

[Handwritten signature]

United States of America)
City, County and State of New York) S. S.

I George E. Sokolsky, a native born citizen of the United States and a resident of 300 West End Avenue, in the City and State of New York, being duly sworn, doth depose and say:

I do not recall when I first met Mr. Mamoru Shigemitsu. I arrived in China in the Spring of 1918 and finally left it in 1931. During the intervening years I became acquainted with Mamoru Shigemitsu and his wife and we formed a fast friendship which lasted until I left the Far East in 1931. We dined together; we visited each other's families; we often attended dinner parties and dances at the Majestic Hotel and other places. Many American, British, and Chinese guests attended these parties and many of them were given by Chinese in his honor. Shigemitsu achieved a personal popularity among Chinese unequalled by any other Japanese.

My own friendship with Shigemitsu arose from the fact that I had been very fond of his predecessor at the Japanese Embassy in Peking, Saburi, who had committed suicide because of opposition to militarism in his country. I knew that Shigemitsu had come under the influence of Saburi and that his tendencies and opinions were anti-militarist, toward the West, and toward what is so generally called nowadays, democratic government. In many conversations over many years we discussed these problems with utter and complete candour and I think I knew his mind as well as anyone

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could and that he, at all times, believed that the future of his country lay in the ^closest relations with Great Britain and the United States.

I find, among my notes, that on Sunday, December 21, 1930, I discussed with Shigemitsu, Chinese Minister of Finance T. V. Soong's plan for settling the outstanding difficulties between China and Japan, particularly in relationship with loans and loan agreements. At that time Mr. Soong was discussing this problem with representatives of the Japanese Government and Japanese banking interests. Conversations had been held at various times and places prior to my conversation with Shigemitsu. The previous June, I had been in Tokyo and had discussed this question with Baron Hirohara and Mr. Inouye of the Yokohama Specie Bank and it appears that both expected an early settlement of the financial and political problems and we expressed great hope for it. Shigemitsu, during that conversation, ~~made~~ made the point that it would be simpler to find ^a a soft spot in Japan than it was in China; that the anti-Japanese movement in China was stronger than the resistance to China in Japan. At any ~~xx~~ rate, we talked for some three hours, covering the entire field, and Shigemitsu then expressed a desire that a settlement should be reached with great speed as he feared that there might be trouble between the two countries, if nothing were done. He did not threaten trouble, but clearly hoped that a way could be found to settle once and for all the impediments to friendly relations.

My notes indicate that he expressed himself as follows: that he feels that his career is at stake in the settlement of this question and he also realizes the necessity for speed and that he

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will devote himself to finding a basic formula without resorting to what he called a scientific solution. My ^mimpression at the time was that he would make a proposal to accept a fifty per cent settlement of this ~~debt which~~ ^{debt which} the Chinese owed the Japanese. The ⁿwhole conversation indicated a very strong desire to be of tremendous assistance to China.

In March of 1931, I found myself again in Japan and before this visit to Japan, Shigemitsu, T. V. Soong and I had lunch in T. V. Soong's office in Nanking where we discussed the entire prospect again of a settlement between China and Japan and Shigemitsu practically placed himself at the disposal of T. V. Soong. I was astonished that a representative of any foreign country, particularly Japan, would go as far as Shigemitsu did in aiding China.

I have before me a letter, written on March 17, 1931, by me to T. V. Soong. That letter would indicate that I had seen Mr. Takeuchi and Mr. Tani of the Foreign Office and that a draft had been drawn up for me to send to Soong and that they had agreed that this question of settlement of the outstanding problems between China and Japan should be handled in Japan by Mr. Takeuchi and Mr. Tani and in China by Shigemitsu. I quote the first sentences of the memorandum:

"I explained to Mr. Takeuchi that I was not empowered to discuss the Consolidated Debt Question but that negotiations were continuing between Minister Soong and Mr. Shigemitsu and that I looked forward to an early settlement..."

The gist of this memorandum is of no importance in the present instance except to indicate the general feeling in Japan

at the time, particularly in the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Finance and among Japanese bankers that Shigemitsu was closer to the Chinese than any Japanese had been in recent years and that he was doing a great service to prevent a break between the two countries. I must make this point, that in March I ~~known~~ already knew that should this discussion fail, the consequence might be a complete break of all relations between China and Japan-- a break which occurred the following September -- and that if Shigemitsu failed, the failure would be of world-wide consequence. It is from this standpoint that I quote a paragraph from my memorandum of that date:

"His people (the Japanese to whom I was speaking) would ~~like~~ like to go ahead with the plan now being considered by the Minister and Mr. Shigemitsu, and will be ready to make a reasonable sacrifice, provided all the other creditor countries make similar sacrifices. At any rate, they were anxious for speed in settlement, as they believed that speed involved a tremendous advantage to the National Government, while at the same time, it would ~~close~~ close this question in Japanese political and financial circles and engender a better atmosphere. I agreed that ~~speed~~ speed was a necessity and hoped that the conversations between the Minister of Finance (T.V. Soong) and Mr. Shigemitsu would, at any rate, be so far advanced by May 5, that it would be possible to include a discussion of the problem in your (Soong's) address to the Constituent Assembly which opened at that time. Mr. Takeuchi expressed the opinion that Japan would place no obstructions in your path, provided a fair percentage could be worked out. The Japanese recognized the necessity for reduction and the question of the

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percentage of reduction involved fairness and state^smanship on both sides."

During the week of March 10 to 17, 1931, the date is not specific in my notes, I spent an hour and one half with Baron Shidehara who was then in charge of the Foreign Office. Mr. Tani was present. Baron Shidehara was, at that time, under terrific attack in Japan because of what was regarded as an over-friendly attitude toward China. His own position was becoming increasingly difficult. He said that he depended entirely upon Shigemitsu whose attitude toward China he believed to be right. He spoke of Shigemitsu in the highest terms and expressed the hope that Shigemitsu's policy of friendship between Japan and China and the settlement of outstanding obstacles to friendship would succeed as it was the only sound policy for his country to pursue. He indicated to me that if Shigemitsu failed, his government would fail and that decades of progress in Japan would be ~~wipe~~ wiped away.

I cite these incidents to indicate that over a period of years when the general attitude in Japan toward China was antagonistic, Shigemitsu staked his career upon a policy of friendship and cooperation. His attitude was, without exception, generous not only toward China but toward my own country. I can not believe that anything, beyond the call of duty and ~~by~~ beyond compulsions, could have changed his mind during ~~these~~ recent years when, of course, I have not seen him.

For his personal integrity, his honor as a gentleman^a, I have the highest regard.

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I give this affidavit prompted only by the desire that the facts, as I know them, be recorded.

/s/ George E. Sokolsky

Sworn to before me this 17th
day of January, 1947.

/s/ Nettie J. Zimmerman

Notary Public, State of New York

アメリカ合衆國

ニューヨーク州郡及び市

合衆國出生市民ニシテ「ニューヨーク州及び市」ウエ
ト、エンド、アヴェニュー「三」番地居住者「ジョージ、イー、
ソコルスキイ」ハ宣誓ノ後左ノ通り證言ス

余が初メテ重光葵氏ニ出會ツテノハ何時カ記憶ニテ
居ナイ。余ハ一九一八年春中國ニ着キ、最後ニ一九三年
迄去ツク。此ノ間余ハ重光葵及同夫人ト知合ヒ、密
接ナル友誼ヲ結ビソレハ一九三一年余が極東ヲ去ル迄続
イタ。我々ハ共ニ會食シ、オ互ヒノ家庭ヲ訪問シ、
屢々「マジェステイク、ホテル」ソノ他ノ場所ニ於ケル會食
及ビ「ダンス」ニ行ウク。「アメリカ人」、「イギリス人及ビ中國
人」來客ヲ數モ此等ノ會合ニ列シ、且氏ノ為ニ中國人

が催シテ會合モ多クツタ。重光氏ハ中国人ノ間ニ
個人的信望ヲ博シタガ、他ノ日本人デコレニ及ブモ
ノハナカツタ。

余ノ重光氏トノ交友關係ハ、余ガ北京日本大使館ノ氏
ノ前任者デ、本國ニ於ケル軍國主義反對ノ為自殺シ
左分利派ガ非常ニ好キデアツタトイフ事實カラ来
テ居ル。余ハ重光ガ左分利ノ影響ヲ受ケ、且氏ノ傾
向及意見ハ及軍國主義的、親西洋的デアリ、今日
所謂民主主義政府ニ向キテイタコトヲ知ツテ居ル。數
年ニ互ル累次ノ會談中我々ハ此等ノ問題ヲ極メテ
素直ニ論ジ、余ハ何人ニモ劣ラズ氏ノ心境ヲ知り、氏
ガ何時モ本國ノ將來ハ英米トノ最モ密接ナ關係
ニカカルト信ジテ居タコトヲ知ツテイル。

又、
余ノ備忘録ニハ一九三〇年十二月二十一日日曜日余ガ殊
ニ借款及ビ借款協定ニ關係スル日華懸案ノ種々ノ

困難ヲ解決セントスル中国財政部長宋子文ノ案ニ
 付重光ト論ジタコトガ出テ居ル。其時宋氏ハ日本
 政府及ビ日本銀行界ノ代表者ト此ノ問題ヲ論
 ジテ居タ。會談ハ余ノ重光トノ會談以前色々
 ノ時、所デ行ハレテ居タ。ソノ前ノ六月余ハ東京
 ニ赴キ幣原男及ビ横濱正金銀行ノ井上氏トコノ
 問題ヲ論ジタコトガアルガ、二人共財政及ビ政治問題
 ノ至急解決ヲ豫期シテ居タヤウデ、コレニ対スル大ノ
 希望ヲ述ベテ居タ。前記會談中重光ハ中込ニ於ケル
 ヨリモ日本ノ方カ^{ツドク}危險ナ^{ツドク}個所^{ツドク}見出スコトガ容易デア
 ル。中国ノ反日運動ハ日本ノ中国ニ対スル反対ヨリモ強
 イト論ジタ。鬼モ角我々ハ約三時間全分野ニ互ツテ
 語り合ワタガ、ソノ時重光氏ハ、若シ何モシナイト兩國
 間ニ紛争ガ起ルカモ知レナイト至急解決ニ到達ス
 ベキデアルトノ希望ヲ述ベタ。氏ハ紛争ガ起ルトカ脅カシ
 タノデハナク、友交関係ニ対スル障害ヲ一舉ニ解決スル

方法が見出サレルダラウト明カニ希望シテ居タノデアリ余
 前記録ニハ氏ハ氏ノ前途カ此ノ問題ノ解決ニ懸心ツテ
 居ルト感じ、又至急ノ必要ガアルコトヲ認メ、氏ノ所謂科学
 的解決ニ訴ヘズニ基本的方式ヲ見出スコトニ専心シヤ
 ト述ベタコトヲ示シテ居ル。其時余ノ印象ハ氏が中国ノ
 対日借款ノ五割解決ヲ受諾スル稱提案スルデアラウト
 云フニアワタ。會談全体ハ中国ヲ極力援助シタイトノ
 極メテ強イ希望ヲ示シタ。

一九三一年三月余ハ再び日本ニ赴クガ、コノ日本訪問
 前重光、宋子文及び余ハ南京ノ宋子文事務所テ
 午餐ヲ共ニシ再び曰華間解決ノ見通シニ付一々論ジ、
 重光ハ殆ド宋子文ノ思通りニ任稱トシタ。余ハ如何
 ナル外國ニモアレ代表者ガ重光程ニ中国ヲ援助セントス
 ルモノアリヤニ驚キタ。況ンヤ日本ノ代表者^ニ於テヤデ
 アル。

4
 余ノ面前ニ余ガ一九三一年三月十七日宋子文ニ宛テタ

手紙がアル。此ノ手紙ハ余ハ武内氏及ビ外務省
 谷氏ニ會ヒ余ヨリ宋ニ送ルヲ案文ガ作成セラレテ
 居リ且ツ同氏等ガ日華間懸案解決ノ此ノ問題ハ日
 本ニ於テハ武内氏及ビ谷氏、中国ニ於テハ重光氏
 ニヨリ取扱ハレルコトニ意見一致シテ居ル。余
 ハコノ覺書ノ最初ノ部分ヲ引用スル。

「余ハ武内氏ニ對シ、余ハ借款整理問題ヲ論ズル權限
 ヲ持クナイガ交渉ハ宋部長、重光氏間ニ統ケラレテ居リ
 余ハ急速ニ解決ヲ期待シテ居ル旨説明シタリ……」
 此ノ覺書ノ要領ハ當時日本ニ於テ、殊ニ外務省及ビ
 大藏省並ニ日本銀行家ノ間ニ於テ、重光ガ近年ニ於
 テハトノ日本人ヨリモ中国側ニ密接テアリ、氏ガ兩國
 間ノ決裂ヲ防止スル爲ニ大イナル働キヲ爲シテ居ルトイフ
 一般ノ感シノアツクコトヲ示ス以外ニハ、此ノ場合重要性ハナ
 イ。余ハ若シ此ノ誑合ガ失敗スレバソノ結果ハ日華關係
 一切ノ全面的決裂ヲアリ（決裂ハソノ後九月ニ起ツタ）若

6.

之重光が失敗スレバソノ失敗ハ世界的影響ヲ齎スコトヲ
三月既ニ知ツテ居タ莫ハハツキリサセネバナラナイ。コノ
見地ヨリ余ハ同日ノ余ノ總覽書カラ一節ヲ引用スル。

「氏ノ本国人(余ノ會談シタ日本人)ハ(目下)部長及心
重光氏が研究中ノ案ヲ進ミタガツテ居リ、他ノ責權
國が總テ同様ノ犠牲ヲ拂フ限り、相互ノ犠牲ヲ拂
フワモリテアル様ダ。兎モ角至急ノ解決ヲ欲シテ居タ、
ソレハ早イコトが國民政府ニ多大ノ利益ヲ齎ストセシ。
ニ日本ノ政治、經濟界ニ於テ此ノ問題ヲ終結セシメ空
案ヲ好轉セシムルト彼等ハ信ジテ居タカラテアル。至急ヲ
要スルコトニハ余モ同意見デ、少クモ財政部長(宋子
文)及ビ重光氏ノ會談ガ九月五日迄ニハ大クニ進捗シテ
當時開催中ノ憲法議會ニ対スル貴下(宋)ノ演說中
ニ此ノ問題ノ論議ヲ取入レ得ル様希望スルモテアル。武
内氏ハ然ルベキ比率ガハジキ出サレル限り日本ハ貴下

ノ邪魔ヲシナイガラウトノ意見ヲ述ベク。日本側ハ天引ノ必要及ビ天引ノ比率ノ問題ニ付双方公正及ビ大局的見地ニ立ツコトが必要デアルト認メテイヤ。

余ノ備忘録ニハ日附ハ特定シテナイが一九三一年三月十日乃至十七日ニ亘ル週間ニ於テ余ハ當時ノ外務大臣幣原男ニ一時間半ばかり會ツコトガアル。谷氏モ同席デアワタ。當時幣原男ハ態度ガ中国ニ対シ過度ニ友好的デアルト見ラレタ爲日本ニ於テヒドイ攻撃ヲウケテ居タ。氏ノ地位ハ益々困難トナワテ居タ。氏ハ全然重光ニマカセテアリ、ソノ中国ニ対スル態度ハ正シイト信ズルト語ツタ。氏ハ重光ヲ激賞シ、日華友交ヲハカリ友交關係ニ対スル大ナル障害ヲ解決セントスル重光ノ政策ガ国家ノ遂行スベキ唯一ノ健全ナル政策デアラカラ成功スルデアラウトノ希望ヲ表明シタ。同男ハ若シ重光ガ失敗スレバ政府モ失脚シ日本ニ於ケル數十年ノ進歩ハ解消スルデアラウト余ニ語ツタ。

余ハ數年ニ亘リ日本ノ中国ニ対スル一般的態度ガ敵対的デ

8.

アツタノニ、重光ハ交友及ビ協力ノ政策ヲトリ之ニ氏ノ前^将業
 述ヲ賭シテ居タコトヲ示ス為此等ノ事実ヲ引用スルノ
 デアル。氏ノ態度ハイツモ中国ノミナラス本国ニ対シ寛
 大デアツタ。余ハ義務ヲ為及ビヤクニヤマレ又場合ノ外
 近年(無論余ハ近年氏ニ會フテイナイガ)氏ノ心境ヲ変化
 セシメタモノガアルトハ信ゼラレナイ。

氏ノ人格ノ眞実性、紳士トシテノ氏ノ名譽ニ対シテハ
 余ハ最高ノ敬意ヲ有スル。

余ハ余ノ知フテ居ル事実ヲ記録セントスルノ希望ニノミヨ
 ツテコノ口供書ヲ作成スルモノデアアル。

「ジョージ、イー、ソコルスキ」(署名)

一九四七年一月十七日余ノ面前ニテ作成ス

「ニューヨーク州公證人

「ネウテイ、ジェイ、シママン」(署名)

昭和二十二年（一九四七年）

一月十七日 於 ニューヨーク 州

供述者

ジョージ・イ・ソルスキイ

右ハ當立會人ノ而前ニテ宣誓シ且ツ署名捺印シタルコトヲ證明
シマス

同日 於

立會人 ネフテイ・ジエイ・ケニマン

宣
誓
書

良心ニ従ヒ眞實ヲ述ベ何事ヲモ黙秘トズ又何事ヲモ附加トザル
コトヲ誓フ

署名捺印

ジヨージ、イ・ソユルスギイ

On this 17 day of Jan, 1947

State of New York

DEPONENT George E. Sokolsky

I, Nellie J. Zimmerman hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date
at the same place

Witness: (signed) Nellie J. Zimmerman (seal).

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell
the whole truth withholding nothing and adding
nothing.

George E. Lokaskey

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8. STATEMENT BY SOKOLSKY

United States of America)
City, County and State of New York) S. S.

I George E. Sokolsky, a native born citizen of the United States and a resident of 300 West End Avenue, in the City and State of New York, being duly sworn, doth depose and say:

I do not recall when I first met Mr. Mamoru Shigemitsu. I arrived in China in the Spring of 1918 and finally left it in 1931. During the intervening years I became acquainted with Mamoru Shigemitsu and his wife and we formed a fast friendship which lasted until I left the Far East in 1931. We dined together; we visited each other's families; we often attended dinner parties and dances at the Majestic Hotel and other places. Many American, British, and Chinese guests attended these parties and many of them were given by Chinese in his honor. Shigemitsu achieved a personal popularity among Chinese unequalled by any other Japanese.

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I find, among my notes, that on Sunday, December 21, 1930, I discussed with Shigemitsu, Chinese Minister of Finance T. V. Soong's plan for settling the outstanding difficulties between China and Japan particularly in relationship with loans and loan agreements. At that time Mr. Soong was discussing this problem with representatives of the Japanese Government and Japanese banking interests. Conversations had been held at various times and places prior to my conversation with Shigemitsu. The previous June, I had been in Tokyo and had discussed this question with Baron Shidehara and Mr. Inouye of the Yokohama Specie Bank and it appears that both expected an early settlement of the financial and political problems and expressed great hope for it. Shigemitsu, during that conversation, made the point that it would be simpler to find a soft spot in Japan than it was in China; that the anti-Japanese movement in China was stronger than the resistance to China in Japan. At any rate, we talked for some three hours, covering the entire field, and Shigemitsu then expressed a desire that a settlement should be reached with great speed as he feared that there might be trouble between the two countries, if nothing were done. He did not threaten trouble, but clearly hoped that a way could be found to settle once and for all the impediments to friendly relations.

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In March of 1931, I found myself again in Japan and before this visit to Japan, Shigemitsu, T. V. Soong and I had lunch in T.V. Soong's office in Nanking where we discussed the entire prospect again of a settlement between China and Japan and Shigemitsu practically placed himself at the disposal of T.V. Soong. I was astonished that a representative of any foreign country, particularly Japan, would go as far as Shigemitsu did in aiding China.

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"I explained to Mr. Takeuchi that I was not empowered to discuss the Consolidated Debt Question but that negotiations were continuing between Minister Soong and Mr. Shigemitsu and that I looked forward

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/S/ George E. Sokolsky

Sworn to before me this 17th
day of January, 1947.

/s/ Nettie J. Zimmerman
Notary Public, State of New York

On this 17 day of Jan, 1947

At New York State of

DEPONENT /S/ George E. Sokolsky (seal)

I, Nettie J. Zimmerman hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date, at the same place.

Witness: /S/ Nettie J. Zimmerman (seal)