvement in the plot was known by many of the active exiles. Max Lesnik, editor and publisher of *Replica*, the most prominent Spanish-language weekly publication in the community, said he was aware of Veciana's involvement in the assassination attempt at the time. (105) He said, however, that Veciana told him that it was "his own plan," and did not mention the involvement of a Maurice Bishop. (106) Lesnik could not identify Bishop but said he always did think that Veciana must have had "some high Government contacts, probably CIA." (107)

(153) The committee also attempted to confirm Vecianas' role in the Chile plot by locating two other anti-Castro Cubans allegedly involved with him. They were interviewed in Caracas, Venezuela, but, because they are not U.S. citizens, they could not be subpoenaed for sworn statements.

(154) One of those named was Lucilo Pena. A Cuban-born graduate of Auburn University in Georgia, Pena is now a Venezuelan citizen and a sales manager for a large chemical firm. He has lived in Venezuela since 1961. (108)

(155) Although Pena denied any involvement in the Castro assassination plot in Chile, he admitted to knowing Veciana since "1964 or 1965," when he was active in Alpha 66's "Plan Omega," a plot to invade Cuba from a base in the Dominican Republic. (109) He said he first met Veciana through a friend, Secundino Alvarez, who was the Caracas chapter leader of Alpha 66. (110) (Alvarez was among those named by Veciana as also being involved in the Chile plot.) (111) Pena admitted he had been in contact with Veciana during the period the Chile plot was being planned but, he said, their meetings were only casual, usually at boxing matches which Veciana promoted. (112) Pena also admitted that Veciana may have discussed the possibility of assassinating Castro with him during one of these encounters at the boxing matches. "I think he asked some help in raising money," Pena said, "but that's all I know about that." (113) Pena denied any knowledge or involvement in any plot to blame Russian agents for the planned Castro assassination in Chile. "I am not the type to do that kind of counterintelligence work," he said. "I am too open and honest." (114)

(156) Pena, however, admitted to knowing, perhaps since 1963, Luis Posada, another anti-Castro Cuban in Caracas, who Veciana claims was involved in the plot to kill Castro in Chile. (115)

(157) The committee interviewed Luis Posada in the Venezuelan political prison, Cuartel San Carlos, in Caracas. Posada had been arrested in October 1976, along with well-known anti-Castro Cuban terrorist Orlando Bosch, and indicted for being involved in the bombing of a Cubana Airlines plane in which 73 persons were killed. (116)

(158) Posada had earlier been linked with assassination plots against Cuban officials in Chile, including two who disappeared in August 1976. (117)

(159) Posada's background as a military and intelligence operative is eclectic. He was a member of Brigade 2506, but he did not take part in the Bay of Pigs landing. (118) In 1963, he joined the U.S. Army and was commissioned a first lieutenant. (119) He resigned his commission in 1964. (120) He went to Venezuela in 1967 and shortly afterwards joined the Venezuelan secret police, called DISIP, the Direccion de los Servicios de Inteligencia y Prevencion. (121) From 1971 to 1973, he was chief of operations of the General Division of Security for DISIP, which included counterintelligence. (122) He resigned from DISIP in 1973 and went to Washington, D.C. to take training from what he termed "a private company" in the field of lie detection. (123) He then returned to Caracas to open his own private detective agency.

(160) Posada told committee investigators that he was not involved in the Castro assassination attempt in Chile in 1971. (124) He admitted that he knew Veciana but said he only met him twice, once in Miami and once in Caracas at the boxing matches. (125) He said he did talk to Veciana about the time the Chile plot was being planned, but Veciana never mentioned anything to him about it. (126)

(161) Another aspect of Veciana's allegations that were of interest to the committee was Bishop's suggestion of developing a misinformation scheme involving a Castro intelligence agent and Oswald. (127) Veciana said that Bishop knew that a relative of his was in the Cuban



Intelligence service assigned to Mexico City at the time of the Kennedy assassination. (128) According to Veciana, a news story was circulating immediately after the assassination that Oswald had met a couple on the Mexican border while on his way to Mexico City prior to the assassination. (129) Bishop, Veciana said, suggested he attempt to get in touch with his relative and offer him a bribe to say that it was he and his wife who met Oswald in Mexico. (130) Veciana said he was never able to get in touch with his relative about it and eventually Bishop told him to forget it. (131)

(162) Veciana's relative, Orestes Guillermo Ruiz Perez, was, in fact, a relative by marriage, the husband of a first cousin to Veciana. (132) Veciana said he first learned of Ruiz's affiliation with Castro's intelligence service shortly after Castro took power. He and Ruiz were walking in a Havana park when they were stopped and searched by Castro's police. Ruiz was found to be carrying a gun and was taken away. Concerned, Veciana immediately placed a call to a close friend inside Castro's government, Minister of Finance Rufo Lopez-Fresquet. Lopez-Fresquet told Veciana not to worry about Ruiz because Ruiz was actually working for the intelligence service. (133)

(163) Although Ruiz was a Castro agent and Communist he warned Veciana that he was being observed visiting the American Embassy in Havana and told him to be careful. (134) That was why Veciana later thought that he might be able to turn Ruiz into an anti-Castro agent. Some time after the Kennedy assassination, Veciana said he was approached by another anti-Castro Cuban named Robert Vale. (135) Vale asked Veciana to attempt to contact Ruiz about possibly becoming an asset for the CIA. (136) Ruiz, at the time, was stationed in Spain, and when Veciana found a friend, Roblejo Lorie, who was traveling to Spain, he asked him to carry a letter to Ruiz. Lorie gave the letter to Ruiz but, according to Veciana, Ruiz tore the letter up in front of Lorie and told him that he did not want to have any contact with Veciana because he knew Veciana "was working for the CIA." (137)

(164) The committee was able to interview Orestes Guillermo Ruiz in Havana. (138) Ruiz acknowledged that he was related to Veciana through marriage. (139) He said that "everyone in Cuba" knows that Veciana is associated with the CIA and was involved in assassination attempts on Castro. (140) He said, however, aside from what he read in the American newspapers, he has no knowledge of Veciana's association with Maurice Bishop or who Maurice Bishop could be. (141) He said he was never contacted by Veciana about Oswald (142) and, in fact, has not seen Veciana since 1959. (143)

(165) Ruiz expressed disdain for Veciana, said he considered him a coward (144) and "a person you cannot believe." He said Veciana had personality problems and was under psychiatric care from the time he was 16 years old until he was 21. (145) Ruiz said that "another counterrevolutionary," a cousin of Veciana's who is a doctor "in Miami or Chicago" and whose name is Jose Veciana, could attest to Veciana's psychiatric problems because he had advised the family about them. (146)

(166) Committee investigators located Dr. Jose Veciana in Martin, Tenn., where he was chief of pathology at Volunteer General Hospital. He confirmed that he is a first cousin to Antonio Veciana and that he

had known him when he was a child in Havana. (147) Dr. Veciana said he has never known his cousin to have personality problems or to have ever been under psychiatric care. He said he himself has never provided Veciana any psychiatric advice nor offered it to his family. (148) He said he believed that Veciana must be of sound mental condition because he knows that Veciana had to undergo vigorous tests in his rise in the banking business. (149)

(167) Veciana himself denied Ruiz' allegations that he had had psychiatric problems as a young man. His mother confirmed his denial. (150)

#### THE SEARCH FOR BISHOP

(168) One of the factors utilized in the committee's efforts to locate Maurice Bishop was the description of him provided by Veciana. When he first met him in 1960, Veciana said, Bishop was about 45 years old, about 6 feet, 2 inches tall, weighed over 200 pounds, and was athletically built. He had gray-blue eyes, light brown hair, and a light complexion. (151) Veciana said, however, that Bishop appeared to spend much time outdoors or in sunny climate because he was usually well tanned and there was some skin discoloration, like sun spots, under his eyes. (152) He appeared to be meticulous about his dress and usually concerned about his weight and diet. (153) In the latter years that Veciana knew him, Bishop began using glasses for reading. (154)

(169) Shortly after he revealed his Bishop relationship to Senator Schweiker's investigator, Veciana aided a professional artist in developing a composite sketch of Bishop. Schweiker's office provided the committee with a copy of the sketch. Veciana told the committee that he considered the artist's composite sketch of Bishop a "pretty good" resemblance. (155)

(170) Prior to the committee's efforts, Senator Schweiker's office, as well as the Senate subcommittee he headed, looked into certain aspects of Veciana's allegations. Schweiker, for instance, requested the Belgian Embassy to conduct a record check for information about a passport issued under the name of "Frigault." The Belgian Embassy said that, without additional identifying information, it could not help. (156) In addition, Schweiker's investigator showed Veciana numerous photographs of individuals who may have used the name of Bishop, among them Oswald's friend, George de Mohrenschildt, who was then a teacher at Bishop College in Dallas. The results were negative. (157)

(171) It was Senator Schweiker who focused the committee's attention to David Atlee Phillips, former chief of the Western Hemisphere Division of the CIA Deputy Directorate of Operations, as perhaps having knowledge of Maurice Bishop. Immediately after receiving the Bishop sketch, Schweiker concluded that Phillips, who had earlier testified before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, bore a strong resemblance to the sketch.

(172) When Veciana was shown a photograph of David Phillips by Schweiker's investigator, he did not provide an absolutely conclusive response. (158) For that reason, it was decided that Veciana be given the opportunity to observe Phillips in person. (159) Schweiker arranged for Veciana to be present at a luncheon meeting

of the Association of Retired Intelligence Officers in Reston, Va., on September 17, 1976.(160) Phillips was one of the founders of the association. Veciana was introduced to Phillips prior to the luncheon.(161) He was introduced by name but not by affiliation with Alpha 66 or involvement with anti-Castro activity.(162) According to Schweiker's investigator, there was no indication of recognition on Phillips' part.(163) Following the luncheon, Veciana had the opportunity to speak with Phillips in Spanish.(164) Veciana asked Phillips if he was in Havana in 1960 and if he knew Julio Lobo.(165) Phillips answered both questions affirmatively and then asked Veciana to repeat his name.(166) Veciana did and then asked, "Do you know my name?" Phillips said he did not.(167) Phillips was asked if Veciana was on Schweiker's staff.(168) He was told that he was not, but that Veciana was helping Schweiker in his investigation of the Kennedy assassination.(169) Phillips declined to be interviewed by Senator Schweiker's investigator, but said he would be happy to speak with any Congressman or congressional representative "in Congress."(170) Following the encounter of Veciana and Phillips, Schweiker's investigator asked Veciana if David Phillips was Maurice Bishop.(171) Veciana said he was not.(172)

(173) Schweiker's investigator expressed some doubt about Veciana's credibility on the point, however, because of Veciana's renewed interest in continuing his anti-Castro operations and his expressed desire to recontact Bishop to help him.(173) In addition, Schweiker's investigator expressed doubt that David Phillips, who was once in charge of Cuban operations for the CIA and whose career was deeply entwined in anti-Castro operations, could not recognize the name of Veciana as being the founder and vociferous public spokesman for one of the largest and most active anti-Castro Cuban groups, Alpha 66.(174)

(174) The committee considered other factors in examining Phillips, including his principal area of expertise and operations until 1963.(175) In 1960, when Veciana said he first met Bishop in Havana, Phillips was serving as a covert operative in Havana.(176) From 1961 to 1963, Phillips was Chief of Covert Action in another relevant country. When Oswald visited the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City in 1963, Phillips was also in charge of Cuban operations for the CIA in same country. Phillips had earlier lived in and had numerous associations in another relevant country.(177) He had also served as chief of station in several other places of general relevance.(178) (175) The committee developed other information that further gave support to an interest in Phillips in relation to Bishop. In Miami, its investigators interviewed a former career agent for the CIA, who for present purposes will be called Ron Cross. From September 1960 until November 1962, Cross was a case officer at the CIA's JM/WAVE station, the operational base which coordinated the Agency's activities with the anti-Castro exiles.(179) He handled one of the largest and most active anti-Castro groups.(180) At the time that Cross was at the Miami JM/WAVE station, David Phillips was responsible for certain aspects of the CIA's anti-Castro operations. Cross coordinated these operations with Phillips, who would occasionally visit the JM/WAVE station from Washington.(181) Generally, however,

Cross worked with Phillips' direct assistant at the station, who used the cover name of Doug Gupton.

(176) In his book about his role in the Bay of Pigs operation, former CIA officer E. Howard Hunt used a pseudonym when referring to the chief of the operation. (182) The chief of propaganda was David Phillips. Hunt called him "Knight." (183)

(177) When asked by the committee if he was familiar with anyone using the cover name of Bishop at the JM/WAVE station, Cross said he was "almost positive" that David Phillips had used the cover name of Maurice Bishop. (184) He said he was "fairly sure" that Hunt himself had used the cover name of Knight. (185) Cross said, however, that the reason he was certain that Phillips used the name of Bishop was because he recalled sometimes discussing field and agent problems with Phillips' assistant, Doug Gupton, and Gupton often saying, "Well, I guess Mr. Bishop will have to talk with him." Cross said: "And, of course, I knew he was referring to his boss, David Phillips." (186)

(178) The committee ascertained that the cover name of Doug Gupton was used at the JM/WAVE station by a former CIA employee.

(179) The committee staff interviewed Doug Gupton on August 22, 1978, at CIA headquarters. (187) Gupton said he worked for the CIA from December 1951 until his retirement. (188) Gupton confirmed that he was in charge of a special operations staff at the Miami JM/WAVE station and that his immediate superior was David Phillips. (189) Gupton acknowledged that Ron Cross (cover name) was a case officer who worked for him and that he saw Cross on a daily basis. (190) Gupton said he did not recall whether E. Howard Hunt or David Phillips ever used the name of "Knight." (191) He said he does not recall Phillips ever using the name of Maurice Bishop. (192) When told about Cross' recollection of him referring to Phillips as "Mr. Bishop," Gupton said: "Well, maybe I did. I don't remember." (193) He also said, however, that he never heard the name of Bishop while he was stationed in Miami. (194) When shown the sketch of Bishop, he said it did not look like anyone he knew. (195)

(180) Explaining his working relationship with David Phillips, Gupton said he was in contact with him regularly in Washington by telephone and cable, and that Phillips visited Miami "quite often." (196) Gupton said, however, that there were two sets of operations. His set of operations was run out of Miami and he kept Phillips informed of them. Phillips ran another set of operations personally out of Washington and, Gupton said, Phillips did not keep him briefed about them. (197) Gupton also said he knew that Phillips used many of his old contacts from Havana in his personal operations. (198)

(181) David Atlee Phillips testified before the committee in executive session on April 25, 1978. He said he never used the name Maurice Bishop. (199) He said he did not know of anyone in the CIA who used the name Maurice Bishop. (200) He said he had seen Antonio Veciana only twice in his life, the second time the morning of his hearing before the committee when Veciana, who had testified earlier, emerged from the hearing room while he, Phillips, was in the hallway. (201) Phillips said the first time he met Veciana was at a meeting of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers in Reston. (202) He said:

that Veciana was brought to that meeting by an investigator from Senator Schweiker's office but, said Phillips, Veciana was not introduced to him by name but only as "the driver." (203) He said Veciana asked him some questions in Spanish, but at the time he did not know who Veciana was or why Senator Schweiker's office had sent him to the meeting. (204)

(182) Phillips also testified that he had never used the name Frigault and had never used a Belgian passport. (205)

(183) Phillips was shown the sketch of Maurice Bishop but could not identify it as anyone he knew. He said, however, "It looks like me." (206)

(184) In sworn testimony before the committee in executive session on April 26, 1978, Antonio Veciana said that David Atlee Phillips is not the person he knew as Maurice Bishop. (207) He said, however, that there was a "physical similarity." (208)

(185) On March 2, 1978, the committee requested the CIA to check all its files and index references pertaining to Maurice Bishop. (209) On March 31, 1978, the CIA informed the committee that its Office of the Inspector General, its Office of the General Counsel, its Office of Personnel, and the Deputy Directorate of Operations had no record of a Maurice Bishop. (210)

(186) On August 10, 1978, B. H., a former covert operative of the CIA, was interviewed by the committee in a special closed session. (211) B. H. was a CIA agent from 1952 to 1970. (212) Between 1960 and 1964 he was assigned to Cuban operations. (213) As such, he testified, he was involved in "day-to-day" operations with David Atlee Phillips. He characterized Phillips as "an excellent intelligence officer" and "a personal friend." (214)

(187) When asked if he knew an individual named Maurice Bishop, B. H. said:

"Again, Mr. Bishop was in the organization but I had no personal day-to-day open relationship with him. Phillips, yes; Bishop, no. I knew them both." (215)

(188) Although he couldn't describe Bishop's physical characteristics, B. H. said he had seen him "two or three times" (216) in the "hallways or cafeteria" (217), at CIA headquarters in Langley. B. H. said he thought Bishop worked in the Western Hemisphere Division (218) and that he had a position "higher than me." (219) He could not be more specific. The two or three times he saw Bishop, he said, was between 1960 and 1964 when he himself was in Cuban operations, although, he said, he did not know if Bishop worked in that area also. (220)

(189) Asked how, if he did not personally know Bishop, he knew the person he saw at CIA headquarters was Maurice Bishop, B. H. said: "Someone might have said, 'That is Maurice Bishop,' and it was different from Dave Phillips or Joseph Langosch guys that I know." (221)

(190) When shown the sketch of Maurice Bishop, however, B. H. could not identify it as anyone he recognized.

(191) On August 17, 1978, the committee deposed John A. McCone, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency from October 1961 until April 30, 1965. (222)

(192) During the course of the deposition, the following questions and answers were recorded:

Q. Do you know or did you know Maurice Bishop?

A. Yes.

Q. Was he an agency employee?

A. I believe so.

Q. Do you know what his duties were in 1963?

A. No.

Q. For instance, do you know whether Maurice Bishop worked in the Western Hemisphere Division or whether he worked in some other division of the CIA?

A. I do not know. I do not recall. I knew at that time but I do not recall.

Q. Do you know whether Maurice Bishop used any pseudonyms?

A. No; I do not know that. (223)

(193) In view of the information developed in the interviews with B. H. and former Director McCone, the committee asked the CIA to renew its file search for any files or index references pertaining to Bishop. (224). It also asked for a written statement from the CIA indicating whether an individual using either the true name or pseudonym of Maurice Bishop has ever been associated in any capacity with the CIA. (225)

(194) A reply was received on September 8, 1978, from the CIA's Office of Legislative Counsel indicating that all true name files, alias files and pseudonym files were again checked and, again, proved negative. "No person with such a name has a connection with CIA," said the reply. (226) Added the Agency: "Quite frankly, it is our belief—from our earlier check, reinforced by this one—that such a man did not exist, so far as CIA connections are concerned."\* (227)

(195) Additional efforts to locate Maurice Bishop were made by the committee in file requests to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. (228) and to the Department of Defense. (229) Both proved negative. (230)

(196) Although file reviews of Maurice Bishop proved negative, the

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\*On October 19, 1978, the committee's chief counsel received a letter from the principal coordinator in the CIA's Office of Legislative Counsel. The letter said, in part: "This is to advise you that I have interviewed Mr. McCone and a retired employee concerning their recollections about an alleged CIA employee reportedly using the name of Maurice Bishop. \* \* \*

"We assembled photographs of the persons with the surname of Bishop who had employment relationships of some type with CIA during the 1960's, to see if either Mr. McCone or the employee would recognize one of them.

"Mr. McCone did not feel it necessary to review those photographs, stating that I should inform you that he had been in error. \* \* \*

"The employee continues to recall a person of whom he knew who was known as Maurice Bishop. He cannot state the organizational connection or responsibilities of the individual, not knowing him personally, and feels that the person in question was pointed out to him by someone, perhaps a secretary. He is unable, however, to recognize any of the photographs mentioned above. \* \* \*

"In summary, Mr. McCone withdraws his statements on this point. The employee continues to recall such a name, but the nature of his recollection is not very clear or precise. We still believe that there is no evidence of the existence of such a person so far as there being a CIA connection. \* \* \*" (J. F. K. Document No. 012722.)

committee learned that Army intelligence had an operational interest in Antonio Veciana during one period. (197) Veciana was registered in the Army Information Source Registry from November 1962 until July 1966. (231)

(198) The nature of the Army's contact with Veciana appeared to be limited to attempting to use him as a source of intelligence information about Alpha 66 activities, with Veciana, in turn, seeking to obtain weapons and funds. (232) Veciana acknowledged and detailed to the committee these contacts with Army intelligence and said that, aside from keeping Bishop informed of them, they had no relationship with his activities with Bishop. (233)

(199) Given the Army's acknowledgement of an interest in Veciana and Alpha 66, the committee made the assumption that the CIA may also have had an interest in Veciana and his Alpha 66 activities as part of its pervasive role in anti-Castro operations during the 1960's.

(200) In a review of its own files on March 15, 1978, the CIA noted that Veciana had contacted the Agency three times—in December 1960; July 1962; and April 1966—for assistance in plots against Castro. (234) According to the CIA: "Officers listened to Veciana, expressed no interest, offered no encouragement and never recontacted him on this matter. There has been no Agency relationship with Veciana." (235)

(201) The committee's own review of the Agency's files basically confirmed the stated conclusions about the meetings with Veciana in 1960 and 1966. A review of the files pertaining to 1962, however, revealed that on July 7, 1962, Veciana received \$500 from a wealthy Puerto Rican financier and industrialist with whom the CIA had a longstanding operational relationship. (236) Although the files do not explicitly state whether the money originated with the CIA or the industrialist, and even though during this same period the Agency was using the Puerto Rican, it appears that in Veciana's case the money was provided by the industrialist, and not by the Agency.

(202) Finally, to locate or identify Maurice Bishop, the committee issued a press release on July 30, 1978 and made available to the media the composite sketch of Bishop. The sketch was part of a release of several other items, including two sketches and three photographs. The committee warned that it should not be assumed that the release indicated the committee believes the person in the sketch was involved in the Kennedy assassination, only that information resulting from possible citizen recognition of the sketch might "shed additional light on the assassination." The committee asked that anyone who had information contact the committee by mail, not by telephone. (237)

(203) By November 1, 1978, the committee received from the general public a total of four written responses relating to the Bishop sketch. The three photographs were identified, the two sketches were not. (238)

(204) No definitive conclusion could be reached about the credibility of Antonio Veciana's allegations regarding his relationship with a Maurice Bishop. Additionally, no definitive conclusions could be drawn as to the identity or affiliations of Bishop, if such an individual existed. While no evidence was found to discredit Veciana's testimony, there was some evidence to support it, although none of it was con-

clusive. The available documentary record was sufficient to indicate that the U.S. Government's intelligence community had a keen interest in Antonio Veciana during the early 1960's and that he was willing to receive the financial support he needed for the military operations of his anti-Castro groups from those sources. From the files of these agencies, it thus appears reasonable that an association similar to the alleged Maurice Bishop story actually existed. But whether Veciana's contact was really named Maurice Bishop, or if he was, whether he did all of the things Veciana claims, and if so, with which U.S. intelligence agency he was associated, could not be determined. No corroboration was found for Veciana's alleged meeting with Lee Harvey Oswald.

Submitted by:

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*Investigator.*

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#### IV. CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL: A CONCISE HISTORY

(205) The forerunner of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) was the Frente Revolucionario Democrático (FRD), formed in May 1960. (1) At the head of it were the leaders of five major anti-Castro groups. The proclaimed purpose of the FRD was to establish a democratic government in Cuba through the use of military force. (2)

(206) The FRD set up headquarters initially in Mexico, but recruited most of its proposed invasion force from Miami. (3) The military arm of the FRD was known as Brigade 2506. (4) The Brigade was eventually composed of 1,443 men who were trained by U.S. Army specialists at two sites on the south coast of Guatemala. (5)

(207) The leaders and their organizations that composed the FRD executive committee were: Aureliano Sanchez Arango of the Triple A group; Justo Carrillo of Montecristi; Antonio de Varona of Rescate; Manuel Artime of the Revolutionary Recovery Movement (MRR); and Dr. Jose Ignacio Rasco of the Christian Democratic Movement (MDC). (6) Antonio de Varona served as General Coordinator (7) and the membership was soon expanded to include Dr. Antonio Maceo, a noted Cuban surgeon; former Cuban President Carlos Hevia; and conservative leader Rafael Sardinas. (8)

(208) In March 1961, The State Department pressured FRD leaders to accept the Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo (MRP), headed by Manuel Ray Rivero, into the FRD. (9) The inclusion of Ray's group into the alliance of Cuban exiles was reportedly also "terribly important to the White House," which wanted to broaden the political base of the FRD. (10) In an effort to attract Ray and his group into the FRD, Antonio de Varona resigned voluntarily and Dr. Jose Miro Cardona was elected its new president. (11) Dr. Miro Cardona was a former Havana jurist who broke with Castro after serving him as his first Prime Minister. (12)

(209) Shortly before the April 17, 1961, Bay of Pigs invasion, the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) was formed to coordinate and direct FRD activities with U.S. Government support. (13) The new organization had direct access to President Kennedy and top White House aides. (14) All the groups within the CRC maintained their separate identities. (15) The leaders expressing publicly their unity, especially during the period prior to the planned invasion. The regrouping included the following Cuban exile leaders: Chairman, Dr. Jose Miro Cardona; Board of Directors—Antonio de Varona, Justo Carillo, Carlos Hevia, Antonio Maceo, Manuel Ray, and Manuel Artime. (16) CRC committees were organized in key cities in the United States and delegations appointed in Latin American countries. (17)

(210) The failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion resulted in Castro capture and imprisonment of over 1,000 of the Brigade's members. (18) The dejected leaders of the CRC, who had been sequestered for security

reasons at the start of the invasion, (19) were later taken to the White House for a personal visit with President Kennedy who expressed his regret and assumed responsibility for the invasion failure.(20)

(21) Shortly after the unsuccessful invasion, Manuel Ray withdrew his organization, the MRP, from the Council,(21) and by October 1961, the CRC had completely absorbed the FRD.(22) Dr. Miro Cardona remained at the helm of the Council, which had been enlarged to include the Revolutionary Action and a faction of the 30th of November Movement.(23) While some unification had been achieved through the FRD and CRC, the Cuban exile groups were plagued by factionalism, personal rivalries for leadership roles, and conflicting programs.(24) Nevertheless, the CRC was still considered the principal unifying organization of the Cuban exile community(25) although no anti-Castro leader emerged who could command broad support of the community.(26)

(212) After the October 1962 missile crisis, the policy of the United States toward the Castro regime changed drastically. In his book "The Losers," Paul Bethel, former press attaché at the Havana Embassy noted:

There is no doubt that President Kennedy and his brother, the Attorney General, consciously set about the business of stopping all efforts to unhorse Fidel Castro—from outside exile attacks, and from Cuba's internal resistance movement.(27)

When two Cuban exile groups made raids against Russian installations in Cuba and a Russian freighter in the Cuban port of Caribarien, the Attorney General dispatched 600 Federal agents to Miami in an effort to prevent further actions against the Castro regime.(28) A directive was issued that prohibited key anti-Castro leaders in Miami from leaving the area without Federal approval.(29)

(213) Although individual groups received financial aid from the U.S. Government(30) the effectiveness of the CRC as a unifying organization deteriorated. In April 1963, Jose Miro Cardona resigned his position as president in a clash with the Kennedy administration over Cuban policy.(31) Miro Cardona claimed that Kennedy had promised another invasion would be launched and had instead chosen a course of peaceful coexistence with the Castro regime.(32) The CRC was revamped and Dr. Antonio Maceo elected president,(33) although Antonio de Varona was still a dominating force in the organization.(34) Government funds to the CRC were cut off on May 1, 1963, and could no longer support its Latin American delegates.(35)

(214) The credibility of the CRC then took a severe blow. In June 1963, the Miami News revealed that a highly publicized commando raid on Cuba, purportedly made on June 21, was actually a hoax.(36) According to the newspaper, "Although Dr. Maceo did not say it, sources related that the proposed landing of up to 3,000 commandos was a fraud that ballooned with the tacit consent of other publicity-minded CRC members."(37) Following the revelations, Dr. Maceo resigned as president of the CRC and was succeeded by Antonio de Varona.(38)

(215) Varona was able to hold the financially pinched CRC together for about 6 months, but he himself had to leave Miami in early 1964 and move to New York to seek employment, giving up his full-time activities as an anti-Castro revolutionary leader.<sup>(39)</sup> The Cuban Revolutionary Council quietly disintegrated.

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V. CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL (CRC):  
NEW ORLEANS CHAPTER

(216) Nine days after the assassination of the President, the U.S. Secret Service began an investigation into the activities of Lee Harvey Oswald during his residency in New Orleans. (1)

(217) Oswald had been arrested there in August 1963 while distributing Fair Play for Cuba literature. Some of his leaflets had the address 544 Camp Street stamped on them. The Secret Service endeavored to determine if Oswald maintained an office at this address. (2)

(218) During the course of its investigation, the Secret Service ascertained that the New Orleans chapter of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) had occupied an office at 544 Camp Street for about 6 months during 1961-62. At that time, Sergio Arcacha Smith was the official CRC delegate for the New Orleans area. The Secret Service also learned that Arcacha Smith had been fired from his position by the Miami CRC headquarters in early 1962, allegedly because he did not have the confidence of the New Orleans Cuban exile community. Luis Rabel replaced Arcacha Smith and moved the CRC offices to his home. (3)

(219) At the time of the Secret Service investigation, another Cuban exile, Frank Bartes, headed the New Orleans CRC delegation and maintained offices in his home in Metairie, a suburb of New Orleans. (4)

(220) After an extensive investigation by the FBI and the Secret Service regarding the possibility that Oswald rented office space at 544 Camp Street, the Warren report concluded there was no evidence that Oswald ever maintained an office at that address. (5)

(221) This material only pertains to the committee's attempt to ascertain if any activities of the CRC had any relationship to Oswald's activities in New Orleans.

(222) The Committee questioned the first New Orleans delegate to the CRC, Sergio Arcacha Smith. (6) He told the committee that he arrived in Miami in August 1960 and, at the request of Antonio de Varona, a director of the CRC, agreed to establish a chapter of this group in New Orleans. Arcacha Smith was initially afforded free office space in the Balter Building; he later rented space at 544 Camp Street. (7)

(223) During his tenure as head of the New Orleans delegation, Arcacha Smith endeavored to raise funds by selling CRC bonds, and was instrumental in organizing several rallies to promote the cause of the Cuban exiles. (8)

(224) Arcacha Smith said he had never seen Oswald in New Orleans and, from what he had read, Oswald was not even in that city at the same time Arcacha Smith lived there. (9) When he was relieved of his official position with the CRC in early 1962, Arcacha left New Orleans. (10)

(225) Arcacha Smith's replacement, Luis Rabel, assumed the delegate duties in January 1962 but, he told the committee, found it necessary to resign by October of that year because his job entailed extensive traveling. (11) During his short tenure, Rabel said he organized several rallies and brought in prominent Miami speakers to inspire the New Orleans Cuban exile community. (12) Other than going to the Camp Street address to remove office materials left there by Arcacha Smith, Rabel said he had no connection with the building and never saw Oswald in New Orleans. (13)

(226) Frank Bartes, former president of Consolidated Railroads in Cuba, (14) became the third designated delegate of the New Orleans CRC chapter. He reported the activities of the group regularly to the FBI (15) and was primarily concerned with solicitation of monthly pledges from Cubans for the purchase of arms for their countrymen actively engaged in the fight against Castro. (16) He reported that he had purchased an M-2 rifle with collections and displayed it at an October 1963 meeting for "psychological reasons." (17) Bartes said, however, because of the rate of collections at that time, the group was able to send only enough money to the Miami CRC headquarters to purchase one gun per month. (18)

(227) On November 15, 1963, a CRC meeting was held at Gallier Hall. Antonio de Varona was invited to come to New Orleans to speak to the Cuban exiles and bolster their morale. (19) He stayed at the home of Agustin Guitart, (20) uncle of Silvia Odio.

(228) Bartes told the committee he headed the New Orleans delegation until the CRC was dissolved in 1964. (21) During his tenure, he said, he maintained the CRC office in his home. (22) He could not recall ever having visited the 544 Camp Street office maintained by Arcacha Smith in 1961-62. (23)

(229) After Carlos Bringuier and Oswald had been arrested in a street scuffle, Bartes appeared in court with Bringuier. (24) Although not a CRC member, Bringuier was respected by Bartes and it was as a show of support that Bartes appeared at Bringuier's hearing. (25)

(230) After the hearing, the news media surrounded Oswald for a statement, Bartes said. At this point, Bartes got into an argument with the media and Oswald because the Cubans were not being given an opportunity to present their views. (26) He also spoke to an FBI agent that day, warning that Oswald was a potentially dangerous man. (27) Bartes declined to identify the agent to the committee, saying only that he had had frequent contact with him during this period of time. (28) Bartes said he had no other contact with Oswald. (29)


(231) The evidence would seem to indicate, therefore, that the New Orleans chapter of the CRC had no relationship with Oswald other than the brief encounter with Bartes, and in no way was officially involved in any activities that touched upon those of Oswald.

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## VI. BRIGADE 2506—MANUEL ARTIME—MOVIMIENTO DE RECUPERACION REVOLUCIONARIA (MRR)

(232) No other anti-Castro Cuban group more naturally attracted the initial attention of the committee than Brigade 2506, the organization formed specifically for the Bay of Pigs invasion and the one that experienced the most dramatic relationship with the Kennedy administration in terms of its hopes and failures.

(233) Following their release from Castro's prisons in December of 1962, the members of the brigade harbored deep-seated emotional conflicts in their attitude toward the government. An observer who watched them arrive in Miami noted:

They were earnest, bewildered, still in a state of shock at their sudden liberation, still nursing a bitter sense of betrayal at the manner in which they were sent ashore and abandoned, still torn between trust and cynicism, still in awe at the power of an American Government that could, at will it seemed, pluck them out of the darkest dungeons in Havana and on the Isle of Pines, and deposit them back in Florida with their families by Christmas Eve. (1).

(234) In the perspective of an investigation of the Kennedy assassination, the members of Brigade 2506 had to be considered of primary interest if only in terms of motivations and means. As one member, who later became involved in anti-Castro terrorist activity, explained: "We learned from them. We use the tactics that we learned from the CIA \* because we were trained to do everything. We were trained to set off a bomb, we were trained to kill." (2)

(235) The formation of what was to become Brigade 2506 can be traced to March 1960 when President Dwight Eisenhower authorized the CIA to organize, train, and equip Cuban refugees for the purpose of eventually overthrowing Castro. (3) To head the group, a young physician was chosen who had organized the Movimiento de Recuperación Revolucionaria (MRR), the first anti-Castro action group inside Cuba. (4) His name was Manuel Artime; he had fled Cuba the previous December. (5) Castro had appointed him a member of the National Agrarian Reform Institute but when, in October 1959, he heard Castro outline a plan to communize Cuba, Artime publicly resigned his position and denounced Castro. (6)

(236) The group that eventually grew into Brigade 2506 originally consisted of only 28 men. (7) The nucleus was 10 former Cuban military officers whom Artime had recruited. (8) He told them that he had been told by a group of Americans who claimed to have no association with the U.S. Government that they would receive a huge amount of arms, equipment, and funds. (9) The Americans tried to give Artime and

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\*In fact, U.S. Army Special Forces, not the CIA, trained the brigade.

his men the impression that an anonymous Cuban millionaire was paying the bills, but the Cubans eventually began referring to their benefactor as "Uncle Sam." (10)

(237) At secret camps in Florida, in Panama, and eventually in Guatemala, the U.S. Government trained the core of future brigade leaders in guerrilla warfare. (11) By September 1960, this initial cadre was part of a group of 160 men undergoing vigorous military conditioning in the treacherously dense mountain jungles of the Sierra Madre in Guatemala. (12) That month, one of the men, Carlos (Carlyle) Rodriguez Santana, was killed in training. (13) In his honor, the members of the unit decided they would name the brigade after his serial designation, 2506. (14)

(238) Although Manuel Artime, through his MRR organization transplanted in Miami, was the principal recruiting apparatus for brigade personnel, chosen as military leader of the brigade was Jose ("Pepe") Perez San Roman, a graduate of Cuba's military academy who had also undergone U.S. Army officer training at Fort Benning, Ga. (15) He had been freed by Castro from a Batista prison, then later reimprisoned by Castro before escaping from Cuba. (16)

(239) Nevertheless, it was Artime who remained the key figure in the U.S. Government's relationship with the activist exiles and the brigade. When, as the Cuban exile population in Miami grew and the political squabbling among anti-Castro factions spread to Guatemala and sparked a camp mutiny that almost stopped the training, it was Artime the CIA called upon to help resolve the problem. (17) Artime had been made a director of the Frente Revolucionario Democrático (FRD), (18) a political and propaganda organization involving several anti-Castro groups formed in May 1960. (19) The brigade was to be its military arm. (20) But the political fighting among the groups eventually led to its dissolution and creation of a broader-based organization, the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC), before the Bay of Pigs invasion. (21) Artime also was made a director of that group. (22)

(240) The Bay of Pigs invasion took place in April 1961. (23) More than 1,200 brigade members were taken prisoner by Castro. (24) Before they were released in December 1962, in an exchange for \$53 million in medical supplies, (25) the members of the brigade suffered not only the humiliation of defeat and capture by Castro, they also were subject to the agony of false hope when, within a few months of their imprisonment, they saw Castro's offer to exchange them for 500 tractors become inextricably bogged in the muck of partisan U.S. politics. As one historian noted:

The prisoners suffered more from domestic politics than they did at the hands of Castro. \* \* \* Had the political climate in the United States been less inflammatory, it is not at all unlikely that Brigade 2506 could have been released in June of 1961 for \$28 million in tractors, cash, and credits. Instead of freedom through tractors, however, the men were doomed to the degradation of a year and a half longer in prison. (26)

(241) The final formation of Brigade 2506 took place at the Orange Bowl Stadium in Miami on December 29, 1962. President Kennedy

was there to welcome back the surviving members who had spent almost 20 months in Castro's prisons.(27) The crowd of 40,000 friends, families, and relatives cheered in tearful joy as brigade chief Pepe San Roman presented Kennedy with the brigade flag, which had flown over the Bay of Pigs beach for 3 days.(28) The President accepted the flag and declared: "I can assure you that this flag will be returned to this brigade in a free Havana." Mrs. Kennedy spoke in Spanish and called the brigade members "the bravest men in the world."(29) It was a dramatic and emotional scene, but it may have been misleading. Although the event reflected publicly a concordant rapport between the President and the brigade, beneath the surface there ran a vein of bitter resentment among those who felt the event was a display of political hypocrisy. E. Howard Hunt, once assigned liaison duties with the brigade, claimed later that the brigade feeling against Kennedy was so great that the presentation of the flag nearly did not take place.(30)

(242) Nevertheless, it is difficult to finalize an assessment of the brigade's collective attitude toward the U.S. Government and the Kennedy administration following the Orange Bowl event. Kennedy's resolution to the Cuban missile crisis, in which he promised Castro that raids against Cuba from the U.S. mainland would be halted, was considered an act of betrayal to their cause by many of the exiles in the anti-Castro communities. Yet most of the members of the brigade seemed to maintain a basic confidence in the U.S. Government's resolve to topple the Castro regime, and, in fact, nearly half of them enlisted in the U.S. Armed Forces through a special arrangement made by President Kennedy himself.(31)

(243) Although Brigade 2506 officially ceased to exist after December 1962,(32) Manuel Artime, who had become known as the CIA's "golden boy,"(33) was soon scouting around Latin America for sites on which to establish guerrilla training camps. By October 1963, he had established four bases, two in Costa Rica and two in Nicaragua.(34) Artime's 300-man force consisted mainly of veterans of the brigade.(35) Artime would later admit that his resources included two large ships, eight small vessels, two speed boats, three planes, and more than 200 tons of weapons and armaments and about \$250,000 in electronic equipment.(36) During the year of his operation, Artime was able to conduct four major operations, three of which failed: the mistaken shelling of a Spanish cargo ship (which caused an international uproar); an infiltration mission in which all the participants were captured; an unsuccessful assassination attempt on Castro;(37) and finally, a six-man infiltration mission that did succeed.(38)

(244) Although Artime received U.S. Government support, there remained the question of whether President Kennedy was knowledgeable of or approved Artime's anti-Castro operations after the Cuban missile crisis. Following the assassination of both John F. Kennedy and Robert F. Kennedy, Artime said publicly that both the President and his brother were responsible for his establishing the Latin American bases.(39) He said that after his return from prison in Cuba, he met President Kennedy in West Palm Beach, Fla., and that Kennedy referred him to his brother.(40) Artime said he met Robert Kennedy

in Washington and that the then Attorney General promised him military aid if he, Artime, could get the bases. (41)

(245) Artime claimed that his anti-Castro operations from the bases ceased "when Bobby Kennedy separated from the Johnson administration." (42) Nevertheless, in December 1964, the Costa Rican police ordered the camps shut down when it uncovered a \$50,000 contraband whisky operation involving a plane from Artime's group. The camps in Nicaragua were also closed, although Artime kept close personal ties to that country by becoming a beef broker for Nicaraguan President Gen. Anastasio Somoza, the country's largest beef producer. (43)

(246) When Artime was first contacted by the committee, he stated that he had had direct contact with both President Kennedy and Robert Kennedy and, through them, was given full support by the CIA for his anti-Castro operations. He said he felt the death of President Kennedy marked the end of the U.S. Government's attempts to liberate Cuba. (44) He agreed to be interviewed by the committee (45) but, before that was possible, he died of cancer at the age of 45 after a brief illness. (46)

Submitted by:


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## VII. MOVIMIENTO DEMOCRATA CRISTIANO (MDC)

(247) After Castro's assumption of power in 1959, it became evident to many Cubans that political parties were being suppressed and the 26th of July Movement was being infiltrated by Communists. This political atmosphere gave rise to the creation of underground organizations such as the Christian Democratic Movement of Cuba (MDC). (1) Proclaiming the doctrine of Christianity as its foundation, the MDC published a manifesto in March 1960 (2) denouncing communism and strongly advocating the free enterprise system. (3) One of the founders of the MDC, 35-year-old law professor Dr. Jose Ignacio Rasco, was elected head of the organization (4) and immediately criticized the violence prevalent in the Castro regime. (5) This public criticism produced pressure on him to leave Cuba and he arrived in Miami on April 22, 1960. (6) By June, Rasco had allied himself and the MDC with the Frente Revolucionario Democrático (FRD) (7) and thus became one of the five original exile Cuban leaders brought together by the U.S. Government to form the nucleus of a Cuban government-in-exile. (8)

(248) After the Bay of Pigs invasion, the MDC split into factions. (9) Rasco remained head of the largest faction and organized delegations in Miami, New York, Chicago, Venezuela, and Cuba. (10) The clandestine faction operating in Cuba was led by a Cuban who used the alias "Lucas." (11) When this Cuban arrived in the United States in October 1961, he presented his credentials to the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC), claiming he was the representative of the MDC movement in Cuba. (12) Council president, Dr. Miró Cardona, accepted him into the CRC hierarchy. (13) The "Lucas" faction remained with the council but its role was ineffectual because the Cuban eventually failed to hold the group together. (14)

(249) The "Rasco" faction of MDC had as its military chief an independently wealthy young Cuban, Laureano Batista Falla. (15) Free spirited and under no financial pressures, Batista Falla organized and partially financed the infiltration attempts of the MDC. (16) It was one of the most active and effective underground groups in Cuba during the early 1960's. (17)

(250) At that time, most underground groups worked together, sharing supplies and information. (18) Nevertheless, the repressive measures of the Castro regime after the April 1961 invasion caused members of the Cuban underground to live in fear of discovery and made intergroup liaison extremely risky. (19) Despite the inherent dangers, the underground movements of the MDC and Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo (MRP) worked jointly for an all-out sabotage effort in the fall of 1961. (20)

(251) The "Batista" faction of the MDC (so named after the youthful military chief rose to the position of president in 1962) (21) entered into similar cooperative alliances with other exile groups for

the purposes of propaganda, sabotage, and supplying the Cuban underground. Many MDC members joined the Cuba Committee in 1962, which was formed to counteract the propaganda of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, a pro-Castro organization in the United States.(22) The MDC and the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE) worked together to formulate plans for an underground organization to infiltrate Oriente Province.(23) The active operations between the MDC and other anti-Castro groups peaked in the year 1963. One involved the MDC, the Movimiento Insurreccional de Recuperacion Revolucionaria (MIRR), and the Movimiento Recuperacion Revolucionaria (MRR). In April, Frank Sturgis, Miami-based soldier of fortune, supplied information that Batista Falla, Orlando Bosch Avila, Manuel Artime, and Alexander Rorke were jointly planning an airstrike over Havana on April 25.(24) According to Sturgis, the strike was to originate from an airstrip in Puerto Rico and the target was a sugar refinery.(25) The bombs were homemade, assembled by Batista.(26) Rorke announced publicly that the strike had taken place as scheduled, which took the other planners by surprise.(27) Sturgis claimed the strike was still in the planning stage and financial backing had not been completed.(28) This incident created a stir and resulted in an intensive FBI investigation of Rorke's allegation.(29) Since Radio Havana, contrary to usual policy, made no immediate protest over the bombing,(30) the FBI concluded that Rorke's story was probably untrue(31) and, according to Sturgis, merely a publicity stunt.(32)

(252) In early June 1963, the MDC made a unity pact with Commandos L, in which Commandos L was to provide training and assistance in military intelligence and the MDC was to provide three small boats and a team of men to infiltrate Cuba.(33) The MDC also made a pact with Dr. Carlos Prio Socarras, former President of Cuba, who donated \$50,000 to the group for military aid in return for its promise of political support.(34)

(253) Richard Rudolph Davis, a Cuban alien,(35) had a peripheral association with the MDC through his contact with Batista Falla in the summer of 1963. This association was noted in book V, "Final Report of the Senate Select Committee To Study Governmental Operation."(36)

(254) Davis was residing in New Orleans and, although not an MDC member, claimed to have once been a "coordinator" for the group and the New York Police Department.(37) He was a friend of Batista Falla and contacted him because, he said, Batista Falla was in a position to recommend men in the Miami area who needed work.(38) Davis claimed he could provide employment for a small group of Cuban emigres. He said he had entered into a business deal with geologist David L. Raggio and a wealthy, rightwing New Orleanian, Gus de LaBarre, forming the Guatemalan Lumber & Mineral Corp.(39) It was their intention to train the Cubans on some land in Lacombe, La., to which De LaBarre had access through his nephew Frank de LaBarre.(40) After a necessary training period, the group was to be sent to Guatemala to cut mahogany trees, he claimed.

(255) A group of about 18 Cubans did arrive in New Orleans in the summer of 1963. Leading them was a well-known Cuban exile,

Victor Paneque,(41) who used the military code name of "Comandante Diego."(42) Paneque was closely associated with Batista Falla in the military activities of the MDC.(43) Davis admitted later to the FBI that the men had arrived dressed in khakis(44) and thought that they were to receive military training.(45)

(256) In the latter part of July 1963, the FBI conducted a raid on property near that of the "lumber company" training camp. The Bureau seized a cache of dynamite and other explosives.(46) This raid, according to Davis, unnerved his trainees, and they elected to return to Miami.(47)

(257) A somewhat different version of this episode comes from Gus de LaBarre's nephew and attorney, Frank de LaBarre, who first related his story in 1966 to his former law school classmate, Jim Garrison.(48)

(258) De LaBarre said his "Uncle Gus" had introduced him to Davis, whom De LaBarre described as a "floater." They came to see De LaBarre about drawing up articles of incorporation for the Guatemalan Lumber Co. and that is when he says he learned of their plans to bring unemployed Cubans from Miami to train as lumberjacks. Uncle Gus sent provisions to the exiles on a daily basis and solicited money for food and clothing from friends and relatives.(49)

(259) Although he suspected that military training was being conducted at the camp, Frank de LaBarre said he did not pay much attention to the activities of the group. When he heard on his car radio that the FBI had seized a cache of ammunition at a house in Lacombe, however, he immediately called his uncle. Although receiving assurances that the lumber group was not involved, De LaBarre called the officers of the corporation together and insisted that the Cubans be taken out of there. Davis told him that the Cubans did not want to leave, whereupon De LaBarre said he had to do some real "brainstorming." He rented a Hertz ton-and-a-half truck and instructed Davis to take it to the camp and tell the Cubans "that the invasion is on." Davis complied, and the Cubans loaded their gear, jumped in the truck, and were brought to the Greyhound bus terminal in New Orleans. Each was given a one-way ticket to Miami plus a small amount of cash and told they would get their orders when they reached Miami. Looking as though ready for war, with knapsacks and guns bulging from under their clothes, they boarded the bus. De LaBarre said that was the last he saw of them.

(260) The last he heard of Davis, he said, was in 1964 when one of De LaBarre's friends reported he had gone into business with Davis and was left with a lot of bills.(50)

(261) Other than providing the manpower for the training camp, Batista Falla was not involved in this episode or was the MDC as an organization.

(262) Concurrent with his involvement with leaders of other exile organizations, Batista Falla was dealing with foreign governments in an effort to gain support for his faction of the MDC. After the World Congress of Christian Democrats in Strasbourg, France, two officials of a foreign political party conferred with the MDC in Miami.(51) According to one of the officials, his country, after months of study, had decided to help finance the MDC, not because they were

particularly fond of them, but felt once Cuba was liberated the Cubans would have a moral superiority over the rest of Latin America.(52) (263) Another offer of help came from an official who provided the MDC a base for operations in that country.(53) Another Latin American official allegedly also offered to make a base available for the MDC and provide it with personnel and supplies.(54) Recognizing that these Latin American bases of operation were important to the MDC, Batista Falla nonetheless preferred to work out of the Miami area. Its proximity to Cuba, good facilities for operating boats and the availability of a large number of Cubans to serve as mechanics and do other necessary labor made Miami more desirable than the Latin American facilities.(55) The major drawback in Miami was the presence of U.S. Government officials determined strictly to enforce the Neutrality Act and other Federal statutes.

(264) U.S. Customs raided MDC headquarters in Miami on April 21, 1964, and confiscated a large cache of arms and ammunition.(56) Undeterred, the MDC simply relocated the military section in separate headquarters, continued to store materials for infiltration and attack missions against Cuba.(57) and conducted study courses in military training and theory.(58) In July, Batista Falla and Victor Paneque infiltrated men and equipment into Cuba to form a nucleus of guerrilla bands that, once they got adequate arms and ammunition, planned to go into the mountains of Cuba.(59)

(265) The MDC eventually suffered the fate of other anti-Castro organizations: Increasing difficulty in financing infiltration and sabotage missions, and intensive surveillance by U.S. authorities determined to limit their activities. The organization's activities gradually declined. Batista Falla eventually gave up his anti-Castro activities, moved to Washington, D.C., and received a doctoral degree in political science.(60) In the spring of 1970, he moved to Venezuela.

Submitted by:


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## VIII. JUNTA REVOLUCIONARIA CUBANA (JURE)

(266) In a Miami press interview on July 23, 1962, Manuel Ray Rivero announced the formation of the Cuban Revolutionary Junta (JURE), an anti-Castro Cuban exile group designed to unite all the popular splintered factions outside Cuba into an effective working organizations. (1) Other key leaders involved in the new organization included Felipe Pazos, Raul Chibas, Rogelio Cisneros, Ramon Barquin and Justo Carrillo. (2) Although Ray felt the Cuban Revolutionary Council was no longer effective, he attempted to receive financial assistance from it until JURE gained momentum. (3)

(267) As its opening promotional salvo, JURE issued a "Declaration of Principles." It called for free elections, the restoration of human rights and social justice, new economic development programs and agrarian reform, breaking relations with the Soviet bloc, restoration of legitimate property, proscription of the Communist Party and release of political prisoners. (4)

(268) Ray's group was considered an "autonomous" anti-Castro Cuban group by the CIA. (5) The concept of autonomous operations was conceived by Walter Rostow, State Department counsel. (6) Rostow proposed a "track two" approach to Cuban operations to parallel regular CIA-controlled Cuban teams. (7) This approach would enable financial aid, advice and guidance to Cuban leaders such as Ray. (8) Autonomous operations were approved June 1963. (9)

(269) The rule under which the operations functioned set forth the following guidelines:

1. Operations to be executed exclusively by Cuban nationals dedicated to the idea that the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime must be accomplished by Cubans inside and outside Cuba working in concert.

2. If the effort to overthrow the Cuban regime became too costly in human lives, the United States would withdraw financial support and would not consider resumption at any future date.

3. All operations had to be mounted outside the territory of the United States.

4. If ever charged with complicity, the U.S. Government would publicly deny any participation in the groups activities.

5. U.S. presence and direct participation would be kept at an absolute minimum. An experienced liaison officer would be assigned to each group to provide general advice, funds and material support.

6. No fixed time schedule would be given to these operations. (10)

(270) Possibly because of this loosely structured control over JURE, the day-to-day activities of the group were closely monitored. A JURE member, for instance, was in frequent contact with an individual and supplied him with a variety of confidential information about JURE. This source provided information on Ray's meeting with Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy in September 1963; (11) Ray's

negotiations on behalf of JURE;(12) secret JURE meetings;(13) allegations that the Governor of Puerto Rico was purposely sidetracking an FBI and INS investigation of illegal arms possessed by JURE;(14) JURE animosity toward Manuel Artime and the MRR;(15) and the location of JURE training bases.(16)

(271) Manuel Ray himself was personally critical of the CIA and told one JURE associate that he thought CIA agents "... were more dangerous than the Kennedy administration." He maintained that, "The Kennedy administration would end but CIA agents always stayed, and their memory was longer than the memory of elephants and they never forgot or forgave."(17)

(272) During a JURE meeting in Miami in August 1962, Ray claimed that JURE had arsenals in Venezuela and the Dominican Republic; a B-26 airplane, territory available for training in Costa Rica; and support through indirect means from the United States.(18) According to an FBI report, JURE was considered one of the five major exile groups with clandestine assets (19) and the U.S. Government was interested in the group because of its potential.(20)

(273) Because of its size and Ray's dynamic leadership, JURE seemed destined for a role of some importance in the anti-Castro movement. (21) The group set a target date of October 31, 1962 to raise \$100,000. The money would be used to recruit new members, begin a propaganda campaign against Castro and purchase arms and supplies.(22) Within a year, JURE had membership delegations in 12 cities in the United States, a chapter in Puerto Rico, and 12 delegations in foreign countries, mostly Latin American.(23)

(274) In August 1963, JURE planned to sabotage a powerplant in Havana (24) and Ray requested that certain high explosives and grenades be cached inside Cuba or San Juan. (25) It was recommended that the request be granted in order to test Ray's capabilities (26) in regard to this plan. (27) Ray acquired a 25-foot boat for infiltration and exfiltration purposes and expressed a desire to purchase another vessel that would enable him to extend operations along the south coast of Cuba. (28)

(275) Plans were made to deliver military equipment to JURE that would then be transported into Cuba. (29) The operation, originally scheduled for November 23, 1963, was moved up two days.(30) The cache was completed. (31) The JURE boat failed to make the scheduled pick up,(32) and Ray offered no satisfactory explanation for this failure to perform. (33) Ray claimed the vessel was low on gas, (34) a doubtful explanation, as the vessel arrived at its destination on schedule. (35)

(276) Ray was not physically scheduled to be on the boat during operation(36) because his activities during the latter part of 1963 were political. He was, at this time, conferring with Attorney General Kennedy (37) about the Cuban situation(38) and traveling extensively in Latin America seeking support for JURE.(39)

(277) No documentation has been found to substantiate the success or failure of any of the JURE raids or infiltrations during this period, but by January 1964, the organization had gained enough strength to induce several other Cuban exile organizations to merge with it. (40) The largest of these groups were the Ejercito Libertador de Cuba

(ELC) and Cuba Libre. (41) The ELC's union with JURE brought to the organization former veteran rebel army officers in exile and had the potential of giving JURE the best military expertise and support in the entire exile community. (42)

(278) Carlos Zarraga of Cuba Libre became the JURE chief of support (43) and was responsible for acquiring most of the JURE arms and the large supply of explosives which were stored in Miami and Puerto Rico. (44)

(279) Manuel Ray again began formulating plans to infiltrate Cuba in March 1964. (45) He planned to accompany two teams of commandos into Oriente Province and, once successfully inside Cuba, initiate continuous bombings of strategic and nonstrategic targets. (46) Ray's plans, however, were delayed and a new target date of May was set.

(280) Ray's seriousness of purpose was open to question at the time because he permitted persons from the media to observe infiltration attempt. (47) Andrew St. George, on assignment with Time-Life magazine, planned to accompany Ray, (48) as did Tom Duncan, then a Life photographer. (49) Rogelio Cisneros received word on May 30, 1964, that the JURE boat to be used by the infiltrators had developed motor trouble. (50) Ray's group was arrested by the British near Cayo Largo and taken to Nassau. (51)

(281) Ray's failure to infiltrate Cuba severely damaged his credibility within the anti-Castro community. Some exiles felt his grand infiltration scheme was a publicity stunt and others considered it a joke. (52) JURE members were confused and undecided over how to defend Ray. (53)

(282) Another episode on May 1964 compounded JURE's problems. Rogelio Cisneros had obligated \$50,000 of JURE money to an El Monte, Calif., arms manufacturing company for weapons to be shipped to Florida. (54) The Revenue Division of the Treasury Department considered a raid on the arms company. (55)

(283) At this point, there began a general disintegration of JURE membership. (56) Rogelio Cisneros announced in August 1964 that he was resigning from the organization. He contended Ray was incapable of directing both political and military activities. (57) Then another key leader, Carlos Zarraga, resigned in September.

(284) JURE received \$75,000 during the period of October to December 31, 1964. The money was intended to underwrite JURE's relocation of its activities outside the United States. (58) Ray's liaison officer noted at the time: "If Ray is successful in Cuba, he will not need our help; if he is not, our help won't do much good. He is honest and at least he assumes it will be largely spent for the purpose he wants to achieve. Whatever Ray may ever say, he was treated the way he asked to be treated. We have played the game in a manner beyond reproach." (59)

(285) JURE continued in existence until August 1968 (60) but was relatively ineffective in its latter years. (61)

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## IX. DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO ESTUDIANTIL (DRE)

(286) The Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE)(1) was the outgrowth of an activist student group in Cuba that originally fought against Batista.(2)

In the late spring of 1960,(3) three DRE leaders escaped from Cuba (4) and arrived in Miami.(5) They immediately offered their services to the Democratic Revolutionary Front (FRD) with the intent of organizing an anti-Communist student organization within this group.(6) Nevertheless, it later was decided that the DRE would be an "affiliate," but not a member of the Frente.(7) The leaders of the DRE were kept on a regular monthly retainer by the U.S. Government, as were all members engaged in training for paramilitary operations and propaganda dissemination.(8) They were also supplied with weapons and ammunition on occasion.(9).

(287) The first DRE infiltration team (10) landed in Cuba in November 1960, (11) with the objective of organizing anti-Castro student propaganda and conducting general harassment operations.(12)

(288) By April 1961, 400 guerrillas(13) were operating effectively from the Sierra Maestra mountains.(14) Nevertheless, 74 men were captured (15) concurrently with a failure to receive air-dropped supplies. (16) This capture was a severe setback for the DRE underground prior to the Bay of Pigs.(17)

(289) One leader was also arrested in April 1961, but his true identity was unknown to the authorities and he was released following an interrogation.(18) Escaping again to Miami, he made three daring attempts to reinfiltrate Cuba in 1961. Although he failed, his exploits reportedly made him an underground hero to the students in Cuba.(19)

(290) The DRE chief of military operations,(20) who also infiltrated into Cuba prior to the Bay of Pigs invasion and told the committee that the Cuban underground believed it had the total backing of the United States.(21) By March 1961, however, one leader testified that the underground realized the invasion would be a failure, because the U.S. Government had failed to perform even before the invasion.(22) "It never got us the supplies it promised and never did the things it was supposed to do," he claimed.(23) Another leader was also upset about Agency performance and once wrote to friends threatening to kill CIA personnel if anything ever happened to one person as a result of Agency bumbling.(24) The DRE chief of military operations told the committee he thought the invasion was designed to fail and that it was only conceived to relieve the pressure building in the anti-Castro exile community. (25)

(291) Although DRE members had a deep-lying opposition to U.S. plans and policies,(26) they continued to accept U.S. funding, con-

tinued despite evaluation of the group as an "enfant terrible." (27) CIA headquarters received a report that the five top officials of the DRE had established a position for themselves as "oracles," because of their ability to acquire money from the U.S. Government. (28) This support allowed the DRE to play an inordinately influential role in the exile community. (29) According to the DRE chief of military operations, by July 1962, the DRE had taken to soliciting support for proposed propaganda operations but actually using the funding for military operations. (30)

(292) For instance, in early September 1962, the DRE official said he received a call from another leader notifying him of an impending major military operation. (31) The latter told him the DRE had all the weapons, ammunition, and support it needed. (32) The raid turned out to be the attack on the Blanquita Theater in Havana, which received a great deal of publicity. (33) Castro even raved about it, claiming it was an attempt on his life by the CIA. (34) In fact, according to the DRE official, the raiders did not know that Castro was scheduled to be at the theater the night of the shelling. (35) In any event, there was a tremendous uproar when the raiders returned to the United States. The DRE leaders were called to Washington to confront U.S. Government officials, including Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy and CIA Operations Chief, Richard Helms, (36) who both told them they were doing a great job but wasting their time in such independent actions. (37)

(293) As a result of the Blanquita raid publicity, the DRE was subsequently able to raise about \$200,000 in private funds. That enabled the group to establish an operating base on Catalina Island near the south coast of the Dominican Republic from which it hoped to make a major strike against Cuba. (38) Nevertheless, after the October 1962 missile crisis, (39) the Dominican Republic Government informed the DRE leaders that the United States was putting great pressure on it to shut down the DRE operations and it therefore could no longer permit the group to operate out of its country. (40)

(294) Thus, the DRE was, of all the anti-Castro groups, one of the most bitter toward President Kennedy for his "deal" with the Russians. (41) In a letter dated February 21, 1963 and addressed simply to "Sirs," the DRE said it was grateful for the initial support of the United States, but could no longer operate under restrictions of U.S. policy. The DRE demanded that the U.S. Government, "... understand that the Cubans cannot continue waiting for the international policies, because those dying of hunger are Cubans, because it is our country that bodily suffers slavery, because it is our blood that runs in Cuba." (42)

(295) Despite such strong sentiment, the DRE continued to accept support although its more militant members had been urged to join Manuel Artime's Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionaria (MRR) forces. (43) Whether or not this suggestion was ever taken by any DRE members is not documented, but the top leaders remained a homogeneous group and, by 1964, were soliciting additional financial support outside the U.S. Government. They were successful in receiving some funds from the Bacardi rum family in Miami. (44)

(296) Although the DRE continued its relationship with the U.S.

Government until the end of 1966,(45) the group's activities, like those of other anti-Castro organizations, declined in intensity and effectiveness.

(297) Because the DRE was an extremely militant "action" group, the committee was especially interested in DRE operations prior to the assassination of President Kennedy on November 22, 1963.

(298) As noted, one of the effects of the Blanquita raid in September 1962, was to garner the DRE a blast of national publicity, which, in turn, gave the leaders of the group the opportunity to solicit additional funding from wealthy individuals who were sympathetic to their anti-Castro cause.(46) Among those who wound up supporting the DRE was Miami multimillionaire William Pawley, a staunch rightwing conservative, former owner of the Havana bus system, and a friend of former CIA Director Allen Dulles.(47) Another supporter of the DRE was a friend of Pawley's, former Ambassador to Italy Clare Boothe Luce,(48) then the wife of Time-Life publishing boss Henry Luce, and later, a Nixon appointee to the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

(299) In its review of DRE activities, the committee took special interest in a relatively recent series of events involving Clare Boothe Luce. In October 1975, Luce was being interviewed by Vera Glaser, a reporter and columnist for Knight newspapers, when she told Glaser of an alleged incident involving members of the DRE and Lee Harvey Oswald.(49) At the time, Senator Richard Schweiker and Senator Gary Hart were in the midst of their subcommittee investigation of the Kennedy assassination as part of the Senate select committee inquiry into intelligence activity.

(300) According to Glaser's report of the interview, this is basically what Luce told her :

(301) Luce said that after the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion, her friend, William Pawley, persuaded her to help sponsor a fleet of motorboats for a group of anti-Castro Cubans who, Pawley envisioned, would be Cuban "Flying Tigers," flying in and out of Cuba on intelligence-gathering missions. Pawley had helped start Gen. Claire Chennault's original Flying Tigers in World War II. Luce said she agreed to sponsor one boat and its three-man crew. She said she met with this Cuban boat crew about three times in New York and, in 1962, published a story about them in Life magazine.(50)

(302) Following the missile crisis in October 1962, Luce said that the Kennedy administration clamped down on exile activities against Cuba, and the Pawley-sponsored boat raids were discontinued. Luce said she never saw her "young Cubans," as she called them, again.(51)

(303) Then, on the night of Kennedy's assassination, Luce said she received a call from New Orleans from one of the boat crew Cubans. Luce told Glaser she would call him Julio Fernandez. She said the Cuban told her he called because he wanted to tell her about some information he had concerning the President's killer, Lee Harvey Oswald.(52)

(304) Luce told Glaser that, according to "Julio Fernandez," Oswald had approached the anti-Castro group to which Fernandez belonged and offered his services as a potential Castro assassin. The Cubans, however, did not trust Oswald, suspected he was really a Communist,

and decided to keep tabs on him. They eventually penetrated Oswald's Communist "cell" and tape recorded his talks, including his bragging that he could shoot anyone, even the Secretary of the Navy. (53)

(305) Then suddenly, Luce said Fernandez told her, Oswald came into some money, went to Mexico City and finally to Dallas. Luce said Fernandez told her he still had the tape recordings of Oswald, as well as photographs of Oswald and samples of handbills Oswald had distributed on the streets of New Orleans. Fernandez, she said, asked her what he should do. (54)

(306) Luce said she advised him to contact the FBI immediately. She then told Glaser that she did not think about the story again until the Garrison investigation hit the headlines in 1967. Luce said she then contacted the Cuban who had called her. He told her his group had followed her instructions and turned their material over to the FBI. But, he said, they were advised to "keep their mouths shut" until further contact. Further contact was never made, he said. (55)

(307) Luce said that Fernandez then told her that one of the members of his group had since been suddenly deported and that another had been murdered. He himself, he said, wanted nothing further to do with the Kennedy assassination. (56)

(308) After Luce told her this story, Vera Glaser immediately went to Senator Schweiker and told him about the alleged Oswald encounter. (57) Intrigued, Schweiker contacted Luce directly and asked her for information about the Cuban who had called her (58) As a result, Schweiker sent a staff investigator in search of "Julio Fernandez." No such individual was ever found. (59)

(309) During the course of its own investigation into the Luce allegations, the committee reviewed the 1977 CIA Task Force report that dealt with the newspaper reports of the incident. (60) According to the task force report, Luce called then CIA Director William Colby on October 25, 1975, and told him that Schweiker had called her to ask her for details about the allegations. She said she had given Schweiker the name of Justin McCarthy who, along with Pawley, had initially aroused her interest in helping the anti-Castro Cubans. Nevertheless, she said she did not tell Schweiker how to locate him. (61)

(310) Luce told Colby that after she talked to Schweiker, she had contacted McCarthy. He told her that he doubted that anything would come of a congressional probe and suggested instead that she contact Colby. Luce then told Colby that McCarthy gave her the names of three Cubans with whom he had been associated in DRE activities. They were Luis Fernandez Rocha, Jose Antonio Lanusa, and someone he remembered only by his code name, "Chilo." (62)

(311) According to the 1977 task force report, as a result of Luce's call to him, Colby contacted Justin McCarthy and attempted to persuade him to call Senator Schweiker and provide him with any information or evidence he might have. McCarthy said he did not want to get involved because there were too many "political opportunists" in Washington. (63)

(312) With this background of information, the committee decided to conduct its own investigation into the Luce allegations.

(313) Luce told the committee basically the same story given to Vera Glaser. (64) Luce was specifically asked if she was certain the late night



call on November 22, 1963, came from New Orleans. She was definite in her answer that it did. The Warren report account of the Bringuier/Oswald association was outlined for her. She responded that it sounded much the same as the type activity in which her "boys" were engaged. Luce also told the Committee she did not recognize the name Jose Antonio Lanusa, mentioned in her conversation with Colby in 1975. (65)

(314) The committee located in Miami three anti-Castro Cubans, who were among the leaders of the DRE in 1963. One of them, Juan Manuel Salvat Roque, was a founder of the group. He was interviewed by committee investigators on February 7, 1978. (66) Although Salvat did not recall Luce's involvement with the DRE, he said he "heard" William Pawley had provided the group some support. (67) He said that, as far as he remembers, the group never received a large amount of money from any single individual, but received small contributions from a great many people. (68) He said that, according to his knowledge, Carlos Bringuier, the New Orleans delegate of the DRE, was the only member of the group who ever had any contact with Oswald. (69) Committee records, moreover, indicate that Carlos Bringuier became the New Orleans delegate to the DRE in the summer of 1962. (70) As detailed elsewhere, Bringuier and Oswald had a confrontation on Canal Street in New Orleans in August 1963, when Oswald was distributing "Fair Play for Cuba" leaflets. Both Bringuier and Oswald were arrested, but were later brought together to engage in a radio debate. (71) Further, Bringuier previously had arranged for a friend of his, Carlos Quiroga, to approach Oswald and talk to him on the pretense of being interested in pro-Castro activities. (72)

(315) Isidro "Chilo" Borja, another leader of the DRE, was interviewed by the committee on February 21, 1978. (73) Borja said he knew Luce was supportive of the DRE, but said he did not know the extent of her financial involvement. (74) He also recalled Bringuier's contact with Oswald and the fact that the DRE relayed that information to the CIA at the time. (75) Borja said his responsibilities with the DRE involved only military operations (76) and he suggested that Jose Antonio Lanusa, who handled press and public relations for the group, knew Luce and had been in contact with her. (77)

(316) Jose Antonio Lanusa was interviewed by the committee on April 22, 1978. Lanusa said that on November 22, 1963, he and a small group of DRE members were at a Miami Beach hotel when they heard the news of the assassination of the President. (78) When Oswald's name was broadcast, Lanusa recalled the name as that of someone who had something to do with one of the DRE delegates, so Lanusa and those who were with him went to the Miami DRE office to search the files to determine if Lanusa's suspicion was right. (79) By late afternoon, they had found delegate Bringuier's report from New Orleans detailing his encounter with Oswald. Along with it was a sample Fair Play for Cuba (FPCC) leaflet and a tape recording of the radio debate. (80) With this discovery, someone immediately called a CIA contact. This person told them not to do anything or contact anyone else for at least an hour. He said he needed that time to contact Washington headquarters for instructions. (81) Nevertheless, Lanusa said, he was so anxious to release the information that Oswald was associated with a pro-Castro group that he contacted the major news organizations before the hour was up. (82)

(317) When the CIA contact called back, he told them the FBI would contact the group. The next day, Lanusa said, Miami FBI agent James J. O'Conner showed up at DRE headquarters. He was given Bringuier's report, the FPCC leaflet, and the tape recording of the radio debate. Lanusa said O'Conner told them they would get a receipt for the material but, Lanusa said, they never did. Neither, he said, was the material ever returned. (83)

(318) Lanusa also told the committee that soon after the DRE shelving of the Blanquita Hotel in 1962, he was introduced to Clare Boothe Luce by Justin McCarthy, who Lanusa said was the DRE's public relations contact with the New York major media. (84) Lanusa said Luce told them she wanted to publish the Blanquita raid story in *Life* magazine and that she would give the DRE the \$600 she would receive from the magazine as payment for that story. (85) As far as he knows, Lanusa said, that was the only contact any member of the DRE ever had with Luce. (86) Lanusa also said he strongly doubted Luce or William Pawley ever paid for motorboats for the DRE because, he said, he knew how all of the boats were acquired. Lanusa said he had no knowledge of any DRE member having been deported or murdered. (87) Lanusa said, "I think Clare Boothe Luce shoots from the hip without having her brain engaged." (88)

(319) In investigating her allegations, the committee considered the possibility that Luce incorrectly identified the source of her information. The source of the documentation of Oswald's contact with the DRE was New Orleans-based Carlos Bringuier. Nevertheless, Bringuier told the committee he never engaged in any paramilitary DRE activities (89) and therefore could not have been one of the crew members of the alleged Luce-sponsored motorboat. Bringuier's New Orleans associate, Celso Hernandez, the secretary of the chapter, (90) also said he never received any paramilitary training and did not know Oswald prior to encountering his passing out pro-Castro literature on Canal Street in New Orleans. (91) Bringuier also told the committee he knew Luce by reputation only, had never contacted her personally, and had never given her any information about his experience with Oswald. (92) He further said he was not aware of the fact that Luce was involved in any Cuban exile activities. (93) Bringuier maintained that no member of his DRE group in New Orleans had any contact with Luce during this period of time. (94)

(320) The investigation of the Warren Commission documented that Oswald was interested in establishing a chapter of the FPCC in New Orleans and had contact with the New York headquarters of this pro-Castro organization during the summer of 1963. (95) Luce raised questions about the nature and extent of involvement the New Orleans chapter of DRE had in monitoring Oswald's activities, and its association with the FBI regarding Oswald's Communist activities.

(321) The evidence indicated that the official DRE delegate in New Orleans was Carlos Bringuier, and that he was aided by two Cubans, Celso Hernandez, and Miguel Aguado. In an attempt to monitor Oswald, Bringuier approved the efforts of his friend, Carlos Quiroga, to call on Oswald to elicit additional information about FPCC activities in New Orleans.

(322) None of the New Orleans individuals associated in these events had any involvement in the paramilitary activities of DRE. The New Orleans chapter engaged solely in propaganda and fundraising activities. No New Orleans DRE member had any association with Luce.

(323) The first report of Oswald's contact with the DRE in New Orleans came from the group's headquarters in Miami. This information was released to national news organizations, the CIA, and the FBI shortly after the identification of Oswald as Kennedy's assassin. The evidence indicates that the Luce allegations, although related to certain facts, cannot be substantiated in the absence of corroboration by other individuals.

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## X. MOVIMIENTO INSURRECCIONAL DE RECUPERACION REVOLUCIONARIA (MIRR) AND ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA

(324) When four of Castro's army officers and 100 men deserted and left for the Las Villas Mountains in August 1960, they formed the nucleus of the Movimiento Insurreccional de Recuperacion Revolucionaria (MIRR). (1) Helping lay the groundwork for this organization was the former chief of the 26th of July Movement in Las Villas Province, Dr. Orlando Bosch Avila. (2) Bosch had left Cuba 1 month previously and, from Miami, issued a call for rebel army men to desert. (3) Promoting the defection of army personnel and carrying out sabotage operations throughout Cuba were the early primary activities of the MIRR. (4) In both, it was extremely effective.

(325) Former rebel army officer Victor Paneque assumed military leadership of the group (5) and, within a few months of his escape from Cuba, organized a team of infiltrators to reenter the country to continue MIRR operations. (6)

(326) Orlando Bosch became general coordinator of MIRR, working with individuals and other groups involved in operations against Cuba and securing necessary financial backing. (7)

(327) A pediatrician by profession, (8) Bosch became immersed in his political movement and for 18 years carried out a crusade to overthrow Castro. His efforts at times have been characterized as "bumbling," but he has also been termed "single-mindedly" and "morally committed." (9) Widely viewed in the U.S. press as a Cuban patriot when he first began his anti-Castro activities, Bosch's increased acts of violence gradually changed his image to that of a terrorist. (10) The intensity and violence of his activities, which have always been widely publicized, were a major factor in the committee's decision to examine Bosch and the MIRR among those Cuban exile organizations considered capable of involvement in an assassination conspiracy.

(328) Bosch was interviewed by the committee in Cuartel San Carlos prison in Venezuela. He is charged with complicity in the October 6, 1975, bombing of a Cubana Airlines plane which resulted in the deaths of 73 people. (11) Although denying involvement in the airplane bombing, Bosch said he approved of it. (12) Claiming terrorism a necessary evil in fighting Castro, Bosch stated, "You have to fight violence with violence. At times you cannot avoid hurting innocent people." (13)

(329) The activities of the MIRR in the early 1960's were carried out by a small group of individuals. There were reportedly never a great deal of members in Miami. (14) In 1966, Bosch claimed to have only 20 men outside Miami, located in various seaport cities in the United States (15) One of the major interests of the MIRR was to blow up vessels trading with Cuba. (16) In this, it was effective, but

the MIRR successes in the early 1960's was a result of its association with a number of other anti-Castro organizations and individuals.

(330) Bosch said that in late 1961 he was contacted by Evelio Duque, leader of Ejercito Cubano Anticomunista (ECA), who indicated he might be getting CIA support for his group and wanted Bosch to join him. (17) Together they submitted a plan to the Agency outlining their conditions for CIA support and were informed about a month later the plan had been approved. (18) Acting as the political leader in this alliance, Bosch joined Duque, the military leader, at a camp in Homestead, Fla., and was in touch with a CIA liaison officer. (19)

(331) Bosch soon came to the conclusion that the camp was an exercise in futility. He believed that the CIA had no intention of mounting another invasion or initiating attacks against Cuba. He felt the U.S.-sponsored camps were merely a means of keeping the exiles busy and, privately and unofficially, his CIA contact confirmed his suspicions, Bosch said. (20) After 9 months of frustrating inactivity, he published a pamphlet, "The Tragedy of Cuba," in which he accused the United States of misleading the Cuban exiles. He sent a copy to President Kennedy and then closed down the camp. (21) After this, Bosch said he had no more dealings with the CIA. (22)

(332) Bosch maintained an ongoing relationship, beginning in late 1960, with Frank Sturgis, well-known anti-Castro soldier of fortune; (23) Alexander Rorke, former clerk at the FBI; (24) and William Johnson, an American pilot who, along with Sturgis, provided information to the CIA on Cuban exile activities. (25) Johnson had full control over all MIRR operations. (26) Bosch was concerned with financing raids against Cuba and did not know the nature of the missions until their completion. (27)

(333) According to Johnson, American pilots were placed under contract to fly three airstrikes over Cuba for the MIRR. (28) They were to receive \$2,000 per mission. (29) Johnson admitted his own motive was purely mercenary. (30)

(334) Although relatively inactive in 1962, (31) the MIRR engaged in a series of bombing raids over Cuba in 1963 primarily aimed at destroying the production of sugar (32) in an effort to disrupt the economy. It also reportedly conducted airstrikes against a MIG base in Cuba (33) and various other strikes aimed at strategic targets. (34) The raids were effective but not without risk. In several instances, the raiders' planes were shot down and pilots killed. (35)

(335) Concurrent with an association with American adventurers, the MIRR also had associations with other exile organizations. It planned raids against Cuba in cooperation with Commandos L (36) and discussed unity raids with members of RECE. (37) Bosch, at this time, was interested in establishing a base of operations in the Dominican Republic to facilitate long-range planning. (38)

(336) The documentation the committee examined failed to explain how the MIRR was able to finance its extensive operations; further, Bosch did not specify any source. Bosch told the committee that his association with Frank Sturgis alone culminated in 11 airstrikes over Cuba. (39) At that time, he said, they usually rented a plane for \$400 plus \$60 an hour. (40) Bill Johnson charged \$4,000 for pilot

fees for each mission.(41) Bosch said he knew the pilots only got \$2,000 and Johnson pocketed the rest, but his purpose was to fight Castro whatever it cost.(42) Bosch's commitment to fight Castro extends to the present.(43)

(337) The funds were initially furnished MIRR from a Chicago-based Cuban exile, Paulino A. Sierra, who allegedly collected moneys from gambling interests.(44) Some money came from anti-Castro supporters in Puerto Rico.(45) It is known that the FBI was long interested in the source of finances of the MIRR and in March 1964 authorized a 30-day mail check on it and Bosch in an effort to identify possible sources.(46) During this time, several wealthy Cuban exiles received threatening letters demanding large contributions for the fight against Castro.(47) Bosch was implicated in these extortion attempts,(48) brought to trial, and acquitted.(49) He told the committee that in 1967 he once used the funds he had collected in settlement for a personal injury automobile accident to buy explosives and weapons.(50) Whatever Bosch's methods of raising money, there is no indication he ever used it to enrich himself.(51)

(338) Well financed and totally dedicated, Bosch managed to run afoul of the U.S. Government authorities at least seven times in slightly over a 4-year period. Several of these encounters resulted in his arrest,(52) but he was always acquitted.(53)

(339) In July 1967, Bosch and the MIRR became assimilated into a new movement, known as Cuban Power(54) and the tempo of violent activities increased. On September 16, 1968, Bosch was arrested for firing a bazooka into the hull of a Polish ship anchored in Miami harbor.(55) He was subsequently tried and sentenced to 10 years in a Federal prison.(56) From his prison cell in Atlanta, Ga., Bosch allegedly was making plans to resume bombing Japanese and Spanish ships trading with Cuba as soon as he was released.(57) He was granted parole on November 1, 1972 and immediately began traveling through Latin America, in violation of that parole.(58) He said his aim in Latin America was to forge alliances with countries which had powerful Cuban exile communities.(59) So effective was he in making solid political alliances, that in the ensuing years he was able to travel freely, with forged passports, throughout Latin America.(60)

(340) Whether or not Bosch was the principal conspirator in the bombing of the Cuban airliner, it is known that his Cuban Power movement, which merged with other Cuban activists in 1976 (61) to form a Cuban Secret Government (62) engaged in acts of terrorism. (63) This latter group was linked with numerous recent bombing incidents,(64) an assassination attempt against Henry Kissinger.(65) the assassination of Orlando Letelier in Washington, D.C.(66) and the bombing of the Cuban Airlines plane.

(341) Orlando Bosch, a zealot, turned out to be the most aggressive and volatile of the anti-Castro leaders. That alone could validly raise the question of possible association with the assassination of President Kennedy. In addition, the committee was presented with an allegation that specifically connected him to a conspiracy.(67) but investigation failed to support the claim that Bosch had been in

Dallas in November 1963 in the company of Lee Harvey Oswald. When asked, Bosch told the committee he was at his home in Miami when he heard President Kennedy had been shot. (68)

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- (32) Ibid., items 10, 11, 12, p. 5.
- (33) Ibid., item 14, p. 6.
- (34) Ibid., items 1, 2, 3, p. 8, and items 4, 5, p. 9.
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- (39) See ref. 8, p. 2.
- (40) Ibid.
- (41) Ibid.
- (42) Ibid.
- (43) See ref. 12.
- (44) See ref. 4, item 16, p. 6.
- (45) Ibid., item 7, p. 11.



- (46) Ibid., item 6, p. 9.  
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 (50) See ref. 8, p. 5.  
 (51) See ref. 9.  
 (52) See ref. 4, FBI cables, item 6, pp. 15, 16, 17.  
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 (55) Blake Fleetwood, "I Am Going to Declare War," New Times, May 13, 1977, p. 46.  
 (56) Ibid.  
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 (66) See ref. 55, p. 51.  
 (67) Immunized executive session testimony of Marita Lorenz, May 31, 1978.

Hearings before the House Select Committee on Assassinations. Lorenz, who had publicly claimed she was once Castro's mistress (Miami News, June 15, 1976), told the committee she was present at a September 1963 meeting in Orlando Bosch's Miami home during which Lee Harvey Oswald, Frank Sturgis, Pedro Diaz Lanz, and Bosch made plans to go to Dallas (pp. 31-34). She further testified that around November 15, 1963, she, Jerry Patrick Hemming, the Novo brothers, Pedro Diaz Lanz, Sturgis, Bosch, and Oswald traveled in a two-car caravan to Dallas and stayed in a motel where they were contacted by Jack Ruby. There were several rifles and scopes in the motel room (pp. 43-54). Lorenz said she returned to Miami around November 19 or 20.

All possible individuals involved in this allegation were questioned by the committee with the following results:


- Interviewed on June 16, 1978, Orlando Bosch told the committee he had met Lorenz once in 1962 at which time he was planning an air raid over Cuba with Alexander Rorke. Lorenz later called him and said she wanted to get involved in anti-Castro activities, but Bosch turned her down and never saw her again. He further stated he had never traveled west of New Orleans in his life (JFK Document No. 009363, p. 2).
- In a March 21, 1978, deposition in Miami, Fla., Jerry Patrick Hemming responded negatively to the questions: "Did you ever drive from Miami to Dallas with Marita Lorenz? Or Frank Sturgis? Or a man identifying himself as 'Ozzie'?" (pp. 170-71).
- Immunized testimony was received in Washington, D.C., on April 28, 1978, from Pedro Diaz Lanz, who denied Lorenz' allegation (p. 64), and explained his whereabouts on November 22, 1963 (p. 65).
- In a March 20, 1978, deposition in Miami, Frank A. Sturgis was asked if he did, ". . . in the company of Marita Lorenz, Leon Oswald and others drive from Miami to Dallas a day or two before the assassination?" Sturgis responded:

Sir, that is an absolute lie. I have never been with Marita Lorenz and Ozzie, as she calls him, or with Pedro Diaz Lanz, or Marcus Diaz Lanz, or Dr. Orlando Bosch, or Jerry Patrick, which she claimed all of us besides some other Cubans, were in two automobiles and left Miami, Fla., 2 days before the assassination of the President of the United States. She is a liar. I took a polygraph examination to that effect that I have never been involved in any conspiracy to kill the President of the United States, nor was I with her at any time conspiring to kill the President of the United States, nor was I with her in any automobile with these people or any other people going to Dallas to plot to kill the President of the United States. She is an absolute liar [p. 157].

Sturgis said that on November 22, 1963, he was in his home in Miami, Fla. (p. 155).

The committee found no evidence to support Lorenz' allegation.

- (68) See ref. 8, p. 1.



## XI. JUNTA DEL GOBIERNO DE CUBA EN EL EXILIO

(342) In April 1963, the spirit of the exiled Cubans who hoped to return to a liberated Cuba reached its nadir. The U.S. Government, which had been subsidizing a Cuban anti-Castro organization, the Cuban Revolutionary Council, dropped its extensive backing of this most visible example of American assistance to the Cuban movement.(1) The move came on the heels of an announcement of a tough new policy of the Justice and State Departments. They planned a vigorous enforcement of laws breached by anti-Castro Cuban raiders, who were operating hit-and-run guerrilla attacks from the United States on Cuban and Russian targets.(2) These events resulted in another shuffling of alliances between various Cuban groups, but no bright new hopes.

(343) Despite a common desire to overthrow Castro and return to Cuba, the exiles differed in many ways. They represented the extremes of the political left and right, and everything in between. Many had carried arms against Batista; others were former Batistianos. They differed as to how the counterrevolution could be accomplished. They differed as to what type of government and which leaders would take the place of the ousted government. Unification of these diverse stances seemed doubtful.

(344) Dr. Paulino Sierra Martinez, a Cuban exile and lawyer from Chicago, hoped to foster a change. Arriving in Miami in May 1963, Sierra scheduled a series of meetings at a local hotel and invited Cuban exile leaders of all political persuasion to discuss unification for the purpose of military invasion of Cuba.(3)

(345) To many Cubans the idea seemed ridiculously naive.(4) Sierra was hoping to unify elements that had remained splintered throughout most previous efforts, attempting to draw well-known exile leaders when he himself was virtually unknown in the anti-Castro movement.

(346) But Sierra came with some big ideas and big promises. He claimed to represent a group of Americans in Chicago interested in combining their efforts with those of the Cuban exiles to overthrow the Castro regime with or without U.S. Government approval.(5) Sierra told them that American financial interests would participate on condition there was a true unity of the majority of Cubans in exile.(6) For military planning, he claimed he had the assistance of several high-ranking U.S. Navy and Army officers, who would also help arrange for arms and the establishment of training bases in a Latin American country.(7) Most surprisingly, Sierra claimed the Chicago backers were willing to lend assistance to the extent of \$30 million,(8) no small sum even for a large-scale government-backed operation. For a private group it was unheard of.

(347) While many Cubans did not immediately join Sierra, by July 1963 he had built a coalition of predominantly rightwing anti-Castro

groups and attracted some impressive names from among the exiles to form an organization called the Junta de Gobierno de Cuba en el exilio (JGCE—Junta of the Government of Cuba in Exile.) (9)

(348) Among the groups to join Sierra's junta were the Unidad Revolucionaria faction headed by Juan Medina Vega (10) and the major faction of the 30th of November Group headed by Carlos Rodriguez Quesada. (11) Sierra could also boast the participation of Jose "Pepin" Bosch, president of Bacardi Rum, and Alberto Garrido, a much-admired Cuban entertainer. (12)

(349) In the selection process by which the committee chose those anti-Castro groups to be further investigated, certain factors about the junta discovered in preliminary research indicated a need to carefully examine the purpose and activities of this group.

(350) The junta was active during the critical period of interest to the committee. Sierra surfaced in March 1963 (13) and the organization abruptly ceased activity by January 1964. (14) The committee hoped to discover what sparked the group's genesis and what contributed to its final demise.

(351) Its financial backing appeared to be remarkably impressive, and although Sierra claimed the group was to receive funds from American companies whose financial assets in Cuba had been nationalized, it was widely rumored that the money was actually from "gambling interests" of organized crime. (15) There were other rumors that wealthy Texans were behind the group. (16) The committee hoped to determine exactly what means were available to the group and from what source.

(352) Preliminary research also indicated that the Secret Service in Chicago was investigating a "threat to the President" case at the time of President Kennedy's assassination, in which Paulino Sierra was of interest. (17) The committee wished to explore the nature of the allegation and the extent of Sierra's involvement in the case.

(353) The committee obtained considerable information from the contemporaneous investigative reports of the Central Intelligence Agency, the FBI, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service regarding the structure, membership, and activities of the junta. Field interviews and research into reports of the Secret Service probed those questions raised by the alleged threats against the President.

(354) Paulino Sierra Martinez was a tall and dapper lawyer (18) employed in the legal counsel's office of the Union Tank Car Co. in Chicago. (19) Before his immigration to the United States, he had reportedly been employed by Carlos Saladrigas, a minister under Batista. (20) He had also worked with Santiago Alvarez Rodriguez, former senator during Batista's regime. (21) Sierra left Havana in 1960 and settled for a time in Miami where he worked as a judo instructor and translator (Sierra speaks, reads, and writes English, Italian, French, and Spanish). (22) In 1962, he moved to Chicago and was admitted to the Illinois bar under the sponsorship of William Browder, general counsel of Union Tank Car Co., for whom Sierra soon began work. (23)

(355) By early 1963, Sierra had organized a Cuban Lawyer's Association in Chicago and gained somewhat of a reputation as "coordinator" of Cuban activities in the Chicago area. (24) In March 1963, he

was mentioned in an article in the Chicago Tribune for his active role in Cuban exile affairs in Chicago. (25) Nevertheless, he still had not made a national name in Cuban exile affairs.

(356) Yet, as noted previously, Sierra's meetings with anti-Castro Cuban exiles in Miami in the spring of 1963 produced the official structure of a Cuban government in exile by July. (26) Sierra was named Secretary General, Felipe Rivero Diaz was named Vice Secretary General. Carlos Rodriguez Quesada was appointed head of internal affairs, Juan Medina was to head up finances, Manuel Lozano Pino was named head of external relations, Alberto Garrido was put in charge of propaganda, Reinaldo Pico was given a position in charge of labor issues, and Gilberto Rodriguez was asked to run military operations. (27)

(357) The junta was formed after an organizational meeting in Chicago in June 1963 with Union Tank Car Executive Vice President J. W. Van Gorkum and General Counsel William Browder. (28) Information regarding the meeting is scant. One source who attended said that Van Gorkum and Browder discussed the unity plan only insofar as suggesting that if the group could successfully establish a government in exile, it then might be able to obtain U.S. Government support and financing from other sources. (29)

(358) But evidence exists to suggest that Union Tank Car had a greater role in the junta. The company was reportedly paying for Sierra's personal and travel expenses plus his salary. (30) Browder also told FBI agents in October 1963 that although he did not know the identity of Sierra's backers, he (Browder) kept the group's funds under his control to avoid any possible criticism of misappropriation or mismanagement of funds by Sierra. (31) Browder would not indicate the exact amount under his control other than to say it was "considerable." (32)

(359) There have been several contradictory reports to the CIA and FBI regarding the source of Sierra's funds.

(360) Early reports indicated Sierra's backers were Chicago gamblers. The Miami News headline for an article reporting on Sierra's meetings read "Gamblers Pop Out of Exile Grab Bag." (33) The source of such reports is unclear, although there are indications it may have been Sierra himself.

(361) At Sierra's initial meetings with Cuban groups, he was accompanied by an American named William Trull, (34) who may have been partly responsible for circulation of rumors of the involvement of gambling interests in Sierra's proposals, but whose ultimate relationship to Sierra is obscure.

(362) In an interview with the FBI in June 1963, Sierra said Trull had called him after seeing the March 10 article about Sierra in the Chicago Tribune. (35) Sierra said Trull talked about sponsorship of a unified group of Cuban exiles and vaguely mentioned the owner of the King Ranch and a Mr. "Jarvis," who Trull identified as a millionaire in Texas. (36) Sierra said he was concerned about Trull being involved with "impure" financial sources, and would have nothing further to do with him. (37)

(363) Trull's story is different. A former entertainer from Dallas, Trull said Sierra had first contacted him in March 1963 and proposed that he help Sierra explain Sierra's plan to the Cuban exiles in

Miami. (38) Trull said Sierra had wired tickets so that he could join Sierra in Miami for the series of meetings with the exiles. (39) Sierra carefully outlined the proposal Trull was to explain to such Cuban leaders as former Cuban Prime Minister Carlos Prio and Eusebio Mujal, a former Cuban labor leader. (40) Trull reiterated the plan to the Cubans, telling them he represented wealthy American interests who had a business proposition for the Cuban people if they would unify with Carlos Prio as president and Sierra as secretary of a provisional government. (41)

(364) Reports by Cubans who heard Trull lend credence to his tale. Trull was found to be "contradictory" and "vague" about his plan, (42) as might be expected of a person who was just repeating what he had been told.

(365) Trull later told FBI agents that he had dropped names to Sierra such as Cleburg of the King Ranch, but Sierra had told him he did not need Trull's financial influence. (43) Sierra claimed, according to Trull, that representatives of Las Vegas or Cleveland gambling interests had contacted him and offered up to \$14 million in exchange for 50-percent interest in gambling concessions in Cuba, provided Sierra was able to organize a successful ouster of Castro. (44)

(366) Trull told the FBI that because he had frequently performed before Cuban audiences, he felt he had been chosen by Sierra and used as an "actor" to sell the Cubans on Sierra's plans. (45)

(367) Sierra had other assistance at his early meetings that disappeared as quickly as Trull. According to a CIA report, one of the promoters for a meeting in May with exiles was George Franci, a Haitian national who had previously been involved in gambling interests in Havana. (46) Franci's name does not show up as involved in any later activities of Sierra, particularly after the stories of gamblers' backing hit the newsstands.

(368) As late as July 1963, Sierra himself was the source of another report that gamblers were backing him. Miguel A. "Cuco" Leon, a colleague of Manuel Artime Buesa, reported that when Sierra visited Nicaragua that month, he told him he represented U.S. gambling concessions in Cuba. (47)

(369) Another possible basis for the stories about Sierra's "gambler's backing" are separate reports of an actual offer to Chicago Cubans in March 1963.

Dr. Cesar Blanco of the Chicago-based Cuban Bar Association of Illinois reported a meeting of Cuban exiles on March 11, 1963. (48) He said that a Burt Mold of the American Education League of Los Angeles had asked Blanco how much money the Cubans needed to work out a program to free Cuba. (49) Mold, according to Blanco, stated that the "Nevada group" would help since the U.S. Government could do nothing. (50) Blanco said that Mold even offered Blanco the job of head of police in Cuba when the country had been freed. (51)

(370) A CIA report of March 1963 reported that Blanco and Sierra had been approached by gamblers from the West to work with them. (52) It was reported that Sierra spoke about an offer of \$10 million in backing for guarantees of gambling concessions in Cuba after Castro was overthrown. (53)

(371) In his public meetings in Miami in May, Sierra had publicly named the American Educational League of Los Angeles as being in support of his proposal.(54) When that group challenged Sierra's claims, Sierra backed off, indicating he had received assurances of assistance from other sources.(55) But it is not known whether Mold had made the offer at the behest of the American Educational League or for some other party. His affiliation with the league was just as a member.(56)

(372) If an offer from gambling interests was ever made, it appears that Sierra either backed away from such an offer or began to dress it in legitimate clothing after the adverse publicity.

(373) The backers were identified in public in only the most nebulous terms. Sierra claimed several U.S. companies were behind his plans and these at first were only identified as the Lawyer's Corp. and the American Bankers.(57) Later, he frequently named such large corporations as United Fruit, Esso, Standard Oil, Du Pont, and United States Steel, among others.(58)

(374) The Chicago office of the FBI closed its investigation of Sierra's activities in June 1963, concluding that he was involved in a "con job" rather than any real activities, hoodlum or otherwise.(59)

(375) The FBI's decision to close the investigation may have been justifiable at the time, since there was no indication either through money spent or by actual group-sponsored operations that Sierra had a viable organization.(60) The activities, however, were just beginning.

(376) As soon as the organization was formally set up, Sierra and Felipe Rivero left on a trip to Nicaragua and Colombia to discuss plans for a military base of operations outside the United States.(61) They reportedly spoke with Luis Somoza in Nicaragua and also attempted to obtain the use of the Isle of Andres off of Colombia.(62) It was also reported that Sierra and Rivero traveled to New York, Chicago, St. Louis, and Washington, D.C., to meet with backers and make further arrangements.(63) Later, it was learned that Sierra alone had spent a little over \$11,000 on travel expenses by October 1963.(64)

(377) The group was also spending money on arms and equipment by late summer 1963. Rich Lauchli, a well-known arms dealer from Collinsville, Ill., was contacted by Sierra in August to purchase a quantity of guns.(65) Soldier-of-fortune and Gerry Patrick Hemming associate, Steve Wilson, was asked by Sierra to deliver the arms to Miami.(66) Sierra also ordered a two-man submarine from California in October 1963.(67) which was transported to Miami for storage in the garage of Cuban exile Manuel Aguilar.(68)

(378) The FBI received information that Sierra had been on an arms shopping spree in Detroit accompanied by Jose Cardoso, and purchased \$6,000 to \$7,000 worth of weapons to be transported to Miami.(69) Dennis Lynn Harber, another Hemming associate, assisted Sierra in the transport of military equipment.(70)

(379) Sierra was also holding discussions with several "action" groups for assistance in a military operation against Cuba.(71) Among those contacted who reportedly signed "pledges" of support were Aldo Vera Serafin of the militant MAPA group (American Patriotic Action Movement);(72) Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo and Antonio Veciana

Blanch of the SNFE-Alpha 66 alliance;(73) Santiago Alvarez Rodriguez of Comandos L;(74) Eduardo Mor Ruiz, an independent anti-Castro Cuban fighter;(75) and Orlando Bosch of MIRR.(76)

(380) Reports of funds given to those groups indicate Sierra was advancing modest sums from the alleged \$650,000 at his disposal. Aldo Vera Serafin reportedly received \$3,500(77) and Tony Cuesta of Comandos L received \$1,000.(78) Members of the Junta's board of officers also received contributions from Sierra. Carlos Rodriguez Quesada received \$2,800; Felipe Rivero Diaz received \$1,890; and Gilberto Rodriguez got \$1,500.(79)

(381) There are various descriptions of the military operations allegedly being prepared by the Junta. On October 30, 1963, information was received that the Second National Front of Escambray had plans for an operation from a base in the Dominican Republic.(80) The arrangements were allegedly being made by Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, head of SNFE, and Abel Camacho in Key West.(81) The plan called for action against a bridge in Oriente Province and had been masterminded by Antonio Veciana and one of the engineers who had designed the bridge.(82) Consistent with this information, it was also reported to the FBI that the Junta offered soldier-of-fortune Joe Garman \$11,000 to lead a raid on Oriente Province.(83) (382) There were other reports that an attack on a Havana oil refinery was planned.(84) Still other reports simply indicated that although all-out war against Castro was the objective, a hit-and-run raid for publicity purposes would be attempted first.(85)

(383) While all these activities were getting underway, Sierra had some conflict with other officers in the Junta. Gilberto Rodriguez Hernandez was replaced as military coordinator in the summer of 1963 because, according to Sierra, Hernandez was feared to be a Castro agent.(86) In turn, Hernandez, who had returned from Cuban prison in April 1963 in the prisoner exchange, called Van Gorkum and Browder at Union Tank Car Co. and complained bitterly about Sierra's lack of leadership.(87)

(384) After Sierra had signed a pact with Alpha 66-SFNE, another member of the Junta, Manuel Lozano Pino, resigned from his position as head of external relations.(88) He objected to the inclusion of such a "left-wing" organization, but also protested Sierra's expenditures.(89)

(385) These complaints may have had something to do with Sierra's summons to Chicago in early November 1963 for a stormy session with Browder.(90) Sierra was blasted for wasting funds, reportedly totaling up to \$50,000.(91) According to sources of the CIA and FBI, Sierra was accompanied to the Chicago meeting with Armando Fleites of SNFE, and Browder allegedly ordered Sierra to turn over all moneys and supplies to the SNFE-Alpha 66 alliance.(92) Although several of the Junta officers had asked for Sierra's replacement and had specifically named Jose "Pepin" Bosch as an attractive alternative.(93) Sierra remained in place as the "guiding spirit" for the next 2 months:(94) the remainder of the group's existence.

(386) A CIA memorandum reported on November 20, 1963, of the strange activities of Sierra and the Junta:



Although he (Sierra) has been some what ubiquitous among Cuban exile leaders in Miami since March 1963, he still remains somewhat of a mystery man in terms of his means of support, and indeed, his long-range objectives. (95)

(387) The report also raised the question of how Sierra managed to remain in the exile political scene so long. "Perhaps his mysterious backers are providing him with sufficient funds to keep the pot boiling for the present," the writer of the memo conjectured. (96) Indeed, Sierra's activities were not only continuing, but he also soon found himself the subject of interest in a Secret Service investigation into a threat against the President.\*

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- (9) Staff summary of CIA file, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 1 (ref. to dispatch 12627, Nov. 20, 1963, and attachments).
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\*See the agency performance section I D 1 of the committee's report for more information about this threat.

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- (47) See ref. 3, p. 7 (ref. FBI memo, Sept. 23, 1963, re Paulino Sierra Martinez).
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- (51) Ibid.
- (52) Id. at p. 3, CIA undated report.
- (53) Ibid.
- (54) See ref. 3, p. 7 (ref. FBI memo to Director from SAC, Miami, Dec. 10, 1963, re Americanism Educational League).
- (55) Ibid.
- (56) Ibid. (Note: Mold was also listed as a member of "Americans for Freedom" at the same address as the American Educational League. There is no evidence that this group was ever investigated by the FBI. See House Select Committee on Assassinations staff summary of CIA file, p. 6, undated CIA report.)
- (57) See ref. 3, p. 1 (ref. CIA report, Apr. 30, 1963).
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- (59) See ref. 3, p. 3 (ref. memo to Director from SA, Chicago, June 26, 1963, re Paulino Sierra Martinez).
- (60) This conclusion is based on a review of all documents pertaining to Sierra.
- (61) See ref. 3, p. 10 (ref. CIA report, Nov. 7, 1963), and p. 11 (ref. report 406, July 5, 1963).
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- (64) Id. at p. 9 (ref. CIA report, Nov. 14, 1963).

(65) *Id.* at p. 7 (ref. FBI memo, Nov. 14, 1963, from Miami re INTERPEN), p. 8 (FBI memo, Nov. 2, 1963, from Miami re JGCE, pp. 29-30); see also Gerry Patrick Hemming chronology from FBI files.

(66) See ref. 3, p. 8 (ref. FBI memo, Nov. 2, 1963, from Miami re JGCE, pp. 29-30). (Note: The use of soldiers-of-fortune types such as Wilson and Garman may have been a result of prior contact with Hemming's men by Carlos Rodriguez, Quesada and the MILTN. See FBI notes—Quesada, Hemming chronology).

(67) *Id.* at p. 10 (ref. CIA report, Oct. 16, 1963).

(68) *Ibid.* (Note: Aquilar's group affiliation was unknown. However, he was known to be acquainted with Loran Hall, Lawrence Howard and William Seymour, who spent much time at Aquilar's house. See memo, June 5, 1968, of conversation with Aquilar. See also Nov. 1, 1963 memo re Hemming complaint that Hall stole a rifle and that Hall was staying with Aquilar at that time).

(69) See ref. 3, p. 6 (ref. FBI memo, Nov. 1, 1963, from Miami re SNFE).

(70) *Id.* at p. 7 (ref. CIA report, Nov. 22, 1963); see also staff summary, p. 2 (ref. CIA report 4039, Nov. 14, 1963).

(71) *Id.* at p. 9 (ref. FBI memo, Nov. 2, 1963, from Miami, JGCE, p. 43) and p. 5 (ref. CIA report, May 17, 1963); see also staff summary of CIA file, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 1 (ref. dispatch 12627, Nov. 20, 1963, with attachment).

(72) Staff summary of CIA file, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 1-2 (ref. dispatch 12627, Nov. 20, 1963, with attachment).

(73) *Id.* at pp. 1-2 and p. 5 (ref. CIA memo Apr. 18, 1963).

(74) *Id.* at p. 2 (ref. dispatch 12627, Nov. 20, 1963, with attachment).

(75) *Ibid.*; see also J. F. K. Document 012887 (ref. CIA report, Sept. 27, 1963).

(76) Staff summary of CIA file, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 9 (ref. CIA report, Sept. 14, 1963).

(77) Staff summary of CIA file, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 2 (ref. CIA report, Nov. 14, 1963).

(78) Summary, p. 8, note 3 (ref. FBI memo, Nov. 2, 1963 from Miami re JGCE, pp. 29-30).

(79) Staff summary of CIA file, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 2 (ref. CIA report, Nov. 14, 1963).

(80) See ref. 3, p. 7 (ref. FBI memo, Nov. 1, 1963, from Miami re SNFE).

(81) *Ibid.*

(82) *Ibid.*

(83) *Id.* at p. 8 (ref. FBI memo, Nov. 2, 1963, from Miami re JGCE, pp. 29-30).

(84) *Id.* at p. 10 (ref. CIA report, Oct. 15, 1963); see also staff summary of CIA file, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 2 (ref. report, Oct. 15, 1963 extract).

(85) Summary, CIA handbook.

(86) See ref. 3, p. 9 (ref. FBI memo, Nov. 2, 1963, from Miami re JGCE, p. 37).

(87) *Id.* at pp. 10-11 (ref. CIA report, Sept. 13, 1963).

(88) Staff summary, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 2 (ref. CIA report, Nov. 14, 1963, extract); see also J. F. K. Document 021887, p. 9 (ref. CIA report, Nov. 14, 1963).

(89) Staff summary of CIA file, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 2 (ref. CIA report, Nov. 14, 1963).

(90) See ref. 3, p. 8 (ref. CIA report, Dec. 11, 1963).

(91) *Ibid.*; see also staff summary of CIA file, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 2 (ref. dispatch 12627, Nov. 20, 1963, with attachment).


(92) See ref. 3, p. 8 (ref. CIA report, Dec. 11, 1963).

(93) *Id.* at p. 11 (ref. CIA report, Sept. 13, 1963).

(94) Staff summary of CIA file, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 2 (ref. dispatch 12627, Nov. 20, 1963, with attachment).

(95) *Ibid.*

(96) *Ibid.*



## XII. DAVID FERRIE

(388) In connection with its investigation of anti-Castro Cuban groups, the committee examined the activities of David William Ferrie, an alleged associate of Lee Harvey Oswald. Among other contentions, it had been charged that Ferrie was involved with at least one militant group of Cuban exiles and that he had made flights into Cuba in support of their counterrevolutionary activities there.

(389) On Monday afternoon, November 25, 1963, Ferrie, Moreover, voluntarily presented himself for questioning to the New Orleans police, who had been looking for him in connection with the assassination of President Kennedy. (1) The New Orleans district attorney's office had earlier received information regarding a relationship between Ferrie and accused assassin Lee Harvey Oswald, (2) including allegations that: Ferrie may have been acquainted with Oswald since Oswald's days in the Civil Air Patrol youth organization in 1954-55, Ferrie may have given Oswald instruction in the use of a rifle and may have hypnotized Oswald to shoot the President, and that Ferrie was in Texas on the day of the assassination and may have been Oswald's getaway pilot. (3)

(390) Ferrie denied all the contentions, stating that at the time of the President's assassination, he had been in New Orleans, busy with court matters for organized crime figure Carlos Marcello, who had been acquitted of immigration-related charges that same day. (4) Other individuals, including Marcello, Marcello's lawyer, the lawyer's secretary, and FBI agent Regis Kennedy, supported Ferrie's alibi. (5)

(391) Ferrie also gave a detailed account of his whereabouts for the period from the evening of November 22, 1963, until his appearance at the New Orleans police station. (6) Interviews of Ferrie's associates and the results of a field investigation verified Ferrie's statements. (7)

(392) Ferrie's assertion that his Stinson Voyager airplane could not be flown at the time of the assassination was later verified by the FBI. (8) Jack Martin, a New Orleans private detective and colleague of Ferrie, who had originally mentioned Ferrie to New Orleans officials, subsequently informed authorities he had no specific information to support his allegations. (9) Thus, the FBI and the Warren Commission concluded that the stories relating to an Oswald-Ferrie relationship were unfounded.

(393) Ferrie died in 1967, shortly after New Orleans District Attorney Jim Garrison announced he was reopening the Kennedy probe and was interested in Ferrie's activities in 1963. While there was much speculation that his death may have been suicide, the New Orleans coroner determined the death was a result of natural causes. (10) Nevertheless, this further fueled suspicion about his activities.

(394) The committee determined that Ferrie's activities during the months prior to the assassination of President Kennedy warranted examination. The committee was particularly concerned about the

possibility of a relationship between Oswald and Ferrie. Several parallels in the lives of the two emerged: complex personality and political beliefs; difficulty in achieving normal social adjustment; and a pattern of visiting the same locality at the same time, and engaging in similar activities.

(395) A detailed record of Ferrie's life and associates is currently available. The committee examined FBI and Secret Service investigative reports generated immediately after the assassination and FBI and INS reports from before and after the assassination; it received information developed during the 1967-68 Garrison investigation; and it examined the files of the extensive investigation of Ferrie conducted by the Federal Aviation Administration, Eastern Airlines, and the New Orleans police from 1961 to 1963, an investigation that was the result of criminal charges against Ferrie filed in 1961. Additionally, the committee conducted its own field investigation.

(396) Ferrie was born in 1918 in Cleveland, Ohio, the son of James Howard Ferrie, a police captain and an attorney. (11) Ferrie attended parochial grammar and high schools. (12) Although there are no indications that his childhood was anything but normal, numerous acquaintances and associates of Ferrie reveal that he grew to be a complex, even bizarre, individual. One aptly stated, "Not inappropriately, he (Ferrie) was described as a paradox." (13)

(397) His unusual personal appearance was partially a result of the loss of his body hair induced by a rare disease. (14) He wore a make-shift toupee and exaggerated fake eyebrows affixed crudely with glue as compensation. (15) Persons who knew him considered him sloppy and unkempt, with a proclivity for foul language. (16)

(398) Ferrie was often described as "very aggressive" and "highly obnoxious." (17) He resented authority, (18) was opinionated, and often difficult to get along with. (19) Yet he was able to exert tremendous influence over his close associates, including many young men in his Civil Air Patrol squadron. (20)

(399) Several of Ferrie's associates indicate he was a homosexual and a misogynist. (21) His sexual exploitation of younger men would eventually cause him numerous problems.

(400) Although his formal education was not extensive, Ferrie was considered highly intelligent, even brilliant. (22) He had originally studied theology in the hope of becoming an ordained priest, but he left seminary school before graduation because of "emotional instability." (23) Later, in 1941, he received a bachelor of arts degree from Baldwin-Wallace College, (24) majoring in philosophy. (25) He also received, through a correspondence course, a doctorate degree in psychology from an unaccredited school, Phoenix University, Bari, Italy. (26) In August 1957, he traveled to Italy to take the final board exams. (27)

(401) Ferrie spent considerable time studying medicine and psychology, (28) especially the techniques of hypnosis which he frequently practiced on his young associates. (29) Ferrie had even set up a laboratory over his garage, (30) where he claimed he lost his hair, alternately attributing it to a radiation experiment, chemical explosion, and cancer research experiments. (31) He listed his name in the telephone book as "Dr." David Ferrie; (32) many friends did erroneously believe he

was a medical doctor and a psychologist.(33) This veneer of respectability and achievement could be the reason Ferrie referred to his Ph. D. degree as his "most prized possession."(34)

(402) Ferrie was also philosophically and politically complex. He considered himself a devout Catholic,(35) and made several attempts to become a priest,(36) even though he described himself as a "theological liberal."(37) He also claimed to be liberal in his civil rights attitude.(38) He was rabidly anti-Communist,(39) however, and frequently critical of each Presidential administration for what he perceived to be sell-outs to communism.(40)

(403) Ferrie often spoke to business and civic groups about politics.(41) Ferrie associates told FBI agents in 1961 that Ferrie had been "critical of the Roosevelt administration \* \* \* (as it) was trying to drive us into communism."(42) Associates also said Ferrie "was also critical of the Truman administration for the same reason."(43)

(404) Ferrie was asked to discontinue his remarks at a speaking engagement in July 1961 before the New Orleans chapter of the Military Order of World Wars.(44) His topic was the Presidential administration and the Bay of Pigs fiasco.(45) The organization put a stop to Ferrie's remarks when he became too critical of President Kennedy.(46)

(405) He apparently expressed his views to anyone who would listen. During an interview with an IRS auditor in 1960, Ferrie was "outspoken" in his derogatory comments about the United States.(47) He complained bitterly about his alleged tax persecution to such an extent that the agent reported he thought Ferrie was actually deranged, a "psycho."(48)

(406) Ferrie's major avocation and occupation was flying. Even associates who were critical of Ferrie's character considered him an excellent pilot.(49) An early acquaintance believes that Ferrie first started to fly at his father's suggestion to take his mind off of his failures at the seminary.(50) He took lessons at Sky Tech Airway Service in Cleveland, Ohio, between 1942 and 1945.(51) He then worked as a pilot for an oil drilling firm which had jobs in South America.(52) When the company went out of business, Ferrie tried teaching at Rocky River High School,(53) but he was fired in 1948 for psychoanalyzing his students instead of teaching them.(54)

(407) In 1949, Ferrie left the Cleveland area after rumors, that he had taken several young boys to a house of prostitution, circulated through his neighborhood.(55) Although Ferrie's exact movements are not known, it appears he had gone to Tampa, Fla., where he received his instrument rating at Sunnyside Flying School.(56)

(408) In 1950, Ferrie returned to Cleveland. He worked as an insurance inspector,(57) and joined the Army Reserve for a 3-year stint, leaving with an honorable discharge in 1953.(58)

(409) Life started going well for Ferrie. In 1951, he submitted an application to Eastern Airlines, omitting details of his past emotional and occupational difficulties.(59) Eastern Airlines hired him in Miami, and soon transferred him to New Orleans.(60)

(410) Internal Eastern Airlines memoranda indicated Ferrie was accepted for employment, but consideration was given to firing him almost immediately for falsifying parts of his application.(61) The

New Orleans branch was advised to keep Ferrie only until a replacement could be found and a "close watch" on Ferrie's progress was recommended.(62) Initial reports, however, were favorable.(63) Ferrie was considered by his fellow pilots to be doing a good job, although he was "odd" at times.(64) Eastern decided to retain him.(411) Ferrie approached his job enthusiastically, devoting his own time to talking at schools and clubs to promote interest in aviation and travel in the Southwest area.(65) In 1953, the president of Eastern wrote him a letter personally commending Ferrie's efforts on behalf of the company.(66) This early record of dedication and competence may have accounted for Ferrie's longevity as an Eastern Airlines captain, despite complaints through the years.(67) Ultimately, the infractions became too serious, and, after a long investigation and a hearing process that lasted from 1961 until 1963, Ferrie lost his job.

(412) Ferrie had always been engrossed in activities related to flying, including the Civil Air Patrol, which he had first joined in Cleveland.(68) Over the years, his difficulties with the hierarchy and authorities of the Civil Air Patrol would increase, but Ferrie remained intensely popular with many of the members and enjoyed a reputation as a first rate instructor and organizer.(69) Jean Naatz, an aviatrix of national renown, stated, "He had done more for the Civil Air Patrol than anyone else and built up the squadron to one of the biggest squadrons in the State of Ohio."(70)

(413) Ferrie also built the same reputation with many CAP cadets in the New Orleans area. One CAP commander said, "David Ferrie is a good organizer \* \* \* he made the CAP at the New Orleans Airport everything it is today. He has a large following among the cadets of the CAP, and is an excellent flying instructor."(71) By 1953, there were about 80 cadets assigned to his squadron.(72) Ferrie spent about 6 hours a week in official CAP activity and much of his own time associating with his cadets.(73) Ferrie became known for his enthusiastic approach to cadet training, emphasizing tutoring in science and mathematics and putting cadets in charge of their own discipline.(74) The squadron had an award-winning drill team.(75)

(414) His appeal to several young men may have been related to his taking an extraordinary interest in them: he gave them flying instruction and flight time in his own airplane;(76) he often gave parties at his residence where liquor flowed freely;(77) and he offered his home as a place for the boys to stay when they were unhappy at home.(78) He urged several boys to join the armed forces,(79) to begin careers in aviation,(80) or to join seminaries.(81) Many of Ferrie's cadets became involved in Ferrie's wide spectrum of other activities.(82)

(415) Ferrie's tremendous influence and close association with these young men eventually became a controversial subject with many parents.(83)

(416) Ferrie did not bother to renew his CAP commander charter when it ran out in 1954,(84) although he continued to wear the insignia of the CAP on his fatigues.(85) He did renew his commander charter in 1959, when he augmented his cadet's standard CAP rifle training by instituting an association with the New Orleans Cadet Rifle Club.(86) Ferrie also started a group called the "Falcon Squadron," com-



posed of Ferrie's closest CAP associates. (87) A group within this group, the "Omnipotents," was allegedly started to train cadets in what to do in the event of a major attack on the United States. (88) (417) Ferrie's job and ownership of an airplane enabled him to travel around the country with relative ease. He told officials he frequently traveled to Texas and other parts of the South, including Miami. (89) He also visited New York on occasion. (90) The amount of time Ferrie spent in these other cities could not be determined. In August 1959, while in Miami, Ferrie was put under a 24-hour surveillance by customs agents who believed he was involved in gun smuggling. (91) Following a brief investigation, including a tapping of his telephone conversations, it was determined that Ferrie was not involved in any illegal activity, but merely planning an outing for his "scouts". (92) The investigation was dropped. (93)

(418) Ferrie also became involved in other activities. In 1959, he had found an outlet for his political fanaticism in the anti-Castro movement. (94) By early 1961, Ferrie and a young man whom Ferrie had first met in the CAP, Layton Martens, were working with Sergio Arcacha Smith, head of the Cuban Revolutionary Front delegation in New Orleans. (95)

(419) Ferrie soon became Smith's eager partner in counterrevolutionary activities. (96) He reportedly built two miniature submarines, which he planned to use for an attack on Havana Harbor, (97) obtained several rifles and mortars for the proposed invasion, (98) and was reportedly teaching Cubans how to fly. (99) Further, several of Ferrie's cadets claimed to have taken trips to Cuba in Ferrie's airplane. (100)

(420) Ferrie was also involved with Arcacha Smith, adventurer Gordon Novel and Layton Martens in a raid on a munitions dump in Houma, La. (101) In September 1961, the U.S. border patrol received information that Ferrie was attempting to purchase a C-47 airplane for \$30,000 and reportedly had a cache of arms in the New Orleans area. (102) The report was never verified. There were also unverified reports that Ferrie provided Arcacha Smith with personal financial assistance. (103)

(421) Arcacha Smith wrote Eastern Airlines then-president Eddie Rickenbacker on Ferrie's behalf requesting a 60- or 90-day leave with pay for full-time work for the CRC. The request was denied. (104) Nevertheless, Ferrie's vacation in April 1961 coincided with the Bay of Pigs invasion. (105) Ferrie's role, if any, is not known.

(422) The CRC in New Orleans was affiliated with the main branch of the CRC in Miami, which had been receiving funds from the U.S. Government. (106) Some of these funds may have been disseminated to the New Orleans branch to cover operating costs. Nevertheless, there is no evidence Ferrie received funds from either the CRC or the U.S. Government and no evidence that Ferrie was connected in any way with the U.S. Government. (107) Ferrie's assistance and interest appears to have been completely voluntary.

(423) During this time Ferrie had continued to have personal problems. In 1960, he had provoked the ire of other CAP commanders while on a cadet campout. (108) The incident ended with Ferrie withdrawing his cadets from the outing and eventually led to his permanent resignation from the CAP in 1960. (109)

(424) Ferrie's troubles intensified when charges were brought against him by parents of boys who had run away from home. (110) In one in-

stance, Ferrie had gained entrance to the New Orleans Detention Center to visit one runaway boy by signing himself in as a doctor. (111) (425) The parents of another boy complained to authorities that their son was staying with Ferrie. (112) As a result, Ferrie was arrested on August 8, 1961 for contributing to the delinquency of a juvenile. (113)

(426) Cuban exile leader Arcacha Smith\* intervened on Ferrie's behalf by telling police that the boy would be returned to his parents if they did not press charges against Ferrie. (114) But Ferrie was arrested again on August 11, 1961, for crime against nature on a 15-year-old boy and indecent behavior with three others. (115)

(428) An intensive New Orleans police investigation of the charges against Ferrie produced statements from several boys that Ferrie had committed indecent acts with them. (117) The boys also told investigators Ferrie had told them he had had homosexual relations with a married man in Houston. (118) On August 26, Eastern Airlines removed him from the payroll for an indefinite period (119) and the Federal Aviation Administration then opened its own investigation into the charges. (120)

(429) With his problems mounting, Ferrie sought legal aid from New Orleans attorney G. Wray Gill, Sr. (121) Ferrie later testified that he and Gill had entered into an agreement in March 1962 that Gill would represent Ferrie in his legal difficulties in return for Ferrie's research and investigative work on other cases for Gill. (122)

(430) Ferrie also testified that he also entered into a similar arrangement in February 1962 with Guy Banister, (123) a former FBI agent who ran a private investigative firm. (124) By the terms of the agreement, Ferrie's work for Banister included analyzing autopsy reports in payment for Banister's investigative services. (125) Banister stated he handled Ferrie's case "personally". (126)

(431) Ferrie may have first met Banister late in 1960 or early 1961 when Banister, also a strong anti-Communist, was helping to establish the "Friends of Democratic Cuba" organization as an adjunct to Sergio Arcacha Smith's CRC. (127) At the time, Banister's investigative business and the CRC were both located in the Balter Building. (128) In February 1961, Banister was conducting background investigations of the members of the CRC from a list provided by Arcacha Smith. (129) In early 1962, both moved their offices to the Newman Building, which carried the two addresses for the two streets it faced: 531 Lafayette and 544 Camp Street. (131)

(432) Jack Martin, a private investigator associated with Banister, (132) may also have been contacted by Ferrie for assistance on his case. Ferrie testified in August 1963 that he had helped Martin on a case involving a phony religious order in Louisville, Ky., in November 1961. (133) Later, Martin wrote letters to the FAA and Eastern Airlines on Ferrie's behalf. (134)

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(427) \*Arcacha Smith was having problems of his own. He had moved the office of the CRC to the Newman Building at 544 Camp Street in 1962, but lack of funds caused him to leave town in mid-1962, his reputation among anti-Castro Cubans tarnished by his association with Ferrie. He was also accused by several Cuban exiles of misappropriation of funds. (116)

(433) With this assistance, Ferrie was able to resolve many of his difficulties. At the end of February 1962, Ferrie was tried and acquitted of the charges of extortion. (135) The other charges were nolle prosecuted in November 1962. (136)

(434) Ferrie managed to stay afloat financially despite his loss of income from Eastern Airlines in 1961. Although he was categorized as a "poor" credit risk in October 1962 by the New Orleans Retail Credit Bureau, (137) Ferrie made payments on his car (138) and met living expenses.

(435) Meanwhile, he was also attempting to be reinstated as an Eastern pilot. Attorney G. Wray Gill notified Eastern when the last of the charges against Ferrie had been nolle prosecuted; (139) Eastern responded with a letter inviting Ferrie to discuss the charges at a meeting in Miami. (140) Ferrie did not go. (141) Instead, several individuals, including one of the boys who had been named in a sex offense charge against him, (142) wrote to Eastern to plead that Ferrie be reinstated. (143) Ferrie also filed a "grievance" against Eastern. (144) Then, in February 1963, he went to Miami with attorney Gill for the hearing regarding his dismissal. (145) Eastern ruled against him: (146) Ferrie filed another grievance. (147)

(436) Hearing dates were scheduled and rescheduled. (148) During this period, Ferrie was often seen at Banister's offices in 544 Camp Street (149) as he prepared his case.

(437) Ferrie's final grievance hearing was set for July 15, 1963, in Miami. (150) Ferrie, Gill and Banister were in Miami on July 15, 16, and 17 while Eastern Airlines presented its case against Ferrie. (151) The record of these hearings reveals that the company's charges were based on Ferrie's deliberate omissions and inaccuracies in his original application to the company; charges of Ferrie's moral turpitude; and his having misrepresented himself as a medical doctor and psychologist. (152)

(438) The hearings were resumed on August 5. (153) Testifying in Ferrie's defense were former CAP cadet, John Irion; Ferrie's long-time friend, James Lewallen; Ferrie's investigator, Guy Banister; and Ferrie himself. (154) Layton Martens provided a sworn deposition in defense of Ferrie's character. (155) Banister testified to Ferrie's good character supposedly based on his own investigation of Ferrie. (156)

(439) In cross-examination, Banister could not rationalize to the satisfaction of the hearing board the reasons for Ferrie's vituperative remarks in 1961 against President Kennedy (157) nor could he adequately explain Ferrie's involvement with a questionable church group. (158)

(440) On September 30, Ferrie received the final decision from the Eastern appeal board: (159) it unanimously upheld his discharge. (160)

(441) By the fall of 1963, Ferrie had become actively involved in the defense investigation of Federal charges of a fraudulent birth certificate against Carlos Marcello an alleged organized crime leader in New Orleans. (161) Ties to Marcello continued through Ferrie's lifetime. As late as 1966, 6 months prior to his death, Ferrie was working with known Marcello associate, Jacob Nastasi, in an aircargo service. (162) According to information developed during an FBI

antiracketeering investigation of Nastasi, Ferrie had previously worked with Marcello associates in another airline company known as United Air Taxi Service.(163) Ferrie's involvement with Marcello may have begun as early as the spring of 1961.(164) An unconfirmed Border Patrol report of February 1962 alleges that Ferrie was the pilot who flew Carlos Marcello back into the United States from Guatemala after he had been deported in April 1961 as part of the U.S. Attorney General Robert Kennedy's crackdown on organized crime.(165) This may have helped Ferrie establish an enduring relationship with the Marcello organized crime family.

(442) The return of Marcello to the United States coincided chronologically with Ferrie's activities with the Cuban Revolutionary Counsel.(166) According to Carlos Quiroga, a Cuban who had been involved with the CRC, Ferrie often provided Arcacha Smith with funds(167) stating, "Ferrie lent him (Arcacha Smith) money when he needed it for his family . . . He (Ferrie) had \$100 bills around all the time," even after he had lost his job with the airlines.(168)

(443) An FBI report of April 1961 indicated Marcello offered Arcacha Smith a deal whereby Marcello would make a substantial donation to the movement in return for concessions in Cuba after Castro's overthrow.(169) One explanation of Ferrie's ability to provide funds to Arcacha Smith may be that he acted as Marcello's financial conduit.

(444) Another indication of any early Ferrie relationship with the Marcello organized crime family may be the legal assistance that Marcello's lawyer, Jack Wasserman,(170) provided to Ferrie associates, Layton Martens, who identified himself to police as Arcacha Smith's second-in-command.(171) and Andrew Blackmon.(172) Both had been arrested shortly after Ferrie's arrest for indecent behavior.(173)

(445) Ferrie's ties to the Marcello organized crime family continued through his association with G. Wray Gill, Sr., who was also attorney of record for Carlos Marcello.(174)

(446) Ferrie told the FBI that he had begun work on Marcello's case after his last Eastern grievance hearing.(175) In telling the Bureau about his work for Marcello, however, he mentioned only activities in October and November.(176)

(447) Ferrie said he went to Guatemala on business for Marcello from October 11 to October 18 and from October 30 to November 1.(177) The day after Marcello's trial started, November 5, Ferrie purchased a .38 caliber revolver.(178) On the weekends of November 9 and 16, Ferrie stayed at Churchill Farms, Marcello's Louisiana countryside estate.(179) He said he had gone there to map out strategy for Marcello's trial.(180)

(448) New Orleans police records for November 22, 1963, indicate that Guy Banister pistol-whipped Jack Martin on the evening of the assassination in a heated argument over "long-distance telephone calls." (181) Although Martin reported the assault to the police, he refused to press charges against Banister.(182) Within 48 hours, however, Martin had the entire New Orleans police department hunting for David Ferrie.(183) He told the police that Ferrie may have been

involved in the Kennedy assassination.(184) Specifically, he suspected, that Ferrie was in Texas on the day of the assassination; that he was supposed to have been the getaway pilot in the assassination; and that Ferrie had known Oswald from their days together in the Civil Air Patrol, when Ferrie had given Oswald instructions in the use of a rifle.(185)

(449) In an attempt to locate Ferrie for questioning, police arrested two Ferrie associates. Layton Martens and Alvin Beauboeuf, at Ferrie's residence and charged them with vagrancy.(186) While Beauboeuf was uncooperative during the questioning,(187) Martens was more talkative.(188) He said Gill had come by to relay a message to Ferrie that his library card was found among Oswald's effects.(189) Martens' story was unsubstantiated.

(450) Ferrie returned to New Orleans on the afternoon of November 25.(190) He and attorney Gill appeared at the district attorney's office around 4:30 p.m.(191) He was questioned by the New Orleans police, the U.S. Secret Service, and the FBI.(192) He denied ever seeing Oswald before.(193)

(451) Ferrie also said that he had been in New Orleans until at least 9 p.m. on November 22, celebrating Marcello's trial victory at the Royal Orleans.(194) He said he then left the city with two friends for some rest and relaxation.(195)

(452) Ferrie's account of his travels between November 22 and November 25 contained some contradictions. Ferrie said he left New Orleans by automobile, bound for Houston and accompanied by Melvin Coffey and Al Beauboeuf.(196) The group checked in at the Alamotel early on November 23.(197) That date on the motel registration card was written over a November 22 notation.(198) The motel employee said that was because of the early morning hour of the checkin, however, and that he was certain the correct date was the 23d.(199)

(453) On the afternoon of November 23, Ferrie said he, Beauboeuf, and Coffey went figure skating at the Winterland Skating Rink.(200) The three then went to the Belair Skating Rink(201) before driving 1 hour to Galveston, Tex., where they arrived at 9 p.m. and a short time later, checked into the Driftwood Motel.(202)

(454) Checkin and checkout times for the Houston and Galveston hotels conflict. Alamotel records in Houston indicate that Ferrie and his friends checked into the hotel early on November 23 and did not leave until 8 or 9 p.m. on November 24.(203) Yet the registration records and witnesses at the Driftwood in Galveston show the three registered late on November 23 and checked out at 10 a.m. on November 24.(204)

(455) Records from the motels indicate the group made a number of phone calls.(205) Two calls made from the Alamotel went to radio stations WSHO and WDSH in New Orleans.(206) A collect call went to the Town and Country Motel, Marcello's New Orleans headquarters.(207)

(456) Evidence indicated that Ferrie conducted his own investigation into the Kennedy assassination. Oswald's former landlady in New Orleans, Mrs. Jesse Garner, told the committee she recalled that Ferrie visited her home on the night of the assassination and asked about Oswald's library card.(208) Mrs. Garner would not talk to Ferrie.(209)

(457) A neighbor of Oswald's, Mrs. Doris Eames, told New Orleans district attorney investigators in 1968 that Ferrie had come by her house after the assassination, inquiring if Mr. Eames had any information regarding Oswald's library card. Eames told Ferrie he had seen Oswald in the public library but apparently had no information about the library card Oswald used. (210)

(458) Ferrie also talked with several former members of the Civil Air Patrol in an attempt to find out if any former cadets recalled Lee Harvey Oswald in Ferrie's squadron. Among those contacted was former cadet Roy McCoy, who told the FBI that Ferrie had come by looking for photographs of the cadets to see if Oswald was pictured in any photos of Ferrie's squadron. (211)

(459) The implications of Ferrie's associations, his activities, and the allegations that Ferrie and Oswald had been seen together in Clinton, La., in the late summer, 1963, and were acquainted while both were active in the Civil Air Patrol in 1955, are discussed in the anti-Castro Cuban conspiracy and the organized crime conspiracy sections of the committee's report.

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#### REFERENCES

(1) Memo from Sedgebeer to Giannusso, New Orleans district attorney's office, May 22, 1964, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J. F. K. Document 003840) ; see also New Orleans police report of Francis Martello, Nov. 25, 1963.

(2) FBI report, No. 62-109060, interview of Jerry P. Stein, Nov. 25, 1963 (p. 300) ; and FBI report, No. 62-109060, interview of Jack S. Martin, Nov. 25, 1963 (p. 309). Note: All FBI reports were obtained from file No. 62-109060 unless otherwise specifically noted.

(3) Jack Martin letter to Robert Robey of FAA, the Federal Aviation Administration, Nov. 25, 1963 ; FBI report, interview of Jack Martin, Nov. 25, 1963 (p. 309) ; and New Orleans police report, interview of Edward Voebel, Nov. 27, 1963, FAA, vol. 1 (J. F. K. Document 014964).

(4) FBI report, interview of David Ferrie, Nov. 26, 1963.

(5) Immunized testimony of Carlos Marcello, Jan. 11, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 67 ; FBI report, interview of G. Wray Gill, Nov. 27, 1963 ; and FBI memo, May 18, 1967, No. 62-109060-5255, Regis Kennedy, p. 2. Note: There are discrepancies about whether Ferrie was in the courthouse or in Gill's office on the day of the assassination. Marcello and Kennedy said Ferrie was in the courtroom (both statements were taken some years after the event). Gill said he knew Ferrie was in Gill's office at 12:15 p.m. on Nov. 22, 1963, because Gill had called his secretary at that time to tell her the federal jury had returned a verdict in favor of Marcello. Gill's secretary told Gill that Ferrie had left Gill's office at that time (12:15 p.m.) stating he would return at 1:30 p.m., which he failed to do. Gill's secretary, Aldie Guidroz, was not questioned as to Ferrie's whereabouts. Ferrie told the FBI he was in New Orleans "all day" on Nov. 11, 1963. The date, Nov. 11, may have been a typographical error meant to have been Nov. 22, 1963, since there is no significance to Nov. 11, 1963. See FBI report, Nov. 26, 1963, for interview with Ferrie.

(6) FBI report, interview of David Ferrie, November 26, 1963.

(7) FBI report, interview of Melvin Coffey, November 20, 1973. Coffey told of trip planned since November 20, although he did not know the destination. He said Ferrie and Beauboeuf were particularly interested in ice skating, so they went to Houston.

(8) FBI report, interview of M. Coffey, November 30, 1963. Coffey said the plane had not been airworthy for some time. He last heard it was used February

1963: FBI report, interview of James Lewallen, November 27, 1963, p. 214; and FBI report, interview of David Ferrie, November 27, 1963, p. 200 (Ferrie said the plane had not been airworthy since the spring of 1962). Note: While the evidence tends to show Ferrie's plane had not been in working order for some time, an FAA document indicated that Jack Martin believed Ferrie's Stinson was airworthy as of July 1963, or, at least, that a Stinson aircraft was available to Ferrie at that time. See memo to the file, July 18, 1963, FAA, vol. 1, HSCA (J. F. K. Document No. 014904).

(9) Secret Service Report No. CO-2-34, 030, December 13, 1963, p. 5 (J. F. K. Document No. 014904); see also vol. 5, FAA news article, exhibit A, February 22, 1967, Fort Worth Star-Telegram.

(10) Memo re: Autopsy of Ferrie from Jim Garrison to Jim Alcor (J. F. K. Document No. 003840); see also Newsweek, March 6, 1967, "Carnival in New Orleans" (file Ferrie, D.W. S.W. 67.91) (J. F. K. Document No. 014904); see also Fort Worth Star-Telegram, February 23, 1967, "Death of Ferrie Stymies JFK Probe."

(11) FAA file, vol. 2, Southern Research Investigation, No. 11-N-224, January 25, 1963, p. 10 (hereinafter SR-11-N-224 and date) (J. F. K. Document No. 014904).

(12) *Id.* at p. 23.

(13) *Id.* at pp. 21 and 23.

(14) *Ibid.*; and *ibid.*, December 19, 1963, p. 20. A doctor who treated Ferrie said he suffered from "a disease causing emotional anxiety caused by nervous shock and thyroid deficiency."

(15) *Ibid.*, SR November 19, 1962, p. 10. (Meister said in an interview that Ferrie "wears a toupee, possibly self-made.") FBI report, September 22, 1961, p. 5. Mrs. Nichols who knew of Ferrie said "he wears a wig." FAA, vol. 4, Robey report, p. 9, interview of Mr. T. W. Christiansen, p. 10 and interview Col. Joseph G. Ehrlicher.

(16) *Ibid.*, FAA, vol. 2, exhibit III, Statement of Cadet; FBI report, interview of Mrs. Dunn and Mrs. Nichols, September 22, 1961.

(17) See ref. 11, SR-11-N-224, November 19, 1962, FAA, vol. 2, p. 10, interview of Al Meister.

(18) *Ibid.*, vol. 3, exhibit XX, Ferrie file from St. Charles Seminary, December 1, 1961. (Ferrie was described as "critical of authority," "careless about observing rules," "ignored authority," "indulges freely in criticism of his superiors"); see also FAA, vol. 4, Robey report, p. 10, interview of Col. Joseph G. Ehrlicher, "resented authority."

(19) *Ibid.*, SR-1-N-224, November 19, 1962, FAA, vol. 2, interview of George Piazza who told investigators "Ferrie is the type of individual who fancies himself an expert in all matters and, hence, believes himself infallible. To this end Ferrie would express his philosophical ideas in no uncertain terms." See also FAA, vol. III, exhibit XX, Ferrie file from St. Charles Seminary; FAA, vol. 4, report of Robey, p. 7, Rev. Francis B. Sullivan, professor of theology at St. Charles Seminary, feels Ferrie to be a "preconditioned psycho, impresses people by pretending to be an expert on everything, definitely has a talent for character assassination" (p. 11). Douyear McGray called Ferrie "eccentric and dictatorial" (p. 12). Al Meister described him as "officious and dictatorial."

(20) *Ibid.*, FAA file, vol. 4, exhibit III, Statement of Cadet, Dec. 1, 1961. Ferrie seemed to "hold the cadets in the palm of his hand" (p. 4). S. R. 11-N-224, Nov. 19, 1962, p. 10, interview of Al Meister. He said Ferrie was very influential. Interview of Piazza. He said Ferrie "seemed to have a certain talent and background in the use of psychology and would use this as well as his philosophical ideas to influence some of the youths in the CAP squadron." See also interview of Bob Boyleston, Oct. 17, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J. F. K. document No. 012865); FBI report, Oct. 30, 1961, "David William Ferrie," interview of John Harris, who said "Ferrie has a group of young boys whom he supports and controls completely;" FAA, vol. 4, Robey report, p. 9 (J. F. K. document No. 014904), interview of Colonel Harry A. Webb: "I had ability to get affection of the cadets and that they would do almost anything for him."

(21) *Ibid.*, SR 11-N-244, Nov. 19, 1962, p. 10. Meister advised that he had heard through cadet sources "that subject is possibly a homosexual," and also that Ferrie "hated women;" FBI interview of A. Gifford, Nov. 25, 1963; FAA, vol. 4, Robey Report, p. 11—Ferrie told Joseph Howard girls and women were no good

and intellectually inferior to men. John Johnson said Ferrie thought women dense (J. F. K. document No. 014904).

(22) *Ibid.*, SR 11-N-224, Jan. 25, 1963, p. 16, Mrs. Jean Naatz; FBI report, Sept. 22, 1961, No. 105-104-340-3, p. 4, interview of Joseph Lisman and interview of Mrs. Ruby Nichols, p. 5.

(23) *Ibid.*, SR-11-N-224, Dec. 19, 1962, p. 19, Ferrie was treated for emotional problems in 1944, FAA, vol. 2, letter of J. H. Ferrie to St. Charles Seminary.

(24) *Id.* at pp. 18-19, FAA, vol. III, exhibit.

(25) *Ibid.*, FAA, vol. III, exhibit, transcript of grades from Baldwin-Wallace College, Berea, Ohio, June 9, 1941; lists all courses.

(26) Synopsis of a Small Business Administration hearing, testimony of Ronald Hubner, Southern Research investigator, p. 3 (J. F. K. document No. 014930). See also vol. K, FAA file, ALPA SBA, D. W. Ferrie, 15-63, 29-63, 48-63, EAL EXH No. 6, letter of Dec. 17, 1962, from U.S. Foreign Service to Mr. Risley, Southern Research (J. F. K. document No. 014904).

(27) SBA hearing, Ferrie testimony, synopsis, p. 4 (J. F. K. document No. 014930). (Ferrie claims he also wrote a doctor's thesis for his degree on an aspect of the psychology of vision—the use of hypnotherapy in retinitis.)

(28) FAA, vol. 4, Robert Robey Report, p. 11. John Johnson, Ferrie told them he had taken a premedical course, p. 12 (J. F. K. document No. 014904); Al Landry said Ferrie told him he was studying at Tulane University; Robert Morrell (FAA, vol. 4, Robey Report, p. 11) (Ferrie led people to believe he was studying medicine at Tulane University. Karl Koster said Ferrie told him he studied medicine. Ferrie also had a copy of a Ph. D. in psychology on his wall (p. 15)).

(29) SBA hearing, synopsis of testimony of John Irion (J. F. K. document No. 014930). FAA, vol. 4, Robey Report, p. 8—Edward W. Strubo advised Ferrie tried hypnosis on the students, p. 10 (J. F. K. document No. 014930); Robert E. Morrell said "he had seen David Ferrie use hypnosis."

(30) Interview of John Irion, Oct. 19, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 3 (J. F. K. document No. 012754); FAA, vol. 4, Robey Report, p. 8, FAA, vol. 4, report, Aug. 22, 1961, Jefferson Parish Police Department, Juvenile Division (J. F. K. document No. 014904).

(31) *Ibid.*, FAA, vol. 4, Robey Report, p. 10—Robert Morrell said Ferrie claimed he lost his hair in an experiment with cancer serum, p. 12; Al Landry said Ferrie told him the loss was due to a chemical explosion; Landry's father was told it was due to radiation (p. 13); Larry C. Adams thought it had been "lost in a chemical experiment."

(32) Synopsis of SBA hearing, Dr. Isadore Yager, p. 2 (J. F. K. Document 014930), and of David Ferrie, pp. 4-5. Ferrie admitted using "Dr." but for legitimate reasons. He claimed he had a Ph. D. degree from Phoenix University, Bari, Italy; vol. K, FAA file, ALPA SBA, D. W. Ferrie, 15-63-29-63, 48-63 (J. F. K. Document 014904) (EAL Exhibit 4a photocopy of telephone book with Ferrie listing).

(33) *Ibid.*, FAA, vol. 2, exhibit III, statement of cadet—"he was believed to be a medical doctor and a doctor of philosophy"; SBA hearing, testimony of Dr. Isadore Yager, synopsis, p. 2 (J. F. K. Document 014930).

(34) *Ibid.*, SBA hearing, Ferrie testimony synopsis, p. 4.

(35) FAA, vol. 2, exhibit III, p. 4 (J. F. K. Document 014904), statement of cadet—"Ferrie constantly preached to us on the subject of religion \* \* \* insisted we attend church \* \* \* and remember to pray."

(36) See SR-11-N-224, Dec. 19, 1962 (J. F. K. Document 014904)—although Ferrie denies applying for ordination to any church (SBA hearing, Ferrie testimony), he has shown such a desire since his youth. See FBI Report 52-109060-4595, Mar. 2, 1967, p. 1, interview of Carl John Stanley. "Archbishop of the Metropolitan Eastern Province, American Orthodox Catholic Church, told the FBI he consecrated Ferrie as bishop in July 1961 but deposed him in January 1962 when it was learned he had been discharged from his Eastern Airlines position because of homosexual activity." See also FAA, vol. 2, exhibit III, p. 4 (J. F. K. Document 014904), statement of cadet—"several times he (Ferrie) considered becoming a priest."

(37) SBA hearings, testimony of Ferrie synopsis, p. 4 (J. F. K. Document 014930).

(38) FBI report of SA E. Wall's and T. Viatel's interview of Ferrie, Nov. 27, 1963, 62-109060, supported Kennedy Civil Rights program.

(39) FAA, vol. 3 (J. F. K. Document 014904). Ferrie letter to Captain G. E. Greiner, Oct. 30, 1961, suggesting persecution of himself by Communists.



- (40) FBI report, interview of Joseph Lisman, Sept. 22, 1961.
- (41) Ibid.
- (42) Ibid.
- (43) Ibid.
- (44) Vol. K, FAA file, ALPA SBA, EAL Exhibit No. 7, D. W. Ferrie, 15-63, 29-63, 48-63, title of talk—"Cuba"—April 1961 Present, Future (J. F. K. Document 014904).
- (45) Ibid.
- (46) Ibid.
- (47) FBI report, Nov. 27, 1963, p. 199. Ferrie later admitted that after the Bay of Pigs invasion, he severely criticized President John F. Kennedy, both in public and in private. He said he had also been critical of any President riding in an open car and had made the statement that anyone could hide in the bushes and shoot a President. He denied, however, ever making a statement that Kennedy should be killed with the intention that this be done. FAA, vol. 4, p. 17, Robey report, interview of Charles Williams, IRS Agent (J. F. K. Document 014904).
- (48) Ibid.
- (49) Synopsis of SBA hearing, testimony of Cornelius Michael Kramer, p. 4 (J. F. K. Document 014930).
- (50) See ref. 11, FAA, vol. 2, exhibit GGG, SR 11-N-224, Jan. 25, 1963, p. 10 (J. F. K. Document 014904).
- (51) Ibid., FAA, vol. 4, attachment J. Ferrie application for employment for Eastern Airlines, Apr. 6, 1951.
- (52) Ibid., FAA, vol. 2, Jan. 25, 1963, p. 15.
- (53) Ibid., FAA, vol. 2, exhibit FFF, Dec. 19, 1962, p. 20.
- (54) Ibid.
- (55) Id. at p. 21.
- (56) Ibid.
- (57) Ibid., FAA, vol. 2, exhibit GGG, Jan. 25, 1963, pp. 13-14.
- (58) Ibid., FAA, vol. 3, exhibit SS, U.S. Civil Service Commission, report of record search, Sept. 29, 1961, for David Ferrie (gives military record).
- (59) Ibid., vol. K, FAA file, ALPA SBA, D. W. Ferrie, No. 1563, 29-63, 48-63, legal brief of Eastern Airlines grievance of David W. Ferrie, pp. 9-10.
- (60) Ibid., vol. R, EAL file, Ferrie, D. W., personnel records, June 15, 1951, transferred to New Orleans "due to domicile preference."
- (61) Ibid., FAA, vol. 4, attachment L, memo from J. H. Halliburton to Captain J. F. Gill, May 23, 1951; Eastern Airlines received derogatory information from retail credit bureau, May 21, 1951.
- (62) Ibid.; see also memo from J. F. Gill to Captain G. E. Thomas, June 26, 1951, attachment M; and memo from F. A. Stone to G. E. Thomas, July 5, 1951, attachment O.
- (63) Ibid., FAA, vol. 4, attachment Q: see also memo, July 13, 1951, from G. E. Thomas to Captain F. A. Stone—"I have had him with a couple of captains here and their reports are nothing but the best. They say he has excellent possibilities."
- (64) Ibid., Attachment P, handwritten note from "George" to Captain John on memo from J. H. Halliburton to Captain G. E. Greiner, July 6, 1959.
- (65) Ibid., FAA, vol. 4, attachment T, memo, Mar. 19, 1959, A. T. Thoruhill to Captain E. V. Rickenbacker.
- (66) Ibid., FAA, vol. 4, attachment H, letter, E. V. Rickenbacker to D. W. Ferrie, May 23, 1953. Rickenbacker had noted to the file, "This man's efforts bear watching and his qualifications justify his being used and helped whenever possible in line of duty—and even beyond."
- (67) Among the complaints against Ferrie: Ibid., FAA exhibit HHH, Sept. 7, 1960, letter to Ferrie from R. W. Tyler, acting regional counsel for Eastern, re: use of Ferrie's plane by student pilot carrying a passenger. Plane not properly certificated or registered: see ref. 11, SR-11-N-224, Nov. 19, 1962, regarding allowing use of rider pass to George Piazza, who Ferrie claimed was his "ward"; see also FAA, vol. 3, exhibit EE: FAA, vol. 3, exhibit II, memo to Captain P. L. Foster, Dec. 19, 1959, regarding a near miss of a mid-air collision, Nov. 24, 1959.
- (68) Ibid., SR-11-N-224, Dec. 19, 1962, exhibit FFF, p. 21.
- (69) FBI report No. 105-104-340-1, September 22, 1961, p. 4.
- (70) SR-11-N-224, Jan. 25, 1963, p. 15 (J. F. K. Document 014904).
- (70a) Ibid., FAA, vol. 3 exhibit YY, letter to Colonel D. H. Hass, Oct. 21, 1958, from Robert E. Morrell.

- (71) FBI report No. 105-104-340-1, Sept. 22, 1961, p. 4.
- (72) FAA, vol. 3, exhibit XX, letter, Oct. 21, 1958, Robert Morrell to Colonel D. Hass (J. F. K. Document 014904).
- (73) FBI report No. 105-104-340-1, Sept. 22, 1961, p. 4.
- (74) Synopsis of SBA hearing, testimony of John Irion (J. F. K. Document 014930); FAA, vol. 3, exhibit YY, letter, Oct. 21, 1978, from Robert Morrell to Colonel D. A. Hass (J. F. K. Document 014904).
- (75) *Ibid.*, FAA, vol. 4, Robey report, p. 9, attachment XX, the CAP Drill Team once went to Dallas, according to Bob Boyleston (HSCA Interview, Oct. 18, 1978). Ferrie made all the arrangements and appeared to have had contacts there. (Date of the alleged trip is unknown.) (J. F. K. Document 014904.)
- (76) FAA, vol. 4, pp. 14-15, Robey report, Interview of Ted Ahermathy. He said flight instructions and flight time were forbidden to CAP cadets (J. F. K. Document 014904).
- (77) Synopsis of SBA hearing, testimony of Ronald Hubner, synopsis p. 3 (J. F. K. Document 014930); see also FAA, vol. 2, exhibit III, statement of Cadet, p. 2 (J. F. K. Document 014904).
- (78) *Ibid.*, FAA, vol. 2, exhibit III, statement of Cadet, p. 2, Ferrie's house was a "center of operations for his group."
- (79) *Ibid.*, FAA, vol. 4, Robey Report: p. 10, interview of Robert Morrell.
- (80) SBA hearing, Aug. 8, 1963, testimony of James R. Lewallen, p. 8 (J. F. K. Document 014930).
- (81) See ref. 11, SR-11-N-224, Nov. 19, 1962, p. 21, interview of Spontenelli (J. F. K. Document 014904); FAA, vol. 2, exhibit III, statement of Cadet, p. 6, Ferrie "encouraged the boys to become priests if they felt inclined in that direction." FAA, vol. 4, Robey report, p. 11, Father Ward, priest—Ferrie called him up and started sending him CAP members expressing a desire to go into the priesthood: p. 13, Al Meister—Ferrie was instrumental in persuading him to go into the seminary.
- (82) Contact report, Layton Martens, May 25, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J. F. K. Document 008629); see also (J. F. K. Document 003287).
- (83) Synopsis of SBA hearings, testimony of John Espenan, father of Cadet (J. F. K. Document 014930); (See ref. 11, SR-11-N-224, Nov. 19, 1962, exhibit EEE, p. 9 (J. F. K. Document 014904)), *ibid.*, FAA, vol. 4, Robey report, p. 10, Interview of Colonel J. Ehrlicher.
- (84) Synopsis of SBA hearing, testimony of John R. Espenan, pp. 2-3 (J. F. K. Document 014930); testimony of David Ferrie, synopsis, p. 6; and see ref. 11, SR 11-N-224, Nov. 19, 1962, exhibit EEE, p. 9.
- (85) *Ibid.*, SR-11-N-224, vol. K, FAA file, ALBA SBA, D. W. Ferrie, 15-63, 29-63, 48-63, brief of EAL on grievance of Ferrie, p. 13.
- (86) *Ibid.*, FAA, vol. 2, exhibit GGG, Dec. 19, 1962, p. 6.
- (87) Synopsis of SBA. Hearing. Testimony of Ferrie, testimony of John Ernest Irion (J. F. K. Document 014930); FAA, vol. 4, Robey report, p. 14 (J. F. K. Document 014904).
- (88) *Ibid.*, FAA, vol. 4, attachment I, Oct. 30, 1961, FBI report; and ref. 11, SR-11-N-224, Dec. 19, 1962, p. 7. While would-be members claimed approaches were made to them to join the group, Banister testified there never was such a group by that name (SBA hearing, Banister testimony).
- (89) *Ibid.*
- (90a) Secret Service Report, Dec. 13, 1963, No. CO-2-34, 030, p. 4—traveled to San Antonio, Corpus Christi, Brownsville (J. F. K. Document 003840).
- (91) FAA, vol. 3, exhibit FF, memo to C. J. Simons from S. J. Minnisale, Aug. 14, 1959 (J. F. K. Document 014904).
- (92) *Ibid.*
- (93) *Ibid.*
- (94) FAA, vol. 3, letter to Captain G. E. Greicher, Oct. 30, 1961, from Ferrie (J. F. K. Document 014904).
- (95) See ref. 82, FAA, vol. 4, Robey report, attachment I, FBI report, Oct. 30, 1961, interview of Ferrie, Aug. 22, 1961, p. 4 (J. F. K. Document 014904); FAA file, ALPA SBA, D. W. Ferrie, 15-63, 29-63, 48-63; EAL EXH: Juvenile Bureau Report, Aug. 18, 1961, item No. H8507-61, p. 2.
- (96) *Ibid.*, FBI report, Aug. 22, 1961. Note: It was also reported that Ferrie had applied for a visa to Venezuela on Nov. 15, 1961, which request was denied.

Ferrie had also applied for a passport. His purpose is unknown. FAA, vol. 5, attachment QQ.

(97) *Ibid.* The submarines were found in a Sept. 22, 1961 search of Ferrie's house. Also discovered among Ferrie's effects were: a Morse code key, four model 1903 Springfield rifles, two .22 caliber rifles, one rifle, a flare gun, .38 caliber revolver, a sword, a quantity of ammunition, three maps (of Havana Harbor, the coast of Cuba, West Indies, Cuba and North Coast), plus the two submarines. FAA, vol. 4, attachments F through I. Ferrie said he purchased the guns at the Crescent Gun Shop, New Orleans.

(98) Interview of Carlos Quiroga, June 2, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, attached material. See also FBI report 62-109060. FOIA materials, interview of Quiroga by the New Orleans District Attorney's office (J. F. K. Document 008846).

(99) FAA, vol. 4, Robey report, p. 12. Michael Finney said Ferrie had been training Cuban pilots in the New Orleans area (J. F. K. Document 014904).

(100) Interview of John Irion, Oct. 28, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J. F. K. Document 012754); see ref. 30.

(101) FBI teletype, May 7, 1967, to Director from New Orleans, 62-109060-5237.

(102) FAA, vol. 4, attachment I, FBI report, Oct. 30, 1961, New Orleans, Los Angeles, for David William Ferrie (J. F. K. Document 014904).

(103) FBI 62-109060, copy of New Orleans district attorney's interview with Carlos Quiroga, 1968; see also statement of Herbert R. Wagner of Herb Wagner Finance Service, Dec. 6, 1967, indicating that Ferrie assisted Arcacha Smith in obtaining a loan (J. F. K. Document 000834).

(104) FAA, Vol. 5, exhibit BB, July 18, 1961, letter from Arcacha Smith to Captain Eddie V. Rickenbacker (J. F. K. Document 014904).

*Ibid.*, FAA, Vol. 5, exhibit CC, letter to Arcacha Smith from J. P. Halliburton, Aug. 1, 1961.

(105) *Ibid.*, EAL file, Ferrie, D. W., vacation information form, Apr. 17, 1961. Request for leave for period April 16-31, 1961. The Bay of Pigs invasion began April 17, 1961.

(106) Staff review of CIA file for Sergio Arcacha Smith, May 1, 1978. Office of Security, memo from Raymond G. Rocca, May 31, 1961, item F; also, memo from Donovan E. Pratt, Sept. 28, 1967, items A, B, and C, regarding Arcacha Smith. The Sept. 28, 1967 Pratt memo also found in Office of Security file for David W. Ferrie. One local office did believe the group had the "unofficial sanction of CIA"—Lieutenant Martello, p. 10, 11-N-224, Dec. 19, 1962, Exhibit FFF (J. F. K. Document 014904).

(107) *Ibid.*, SR-11-N-224, Nov. 19, 1963, p. 14; synopsis of SBA hearing, Ferrie testimony, p. 7 (J. F. K. Document 014930).

(108) *Ibid.*

(109) See ref. 11, SR-11-N-224, Nov. 19, 1963, p. 14.

(110) SBA hearings, testimony of Roland P. Fournier, re: Ferrie involvement in Alexander Landry and Albert Cheramie cases, pp. 1 and 2.

(111) *Ibid.*; and vol. K, FAA file, ALPA SBA, D. W. Ferrie, No. 15-63, 29-63, 48-63, EAL exhibit, insert No. 1, Juvenile Bureau report, Aug. 18, 1961, item H-8507-01, p. 6.

(112) *Ibid.*, FAA, vol. D, vol. 4, attachment C, investigative results—Jefferson Parish Police Juvenile Division, Aug. 29, 1961, Ferrie "suspected of harboring the juvenile and also encouraging him to run away from home"; ALPA No. 48-63, letter from William G. Bell to Capt. V. O. Rowland, May 2, 1963; and vol. K, FAA file, ALPA SBA, D. W. Ferrie, 15-63, 29-63, 48-63, EAL exhibit, insert No. 1, juvenile bureau report, Aug. 18, 1961, item No. H-8507-61.

(113) See ref. 11, SR-11-N-224, Nov. 19, 1962, exhibit EEE, p. 3, from the Louisiana State Police criminal record for David W. Ferrie, ALPA No. 48-63, letter from Bell to Rowland, May 2, 1963.

(114) *Ibid.*, ALPA file No. 48-63, letter from William Bell to Capt. V. G. Rowland, May 2, 1963; FAA file, ALPA SBA, D. W. Ferrie, 15-63, 29-63, 48-63, EAL exhibit, insert No. 1, juvenile bureau report, Aug. 18, 1961, item No. H-8507-61, p. 4.

(115) *Ibid.*, SR-11-N-224, Nov. 19, 1962, exhibit EEE, p. 3, from Louisiana State Police records for David W. Ferrie, news article, Times-Picayune, New Orleans, La., Aug. 22, 1961, attachment B; FAA, vol. 4; FAA, vol. 4, attachment C, Jefferson Parish Police Department investigative report.

(116) Ibid., SR-11-N-224, Dec. 19, 1962, exhibit FFF, p. 10. Lieutenant Martello, pp. 9-10; Secret Service interview of Arnesto Rodriguez, Dec. 9, 1963, by SA's Gerrets and Rice (J. F. K. Document 003759).

(117) Synopsis of SBA hearing, testimony of Sgt. Roland P. Fournier, New Orleans Police—juvenile bureau (J. F. K. Document 014930).

(118) FAA, vol. 4, attachment C, investigative report of Jefferson Parish, Police Department, New Orleans, Aug. 22, 1961 (J. F. K. Document 014904).

(119) Ibid., FAA, vol. 3, exhibit HH, Aug. 26, 1961. Eastern Airlines to FAA informing them Ferrie had been removed from the payroll; and exhibit JJ, Aug. 29, 1961, Greiner to Ferrie.

(120) Ibid., FAA, vol. 4, exhibit A, case of "Good Moral Character," opened Sept. 8, 1961, by Richard E. Robey, summary of the report; and FAA, vol. 3, exhibit KK, Eastern Airlines opened investigation also.

(121) Synopsis of SBA hearings, testimony of David Ferrie (J. F. K. Document 014930).

(122) See ref. 11, SR-11-N-224, Nov. 19, 1962, p. 6 (J. F. K. Document 014904).

(123) Ibid., EAL file, grievances of David W. Ferrie, Aug. 5, 1963, vol. 3, testimony of Banister, p. 840.

(124) Ibid., p. 825.

(125) Ibid., p. 855.

(126) Ibid., p. 855.

(127) Ibid., p. 840; see also staff summary of FBI file for Guy Banister, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J. F. K. Document 012799).

(128) Guy Banister file, Garrison papers, Aug. 14, 1977 (J. F. K. Document 100189).

(129) Staff summary of FBI file for Guy Banister, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J. F. K. Document 012799). (Note: Banister explained before the airline pilots board about his work with "Arcacha Smith and others." Banister said, "I had high-ranking Cuban refugees in my office asking me how to go underground and I gave them diagrams for that. I have talked to military and political leaders from the various provinces of Cuba that have slipped out and slipped back." Vol. 5, EAL file, grievances of David W. Ferrie, Aug. 5, 1963, vol. 3, testimony of Banister, p. 841 (J. F. K. Document 014904).

(130) Secret Service file No. CO-2-34, 030, Dec. 3, 1963, SA. A. Vial, p. 14, regarding telephone interview of Sam Newman.

(131) Interview of Jack Martin, Dec. 5 and Dec. 6, 1977. House Select Committee on Assassinations (J. F. K. Document 005212 and 005213); and interview of Sam Newman, Mar. 2, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J. F. K. Document 005962).

(132) See ref. 131, Martin interview, Dec. 5, 1977; and Martin interview, Dec. 6, 1977.

(133) Synopsis of SBA hearing, Ferrie testimony, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 5-6 (J. F. K. Document 014930).

(134) FAA, vol. 1, correspondence from Jack Martin (J. F. K. Document 014904).

(135) Ibid., SR 11-N-224, Dec. 19, 1962, p. 14.

(136) Ibid.

(137) Ibid.

(138) Ibid.

(139) Ibid., ALPA No. 48-63, letter from G. Wray Gill to Capt. George Greiner, Jan. 8, 1963.

(140) Ibid., FAA, vol. 3, exhibit KK, letter from Capt. Greiner to Ferrie, Sept. 1, 1961.

(141) Ibid., FAA, vol. 3, exhibit LL, letter from Ferrie to Capt. Greiner, Sept. 5, 1961.

(142) Ibid., FAA, vol. 2, exhibit AAA, letter of Eric Michael Crouchet to FAA, Oct. 22, 1962.

(143) Ibid. Among those who intervened on Ferrie's behalf were Congressmen Morrison and Long, old friends of G. Wray Gill. (See ALPA No. 48-63, letter from William G. Bell to J. O. Jarvard, May 2, 1963) (J. F. K. Document 014904).

(144) Ibid., ALPA No. 48-63, letter from EAL, Apr. 11, 1963 to Ferrie, grievance No. 15-63, filed Jan. 21, 1963.

(145) Ibid., vol. K, FAA file, ALPA SBA, D. W. Ferrie, 15-63, 29-63, 48-63, minutes of meeting, Feb. 18, 1963, Miami.

(146) Ibid.

(147) *Ibid.*, grievance No. 29-63, filed Feb. 18, 1963, and grievance No. 48-63, filed Feb. 13, 1963; ALPA No. 29-63, June 4, 1963, to J. B. Railsback from Charles H. Ruby, Airline Pilots Association; letter from Ferrie to EAL, Feb. 15, 1963, in ALPA 29-63.

(148) *Ibid.*, see ALPA files for correspondence; ALPA No. 29-63, ALPA file No. 48-63, letter to Capt. J. T. Robertson from J. B. Railsback, ALPA 45-62, and letter to D. W. Ferrie from R. W. Rivenbark.

(149) Interview of Vernon Goerdes regarding Louise Decker, Feb. 15, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J. F. K. Document 005807); interview of Carlos Quiroga, Feb. 22, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J. F. K. Document 006190); and ref. 131, Martin interview, Dec. 5, 1977.

(150) Vol. S—miscellaneous, letter to Capt. George W. Youngerman et al., from J. B. Railsback, EAL Pilots System Board of Adjustment, July 8, 1963 (J. F. K. Document 014904).

(151) *Ibid.*, vol. T, EAL file, grievances of David W. Ferrie, Miami, transcript of hearing, July 15, 16, 17, 1963, vol. I.

(152) *Ibid.*, vol. K, FAA file, ALPA SBA, D. W. Ferrie, 15-63, 29-63, 48-63, brief of EAL on grievance of David W. Ferrie, pp. 9-10.

(153) *Ibid.*, vol. U, EAL file, grievances of David W. Ferrie, Miami transcript of hearing, vol. II.

(154) *Ibid.*, vol. V, EAL file, grievances of David W. Ferrie, transcript of hearing, Aug. 5, 1963, vol. 3, pp. 461-743.

(155) *Ibid.*, vol. K, FAA file, ALPA SBA, D. W. Ferrie, 15-63, 29-63, 48-63, brief of EAL on grievances for David Ferrie, p. 10 (ALPA Exhibit 24).

(156) *Ibid.*, vol. V, EAL file, grievances of David W. Ferrie, Aug. 5, 1963, vol. 3, testimony, pp. 856-857.

(157) *Ibid.*, pp. 842, 858.

(158) *Ibid.*, p. 8.

(159) *Ibid.*, FAA, vol. 4, Robey report, p. 17, July 30, 1963, attachment DDD, letter from William G. Bell; vol. M, EAL file, D. W. Ferrie, ALPA 15-63, filed Jan. 21, 1963, decision of the board, Sept. 25, 1963.

(160) *Ibid.*, vol. M, EAL file, D. W. Ferrie, ALPA 14-63, filed Jan. 21, 1963, decision of the board, Sept. 25, 1963. (Note: Ferrie was awarded \$1,635.90 in full settlement of all claims. See memo from T. J. Kennedy to Capt. C. F. Hamner, Oct. 11, 1963, Ferrie, D. W., file.)

(161) FBI report, interview of David W. Ferrie, Dec. 5, 1963.

(162) FAA, vol. 1, attachment L. Ferrie was reportedly fired from his job with Space Airfreight following complaints by FAA officials that operations under Ferrie's direction were not being carried out according to FAA regulations (J. F. K. document 014904).

(163) FBI Report 92-10976-2, Nov. 27, 1968, pp. 1-4.

(164) Staff summary of Immigration and Naturalization Service file for David Ferrie, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J. F. K. document 012305).

(165) *Ibid.*

(166) *Ibid.*; FAA vol. 4, Robey report, attachment I, FBI report, Aug. 22, 1961, interview of David Ferrie (J. F. K. document 014904).

(167) FBI report, interview of Carlos Quiroga by New Orleans District Attorney's Office, 1968.

(168) *Ibid.*

(169) Staff summary of FBI file for Sergio Arcacha Smith, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J. F. K. document 004110).

(170) Outside contact report, House Select Committee on Assassinations, Mar. 13, 1979 (J. F. K. document 014933).

(171) *Ibid.*

(172) *Ibid.*

(173) *Ibid.*

(174) FBI report, interview of G. Wray Gill, Sr., p. 2.

(175) FBI report, interview of David Ferrie, Nov. 26, 1963, p. 3.

(176) *Ibid.*

(177) *Ibid.*

(178) Receipt of purchase, Oct. 16, 1978 (J. F. K. document 012523).

(179) FBI report, interview of David Ferrie, Nov. 26, 1963, p. 3.

(180) *Ibid.*

(181) Guy Banister file, item GB-2. Garrison papers, New Orleans Police report, Nov. 22, 1963 (J. F. K. Document 001986). Note: There are conflicting reports as to why Banister attacked Martin. Martin has told the committee that it was over

a remark he (Martin) had made in jest about the Kennedy assassination. Banister's secretary, Delphine Roberts, who was also present, told the committee the two men came to blows when Martin tried to remove certain files from the office (see interview of Jack Martin, Feb. 15, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 3 (J. F. K. Document 000212) and interview of Delphine Roberts, July 6, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 3 (J. F. K. Document 009978)). The original police report referenced above indicates Banister and Martin were engaged "in various discussions about personal and political subjects" when the matter of the long-distance telephone calls came up and the conversation grew heated.

- (182) Ibid.
- (183) FBI interview of G. Wray Gill, Nov. 27, 1963, p. 219. SA J. Smith; FBI teletype, Nov. 26, 1963, to SAC Dallas and Director from SAC, New Orleans, pp. 2-3, 7, and 15.
- (184) Ibid.
- (185) Ibid., pp. 2-4 and 7-8; letter from Jack Martin to Richard Robey, FAA investigator, Nov. 25, 1963, FAA. vol. 4 (J. F. K. Document 014904).
- (186) FBI report, Nov. 25, 1963, interview of Layton Martens, St. Hoverson, p. 2 (p. 302).
- (187) FBI report, Nov. 25, 1963, interview of Alvin Beauboeuf by SA Scheffer (p. 307).
- (188) FBI report, interview of Layton Martens, Nov. 27, 1963, SA Hoverson, p. 2 (p. 303).
- (189) Ibid.
- (190) FBI teletype, Nov. 26, 1963, to Director from SAC, New Orleans, p. 16.
- (191) Ibid., Secret Service report, Dec. 13, 1963, CO-2-34, 030, p. 4 (J. F. K. Document 003840).
- (192) FBI teletype, Nov. 26, 1963, to Director from SAC New Orleans, pp. 11-17; Secret Service report, Dec. 13, 1963, CO-2-34-030, p. 3 (J. F. K. Document 003840).
- (193) FBI teletype, Nov. 26, 1963, to Director from SAC New Orleans, pp. 12-13; statement by David W. Ferrie in FBI file, p. 580, No. 44-2064, Dec. 10, 1963.
- (194) FBI teletype, Nov. 26, 1963, to Director from SAC New Orleans, p. 13; FBI interview of G. Wray Gill, Nov. 27, 1963.
- (195) FBI interview of David Ferrie, Nov. 26, 1963, No. 89-69, pp. 3-4. Ferrie's activities for the period Nov. 22-25, 1963 are described in detail in this report; see also FBI interview of Melvin Coffey, Nov. 30, 1963, New Orleans, SA E. Wall.
- (196) FBI report, No. 62-109060-2143, Dec. 18, 1963.
- (197) FBI report, No. 62-109060-2143, Dec. 18, 1963, p. 1, interview of Lee Fletcher.
- (198) Ibid.
- (199) Ibid.
- (200) FBI report, No. 62-109060-2143, Dec. 18, 1963, p. 1, interview of Chuck Rolland. Ferrie called ahead on Nov. 22, 1963, arrived Nov. 23, 1963 between 3:30 and 5:30, did not discuss operating rink as Ferrie had suggested he would.
- (201) FBI teletype, Nov. 26, 1963, to Director from SAC, New Orleans, p. 14.
- (202) FBI report, No. 62-109060-2143, Dec. 18, 1963, p. 2.
- (203) FBI report, No. 62-109060-2143, Dec. 18, 1963, p. 1.
- (204) FBI report, No. 62-109060-2143, Dec. 18, 1963, p. 2. Hotel registration card No. 38063; checked in 11 p.m., Nov. 23, 1963; checked out Nov. 24, 1963. Mrs. Shirley Dial, clerk at the Driftwood Motor Hotel, recalled three individuals checked out at around 10 a.m. on Nov. 24, 1963.
- (205) FBI report, No. 109060-2143, Dec. 18, 1963, five calls made from Alamotel, Houston, and one call made from Driftwood Motor Hotel, Galveston.
- (206) FBI report, No. 62-109060-2143, Dec. 18, 1963, p. 1.
- (207) FBI report, No. 62-109060-2143, Dec. 18, 1963, p. 1—indicated Ferrie called 947-6435 in New Orleans collect.
- (208) Deposition of Mrs. Jesse Garner, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 34. Note: While Mrs. Garner believes it was the night of the assassination, it would appear, given that Ferrie left New Orleans that evening, that Ferrie may have come by her house on a later date.
- (209) Ibid.
- (210) Ferrie file, Item DF-7, Mar. 11, 1968, Garrison file (J. F. K. Document 008840).
- (211) FBI report, Nov. 27, 1963, interview of Roy, p. 212, McCoy 105-82555-10, SA Callendel.

### XIII. 544 CAMP STREET AND RELATED EVENTS

(460) On August 9, 1963, Lee Harvey Oswald was arrested on Canal Street in New Orleans and charged with disturbing the peace. (1) The arrest was the result of a confrontation with anti-Castro Cuban exile Carlos Bringuier and two of his associates, Miguel Cruz and Celso Hernandez. (2) Oswald was handing out pro-Castro leaflets (3) when Bringuier, Hernandez and Cruz approached him. (4) When Hernandez tried to take the leaflets from Oswald, a shouting match began; (5) the New Orleans police then intervened, arresting all four individuals. (6) (461) Samples of Oswald's literature were confiscated by the police. (7) One of the pamphlets bore the hand-stamped imprint of an address for the pro-Castro Fair Play for Cuba Committee—of which Oswald was the president and only member in New Orleans—as "544 Camp Street, New Orleans, La." (8)

(462) This pamphlet was among the materials turned over by the New Orleans police department to the Secret Service following the assassination. (9) The Secret Service and the FBI then set out to investigate the 544 Camp Street address. (10) These agencies established several facts:

(463) The address had been stamped with a home printing kit in the same manner Oswald had stamped other literature with his alias "A. J. Hidell" or "L. H. Oswald," (11) indicating it was by Oswald's own hand that the 544 Camp Street address was printed on the pamphlet. (464) It was learned also that Oswald had written to the national president of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, Vincent T. Lee, on August 1, 1963, 8 days before his arrest. (12) In the letter, Oswald mentioned he had rented an office for his local FPCC chapter, but was told to vacate after 3 days because the building was to be remodeled. (13)

(465) The FBI and the Secret Service investigation apparently focused on whether or not Oswald actually had rented an office at the 544 Camp Street address. (14)

(466) In interviews with the FBI and the Secret Service, the building owner, Sam Newman, denied renting an office to Oswald. (45) Others renting office space at 544 Camp Street were questioned, but none recalled seeing Oswald at the Newman Building or elsewhere in New Orleans. (16)

(467) During the course of that investigation, however, the Secret Service received information that an office in the Newman Building had been rented to the Cuban Revolutionary Council from October 1961 through February 1962. (17) Leaders of the CRC were contacted and asked if they had any association with or knowledge of Oswald or the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. (18) The Cubans said they had none because they had vacated the building 15 months prior to Oswald's appearance in New Orleans. (19)

(468) The investigation of a possible connection between Oswald and the 544 Camp Street address was closed. (20) The Warren Commission findings concurred with the Secret Service report that no additional evidence had been found to indicate Oswald ever maintained an office at the 544 Camp Street address. (21)

(469) The committee investigated the possibility of a connection between Oswald and 544 Camp Street and developed evidence pointing to a different result.

(470) The committee learned that the Newman Building occupied the corner lot facing Lafayette Square. On one side its address was 544 Camp Street. (22) Its other entrance was addressed 531 Lafayette Street. (23) It was a three-story granite structure owned and operated by Sam Newman as a rental income property for commercial offices. (24).

(471) The committee interviewed Sam Newman and other witnesses to obtain a complete list of the occupants of the building for the period from May 1963, when Oswald arrived in New Orleans, to September 1963, when he departed.

(472) Newman told the committee he had great difficulty renting space in the building. (25) Consequently, there were few tenants there in the summer of 1963. The Camp Street address was the main entrance to offices for two workers' associations: the Hotel, Motel, and Restaurant Workers' Union and the Amalgamated Association of Street Electric Railway and Motor Coach Employees of America. (26) It was also the entrance that led to the quarters of the building's janitor, James Arthus. (27) There was only one office at the Lafayette Street address, that of Guy Banister Associates, a private investigative firm. (28) The offices once rented by the Cuban Revolutionary Council at 544 Camp Street still lay empty. (29) "Mancuso's," a small coffee shop, was located on the ground floor with its own entrance onto the corner of Camp and Lafayette Streets. (30)

(473) The committee located and interviewed individuals associated with these organizations. Whenever possible, the committee obtained relevant records from the organizations to check for any link to Oswald or persons implicated in the assassination investigation. The committee investigation produced no evidence of any connection between Oswald and any person or organizations occupying the Newman Building in 1963, except for that involving Guy Banister's private detective agency.

(474) Before discussion of the investigation of the Banister office, this material sets forth the results of the investigation into the other occupants of 544 Camp Street.

(475) The Hotel, Motel, and Restaurant Employees Union is known today as the Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders' Union (International). (31) Although the committee was unable to locate personnel who had worked in the office at 544 Camp Street and had been interviewed by the Secret Service following the assassination, the committee did obtain a "master" membership list from the union. (32) The lists contained names of members for the years 1962 through 1964 that were studied for names of associates of Oswald or others of interest in the investigation. Among the names appearing on the list as a member from October 30, 1962, "through April 1963" was Kerry



Thornley, (33) who had been an acquaintance of Oswald's for "3 or 4 months" in 1959 when both were stationed at the El Toro Marine Corps base in Santa Ana, Calif. (34) Later, Thornley learned of Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union from newspaper accounts. (35) Thornley found the story so interesting that he set out to write a novel based on Oswald's defection. (36)

(476) Nevertheless, the committee's investigation of Kerry Thornley uncovered nothing of significance in the appearance of Thornley's name on the list of members of the union. As reflected in the union's records, Thornley dropped his membership after April 1963. (37) Thornley had left New Orleans to travel to California and Mexico and did not return to New Orleans until August 1963, (38) leaving little overlap of time in which Oswald and Thornley could have possibly come in contact.

(477) Thornley firmly denied contact with Oswald at 544 Camp Street in New Orleans or at any time since his Marine Corps days. (39) His statements have been corroborated and no evidence has been found to contradict him.

(478) The committee also located and interviewed George S. Gay, present president of the Amalgamated Association of Street Electric Railway and Motor Employees of America. (40) Gay has been president of the union since 1960 (41) and confirmed for the committee that the union's office was located in the Newman Building in 1963. (42) While Gay reiterated what he had told Secret Service agents, that he did not recall ever seeing Oswald in the building, (43) he told the committee he was not in the office very much due to frequent business trips. (44) He said he did not mingle with the other tenants in the building. (45) Gay believed the union's secretary at the time, Mrs. Eugenia Donnelly, would have more information about others in the Newman Building. (46) Subsequent attempts to locate Donnelly proved futile and she was believed deceased. (47) Unfortunately, she was not questioned by investigating officials following the assassination of President Kennedy.

(479) Jack Mancuso, owner of Mancuso's Coffee Shop located on the ground floor of the Newman Building, was interviewed by committee investigators and questioned about his customers. (48) Mancuso recalled that Guy Banister and his associates Jack Martin and David Ferrie were "steady" customers, but Mancuso could not personally recall ever having seen Oswald. (49) Mancuso was not interviewed by FBI or Secret Service agents following the assassination. (50)

(480) James Arthus was interviewed by Secret Service agents immediately following the assassination. (51) He told the agents that an unknown man had attempted to rent an office at 544 Camp Street, but that he had discouraged him. (52) Arthus could not describe the man and recommended the agents speak with "Mrs. Downing," presumed to be Mrs. Donnelly, since she had also seen the man and could possibly provide a description of him. (53) As pointed out above, Mrs. Donnelly was not interviewed by either the Secret Service or the FBI on this matter. The committee learned that Arthus died in 1967. (54)

(481) The FBI and the Secret Service apparently failed to question all the occupants of 544 Camp Street, including a witness who may have had information about a man who had attempted to rent space

there. While the FBI did speak to Guy Banister, there is no indication from the report of that interview that Banister was asked any questions about Oswald. Instead, he was asked about Serigo Arcacha Smith and the Cuban Revolutionary Council. (55)

(482) The overall investigation of the 544 Camp Street issue at the time of the assassination was not thorough. It is not surprising, then, that significant links were never discovered during the original investigation. The committee concentrated on an investigation of the activities and individuals in and around the office of Guy Banister, since this was the area of the least investigation in the days following the assassination. Various resources were consulted by the committee for information regarding Banister and his colleagues. These included: original documents from Banister's office collected during the 1967-69 investigation into the Kennedy assassination by the New Orleans District Attorney; investigative reports of the district attorney's office dating from that investigation; materials amassed during the 1961-63 investigation of David Ferrie by Federal Aviation Administration officials including transcripts of Ferrie's grievance hearings; information obtained from Aaron Kohn of the Metropolitan Crime Commission of New Orleans; and information obtained from reviews of relevant files of the FBI, Secret Service, DOD and CIA. In addition, the committee interviewed several surviving witnesses, many of whom had worked for or with Guy Banister.

(483) According to one of Banister's own biographical sketches dated March 1964, he was born in a log cabin in rural Louisiana in 1901, the eldest of 7 children. (56) He started his career in criminal justice with the police department of Monroe, La. (57) In 1934, he became a special agent for the agency of the Department of Justice that was soon to be named the Federal Bureau of Investigation. (58) Banister served in the FBI for 20 years, 17 of those years as special agent in charge. (59) He retired in 1954 to become assistant superintendent for the New Orleans Police Department and was assigned the task of investigating police corruption. (60) After a falling out with the mayor of New Orleans, allegedly over Banister's attempt to have the mayor indicted on charges of "malfeasance, etc.," Banister quit public service and formed his own private detective agency, Guy Banister Associates, Inc. (61)

(484) According to FBI files reviewed by committee staff, Banister also became excessively active in anti-Communist activities after his separation from the FBI and testified before various investigating bodies about the dangers of communism. (62) The CIA file on Guy Banister indicated the agency considered in September 1960 using Guy Banister Associates for the collection of foreign intelligence, but ultimately decided against it (63), for several reasons. (64) Early in 1961, Banister helped draw up a charter for the Friends of Democratic Cuba, an organization set up as the fundraising arm of Sergio Arcacha Smith's branch of the Cuban Revolutionary Council. (65) Banister described his work for the Council:

Our work was primarily to gather food and clothing for the refugees. However because of my being known in con-

nection with that, [and] my background being known with Arcacha Smith and others, I have had high-ranking Cuban refugees in my office asking me how to go underground, and I gave them diagrams for that. I have talked to military and political leaders from the various provinces of Cuba that have slipped out and slipped back. (66)

(485) The FBI files also indicate Banister was performing another service for the Cuban exile group. He ran background investigations on those Cuban students on the campus of Louisiana State University who wished to be members of Arcacha Smith's anti-Castro group, ferreting out any pro-Castro sympathizers who might be among them. (67) Banister also talked Sam Newman into leasing 544 Camp Street to the Cuban Revolutionary Council. (68)

(486) It was probably a result of such anti-Castro activities that Banister became acquainted with David Ferrie. Ferrie, an Eastern Airlines pilot, was also extremely active in Sergio Arcacha Smith's anti-Castro group. (69) Ferrie shared Banister's anti-Communist and anti-Castro fervor. (70)

(487) Both Ferrie and Banister were implicated in a raid in late 1961 against a munitions depot in Houma, La., in which various weapons, grenades and ammunition were stolen. (71) Banister's role may have been limited to storing the materiel which was reportedly seen stacked in Banister's back room by several witnesses. (72) Others who actually participated in the raid, include Andrew Blackmon, a Ferrie associate and former Civil Air Patrol cadet, and Sergio Arcacha Smith. (73)

(488) In February 1962, Ferrie requested Banister's assistance in fighting his recent dismissal from Eastern Airlines. (74) Banister investigated the case for Ferrie's defense to charges brought by the airline and local New Orleans police of crimes against nature and extortion. (75) In exchange, Ferrie provided Banister research services, such as analysis of autopsy reports. (76) Banister worked with Ferrie's lawyer, G. Wray Gill, on this matter until its culmination in Ferrie's hearing before the Airline Pilot's grievance board in the summer of 1963. (77) Banister testified on Ferrie's behalf during those hearings. (78) According to the statements of witnesses in the fall of 1963, Ferrie and Banister worked together again with G. Wray Gill for the defense of New Orleans organized crime head Carlos Marcello on a deportation case. (79) Little is known of Banister's exact contribution to that investigation which ended in acquittal on the day and at almost the precise hour that President Kennedy was shot. (80)

(489) The long-standing relationship of Ferrie and Banister is significant since Ferrie became a suspect in the Kennedy assassination soon after it had occurred. (81) The information to the district attorney's office that had put the spotlight on Ferrie had emanated from Banister associate, Jack Martin. (82) As detailed elsewhere in this staff report, although Ferrie was cleared of suspicion in the assassination during the original investigation, the committee found evidence of a possible association between Ferrie and Oswald.

(490) Although Banister was questioned by the FBI following the assassination in regard to the activities of the CRC at 544 Camp Street,

the FBI and the Secret Service failed to discover the significance of Banister's connection to 544 Camp Street; Banister's close association with a suspect in the assassination, David Ferrie; and Banister's close association with Ferrie's accuser, Jack Martin—all of which raised the question of what, if anything, was Banister's relationship to Lee Harvey Oswald.

(491) Witnesses interviewed by the committee indicate Banister was aware of Oswald and his Fair Play for Cuba Committee before the assassination. Banister's brother, Ross Banister, who is employed by the Louisiana State Police, told the committee that his brother had mentioned seeing Oswald hand out Fair Play for Cuba literature on one occasion. (83) Ross Banister theorized Oswald had used the 544 Camp Street address on his literature to embarrass Guy. (84) Ross Banister did confirm Guy's interest in the assassination and Oswald, but knew of no direct association between Oswald and Banister.

(492) Ivan E. "Bill" Nitschke, a friend and business associate and former FBI agent, (85) corroborates that Banister was cognizant of Oswald's leaflet distributing. Nitschke was deposed by the committee in July 1978. (86) He testified that he had known Banister when they were both in the FBI and for a short time worked for Banister in the office in the Newman Building. (87)

(493) Nitschke said he never saw Lee Harvey Oswald at 544 Camp Street and does not know if Banister ever met Oswald. (88) Nevertheless, Nitschke recalls that Banister became "interested in Oswald" during the summer of 1963 when Oswald had been distributing handbills. (89) Nitschke recalls Banister had some of these handbills in his office or made reference to them. (90) From the context of the conversation, however, he was not pleased. (91)

(494) Delphine Roberts, Banister's long-time friend and secretary, stated to the committee that Banister had become extremely angry with James Arthus and Sam Newman over Oswald's use of the 544 Camp Street address on his handbills. (92)

(495) The committee questioned Sam Newman regarding Roberts' allegation. Newman could not recall ever seeing Oswald or renting space to him. (93) He did recall, however, asking a young man who was in the office once used by the Cuban Revolutionary Council to leave. (94) Newman did not think this person was Oswald. (95) Newman theorized that if Oswald was using the 544 Camp Street address and had any link to the building, it would have been through a connection to the Cuban Revolutionary Council or Banister's office. (96)

(496) The committee questioned other individuals once affiliated with Guy Banister, including: Joseph Newbrough and Vernon Gerdes, investigators who had worked with Banister in 1963; (97) Mary Helen Bregel, one of two secretaries in Banister's office from approximately June 1963 to December 1963; (98) Louise Decker, a secretary in Banister's office for the period from October 1961 to January 1962; (99) Joseph Oster, one time partner of Banister's who set up his own private detective agency, Southern Research, in 1958; (100) and Carlos Quiroga, the Cuban exile who visited Oswald at his home on approximately August 16, 1963, endeavoring to learn more about the FPCC. (101) Quiroga told the committee he frequently visited Banister's office and Mancuso's coffee shop in the company of Sergio Arcacha Smith and

David Ferrie when all were heavily involved in Cuban exile activities. (102) Yet this would have been in 1961 and 1962. (103) None of these individuals recalled seeing Oswald at 544 Camp Street. Several witnesses recommended the committee speak with Jack Martin or Delphine Roberts since they were in most contact with Banister. (104)

(497) Martin and Roberts have both been interviewed by the committee on several occasions. Roberts, who initially refused to speak with the committee staff, told the committee she was very active in anti-Communist activities in the early 1960's. (105) She said she worked with Banister as a volunteer typing correspondence, making files and clipping newspapers because Banister was working for what Roberts believed in. (106) Roberts claimed Banister had an extensive file on Communists and fellow travelers, including one on Lee Harvey Oswald, which was kept out of the original files because Banister "never got around to assigning a number to it." (107) Roberts did not remember what was in the file other than that it contained general information on Oswald such as newspaper clippings. (108) Roberts also related the incident described previously in this section in which Banister became angry over Oswald's use of the Camp Street address. (109) Roberts gave the committee her version of an incident that took place late in the evening on the day of the assassination. She said Jack Martin came into the office and approached the area of the office where the files were kept, when Banister walked in. (110) Banister accused Martin of stealing several files and hiding them in his coat. (111) When Martin protested, Banister pulled out his gun and struck Martin on the head, causing him to bleed. (112) Both men then went into Banister's private office and continued their discussion beyond Roberts' earshot. (113)

(498) During another interview, Roberts told the committee that Oswald came into the office seeking employment and sometime later brought Marina in with him. (114) Contrary to her statements in the initial interview, that she had never seen Oswald, she stated that she saw Oswald come into Banister's office on several occasions. (115) Because of such contradictions in Roberts' statements to the committee and lack of independent corroboration of many of her statements, the reliability of her statements could not be determined.

(499) A New Orleans police complaint filed by Jack Martin on November 22, 1963, corroborated Roberts' story insofar as it established Banister's assault against Jack Martin with the pistol. (116) According to the report, Martin and Banister had been drinking at a bar neighboring the Newman Building, then visited the Banister's office and became involved in various discussions about "personal and political subjects." (117) They then began to argue about unauthorized long-distance telephone calls which Banister accused Martin of making from the office. (118) The discussion became more heated and Banister pulled out a .357 magnum revolver and hit Martin on the head four or five times with the butt of the gun. (119) When Martin began to bleed, Banister stopped hitting him and Martin went to the restroom to clean up. (120) Banister told Martin to watch himself and be careful. (121) Martin then went to Charity Hospital for treatment, returned home and called the police to file the report. (122) Martin refused to press charges as Banister was "like a father" to him. (123)

(500) Martin was questioned by the committee regarding the incident and for information about Banister's office. Martin told the committee he is a part-time investigator and writer, as he was in the early 1960's. (124) Martin was one of the members of Banister's investigative "pool" and was frequently in and out of Banister's office. (125) Martin told the committee that on November 22, 1963, he was having drinks with Banister at a local bar and they got into an argument. (126) They went to Banister's office and, in the heat of the quarrel, Banister said something to which Martin replied, "What are you going to do—kill me like you all did Kennedy?" (127) Banister drew his pistol and beat Martin in the head. (128) Martin believed Banister would have killed him but for the intervention of Banister's secretary, who pleaded with Banister not to shoot Martin. (129)

(501) It was the day after this incident that Martin related his suspicions about David Ferrie to the New Orleans district attorney's office. (130) Martin had at one time been a close associate of Ferrie. (131) Ferrie told the FBI he met Martin in the fall of 1961, probably not long after Ferrie had met Banister. (132) Martin apparently shared Ferrie's interest in obtaining a position with an ecclesiastical order, although Ferrie insisted he became involved with these religious orders only to assist Martin in a Department of Health, Education, and Welfare investigation into the sale of phony certificates of ordination and consecration. (132) Ferrie said he and Martin had a falling out when he put Martin out of attorney G. Wray Gill's office in June 1963, because Gill did not want Martin "hanging around the office." (134) Gill said Ferrie and Martin had been "close friends" until they got involved in an "ecclesiastical deal wherein Martin was supposed to represent a large territory of the Holy Apostolic Catholic Church of North America." (135) Martin held Ferrie responsible for not getting the job and has "slandered Ferrie at every opportunity." (136) (502) Martin has also told the committee he saw Lee Harvey Oswald with Ferrie in Guy Banister's office in 1963. (137) Nevertheless, in light of Martin's previous contradictory statements to authorities shortly after the assassination in which Martin made no such allegation about having seen Oswald. (138) it may be argued that credence should not be placed in Martin's statements to the committee.

(503) The committee sought to trace Banister's office files that had been reportedly scattered to various individuals or agencies soon after Banister's death in June 1964.

(504) Mary Banister Wilson, Guy Banister's widow, told the committee she had not retained any of the files but had given many away to various organizations. (139) Mrs. Wilson said she sold some of Banister's files to the Louisiana State police in a transaction involving Russell Willie of the State police. (140) She said another portion of the file was given to Aaron Kohn of the New Orleans Metropolitan Crime Commission. (141) The committee learned several books from Banister's collection went to Banister's associate, Kent Courtney. (142) The rest of Banister's "extensive" library of books was donated to the Louisiana State University Library. (143)

(505) Russell Willie and Joseph Cambre of the Louisiana State Police confirmed for the committee that they purchased from Mary Banister in late 1964 a five-drawer file containing file folders belonging

to the late Guy Banister. (144) The "half-filled" file cabinet contained 10 large manila folders, each subject titled and numbered. (145) One of the folders contained a group of 3" by 5" index cards. (146) The index cards contained numbers and subject headings corresponding to the file folders in the cabinet. (147) Not all the files listed in the index were among those files given to the Louisiana State Police; most of the files obtained by the State police dealt with Communist groups and subversive organizations, according to State Police Officer Cambre. (148) Cambre recalled that although Lee Harvey Oswald's name was not included among the main subjects of the files, Oswald's name was included among the main subjects of the file on the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. (149) Cambre had read the FPCC file and found news clippings and a transcript of a radio program in which Oswald had participated, presumably a transcript of the August 21, 1963, debate between Oswald and Carlos Bringuier on WDSU radio. (150) Unfortunately, this file was routinely destroyed in keeping with the requirements of the Privacy Act. (151)

(506) Aaron Kohn, managing director of the New Orleans Metropolitan Crime Commission, acknowledged that he received files from Mary Banister Wilson after Guy Banister's death. (152) The files received by Kohn dealt with an investigation of corruption within the New Orleans Police Department, which Banister had conducted while he was assistant superintendent of police in New Orleans in the mid-1950's. (153)

(507) While the committee was unable to trace or recover all of Banister's files, a partial index of the files was made available by Jim Garrison, former district attorney of Orleans Parish, La. (154) Garrison had sent investigators to the Louisiana State Police intelligence section in 1967 during his investigation into the assassination of President Kennedy. (155) The index did not include the name of Lee Harvey Oswald or the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. (156)

(508) Thus, the committee could find no documentary proof that Banister had a file on Lee Harvey Oswald nor could the committee find credible witnesses who ever saw Lee Harvey Oswald and Guy Banister together. There are indications, however, that Banister at least knew of Oswald's leafletting activities and probably maintained a file on him. As for Jack Martin's reasons for calling attention to Ferrie as a suspect in the assassination, they may not have been based on personal knowledge—Martin never claimed such information—but his action seems to have been based on sincere concerns and some legitimate suspicions. Consequently, it is not possible to determine definitely the reasons for Banister's assault on Martin the night of the assassination, specifically, whether it had anything to do with Martin's suspicions of Ferrie.

(509) The primary import of the 544 Camp Street address must be analyzed within the context of evidence of a Ferrie-Oswald link. Unfortunately, the precise nature of their relationship may never be known.

(510) As can be seen by the committee investigation into Ferrie's associations and activities throughout his life and especially during the summer of 1963, there are several factors which explain why Ferrie and Oswald could have become closely associated, as improbable as this may seem:

(511) A. Both men spent considerable time in the same locale: Ferrie frequently visited the office of Guy Banister in the building at 544 Camp Street;\* Oswald worked only one block away and had used 544 Camp Street as the address of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. Additionally, the testimony of a number of witnesses from Clinton, La., placing Oswald and Ferrie together in early September 1963, may be credible. Evidence also exists to support the belief that a Ferrie colleague, Guy Banister, knew Oswald's pro-Castro leafletting.

(512) B. Both men had similar, fervent interest in political topics, especially the Cuban question. Although Ferrie stood firmly on the anti-Castro side of the issue and Oswald was involved in pro-Castro activities, this alone would not rule out the possibility of an Oswald-Ferrie association.

(513) Oswald, on at least one occasion, made a friendly overture to a known anti-Castro activist, Carlos Bringuier, the New Orleans delegate to the Student Revolutionary Directorate (DRE) and even offered Bringuier assistance in military training of Cuban exiles. The Oswald-Ferrie association may have begun in the same manner.

(514) C. Significant to the argument that Oswald and Ferrie were associated in 1963 is evidence of prior association in 1955 when Ferrie was captain of a Civil Air Patrol squadron and Oswald a young cadet. This pupil-teacher relationship could have greatly facilitated their reacquaintance and Ferrie's noted ability to influence others could have been used with Oswald.

(515) D. Ferrie's experience with the underground activities of the Cuban exile movement and as a private investigator for Carlos Marcello and Guy Banister might have made him a good candidate to participate in a conspiracy plot. He may not have known what was to be the outcome of his actions, but once the assassination had been successfully completed and his own name cleared, Ferrie would have had no reason to reveal his knowledge of the plot. Further, fear for his life may have prevented him from doing so.

(516) While it could not be definitely determined whether Ferrie had any contact with Oswald after Oswald left New Orleans on September 24, 1963, until the day of the assassination only 2 months later, the possible Oswald-Ferrie relationship is a significant Oswald association.

Submitted by:

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\*Strangely, although Ferrie seemed to be straightforward during his interviews with FBI agents in discussing his opposition to Kennedy, his conflict with Jack Martin, his involvement in the Marcello case, et cetera, Ferrie denied outright that he had ever known "of the Cuban Revolutionary Front maintaining an office at 544 Camp Street, nor does he have any knowledge of Sergio Arcacha Smith maintaining an office at that address during the time he was head of the organization and later after he was replaced." (157) This is clearly in contradiction to the accounts of the witnesses on this subject.



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- (34) FBI teletype, FOIA material, 62-109060-1668, Nov. 26, 1963, p. 9.
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- (62) Staff review of FBI files for Guy Banister, Oct. 28, 1978, pp. 1-2.
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- (64) Staff review of FBI files for Guy Banister, Oct. 28, 1978, pp. 1-2. (Note: Coincidentally, Gerard F. Tujague, owner of Gerard F. Tujague, Inc. Forwarding Co., who had employed Oswald as a messenger from November 1955 to January 1956, was also a member and officer (vice-president) of Friends of Democratic Cuba (see FBI teletype, 62-109060-1668, Jan. 26, 1963, p. 5).)
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- (100) Outside contact report, Joseph Oster, Jan. 27, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J. F. K. Document 005207).
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- (102) *Id.* at pp. 50, 51, and 57.
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#### XIV. MANUEL RAY RIVERO (MRP-JURE)

(517) When he first came into prominence as a Cuban exile leader, Manuel Ray Rivero was described as "softspoken and unassuming," a person of "highest intellect, sincerity, and conviction"—in other words, a natural leader. (1) In 1947, the 23-year-old Ray was granted a scholarship by the Cuban Ministry of Public Works to study civil engineering at the University of Utah. (2) Ray was in the United States for 2 years before returning to his native Cuba in 1949 and obtaining various positions in the engineering field, one of which was project manager for the construction of the Havana Hilton Hotel. (3)

(518) Reacting to the excesses of the military rule of Fulgencio Batista, Ray organized the Civic Resistance Movement in 1957 and began supervising sabotage and acts of terrorism against the Government. (4) His political posture and active resistance to Batista was recognized by Fidel Castro who, upon assuming control of the Government of Cuba, appointed Ray his Minister of Public Works in February 1959. (5) Within a few months of his appointment, Ray confided to two anti-Castro Cubans that he had recognized the symptoms of communism in the Castro regime but was not prepared to conspire against "El Lider Maximo." (6)

(519) Ray's tenure in Castro's government was short lived. He was relieved of his official position in November 1959. (7) No definite reason for this sudden move has been documented but, according to one source, Ray did not leave Castro because of ideological or policy discrepancies, but rather because of a personality clash with Castro's Minister of Labor who almost shot Ray after a stormy cabinet meeting. (8) Another theory about his leaving was that he opposed Castro's plan to declare Hubert Matos a traitor and execute the Cuban revolutionary hero with whom Ray had been associated. (9)

(520) For whatever reason, Ray did continue to permit his name to be associated with the Castro regime (10) until May 1960 when he formed the Revolutionary Movement of the People (MRP). (11)

(521) The MRP was an anti-Castro organization that believed that the ideas and aims of the democratic left best suited the needs and aspirations of the Cuban people. (12) It did not wish to reinstate the 1940 Cuban constitution, rather it favored continuation of the laws passed by Castro at the beginning of his regime (13) and advocated the regulation of private investment and nationalization of all utilities. (14) Associated with Ray in this underground organization were Rogelio Cisneros, (15) Rufo Lopez Fresquet, Felipe Pazos, and others. (16)

(522) Organized in each of Cuba's six provinces, the MRP was considered the most important underground group. (17) Working in tightly organized cells, the leadership in one province was unaware of the identities of their counterparts in other provinces. (18) The MDC

engaged in acts of sabotage and was supplied with explosives sent by launches from the Florida Keys. (19)

(523) Having waited until May 1960 to organize his resistance group, Ray was criticized as being suspiciously tardy to the anti-Castro movement. (20) Charges of "Fidelism without Fidel" were made against him and the MRP because of their leftist ideologies. (21) Perhaps for these reasons, Ray's background was questioned by some in the State Department (22) and the Miami CIA station (23) when, in the summer of 1960, he was in the process of becoming a member of the Frente Revolucionario Democrático (FRD), a newly formed anti-Castro organization sponsored by the U.S. Government. (24) The U.S. Government considered him an important political asset (25) and facilitated his entrance into the United States (26) on November 10, 1960. (27)

(524) Nevertheless, there was disagreement within the U.S. Government about Ray's political compatibility with U.S. Government policy. In a memo for record, dated November 21, 1960, one officer declared ". . . Ray did not politically represent anything to cheer about." (28) An officer who met privately with Ray in November 1960 noted that his political posture was "doubtful" as far as U.S. Government acceptance was concerned, (29) and a further assessment portrayed Ray as so far "left in his thinking that he would be as dangerous to U.S. interests as Castro." (30)

(525) Some prominent Cubans also expressed negative opinions about Ray, among them Dr. Jose Miro Cardona, president of the FRD. Miro opposed Ray because he considered his program too Marxist (31) and declared that Ray was bitterly anti-American as well as probably totalitarian in his thinking. (32) Manuel Artime, head of the Movimiento Recuperacion Revolucionaria (MRR), noted that Ray's group was opposed to banning the Communist Party and in favor of "nationalizing everything." (33) Although aware of his controversial political philosophy, attempts were continued to recruit Ray to join the FRD (34) because the White House and State Department pushed for his inclusion. (35)

(526) Ray received full operational approval as a "political asset" on February 7, 1961. (36) He resisted joining the newly formed Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) just as he had resisted inclusion into the FRD. He said he felt the members of the CRC were too restrained and he did not want to become a part of a situation in which someone else was running the show for the exiles. (37) Three weeks before the Bay of Pigs invasion, however, Ray was persuaded to join the CRC as a show of unity. (38)

(527) In recalling the events of this period, Ray told the committee that he was aware of the fact that certain influential and wealthy Americans, among them former Ambassador William Pawley, were opposed to him and that a lot of heavy propaganda was being circulated accusing him of being a Communist. (39)

(528) Ray withdrew from the CRC shortly after the Bay of Pigs invasion. In a Miami news conference on May 28, 1961, he said the major reason for the MRP break with the CRC was that the Council had failed to live up to the written promises given it in March, outlining conditions Ray had insisted upon before joining the organiza-

tion.(40) The first condition had been that the Council was to give first priority to the underground fighters in Cuba during the Bay of Pigs invasion. Second, Ray had insisted that anyone too closely associated with the Batista regime would not be used in the invasion. In addition, he said, he was to have been allowed prior approval of any appointment of invasion military leaders.(41) Ray told the assembled newsmen that his program to overthrow Castro was based on maximum mobilization of the discontented people inside Cuba, and that he thought the leadership of this underground should come from Cubans who could prove they had access to such a potential force.(42)

(529) Ray sought U.S. Government support for the MRP independent of the Council,(43) claiming that the group had an effective underground organization but needed material and financial support.(44) Ray felt the MRP had to be allowed to plan its own operations and broaden its base of financial support to include sympathetic Latin American governments.(45) He was totally opposed to another large invasion.(46)

(530) A recommendation was made that Ray be given an initial \$50,000 for operational expenses.(47) Reaction in the U.S. Government was immediate. Within 24 hours a memorandum was circulated, objecting to the recommendation and claiming that Ray did not ever produce any substantial military actions against Castro.(48) Ray was told to submit a "prospectus" of his plans for the MRP and advised that no financial help would be forthcoming until such a plan was reviewed.(49)

(531) Ray went to Puerto Rico about July 1961, where he received sympathetic support for the MRP from the Governor of that island, Luis Munoz Marin, who personally liked Ray.(50) While Ray was in Puerto Rico, a member of the MRP underground in Cuba reported to the MRP Executive Council that he had been told that no material resources would be available for the group until Manuel Ray was dismissed as general coordinator.(51) Charging the U.S. Government with repeated interference in the affairs of the MRP, Ray resigned so that there would not be any obstacle to the group's cohesion.(52)

(532) In October 1961, the Puerto Rican Planning Board announced that Ray had accepted a \$12,000-a-year position as consultant to that Board.(53) Although there was no evidence that the Puerto Rican Government was supporting the MRP, Ray was looked upon with great favor by Puerto Rican officials(54) and he endeavored to rebuild the MRP with Cuban exiles residing there.(55)

(533) Although still associated with the national leadership of the MRP in April 1962,(56) Ray began formulating plans for a new anti-Castro organization, Junta Revolucionario Cubana (JURE)(57) which, he said, would be only political in nature.(58) Ray freely admitted that this group, organized in July 1962(59) would cooperate with the CRC but ultimately hoped to dominate it.(60)

(534) Concurrent with his JURE activities, Ray began giving information to the U.S. Government regarding possible recruitment or defection of Castro officials.(61) Specifically, he discussed plans to approach a Cuban Ambassador.(62) The degree of Ray's success in this area is not documented, but his efforts continued into the sum-

mer of 1963.(63) It was noted that Ray's abilities were quite impressive.(64)

(535) In June 1963, the concept of "Autonomous Operations" was inaugurated under which JURE could be financed independently, not through the CRC.(65) Military operations were also initiated(66) with Rogelio Cisneros as JURE military coordinator.(67)

(536) Under his interpretation of the "Rules of Engagement of the Autonomous Operations," Cisneros felt that JURE was not obligated to report its military or political plans to the U.S. Government but that the latter was obligated to finance JURE's purchase of military equipment.(68)

(537) By the fall of 1963, Ray was devoting his full time to JURE,(69) traveling extensively in Latin American countries to gain support which would allow JURE to mount resistance operations inside Cuba.(70) Ray told this committee that he and Cisneros were in Caracas for this purpose on November 22, 1963. He remembered that the assistant to a Venezuelan official came into the JURE meeting shortly after lunch that day and announced that President Kennedy had been shot.(71)

(538) In January 1964, Ray's organization was making plans to move their operations to another area (72) and, at the same time, establish a guerrilla training base.(73) He also began to formulate plans for his own infiltration into Cuba (74) declaring that he would turn the operation of JURE over to Rogelio Cisneros during his absence.(75)

(539) Ray's plan was delayed until May, at which time he quit his job in Puerto Rico and dropped out of sight.(76) His infiltration plans were known throughout the Miami Cuban exile community.(77) Soon the story spread to Cuba where Castro ordered a full-scale military alert and rounded up scores of suspected Ray supporters.(78)

(540) After several days of bad weather and dodging Cuban patrol boats, Ray and his crew of seven.(79) including a reporter-photographer team from Life magazine,(80) landed at the Anguilla Cays, 40 miles off the Cuban coast.(81) There Ray intended to make a final equipment check and a final radio transmission.(82)

(541) Because of their proximity to Cuba, the Anguilla Cays were heavily patrolled by Castro forces and by the British who owned them.(83) The British discovered Ray and his group and their cache of weapons and explosives, arrested them for illegal entry into the Bahamas and took them to Nassau.(84) The minimal fine of \$14 was levied on each member of the group and each was admonished to never trespass again.(85)

(542) Upon his release, Ray said that he was as determined as ever to infiltrate Cuba: "Fidel knows me," he said, "and he knows I'm coming." (86)

(543) Compounding Ray's problem was the revelation by the FBI and U.S. Treasury that Rogelio Cisneros had illegally purchased \$50,000 worth of arms for JURE from a California arms manufacturer.(87) It also caused considerable embarrassment.(88) Because of the autonomous nature of its relationship with JURE, no attempt was made to stop Revenue's investigation.(89) Ray was told to move all his operations outside U.S. territory.(90)

(544) In order to shore up his waning credibility within the Cuban exile community, Ray again tried to infiltrate Cuba in July 1964 but, again, his boat developed motor trouble and the plan was aborted.(91)



The failure this time led three exile groups to withdraw from JURE.<sup>(92)</sup>

(545) All these events, from May through July, resulted in a decision to stop financing Ray until he ceased all activities from the U.S. mainland.<sup>(93)</sup> A final payment was made to the group to facilitate the move,<sup>(94)</sup> thereby "closing the books" on JURE.<sup>(95)</sup>

(546) Ray kept his organization together until August 1968<sup>(96)</sup> although it was relatively ineffective. He personally maintained an interest in anti-Castro activities. In 1969, he called together a congress of Cuban exiles to create a new organization.<sup>(97)</sup> As late as 1972, he was actively engaged in the formulation of the People's Revolutionary Party, hoping to reinvigorate the anti-Castro movement,<sup>(98)</sup> but it, too, failed to make an impact.<sup>(99)</sup>

(547) In 1978, Ray was residing in Puerto Rico and headed his own engineering consulting firm in San Juan.<sup>(100)</sup>

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## XV. ADDENDUM TO THE JUNTA DEL GOBIERNO DE CUBA EN EL EXILIO: CARLOS RODRIGUEZ QUESADA

(548) Carlos Rodriguez Quesada was general coordinator of the Cuban underground movement known as the 30th of November, (1) named for an anti-Batista uprising on November 30, 1956, led by Frank Pais who was killed in the assault. (2) The organization was made up mainly of labor union members. (3)

(549) Quesada was also a leader of the labor movement among sugar and agricultural workers in the Province of Las Villas and rose to national prominence in the Confederation of Cuban Workers (CTC). (4) Although Quesada had fought Batista with Castro and was elected to Secretary General of the CTC after Castro took power, he grew disgruntled with Castro's Communist leanings. (5)

(550) Likewise, the 30th of November that philosophically leaned toward socialism and nationalization of industry, was totally opposed to Castro and communism. (6) The group began across-the-board anti-Castro activities including guerrilla actions, sabotage, propaganda, and exfiltrations of members from Cuba. (7) The 30th of November was considered to be one of the most effective organizations in the Cuban underground until infiltration by Castro agents and Cuban Government repression following the Bay of Pigs invasion severely crippled its activities. (8)

(551) Quesada and other 30th of November members were forced to seek asylum. (9) Quesada escaped to the United States in March 1961 aboard a fishing boat. (10)

(552) During his last days in the Cuban underground, Quesada had been in contact with U.S. agents in Havana. (11) Nevertheless, after he took asylum, he began to disagree with them about how to utilize the underground members within labor and peasant organizations. (12) But the 30th of November did join the Cuban Revolutionary Council, and was funded by it. (13)

(553) Yet Quesada also had his troubles with the council. One incident occurred when Quesada went to Puerto Rico on a special operation for the council. (14) It was learned that Quesada had been independently courting sympathetic military leaders and Senators who disagreed with what was then State Department policy toward Cuba. (15) At the same time, Quesada was involved in discussions among the leaders of the DRE, MRP, and the 30th of November about forming a new unity group outside the council organization umbrella. (15a)

(554) These activities put Quesada at odds with the council leadership and in March 1962 he was expelled by Antonio de Varona, the council's general coordinator, for "lack of discipline." (16) The actual reason given for Quesada's expulsion was his involvement in organizing a hunger strike in Bayfront Park in Miami at which 152 people

were arrested. (17) The strike had been planned as a peaceful demonstration during President Kennedy's March 10 visit to Miami. (18) The strikers called for aid for the liberation of Cuba and the resignation of Jose Miro Cardona as head of the council. (19) Other well-known Cuban exile leaders such as Laureano Batista Falla of the MDC had joined Quesada in the protest. (20) The so-called peaceful demonstration, however, deteriorated into a wild melee and the arrests ensued.

(555) A few weeks later, Quesada held a press conference criticizing the council. (21) These actions caused a division among the members of the 30th of November. (22) Part of the group elected to remain with the council while Quesada set up a rival faction named the *Movimiento Revolucionario de Frank Pais*. (23) Because the 30th of November had been so closely identified with Quesada and his followers, Quesada's group continued to be referred to as the 30th of November. Having lost the healthy council subsidy, however, Quesada spent the next few months trying to gain recognition for his group and find ways to fund it. (24)

(556) The group soon became known as one of the more outspoken of the anti-Castro organizations. In April 1962 an FBI report noted that the group's leaders no longer trusted the U.S. Government. (25) Quesada revealed that in a February 1962 operation the 30th of November group had given names of the participants in Cuba to the CIA but those individuals had been subsequently arrested. (26)

(557) By 1963, Quesada's attitude toward the U.S. Government showed no signs of softening. In March, he wrote a letter to President Kennedy requesting immediate armed intervention in Cuba to fight communism. (27) "You are either with or against America," Quesada claimed. (28)

(558) Shortly after, Quesada and his followers joined Paulino Sierra's *Junta del Gobierno de Cuba en el Exilio*. (29) Quesada became the junta's head of internal affairs. (30)

(559) Several reports reviewed by the committee, however, raise questions about Quesada's motivation in joining the junta. One report indicated Quesada wanted respectability to cover illicit dealings. (31) The report also suggested Quesada was living suspiciously high for someone receiving assistance from the Cuban Refugee Center. (32) Other reports were more critical. One called Quesada unreliable and untrustworthy, describing him as a man who surrounds himself with "thieves, homosexuals and drug addicts." (33)

(560) In early 1964, after the junta had ceased activities, Quesada was expelled from his own group, the *MRFP*. (34) There were reports that Quesada had been misappropriating funds for his own use. (35)

(561) In assessing Quesada's role in the *Junta del Gobierno de Cuba* and the effectiveness of the junta itself, Quesada's personal relationship with the anti-Castro organizations may be significant. Several reports reviewed by the committee suggest that "opportunists" made up much of the membership of the junta and contributed to its final demise. (36) Quesada may well fit into that category of individuals who sought funds from the junta but made no effort to recruit followers

or help unify all the anti-Castro groups into the junta. In fact, Quesada may have been less a true leader of a group than one who used his role in the organization for his own ends.

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**THE EVOLUTION AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE CIA-  
SPONSORED ASSASSINATION CONSPIRACIES AGAINST  
FIDEL CASTRO**

—  
Staff Report  
of the  
Select Committee on Assassinations  
U.S. House of Representatives  
Ninety-fifth Congress  
Second Session

—  
March 1979

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## I. FOREWORD


(1) The attempt of the U.S. Government to assassinate Cuban Premier Fidel Castro and other foreign leaders during the 1960's seriously disturbed the American people. When it was disclosed that the Central Intelligence Agency solicited and received the assistance of various members of organized crime in the furtherance of plots, additional concern was expressed.

(2) These assassination attempts, moreover, gave birth to the theory that Fidel Castro may have orchestrated the assassination of the President in retaliation for the plots on his life.

(3) In its final report published in April 1976, the Senate Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC) considered this theory.

(4) In its report, the SSC focused on two operations of the CIA that may have provoked Castro into retaliation. First, the SSC documented the joint effort of the CIA and organized crime to eliminate Castro. Second, the SSC examined the nature and extent of the CIA AMLASH operation. The SSC concluded its analysis with the statement that "[t]he committee believes the investigation should continue in certain areas, and for that reason does not reach any final conclusions."<sup>(1)</sup>

(5) This staff report is an effort to summarize the result of additional investigations. Not every detail of the CIA-Mafia plots or of the AMLASH operation is reviewed. Neither is any effort made to resolve all of the conflicting viewpoints of the SSC and the CIA in regard to the importance of the various operations.<sup>(2)</sup> Instead, this report presents a review of the CIA operation AMLASH and of the involvement or potential involvement of organized crime in the CIA operations against Castro during 1960-63. From this review, it will then be possible to analyze the nature, scope, and implications of these operations.



## II. BACKGROUND MATERIAL—RELEVANT SUMMARY

### A. CIA-MAFIA PLOTS

(6) The genesis of the use of the national syndicate of organized crime by the CIA to attempt to assassinate Castro is placed by the 1967 report of the Inspector General (I.G. Report) as occurring during a conversation between the Deputy Director of Plans, Richard Bissell, and the Director of Security, Col. Sheffield Edwards. (3) These plots extended from late 1960 until early 1963 and can be divided into two stages. (4) The first stage occurred from August 1960 until April 1961 and can best be termed as phase I or the pre-Bay of Pigs period. (5) From April 1961 until late 1961, CIA records indicate that the operation was inactive. (6)

(7) In late 1961, the CIA decided to renew the CIA-Mafia plots, then creating phase II, and kept them active until late 1962 or early 1963. (7)

(8) During the initial stages of phase I, Edwards assigned the specific task of locating the proper persons to assassinate Castro to the Chief, Office of Security Operations Support Branch. (8) Both men agreed that the Support Chief should contact Robert A. Maheu, a private investigator and former FBI man, whom the CIA had previously used in several covert operations, to recruit the necessary personnel. (9)

(9) Maheu subsequently contacted John Roselli, (10) an organized crime figure, who in turn recruited two persons known initially to the Support Chief as "Sam Gold" and "Joe." (11) The Support Chief says he, along with Maheu, later discovered the true identities of these persons to be Sam Giancana and Santos Trafficante, respectively, (12) two major figures in organized crime.

(10) After meeting several times in Miami and deciding upon poison pills as the method of assassination, the I.G. report states that Trafficante made the arrangements for the assassination of Castro with one of his contacts inside Cuba on one of the trips he allegedly made to Havana, Cuba. (13) This contact was a Cuban official who held a position close to Castro. (14)

(11) The I.G. report then stated that Roselli passed the pills to Trafficante. (15) Roselli subsequently told the support chief that the pills were delivered to the Cuban official in Cuba. (16) The Cuban official apparently retained the pills for a few weeks and then returned them since he was unable to fulfill any plan. (17) The Cuban official was no longer in a position to kill Castro because he had lost his Cuban post. (18)

(12) With the Cuban official unable to perform, the syndicate looked elsewhere. Roselli next told the support chief, sometime during early 1961, that Trafficante knew a man prominent in the Cuban exile movement who could accomplish the job. (19) After receiving approval,

Trafficante approached this person about assassinating Castro and reported that he was receptive.(20) The I.G. report stated that the support chief again distributed pills that eventually reached the Cuban exile leader.(21)

(13) This activity concluded the pre-Bay of Pigs phase of the plots. The I.G. report did not document any actual attempt to administer the pills to Castro.

(14) The I.G. report related that after a period of apparent dormancy,(22) Bissell directed William Harvey, a CIA agent, in approximately November 1961 to reactivate the CIA-Mafia plots.(23) The support chief then introduced Harvey to Roselli.(24) During this phase, the CIA decided against using Giancana or Trafficante; instead, a person referred to as "Maceo" entered the plot as the person who would help provide Castro contacts.(25) In addition, the plots still utilized the services of the Cuban exile leader.(26)

(15) Even though the plots no longer included Trafficante and Giancana, the CIA admitted that Roselli most likely kept them informed. The 1967 I.G. report noted that "[i]t would be naive to assume that Roselli did not take the precaution of informing higher-ups in the syndicate that he was working in a territory considered to be the private domain of someone else in the syndicate."(27)

(16) In June 1962 Roselli reported to Harvey that the Cuban exile leader dispatched a three-man team into Cuba with the general assignment of recruiting others to kill Castro and, if the opportunity arose, to kill him themselves, maybe through the use of pills.(28) In September 1962, Roselli reported to Harvey in Miami that the "medicine" was reported in place, that the three-man team was safe, and that the Cuban exile leader was prepared to dispatch another three-man team to infiltrate Castro's bodyguard.(29) In December 1962, Roselli and Harvey agreed that not much seemed to be occurring and by February 1963, Harvey terminated the plots.(30)

## B. LAS VEGAS WIRETAP INCIDENT

(17) The I.G. report also mentioned an event that occurred during phase I of the CIA-Mafia plots that resulted in the first dissemination of the details of the plot to persons other than the ones involved in the operation. On October 31, 1960, Las Vegas police arrested Arthur J. Balletti, an employee of a Florida investigator named Edward DuBois, for placing an electronic bug in a hotel room in Las Vegas.(31) Subsequent investigation determined that Robert Maheu authorized the surveillance and possibly the wiretap of the subject involved and that Maheu probably acted on behalf of Giancana and the CIA.(32)

(18) The violation of the wiretap statute placed the case under Federal jurisdiction and the FBI soon began an investigation. In the course of this investigation, Maheu informed the FBI that he instituted the surveillance on behalf of CIA efforts to obtain Cuban intelligence through the hoodlum element, including Giancana.(33) In its efforts to prevent the prosecution of Balletti, Maheu, and an unidentified individual known as J. W. Harrison, who had allegedly assisted Balletti in the wiretap, the CIA eventually told the Justice Department the details of phase I of the CIA-Mafia plots to kill Castro. This

communication can most accurately be related through the following memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Ramsey Clark (quoted in part):(34)

To: Attorney General  
From: Director, FBI

[Attorney General Robert Kennedy] indicated that a few days prior to [5-9-62] he had been advised by the CIA that Robert A. Maheu had been hired by the CIA to approach Sam Giancana with a proposition of paying \$150,000 to hire gunmen to go into Cuba and kill Castro. He further stated CIA admitted having assisted Maheu in making the "bugging" installation in Las Vegas which uncovered this clandestine operation and for this reason CIA could not afford to have any action taken against Giancana or Maheu. Mr. Kennedy stated that upon learning CIA had not cleared its action in hiring Maheu and Giancana with the Department of Justice, he issued orders that the CIA should never again take such steps without first checking with the Department of Justice.

Mr. Kennedy further advised that because of this matter it would be very difficult to initiate any prosecution against Giancana, as Giancana could immediately bring out the fact the U.S. Government had approached him to arrange for the assassination of Castro. He stated the same was true concerning any action we might take against Maheu for any violation in which he might become involved.

(19) In summary, the Las Vegas wiretap incident forced the CIA to acknowledge the existence of the CIA-Mafia plots to non-CIA Government officials and provided the first occasion for participants to manipulate the operation to prevent prosecution.

#### C. ROBERT MAHEU AND THE LONG COMMITTEE

(20) The next major event related to the CIA-Mafia plots occurred in 1966 when Maheu used his involvement with the CIA to avoid testifying before Senator Edward Long's committee, which was investigating invasions of privacy.(35) The attorney for Maheu, Edward Pierpont Morgan, informed the committee that Maheu contacted him during the fall of 1966 and said he was going to be called before the Long committee in conjunction with the Morgenthau investigation.(36) Maheu then informed Morgan of the plots and suggested that any testimony might necessarily reveal his previous covert activities with the CIA.(37) Morgan then contacted Senator Long and Lawrence Houston, the General Counsel to the CIA, to reiterate Maheu's concerns in an apparently successful effort to block any testimony.(38)

#### D. EFFORTS OF JOHN ROSELLI TO AVOID PROSECUTION

(21) The SSC related that in May 1966, the FBI threatened to deport Roselli "for living in the United States under an assumed name unless

he cooperated in an investigation of the Mafia.”(39) The SSC then stated that Roselli contacted Edwards who subsequently spoke to the FBI in regard to Roselli.(40)

(22) The SSC reported that Roselli again contacted CIA sources in an effort to thwart prosecution when Roselli was arrested for fraudulent gambling activities at the Friars Club in Beverly Hills, Calif., in 1967.(41) Roselli contacted Harvey, who was no longer a CIA employee, to represent him.(42) Harvey subsequently attempted unsuccessfully to influence the CIA into preventing the prosecution.(43) The Justice Department, however, subsequently convicted Roselli for a violation of the interstate gambling laws.(44)

#### E. DEBUT OF THE RETALIATION THEORY

(23) The genesis of this theory can be attributed to an interview that Premier Castro held on September 7, 1963, with Associated Press Reporter Daniel Harker. In that interview, Castro warned against the United States “aiding terrorist plans to eliminate Cuban leaders.”(45) He stated, according to Harker, that U.S. leaders would be in danger if they promoted any attempt to eliminate the leaders of Cuba.(46)

(24) In early January 1967, Edward Morgan approached Columnist Drew Pearson, related the background of the plots, posed the possibility that the plots could have provoked a Castro retaliation, and asked Pearson to inform Chief Justice Earl Warren of the operation.(47) Warren subsequently informed Secret Service Director James J. Rawley who in turn notified the FBI.(48) Morgan informed the committee that Roselli initially approached him complaining of excessive FBI surveillance ever since he had been involved in this patriotic venture.(49) Roselli also informed Morgan that Castro had retaliated for these plots by assassinating President Kennedy.(50)

(25) After receiving this information the FBI decided not to investigate the allegation further.(51) Following the publication of the Jack Anderson and Drew Pearson articles of March 3 and 7, 1967, however, where the theory of retaliation first gained public notoriety, President Johnson ordered the FBI to investigate the matter.(52)

(25a) The FBI consequently interviewed Edward Morgan on March 20, 1967.(53) Morgan informed the FBI that he represented clients that were reasonable individuals who entered into a project that they understood to have high governmental backing and that involved the assassination of Fidel Castro.(54) Morgan then stated that his clients had reason to suspect that Castro learned of these plots and killed President Kennedy in retaliation.(55)

(26) The FBI investigation resulted in President Johnson acquiring a personal interest in the retaliation theory, which prompted CIA Director Richard Helms to prepare a report on the assassination plots.(56)

#### F. CIA 1967 INSPECTOR GENERAL'S REPORT

(27) On March 23, 1967, Director Helms ordered the CIA Inspector General to prepare a report (I.G. Report) on the CIA assassination plots.(57) This report detailed the accounts of various CIA plans and operations against Castro including an analysis of the CIA-organized crime plots and the AMLASH operation. The I.G. Report also examined the 1960 Las Vegas wiretap incident.

(28) In reference to the AMLASH operation, the I.G. Report related AMLASH's activities in Madrid, Spain in late 1964 and early 1965, where AMLASH was meeting with Manuel Artime.(58) The I.G. Report noted further that Rafael Garcia-Bongo, a former lawyer in Cuba for Santos Trafficante, was in Madrid, Spain in March 1965.(59) Bongo claimed to be in contact with dissident Cuban military leaders, including AMLASH.(60)

#### G. ANDERSON ARTICLES

(29) In 1971, Anderson once again published information setting forth the retaliation theory in two articles dated January 18 and 19. These articles exhibited more detail, relating that several assassins made it to a rooftop within shooting distance of Castro before being apprehended, that this event occurred in late February or early March 1963, that Robert Kennedy at least condoned the CIA-Mafia plots, and that Roselli delivered poison pills to be used in killing Castro to a contact at the Miami Beach Fontainebleau Hotel on March 13, 1961.(61).

#### H. ROSELLI DEPORTATION

(30) In 1971, the same year that Anderson released additional information on the plots, the CIA contacted the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of Justice, in an attempt to prevent information on CIA operations from being disclosed in the event INS brought deportation proceedings against Roselli.(62) The CIA's concern was the protection of intelligence sources and methods. The SSC stated in its Interim Report, released in November 1975, that the deportation order was still in the process of being litigated.(63) In August 1976, authorities discovered Roselli's butchered body stuffed in an oil drum and floating in Miami's Biscayne Bay. His colleague in the plots to kill Castro, Sam Giancana, had been shot to death in his home in June 1975.

#### I. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(31) In connection with its mandate to investigate the full range of governmental intelligence activities, the SSC "examined the performance of the intelligence agencies in conducting their investigation of the assassination and their relationship to the Warren Commission."(64) In April 1967, the SSC published its final report (Book V), which, in essence, faulted the CIA for its errors of omission in not informing the Warren Commission of the CIA's ongoing plots against the life of the premier, Fidel Castro.

(32) After reviewing the details of the CIA-Mafia plots, the SSC stated that "Castro probably would not have been certain that the CIA was behind the underworld attempts" and that it would have been unlikely that Castro would have distinguished the CIA plots with the underworld from any plots sponsored by the Cuban exile community and not affiliated in any way with the CIA.(65)

(33) The SSC identified the AMLASH operation, however, as being "clearly different" from the underworld plots.(66) The SSC stated that AMLASH was in progress at the time of the assassination, that

it could clearly be traced to the CIA, and that AMLASH's proposal for a coup had been endorsed by the CIA, the initial step being the assassination of Castro.(67) The SSC cautioned, however, that it saw "no evidence that Fidel Castro or others in the Cuban Government plotted President Kennedy's assassination in retaliation for U.S. operations against Cuba."(68)

(34) As related in the introduction to this material, the SSC did not reach any conclusion because it believed additional investigation needed to occur.(69)

### J. CIA 1977 TASK FORCE REPORT

(35) As a result of concern with the Senate criticism and the effect that Book V caused in the media, the CIA prepared a comprehensive report in 1977 designed to critique, at least within the CIA, the critical questions postulated in the SSC final report.

(36) The T. F. Report identified a principal theme of Book V as the possibility that Castro retaliated against the United States for attempts on his life and that the CIA operations may have specifically caused such actions by Castro.(70) In responding to this theory, the CIA decided:

(1) to conduct a full review of information and operations against the Cuban target to identify any activity that might relate to the assassination of President Kennedy; and

(2) To review the possibility that CIA activities against Cuba did, by their nature, cause Castro to order the assassination of President Kennedy.(71)

(37) The details of the T. F. Report are related in this staff report because no source has previously released them publicly.

#### 1. *Syndicate operations*

(38) The T. F. Report first refers to a series of articles written by Paul Meskill and appearing in the New York Daily News in April 1975.

(39) In these articles Meskill described how Frank Fiorini, also known as Sturgis, allegedly recruited Marita Lorenz, a former mistress of Castro, to spy on Castro(72) and how Sturgis knew a Cuban official and planned to use him in a bombing assassination of Castro.(73) Meskill asserted that Sturgis claimed he had been a hired operative for the CIA for at least a decade and that Sturgis was in touch with all the casino operators in Havana during the period of the Castro takeover.(74) In another article on June 13, 1976, Meskill related the claim of Marita Lorenz that in the fall of 1960 Frank Sturgis, acting for the CIA, gave her two capsules of poison powder, which she was to sprinkle in some food or drink of Castro.(75)

(40) The writers of the T. F. Report were concerned with these assertions because aspects of the newspaper story were similar in some respects to certain elements involved in phase I of the CIA operation. The possibility of some relationship with the CIA operation attracted the attention of the CIA.(76)

(41) In reference to Sturgis' allegation that he had been a hired operative for the CIA for a decade, the T. F. Report asserted that "he was in contact with some of the CIA Cuban employees in the Miami area, but had no direct relationship with the Agency."(77) The T. F.



Report recognized that Sturgis, through his gambling activities and relationships with various casino owners, may quite possibly have known the Cuban official, and also raised the question of whether Sturgis may have been a source of information to Castro regarding the Cuban official's participation in any assassination plot. (78)

(42) In reference to the Lorenz-Sturgis poison pill plot, the T. F. Report noted the similarity of this plot to the details in an October 18, 1960, FBI memorandum describing a plot to kill Castro. (79) The CIA concluded that this October date is too early for the CIA syndicate operations and that therefore the syndicate may have been acting independently. (80)

(43) The CIA also concluded that the Cuban exile leader active in the CIA syndicate operations may have already been active in plots with the Mafia when the CIA approached him. (81)

(44) The CIA cited two FBI memorandums as support. First, a December 21, 1960, memorandum pertaining to underworld support for some Cubans; and second, a January 18, 1961, memorandum relating an unconfirmed report that the Cuban exile leader was one of the Cubans receiving support. (82)

(45) The CIA acknowledged further that although the operation with the Mafia was suspended after the Bay of Pigs, it appeared to still be in progress when reactivated in early 1962. (83)

(46) The report summarized its position concerning non-CIA-sponsored syndicate operations in the following passage:

It is possible that CIA simply found itself involved in providing additional resources for independent operations that the syndicate already had underway \* \* \* [I]n a sense CIA may have been piggybacking on the syndicate and in addition to its material contribution was also supplying an aura of official sanction. (84)

## 2. AMLASH

(47) The T. F. Report stated the SSC suggested that AMLASH was possibly a Castro agent assigned a provocation mission that would then justify retaliation, or, in the alternative, that AMLASH was a security risk through which details of the plotting may have surfaced to Castro, thus providing the impetus for provocation. (85) Additionally, the T. F. Report cited the SSC as holding that in either case, AMLASH should have been reported to the Warren Commission. (86)

(48) The T. F. Report contended neither theory is correct. (87) stating that the relationship between the CIA and AMLASH before the death of President Kennedy was so "unsubstantial and inconclusive that it provided no basis for AMLASH/1 to feel that he had any tangible CIA support for plotting against Castro." (88)

(49) In support, the T. F. Report proceeded to narrate the Agency's understanding of the operation. On August 17, 1962, the case officer for AMLASH reported that he "[has] no intention [of giving AMLASH/1] physical elimination mission as requirement but recognize this [as] something he could or might try to carry out on his own initiation." (89) Headquarters replied the next day, "Strongly concur that no physical elimination mission be given AMLASH/1." (90) From August 29, 1962, until September 1963, the CIA stated, it did not have any contact with AMLASH. (91)

(50) On September 7, 1963, the CIA received the following cable:

AMLASH still feels there only two ways accomplish change either inside job or invasion he realistic enough to realize latter out of question. According AMWHIP, AMLASH still awaiting for U.S. reveal plan of action. (92)

The T. F. Report noted that the SSC interpreted "inside job" as referring to an operation against Castro; the CIA, however, said it referred to a general commitment concerning how to effect change.(93) The T. F. Report also stated that at this point Book V said "characterization of this phase of the AMLASH operation is disputed."(94) The CIA contended that any dispute exists only in the eyes of the SSC.(95)

(15) The T. F. Report next commented on an interview of Castro by Associated Press reporter Daniel Harker in which Castro said that anti-Castro terrorists had the support of U.S. leaders.(96) The T. F. Report stated that the Book V implied that AMLASH/1 may have reported to Castro what the SSC characterized as assassination plots.(97) The CIA response is that "Castro's remarks at that time could not have stemmed from anything said to AMLASH/1 by CIA officers as they proposed nothing and undertook nothing." (98)

(52) On October 11, 1963, the case officer cabled headquarters and said that AMLASH/1 claimed to have the necessary people and equipment to overthrow Castro without U.S. assistance.(99) In October 1963, Desmond Fitzgerald met AMLASH/1 outside the United States.(100) At this meeting the CIA maintained that Fitzgerald rejected AMLASH's request for an assassination weapon: specifically, a high-powered rifle with a telescopic lens.(101) The T. F. Report contends that at this point it was clear that AMLASH was informed that there would be no U.S. assistance until after the fact, which was contrary to the SSC statement in Book V that it was uncertain how AMLASH interpreted the putoff by Fitzgerald.(102)

(53) On November 19, 1963, Fitzgerald approved informing AMLASH/1 that he would be given a cache inside Cuba and that a high-powered rifle with a scope would be included upon request.(103) On November 20, the case officer informed AMLASH that he would be receiving the meeting he requested.(104) This meeting occurred on November 22.(105)

(54) The T. F. Report summarized the significance of these contacts with AMLASH as related to the contention in Book V in the following passage:

Whatever the relationship with AMLASH/1 following the death of President Kennedy, there is every indication that during President Kennedy's life AMLASH/1 had no basis for believing that he had CIA support for much of anything. Were he a provocateur reporting to Castro, or if he was merely careless and leaked what he knew, he had no factual basis for leaking or reporting any actual CIA plot directed against Castro.(106)

(55) Finally, in reply to the SSC allegation that the CIA inadequately responded to the Warren Commission's request for all possible relevant information, the T. F. Report observed:

While one can understand today why the Warren Commission limited its inquiry to normal avenues of investigation, it would have served to reinforce the credibility of its effort had it taken a broader view of the matter. CIA, too, could have considered in specific terms what most saw in general terms—the possibility of Soviet or Cuban involvement in the assassination of (J.F.K.) because of tensions of the time . . . The Agency should have taken broader initiatives, then, as well. (107)

#### K. RECENT ANDERSON ARTICLES

(56) In September 1976 and October 1978, Jack Anderson again published articles that propounded the retaliation theory. (108) In addition, for the first time Anderson revealed publicly that John Roselli served as his source for the retaliation theory in all of the articles published through the years.

(57) The September 7, 1976, article appearing in the Washington Post contained all components of the retaliation theory. The article stated:

Mafia mobster John Roselli may have taken the secret of the John F. Kennedy assassination with him to his death. He was brutally murdered a few weeks ago, his hacked up body stuffed into an oil drum and dumped into Miami's Biscayne Bay.

Before he died, Roselli hinted to associates that he knew who had arranged President Kennedy's murder. It was the same conspirators he suggested, whom he had recruited earlier to kill Cuban Premier Fidel Castro.

By Roselli's cryptic account, Castro learned the identity of the underworld contacts in Havana who had been trying to knock him off. He believed, not altogether without basis, that President Kennedy was behind the plot.

The Cuban leader, as the supreme irony, decided to turn the tables and use the same crowd to arrange Kennedy's assassination according to Roselli's scenario. To save their skins, the plotters lined up Lee Harvey Oswald to pull the trigger.

Roselli could never be pinned down on names or details. It was also difficult to assess whether he knew what he was talking about or whether he merely described what he thought might have happened. Certainly there is no real evidence to support Roselli's story. But there are enough curious circumstances to justify telling it. Here are the fascinating highlights.

The ruggedly handsome Roselli, a flamboyant mobster with underworld contacts in Havana, was recruited by the Central Intelligence Agency in 1960 to assassinate Castro. He had no authority, however, over the underworld elements in Havana.

They were under the loose control of Florida's Mafia chieftain, Santos Trafficante. His gambling enterprises in Havana had been closed down by Castro after the 1959 revolution.

In fact, Trafficante had been lodged for a period in a Cuban jail, an indignity that didn't endear Castro to him.

After Trafficante made it back to his Florida haunts, he left part of his organization behind in Havana. Some of his henchmen even managed to develop contacts in Castro's inner circle. These were the people Roselli wanted to use to knock off Castro.

But Roselli didn't have the stature inside the Mafia to make the necessary arrangements with Trafficante. So Roselli called in his patron, the Chicago godfather Sam (Momo) Giancana, to deal with Trafficante.

As Roselli's associates tell it, he persuaded Giancana that it would be to their advantage to win the good will of the CIA. Convinced, Giancana flew down to Florida to make the preliminary arrangements.

Once Giancana and Trafficante set it up, Roselli used the Havana underworld to plot Castro's demise. At first, they tried to plant poison pills, supplied by the CIA, in Castro's food. The pills would have made it appear that he died of natural causes. When this failed, snipers were dispatched to a Havana rooftop. They were caught.

The word reached Roselli that some of the plotters had been tortured and that Castro had learned about the whole operation.

The CIA called off the Roselli operation in March 1963, but recruited a Castro associate, Rolando Cubela, to murder Castro.

In an impromptu, 3-hour interview with Associated Press reporter Daniel Harker, Castro indicated that he knew about the attempts on his life and warned that U.S. leaders also might not be safe. That was September 7, 1963.

According to Roselli, Castro enlisted the same underworld elements whom he had caught plotting against him. They supposedly were Cubans from the old Trafficante organization. Working with Cuban intelligence, they allegedly lined up an ex-Marine sharpshooter, Lee Harvey Oswald, who had been active in the pro-Castro movement.

According to Roselli's version, Oswald may have shot Kennedy or may have acted as a decoy while others ambushed him from closer range. When Oswald was picked up, Roselli suggested, the underworld conspirators feared he would crack and disclose information that might lead to them. This almost certainly would have brought a massive U.S. crackdown on the Mafia.

So Jack Ruby was ordered to eliminate Oswald, making it appear as an act of reprisal against the President's killer. At least this is how Roselli explained the tragedy in Dallas.

Several key CIA officials believed that Castro was behind the Kennedy assassination.

It has also been established that Jack Ruby, indeed, had been in Cuba and had connections in the Havana underworld. One CIA cable, dated November 28, 1963, reported that "an American gangster type named Ruby" had visited Trafficante in his Cuban prison.

### III. ISSUE ANALYSIS

#### A. PREFACE

(58) The committee investigated this material to determine what conclusions, if any, could be drawn concerning the nature, scope, and implications of these operations. In this regard, various issues are presented in the following sections and subjected to analysis.

(59) To fulfill this process, the committee reviewed material from numerous governmental sources that pertained to the persons and operations relevant to the investigation. These persons included:

1. John Roselli—principal in CIA-O.C. operation.
2. Santos Trafficante—principal in CIA-O.C. operation.
3. Cuban exile leader—principal in CIA-O.C. operation.
4. Sam Giancana—principal in CIA-O.C. operation.
5. Robert Maheu—principal in CIA-O.C. operation.
6. Michael McLaney—Involved in Havana casino business.
7. Samuel Benton—Involved in Havana casino business.
8. Norman Rothman—Havana casino operator.
9. John Martino—Anti-Castro activist.
10. Edward P. Morgan—Washington, D.C., attorney.
11. Edward K. Moss—International public relations representative.
12. Dino Cellini—Havana casino operator.
13. Richard Cain—Associate of Sam Giancana.
14. Charles Tourine—Involved in Havana casino business.
15. Rafael "Macho" Gener—Associate of Santos Trafficante.
16. Identity protected—Anti-Castro Cuban.
17. Identity protected—Anti-Castro Cuban.
18. Joseph Shimon—Former inspector for the Washington, D.C., Police Department; associate of Sam Giancana.
19. Angelo Bruno—Reputed organized crime leader of Philadelphia.
20. Sam Mannarino—Havana casino operator.
21. Kelly Mannarino—Havana casino operator.
22. Edward Browder—Pilot active in anti-Castro activities.
23. Joseph Merola—Pilot active in anti-Castro activities.
24. Arthur Balletti—Former private detective for Edward Du Bois.
25. Dominick Bartone—Reputed organized crime figure from Cleveland, Ohio.
26. Richard Helms—Former Director of CIA.
27. Chief, Office of Security Operations Support Branch—Former employee of CIA.
28. Luis Balbuena Calzadilla—Associate of the Cuban referenced in item 16.
29. AMLASH—Cuban official in the Castro government.
30. William Alexander Morgan—Figure active in anti-Castro activities.

31. Identity protected—Cuban official close to Castro.
  32. Jack Anderson—Columnist.
  33. Frank Sturgis—Soldier of fortune active in anti-Castro activities.
  34. Fidel Castro Ruz—Premier of Cuba.
  35. Victor Espinosa Hernandez—Anti-Castro Cuban.
  36. Meyer Lansky—Organized crime figure.
- (60) Whenever possible and desirable, the committee either interviewed or deposed these persons or subpoenaed them to give testimony before the committee.
- (61) The government and other sources where the committee requested and reviewed material were:
1. Central Intelligence Agency.
  2. Federal Bureau of Investigation.
  3. Drug Enforcement Agency.
  4. Department of Defense.
  5. Department of State.
  6. Department of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms.
  7. U.S. Customs Service.
  8. Immigration and Naturalization Service.
  9. U.S. Senate Committee on Intelligence.
  10. U.S. Secret Service.
  11. Chicago Crime Commission.
  12. Chicago Police Department.
  13. New York City Police Department.
  14. Public Safety Department, Organized Crime Bureau, Dade County, Fla.
  15. Cuban Government.

(62) In the majority of instances, review of the material at these sources and the statements from individuals were not pertinent to any assassination plots against Castro, particularly the CIA-organized crime and the AMLASH operations. Further, much of the relevant information acquired was already known through the SSC investigation and the CIA I. G. Report and T. F. Report. For this reason, the following analysis represents evidence derived principally from information substantively the same as that which the SSC and CIA considered previously. Nevertheless the committee investigation resulted in additional factual corroboration of this information from a diversity of sources. (109)

## B. AMLASH OPERATION

### *1. Characterization of the AMLASH operation*

(63) Richard Helms, the former Director of the CIA, stated in his testimony before the committee that the AMLASH operation was not designed to be an assassination plot. (110) As already indicated, the T. F. Report concluded that AMLASH had "no factual basis for leaking or reporting any actual CIA plot directed against Castro" during President Kennedy's life. (111)

(64) Joseph Langosch, the Chief of Counterintelligence for the CIA's Special Affairs Staff in 1963, the component responsible for CIA operations directed against the Government of Cuba and the

Cuban Intelligence Services, offered a contrasting view to the testimony of Mr. Helms and the assertions of the T. F. Report. (112) Desmond FitzGerald headed the special affairs staff (113) that was responsible for the AMLASH operation. (114) In an affidavit to the committee, Longosch recalled:

[T]he AMLASH operation prior to the assassination of President Kennedy was characterized by the special affairs staff, Desmond Fitzgerald (sic) and other senior CIA officers as an assassination operation initiated and sponsored by the CIA. (115)

(65) Langosch recollected further that as of 1962 it was highly possible that the Cuban Intelligence Services were aware of AMLASH and his association with the CIA and that the information upon which he based his conclusion that the AMLASH operation was insecure was available to senior level CIA officials, including Desmond FitzGerald. (116)

(66) In response to Langosch's sworn statements, the committee received the affidavit of Kent L. Pollock (CIA pseudonym), a former CIA employee. Pollock "served as executive officer for Desmond FitzGerald during the entire period in which he was chief of the special affairs staff . . . and discussed with him the AMLASH operation as it progressed." (117) Pollock specifically contested the assertions of Langosch stating:

To the best of my knowledge, Mr. FitzGerald considered the AMLASH operation to be a political action activity with the objection of organizing a group under AMLASH/1 to overthrow Castro and the Castro regime by means of a coup d' etat. I heard Mr. FitzGerald discuss the AMLASH operation frequently, and never heard him characterize it as an assassination operation. Mr. FitzGerald stated within my hearing on several occasions his awareness that coup d' etat often involves loss of life. (118)

(67) He also stated:

Desmond FitzGerald did not characterize the AMLASH operation as an "assassination operation"; the case officer did not; I, as Executive Officer did not, never discussed any aspect of the AMLASH operation with Joseph H. Langosch; the deputy chief, the other branch chiefs and the special assistants could not have so characterized it since they did not know about the pen (the pen was specially filled with a hypodermic syringe in response to urgings by AMLASH for a means to start the coup by killing Castro.) The case officer offered the pen to AMLASH on the day of President Kennedy's death. AMLASH rejected the pen with disdain. (119)

(68) The committee also reviewed numerous files in an effort to determine the true character of the AMLASH operation. In the course of its investigation, the committee found no specific evidence that the AMLASH operation provoked Premier Castro into assassinating President Kennedy. Although it is possible that he learned of it, and

if so, that he assumed it involved both assassination as an objective (or probable consequence), and U.S. Government support.

*2. The probability that Castro would have assassinated the President of the United States*

(69) In his interview with the committee, Premier Castro set forth some reasons why he would not have assassinated President Kennedy. Castro said in part:

That was insane. From the ideological point of view it was insane. And from the political point of view, it was a tremendous insanity. I am going to tell you here that nobody, nobody ever had the idea of such things. What would it do? We just tried to defend our folks here, within our territory. Anyone who subscribed to that idea would have been judged insane . . . absolutely sick. Never, in 20 years of revolution, I never heard anyone suggest nor even speculate about a measure of that sort, because who could think of the idea of organizing the death of the President of the United States. That would have been the most perfect pretext for the United States to invade our country which is what I have tried to prevent for all these years, in every possible sense. Since the United States is much more powerful than we are, what could we gain from a war with the United States? The United States would lose nothing. The destruction would have been here. (120)

(70) Castro also added:

I want to tell you that the death of the leader does not change the system. It has never done that. (121)

(71) In this interview Castro also commented on the speech of September 7, 1963, that has been cited throughout the years as an indication that Castro may have assassinated President Kennedy in retaliation. Premier Castro asserted:

So, I said something like those plots start to set a very bad precedent. A very serious one—that that could become a boomerang against the authors of those actions \* \* \* but I did not mean to threaten by that. I did not mean even that \* \* \* not in the least \* \* \* but rather, like a warning that we knew; that we had news about it; and that to set those precedents of plotting the assassination of leaders of other countries would be a very bad precedent \* \* \* something very negative. And, if at present, the same would happen under the same circumstances, I would have no doubt in saying the same as I said (then) because I didn't mean a threat by that. I didn't say it as a threat. I did not mean by that that we were going to take measures—similar measures—like a retaliation for that. We never meant that because we knew that there were plots. For 3 years we had known there were plots against us. So, the conversation came about very casually, you know; but I would say that all these plots or attempts were part of the everyday life. (122)

(72) Some general analysis here may be of some assistance. It does not seem likely that Castro would make a veiled reference to assassi-



nating any American leader in retaliation for plots on his life if he was actually planning or contemplating such acts: he would want to call as little attention as possible to himself. Rather, it seems Castro was attempting to display his public dismay and knowledge of such attempts in an effort to prevent their continuance.

(73) Consequently, together with an absence of any evidence implicating Castro in the assassination, it seems probable that this incident, while displaying Castro's displeasure at American activities, does not implicate Castro in the assassination. This argument is not based on Castro's denial that he made a threat; Castro would naturally deny such a charge. It rests on what would seem to be reasonable.

(74) There are additional reasons to discount any involvement of Castro in the assassination. These reasons are also necessarily general in character.

(75) First, William Atwood, Special Advisor to the U.S. Delegation to the United Nations, was involved in diplomatic efforts to establish a framework for détente during the fall of 1963. (123) Atwood told the SCC that McGeorge Bundy, an advisor to President Kennedy, told him that President Kennedy was in favor of "pushing toward an opening toward Cuba" to take Castro "out of the Soviet fold and perhaps wiping out the Bay of Pigs and maybe getting back to normal." (124) Atwood also arranged for a French journalist, Jean Daniel to meet with Kennedy prior to a scheduled trip by Daniel to see Castro. (125) Daniel and Kennedy discussed the prospects for reestablishing United States-Cuba relations and Kennedy asked Daniel to see him after visiting Castro. (126).

(76) It seems likely that such efforts to establish a peaceful co-existence between the United States and Cuba would have dampened any desire by Castro to assassinate Kennedy.

(77) Second, in comparing the attitudes of the leaders of the United States, it can be argued that President Kennedy supported a less hostile attitude and position toward Cuba. Even if Castro felt the relations between Cuba and the United States were bad under the Kennedy Presidency, there were legitimate reasons to suspect they would have been worse under the Johnson administration.

(78) Consequently, assuming that AMLASH was not an assassination plot during the life of President Kennedy and that Castro uncovered its existence and scope, it is highly unlikely that Castro would have been provoked in a manner sufficient to induce assassinating President Kennedy in retaliation. Further, assuming that AMLASH was an assassination plot during the life of President Kennedy and that Castro uncovered its existence and scope, it is still unlikely that Castro would have resorted to assassinating the President of the United States in retaliation.

### *3. Summary*

(79) Thus, with the prospects of renewed diplomatic relations in the air and the knowledge that Kennedy possessed a more favorable attitude toward Cuba than other military or political leaders, Castro would have had every reason to hope that Kennedy maintained the Presidency. Further, eliminating Kennedy would not necessarily have favorably altered the U.S. operations and ties toward Cuba. In addition, it does not seem probable that Castro would have assassi-

nated President Kennedy because such an act, if discovered, would have afforded the United States the excuse to destroy Cuba. The risk would not have been worth it.

### C. CIA-ORGANIZED CRIME PLOTS

#### 1. SCOPE AND NATURE OF PLOTS

##### (a) *Roselli knowledge of CIA sponsorship*

(80) The support chief informed the committee that Maheu told Roselli he represented an international group of clients who had vested interests in Cuba. Roselli, however, testified to the SSC that Maheu told him from the beginning that the support chief was with the CIA.(127) Maheu confirmed this account to the SSC.(128) Maheu has also indicated that Giancana knew at the time that the support chief was with the CIA.(129) Further, Trafficante testified to the committee that Roselli informed him that he (Roselli) was operating as an agent of the CIA.(130)

(81) The weight of the evidence indicates that Roselli, and thus Giancana and Trafficante, knew the CIA was behind the assassination plots at an early stage.

##### (b) *Discovery of true identities*

(82) Roselli arranged for the entrance of Giancana and Trafficante into the plots and introduced them to the support chief as "Sam Gold" and "Joe."(131) The support chief contends he learned the true identities of these persons a few months after the operation was in progress when he and Maheu saw an article in one of the Sunday sections of the Miami newspaper.(132) This article supposedly pertained to organized crime in the United States and contained pictures of top hoodlums, including Sam Giancana and Santos Trafficante.(133) In the I. G. Report the support chief stated that the article came from the Parade magazine(134) in the Miami Times. Maheu also contended that he did not know the true identities of Sam Gold and Joe until this article appeared.(135) The support chief also stated that this incident occurred after "we were up to our ears" in the operations and consequently the CIA decided to progress forward.(136)

(83) The SSC conducted a search of supplements to all Miami newspapers for the requisite time period and could not locate any such article.(137) The committee consequently searched Parade magazine for the fall of 1960, all of 1961, and all of 1962, the years that spanned the entire operation. The committee found that on January 21, 1962, Parade published an article entitled "The Untold Story: Our Government's Crackdown on Organized Crime," written by Jack Anderson, which contained a listing of the top 10 hoodlums in the country as well as several photographs of mobsters, including Santos Trafficante.(138) The article focused on the efforts of Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy's campaign against organized crime and mentioned both Giancana and Trafficante.

(84) Although this Parade article appears to correspond with the support chief's and Maheu's description, it is over 1 year past the beginning months of the operation. Indeed, it occurred 9 months after the completion of phase I of the plots. Neither the SSC nor the com-

mittee has discovered any other article pertaining to organized crime in Parade magazine or the supplements of any Miami newspaper for the alleged time period.

(85) It appears the support chief and Maheu are not telling the truth in an attempt to look for an *ex post facto* reason for continuing the operation after the introduction of two of the top organized crime figures in the United States. Implicit in their contention is that while the CIA wished to solicit criminal sources to assassinate Castro, it would not knowingly have recruited any figures from the top echelon of organized crime. (139) Additionally, the support chief's statement that "we were up to our ears in it" is even more difficult to fathom since according to the I. G. Report, the operation was in its embryonic stage in the fall of 1960 and no pills were even delivered until approximately February or March of 1961. Without additional support, the contentions of Maheu and the support chief are not believable.

(86) Further, this CIA plot to assassinate Castro was necessarily a highly volatile and secret operation. Once Roselli introduced additional contacts into the scene, it is not logical that the CIA would have neglected to verify the identities of such principals. On the contrary, it is more believable that the CIA ascertained the true identities of "Sam Gold" and "Joe" at an early stage and progressed consciously forward in the operation, confident that these two persons, in the words attributed to Col. Sheffield Edwards, were individuals "tough enough" to handle the job. (140)

(C) *Roles of principals*

(1) *Phase 1*

(87) Col. Sheffield Edwards assigned the support chief the task of finding someone to assassinate Castro. (141) They both decided to use Maheu as someone to recruit persons to effectuate the operation. (142) The support chief also described his role as the liaison to the CIA and confirmed that all reports or information would proceed through him to the Agency. (143) In addition, the support chief said he acted as a "babysitter" to Roselli: He remained with him to occupy his time to insure that Roselli was fulfilling his role. (144)

(88) There exists a discrepancy over who suggested Roselli for the operation, (145) but in any event, he was recruited because he had connections with persons who could handle the assignment. (146)

(89) Conflict arose over the role of Giancana. Roselli informed the SSC that Giancana was only a "back-up" man. (147) Giancana was murdered 4 days before Roselli made this statement. Maheu, however, described Giancana as having a key role and characterized his job as "to locate someone in Castro's entourage who could accomplish the assassination." (148) Joseph Shimon, a close friend of Roselli who had knowledge of the plots at the time, stated that Roselli contacted Giancana to provide Cuban contacts. (149) Shimon further characterized Giancana as only providing contacts, specifically Santos Trafficante, and not as an active participant. (150)

(90) The most sound analysis is that Giancana served solely as a person Roselli could approach who could then make the necessary contact into the Cuban domain, specifically Santos Trafficante. Roselli, who FBI files indicate represented Giancana's interest in Las Vegas

and was subordinate to him, probably would not directly contact the organized crime boss of the Cuban and southern Florida area without first contacting his superior, Giancana, who would then make any necessary arrangements. Both Giancana and Trafficante, being bosses of two organized crime domains, would have the means, power, and stature to arrange for the assassination.

(91) After contacting Trafficante, who had the influence to recruit the necessary personnel to perform the assassination, Giancana probably was not an active participant in handling the poison pills or actually arranging the assassination. (151)

(92) The role of Trafficante, the only living major organized crime figure involved in the plots, is a major source of conflict. The I. G. Report contained several references to Trafficante which characterize his function. In discussing how poison pills could be given to Castro, it stated that "Trafficante ('Joe, the courier') was in touch with a disaffected Cuban official with access to Castro and presumably of a way that would enable him to surreptitiously poison Castro." (152) Later the report stated that "Roselli passed the pills to Trafficante" and that "Roselli reported to [the Support Chief] that the pills had been delivered to [the Cuban official] in Cuba." (153) After the Cuban official lost his position in the Cuban government and could no longer pass any pills, the I. G. Report said "Roselli told [the Support Chief] that Trafficante knew of a man high up in the Cuban exile movement who might do the job." (154) Roselli identified him as a leading figure in the Cuban exile movement. (155) The following passage further confirms Trafficante's role:

Trafficante approached [this Cuban] and told him that he had clients who wanted to do away with Castro and that they would pay big money for the job. [The Cuban] is reported to have been very receptive, since it would mean that he would be able to buy his own ships, arms, and communications equipment. (156)

(93) Trafficante testified in public to the committee that Roselli asked him to act solely as an interpreter between the American operations and the Cuban contacts. (157) Trafficante denied handling or carrying any poison pills used in the operation, (158) denied recruiting the Cuban exile leader, (159) and denied recruiting the Cuban official. (160). In his Senate testimony, Roselli confirmed Trafficante's role as that of a translator. (161)

(94) The Support Chief, however, informed the committee that Trafficante was the person in contact with Cubans in Havana. (162) Giancana partially confirmed this, according to the I. G. Report, by identifying Joe as a man "who would serve as a courier to Cuba and make arrangements there." (163) The Support Chief also confirmed that he was the only CIA conduit and that if the I. G. Report states Trafficante contacted or procured the assassin then it accurately reflects the information the CIA received. (164)

(95) The 1975 and 1978 congressional testimony of Roselli and Trafficante corroborate each other, but remain contrary to how the principals reported the facts in 1967. The evidence indicates strongly that Trafficante was not merely an interpreter but an active participant in passing the poison pills and in recruiting the potential assas-

sins. One can understand why Trafficante today wishes to downplay his role; the facts, however, simply do not support his assertions. The evidence supports the I. G. Report.

(96) The committee also heard testimony from the Cuban exile leader. He stated that he is not aware of any CIA assassination plots to kill Castro and denied involvement in their operations.(165) He is obviously not telling the truth.

(2) *Phase 2*

(97) In phase 2 William Harvey assumed the Support Chief's role.(166) Giancana and Trafficante were no longer involved in the operation.(167) The I. G. Report states that Roselli remained as a prominent figure and worked "directly with the Cuban exile community and directly on behalf of the CIA."(168)

(98) Although the I. G. Report does reflect that Trafficante was not involved in phase 2,(169) it contained this caution :

Trafficante was one of the principals in Shef Edwards phase 1 of the operation. He presumably was not involved in phase 2 under Harvey, but we cannot be sure of that. After all, Trafficante was the man who brought the Cuban exile leader into the operation late in phase 1, and the Cuban exile leader was one of the main players during phase 2.(170)

(99) It is reasonable to assume that Roselli at least kept both Giancana and Trafficante informed of the operation's progress.

(d) *Delivery of the pills*

(100) Neither the I. G. Report nor the SSC pinpoints the date on which the support chief delivered the pills to Roselli during phase 1 of the plots. The chain of custody, as already mentioned, was for Roselli to deliver the pills to Trafficante. The subsequent steps remain a mystery but Roselli reported to the support chief that the pills had been delivered to the Cuban official in Cuba in late February or early March 1961.(171)

(101) Joseph Shimon informed the committee that he and Maheu traveled together to Miami to the Fontainebleau in March 1961, to witness the Patterson-Johansson fight.(172) Once there Maheu informed him of the plot to assassinate Castro.(173) Shimon also says that during this trip he attended a meeting where a poisonous liquid to be used in the assassination was passed.(174)

(102) Shimon is probably the source for Jack Anderson's column of January 19, 1971, which fixes the date of the passage of the poison at the Fontainebleau as March 13, 1961.

(103) In any event, it appears that the CIA did not pass any pills, poison, or assassination weapons before February 1961. The fall segment of the plots only constituted a planning stage; no one undertook any operational activities.

(104) Richard Helms stated in his testimony to the committee that he doubted if the pills ever left the United States or *even* if this project was an assassination plot. He said :

I also understand that there was a question of poison pills which were supposed to be transported to Havana. There was

never any evidence they were transported there or ever left the United States. There was never any evidence that the plot ever left the Florida mainland, and if it was indeed an assassination plot, it was misadvertised to me because I had understood it was an effort to see if a connection could be made between the Mafia in Florida and the Mafia in Havana. As to the best of my knowledge, the connection never was made. (175)

(e) *Location of Trafficante*

(105) To support the description of Trafficante as a courier, the I. G. Report states that "[A]t that time the gambling casinos were still operating in Cuba, and Trafficante was making regular trips between Miami and Havana on syndicate business." (176)

(106) The committee has obtained some evidence that indicates that Trafficante was not traveling to Cuba during this period. No records available to the committee from INS, State Department, or the FBI reflect any travels after February 1960. During this time, the FBI maintained physical surveillance on Trafficante. (177) Trafficante testified before the committee that he only made two trips to Cuba after his release from the Trescorna prison, Cuba, in August 1959, and that these trips occurred within 2 to 3 months of this release. (178) Additionally, considering Trafficante's reputed top position in the La Cosa Nostra, it seems more reasonable that Trafficante would send a representative to Cuba to conduct any business rather than risk being detained by Castro again.

(107) If Trafficante was actually traveling between Miami and Havana, the implications are interesting. He was either willing to risk being detained again or had acquired assurance from the Cuban Government regarding his safety. In any event, the presence of Trafficante during the fall of 1960 in Cuba raises the possibility of a more cooperative relationship between himself and the Cuban Government than believed previously. Such a relationship during the period when Trafficante was scheming to assassinate Castro invites the theory that Trafficante was possibly informing the Cuban Government of activities in the Miami area in general and of the plots in particular. In return for such information, Trafficante could have been promised lost gambling operations as well as support and a Cuban sanctuary for the smuggling of contraband into the United States.

(108) There are enormous ramifications to such a theory and it should be stated explicitly that the committee has not received any information or evidence that would demonstrate it. In addition, the available evidence indicates Trafficante was not traveling between Miami and Havana although it is recognized that Trafficante, probably could have made such trips and not disrupt his normal route in Miami and Tampa, notwithstanding the effect of any surveillance.

(f) *Cuban exile leader's other contacts*

(109) As previously related, the FBI forwarded to the CIA a memorandum dated December 21, 1960 revealing that U.S. racketeers were making efforts to finance anti-Castro activities and subsequently forwarded another memorandum dated January 18, 1961 that associated the Cuban exile leader with those schemes. (179)

(110) Other sources were also providing assistance to the Cuban exile leader to conduct anti-Castro operations. At the time of his introduc-

tion into the CIA-organized crime plots, the Cuban exile leader was active in the Revolutionary Democratic Front and the Cuban Revolutionary Council. (180) The exile leader informed the committee that the purpose of the council stemmed from an agreement with the American Government to invade Cuba and establish democratic control of the island. (181)

(111) Adding to the support for the Cuban exile leader were the promotional efforts of Dino and Eddie Cellini who reportedly were working through a Washington, D.C., public relations firm: Edward K. Moss & Associates. Moss had previous CIA associations. He also was supposedly acting as a conduit for funds supplied by the Cellini brothers with the understanding that this group would receive privileged treatment in the Cuba of the future. (182)

(112) In his testimony before the committee the Cuban exile leader also described a meeting with an anti-Castro Cuban and Meyer Lansky in Lansky's home in Miami in the summer of 1960. (183) Lansky said he had business interests in Cuba and wanted to help the Cubans fight Castro, destroy Castro, and try and establish a democratic government. (184)

(113) The logical inference to be drawn from this is that the CIA, organized crime, and other persons interested in removing the Castro regime all settled upon the Cuban exile leader, probably independently, as a person who had the potential of uniting the multitude of exile groups to overthrow Castro. Additionally, the exile leader's reported contacts with organized crime raises the possibility that he was involved with them in a plot to kill Castro before the evolution of the CIA-organized crime plots. If this was the case, then Trafficante's recruitment of the exile leader into the CIA operation would result in providing official U.S. sanction to an already existing independent operation. The CIA recognized this in stating, "[I]t is possible that the exile leader already was involved in independent operations with the criminal syndicate when first approached prior to the Bay of Pigs in March 1961 to carry out the Castro assassination." (185)

(g) *Introduction of "Joe" and "Gold" and related events*

(114) The timing of the introduction of Giancana (Gold) and Trafficante (Joe) is important to the analysis of the true role of organized crime in the Castro assassination plots. This introduction, together with other related events, suggests further the thesis that the CIA found itself involved in providing additional resources for an independent operation that the syndicate already had commenced.

(115) According to the I. G. Report, the entrance of Giancana and Roselli occurred during the week of September 25, 1960. (186) In contrast, the SSC did not assign a precise date for their entrance because of conflicting evidence between the I. G. Report and Maheu's Senate testimony which set the date after November 1960. (187) The SSC did conclude, however, that Giancana was involved in the operation during October because of the Las Vegas wiretap incident which occurred on October 30, and because of the October 18, 1960, FBI memorandum that revealed Giancana had told several people of his involvement in a plot to assassinate Castro. (188)

(116) Although these two events that the SCC cited may support the involvement of Giancana during October, they also invite speculation

of independent organized crime operations. The October 18, 1960, FBI memorandum is particularly applicable. This states:

[D]uring a recent conversation with several friends, Giancana stated that Fidel Castro was to be done away with shortly, said it would occur in November. Moreover, Giancana said he had already met with the would-be assassin on three occasions, the last meeting taking place on a boat docked at the Fontainebleu Hotel, Miami Beach. Giancana stated everything had been perfected for killing Castro and that the assassin had arranged with a girl, not further described, to drop a "pill" in some drink or food of Castro. (189)

(117) Since the poison pills that the CIA prepared at Giancana's request were not ready for delivery until late February or early March 1961, it is doubtful that Giancana's November 1960, assassination plot was part of the CIA operation. Rather, it appears that organized crime already had its poison plan in progress, using a mistress of Castro to accomplish the deed, when the CIA entered the scene fortuitously. Organized crime then occupied a perfect position: If their private plot succeeded, they then would possess far-reaching blackmail potential against the CIA that they could exercise at an opportune moment. If their intrigue failed, however, they could then assume the position that they were only executing the directives of the Government and could possibly still use their involvement as blackmail potential.

(h) *Richard Cain*

(118) The assassination attempt that is referenced in the October 18 memo may have involved Richard Scallzetti Cain. Cain, in connection with the top echelon criminal informant program, informed the FBI of his criminal activities and close association with Giancana. (190) Cain admitted that he had worked covertly for Giancana and been on his payroll while he was a member of the Chicago Police Department from 1956-60, director of a private detective agency from 1960-62, and chief investigator for the Cook County Sheriff's Office from 1962-64. (191)

(119) Several of Cain's activities during the fall of 1960, together with his past experience, support the proposition that if Giancana was involved in any Cuban affairs, specifically an assassination of Castro independent of the CIA plot, he would have recruited Cain to assist him.

(120) First, Cain maintained a record of providing information voluntarily to the CIA concerning his foreign ventures, a practice Giancana may have promoted in an effort to gain possible leverage with the CIA. In a CIA memorandum to the FBI dated November 4, 1960, Cain supplied the following information in his first contact with the CIA:

1. That in 1950-52 while in Miami, Fla., he initiated several telephone taps on various Cuban revolutionary figures under the supervision of William Buenz, a private detective who had contact with the Batista government;

2. That on October 2, 1960, William Buenz, then operating out of New York City, met with Cain at O'Hare Airport and offered him \$25,000 to travel to Cuba at the request of former President Piro to install telephone taps on various Cubans; and



3. That is 1959, Constantine Kangles, a former attorney for the Cuban 26th of July movement, inquired whether Cain would instruct Castro army officers in the use of polygraphs.(192)

(121) It seems more than coincidental that Cain's approach to the CIA to supply this information occurred simultaneously with Giancana's meeting with Roselli and Maheu. Cain subsequently volunteered information to the CIA during 1961-63.

(122) Second, on November 2, 1960, a confidential informant told the Bureau that on October 20, 1960, Serapio Montejo, the former head of the July 26 movement in Chicago, met Richard S. Cain in the office of Constantine Kangles, the former attorney in Chicago for the Cuban 26th of July movement and former counsel in the United States for the Cuban Government headed by Fidel Castro.(193) Cain indicated to Kangles that he had clients who wished to get news stories and photographs out of Cuba concerning rebel activity in the Cuban foothills.(194) Cain indicated further that he wanted to cover this story and was soon going to Miami in an attempt to enter Cuba, and that Jack Mobley, a Chicago columnist, and Bob Ajamian, of Life magazine, had knowledge of this venture.(195)

(123) Third, on November 2, 1960, the FBI interviewed Cain in Miami at the Sands Hotel, Miami Beach.(196) Cain said he was a representative of Accurate Detective Laboratories,(197) Life magazine, and 64 other newspapers.(198) After providing information on the military armaments in Cuba, Cain said that the resistance movement had 800 men fighting in the Escambray Mountains and that he was awaiting the opportunity to parachute into the Escambrays to take photos for Life. Cain said that the Cuban exile leader gave him the information on the Cuban armaments.(200)

(124) When Cain's plans to visit Cuba, either to install wiretaps for former President Prio or to take photographs of rebel activity, or both, are considered simultaneously with Giancana's presence in Miami, Giancana's reference to the assassination of Castro in November and Cain's approach to the CIA, the true purpose and possible interrelation of these events become even more suspect. The wiretap assignment and the photographic story may have been covers: Giancana may have been attempting to send Cain to Cuba to supervise the poisoning attempt on Castro. Cain was connected to La Cosa Nostra, spoke Spanish, had extensive contacts in Latin America, was well-versed in sabotage and investigative procedures, had been on Giancana's payroll for 4 years, and apparently was attempting to arrive in Cuba by approximately November 1960.(201) Further, Cain's reference in his FBI interview to the Cuban exile leader, the person that the CIA concedes may have been active in independent organized crime assassination plots against Castro prior to his recruitment by Trafficante in March 1961, raises more suspicion.

(125) It can, therefore, be argued that these events indicate that Cain may have been the "assassin-to-be" whom Giancana referred to in the October 18, 1960, FBI memorandum, or he may have been the contact man for the operation.

(126) Cain could also have provided another service to Giancana. As already indicated, a second person, called J. W. Harrison, allegedly accompanied and assisted Balletti in the wiretap. Although the Justice

Department pursued this investigation vigorously and prepared to indict the principals, no one could determine who Harrison was and no participant would admit to knowing his identity.

(127) There is no doubt he existed: he signed the hotel register and accompanied Balletti on the flight to Las Vegas. (202) DuBois, the private investigator Maheu hired to conduct the surveillance, maintained that Maheu arranged for J. W. Harrison to accompany Balletti from Miami to Las Vegas to assist in the operation. (203) The support chief, the CIA liaison man, informed the committee that whoever Harrison was he was not a CIA employee. (204)

(128) Clearly, someone arranged for Harrison's presence and knows his true identity. Since DuBois and Balletti acted only as the instruments of Maheu, it seems logical that they would have revealed Harrison's identity in the face of Federal prosecution if Harrison were just an employee of DuBois with no connection to the CIA or to the associates of Maheu in the CIA operation against Castro. Thus, Balletti and DuBois either did not know the identity of Harrison or felt that their client's interests prohibited them from revealing such information.

(129) The theory that Maheu provided Harrison at the request of a source that had a direct interest in the surveillance seems most logical. Maheu, however, denied ever recruiting or arranging for Harrison to participate in the operation. (205) Maheu did say, however, that he instituted the surveillance to pacify Giancana's concerns in a personal matter and to uncover any possible leaks regarding the operation. (206) Roselli confirmed these two accounts in his Senate testimony. (207) Shimon informed the committee further that Giancana told him he paid \$5,000 for the Las Vegas operation. (208)

(130) Assuming that Maheu did provide for Harrison, he did so at the request of someone else. Maheu did not have any reason independently to prefer one person over another: the CIA or Giancana, however, did have such a personal interest. Giancana's interest obviously stemmed from his personal matter and it is probably correct that Giancana requested Maheu to bug the room. This personal interest could have prompted Giancana to direct Maheu to use a person of Giancana's choice: Cain fit that role perfectly. He was a skilled electronic surveillance technician and was in Miami during late October and early November, which was the debarkation point for Harrison and Balletti on their trip to Las Vegas.

(131) As already mentioned, Maheu, in a deposition to the committee, denied any knowledge of Cain. (209) When shown several photographs of Cain from the late 1950's and early 1960's, Arthur Balletti also could not identify Cain as Harrison. (210) These denials do not detract from the theory that Cain was Harrison: If no one would identify Harrison in 1960 there is no reason to expect any change in testimony.

(132) In regard to the wiretap incident, the CIA had an interest in surveilling target A (two persons were targets, target A and target B) because of the October 18, 1960, memorandum where Giancana discussed an assassination plot against Castro. The SSC concluded that this memo caused the CIA to be concerned about determining if Giancana was leaking information on the CIA-organized crime plots.

This may be partially correct, but as already indicated, the FBI memorandum depicts a plot substantially in progress and involving a girl who cannot be found in the October status of the CIA operation. The CIA could have been more concerned that Giancana was involved in a separate assassination plot and consequently could have been concerned with its nature and extent.

(133) The reasons why target A was the object of such surveillance were two-fold. First, target A's relationship with Giancana might have entailed the learning of certain clandestine activities. Second, target A was one of the "several friends" in the conversation related in the October 18 memo. (211)

(134) The CIA interest would also explain why a wiretap was installed. Maheu informed the committee that he only ordered physical surveillance of the target and could not understand why anyone installed a wiretap since the primary intent was to check on the personal matter. (212)

(135) Physical surveillance and a room bug would, admittedly, be more than adequate to uncover any evidence of the personal matter. If, however, Maheu also wished to investigate the possibility of leaks in the operation as well as the possibility of Giancana's involvement in an independent plot, then the use of a wiretap would have been logical.

(136) Assuming that investigating the personal matter was not the primary focus of the Las Vegas operation, it can be argued that direct surveillance of target A in target A's own room and other habitats, as opposed to investigating target B, would have been the optimum method to investigate for any leaks and information that Giancana may have provided. This type of investigation, however, would have run the risk of incurring the wrath of Giancana and his possible departure from the CIA assassination plots if he detected the surveillance. Through the cover of surveilling target B for a possible association with target A, however, the CIA had the opportunity to surveil target A to obtain information on the assassination plots for a reason which met the approval of Giancana. Indeed, Giancana probably always believed that his directive to investigate the personal matter was the only issue involved in the surveillance.

(137) In any event, the objectives of both Giancana and the CIA could have been achieved whether Harrison was a Giancana choice, specifically Cain, or an Agency operative.

(138) After the Las Vegas operation backfired, the CIA obviously decided to continue the assassination plots. This indicates that the Support Chief felt the security of the CIA organized crime plot had not been seriously breached. Additionally, it possibly indicates that the CIA determined that even if Giancana was involved in an independent operation, that it would not hamper their efforts, and that all interests could be reconciled.

(i) *The "girl" in the October 18, 1960, FBI memorandum*

(139) In this memo, Giancana spoke of a girl who was going to drop a pill in some food or drink of Castro. This format is again in contradiction to the CIA operation which initially relied on the Cuban official, someone close to Castro, to administer the pills.

(140) The identity of this "girl" referred to by Giancana has not been conclusively ascertained, but it is reasonable to assume that Trafficante was in a position to recruit a mistress of Castro because of his numerous contacts in the Cuban gambling and prostitution circles. Consequently, the use of a girl is quite logical and further supports the involvement of organized crime in an independent plot to kill Castro.

(141) Therefore, the CIA is probably correct in asserting what the Agency "may have been piggy-backing on the syndicate and in addition to its material contribution was also supplying an aura of official sanction." (213)

(j) articles on Frank Sturgis

(142) As indicated in section II Paul Meskill of the New York Daily News wrote several articles in 1975 and 1976 concerning activities of Frank Sturgis. These articles reflect further the theory that organized crime was involved in independent Castro assassination plots.

(143) The following points should be made about this theory; they also more thoroughly respond to the allegations in the Meskill articles:

(144) First, organized crime probably initiated independent assassination plots against Castro prior to any CIA involvement in late 1960. Such plots may have been in progress when the CIA reactivated its plans to kill Castro in April 1962.

(145) Second, organized crime could quite possibly have been directing activities such as those described in the New York Daily News article.

(146) Third, Frank Sturgis most probably established contacts with organized crime through his gambling associations and probably was used by them in some capacities. This does not mean that he was connected to organized crime.

(147) Fourth, Frank Sturgis probably knew the Cuban official and could have been involved with him in an assassination plot. Since Sturgis is not a reliable source, however, his allegations are suspect.

(148) Fifth, according to the available evidence, the CIA was not involved in any operations with the Cuban official prior to late 1960.

(149) Sixth, Sturgis was not necessarily involved with Marita Lorenz, one of Castro's witnesses or the Cuban official in a plot to kill Castro. He may have learned of plots involving the Cuban official and possibly Marita Lorenz in Miami after the Cuban official arrived there in 1965.

(150) Additionally, the April 1975 Meskill articles did not include the Sturgis-Lorenz plot to kill Castro with poison pills. It was only after the publication of the SSC interim report in November 1975 and the final Report in April 1976, that Meskill described this plot. Thus, Sturgis may have combined accurate information obtained from the Cuban official and other Miami sources with the facts the SSC presented and then fabricated the Marita Lorenz story, which, together with other evidence such as the October 18 memo, can unfortunately succeed in appearing both logical and believable.

(k) *Implications arising from phase 2*

(151) Significant differences are apparent between phase 1 and phase 2 which reflect upon organized crime's motivation and seriousness in fulfilling its part of the bargain originally initiated in 1960.

(152) First, in phase 1, Roselli and his colleagues demonstrated their ability to execute the contract on Castro by naming their source who was, indeed, in a position close to Castro. In phase 2, the modus operandi and the ability of the assassin or assassins becomes quite vague. Harvey reported that the Cuban exile leader had an asset in Cuba who had access to someone in a restaurant which Castro frequented who could administer the poison. (214) In June 1962, Roselli reported to Harvey that the Cuban exile leader had dispatched a three-man team to Cuba to recruit persons to kill Castro, or to kill him themselves, maybe with poison pills, if the opportunity arose. (215) Harvey said they had no specific plans. (216)

(153) Second, as already indicated, the cast of the organized crime figures involved changed. Mahen, Giancana, and Trafficante allegedly retired from the scene, with a "Maceo" assuming the position of Trafficante. Roselli and the Cuban exile leader remained. The CIA is probably correct in suggesting that these figures, at least Trafficante and Giancana, were kept informed of the progress of the plots.

(154) What is puzzling is the introduction of a person simply referred to as "Maceo" into a highly sensitive and covert CIA operation without any apparent attempt by the CIA to check his background or ascertain his identity. It seems extraordinary that the CIA would permit the plots to go forward without performing any security check. Indeed, it seems more logical that at least Roselli and Harvey did ascertain the identity of Maceo and for whatever reason decided to withhold this information.

(155) Further, although the I.G. Report characterized Maceo as Roselli's man, it is more probable that Trafficante, who had recruited all the Cuban personnel used previously in the attempts and who maintained the most complete network of Cuban allies in Miami and Cuba, provided this individual. If this argument can be sustained then it displays Trafficante again performing a direct role during phase 2, a function every source has denied.

(156) A related issue is whether "phases" actually existed or whether the operations to kill Castro encompassed a continuous time period. As previously indicated, the CIA suggests that the plot was dormant from the Bay of Pigs until Harvey assumed direction in the spring of 1962. Both Harvey and the Support Chief stated, however, that Harvey "took over a going operation." Considering that Roselli was immediately able to mobilize his forces in 1962 in response to Harvey's request, and that this mobilization involved the Cuban exile, whom Trafficante recruited in phase 1, it seems reasonable to assume that some of the individuals in phase 1 were actively attempting to kill Castro after the Bay of Pigs and probably until the advent of Soviet solidification. These efforts, however, may well have been conducted without CIA knowledge and further support the theory of independent organized crime plots.

(157) During late 1962 and early 1963 phase 2 terminated undramatically and slowly. In retrospect, the ambiguous modus operandi, the lack of identity of the potential assassins, the total reliance of Harvey on Roselli for any information, and the seemingly apathetic desire of the CIA to corroborate any information from Roselli, all converge to posit the theory that organized crime was not seriously

attempting to assassinate Castro following the solidification of Soviet influence in the Castro regime.

(158) In this regard Trafficante, Lansky, and other Cuban casino owners must have realized by mid-1962 that the "golden goose" of Havana had laid its last egg, and that fortunes were to be made elsewhere. Certainly, history shows growing Lansky influence in the Bahamas and Las Vegas, Trafficante projects in the Dominican Republic, and burgeoning bolita operations in Florida arising from the influx of Cuban exiles. Further, organized crime may have determined that the new Justice Department crackdown may not have permitted the "wide open" Cuba of the pre-Kennedy era even if the United States had succeeded in ousting the Cuban regime.

(159) Consequently, while the U.S. Government, specifically the CIA, still possessed a viable interest in assassinating Castro, organized crime apparently did not.

## 2. MOTIVATION OF ORGANIZED CRIME TO BE INVOLVED IN THE PLOTS

(160) Despite the reasons just presented to discontinue attempts to kill Castro, organized crime still had strong incentive to string the CIA along. Specifically, this incentive was to establish a relationship with the CIA for subsequent use in thwarting prosecution for various offenses and thus blunting any Justice Department proceedings against organized crime.

(161) It seems likely that organized crime, while always recognizing the benefits of establishing a relationship with the CIA, was also initially seriously interested in assassinating Castro to regain lost territory. As already indicated, this desire probably ebbed with the solidification of Soviet influence and other factors just mentioned. After this occurrence organized crime may only have put forth the "appearance" of involvement and good faith in the plots to define further a relationship with the CIA. Indeed, the CIA prevention of prosecution in 1961 in the Las Vegas wiretap incident would have given Maheu, Roselli, and Giancana confirmation of the value of such a relationship and impetus for continuing it in 1962 even though the assassination of Castro may no longer have been a viable alternative.

(162) The actions of Maheu, Giancana, and particularly Roselli in the years following these plots support this theory. As related in section II, these individuals actually did use their CIA affiliation and knowledge of the plots in attempts to hinder law enforcement prosecutions and objectives. (217)

(163) The success of some of their efforts verifies the tremendous blackmail potential they possessed. As Sam Papich, the FBI liaison to the CIA, commented in May 1967, Giancana and Roselli had the CIA "over a barrel" because of "that operation" and he doubted that the FBI would be able to do anything about either Giancana or Roselli because of "their previous activities" with the CIA. (218)

(164) In an interview with the committee, former Deputy Director of the CIA Richard Bissell discussed the issue of blackmail, stating that he had come to feel that the threat of blackmail by the underworld figures involved had constituted the single greatest danger in the plots. (219) Bissell, as Deputy Director for Plans, had been per-

sonally involved in the planning and authorization of the CIA-Mafia plots in 1960-61.(220) Bissell had not been interviewed by the Inspector General's Office during their 1967 investigation of the plots, and thus his recollections and views were not contained in the Inspector General's Report.(221)

(165) Bissell told the committee that he believed he and other Agency officials should have been more cognizant of the possibility of blackmail by the organized crime figures involved in the plots.(222) Bissell stated, "We didn't give it sufficient attention at that time. It was unwise. We only thought of the possibility of blackmail later."(223) The former Deputy Director recalled that the CIA's main fear at the time had been "some sort of unfavorable publicity, if by chance it leaked out," rather than the potential ramifications of entering into such a sensitive relationship with powerful criminal figures.(224) Bissell went on to state: "I knew it was serious. I knew these were Mafia leaders. And I knew they were in a position to make very damaging revelations about the Agency. But we thought it was all under control."(225)

(166) While Bissell stated that he and his colleagues had not realized the potential for blackmail when they first enlisted Mafia leaders in the assassination plots, the CIA officer who later assumed control over the continuing plots has stated he was well aware of—and fearful about—such a possibility.(226) William Harvey, the clandestine services agent who coordinated the reactivation and continuation of the plots in 1962 and 1963, testified in 1975 that he and then Deputy Director Richard Helms had concealed the existence of the assassination plots from CIA Director John McCone partly out of concern over the potential for such blackmail. In his Senate testimony, Harvey stated that he and Richard Helms decided not to inform McCone about the plots:

\* \* \* until we reached the point where it appeared it might come to fruition or had a chance to assess the individuals involved and determine exactly the problem we faced, including the possible problem—and it was a very, or it appeared to be, and in my opinion was, at that time, a very real possibility of this Government being blackmailed either by Cubans (exiles) for political purposes or by figures in organized crime for their own self-protection or aggrandizement, which as it turned out, did not happen, but at that time was a very pregnant possibility.(227)

(167) Upon learning partial details of the plots, both Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy and FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover had immediately recognized the disturbing leverage the participants in the plots had gained through their involvement with the CIA in the murder attempts. As noted earlier, Attorney General Kennedy was partially briefed about the pre-Bay of Pigs assassination attempts, authorized during the Eisenhower administration in May 1962.(228) Upon being informed of the plots, Kennedy had met with FBI Director Hoover to share the information and to voice his anger over the CIA's actions.(229) In the memorandum of their conversation prepared on May 10, 1962, Hoover stated that Kennedy had

angrily noted that the CIA's use of these figures had resulted in the possibility that "the CIA was in a position where it could not afford to have any action taken against Giancana and Maheu." (230) Hoover further noted that he had been greatly disturbed over the Agency's use of these individuals, stating, "I expressed great astonishment at this in view of the bad reputation of Maheu \* \* \*. The Attorney General shared the same views." (231)

(168) In his interview with the committee, former Deputy Director Richard Bissell stated that he had been distressed over reports that CIA Director John McCone had never been told about the Agency-Mafia assassination plots during the period in which they were occurring. (232) McCone had been appointed Director of the Agency by President Kennedy in November 1961 thus serving as head of the CIA during the last 15 months in which the plots were continuing. (233) In his Senate testimony in 1975, Richard Helms (who served as McCone's Deputy Director during the period in which the plots were continuing) stated that he could not recall telling McCone of the existence of the plots while they were occurring. (234) Helms went on to state, "[I] was trying to scratch my head as to why I didn't tell him at the time and my surmises are the best I can come up with. I am really surprised I did not discuss it with him at the time." (235) McCone's former Executive Assistant, Walter Elder, told the Senate that McCone had once notified Deputy Director Helms that "assassination could not be condoned and would not be approved," and that the Agency was never to become involved in such activity. (236) In his Senate testimony, William Harvey stated that Director McCone had once personally told him that the Agency and U.S. Government must not engage in such plots against any foreign leader, and further, that "if I got myself involved in something like this, I might end up getting myself excommunicated." (237) As noted earlier, Harvey went on to testify that he and Helms had withheld their knowledge of (and personal involvement in) the murder plots from Director McCone, partly out of fear "of this government being blackmailed \* \* \* by figures in organized crime \* \* \*." (238)

(169) Speaking of the failure of Helms, Harvey, and other Agency personnel to inform Director McCone of the plots, former Deputy Director Bissell told the committee, "The Director should have been informed. This was bad, and shouldn't have gone on." (239) Bissell, who left the Agency in January 1962, stated, "The Director should know if his subordinates—his top subordinates—are in a position of being subject to blackmail or are in fact being blackmailed by Mafia figures or anyone else. This is very bad." (240) Bissell commented that "in something that sensitive, involving national security, you shouldn't have that potential of blackmail going unknown to the Director." (241)

(170) Bissell told the committee that he would not have become involved in the early plots without then Director Allen Dulles' personal authorization, stating, "If Dulles told me not to become involved in such a thing, I know for sure I wouldn't. You can't disobey the Director." (242) Speaking of Director McCone's reported notification of both Richard Helms and William Harvey that the Agency must not become involved in assassination activity, Bissell stated, "I cannot say



what McCone's reaction would have been if he found out about such a violation of his wishes at the time. I do know that Helms would have been in a most uncomfortable position, but I can't speculate." (243) The former Agency official stated, "It's wrong. Obviously senior officials should follow directions, especially on something like that." (244) Bissell further commented, "If McCone told Helms and Harvey not to get involved, then it raises obvious questions about their actions—I would rather not speculate about this. I don't know who gave what orders to whom after I left." (245)

(171) Speaking of the CIA's withholding of all information pertaining to the existence of the CIA-underworld assassination plots from the Warren Commission, Bissell stated that the Agency probably "didn't think it was relevant I would guess." (246) Bissell further stated, "I can't believe the potential concern over blackmail by the Mafia people would have been allowed by the Agency to serve as a reason for shielding the existence" of the plots from the Presidential Commission. (247) Nevertheless, Bissell added, "I guess you couldn't absolutely rule out such a possibility." (248)

(172) Asked if he believed that the Agency would have informed the Warren Commission of the CIA plots if there had been substantive news reports at the time linking Santos Trafficante, Sam Giancana, or other organized crime leaders to the assassination of President Kennedy, Bissell stated, "I can't speculate what it would have done. I would hope so." (249) Bissell went on to state that he believed that if the Agency actually suspected such Mafia involvement in the President's murder, it would probably have informed the Warren Commission of the CIA plots. Bissell stated, "They wouldn't have liked to. But I do think they would have told Earl Warren." (250) Bissell stated his belief that had the Agency found that Trafficante or Giancana had been involved in some way with President Kennedy's assassination, it would have informed the Warren Commission of the CIA plots against Castro, even though such information would have led to the disclosure of the Agency's own prior involvement with these same Mafia elements in assassination conspiracies. (251)

### 3. RETALIATION THEORY

#### *(a) Results of the committee's investigation*

(173) The committee found no evidence that these operations provoked Premier Castro to assassinate President Kennedy in retaliation.

(174) The committee also found no specific evidence that Castro knew of CIA sponsorship of these activities or even knew of their existence prior to the death of President Kennedy. If Castro did discover their existence, however, the contention of the SSC that Castro would not have connected them with the CIA seems invalid. (252) It is recognized that only a few persons actually knew of the CIA sponsorship and that the Cuban operatives and others engaged in penetrating Cuba or directly participating in the assassination efforts were reportedly told that the U.S. businessmen and organized crime sponsored the operation. It still seems more probable, however, that while not being able to be certain, Castro would have highly suspected the CIA in any assassination plot he uncovered, at least to the degree

that he would have suspected the CIA was funding the person or persons plotting his murder. The reason is that Castro suspected the CIA of constantly attempting to overthrow his government through every possible method including assassination. Castro's meeting with Senator George McGovern where Castro gave McGovern a listing of alleged CIA-sponsored assassination plots supports this contention. (253)

(175) Consequently, there is no reason to assume that Castro would not have attributed most plots, including these plots, to the CIA.

*(b) Proponent of the retaliation theory*

(176) In an article in the Washington Post on September 9, 1976, Anderson revealed that ex-CIA agent William Harvey, attorney Edward P. Morgan, and reputed mobster John Roselli were the sources for his newspaper articles. It seems certain that John Roselli was the person who informed Harvey and Morgan about the plots and the retaliation theory; thus, only one source, John Roselli, actually existed. Further, John Roselli supplied all information concerning the operation to the CIA through either the Support Chief or William Harvey.

(177) The public dissemination of the details of the plots corresponds remarkably to the efforts of John Roselli to prevent his deportation in 1966 and 1971, and to prevent his prosecution for illegal gambling activities in 1967. These coincidences plus other evidence indicate that John Roselli manipulated the facts of the plots into the retaliation theory in efforts to force the CIA to intervene favorably into his legal affairs to prevent the further disclosure of the plots in general and the retaliation theory in particular and to prevent further waves of public paranoia. In some instances John Roselli was successful.

*(c) Summary*

(178) Even assuming that Castro did ascertain the existence of the CIA-organized crime plots and that the CIA sponsored them and ignoring the belief that Roselli fabricated the retaliation theory, it is still unlikely that Castro would have resorted to assassinating the President of the United States in retaliation for the reasons indicated in the AMLASH portion of the issue analysis section. Specifically, these reasons are:

1. The prospect of exposing Cuba to invasion and destruction would not have been worth the risk;
2. The act of changing a leader does not necessarily change the system;
3. Castro may have recognized that among the leaders of the United States, Kennedy may have maintained the least hostile approach toward Cuba; and
4. The growing prospect of détente between Cuba and the United States would have refrained Castro from assassinating an American official.

4. RELATED ORGANIZED CRIME ACTIVITIES

(179) The committee reviewed additional evidence that raises the possibility that various organized crime figures were involved in attempts to assassinate Castro that were unrelated to the efforts of the CIA.

*(a) Norman Rothman*

(180) To ascertain more information about organized crime's knowledge about Castro assassination plots, the committee investigated Norman Rothman, who was active in operating various casinos in Cuba before the Castro takeover and who consequently maintained associations with organized crime and the Batista regime.

(181) At various times, Rothman served as manager of the Sans Souci and Copacabana Clubs in Cuba representing the interests of the Mannarino brothers of Pittsburgh. (254)

(182) FBI files on Rothman indicate that a proposal to kill Castro was allegedly made to Rothman as a "quid pro quo" in which Rothman expected to avoid imprisonment for a 1960 gun running conviction. (255) During an FBI interview, Rothman stated that he had been in "personal contact with White House attorney Harry Hall Wilson, as well as Assistant Attorney General John Seigenthaler, both of Washington, D.C." and members of the Kennedy administration. (256)

(183) In a deposition to the committee taken in Miami on April 16, 1978, Rothman expanded on this theme to include a series of mysterious telegrams summoning him to the White House for a series of two or three meetings that began in Attorney General Kennedy's office with members of his staff and continued in a conference room where Rothman's assistance in providing contacts inside Cuba was explored. (257)

At the last meeting Rothman says that:

One of them happened to discuss (the assassination of Castro) with me, but not in a technical way. You know, just in a casual way. That is about it. I cannot for the moment remember it word for word because it is too far back. (258)

(184) The evidence suggesting such an approach to Robert Kennedy is entirely uncorroborated and makes little sense when viewed in light of the Justice Department crackdown on organized crime. Further, it seems extremely doubtful that any meeting with Rothman on this topic would have occurred at the White House. Consequently, it is highly unlikely that any such event ever occurred.

*(b) Name links between the AMLASH and the CIA-organized crime operations*

(185) The committee also reviewed evidence which indicates that organized crime may have been aware of the AMLASH operation during its existence.

(186) The I. G. Report identified three name links between the AMLASH operation and the organized crime operation. The I. G. Report did not sufficiently analyze, however, that the common denominator in two of the links was Santos Trafficante.

*(1) Link 1*

(187) In March 1961, the CIA received information that both a high-ranking military figure in the Castro regime and a former official close to Castro wished to defect. (259). The military officer was AMLASH and the official was the Cuban official used in phase 1 of the CIA-organized crime plots. As already indicated, the IGR documents revealed that Trafficante recruited the Cuban official.

(188) Other than the coincidence of both the Cuban official and AMLASH seeking infiltration at the same time there is nothing to suggest a relationship between the two men in attempting to assassinate Castro: no common denominator exists among Trafficante, Roselli, Giancana, or any other members of the American gambling syndicate. This link is insignificant.

(2) *Link 2*

(189) In mid-March 1965, Rafael Garcia Bongo, a Cuban lawyer whose brother occupied the prestigious position of Minister of Sports in Cuba, contacted the CIA to inform the agency that "he was in contact with a group of military officers who were planning to kill Castro." (260) It quickly became clear to CIA employees that Bongo's reference was to AMLASH and the group of military men who were allied with him in attempting to depose Castro. (261) Although the I. G. Report and the T.F. Report were silent regarding an attitude toward Bongo's information, it must be assumed that the CIA did not respond affirmatively since the AMLASH operation was in progress at the time and the process of delivering arms caches to the Cuban official's people within Cuba was underway.

(190) Interestingly, Bongo identified himself to Agency personnel as a lawyer who represented the Capri Hotel and Casino in Havana, and who had been jailed in July 1962, for a period of 75 days, allegedly as a reprisal for representing Santos Trafficante. (262) Bongo's utilization of the short prison term to establish his "bona fides" is questionable since Trafficante was in jail during August 1959. For the Cuban Government to wait 3 years to exact retribution for that representation seems unlikely. Possibly, Bongo was involved in approaching the Castro government in 1962 on Trafficante's behalf for permission to reopen the Capri casino.

(191) One aspect of the Bongo-Trafficante relationship deserves fuller treatment. As already indicated, it has been reported by Jack Anderson that the secret source until his death, John Roselli, had reason to speculate that Cubans recruited originally by Santos Trafficante to kill Castro were "turned around" and sent back to the United States where they were directly involved in the assassination of President Kennedy. If this line of hypothecation is adopted, then the trip by Bongo could assume other implications such as the possibility that Bongo's real purpose in contacting the CIA was to act as a double agent for Castro in ascertaining the nature and scope of the AMLASH operation. Castro probably became aware of the meetings with AMLASH in the fall of 1964 since the list of charges upon which AMLASH went to trial in 1966 began with these meetings. If Castro had begun his suspicions of AMLASH's role with the CIA during late 1964 or early 1965, it is likely that he would have begun counterintelligence measures to confirm his fears that could have led to Castro sending Bongo on the trip to contact the Agency. Given the Trafficante-Bongo relationship, it can be postulated that Trafficante would have been aware of Bongo's true mission prior to his departure or at least became knowledgeable at some later date.

(192) Given the extent of Trafficante's high-level contacts within the exile community and the low-level security in the CIA exile operations, it is therefore logical that Trafficante and other members of

the underworld knew, in some fashion, part or all of the AMLASH plot. The question becomes: So what? Short of being able to blackmail the Government about the modus operandi of the 1960-62 events, the significance of mob knowledge of AMLASH is not readily apparent.

(193) If, however, Trafficante was a double agent, working for the CIA but actually supplying information to Castro, then another scenario emerges. It is then logical to assume that Castro knew of the AMLASH and CIA-organized crime operations from their inception. As mentioned earlier in this material, Trafficante could have received a sanctuary and assistance in smuggling contraband for such information. As also discussed earlier, this knowledge would not, however, have prompted Castro to kill President Kennedy. Nevertheless, contemporaneous knowledge of the plots would have been beneficial for another reason: Castro would then have been able to neutralize the effects of the assassination plots.

(194) Consequently, while any contacts between AMLASH and Bongo would not have necessarily effected the untenability of the retaliation theory, they would have been extremely valuable.

### (3) *Link 3*

(195) The SSC may have intended to imply that information contained in the I.G. Report from "A," an anti-Castro Cuban, raised the possibility that a link existed between the AMLASH operations and the 1960-62 CIA plots to assassinate Castro using underworld contacts. (263)

(196) A review of the I.G. Report did not sustain such conjecture. While the I.G. Report indicated that as of 1965, "A" had knowledge of AMLASH's plans to assassinate Castro, and thus possibly knew about the AMLASH operation, (264) there was no available evidence cited in the I.G. Report, however, to suggest that "A" had knowledge of, or involvement with, any of the syndicate or Cuban exiles who participated in Phase 1 or 2 of the CIA-Mafia assassination plots during 1960-62. To make this connection requires seizing upon the I.G. Reports tentative identification of "name links" between the 1960-62 organized operation and AMLASH intrigue, and expanding the amorphous nature of those "name links," which included "A," so that a possible theory could emerge that "A" was the conduit through which the syndicate became knowledgeable of both the AMLASH operation and the initial CIA efforts to eliminate Castro.

(197) The only basis for such a nexus between AMLASH and the 1960-62 CIA syndicate plots is based upon "A's" exile activities in June-July 1963. (265) Reports of these activities detailed his involvement with anti-Castro exiles and "underworld figures" who were operating the guerrilla training camp in New Orleans in July 1963.

(198) The "underworld figures" reference related to Michael and William McLaney, who have been considered organized crime affiliates by some law enforcement and media personnel. Again, however, no evidence from any source places either of the McLaney brothers into the early CIA plots to kill Castro or into the AMLASH operation. A review of the June-July 1963 activities of McLaney and "A" led only to the inference that their operation was a private limited venture with no agency or syndicate support and little chance of success.

(199) Since the Senate did not interview either of the McLaney brothers or "A" nor ask principals of the 1960-62 plots of their knowledge of or relationship to McLaney or "A" the question of organized crime knowledge of the full range of CIA Castro plots was based on little investigation. What little "evidence" there is consists partially of "A's" admission to being friends with "Cappy" Rothman, Norman Rothman's son, and of "A's" casual knowledge of American gamblers gained from his visits to Havana casinos during his student days. There is no evidence, however, that Rothman, or any other associate of "A", were knowledgeable of the AMLASH or CIA-organized crime operations.

(200) Other evidence pertains to Mike McLaney's ties to organized crime, which have been investigated within Federal law enforcement agencies since the 1950's. No solid evidence, however, has linked him to Trafficante, Roselli, or Giancana, possibly because McLaney has most frequently been mentioned with Meyer Lansky. To establish a link between McLaney and the principals in the 1960-62 plots, requires a series of hurdles that include:

1. Meyer Lansky was a plotter with Trafficante;
2. McLaney was Lansky's "action" man; and
3. The various underworld figures acted in concert in promoting anti-Castro operations.

(201) These premises are not easily supportable with facts. Consequently, there is no evidence to support a possible "A" link.

##### 5. DEATHS OF ROSELLI AND GIANCANA

(202) As indicated earlier, both Sam Giancana and John Roselli were murdered: Sam Giancana was shot in the basement of his home in Chicago in June 1975, just prior to his scheduled testimony before the SSC regarding the CIA-organized crime plots; John Roselli's butchered body was found inside an oil drum which was floating in Key Biscayne Bay, Fla., in August 1976, shortly after his testimony before the SSC regarding the CIA-organized crime plots.

(203) Various theories have surfaced concerning why they were killed and who was responsible. One theory relevant to this investigation is that Giancana and Roselli were killed because of their participation in the Castro assassination plots and the SSC attempts to elicit information on the plots. In this regard, Trafficante has most often been the person assigned responsibility for the deaths. On the other hand, the Justice Department informed the committee that it believes that organized crime performed the murders for reasons that were unrelated to the CIA-organized crime plots. (266)

(204) The Justice Department is still investigating both murders. The committee has not uncovered evidence relevant to solving these murders. It is likely, however, that a variety of motivations inspired the deaths. These motivations included internal mob conflict, especially in the case of Giancana, and participation and knowledge of the CIA-organized crime plots.

(205) It is quite possible that Trafficante approved of and assisted in the murder of John Roselli. Trafficante's motivation could have been to maintain a low profile in connection with the CIA plots and

to prevent disclosure of other unknown persons involved in the plots as well as other operations and activities which an investigation of the plots might uncover. This does not mean that such activities were necessarily connected to the assassination of President Kennedy. For instance, Trafficante may have wished to protect a covert relationship with Castro that may have entailed his running contraband through Cuba into the United States.

(206) Consequently, although the deaths of Roselli and Giancana may have been related to the CIA-organized crime operations, they are not necessarily related to the assassination of President Kennedy.

**6. CIA ACTIONS IN CONCEALING THE REACTIVATION AND CONTINUATION OF THE ASSASSINATION PLOTS FROM ATTORNEY GENERAL ROBERT F. KENNEDY**

(207) From an examination of the CIA's use of organized crime in assassination conspiracies against Castro, it appears that the Agency concealed the continuation of those plots in 1962 and 1963 from Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy.

(208) As already indicated in section II, part B, Attorney General Kennedy had been told of the pre-Bay of Pigs phase of the plots during a CIA briefing on May 7, 1962. (267) Rather than the CIA volunteering this information about the existence of such plots, the meeting had come about when Attorney General Kennedy had inadvertently learned that the CIA had secretly utilized the services of former FBI Agent Robert Maheu and Chicago Mafia leader Sam Giancana a year earlier. (268) This information had surfaced during the course of a wiretap prosecution against Maheu; a prosecution the Agency had warned might "result in most damaging embarrassment to the U.S. Government." (269)

(209) During the briefing CIA officials Sheffield Edwards and Lawrence Houston informed Kennedy about the Agency's use of the underworld in a 1960-61 plot to assassinate Castro. (270) As the CIA's own evidence and internal records of the plots has shown, as well as the Senate committee's investigation of the matter, Edwards and Houston told Attorney General Kennedy that the assassination efforts against Castro had begun during the Eisenhower administration, had climaxed at the time of the Bay of Pigs invasion, and "had been terminated completely." (271)

(210) Yet, as the CIA (272) and Senate evidence makes clear, and as the committee's investigation has confirmed, the CIA-organized crime plots were actually being reactivated and intensified at the very time that Agency officials were telling Attorney General Kennedy that they had been "terminated." (273) In the I. G. Report, it was noted that:

The Attorney General was not told that the gambling syndicate (assassination) operation had already been reactivated, nor, as far as we know, was he ever told that CIA had a continuing involvement with U.S. gangster elements. (274)

(211) While noting the accuracy and veracity of the preceding conclusion from the I.G. Report other statements in the I.G. Report that seemingly attempt to justify, excuse, or even deny the CIA's concealment of this important information about the plots from Attorney General Kennedy have been disturbing.

(212) Lawrence Houston, the CIA's former general counsel, testified in 1975 that Attorney General Kennedy had voiced strong anger over the CIA's use of the Mafia during his briefing by Edwards and Houston on May 7, 1962. (275) Houston, who testified that while Edwards was familiar with the plots, he (Houston) was not, stated that Kennedy had specifically ordered that he be personally notified before the Agency ever considered utilizing organized crime figures again. (276) Houston testified: "If you have ever seen Mr. Kennedy's eyes get steely and his jaw set and his voice get low and precise, you get a definite feeling of unhappiness." (277) Houston testified that Kennedy had stated, "I trust that if you ever try to do business with organized crime again—with gangsters—you will let the Attorney General know." (278) Former Office of Security Director Edwards similarly testified that Kennedy had demanded, "I want you to let me know about these things." (279)

(213) In the 1967 I.G. Report, it was noted that Attorney General Kennedy believed that as a result of the meeting, he would be told of any such future actions contemplated by the Agency. The Inspector General concluded, "From reports of the briefing, it is reasonable to assume that Kennedy believed he had such a commitment from Agency representatives." (280)

(214) The Inspector General's report then went on to conclude, however, that Edwards had "probably acted properly" in concealing knowledge of the reactivation and continuation of the Mafia plots from Robert F. Kennedy. The CIA report stated:

The gambling syndicate operation had been taken from him, and, in retrospect, he probably acted properly in briefing the Attorney General on only that aspect of the operation for which he had been responsible and of which he had direct, personal knowledge. (281)

(215) One page later in the report, the Inspector General went on to state: The Attorney General on May 7, 1962, was given a full and frank account of the Agency's relations with Maheu, Roselli, and Giancana in the Castro operation \* \* \*. (282) These inconsistencies in the Inspector General's report, the official Agency document on the CIA-Mafia assassination conspiracies, demonstrate a lack of good faith. The statement that Edwards "probably acted properly" in concealing the continuation of the murder plots from Attorney General Kennedy is misleading and inexcusable. This statement is all the more disturbing when considering that the Inspector General's Office knew that Edwards' own assistant was then still involved in the plots, with Edwards' personal knowledge. (283) Further the I.G. Report's description of the briefing on May 7, 1962 as "full and frank" is also untruthful, in light of the reactivation and continuation of the plots under the direction of Deputy Director Richard Helms, CIA agent William Harvey, and Mafia leader John Roselli. Additionally, the Inspector General also knew that Edwards had personally prepared a fraudulent internal memorandum for the files, in which he stated falsely that the assassination plot and utilization of John Roselli was being dropped. (284)

(216) The implications of the I. G. Report's conclusions about the adequacy and propriety of Sheffield Edwards and Lawrence Hous-



ton's May 1962 briefing of Attorney General Kennedy are serious. The Inspector General's Office was cognizant of the fact that Edwards had withheld—and thereby concealed—the continuation of the plots from the President's brother, Robert Kennedy, and more importantly, that this concealment of information concerning the Mafia murder plot was in direct disobedience to the Attorney General's personal direction. (217) The concealment of the reactivation and continuation of the CIA-Mafia assassination plot from Attorney General Kennedy—and hence, in all likelihood President Kennedy—was serious. The Inspector General's apparent endorsement and justification of such concealment in the report prepared for Director Helms in 1967 is also troublesome.

(218) The Agency's withholding of information pertaining to the CIA-Mafia assassination attempts from the Warren Commission becomes all the more troubling when the withholding of the same matters from the Attorney General (who did ask for such information in 1962) is considered.

(219) While the propriety of these Agency actions in 1962 and 1964 must be seriously questioned, the judgments and statements of the I. G. Report must be weighed just as seriously. As the most important embodiment of internal checks and balances within the Agency, the Inspector General's Office is intended to serve the function of conducting official internal reviews and investigations of potential wrongdoing and internal abuse. The findings and judgments of the Inspector General have long been integral to the continuing integrity and well being of the Agency's operations and activities.

Consequently, the judgments reached by the Inspector General in 1967 regarding the propriety of Sheffield Edwards' actions in the briefing of Attorney General Kennedy about the assassination plots in May of 1962 tainted the function of the Office of the Inspector General. To state in 1967 that Edwards had "probably acted properly" in withholding the important information that he did, and to characterize the May 7 briefing as "full and frank," represents a serious mistake in judgment. As former Director Richard Helms described the plots themselves, it is "not \* \* \* very savory." (285)

Submitted by:

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#### REFERENCES

(1) *The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies*, book V, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations, April 23, 1976, p. 2. Senate No. 94-755 (hereinafter cited as *Book V*).

(2) The complete details of the AMLASH and CIA-organized crime plots can be reviewed in book V and *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, Interim Report, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations, November 20, 1975, Senate Report No. 94-465 (hereinafter cited as *interim report*).

(3) 1967 Report of the Inspector General, Central Intelligence Agency, p. 14 (hereinafter cited as *I. G. Report*); Interim Report at p. 74.

(4) See generally, *I. G. Report*.

(5) *Id.* at pp. 3, 14.

(6) *Id.* at p. 3.

(7) *Id.* at p. 15.

- (8) Ibid.
- (9) Ibid.
- (10) Ibid., p. 16. There is some disagreement between Robert Maheu and the Support Chief over who suggested that Roselli be contacted; each believes the other did. In any event, Maheu initiated the contact with Roselli.
- (11) Id. at p. 19.
- (12) Ibid.
- (13) Id. at p. 20.
- (14) Id. at p. 25.
- (15) Id. at p. 27.
- (16) Ibid.
- (17) Ibid.
- (18) Id. at p. 28.
- (19) Id. at p. 29.
- (20) Id. at p. 31.
- (21) Id. at p. 32.
- (22) The CIA contends that the plots were dormant after the Bay of Pigs (see fn. 6). The possibility exists, however, that the plots were an on-going operation.
- (23) I. G. Report, p. 39.
- (24) Interim Report, p. 83.
- (25) I. G. Report, p. 48.
- (26) Id. at pp. 47, 49.
- (27) Id. at p. 49.
- (28) Id. at p. 51.
- (29) Ibid.
- (30) Id. at p. 52.
- (31) Interim Report, p. 77.
- (32) Interim Report, pp. 78-79.
- (33) FBI memorandum to Sullivan from Wannall, "CIA's Intention to Send Hoodlums to Cuba to Assassinate Castro," March 6, 1967.
- (34) FBI blank letterhead memorandum to the Attorney General from the Director, FBI, March 6, 1967.
- (35) Interim Report, p. 79.
- (36) Interview with Edward Pierpont Morgan, HSCA, June 22, 1978, p. 1 (JFK document No. 009530).
- (37) Ibid.
- (38) Ibid.
- (39) Interim Report, footnote 4, at p. 85.
- (40) Ibid.
- (41) Ibid.
- (42) Ibid.
- (43) Ibid.
- (44) Ibid. See also Deposition of Robert Maheu, August 8, 1978, HSCA, p. 30 (J. F. K. document No. 012926), in which Maheu discusses the issue of Roselli using Agency connections as assistance in court proceedings. Maheu stated that Roselli's attorney called him to ask him to participate in a statement to be submitted in the Friar's Club case regarding Roselli's involvement in the CIA-organized crime plots.
- (45) Book V, p. 14.
- (46) Ibid.
- (47) See fn. 36, Interview of Morgan, p. 3.
- (48) Book V, p. 80.
- (49) See fn. 36, Interview of Morgan, p. 2.
- (50) Id. at p. 3.
- (51) Book V, p. 82.
- (52) Ibid. The I. G. Report noted in reference to the release of these plots that: Pearson's "ultimate source," Roselli, knows more about certain details of the gambling syndicate operation than we do, and he evidently has talked (I. G. Report, p. 126).
- (53) FBI airtel, to Director, FBI, from SAC Washington Field Office, March 21, 1967, FBI document No. 62-109060-4839.
- (54) Ibid., p. 3.
- (55) Ibid. It should be noted that during this time, March 1967, Roselli met with Jim Garrison in Las Vegas. Garrison, of course, was then in the midst of his highly publicized trial into the death of President Kennedy. The I. G. Report

stated: The Roselli-Garrison contact in Las Vegas in March is particularly disturbing (I. G. Report, p. 127).

- (56) Book V, pp. 85, 86.
- (57) Id. at pp. 85-86.
- (58) I. G. Report, pp. 101-103.
- (59) Id. at p. 103.
- (60) Id. at p. 104.
- (61) The Washington Post, Jan. 18, 1971, section B, p. 7; Jan. 19, 1971, section D, p. 15.
- (62) Interim Report, footnote 4, at p. 85.
- (63) Ibid.
- (64) Book V, p. 1.
- (65) Id. at p. 68.
- (66) Ibid.
- (67) Id. at p. 5.
- (68) Id. at p. 2.
- (69) Ibid.
- (70) 1977 Task Force Report, Central Intelligence Agency, pp. 1, 2 (hereinafter cited as T. F. Report).
- (71) Ibid., tab A, at pp. 1-2.
- (72) Paul Meskill, New York Daily News, Apr. 20, 1975.
- (73) Paul Meskill, New York Daily News, Apr. 21, 1975.
- (74) Paul Meskill, New York Daily News, Apr. 21, 1975 and Apr. 23, 1975.
- (75) Paul Meskill, New York Daily News, June 13, 1976.
- (76) Book V, p. 80.
- (77) T. F. Report, tab C, p. 15.
- (78) Ibid., tab C, p. 17.
- (79) Id. at p. 19.
- (80) Id. at p. 18.
- (81) T. F. Report, at tab C, p. 19.
- (82) Id. at p. 20.
- (83) Ibid.
- (84) Ibid.
- (85) T. F. Report, tab D, p. 1.
- (86) Ibid.
- (87) Id. at pp. 1, 2.
- (88) Ibid.
- (89) Id. at p. 5.
- (90) Ibid.
- (91) Ibid.
- (92) Id. at p. 8.
- (93) Id. at p. 8.
- (94) Ibid.
- (95) Ibid.
- (96) Id. at p. 9.
- (97) Ibid.
- (98) Ibid.
- (99) Id. at p. 10.
- (100) Id. at p. 11.
- (101) Id. at p. 13.
- (102) Id. at p. 14.
- (103) Id. at p. 15.
- (104) Id. at p. 16.
- (105) Ibid.
- (106) Ibid.
- (107) T. F. Report, p. 10.
- (108) Jack Anderson and Les Whitten, "Behind John F. Kennedy's Murder," The Washington Post, Sept. 7, 1976; "CIA Withheld Data in J. F. K. Probe," The Washington Post, Sept. 9, 1976; "Roselli Points From His Grave," The Washington Post, Oct. 23, 1978; "The Story Behind Trafficante's Testimony on J. F. K. Assassination," The Washington Post, Oct. 2, 1978.
- (109) For this reason information previously footnoted in this report which is used in the following analysis may not be cited again.
- (110) Executive session testimony of Richard Helms, Aug. 9, 1978, hearings before the House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 26-27.
- (111) See reference No. 106.

- (112) Affidavit of Joseph Langosch, Sept. 14, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 1.
- (113) Book V, pp. 3, 8, 79.
- (114) Ibid.
- (115) Affidavit of Joseph Langosch, Sept. 14, 1978, p. 4.
- (116) Ibid.
- (117) Affidavit of Kent L. Pollock, Oct. 5, 1978 House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 1.
- (118) Ibid., par. 3, p. 2.
- (119) Ibid., par. 4, p. 2.
- (120) Interview of Fidel Castro Ruz, House Select Committee on Assassinations, Apr. 3, 1978, pp. 38, 39 (J. F. K. document No. 011776).
- (121) Id. at p. 40.
- (122) Id. at pp. 2, 3.
- (123) Interim Report, p. 173.
- (124) Id. at p. 174.
- (125) Ibid.
- (126) Ibid.
- (127) Ibid.; see in particular p. 76.
- (128) Interim Report, p. 76; fn. 1.
- (129) Deposition of Robert Maheu, House Select Committee on Assassinations, Aug. 8, 1978, p. 18 (J. F. K. document No. 012926).
- (130) Immunized testimony of Santos Trafficante, Sept. 28, 1978, hearings before House Select Committee on Assassinations, 95th Congress, 2d Session (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), volume V, p. 361.
- (131) Affidavit of the Support Chief, House Select Committee on Assassinations, Sept. 25, 1978, pp. 7, 8.
- (132) Id. at p. 8.
- (133) Ibid.
- (134) I. G. Report at p. 19.
- (135) Deposition of Robert Maheu, Aug. 8, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 17 (J. F. K. document No. 012926).
- (136) Interim Report, p. 77.
- (137) Ibid., footnote 1, p. 77.
- (138) Jack Anderson, "The Untold Story: Our Government's Crackdown on Organized Crime." The Washington Post, Parade magazine, Jan. 21, 1962.
- (139) Such a distinction is invalid: the action of dealing with any criminal sources in a plot to kill is reprehensible enough.
- (140) Interim Report, p. 74.
- (141) Id. at p. 74.
- (142) Ibid.
- (143) Affidavit of the Support Chief, House Select Committee on Assassinations, Sept. 25, 1978, p. 12.
- (144) Ibid.
- (145) Both Maheu and the Support Chief attribute each other with suggesting that John Roselli be recruited. See Interim Report, p. 75.
- (146) Interim Report, p. 75.
- (147) Interim Report, p. 77.
- (148) Ibid.
- (149) Interview of Joseph Shimon, House Select Committee on Assassinations, Aug. 17, 1978, p. 4 (J. F. K. document No. 013889). See also Interview of Joseph Shimon, British Broadcasting Corporation, Dec. 19, 1977, p. 6.
- (150) See footnote 149: Interview of Joseph Shimon, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 4; BBC Interview, p. 2.
- (151) This contention refers only to the CIA-organized crime plots and not to any independent operation that Giancana may have been involved in.
- (152) I. G. Report, p. 25.
- (153) Id. at p. 27.
- (154) Id. at p. 29.
- (155) Ibid.
- (156) Id. at p. 31.
- (157) See ref. 130, immunized testimony of Santos Trafficante, Sept. 28, 1978, volume V, p. 361.
- (158) Id. at p. 365.
- (159) Id. at p. 363.

- (160) *Id.* at p. 365.
- (161) Testimony of John Roselli, Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations, June 24, 1975, p. 20.
- (162) Affidavit of the Support Chief, Sept. 25, 1978, p. 17.
- (163) I. G. Report, p. 19.
- (164) Support Chief, p. 17.
- (165) Executive session testimony of Cuban exile leader, hearings before House Select Committee on Assassinations, Mar. 16, 1978, p. 58.
- (166) I. G. Report, p. 43.
- (167) *Id.* at p. 48.
- (168) *Ibid.*
- (169) *Ibid.*
- (170) *Id.* at p. 49.
- (171) *Id.* at p. 27.
- (172) Interview of Joseph Shimon, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 3 (J. F. K. Document 013889).
- (173) *Ibid.*
- (174) *Ibid.*
- (175) See reference 110, Testimony of Richard Helms, volume IV, pp. 5-250.
- (176) I. G. Report, p. 19.
- (177) See file on Santos Trafficante at the Department of State.
- (178) See ref. 130, Immunized Testimony of Santos Trafficante, volume V.
- (179) I. G. Report, p. 29.
- (180) See ref. 165, executive session testimony of Cuban exile leader, hearings before House Select Committee on Assassinations, Mar. 16, 1978, pp. 7, 10.
- (181) *Id.* at p. 10.
- (182) I. G. Report, p. 30.
- (183) See reference 180, executive session testimony of Cuban exile leader.
- (184) *Ibid.*
- (185) T. F. Report, tab C, p. 19.
- (186) I. G. Report, p. 18.
- (187) Interim Report, ref. 2, p. 76.
- (188) *Ibid.*
- (189) FBI memorandum, Oct. 18, 1960, to the Director, CIA, from J. Edgar Hoover, subject: "Anti-Castro Activities IS-CUBA," file No. 109-584-2053.
- (190) FBI report, Mar. 8, 1973, Richard Cain file, 92-12846-11.
- (191) *Ibid.* Cain's superiors dismissed him from office in 1964 when Cain went to trial in a drug case investigation. After 1964, Cain traveled extensively with Giancana throughout the world and also served a 3-year sentence in the Texarkana Federal penitentiary following a 1969 conviction for conspiracy in the 1963 robbery of Franklin Park Bank, Illinois. As a result of the bank robbery Cain became a target of the TOP echelon criminal informant program. Early in his career, Cain established a reputation for experience in sabotage, polygraphs, and electronic surveillance. Cain was reportedly fluent in Italian and Spanish and traveled extensively throughout Latin America. In 1973, Cain was slain in gangland fashion in a Chicago restaurant. See generally FBI file on Richard Scallzetti Cain, file 92-12846.
- (192) CIA memorandum to FBI, Nov. 4, 1960, to the Director, FBI, from Deputy Director of Plans, CIA, file No. 105-93264-2, subject: Cain.
- (193) FBI letterhead memorandum, Nov. 2, 1960, office: Chicago, Ill.; subject: Anti-Fidel Castro Activities—Internal Security—Cuba; file No. 105-93264; also contained in Richard Cain file, which was supplied to House Select Committee on Assassinations. See also FBI report, Dec. 1, 1960, Chicago, Ill., subject: Accurate Detective Laboratory, aka, Cain Investigation, file No. 139-1403-3.
- (194) *Ibid.*
- (195) *Ibid.*
- (196) FBI blank letterhead airtel, Nov. 3, 1960, to the Director from SAC, Miami, subject: Military and Naval Matters—Cuba; file No. 105-93264.
- (197) *Ibid.*
- (198) *Ibid.*
- (199) *Ibid.*
- (200) *Ibid.*
- (201) See reference 191.

(202) FBI report, Apr. 11, 1961, subject: Arthur James Balletti, p. 3, contained in House Select Committee on Assassinations request to FBI of Aug. 10, 1978. See also Dec. 23, 1960 FBI interview of Balletti contained in FBI report, Jan. 28, 1961, Arthur James Balletti, J. W. Harrison, file No. 139-1201-15.

(203) FBI report, Jan. 28, 1961, Arthur James Balletti, J. W. Harrison, file No. 139-1201-15, p. 4 (interview of Edward DuBois).

(204) Outside Contact Report of Support Chief, House Select Committee on Assassinations, Sept. 19, 1978 (J. F. K. document No. 012367).

(205) Interview of Robert Maheu on June 2, 1961 contained in FBI report, June 9, 1961, subject: Balletti, Unknown Subject; file No. 139-1201-50.

(206) Deposition of Robert Maheu, Aug. 8, 1978, p. 42 (J. F. K. document No. 012926).

(207) Interim Report, p. 79.

(208) Interview of Joseph Shimon, Aug. 17, 1978, p. 5 (J. F. K. document No. 013889).

(209) See reference 44, deposition of Robert Maheu, p. 46.

(210) Outside contact report of Arthur Balletti, Aug. 14, 1978, p. 3 (J. F. K. document No. 010826).

(211) Outside contact report, review of FBI file, Mar. 16, 1979 (J. F. K. document No. 014932).

(212) See footnote 44, deposition of Robert Maheu, p. 40.

(213) T. F. Report at p. 20. To support the proposition further that organized crime may have had separate plots in progress before the CIA-Mafia plots, it is interesting to note the series of news articles during July and August of 1960 that related a serious "sickness" Castro was combatting. The Cuban Government said the sickness was pneumonia. See articles in the New York Times, July 11, 12, 31, Aug. 1, 7, and 11, 1960.

(214) I. G. Report, p. 50.

(215) Id. at p. 51.

(216) Ibid.

(217) Id. at p. 74, where the CIA states that Maheu is aware of three times that the CIA intervened on Maheu's behalf to prevent any prosecution.

(218) Id. at p. 131.

(219) House Select Committee on Assassinations staff interview of Richard Bissell, Dec. 15, 1978 (J. F. K. document No. 014997).

(220) "Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders," p. 74.

(221) Staff interview of Richard Bissell, Dec. 15, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J. F. K. document No. 014997).

(222) Ibid.

(223) Ibid.

(224) Ibid.

(225) Ibid.

(226) "Alleged Assassination Plots," p. 102.

(227) Id. at p. 69. The 1967 Inspector General's report took note of the leverage that those involved in the murder plots had attained as a result of their association with the CIA. In one section of the report (pages 128-129) titled, "*Should we try to silence those who are talking or might later?*" (emphasis theirs), the Inspector General's Office noted that one or more of the conspirators, most likely John Roselli, was then leaking information about the plots to newsmen Drew Pearson and Jack Anderson. The report discussed the possibility that Agency pressure could be brought to bear on Roselli and the others to preserve the secrecy of the past assassination plots. The report went on to note that, "None of them would have compunctions about dragging in his CIA connection when he was being pushed by law enforcement authorities."

(228) Id. at p. 133.

(229) Ibid.

(230) Ibid.

(231) Ibid.

(232) Staff interview of Richard Bissell, Dec. 15, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J. F. K. document No. 014997).

(233) "Alleged Assassination Plots," pp. 84-85, 99-103.


(234) Id. at p. 100.

(235) Id. at p. 101.

(236) Id. at p. 106.

(237) Id. at p. 105.

- (238) Id. at p. 102.
- (239) Staff interview of Richard Bissell, Dec. 15, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J. F. K. document No. 014997).
- (240) Ibid.
- (241) Ibid.
- (242) Ibid.
- (243) Ibid.
- (244) Ibid.
- (245) Ibid.
- (246) Ibid.
- (247) Ibid.
- (248) Ibid.
- (249) Ibid.
- (250) Ibid.
- (251) Ibid.
- (252) Book V, p. 68.
- (253) Castro report, Senator George McGovern (J. F. K. document No. 000593).
- (254) See generally, FBI files pertaining to Norman Rothman: File No. 87-57043, file No. 97-4030, volumes 3, 5, 6.
- (255) FBI files on Norman Rothman; see specifically FBI Interview of Norman Rothman, June 29, 1961, SA John P. Lenchin and George E. Davis, Jr.
- (256) Ibid.
- (257) Deposition of Norman Rothman, Apr. 6, 1978, p. 56 (J. F. K. document No. 007235).
- (258) Id. at p. 68.
- (259) I. G. Report, p. 80.
- (260) Id. at pp. 103-104.
- (261) Ibid.
- (262) Ibid.
- (263) Book V, pp. 11-14; I. G. Report, p. 105.
- (264) I. G. Report, p. 105.
- (265) Book V, pp. 11-14; I. G. Report, p. 105.
- (266) Outside contact report, Edward Sharp, Department of Justice Special Investigations Division, June 7, 1978 (J. F. K. document No. 009888).
- (267) Interim Report, pp. 131-132.
- (268) Ibid.
- (269) Ibid.
- (270) Ibid.
- (271) Id. at p. 74.
- (272) Id. at p. 132.
- (273) Id. at pp. 83-84, 133.
- (274) Id. at p. 133. The Inspector General sets forth Robert F. Kennedy's partial knowledge of the plots in a similar manner in another section of the 1967 report. In an analysis of the newspaper column by Drew Pearson and Jack Anderson in 1967, in which it was stated that, "Robert Kennedy may have approved (the) plot," the Inspector General's report disagreed with that statement. The report stated: "Not true. He was briefed on Gambling Syndicate—Phase One after it was over. He was not briefed on Phase Two." The report went on to state (pp. 118-119) that Pearson and Anderson had "a garbled account of the role played by Robert Kennedy."
- (275) Interim Report, p. 133.
- (276) Ibid.
- (277) Ibid.
- (278) Ibid.
- (279) Ibid.
- (280) I. G. Report, p. 64.
- (281) Id. at pp. 64-65.
- (282) Id. at p. 66.
- (283) Interim Report, p. 134.
- (284) Ibid.
- (285) Id. at p. 103.





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ROSE CHERAMIE

Staff Report  
of the  
Select Committee on Assassinations  
U.S. House of Representatives  
Ninety-fifth Congress  
Second Session

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March 1979

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(197)



## ROSE CHERAMIE

(1) According to accounts of assassinations researchers, a woman known as Rose Cheramie, a heroin addict and prostitute with a long history of arrests, was found on November 20, 1963, lying on the road near Eunice, La., bruised and disoriented. (1) She was taken to the Louisiana State Hospital in Jackson, La., to recover from her injuries and what appeared to be narcotics withdrawal. (2) Cheramie reportedly told the attending physician that President Kennedy was going to be killed during his forthcoming visit to Dallas. (3) The doctor did not pay much attention to the ravings of a patient going "cold turkey" until after the President was assassinated 2 days later. (4) State police were called in and Cheramie was questioned at length. (5) She reportedly told police officers she had been a stripper in Jack Ruby's night club and was transporting a quantity of heroin from Florida to Houston at Ruby's insistence when she quarreled with two men also participating in the dope run. (6) Cheramie said the men pushed her out of a moving vehicle and left her for dead. (7) After the assassination, Cheramie maintained Ruby and Lee Harvey Oswald had known each other well. (8) She said she had seen Oswald at Ruby's night club and claimed Oswald and Ruby had been homosexual partners. (9)

(2) Ironically, the circumstances of Rose Cheramie's death are strikingly similar to the circumstances surrounding her original involvement in the assassination investigation. Cheramie died of injuries received from an automobile accident on a strip of highway near Big Sandy, Tex., in the early morning of September 4, 1965. (10) The driver stated Cheramie had been lying in the roadway and although he attempted to avoid hitting her, he ran over the top of her skull, causing fatal injuries. (11) An investigation into the accident and the possibility of a relationship between the victim and the driver produced no evidence of foul play. (12) The case was closed. (13)

(3) Although Cheramie's allegations were eventually discounted, her death 2 years later prompted renewed speculation about her story. It was noted, for example, that over 50 individuals who had been associated with the investigation of the Kennedy assassination had died within 3 years of that event. (14) The deaths, by natural or other causes, were labeled "mysterious" by Warren Commission critics and the news media. (15) The skeptics claim that the laws of probability would show the number of deaths is so unlikely as to be highly suspect. (16) As detailed elsewhere, the committee studied such claims and determined they were erroneous. (17) Nevertheless, allegations involving Rose Cheramie, often counted among the "mysterious" deaths, was of particular interest to the committee, since it indicated a possible association of Lee Harvey Oswald and Jack Ruby; an association of these individuals with members of organized crime; and possible connection between Cheramie's confinement at the State Hospital in Jackson, La.

and Oswald's search for employment there in the summer of 1963.

(4) The committee set out to obtain a full account of the Cheramie allegations and determine whether her statements could be at all corroborated. The committee interviewed and deposed pertinent witnesses. Files from U.S. Customs and the FBI were requested. Information developed during the investigation by New Orleans District Attorney Jim Garrison was examined. Records of Cheramie's hospitalization at the East Louisiana State Hospital were studied.

(5) Hospital records indicate Melba Christine Marcades, alias Rose Cheramie, was brought to the State Hospital in Jackson, La. by police from Eunice on November 21, 1963 and officially admitted at 6 a.m.(18) She was originally from Houston, Tex., where her mother still lived. (19) She was approximately 34 years old in 1963, had used many aliases throughout her lifetime and had lived many years in Louisiana and Texas.(20)

(6) According to the clinical notes, the deputy accompanying Cheramie said the patient had been "picked up on [the] side of [the] road and had been given something by the coroner." (21) The coroner in Eunice was contacted by doctors at the hospital and he told them Cheramie had been coherent when he spoke with her at 10:30 p.m., November 20, but he did administer a sedative.(22) He further indicated that Cheramie was a 9-year mainlining heroin addict, whose last injection had been around 2 p.m., November 20.(23) The doctors noted that Cheramie's condition upon initial examination indicated heroin withdrawal and clinical shock.(24)

(7) Relevant to Cheramie's credibility was an assessment of her mental state. From November 22 to November 24, Cheramie required close attention and medication.(25) On November 25 she was transferred to the ward.(26) On November 27 she was released to Louisiana State Police Lieutenant Fruge.(27)

(8) The hospital records gave no reference as to alleged statements made by Cheramie or why she was released to Lieutenant Fruge on November 27, 1963. These records do indicate Cheramie had been hospitalized for alcoholism and narcotics addiction on other occasions, including commitment to the same hospital in March 1961 by the criminal court of New Orleans.(28) During this stay, the woman was diagnosed as ". . . without psychosis. However, because of her previous record of drug addiction she may have a mild integrative and pleasure defect."(29) Her record would show she has "intervals of very good behavior" but at other times she "presents episodically psychopathic behavior" indicative in her history of drug and alcohol abuse, prostitution, arrest on numerous, if minor, charges.(30)

(9) The committee interviewed one of the doctors on staff at East Louisiana State Hospital who had seen Cheramie during her stay there at the time of the Kennedy assassination.(31) The doctor corroborated aspects of the Cheramie allegations. Dr. Victor Weiss verified that he was employed as a resident physician at the hospital in 1963.(32) He recalled that on Monday, November 25, 1963, he was asked by another physician, Dr. Bowers, to see a patient who had been committed November 20 or 21.(33) Dr. Bowers allegedly told Weiss that the patient, Rose Cheramie, had stated before the assassination that President Kennedy was going to be killed.(34) Weiss questioned Cheramie about

her statements.(35) She told him she had worked for Jack Ruby. She did not have any specific details of a particular assassination plot against Kennedy, but had stated the "word in the underworld" was that Kennedy would be assassinated.(36) She further stated that she had been traveling from Florida to her home in Texas when the man traveling with her threw her from the automobile in which they were riding.(37)

(10) Francis Fruge, a lieutenant with the Louisiana State Police in 1963, was the police officer who first came to Cheramie's assistance on November 20, 1963, had her committed to the State Hospital, and later released her into his custody following the assassination to investigate her allegations.(38) As such, he provided an account further detailing her allegations and the official response to her allegations.

(11) Fruge was deposed by the committee on April 18, 1978.(39) He told the committee he was called on November 20, 1963 by an administrator at a private hospital in Eunice, La. that a female accident victim had been taken there for treatment.(40) She had been treated for minor abrasions, and although she appeared to be under the influence of drugs since she had "no financial basis" she was to be released.(41) Fruge did what he normally did in such instances. As the woman required no further medical attention, he put her in a jail cell to sober up.(42) This arrangement did not last long. The woman began to display severe symptoms of withdrawal.(43) Fruge said he called a doctor, who sedated Cheramie and Fruge transported Cheramie to the State hospital in Jackson, La.(44)

(12) Fruge said that during the "1 to 2 hour" ride to Jackson, he asked Cheramie some "routine" questions.(45) Fruge told the committee:

She related to me that she was coming from Florida to Dallas with two men who were Italians or resembled Italians. They had stopped at this lounge . . . and they'd had a few drinks and had gotten into an argument or something. The manager of the lounge threw her out and she got on the road and hitchhiked to catch a ride, and this is when she got hit by a vehicle.(46)

Fruge said the lounge was a house of prostitution called the Silver Slipper.(47) Fruge asked Cheramie what she was going to do in Dallas: "She said she was going to, number one, pick up some money, pick up her baby, and to kill Kennedy."(48) Fruge claimed during these intervals that Cheramie related the story she appeared to be quite lucid.(49) Fruge had Cheramie admitted to the hospital late on November 20.(50)

(13) On November 22, when he heard the President had been assassinated, Fruge said he immediately called the hospital and told them not to release Cheramie until he had spoken to her.(51) The hospital administrators assented but said Fruge would have to wait until the following Monday before Cheramie would be well enough to speak to anyone.(52) Fruge waited. Under questioning, Cheramie told Fruge that the two men traveling with her from Miami were going to Dallas to kill the President.(53) For her part, Cheramie was to obtain \$8,000 from an unidentified source in Dallas and proceed to Houston with the two men to complete a drug deal.(54) Cheramie was also supposed to

pick up her little boy from friends who had been looking after him.(55) (14) Cheramie further supplied detailed accounts of the arrangement for the drug transaction in Houston.(56) She said reservations had been made at the Rice Hotel in Houston.(57) The trio was to meet a seaman who was bringing in 8 kilos of heroin to Galveston by boat.(58) Cheramie had the name of the seaman and the boat he was arriving on.(59) Once the deal was completed, the trio would proceed to Mexico.(60)

(15) Fruge told the committee that he repeated Cheramie's story to his supervisors and asked for instructions.(61) He was told to follow up on it.(62) Fruge promptly took Cheramie into custody—as indicated in hospital records—and set out to check her story.(63) He contacted the chief customs agent in Galveston who reportedly verified the scheduled docking of the boat and the name of the seaman.(64) Fruge believed the customs agent was also able to verify the name of the man in Dallas who was holding Cheramie's son.(65) Fruge recalled that the customs agent had tailed the seaman as he disembarked from the boat, but then lost the man's trail.(70) Customs closed the case.(71)

(16) Fruge had also hoped to corroborate other statements made by Cheramie. During a flight from Houston, according to Fruge, Cheramie noticed a newspaper with headlines indicating investigators had not been able to establish a relationship between Jack Ruby and Lee Harvey Oswald.(72) Cheramie laughed at the headline, Fruge said.(73) Cheramie told him she had worked for Ruby, or "Pinky," as she knew him, at his night club in Dallas and claimed Ruby and Oswald "had been shacking up for years.(74) Fruge said he called Capt. Will Fritz of the Dallas Police Department with this information.(75) Fritz answered, he wasn't interested.(76) Fritz and the Louisiana State Police dropped the investigation into the matter.(77)

(17) Four years later, however, investigators from the office of District Attorney Garrison in New Orleans contacted Fruge.(78) Fruge went on detail to Garrison's office to assist in the investigation into the Kennedy assassination.(79)

(18) During the course of the New Orleans D.A.'s investigation Fruge was able to pursue leads in the Cheramie case that he had not checked out in the original investigation. Although there appeared to be different versions as to how Cheramie ended up by the side of the road, and the number and identity of her companions, Fruge attempted to corroborate the version she had given him. Fruge spoke with the owner of the Silver Slipper Lounge.(80) The bar owner, a Mr. Mac Manual since deceased, told Fruge that Cheramie had come in with two men who the owner knew as pimps engaged in the business of hauling prostitutes in from Florida.(81) When Cheramie became intoxicated and rowdy, one of the men "slapped her around" and threw her outside.(82)

(19) Fruge claims that he showed the owner of the bar a "stack" of photographs and mug shots to identify.(83) According to Fruge, the barowner chose the photos of a Cuban exile, Sergio Arcacha Smith, and another Cuban Fruge believed to be named Osanto.(84) Arcacha Smith was known to Kennedy assassination investigators as an anti-Castro Cuban refugee who had been active in 1961 as the head of the New Orleans Cuban Revolutionary Front.(85) At that time, he befriended anti-Castro activist and commercial pilot David Ferrie, who

was named and dismissed as a suspect in the Kennedy assassination within days of the President's death.(86) Ferrie and Arcacha Smith were also believed to have had ties with New Orleans organized crime figure Carlos Marcello.(87) Arcacha Smith moved from the New Orleans area in 1962 to go to Miami and later to settle in Houston.(88) The weekend following the assassination, Ferrie took a trip to Houston and Galveston for a little "rest and relaxation," while police searched New Orleans for him after receiving a tip he had been involved in the assassination.(89) The committee has found credible evidence indicating Ferrie and Oswald were seen together in August 1963 in the town of Clinton, La., 13 miles from the hospital in Jackson where Cheramie was treated and where Oswald reportedly sought employment. Allegations regarding Arcacha Smith and Ferrie and the committee's investigation are set forth in detail elsewhere in the Report.(90) Clearly, evidence of a link between Cheramie and Arcacha Smith would be highly significant, Arcacha Smith, however, denied any knowledge of Cheramie and her allegations. Other avenues of corroboration of Fruge's identification of Cheramie's traveling companion as Sergio Arcacha Smith and further substantiation of Cheramie's allegations remained elusive.

(20) U.S. Customs was unable to locate documents and reports related to its involvement in the Cheramie investigation although such involvement was not denied.(91) Nor could customs officials locate those agents named by Fruge as having participated in the original investigation, as they had since left the employ of the agency.(92)

(21) Since the FBI had never been notified by the Louisiana State Police and U.S. Customs of their interest in Cheramie, the FBI file did not have any reference to the Cheramie allegations of November 1963.(93) FBI files did give reference to the investigation of a tip from Melba Mercades, actually Rose Cheramie, in Ardmore, Okla. that she was en route to Dallas to deliver \$2,600 worth of heroin to a man in Oak Cliff, Tex.(94) She was then to proceed to Galveston, Tex., to pick up a load of narcotics from a seaman on board a ship destined for Galveston in the next few days.(95) She gave "detailed descriptions as to individuals, names, places, and amounts distributed."(96) Investigations were conducted by narcotics bureaus in Oklahoma and Texas and her information was found to be "erroneous in all respects."(97)

(22) A similar tale was told in 1965: FBI agents investigated a tip from Rozella Clinkscales, alias Melba Mercades, alias Rose Cheramie.(98) Like the stories told in 1963, Cheramie-Clinkscales claimed individuals associated with the syndicate were running prostitution rings in several southern cities such as Houston and Galveston, Tex., Oklahoma City, Okla. and Montgomery, Ala. by transporting hookers, including Cheramie-Clinkscales, from town to town.(99) Furthermore, she claimed she had information about a heroin deal operating from a New Orleans ship.(100) A call to the Coast Guard verified an ongoing narcotics investigation of the ship.(101) Other allegations made by Cheramie-Clinkscales could not be verified. Further investigation into Cheramie-Clinkscales revealed she had apparently previously furnished the FBI false information concerning her involvement in prostitution and narcotics matters and that she had been confined to a mental institution in Norman, Okla. on three

occasions. (102) FBI agents decided to pursue the case no further. (103) The FBI indicated agents did not know of the death of their informant on September 4, 1965, occurring just 1 month after she had contacted the FBI. Louisiana State Police investigating Cheramie's fatal accident also apparently did not know of the FBI's interest in her.

Submitted by,

PATRICIA ORR, *Researcher.*

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- (2) Ibid.
- (3) Ibid.
- (4) Ibid.
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- (6) Ibid.
- (7) Ibid.
- (8) Ibid.
- (9) Ibid.
- (10) Louisiana State Police Memo, from Lt. Francis Fruge, Parish of St. Landry, April 4, 1967, in (JFK Document No. 013520).
- (11) Ibid.
- (12) Ibid.
- (13) Ibid.
- (14) "The Bizarre Deaths . . ." See FN No. 1.
- (15) Ibid.
- (16) Ibid.
- (17) See Anti-Castro Cuban section of the Staff Reports.
- (18) East Louisiana State Hospital, Jackson, La., records for Melba Christine Marcades AKA Rose Cheramie, (JFK Document No. 006097).
- (19) Ibid.
- (20) Ibid. Note: FBI records list Cheramie's (Marcades) birthdate as October 14, 1932, in Dallas, Tex. (See FBI file No. 166-1640 in JFK Document No. 012979).
- (21) Ibid.
- (22) Ibid.
- (23) Ibid.
- (24) Ibid.
- (25) Ibid.
- (26) Ibid.
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- (28) Ibid.
- (29) Ibid.
- (30) Ibid.
- (31) HSCA Contact Report, July 5, 1978, Bob Buras (with Dr. Victor Weiss), (JFK Document No. 009699).
- (32) Ibid.
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- (36) Ibid.
- (37) Ibid.
- (38) HSCA Contact Report, April 7, 1978, Bob Buras (with Mr. Francis Louis Fruge), p. 1 (JFK Document No. 014141).
- (39) HSCA Deposition of Francis Louis Fruge, April 18, 1978 (JFK Document No. 014570).
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- (41) Id. at p. 5.
- (42) Ibid.
- (43) Id. at p. 6.
- (44) Ibid.
- (45) Id. at p. 8.
- (46) Ibid.
- (47) Id. at p. 9.



- (48) Id. at p. 13.  
 (49) Ibid.  
 (50) Ibid.  
 (51) Id. at p. 12.  
 (52) Ibid.  
 (53) Id. at p. 13.  
 (54) Id. at p. 14.  
 (55) Ibid.  
 (56) Ibid.  
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 (58) Ibid.  
 (59) Ibid.  
 (60) Ibid.  
 (61) Ibid.  
 (62) Id. at p. 15.  
 (63) Id. at p. 17; East Louisiana State Hospital, Jackson, La., records for Melba Christine Marcades AKA Rose Cheramie (JFK Document No. 006097).  
 (64) HSCA Deposition of Francis Louis Fruge, April 18, 1978, p. 20 (JFK Document No. 014570).  
 (65) Id. at p. 22.  
 (66) Ibid.  
 (67) Id. at p. 18.  
 (68) Id. at p. 22.  
 (69) Id. at p. 23.  
 (70) Ibid.  
 (71) Ibid.  
 (72) Id. at p. 19.  
 (73) Ibid.  
 (74) Ibid. Note: Fruge also indicated the Club was called the "Pink Door," although Ruby is not known to have ever had a club by this name. See also, Louisiana State Police Memo., April 4, 1967, from Lt. Francis Fruge, Parish of St. Landry, in JFK Document No. 013520).  
 (75) Id. at p. 20.  
 (76) Ibid.  
 (77) Ibid.  
 (78) Id. at p. 24.  
 (79) Id. at p. 25.  
 (80) Id. at p. 27-8.  
 (81) Id. at p. 27.  
 (82) Id. at p. 28. See also HSCA Contact Report, April 7, 1978, Bob Buras (with Francis Louis Fruge) (JFK Document No. 0141414).  
 (83) Id. at p. 28.  
 (84) Id. at p. 28, 30.  
 (85) See Staff Report on Anti-Castro Cuban activity.  
 (86) Ibid.  
 (87) Ibid.  
 (88) Ibid.  
 (89) See Staff Report on Anti-Castro activity.  
 (90) Ibid.  
 (91) See Staff Memo.. Rose Cheramie File, contact with Dennis Cronin, U.S. Customs (JFK Document No. 013520).  
 (92) HSCA Contact Report, June 26, 1978, Marty Daly (with U.S. Customs), (JFK Document No. 009481).  
 (93) See FBI file No. 166-1604 for Melba Christine Marcades, Vol. 1 of 1, (JFK Document No. 012979).  
 (94) Id. at FBI 166-1604-3, February 11, 1966, Enclosure No. 1.  
 (95) Id. at FBI 166-1604-2, December 14, 1965, Enclosure.  
 (96) Ibid.  
 (97) Ibid.  
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 (100) Id. at p. 2.  
 (101) Id. at p. 4.  
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