

Rec Evidence re HATA

II - References dealing with the period from 1 January 1939 to 1 March 1941:

1. Record page 3780, 3844, Mr. John Goette testified that on 27 September 1939, a defendant SUZUKI in a conversation with him in Tokyo stated that since they could not get Generalissimo Chiang-kai-Shek on their side, the war against China would go on. This was shortly after the defendant HATA became War Minister.
2. Record page 3500-3501. Exhibit No. 261 is a collection of speeches by Foreign Minister MATSUOKA, Yosuke, delivered in 1941, in one of which he states the following:

" \* \* \* The work of the establishment of MANCHUKUO is the first step of the Reconstruction of the New Order in East Asia and at the same time was the herald of the construction of the World New Order and its position in the world history should be said to be very important. The true significance of the MANCHURIAN Incident will be realized for the first time when the reconstruction of the New Order in East Asia will be accomplished, for which we are now making every endeavor."

III - References dealing with the period from 1 March 1941 to August, 1945:

1. The references particularly applicable to HATA at this particular time are, so far as I have been able to determine up to now, statements of atrocities perpetrated in China during the period when he was Commander in Chief of all the Japanese armies in China. Attached hereto is a compilation of these references which I have obtained from the Chinese Division.

NOTE: I have particularly looked for references in the record in the China phase of the case in preparing this paper. Other references to later periods will be forwarded at such time as I find these further references.



1. On 14 February 1938 Shunroku HATA succeeded MATSUI as Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Expeditionary Force in Central China. On 1 March 1941 he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Expeditionary Force in China. He allowed his soldiers to indulge in rapes, arsons, murders etc.
2. Shunroku HATA started and completed an attack on Wuchang-Hankow and helped the Chinese traitors form a puppet government for the specific purpose of usurping the sovereignty of China.
3. Shunroku HATA declared that the complete occupation of the whole of China was a matter of absolute necessity. As a leader and perpetrator of the aggressive war in China, he should be held responsible for all war crimes and atrocities committed by the Japanese Army under his command.
4. During the tenure of his office as War Minister in 1940, he was opposed to the moderate policy of the accused MINAMI, and submitted to the Japanese Government a proposal for the establishment of an all-out war-time system together with other demands. Undoubtedly, he is one of the most cruel and furious members among the Japanese Militarists.

Incl



5. During the period from 1941 to 1942, he started in succession three big aggressive campaigns in northern Hunan Province with himself as Commander-in-Chief. Both the number of the innocent Chinese people killed and the amount of the property destroyed cannot be measured.



The following is an index to various testimonies, affidavits and interrogations (already presented before the Tribunal) concerning crimes for which HATA, Shunroku, should be held responsible.

I. Testimonies:

1. Testimony of Mr. John B. Powell concerning the inhuman treatment he underwent in the Japanese internment camp in Shanghai following his arrest by the Japanese on 20 December 1941. (See Record of Court Proceedings, Pages 3270-3314)
2. Testimony of Mr. A. A. Dorrance concerning the execution by Japanese soldiers of the Chinese prisoners of war. (See Record of Proceedings, Pages 3390-3414)
3. Testimony of Mr. Harold Frank Gill concerning the opium situation in Shanghai after the Japanese occupation of the City. (See Record of Court Proceedings, Pages 4407-4423)

II. Affidavits:

1. IPS Doc. No. 2077, Court Exhibit No. 360 - Affidavit by Liu Chun-Ju concerning Japanese atrocities in Ping Chuan District, Jehol Province, in August 1941. The members of over 300 families were killed and one entire village was burned by Japanese troops.
2. IPS Doc. No. 2100, Court Exhibit No. 355 - Affidavit by Chang Lia-Sun concerning Japanese atrocities in Ping Yang District, Kwangsi Province, on 26 November 1944. Two Chinese civilians were killed by Japanese troops aside from robbery.
3. IPS Doc. No. 2102, Court Exhibit No. 357 - Affidavit by Wei Liao-Shih concerning Japanese atrocities in Ping Yang District, Kwangsi Province, on 15 November 1944. Murders, pillages, rapes and arsons were indulged in by Japanese troops in the said district.
4. IPS Doc. No. 2103, Court Exhibit No. 358 - Affidavit by Wei Li-Shih concerning Japanese atrocities in Chow Hsu Hsien on 15 November 1944. Japanese troops indulged in plundering, rapes and murders.



5. IPS Doc. No. 2105, Court Exhibit No. 359 - Affidavit by Chow Ju-Tao concerning Japanese atrocities in Ping Yang District, Kwangsi Province, on 2 November 1944. Murder.
6. IPS Doc. No. 2106, Court Exhibit No. 331 - Affidavit by Chen Kun-Ching concerning Japanese atrocities in Kiang Ling District, Hupeh Province, on 5 March 1943. Arson and robbery.
7. IPS Doc. No. 2107, Court Exhibit No. 332 - Affidavit by Yao Tseng-Wu concerning Japanese atrocities in Kiang Ling District, Hupeh Province, on 5 March 1943. Arson and plundering.
8. IPS Doc. No. 2108, Court Exhibit No. 333 - Affidavit by Ho Hui-Ching concerning Japanese atrocities in Kiang Ling District, Hupeh Province, on 15 September 1943. Arson.
9. IPS Doc. No. 2109, Court Exhibit No. 334 - Affidavit by Wei Ching-Fang concerning Japanese atrocities in Kiang Ling District, Hupeh Province, on 15 September 1943. Arson.
10. IPS Doc. No. 2110, Court Exhibit No. 335 - Affidavit by Leo Foo-Shan concerning Japanese atrocities in Kiang Ling District, Hupeh Province, on 15 September 1943. Arson.
11. IPS Doc. No. 2111, Court Exhibit No. 336 - Affidavit by Liu Huan-Chang concerning Japanese atrocities in Kiang Ling District, Hupeh Province, on 15 September 1943. Arson.
12. IPS Doc. No. 2112, Court Exhibit No. 337 - Affidavit by Ho Ming-Hai concerning Japanese atrocities in Kiang Ling District, Hupeh Province, on 15 September 1943. Arson and plundering.
13. IPS Doc. No. 2113, Court Exhibit No. 338 - Affidavit by Young Chao-Shung concerning Japanese atrocities in Kiang Ling District, Hupeh Province, on 15 September 1943. Arson and plundering.
14. IPS Doc. No. 2114, Court Exhibit No. 339 - Affidavit by Ho Chen-Kuen concerning Japanese atrocities in Kiang Ling District, Hupeh Province, on 15 September 1943. Arson.



15. IPS Doc. No. 2115, Court Exhibit No. 340 -  
Affidavit by Wei Chin-Fang concerning Japanese  
atrocities in Kiang Ling District, Hupeh Province,  
on 15 September 1943. Arson.
16. IPS Doc. No. 2169, Court Exhibit No. 350 -  
Affidavit by Wang Shi-Ziang concerning Japanese  
atrocities in Tai Shang District, Kwantung  
Province, on 4 July 1944. Massacre, Arson, robbery, etc.
17. IPS Doc. No. 2170, Court Exhibit No. 351 -  
Affidavit by Liu Chi-Yuan concerning Japanese atrocities  
in Wei Yang District, Kwantung Province, on 21  
December 1941. Massacre of about 2,000 innocent Chinese  
civilians.
18. IPS Doc. No. 2217, Court Exhibit No. 341 -  
Affidavit by Tamura, Nobusada, concerning Japanese  
atrocities in Changsha, Hunan Province, in September  
1941. Robbery and massacre.
19. IPS Doc. No. 2218, Court Exhibit No. 342 -  
Affidavit by Hsieh Chin-Hua concerning Japanese  
atrocities in Changsha, Hunan Province, on 17 June  
1944. Massacre and arson.
20. IPS Doc. No. 2222, Court Exhibit No. 344 -  
Affidavit by Ti-Shu-Tang concerning Japanese atrocities  
in Yoo Yang District, Hupeh Province, in May 1942, and  
also the inhuman treatment he underwent as prisoner of  
war in Japan.

III. Interrogation of the accused HATA, Shunroku. (See Record  
of Court Proceedings, Pages 3443-3452)

Note - The testimonies and affidavits concerning the Rape of  
Nanking are not included herein.



23 May 1947

To: Mr. Sutton

From: Mr. Crowe

Subject: Record References Pertaining to the Defendant, Hata.

I herewith forward a revised paper on the above subject, including additional record references.

*Smith N. Crowe Jr.*  
Smith Crowe

The girl misunderstood me so there will have to be attached to the former report as replacements for numerals II and III. Number I is the same in both papers.

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2. Record page 3500-3501. Exhibit No. 261 is a collection of speeches by Foreign Minister MATSUOKA, Yosuke, delivered in 1941, in one of which he states the following:

" \* \* \* The work of the establishment of MANCHUKUO is the first step of the Reconstruction of the New Order in East Asia and at the same time was the herald of the construction of the World New Order and its position in the world history should be said to be very important. The true significance of the MANCHURIAN Incident will be realized for the first time when the reconstruction of the New Order in East Asia will be accomplished, for which we are now making every endeavor."
3. Record page 6082-6083. Exhibit No. 498 is a telegram headed "Tokyo, 8 September 1939," marked "Top Secret," to the German State Secretary by Ambassador Ott. The telegram reads as follows:

"The Ambassador in Moscow, SHIRATORI, will return from Rome, since at that time he had taken up the post of Ambassador purely in the expectation that he would succeed in concluding an Italian-Japanese-German military alliance."
4. Record page 6148-6150. Exhibit No. 514 is a telegram sent to Germany from the German Ambassador Ott in Tokyo on the 23rd of March, 1940. In the telegram Ott noted a stiffening of the Japanese attitude toward England and America and stated the following:

"Noteworthy is the report of strong words by the spokesman of the army in the Diet and statements by the War and Navy Ministers that Japan's progress in China cannot be stopped by the obsolete Nine Power Treaty. This attitude has obviously been influenced by the opposition of the Anglo-Saxon powers to the New Chinese Central Government."
5. Record page 6150-6151. Exhibit No. 515 is a telegram to the Reich Foreign Ministry from the Ambassador in Tokyo dated May 10, 1940. In this telegram the Ambassador stated that the Yonai-Arita government was striving for rapprochement with England and America, but that he



considered the realization of this unlikely "in view of America's stubborn attitude, and the markedly stronger anti-British opinions in the Army, the people, and some economic circles."

6. Record page 6190-6211. Exhibit No. 527 is the minutes of the joint conference of War, Navy and Foreign Ministers on the strengthening of harmony between Japan, Germany and Italy, dated July 12, 1940. Hata did not appear but the War Ministry was represented by Lieutenant Colonel Takayama. This document showed the strong Japanese desire for the conclusion of the Military alliance between Japan, Germany and Italy as a means of realizing the Japanese Empire's plan of expansion in East Asia and the South Seas. At this meeting it is agreed that the plan be indicated in the form of a diplomatic note, except in the case of the recognition of Japan's position in French-Indo China and the Dutch East Indies, wherein it was resolved that the formality of an agreement may be issued. The details of the plan appear on Record page 6203 to 6211.
7. Record page 6212-6232. Exhibit No. 528 bearing the date of July 16, 1940, is the minutes of the adjourned conference unifying the opinions of the Army, Navy and Foreign Ministers on these plans. Lieutenant Colonel Takayama again represented the War Ministry and said on page 6214 that he agreed with the plan as a whole.
8. Record page 6233-6237. Exhibit No. 529 is the text of a radio speech by Foreign Minister Arita of the Yonai Cabinet. In this speech he stated that Japan was now engaged in the task of establishing a new order in East Asia and that the countries of East Asia and in the regions of the South Seas were very closely related to each other and should naturally be unified under a single sphere. He further stated that Japan expected the Western powers to refrain from interferences in East Asia. Hata was at this time War Minister.
9. Record page 6238. Exhibit No. 530 is a telegram dated July 1, 1940, from Ambassador Ott in Tokyo to the German government in which he stated that the originally intended attempt of the Foreign Minister to announce a more active Foreign Policy was thwarted by protests from the opposition led by the Army and the growing influence of the Army results from the stronger military attitude toward Hong Kong and Indo China (stronger attitude mentioned was to be one indicating that the government had never deviated from the Axis policy.)
10. Record page 6239-6240. Exhibit No 531 is a telegram from Ott to Germany dated July 3, 1940, in which he stated that the Army protests were on the grounds that the policy of



sympathy with the Axis is not compatible with the policies hitherto pursued by the Cabinet and because the Army wanted to avoid the Yonai-Arita Cabinet using a sudden stress of friendship with the Axis as a move to defeat the opposition, which is close to the Axis, and thus save its own existence. He understood that the Press Chief of the Foreign Minister who disclosed the original text of Arita's speech and answered the Army's protests was arrested for indiscretion.

11. Record page 6240-6257. Exhibit No. 532 is an excerpt from Kido's Diary relating the story behind the downfall of the Yonai Cabinet. On page 6243 the Diary shows that Kido obtained information that War Minister Hata would take the opportunity to submit an important proposal to Premier Yonai. On page 6244 the Diary shows that War Minister Hata submitted his resignation from the Cabinet at 9 a.m., July 16, 1940.
12. Record page 6257-6258. Exhibit No. 533 is a telegram from Tokyo for the German General Staff dated July 17, 1940. The first paragraph of this telegram reads as follows:

"1) In accordance with the Cabinet change, forced by the Army, a speedy Japanese transition to a more active anti-English policy is to be expected. I have strictly confidential information from Japanese General Staff that siege batteries have been already mobilized for attack on Hong-kong in the case that it might be necessary."
13. Record page 6259-6260. Exhibit No. 534 is an entry from Kido's Diary dated July 14, 1940. Kido states that he had heard from War Minister Hata that in the Four Ministers' Conference on the 12th it had been decided that preparations would be pushed for a heavy artillery mobilization for the purposes of a South China campaign.
14. Record page 6262-6263. Exhibit No. 536 is a telegram from Woermann, a member of the German Foreign Ministry in Berlin, dated 22 July 1940. In this it is stated that the new Yonai Cabinet will establish a foreign policy of rapprochement with the Axis powers. This was decided by the Ministers including War Minister Tojo.
15. Record page 6266-6267. Exhibit 539 is an entry from Kido's Diary dated July 18, 1940. Kido states that the Emperor told him that the War Minister (Hata) had just secretly recommended Tojo for War Minister and Yamashita, Tomoyuke, for Inspector General for the Air Forces.
16. Record page 6268. This is a statement by Mr. Tavenner showing the defendant, Hata, was appointed Military Councillor on July 22, 1940, the day after he was replaced as War Minister by Tojo.



17. Record page 6293-6294. Exhibit 546 is a document signed by the German Ambassador Ott and dated July 31, 1940 in Tokyo. This telegram reads as follows:

"According to reliable information, the Japanese action against the British Spy Service, organized all over the land, was carried out at the demand of the new War Minister, Tojo. The War Minister is hereby pursuing two aims.

"1. Acute aggravation of Anglo-Japanese relations, to drive them as much as possible to a breaking point and to hasten the action against British possessions in East Asia desired by the Army.

"2. A blow against the influential pro-British groups - viz court and economic circles - which, impressed by the energetic action, will be dissuaded from further pro-British activity."

This record reference shows the action taken by Tojo immediately after his ascendancy to the post of War Minister for which he was recommended by Hata. We may assume that Hata's recommendation was an important factor in his elevation to the post, and this telegram, dated ten days after he became War Minister, precludes there having been a change of opinion on Tojo's part during such a short period between his recommendation by Hata and this telegram.

18. Record page 6824-6825. Exhibit No. 619 is an excerpt from Kido's Diary of June 19, 1940, in which he stated that he had talked with the Foreign Minister and discussed two plans which were debated the day before in a Four Ministers' Conference relative to the French Indo-China situation. These two plans and the comments by Kido are as follows:

"(1) That a request be submitted regarding the Pro-Chiang acts, and in case the request is refused by the French that force be employed;

"(2) That force be employed at once from the beginning on the idea that negotiation is unnecessary.

"The military ministers wanted the second plan not to be adopted at present. It was their idea to have the first part of the first plan put into effect at once, and to decide, after waiting for a reply, whether to resort to force or not. The above policy was decided upon."

19. Record page 15744-15745. Exhibit 2198 is a telegram from Ambassador Ott in Tokyo to the German Army dated September 6, 1939. It states, among other things, the following:



"The speeches on the Japanese side exchanged at yesterday's reception of German Military and Air attaches by former Japanese War Minister, General ITAGAKI, and successor, General HATA, were of a definitely hearty character."

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2. Record page 11384-11387. Exhibit No. 1281 is an excerpt from Kido's Diary of April 4, 1945. On page 11,386 he states that Marshal Hata and Marshal Sugiyama "have been decided upon to go out as Commanders-in-Chief of the defense structure."



MEMORANDUM FOR: **Mr. Crowe** 5 June 1947  
**Mr. Sutton**  
 FROM: **EDWARD P. MONAGHAN, Chief,**  
**Investigative Division, IPS**  
 SUBJECT: **Defense Witness**

1. Please find attached hereto list of material available on the following witness and/or witnesses.

DEFENDANT

**Hata, Shunroku**

The attached information has been taken from the compiled report prepared by MIS. The report was previously classified secret; however, this classification has been cancelled and at the present time does not carry any classification. It will be noted that much of this information has been furnished in curriculum vitae obtained from the Cabinet Secretariat's office.

WITNESS

LIST OF MATERIAL AVAILABLE

**Hata, Shunroku** Info. from MID Report

2. Please acknowledge receipt of this memorandum by initialling and returning attached carbon copy to this office, Room 300.

Incl  
 (Described above)

EDWARD P. MONAGHAN



**Field Marshal Shunroku HATA:** Member Supreme Military Council. Head of one of two General Army Commands in Japan Proper

1879 July Born Hokkaido. Brother of Late General Eitaro Hata.  
Married Chiyo, sister of Kuroku Ikebe  
1901 Graduated Military Academy  
1907 Graduated Military Staff College  
1920 Studied in Germany  
1926 Commander Fourth Brigade, Field Artillery  
1927 Chief, Fourth Section, General Staff Office  
1931 Inspector General of Artillery  
1933 Commander 14th Division  
1935 Director Army Aviation Department  
1936 Commander Japanese garrison in Formosa  
1937 Aug. General  
1938 Member Supreme Military Council  
1938 Feb Commander Japanese Expeditionary Forces in Central China  
1939 Chief Aide de Camp to Emperor  
1939 Aug 1940 War Minister of Abe and Yonai Cabinets  
July Supreme Military Councilor  
1940-41 Commander in Chief of Japanese Forces in China  
1941 Mar Field Marshal  
1944 June Inspector General of Military Education, and automatically  
" Nov a member of Supreme Military Council  
1945 Apr Relieved of above duty; given one of two General Army  
Commands in Japan Proper.

Address: 122 Taishido, Setagaya-ku, Tokyo

One of most brilliant of Japanese Army officers and army preparedness propagandist of wide note. Graduated from Military Staff College at head of class. In 1939 reported more cosmopolitan, better informed, and more tolerant of foreign viewpoint than average high Japanese officer. As strict disciplinarian strongly deplored Tokyo army revolt of Feb. 1936. Following Nanking outrages of 1937-38 replaced General Iwane Matsui as Commander of Japanese forces in Central China for purpose of restoring discipline, which he did quickly and efficiently (1, 23, 46, 37)

Without clan or group affiliations. Although rated as a conservative in no way sympathetic with the radical doctrines of "Young Officer" group. Hata has been a foremost advocate of Japan's totalitarian foreign and domestic policy during recent years. While Minister of War in Yonai Cabinet presented following demands: (1) reasonably speedy disposal of China incident; (2) establishment of new political structure (new single party); (3) creation of super-defense system; (4) change in foreign policy (closer ties with Axis). Premier Yonai refused agreement. Hata resigned, the cabinet fell, and Japan started on her totalitarian course. (48,49)



Shunroku HATA (Continued)

According to Domei report broadcast from Tokyo 7 April 1945 Hata was given one of two new general army commands to control ground defenses of Japanese homeland (Field Marshal Sygiyama was given the other). Both will be directly responsible to the Emperor.

A close friend of former Premier Koiso and classmate of Field Marshal Sugiyama. Speaks some German. Affable and convivial with the reputation (in 1937) of being able to drunk more liquor than any other officer in the Japanese Army and still retain his senses. (45)



*Arita*  
#

Summary of Interrogation of SUMA Yakichiro on 3 June 1947

see also IPB doc 4044, 2 items 10 and 11  
4047, " 6 and 10.

A) Tientsin Negotiations:

At the time of the beginning of the Tientsin negotiations in the summer of 1939, I was Councillor to the Japanese Embassy in Washington. I know, therefore the gist of these negotiations only from reports and not from any personal participation in them up to the time when I arrived in Tokyo in the Fall of 1939. It is my impression that at the time of these negotiations the British Government (Lord Halifax was Foreign Minister and Sir Robert Craigie was Ambassador to Japan) desired an overall settlement in regard to the mutual positions of Great Britain and Japan in China and a stabilization of the situation in the Far East. I believe that the Japanese Foreign Ministry also wished to arrive at such a fundamental agreement. The Japanese Army, however, was bent on eliminating British influence in China. When I say the Japanese Army, I mean the highest ranks in the Army, including the War Minister, the Chief of the General Staff, the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, etc., the rank and file of the Army, and Army minded groups. Since a general agreement would have served as a basis for the situation in China in the future and would have perpetuated some British influence there, possibly even leading to a strengthening of China in her resistance against Japan, the Army was opposed to such a general settlement.

The immediate issues in the Tientsin negotiations were the following: 1) Extradition of four Chinese who had found refuge in the Tientsin concession. This was the origin of the "Incident" which led to a Japanese blockade of Tientsin, search of persons entering the concession by the local Japanese military and protests by Great Britain which brought about the Craigie-Arita Conferences. 2) The question of transfer of the silver of the Chinese Government which was deposited in a bank in the concession. I believe the tendency of the Japanese Army was to have the silver transferred to the provisional government in Peiping (under Wang-Kel-Min) and, under a slogan "financial independence of North China from the Kuomintang Government" to eliminate the use of the Kuomintang currency from Tientsin. *(The currency question was the kind immediately issue)*

Complete achievement of the aims of the Army in these *later* two questions would have substantially weakened the importance of the Tientsin concession and British influence in China

When I assumed my position as Chief of the Information Bureau of the Foreign Ministry in October 1939, the Tientsin question had substantially been settled and I had to deal only with the "aftermath" of the affair. The four Chinese had already





been extradited. A compromise on the other questions was reached early in 1940. The negotiations at that time were of a purely technical nature. The question of an over-all settlement in connection with the Tientsin negotiations was no longer entertained, and therefore the Army had lost interest in that matter. The most important questions of foreign policy at that time were the closing of the Burma Road from the British side, the establishment of a modus vivendi regarding Japanese-American trade after the expiration of the American-Japanese trade agreement from the U.S. side, and the opening of the Yangtze Valley trade and recompensation for U.S. damages in China from the Japanese side.

To my knowledge there was no connection between the opposition of the Army to an over-all settlement with Great Britain and the desire of some Army circles for a closer alliance with Germany. It is possible, however, that the German Embassy was active in Tokyo trying to convince the Army circles that such a connection existed. It is also possible that the instigators of the anti-British demonstrations which occurred in the course of the Tientsin negotiations in Tokyo are identical with the persons who desired a closer alliance with Germany.

B) The Foreign Policy of the Abe-Yonai Cabinets:

When I arrived in Tokyo from Washington, I was nominated to accept a diplomatic post at Peking. However, Premier Abe, who at that time was concurrently Foreign Minister, decided to change this plan and to keep me in Tokyo as Chief of Information Bureau of the Foreign Ministry. Since I was considered well-informed about the U.S. attitude because of the position I had held in Washington, this change in plans was an indication of the importance attributed to Japanese-U.S. relations by Premier Abe. It was the policy of the Abe Cabinet--and as I gathered from a talk with Baron Hiranuma also the policy of the preceding Hiranuma Cabinet--that Japan should avoid being drawn too closely to Germany and to strive for the maintenance of peace with the United States in the Pacific area. During the Hiranuma Cabinet it was the Army that desired the German-Japanese alliance, and in cabinet meetings this viewpoint must have been represented by the War Minister. At my first conversation with Premier Abe not long after the inauguration of his Cabinet he told me that he wished to avoid a close entanglement with Germany, stay neutral and follow "a middle of the road policy." When I pointed out that the China incident was the vortex of relations with the United States, he replied that the China Incident was rather in the hands of the Army. Abe also intimated to me that he was planning to turn over the Foreign Ministry to a "pro-American personage." He later made Admiral Nomura Kichisaburo his Foreign Minister.

Opposition against this foreign policy of the Abe Cabinet arose because activist circles felt that it was idly doing



nothing in spite of important changes in the world situation and that there were too many conferences with the British and U.S. Ambassadors but not enough with the German Ambassador. These opinions were voiced in very pointed and unfriendly interpolations in the Diet and in articles in such newspapers as "Tochi" and "Kokumin." The Abe Cabinet resigned early in 1940.

The succeeding Yonai Cabinet followed an identical foreign policy and was therefore immediately confronted with the same opposition. The Foreign Minister of this Cabinet was Mr. Arita. In my official position I did not only gather information from various sources inside and outside Japan but was also informed by Mr. Arita about happenings in all Cabinet meetings. I had daily conferences with him and am, therefore, well acquainted with his foreign policy.

Arita wished to follow an orthodox foreign policy--neutral but not forgetting the Anglo-Saxon line even at that juncture-- and to solve the Chinese question while maintaining friendship with the United States and Great Britain. The opposition centering around certain Army circles was eager to steer Japan into the Axis Camp and not to lose any time in doing so in order not "to miss the bus." This trend became stronger after 10 May 1940 when Germany invaded Holland and launched its blitzkrieg against Belgium and France. War Minister Hata, while enthusiastically for an alliance with Germany, thought the Army realization of such an alliance not practicable at that time, and was therefore deemed "luke warm" by certain younger Army men. ))))

The first goal of the opposition was the downfall of the Yonai-Arita Cabinet which stood in the way of such a course. The first attempt to achieve this goal came in connection with the radio address which Foreign Minister Arita made on 29 June 1940.

This address was planned in order to counter the unpopularity of the Arita foreign policy. By stressing Japan's close connection with the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, especially in regard to foreign trade, the Cabinet wanted to enhance its prestige, win support from trade interests in Japan and show that it was not idle but had a constructive foreign policy. There was agreement within the Cabinet including War Minister Hata and Overseas Minister Koiso in regard to this foreign policy statement.

A few days before the statement was made, articles about it appeared in various newspapers. The "leakage" did not occur in the Foreign Ministry. I conducted an investigation which showed that it originated from another member of the Cabinet who disclosed some of the contents of the speech. The newspapers



then elaborated on his remarks so that great parts of these articles were simply speculations as to the contents of the speech. In particular, there was no strong reference to Germany in the original draft. As a matter of fact, neither form nor content of the announcement were changed at any time. The speech, as it was delivered, was identical with the original draft. The conference between officials of various ministries on 28 June 1940 was just a routine matter and no opposition to the contents of the speech was raised at this conference. I did not participate in this conference.

In spite of the agreement within the cabinet regarding the speech, which agreement was obtained before any consultation between the War Minister and the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau and other high Army officials had taken place, the Army was against such a Foreign Ministry statement. It was felt that a statement as contemplated would only camouflage the "do nothing policy" of Arita.

The Army used this occasion to attempt the elimination of the Yonai-Arita Cabinet in the following manner: The Army, through the War Minister, would express its strong displeasure with the "attitude of the Foreign Minister caused by the radio address." In view of the earlier concurrence of the War Minister, this complaint was kept very vague. Such a vague complaint was intended to cause friction between the Foreign Minister and the War Minister. The friction was purposely increased by the fact that I was called to the Gendarmerie (Kempei-Tai), apparently in order to be questioned regarding the "leakage," but actually in order to play up the friction which could then develop into the downfall of the cabinet because of differences between the two ministers. It was true that the orders must have originated from the higher circles within the Army, and I believe it originated from General Muto who was then Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau.

Arita recognized the intention underlying this action and was eager not to have the friction develop further so that it should not give an opportunity to claim a rift within the cabinet, leading to its downfall. On or about the first of July, he visited War Minister Hata to complain about the Gendarmerie action. At a return visit of War Minister Hata, about the third of July, to Mr. Arita, the question was straightened out by accepting an apology for the action of the Gendarmerie and by generally agreeing on closer cooperation between the two ministries. Thus the first stroke against the Cabinet was frustrated.

The next attempt occurred on 7 July 1940 when opposition members interfered with the speech Foreign Minister Arita delivered on the occasion of the Third Anniversary of the China Incident. War Minister Hata spoke from the same platform. The Cabinet



Information Bureau which had staged the anniversary celebration apologized for this incident.

Around the 12th of July, General Muto visited Mr. Ishiwata, Chief Secretary of the Cabinet, to urge a change of the foreign policy so as to cope with the military situation in Europe. Ishiwata disagreed. A few days later General Hata handed a note of resignation to Premier Yonai. Thereupon the entire Cabinet resigned, as Yonai stated "on account of disagreements within the Cabinet."

When the Yonai Cabinet fell, the opposition lost no time in establishing their foreign policy. As soon as the Konoye Cabinet was nominated and even before all positions were filled the Prime Minister (Konoye), Foreign Minister (Matsuoka), War Minister (Tojo) and Navy Minister (Oikawa) agreed on the foreign policy of the new Cabinet which consisted in swinging Japan into the Axis Camp. Foreign Minister Matsuoka kept me in Tokyo in order to make two important announcements in my capacity as spokesman of the Foreign Ministry. These announcements concerned the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact and the establishment of the Wang-Ching-Wei Government in China. The position of Chief of the Information Department of the Foreign Ministry was then abolished or rather consolidated with the Cabinet Board of Information. I was appointed Ambassador to Madrid and left Tokyo on 28 December 1940. I am certain that my change of position had no connection with the incident concerning Foreign Minister Arita's radio address.



Hata

J.P.S. Dec. 30

Foreign Relations of the U.S. - Japan

Vol 1, 1931-41 State Dept Washington

Statement by Hata 3-10-38

at his first press conference

no change in Japan's "immutable policy" towards China.

"Accordingly it may be necessary for Japanese forces to remain in China for 3 years or 10 years or 100 years

depending on the circumstances."



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION  
CHINESE DIVISION

5 June 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. David Nelson Sutton  
FROM : Judge C. C. Hsiang  
SUBJECT : Examination of Documents not yet Specifically  
Linked to any Defendant - Group III - Unintroduced


HATA, ITAGAKI and KIMURA

Upon examination, the following documents are found to be of considerable interest. It is suggested that attorneys concerned order the scanning of the same so as to determine whether they should be processed.

1. IPS Doc. 30, Excerpt from Foreign Relations, 10 March 1938. HATA gave his first press interview after he assumed the command in China. He said that the Japanese Army in central China may have to be there for five, ten or even a hundred years and will drive on to Hankow or anywhere else.
2. IPS Doc. 2381, Foreign Office Telegrams, 4-1-373. MORISHIMA, Acting Consul General at Mukden, reported to Foreign Minister INUKAI that Consul General HAYASHI, before his departure, cautioned the Commander in Chief and senior staff members of the Kwantung Army not to violate the Nine Power Treaty. However, the senior staff members of the Kwantung Army reported to the Commander in Chief that a new state upon the pretext of Chinese initiative would not seem to violate the said Treaty and therefore no change was necessary in the fixed plan.
3. IPS Doc. 2381, Foreign Office Telegram, 4-1-387. MORISHIMA, Acting Consul General at Mukden, reported to Foreign Minister YOSHIZAWA that ITAGAKI, on 27 January 1932, flew to Port Arthur in order to confer with Hsuan-Tung (FU YI) on the formation of the new state.
4. IPS Doc. 1054, Secret Manchurian Files, Item 19, 5 December 1940. KIMURA, Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army, suggested the employment of Japanese reservists in Manchukuo Army. (Reference is also made to this in another Memorandum on UMEZU, Commander in Chief of the Kwantung Army)
5. IPS Doc. 1054, Secret Manchurian Files, Item 23, 11 December 1940. Kyo-Wa-Kai (Concordia Society) should employ graduates of schools in Japan proper. This was dispatched by KIMURA, Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army. (Reference is also made to this in another Memorandum on UMEZU, Commander in Chief of the Kwantung Army)
6. IPS Doc. 1054, Secret Manchurian Files, Item 39, 16 December 1940, a report from South Manchurian Railway Company to the Headquarters of the Kwantung Army entitled "Directions to Spies in China". KIMURA was then the Chief of Staff. (Reference is also made in another Memorandum on UMEZU)

Copies for: Mr. Sutton  
Mr. Lopez  
Mr. Edwards  
Commander Yale Maxon  
Mr. Wagner

Che-Chun Hsiang





Book of additional Document

not introduced.

of ps # 2999

3001

3002

3003

3004

on the way, see p 23 May 47



Check dates  
of Faure's memo

Cabinet April 1814 B

1814 E

March 11 on Faure's memo  
of stray ch...

See 1683 D

5 msh conference

1 Nov 1939

1814 C

Hata

5 msh conference 26 July 39

Cost of new gant in Mongolia &  
Asienking

Decided by Jap advisors

approved by cabinet meeting 7 Aug 39

? PS. 2178 H

See Faure's memo w/ but see 546

China case

8 May

p. 11 see 36



Hata file

1 PS Doc

Foot no. 2656 - Sup analysis  
13 May 47

2 Lem 96

Diplomatic

Outline of Guiding Principles

of the new Constitution of Feb 1946



Hola file

for the changes in Aritai

March June 1940

see airta file +

the memo of Stearns

therein -



Houta

Articles in Oshii

2999  
3001  
3002  
3003

change of the report of Houta

Leading & fall of your  
Cabinet -

see

to Steiner in  
handling this



Hata

Doc 3008

dict meeting 33 Mar 1940

concerns by the inst. Hata  
re allied toward to  
China incident  
+ the European war -

3/2/47

Anthony's transcripts

Crowe

very important



RE: HATA, Shunroku

DATE: 5 April 1946

STATUS: Pending

On 9 January 1946 the records of the Personnel Section, Cabinet Secretariat were examined at the Diet Building, Tokyo.

Complete personnel records of the subject were micro-filmed. Photostatic copies, together with translation, are on file as Exhibit No. 132.

Following is a transcript of the translation:

HATA, Shunroku

DOMICILE : Hokkaido

SOCIAL STATUS: Samurai

BORN : 26 July 1879

1899 May 29 Graduated from the Central Military Preparatory School

1899 May 31 Appointed as an Officer Candidate;  
Entered the First Field Artillery Regiment

1899 Dec 1 Entered Military Academy

1900 Nov 21 Graduated from the above Academy;  
Appointed as a Probationary Officer

1901 Jun 25 Appointed Second Lieutenant of Artillery  
(Cabinet;  
Attached to the First Field Artillery  
Regiment (War Office)

1901 Oct 10 Granted 8th Court Rank, Senior Grade

1903 Nov 18 Appointed 1st Lt. of Artillery (Cabinet)



1904 Feb 19      Granted 7th Court Rank, Junior Grade

1905 Jun 27      Appointed Captain of Artillery (Cabinet)

1905 Aug 11      Granted 7th Court Rank, Senior Grade

1906 Mar 12      Released from the above post and attached  
to the First Field Artillery Regiment  
(War Office)

1906 Apr 1      Decorated with the 5th Class Order of the  
Golden Kite;  
Awarded the War Medal of the Russo-Japan-  
ese war: 1904-1905;  
Decorated with the 6th Order of Merit  
with the Single Ray of the Rising Sun

1907 Dec 10      Ordered to enter the Military Staff College

1909 Jan 12      Attached to the First Artillery Regiment

1910 Sep 30      Granted 6th Court Rank, Junior Grade

1910 Dec 9      Released from the above post and appointed  
as a member of the General Headquarters Staff

1911 Sep 21      Ordered to take an official trip to China

1912 Mar 16      Released from the above post;  
Ordered to reside in Germany for the Inves-  
tigation of Military Affairs (War Office)

1913 May 31      Decorated with the Order of Sacred Treasure

1914 Jul 10      Appointed Major of Artillery (Cabinet)

1914 Aug 23      Attached to the Headquarters of the  
General Staff

1915 Oct 30      Granted the 6th Court Rank, Senior Grade

1916 May 2      Released from the post of an attached  
officer to the Headquarters General Staff  
and appointed as a member of the Headquar-  
ters General Staff.

1915 Nov 7      Decorated with the 4th Order of Merit with  
the Small Cordon of the Rising Sun and  
granted ¥600  
Awarded War Medal of 1914-1915



1917 Feb 9 Appointed as a member of the Higher Examination Committee of Foreign Languages

1918 Jul 24 Appointed Lt. Col. of Artillery (Cabinet)

1918 Aug 20 Concurrently appointed as a committee member of the Military Technical Examination Dept. (War Office)

1918 Dec 3 Ordered to take an official trip to Europe (Cabinet)

1919 Feb 5 Appointed as a member of the Peace Plenipotentiary Party (War Office)

1919 Apr 15 Relieved from the above post; Appointed as an instructor of strategy at the Military College (War Office)

1919 Dec 25 Relieved from the above post; Appointed as a member of the Headquarters General Staff

1920 May 26 Ordered to take an official trip to China (War Office)

1920 Sep 7 Awarded 3rd Order of Merit; Decorated with the 3rd Order of Merit with the Middle Cordon of the Rising Sun and given ¥2,300 in recognition of his meritorious services rendered in the conclusion of the Peace Treaty with Germany and also in the War of 1915-1920:

1920 Nov 30 Granted the 5th Court Rank, Junior Grade (Cabinet)

1921 Jul 20 Appointed Colonel of Artillery; Appointed the Regimental Commander of the First Field Artillery Regiment (War Office); Released of member of the Examination Committee of Foreign Language (War Office)

1922 Aug 15 Appointed the Regimental Educational Commander at the Field Artillery School and teacher and member of Research Dept. thereof (War Office)

1923 Aug 6 Released from the above and concurrent posts; Appointed Chief of Section of the Headquarters General Staff (War Office)



1923 Aug 16 Concurrently appointed as the staff of the Naval General Staff (Navy Dept.)

1923 Nov 6 Appointed as a member of Military Technical Conference

1923 Nov 16 Appointed as Commissioner of Military Technical Investigation Bureau (War Office)

1925 Jul 17 Concurrently appointed as a member of the Research Department of the Military School of Communication (War Office)

1925 Dec 28 Granted 5th Court Rank, Senior Grade

1926 Feb 10 Awarded Silver Cup in recognition of merit rendered in the negotiation of the Russo-Japanese Treaty

1926 Mar 1 Released from the post of the Staff of the Naval General Staff (Navy Department)

1926 Mar 2 Relieved of the post of a member of the Military Technical Conference (Cabinet); Appointed Major General (Cabinet); Appointed Commander of Heavy Artillery of the 4th Brigade

1927 Jul 26 Relieved of the above post; Appointed Chief of the 4th Department of the Headquarters General Staff (War Office)

1928 Aug 10 Appointed Chief of the First Department of the Headquarters General Staff

1929 Apr 12 Appointed Chief of the General Staff of the Military Review of the Emperor's Birthday (War Office)

1930 Dec 17 Decorated with the 2nd Class Order of Merit with the Order of the Sacred Treasure

1931 Jan 16 Granted the 4th Court Rank, Junior Grade

1931 Aug 1 Appointed Lt. Gen. (Cabinet); Appointed as an Inspector of Artillery (War Office)

1933 Aug 1 Released from the above post (War Office); Appointed Commander of the 14th Division (Cabinet)



1933 Sep 1	Granted 4th Court Rank, Senior Grade
1934 Apr 29	Decorated with the first order of merit with the Grand Cordon of the Rising Sun in recognition of meritorious services rendered in the Incident of 1931-1934
1935 Dec 2	Appointed Chief of the Army Air Force Headquarters (War Office)
1936 Jan 16	Appointed as a member of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (Cabinet)
1936 Aug 1	Released from the regular post (War Office); Appointed Commander of the Formosan Army (Cabinet)
1936 Oct 1	Granted 3rd Court Rank, Junior Grade
1936 Oct 14	Released from the post of a member of National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics
1937 Aug 2	Released from the above post (War Office); Appointed Military Councillor (Cabinet)
1937 Aug 26	Relieved of his present post (not in the official gazette); Appointed <u>Inspector-General of Military Education</u> and concurrently appointed <u>Military Councillor</u> (Cabinet)
1937 Nov 1	Appointed Full General
1937 Dec 13	Appointed Councillor (Gitei-Kan) (Cabinet)
1938 Feb 14	Released from the regular and the additional posts (War Office) (Not announced in the official gazette)
1938 Feb 14	Appointed Commander of the Expeditionary Force to Central China (Cabinet) (not announced in the official gazette)
1938 <del>Mar</del> <sup>Dec</sup> 15	Released from the above post (War Office); Appointed Military Councillor (not announced in the official gazette) (Cabinet)
1939 May 25	Released from the above post
1939 May 25	Appointed Chief Aide-de-Camp to His Majesty (Cabinet)

8/21/37  
2/10/38

*Changed in  
file as original  
attached*

*the new  
note  
1938 Dec 15  
p. 702*



- 1939 Aug 30 Appointed War Minister and concurrently President of the Manchurian Affairs Board (Cabinet)
- 1939 Sep 1 Granted 3rd Court Rank, Senior Grade
- 1940 Jul 22 Released from the regular and additional posts by request (Cabinet);  
Appointed Military Councillor (Cabinet)
- 1941 Mar 1 Appointed Commander in Chief of the Expeditionary Force to China (Cabinet)
- 1941 Apr 29 Decorated with the 1st Class Order of the Golden Kite (in recognition of his meritorious services rendered in the China Affair)
- 1944 Jun 2 Appointed member of the Board of Field Marshals and Admirals and awarded specially the title of Field Marshal (Cabinet)
- 1944 Jun 15 Granted 2nd Court Rank, Junior Grade
- 1944 Nov 22 Appointed Inspector-General of Military Education (not announced in the official gazette) (Cabinet)
- 1945 Apr 7 Appointed Commander in Chief of the 2nd Army Corps (Cabinet) (not announced in the official gazette)
- 1945 Nov 30 The Institution of Field Marshals was abrogated by the abolition of the charter of the Board of Field Marshals by the Imperial Ordinance No. 669

*Rec'd  
in record* {  
1940

P E N D I N G



ROUGH TRANSLATION

Doc. No. 625

CORRECT IN TEXT ONLY

Do not see

Length of time to be kept - Permanent

Sanctioned by - Vice Commission

Action decided by - Kokubun

Receipt number - Army-Secret-China-Receipt, Number 979

Government department of Origin - Bureau of Military Service, Military Service Section

Subject - Concerning the instruction and control of the speeches and actions of the army units and army men returned from the China Incident Area

Minister - Vice Commission

Vice Minister of Administration

Vice Minister - Yamawaki

Councillor

High ranking adjutant - Kokubun

Chief of Competent Bureau - Yamamoto (Proxy)

Secretary - Military Service

Adjutant of Competent Bureau - Ooba

Chief of Competent Section - Yamamoto

Staff of Competent Section - Mukada

Section in Competent Bureau

Number - Military Service A22

Received

Presented - February 1, 1939

Minister's Secretariat

Received - February 1, 1939

Finished - February 15

Connection - Bureau Chief-Military Affairs-Tanaka (Vice Commission)

Section Chiefs



Military - Tanaka

Defense - /stamp/ Kunitaro Yamada

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Army-China-Secret

From the Vice Minister to the Army forces concerned (Army forces in Japan proper, Korea, Formosa and Manchuria)

Draft of Memorandum

Orders and notices pertaining to the instruction and control of the speeches and actions of the army units and army men returned from the China Incident Area have been issued but in a small percentage, it is not just a few who do not control their speeches and actions. Moreover, it is necessary to be careful of the commanders of the forces who lack a firm grasp of control and consequently allow laxity of discipline or to be careful of the leaders who do not pay sufficient attention to the text of the orders and notices concerning objects which army men brought back from China. And especially, not only does the improper talk of the returned officers and men after their return to the homes become the cause of rumors but also impairs the trust of the people in the army, disrupts the unity of people supporting the army, etc. The damage is extremely large. As it is believed that in the future, the returning forces will gradually increase owing to replacements, demobilization, etc. I repeat the order again to make the control of the directing even more strict and consequently glorify the meritorious deeds, raise the Japanese Army's military reputation and insure that nothing will impair the accomplishment of the object of the Holy War.

For reference in tightening the instructions the book, "The Situation of the Military Forces and Army Men Returned from the Area of Disturbance," is being forwarded to you under separate cover.

Army-Secret-China General Order No. 349  
February 6, 1939. (4,460) Miyako

Army-Secret-China Order

Draft of memorandum from the adjutant to the chief of the General Affairs Section in the General Staff Headquarters.

As the matter concerning the subject is being sent to you under separate cover it is requested that you take appropriate measures.

Army-Secret-China General Order No. 404  
February 11, 1939. Okuyama

/One more sign which is not clear/

/Paper slip pasted on/

All notices to the forces in the disturbance area will be sent in



duplicate in the name of the vice chief of staff. As the Headquarters of the General Staff has been consulted, the copies of "Central China, North China Collection" will be sent to the Headquarters of the General Staff simultaneously. The matter is to be /settled when the printing is done./

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The separate cover

Top Secret

Of Part 4460

The situation of the Military Forces and Army men Returned from the Disturbance Area.

Notice - No further publications allowed.

Handle strictly with care to prevent leakages.

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The military forces and the men returned from the disturbance area are generally <sup>well-</sup>disciplined and well behaved. They are a credit to the Army, and are careful about their speeches and actions but among a fraction of them, overcome by the welcome accorded them, their feeling of victorious return, their feeling of superiority in having endured the grim army life, etc., there are not just a few who do not restrain their speeches and actions. There are some who, upon their return to their homes after being discharged, wish to boast of their honor or merits, and fabricate stories about their officers and other units, and thus abuse them, boast about the tragedies in the battlefield, allow military secrets to leak through in their attempts to appear well-informed, exaggerate the slackness of military discipline and morals for the sake of telling stories, etc. The speeches mentioned above sometimes not only become the cause of rumors but may also affect the trust of the people in the Japanese Army, impair the unity of the people at home, etc. The harm is extremely great and special care is necessary in the instructions and in the control of these matters. Moreover, it is necessary that the commanders of the returning units have a firmer grasp of the control of their Units.

1. Regarding military discipline and morals. Although, in general, the morale is high and the disciplines and morals are being maintained, there are among a few some who, excited by the spirit of victorious return, do not pay sufficient attention to the orders and instructions of the commanders, some who behave in an undignified manner in front of the welcoming people, etc., some who start fighting after getting drunk, and some who use profane language concerning military discipline.

Instances when the commanders' control was insufficient and marching discipline was terrible are given below:



(1) There are some men who leave the ranks without reason to speak to the welcoming parties.

(2) There are some men who without reason pull the callers into the ranks to converse with them.

(3) There are men who accept food and drink from the welcoming parties and eat while marching.

(4) There are men who march while holding hands with women and girls.

(5) There are men who let their wives carry their rifles and march carrying their children in their arms.

(6) There are men whose handling of the rifles and whose appearance and behavior are very bad.

The main examples where care is necessary in speeches regarding military discipline and public morals are as follows:

(1) In the unit at xx district I hear that military discipline was strict but in our unit military discipline and public morals were fortunately no problem at all.

(2) In the battlefield the commander used the term "enlist" for "requisition." Whenever we ran short of food he ordered, "Enlist some help." But really "enlist" and "requisition" amounted to the same thing. They say that the Japanese army is strict but requisition is something that sticks with war.

(3) The thing I like best during the battle is plundering. In the front lines the superiors turn a blind eye to plundering and there were some who plundered to their hearts' content.

(4) The platoon commander rose from the officers' candidates group and could not even handle the men. The officer gave orders but the men acted on their own and produced better results. Obeying the poor directions of these officers from the officers' candidate group would only result in a greater number of casualties.

(5) Discipline is strict in the peacetime army but in the battlefield it could not be so. The lazybones gain. Many conscientious workers fell early in the battlefield.

(6) At xx we captured a family of four. We played with the daughter just as we would with a harlot. But as the parents insisted that the daughter be returned to them we killed them. We played with the daughter as before until the unit's departure and then killed her.



- (7) One company commander unofficially gave instructions for raping as follows: "In order that we wont have problems, either pay them money or kill them in some obscure place after you have finished."
- (8) If the army men who participated in the war were investigated individually, they will probably be all guilty of murder, robbery, or rape.
- (9) When we were attacked by the Chinese troops near xx in North China, there were about eight deserters.
- (10) In the battlefield we think nothing of rape. There are even some men who resisted with firearms when discovered by the military police in the act.
- (11) In the half a year of battle about the only things I learned are rape and burglary.
- (12) In the battlefield when the superior gives the order "Advance" nobody advances if there are shells whizzing around.
- (13) In the lulls between the battles gambling was popular and there are men who returned with considerable amounts of money.
- (14) In the battlefield quite a number of men got souvenirs of precious stones, metals, etc., with the excuse of requisition.
- (15) The Japanese Army used many Chinese spies but after they became unnecessary the army killed them.
- (16) In the unit they were issuing three-yen tickets to officers, two-yen tickets to non-commissioned officers, one-yen tickets to the men for prostitutes and thus provided recreation for the soldiers.
- (17) Some Japanese soldiers are quite hard. They examined the corpses of their comrades individually to extract even the gold teeth.
- (18) The ones who carry the plundered goods back to Japan are not the other ranks but the officers. I saw some plundered goods being confiscated by the military police from the baggage of returning officers. Some officers are very cheeky.
- (19) The military police often scolded us when they found us confiscating cows and pigs in the line of communications area but as we could not fight without eating we killed and ate the animals as soon as we came across them in the front line.
- (20) The plundering by our army in the battle area is beyond imagination. Pacification is being practiced in only a small part of the occupied area.
- (21) The prisoners of the Chinese army were sometimes lined up in one line and killed to test the efficiency of the machine gun.



2. The situation of the opinions of the returned officers and men. In general they have moderate thoughts and there have been no expressions of extremely violent opinions but among a few other ranks there are men who abuse the poor directing abilities of the officers, men who express dissatisfaction about promotions, men who say that the commander sacrificed many of his men for glory, etc. These speeches require attention.

Following are some examples of speeches which require attention in respect to ideas:

(1) Whether there are many dead or not depends on the ability of the commanding officer. To raise the quality of the officers and to educate them is more important than to train the men. (N.C.O.)

(2) During the present disturbance, in major battles at various places, the commanders of the forces competed to be the first to occupy any important place. For this reason the rear units such as the field train transport suffered many casualties. These casualties are really sacrifices for the commanders. (N.C.O.)

(3) Our company commander had his men dig trenches first of all and was looking from there. He was immediately injured in the foot and evacuated with the aid of two men. However, when any man was injured, he had to evacuate by himself. The lot of the men in the battlefield is certainly pitiful. (Private.)

(4) During the marches, the men became so tired that when they saw the battalion commander on his horse they openly said to one another, "The men are walking so the battalion commander should walk, too." "Pull him down from the horse," etc. (Private.)

(5) In the battlefield the difference between officers and men is not clear. I have seen at various places men scolding the N.C.O.'s and N.C.O.'s using the officers' belongings without permission. People with audacity are the ones' with power. (N.C.O.)

(6) The conscripts, unlike the regulars, have no respect for the officers from the beginning. It appears that the officers themselves feel uncomfortable because they are not unreasonable. Consequently discipline increasingly became lax and plundering, etc., took place.

(7) It appears that the higher the rank becomes the more timid the man becomes. They lack the spirit to lead the men. There is no reason why the men should move in accordance with the orders of such superiors. (N.C.O.)

(8) During a lull in the battle, the platoon commander used his subordinates very hard and used very coarse words, but when in the front line, they (platoon commanders) used to go back pretending to have stomach-ache. (Privates)



(9) The officers called up from the reserve are not worthy of respect as leaders because their personality is very bad. (Private)

(10) I would not like to go to fight the war again. Those who died in the war met a very unhappy fate. (Private)

(11) Those who want to come back to their native country alive must drop behind. (Private)

3. The conditions of keeping military secrets. There are some who disclose secrets concerning the military power. The number of the army units and the strategy and action of the army units. Chief examples:

(1) A Warrant Officer disclosed the correct number of the soldiers of the force, saying, "I and xxx men were relieved and returned because of our age," and so on, in his answer to the congratulations of a certain Prefectural Governor in the public welcome party.

(2) A wounded soldier told to a passenger on his way home from the front, "Many people think that our army division went over to Formosa but that is wrong, the army division which went over to Formosa was the 'so and so' army division."

(3) A Superior Private wanted to hand over a secret paper on the Unit's march to tell his cousin who welcomed him that he would not be able to see him on that day and wanted to see him the day after the next day. (In the paper, the organization of the returned army units was recorded.)

(4) There are some leaders of platoons and squads who do not return the regular army map, and some special duty personnel who keep the table of the organization of the army staffs and distribute the table of the organization of the company and comrades' table among all members of company.

(5) There was one who left the paper which is recognized to be the manuscript of the cipher key for the war strategy and the table of the name of the crews in the cabin of the commanding officer of transportation.

(6) There was one who left the table of the organization of the army units in the train.

(7) When an officer (or an N.C.O.) ordered the lunches for the army units returned, he made public the number (organization) of the units by telling the lunch maker the number of the army units according to the organization.

(8) There are some non-commissioned officers who possess the army's secret map, the table of the number of the company's weapon and the organization table.

(9) There are some who took the picture of the secret fort without the admission of the authority.



(10) There are some who told the name of his army division and commander of his army division and the organization of the division.

(11) A Lieutenant, Engineer, of the second reserve who was in the army hospital because of injury in battle, coming home on leave, made speeches in various places on the battle affairs of the China Incident as his friends requested. In his speech, he told about the organization of an expeditionary division to make the story clear, or let himself go so far as to tell of instances where the commander took action which can be allowed under the Military Penal Code 22 to maintain the military discipline, or instances where the Japanese army killed Chinese civilians in a mass. He made such a speech as would cause the people to mistrust the army or the rumors concerned with the righteousness of the Japanese Army.

/On the paper slip pasted on/

(The Military Penal Code 22 provides that: Actions which are necessary to maintain military discipline in the unit, in an emergency suppressing a rising plotted by many people in face of the enemy, shall not be punished.)

4. Concerning articles carried back by soldiers. Though the number of illegal or prohibited articles carried back by returning soldiers has decreased lately, yet there are some instances as follows, where more control is needed:

(1) Some Chiefs of Staffs or Commanding Officers, being not well-informed about the standard of the admittance of the articles to be carried back, distributed among the men license cards authorized by the stamp of the Unit Commander, and in which army men made entries freely.


(2) There are not a few N.C.O.'s who carry back cameras with them, and not a few military personnel who purchase and bring back precious jewels and furs beyond their means. The Commanders must control these matters.

5. Assiduity of the discharged soldiers in their business after returning home. Some of them do not work hard in their companies and factories, after they are discharged and come home. It is necessary to give them good instruction and training before they are discharged in order to make them change their minds so that they would be examples of good workers in their society.

(The End)



Hata



625

Document

~~371~~

Supplemental Analysis

very important



Javene rays do not use



21 March 1947

Document 1685

Appears to pertain to HATA who is being called as a witness on behalf of UMEZU.

Mr. Brown



17 March 1947

MEMO TO: Mr. A. T. Laverge  
FROM : Mr. D. N. Sutton  
SUBJECT: Defense Document 635 as applied to  
Defendant HATA

The information carried in Defense Document 635  
(Exhibit 2344) is correct as to the defendant HATA.



~~Recommendation~~

Pin

~~D for father~~

13 March 1946

REPORT TO: Executive Committee

RE: Field Marshal HATA, Shunroka

The subject's name does not appear in the suggested list of probable defendants submitted by the Evidence and Defendants Committee but is included in the revised list of possible defendants submitted by that committee. He was recommended for inclusion in the list of defendants by Major Barnard.

The files on HATA reveal only the importance of his military and political career and except in the instance noted below point to no evidence of the instigation or approval of criminal acts. Neither, however, does any evidence but his own tend to exculpate him from the suspicion which may be inferred from the importance and responsibility of the political and military posts held by him during the period of Japan's aggression.

Particularly in this report it is to be noted that he was Commanding General of the China Expeditionary Force in 1938 and again from July 1940 to 1944, so that prima facie he may be held responsible for incidents during these periods.

Besides what appears in this subject's file there are two other documents which indicate his responsibility for the unlawful treatment of prisoners who had engaged in air raids. Document No. 16 covers an order issued August 13, 1942, providing that "the bombing, strafing and otherwise attacking of private properties whatsoever, with the object of destroying or damaging same" should be punished by death if not committed to life imprisonment or a prison term of not less than ten years, which order was specifically made applicable "to all acts committed prior to the date of its approval," but the language quoted in this document differs somewhat from the translation which appears in Document No. 626 which reports the acts denounced as "the bombing, etc.---for the purpose of destroying non-strategic private property." For purposes of accuracy a retranslation is suggested.

Document No. 629 shows HATA's approval of the policy followed with respect to the treatment of prisoners who had conducted air raids over Japan and is a telegram to the



Rpt to Exec. Committee, 13 Mar 46, re: HATA, Shunroka

Assistant Minister of War, reading as follows:

"As we cannot allow American air-force personnel-----to escape to the Chinese continent--- or seek safety by hoping to become prisoners of war, we want positively to destroy such enemies----and we want to make a statement to the effect that we intend to punish such (persons) with severity. But according to international law limitations, we wish to have prompt opinion from the Ministry concerning the matter."

This telegram dated April 25, 1942 was replied to by the Assistant Minister of War on May 8, directing HATA to make no statement since the matter was being taken care of "at the center."

Since no evidence particularly links HATA with the offense of conspiring to make aggressive war, further investigation of this phase of his activities should be made if his acts in connection with the treatment of prisoners of war are considered important enough to warrant his inclusion in the indictment. So far he seems not to have been made the direct subject of much investigation and most available data has been taken from the ATIS files. By this agency it is said:

"HATA is primarily a soldier, devoted to his profession, with an unusually broadminded and varied experience in important army posts of every kind. Quiet-mannered, dignified and liberal-minded, he gets on well with foreigners. Highly esteemed by both the Army and the general public, he commands their full confidence and is considered to have a restraining influence on the military combined with an acute mind and a wide outlook. He is reported to be popular with the Imperial Household and the Moderates. His most dangerous opponents are the "Young Officer Clique" and extremist secret societies."

From the CIS files this information was taken:

"Although without affiliations in the Army Cliques and a stern disciplinarian, HATA was a foremost advocate



Rept to: Exec. Committe, 13 Mar 46, re: HATA, Shunroka

of expansion and totalitarian policies within the country. While Minister of War in the YONAI Cabinet he made the following demands of Premier YONAI:

1. Reasonably speedy disposal of the China Incident.
2. Establishment of new political structure (new single party).
3. Creation of super-defense system.
4. Change in foreign policy. (Closer ties with the Axis)."

The YONAI Cabinet is said to have fallen because of these intransigent demands which illustrated HATA's political views.

X | Captain Williamson and Colonel Hornaday, who have made studies of the promotion of the opium traffic in China, are both of the opinion that it could not have attained its proportions without HATA's connivance. It is possible that further investigation of this matter may involve him. Such evidence, however, is at present inconclusive.

ALBERT WILLIAMS



It will be remembered that HATA was Minister of War in the ABE and YONAI Cabinets, 30 Aug 1939 until 22 Jul. 1940. It is my opinion that if the statements of the Chinese prosecutors can be backed by convincing evidence, that his name should be included in indictment. Some evidence (of his career as a General in China) is most necessary.

General Count ~~TERAUCHI~~, Juichi is reported by British "dying of arterio sclerosis in a Malaya hospital". He is a top war criminal, but I recommend to pass him up. We do not want to prosecute men with one foot in the grave, and he is too far off to bring here in time. I mention this because he was assigned to me for questioning.



Gen. HATA Shunroku

Opium

TANAKA K. O.

Narcotics brief

---



EXTRACTS FROM KIDO'S DIARY.

HATA, Shunroku (War Minister)

7.11.40 E - Extract.

X I was received in audience and His Majesty talked quite informally on various subjects. He believed that England will refuse our proposal for her suspension of helping Chiang Kaishek and it may result in the occupation of Hong Kong, which will lead to ultimate declaration of war. If so, the United States will start embargo. I replied that our country as well as our people should make up a firm resolution and be prepared against any possible outcome, but at the same time we should study the problem very carefully by holding a Supreme Commanders' Liaison Conference and a Council in the Imperial Presence and be cautious not to be misled by envoys.

His Majesty said also that he anticipated the Chinese incident before it broke out and suggested that the War Minister try to make a compromise with China. The Minister replied that there was no fear about Soviet Russia and China could be settled within a few months. It was His Majesty's intention to consult with Prince KONOYE and decide the policy at a Council in the Imperial Presence. Even this would be, he thought, useless if it was opposed by the army. He expressed frankly the present unfavorable turn in the condition.

X His Majesty continued stating that he talked with the War Minister yesterday over the Chungking operation, which seemed far from making any progress. Our proposal was refused by Chungking. If this operation failed, Germany will be asked for assistance. In any event, things should be handled carefully and one should not be excited.

X At 5.00 P. M., MR. SHIGEMITSU called and expressed his views relating to the movement of political parties and opinions of the Bureau of Military Affairs in the new political system. Lieut-General TOJO was much talked about for War Minister but MIYAMA's name was superseding TOJO's for the last few days.

7.14.40\* - Extract.

X I was received in audience and was asked whether or not an order for heavy artillery mobilization, which was secretly reported by the Prince, the Chief of General-Staff, was fully negotiated with the government. I replied that I would ask the Chief Aide-de-Camp to confirm the relation with the War Minister and if it is not satisfactory I would ask the Premier myself and let His Majesty know the same. It was learned from the War Minister that at the four Ministers' Meeting held on the 12th, it was agreed that the preparation for mobilization shall be started as it would take a month and a half in completing it. The Finance Minister also agreed to the same. It is of course understood a further cabinet decision would be required in case of issuing an order for actual operation. After confirming the above from the Foreign Minister, who was in the same accord with the War Minister, I made a report to His Majesty.

At this time, His Majesty said that he still had confidence in the YONAI cabinet and wished His thoughts be conveyed to Premier YONAI even though the cabinet change might be inevitable.



H.T.I., Shunroku (continued).

7.18.40 E - Extract.

When I was received in audience this afternoon, His Majesty said that the War Minister had just secretly recommended TOJO for War Minister and Tomoyuki YAMASHITA for Supreme Commander of the Air Force. His Majesty thought it strange for Prince KONOYE had not yet accepted TOJO for the post.

Regarding Chungking operation, I was told by His Majesty to the effect that it was favorably developing and if Chiang Kaishek himself was unable to attend the meeting either Ho Ying-Chin or Kung Hsiang-hsi should be sent.

3.4.41 E - Extract.

X I was received in audience at 11.20 in the morning. The Emperor told me about General H.T.I.'s own opinion concerning our military policy towards the nations in the South. Then I had a talk with the Chief Aide-de-Camp on General H.T.I.'s opinion. Mr. ANDO, governor of KYOTO prefecture, visited my house at 8.30 in the evening. He brought me information about the Far Eastern Federation. He said, that General MUTO, General TANAKA and General SUZUKI, great functionaries in the Army, had met together lately, and had decided to establish a branch of the Federation at home, a decision which might put the War Minister in a spot.

Apparently resigned & broke up  
YONAI cabinet



Hata

~ fall of Yovai Cabinet

3001-3

~~J.P.S. 2000 nos~~

one then included in the

memo by Lt Flemer



File # 303, Ser. 7 - Re China Incident

Case # 115, USSBS # 343

File 200, Ser. 34: Visited by Mrs. Suziko  
KAWABE at Sugamo Prison  
on 22 March 1946

File 53, Ser. 28: Above was HATA's Chief of  
Staff, stated that to use  
gas a request had to be  
made to Imperial Gen. H.Q.  
& reports had to be made to  
Imperial S.H.Q.

File 200, Ser. 38: On July 26, 1937 KAWAGISHI received  
orders from KATZUKI for an  
offensive against Chinese Garrison  
Army stationed at Nanyuan.  
Offensive was to begin at  
dawn & to be supported by  
brigade under the command  
of above & other elements.

Kawabe



Hota

Σ 1991

Dec 6 26

Regulations re punishment  
any flyers

Issued by for they cond.  
China and Dec 13 Aug 42

J. 28 Codes summary



*Mr. Sutton 371*

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION  
DOCUMENT DIVISION

24 Sep 47

FROM : Chief, Doc. Div.  
TO : All Concerned  
SUBJECT: Reference to SAIONJI Diary Excerpts

1. In the interest of saving time it is advisable that all attorneys who are interested in having portions of the SAIONJI Diary processed adhere to the following numbering system.

2. Both the English and the Japanese versions are identically subdivided into chapters. Henceforth, in addition to the page numbers, the attorney in his request will kindly give the chapter number as well in order to expedite location of the material in the Japanese copy. A sample follows.

IPS Doc No 3150-130B, pp 7,8

Doc 3150 is the SAIONJI Diary; 130 is the chapter number; B indicates the second request in Chapter 130, and pp 7,8 are the 7th and 8th pages respectively.

*Yale Maxon*  
\_\_\_\_\_  
YALE MAXON



DOC. NO. 3150 -

Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Part XXIV  
Vol. 1

Chapter 370 Page 2878

20 July 1947.

In the afternoon, I called at KIDO's villa in Zushi, but he had just returned to the Hayama Palace. Because Chief of the General Staff, Prince KANIN, had called, KIDO had been summoned and we had missed each other. Because Mrs. KIDO asked me to wait awhile, I waited until 4 o'clock when both MATSUDAIRA and KIDO came home.

According to what I heard, the purpose of Prince KANIN's audience was in connection with the Southern (South Seas) Operations. The Emperor asked KIDO: "Have previous arrangements been made with the government in connection with the Southern (South Seas) operations?" So, KIDO immediately called up the Foreign Minister in Tokyo and relayed the question. The Foreign Minister answered: "That has already been decided by the Four Ministers' Conference and it has been recognized by the government."



Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Part I

"Prelude to Mukden"

Chapter 1 Page 7-8.

13 July 1931.

..... On the night of the 13th, a newspaperman came to my place and reported the fact that the Chief Aide-de-Camp to the Emperor was to be the commander of the Sixth Division, Lt. Gen. Sadao ARAKI. I was very intimate with Lt. Gen. ARAKI but he was an idolizer of Baron HIRANUMA and a prominent figure in the KOKUHONSHA. However, to have such a person serving so close to the Emperor is a serious matter from one point of view and very dangerous .....

.....By these indications, even in the matter of disarmament, it is clear that the extreme rightist KOKUHONSHA is maneuvering in concert with the Army. I believe that it is very troubling that these problems arise, both directly and indirectly.



*Mr. Sutton*  
*Rm 371*

INDEX - SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

DEFENDANT:

HATA, Shunroku . . . . . (XIV) 2023; (XVIII) 2465; (XIX) 2538-39;  
2543, 2546; (XX) 2574; (XXI) 2625, 2627-28;  
2640-41; 2659, 2666, 2677, 2690, 2693, 2696,  
2699, 2700, 2703; (XXII) 2720, 2722, 2726,  
2730-31, 2734, 2741, 2747, 2749, 2752,  
2766, 2768, 2779, 2789, 2792-93, 2796;  
(XXIII) 2822, 2829, 2833, 2835, 2860, 2866,  
2868; (XXIV) 2874-75, 2879.

*\* not deluded + me 9-10-40*



*cannot use*

Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Part XIX

Chapter 327 Page 2538-9

31 May 1939.

On the 25th, there finally was a change in the office of Chief Aide-de-Camp to His Majesty and Gen. HATA Shunroku was appointed while the former Chief Aide-de-Camp, USAMI, resigned. Although the former Chief Aide-de-Camp wasn't a bad person at all, it seems he didn't have a will of his own, nor an understanding of the wishes of the Emperor. It can be conceived that this came about due to the great confusion of the Emperor. However, the matter of just how difficult it was for the Emperor or how greatly His Majesty was inconvenienced because of the Chief Aide-de-Camp can be attested to by the statement made by the Emperor to Aide-de-Camp HIRATA after the new Chief Aide-de-Camp had been installed. This was: "The new Chief Aide-de-Camp seems very capable." No one knows the reason why the Army changed the Chief Aide-de-Camp so unexpectedly. At the Office of the Aide-de-Camp, Vice-Admiral HIRATA carried out the orders of the Emperor in the proper way, and had the great confidence of the Emperor. So, it could be said that HIRATA was very oppressive while the former Chief Aide-de-Camp was



in office and that the former Chief Aide-de-Camp was not relied upon by the office itself. Therefore, it can be conceived that the new Chief Aide-de-Camp was placed in office to oppose the Naval Aide-de-Camp.



Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Part XIX

Chapter 328 Page 2543

6 June 1939.

On the morning of the 1st, I met the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal at the Imperial Palace and he spoke of the time Chief Aide-de-Camp HATA was appointed by the Emperor. The Army had unexpectedly said changes will be made and the former Chief Aide-de-Camp resigned and Gen. HATA replaced him. As soon as Gen. HATA assumed his post, he was addressed by the Emperor regarding the strengthening of the Japan-Germany-Italy Anti-Comintern Pact. His Majesty said: "Get the details from YUASA." Then the Chief Aide-de-Camp came to see the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and listened to the post developments. The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal politely told the Chief Aide-de-Camp that the Emperor was quite pleased and also that foreign policy plans were at a standstill.



Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Part XIX

Chapter 328 Page 2545-6

6 June 1939.

I (HARADA) called on Prince SAIONJI on the morning of the 4th and reported on the progress until now. I also talked of the change in the post of Chief Aide-de-Camp and he (SAIONJI) said: "After all, the Chief Aide-de-Camp is credited with meritorious service in past battles. In other words, didn't the Army appoint a high ranking general of experience in opposition to the Naval Aide-de-Camp?" I (HARADA) told Prince SAIONJI: "Though KONOYE will call on you tomorrow, according to his (KONOYE'S) story, there isn't any special points to speak of. It's merely a simple greeting."

I (HARADA) came back to Tokyo together with KONOYE on the 5th. But, before I left, I spoke to Vice-Minister YAMAMOTO from Okitsu and he was saying that the research on the original bill has finally been completed and the War and Navy Ministers will meet at 10:30 a.m. today to reach a decision. Consequently, I (HARADA) came back, and upon conversing with the Minister of Foreign Affairs over the phone, the story was that the Army and Navy finally found an agreeable point, thus the problem of strengthening of the Japan-Germany-Italy Anti-Comintern Pact was clarified.



*not especially good*

Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Part XXI

Chapter 338 Page 2624-5

1 September 1939.

On the morning of the 31st, I (HARADA) met the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and was told various facts. "The Premier now holds the additional post of Foreign Minister. However, he will soon put someone in. At the time that Gen. ABE was ordered to form the new Cabinet, the Emperor was very indignant about the faults of the Army. He said: 'Even if they recommend a certain person for War Minister, as have been written up in the press, I have no intention of accepting him.' He stated with a very grave attitude: 'UMEZU or HATA must be made Minister (War). Even if the 'Big Three' (Chief of General Staff, Inspector-General of Military Training, and War Minister) decide on someone else and submit it to me, I have no intention of allowing that choice. Carry out the affairs of state with the Constitution as the foundation. I think that it is to Japan's advantage to use England and the United States where our foreign policy is concerned. In such times as these, I have deep concern regarding the selection of the Ministers of Home Affairs, Justice, Foreign Affairs and Finance.' It was the Emperor's



idea to put in, as War Minister, someone of his own choice. He felt deeply that he (War Minister) should cooperate with the Premier and purge the Army thoroughly, or diplomatic intercourse and internal administration would be impossible."

That same day at 8:30 p.m., I (HARADA) met the Premier. He said: "I was granted an audience by the Emperor and he asked about various matters. The Army finally selected Gen. HATA. The Emperor said: 'So the Army still doesn't like UMEZU.' He questioned me about each Cabinet Minister. . . . ."



Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Part XXI

Chapter 339 Page 2627-8.

11 September 1939.

The Premier's determination to cooperate with the feelings of the Emperor and to obey his wishes to every extent is quite strong. Also, the War Minister, Gen. HATA, having been Chief Aide-de-Camp and close to the Emperor for awhile, knew well the points which were worrying the Emperor. He (War Minister) was also quite well aware of the outrageous features of the Army. It is a fact that he joined the Cabinet with great determination. The only thing that is very regrettable is that the circumstances surrounding the Premier are very bad. ARISUYE is doing harm to him. Unless ARISUYE is separated from him, he will have difficulties. I thought the new War Minister should be warned about this point, and phoned the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal about this. I think that I shall talk to the War Minister myself when I have the chance. . . . .



Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Part XXII

Chapter 358

Page 2788-9

29 March 1940.

The next morning I went to IKEDA Seihin's place.  
IKEDA said: " . . . . .  
Prince KONOYE told me some time ago that when the  
War Minister and Prince KONOYE met on March 1, the  
War Minister asked him to send AKIYAMA directly to  
the Chungking Government. The fact that Prince  
KONOYE consented to this without any stipulations  
is very dangerous to Prince KONOYE's political life."  
IKEDA was deeply worried about this.



Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS  
Part XXII

Chapter 359 Page 2792-3

6 April 1940.

(HARADA to KONOYE)

" . . . . . I have persistently cautioned you, but in the matter of you being requested by the War Minister to speak to AKIYAMA, I think that you should first suggest to the War Minister that he speak to the Premier himself. This, from the standpoint of your personal responsibilities, will indicate that you are checking the plot to a certain extent. If you do not do this, it might endanger your future political career. You will have to decide the matter with the War Minister and then advise him that it will be wise for him to speak with the Premier as well as the Foreign Minister himself." KONOYE did not answer that time.

At 11:00 p.m. that night, KONOYE phoned me and said: "I met the War Minister at Prince CHICHIBU'S Science Promotion Society's dinner party. As I wanted to hear of the recent developments, I told him about AKIYAMA. However, the War Minister said: 'I have not heard from AKIYAMA since then, other than that he will not make a partial report.' I told him that it would be a wise idea for him to relate the story to the Premier.



Please be relieved. The War Minister was saying that  
he will confer with the Premier."



(H.S.)

Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Part XXII

Chapter 359 Page 2796

6 April 1940.

Early on the morning of the 3rd, I visited Gen. ABE to congratulate him upon his appointment as special envoy. Upon discussing matters, the general seemed concerned over the state of affairs within the Army. Moreover, he had also heard from War Minister HATA about the KONOYE and AKIYAMA problems. In short, the War Minister went to Prince KONOYE and inquired if there were someone who would act as an intermediary between CHIANG Kai-shek and the Japanese Government. To this, KONOYE is said to have recommended AKIYAMA. When I met KONOYE the last time, I understood that the War Minister had designated AKIYAMA. Moreover, Gen ABE was complaining of the many unsolved problems in connection with his forthcoming trip to China. He was also quite concerned over the mixed opinions and disunity within the Army.



Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Part XXIV  
Vol. 1

Chapter 370 Page 2873

20 July 1940.

According to KIDO's version, Vice Minister of War ANAMI came to him and stated that the Military cannot possibly be satisfied with the present cabinet's organization. Therefore, in order to change the foreign policy, ANAMI stated that a shake-up of the cabinet must take place. KIDO was concerned about the possibility of a government upheaval within the near future.

From Foreign Minister ARITA, I heard: "I spoke to Chief Cabinet Secretary ISHIWATA and YONAI about the desirability of KONOYE's new political order and united government. It seemed both were giving it considerable deliberation."

On the morning of the 11th, I called Vice Minister ANAMI on the phone and feigning innocence, I asked: "Just what are you insisting on?" ANAMI replied: "At present, there is no consistency between the foreign policy and military operations. In order for these to coincide, the Cabinet must inevitably be changed. I wish Prince KONOYE will exert his efforts to this end."



DOC. NO. 3150 -

Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Part XXIV  
Vol. 1

Chapter 370 Page 2882

24 July 1940.

. . . . . As the result of the meeting of  
the Big Three of the Army, Lt. Gen. TOJO was recom-  
mended to KONOYE as a suitable successor to the War  
Minister.



DOC. NO. 3150 -

Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Part XXIV  
Vol. 1

Chapter 370 Page 2879-80

20 July 1940.

On the previous day (16th) I held a telephone conversation with KONOYE and he said persistently: "Even if I were to participate in this case, it will not yet be possible to form the new political order. The reason I had resigned as President of the Privy Council was in order to direct my efforts to the formation of this new political order. Therefore, it would not be reasonable if I were to be the Premier at this time. Furthermore, the responsibility for the overthrow of the Cabinet lies with the Army, so I would like to see the Army take it over. How can we make this happen?" Therefore, I phoned Admiral OKADA and former Premier HIROTA. However, the Army clique agreed with KONOYE and said: "Because we want it that way, we will do something." But, when it came to a showdown, things did not seem to go that way.



Perma

not copied

XXI

2699

13 Dec 1939Lord Kay of Brimley had

states Emperor desires a peace  
 solution as soon as possible. He is  
 pleased if the war ends than his  
 chief aim is to Conf.

XXII

f. 2771

Mukai said Gen. Nagaki is not fit  
 He is opposed to negotiations with Wang Ching wei  
 it is feared negotiations will be broken.  
 The army is saying that Mukai will not do  
 It is a way who believe new cabinet  
 should be centered around Hata  
 with Kato as minister of Home Affairs



Presen.

Vol ~~XII~~ f. 2789

Akiyama being sent as envoy +

Chiang Kai Shek Govt -

IKEDA <sup>Seiki</sup> raid

Prince Konoye told him something  
ago that on 9 March 1940 Gen. Matsui  
called him + read Akiyama direct  
to the Chiang Kai Shek Govt. - that he  
thought Prince Konoye's words  
+ this without an stipulation  
was politically dangerous

See pp 2792-3



Higgins

HATA SHUNROKU

ANALYSIS

of the responsibility of the accused arising out of his official position for the facts stated in prosecution's phase " Aggression against the USSR."

Official positions  
( directly connected with the said phase )

Responsible  
for the following facts;

1. 10 Aug. 1928 - 1 Aug. 1931 -  
Chief of the 1st Department  
of the Headquarters General  
Staff.

3. Aggressive intentions of the  
imperialistic clique of Japan  
in regard to the USSR. ( 1928-  
1945 ).

Cc. 5, 17 of the Indictment.

a/ The affidavit of Myiake  
Mitsuhara, who stated that  
the plan of operations, that  
were to lead to the occupation  
of Manchuria, was a most impor-  
tant part of the over-all ope-  
rations plan for the Japanese  
troops against the USSR which  
the General Staff had.

4. Plans of the war of aggres-  
sion against the Soviet Union  
from 1928 to 1940

C.17 of the Indictment.

/ Pros. Doc. N1950, exb N699/

2. 1 Aug. 1931 - 1 Aug. 1933-  
Inspector of Artillery ( War  
Office ).

3. 1 Aug. 1933 - 2 Dec. 1935  
Commander of the 14th Division.

4. 2 Dec. 1935- 1 Aug 1936  
Chief of the Army Air Force  
Headquarters ( War Office )

5. 26 Aug. 1937 - 14 Feb. 1938  
Inspector-General of Military  
Education and concurrently  
Military Councillor

3. Aggressive intentions of  
imperialistic clique of Je  
in regard to the USSR. ( ?  
1945 )

Cc. 5, 17 of the Ind



a/ The affidavit of Yanagita Genzo testifying on the preparation of Japanese officers for a war against the USSR.  
/Pros. Doc. N2238, exb. N723/

6. 14 Feb. 1938 - 25 May 1939 - Commander of Expeditionary Force to Central China and 15/III 1938 - Member of Supreme War Council.

7. 25 May 1939 - 30 Aug. 1939 Chief Aid-de-Camps to the Emperor.

8. 30 Aug. 1939 - War Minister and President of the Manchurian Affairs Board .

a/ The affidavit of Yatsugi Kadzuo stating that the War Ministry was a juridical member of the society "Kokusaku-Kenkyu-Kai" and paid 3,000nyen in fees annually  
/ Pros.doc. N2233, exb N678/

b/ The affidavit of the witness Yanagito Genzo, who states that the activities of the Kwantung Army for the creation of the Manchurian military base against the USSR were carried on under the direction of the war Ministry.  
/ Pros.Doc. N2238, exb N723/

c/ Affidavit of the witness Kusaba Tatsumi, pointing out that the War Ministry coordinated the plans for

11. Undeclared war of aggression against the USSR in the Lake Khassan area. (July-August 1938)  
Cc. 25,35,52 of the Indictment.

4. Plans of a war of aggression against the Soviet Union from 1928 to 1940.  
C. 17 of the Indictment.

5. The seizure of Manchuria and turning it into a military base for an attack on the Soviet Union. Violation of provisions of the Portsmouth Treaty, and of the Peking Convention of 1925. ( 1931-1945)  
C. 17 of the Indictment.

6. The establishment of the military base for an attack on the USSR in Korea. The violation of the provisions of the Portsmouth Treaty and of the Peking Convention of 1925.  
C. 17 of the Indictment.



the construction of railways in Manchuria with the cabinet of Ministers.

/ Prosecution.doc.N 1982  
exb. N 837 )

d/ The affidavit of the witness Kita Seichi stating, that preparation of Manchuria as a military base for the attack against the Soviet Union was carried on according to the plan of the Government, of the First Department of the Army General Staff and of the Bureau of Military Affairs. War Ministry.

As one of the leaders of the Japanese ruling clique, which fact is proved by his having held important government posts for a long time, is responsible for the general policy of the Japanese Government, which found its expression in specific aggressive acts against the USSR.

10. Systematic violation of the state frontier of the USSR. (1932-1945 ).

C. 17 of the Indictment.

12. Undeclared aggressive war against the USSR and the Mongolian People's Republic in the Nomonghan area. ( May- September 1939 )

Cc. 26,36,51 of the Indictment.

14. The conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Pact, which was a military political alliance of aggressors directed against the democratic states and against the USSR, in particular. The results of its enforcement as regards the USSR prior to the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact. ( 1936-1940 )

Cc.5,17 of the Indictment.

15. The conclusion of the Tri-partite Pact finally shaping the conspiracy of aggressors against the democratic states, and the USSR in particular.

Cc.5, 17 of the Indictment.

17. Active realization of the aims of conspiracy as regards the Soviet Union during the period of the aggressive war of Germany against the USSR and gross violation of the Neutrality Pact.

19. Plans of an aggressive war against the USSR from 1941 to 1944.

C.17 of the Indictment.



HATA, Shunroku

Points in His Interrogation by Lt. Col. Beebe (Chemical Warfare Section) on 10 April 1946:

1. Top Positions in the Japanese Army.

The top is the War Minister.

The Chief of Staff is about equal in power.

"The Inspector General of Military Education is also a top position."

(HATA was Inspector General of Military Education during a part of the first KONOYE Cabinet from 26 August 1937 to 14 February 1938 and again during a part of the KOISO Cabinet 22 November 1944 to 7 April 1945.)

2. How the Minister of War is Chosen.

"The retiring War Minister, the Vice-Minister of War, and the Chief of the Personnel Affairs Bureau select a candidate, then the retiring War Minister, the Chief of Staff and the Inspector General of Military Education confer and make the decision. This man is then recommended to the new Premier. The War Minister must be of the rank of at least Lieutenant General."

3. How the Chief of Staff is Chosen.

The War Minister and the Inspector General of Military Education pick the man and recommend him to the Emperor who issues the appointing order.



4. Use of Gas.

Gas warfare was forbidden by Imperial General Headquarters.

Tear gas could be used at any time. No specific permission was necessary.

Sneezing gas (called by the Japanese red candle) could also be used at any time but when used it was reported to HATA and he reported to Imperial Headquarters. He does not remember its use in 1937. It was used 5 or 6 times from 1941 to 1944.

Tear and sneezing gas could be used by field commanders without his authority.

Very good technical results were secured from the use of tear and sneezing gas. The Chinese had few gas masks and when sneezing gas was used they would break and run.

Tear and sneezing gas were not used recklessly. Only where the Japanese expected great loss to themselves or to the enemy would they use it.

He did ask permission to use tear and sneezing gas in the 194-1944 period which was granted by General SUGIYAMA.



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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF CHEMICAL OFFICER

APO 500  
13 April 1946

SUBJECT: Japanese Chemical Warfare Policies and Intentions.

TO : Chief, Chemical Warfare Service, Washington 25, D. C.  
(Attention: Chief, Intelligence Branch).

1. Inclosed herewith are reports of interrogation of the following former Japanese Army Officers concerning basic Chemical Warfare policies:

- General Hideki Tojo
- General Shunroku Hata
- General Masakazu Kawabe
- Lieutenant Colonel Susumu Sekiguchi

2. Additional reports will follow.

GEOFFREY MARSHALL  
Colonel, CWS  
Chief Chemical Officer

- 4 Incls:
- Incl 1. Interrogation of Gen. Hideki Tojo
- Incl 2. Interrogation of Gen. Shunroku Hata
- Incl 3. Interrogation of Gen. Masakazu Kawabe
- Incl 4. Interrogation of Lt. Col. Susumu Sekiguchi

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF CHEMICAL OFFICER

10 April 1946

## Continued Interrogation of General Masakazu Kawabe

General Masakazu Kawabe was interrogated a second time at 0930, 9 April 1946, at Sagamo Prison, Tokyo.

Persons present: General Masakazu Kawabe  
Lieutenant Colonel John E. Beebe, Jr., CWS, Interrogator  
2nd Lieutenant Francis M. Ellis, Inf., Interpreter

- Q. When I was here a month ago you stated that you did not know the use of gas in China. Is that correct?
- A. Only the possession of special smoke (aka to) and special smoke equipment.
- Q. Did the Japanese Army make a distinction between the major toxic gases and the minor toxic gases?
- A. Gases were divided according to effect. In training, a distinction was made. Training covered toxicity and effects of different gases.
- Q. I have a document which I will show to you. Do you recognize this document? (General Kawabe was handed a Japanese document which translated reads: "Lessons From the China Incident", Chemical Warfare Section No. 7, April 15, 1938, published by the Inspectorate General of Military Education.)
- A. I have seen this before and remember it.
- Q. Are you the publisher of this document?
- A. Yes. My name appears on it.
- Q. This character representing your first name is sometimes read "Shozo" is it not?
- A. Yes. There are two readings. The average person would read it "Shozo". I read it "Masakazu".
- Q. What were the circumstances under which you published this document?

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- A. I don't remember very well, I don't recall the contents very well or the reason, but it was a rescript for the education of the Japanese soldiers participating in the China Incident.
- Q. Does not this document deal with gas warfare and the experiences of the Japanese Army in using gas against the Chinese?
- A. I think it is about the use of the special smoke (aka to) candle.
- Q. Is this a toxic smoke candle?
- A. It is a toxic gas, but it is supposed to be a gas hidden in smoke, but its main use is smoke.
- Q. When we were here a month ago, you told us you were Chief of Staff of the Central China Expeditionary Force from February 1938 to January 1939. The instances of the use of toxic smoke mentioned in the document I showed you occurred during this time. Can you explain how it came to be used?
- A. I do not know. I was Chief of Staff then. I did not know of its being used nor did I receive any reports of its use. I do not recall it.
- Q. Do you know General Tojo?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Was he not Vice-Minister of War during this period?
- A. Yes.
- Q. General Tojo states that the Supreme Commander in China requested authority of the Chief of Staff to use gas in China during this period. Is not this true?
- A. I do not remember it.
- Q. As Chief of Staff of the China Armies would you not know of such a demand?
- A. I should know but I cannot recall. When was this demand made?
- Q. About May 1938.
- A. I do not know of any demands in that period. The Armies were divided into two groups, a northern and a central group.
- Q. These examples are from the Central China Expeditionary Forces.

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- A. That is my group. I should know.
- Q. I will refresh your memory. Do you recall the battle waged by the 20th Division near Kyokuyo on 6 July 1938?
- A. I recall that such a battle occurred.
- Q. Some 6,000 to 7,000 special smoke candles were used in that operation. Do you recall that?
- A. Because I had no connection with this group, I do not know the details. They may have used special smoke candles, but the fact was never stated to me.
- Q. Do you recall the Joyo River battle waged by Katayama's Brigade on 2 June 1938?
- A. I do not remember it.
- Q. I will show you this map and sketch of the battle. (Sketch and map of Example No. 1, from "Lessons From the China Incident, No. 5", dated 13 October 1938, was shown General Kawabe.)
- A. I do not remember it.
- Q. Was this Katayama Brigade authorized to use gas in the Joyo Battle?
- A. I do not remember.
- Q. Would any organized force of the Japanese Army use gas without authority?
- A. No, they could not. Permission is necessary.
- Q. Who could grant that permission?
- A. The request to use gas is made by the Commander of the Central China Expeditionary Force to Imperial General Headquarters in Tokyo. After Imperial General Headquarters' approval, the orders to lower units to use gas are issued by the Central China Force Commander.
- Q. Since gas was used against the Chinese, then the Central China Expeditionary Force Commander must have made a demand to Imperial General Headquarters for its use. Is that true?
- A. I have given you the chain of command, but I repeat that I do not remember the demand.
- Q. Are you familiar with the Morita Detachment?
- A. No, I do not recall.

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- Q. Do you recall the action around Kochin, Jigashu and the Kaiga River around Okako about 18 - 19 May 1938?
- A. Yes. I remember this battle.
- Q. Are you familiar with the use of toxic smoke in this engagement?
- A. The fact that it was used I do not remember.
- Q. Would you, as Chief of Staff, normally be advised of the use of such a weapon as gas?
- A. The fact that it was used would have been reported to me.
- Q. How then, General Kawabe, can you explain your inability to recall these instances of the use of gas when normally it should be reported to you?
- A. I realize what you say should be true, but the fact that I cannot recall it is true.
- Q. I thought you would have had a clearer recollection because you published this document I showed you earlier - "Lessons From the China Incident", No. 7.
- A. I just put my name to the document without knowing the contents. I am very sorry.
- Q. Who prepared this document?
- A. The Chemical Warfare School officers at Marashino prepared it and after consultation with my staff, I authorized its publication. That was my responsibility.
- Q. Do you recall what officers at Marashino prepared this document?
- A. I don't clearly recall, but I think Major General Nishihara, head of the school. I remember Lieutenant Colonel Sekiguchi was there at some time.
- Q. Where did the information used to prepare this document originate?
- A. In general, the reports come up through the chain of command to the Imperial General Headquarters where they are assembled, and the necessary documents are made available to the special service schools.
- Q. Was there a liaison officer between Imperial General Headquarters and the Marashino Chemical Warfare School?

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- Q. There was no special liaison officer, but on the staff were men who could pick out the special documents the school would need.
- Q. Going through the chain of command to Imperial General Headquarters, would not these reports have come through you as Chief of Staff?
- A. Yes, I should see them, but there were so many I did not see them all.
- Q. When was your first knowledge that gas had actually been used against the Chinese?
- A. When I was Chief of Staff Inspectorate General of Military Education, was the first time I knew gas (aka to) had been used.
- Q. Do you recall the protests made by the Chinese government during 1938 concerning the Japanese use of poison gas?
- A. Yes. I remember.
- Q. On 5 May 1938, China notified the League of Nations that Japan planned to use poison gas. On 14 May 1938, the League Council passed a resolution condemning the Japanese use of poison gas. What effect did this have on Japanese Army policy concerning the use of poison gas?
- A. I do not recall that there was any change at all.
- Q. Was not this a matter which was considered to have very grave and serious repercussions?
- A. Yes. That other countries would retaliate was thought about. We considered the use of toxic smoke as a special case. This is my private opinion.
- Q. From what you say, I gather that you and the Commander-in-Chief of Central China Expeditionary Force discussed the use of toxic smoke at this time. Is that true?
- A. No. I did not.
- Q. Who was the Commander-in-Chief of the Central China Expeditionary Force at that time?
- A. General Shunroku Hata.
- Q. Who was the Chief of the Army General Staff at this time - 1938?
- A. Prince Kan-in-nomiya.
- Q. Then the decisions were made by General Hata and Prince Kan-in-nomiya?

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- Q. Yes. The use of poison gas I have thought about deeply. There is a difference in toxic smoke. You used sneezing gas against your robbers in the States. My feeling is that toxic smoke is not a poison gas.
- Q. Why is toxic smoke (aka to) not a poison gas?
- A. Because the effects are light. Gases are divided according to whether they cause permanent or temporary disability. Special smoke (aka to) is classified in the temporary group.
- Q. By that do you mean that the injury caused by special smoke (aka to) is not serious or permanent?
- A. Yes. It is quite temporary.
- Q. General Kawabe, I would like you to read Chapter VI of this document "Lessons From the Chinese Incident", No. 7, Chemical Warfare Section, published 15 April 1939 by you while Chief of Staff, Inspectorate General of Military Education, and give me your comments. (General Kawabe was handed the document. Chapter VI is translated as follows:)

## "Chapter VI. THE CHINESE ARMY AS SEEN FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF CHEMICAL WARFARE.

"1. General. Evidently they have begun to give serious consideration to chemical warfare and made attempts to institute chemical warfare training and to organize equipment, but they are yet only in the experimental stage. However, stimulated by the bitter experiences of the present incident, the Chinese Army will double their efforts to achieve better defensive measures.

### "2. Defensive Equipment.

(1) Their protective equipment is not standardized and varies widely from army to army. Their gas-masks, for instance, are mostly imported from abroad and the great majority of these are of poor quality. This is particularly true of their home-made gas-masks.

(2) Although the number of gas-masks carried by the troops differ greatly in different army groups, in the armies not under direct control of the Chungking Government, only the officers are given gas-masks and these are very defective; while in the regular armies under the direct control of Chungking, many of the soldiers in the front lines are furnished with gas-masks.



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#3. Defensive Training. Instruction and training in defensive operations seem to be very primitive as is proven by the actual examples enumerated below. It is worth noting that they seem to have neglected the morale side of instruction.

- (1) Some soldiers at the front lines carried their gas-masks without canisters fitted to them.
- (2) Some did not uncover the lid of the canister and were asphyxiated by the mask.
- (3) Some died by asphyxiation, sticking their noses and mouths into the ground.
- (4) Some wore their gas-masks but because of their not being air tight became incapable of combat.
- (5) Mistaking smoke for gas, at the sight of smoke, they abandoned their strongly fortified positions and retreated.
- (6) Some carried their masks, but lost their heads in the turmoil and could not put on their masks.
- (7) When prisoners were told to demonstrate the use of masks, their movements were very slow and awkward and they seemed completely indifferent to the air-tightness of the masks.
- (8) Although the Chinese armies, when attacked with special smoke, would generally abandon their positions, they would soon return unless we broke through their defense lines while the screen persisted.

When the soldiers came in contact with special smoke, some seriously affected persons bled through their noses and mouths and died from asphyxiation.

(9) The fact that the Generalissimo himself and his higher commanding officers often issued instructions, such as the following, to the armies shows how primitive their education in chemical warfare was:

'1. When the enemy undertakes to make a smoke screen, you must not, in any event, mistake it for toxic gases and make an unnecessary fuss about it, but hold calmly to your position and receive the attack.

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'2. Most of the gases which the enemy uses are non-persistent ones; therefore, if our army, if it can take simple defensive measures against them, can meet them when the time comes, rout the enemy and defeat the purposes of the enemy's operation.

'3. Each unit should always be provided with gas-masks. If the supply of masks is insufficient, emergency manufacture must be carried out and full preparations made. The enemy's gas attacks must be repelled at all times.'

- A. I think this is all concerning toxic smoke (aka to), and also it is about the use of toxic smoke and non-toxic smoke mixed together.
- Q. What is your comment on this point relative to the Chinese - that "some died by asphyxiation, sticking their noses and mouths into the ground"?
- A. While it is temporary in effect, it can be very painful, and the Chinese, not knowing its results, probably became afraid and as written threw themselves on the ground and stuck their faces in the mud.
- Q. How do you explain this passage: "When the (Chinese) soldiers came in contact with special smoke, some seriously affected persons bled through their noses and mouths and died from asphyxiation"?
- A. Toxic smoke (aka to) is temporary in effect, but as is written, too much was probably taken in and the body being weak, they died, and the same result would probably occur with ordinary smoke.
- Q. This special smoke was used upon the Chinese by the Japanese Army, was it not?
- A. Yes. As written here it is true.
- Q. Do you have any further comments to make on the use of special smoke against the Chinese?
- A. I would like to be able to remember more on this, but I am very sorry, I do not remember.
- Q. Do you remember the policy concerning the use of mustard, lewisite and phosgene in China?
- A. The use of these gases was not thought about. No one had it. It was forbidden.

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Q. Do you have anything further to offer?

A. I have something more to say on the difference between special smoke (aka to) and poison gas. What I said was my private opinion. I can't speak for the Army.

Q. Death is a rather permanent disability, is it not?

A. War is war. Such things happen in war.

Q. What about international law and treaties on the use of gas?

A. In my opinion treaties did not cover special smoke (aka to).

The interrogation was concluded at this point.

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF CHEMICAL OFFICER

AFO 500  
11 April 1946

Interrogation of General Shunroku Hata

General Shunroku Hata was interrogated at 0925, 10 April 1946, at the Sagano Prison, Tokyo.

Persons present: General Shunroku Hata  
Lieutenant Colonel John E. Beebe, Jr., CWS, Interrogator  
2nd Lieutenant Francis M. Ellis, Inf., Interpreter

Q. State your name and rank.

A. Shunroku Hata, General, Japanese Army.

Q. How old are you?

A. 67

Q. When were you commissioned in the Japanese Army?

A. 1901

Q. When were you promoted to General Officer?

A. Major General, 1926; Lieutenant General, 1931; full General, 1937.

Q. When did you assume command of the Central China Expeditionary Force?

A. 16 February 1938.

Q. When did you relinquish that command?

A. December 1938.

Q. What was your next assignment?

A. Member of the Supreme War Council. My following assignments were:

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May 1939 - August 1939	Chief Aide de Camp to the Emperor
September 1939 - January 1940	War Minister in the Abe Cabinet
January 1940 - July 1940	War Minister in the Yonai Cabinet
	I was replaced as War Minister by General Tojo. ✓
July 1940 - February 1941	Member of the Supreme War Council
March 1941 - November 1944	I was Commander-in-Chief of all the China Armies. This included the North, Central and South China Armies but not the Kwantung Army.
December 1944 - July 1945	I was Inspector General of Military Education.

Q. What are the top positions in the Japanese Army?

A. The top is the War Minister. The Chief of the Army General Staff is about equal in power, which position is stronger depends upon the individuals. The Inspector General of Military Education is also a top position. In the War Ministry besides the Minister, the Vice-Minister and the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau are key positions.

Q. How is the War Minister chosen and who chooses him?

A. The retiring War Minister, the Vice-Minister of War, and the Chief of the Personnel Affairs Bureau select a candidate, then the retiring War Minister, the Chief of Staff and the Inspector General of Military Education confer and make the decision. This man is then recommended to the new Premier. The War Minister must be of the rank of at least Lieutenant General.

Q. How is the Chief of Staff chosen and who chooses him?

A. The War Minister and the Inspector General of Military Education pick the man and recommend him to the Emperor who issues the appointing order.

Q. In those cases where an Imperial Prince was Chief of Staff, was he actually in control or was the real power exercised by another?

A. The Vice Chief of Staff and also the prince exercised control. It is the same when the Chief of Staff is not a prince.



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- Q. In the case of Prince Kan-in-nomiya (more accurately, Prince Kan-in; also known less commonly as Imperial Prince Kotohito), who was Chief of Staff from December 1937 to October 1940, was he actually issuing the orders or was for instance the Vice Chief, General Tada, who was Vice Chief of the General Staff from August 1937 to December 1938?
- A. The orders came from the Chief of Staff who took them to the Emperor for permission, and if he approved, the Chief of Staff issued the orders. These were high questions of overall strategy concerning the opening of campaigns. For example, the responsibility of the China Army, whether to take Hankow or not, was decided at this level. The execution was left to the field commander. The General Staff issued orders to carry out these policies. I was not there, but I think Prince Kan-in-nomiya carried his responsibilities. The Imperial Princes chosen as Chiefs of Staff were men of genuine military ability. (Note: ~~Prince Kan-in-nomiya was the son of the Emperor Meiji and uncle to the present Emperor of Japan.~~)
- Q. At the time you assumed command of the Central China Expeditionary Force, February 1938, were you authorized to employ gas warfare?
- A. No. It was forbidden by Imperial General Headquarters.
- Q. When did you receive permission to employ gas warfare?
- A. In each case we were authorized by Imperial General Headquarters. There was no blanket authority.
- Q. When did you first receive authority to employ gas?
- A. Tear gas could be used at any time. No specific permission was necessary. Sneezing gas (aka to - literally translated as red candle. Note: The Japanese sneezing gas candle, diphenylcyanarsine, is marked with a red band and universally referred to by Japanese Army officers as red candle.) could also be used at any time. When they were used, reports had to be made quickly to me and I reported to Imperial General Headquarters.
- Q. When did you first receive authority to use tear and sneezing gases?
- A. It was not used at Hankow. I do not remember its use in 1937. We used it five or six times from 1941 to 1944. I do not remember about 1938.
- Q. The instances of the use of tear and sneezing gases used at various places in Central China such as around Hankow came to you for transmittal to Imperial General Headquarters, did they not? "Lessons

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From the China Incident<sup>a</sup>, No. 7, Chemical Warfare Section, published 15 April 1939 by the Inspectorate General of Military Education states that the battles from which these lessons in the use of gas are derived range from the Battle of Joshua to those around the Kanke and Canton areas. Specifically, operations in the mountains near Hankow; operations of the Hata Detachment, the 6th and 9th Divisions; operations near Daino by the Formosan 2nd Infantry Regiment, Torigame Hill near the Yangtse River, near Daishi-Iso by the 68th Infantry Regiment; Santen Hill by the Formosan 1st Infantry Regiment; the 1st Regiment of the Hata Detachment at Buzan Hill; the 23rd Infantry Regiment near Dokansen; the Formosan 1st Infantry Regiment in the Oyama Hills and the 23rd Infantry Regiment in the southwestern district of Zansui.

- A. I don't know. In these cases I would not know about it.
- Q. Do you recall discussing the use of tear and sneezing gas with your Chief of Staff, General Kawabe?
- A. No, I did not. I did not know about the instances you mentioned.
- Q. Could your field commanders use tear and sneezing gas without your authority?
- A. Yes.
- Q. At some point they had been authorized, had they not?
- A. They could use it without specific authority. I don't remember very clearly but I think it is written in Sakusen Yomurei (Japanese tactical manual).
- Q. Under what circumstances was lewisite used?
- A. We did not have any lewisite, phosgene or mustard so of course we did not use any.
- Q. The five or six instances of using sneezing gas between 1941 and 1944, you mentioned earlier, was special permission required from Imperial General Headquarters?
- A. I don't remember. I read the report of its use.
- Q. When and where was it used?
- A. I don't remember, but I think it was used about five or six times, firing about five or six shots each time it was used.

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Q. Did you enjoy good tactical results from the use of tear and sneezing gas?

A. Very good results. The loss to us in casualties was almost none. On our part we had no casualties and the Chinese broke and fled in disorder. A few had gas-masks but most did not. The Chinese seemed to be able to tell the difference between plain smoke and sneezing gas for they would not run from the former, but the minute sneezing gas was used, they would break and run.

Q. Do you recall the protest made by the Chinese in 1938 concerning the use of gas by the Japanese Army?

A. I do not remember that. When were they made?

Q. On 5 May 1938, China notified the League of Nations of the imminent use of gas by Japan, on 14 May 1938, the League Council passed a resolution condemning the Japanese use of gas; and 30 September 1938 the League of Nations Council adopted a resolution calling for the investigation of the alleged use of poison gas by Japan.

A. I had not heard of that. Are sneezing gas and tear gas considered poison gas?

Q. Gas is gas. What is your definition of poison gas?

A. Poison gas is one which kills or has a permanent disabling effect. I think mustard, lewisite and phosgene are poison gases, but tear and sneezing gases are not. Where avoidable, we did not use tear and sneezing gas, nor did we use it recklessly. Only where we expected great loss to ourselves or the enemy did we use it. III

Q. I have a document here of which I would like to have you read the last two or three pages. The name of this document is, "Lessons From the China Incident", No. 7, Chemical Warfare Section, published 15 April 1939, by the Inspector General of Military Education. Please read chapter VI of this document and give us your comments. (Chapter VI of the document is given to the witness to read, translation of which is as follows:)

"Chapter VI. THE CHINESE ARMY AS SEEN FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF CHEMICAL WARFARE.

"1. General. Evidently they have begun to give serious consideration to chemical warfare and made attempts to institute chemical warfare training and to organize equipment, but they are yet only in the experimental stage. However, stimulated by the bitter experiences of the present Incident, the Chinese Army will double their efforts to achieve better defensive measures.

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"2. Defensive Equipment.

(1) Their protective equipment is not standardized and varies widely from army to army. Their gas-masks, for instance, are mostly imported from abroad and the great majority of these are of poor quality. This is particularly true of their home-made gas-masks.

(2) Although the number of gas-masks carried by the troops differ greatly in different army groups, in the armies not under direct control of the Chungking Government, only the officers are given gas-masks and these are very defective; while in the regular armies under the direct control of Chungking, many of the soldiers in the front lines are furnished with gas-masks.

"3. Defensive Training. Instruction and training in defensive operations seem to be very primitive as is proven by the actual examples enumerated below. It is worth noting that they seem to have neglected the morale side of instruction.

(1) Some soldiers at the front lines carried their gas-masks without canisters fitted to them.

(2) Some did not uncover the lid of the canister and were asphyxiated by the mask.

(3) Some died by asphyxiation, sticking their noses and mouths into the ground.

(4) Some wore their gas-masks but because of their not being air tight became incapable of combat.

(5) Mistaking smoke for gas, at the sight of smoke, they abandoned their strongly fortified positions and retreated.

(6) Some carried their masks, but lost their heads in the turmoil and could not put on their masks.

(7) When prisoners were told to demonstrate the use of masks, their movements were very slow and awkward and they seemed completely indifferent to the air-tightness of the masks.

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(8) Although the Chinese armies, when attacked with special smoke, would generally abandon their positions, they would soon return unless we broke through their defense lines while the screen persisted.

When the soldiers came in contact with special smoke, some seriously affected persons bled through their noses and mouths and died from asphyxiation.

(9) The fact that the Generalissimo himself and his higher commanding officers often issued instructions, such as the following, to the armies shows how primitive their education in chemical warfare was:

'1. When the enemy undertakes to make a smoke screen, you must not, in any event, mistake it for toxic gases and make an unnecessary fuss about it, but hold calmly to your position and receive the attack.

'2. Most of the gases which the enemy uses are non-persistent ones; therefore, if our army, if it can take simple defensive measures against them, can meet them when the time comes, rout the enemy and defeat the purposes of the enemy's operation.

'3. Each unit should always be provided with gas-masks. If the supply of masks is insufficient, emergency manufacture must be carried out and full preparations made. The enemy's gas attacks must be repelled at all times.'

- A. In this case, it was not the case of the poison gas but that they (Chinese soldiers) suffocated themselves.
- Q. Why did they suffocate themselves?
- A. Because they did not have a gas-mask. Those who did have did not know how to use them.
- Q. How do you reconcile your statement that special smoke or sneezing gas is not a poison gas with this statement from the passage you read: "When (Chinese) soldiers came in contact with special smoke, some seriously affected persons bled through their noses and mouths and died from asphyxiation"?
- A. I think this was a special case, and in ordinary cases one doesn't die from special smoke (aka to).

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- Q. But these died. Doesn't that make this a poison gas?
- A. I have never heard that there was death before. This is the first time I have seen this.
- Q. These examples and comments are based on the experiences of the Japanese Central China Expeditionary Force during the time you were the commander, were they not?
- A. While I was Commander-in-Chief I did not hear of these things. My thoughts were that tear gas and sneezing gas would not take a person's life. Mustard, lewisite and phosgene are poison gases because they are killing agents, so we never used them.
- Q. As the Commander-in-Chief of the Central China Expeditionary Force, were you not responsible for the acts that occurred during that time?
- A. Yes. I have the responsibility.
- Q. General Tojo stated that demands were frequently made by the commanders in China to use gas against the Chinese. Is that correct?
- A. I did not ask permission to use mustard or lewisite, but I did ask permission to use tear and sneezing gases.
- Q. Was that authority granted?
- A. Yes. We received permission.
- Q. When?
- A. In the 1941 to 1944 period.
- Q. Who granted that authority?
- A. Prince Kan-in-nomiya.
- Q. Prince Kan-in-nomiya died in 1940.
- A. Then it was General Sugiyama.
- Q. Since as you have seen there were many instances of use of gas in 1938, you must have also received permission to use it in 1938.
- A. Yes, I think that is so, sir.
- Q. Did you ever receive any change in policy on the use of gas against the Chinese?
- A. No. It was all right to use tear gas, special smoke sneezing gas. The policy never changed from the first.

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- Q. As War Minister from 1939 to 1940, did you have any authority to make or change this policy?
- A. As War Minister I had no concern with operations. It was the responsibility of the Imperial General Headquarters.
- Q. Do you remember the use of gas against the Chinese in the following instances? Ichang, 8-10 October 1941; Changsha (South Gate), 3 January 1942; Changsha, 4 January 1942; Paotau, Suiyan, 15 February 1942; Paotau, Suiyan, 11 March 1942; Puncheh, Kingsi, 14 March 1942; Hanchen, Shensi, 29 March 1942; Hanchen, Shensi, 1 April 1942; Ichuan, Shensi, 14 April 1942; Ichang, Ho-Shao Shan, 1 May 1942; Taihagshan, 8 May 1942; Hueining, Tsaishan, 26 May 1942; Kingsia, Cheking, 26 May 1942; Chuhsien, Chekiang, 3 June 1942; Shanchachuen, Shansi, 10 June 1942; Linhsien, Honan, 10 June 1942; Fengchen, Shansi, 27 June 1942; Shaoyi, Shansi, 11 July 1942; Shan Chai Chun, Shansi, 24 July 1942; Wuma, Chekiang, 3 October 1942; Lao Chu Ling, Chekiang, 9 October 1942; Feng Chen, Shansi, 16 December 1942; Mien Chih, Honan, 18 December 1942; Machen, Hupeh, 30 December 1942; Hungtung, Shansi, 2 January 1943; Lin Fen Hung Ting, February 1943; Khao Kheng, February 1943; Mitosau, Hupeh, 3 March 1943; Keingkou, Hupeh, 12 Mar 43; Mitosau, Hupeh, 13 March 1943; Cuchinkou, Hupeh, 17 March 1943; Yuan Chu, Shansi, 7 April 1943; Shansi, 13 May 1943; Paotow, 1 June 1943; Matou Shan, Shansi, 1 June 1943; Jent - Ho-Ping, 29 November 1943; Changteh, 1 December 1943; Changfa, 9-16 June 1943; Ningsiang, 16 June 1943; and Hengyang, 25 June 1943.
- A. I do not know about this at all. These are all small battles. I did not see the reports.
- Q. Were you the responsible commander in China at this time?
- A. Yes. I do not know all about my forces.
- Q. Are you not responsible for the operations conducted by your forces?
- A. I do not know the actual facts but I hold the responsibility. These cases were not reported to me.
- Q. Five or six were reported to you, were they not?
- A. Yes. Very small battles.
- Q. Did you ever order your troops to discontinue the use of gas against the Chinese?
- A. No. They could use sneezing gas without stopping. That was the policy of Imperial General Headquarters.

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- Q. Earlier you mentioned you had no recollection of the fuss made in the League of Nations about Japanese use of gas. General Kawabe recalls that well. Does this refresh your memory?
- A. No. Kawabe should have told me.
- Q. Since Japan was being embarrassed before the world, did you not receive some inquiry from the government, the War Ministry or Imperial General Headquarters about the use of gas in China?
- A. We received none. Since we had the permission of Imperial General Headquarters, they would not question us. If we did not have permission, we would not use it. We would never have used it without permission.
- Q. Did you request permission of Imperial General Headquarters to use it or did Imperial General Headquarters order you to use it?
- A. I do not remember clearly. Since it was written in the tactical manual, it was considered all right by Imperial General Headquarters. The manual states you must go to Imperial General Headquarters for permission to use gas in general.
- Q. Do you have anything further to offer?
- A. As I have said before, I do not think that tear and sneezing gases come into the scope of poison gases. We did not use it indiscriminately, but in unavoidable cases to decrease casualties we used it.

The interrogation was completed at 1300.

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