

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
Civil Information and Education Section  
Research and Information Division

TRANSLATION

Serial No. RI(T)11-E-9

15 April 1946

SUBJECT : The National Educational Personnel Labor Union  
(Zenkoku Kyoiku Shokuin Rodokumiai Kyogikai):  
Declaration of the Founders, with a Draft of the  
Constitution.

PREPARED BY: Education Research Unit

SOURCES : Conferences with Mr. Sagayama, Councillor, Japan  
Education Association, and material supplied by  
the Japan Education Association.

COMMENT:

The National Educational Personnel Labor Union Council (Zenko-ku kyoiku Shokuin Rodokumiai Kyogikai), most recent of the teachers' unions, appeared on the horizon 2 April 1946, and includes educational employers and officials as well as teachers. Two of its organizers are Tatsuo Sawada, assistant chairman of the Ministry of Education Personnel Labor Union (Mombusho Shokuin Kumiai) and Shinsho Takahashi, chairman of the same (address: Secretariat, Ministry of Education). This union, according to its organizers, is to be organized under the new labor union law; as yet it has no definite organization and is merely in the preparatory stage. On 2 April 1946 the following statement was made:



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A. DECLARATION OF THE FOUNDERS (A TRANSLATION).

We are in the most critical situation that has ever been experienced in our history. It may be impossible to express in a word what has caused this misfortune; but the lack of scientific thought and of reasonableness is the greatest of the causes. The feudalistic administrative organization and personnel administration have brought no result but an ingrained self-conceit on the part of the bureaucrats.

Accordingly, in the name of patriotism, the scientific and reasonable spirit of education has been disregarded or misunderstood by some militaristic and bureaucratic people in their nationalistic and militaristic outlook. Our guiding spirits have cried loudly for independence of study and liberty of research for many years, but their words have proven of no avail. The educational circles, betraying their weakness completely, have followed the guidance of the oppressors indiscriminately.

It is a matter of common knowledge that the rise and fall of a nation depends upon the results of education. In spite of the fact that the importance of education has been recognized for the past many years, we have had practically no regard for our education. If educational expenditures had been greatly increased, if educational personnel had been better treated, if educational facilities had been more available, we should have been a quite different people. It is a matter of great regret to see the fall of the scientific and cultural level and the deterioration of national morality in our country. The only way for disarmed Japan to keep peace lies in education. One cannot hope for the



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safety of our nation without the development of education. Having realized the importance of our mission, we have not been able to spend even a moment idly. Now is the time when we should reflect on our conduct, realize our responsibility and mission, and exert ourselves with dauntless spirit. Now we should exert our educational influence, encourage our national spirit and morality, and raise our scientific and cultural level. Thus we should take part in the reconstruction of our country. We believe that the most important step in accomplishing this purpose is to establish, as a recognized principle, the priority of education.

We, who are members of the masses of workers, have not only been in straitened circumstances due to serious economic problems, but our social status also has not been very high; so, we believe it is necessary to establish a new order which enables us to devote ourselves to the completion of our important mission by securing and protecting our living rights, restoring our personal rights, and raising our social status. By breaking down the past feudalistic, bureaucratic organization and personnel system which have made us what we are, we plan to establish educational autonomy and educational rights, together with the realization of democracy in the government and in education.

The Educational Ministry Personnel Union has already been organized. School unions are being organized rapidly. The preliminary meeting of the National Government and Public Officials' Union (Zenkoku Kankori Shokuin Rodo Kumiai), which will be composed of all government and public officials, has already been held. Their union will soon be established. We feel keenly that it is



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quite necessary for us who are connected with education to be united now. We have started an active movement with the support of our 500,000 comrades, and are exerting ourselves to the achievement of our object by our strong union and organization. We cannot but hope earnestly that our comrades will rise up now.

B. CONSTITUTION (DRAFT). (A TRANSLATION).

Chapter I - General Rules

Art. 1. This Council shall be called National Educational Personnel Labor Union Council (Zenkoku Kyōiku Shokuin Rōdō Kumiai Kyōgikai).

Art. 2. This Council shall be composed of labor unions of all government, public and private school teachers, and of educational personnel associations.

Art. 3. This Council shall have its office in Tokyo City.

Chapter 2 - Purpose

Art. 4. This Union, in close cooperation with all unions, shall contribute to the establishment of a cultural state based on the principle of the priority of education, shall improve labor conditions and raise economic standards, shall fulfill its obligations for the promotion of culture, and shall put into effect the independence and democratization of education.

Chapter 3 - Objectives

Art. 5. In order to fulfill the purposes noted in Article 4, the objectives of this Council shall be:

1. To establish as fundamental the principle of educational priority.
2. To make plans to secure educational independence and to



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establish educational rights.

3. To democratize educational administration, educational personnel, and the entire system of education.
4. To improve labor conditions and to raise economic standards.
5. To develop ability, to put into practice the maintenance of a fair status and impartial treatment, and to promote social status in other ways.
6. To establish the principle of collective bargaining.
7. To encourage intellectual activities, to develop character, and to promote culture.
8. To provide mutual aid and welfare facilities.
9. To cooperate with other unions.
10. To cooperate with cultural associations.
11. To maintain liaison and cooperate with foreign educational associations.
12. To publish organ newspapers and magazines.
13. To perform any other duties necessary to accomplish the purposes of the Union.

#### Chapter 4 - Organization.

Art. 6. The Council shall consist of:

The Great Congress

The Central Committee

The Standing Committee

Art. 7. The Great Congress shall be the supreme deliberative organ of this Council and shall be composed of representative committees of the member unions. The Great Congress shall be convened by the Chairman in April every year, and in extraordi-



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nary cases as follows:

1. When the Chairman considers it necessary.
2. When the Central Committee decides on it.
3. When more than a third of the union committees approve and request it, stating their reasons.

The Chairmen of the Great Congress shall be elected by the members from the representative committees.

Art. 8. The Central Committee shall be the deliberative organ from one Great Congress to the next, and shall be composed of all members of the Central Committees.

Art. 9. The Standing Committee shall be the executive organ of the labor unions and be composed of all Standing Committees. It shall transact matters both of little and of urgent importance.

Art. 10. The Standing Committee shall have a General Affairs Bureau and necessary departments. Every department shall be under the control of the Standing Committee and be composed of a head of the department and several members. Regulations concerning every department shall be prescribed elsewhere.

Art. 11. The Standing Committee or the Central Committee shall be convoked by the Chairman whenever necessary.

The members of the Standing Committee or the Central Committee may request the Chairman to call a meeting of their respective committees with the approval of more than a third of the members.

Art. 12. A meeting shall not be convened unless more than half of the members are present; but in the case of the Great Congress or the Central Committee, if a member cannot be present, he shall be regarded as being present by sending a letter of attorney.



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Letters are limited to four persons.

Art. 13. The decision of the conference shall be decided by a majority vote. If there is a tie, the chairman shall cast the deciding vote.

#### Chapter 5 - Officers

Art. 14. The Council shall have the following officers:

Chairman

2 Assistant Chairmen

1 Secretary

Several Standing Committee Members

Three Inspecting Committee Members

Several Central Committee Members

Other officers shall be selected as necessary to carry on the work of the Union. In that case regulations shall be prescribed later.

Art. 15. The Chairman shall represent the Council and regulate Council affairs.

Art. 16. The Assistant Chairmen shall assist the Chairmen and take his place if he is unable to attend.

Art. 17. The Secretary shall assist the Chairman or the Assistant Chairmen, and transact ordinary affairs.

Art. 18. The Standing Committee shall delegate duties of this Council to its members and shall regulate affairs. The Standing Committee shall consist of the Chairmen, Assistant Chairmen, and Secretary.

Art. 19. The Inspecting Committee shall inspect the property and finances of the unions. When any deficit is discovered, the



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Standing Committee shall be informed.

Art. 20. The Central Committee shall be elected by the representative Committees. Manner of election and composition shall be prescribed elsewhere.

Art. 21. Representative committees shall be elected by all the unions. Manner of election and composition shall be prescribed elsewhere.

Art. 22. The Chairman, Assistant Chairmen, Secretary, the Standing Committee, and Inspection Committee shall be elected by the representative committees. Manner of election shall be prescribed elsewhere.

Art. 23. The period of service of each committee member shall be one year, but he may be re-elected. A member elected to fill a vacancy shall serve during the remaining period of his predecessor's term.

Each committee shall perform its work until its succeeding committee is elected, even though its period of service may be over.

Art. 24. Advisers and clerks may be appointed to this Council.  
Chapter 6 - Finance.

Art. 25. The necessary expenditures of this Council shall be paid for from fees, contributions, and other income. The fees shall never be returned for any reason once they are paid.

Art. 26. The fiscal year of this Council shall begin on April 1st of each year and end on March 31 of the following year.

Art. 27. The rules for the finances of the Council shall be prescribed elsewhere.



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Chapter 7 - Admission, Resignation, and Control

Art. 28. A union which wishes to join our Council shall submit an application signed by all its officers to the Standing Committee, and get its approval.

Art. 29. When a union wants to resign from the Council it shall submit a report of the reasons with the signatures of all its officers to the Standing Committee and get its approval.

Art. 30. All the unions which belong to the Council shall report their constitutions and important decisions to this Council.

Art. 31. The Chairman may consider all undertakings of the unions collectively, and may unify and consolidate them in order to manage this Council.

Art. 32. Any union which comes under any of the following provisions shall be dismissed at the decision of the Central Committee.

1. Unions which violate the Constitution.
2. Union which disobey the orders of the Council.
3. Unions which dishonor the Council.

Art. 33. A union which is not contented with any of the above provisions may appeal to the Great Congress for a final decision.

Chapter 8 - Additional Regulations

Art. 34. Any change in the above constitution shall be decided upon by the Great Congress.

Art. 35. The necessary regulations to operate the above constitution may be prescribed elsewhere.

Art. 36. This Council shall be organized on 1946.



A-S 4587

S/P - Mr. Kennan

January 27, 1948

A-S - Mr. Saltzman

SANACC 356/1 (Policy for Democratization of Japanese Farmer Unions and Cooperatives)

This is in response to your question concerning the above-mentioned policy paper.

The "United States Initial Post-surrender Policy for Japan", (SWNCC 150/4/2), states that the Japanese "shall be encouraged to form democratic and representative organizations". Japanese farmers' unions had been dissolved in 1940, and farm cooperatives had fallen under Government control long before that. Therefore SCAP, acting under the authority of the post-surrender policy statement, on December 9, 1945 directed the Japanese Government to prepare plans to foster an agricultural cooperative movement "free of domination by non-agrarian interests and dedicated to the economic and cultural advancement of the Japanese farmer."

The Department had not considered that an FEC policy statement specifically covering Japanese farm organizations was necessary in view of the action already taken by SCAP. However, in June, 1946, the New Zealand delegation in FEC introduced a paper stating principles to govern establishment of Japanese farm organizations, which would be applicable not only to cooperatives but also to farmers' unions. The New Zealand paper was generally consistent with the line already being followed by SCAP. If the U.S. had taken the position that no paper was necessary at all, a jurisdictional issue would have been drawn in FEC with a possibility that the U.S. might prevail only through exercise of the veto. It was thus considered necessary to respond to the New Zealand position on its merits. The proposals subsequently adopted with minor changes as SANACC 356/1 were therefore introduced into SANACC in order to obtain an approved U.S. position for use by General McCoy. SANACC 356/1 has now been introduced into FEC as a statement of the U.S. position and a working committee is engaged in adjusting the differences between the U.S. and New Zealand papers. These differences are matters of detail rather than principle.

Although SCAP had ample opportunity to comment on SANACC 356/1 prior to its final adoption, he did not do so. SANACC approved this paper on December 9, 1947. Meanwhile, the Japanese Diet on November 7, 1947 had passed the Agricultural Cooperative Association bill in compliance with the SCAP directive of December 9, 1945.

There are two significant differences between SANACC 356/1 and the provisions of the newly passed Japanese law. First, 356/1 includes within its scope Japanese farmers' unions, whereas the statute covers only cooperatives. This is believed to raise no problem since the provision of SANACC 356/1 referring specifically to farmers' unions serves in the main to accord such organizations privileges already extended to similar organizations, such as trade unions. Many of these privileges are, in fact, secured by the Japanese constitution. Second, the statute permits penalties for violation of law to be inflicted upon cooperatives through administrative action, whereas 356/1 makes such punishment a matter for the courts.

894.5043 / 1-2748



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The provision of the policy paper seems preferable, since bureaucratic control of cooperatives in pre-surrender Japan contributed to their regimentation for military purposes. SCAP has not yet commented on SANACC 356/1, and his views on this last point are therefore not known.

*Bois.*  
A-S:BO'Sullivan:oe

Cleared by:Schuler, ADO

Fearey, NA





UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER FOR JAPAN

No. 133

Tokyo, February 28, 1948

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Refer to IR for action  
MAR 17 1948  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICY  
OFFICE OF  
MESSAGE CENTER

RECEIVED DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1948 MAR 15 PM 1 27

Subject: Control Associations.

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INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICY

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The Acting Political Adviser has the honor to enclose five copies of a directive issued by this Headquarters (SCAPIN 1860) dated February 16, 1948 regarding the interpretation and implementation of policy concerning the elimination of Control Associations.

The directive sets forth the interpretation to be followed by the Japanese Government of the term "control association" as used in previous directives under reference, and further directs the Government to instruct each Prefectural Governor regarding the substance and interpretation of the previous directives with an injunction to prepare lists of all control associations in each prefecture. These lists will be reviewed by General Headquarters and returned to the Japanese Government with instructions for dissolution or other action regarding each organization listed.

Previous directives referred to in SCAPIN 1860 were designed to effect withdrawal from industry of the power to control distribution of materials and products by the method of exclusive purchase and sale by designated private companies. The Government was instructed simultaneously to produce plans to carry on distribution functions through a government distribution corporation.

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Enclosure: att 53

General Headquarters, SCAP, directive (SCAPIN 1860), February 16, 1948 regarding Control Associations (five copies).

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
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Enclosure to Despatch No. 133 dated  
February 28, 1948 from the Office of the  
United States Political Adviser for Japan,  
Tokyo, entitled "Control Associations".



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
APO 500

AG 004 (16 Feb 48) ESS/AC  
SCAPIN 1860

16 February 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR: JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

SUBJECT: Interpretation and Implementation of Policy Concerning  
the Elimination of Control Associations

1. Reference the following memoranda for the Japanese Government from  
General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers:

a. AG 080 (6 Aug 46) ESS/AC, (SCAPIN 1108), 6 August 1946, subject:  
Dissolution of Control Associations (Tosei Kai) and Authorization to Estab-  
lish Government Allocation Agency together with Necessary Control Organs  
within Specific Industries.

b. AG 400 (11 Dec 46) ESS/AC, (SCAPIN 1394), 11 December 1946, sub-  
ject: Methods of Control under the Temporary Demand and Supply Adjustment  
Act.

2. In the implementation of reference memoranda paragraph 1a and 1b,  
above, the Japanese Government is directed to conform to the following inter-  
pretations:

a. The term "control association" shall be construed to mean any  
company, association or other type of organization (whether or not the name  
of such organization contains the words "tosei kai," "tosei kumiai," "tosei  
kaisha" or any other words indicating control) which exercises any of the  
following control functions:

(1) Compelling, by any means, other individuals or companies  
in a given industry or trade to:

(a) Be members of its organization.

(b) Pay dues or fees.

(c) Adhere to a given set of rules of trade.

(2) Controlling the distribution or sale of any materials or  
product (other than its own) by means of any of the fol-  
lowing:

(a) Exclusive right of purchase or sale.

(b) Mandatory inspection.



BASIC: Memo for JG, SCAPIN 1860

- (c) Preparation of schedules of allocation, rationing or other distribution.
- (d) Extension of credit or credit guarantees to its members.

3. In the implementation of reference memoranda paragraph 1a and b, above, the following procedure will be used:

a. The Japanese Government will issue instructions to the Prefectural Governors of the substance and interpretation of these directives and instruct each Prefectural Governor to take steps immediately to prepare two (2) lists (in Romaji and English) of control associations operating in his prefecture as follows:

- (1) All control associations which perform operating functions such as warehousing, manufacturing or processing.
- (2) All other control associations.

b. These lists will include, but not be limited to, the following organizations:

- (1) Organizations originally formed under the "Important Industrial Enterprises Organization Law" (Juyo Sangyo Ontai Rei); "Controlling Company Ordinances" (Tosei Kaisha Rei); and the "Commercial and Industrial Organization Law" (Shoko Kumiai Ho), where such organizations include the word "control" (tosei) in their name. This applies whether or not the organization has since been reorganized.

c. Agencies or corporations wholly-owned by the Japanese Government should be excepted from the lists.

d. These lists will be submitted to the Prefectural Military Government Team within sixty (60) days of the date of this memorandum.

4. The Japanese Government is hereby informed that after appropriate review these lists will be returned to the Japanese Government with instructions for dissolution or other action re each organization on the list.

5. The Prefectural Governors will be instructed to furnish the Prefectural Military Government Team, upon request, information regarding the progress of actions taken in accordance with this memorandum.



BASIC: Memo for JG, SCAPIN 1860

6. Direct communication is authorized between the interested staff sections of General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and agencies of the Japanese Government concerned to implement all provisions of this memorandum.

FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER:

*for* *agRehe*  
R. M. LEVY,  
Colonel, AGD,  
Adjutant General.



UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER  
FOR JAPAN

No. 209

UNCLASSIFIED

Tokyo, March 31, 1948

MESSAGING CENTER

1948 APR 9 9 23 PM 2 30

INTERNATIONAL TRADE  
FOODS

Subject: Fraction Activities in Trade Unions

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The Acting Political Adviser has the honor to enclose five copies of a press statement of the Chief of the Labor Education Branch, Labor Division, Economic and Scientific Section of this Headquarters on March 12, 1948 concerning fraction activities in trade unions, together with five copies of a pamphlet which outlines the methods used by racketeers and political party fractions in securing control of trade unions. The pamphlet is entitled The Struggle for Trade Union Democracy and its purpose is to help eliminate the influence of the labor racketeer, the company unionist, and the fraction group by knowledge of how such groups operate. The description of the main element of the political fraction--a small disciplined group operating inside the union like a machine--is particularly interesting by reason of the fact that it is a device believed to be used extensively by communists.

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In addition to the pamphlet, the Labor Division is distributing copies of a new film entitled Proper Union Movement. The film strip is based on the pamphlet and is claimed to illustrate graphically the importance of democratic controls and the dangers of totalitarian control by fraction activities. During the next few months this film strip will be available for free loan to labor unions and other interested groups. Every prefecture has a film strip machine ready for free use of labor unions.

Enclosures:

1. Press statement of Chief, Labor Education Branch, ESS Labor Division, GHQ, SCAP, March 12, 1948. (5 copies).
2. Pamphlet, The Struggle for Trade Union Democracy, ESS, GHQ, SCAP, December 1947 (5 copies).

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AND HEALTH AFFAIRS - ILM

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Press Statement of Mr. Richard L-G. Deverall, Chief, Labor Education Branch, ESS Labor Division, GHQ, SCAP, given at 1100 hours on the 12th March, 1948, at Radio Tokyo Bldg., Tokyo.

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#### FRACTION ACTIVITIES IN TRADE UNIONS

One year ago, G. H. Q. published a pamphlet which outlined the methods used by racketeers and political party fractions in securing control of trade unions.

It seems appropriate at this time for G. H. Q. to re-issue that pamphlet, revised and made as timely as possible, in order to further one of the basic missions of the Occupation: the democratization of Japan. Publication of this pamphlet is not a warning to union members. On the contrary, it is advice.

The Japanese rank-and-file trade unionists are to be congratulated for the major strides forward they have taken on the road to democracy.

Labor racketeering and political fraction activities both use the same basic techniques: (1) secret meetings; (2) secretly-determined plans; and (3) domination of large groups through the coordination of the activities of a small fraction or group. Another device used by both racketeers and fraction groups is the intimidation by force through the use of gangsters or direct-actionists. By the use of physical force and terror, the racketeer or fraction element is able to control large groups of workers.

One of the greatest weapons in eliminating the influence of the labor racketeer, the company unionist, or the fraction group is a knowledge of how such groups operate.

A democratic labor union is particularly subject to abuse because a small group can caucus outside of union meetings, develop a secret plan of action, and then manipulate union meetings. This is particularly easy when the rank-and-file is completely unaware of the existence of a caucus and its conspiracies.

The main element of the political fraction -- a small, disciplined group operating inside the union like a machine -- is serious enough when limited to one local union. Such cell action becomes more serious and significant when it takes place concurrently in several local unions, or several national unions. In such a case, the policy of the national union or the group of local unions is being decided by a political leadership which often represents only a minority of the union membership.

Using the cell technique of domination, a central political leadership directs the trade union movement into channels which will promote the aims and current objectives of a political party, rather than the union membership. From a central headquarters, plans and programs are transmitted to the cell or fraction leaders in the national unions and local unions, and in a short time the cell leaders and cell members are appearing at union committee meetings persuading the union members to adopt certain policies and programs. Through such central control and through iron discipline imposed from above on each cell or fraction, some trade unions follow a program whose purposes are contrary to the interests of the rank-and-file unionists.

Your attention is therefore invited to a close examination of the pamphlet which we are giving you today, and you are invited to make as wide use as possible of the contents.

As an additional step in the information and education of Japanese trade unionists with regard to the facts of the political aspects of the



trade union movement, the Labor Division has requested the Labor Ministry to distribute copies of a new film strip entitled "Proper Union Movement." This film strip, based on this pamphlet, illustrates graphically the importance of democratic controls, the dangers of totalitarian control by fraction or cell activity.

During the next few months, this film strip should be available for free loan to labor unions and other interested groups. Every Ken has a film strip machine ready for the free use of labor unions, and they are invited to make use of this new facility.

In closing, a word should be said about the problem of subduing fraction activity within the labor union. This is primarily the business of the trade union. Any movements to oust fraction leaders from the trade unions must not be seized or exploited by employers in order to harm the trade union movement. Just as the employers would object if workers wanted to assist them in settling a quarrel within the Chamber of Commerce, so too workers will insist that they take care of their own internal problems.

The trade union movement must be united to exercise its full strength. But this unity must not be broken by the activities of a minority whose loyalty rests with a political sect and not with the union. False cries of 'unity' cannot be used to prevent legitimate rank-and-file reform. Lasting unity can only come when a labor movement is free of political fraction manipulation.

We have every reason to believe that the Japanese rank-and-file trade union members are on the march to build strong, solid, free labor unions: an indispensable part of democracy in the Orient.

- end -

Attached:

1. ESS Pamphlet, "The Struggle for Trade Union Democracy".
2. Japanese language script for the film strip "Proper Union Movement".



THE STRUGGLE FOR TRADE UNION DEMOCRACY



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
Economic and Scientific Section

TOKYO  
December . . . . . 1947



### Preface

The struggle of trade union members to establish trade union democracy is not accomplished when a convention has been held, a constitution has been written, and the delegates return to their local union to report on the proceedings.

On the contrary, the experience of trade unions the world over has clearly shown that trade union democracy is a process of growth. It is the result of action to establish democracy, and counter-action to preserve that democracy. It is the story of trial and occasional success. It never ends, for the minute that trade union members rest from their labors and proclaim "Now we have a perfectly democratic union" other forces begin their work to dismantle the democracy so perfected.

In a democratic country, every new generation must defend democracy and win it anew. Once established, there is no guarantee of its uninterrupted continuance.

It is axiomatic that the heart of the democratic trade union movement is found in the experience and intelligent understanding of the trade union rank-and-file membership. The finest and most democratic trade union constitution cannot of itself guarantee perfect democracy.

Democratic trade unionism grows as the rank-and-file union member, through daily experience and continued workers' education, learn to control and operate their trade union as they want it conducted.

Thus the Eastern Commission "Sixteen Principles for Japanese Trade Unions" state in part that "The formation of trade unions should be a process of democratic self-expression and initiative, proceeding from the workers themselves. Employers should not be allowed to take part in the organization or conduct of unions or to finance them." In addition, the principles state that "Trade union officials and standing committees should be elected by the workers concerned by secret ballot and democratic methods. It should be the responsibility of the unions to ensure that all officials have been democratically elected at regular stated intervals and that all their activities are democratically conducted."

In the same declaration of principles, the EEC states that in Japan there should be permitted "no new workers organization with militaristic, ultra-nationalistic, fascist, or other totalitarian aims..."

The purpose of this pamphlet is to first analyze the types of totalitarian influences which have been at work within democratic trade unions the world over, and then suggest to the rank-and-file trade unionist the remedies to be used in defeating the assault upon democratic trade unionism made by totalitarianism in whatever guise it may assume.

### For Good or for Ill...

The rank-and-file members of trade unions must understand that their trade union movement can be a powerful instrument for social betterment and social good... or a lethal weapon to destroy democracy and establish brutal dictatorship and labor bossism. Properly used, the trade union movement can be a positive good for economic betterment. If abused by totalitarian and selfish interests, it can play a major part in plunging the economy into ruin and bring about the collapse of nations.

Generally speaking, there are two major abuses which must be clearly understood by the rank-and-file if they are to be defeated. And it is well to note that what is said derives from the experience of the French labor movement, the American labor movement, the British labor movement, and the democratic trade union movements of other countries. In every case, such abuses have arisen in the face of widespread rank-and-file ignorance and lack of interest in the management of trade unions.

Both of the abuses are types of labor racketeering, a slang expression for the exploitation of a good thing for bad purposes.



Both types of labor racketeering live by use of undemocratic procedures, fraud, character assassination, deceit, and secret manipulation.

One type is labor-racketeering-for-money.

The other is labor-racketeering-for-power.

One is as great an evil as the other.

#### Labor-Racketeering-for-Money

Consider the formation of a labor union in a plant employing one thousand workers. Most of the workers are not aware of the meaning of trade unionism, but they are interested in improving their working conditions.

Suppose, for the sake of example, that there is a man, or a small group of men, who see in the union a type of black market ... a way to make money without having to work very hard.

When the union is formed, these men attend the initial meetings and find out what it is all about.

One of the men perhaps is a black marketer or oyakata. He calls in his friends one night and tells them: "This new union is a very good idea. If we can become the officers of the union. I think we can make a very large sum of money for ourselves. But the union unfortunately has just elected an honest man as President. We must first plan how to get rid of this president and stop all this talk about rank-and-file democracy."

#### The Caucus

The labor racketeer group then begins to meet secretly in order to develop a program. This private meeting of a small group is called a 'caucus', or meeting of the leaders of a faction. The caucus meets prior to union meetings. A conspiracy is developed. Each member of the caucus is given a specific mission.

Perhaps the caucus decides to attack the integrity of the President of the union at the next union meeting. Member A of the caucus has one task, Member B another, and so on.

#### "Railroading" the Membership

When the meeting is held, the rank-and-file have met in order to discuss routine union matters. They have no plans, and they do not know of the caucus conspiracy.

After a short time, Member A arises and makes a short speech on the qualities of a true union leader. Member B arises and states that their President is immoral or dishonest. Member C rises immediately and makes another speech along the same lines. By this time the rank-and-file are whispering to each other ... and the union President is wondering what it is all about.

Member D, the head of the group, then rises and shouts for a vote on whether or not to remove the President.

Rank-and-file members say to one another: "Ah so! Something is rotten here. I did not know the President was such a dishonest and immoral man..."

Like fish biting on the hook, the uninformed and politically naive rank-and-file may swallow the story of the caucus hook, line and sinker.

Trade unionists call this 'railroading' the membership. The caucus lays the tracks and runs the membership down their secretly-laid rails. Often, such use of this simple device can result in the downfall of an honest and good union leader. The men who brought about the downfall of the leader then take over, saying it is in the interests of democracy. Henceforth the union is under their domination.



### Gangsters

If they cannot railroad the rank-and-file, the next device they may try is the use of gangster tactics. One way to destroy the leadership of the local union is to hire gangsters or youthful direct-actionists, who wait until a dark night, waylay the President of the union in a lonely part of town, and beat him so severely that he is put in the hospital. During his enforced absence, the racketeers take over.

Another method is for the racketeers to visit the president of the union at his home and try to convince him that he should go along with the group. Several gangsters come with the labor racketeers. If the President does not give in, he is threatened with a beating on the spot.

Still another method is to have gangsters visit meetings of the local union. Member A of the caucus will start an argument, and then Member B may provoke a physical fight with the chairman of the local union meeting. The gangsters at the meeting then start a general fight. The union meeting ends in a grand uproar and utter confusion.

The rank-and-file, not knowing that a caucus is operating, say to one another: "This is frightful. I do not want to go to any more union meetings like that."

Again, by the use of physical force and terror or by daily caucus-controlled gangster intimidation of leaders, the labor racketeer element is able to use gangsters to destroy trade union democracy.

### Making Money

Once the racketeers have seized power over a local union, they begin to find ways and means of exploiting the union membership for their profit. They may approach the head of the company at the time of negotiations and say: "The workers will strike unless they receive an allowance of so many yen per month. However, if you will give us twenty thousand yen for ourselves, we can settle the allowance dispute for half the amount. There will be no strike if you care to settle with us privately."

A dishonest employer may give in to such pressure, pay the money, and the union membership is betrayed by their racketeering leaders ... who depart for the hot springs with their dishonest yen.

Another racket based on abuse of the strike is the sale of "strike insurance." The labor racketeers visit the employer and advise him: "It is very difficult to control the rank-and-file. They may strike at any time. If we are given the use of a motor car, a special ration of food and sake, and other special favors, we will try very hard to control the workers. In fact, if you will also give us ten thousand yen a month, we can guarantee that there will be no strikes in your plant." The employer may agree. The workers, naturally, have no knowledge of these negotiations and in fact may not even be talking about a strike.

Another racket is to raise the union initiation fee to a high level, and refuse employment to new workers unless they pay the high fee. Because racketeering union leaders publish no adequate financial statements, they can pocket most of this extra money.

If racketeering leaders can secure control over larger bodies of workers, they can extort larger and larger sums of money. They can levy fines, initiation fees, and increased dues ... and if any member protests, he is quietly visited some night by the racketeer's gangsters, who threaten or beat him.

### Union Bosses

Racketeering on the higher level develops into union bossism under which the leader or actually is working for the companies. Such dishonest leaders will openly speak long and loud about democracy. But if any union member raises the question of an election, or the publication of a financial statement, he is soon rubbing his head and wishing he had kept his mouth shut.



When an employer is afraid that an independent union will be formed in his plant, he may secretly visit such a labor boss and tell him he will sign a contract. Without the rank-and-file in the plant knowing what is going on, such a labor boss will sign a poor contract. The membership later learns that they belong to a union.

They must pay the initiation fee. They must pay the dues. and they must obey the orders and commands of the union boss. If they don't the union boss sends in his gangsters to enforce his brand of "democracy." Such a secretly-concluded contract is called a "backdoor agreement" because it is signed without the knowledge of the workers whom it covers.

#### Perversion of Unionism

The exploitation of the trade union by labor racketeers and union bosses is the very perversion of trade unionism. The union serves the purpose of only one man, or a small group of men - and the purpose is yen, more yen, and still more yen for the union racketeers. If the rank-and-file accept, or are forced to accept, such conditions, this can go on for years. No democratic meetings are held, no democratic votes are taken, and the union does not function in the interest of the workers who pay the dues.

Once established, racketeering and bossism are difficult to destroy. But if the rank-and-file in such an oppressed union immediately band together, demand public financial reports, and demand regular secret elections, they can probably expel such racketeers and union bosses.

The greatest weapon in fighting labor racketeers and union bosses is a knowledge of what they are and how they operate. Once a large group of workers understands how their union democracy has been perverted or destroyed, it is usually not very long before they recapture their union and democracy lives once more.

#### Racketeering-for-Power

The abuse of labor-racketeering-for-power, in many democratic countries, has usually involved small political parties which seize control of local or national unions in order to extend their own political power.

In order to understand the purposes and methods of this type of labor racketeering, which seeks to control the trade unions in order to use their power, let us make a few general observations.

The typical trade union contains persons of many differing social and political views. In a democratic trade union, any movement or direction which is proposed for the union is proposed at an open membership meeting; it is discussed freely by the rank-and-file; and it is voted upon. The final decision represents the will of the majority.

We have pointed out that a democratic organization is particularly subject to abuse because it is often easy for a small group to caucus outside of union meetings, develop a secret plan of action, and they manipulate union meetings by such prearrangement. This is particularly easy when the rank-and-file are completely unaware of the existence of a caucus and its conspiracies.

#### Boring From Within

Consider an example. A certain political party has an ideological program. If it approaches the workers in a trade union and asks them to support the ideological program, the majority of the workers may object. The party may then try to find some undemocratic method of boring into the union and making it move in a certain direction despite the expressed will of the rank-and-file.

The party forms a small caucus, or cell, of loyal and faithful political workers inside the plant. They begin to hold private meetings, or caucuses. Before each union meeting, they arrange who will say what, they agree on what actions are to be proposed, and they agree on the tactics to be employed.



When the union meeting opens, the average member has come to take part in democratic trade union discussion. But the members of the small cell or fraction having met previously and laid a plan of action, will rise, speak, and take over the union meeting without anyone suspecting that a political machine is at work inside the trade union.


One member of the cell may make a speech. Another will praise it. A third member of the cell will make a motion based on the speech of the other two. And another member of the cell will call for a vote on the question.

Moving quickly, by having a disciplined group working according to plan, the cell operates like a machine inside the union and the meeting is often captured.

Let us present the situation graphically.



Each dot represents a rank-and-file member. At each meeting, the rank-and-file discuss issues on their merits and vote without any prearrangement or conspiracy. This is democratic trade unionism.



In this type of meeting, the cell has both purpose and direction. Operating as a machine, they guide the meeting, and the membership is led by the cell. This is machine-dominated trade unionism.

In the first diagram, there is no outside caucus operating. Every issue is upon the table, people speak their mind freely, there is free and open discussion, and the final vote on each issue represents the intelligent, considered vote of the trade union membership.

In the second, a cell is operating. It has both direction and preplanned purpose. By moving quickly with machine-like precision such a cell group can swing the membership along.

That is how the political party seeking to dominate the union first begins its efforts to capture the union.

#### Sabotage

The next move is often the sabotage of union meetings. If too many union members come to union meetings, there may be too much union democracy - and a small group cannot capture unions if there is "too much democracy."

At a caucus, the cell may therefore conspire to sabotage the next membership meeting.

At the meeting, each cell member makes a long speech on some relatively unimportant problem. If any other union member speaks, a cell member follows him and repeats everything he has said, agreeing or disagreeing. The purpose of the cell members is to waste time.

The union members sit for hours while the speeches and the arguments proceed. Many yawn. Finally some of the rank-and-file leave the meeting and go home.

After five or six hours of wrangling speeches, the meeting finally comes to an end. Some of the members say to each other: "Another stupid meeting like that and I will stay at home nights."

The cell does the same thing at the next meeting, and again at succeeding meetings. Finally the honest and unsuspecting trade union members become disgusted with the length and stupidity of their union meetings. Not realizing that a political machine is trying to capture the union, they cease attending union meetings. By the time of the next election, practically the only persons attending union meetings are persons who belong to the cell, or persons friendly to the cell membership. This small group can then nominate and elect itself.



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Once they have captured the union, the cell can then vote donations of union funds to the political organization which they represent, and the small party is able to amass sums of money in an apparently democratic manner. The cell takes over the union newspaper and soon the paper is nothing but the tinkling bell of the political party. Slowly but surely the trade union becomes the concubine of the political party.

The cell has won control by destroying democracy. Totalitarian control over the union has been established by a small group who are now dictating policy to the entire rank-and-file.

#### Totalitarian Domination

This cell controls their union in the same manner as the labor racketeers who are running a union for their own selfish purposes. If any union member protests that the union is being run by dictators, he may be stopped on his way home and be severely beaten by cell youth attack members. Perhaps he will be thrown into the river. Other union members see and hear of such things and decide that it is better to keep their mouths shut.

Members who attend union meetings attempting to vote against the cell are vilified in the shop. The cell group spreads stories about them and causes other workers to believe that they are anti-union or friends of goyo kumiai. They are termed "political degeneratives," "reactionaries," and other terms as may serve the undemocratic purposes of the cell or political fraction.

Like the puppet at a marionette show, the union becomes the creature of the political cell or fraction. Strikes may be called, not because a strike is needed to win just demands for the workers but because the cell has decided (or been told) that it is necessary in order to promote the political aims of the cell's political leadership.

Again, when a strike is needed or necessary in order to promote the just needs and demands of the workers, the cell leadership may refuse to permit such a strike because the current political line of the cell is opposed to the calling of strikes at that time.

#### Centralized Control

It is serious enough to have an undemocratic minority boring into one local union. Such cell action becomes more serious and significant when it takes place concurrently in several local unions, or several national unions.

In this case, the policy of the national union or the group of local unions is not being decided by the rank-and-file of the respective unions, but by a political leadership which is not a major part of the union membership.

Under such an undemocratic system of totalitarian control, a central political leadership develops the ideology of the political party and works out plans and programs for the trade union movement which will promote the aims and current objectives of the political party.

These plans and programs are transmitted to the cell or fraction leaders in the national unions and local unions, and in a short time the cell leaders and cell members are appearing at union board meetings and union membership meetings in order to persuade the rank-and-file to adopt certain policies and programs.

The plans and programs are not presented as having come from a central source. Rather they are presented "spontaneously" as plans and programs which will advance trade unionism and increase "freedom," "peace," and "democracy."

Through such central control and through the iron discipline imposed from above on each cell or fraction, some trade unions in foreign countries have from time to time been guided by outside political organizations whose purposes were contrary to the purposes and interests of the rank-and-file trade unionists. Moreover such efforts to bore into the labor unions succeeded, trade union democracy was destroyed and a well-organized minority was able to direct the unions toward their own peculiar political ends. Thus the rank-and-file in some unions lost control of their unions temporarily because trade union principles were displaced by political direction from outside the trade union movement.




### Control Methods

There are many methods used in controlling trade unions by these antidemocratic minority racketeer cells. One method is first to insert in the constitution of the union a clause under which the leadership of the union can expel any person who "violates the peace and order of the union, or disrupts union meetings." Without a fair trial, and without any chance of appeal to higher trade union authority, democratic trade unionists who oppose totalitarian control have often been expelled from such unions and lost their jobs by dishonest use of such clauses by undemocratic minority elements.

In some cases, anti-Communist labor racketeers have unjustly expelled a Communist trade union member. In other cases, Communist labor racketeers have unjustly expelled anti-Communist members.

Both are wrong!



Here a central group directs the activities of the several cells. Through prearrangement and clever manipulation of the local unions, the unions apparently adopt programs which are in line with the program of the political group. Of course, the rank-and-file are not aware that they are being directed by an organization outside the labor movement.

### Transmission Belt

Another method of controlling or heavily influencing the trade union movement from outside the unions is the use of the transmission belt technique.

Consider an electric motor driving a large machine, which for the sake of example we will call the union machine. The motor receives its power from a certain source; it turns; the belt connecting the motor to the union moves; the union machine rotates.

If we are able to see the source of power, the motor, and the belt, we can understand what is moving the union machine.

However, if the source of power is in one place and the motor in another place, we can see only the belt and the union machine. We are unaware of the source of power and the type of motor. For all we know, it can be an electric motor, a windmill, a gasoline engine, a charcoal burner, or a water wheel.


If the cell or fraction finds that it cannot bore directly into the union, it may often devise a transmission belt technique to control or otherwise move the union.

In the American labor movement, the transmission belt is usually some small organization set up by a political group or special interest group with the pur-




pose of exploiting the labor movement. The transmission belt organization will often be given a very high sounding title, such as the "Labor Liberation Society," or "League for Free Rice, Free Rent, Peace, Anti-war, Freedom, and Democracy." It may publish a newspaper, express great interest in the unions, support strikes, and otherwise aid every move the union makes.

The union members are deluged with propaganda from this transmission belt organization. They read the propaganda and exclaim: "Ah, so desu ka! This organization is a friend of our labor union. That is very good. We must all support it."



Here the worker is able to see the source of power, the motor, the belt, and the union machine. In this case the cell is composed of trade union principles, the motor is the needs and desires of the worker, the belt consists of the democratic procedures of the union ... and the worker knows what is what.

Here the political cell is hidden, and the motor is also hidden. The worker sees only one part of the belt and the union machine. He does not know what is running the union machine.



The only thing wrong with such an arrangement is that the cell organization never tells the trade union members that it is being operated by a secret political cell or fraction and a secret motor.

When the political cell has determined upon a certain political policy, the transmission belt organization then goes to work and contacts the unions seeking their support for the program. Donations of you may be requested, and soon many unsuspecting unions are giving money and support to the "friendly" organization although they never know who is actually receiving the money.

In the same manner, such transmission belt organizations often sponsor labor schools with the announced purpose of helping the labor unions. They supply teachers, classrooms, books, and charge the union small fees for their help and assistance.



Naturally the unions have sometimes welcomed this support and aid. They have even advised their members to attend these schools. But slowly, undercover, the school mixes trade unionism with political doctrines and it is not long before the union members have unsuspectingly switched their allegiance from the trade union to the transmission belt organization. Once sufficient union members have been captured, the political cell or fraction can come out into the open and capture the union.

The point of all this is that such hidden transmission belt organizations are fundamentally dishonest. They say one thing but mean another. They have but one purpose: to capture and control trade unions by the use of undemocratic methods. As soon as such organizations are exposed, experience indicates, they are often dissolved by their own members because through the exposure they have lost their political usefulness. A few of the original members and some new "neutral" members (called fellow travellers) form a new organization at a new address. This time it may be the "League for Culture, Peace, Freedom, Democracy, and Free Food for Babies."

Wise and sophisticated trade unionists know that it is the same old organization with a new front. It is the same transmission belt organization trying to drive or influence the trade union with the same hidden political cell's motor.

It is almost needless to say that the political party is careful to phrase its program in terms which sound very much like those which are used by workers. The political party proclaims itself to be the "true friend of the working class," and by these appeals to self-interest of the workers, the party is able to use what may be justified objectives as a further vehicle for its own camouflaged revolutionary political program. When trade unions or trade union members permit infiltration of political parties under the guise of "friendly bodies" they are actually in danger of serving not the trade union but the political party.

#### Control Points

American experience has been especially bitter with regard to the Communist Party of the United States. Members of the party who are operating as cell or fraction members within the trade union movement will regularly deny that they are members of the Communist Party. At times, American Communists have publicly denounced the Communist Party in order to deceive the rank-and-file.

Seldom will American Communists aspire to the presidency of a national union for they find it much easier and more convenient to control the union through other means.

American experience has shown that the anti-democratic Communist racketeering minority will select some well-intentioned but misinformed union leader as its "dummy." The cell members go to work and tell everyone what a great and wonderful rank-and-file leader this "dummy" is. If they can get their "dummy" elected, all they ask in return is a reward of a few control points. These control points are appointments on the union staff such as Education Director, Publicity Director, Political Action Director, or Director of the Legal Department.

Once the cell has a few of its members on the union payroll, it can then exert great pressure on union officials and guide them according to the policy of the cell or fraction. Further, if they can secure control of the union newspaper and the union education system, they can systematically develop cell political propaganda and, under the guise of progressive trade unionism, slowly pervert the union into being nothing but an agent for the political ideology which the cell or fraction represents. Thus it has occurred in America that there have been some unions with a majority of non-Communist rank-and-file members which nevertheless had a national headquarters operated and controlled by Communist Party members, few of whom were ever elected by the rank-and-file.

On the local union level, the undemocratic political cell racketeers rarely seek to become shop stewards or union presidents. Rather they seek the post of Secretary of the local union, or ask to be put in charge of educational work or to operate the union newspaper or bulletin board. Once again it is their purpose to influence the leader of the union and to propagandize the union membership using the funds of the union to accomplish this purpose.



There are some persons who are sincere Communists who are not members of the Communist Party. But those persons who are allied with the Communist Party know well the brand of fascism which is practiced under the highly-illusory name of "centristic democracy". Under this perversion of democracy, a small group at the top of the party dictate the policies and programs of the party. Members are bound by an iron discipline to do as they are ordered. When party members deviate from the party line, they are purged just as Hitler and the other fascist purged persons whom they felt were not "good" Nazis. This in a sense is a type of political militarism, for it involves not only dictatorial control of persons for revolutionary purposes, but imposes a dictatorial control of the intellect of men ... a dictatorial control which is repugnant to democratic men, and an utter violation of every basic principle of democracy.

Thus, Mr. Clement Attlee, Labor Prime Minister of Great Britain, in addressing the British Trade Union Congress in 1946, stated in part: "...democracy is becoming a much-abused word. It is often used by those who have never understood or practised democratic principles to mean the achievement of power by hook, or more often by crook, by the Communist Party, while freedom means the denial of liberty to all those who refuse to accept the Communist philosophy. Everyone who does not take his orders from the Communists is described as a Fascist..."

#### Red-Baiting

The American trade union movement has had wide and bitter experience with "red-baiting." Red-baiting, simply, is calling a person a Communist when he is not a Communist. It is branding a program as Communist when the program or policy is not Communist. Many employers, in order to frighten or intimidate their employees, have frequently charged that the workers' leaders were Communists. The workers, knowing that their leaders were not Communists, resented this and termed it "red-baiting." American trade unionists as a rule detest any form of "red-baiting."

Where the Communists have operated within the trade union movement, they have put this foolish and dishonest practice to their own use. When a Communist is exposed as a Communist, he usually denies the charge and accuses the other person of being a "red-baiter." By confusing the issue, and by hiding behind something which the worker feels is unfair and undemocratic, the Communist is able to protect himself from exposure. By making liberal use of the charge of "red-baiting" many actual Communists have been able to protect themselves and remain in control of trade unions.

#### General Tactics

In America, the political cells or fractions have followed various policies from time to time. At one time, the Communists in America refused to join the American Federation of Labor because they knew they could not control it. Instead, they set up rival unions and tried to enlist the support of American workers. Failing in the attempt to build Communist unions, the Communists dismantled the rival unions and pursued the more successful policy of boring into established trade unions or boring into newly established labor unions, knocking down opposition with the cry! "Labor unity - unify the labor front."

The changes in tactics, the changes in the political line, and the struggle to bore into unions has resulted in turmoil and confusion in segments of the American labor movement for many years. Much trade union strength in America has been utterly wasted because democratic trade unionists have had to fight anti-democratic minority groups with time and effort that could have been more usefully employed in building a strong and stable trade union movement.

With respect to American trade unions, the political labor racketeers have developed three methods of operations:

- a. If possible, the cell or fraction will secure control and dominate the trade union openly. That has never happened in any major labor organization in America.



b. Or the cell will support certain persons who are either uninformed or opportunistic. They are used as "dummies" behind which the cell can control or influence the labor unions.

c. Or, if they are extremely weak, the cell will promote "unity" and "popular front" programs, securing as many jobs as possible on union payrolls for its members. The cell hopes to exploit union job opportunities and thus create a greater opportunity to capture the union at a later date.

#### Summary of Cell Activity

Returning to the original theme, the cell or fraction operates as an undemocratic and anti-democratic minority seeking to foist its program upon the rank-and-file through labor-racketeering-for-power. The purposes of the cell are many:

a. The cell proposes politically-dictated resolutions to the trade union, which in turn aids in influencing the policy of the union to correspond with the political aims of the cell.

b. The cell tries at every opportunity to use union funds and union facilities for its own purposes - propaganda or otherwise.

c. The cell endeavors to marshal the voting strength of labor to support the candidates of the political party the cell represents.

d. The cell group makes use of the strike and other labor weapons as part of its political program. At one time, it may advocate strikes in order to sharpen class warfare. A year later, it may foster "no strike" pledges in order to promote class collaboration. In each case, trade union weapons are prostituted for political purposes.

e. The cell uses paid union positions to reward cell members for their loyalty. Such positions can also give the cell members increased opportunities for political activity.

f. The cell advances union leaders who will follow its policy, or will accept support opportunistically. Leaders representing true rank-and-file democracy are broken if possible.

g. The cell develops to a high point the art of name-calling. Its friends are "great leaders." Its enemies or people whom it cannot use are "reactionary" or "political degenerates."

h. U-democratic union structure is used whenever possible.

#### Rival Racketeers

The experience of the labor movement is replete with examples of how differing political factions and cells have struggled for control of various labor unions. Instead of building strong and responsible trade unions, these quarreling cells or fractions often disrupted union meetings, bungled or lost strikes, crippled union democracy, and misled the trade unions to such an extent that the rank-and-file become disgusted with trade unionism and even refused to attend union meetings.

One great American union was captured by such a cell directed from outside the labor movement early in 1939. A situation developed wherein rival political factions were battling for control of the national union. The rank-and-file became disgusted with the turbulent political struggles inside the union. The leadership of the union was split by the factional fight. Union membership dropped from 400,000 to less than 40,000 persons within six months.

Within a year, a good section of the remnant of the national union had driven the political cells out of the union and slowly the membership returned to the union and began paying dues again. But the political factionalism had cost the union membership hundreds of thousands of dollars in wasted funds and many rank-and-file members were disillusioned.



By late 1942, this national union had regained its membership and increased it to one million members. The disruptive political cell had consisted of approximately one hundred persons. They had wrecked the union for a short time. The membership of the union had been ignorant of totalitarian politics until that time. They are now well aware of the dangers of minority control, for the body of their union still carries scars from the factional fight.

Many other trade unions have been torn up and disrupted by such internal fighting between political cells trying to force minority control on the majority. Indeed, in America today the average American trade unionist not only understands the role of the political cell or fraction within the union, but he also has a thorough dislike for such activities. The American rank-and-file union members insist on running their own unions.

#### Information and Education

Because many rank-and-file union members did not have sufficient information and education on such racketeering, the world labor movement suffered some severe setbacks, saw members beaten or shot down by minority groups, and saw democracy trampled underfoot by minority labor racketeers who chanted aloud: "We believe in democracy." Democratic trade unionists have seen the people who so often ardently shout "democracy" hard at work choking the life out of democracy through labor racketeering, minority control, and undemocratic procedures.

Democratic trade unionism has too much to do in building strong unions. It cannot waste much time in quarreling with or battling racketeering elements who seek to establish totalitarian control.

The primary guarantee against racketeering of any kind in the labor movement will be found in a knowledge of such racketeering on the part of the rank-and-file. Forwarned is forearmed!

Another guarantee against racketeering will be found in well-written democratic constitutions which are written and approved by the rank-and-file. The dangers of racketeering can be minimized by including in such democratic trade union constitutions specific provisions for regular monthly (or more frequent) membership meetings in the local union, for a union structure which requires secret election of all union officials and officers by the rank-and-file, for votes by the rank-and-file nomination and election of officers.

Some American trade unions broke totalitarian control by subjecting all elections of top national union officials to a rank-and-file referendum vote conducted by public accountants with no interest in inter-union politics.

Such democratic trade union constitutions will also provide for regular trial procedures for the expulsion of members and for appeals to higher union authority. The union constitutions should also provide for regular financial reports, and other controls over the use of union funds. The regular calling of general conventions of the union, with rank-and-file control over the delegates, should also be assured.


The American unions have also found that union meetings should follow a regular order of business, open and close at specified hours, and be regulated by rules of procedure clearly established and known by the entire membership (Parliamentary Procedure).

Above all, the guarantee of free and independent trade unionism will be found in the intelligent and enthusiastic interest of the rank-and-file in the operation of both their local union and their national union. Democratic trade unionism flourishes where there are broad workers' education programs, where democratic procedures are used on every level of union activity, where there are frequent local union meetings with high attendance of the rank-and-file, and where there is intelligent interest on the part of the rank-and-file.

This diagram represents four trade unions which are operated according to democratic trade union procedures, founded on democratic trade union principles. On a specific trade union issue, each union makes its own decision and may move



in a variety of directions in developing its policy. The rank-and-file of each union, employing trade union principles, make their own policy determination.



#### Preventive Measures

There are certain specific measures which must be taken. The "Sixteen Principles for Japanese Trade Unions" adopted by the Far Eastern Commission on 6 December 1946 contain practically every such preventive measure. They are a MUST for each and every Japanese trade union.

Other additional measures may be taken which derive from the world-wide experience of trade unions in France, Italy, Germany, England, America, and other democratic countries.

#### Frequent Meetings

FEC Principles emphasize that "Emphasis should be placed on the importance of a solid local basis for future trade union activity in Japan." Local trade unions (i.e., unions formed in an individual factory, mill, mine, or other place of work) should be so operated that they are controlled by their membership. In most democratic countries, it has become a tradition for local unions to meet once a month. Each and every member attends the meeting, it is conducted in a democratic manner, and every policy question is decided by the rank-and-file through vote.

FEC Principles continue: "The formation of trade unions should be a process of democratic self-expression and initiative, proceeding from the workers themselves..."

In democratic countries, this has meant that each local union is so organized that the various problems of the workers are classified, and a committee of rank-and-file workers is created to deal with each specific problem. These committees submit a report to the entire membership at each monthly meeting, and their respective work is the basis for either further study or for action.

But the important fact is that the membership makes the determination of policy. The men, women, and youths in the local union decide what will and what will not be done. The President or Chairman of the local may disagree, but once a majority vote has been taken, the President must obey the will of the local union. Likewise, at monthly meetings, the Executive Board of the union must report its actions to the membership: whatever the membership decides, the Board must do.

Without frequently meeting, it is impossible for the trade union to develop solidly on the local union front. Without frequent meetings, it is impossible for the rank-and-file to discuss problems, and make known their wishes on policy and union decisions.



At times, a local union consists of members in various places, either within the same city or in several cities. In such cases, the union may provide for delegates from each section meeting periodically in order to govern the union. Such a practice invites top control and minority manipulation. When a local union is so large or spread over such a large area that the membership cannot hold regular monthly mass meetings, it would seem to be in the interests of democracy to divide the membership into two or more local unions so that democratic control can prevail.

#### Secret Ballot Elections

The officers of the union, be they local union officers or national union officers, must represent the people they speak for. If officers are appointed or receive their office through some devious devices, the basic principles of democracy are being violated.

FED Principles clearly state: "Trade union officials and standing committee should be elected by the workers concerned by secret ballot and democratic methods." Election of union officials usually takes place on two levels - the local union, and the national union.

#### Local Union Elections

Elections are a very important part of trade union democracy, and careful procedures must be established in order to safeguard democracy.

The usual procedure in democratic countries is to hold a full membership meeting of every member of the union one month before the date of the election. The purpose of this meeting is to nominate or name persons who are to be candidates for the various union offices. Persons now serving may be renamed along with new nominees.

The usual procedure is for the Chairman of the union to declare at the appropriate time, "We will now nominate officers and committee members for the next regular election, which will take place in this hall one month hence. What is your pleasure?"

One union member raises his hand and, after being recognized, states "I nominate Sato San." Another union member says, "I second the nomination" (which means, in effect, "I agree"). Other union members arise and name various candidates for the post of Chairman. When no further names are mentioned, the Chairman then reads off the names in reverse order and asks each person named if he desires to stand for election. Those who accept are formally nominated for the post of Chairman. This is repeated for every other union office and for committee members (Executive Committee and the Trustees).

Sometimes the local union may elect to make use of the written nomination. A petition is circulated within the union which states "I, the undersigned, nominate Jichiro Sato to be Chairman of our Union." If such petitions are signed by a certain minimum number of persons, a number specified in the local union by-laws, it is received by the Chairman and the person, if he accepts, is announced as having been formally nominated.

After the meeting, the Secretary of the local then posts a list of all persons who have accepted for each office. The list is posted at every possible point where union members can be reminded of the candidates.

It is often the custom for each candidate to make a short statement in the union newspaper, or on the union wall newspaper, as to his past record, his attitude on current union problems, and his promises as to what he will do if elected. During the month, the entire rank-and-file then has ample opportunity to analyze each person.

At the next meeting, a month hence, small paper ballots have been prepared which list the office and the names of the candidates. Rank-and-file union members, representing all factions within the union (men, women, youth, and so forth) are either elected or appointed to act as the vote counters. Each member is given one ballot, he marks his choices secretly, and presents the folded ballot to the vote counters along with his union card. The union card is marked in ink to indicate he has voted. This is done to prevent possible fraud.



When everyone has voted, one vote counter begins to open the ballots. Another vote counter stands at a blackboard. A third and fourth vote counter look over the shoulders of the other members to make sure that they are counting correctly. They go through the ballots one by one - "One vote for Sato San, one vote for Suzuki, one vote for Matanabe..." and so forth. At the end of the count, everyone knows exactly who has been elected for what office. And the person elected, truly represents the rank-and-file. Of course, a person must receive a majority vote. If three persons run for president and none receive a majority, the person with the least number of votes is dropped, and the membership again votes by secret ballot for the remaining parties. This is called a run-off election.

#### National Union Elections

National unions consist of a variety of local unions from all over the country. Sometimes they will conduct their vote at a convention, using the same procedures as above, but doing it all within a few days - nominations by convention delegates on one day, with the election a few days later in order to give everyone time to talk it over.

But in many American and British unions the procedures of referendum voting are used to ensure absolute rank-and-file democracy. The convention merely has the right of nominating many persons for each office. After the convention has adjourned, the procedure of taking the vote is handed over to a pre-arranged third party - a firm of lawyers, accountants, or a labor relations committee.

The third party uses double post cards. One postcard is mailed to every paid-up union member. It instructs him to mark his vote and mail it back to the third party at once. The other half of the post-card contains the ballot. Each member receives the ballot in his home, marks his vote, and mails it back to the third party. Within a month, or some reasonable period, the third party then announces the results, and returns the completed ballots to the union in case anyone doubts their honesty.

Unions with as many as 500,000 members use this method of election of top union officials because they have learned through positive experience that unless the rank-and-file make the choice, there is always the danger of minority group manipulation at conventions.

#### Duties of Officers

Trade Union constitutions should provide clearly for the precise nature of the duties of the several officers of the local and/or national union. The constitution should also provide for ways and means for the impeachment and possible removal of officers who fail to discharge their duties to the union.

If officers of a union are forced to resign by a small group of noisy persons, or if they are subjected to character assassination, rumors, and campaigns of vilification, democratic trade unionism cannot for long exist. If a group of members in a union do not like their leaders, they should institute regular proceedings, have a trial according to the constitution, and call a special convention of the entire union to voice its decision. Of course if they do not like the leaders, they must remain content to wait for the next regular election of officers.

Any union officer or officers who permit a small group to force them out of office, through resignation, without the use of procedure and without waiting for re-election are derelict in their duty to the rank-and-file members of the union. To permit minority elements to force resignation is to turn the union over to tiny groups, paving the way for totalitarian control.

#### Trade Union Finances

ABC Principles flatly state that employers (private or governmental) "should not be allowed" to finance unions.

There are many reasons for this prohibition of union financing on the part of employers. One is that if the employer finances the union, there is always the possibility of employer influence of union officials. But more important,



when the rank-and-file do not have to pay the expenses of their union, they do not take an interest in it. Trade union members must force themselves to pay the entire expenses of their own union. If they do so, they will watch their union, attend meetings, and take an interest in the type of officers selected for top union positions. In no democratic country in the world are trade union officials or trade unions financed in whole or in part by the employer - either private or public.

#### Accounting

Another FEJ Principles states that "The balance sheet and table of income and expenditure of each trade union showing also the source of large contributions should be available for public inspection. Safeguards such as annual audit by a professionally competent auditor appointed by the members should be taken to ensure the accuracy of the statements.

On both the local union level and on the national union level, rank-and-file trade unionists should insist on this practice. It is their only possible protection from racketeering, mis-use of union funds, and unauthorized union expenditures.

#### Workers' Education

Fundamental to all of the above is workers' education - the training of each and every worker - men, women, and youth - in a thorough understanding of trade unionism, collective bargaining, labor law, political action, and so forth.

FEJ Principles state that "Trade unions should be encouraged to promote adult education and an understanding of democratic processes and of trade union practices and aims among their members."

Where the membership remains ignorant, small minorities can play with the union as if it were their personal property. Small political fractions can manipulate the union as they will, for the membership does not know what it is all about. Workers' education is indeed the basic guarantee of true democratic trade unionism.

#### Summary

Each and every trade union member may well sit down and compare his national union and his local union with the following list of questions:

#### Check List

1. Does my local union have a regular monthly membership of all the members: youth, men, and women?
2. Do the local union members decide the policies of the union to be followed by the Chairman and Executive Committee?
3. Does my union use secret ballot election for the election of all officers and executive committee members? Do we have ample time to determine the qualifications of nominees?
4. Does my union publish a regular financial report?
5. Do the officers and Executive Committee members submit a complete report on their actions to a regular membership meeting which criticizes and votes on such reports?
6. Is my union free of secret caucus meetings, faction activity, or cell infiltration?
7. Does my union carry on practical trade union education for every member of the union: youth, men, and women?
8. Is my union financed by the union membership? Is my union free of any financing by private or public employers?



9. Do I play a part in the election of the officials of top national unions and top union federations of national unions?

10. Does my union constitution guarantee trial of members before expulsion? Does the rank-and-file have a final vote on any proposed expulsions from the union? Can a member so expelled appeal to the convention of the next higher union unit?

11. Does your regular local union meeting follow an agenda known to every member? Does the local union follow the procedures of parliamentary procedure?

12. Are the rank-and-file members of the union active from month-to-month, week-to-week in union affairs?

13. Is my union free from control of domination by any political party?

14. Does my union have a written contract with the employer which specifies wages, hours, and working conditions, and includes provision for the peaceful settlement of grievances through an impartial umpire or arbitration?

If the answer is "yes" to the majority of these questions, then you probably belong to a democratic trade union.

If the answer is "no" to the majority of these questions, then you are probably a member of a union controlled by politicians or racketeers.

And if the answer is "no" you owe it to yourself, your union, and your country to take immediate democratic action to see to it that you run your own union.

Trade unionists!

The trade union movement belongs to you. See that your union serves you and your fellow trade union members, as well as your country!



"You see, with this new democracy WE the common people must do our part.....!"





UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER  
FOR JAPAN

DIVISION OF  
WEST ASIAN AFFAIRS

MAY 1 1948

Tokyo DEPARTMENT OF STATE

No. 219

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DIVISION OF OCCUPIED AREAS  
AND ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

H. O. 6/23/48

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
APR 21 1948  
DIVISION OF  
INTERNATIONAL LABOR, SOCIAL  
AND HEALTH AFFAIRS - ILH

SUBJECT: Teachers' Unions in Japan.

The Acting Political Adviser has the honor to enclose two copies of a special report of the Civil Information and Education Section, Analysis and Research Division, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, entitled "A History of Teachers' Unions in Japan", No. AR-304-E-D-9 dated March 25, 1948.

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Enclosure: *attached*

Two copies, "A History of Teachers' Unions in Japan".

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
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INTERNATIONAL LABOR, SOCIAL  
AND HEALTH AFFAIRS - ILH

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*Enclosure to Dispatch no. 219  
dated April 8, 1948 from the U.S.  
Political Advisor for Japan, Tokyo  
entitled "Teachers' Unions in Japan".*

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
Civil Information and Education Section  
Analysis and Research Division

A HISTORY  
OF  
TEACHERS' UNIONS IN JAPAN

Special Report Prepared by  
Education Research

AR- 304-E-D-9

25 March 1948

*7W 894.5043/4-848*

*(see log files)*



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
Civil Information and Education Section  
Analysis and Research Division

SPECIAL REPORT

SERIAL NUMBER AR-304-E-D-9 25 March 1948  
TITLE A History of Teachers' Unions in Japan  
PREPARED BY Education Research  
DATES OF STUDY 2 June 1947 to 15 November 1947

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## INTRODUCTION

## PURPOSE

The aim of this study is to record factually and concisely the development in Japan of teachers' unions. This report undertakes to give general information concerning the origins, activities, and programs of the national unions and to describe the events transpiring between 1 December 1945 and 8 June 1947.

## SCOPE

For purposes of fuller understanding of the movement, it includes an examination of the historical background beginning with the first significant organization of teachers in 1883. It embraces the postwar factors which preceded and accompanied the unionization of teachers. It terminates with an account of the amalgamation of the two national unions. The field of this report is limited to the national unions which originated in Tokyo. Consequently, prefectural and various other local unions are treated cursorily. There is neither discussion of leading personalities nor of the mechanics of the internal functioning of the individual unions. The emphasis has been placed on demonstrating how teachers' unions operated with respect to society, to each other, and to the Government.

## SOURCES OF DATA

Materials used for this study were obtained from newspapers, periodicals, Civil Information and Education Section Reports; statistical tables prepared by the Tokyo Price Board, by the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and by the Economic and Scientific Section, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers; interviews with Government officials and men prominent in the teachers' union movement, and replies to questionnaires submitted to them. Documentation has been indicated in footnotes, and sources have been listed in the bibliography and other appendices.

## EVALUATION OF DATA

This study has presented a more than usually serious problem in the matter of materials. Because of the youth of the movement almost no printed information was available except that published in newspapers reporting current developments. This was not highly reliable, since the partisanship attending the union movement made complete objectivity



A HISTORY OF TEACHERS' UNIONS IN JAPAN

of approach impossible. The novelty of the teachers' movement and the fluidity of the union organizations impeded accurate reporting by the newspapers, which not infrequently confused even the names of the unions. It is a rather generally accepted opinion that the staffs of some of the daily journals were dominated by elements which favored the radical unions. Under the existing circumstances, most of the data used were necessarily obtained from reports published by unions and from statements, oral and written, made by Government and union officials. The loose organization of the unions aggravated the difficulty of gathering data, because records were poorly kept. As a consequence, unions have not been able to furnish useful financial statements or complete membership lists. Figures concerning membership must therefore be regarded as approximations padded as a result of the desire of each union to enhance its prestige by claiming large numbers of adherents.

## SUMMARY

From 1883 to 1944, the Government-sponsored Imperial Education Association\* was the sole teachers' organization of national significance. Independent teachers' groups were discouraged. On 1 December 1945, the Zen Nihon Kyoin Kumiai or Zenkyo (All-Japan Teachers' Union) was organized. Its program called for salary increases and educational and social reforms. On 2 December 1945, the rival Nihon Kyoikushi Kumiai (Japan Educators' Union) was organized. Its objectives were limited to improving teachers' economic welfare. Soon after its rise this union declined and was succeeded in April 1946 by the Tokyo To Kyoshokuin Kumiai or Tokyo Kyo (Tokyo Metropolis Federation of Educational Personnel Unions) which represented a coalition of youth, middle, and elementary school teachers' groups of conservative views.

In June 1946 the Tokyo Metropolis Federation of Educational Personnel Union became a national union--The Kyoin Kumiai Zenkoku Remmei (National League of Teachers' Unions). In the same month, the Zenkyo reorganized to become the Nihon Kyoiku Rodo Kumiai or Nikkyo Ro (Japan Educational Labor Union) and subsequently campaigned jointly with other Government employees for wage increases. The Government, during this period, granted small concessions.

For many months, efforts to unite both unions failed. In December 1946 the Nikkyo Ro combined with independent prefectural

\* The name was changed in 1944 from Imperial Education Association to Greater Japan Education Association. In September 1946 the name was changed to Japan Education Association.



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INTRODUCTION

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unions and reorganized under the name of Zenkyo Kyo Kumiai Kyogikai or Zen Kyo Kyo (Council of All-Japan Teachers' Unions).

The Zen Kyo Kyo prepared to join in the general strike of 1 February 1947. The National League of Teachers stood aloof from the strike activities. After a direct order from General MacArthur to the labor leaders on 31 January 1947 had prevented the strike, both unions resumed negotiations to effect amalgamation. On 8 June 1947, the two national unions became the Nikkyo Ro.



## Chapter 1-

## PREWAR ORGANIZATIONS

With the extension of popular education during the early days of the Meiji Era, a number of cultural and educational societies appeared. No nationwide organization of educators came into being until the Government, in 1883, sponsored the Teikoku Kyoiku Kai (Imperial Education Association)<sup>1</sup>; shortly thereafter, at the suggestion of the Government, all independent cultural and educational societies coalesced with the officially sanctioned educators' organization.<sup>2</sup>

Attempts to establish independent teachers' organizations met with failure. In 1919, a conservative teachers' society was suppressed by the police. During the period between 1928 and 1933, various groups of teachers banded themselves into unions. None of those groups endured. The police arrested the leaders and the participants. An attempt to organize a teachers' union in Korea, then a colony of Japan, also quickly was suppressed by the authorities, who charged that member teachers' societies were radical groups.<sup>3</sup> From 1933 until the capitulation of Japan, there appears to have been no attempt to form independent teachers' groups, the Imperial Education Association functioning as the sole recognized teachers' organization.

The outbreak of the Second World War afforded the militarists an opportunity to exploit the Imperial Education Association for their own ends. In 1944, as if to emphasize the expansionist character of the Japanese campaign, the name was changed to Dai Nippon Kyoiku Kai (Greater Japan Education Association). It "was obviously nationalistic and functioned as virtual agent of the Ministry of

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1. Ministry of Education, "Reply to Questionnaire for the Mombusho," 20 June 1947.
  2. Conference: UTSUMI, Tezuki, secretary of the School Education Bureau, 28 June 1947.
  3. KAWAMURA, Tadao, Shiso Mondan Nempyo (Year Book on the Thought Question), Tokyo, 1936, Appendix, pp.7-9.



Education."<sup>4</sup> In 1944, the Government invited all teachers to join the Association. This they did, for Government invitations were not taken lightly.<sup>5</sup> University professors, who were less inclined to conform, also joined. In fact, not a few liberal educators joined "with the obvious intention of evading complications with the trend of the times."<sup>6</sup>

Not until free speech was introduced after the surrender of Japan did the attitude of some teachers toward the Education Association manifest itself. The Association, with an annual subsidy of a million yen and an annual income from dues of a half million yen, was financially secure<sup>7</sup> -- but the teachers were not profiting from it, according to the changes made. It was charged that the "Dai Nippon Kyoiku Kai has misappropriated... contributions from teachers... to provide for the extremely liberal family allowances in addition to the handsome salaries of its officers and other staff personnel without contributing anything to the protection of the general mass of teachers."<sup>8</sup> Partial confirmation of this charge was made by the Education Association itself. One of its committees to effect reforms stated that the Association "had hitherto remained quite aloof from the teachers at large."<sup>9</sup>

The reaction against the Greater Japan Education Association occurred throughout Japan. In February 1946, the teachers of Kagoshima prefecture "inaugurated a new organization--regarded as a silent revolt against the local chapter of the Dai Nippon Education Association."<sup>10</sup>

"Despite the fact that the Greater Japan Education Association has a history of 70 years, it can hardly be called

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4. TANAKA, Kotaro, former Minister of Education, "Reply to a Questionnaire," 16 July 1947.
  5. UTSUMI, as previously cited.
  6. TANAKA, as previously cited.
  7. Ministry of Education, "Reply to Questionnaire for the Mombusho," 20 June 1947; also Dai Nippon Kyoiku, "Report," 23 February 1946.
  8. Kyoiku Rodo, "Dissolution of Dai Nippon Kyoiku Kai Decided," 24 July 1946; also Shukan Kyoiku Shinbun, 31 August 1946.
  9. Conference: KENNOKI, Toshihiro, assistant director, Bureau of School Education, Ministry of Education, 27 May 1947.
  10. "Silent Revolt of Young Teachers," Minami Nippon Shinbun, 28 February 1946.



## PREWAR ORGANIZATIONS

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popular among educators in Kagoshima Prefecture," the paper stated.

A few months later, hostile pressure from the newly-organized teachers' union effected the dissolution of the Education Association branch in Aomori.<sup>11</sup>

The Association was exposed to new attacks when it was given the responsibility of naming some of the members to the screening boards which were designed to examine militaristic and ultranationalistic tendencies among teachers. The Education Association, wrote one paper, was not a desirable agency to expunge undemocratic elements.<sup>12</sup>

The proponents of this Association affirmed that the official teachers' organization was to promote "the educational ideal of the Japanese people on the fundamental principle of our national polity."<sup>13</sup> Other broad ideals were "the encouragement of the indefatigable assiduity of its members"<sup>14</sup> and the rendering of "loyal service to national education by uniting all educators and those who have an understanding of national education."<sup>15</sup>

The Government recognized the value of the Education Association in its program and contributed to its financial support. The Education Association "was considered all the more worthy of being subsidized by the Government for its nationalistic tendency, which no doubt contributed to effect the objectives of the Government."<sup>16</sup> Another justification of the subsidy was that the Association aimed at "securing the stabilization of teachers' livelihood"<sup>17</sup> and gave "assistance for the encouragement of research and investigation in order to bring about better results."<sup>18</sup>

There was, however, an opposing point of view. The

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11. "A Lesson from the Struggle of Aomori Unions," Kyoiku Rojo, 10 August 1946.
  12. Editorial, Nippon Kyoiku Shimbun, 15 May 1946.
  13. TANAKA, Kotaro, Ex-Minister of Education, "Reply to Questionnaire," 16 June 1947.
  14. Ibid.
  15. Ministry of Education, "Reply to Questionnaire for the Mombusho," 20 June 1947.
  16. TANAKA, as previously cited.
  17. Ibid.
  18. Ministry of Education, "Reply to Questionnaire for the Mombusho," 20 June 1947.



aim of the Imperial Education Association, in the opinion of a hostile critic, Goro HANI, an organizer of one of the later unions, was to crush the initiative of teachers and to imbue them with obsequious attitudes towards authority and with totalitarian thinking patterns. The Government, he charged, disguised its purpose by professing specious ideals, but it permitted no intellectual freedom.<sup>19</sup> The contribution of the Education Association toward the realization of the "stabilization of teachers' livelihood" was not clear to some teachers, who asserted that there was no such contribution.<sup>20</sup> The worth of the research encouraged by the official organization was challenged by HANI, who charged that teachers were expected to buy the publications and thus furnish a source of income for the Association.<sup>21</sup>

The system of choosing the officialdom of the Education Association reflected its authoritarian character. The body of teachers had little voice in this educators' association. The Minister of Education appointed the president and vice-president; the president, in turn, chose directors and councillors.<sup>22</sup> This method of selecting officials seemed to afford opportunities to provide sinecures for people who were not connected with education. "Not a few seats of its staff were occupied by ultranationalists and retired high officials of the Ministry of Education."<sup>23</sup>

In the face of growing opposition after the War, the Association rose to defend itself. It argued that whereas labor unions "work purely for the improvement of financial life," the Education Association strove for the "spiritual

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19. Conference: HANI, Goro, former member, Central Executive Committee, Zen Nihon Kyoiku Kai, 5 June 1947.  
(Note: HANI is an active left-wing intellectual. He was formerly a professor of history at Jiyu Gakuen (Liberal School) Tokyo. He was imprisoned twice in 1933 and 1943 for violating the Peace Preservation Law. In 1947, he was elected to the House of Councillors of the Diet.)
  20. "Dissolution of Dai Nippon Kyoiku Kai Decided," Kyoiku Bodo, 24 July 1946.
  21. HANI, as previously cited.
  22. Ministry of Education, "Reply to Questionnaire for the Mombusho," 20 June 1947.
  23. TANAKA, Kotaro, as previously cited.



## PREWAR ORGANIZATIONS

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improvement" of teachers.<sup>24</sup> Furthermore, it maintained that "strong cooperation with the Government"<sup>25</sup> was essential to raising the cultural level of Japan. It also pointed out the fact that the Association had distributed to needy teachers an unspecified amount of clothing and had acted to obtain school supplies at favorable prices.<sup>26</sup> In 1946, 4000 phonographs were secured at reasonable prices and plans to acquire reed organs were being laid.<sup>27</sup> In addition, it was indicated that the Education Association had conducted research and made recommendations to promote the welfare of teachers.<sup>28</sup>

The teachers were not dissuaded from their opposition to the Education Association. The radical and moderate wings of the teachers' movement continued to berate the Ministry of Education for its position in regard to the Association -- the one demanding outright dissolution, the other drastic modification and democratization.<sup>29</sup>

Responsive to the pronounced opposition, the Ministry of Education encouraged reforms. The Dai (Greater) was dropped from the title, and the new Japan Education Association was born in September 1946. Structural changes in the Association followed. The president was to be elected by the councillors instead of being chosen by the Minister of Education. The prefectural branches were to enjoy autonomy, and the Central office was to serve as a liaison unit. The Government announced that the subsidy was to be continued;<sup>30</sup> this prompted renewed protests.<sup>31</sup> Occupation authorities strongly suggested that democratization implied a severance of ties with Government agencies, as well as independence

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24. Dai Nippon Kyoiku Kai, No. 303, May-June 1946, p. 17.
25. Ibid.
26. Ministry of Education, "Reply to Questionnaire for the Mombusho," 20 June 1947.
27. SAGAYAMA, as previously cited, 16 December 1946.
28. Conference SAGAYAMA, 7 February 1947.
29. Kyoiku Rodo, op cit., 24 July 1946; Shukan Kyoiku Shimbun, 31 August 1946; Yomiuri Shimbun, 2 June 1946; YOKOMICHI, S., "Prospectus for the New Japan Education Association," 29 April 1947.
30. SAGAYAMA, previously cited, 16 December 1946.
31. Conference: FUJISAKA, Tonomo, staff member, 26 December 1946.



from national and prefectural government control.<sup>32</sup> The Association pleaded for the extension of the subsidy until 1948, but the Ministry of Education, acting on the suggestion of Occupation authorities, terminated the annual monetary grant in March 1947.<sup>33</sup>

During the same month, the Association yielded office space to union representatives who stated that they intended to move in whether or not permission was granted. In some twenty prefectures, the property of the dissolved branches of the Japan Education Association was appropriated by the unions.<sup>34</sup>

The process of revamping the Japan Education Association was still in progress during the summer and early fall of 1947. The Association now proposes to encourage democratic education and culture. Research is to be promoted and "transactions in necessary school supplies and the operation of welfare facilities"<sup>35</sup> are to be continued.

To what extent the new Association will influence the teachers' movement cannot be gauged. In July 1947, the membership of the Association was not fully determined.<sup>36</sup> To many members of the teachers' union movement, the Japan Education Association appeared to be a moribund and purposeless society.<sup>37</sup>

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32. Dai Nippon Kyoiku Kai, "The Advice Given by SCAP about Japan Education Association," 23 May 1947. This refers to advice from the Civil Information and Education Section, CIEC, SCAP.
33. SAGAYAMA, as previously cited, 7 February 1947.
34. Conference: SUZUKI, Shinichi, chief, General Affairs Section, Japan Education Association, 15 January 1948.
35. "Fundamental Principles of Reorganization," Shukan Kyoiku Shimbun, 23 June 1947.
36. Conference: FURUYA, Keiji, director, Executive Office, Nippon Kyoiku Kai, 2 July 1947.
37. Conference: NARITA, Yoshihide, vice-secretary, Nihon Kyoshokuin Kumiai, 19 July 1947.



## Chapter 2

## POSTWAR DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING THE TEACHERS' UNION MOVEMENT

The rise of teachers' unions during the immediate postwar period can be understood better in the light of several events and conditions that were prominent in the contemporary scene.

The SCAP directive of October 1945,<sup>1</sup> guaranteeing the right of organization to the people of Japan, established a new freedom to supplant the former repression of attempts to organize. There resulted an active general labor movement, including the unionization of teachers, who traditionally were one of the more conservative groups in Japan.

Immediately following the beginning of the Occupation, many teachers who considered their postwar positions insecure because of their activities or affiliations during the war, resigned their positions. Of the more than 400,000 teachers in Japan in August 1945, 115,778 had resigned before 7 May 1946.

When the Purge directive<sup>2</sup> and ordinance<sup>3</sup> were issued, more teachers, presumably aligned with the ultraconservative and ultranationalistic elements which had enforced the policy of repression toward teachers, were eliminated.

Significant also in its positive phase was the return to status of many teachers and other educational leaders<sup>4</sup> who had been forced from the profession because of their democrat-

1. SCAP Directives to the Imperial Japanese Government, "Removal of Restrictions on Political, Civil, and Religious Liberties," 4 October 1945, Vol. I, No. 93.
2. Imperial Ordinance No. 263, "The Removal, Exclusion, Reinstatement, etc., of Teachers and Educational Officials under Imperial Ordinance No. 522 of 1942, Concerning the Orders to Be Issued in Consequence of Our Acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration," 7 May 1946.
3. Bureau of School Education Tsucho (Notification) No. 6, "Concerning the Purge of Education Lists Having Personal Histories of Professional Military Officers," 27 October 1945.
4. Bureau of School Education, Tsucho (Notification) No. 17, "Concerning the Reappointment of Dismissed and Retired Teachers," 1 November 1945.



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ic or otherwise liberal thought. These individuals were now able, in their restoration to the teachers' profession, to provide great impetus to the dissemination of liberal ideology. Consequently, the proportion of liberalism to conservatism in the teaching profession was increased.

A new philosophy of education was making itself felt throughout educational circles in Japan. This new philosophy evaluated all problems in education from the democratic point of view, with emphasis on the individual, his rights, and the fundamental freedoms.

Another factor encouraging the growth of liberalism among teachers was the U. S. Education Mission, which came to Japan in March of 1946. Its recommendations for reform were made in an extended report<sup>5</sup> after a careful study of the education system of Japan.

More directly responsible than any other factor for the growth of a democratic ideology and practice in Japanese education are the official and legal measures that have been effected through the joint efforts of the Ministry of Education and Occupation agencies. The laws, ordinances, directives, instructions, and suggestions issued through these channels have created an official structure in which it is possible to implement a liberal philosophy.

Impossible of measurement, and yet undoubtedly of major importance in encouraging liberalism of thought among Japanese teachers and education officials, is the work done by the officials of the Ministry of Education and Occupation agencies in educating Japanese educators through individual conferences, discussion groups and forums, field trips, demonstrations, lectures, and innumerable other forms of personal guidance.

Since the close of the war, these various factors have been effective in the Japanese scene concurrently with the development of teachers' unions.

Besides the above factors, another, the economic situation, had the most prominent influence in the development of teachers' unions in Japan.

Despite the breach with traditionally approved conduct

5, Report of the United States Education Mission to Japan, submitted to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Japan, 30 March 1946.



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which unionization may have involved, the overwhelming majority of the teachers joined unions. It is significant that the union campaign was directed toward the objective of winning wage increases. The issues involved, the demands made, the slogans presented--all were fundamentally economic in character<sup>6</sup> until the failure of the February strike in 1947.

Teachers' salaries in Japan never had been large. The teachers' base pay, which was supplemented by a complicated system of allowances for housing, dependents, and a slight tenure increment,<sup>7</sup> sufficed to meet basic essentials. There was recognition of the fact that the teachers' situation required amelioration. In fact, teachers "never were accorded the standard of pay of other workers in state or public office services." It used to be said that the Education Minister was a mere guest at the cabinet sessions and therefore never had much influence.<sup>8</sup> No agency manifested any interest in effecting an increase in the teachers' stipend until 1942; i.e., seven years after the China Incident, with the resulting start of a wartime economy. The Japanese Government then belatedly granted a ten percent increase in teachers' base pay, as well as an increase in allowances. This increase did not keep pace with the constant rise of prices.

To have an adequate comprehension of the economic crisis as it affected teachers and all salaried workers, it is necessary to make a comparison between living costs and salaries. The constant upward climb of commodity prices during the war consistently reduced the real income of the teachers.

A somewhat limited study of the livelihood of teachers between April 1945 and March 1946 indicates that teachers' salaries were entirely inadequate.<sup>9</sup> Although this investigation was not conducted as a survey (and the averages arrived at are not from statistically complete data), its results indicate the general situation concerning the disparity between the cost of living and teachers' incomes. According

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6. See Appendix "G" for representative sets of demands.
  7. Civil Information and Education Section, SCAP, Education in Japan, 15 February 1946, p. 51.
  8. Editorial, Mainichi Shimbun, 28 October 1946.
  9. Check Sheet from Chief, Compilation Branch, Operations Division, CIS, to Chief, Operations Division, CIS, "Livelihood of Teachers," 8 February 1946. See Appendix B.



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to the report on this study, the following facts obtained as regards the differences between average total monthly salaries (including allowances) and average total expenses in December 1945:

Teachers	Average Monthly		
	Salary	Expenses	Deficit
Elementary School Teachers (30-40 years of age)	¥143	¥450	¥307
Middle School Teachers (30-40 years of age)	217	600	383
High School Professors (30-40 years of age)	198	800	602
Imperial University Assistant Professors	225	900	675
Imperial University Professors	313	1,100	787

Since the great majority of teachers and educational personnel in Japan hold civil service ratings within the "hannin" (lowest classification), their monthly salaries are automatically set within the following prescribed range:

<u>Hannin</u> First Rank	¥100 or more
<u>Hannin</u> Second Rank	¥ 70 or more
<u>Hannin</u> Third Rank	¥ 50 or more
<u>Hannin</u> Fourth Rank	Less than ¥50

On this schedule as it was applied in June 1944, an elementary or middle school teacher might receive annually from ¥600 to ¥2,770, or a monthly salary of from ¥50 to ¥235; an elementary or middle school principal, from ¥1,050 to ¥3,400, or a monthly salary of from less than ¥100 to not quite ¥300; a university professor from ¥3,400 to ¥4,050, or a monthly salary of from less than ¥300 to less than ¥350.<sup>10</sup>

The increase in the general cost of living between 1937 and 1942, despite Government control, is illustrated by the increase in prices of some essential items. Mackerel, for example, had risen in price from ¥.03 per 100 momme (132 oz.) in 1937 to ¥.22 in 1942; soy beans, from ¥.35 to ¥.54 per sho (3.82 pints); geta (wooden sandals) from ¥1.63 to ¥3.17 per pair.

10. Ibid. See also Appendix C.



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The lack of reliable statistics for the period between 1942 and the end of 1945 makes impossible accurate comparisons between the earlier and the later war years, during which prices continued their upward trend. Meanwhile the supply of commodities became increasingly limited. Spiraling prices after September 1945, which resulted from postwar inflation in Japan, made the situation of teachers critical.

The effect of inflation on living costs is indicated by the results of a study<sup>11</sup> by the Tokyo Bukkacho (Tokyo Price Board) of the average living costs of laborers in Tokyo between April 1946 and January 1947. The average total cost per month for all items in 1937 was ¥55. By April of 1946 this average total cost had jumped to ¥1,500, over 27 times the 1937 figure. In January 1947 it had climbed to ¥1,871, 34 times the 1937 figure. In the eight listed categories for living costs, prices for April 1946 were from three to 53 times the average costs for 1937. In 1937, the average expenditures for food were approximately ¥21; in April 1946 the cost of the same item had risen to ¥1,213. This figure includes the cost of black-market food purchased to supplement the inadequate quantity. Costs in 1946 in other categories increased from three (housing) to 26 (miscellaneous) times the 1937 figure.

The tempo of inflation increased markedly during the period from the close of the war until the spring of 1946. In September 1945, one month after the cessation of hostilities, the average retail price index in Tokyo was about two and a half times that for June 1937; by May 1946 it was nearly 15 times that in June 1937, or nearly six times what it had been in September 1945.<sup>12</sup> One month later, in June 1946, it had increased to 16½ times the June 1937 index.<sup>13</sup>

The upward trend continued throughout the remainder of 1946 and into 1947. With average prices for the period from August 1946 to March 1947 as a base (an index of 100), there is a consistent monthly increase in the index (all items)

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11. "Living Costs Per Month of Laborers Living in Tokyo, April 1946-January 1947," issued by the Bukkacho, 5 June 1947. See Appendix D.
  12. Tokyo Bukkacho (Tokyo Price Board), "Monthly Report on Price Index, March 1947," 15 April 1947. See Appendix E.
  13. Ibid.



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from 81.6 (August 1946) to 239 (August 1947).

According to the Shukan Kyoiku Shimbun, a teachers' journal, food rationed at fixed and uninflated prices was not adequate to avert starvation. In Tokyo, in November 1946, the Government food ration could supply less than one tenth of the fish required, less than two-thirds of the rice, and merely one-fourth of the vegetables requisite to a minimum diet.<sup>14</sup> Another study supported the statement that officially rationed food was below subsistence needs and concluded that a minimum salary must exceed ¥600 a month.<sup>15</sup> Thus in the light of postwar inflation, the 10 percent increase in base pay in 1942 was not sufficient.

The same teachers' journal estimated the minimum subsistence salary for an unmarried adult at ¥920 in November 1946.<sup>16</sup> But in that month, Minister of Education TANAKA stated that "those who are paid less than ¥600 are the 90,000 assistant teachers whose average pay is ¥340, and 160,000 regular teachers of the third class who constitute 60 percent of the total number of teachers, whose average pay is ¥500."<sup>17</sup> Officials of the Education Ministry asserted that between April 1945 and March 1946, the earnings of teachers ranging from the elementary to the university level, barely covered one-third of their needs.<sup>18</sup>

There were marked manifestations of distress during the first few months of 1946. In April, the Ministry of Education issued a directive to the prefectural governors to prohibit teachers from requesting food from pupils.<sup>19</sup>

Within a week, the Ministry of Education was obliged to retreat to a less prohibitive attitude.<sup>20</sup>

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14. "Government Workers Salary Schedule," Shukan Kyoiku Shimbun, 20 January 1947.
  15. Dai Nihon Kyoiku Kai, "Research Report on Teachers' Living Expenses," 20 May 1946.
  16. Shukan Kyoiku Shimbun, 20 January 1947, *op. cit.*
  17. "Minister TANAKA Smiles Approval of Cabinet Appropriation of ¥500,000,000 to Guarantee ¥600 Minimum," Mainichi Shimbun, 13 November 1946.
  18. Check Sheet from Chief, Compilation Branch, Operations Division, CIS, to Chief, Operations Division, CIS.
  19. Ministry of Education, Hatsu Gaku No. 181, 5 April 1946. See Appendix M.
  20. Ministry of Education, Hatsu Gaku No. 187, 11 April 1946. See Appendix N.



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Coupled with the difficulty arising from the insufficiency of their earnings was the fact that the teachers' salaries were delayed after June 1946. "It was never paid on the 22nd as it should be. College professors could not very well turn black-marketeers, so their wives sold their clothes.<sup>21</sup> Teachers got their pay for July and August in September.<sup>21</sup> Teachers consequently hired themselves out as laborers, worked for the Occupation Forces, or rented out part of their homes."<sup>22</sup>

Some who failed to make economic readjustments went into black-marketing and petty crime. The Mainichi Shimbun reported the fact that teachers' names had begun to appear on police registers.<sup>23</sup>

The difference in the pay level of ordinary workers and that of teachers was contrasted by the press. "Workmen in electric factories are earning ¥3,000 a month, according to the official report," wrote the Mainichi Shimbun, "yet they are striking."<sup>24</sup> The earnings of some unskilled young workers exceeded those of the teachers. A typical Government official working in a Government department earned "about 80 percent more at the same age" than a teacher. The awareness that workers had achieved a degree of success in effecting wage raises may have served as an incentive among teachers to organize.

The Japanese teacher was regarded by the community as a model of good conduct and as a preceptor of morals.<sup>25</sup> Consequently, the teacher was deeply imbued with a reluctance to employ the weapons of the industrial workers--the trade union and the strike.

Among some teachers, however, a militant attitude manifested itself. "Up to this day," protested one, "we have been selling our clothes, eating watery rice porridge, and barely getting along. But now we are on the verge of abandoning our vocation. You high officials and bureaucrats,

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21. "Disturbance over Salary at Yamayata Higher School," Asahi Shimbun, 14 October 1946.
  22. INAGAKI, Masanobu, formerly assistant professor of economics at Keio University, is a member of the Communist Party. Radio address, 15 January 1946.
  23. "Difficult Living Conditions of Teachers Make Some Go Wrong," Mainichi Shimbun, 30 October 1946.
  24. "Teachers Salaries," Mainichi Shimbun, 30 October 1946.
  25. Editorial, Dai Ichi Shimbun, 12 December 1946. Also HANI, previously cited.



I fear, cannot understand our difficulties."<sup>26</sup>

The membership in unions which increased so rapidly seems to have been motivated primarily by economic pressure. To be sure, unions made revolutionary demands; they advocated a fundamental revision of school administration; they opposed the school inspector system; and one union championed the popular election of principals. Nevertheless, there is no evidence that teachers as a whole considered political action or revolutionary ideology as the means to mitigate their difficulties.

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26. "Reply of the Finance Minister Due on the 23rd," Shukan Kyoiku Shimbun, 21 October 1946.



## Chapter 3

## POSTWAR UNIONS

## ZENKYO--A RADICAL UNION

There were some early attempts by individuals to promote union activities among teachers, but no significant organization materialized until 1 December 1945.<sup>1</sup> Not until a few weeks had elapsed after the surrender did the Japanese Government discharge political prisoners.<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, the Peace Preservation Law, which conferred on the police broad repressive powers, continued in effect until 4 October 1945. Consequently, to engage in unionizing activities before that date was to invite police reprisals.<sup>3</sup> Civil liberties were instituted on 4 October 1945: a SCAP directive secured the abrogation of all totalitarian measures.<sup>4</sup>

Freedom to act unhampered by police restraints gave impetus to unionization. Under the leadership of HANI, a history teacher in the Jiyugakuen (Liberal School), a group of teachers of widely varied shades of political opinion formed the Zen Nihon Kyoin Kumiai (All-Japan Teachers' Union) on 1 December 1945. The primary objective was to weld together into an effective unit the community of Japanese educators, regardless of individual political inclinations.<sup>5</sup> The criterion of acceptability in the Zenkyo was willingness to improve the teachers' status; all were expected to submerge their differences for the attainment of common aims. Fascists or ultranationalists, as well as communists, were to be welcomed.<sup>6</sup> There appears, however, to have been no significant participation in the formation of Zenkyo by nationalists. On the other hand, teachers discharged

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1. Conference: OGASAWARA, Fumio, former secretary, Zen Nihon Kyoin Kumiai, 27 June 1947.
  2. Conference: KAJIYAMA, Tsumoru, former editor, Towa Fukuinsha, 29 July 1947.
  3. HANI, Goro, former member, Central Executive Committee, Zen Nihon Kyoiku Kai, 5 June 1947.
  4. SCAP Directive to the Imperial Japanese Government, "Removal of Restriction on Political, Civil, and Religious Liberties," 4 October 1945, Vol.I, No. 93.
  5. HANI, formerly cited.
  6. Ibid.



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during the War for radicalism collaborated with the Zenkyo.<sup>7</sup>

The Zenkyo immediately embarked on a propaganda campaign to publicize its views and to attract members. A weekly journal, the Nippon Kyoiku Shimbun (Japan Teachers' Journal), whose first issue announced the aims<sup>8</sup> of the Zenkyo, was published on 1 December 1945. There was an appeal to raise the cultural level of Japan and to democratize all institutions of the country. This journal urged the acceptance of the thesis that not only was the teachers' union to make a common front with the workers of Japan, but also the teachers were to look forward to concerted efforts with international unions. Another article,<sup>9</sup> written by HANI himself, helped to raise a barrier between radical and conservative teachers. HANI attacked the Emperor for his failure to acknowledge his war-guilt. The Emperor's conduct, wrote HANI, encouraged silence on the part of the militarists and the industrialists. At the same time, HANI characterized the Ministry of Education as an agency which had disseminated nationalism rather than education.<sup>10</sup> HANI continued his attacks against the Throne in the public press. He portrayed the Imperial Family as a political anachronism which served to hold the mass of people in subjection.<sup>11</sup>

Although Zenkyo never officially endorsed an anti-Emperor attitude, the fact that the organ of the union published what was regarded as revolutionary propaganda served to identify Zenkyo as a communist-dominated union.<sup>12</sup> It appeared that Zenkyo had aligned itself with the enemies of the Throne.<sup>13</sup>

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7. INAGAKI, Masanobu, former member, Central Executive Committee, Zen Nihon Kyoin Kumiai, "Reply to Questionnaire," 3 July 1947.
  8. "Restore Education to the People," Nippon Kyoiku Shimbun, 1 December 1945. The Nippon Kyoiku Shimbun, issued 1 December 1945 by the Zen Nihon Kyoin Kumiai, is not to be confused with the Nippon Kyoiku Shimbun established 1 May 1946, by a private company, the Nippon Kyoiku Shimbun Sha, which is free from any connection with the teachers' union. Seizaburo FUKUDA was editor of the independent Nippon Kyoiku Shimbun. Source: Telephone conversation: Mr. SUDO, Chief, General Affairs Section, Nippon Kyoiku Shimbun Sha, 17 and 19 January 1948.
  9. HANI, in Nippon Kyoiku Shimbun, 1 December 1945.
  10. Ibid.
  11. HANI, Goro, "The Position of the Emperor," Mainichi, 12 and 13 January 1946.
  12. OGASAWARA, previously cited.
  13. NAKANISHI, Yusaburo, former secretary, Tokyo To Kokumin Gakko Kyoin Kumiai, "Reply to Questionnaire," 26 June 1947.



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This served to alienate the conservative teachers, who later felt compelled to establish their own union, although there was general agreement on the program for bettering the condition of teachers.

In the weeks following its organization, the Zenkyo continued to publish its program, which embraced economic proposals to raise the teachers' standard of living. The immediate objective was to increase the teachers' pay five times and to provide relief for teachers who had lost their homes in the air raids.<sup>14</sup> Medical and unemployment insurance were among the other welfare demands.<sup>15</sup> The Zenkyo was "determined to establish a single union for teachers throughout Japan and to promote a single labor union conference" for every industry in Japan.<sup>16</sup> In consonance with this aim was the demand for the right of collective bargaining.<sup>17</sup>

Parallel with these economic objectives, the Zenkyo outlined a program which appeared to extend beyond the province of trade-unionism. Prefacing its political and social aims with a demand for the immediate abolition of the Greater Japan Education Association, because it was a tool of the militarists, the Zenkyo favored punishment for "educators responsible for the War"<sup>18</sup> and the "re-education of militaristic or nationalistic teachers."<sup>19</sup> At the same time, this union urged the instant re-appointment of "progressive teachers"<sup>20</sup> and asserted "that textbooks compiled and published by the Government must be done away with entirely."<sup>21</sup> Zenkyo seemed to imply that it was qualified to assume governmental functions by contending that the Union "must control school administration."<sup>22</sup> Coupled with this bid for political power was the proposal that school principals be elected by the public. The campaign to reduce the appointive power of the Government was motivated by the view that

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14. Zen Nihon Kyoin Kumiai, "Report on Aims and Principles Adopted at the National Council," 19 and 20 January 1946."
  15. IRIE, Michio, former member of the Central Executive Committee, Zen Nihon Kyoin Kumiai, 17 December 1945.
  16. Zen Nihon Kumiai, op. cit.
  17. IRIE, as cited above.
  18. Ibid.
  19. Ibid.
  20. Ibid.
  21. Zen Nihon Kyoin Kumiai, op. cit.
  22. Ibid.



all "officials are finally appointed by the Emperor"<sup>23</sup> and that they are "despotic and corrupt."<sup>24</sup>

To overcome the evils inherent in Japanese education, stated the Zenkyo, the whole school pattern should be revised. Instead of training the youth of the nation to be amenable to the purposes of a feudal society, training in democratic education was held up as the ideal to be sought.<sup>25</sup> To achieve this end, individual freedom for teachers was essential. The powers of the principal and those of the school inspector were attacked as stumbling blocks to progress. The school inspectors, in the eyes of the Zenkyo, played the part of the secret political police who supervised the teachers in the same manner as that in which the police supervised the people.<sup>26</sup> The first step toward freedom for the teacher, argued the Zenkyo, was the elimination of the school inspector.<sup>27</sup> In short, this union stressed the necessity of purging from the school system reactionary and militaristic elements. With the abolition of school inspectors and the installation of popularly elected principals, the union would face less opposition in its effort to strengthen its hold on the administration of schools. The Zenkyo hoped to combine with other labor unions to constitute a united front, and thus enhance its prestige as a political force.

Conservative teachers recognized in this program the infiltration of communist influences which intended to utilize the teachers' union as an implement.<sup>28</sup> This was the factor which split the teachers' movement into warring groups. Teachers of moderate political views refused to accept an ideology incompatible with their positions.

#### NIKKYO--A CONSERVATIVE UNION

On 2 December 1945, one day after the Zenkyo had been founded, the Nihon Kyoikusha Kumiai or Nikkyo (Japan Educators' Union) was launched by the Christian leader, Toyohiko KAGAWA, to accomplish educational reform without violating

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23. Zen Nihon Kyoin Kumiai, "Statement of Aims," undated report, 1946.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Zen Nihon Kyoin Kumiai, "Report on Aims and Principles Adopted at the National Council on 19-20 January 1946."
28. NAKANISHI, formerly cited.



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the cultural pattern of Japan.<sup>29</sup> Although the economic demands were similar in many respects to those of the Zenkyo, politically the Nikkyo was quite remote from its radical competitor. The general aims of the Nikkyo were to effect the democratization of education, to assure a decent livelihood for teachers, and to erect a "cooperative form of society based on the teaching of love"<sup>30</sup> and "an everlasting peaceful world."<sup>31</sup>

The nature of the cooperative society that the Nikkyo proposed may be studied by considering its plan to supplement teachers' income. The Nikkyo recommended that farm land be granted to schools "on which students, teachers, and other members of the community might work and from which they would receive shares of the crops according to the size of their families."<sup>32</sup> In addition, a five-day instead of the six-day school week was suggested so that more time would be free for farming.

Proposals to solve the immediate problems of teachers were presented to the Tokyo authorities in January 1946. To combat inflation, a ¥500 allowance for each teacher and ¥100 grant for each member of his family was demanded.<sup>33</sup> The Nikkyo declared its opposition to the proposed dismissal of some 800 elementary teachers in Tokyo and requested the authorities to reduce the number of pupils in each class so that teachers from burnt-out schools could be absorbed.<sup>34</sup> The Zenkyo also joined in the protest against the discharge of teachers and the combined effort resulted in partial success. A fraction of the contemplated number were discharged.<sup>35</sup> Similarly, the joint appeal for allowances was instrumental in winning a special bonus in February and a temporary allowance in April.

Like the Zenkyo, the conservative Nikkyo also disparaged the Greater Japan Education Association as a Government organization which much be replaced by a democratic union.

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29. Conference: WATANABE, Isao, secretary to Toyohiko KAGAWA, 24 June 1947.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. Civil Information and Education Section, SCAP, Activities of the Japan Educators Union (Nippon Kyoikusha Kumiai), RI-148-E-A-19, 24 April 1946.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

35. OGASAWARA, formerly cited.



Although the Nikkyo did not clarify its political program, it did have political ambitions. This union endorsed political candidates; it stated that it had no prejudice against any political party, but affirmed that most of its candidates belonged to the Socialist Party.<sup>36</sup> The fact that KAGAWA and other central figures were Socialists did not detract from the conservative character of the union.

The appeal of the Nikkyo appeared to be limited chiefly to instructors on the upper levels. The group which founded the Nikkyo were teachers "of middle schools, colleges, and universities,"<sup>37</sup> and the consequence was that it could not attract the "provincial masses."<sup>38</sup> The Nikkyo approval of the Emperor-system militated against its winning over the reformist elements among teachers, and "those who were of communist or neutral inclination, left to join the Zenkyo... Such being the case the Nikkyo from the beginning had a tendency away from the masses."<sup>39</sup>

#### CONFLICT

Attempts were made from the very beginning to combine the Zenkyo and the Nikkyo--but all efforts failed. The Nikkyo proposed as a condition of amalgamation that the Socialist Party be supported and that KAGAWA be elected to the presidency of the union. The Zenkyo countered this proposal by stating that party ties should be avoided and that a president should be freely chosen. Since neither side yielded any concessions, the negotiations failed.<sup>40</sup>

The difference between them was more than the choice of a president or the endorsement of a political party. There was a deep ideological conflict between the two organizations. The Zenkyo was prepared to revolutionize Japanese society; the Nikkyo, on the other hand, wanted to preserve it in the status quo. The Nikkyo stressed the desirability of having defenders of the Emperor system in the Union. That, of course, would have excluded the Communists and other reformers. Since

36. Civil Information and Education Section, SCAP, Activities of the Japan Educators Union (Nippon Kyoikusha Kumiai), No. RI-148-E-A-19, 24 April 1946.

37. WATANABE, formerly cited.

38. OGASAWARA, formerly cited.

39. WATANABE, formerly cited.

40. "Zenkyo and Nikkyo," Nihon Rono Rsushin, No. 33, 27 March 1946.



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the Zenkyo admitted Communists and had been branded as a Communist group, conciliation seemed impossible.

The intensity of conflict between them increased. The Zenkyo stamped the Nikkyo as a "pseudo-labor union,"<sup>41</sup> and charged that the Nikkyo was not representative of the teachers, inasmuch as its membership consisted of "noted educators and principals of secondary schools."<sup>42</sup> The unsupported assertion that the Nikkyo was sponsored and controlled by the Government also was made.<sup>43</sup>

The Nikkyo retaliated in kind, consistently calling the Zenkyo a communist association which derived its strength from the aggressive guidance of Communists and from "rich economic resources."<sup>44</sup>

The Zenkyo denied these accusations, protesting that "rumors that we have been given financial support by the USSR or by the Communists are nothing but the propaganda created by the bureaucrats and fascists against us."<sup>45</sup> The Zenkyo added that the Communist stigma which the Nikkyo had put on it lingered in the provinces and injured its membership campaign.<sup>46</sup> Having declared the Nikkyo an enemy with whom compromise was impossible, the Zenkyo pronounced the Nikkyo to be a cultural organization devoid of trade union aims, interested in defending the status quo, and indifferent to organizing a struggle for economic betterment.<sup>47</sup>

The Zenkyo had one road open. That was to ignore the existence of the Nikkyo and to proceed to organize prefectural unions under a central leadership. The vigorous campaign of the Zenkyo overshadowed that of the Nikkyo, which had begun to experience internal discord.

In February 1946, the movement to organize a single industrial union for Japan culminated in the Sanbetsu, the Japanese equivalent of the CIO. The Zenkyo participated

41. IRIE, previously cited.

42. "Zenkyo and Nikkyo," Nihon Rono Tsushin, No. 33, 27 March 1946.

43. Ibid.

44. WATANABE, previously cited.

45. INAGAKI, previously cited.

46. "Zenkyo and Nikkyo," Nihon Rono Tsushin, No. 33, 27 March 1946.

47. "To the First Nation-wide Conference," Nihon Rono Tsushin, No. 33, 27 March 1946.



in the preparatory meetings.<sup>48</sup>

KAGAWA and his faction, on the other hand, favored aligning the Nikkyo with the moderate Sodomei (The General Federation of Labor). Opposing KAGAWA was a group which favored abstention from the labor movement. The disagreement culminated in the actual expulsion of KAGAWA's opponents from membership.<sup>49</sup> The loss in strength and subsequent financial difficulties reduced the effectiveness of the Nikkyo. Most of its membership, estimated at 30,000 at its peak, drifted away to a newly-organized conservative union in June 1946.<sup>50</sup> In July 1946 the Nikkyo changed its name to Nihon Kyoikusha Kumiai Rengo (Japan Teachers' Union League). Its remaining membership gradually dwindled to the point where functioning as an organized group was no longer practicable.<sup>51</sup>

The decline of the Nikkyo cannot be interpreted as a complete rout of the conservative teachers. The Nikkyo policy of objecting to strikes and demonstrations was adopted by its conservative successors. As a matter of fact, the Nikkyo, during its decline, promoted the tendency of teachers to remain neutral or to join a newly-organized union which would rival the Zenkyo.<sup>52</sup>

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48. "The Second Nation-wide Conference," Nihon Rono  
Rsushin, No. 33, 27 March 1946.

49. WATANABE, as previously cited.

50. WATANABE, previously cited. The new union was the  
Kyoin Kumiai Zenkoku Remmei (National League of  
Teachers' Unions).

51. Ibid.

52. Ibid.



## Chapter 4

## REACTION AGAINST THE ZENKYO

## THE SEIKYO--YOUTH SCHOOL TEACHERS' UNION

With KAGAWA's union as a weak rival to contend with, the field seemed clear and the Zenkyo sought to spread its influence. A women's department was created to stimulate Japanese female teachers to join the movement in order to fight every "vestige of feudalism"<sup>1</sup> in society. Efforts were exerted to bring independent prefectural unions into the fold.<sup>2</sup> By March 1946, it was estimated that the Zenkyo had a membership of 60,000.<sup>3</sup> The growth of this union created interest among some of the unorganized teachers. Some of the teachers of the Tokyo area who might have been disposed to enter the Zenkyo may have felt discouraged by its radical trend.<sup>4</sup> The Nikkyo failure to compete successfully may have been due to some teachers who considered it primarily a cultural association.<sup>5</sup> Those who desired a trade union free from political objectives began to discuss methods of establishing a teachers' union whose interests would be limited to teachers' welfare.

A group of youth school teachers and principals was among the first to plan an independent, nonpolitical union. A series of committee meetings culminated in a general conference which formed the Seinen Gakko Kyoin Kumiai or Seikyo (Youth School Teachers' Union) on 15 March 1946.<sup>6</sup> The aims of the newly-founded Seikyo were expressed in its constitution. This union chose as its major goal the economic improvement of teachers. Like its predecessors, the Seikyo approved of the democratization of education, but did not

1. Women's Department of the Zen Nihon Kyoin Kumiai, "Declaration," 11 January 1946.
2. "Teachers Unions in Various Places in Japan," Nihon Rono Rsushin, No. 33, 27 March 1946.
3. Ibid.
4. NAKANISHI, Yusaburo, former secretary, Tokyo to Kokumin Gakko Kyoin Kumiai, "Reply to Questionnaire," 26 June 1947.
5. Conference: AOKI, Heizaburo, president, Tokyo To Seinen Gakko Kyoin Kumiai, 27 August 1946.
6. Seinen Gakko Kyoin Kumiai, "History of Seikyo," undated, 1946.



suggest measures to effect it. The right to negotiate collectively also was included among its objectives.<sup>7</sup> The economic aims were further clarified later. The Seikyo sought a five-fold raise of the real or actual income received in November 1945 and a grant of ¥100 per capita for every member of a teacher's family. Housing and general relief measures also were demanded. Following the lead of the Zenkyo, the Seikyo opposed salary discrimination against women teachers.<sup>8</sup>

The Seikyo presented these demands for salary increases to the Finance and Education Ministries. In addition to campaigning for salary increases, the union also met frequently to discuss democratization of the schools and related current problems.<sup>9</sup>

In August 1946, it was estimated that the 1,400 members of the Seikyo represented most of the youth school teachers in Tokyo.<sup>10</sup> Although numerically this organization was not powerful, it is possible that it may have been the opening wedge for other conservative groups and that it represented the emergence of the dissident groups which were to challenge the Zenkyo.

#### THE CHUKYO--MIDDLE SCHOOL TEACHERS' UNION

Within a few days of the appearance of the Seikyo, a group of middle school teachers banded themselves together in a union for the same reasons that impelled the youth school teachers to form the Seikyo. The Tokyo To Chuto Gakko Kyoshokuin Kumiai or Chukyo (Tokyo Metropolis Middle School Educational Personnel Union) was established on 19 March 1946. Like the Seikyo, the Chukyo was quite free from political associations or objectives and indicated no interest in the theory of class struggle. The Chukyo did, however, declare that it was opposed to the Japan Education Association or any other Government-sponsored organization.<sup>11</sup>

7. Tokyo To Seinen Gakko Kyoin Kumiai, "Constitution," 15 March 1946.

8. "Practical Points," Nippon Kyoiku Shimbun, 15 May 1946.

9. Conference: AOKI, Heizaburo, President, Tokyo To Seinen Gakko Kyoin Kumiai, 27 August 1946.

10. Ibid.

11. "Secondary School Educational Personnel Union Inaugurated," Asahi Shimbun, 20 March 1946.



## REACTION AGAINST THE ZENKYO

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The Chukyo economic objectives were precisely those of the Seikyo: a five-fold increase in salary and ¥100 allowance for each member of a teacher's family. Similarly, the Chukyo proposed the abolition of discrimination against women, and recommended the establishment of a Metropolitan Education Council to prevent "unfair personnel dealing."<sup>12</sup> Although the Chukyo was a middle school teachers' union, it sought to broaden its range to include all teachers in the country. With this end in view, the leaders of the Chukyo held consultations to devise means to unite their respective unions.<sup>13</sup>

## THE KOKKYO--ELEMENTARY SCHOOL TEACHERS' UNION

Almost parallel with the unionization of the youth and middle school teachers was the organization of yet another group. Elementary school teachers who had not been organized expressed interest in joining a union which was democratic and nonpartisan.<sup>14</sup> They conducted negotiations with the elementary school branch<sup>15</sup> of the Zenkyo, but found that a modification of the objectionable features of the Zenkyo was not attainable.<sup>16</sup> Avoiding the stigma of radicalism, these conservative elementary school teachers prepared to form their own union and to confer with the middle and youth school unions which were equally antagonistic to the Zenkyo.<sup>17</sup> On 25 April 1946, they formed the Tokyo To Kokumin Gakko Kyoin Kumiai or Kokkyo (Tokyo Metropolis National School Teachers' Union).<sup>18</sup>

12. Ibid.

13. NAKANISHI, previously cited.

14. Ibid.

15. This was the Tokyo To Kyoin Kumiai (Tokyo Metropolis Teachers' Union).

16. "Kyoin Kumiai Broken Up?" Asahi, 18 April 1946; also NAKANISHI, formerly cited.

17. Ibid.

18. NAKANISHI, formerly cited.



## Chapter 5

## THE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND THE UNIONS

The Ministry of Education was not unaware of the progress of the Zenkyo. Inasmuch as the Greater Japan Education Association now was seemingly rendered impotent, the Ministry of Education was no longer in position to influence the teachers. The Ministry of Education discovered that it was now dealing with an aggressively led union whose leadership did not seem to reflect the sentiment of the majority of the teachers.<sup>1</sup> An official of the Ministry who investigated the characters of the conservative and radical unions concluded that the "Zenkyo was a better organization before political leaders took over the leadership."<sup>2</sup> He also added that the Zenkyo had accomplished some good, but that it had engaged in too much political fighting and showed signs of Communist control.<sup>3</sup>

The Ministry, in order to counteract the growing influence of the Zenkyo, decided to assist in organizing teachers' unions. The Ministry of Education found justification for participating in unionization on the ground "that the majority of teachers were too conservative to act of their own accord."<sup>4</sup> If the conservative teachers were not organized, the radical Zenkyo eventually would dominate the teachers' movement.<sup>5</sup>

The Ministry, however, did not participate directly. Officials of the Ministry of Education who were at the same time officers of a union of Ministry employees announced that plans to form a new union to embrace all the independent unions had been made.<sup>6</sup> Through the mediation

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1. Conference: SAWADA, Tatsuo, chief, Investigation Section, Ministry of Education, 24-25 August, 1946.
  2. Ibid.
  3. Ibid.
  4. Ibid.
  5. Ibid.
  6. Civil Information and Education, SCAP, The National Educational Personnel Union (Zenkoku Kyoiki Shokuin Rodo Kumiai Kyogikai): Declaration of the Founders, with a Draft of the Constitution, RI (T) 11-E-9, 15 April 1946.



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of Mr. KONO, the leader of the Chukyo, a conference was called on 2 April 1946 to which delegates from all unions were invited.<sup>7</sup>

On the day of the conference, the Ministry officials who were the protagonists of the new union issued a public declaration in which they deplored the fact that the true function of education had been misunderstood or disregarded by militarists and bureaucrats. The declaration added that the economic and social status of teachers was not satisfactory and that a program for the elevation of the teachers' standard of living would have to be instituted. No specific statement was made with respect to salary and allowance increases. The declaration suggested no program for action to neutralize the appeal of the Zenkyo. The Ministry official presented a constitution for the union which included economic and cultural objectives.<sup>8</sup>

The Conference was opened and immediately thrown into confusion by Masanobu INAGAKI, the Zenkyo delegate. He charged that the Ministry of Education was a "hotbed of bureaucracy, and that the bureaucrats were War criminals."<sup>9</sup> INAGAKI challenged the propriety of the Ministry's attempt to establish unions. The task of promoting democratic education belonged to the teachers, and for that reason, continued INAGAKI, the Ministry of Education should discontinue its efforts in the field of unionization.<sup>10</sup>

As a result of this unexpected attack, the convention failed to accomplish its purpose.<sup>11</sup> The Zenkyo had succeeded for the moment in checkmating the Ministry of Education.

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7. NAKANISHI, Yusaburo, former secretary, Tokyo to Koku-min Gakko Kyoin Kumiai, "Reply to Questionnaire," 26 June 1947.
  8. Civil Information and Education, SCAP, The National Educational Personnel Union (Zenkoku Kyoiku Shokuin Kodo Kumiai Kyogikai): Declaration of the Founders, with a Draft of the Constitution, RI (T) 11-E-9, 15 April 1946.
  9. NAKANISHI, formerly cited.
  10. Ibid.
  11. Ibid.
  12. Ibid.



## Chapter 6

## THE FEDERATION OF CONSERVATIVE UNIONS

The failure of the Ministry of Education to unite the teachers under nonradical leadership did not end all efforts to bring conservative teachers together.

United by common opposition to the Zenkyo, the three conservative unions--the Seikyo of the youth schools, the Chukyo of the middle schools, and the newly-founded Kokkyo of the elementary schools--met on 26 April 1946 to form a federation called the Tokyo To Kyoshokuin Kumiai Kyogikai or To Kyo Kyo (Tokyo Metropolis Federation of Educational Personnel Unions).<sup>1</sup>

The Zenkyo recognized in the coalition of the conservative teachers a threat to its aim of uniting all the teachers of Japan. When the elementary school teachers decided to oppose the Zenkyo by grouping themselves independently, the Zenkyo attacked them as a "device of the Government to cut up our organization."<sup>2</sup> Similarly, when it was learned that a federation of conservative unions was under way, the Zenkyo stated that it was the creature of the Education Ministry, organized to hamper the teachers' union movement.<sup>3</sup> The fact that the Zenkyo had emphasized the theory of class struggle and, in general, appeared to sympathize with the program of the Communists served to alienate the moderates among the teachers and to force them into conservative unions. Thus the Zenkyo had contributed to the formation of the rival Federation which was to lead the nonradical teachers.

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1. NAKANISHI, Yusaburo, former secretary, Tokyo to Kokumin Gakko Kyoin Kumiai, "Reply to Questionnaire," 26 June 1947.
  2. "Opposing Teachers' Unions," Yomiuri, 24 April 1946.
  3. "Split in the Teachers' Union," Asahi, 19 April 1946.



## Chapter 7

## THE ZENKYO CAMPAIGN

The Zenkyo, mindful of the loss of prestige attendant upon being branded a radical political society, always attempted to justify its ideology. Education, argued the Zenkyo proponents, could not be divorced from politics. In the past, education had been "under the control of militarists, bureaucrats, landlords, and capitalists."<sup>1</sup> It followed that the intellectual rehabilitation of Japan would have to be political. It was incumbent upon the Japanese to select as educators politically-minded teachers whose interest lay with the laboring rather than with the ruling classes.<sup>2</sup> The Zenkyo proponents reiterated their position that the union instead of the Ministry of Education should manage schools.<sup>3</sup> They reaffirmed their belief in the theory of class struggle, condemning the Federation for advocating class collaboration, and for speaking about "fairness and moderation in a society where the people are divided into classes and one class exploits the other for its own benefit."<sup>4</sup> Educational reform implied social revolution.

Zenkyo propaganda was devised to represent the union as an agent engaged in genuine conflict with the authorities. These tactics presumably sprang from the assumptions that the Government would grant no demands and that all concessions would have to be wrested through organized struggle. "The Government officials," wrote the Zenkyo organ, "are revealing their incompetence and reaction. We cannot expect anything from them. We will have to solve this problem by ourselves."<sup>5</sup> In conformity with this philosophy, the Zenkyo pictured its activities as "fights."

1. YAMAKITA, Tozo, "The Declaration of the Right to Select Teachers," Akarui Gakko, 20 January 1947, p. 14.
2. Ibid.
3. OKA, Jumio, "The Foundation of Democratic Education," Akarui Gakko, 20 January 1947, p. 2
4. Ibid.
5. "Zenkyo Held a National Mass Meeting," Nippon Kyoiku Shimbun, 3 May 1946.



It regarded itself as a militant front against the Ministry of Education and against the Federation, which was "the reactionary union under Government patronage."<sup>6</sup>

The Zenkyo asserted that the Government was an opponent determined to thwart independent teachers' unions. Its charges were numerous. Not only had the Ministry of Education tried to organize unions under its own leadership; it also was suspected of indirectly hampering unionization. The greater Japan Education Association, in its efforts to dissolve a radical union, "went so far as to suppress all unions in Chiba."<sup>7</sup> Some principals of prefectural schools tried to block the progress of the Zenkyo by creating their own unions in the schools. The principals controlled these organizations autocratically, it was charged, and the teachers had no voice in the settlement of important matters.<sup>8</sup> The Zenkyo was sharp in its criticism of the School Principals Association, which attempted to attract the members of the Zenkyo elementary school teachers' union away from the parent body. The Zenkyo interpreted this action as another attempt on the part of the "bureaucracy" to wreck its union.<sup>9</sup>

In the face of these difficulties, the Zenkyo claimed to have spread its influence throughout the country. Prefectural unions which had not affiliated with the Zenkyo looked to it for leadership.<sup>10</sup>

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6. Ibid
  7. NAKANISHI, previously cited.
  8. INAGAKI, Masanobu, previously cited.
  9. "Don't Be Deceived by the Artful Maneuvering of Government-Sponsored Unions," Kyoiku Rodo, 18 May 1946.
  10. "Zenkyo Held a National Mass Meeting," Nippon Kyoiku Shimbun, 3 May 1946.



## Chapter 8

## PREFECTURAL UNIONS

The growth of prefectural unions is an interesting development in the teachers' union movement, although complete information on this aspect is not available. A few sprang up independently without the aid of the Tokyo unions.<sup>1</sup> The rise of unions in Tokyo may have stimulated a similar growth in the provinces.<sup>2</sup> Shortly after its founding, the Zenkyo announced that it had a foothold in a number of prefectures.<sup>3</sup> The Zenkyo strategy for extending its field, apparently, was to establish chapters (they were called "cells" by Zenkyo) in the un-unionized schools to win over the teachers in neighboring schools. Central organization points were formed by the Zenkyo in Kobe, Kyoto, Nagoya, and Fukuoka.<sup>4</sup>

The growth of these newly established unions throughout the prefectures was significant. While some declared themselves in favor of the Zenkyo, others remained unaffiliated. The growth of trade unions among workers and the aggravation of the food shortage in the spring of 1946 accelerated unionization among teachers. It was estimated that 80 percent of the 400,000 teachers in Japan had been unionized by July 1946.<sup>5</sup> Conservative unions continued their independent existence until a national union of conservative teachers appeared. The Zenkyo consequently had the advantage for a while of conducting a membership drive without a centrally-directed opposition.

The extent to which the Zenkyo succeeded in transplanting its philosophy into the prefectures was challenged

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1. Conference: WATANABE, Isao, secretary to Toyohiko KAGAWA, 24 June 1947.
  2. Ministry of Education, "Reply to a Questionnaire for the Mombusho", 20 June 1947.
  3. INAGAKI, Radio Speech, 15 January 1946.
  4. Ibid.
  5. Ministry of Education, "Reply to a Questionnaire for the Mombusho", 20 June 1947.



by Mr. Kotaro TANAKA, the former Minister of Education. He asserted that the members of prefectural Zenkyo unions were frequently unfamiliar with the aims of the Tokyo union. They joined the radical union, he added, because it was well known, and not because they had any strong convictions.<sup>6</sup>

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6. TANAKA, Kotaro, former Minister of Education, "Reply to Questionnaire", 16 June 1947.



## Chapter 9

## THE MAY DEMONSTRATIONS

The Zenkyo did not limit its activities solely to spheres which attracted the interest of teachers. In anticipation of the first free May Day since the War, the Zenkyo arranged a mass meeting in order to draw plans for its participation in the 1946 May Day demonstration.

In addition, the meeting considered other problems and grievances. Committees representing three schools came to the meeting to enlist the aid of the Zenkyo in securing the discharge of an unpopular principal and the rehiring of discharged teachers.<sup>1</sup> The Zenkyo agreed to lead a delegation to the Ministry of Education to interview the Minister. The delegates were met by the vice-minister, who was disinclined to enter into a discussion. Some of the delegates, unrestrained in their speech, forced themselves into the vice-minister's office and demanded that May Day be declared a holiday and that the Ministry of Education recognize the right of the teachers to control the schools in addition to presenting the demands for the reinstatement of discharged teachers.<sup>2</sup> The vice-minister rejected the demands. This occasioned another outburst against the vice-minister, who was obliged to escape from the Ministry.<sup>3</sup>

This was the first of a series of unconventional meetings between the Zenkyo and officials of the Ministry of Education. Throughout the month of May there were a number of incidents which illustrated the hostility between the Zenkyo and the Ministry of Education.

Reports of the May Day demonstration indicate to what degree the Zenkyo had identified itself with other labor unions. Zenkyo members joined the parade, bearing red flags and placards demanding living wages and popular control of education. Prominent Zenkyo leaders participated; they

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1. "Stay Over Night," Yomiuri, 27 April 1946.
  2. "Students Not Allowed," Asahi, 28 April 1946.
  3. "Violent Dispute With the Vice-Minister," Asahi, 27 April 1946.



delivered speeches urging teachers and workers to unite.<sup>4</sup> Children paraded with red flags despite the Ministry's disapproval of celebrating May Day as a holiday.<sup>5</sup>

The continuing Zenkyo demonstrations accentuated the union's campaign to realize its demands. Zenkyo delegations conducted "demonstration parades to the Ministry of Education, sent dozens of representatives, sometimes even hundreds of them, who forced their way into the Ministry of Education and persisted in demanding an interview with the Minister, and even started a 'sit-down' strike in the Ministry of Education for several days and nights."<sup>6</sup>

On 4 May, a Zenkyo committee was granted an interview by Minister of Education ABE. The Zenkyo made two economic demands: the one was for ¥800 base salary; the other was the distribution of food.

The Minister replied that the proposed budget for education had been drastically cut by the Government and that he could do no more than to investigate the food situation.

The Zenkyo restated its political demands.

The Minister refused to consider the Zenkyo plea for school control and denied the right of any other agency to control education.

The Zenkyo urged the Minister not to interfere with the activities of the union.

The Minister declared that he would interfere with the unions whenever the situation warranted such action.<sup>7</sup> The purpose of a labor union, contended the Minister, was to improve labor and economic conditions. "Unions which aim at political or social movements are not recognized as real unions....If their activities should expand beyond the limit of legitimate labor union interests, the Ministry would not be indifferent."<sup>8</sup>

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4. "Five Thousand Teachers Join Grand Spectacle of Revived May Day," Nippon Kyoiku Shimbun, 3 May 1946.
  5. "May Day," Asahi, 28 April 1946.
  6. TANAKA, Kotaro, former minister of education, "Reply to Questionnaire," 16 June 1947.
  7. "The Mombusho Does Not Know Anything," Kyoiku Rodo, 18 May 1946.
  8. "Opposition to Mr. TANAKA," Yomiuri, 22 May 1946.



## THE MAY DEMONSTRATIONS

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The Zenkyo delegates so persistently pursued their course of seeking interviews that the Minister was obliged to hide himself for a few days.<sup>9</sup> The Zenkyo delegates, however, were determined to force the Ministry to meet their demands. They spent a night in the Ministry and invited committees from the prefectures to come to the Ministry to unite with them against the Minister. The newly-arrived prefectural committees joined with the Tokyo delegation and called on Mr. Kotaro TANAKA, the Ministry official who was to become the Minister of Education within a few days.

Mr. TANAKA described the attitude of the Zenkyo leaders, Masanobu INAGAKI and Masao IWAMA, as "simply outrageous," and charged, "INAGAKI read forth their resolution about teachers' pay increase with a volley of the most arrogant and insulting words absolutely beneath the dignity of educators, and denounced the Education Ministry, the Cabinet, and the Emperor....He did not Mister me, and even neglected the use of such common honorifics as daily social intercourse requires...Even at that stage it was quite obvious that they had a political objective in mind and intended to expand their influence."<sup>10</sup>

Nothing was accomplished. Some Zenkyo delegates spent another night in the Ministry building, and the next day they expressed opposition to Mr. TANAKA succeeding Mr. ABE as Minister of Education.<sup>11</sup> Immediately after his assumption of office, Mr. TANAKA received delegates from the Zenkyo and from the Federation and stated that he would try to improve the teachers' welfare without considering the Zenkyo demands.<sup>12</sup> Dissatisfied, the Zenkyo and Federation delegates returned on 25 May to consult with the Minister. The Federation delegates began to confer with the Minister by themselves. When the Zenkyo committee arrived, it asserted that the Zenkyo was the representative of the teachers. The dispute was futile. The Minister again gave neither side any encouragement.<sup>13</sup>

9. TANAKA, as cited before.

10. Ibid.

11. "Kansai Supporters of Stubborn Zenkyo Oppose Mr. TANAKA," Yomiuri, 22 May 1946.

12. "The New Minister of Education Does Not Change His Ideas," Yomiuri, 23 May 1946.

13. "Single Organization of All Teachers," Kyoiku Rodo, 21 June 1946.



The May interviews achieved no material gains, but it appeared that the Zenkyo succeeded in winning the sympathy of a few newspapers which were favorably inclined toward leftist movements.

The Minister of Education pointed out that the Zenkyo had some success in stirring up "prejudices of the public and of the educational world against the Ministry of Education."<sup>14</sup>

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14. TANAKA, formerly cited.



## Chapter 10

## ATTEMPTS AT UNIFICATION

In May, notwithstanding their political differences, the Zenkyo and the Federation conducted negotiations to consolidate.<sup>1</sup> A unified teachers' movement in Tokyo probably would serve to unite the independent prefectural unions under Tokyo leadership. Thus, a centrally-directed teachers' organization embracing the whole country considerably would enhance the bargaining power and political pressure of the union.

The basic ideological differences between the radicals and the conservatives, however, obstructed agreement. One of the primary points of difference was the attitude toward political parties: the Zenkyo asserted that unions would be ineffective unless they functioned politically, while the Federation reaffirmed its adherence to political neutrality. The Federation voiced its objection to parades and demonstrations, indicating that such tactics redounded to the discredit of the teachers' movement.<sup>2</sup>

To circumvent the obstacles to conciliation, both unions agreed to avoid controversial matters at a joint meeting of their delegates scheduled for 1 June 1946.

The final sessions of the committees to arrange the grand mass meeting ended in disagreement on the salary question. The Zenkyo sought ¥600 base pay to which allowances and increments would be added; the Federation demand was limited to a minimum net income of ¥600.<sup>3</sup> The Federation restated its objections to the participation of parents and children in union demonstrations as well as its opposition to political action.

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1. "Single Organization of All Teachers," Kyoiku Rodo, 21 June 1946.
  2. Tokyo To Kyoshokuin Kumiai Kyogikai, "Table of Activities of the Tokyo To Kyoshokuin Kumiai Kyogikai, 20 April 1946 to 7 July 1946."
  3. TANAKA, Kotaro, former minister of education, "Reply to Questionnaire," 20 June 1947.



On 1 June 1946 delegates from the Tokyo and prefectural unions assembled in the Imperial Plaza to institute a united teachers' organization. To the discomfiture of the Federation delegates, a group of adults and children came bearing placards with Zenkyo slogans which urged aid for teachers and food for children.<sup>4</sup> Reports were delivered on the progress of the unions, and demands for presentation to the Ministry of Education were drawn.<sup>5</sup> The meeting was disrupted when NOZAKA, a leading Japanese Communist, rose to deliver a speech pledging the support of his party to the teachers. The Federation delegates as well as members of other conservative unions voiced protests and their opposition to the Communists. NOZAKA resumed, and the Federation delegates left the meeting in a body and held an assembly of their own.<sup>6</sup> They regarded the appearances of the children with placards and of NOZAKA as violations of the Zenkyo promise to avoid controversial issues.

The Federation at its own assembly immediately disassociated itself from the mass meeting being held in the Plaza and dispatched a message to the Ministry of Education indicating that the delegates of the mass meeting were not to be recognized as representatives of an all-union conference.<sup>7</sup> When the delegates of the mass meeting arrived at the Ministry with their demands, the Minister refused to see them. The Zenkyo attributed the failure of the mass meeting to the separatist tactics of the Federation, which was "too prejudiced against the Communists".<sup>8</sup> The Federation countered with the reply that teachers ought to realize their aims through their own efforts, without resorting to politics.<sup>9</sup>

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4. Tokyo To Kyoshokuin Kumiai Kyogikai, op. cit.
  5. Ibid.
  6. "National Mass Meeting of Teachers in Palace Plaza Goes into Confusion," Yomiuri, 2 June 1946.
  7. Ibid.
  8. Ibid.
  9. Ibid.



## Chapter 11

## NATIONAL UNIONS AND THEIR SUBSIDIARIES

The failure of the Federation and the Zenkyo to unite stimulated each of these unions to recruit strength throughout the country. Each group sought to consolidate the unaffiliated prefectural unions under its leadership. While the Zenkyo had indicated some successes in setting up nuclei in the important cities, the Federation thus far had made no effort to expand nationally. The publicity attendant upon the attempts of the Tokyo teachers' union to win concessions from the Ministry had created interest in the prefectures. Prefectural delegates attended union meetings and on occasion participated in demonstrations. The Federation determined to bring the scattered prefectural unions under its control.

Shortly after the 1 June meeting, the Federation, collaborating with the independent teachers' unions in the Tokyo area, announced plans to federate those teachers of Japan who favored a moderate course of action.<sup>1</sup> Invitations were issued by the Federation to all unions in the country to attend a conference to establish a national conservative union. The Zenkyo expressed interest in attending the conference, but the Federation, distrustful of the Zenkyo, refused admittance to delegates of the rival union.<sup>2</sup> On 21 June 1946, the conference, limited to nonradical unions, successfully combined a number of prefectural as well as city unions in a new national organization called the Kyoin Kumiai Zenkoku Renmei (National League of Teachers' Unions),<sup>3</sup> or the Kyo Zen Ren.

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1. Tokyo To Kyoshokuin Kumiai Kyogikai, "Table of Activities of Tokyo To Kyoshokuin Kumiai Kyogikai, 20 April 1946 to 7 July 1946."
  2. Ibid.
  3. Ibid. At this meeting plans also were made for the organizing of the unions in the Kanto district into a branch. It was formally established on 7 July 1946 as the Kyoin Kumiai Kanto Renmei (Kanto League of Teachers Unions), or Kyo Kan Ren.



The newly-organized League renewed the demands which the Federation had made. In the main they were economic. Demand for the immediate grant of a ¥100 allowance for each member of a teacher's family was coupled with the demand for salary increases. The demands also incorporated a plea for the abolition of discrimination in the salaries of women teachers. The League also urged relief for undernourished children, and free distribution of textbooks and school supplies. A committee presented the Minister of Education with the demands. Although the League protested its nonpolitical character, its committee visited Diet members of the various political parties, including the Communists, to enlist their support.<sup>4</sup>

The Zenkyo, following a similar course, called a national conference a few days later with the objective of attracting prefectural unions. Prefectural unions were cognizant that the Zenkyo had become closely associated with the Communists in the public mind, and consequently, they were reluctant to affiliate with a radical organization.<sup>5</sup> Some prefectural unions suggested that their objection to joining the Zenkyo could be overcome by changing the name. The Zenkyo, acting on this suggestion, dissolved itself, and reorganized under a new name, the Nihon Kyoin Rodo Kumiai (Japan Educational Labor Union), or Nikkyo Ro, on 26 June 1946.<sup>6</sup> There is no evidence that a change occurred in leadership or in principles. While its membership may have increased by this move, the degree of its expansion is not known.<sup>7</sup>

By the end of June, the differences between the radical and conservative unions apparently were more clearly delineated. The successor to the Zenkyo, the Nikkyo Ro, found itself faced with a united front of conservative unions led by the National League of Teachers' Unions. The struggle for the control of the teachers' union movement had expanded from a city to a nation-wide scale in a few months.

After the Nikkyo Ro had superseded the Zenkyo, it resumed a course of action calculated to draw public participa-

4. Ibid.

5. INAGAKI, Masanobu, "Reply to Questionnaire", 3 July 1947.

6. "All Battle Lines Unified", Kyoiku Rodo, 26 June 1946.  
The Tokyo branch of the Zenkyo anticipated the change in name. In April, the To Kyo became the To Kyo Ro Tokyo To Kyoiku Rodo Kumiai (Tokyo Metropolis Educational Labor Union).

7. Ibid.



## NATIONAL UNIONS AND THEIR SUBSIDIARIES

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tion into its campaign. In March 1946, when the American Education Mission came to Japan to study the school situation, the Zenkyo had submitted its written recommendation for educational reform. To exploit the interest that the Mission had aroused and to popularize its views, the Zenkyo in addition formed the "Council for the Democratization of Education, calling democratic organizations of workers and farmers together with the object of accelerating educational democratization".<sup>8</sup> The program of this Council was essentially that of the Zenkyo. At the same time, the Zenkyo organized the Society for the Study of Democratic Education, which directed its appeal on a professional level through its magazine, the Akarui Gakko (Bright School).<sup>9</sup>

These organizations had not been successful in attracting a numerous following. Their appeal was limited to teachers.<sup>10</sup> The Nikkyo Ro undertook to revive the Council for the Democratization of Education and sponsored a meeting attended by delegates from sympathetic organizations representing workers and professional men. The reports delivered at this meeting emphasized the necessity of rehabilitating the schools by re-educating teachers and by granting the Council the right to compile the textbooks to replace the "reactionary contents of State-authorized textbooks".<sup>11</sup> The Council affirmed that the re-education of Japan was not the exclusive province of teachers; participation of the citizenry was necessary to implement a revolution in education.<sup>12</sup> No further references were noted in the press about the activities of the Council after the re-organization meeting in August. The Society for the Study of Democratic Education indicated no growth, but it continued to publish the Akarui Gakko, which propagated the ideology of the radical union.

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8. "How Education has been Democratized during the Past Year", Kyoiku Rodo, 10 August 1946. The Japanese name of the Council was Kyoiku Minshuka Kyogikai.
  9. Ibid. In Japanese, the Society is the Mishushugi Kyoiku Kenkyukai.
  10. "Various Democratic Organizations Participate in Council for Democratizing Education", Kyoiku Rodo, 21 August 1946.
  11. Ibid.
  12. "Platform of the Council for the Democratization of Education", Kyoiku Rodo, 25 August 1946.



## Chapter 12

## EFFORTS TO OBTAIN HIGHER SALARY SCALE

## THE ANTI-STRIKE BILL

In July 1946, the Ministry of Education challenged the teachers' unions. The Labor Relations Adjustment Bill, which was to outlaw strikes on the part of civil servants such as police and firemen, was drawn up for presentation to the Diet. The Minister of Education successfully urged that teachers be included in the provisions of this measure.<sup>1</sup> The radical and conservative unions immediately declared their opposition to a law which would deprive them of the right to strike. The Conservative League protested to the Ministry of Education and to the Diet and requested that the provisions of the bill restricting teachers be rescinded. The League contended that a teachers' union could not "be compared with those of the policemen, the firemen, and the jailors, who work for the preservation of public order".<sup>2</sup> The passage of this bill, protested the League, would reduce the unions to the status of "cultural and social institutes".<sup>3</sup> League continued its attack, expressing a lack of confidence in the government for its dilatory tactics with regard to the demands of the teachers.<sup>4</sup>

The Nikkyo Ro, equally determined in its denunciation, interpreted the bill not only as a government conspiracy against teachers, but as an attempt to "suppress all disputes"<sup>5</sup> and "to put education again under the despotic control of the bureaucrats".<sup>6</sup>

The Government responded to the protests and excluded teachers from the provisions of the bill.<sup>7</sup>

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1. "Labor Arbitration Bill", Yomiuri, 7 July 1946.
  2. Kyojin Kumiai Zenkoku Remmei, "Suggestions Concerning the Partial Revision of the Principles of the Bill for the Adjustment of Labor Dispute", 7 July 1946.
  3. Ibid.
  4. Ibid.
  5. "Statement", Kyoiku Rodo, 17 July 1946.
  6. Ibid.
  7. "The Government Changes its Attitude", Mainichi, 10 July 1946.



## PROGRAMS OF THE NATIONAL UNIONS

Shortly after the defeat of the antistrike bill, the national unions joined again in opposition to the government on the salary question. The government had granted special allowances in February, April, and June to avert distress, but it did not reform the salary schedule until September 1946.<sup>8</sup> The new pay system merely revised the method of determining salaries, rather than raising them, although a slight increase was included for low-paid elementary and youth school teachers.<sup>9</sup> In general, the demands of the unions were ignored.

In October the League called a conference to renew the campaign. New demands were adopted. The first of these urged that a ¥600 net salary be established until a permanent base pay could be fixed. The conference also recommended that income tax exemptions be raised, that discrimination against women teachers be abolished, and that allowances be increased. The League also declared its opposition to the unwarranted dismissals of teachers.<sup>10</sup>

The Nikkyo Ro followed the example of the League. A conference to which unaffiliated unions were invited was held. Delegates representing three-fourths of the nation's 400,000 teachers attended, according to estimates.<sup>11</sup> To promote concerted action on the part of all unions represented, the conference organized a committee to act as the spokesman for all unions in the salary campaign. The committee adopted the name of Zen Koku Kyoin Kumiai Saitei Seikatsuken Kakutoku Kyogikai (Council of All-Japan Teachers' Unions to Secure the Minimum Standard of Living),<sup>12</sup> or Zen Kyo So. The Zen Kyo So, acting for the Nikkyo Ro and for the unaffiliated unions, drew up a list of demands to be submitted to the Ministry. Unlike the League, which demanded ¥600 net monthly income, the newly-organized Zen Kyo So proposed that a ¥600 base pay be established.<sup>13</sup>

8. Conference: NISHIDA, Tsuyoshi, secretary, General Affairs Section, School Education Bureau, Ministry of Education, 28 July 1947.

9. Ibid.

10. Kyoin Kumiai Zenkoku Remmei, "Demands Submitted to the Education Minister", 15 October 1946. See Appendix G-1.

11. "Education Minister Charged with His Refusal of Interview", Yomiuri, 27 October 1946.

12. "Teachers' Unions Present Seven Demands to Education and Finance Ministers", Asahi, 19 October 1946. See Appendix G-1.

13. Ibid.



Since allowances were calculated on the amount of the base pay, the effect of this demand was to ask for a much higher increase than the League did.<sup>14</sup> Like the League, the Zen Kyo So also urged the raising of income tax exemptions, the abolition of discrimination against women teachers, the cessation of dismissals, and increases in allowances.

Both unions sought interviews with the Minister of Education. The League delegates were received by the Minister because they "showed a most co-operative attitude toward the Ministry of Education".<sup>15</sup> The Zen Kyo So delegates were refused an interview by the Minister, who regarded this organization as a continuation of the radical Zenkyo under the same leadership.<sup>16</sup> The activities of the Zen Kyo So appeared to the Minister of Education as a "political expression of communistic elements in the educational world",<sup>17</sup> conducted by the very men who had led the May demonstrations, IWAMA and IMAGAKI.<sup>18</sup> The Zen Kyo So accused the Minister of "bureaucratic prejudices"<sup>19</sup> and took measures to familiarize the public with the objectives of the salary campaign. A "mobile corps" of Zen Kyo So teachers delivered speeches in public, sold teachers' journals, and visited parents to acquaint them with the teachers' demands.<sup>20</sup> Not until 1 November, however, did the Minister decide to receive the Zen Kyo So delegation.<sup>21</sup>

The interview was friendly; the Zen Kyo So delivered its demands, and the Minister promised to devote himself to the amelioration of the teachers' situation.<sup>22</sup> On the following day, the Minister handed a written reply to the demands of the Zen Kyo So. He indicated the difficulty of raising teachers' pay without raising the pay of all public officials.<sup>23</sup>

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14. TANAKA, Kotaro, former Minister of Education, "Reply to Questionnaire", 16 June 1947.
  15. TANAKA, as cited above.
  16. "Education Minister Charged with His Refusal of Interview", Yomiuri, 27 October 1946.
  17. TANAKA, cited above.
  18. Ibid.
  19. "Education Minister Charged with His Refusal of Interview", Yomiuri, 27 October 1946.
  20. "Sells Journals on Streets", Yomiuri, 27 October 1946; also "People's Voice on Teachers' Campaign", Yomiuri, 26 October 1946.
  21. "Mediation of Teachers' Dispute", Tokyo Shimbun, 31 October 1946.
  22. "Education Minister Gave Promises", Asahi, 2 November 1946.
  23. "Teachers' Disputes Contine", Jiji Shimpo, 3 November 1946.



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Nevertheless, he continued, attempts to solve the salary question would be resumed "when the fiscal condition of the nation is improved".<sup>24</sup> The raising of income tax exemptions would be referred to the financial authorities. Dismissals of teachers would be curtailed.<sup>25</sup>

The Zen Kyo So interpreted the reply as unsatisfactory, and urged him to reconsider his position. The Minister stated some days later that he had nothing to add to his original reply.<sup>26</sup>

On 6 November 1946, the National Convention of the Zen Kyo So adopted a resolution to resort to a strike if the teachers' situation did not improve. The convention also issued a declaration that Minister TANAKA had not taken measures to aid the unions' salary campaign.<sup>27</sup>

The League in the meantime had continued its negotiations with the Ministry of Education. A number of interviews were held. The Minister stated that he was negotiating to establish a ¥600 net salary, but that he had referred the raising of income tax exemptions to the Ministry of Finance.<sup>28</sup> He gave assurances that discrimination against women teachers would be abolished.<sup>29</sup> Thus, neither the League nor the Zen Kyo So could show progress in attaining immediate pay increases.

The Zen Kyo So invited the League to join in a common campaign against the Ministry of Education. The League declined because it opposed strike tactics. Furthermore, to join the Zen Kyo So was to risk losing its independence of action.<sup>30</sup>

Following the League's refusal to join with the Zen Kyo So, the Minister of Education dispatched a message to the

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid. Also "No Sincerity in the Education Minister's Answer", Shukan Kyoiku Shimbun, 4 November 1946.

27. "Negotiation between Minister and Teachers Broken Up", Yomiuri, 7 November 1946.

28. "Six Hundred Yen Pregnant with Significance in Education", Mainichi, 12 November 1946.

29. Ibid.

30. "The United Front of 400,000 Campaigning Teachers Formed", Nihon Keizai, 10 November 1946.



League to announce that the Cabinet had approved the ¥600 minimum net salary. The date when the minimum salary was to be realized was not indicated.<sup>31</sup> The League viewed this concession with satisfaction, but asserted that it would direct its efforts to securing pay increases for those who earned ¥600 or more, as well as for those who earned less.<sup>32</sup>

The Zen Kyo So in turn protested to the Ministry for having informed the League exclusively of the proposed ¥600 net salary. IWAMA, the leader of the Zen Kyo So, in an interview with the Minister, suggested that his organization should be regarded as the bargaining agent for teachers because it represented some 300,000 people. The League, said IWAMA, deserved no recognition, inasmuch as it represented only some 20,000 teachers. The Minister replied that "not everything should be decided by the majority. The opinions of the minority also should be respected".<sup>33</sup> He declined to consider the Zen Kyo So as the sole bargaining agent for teachers.<sup>34</sup>

Women teachers, who received 10 percent less than the men, also visited the Ministry to urge the abolition of discriminatory treatment. The Ministry official who received them suggested that inasmuch as women do not drink nor smoke, the pay differential should be retained.<sup>35</sup>

#### PREPARATION FOR THE TEACHERS' STRIKE

The Zen Kyo So, apparently viewing negotiation with the Ministry as futile, announced its intention to resort to a strike.<sup>36</sup> To strengthen its hand, the Zen Kyo So decided to make a united front with other unions consisting of government office, railroad, and communication personnel, who were also engaged in a salary campaign.<sup>37</sup> At the beginning of December, a joint campaign committee was appointed to coordinate the activities of the unions.<sup>38</sup> The League did not partici-

31. "Minister Tanaka Informed Kyo Zen Ren of the Acquisition of ¥600", Mainichi, 13 November 1946.
32. "Further Efforts Necessary", Asahi, 13 November 1946.
33. "Opinion of Minority Not to Be Ignored", Yomiuri, 14 November 1946. Also "Council of National Teachers' Unions Ignored", Asahi, 14 November 1946.
34. Ibid.
35. "Is the To Kyo Kyo a Union"? Shukan Kyoiku Shimbun, 18 November 1946.
36. "The Latest Attitude of the Zen Kyo So", Jiji Shimpo, 26 November 1946.
37. "Kyo To Established", Shukan Kyoiku Shimbun, 2 December 1946.
38. Ibid.



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pate in the strike preparations.

The Zen Kyo So, despite its threat to strike, showed no haste in doing so. It continued to negotiate with the Ministry. The Zen Kyo So submitted new demands which included a special year-end bonus and the right of collective bargaining.<sup>39</sup> The reply of the Ministry to the new demands was considered vague by the Zen Kyo So. Nothing was said about collective bargaining; the ¥600 base pay was not attainable at the moment, but a winter allowance was promised.<sup>40</sup>

The Minister's attitude toward the Zen Kyo So campaign was revealed by his reply to a group of parents who appealed to him on behalf of the teachers. "I sympathize with the teachers who are leading a hard life", he said, "but I am not so much moved by teachers who wave red flags and speak of a strike... What I am worrying about is that the majority of the teachers are being led astray by a minority".<sup>41</sup>

New attempts were made by members of both groups to unite the League and the Zen Kyo So. Committees representing the two national unions and some prefectural unions met and agreed to unite their organizations on 22 December 1946.<sup>42</sup> The League, however, decided to reject the recommendations of its committee and refrained from participating in united action.<sup>43</sup> Acting independently, the League conducted a demonstration on 14 December at the Diet and at the Ministries of Finance and Education to renew the demand for ¥600 net salary, which had not yet been realized. The Minister of Education addressed them, with the assurance that he would assume responsibility if the League failed in its objective.<sup>44</sup>

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39. "Zen Kyo So Submits Five Additional Demands", Asahi, 3 December 1946. See Appendix G-3.
  40. "Tanaka's Reply to Zen Kyo So", Dai Ichi Shimbun, 5 December 1946.
  41. "Setagaya Mothers Visit Tanaka for Teachers Aid", Asahi, 1 December 1946.
  42. "Hope for Unification of Teachers' Unions", Asahi, 11 December 1946.
  43. "The Joint Plan Was Rejected", Jiji Shimpō, 14 December 1946.
  44. "Education Minister Greeted Kyo Zen Ren Demonstrators", Asahi, 15 December 1946.



## EFFORTS TO OBTAIN HIGHER SALARY SCALE

During this period, labor unions on a national scale also had waged a campaign for wage increases. They held a demonstration for minimum pay and for the overthrow of the Cabinet.<sup>45</sup> The Zen Kyo So did not participate officially. Its leader, IWAMA, delivered a speech to the gathering, and Tokyo members of the Nikkyo Ro joined the procession which marched to the Diet.<sup>46</sup>

During the period that the Zen Kyo So was campaigning, the Nikkyo Ro suspended its activities and identified itself with the Zen Kyo So. The unions which had cooperated under the leadership of the Zen Kyo So convened on 22 December to combine in one all-embracing organization; the Nikkyo Ro readily dissolved to facilitate the formation of a new national union.<sup>47</sup> The convention was attended by representatives from most of the prefectures; it was estimated that 320,000 teachers were represented. They established a new national union which was called the Zenkoku Kyoin Kumiai Kyogikai (The Council of All-Japan Teachers' Unions), or Zen Kyo Kyo.

The formation of the Zen Kyo Kyo was not without internal struggle. A group of teachers who opposed the radical influences among the leadership convened to discuss methods for the ousting of radicals at the convention and "to bring the union under the control of the conservatives".<sup>48</sup> Evidently, the conservatives had some success; the leader of their group was chosen executive chairman. IWAMA, however, retained his leadership; he was elected chairman of the central campaign committee.<sup>49</sup> The convention adopted the usual demands for the ¥600 base pay, for increased allowances, and for the right to bargain collectively.<sup>50</sup>

The Zen Kyo Kyo, like the League, paraded to the Ministry of Education to present its demands. While the demonstrators waited for their delegation to interview the Minister, a truckload of police appeared. In the course of a dispute between

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45. "Mass Meeting to Overthrow the Cabinet", Asahi, 18 December 1946.
  46. Conference; INAGAKI, Masanabu, former member, Central Executive Committee, Zen Nihon Kyoin Kumiai, 26 December 1946.
  47. "Nikkyo Ro Announces Expansive Dissolution", Shukan Kyoiku Shimbun, 30 December 1946.
  48. Conference; INAGAKI, 30 July 1947; 27 December 1946.
  49. "320,000 Teachers Determined to Win a Minimum Standard of Living", Shukan Kyoiku Shimbun, 30 December 1946.
  50. See Appendices G-2 and G-3.



the demonstrators and the police over the blocking of traffic, several arrests were made.<sup>51</sup> A few minutes later, IWAMA, the head of the delegation was arrested as he left the Minister's office. He was released within a few hours. This incident occasioned protests against the Ministry from the Zen Kyo Kyo and the unions of government employees.<sup>52</sup>

The joint campaign committee which represented all unions of civil servants in their efforts to achieve pay increases met on 28 December 1946. It was agreed that all unions act as members of one organization in submitting a virtual ultimatum to the government to the effect that a strike preparation meeting would be held on 11 January 1947 if the government failed to establish minimum base pay for all government employees.<sup>53</sup>

On 11 January, the Joint Campaign Committee sponsored a rally of its constituent unions to fix 1 February 1947 as the date for the general strike against the government.<sup>54</sup> A list of thirteen demands was submitted to the government with the request that a reply be issued by 15 January. The list contained nothing new except demands for apologies from the police for arresting Zen Kyo Kyo members during the demonstration at the Ministry, and apologies from the Prime Minister for his critical remarks about labor leaders.<sup>55</sup>

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51. "Hungry Wolf Challenges Little Sheep", Shukan Kyoiku Shim-bun, 30 December 1946. Somewhat varying accounts of this incident are reported in the 24 December 1946 issues of the Mainichi Shimbun, the Asahi, and the Yomiuri: According to the Mainichi of 24 Dec., the arrests were made because the demonstrators had no permit for the public gathering and were blocking traffic. Yomiuri of 24 Dec., stated that arrests followed a dispute which started when a policeman pushed a demonstrator. Yomiuri of 24 Dec., states that IWAMA was taken into custody when he protested the arrest of some of his demonstrators.
52. Conference: INAGAKI, 26 December 1946. ---
53. "Joint Campaign Committee of Zen Kan Kocho Rokyo", Asahi, 29 December 1946.
54. "The Government and Public Office Employees' Labor Unions Declare to Go on Strike 1 February 1947", Asahi, 12 January 1947.
55. Council of All-Japan Government and Public Office Employees' Labor Union (Zen Kan Kocho Rokyo), "The 13-point Demand Presented to the Prime Minister, 11 January 1947". See Appendices G-5 and G-6.



## THE FEBRUARY STRIKE

On 15 January, the government replied to the demands. The Prime Minister apologized to the labor leaders and promised to investigate the arrests of the Zen Kyo Kyo members. The government promised to halt dismissals and to abolish discrimination, and further indicated that it would not oppose collective contracts. With respect to the minimum wage, allowances, and income tax reduction, the government gave assurances that investigations were being conducted.<sup>56</sup> The unions viewed the government answer with dissatisfaction and determined to begin the strike on 1 February 1947.

The League, however, maintained its reserved attitude toward the strike. On 11 January, when the Joint Campaign Committee sponsored the rally to fix the date for the strike, the League reaffirmed its unwillingness to participate in the contemplated walkout.<sup>57</sup> The League invited the Zen Kyo Kyo to discuss their proposed salary scales, with the object of arriving at a common demand. The Zen Kyo Kyo rejected the request of the League on the ground that the Joint Campaign Committee already had established and presented to the government an appropriate salary schedule.<sup>58</sup> On the day that the government replied to the Zen Kyo Kyo, a delegation from the League called on the Minister of Education to inquire when the ¥600 net salary would become effective. The Minister replied that he could not indicate definitely the date when the ¥600 net salary would be fixed.<sup>59</sup> The delegation thereupon suggested that the Minister "resign his post immediately".<sup>60</sup> As a further mark of protest against the Minister, the leader of the delegation resigned his position as chairman of the League Campaign Committee.<sup>61</sup> Despite the failure of the Ministry to realize its promises, the League once again reaffirmed its intention to refrain from participation in the strike.<sup>62</sup>

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56. "Labor's Burden to be Eased", Mainichi, 16 January 1947.  
See Appendix G-6.
57. Conference: KONO, Masao, chairman, Kyoin Kumiai Zenkoku Remmei, 3 March 1947.
58. Conference: FUJISHIMA, Tonomo, member, Liaison Committee, Kyoin Kumiai Zenkoku Remmei, 13 January 1947.
59. "Federation of Teachers' Unions Confers with Education Minister", Tokyo Shimbun, 16 January 1947. Also "Yamamoto Requests Tanaka's Resignation", Asahi, 16 January 1947.
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid.
62. KONO, formerly cited.



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The Zen Kyo Kyo, collaborating with other labor unions, made final preparations to declare a general strike on 1 February 1947. At the very last moment, however, a SCAP order which pointed out the risks to Japanese economy implied in a general work stoppage, forbade the strike.<sup>63</sup>

With the issuance of the SCAP order, the campaign committees of the striking unions disbanded.<sup>64</sup> The Zen Kyo Kyo notified its prefectural branches that the campaign against the Ministry would continue despite the suspension of the general strike.<sup>65</sup> The conservative League raised its demands. Resuming its campaign on 5 February, the League submitted to new Minister of Education TAKAHASHI a proposal that the base pay be increased by 25 percent and that a uniform ¥300 raise be given. In addition to regular allowances, the League further suggested a ¥200 allowance for each dependent of teachers living in one of the six big cities and ¥150 for the inhabitants of other localities.<sup>66</sup> The Ministry was not prepared to act favorably on these demands. Within a few days, a Zen Kyo Kyo delegation, at an interview with the Minister, reiterated its demands for the establishment of a higher base pay and for greater allowances. The Minister promised to study the suggestions.<sup>67</sup>

On 13 February the Government announced a temporary salary scale which would provide a 100 percent increase in the net pay of teachers earning ¥600 or less.<sup>68</sup> The Government promised to discuss the fixing of a permanent salary scale within a month.<sup>69</sup> The unions accepted.

The Zen Kyo Kyo pressed for further concessions. At the second interview with the Minister, collective bargaining was discussed, and on 8 March the Ministry of Education and the Zen Kyo Kyo signed a contract which estab-

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63. "MacArthur issues Order Against General Strike," Nippon Times, 1 February 1947.
  64. "Zen To and Kyo To Disbanded the General Strike Formation," Asahi, 2 February 1947.
  65. Central Campaign Committee, Zenkoku Kyoin Kumiai Kyogikai, "Declaration," 1 February 1947.
  66. Kyoin Zenkoku Kumiai Renmei, "Demands Presented to the Ministry of Education," 5 February 1947. See Appendix G-7.
  67. "Zen Kyo Kyo Proposal to the Education Minister," Asahi, 11 February 1947.
  68. "Net Income ¥1,100," Asahi, 14 February 1947.
  69. "The Premier Asked for Union Acceptance of Temporary Salary Scale," Asahi, 21 February 1947.



lished the union as a bargaining agent for its own membership.<sup>70</sup>

The Ministry agreed to abolish salary discrimination based on sex, to reduce the teaching load to forty pupils to a class, and to broaden health and welfare facilities for teachers.<sup>71</sup> Three days later, the League entered into a similar contract with the Ministry.<sup>72</sup>

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70. "Collective Bargaining between the Education Minister and the Zen Kyo Kyo Concluded," Asahi, 11 March 1947.
71. Hatsu Gaku No. 127, 19 March 1947. See Appendix H.
72. "Collective Bargaining Between the Education Minister and the Kyo Zen Ren Concluded," Asahi, 13 March 1947. This contract, with the exception of a few variations in phraseology, was the same as the contract with Zen Kyo Kyo. See Appendix H.



## Chapter 13

## AMALGAMATION OF THE UNIONS

The intervention of SCAP in the strike defeated the tactics of the unions, and induced an apparently more conciliatory attitude on the part of the Zen Kyo Kyo.<sup>1</sup> When the League suggested that efforts to effect the merger of all teachers' unions be renewed, the Zen Kyo Kyo approved.<sup>2</sup> During the month of April, when the unions were conducting preliminary discussions, a government committee on educational reform recommended the establishment of a society similar to the Japan Education Association. The League and the Zen Kyo Kyo, interpreting the proposal as a threat to the unions, issued a joint protest. In like manner, both unions joined to seek clarification on some points in their contracts with the Ministry of Education. "These two joint actions by the unions were useful in accelerating amalgamation."<sup>3</sup>

Committees to expedite the amalgamation of the unions concluded the necessary arrangements; each organization indicated readiness to send delegates to the city of Iara, where the Grand Amalgamation Meeting was to be held on 8 June 1947. Independent teachers' unions expressed their intention to join.<sup>4</sup>

The failure of the unions to keep records makes it impossible to chart reliably the growth in membership.<sup>5</sup> By

1. NAKANISHI, Yasaburo, former secretary, Tokyo To Koku-min Gakko Kyoin Kumiai, "Reply to Questionnaire," 26 June 1947.
2. "Proposal for Merger of Two Unions Voiced at Kyo Zen Ren Convention," Asahi, 24 February 1947.
3. Conference: NARITA, Yoshihide, vice-secretary, Nihon Kyoshokuin Kumiai, 19 July 1947.
4. Ibid.
5. Civil Information and Education Section, SCAP, Membership in National Teachers Unions, 184-CS-D, 29 October 1946. See Appendix I.



the same token, financial statements were "vague and inaccurate."<sup>6</sup> Nevertheless, when the Nara convention opened, it appeared that unionization had embraced nearly all of the 400,000 teachers in the country. The Zen Kyo Kyo had a membership of 278,500; the League, 98,500. The unaffiliated unions accounted for the remainder.<sup>7</sup> On 8 June 1947, the teachers' unions merged into one national organization, the Nihon Kyoshokuin Kumiai (The Japan Educational Personnel Union),<sup>8</sup> or Nik Kyo So.

The election of officers favored conservative leaders, although a few known Communists won posts. The program of the new national union also indicated a victory for the conservatives. Recognizing the strike as a weapon for labor unions, the Nik Kyo So assumed the position that its use was to be avoided as far as possible. The Nik Kyo So also rejected the Zen Kyo Kyo union collaboration policy; it declined to join with other labor unions represented by the National Congress of Industrial Organization.<sup>9</sup> The general aim outlined by the Nik Kyo So is to promote democratic education and culture; the specific one is to advance the welfare of the teacher. A committee was appointed to negotiate with the Ministry of Education on the salary question.<sup>10</sup>

Thus, in the short time of a year and a half, the radical and conservative unions were brought together under central control. The amalgamation of these unions was a confluence of two basically antagonistic trade union philosophies. The one, represented by the Zenkyo and its successors, waged a campaign which utilized demonstrations and unconventional methods to attract sympathetic public attention. At the same time, the Zenkyo program sought to institute social as well as educational reform by cooperating with labor unions and by participating in politics. The other, held by the conservative unions, was that a union should confine its endeavors to improving the status of its member. It rejected both the theories of class struggle and political action which might

6. Civil Information and Education Section, SCAP, Financial Statements of the Tokyo Teachers' Unions, 168-SR-(5)-D, 18 December 1946.
7. NARITA, 22 August 1947. See Appendix J.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. NARITA, as cited.



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infringe on the prerogatives of government.

The initial successes of the radical union may be attributed to its aggressive leadership, but the final success of the conservatives in gaining control over the amalgamated unions indicates that the majority of the teachers accept a nonrevolutionary program.



## Appendix A

RETAIL PRICES OF SELECTED ARTICLES  
Tokyo, 1937-1942

Year	Medium Quality Rice 10 kg	Wheat Flour 100 Monne	Soy Beans 1 Sho	Radishes 100 Monne	Pork 100 Monne	Mackerel 100 Monne
1937	¥2.858	¥.096	¥.354	¥.027	¥ .686	¥.109
1938	2.873	.100	.432	.037	.736	.150
1939	3.939	.115	.475	.031	.893	.163
1940	3.260	.125	.590	.046	.942	.199
1941	3.250	.112	.540	.040	1.000	.247
1942	3.250	.105	.540	.040	1.000	.218

Year	Seaweed 1 Jo	Bean Paste 100 Monne	Green Tea 1 Kin	Cats. 1 Pair	Shoes 1 Pair	Charcoal 10 kg
1937	¥.229	¥.062	¥1.760	¥1.632	¥ 9.190	¥ .933
1938	.230	.064	1.767	2.021	12.238	1.118
1939	.262	.068	2.023	2.354	13.555	1.229
1940	.374	.100	2.498	2.829	17.432	1.370
1941	.372	.100	2.867	3.067	22.091	1.479
1942	.390	.100	2.720	3.169	22.095	1.510

Extract from the Tokyo Bukka Oyobi Chingin Tokai, 1930-1942 (Tokyo Price and Wage Statistics, 1930-1942) issued by the Tokyo Shoko Kaigi Sho (Tokyo Chamber of Commerce and Industry), Tokyo 1943, pp. 36 ff.

Kilogram - 2.2046 lbs.

Monne - .132 oz.

Sho - 3.32 pts.

Jo - 10 sheets.

Kin - 1.32 lbs.