

SUNNCC

Box #

76

SWNCC 091 - GREAT BRITAIN Miscellaneous

[Handwritten notes and stamps, including "Specs" and "Date"]

File No. SWNCC 091 GREAT BRITIAN - MISCELLANEOUS

No.	FROM	DATE	TO	SYNOPSIS
41	Sec. Reid <i>Removed and filed 322.01 since 309 series</i>	6/26/46	Sec. JCS <i>Intelligence Organization</i>	Re: Limitations on Access by other Nations to Intelligence Targets in the U.S. British Zones in Germany.
42	Gen. Norstad	8/1/46		SUMMARY: Inter-American Military Cooperation Program for equipping and training in Latin American countries.
43	Gen. Hood	10/7/46		SUMMARY: U.S. Military Use of Air Facilities in British Honduras, and other British possessions in the Western Hemisphere.
44	Sec. of State	Undated	Sec. Navy & War	Re: Jul 30, 47 decision of the British to withdraw their troops from Greece and Italy
45	Gen. Norstad	4 Sep 47	Chief of Staff Sec. of War	SUMMARY: Military Implications of Withdrawal of British Troops from Greece and Italy.
46	Sec. of State Sec. of Army	9/16/47 29 Sep 47	Sec. of War Sec. of State	Re: Withdrawal of of British Troops from Egypt.
47	Sec. of State	5 Sep 47	Sec. of War 7 Navy	Re: Memo fm British Commonwealth Affairs informing them of note fm British Embassy dtd 20 Aug 47 stating Governor of Trinidad will approach American Consul at Port of Spain to discuss continued operation of broadcasting station established by U.S. Mil. authorities under article XV of Leased Bases Agreement.
48	Mr. Matthews Mr. Moseley Act Sec. Schulgen	25 Feb 46 6 Nov 47 26 Dec 47	Sec. of State Sec. JCS State Mr. SANACC	Re: Proposed Agreement for Use by Civil Aircraft of U.S. Naval and Air Bases Leased from Great Britain. (SANA-584)
49	Mr. Lovett	3 Nov 47	Office EA	Re: Inquiry from Secretary Forrestal concerning Bermuda Bridge. (Ltr. fm. Mr. Forrestal)

LIST OF PAPERS

FILE UNDER NO. SWNCC 091 - GREAT BRITAIN

Serial No.	From	Date	To	Synopsis
31		5/17/45		ADDENDUM TO SWNEC 131 - Visit of British Aviation Mission to U.S. (cross reference 350.05, Dissemination of Military Info. Great Britain, serial 4)
32	Col. McCarthy	5/17/45	Sec., Air Co-ordinating Comm.	Memo enclosing cy of SWNCC 131 for study (cross ref. 350.05, Dissemination of Military Information, G.B., Ser. 5)
33	Mr. Grew	5/16/45	Sec. Navy	Letter enclosing cy of letter from British Ambassador re radar publicity (cross ref. 350.05, Dissemination of Military Information, serial 6)
34	Comm. Richardson	5/18/45	JCS	Memo re Interchange of Radar Information (cross ref. 350.05, Great Britain, ser 7)
35	Maj. Gen. Hilldring	5/15/45	Mr. Clayton, Ass't Sec of State	Letter re Civil Affairs policy directive on the suppression of non-medical use of narcotic drugs in British territories in the Far East.
36		5/31/45		SWNCC 131/1 - Visit of British Aviation Mission to United States (cross reference 350.05, Dissemination of Military Info. Great Britain, serial 8)
37	Col. McCarthy	8/10/45	Col. Brownell	(Memo (with encl) re: British Competition in the Supply of Transport Aircraft to Brazil (cross ref 334, Air Coordinating Committee, serial 16)
38	Lt. Col. Cameron	9/11/45	SWNCC, attn: Col. Field	Memo re letter from British Joint Staff Mission re: Additional Requirements for Japan.
39	Gen. McFarland Mr. Dunn. Col. Reid, SEC.	1/2/46 1/4/46 1/10/46	SWNCC Sec. of State JCS	Memos re: Scientific Representation from British Admiralty and British Air Ministry at Atomic Bomb Trials. <i>Wessels + Transports.</i>
40	Sec. A. D. Reid <i>1/4/46</i> Memo to holders	4/8/46	JCS, Sec. of SWN 4127	Re: Exchange of Order of Battle Information with British Govt. (other letters found 334 MIC Subcommittee)

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FILE UNDER NO SWNCC 091 GREAT BRITAIN

Serial No	From	Date	To	Synopsis
20		3/3/45		Correspondence dealing with British subjects liberated by MacArthur (Cross reference 09, Philippines, serial 6)
21	Col. McCarthy	3/17/45	Messrs Dunn, Gates, McCloy	Memo circulating SWNCC 66 for comments. (Cross reference 152.07, serial 2).
22		3/17/45		SWNCC 66, Clearance of British Military Aircraft through the U. S. (Cross Reference 152.07, serial 1).
23	Mr. Dunn	3/22/45	Sect. State	Memo re SWNCC 66 (Cross Reference 152.07 Aircraft, ferrying and shipping, serial 3).
24		3/24/45		SWNCC 66/1, Clearance of British Military Aircraft through the U. S. (152.07 serial 4)
25	Col. Penoyer	3/29/45	Memo to files	Memo re SWNCC 66 (Cross Reference 152.07 serial 5).
26		4/11/45		SWNCC 104, Office of Strategic Services Supplies for Polish Government in London (Cross Reference 091 Poland, serial 1).
27	Gen. McFarland	5/2/45	SWNCC	Memo re British Air Commission (Cross reference 350.05, Dissemination of Military Info. G.B.) Serial 1
28	Col. McCarthy		Mr. F. Extor	Re visit of Air Mission to U.S. for purpose of studying Aeronautical Research Facilities. (Cross reference 350.05, Dissemination of Military Information, G.B.) Serial 2
28	Sec Forrestal	4/21/45	Sec. Stettinius	Letter re imports, exports of drugs in Far East
29	Thos. Handy	5/3/45	Field Marshal Wilson	Letter re Clearance of Royal Air Force and Royal Navy Military Aircraft, encls: Clearance of Aircraft and AAF Reg's No. 61-4 (cross ref 152.07, Aircraft, Ferrying and Shipping, serial 7)
30		5/16/45		SWNCC 131 - Visit of British Aviation Mission to U.S. (cross reference 350.05, Dissemination of Military Information, Great Britain, serial 3)

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FILE UNDER NO. 091 - GREAT BRITAIN

Serial No	From	Date	To	Synopsis
8	Mr. Ballantine	2/8/45 2/9/45	SWNCC	Letter from Office of Far Eastern Affairs to SWNCC requesting information re allied military intentions in Thailand. Also, letter from Col. Whitson, dated 2/14/45, to JCS transmitting copy of above letter (Cross Reference 091 Thailand, serial 7).
9	Mr. Cox	2/16/45	Mr. Ballantine	Memo advising Mr. Ballantine that JCS has requested his memo of 2/8 be withdrawn. (Cross reference 091, Thailand, serial 8)
10	Col. Whitson	2/17/45	JCS	Letter requesting that above memo and enclosure be returned to SWNCC. (Cross Reference 091 Thailand, serial 9)
11	Mr. Stimson		Mr. Stettinius	Re Agreement between Great Britain and Portugal (Cross Reference 091 Portugal, serial 4).
13	Mr. Grew	2/16/45	Mr. Forrestal	Re Bombing of British hospital ships; TALAMBA AND DORSETSHIRE.
14	Col. Peck, JCS	2/19/45	Col. Whitson	Letter returning Mr. Ballantine's memo requesting certain information of JCS.
15	Sect. of War	No Date	Sect. of State	Disposition of recaptured Allied merchant vessels, together with memo for record dated 1/25/45. (Cross Reference 561, serial 1).
16		2/20/45		SWNCC 32, Proposed British-American Agreement regarding vessels recaptured in Operations for the Liberation of Europe. (Cross Reference 561, serial 2)
17	Mr. Dunn	2/21/45	Sect. State	Memo re Proposed British-American Agreement concerning vessels recaptured in Operations for the liberation of Europe. (Cross Reference 561, serial 3).
18	Mr. Stimson	2/21/45	Sect. State	Letter re British Government's desire to pay compensation to ^{dependents of} pilot and crew of an ATC "C-54" aircraft.
19	Mr. Stimson	2/19/45	Sect. State	Letter re draft of agreement
29		3/8/45		SWNCC 45, Aircraft Assignments by British to Third Countries (Cross reference 452.1, Aircraft, serial 3)

Q. M. C. Form 353 (Old No. 490)
Revised July 26, 1918

LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. 091 - Great Britain

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 3-6788

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM-	DATE	TO-	SYNOPSIS
1	Gen. Sultan	1/4/45	Gen. Marshall	<p><u>Airgram</u> outlining British attitude toward Thailand. Also the following: <u>Memo</u> from Maj. Gen. Hilldring to Asst. Sect. of War re British Proposals with respect to Thailand. <u>Memo</u> from Mr. McCloy to the SWNCC on above subject. <u>SWNCC #5</u> on same subject. <u>Memo</u> from Col. Whitson referring SWNCC 5 to Subcommittee for Pacific and Far East for study.</p> <p>(Cross Reference 091 - Thailand).</p>
2				<p>SWNCC #5/1, British Proposals with respect to Thailand. (Cross Reference 091 Thailand, serial #2).</p>
3	Col. Whitson	2/5/45	Joint Chiefs of Staff	<p>Correspondence, and attachments, concerning equipping of Greek and Yugoslav Air Forces. (Cross-reference-Gre)</p>
4		2/9/45		<p>SWNCC 5/2, British Proposals with respect to Thailand (Cross Reference 091, serial 3).</p>
5	Col. Whitson	2/10/45	Sect., JCS	<p>Letter transmitting copy of SWNCC 5/2 (Cross Reference 091, serial 4).</p>
6				<p>Minutes SWNCC meeting 2/9 re British Proposals with respect to Thailand (Cross Reference 091, serial 5)</p>
7	Col. Fahey	2/8/45	Mr. McCloy	<p>Brief of SWNCC 5, 5/1, British proposals with respect to Thailand for use at SWNCC meeting (Cross Reference 091, serial 6).</p>

INSTRUCTIONS.—When papers on a subject become numerous they will be numbered serially and brief entries made on this form.

SWNCC

Mr. Morely

File
091 Bermuda

was

091 East Butler

Dear Jim:

With reference to your letter of October 24, 1947, enclosing one from Dean Mathey concerning the construction of a bridge in Bermuda, I have investigated the matter of the reception given Messrs. Tucker and Trimmingham when they called at the State Department. They had no appointment with Mr. Wailes and did not see him because he was out of the building all day on another matter. They were, however, courteously received by Mr. Foster and Miss Borjes of the Division of British Commonwealth Affairs who spent nearly an hour with them. They were told that the primary responsibility for the problem rests with the Army and Mr. Foster offered to put them in touch with officers in the Department of the Army familiar with the matter, or with our Legal Adviser's Office, or with the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs, the Director himself being over in the Pentagon at the time. However, they said they had come primarily to see you in order to do a little reconnoitering in advance of the arrival of the formal delegation, of which they would be a part, to consider this matter in conjunction with representatives of the Department of the Army and this Department.

Briefly, their problem is that in 1942 it appeared that the highway communication then in use between Hamilton Parish and St. George's Island would have to be closed because of the construction of the Army Base. The United States therefore expected to build a bridge in a parallel position between certain other islands. The Bermudians asked that, in return for permission to close a channel on the Naval Base, the United States make it a double-duty bridge, i.e., vehicular and

railroad.

The Honorable
James Forrestal,
Secretary of Defense.

(49)

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railroad. But circumstances alter cases; the operation of the Bermuda Railroad has been discontinued, and it was found that the original highway communication need not be closed. A new, hard-surface road has been built by the Army around the Base and I understand the Army is ready to build a modern bridge in the Causeway forming part of the highway to replace an inadequate structure. Thus the same route, generally speaking, will continue in use.

Sincerely yours,

BC:CLBerjes:ehl
11/4/47

CONFIDENTIAL

Office
XXXXXXX
Division of British Commonwealth Affairs

November 3, 1947.

To : U - Mr. Lovett
Through : S/S
From : Director, Office of European Affairs.
Subject : Inquiry from Secretary Forrestal Concerning
Bermuda Bridge.

(Base at Bermuda)

With reference to the attached letter of October 24 from Secretary Forrestal, this is a problem dating back to 1942 and of primary concern to the Department of the Army. Briefly, in connection with the Base at Bermuda the Army relocated an important Bermuda highway and now plans to improve the highway by building a new bridge. The Bermudians, however, want the Army to build a bridge on a parallel route. The Army has taken the strong position that it is not obligated to build the latter bridge and maintains that any legal obligations assumed in 1942 would be fulfilled by the construction of the bridge upon the relocated highway. The office of the Legal Adviser in this Department concurs in this interpretation. Incidentally, we have heard confidentially that some of the Bermudians who are pushing for the bridge which the Army doesn't want to build have speculated in real estate along this parallel route in expectation of the construction of the bridge there.

On October 20 Messrs. Tucker and Trimmingham, who are important citizens of Bermuda and members of the local Parliament, but who, according to the British Embassy, were not officially representing the Colonial Government, visited Washington for the purpose of enlisting the support of Secretary Forrestal. Greatly to their disappointment they were unable to see him and were referred by his people to BC. They did not have an appointment with Mr. Wailes (as stated in Mr. Forrestal's letter). He would of course have been glad to see them

but/

- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL

but he was tied up with another engagement and since they were anxious to return to New York, Mr. Foster and Miss Borjes endeavored to be of service. Messrs. Tucker and Trimingham were courteously received and certainly gave no impression that they considered they had been given a "brush-off". Mr. Foster agreed to do what he could to assist them although he pointed out that the primary responsibility for the problem rested with the Army. He offered to put them in touch with me (I was over in the Pentagon for the day) or Mr. Reber or the Legal Adviser's office or the Department of the Army, if they wished. They remarked that they were returning to Washington in two or three weeks to discuss the problem officially and that they therefore doubted whether any useful purpose would be served by talking to any of the foregoing people on the afternoon they were here.

John D. Hickerson.

Attachment:

Letter from Secretary Forrester,
dated October 24, 1947.

BC:ABFoster:ehl

CONFIDENTIAL

Office
XXXXXXX
Division of British Commonwealth Affairs

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Through : S/S
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John D. Hickerson.

Attachment:

Letter from Secretary Forrestal,
dated October 24, 1947.

BC:ABFoster:ehl

SECRET*091 B. B.
Masc*

THE STATE-ARMY-NAVY-AIR FORCE COORDINATING COMMITTEE
Washington, D. C.

SANA-5864
26 December 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR THE STATE MEMBER, SANACC:

Subject: Agreement for use by Civil Aircraft of
United States Naval and Air Bases
Leased from Great Britain.

Reference: SANA-5809 (6 Nov 47)

In response to the above reference the following
has been received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

"The Joint Chiefs of Staff agree that final approval and signature of the United States-United Kingdom Agreement, which was developed from the Heads of Agreement approved at the Bermuda Civil Aviation Conference, should not remain contingent upon the reaching of a satisfactory agreement with the Government of Newfoundland."

For the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating
Committee:

W. A. SCHULGEN,
Acting Secretary

Copies to:

- 1 - Army Member
- 1 - Navy Member
- 1 - Air Force Member
- 1 - P&O
- 2 - Op-35
- 2 - AC/AS-5
- 1 - JCS

COPY FOR SWHCC FILE

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A-S - Mr. Saltzman

DATE: October 20, 1947

FROM : A-N - Mr. Norton *ng*

SUBJECT: Bases Agreements Opening Leased Bases to Civil Use

The attached papers are submitted for the consideration of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee and particularly for the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

As stated in SWN-3925 dated 25 February 1946 the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed on 9 February 1946 that they would have no objection from a military point of view to the draft Heads of Agreement prepared at Bermuda, it being understood that the final agreement developed from the Heads of Agreement would not be effective until satisfactory arrangements had been made for the use of Goose, Gander, Harmon and Argentia airbases in Newfoundland by civil aircraft. It was also understood that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would have an opportunity to comment from the military point of view on the agreement to be finally prepared from the Heads of Agreement.

The Department has been negotiating with the Government of Newfoundland for approximately fifteen months in an attempt to reach satisfactory agreement concerning the civil use of the Newfoundland bases. It has now become apparent that it will not be possible to reach satisfactory agreement with Newfoundland.

I recommend that as State Department member of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee you submit these papers to the Committee for its consideration so that the Department may proceed with the conclusion of the pending agreement with the United Kingdom developed from the Heads of Agreement.

It should be pointed out that approval of these papers would not deprive the Joint Chiefs of Staff of an opportunity to comment from a military point of view on the agreement to be concluded with the United Kingdom.

Attachments

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OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
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THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE
WASHINGTON, D. C.



SWN-3925
25 February 1946

Handwritten initials:
LFK
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AV
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

Subject: Proposed Agreement for Use by Civil Aircraft of U.S. Naval and Air Bases Leased from Great Britain.

Handwritten:
File
3-7-46

On 9 February 1946, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that they would have no objection from a military point of view to the draft Heads of Agreement submitted to them on 8 February 1946 by the U.S. Delegation at the Civil Aviation Conference in Bermuda with the amendments thereto proposed in the attached telegram. The concurrence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was on the understanding that the final agreement developed from the Heads of Agreement will not be effective until satisfactory arrangements have been made for the use of Goose, Gander, Harmon and Argentia air bases by civil aircraft, and on the further understanding that the Joint Chiefs of Staff will have an opportunity to comment from the military point of view on the agreement to be finally prepared from the Heads of Agreement.

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XR
841-796

811.34544/2-2546

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

Handwritten signature: H. Freeman Matthews
H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS,
Acting Chairman

Enclosure



MAR 7 1946

FILED

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NNDG# 740132
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
By CO/HK NARS, Date MAR 2 1975

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From: International Civil Aviation Conference Belmont
Manor Bermuda

To: War Department

DTG: 090245Z

9 February 1946

To State Clayton War Lt Col Mitchell Office Asst Secy
of War for Air and Navy V. Adm. Sherman DCNO Departments and
Joint Chiefs of Staff McFarland from Baker and Kuter.

The further "serious British objections" to the bases
agreement have been received by the British Delegation in
Bermuda and turn out to be wholly matters of construction.
Some of the points are being explained by the British Dele-
gation to London without need of any suggested change of word-
ing. There are four points where additional wording would
appear to make highly probable an immediate clearance from
London. They are as follows:

1. In Article 3 the addition after the word "rights" in
the 35th line on page 2 of the words, "though not neces-
sarily on the same routes as those operated by the air
carriers of the third country concerned,". We do not feel
that the purpose of Article III (B) is in any way changed
by the addition of these words and that they merely help
to offset a British fear of a construction which we never
intended. For example, if we had a route from New York
to Montreal and the Canadians had a route from Montreal
to Bermuda, the British are worried lest the wording of
Article III (B) would be absolutely mandatory upon the
Canadians to grant the same traffic rights on the New
York-Montreal route as they had arranged with the British
for the Montreal-Bermuda route.

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2. In Article III (C) London is fearful lest its colonial airlines be precluded from carrying cabotage traffic between the bases since the wording refers only to carriers of the United Kingdom. It was certainly not the intention of the U.S. Delegation to prevent British West Indies Airways, for instance, from taking part in such business. It is, therefore, suggested a new paragraph to be numbered Article III (D) which would read "For the purposes of this Article, the terms 'Civil Air Carriers of the United Kingdom' shall be deemed to include those of territories under sovereignty, suzerainty, protection or mandate of the United Kingdom."

3. In Article XI (A) the British request that a small figure 1 be placed after the word "of" in the second line and a small figure 2 be placed after a comma following the word "agreement" in the final line, the figure 2 to be followed by the words "sovereign rights of the Colonial Government concerned". This is evidently to please the Colonial Office. Discussion here brings out the fact that nothing in this agreement could in any way abrogate the sovereign rights of the Colonial Government concerned in any case.

4. The fourth and final point presented by the U.K. Delegation bears on Article VIII (B). Although the British Government has apparently accepted Article V with its introductory sentence, serious objection has been registered to the broadness of the phrase in the 16th line of paragraph 8 (B), namely, "necessary for military reasons". The British Delegation feels that it is mandatory that a qualifying phrase be added to that statement. They will accept the addition of the three words "of overriding necessity" after

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the words "military reasons". Extensive discussion has developed the complete understanding among those assembled in this conference, namely, Self, Bigg, Bathurst, and MacLean on the British side, and Kuter, Baker and Norton on the American side that these additional words do not undermine military authority. Kuter voiced the statement, "Is it understood that these additional words do not reduce the military authority on such decisions by one iota?" Self indicated that that was perfectly clear. It is appreciated that this phrase is a most touchy subject among the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We recommend that these additional words be accepted as refusal to accept this single item might forestall a final agreement on the papers and these words are of face-making value only.

We believe here that clearance of the above suggested wording will make possible, if it is coupled with a strong State Department position that the bases agreement must be initialled in Bermuda along with the signing of an air transport agreement although separate therefrom, immediate final clearance from London which is being strongly urged by the British Delegation. We believe such a strong position should be taken in Washington regardless of what position may have been informally indicated before. If this is not done the efforts of the British Delegation to get final approval will be fruitless. No notification having been received in Bermuda at this time, it is assumed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have not formally cleared the bases agreement. In our opinions the foregoing changes are not of consequence and it is urged that formal Joint Chiefs of Staff clearances incorporating the four changes which we recommend be accepted in the papers before you and which British here feel confident are actually final London objections. British here hope their clearance Saturday P.M.

SECRETSTATE-ARMY NAVY-AIR FORCE COORDINATING COMMITTEE
Washington, D. C.

0910.B.

cmvSANA-5809
6 November 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:

Subject: Agreement for Use by Civil Aircraft of U.S.
Naval and Air Bases Leased from Great Britain

The following received from the Department of State, has not been considered by the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee, and is forwarded for appropriate action by the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

"On February 11, 1946 the United States and United Kingdom Delegations to the Bermuda Civil Aviation Conference initialled Heads of Agreement with respect to the use by civil aircraft of the 99-year leased bases in the Caribbean area and Bermuda. In a letter dated February 11, 1946 the Chairman of the United States Delegation informed the Chairman of the United Kingdom Delegation that final approval and signature by the United States of the agreement developed from the Heads of Agreement would be contingent on reaching satisfactory agreement with Newfoundland regarding the use by civil aircraft of airfields in Newfoundland, i.e., Goose, Gander, Harmon and Argentia.

"For the reasons stated in the enclosure, the State Department has been unable to conclude satisfactory agreements with Newfoundland and is of the opinion that the final approval and signature of the United States-United Kingdom agreement should not remain contingent on reaching satisfactory agreement with Newfoundland. Subject to the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of State intends to proceed with the conclusion of the pending agreement with the United Kingdom.

"It is requested that the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this matter be obtained."

H. W. MOSELEY,
Secretary

1 - State Mbr	1 - P&O
1 - Army Mbr	1 - CAD
1 - Navy Mbr	2 - OP-35
1 - Air Force Mbr	2 - AC/AS-5

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PROPOSED AGREEMENT FOR USE BY CIVIL AIRCRAFT OF U.S.
NAVAL AND AIR BASES LEASED FROM GREAT BRITAIN

Problem

Whether final approval and signature of the proposed United States-United Kingdom Bases Agreement should remain contingent upon reaching a satisfactory agreement with Newfoundland.

Discussion

It will be recalled that at the Civil Aviation Conference in Bermuda in February 1946 the United States was particularly interested in the opening of Newfoundland airfields to use by civil aircraft while the United Kingdom was most interested in such opening of Kindley Field. The United States Delegation went to Bermuda fully expecting to negotiate one agreement opening all the 99-year leased bases (and Gander) to civil use, thereby permitting an interplay of interests in the negotiations. The United Kingdom Delegation claimed, however, that it was not empowered to negotiate for Newfoundland, thereby creating a need for separate treatment of the Newfoundland airfields from those in the Caribbean Area and Bermuda. In this connection the United Kingdom cited Article XI (5) of the 1941 Bases Agreement which provides that any agreement opening the Newfoundland bases to commercial aircraft "shall be between the United States and the Government of Newfoundland." The United States Delegation thereupon proceeded with the negotiation of the Heads of Agreement (Newfoundland airfields not included), but made the reservation that final approval and signature thereof would be contingent on reaching a satisfactory agreement with the Governments of Newfoundland and Canada regarding the use by civil aircraft of airfields in Newfoundland and Labrador, namely Goose, Gander, Harmon and Argentia.

The United States desiderata in Newfoundland have virtually been attained without the necessity of formal agreements. The airfield at Goose Bay, a Canadian 99-year leased base, is now available as a weather alternate by arrangement between the Canadian and Newfoundland Governments. Gander airport is now open and operated by the Newfoundland Government as its international airport. Early in the negotiations with Newfoundland, that Government rejected the idea that Harmon (Stephenville) and Argentia would be available for regular use so long as Gander remains open. Harmon and Argentia are now available on an informal basis as weather alternates and the principal effect of the proposed formal agreement with Newfoundland is to spell

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out the terms of such use and to provide that Harmon and Argentia may be used regularly in the event Gander is closed. The United States has been insistent that the formal agreement accomplish at least one thing, i.e., that Harmon and Argentia be available automatically in the event Gander is closed. In our recent concession to Newfoundland it was agreed that they have the right to designate or not to designate another suitable international airport in the event Gander is closed but we are continuing to insist that the transfer of regular operations to Harmon and Argentia be automatic and not subject to discussions with and consent of the Newfoundland Government.

On October 7 the Consul General at St. John's reported that the Newfoundland Commission of Government would not agree to a deletion we had suggested in Article I (d) to make it clear that the transfer of operations to Harmon and Argentia would be automatic in the event Gander is closed.

It has become sufficiently evident that Newfoundland is adopting a dog-in-the-manger attitude and has no intention whatsoever of concluding the proposed agreement. It seems that the reasons for trying the two agreements together have disappeared. The continued delay in concluding the United States-United Kingdom Bases Agreement covering the bases in the Caribbean Area and Bermuda has strained our relations with Canada. The British have been able on several occasions to tell such countries as Venezuela, Cuba, etc. that they are perfectly willing to permit these nations to use Kindley Field, thereby implying that the United States is to blame for the non-availability of these airfields to third nations. The United States military authorities have urged strongly that the United States-United Kingdom agreement be concluded soon because of the increasing complications which they face in the administration of the bases involved.

Recommendation

It is recommended that, subject to the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the final approval and signature of the proposed United States-United Kingdom Bases Agreement opening the leased bases in the Caribbean Area and Bermuda to civil use be no longer contingent upon reaching a satisfactory agreement with Newfoundland concerning the civil use of the Newfoundland bases.

SECRET

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON



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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY, STATE-ARMY-NAVY-AIR FORCE
COORDINATING COMMITTEE

Reference is made to SWN-3925 dated 25 February 1946.

" On February 11, 1946 the United States and United Kingdom Delegations to the Bermuda ^{and Antigua} Conference initialled Heads of Agreement with respect to the use by civil aircraft of the 99-year leased bases in the Caribbean area and Bermuda. In a letter dated February 11, 1946 the Chairman of the United States Delegation informed the Chairman of the United Kingdom Delegation that final approval and signature by the United States of the agreement developed from the Heads of Agreement would be contingent on reaching satisfactory agreement with Newfoundland regarding the use by civil aircraft of airfields in Newfoundland, i.e., Goose, Gander, Harmon and Argentia.

For the reasons stated in the ^{enclosure} ~~approved memorandum~~ attached hereto (Appendix), the State Department has ~~been unable to~~ ^{conclude satisfactory agreement} reach ~~it necessary to suspend negotiations~~ with Newfoundland and is of the opinion that the final approval and signature of the United States-United Kingdom agreement should not remain contingent on reaching satisfactory agreement with Newfoundland. ^{Subject to the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of State intends to proceed with the conclusion of the pending agreement with the United Kingdom.} ^{It is requested that the views of the JCS on this matter be obtained.}

Phelan P. Claxton
for Charles E. Saltzman
State Member

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~~APPENDIX~~
*Enclosure*C
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October 10, 1947

~~A-N - Mr. Norton~~
~~THROUGH: TRO - Mr. Radius~~
~~AV - Mr. Merchant~~

~~Bases Agreements Opening Leased Bases to Civil Use~~
*Proposed Agreement for Use by Civil Aircraft of U.S. Naval and
 Air Bases Leased from Great Britain*
Problem

Whether final approval and signature of the proposed United States-United Kingdom Bases Agreement should remain contingent upon reaching a satisfactory agreement with Newfoundland.

It will be recalled that at the ~~Conference~~ ^{Discussion} Civil Aviation Conference in Bermuda
~~You will recall that at Bermuda~~ in February 1946 the United States was particularly interested in the opening of Newfoundland airfields to use by civil aircraft while the United Kingdom was most interested in such opening of Kindley Field. The United States Delegation went to Bermuda fully expecting to negotiate one agreement opening all the 99-year leased bases (and Gander) to civil use, thereby permitting an interplay of interests in the negotiations. The United Kingdom Delegation claimed, however, that it was not empowered to negotiate for Newfoundland, thereby creating a need for separate treatment of the Newfoundland airfields from those in the Caribbean Area and Bermuda. In this connection the United Kingdom cited Article XI (5) of the 1941 Bases Agreement which provides that any agreement opening the Newfoundland bases to commercial aircraft "shall be between the United States and the Government of Newfoundland." The United States Delegation thereupon proceeded with the negotiation of the Heads of Agreement (Newfoundland airfields not included), but made the reservation that final approval and signature thereof would be contingent on reaching a satisfactory agreement with the Governments of Newfoundland and Canada regarding the use by civil aircraft of airfields in Newfoundland and Labrador, namely Goose, Gander, Harmon and Argentia."

~~As you know~~ the United States desiderata in Newfoundland have virtually been attained without the necessity of formal agreements. The airfield at Goose Bay, a Canadian 99-year leased base, is now available as a weather alternate by arrangement between the Canadian and Newfoundland Governments. Gander airport is now open and operated by the Newfoundland Government as its international airport. Early in the negotiations with Newfoundland, that Government rejected the idea that Harmon (Stephenville) and Argentia would be available for regular use so long as Gander remains open. Harmon and Argentia are now available on an informal basis as weather alternates and the principal effect of the proposed formal agreement with Newfoundland

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Appendix

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- 2 -

is to spell out the terms of such use and to provide that Harmon and Argentia may be used regularly in the event Gander is closed. The United States has been insistent that the formal agreement accomplish at least one thing, i.e., that Harmon and Argentia be available automatically in the event Gander is closed. In our recent concession to Newfoundland ^{of war} we agreed that they have the right to designate or not to designate another suitable international airport in the event Gander is closed but we are continuing to insist that the transfer of regular operations to Harmon and Argentia be automatic and not subject to discussions with and consent of the Newfoundland Government.

On October 7 the Consul General at St. John's reported that the Newfoundland Commission of Government would not agree to a deletion we had suggested in Article I (d) to make it clear that the transfer of operations to Harmon and Argentia would be automatic in the event Gander is closed.

~~I think~~ It has become sufficiently evident that Newfoundland is adopting a dog-in-the-manger attitude and has no intention whatsoever of concluding the proposed agreement. It seems ~~to~~ that the reasons for tying the two agreements together have disappeared. The continued delay in concluding the United States-United Kingdom Bases Agreement covering the bases in the Caribbean Area and Bermuda has strained our relations with Canada. The British have been able on several occasions to tell such countries as Venezuela, Cuba, etc. that they are perfectly willing to permit these nations to use Kindley Field, thereby implying that the United States is to blame for the non-availability of these airfields to third nations. The United States military authorities have urged strongly that the United States-United Kingdom agreement be concluded soon because of the increasing complications which they face in the administration of the bases involved.

Recommendation

, subject to the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
It is recommended that the final approval and signature of the proposed United States-United Kingdom Bases Agreement opening the leased bases in the Caribbean Area and Bermuda to civil use be no longer contingent upon reaching a satisfactory agreement with Newfoundland concerning the civil use of the Newfoundland bases.

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ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation SWNCC 091 - Great Britain (Misc.)
 Doc: (Copy of preceding w/d document)
 Date undated
 From Charles E. Saltzman
 To Sec/SANACC

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

- Security-Classified Information
- Otherwise Restricted Information

Britain/Post '45
 Authority

DEC 30 1975

Date JTH

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE _____
~~DIVISION~~ OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Division of British Commonwealth Affairs

Col Fielder

File 1
[Signature]

091 Inst Britain
[Signature]

MEMORANDUM FOR SWNCC

Mr. Moseley: *[Handwritten mark]*

In accordance with a recent directive, that whenever letters are addressed both to the War Department and to the Navy Department copies thereof should be forwarded to SWNCC, there are attached copies of letters to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy dated September 5, 1947, informing them of the receipt of a note from the British Embassy dated August 20, 1947, stating that the Governor of Trinidad will approach the American Consul at Port of Spain for the purpose of discussing the continued operation of the broadcasting station established by the United States Military authorities under Article XV of the Leased Bases Agreement.

~~SWNCC~~ SECRETARIAT

Attachments:

- 1. To War Department, September 5, 1947.
- 2. To Navy Department, September 5, 1947.

State Member	-----
Army Member	-----
Navy Member	-----
Ass't State Member	-----
Ass't Army Member	-----
Ass't Navy Member	-----
Executive Secretary	-----
Ass't Exec. Secretary	-----
State Adm. Assistant	-----
Army Adm. Assistant	-----
Navy Adm. Assistant	-----
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SEP 5, 1947

In reply refer to
BC 811.34544/8-2247RESTRICTED

The Acting Secretary of State refers the Secretary of the Navy to this Department's letter dated August 14 1946, stating that a note on the subject of broadcasting by the United States military authorities in Trinidad, which had previously been cleared with the Navy Department, had that day been addressed to the British Ambassador.

The Acting Secretary of State is now in receipt of a note from the Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of the British Embassy dated August 20, 1947, the pertinent paragraphs of which read as follows:

"Mr. Balfour is instructed to express appreciation of this very full explanation of the need for broadcasting to the United States Forces there. Whilst His Majesty's Government still feel some doubt whether the station can be said to come within the definition of a "station established for military purposes" under Article XV of the Bases Agreement, they would not wish to press the matter further at this stage but would propose to note this particular Article for consideration when the discussions take place for the modification of the Bases Agreement generally.

"Mr. Balfour is to say that His Majesty's Government note with pleasure that the United States Government are willing to discuss the modification of the present programme schedule with a view to effecting a mutually satisfactory arrangement with the proposed commercial station in the Colony. The Governor of Trinidad will shortly be approaching the United States Consul at Port of Spain accordingly."

At the same time a despatch was received from the American Consul at Port-of-Spain stating that the Trinidad

Government

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Government has granted an exclusive broadcasting license to the Trinidad Broadcasting Company, Limited, for a period of five years. The commercial broadcasting station is to be operated by the licensed company known as "Radio Trinidad" and service was to be inaugurated on August 1, 1947. The inaugural date had to be postponed because of the delayed arrival of certain equipment, but broadcasting is now expected to commence about the first week in September.

The Consul enclosed a copy of a letter from the Colonial Secretary asking that a conference to discuss the modification of the existing broadcasting schedule of the United States military authorities be held at an early date. The Consul also forwarded a copy of the letter to Colonel Becker, Commanding Officer of the Trinidad Sector, Antilles Department, and has informed the Colonial Secretary that the Department of State and the United States military authorities have been advised of the receipt of his communication and their instructions requested. The Consul added in his letter to the Colonial Secretary that it would be helpful if the Colonial authorities would submit at the earliest possible date any specific proposals or suggestions which could be discussed at the meeting, and that he would be available to discuss any suggested changes with representatives of the Colonial Government at any mutually convenient time.

The comments of the Secretary of the Navy on the above-mentioned matter would be appreciated.

A similar letter has been addressed to the Secretary of the Navy.

BC:CLBorjes:vg

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SEP 5, 1947

In reply refer to
BC 811.34544/8-2247RESTRICTED

The Acting Secretary of State refers the Secretary of War to this Department's letter dated August 14, 1946, stating that a note on the subject of broadcasting by the United States military authorities in Trinidad, which had previously been cleared with the War Department, had that day been addressed to the British Ambassador.

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"Mr. Balfour is to say that His Majesty's Government note with pleasure that the United States Government are willing to discuss the modification of the present programme schedule with a view to effecting a mutually satisfactory arrangement with the proposed commercial station in the Colony. The Governor of Trinidad will shortly be approaching the United States Consul at Port of Spain accordingly."

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The comments of the Secretary of War on the above-mentioned matter would be appreciated.

A similar letter has been addressed to the Secretary of War.

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29 SEP 1947

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Handwritten signature

The Honorable

The Secretary of State

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Reference is made to your letter of September 18, 1947, respecting a possible future British withdrawal from Egypt. It appears that Cyrenaica is probably the best base for the British in the event that they withdraw from the Suez, but a final conclusion on this subject can not be reached without consideration of the over-all Mediterranean situation. I have taken the liberty of showing your letter to the Secretary of the Air Force, and he has authorized me to express his agreement with the views expressed here.

I am informed that agencies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff plan to provide for the inclusion of this question on the agenda for the military discussions, concerning the Near and Middle East, which are to be held next month with representatives of the British armed forces. Definite answers to the particular points raised in your letter should be developed in consequence.

Sincerely yours,

(Sgd) KENNETH C. ROYALL

Kenneth C. Royall
Secretary of the Army

SWNCC SECRETARIAT

- State Member _____
- Army Member _____
- Navy Member _____
- Ass't State Member _____
- Ass't Army Member _____
- Ass't Navy Member _____
- Executive Secretary _____
- Ass't Exec. Secretary _____
- State Adm. Assistant _____
- Army Adm. Assistant _____
- Navy Adm. Assistant _____
- File _____

COPY FOR SWNCC

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Dear Mr. Secretary:

I refer to a recent conversation between General Norstadt, Admiral Sherman, Mr. Loy Henderson and Mr. John D. Hickerson regarding the withdrawal of British forces from Egypt and the possibility of arranging for the establishment of a British base in some other suitable location in the Near East. I understand that the participants in that conversation agreed on Cyrenaica as probably the best location for such a base.

The Department of State has given further consideration to this question, and its conclusions are set forth in the enclosed memorandum. I believe they are substantially in accord with the views previously expressed by representatives of your Department.

As you know, we have agreed to a suggestion made by Mr. Bevin that conversations be held between the British and American Governments looking toward an understanding on a common policy in the Near East. We are proposing that these talks begin with discussions between the military and naval authorities of the two countries. I would suggest that you include in the agenda for such talks the military and naval aspects of a British evacuation of Egypt and possible establishment in Cyrenaica. Among other things, we would like to have a definite estimate as to the time physically required to remove British troops and materiel from Egypt and the possibility of establishing a suitable substitute base in Cyrenaica or elsewhere. You will understand that we would not wish to offer any commitment to the British Government regarding Cyrenaica unless we were sure that it was physically possible and militarily desirable to establish bases in that territory.

I should be glad to receive any comments you may have
on

The Honorable
Kenneth C. Royal,
Secretary of War.

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Authority NND 740132
By CD/KMS NARS, Date NOV 26 1976

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- 2 -

on the enclosed memorandum.

I am sending an identical letter to the Secretary of the Navy.

Sincerely yours,

Acting Secretary

Enclosure:
Memorandum,
dated August 28,
"Withdrawal of British
Troops from Egypt."

NE:JDJernegan/GC NEA BC EUR s/s

9/16/47

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August 28, 1947.

WITHDRAWAL OF BRITISH TROOPS FROM EGYPT

(1) It has become clear that the continued presence of British troops in Egypt represents a liability not only to Great Britain but to the United States and the Western world in general. Their presence is poisoning the atmosphere of the whole Near and Middle East so rapidly and to such an extent that unless some indication is given in the near future that British troops are to be withdrawn from Egypt unconditionally, at a set date, that date to be the earliest practicable, the relations of the Arab world with the Western world may be seriously impaired for many years to come.

(2) In the present international situation Arab hostility towards the United States and towards the Western world would be extremely harmful to our interests. Among other damaging results, a hostile attitude on the part of the Arabs would threaten from the rear the position we are desperately trying to hold in Greece, Turkey and Iran. We should therefore be extremely careful to avoid any action which might be seriously injurious to our relations with the Arab world while at the same time overlooking no opportunity for affirmative action which would strengthen these relations.

(3) Consequently, we consider it extremely important to try to find some means privately to induce Great Britain to make known immediately that it intends unconditionally to withdraw its troops from Egypt at a given date. The evacuation of British troops from the Suez Canal Zone does not appear to present a serious problem, although they are reported to number as high as 90,000. There appear to be, however, tremendous quantities of British material stored in the Zone (reportedly worth one billion dollars) which must be moved before all British troops could be withdrawn, since it is too valuable to be left without British forces to guard it.

(4) Although we believe that British troops should be unconditionally withdrawn from Egypt at the earliest practicable date, we strongly believe that Britain should continue to maintain a base in the eastern Mediterranean area. It would be extremely unfortunate from our point of view for the British troops and material now in Egypt to be removed from the Near Eastern area, since it is clear that if Great Britain is to serve as a stabilizing factor in the area, it should have some base to replace Egypt. There is already a tendency in certain British circles to withdraw entirely from the Near and Middle East leaving no great power established in that area, and thus exposing it to Russian aggression or infiltration. It is essential that this British tendency is discouraged. The question therefore arises as to where the British forces might be sent.

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(5) We have received intimations from the British that they are considering bases in Cyrenaica as probably the most desirable substitute for Egypt, and they have informally endeavored to obtain an expression of our views on this matter. It is understood that our own military and naval planners agree that Cyrenaica is in fact the best location for a base to replace Egypt. It will be recalled that Cyrenaica is a part of the Italian colony of Libya and that in accordance with Article 23 of the Italian peace treaty the Foreign Ministers of the United States, Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union will determine the disposition of the Italian colonies. The treaty provides that if within one year of its coming into force no agreement has been reached, the matter shall be submitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations. It seems unlikely that agreement will be reached among the four Foreign Ministers; therefore, if the Italian treaty goes into effect, the question of the disposition of Cyrenaica, along with that of the other Italian colonies, will go before the General Assembly. It might be possible, particularly in case the friendly backing of the Arab world could be obtained, to rally the two-thirds vote in the General Assembly necessary to give Great Britain a non-strategic trusteeship for Cyrenaica or possibly to arrange for the establishment of an independent state of Cyrenaica, or all of Libya, which would be willing to give the British bases in Cyrenaica. If the British should be granted a simple trusteeship, it is probable that its terms could be drafted in such a way as to enable Great Britain to maintain bases in Cyrenaica without its being designated as a strategic area.

Great Britain is in actual occupation of the territory, and therefore in the absence of any agreement on the part of the four Foreign Ministers or the General Assembly on the subject, Cyrenaica would probably continue under British occupation for an indefinite period of time.

If our objective of retaining Arab good-will is to be achieved, it is obvious that the establishment of British bases in Cyrenaica must have Arab acquiescence. This may be difficult to obtain, but there are definite indications that the Arabs do not want the British forced out of the Near East entirely and, specifically, that they might be willing to see the British established in Cyrenaica as the price of securing their withdrawal from Egypt.

(6) It is therefore recommended that our Government urge the British to indicate at once to the Egyptian Government that they are prepared to announce their intention unconditionally to withdraw all British troops from Egypt

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by a definite date. In issuing such an announcement the British Government could make it clear that its decision was based upon its desire for friendly relations with Egypt and that it still considered that under the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty it had the right to retain these troops in Egypt. At the same time we should inform the British Government that if it would like to transfer its troops and materiel to Cyrenaica immediately, we would have no objection thereto. Furthermore, we would be disposed eventually to support arrangements for the establishment of permanent British bases in Cyrenaica when the final disposition of that territory is decided, provided such arrangements could be effected in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter and provided the making of such arrangements proves to be practicable in the light of the then existing international situation.

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1 APPROVAL
2 SIGNATURE

MSB/P&P/P&O

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1 CHIEF OF STAFF
2 SECRETARY OF WAR

Col Byroade/74974

Military Implications of Withdrawal of
P&O 091.7 TS (2 Sep 47) British Troops from Greece and Italy.

4 September 1947

SUMMARY

1. The Acting Secretary of State in identical letters (copy inclosed) to the Secretary of War and Navy of 27 August 1947 requested the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding the military implications of the withdrawal of British troops from Greece and Italy.

2. In CCS 972, 29 August 1947, the British Chiefs of Staff have made certain recommendations to the United States Chiefs of Staff as to the timing of withdrawal of British forces from Greece and asked for an increase in the Greek Armed Forces necessary to compensate for this withdrawal.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, by approval of JCS 1801/1, 2 September 1947, present their views as to the military implications of such a British withdrawal in the form of a letter to be transmitted to the Secretary of State by the Secretaries of War and Navy, as well as their answer to the British proposals in CCS 972.

RECOMMENDATION

4. Recommend the attached letter to the Secretary of State be signed by the Secretary of War and forwarded to the Secretary of Navy for his signature by the inclosed letter.

COORDINATION

None required.

3 Incls:

- #1-Ltr fm Act. Sec. State dtd 27 Aug 47
- #2-Transmittal ltr to S/N
- #3-Ltr to Sec. State for sig. of S/W & S/N.

SWNCC SECRETARIAT

State Member	_____
Army Member	_____
Navy Member	_____
Ass't State Member	_____
Ass't Army Member	_____
Ass't Navy Member	_____
Executive Secretary	_____
Ass't Exec. Secretary	_____
State Adm. Assistant	_____
Army Adm. Assistant	_____
Navy Adm. Assistant	_____
File	_____

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NOTED-OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
4 SEP 1947

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The Honorable

The Secretary of Navy

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The attached letter to the Secretary of State, presenting the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding the military implications of the withdrawal of British troops from Greece and Italy is forwarded for your signature and subsequent transmittal to the Secretary of State.

Sincerely yours,

(Sgd) **KENNETH C. ROYALL**

Kenneth C. Royall
Secretary of War

1 Incl.
Ltr to Sec. State
w/Incls.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington

August 27, 1947

Dear Mr. Secretary:

As you are aware, the British Government informed this Department on July 30, 1947 of the British decision to withdraw their troops from Greece and Italy. A copy of the communication in which this information was conveyed has been furnished the War Department.

Since that time representations have been made to the British Foreign Secretary in the strongest possible terms urging that British troops be retained (a) in Greece until after final consideration of the Greek case by the Security Council and General Assembly and following that after realistic appraisal and full and frank exchange of views between the United States and United Kingdom Governments and (b) in Italy until a study has been made of the status of our respective forces by the military authorities of both countries. The British Government has agreed that consultation should take place before withdrawal was definitely announced, but a further communication has now been received from Mr. Bevin, a copy of which is attached (Appendix "B"), stating that the British Government had decided to withdraw its troops from Greece in the autumn and from Italy by December 31. This would seem to indicate that although the British Government had been prepared to consult, it has now taken a decision to establish deadlines for withdrawal.

I should appreciate it if this matter could be referred to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff in order that they might study the military implications of such withdrawal and consult with the British Chiefs of Staff with a view to formulating positive military recommendations to both Governments. It might be helpful if they could explore the possibility of removing British forces of an even larger number than contemplated in the present British proposal from areas where their withdrawal would have less significant political consequences.

Upon receiving the views of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff further representations can be made to the British Government.

In suggesting that this matter be referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff the Secretary of State has asked me to make it clear that he does not accept either the premises or the categorical position taken by Mr. Bevin in his message.

With respect to the first and second paragraphs of this message his stated essentiality of British withdrawals by autumn cannot be reconciled with the drastically changed conditions that have occurred since March. The problem is far larger than the mere offset of British withdrawal by an increase in the Greek Army.

With respect to Italy our concern rests with the maintenance of at least a status quo in that area and not with the desire of the British Government to fulfill a pledge to itself which manifestly can have but little effect upon the solution of its present financial problems.

A similar communication has been addressed to the Secretary of the Navy.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Robert J. Lovett

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WAR DEPARTMENT
NAVY DEPARTMENT

Washington, D. C.

TOP SECRET

5 Sept 47

The Honorable

The Secretary of State

Dear Mr. Secretary:

In accordance with the request contained in letter from Acting Secretary of State of 27 August 1947, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have studied the military implications of the withdrawal of British troops from Greece by 31 October 1947 and from Italy by 31 December 1947. Their views are stated in the following paragraphs.

British troops in Greece are not able, and are not intended, to withstand armed attack in force. Their presence is regarded as symbolical of the determination of Great Britain and of the Western Democracies to assure the continued independence of the Greek State. For this reason, they are a strong deterrent to attack in force against Greece and have a marked influence on the internal Greek situation and a substantial effect on the morale of the Greek population.

Given any favorable opportunity, such as the withdrawal of British troops from Greece, there is grave danger that the Greek Guerrilla leaders will issue a call for assistance in repelling attacks by the Greek National Army on the army of the recently proclaimed "Free State of Northern Greece." The comparatively weak Greek National Army could not withstand the guerrilla forces if the latter were augmented by sizeable forces from outside Greece. Thus, there would be grave danger of all Greece coming under communist control. The drastically adverse effect of such a contingency on the military position of the United States and the other Western Democracies is certain. Forces friendly to, if not under the domination of, the USSR would be on the Mediterranean and in a position to interdict shipping through that sea route. Turkey would be outflanked to the west, north and east. Continued alignment of that country with the Western Democracies would be problematical in view of the increased difficulty of their giving assistance to Turkey in the event of war. The possibility of retaining Italy as a nation friendly to the Western Democracies would be greatly lessened, as would be any possibility of retaining Iran as a nation oriented toward the Western Democracies. Access by the United States and Great Britain to the petroleum products of the Middle East, which are essential to their economic welfare and military potential, would be jeopardized.

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Further, the position of the Western Democracies as evidenced by the maintenance of British combat troops in Greece, the firm stand of the United States before the United Nations, and the establishment of a United States aid program have clearly indicated to the world a determination to prevent Greece from falling into the Soviet orbit. In the face of these evident policies, failure in Greece would lead to a dangerous weakening of resistance to communism in the non-Soviet world.

In CCS 972, a copy of which is enclosed, the British Chiefs of Staff have made certain recommendations to the United States Chiefs of Staff as to the timing of withdrawal of British forces from Greece and as to increases in the Greek armed forces necessary to compensate for this withdrawal. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that, in the face of British withdrawal, implementation of these recommendations would be inadequate to assure the independence of Greece. Further, such action would require funds not now available for military assistance to the Greek armed forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have therefore not concurred in these proposals as a solution to the present problem. A copy of their memorandum to the British Chiefs of Staff is enclosed for your information.

In conclusion, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are seriously concerned regarding the military implications of the British decision to withdraw their troops from Greece. Such a withdrawal would surely result in a marked deterioration of our over-all strategic position in the Mediterranean and might well provoke a critical situation in Greece itself. There appears to be no course of action open to the United States which would fully offset the adverse effects of this move.

At present, the United States and Great Britain stand together in Greece on a common front against communist aggression. Should the British now firmly determine to withdraw from this position, the mere act of withdrawal would create a distinct period of disruption and heightened crisis.

Sincerely yours,

(Sgd) **KENNETH C. ROYALL**

Secretary of War

Secretary of Navy

2 Incls:

Incl #1-CCS 972, 29 Aug 47

Incl #2-Appendix "B", Memo

by JCS to British Chiefs of Staff.

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TOP SECRET

Dear Mr. Secretary:

As you are aware, the British Government informed this Department on July 30, 1947 of the British decision to withdraw their troops from Greece and Italy. A copy of the communication in which this information was conveyed has been furnished the War Department.

Since that time representations have been made to the British Foreign Secretary in the strongest possible terms urging that British troops be retained (a) in Greece until after final consideration of the Greek case by the Security Council and General Assembly and following that after realistic appraisal and full and frank exchange of views between the US and UK Governments and (b) in Italy until a study has been made of the status of our respective forces by the military authorities of both countries. The British Government has agreed that consultation should take place before withdrawal was definitely announced, but a further communication has now been received from Mr. Bevin, a copy of which is attached, stating that the British Government had decided to withdraw its troops from Greece in the autumn and from Italy by December 31. This would seem to indicate that although the British Government had been prepared to consult, it has now taken a decision to establish deadlines for withdrawal.

I should appreciate it if this matter could be referred to the US Joint Chiefs of Staff in order that they might study the military implications of such withdrawal and consult with the British Chiefs of Staff with a view to formulating positive military recommendations to

both

The Honorable
James Forrestal,
Secretary of the Navy.

TOP SECRET

(44)

-2-

TOP SECRET

both Governments. It might be helpful if they could explore the possibility of removing British forces of an even larger number than contemplated in the present British proposal from areas where their withdrawal would have less significant political consequences.

Upon receiving the views of the US Chiefs of Staff further representations can be made to the British Government.

In suggesting that this matter be referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff the Secretary of State has asked me to make it clear that he does not accept either the premises or the categorical position taken by Mr. Bevin in his message.

With respect to the first and second paragraphs of this message his stated essentiality of British withdrawals by autumn cannot be reconciled with the drastically changed conditions that have occurred since March. The problem is far larger than the mere offset of British withdrawal by an increase in the Greek Army.

With respect to Italy our concern rests with the maintenance of at least a status quo in that area and not with the desire of the British Government to fulfill a pledge to itself which manifestly can have but little effect upon the solution of its present financial problems.


A similar communication has been addressed to the Secretary of War.

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT A. LOVETT

Enclosure:
From Mr. Bevin.

TOP SECRET



EUR:SReber:bsm

SWNC

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

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both

The Honorable
Kenneth C. Royall,
Secretary of War.

TOP SECRET

(4)

TOP SECRET

-2-

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With respect to the first and second paragraphs of this message his stated essentiality of British withdrawal by autumn cannot be reconciled with the drastically changed conditions that have occurred since March. The problem is far larger than the mere offset of British withdrawal by an increase in the Greek Army.

With respect to Italy our concern rests with the maintenance of at least a status quo in that area and not with the desire of the British Government to fulfill a pledge to itself which manifestly can have but little effect upon the solution of its present financial problems.

A similar communication has been addressed to the Secretary of the Navy.

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT A. LOVETT

Enclosure:
From Mr. Bevin.

TOP SECRET

EUR: SReber: bsm

BC

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NEA

A true copy of
the signed original
[Signature]

~~SECRET~~

Ortn 3 October 1946

~~SECRET~~

691 Dist Antair Miss
Covered

To: 1 P&O
2 C/S
3 SW

For: 142 Approval
3 Signature Hq AAF - AG/AS-5

Lt Col Burke 3752

U. S. Military Use of Air Facilities in British Honduras, and other British Possessions in the Western Hemisphere

OCT 7 1946

SUMMARY

1. Before 1941, U. S. military use of air facilities in British Honduras, and other British possessions in the Western Hemisphere was arranged by an annual exchange of notes between the U.S. and the British in each individual case (Tab X & D).
2. In a letter dated 20 December 1941 (Tab C), the British gave the U.S. permission to use aviation facilities in British Honduras and other British possessions in the Western Hemisphere for the duration of the war.
3. In a British note to the State Department, dated 21 August 1946 (Tab B), the British stated that they wished to renounce the 20 December 1941 agreement, and suggested a return to the pre-war arrangement.
4. On 21 September 1946, the State Department, in a letter (Tab A) to the Secretary of War requested comment on the British desire to renounce the war-time agreement.
5. It is understood that termination of the U.S.-British war-time agreement (Tab C) will not affect the 99 year lease agreements nor present negotiations for air agreements with the British.
6. It is believed that the pre-war arrangement for the U.S. military use of British aviation facilities in the Western Hemisphere will meet U.S. military needs, but it is recommended that a specific list of British air facilities available for U.S. military use in the Western Hemisphere be agreed on, and that an exchange of notes, assuring re-institution of the pre-war arrangement be initiated prior to renunciation of the war-time agreement.

SECRET

OCT 13 46 AM

COORDINATION

None required.

For the Commanding General, Army Air Forces:



SIGNED

REUBEN C. HOOD,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Deputy Chief of Air Staff.

DISPATCHED
OFFICE OF THE
CHIEF OF STAFF



CHIEF OF STAFF

11 OCT 1946

DECLASSIFIED

6 Incls

1. Proposed Ltr to Sec. of State frn S/W
- 2-5 cc correspondence between British & State Dept. Tabs "A" thru "E"

~~SECRET~~

Authority NND 740132

CLASSIFIED BY CO/KMS NARS, Date JAN 18 1977 (43)

~~SECRET~~

AF&PW

Lt Col Burke/cn/6018

Wrtn 3 October 1946

The Honorable

The Secretary of State

Dear Mr. Secretary:

11 OCT 1946

Your 18 September 1946 letter, which inclosed the British Ambassador's note of 31 August 1946 regarding U.S. military use of British aviation facilities in British Honduras and other British possessions in the Western Hemisphere has been received and studied.

The War Department has no objection to termination of the war-time U.S.-British air agreement of 1941, although it is believed that arrangements should be made to continue U.S. use of the above-mentioned air facilities.

In regard to the above, it seems that an exchange of notes between the U.S. and the British should be initiated prior to termination of the present agreement to assure re-institution of pre-war arrangements relative to U.S. military use of British air facilities in the Western Hemisphere. A definite listing of air facilities which will be available for U.S. military aircraft should be secured before any U.S. commitment is made.

It is understood that the 99-year base lease agreements and negotiations for other military air agreements with the British will not be effected by termination of this war-time U.S.-British agreement.

It appears that the annual agreements used before 1941 were satisfactory and should function smoothly in the future.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) ROBERT P. PATTERSON

Secretary of War

~~SECRET~~

SMNCC

Address all communications to
Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

COPY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

In reply refer to
AV

September 18, 1946

SECRET

The Acting Secretary of State encloses for the consideration of the Secretary of War a copy of note no. 477 of August 21, 1946 from the British Ambassador asking whether, in view of the termination of hostilities, the Government of the United States is prepared to renounce the permission granted in 1941 to its official aircraft to use British aviation facilities in British Honduras and in all other possessions in the Western Hemisphere for the duration of the war.

The comments of the Secretary of War on the British Ambassador's note would be appreciated.

A similar letter has been addressed to the Secretary of the Navy.

Enclosures:

Note no. 477
from the British
Ambassador, dated
August 21, 1946,
with its enclosures.

C
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Ref: 2272/ / 46

Y

No: 477

His Majesty's Ambassador presents his compliments to the Secretary of State and has the honour to refer to the Note sent on 20th December 1941 by the Foreign Office to the United States Ambassador in London, granting permission for use by U.S. official aircraft of British aviation facilities in British Honduras and in all other possessions in the Western Hemisphere, and permission for the stationing and movement of U.S. military personnel in those areas.

A copy of the Note is enclosed.

2. It will be seen that these special privileges were granted only for the duration of the War, and His Majesty's Ambassador has been directed to ask whether, in view of the termination of hostilities, the United States Government will now agree to renounce them.

3. In the case of British Honduras, the Secretary of State will be aware that until December 1941, permission for U.S. service aircraft to fly over and land in that Colony was accorded every year by means of an exchange of Notes between the Foreign Office and the United States Embassy in London. Copies of the Notes exchanged in 1941 are attached.

4. If the Secretary of State agrees that the special privileges referred to in paragraph 1 above are no longer applicable, His Majesty's Ambassador is directed to suggest that the arrangements previously obtaining in the case of British Honduras should again be brought into force.

5. The rights granted to the United States for the

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- 2 -

use of base airfields in Antigua and St. Lucia will not,
of course, be affected.

BRITISH EMBASSY,

WASHINGTON, D.C.

21 August, 1946.

C
O
P
Y No. W 14968/14968/802.

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W. 1

30th December, 1941

Your Excellency,

On the 15th December you were good enough to leave with me two copies of two telegrams which your Excellency had received from the State Department.

2. The first of these telegrams requested permission for United States aircraft to fly over and to land on the territory of British Honduras and all other British possessions in the Western Hemisphere, permission for the use of local air ports and their facilities, the privilege of stationing air corps personnel at the local air fields in order to facilitate the movement and servicing of aeroplanes, facilities for the circulation without restriction of uniformed and armed or ~~subh~~ other military personnel as might also be required in this connection and permission for taking air photographs.

3. The second telegram requested facilities to enable the War Department to establish a regular air ferry service between Cairo and Washington on the route Bolling Field - Miami - Puerto Rico - Belem - Natal - Accra - Kano - El Fasher, and permission to make emergency landings at Trinidad.

4. It is my understanding that the above facilities are requested only for the duration of the war and will apply only to military and naval aircraft and to civil aircraft employed solely for official purposes. I therefore hasten to inform Your Excellency that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are glad to grant the desired facilities as regards those of the territories

112

- 2 -

for which they are responsible referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 above.

5. As regards flights over the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, a telegram has been despatched to His Majesty's Ambassador at Cairo requesting His Excellency to obtain the required permission from the Government of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. At the same time, he has been instructed to concert with the United States Minister at Cairo with the object of supporting any approach which the latter may have been instructed to make with a view to obtaining permission for United States aircraft to fly over Egypt.

6. In communicating the above to Your Excellency, I venture to invite attention to the importance of prior notification of aircraft movements to the relevant air authorities even where such movements are a matter of urgent military necessity as difficulties may otherwise arise in regard to recognition. It is desirable that detailed regulations to cover this point should be drawn up as soon as possible between the local and other authorities concerned.

7. It is presumed that, if the State Department require facilities in Newfoundland not covered by the Leased Bases of the 27th March, 1941, requests for these will be made direct to the authorities concerned.

I have the honour to be, with the highest consideration,

Your Excellency's most obedient Servant,

(For the Secretary of State)

/s/ O. G. Sargent

His Excellency

The Honourable

John G. Winant,

etc., etc., etc.

COPY

No. A 5049/4546/45

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

4th July, 1941.

Your Excellency:

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Mr. Herschel Johnson's note No. 346 of the 12th June and to confirm that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom readily agree to the renewal for the year ending the 30th June 1942 of the existing procedure for obtaining permission for service aircraft of the United States of America to fly over and, if necessary, to land in the territory of British Honduras.

I have, etc.,

(For the Secretary of State)

(Sgd.) J. BALFOUR

His Excellency

The Honourable John Gilbert Winant,

etc., etc., etc.

"D"

COPY

No. 346.

EMBASSY OF THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

London, 12th June, 1941.

Sir,

I have the honor to refer to note No. A 3374/3374/45, dated 25th June, 1940, in which the Foreign Office was good enough to inform the Embassy that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom agreed to the renewal for the year ending 30th June 1941, of the present procedure for obtaining permission for service aircraft of the United States of America to fly over and, if necessary, to land in the territory of British Honduras.

I am now under instruction from my Government to request a renewal of this arrangement for the year ending 30th June 1942, and I shall, therefore, be grateful if I might be informed whether this proposal is agreeable to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom.

I have, etc.,

(sgd.) HERSCHEL V. JOHNSON

Charge d'Affaires ad interim

The Rt. Hon. Anthony Eden, M.C., M.P.,
etc., etc., etc.,
Foreign Office, S.W.1.

C

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"8"

CONFIDENTIAL

091/Dept Inter Mis-

- 1 Chief of Staff
- 2 Secretary of War

- 1 Approval
- 2 Signature

P&O, WDGS

Rm 3C-837

Col Weber/72886/fag

P&O 091 Latin America (23 Jul 46)

Inter-American Military Cooperation Program.

26 July 1946

SUMMARY

1. The attached letter from the Under Secretary of State, 23 July 1946, incloses an Aide Memoire from the British Ambassador, 16 July 1946, inviting attention to the fact that British equipment and training have long been predominant in several of the Latin American countries. Aide Memoire also states that it is the British belief that the United States' plan is to furnish about twenty-five percent of the total armed forces of each Latin American country with their military equipment. The British propose to supply at least a part of the remainder. The British inquire whether or not Argentina will be included in our program because the British government is particularly interested in furnishing naval equipment to that country. The Department of State requests comments or suggestions regarding the nature of the reply to the British Ambassador.

2. The proposed military collaboration program with the other American States envisages complete standardization of military and naval training and equipment to avoid a situation similar to that which existed at the start of World War II when the countries were unable to acquire replacements or ammunition for the European equipment then standard. As a consequence, a considerable amount of United States' forces and equipment had to be diverted from the fighting fronts for these countries.

3. It is recommended that the Secretary of War sign the attached letter to the Secretary of State suggesting that the reply to the British Ambassador be to the effect that the program for military collaboration contemplates complete standardization in all of the American Republics. Letter also states that the introduction of non-hemispheric equipment in the American Republics, including Argentina, would be undesirable.

COORDINATION

- Concur - D/I - Col. Carter Clarke, Rm 22-808, Ext. 72534.
- Concur - Navy Dept. - Capt. Dennis, Code 8117, Ext. 3917.
- Concur - CG AAF - Maj Gen. [Name], Rm 3D-1051, Ext. 6551.

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF WAR
DISTRIBUTION



2 incls.

- 1. Proposed ltr fr S/W to S
 - 2. Ltr fr U/Sec State to S
- dttd 23 Jul 46, w/2 incls.

WAR I. O. U.

CONFIDENTIAL

LAURIS NORSTAD

SWNCC SECRETARIAT

Major General, GSC
Director of Plans & Operations

- W. H. Arnold
- May E. [Name]
- Dep. Director
- State Member
- Army Member
- Navy Member
- Ass't State Member
- Ass't Army Member
- Ass't Navy Member
- Executive Secretary
- Ass't Exec. Secretary
- State Adm. Assistant
- Army Adm. Assistant
- Navy Adm. Assistant
- File

NOTED-DEPT
51 JUL 1946

Copy for SWNCC

42

CONFIDENTIAL

31 JUL 1946

The Honorable

The Secretary of State

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I have Mr. Acheson's letter of 23 July 1946 inclosing a copy of the Aide Memoire submitted by the British Ambassador expressing the interest of the British Government in the Inter-American Military Cooperation Bill. I suggest that in replying to the British Ambassador the following information be considered.

The War Department does not know of any plan whereby only twenty-five percent of the military and naval needs of the various republics of this hemisphere would be furnished by the United States. On the contrary, the plan contemplates comprehensive standardization of all military and naval equipment and training in the republics of this hemisphere. A plan whereby any percentage would be furnished from sources outside the hemisphere would defeat entirely the purpose of the plan for standardization of equipment.

The program of standardizing military equipment and training in all of the republics of America, including the United States, is an outgrowth of the desire of these republics, as declared in the Act of Chapultepec, to consult among themselves in order to agree upon the measures to be taken in the event of aggression. Since these republics agree that standardization of equipment, organization, and training within the hemisphere is a necessary advance step to provide for common defense and internal security, the introduction of military or naval equipment manufactured outside the hemisphere would not be compatible with the expressed desires of these republics. Nor would the introduction of equipment produced outside the hemisphere be to the best interests of the United States, since it could only lead to a situation similar to that which we faced at the beginning of World War II when the other American Republics were stocked with European equipment. At that time, replacements and ammunition were not available for the then standard equipment and a considerable amount of men and materiel had to be diverted from United States' forces for the training and equipping of armies of the other American Republics so that they could protect their own coastlines and could furnish some units for transfer to the more active theaters of operation.

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY FOR SWNCC

CONFIDENTIAL

Letter to Secretary of State

In view of the basic purposes of the military collaboration program, it does not appear desirable to apportion it among the nations of the world. Any action leading to the contribution by any other nation to the armaments of the other American Republics, who look to us for leadership and guidance, can only lead to a renewal of the unfortunate prewar situation by serving as an incentive to other non-hemispheric nations to renew attempts to sell large amounts of armaments to the American Republics.

Insofar as Argentina's participation in the program is concerned, I feel that the decision as to whether or not she receives such equipment rests largely with the State Department. I feel that it would be most desirable to include that country in the program of military standardization as soon as she adheres to her hemispheric commitments. Moreover, I would consider it most unfortunate from the viewpoint of the military security of this hemisphere if Argentina were to receive military or naval equipment from sources outside the hemisphere.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) ROBERT P. PATTERSON

Secretary of War

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF WAR
WASHINGTON, D.C.

MAY 1 1950

CONFIDENTIAL

Index of Matter

091 G. B. -

M.S.R.

SUN-4137
11 April 1946

MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS OF SUN-4127

SUN-4127 with enclosures A, B, C and D was circulated on 8 April 1946.

The memorandum referred to above with enclosures has been classified "Confidential" at the request of the originator. Holders of this memorandum are requested to classify their copies accordingly.

A. D. REID,
Secretary

COPY FOR SWICC FILE

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BWH-4127
8 April 1946

VFF:aj

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:

Subject: Exchange of Order of Battle Information
with British Government.

Enclosure "B" was referred to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for Military Information Control by the Navy Member thereof (Enclosure "A") for comment and recommendation.

The State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for Military Information Control perceives no objection to the exchange on the basis indicated in Enclosure "C" provided it is in accordance with agreed procedures of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

It is therefore requested that this matter be referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment from a military point of view and that these comments, when obtained, be forwarded to the Secretary, State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee.

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

A. B. REID,
Secretary

Enclosures:

- A - Ltr dtd 28 Feb 46 from Navy
RHS, Subete for MIC
- B - Ltr dtd 6 Feb 46 from British Joint
Staff Mission to Chief of Naval Intelligence
- C - Navy Dept. Memo dated 23 Feb 46 (Serial 71P30)
- D - Navy Dept. Memo dated 4 Mar 46 (Serial 13P504)

COPY FOR SWHCC FILE

120

COPY

Navy Department
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Washington 25, D.C.

Op-23-22
AS-3/2713
Serial No. 314723

28 Feb 46

MEMORANDUM FOR State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee
(Chairman Subcommittee for Technical
Information Security Control).

Subject: Order of Battle Information - Exchange of
with British Government.

Enclosure: (a) Copy British Joint Staff Mission
letter DC/16/46/RSD to CNI, dtd 6 Feb 1946.

1. Enclosure (A) requests that exchange of
Order of Battle Information be reopened with British
Government.

2. The Navy Department is agreeable to the
reopening of exchange of Order of Battle Information,
provided information obtained from the British Govern-
ment includes pertinent data on aviation elements of the
British Navy.

3. Comment and recommendation on which to base
a reply is requested.

Respectfully,

/s/ John F. Walsh

John F. Walsh
Captain, U. S. N.
Navy Member

Subcommittee for Technical Information Security
Control

cc: Col. Strecker, ASF
Maj. Rhoads, AAF
Lt. Col. Goodrich

Enclosure "A"

COPY 1

BRITISH JOINT STAFF MISSION
OFFICES OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

6th February, 1946.

AIR STAFF

DO/16/46/RBD

Dear Admiral Inglis:

Air Ministry have now re-opened the exchange of Order of Battle information with U.S.A.A.F. and would very much like to re-open the exchange with yourselves on the following basis:-

- (a) Order of Battle of U.S. NAF including organization by Theatre, location of units, type and number of US aircraft in each unit.
- (b) Aircraft strengths of units by types and total aircraft holdings.
- (c) Total strength of personnel by aircrew categories and ground branches or trades.

The information to be restricted to category "Secret" and below without details of future operations.

We shall be very pleased to exchange our equivalent figures with you if this meets with your approval.

Yours Sincerely

R. B. Dowling,
Group Captain.

Rear Admiral T. B. Inglis,
Chief of Naval Intelligence, USN.

cc: F111, DNI,
Navy Dept.

ENCLOSURE "B"

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NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
Washington 25, D. C.

Op-307/eef
SO 2 14 B
Serial: 71P30

23 February 1946

MEMORANDUM

From: Op-03.
To: Op-23.
Subject: Exchange of Order of Battle Information with
British Government.
Reference: (a) British Joint Staff Mission (OCS) Ltr.
DO/16/46/RSD to ONI dated 6 February 1946.

1. Exchange of subject information as proposed by the British Joint Staff Mission in their letter of 6 February is acceptable provided it is in accordance with agreed procedures of the Joint Intelligence Committee and the reciprocal information obtained includes pertinent data on aviation elements of the British Navy.

/s/ FORREST SHERMAN

FORREST SHERMAN
By direction

ENCLOSURE "C"

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
Washington 25, D. C.

Op-504-007/mjg
Serial: 13P804
SO 2 14 5

4 March 1946

M E M O R A N D U M

From: Op-05.
To: Op-25.

SUBJECT: Exchange of Order of Battle Information
with British Government.

Reference: (a) British Joint Staff Mission ltr. SO/16/46
to ONI dated 6 Feb. 1946.

1. No objection can be seen to the exchange of information as requested in the referenced letter provided such exchange of information is not contrary to policies and procedures of the Joint Intelligence Committee. The exchange of information as requested should tend to promote the close relationship which has existed between the Air Forces of Great Britain and the United States in the past and which it is expected will continue in the future.

/s/ R. E. JENNINGS

R. E. JENNINGS
By direction

ENCLOSURE "D"

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
CIVIL AFFAIRS DIVISION
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

[Handwritten signature]
11 September 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY, STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING
COMMITTEE:

ATTENTION: Colonel Field

SUBJECT: Additional Requirements to be Imposed on Japan

Pursuant to my telephone conversation with you on 11 September 1945, it is requested that the attached letter be put on the agenda and considered at the meeting of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee to be held 12 September 1945.

[Handwritten signature: Warde M. Cameron]

WARDE M. CAMERON
Lt. Colonel, GSC
Secretary, Civil Affairs Division

Incl.
Ltr fm Gen Macready
to Gen Hilldring

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740132
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
By CO/LF NARS, Date MAR-2-6 1976

~~SECRET~~

C O P Y~~SECRET~~

BRITISH JOINT STAFF MISSION
OFFICES OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

GENERAL STAFF

~~SECRET~~

September 8, 1945

Major General John H. Hilldring,
Room 3B - 924, Pentagon

Dear General Hilldring,

Additional Requirements for Japan

As I mentioned at our discussion in my office on 6th September, we have received a paper setting out certain draft "additional requirements" for imposition on Japan. These have been approved by the British Government as a basis for discussion, and it is hoped that the U.S. Government will agree that an informal exchange of ideas will be useful.

I enclose 3 copies. Copies have also been furnished to the State Department by the Embassy.

I should be very glad if you would have these examined, and then let me have your preliminary reactions. Could our respective staffs go through the document together as soon as you are ready, to try and clear up any points of difficulty.

Yours sincerely,

G. N. Macready (s)

G. N. Macready, (t)
Lieutenant-General,
Commander, British Army Staff.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

11 September 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY, STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING
COMMITTEE:

ATTENTION: Colonel Field

SUBJECT: Additional Requirements to be Imposed on Japan

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WARDE M. CAMERON
Lt. Colonel, GSC
Secretary, Civil Affairs Division

Incl.
Ltr fm Gen Macready
to Gen Hilldring

~~SECRET~~

COPY

~~SECRET~~

BRITISH JOINT STAFF MISSION
OFFICES OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

GENERAL STAFF

~~SECRET~~

September 8, 1945

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Yours sincerely,

G. N. Macready (s)

G. N. Macready, (t)
Lieutenant-General,
Commander, British Army Staff.

~~SECRET~~

C O P Y

BRITISH JOINT STAFF MISSION
OFFICES OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

GENERAL STAFF

~~SECRET~~

September 8, 1945

Major General John H. Hilldring,
Room 3B - 924, Pentagon

Dear General Hilldring,

Additional Requirements for Japan

As I mentioned at our discussion in my office on 6th September, we have received a paper setting out certain draft "additional requirements" for imposition on Japan. These have been approved by the British Government as a basis for discussion, and it is hoped that the U.S. Government will agree that an informal exchange of ideas will be useful.

I enclose 3 copies. Copies have also been furnished to the State Department by the Embassy.

I should be very glad if you would have these examined, and then let me have your preliminary reactions. Could our respective staffs go through the document together as soon as you are ready, to try and clear up any points of difficulty.

Yours sincerely,

G. N. Macready (s)

G. N. Macready, (t)
Lieutenant-General,
Commander, British Army Staff.

TOP SECRET

6. DISCUSSION OF OCCUPATION POLICIES WITH THE BRITISH

MR. McCLOY stated that General Macready had already approached the War Department on the question of occupation policies and that the British had introduced a paper in the Combined Chiefs of Staff on this subject. He felt that the Combined Chiefs of Staff is not the proper forum for discussion of Japanese policy. General Macready has been so informed. He suggested the desirability of authorizing him and General Hilldring to discuss Japanese policy informally with General Macready and thus have an exchange of ideas without issuing a general invitation to all Powers to discuss such policies with us. MR. MATTHEWS agreed that this might well reduce rather than increase the pressure on us.

THE COMMITTEE:

- a. Agreed that discussion of Japanese policy in the Combined Chiefs of Staff should be avoided;
- b. Authorized representatives of the three Departments to discuss Japanese policy matters informally with British representatives in Washington.

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J.S. J

15 May 1945

Honorable W. L. Clayton
Assistant Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Clayton:

Further reference is made to your letter of 19 March 1945, addressed to the Secretary of War, concerning a Civil Affairs policy directive on the suppression of non-medical use of narcotic drugs in British territories in the Far East.

The United States Chiefs of Staff have approved a Civil Affairs directive to the theater commander charged with the operations in Borneo. The text of the draft forwarded in the British note of February, 1945 was enclosed in that directive. Field Marshal Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, Chief of the British Joint Staff Mission, has been notified of this action. No action was taken with reference to the applicability of the text to the Southeast Asia Command and Hong Kong.

Although the text of the directive was informally coordinated with this department, it is considered appropriate to furnish this additional statement so that you may advise the British Embassy that the matter has been satisfactorily concluded.

Sincerely yours,

J. H. HILLDRING
Major General
Director, Civil Affairs Division

Information Copy For
Secretariat, SWCC

35

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

STATE ✓

W
Mr. Cox
Mr. Moseley
Mr. Gardiner

WAR ✓

W
Colonel McCarthy
Lt. Colonel Pennoyer
Major Field
Major Gunther
Lt. Spittall

NAVY ✓

W
Commander Richardson
J
Lt. Comdr. Rockefeller
J
Lieutenant Geilfuss
J
Ensign Whiteside

 Note

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REMARKS:



THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON

Serial No. 129813
SO 3 21 121

09/1/45 Br

21 APR 1945

Sir:

Reference is made to the letter of the Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. Clayton, to the Secretary of the Navy, inviting such comment as might be thought appropriate upon the draft of a Civil Affairs Policy Directive on Dangerous Drugs for certain Far Eastern Areas, which was transmitted by the British Embassy for the British Government to the Secretary of State on February 19, 1945.

The British Government states that the British Civil Affairs Policy Directive is based on the authority contained in Article 6 of the Charter of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee under which the British Government has the right to prescribe civil affairs policies for British territories located in a United States military command.

It is observed that the British Directive imposes upon Chief Civil Affairs Officers the duty of taking specific measures in the above mentioned areas; namely, (a) making quarterly reports to the Central Opium Board of the quantities of each drug exported or imported, indicating the source of imports and the destination of exports, together with the amount of each drug manufactured, the amounts released for civilian use, and the stocks on hand; (b) prohibiting opium smoking; (c) the review and extension of measures which were intended to create a strong public opinion against opium smoking; and (d) to take steps "to re-establish and extend facilities for the treatment of drug addicts."

The view held by the Navy Department on this subject is in accord with a recent J.C.S. directive to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, which states that the Theater Commander shall endeavor to restrict the production and consumption of narcotic drugs to medicinal uses and for scientific purposes.



Copy for SWNCC Secretariat

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Although this view is expressed in general terms in contrast to the more specific measures proposed by the British, there appears to be no conflict in policy between the British Directive and the views held on this subject by the Navy Department.

Sincerely yours,

WARREN BOPPESSEY

Hon. Edward R. Stettinius,
Secretary of State.

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The Honorable

The Secretary of State

My dear Mr. Secretary:

Reference is made to your letter of 15 February 1945 enclosing a copy of a note dated 7 February 1945 from the British Embassy regarding a proposal for the payment of compensation to the dependents of the pilot and the crew of an ATC "C-56" aircraft which was shot down by fighter aircraft from the U.S.S. Striker while en route from the Azores to Casablanca.

The British Government's willingness to pay compensation to the dependents of the pilot and crew of the aircraft to the extent that the United States Government would have been liable if the aircraft had been shot down by fighters from United States aircraft carriers is deeply appreciated.

The beneficiaries of the members of the crew of the aircraft shot down by the British fighter have received payments under an insurance policy and provision has been made for the payment of other benefits involving cost to the United States. The total compensation thus provided for the beneficiaries by the Government is the same as that which would be paid to them in the event the aircraft had been shot down by one of our own fighters.

Under the circumstances, it is not anticipated that a claim will be asserted against the British Government for the expense incurred in providing the above compensation.

It is pointed out that if the circumstances had been reversed this government would have found itself without authority of law or appropriations specifically available for payments to beneficiaries of crews of British aircraft shot down in connection with combat activities by fighters from United States aircraft carriers.

Sincerely yours,

HENRY L. STIMSON

Secretary of War

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SECRET

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Major C.A. (15 Feb 45)

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING
COMMITTEE

STATE

 Mr. Cox
 Mr. Moseley
 Mr. Gardiner

WAR

 Col. Whitson
 Col. McCarthy
 Major Field
 Lt. Massa

NAVY

 Comdr. Nutting
 Comdr. Richardson
 Lt. Comdr. Rockefeller
 Lt. Geilfuss
 Ens. _____

 Note
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REMARKS:

m. Mosley
Room 178

February 16, 1948

In reply refer to
SWP 740.00117 E.W./1-1445

CONFIDENTIAL

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I refer to a letter dated July 13, 1943 from Admiral William D. Leahy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff addressed to the Department of State and to this Department's letters of July 31 and December 4, 1943 to Admiral Leahy concerning the action of the United States Government in supporting the British Government's protest against the bombing attacks upon the British hospital ships Talamba and Dorsetshire.

In this connection I am enclosing for your information and that of the Joint Chiefs of Staff a copy of despatch no. 10165 dated December 11, 1944, and the enclosures thereto, from the American Legation at Bern. It may be noted that enclosure no. 2 to this despatch, a copy in translation of a note verbale dated November 1, 1944 from the German Foreign Office addressed to the Swiss Legation at Berlin, appears to be a reply to a protest of the British Government on the bombing of certain unnamed hospital ships and also a German protest regarding various instances in which British or American aircraft are stated to have attacked German hospital ships and "other installations protected by the Red Cross". Enclosure no. 4 is a copy in translation of a note verbale dated November 13, 1944 from the German Foreign Office to the Swiss Legation at Bern requesting that the contents of the former's note of November 1, 1944 be brought to the attention of the United States Government in view of the support

of this

The Honorable
James V. Forrestal,
Secretary of the Navy.

-2-

of this Government in protesting the attack on the British hospital ship Dorsetshire.

In this same connection this Department recently received from the British Embassy a copy in translation of the note verbale dated November 1, 1944 from the German Foreign Office addressed to the Swiss Legation at Berlin which was transmitted, in turn, to the British Government. With regard to Section I of this communication, the Department made inquiry of the Embassy concerning the nature of the protest which the German Government is answering since it does not appear to refer to the protest against attacks on the Talamba and Dorsetshire which this Government supported. No reply has been received in the premises.

In so far as Section II of this German note verbale is concerned, the Department is requesting the Embassy to ascertain the nature of the reply, if any, to be made to the German Government's allegations.

Since American aircraft allegedly took part in certain of the attacks mentioned in Section II of the German Foreign Office note verbale of November 1, 1944, I should appreciate it if the Navy Department would give consideration to the matter and would inform the Department of the nature of the reply to be made to the German Government.

A letter in a similar sense is being sent to the War Department.


Sincerely yours,

Joseph C. Grew

Acting Secretary

Enclosure:

From Bern, Despatch no. 10165,
December 11, 1944.



SWP:GTH:FAH

2/8-12/45.

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*Mr. Murphy
Room 178*

February 16, 1945

In reply refer to
SWP 740.00117 E.W./1-1445

CONFIDENTIAL

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of this

The Honorable
Henry L. Stimson,
Secretary of War.

-2-

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Sincerely yours,

Joseph C. Grew

Acting Secretary

Enclosure:

From Bern, Despatch no. 10165,
December 11, 1944.

A true copy of
transmitted original.

SWP:GTH:FAH

2/8-12/45

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STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

Washington 25, D. C.

5 February 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF**Subject:** Supply of Equipment to Greek and Yugoslav Air Forces.**Reference:** JCS Secret Memo to SecWar and SecNav of 3 Jan 45.

There is inclosed, for information, a copy of the joint reply sent to the Secretary of State by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy on subject matter, dated 17 January 1945. This reply is identical to that recommended in the reference except for the addition of the last two paragraphs in order to call attention to possible Soviet military concern in the matter and to note recent action in the Combined Chiefs of Staff thereon.

For the STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE:

WALLACE E. WHITSON
Secretary**Encl:**Copy of SecWar - SecNav
ltr to SecState of
17 Jan 1945.**SECRET**

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The Honorable

17 Jan 1945

The Secretary of State

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The Aide Memoire recently presented by the British Embassy to the Department of State regarding the proposed equipping of several single-engine fighter squadrons for the Green and Yugoslav Air Forces was referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment on the military aspects of the proposal. The Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff on 23 November 1944 also sent the United States Chiefs of Staff a copy of this same Aide Memoire, saying they would be glad to know whether the United States Chiefs of Staff see any objection from the military point of view to the proposed transfer. We have withheld our reply to your memorandum on this matter pending study by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We have now received the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Because of the time involved in organizing, equipping and training the Greek and Yugoslav Air Force squadrons and the limitations on supply for support of all forces in the Balkan Area, the Joint Chiefs of Staff think it most unlikely that this project will result in the use of these squadrons against the Germans during the present war. For this reason, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that, from a military point of view, the British proposal will not assist the prosecution of the war against Germany.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider therefore that the proposed project relates primarily to the equipping of post-war armies and is a matter for decision on a governmental level, and have so informed the British Chiefs of Staff.

As a matter of equipping post-war armies, the Joint Chiefs of Staff see no objection to the proposed project provided assurance is secured that the equipping of these forces, (a) will be placed on a priority below all other commitments; (b) will not result in either a direct or indirect commitment against U.S. resources, including U.S. shipping resources; and (c) will not in any way be construed as altering existing Lend-Lease procedures with regard to re-transfers.

We are in agreement with the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as set out above.

It is noted that His Majesty's Government indicates that it does not "feel it to be necessary to consult the

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Letter to the Secretary of State

- 2 -

Soviet Government before proceeding with their plans for the Greek naval and air forces". It is not entirely clear to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy that the equipment of Greek forces is not a matter of military concern to the Soviets. Accordingly, they suggest that the State Department may wish to consider whether any United States acquiescence in the British proposals is appropriate without consultation with the Soviet Government.

Your attention is invited to the fact that, during the discussion of the proposal in the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the U.S. Chiefs of Staff advised the representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff that they could not accede to this proposal unless they had assurances that no first-line aircraft would be supplied to the Greek and Yugoslav Air Forces. The representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff (6 January 1945) have given such assurances, indicating (a) that only obsolescent British aircraft will be given to the Greeks and Yugoslavs under the present proposals; (b) that no additional requests for aircraft will thereby be made to the United States; and (c) that the British Chiefs of Staff therefore intend to implement their proposals with regard to both the Greek and Yugoslav Air Forces.

Sincerely yours

/s/ Henry L. Stimson
Secretary of War

/s/ James Forrestal
Secretary of the Navy

SECRET

SECRETWAR DEPARTMENT
Washington, D. C.

JAN 15 1945

The Honorable
The Secretary of the Navy

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Reference is made to the memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War, dated 3 January 1945 concerning the supply of equipment to the Greek and Yugoslav Air Forces, and which recommended a draft reply from the Secretary of War and the Secretary of Navy to the State Department.

I am in agreement with the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as expressed in the proposed draft letter. However, I have noted that the Aide Memoire of 21 November 1944 from the British Embassy indicates that the British Government does not "feel it to be necessary to consult the Soviet Government before proceeding with their plans for the Greek naval and air forces". It is not clear to me that the equipment of Greek forces is not a matter of military concern to the Soviets and therefore I feel that the matter should be mentioned to the State Department.

Accordingly, the next to last paragraph of the proposed reply to the Secretary of State has been added by the War Department. The last paragraph has also been added in order to apprise the Secretary of State of recent action in the Combined Chiefs of Staff on this matter.

I have signed this letter and recommend that you sign and forward it to the Secretary of State.

Sincerely yours

/s/ Henry L. Stimson

Secretary of War

SECRET

SECRET**THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Washington 25, D.C.**

3 January 1945.

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR:
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY:****Subject: Supply of Equipment to Greek
and Yugoslav air forces.**

Reference is made to the letters from the Department of State to the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War, dated 4 December 1944, enclosing an aide memoire from the British Embassy dated 21 November 1944.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the aide memoire in which the British Embassy inquires whether the United States Government approves the equipment by the British Government of several single-engine fighter squadrons for the Greek and Yugoslav Air Forces.

It is recommended that the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy reply to the Secretary of State along the lines of the enclosed letter.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

/s/ William D. Leahy

**WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Fleet Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.****Enclosure:
Proposed ltr from
Secys of War and
Navy to Secy of
State.****SECRET**

D R A F T

SECRET

LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY OF WAR AND THE SECRETARY OF
THE NAVY TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The Aide Memoire recently presented by the British Embassy to the Department of State regarding the proposed equipping of several single-engine fighter squadrons for the Greek and Yugoslav Air Forces was referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment on the military aspects of the proposal. The Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff on 23 November 1944 also sent the United States Chiefs of Staff a copy of this same Aide Memoire, saying they would be glad to know whether the United States Chiefs of Staff see any objection from the military point of view to the proposed transfer. I have withheld my reply to your memorandum on this matter pending study by the Joint Chief of Staff. I have now received the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Because of the time involved in organizing, equipping and training the Greek and Yugoslav Air Force squadrons and the limitations on supply for support of all forces in the Balkan Area, the Joint Chiefs of Staff think it most unlikely that this project will result in the use of these squadrons against the Germans during the present war. For this reason, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that, from a military point of view, the British proposal will not assist the prosecution of the war against Germany.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider therefore that the proposed project relates primarily to the equipping of post-war armies and is a matter for decision on a governmental level, and have so informed the British Chiefs of Staff.

As a matter of equipping post-war armies, the Joint Chiefs of Staff see no objection to the proposed project provided assurance is secured that the equipping of these forces, (a) will be placed on a priority below all other commitments; (b) will not result in either a direct or indirect commitment against U.S. resources, including U.S. shipping resources; and (c) will not in any way be construed as altering existing Lend-Lease procedures with regard to retransfers.

I am in agreement with the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as set out above.

SECRET

SECRET

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

Washington 25, D. C.

5 February 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Supply of Equipment to Greek and Yugoslav Air Forces.

Reference: JCS Secret Memo to SecWar and SecNav of 3 Jan 45.

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For the STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE:

WALLACE E. WHITSON
Secretary

Encl:
Copy of SecWar - SecNav
ltr to SecState of
17 Jan 1945.

SECRET

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The Honorable

17 Jan 1945

The Secretary of State

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It is noted that His Majesty's Government indicates that it does not "feel it to be necessary to consult the

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Letter to the Secretary of State

- 2 -

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Your attention is invited to the fact that, during the discussion of the proposal in the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the U.S. Chiefs of Staff advised the representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff that they could not accede to this proposal unless they had assurances that no first-line aircraft would be supplied to the Greek and Yugoslav Air Forces. The representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff (6 January 1945) have given such assurances, indicating (a) that only obsolescent British aircraft will be given to the Greeks and Yugoslavs under the present proposals; (b) that no additional requests for aircraft will thereby be made to the United States; and (c) that the British Chiefs of Staff therefore intend to implement their proposals with regard to both the Greek and Yugoslav Air Forces.

Sincerely yours

/s/ Henry L. Stimson

Secretary of War

/s/ James Forrestal

Secretary of the Navy

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