

BHAVAN'S BOOK UNIVERSITY

ESSAYS AND REFLECTIONS

BY

R. D. RANADE

Compiled by

B. R. KULKARNI



1964

BHARATIYA VIDYA BHAVAN

CHOWPATTY : BOMBAY

आ नो भद्राः क्रतवो यन्तु विश्वतः ।

Let noble thoughts come to us from every side.

— Rigveda, I-89-i

BHAVAN'S BOOK UNIVERSITY

General Editors

K. M. MUNSHI

R. R. DIWAKAR



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GENERAL EDITOR'S PREFACE

THE Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan—that Institute of Indian Culture in Bombay—needed a Book University, a series of books which, if read, would serve the purpose of providing higher education. Particular emphasis, however, was to be put on such literature as revealed the deeper impulses of India. As a first step, it was decided to bring out in English 100 books, 50 of which were to be taken in hand almost at once. Each book was to contain from 200 to 250 pages and was to be priced at Rs. 2.50.

It is our intention to publish the books we select, not only in English, but also in the following Indian languages: Hindi, Bengali, Gujarati, Marathi, Tamil, Telugu, Kannada and Malayalam.

This scheme, involving the publication of 900 volumes, requires ample funds and an all-India organisation. The Bhavan is exerting its utmost to supply them.

The objectives for which the Bhavan stands are the reintegration of the Indian culture in the light of modern knowledge and to suit our present-day needs and the resuscitation of its fundamental values in their pristine vigour.

Let me make our goal more explicit :

We seek the dignity of man, which necessarily implies the creation of social conditions which would allow him freedom to evolve along the lines of his own temperament and capacities ; we seek the harmony of individual efforts and social relations, not in any makeshift way, but within the frame-work of the Moral Order; we seek the creative art of life, by the alchemy of which human limitations are progressively transmuted, so

ESSAYS AND REFLECTIONS

that man may become the instrument of God, and is able to see Him in all and all in Him.

The world, we feel, is too much with us. Nothing would uplift or inspire us so much as the beauty and aspiration which such books can teach.

In this series, therefore, the literature of India, ancient and modern, will be published in a form easily accessible to all. Books in other literatures of the world, if they illustrate the principles we stand for, will also be included.

This common pool of literature, it is hoped, will enable the reader, eastern or western, to understand and appreciate currents of world thought, as also the movements of the mind in India, which, though they flow through different linguistic channels, have a common urge and aspiration.

Fittingly, the Book University's first venture is the *Mahabharata*, summarised by one of the greatest living Indians, C. Rajagopalachari; the second work is on a section of it: the *Gita*, by H. V. Divatia, an eminent jurist and a student of philosophy. Centuries ago, it was proclaimed of the *Mahabharata*: "What is not in it, is nowhere." After twenty-five centuries, we can use the same words about it. He who knows it not, knows not the heights and depths of the soul; he misses the trials and tragedy and the beauty and grandeur of life.

The *Mahabharata* is not a mere epic; it is a romance, telling the tale of heroic men and women and of some who were divine; it is a whole literature in itself, containing a code of life, a philosophy of social and ethical relations, and speculative thought on human problems that is hard to rival; but, above all, it has for its core the *Gita*, which is, as the world is beginning to find out, the noblest of scriptures and the grand-

GENERAL EDITOR'S PREFACE

est of sagas in which the climax is reached in the wondrous Apocalypse in the Eleventh Canto.

Through such books alone the harmonies underlying true culture, I am convinced, will one day reconcile the disorders of modern life.

I thank all those who have helped to make this new branch of the Bhavan's activity successful.

1, QUEEN VICTORIA ROAD,

NEW DELHI.

3rd October, 1951.

K. M. MUNSHI

INTRODUCTION

The present book is a collection of Essays and Reviews by the late Dr. R. D. Ranade. Some of the Essays included in this book were written by Dr. Ranade in his early days as far back as 1905 when he was a student for the degree course. These Essays written in his formative period exhibit the ease with which he could deal with a variety of subjects like philosophy, philology, literature and political economy. The Reviews here included, most of which were written before 1920, attest to his thorough knowledge of the subject as well as to his fully developed critical faculty.

It is but natural for the students of Dr. Ranade's thought to be anxious to read whatever has been written by him, be it a stray essay or a profound treatise on the Gita. I may express my deep gratitude to Shrimati Sitabai Ranade for handing over the Manuscript of the present book. I must equally thank Professor B. R. Kulkarni, Amolakchand College, Yeotmal, for carefully compiling this work. The Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan have taken pains in making the printing of the book perfect in every way including printing of Greek in Greek characters.

Thanks are also due to the various journals from which these Essays and Reviews have been selected and particularly to the Oxford University Press, Bombay, for their kind permission to include the critical review on Carlyle from their publication *Signs of the Times and Characteristics*, by Thomas Carlyle, edited by the late Dr. Ranade.

Camp Bombay :
July 17, 1964

R. R. DIWAKAR

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I

ON THE STUDY OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

I. Introduction: (a) **Objections against Indian Philosophy.** It is an irony of fate that India should have been most known for her philosophy, while her philosophy itself should have been most neglected. Various accusations have been brought against Indian Philosophy. One writer says it would be most desirable to call that study not "Philosophy" but "Sophistics"¹. Another speaks as if European Philosophy could safely afford to neglect it altogether, as it would, in no way, contribute to an illumination of the problems of the Philosophy of Europe. It has been variously damned as barren, dogmatic, *a priori*; its method has been called scholastic; its results have been estimated as unscientific; its mission has been said to be an evangel of idleness. From various standpoints, it has been dubbed pessimistic, rigoristic, deterministic; it looks upon the world as it would look upon darkness; it fosters a cloistered virtue; it preaches an entire mechanism of morals. To these and other estimates of Indian Philosophy in particular come to be added all the charges that can be hurled against philosophy in general, and all philosophy in one mass comes to be included among those branches of human activity which least contribute to the relief of man's estate.

(b) **Reasons for these objections: ignorance and neglect.** It is not our aim here to answer what can be said against philosophy in general: our present concern is with Indian Philosophy itself. We do not deny *in toto* what has been said about Indian Philosophy; we only say that the charges which seem to have been made against Indian Philosophy as a whole

1. Hall: *Index to the Bibliography of the Philosophical Systems of India*: Preface.

are only partially true and that too of particular systems of Indian Philosophy. There is an idea current, to which we shall have occasion to draw our readers' attention at a later stage, that Indian Philosophy is a "Block Philosophy"; that it does not allow of any differentiations; that it represents but one system of philosophy. No greater injustice can be done to Indian Philosophy than making such an assertion about that Philosophy; and having made this, estimating the whole of Indian Philosophy by that criterion, and grossly exaggerating that estimate. Though, therefore, there might be a grain of truth in the bushel of other unqualified criticism which has been passed upon Indian Philosophy, we beg to point out that the criticism is unqualified, mainly because it is founded upon ignorance, and that this ignorance itself is the necessary outcome of a general neglect in which the study of that Philosophy has unfortunately fallen.

II. Causes which have helped the neglect : (a)
There is no interpretation and correlation. We say 'neglect' deliberately; for in spite of the large oriental output made in these days by countries interested in Sanskrit learning, the fact remains that the nature of this output is more philological than philosophical. More interest has been taken in tracing the history of words than in interpreting the meaning of ideas. Numerous scholars have exhibited their 'textual' and 'translative' geniuses, if we might use these words. Far more attention has been devoted to the production of 'critical' editions of works and to the 'translations' of these, than would seem ordinarily justifiable. The result of this has been that while we have had tolerably good texts or translations, we rarely meet with 'interpretations', and never with 'correlations' and 'constructions'. To illustrate what we mean, we have only to cite Dr. Thibaut's translation of the philosophy of Rāmānuja. Well, the translation is good; but neither Dr. Thibaut nor any of his successors has thought it

worth while to 'interpret' the meaning of Rāmānuja. Translations are always bound to be uncouth ; they are like a heavy cart-load which moves slowly along. No European philosopher would like to spend his time in moving slowly through the intricate mazes of the translation. He had rather neglect it altogether than try to understand it with so much trouble. What he wants is not a translation of Rāmānuja, but an interpretation of the meaning of Rāmānuja. What has Rāmānuja to say about the Absolute? What are the relations of the Absolute to God in his system? How is God connected with the human souls and the objects of nature? These are the questions which interest him : these he would like to be 'interpreted' to himself. He would, moreover, like to have made for himself a 'correlation' of the views of Rāmānuja, if possible, with the views of any great philosopher of Europe, so that he might be able to understand the points of resemblance. It is only when he understands how the system of Rāmānuja closely resembles the theism of Dr. James Ward that he begins to take a reflex interest in the philosophy of Rāmānuja. And lastly, when an interpretation and a correlation have been made possible, it is then time for a new 'construction'. Philosophy lives only when it constructs; it dies away when it lives in stagnant water. And, a European philosopher would not think it below his dignity to give attention to any new construction that might be forthcoming even from an Indian scholar. But these three latter processes—interpretation, correlation, construction—require a thorough understanding of European Philosophy; and a Sanskrit scholar would not ordinarily like to have an extra load put over him in that direction. And thus we find the curious spectacle of European Philosophers not caring for Indian translations, and Indian scholars not caring for European Philosophy.

(b) A complete history of Indian Philosophy non-existent. This is one of the main reasons why Indian

Philosophy has come to be neglected. There occasionally arises a Deussen or a Max Muller, who understands the philosophies in both parts of the globe, and who therefore tries to correlate them. But the names are so few, and the attempts have been so partial, that no comprehensive attempt has hitherto been made to write a whole history of Indian Philosophy from the ancient times of the Upanishads to the present day mysticism of Rabindranath. In this connection, one can only contemplate with joy that Dr. Deussen has already completed his two parts of the 'Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie' and has projected a third volume, thus intending to treat after the Vedic and the Upanishadic philosophy, the so-called classical philosophy of India. Not one or two, but various such attempts are necessary to represent Indian Philosophy in its manifold aspects. Garbe, Gough, Rhys Davids and Jacobi have indeed treated those systems of Indian Philosophy which appealed to them most, such as the Sāmkhya and the Upanishads, Buddhism and Jainism and their efforts in that direction are very commendable. But a whole history of Indian Philosophy is, as we said, the desideratum of the hour. The fact that Colebrooke's Essays on Indian Philosophy which were written more than a hundred years ago, the crabbed translation of the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* made by Cowell and Gough, and the *Six Systems* which were originally planned by Max Muller in the early sixties of the last century, have all hitherto remained classical pronouncements on Indian Philosophy in general, is a sufficient indication that no later scholar has thought it worthwhile to bestow his attention on the whole course of Indian Philosophy, and to interpret it not to the Indian world, but to the European world. Kapila and Vyāsa, Śankara and Rāmānuja have scarcely as yet secured their place beside Plato and Aristotle, Kant and Hegel, as Max Muller so fondly dreamt².

2. Max Muller : *Six Systems* (1912) : Preface : xviii, xix.

Scarcely has a co-operation been hitherto possible between European and Indian thinkers as he so much wished³. Thanks to the Government of India Sanskrit scholarships, we are recently having certain independent interpretations from England-returned scholars on such subjects as the Indian Realism⁴ or the Doctrine of Māyā⁵, published only recently. Such monographs would be the only true preliminaries of a history of Indian Philosophy and we request all Indian scholars who take an interest in Indian Philosophy to cease 'translating'—the age of translation is gone—and to commence 'interpreting' the Indian systems in terms of 'European thought. Without a complete history of Indian Philosophy, we are, as it were, on a chartless sea; and he who would first write a complete history of that Philosophy might thereby confer a great boon on the study of that subject. Nor need the absence of any definite chronology be a serious impediment in his way. For though chronology is a chief ingredient in any history, it need not be the most important one, at least so far as the history of philosophy is concerned. It is entirely possible to write a history of the problems of philosophy as for example, Janet and Seailles have done in the case of European Philosophy. A 'Problem' history of Indian Philosophy might thus take the place of a chronological one.

(c) **The method of Sanskrit Philosophy itself partly responsible.** A third reason why Indian Philosophy has fallen into neglect is the method of Sanskrit Philosophy itself. The Indian Philosophers far more closely resemble the Germans than the Greeks. Their watch-word is cumbrousness, not simplicity. When one turns to a page of Rāmānuja or Kant from that of Plato, one can easily appreciate what we mean. Their hairsplitting subtleties, their difficult

3. Op : cit : Preface v, vi.

4. Chakravarti : *Indian Realism*.

5. Prabhu Dutt Shastri : *Doctrine of Māyā*.

constructions, their feigned objections and their equally feigned answers deservedly bring the Indian Philosophers on a par with the school-men; and had not their method of raising imaginary objections been imitated in modern times by such a lucid writer as Royce they would have had absolutely no redeeming trait, so far at least as the imaginary method was concerned! And we need not thus blame people when they charge Indian Philosophy with presenting an appearance not of progression, but retrogression, even of introgression. Then, the singular feature of Indian Philosophy of piling up commentaries over commentaries serves only to confound the readers; and when these commentaries are inaccurately printed as they usually are, they leave the confusion only worse confounded. The Sūtras, the Bhāshyas, the Bhāmati, the Kalpataru, the Parimala form a very interesting ladder indeed, but as we ascend higher on the scale, we descend lower in import. Words are confounded with things; explanation of the text is considered superior to the understanding of the problem; and the reader is left groping in the centre of the thicket without ever having discovered its circumference. Lastly, the constant appeal to authority takes the place of an appeal to independent reasoning and an argument is taken to be right because somebody advocates it, and not because, the author can speak from personal experience. And this is sure to irritate a man who may make reason his guiding light.

(d) **The unfounded charge that Indian Philosophy is a Block Philosophy.** The last and the most serious hindrance in the way of the progress of Indian Philosophy is the universal belief, born and bred in ignorance, that Indian Philosophy is a Block Philosophy, that it represents but one system of thought. And this philosophy has been designated Pantheism, Determinism, Pessimism, Asceticism. Mark, the system is supposed to be not *Pan—theism* but *Pan—theism*, and as such productive of different creeds. It does not lay

stress, it is said, on the "Theos", God, but on the "Pan", the World-all, and as such is not akosmism but atheism. Such a statement involves a double fallacy : in the first place, even if we suppose it to be one, it is not atheism but at most akosmism. Indian Philosophy, as a matter of fact, is as rich and varied as European Philosophy itself. It has many points of contact with Greek Philosophy, and the close resemblance which many of its systems bear to the metaphysical systems which are reigning in Europe at the present day, if just thought about, might strike a student with astonishment. It is just this understanding of similar points in the midst of dissimilar ones that constitutes the function of what we have above called the "correlation of philosophies." It is only when we understand that such a correlation with different systems is possible that we may give up the erroneous idea that Indian Philosophy is only Pantheism.

III. How a correlation can be made. It is with the view of showing that Indian Philosophy is as rich and varied as European Philosophy, that we wish to enter here on a brief correlation of different types of philosophy in India and Europe, and if the discussion seems to be somewhat too technical, we beg our readers to excuse us. It is not until we have shown that Indian Philosophy has such great similarities with European Philosophy that we can understand the importance of our own Philosophy : it is not until then, that we can understand the significance of Deussen's words "Indians, keep to your Philosophy".⁶ The correlation must necessarily be brief, and in order that this brevity may be attainable, we shall devote more attention to the similarities than to the differences.

(a) **In Metaphysics.** To begin with, we might note the great resemblances between the ancient metaphysical

6. Deussen: *Elements of Metaphysics*, Colonial Library; Macmillan.

systems of India, and the present metaphysical systems of the West. The Absolutism of Bradley has numerous points of contact with the Advaitism of Śankarāchārya.

(i) Śankara and Bradley. Both suppose that the Absolute is the only ultimate real. With both, God is different from the Absolute. With both, God is unreal as compared to the Absolute. Both consider that our souls, our bodies, the worldly objects that we see, are ultimately appearances. And both hold that Space and Time are only phenomenal, and are transcended in the Absolute. Such a dictum involves that the Absolute be super-moral, beyond good and bad. And we find that with Śankara and Bradley, the Absolute transcends moral relations. Moreover, with regard to the content of the Absolute, both Śankara and Bradley hold that it is of the nature of intuitive experience. It is usual to speak of Śankara's Absolute as being of the nature of the unconscious, but those who will think deeper will find that Śankara's Absolute is Sat, Chit, and Ananda, that is, Being, Thought and Bliss. Prof. Royce points out that though Bradley talks of a personal Absolute as being an intellectually dishonest conception, still Bradley's Absolute "despite all Mr. Bradley's objections to the self, escapes from self-hood only by remaining to the end a self".⁷ And if this interpretation be correct, Śankara's Absolute Consciousness, Bradley's Absolute Experience, and Royce's Absolute Person differ, if at all, only in names.

To show how close the resemblance is, let us take the following from T. Case: "Reality is one Absolute super-personal experience, to which the so-called plurality of things, including all bodies, all souls, and even a personal God is appearance—an appearance, as ordinarily understood, selfcontradictory but appearing to one spiritual reality

7. Royce : *The World and the Individual* I. p. 552.

reconciled".⁸ Would not a student of Sanskrit Philosophy take this as an exact description of Śankara's Philosophy? And yet it is about Bradley that T. Case is speaking. We thus see how very close Śankara, Bradley, Taylor and Royce are. Nor is Śankara a determinist as is ordinarily supposed. He does allow freedom to souls in the sense that they are free so far as they express the eternal purposes of the Absolute, and in this he is on a par with the other Idealists. The great difference between Royce and Śankara is that while the former says that the soul comes into existence in time, Śankara says that, seen from one point of view it is eternal, while seen from another and higher, it is merely an appearance as compared with the absoluteness of the Absolute which is Bradley's position. This, as the reader will see, is not determinism in the ordinary sense. What we have tried to represent is that Śankara's Philosophy may be best described as an Absolutism, or a spiritual Monism, but not as a mechanistic, deterministic Pantheism.

(ii) Ramanuja and Protestant Theism. Other philosophers we must treat more briefly. Rāmānuja's system which is a numerically pluralistic but a qualitatively monistic system, has its best parallel in the theism of Prof. James Ward, and in personal Idealism generally, represented by such writers as Rashdall. Rāmānuja's Absolute is God and the world, the world including the souls. Such is also the theism of James Ward⁹, and of Protestant Christianity generally. William James has a clever remark in his *Pragmatism*, where he talks of the "pantheism" of the Anglo-Hegelian school "having influenced the more studious members of our Protestant ministry, and

8. T. Case: *Article Metaphysics, Encyclopaedia Britanica*. 11th Edition.

9. "The only absolute then that we can admit is the Absolute which God and the World constitute". *The Realm of Ends*, p. 242.

having already blunted the edge of the traditional theism in Protestantism at large"¹⁰. Christian theism is no longer the dogmatic scholastic theism of the Catholic church, but a pluralistic personal Idealism, and as such has very close resemblances with the philosophy of Rāmānuja.

(iii) **Madhva and Catholic Theism.** The Philosophy of Madhva, again, has a very close resemblance with the dogmatic Catholic theism above referred to. There is a plurality of souls; only, that in Madhva these are eternal while in Catholic theism, they are created by the free act of God. The world is real. And God is a ruler of the world and the souls. The controversy between Madhva and Śankara can be very well paralleled by that between this dogmatic Catholic theism, and the Absolutism above discussed. Indeed Mr. Rickaby, a prominent writer in the Stonyhurst series, pledges himself in his introductions to give battle to Idealism of all kinds.

(iv) **Śāmkhya and Mc Taggart.** Coming to other systems, we find a great resemblance between the plural souls of the Śāmkhya without a ruling God, and the "system of selves or spirits, uncreated and eternal, forming together a unity but not a conscious unity" of the non-theistic Idealist, Mc Taggart¹¹. Both of these differ from the theistic monadism of Leibnitz, who postulates a God as pre-establishing the harmony between one monad and another and between microcosm and macrocosm. And, it is curious to find that while Mc Taggart's philosophy is non-theistic Śāmkhya is also *nirīśvara* (God-less).

(b) **In Epistemology.** There are many other correlations between Indian and European Philosophy, into which we do not here enter for want of space. Not only is metaphysical

10. James: *Pragmatism*, p. 17.

11. Rashdall: *Philosophy and Religion*, p. 123.

correlation possible, but also epistemological, logical and ethical. We can easily find parallels in European Philosophy for the nihilism of the Mādhyamikas, the subjectivism of the Yogāchāras, the Representationism of the Sautrāntikas, and the Presentationism of the Vaibhāshikas¹².

(c) In Logic. The resemblances between the Aristotelian Logic and the Logic of Gautama are written in such "text and capital letters that he who runs by may read them."

(d) In Ethics. The Hedonism of the Chārvākas may be paralleled by that of the Epicureans; the rigorism of the Bauddhas by that of the Stoics; and the three-fold ethical ideal of the Bhagavadgītā, namely, its activism, its ideal of duty, and its self-realisation by those of Eucken,¹³ Kant, and Green respectively. And the whole doctrine of the Bhagavadgītā can be set on a par with the teachings of the New Testament as has been done lately by a very sympathetic member of the English Church in his "*Soul of India*"¹⁴.

IV. Can India acquire its deserved place in the World's Thought? We have thus briefly seen how a correlation of Indian and European philosophies is possible. It is only when a philosophical Plutarch gives to the world a comparative estimate of Indian and European philosophy that the philosophy of India will come to have its deserved place in the world's philosophy. We have seen that it is the duty of Sanskrit scholars to interpret the philosophies of India in terms of European thought. Then alone is it possible that the philosophers of Europe will begin to take interest in Indian Philosophy. What we henceforth want is a collaboration of a Royce and a Lanman, or if possible a combination of them in single individuals like Dr. Deussen. We want people to

12. Cowell and Gough : Translation of *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*, p. 15.

13. Eucken : *Philosophy of life* : People's Books, p. 41.

14. Howell : *Soul of India* (1913).

pierce the rind and reach the kernel, to leave the method and reach the spirit of Indian Philosophy. Let not the dogmatism of method turn away the minds of men from reaching the inner meaning of Indian Philosophy. That meaning we assure them, they will find to be rich and varied : it will favourably compare with the meaning of any philosophy in the world. In this way alone is a true revival of Indian Philosophy possible. We want anthropologists to take interest in Indian Philosophy as a chapter in the world's thought ; we want comparative philosophers who will relate Indian Philosophy with European thought ; we want lovers of truth who would value Indian Philosophy *per se*. Indian Philosophy need not be judged by the utility it may confer on man ; the Sun may not be judged by the quantity of gas he saves us. Indian Philosophy may not bake any bread ; but like its compeer philosophies, it will give man God, Freedom, Immortality. Even if we choose to look at it from the pragmatic point of view, it may be confidently asserted that it will give satisfaction no less than any other philosophy of the globe.

II

LANDMARKS OF INDIAN POLITICAL ECONOMY

INTRODUCTION

I am going to read before you to-day a paper on the "Landmarks of Indian Political Economy." I am conscious of my inability to do complete justice to the subject; and if it is at once vast and difficult and therefore beyond comprehensive treatment at my hands, the only excuse I will plead will be its vital importance to India. Carlyle tells us that Political Economy is a dismal science; Comte is perfectly convinced that it is no more than a sterile contention of words, and Harrison speaks of its being banished to the moon. And yet what Carlyle, Comte and Harrison say is only applicable to the 'laissez faire' system of economics; an economics whose watchword is competition, which wholly deals with an imaginary state of affairs, and which "looks back on the past with limitless contempt;" which, being all matter and no form, cannot be adequately treated by the method of mathematics, which is all form and no matter; whose essence is Individualism and not Nationality, which considers all state regulation as a check on liberty, and whose one absorbing theme is cheap production without any reference to its final cause. The hey-day of Orthodox Economics is gone; it is gone perhaps never to return. Fresh ideas have been started, and nationalistic doctrines are being preached. People have begun to understand that nations live in coats-of-mail, and philanthropy in politics is being considered a piece of divine imbecility. True Political Economy has been recently "built on the rock, and the rest have been tossed on the waves of

time.” “The past has become the mightiest teacher to the future ; looking back on the tombs of departed errors, people have beheld by the side of each the face of a Warning Angel.” If they condemn Liberalism because it is too individualistic, they also condemn Socialism, because it expects too much from the State. Eminent political economists have brought economics down from the moon (as Harrison would say) to converse upon the earth ; and we see its tenement in the press as on the platform, in closets as in councils.

Now, Indian Political Economy is rather too vast a subject to be adequately treated in a morning's paper ; hence, the necessity of dealing with its landmarks. These landmarks themselves were so numerous, that I was obliged to select only a few of them. The Permanent Settlement, Indian Free-trade, Indian Finance, Socialistic India, the Economic Drain, the Currency Question, the Emigration Problem, Indian Banking and many others are all good points to handle. Of these I have only chosen (1) the Permanent Settlement, (2) Free-trade and India and (3) The Currency Question.

Those of you who are outside the temple of Political Economy will forgive me if I am obliged to use words which seem technical and superstitious ; and those of you who are inside the temple—as I see most of you are—will kindly correct me, if my ideas are profane and irreligious.

The Permanent Settlement

The year 1793 is an important year in the annals both of France and India. In France, people were roused to action by the liberty-theory of Montesquieu, Rousseau and Voltaire ; in India, the equality-theory roused Francis, Cornwallis and Shore to a liberal measure. In the one case, poverty made the revolutionary war ; in the other, a war was made against poverty, and its atrocities were minimised in Bengal. I hope to make these points clear as I proceed ; and before doing this,

I shall give the history of the Permanent Settlement for better judgment of the criticism.

Lord Cornwallis came to India with full instructions from the Court of Directors. He had previously come to grief in America, and was intent upon winning his lost prestige by his career in India. The attempts of Philip Francis in 1776 to make a permanent settlement, and his representations to the Court of Directors bore fruit in a period of ten years; and the Directors, in their letter to Cornwallis in 1886, advised him to make such a settlement.

Then came the famous minute of Sir John Shore in 1789. In it, he referred to the revenue settlements that had been made by Todar Mall in 1582 and by Jaffer Khan in 1722. By these settlements, says Shore, "Specie, comparatively scarce in Akbar's reign, was poured into the country through new channels." Sir John Shore then points out that since the acquisition of Bengal by the Company, the country was being exhausted of its silver, and that such a step, as a permanent settlement, was absolutely necessary for replenishing the resources of the people. A settlement with the Zamindars, says Shore, would be far more beneficial than a settlement either with the ryots, or with the farmers of the revenue. "I consider the Zamindars" says Shore "as the *proprietors* of the soil, to the property of which they succeed by right of inheritance, and the sovereign authority cannot justly exercise the power of depriving them of the succession." "Removed from the control of the Government the distance of half the globe, the property of the inhabitants ought to be secured against the fluctuations of caprice, and the license of unrestrained control." "The security of the Government with respect to the revenues" continues Sir John Shore "can be established by making a permanent settlement with the Zamindars," and a maximum of taxation can be obtained by greatly increasing the rent. Shore wanted to make the

settlement for a period of ten years certain, *but* with a view to permanency. Lord Cornwallis objected to this, and said that such a step might indicate the uncertainty of the policy of the Government. Cornwallis argued, moreover, like Arthur Young "the magic of property will turn sand into gold." "One-third of the Company's territory in Hindustan" says Cornwallis "is now a jungle, inhabited only by wild beasts. Will a ten years' lease induce any proprietor to clear away that jungle? Twenty years have been employed in collecting information... Voluminous reports have been transmitted by the various collectors." The assessment of his settlement, said Cornwallis, would be *double* the assessment of Jaffar Khan's, and *treble* that of Nandkumar's. "The assessment was, therefore, as severe as could possibly be made; and it was possible to raise it so high, because it was declared to be final and permanent." The permanency of the Settlement was proclaimed in 1793.

Such, then, is the text on which the following remarks are based. By the permanent settlement, the Zamindars were obliged to pay a *definite amount* of land-tax to Government, year after year, without the fear of having that amount raised by any means. In 1793, the amount they had to pay formed 90 per cent of the rent they obtained from their tenants for the use of their land; now, the same amount forms only 28 per cent of the rental of landlords. The result of this is that the Zamindars have become immensely rich. That the tenants have also profited by the step can be seen from the fact adduced by Dutt that since 1793, "there has never been a famine in permanently settled Bengal, which has caused any serious loss of life." The whole province of Bengal has been, in short, happy and prosperous.

Now, it is a fact that Cornwallis had English land-tenure on the brain. The idea of Cornwallis was that the Bengal Zamindar was like an English landlord. He consequently made the Zamindars of Bengal land-owners, and seriously dama-

ged the revenue of the State. Government cannot now increase its revenue in proportion to the increase of fertility of the soil.

We are inclined to think that it was not the liberal tendency alone of Cornwallis, which induced him to take such a step. The English dominion in 1793 was mainly restricted to Bengal. It is true that Cornwallis had beat the Tiger of Mysore in 1792, but he had not killed him. He might spring up at any moment and pounce on the Company, which was no lion in those times. The Maharathas were no inferior enemies of the British and were the masters of a much greater territory. The Sindia and Holkar ranged at will in Hindustan and might at any time rise against the English. The Sikhs might make head, and the Company would at any time be required to leave the shores of India. The consideration of self-defence and consolidation, therefore, might have weighed with Cornwallis in securing the hearts of the people of Bengal. Moreover, England was situated at a distance of 6000 miles from India, and aid from England could not be at hand, before seven months at least had expired. It is all very well to say in these days that Cornwallis took a step, which was prejudicial to the interests of the English; but, if we look into the circumstances of the case, we cannot blame Cornwallis for having acted as he did.

An excellent effect of the permanent settlement was that it created a well-to-do middle class. It created an influential nobility, which, as Bacon says, "is always a platform of good". Though the permanent settlement overlooked, to a certain extent, the interests of the ryots, and left them to the mercy of the Zamindars, still, on the whole, the ryots had prospered, because the Zamindars had, more often than not chosen to be patriarchs of their people. The permanence of tenure led to the improvement of land, and to the growth of agricultural

products; and the well-being of millions more than counterbalanced the disadvantages to the Government. The same settlement, then, which appeared a blunder to an Englishman, had endeared Cornwallis to thousands of Indians, and placed him on the pinnacle of fame.

Free-trade and India

“Economics minus Politics,” says an eminent authority “is the definition of free-trade.” The Orthodox Economists make a point of saying that Economics is a Science which is in no way connected with Ethics or Politics. As a matter of fact, it is the most complex of sciences. Economics minus politics is just as curious a ‘phenomenon’ as the play of Hamlet without Hamlet in it.

Now, the Mercantilists were a set of statesmen whose first object was “national independence,” and if there are any set of statesmen who have been continually and falsely abused, it is the Mercantilists. Money, said they, was the sinews of war. Their first object was to manage their commercial affairs in such a way that money should always keep coming in. They, therefore, tried to make their exports exceed their imports, so that more money should keep coming in, than going out. Smith and Ricardo misunderstood the principle of the Mercantilists, and attributed to them the manifestly false notion that money was the only form of wealth. As a matter of fact, the Mercantilists believed not that money alone was wealth, but that money was the *highest* form of wealth. Smith and Ricardo went to the other extreme, and said that money was no wealth at all. It is ridiculous to say that money is no wealth, because you cannot ‘eat’ it. In the Mercantilist age, people lived in coats of mail, and had to fight every now and then. Now, in times of war, every form of wealth other than money is comparatively useless. Napoleon the Great had made money his primary concern; the Russian

statesmen take care to see that the State has got an immense amount of gold and silver money in its coffers. All great statesmen always do the same thing.

This mercantile system has been acknowledged to be the opposite pole of free-trade. Free-traders—who are almost all of them liberals—make it a cardinal point to neglect nationality. They annihilate all the distinctions of different nations, and consider that the world is, as it were, only one nation consisting of homogeneous units. Their one object of care is the consumers, and they would not pay the slightest attention to the producers. It is true that manufacturing people are benefited in a country like England by free-trade, but the spirit of nationality departs from the free traders ;

“ Ill fares the land, to hastening ills a prey
Where wealth accumulates, and men decay.”

Now the East India Company was essentially a political body of traders, which first supplied cheap and valuable goods (such as silken cloth) to England. The artisans of England began to learn the art from the Indian products that were imported into England. And as they became skilled and began to supply English-made goods in England, there was no longer any necessity of importing foreign goods into the country. Heavy taxes then began to be levied on the imports of England, so much so, that a record case is cited when the Parliament put a tax of 85 % on the Indian Calicoes that were imported into the country. The Swadeshi spirit of the Englishmen was really admirable !

But times changed in India as well as in England during the middle part of the 19th century. The sun of Bright and Cobden was in the ascendant in England in 1846; and the moon of the Indian statesmen of the time shone by its reflected light. Bright and Cobden passed free-trade in England. Indian statesmen followed suit, and passed free-trade in India.

The prosperity of England which followed for a few years after 1846 made Bright and Cobden attribute it to their brilliant free-trade. As a matter of fact, this apparent prosperity was due to the discovery of gold mines in Australia and California, to the start which England had in the Commerce of Europe, to its scientific genius which could invent all possible kinds of machinery, to its highly organised system of banking and credit, and to its position as an Empire. Indian statesmen did not understand this, and thought in honest simplicity that what was true of England could also be true of India under any circumstances. They did not see that India was mainly an agricultural country and that free trade would, therefore, ruin her manufactures. They did not see that India was yet in her infancy, and that her industries should, therefore, be treated at least as their master, Mr. Mill, dictated to them. They were not aware of the deplorable absence of any banking or credit organisation in India ; they did not see that India did not possess an iota of Science ; and they shut their eyes to the dependent position of India. If, therefore, free-trade was passed in India, it was passed not in *her* interests.

The result of the introduction of free-trade in India has been the ruin of all the manual arts, of which India was so marvellous a repository. Our ancient weavers have gone ; our artistic workmen have disappeared. Government have of their own accord rejected the revenue, which they could have easily collected out of the exports and imports of the country, if they had chosen to be protectionists. The income-tax and the salt duty had, therefore, to be raised. Other countries such as Japan, China, Germany and America—to whom India owes nothing—even these countries have been given a direct advantage over the products of India herself !

And even as if all this was not enough, Lancashire cannot bear the prosperity of Indian cities and their products. Thrice

have the interests of India been sacrificed for those of Lancashire ; firstly, when free-trade was passed in India, secondly, when the proclamation was made of levying an excise-duty on superior Indian cloth and thirdly, when investigations were recently made concerning the Mill Labour Question. Lancashire cannot afford to see Bombay having such an amount of labour at such a cheap cost ; it has, therefore, recently exerted its utmost to reduce the working hours of Bombay mill-hands. Humanity is the stalking-horse behind which Lancashire aims jealously at the prosperity of Bombay.

The Swadeshi Movement, which, on all hands, is acknowledged to be the apostle of self-help, aims at the encouragement of indigenous industries. If Government cannot stop free-trade, why, the people of India have come forward to help themselves, and to see, as far as possible, that they buy no other goods than those which are made in India. The Swadeshi Movement thus strikes at the root of Free-trade, and tries to show to the world what private enterprise and combination can do in spite of the inadvertent policy of Government.

The Currency Question

“ The Currency Question, ” says Disraeli, “ has driven more people mad than the passion of love. ” It is one of the most difficult and intricate parts of Political Economy. And if, gentlemen, you do not find in my treatment of it much critical analysis, I hope, the difficulty of the subject will induce you to excuse me.

The Currency Question is so vitally connected with the subject of Bimetallism, that the treatment of the one will not be complete unless it is seen in its entire relation to the other. The history of this latter question began in 1797. England was then engaged in the war of the French Revolution. She had to advance a vast amount of specie to its continental allies for

the war with Napoleon. Year after year, large quantities of gold were transmitted to the continent from England, and in the course of a few years, she began to find that there was not enough specie left in the country for ordinary commercial transactions. The crisis was reached in 1797, when Pitt, assisted by the millionaires and financiers of London, declared the suspension of cash payment: that is to say, he declared that none was bound to pay coins in return for notes; he declared, in other words that the currency was inconvertible. And when the ordinary people found that it was not Pitt alone, but also the financiers of London, who had taken an active part in such a proclamation, they prevailed on themselves to accept the inconvertible notes, and began to look upon them as if they were gold and silver money. Time went on; Napoleon was defeated; the war with the French came to a successful close, and "Peace began to have her victories no less renowned than War." This was about 1815. An unfelicitous idea now struck Ricardo, who was a man in the money-market, and he began to question the authority of Pitt and his financiers, and asked why he was *bound* to take the inconvertible notes. Now it is a principle of finance that money is good only so long as people will take it, and it ceases to be money when people refuse to take it. Many people followed Ricardo in questioning the authority of Pitt in forcing inconvertible paper on them, and Sir Walter Scott rewarded these people by giving them the deserving epithet 'preposterous pedants'. The agitation went on for full four years and came to a head in 1819. Cash payments were now resumed, and the question came before the public whether gold and silver coins were both to be introduced as before 1797, or whether gold currency was to be kept, and silver ousted from the currency of the country. Peel, the one aim of whose life was to pander to the interests of the

“ money-bags ” of England, passed the Law of Single Currency in 1819, and silver ceased to be legal tender except for small sums.

The mischief thus set afoot by Ricardo did not take a rapid course; but yet, when it did take its course, it was the cause of many dire consequences. It was not till 1873 that Germany, the proud conqueror of France, determined to follow England and to establish a monometallic standard. Elated by her successes over France, Germany set to work to oust silver from her currency, and she almost succeeded in this object, but only at a very great cost. Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Austria and Spain all followed suit. The members of the Latin Union, however, in connection with America, have ever since been the advocates of Bimetallism, because they have been unwilling to incur the enormous expenses of establishing the single gold currency. Monetary conferences have been held from time to time on the Continent; and England has persistently refused to give up her Single Gold Currency. The members of the Latin Union have consequently *closed their mints to new silver coinage*, though they have not deprived the existing silver coins of their position as legal tender.

Now, let us hear and refute, if possible, what the monometallic countries have to say on their behalf. They say that the price of silver has not gone down at all; it is gold which has risen in value. They contend that the fixing of the relative value of silver and gold coins by Law is as ridiculous as the determination by Law of the price of any commodities. They assert that in a Bimetallistic country, the prices of all commodities are influenced both by gold and silver, and are, therefore, more unstable than in countries where they are influenced only by gold. They say that *Universal Bimetallism* is a dream; and that if only a few countries were to declare for

Bimetallism, Gresham's Law would come into operation and drive away *that* one of the two coinages in the country, which is intrinsically more precious than its market value ; and that, therefore, only the other coinage will remain in the country, thus compelling it to turn Monometallistic. Finally, with an overweening vanity they assert that *they* are the God's anointed ; that gold coins are reserved for rich countries like themselves ; and that silver coins are meant for poor countries like India.

The very statement of these arguments carries with it its refutation. When Giffen says that silver has not gone down at all and that it is only gold which has risen, he does not look to countries like India, which mostly use silver. He will realise in such countries the truth of the contention that silver has dropped as if from a cliff. Nor will he for a moment dare to say that Law cannot fix the relative value of gold and silver coins, if he opens his eyes to the fact that Government can do more impossible things, if only its credit is stable ; for example, he may look to the history of inconvertible notes. He does not see that Universal Bimetallism is not a dream. Can he not recollect that it was Bimetallism which had prevailed all over the world from time immemorial down to the ill-starred Law of 1819? Nor could Gresham's Law come into operation if *all* countries were bimetallic. The fact is that monometallism is a rash and theoretic change ; the testimony of the whole world from time immemorial is against it, while the greatest argument that can be brought in favour of a Double standard is that it exerts a healthy, compensating influence. When gold becomes scarce and a person has to pay his debts, he can resort to silver and vice versa. Bimetallism exercises a compensating influence like a chronometer, the spring of which is made of two different metals. As weather changes, one metal expands, while the other


contracts, so that the length of the spring remaining the same, the watch goes on regularly.

Cernuski, the veteran hero of Bimetallism, has proved beyond question that a double standard is most practicable and desirable. And one is inclined to think that even the sternest monometallists might be questioning the truth of their own policy in their private moments. Notwithstanding, almost all the nations of Europe have persisted in their policy of monometallism. It is a long time since the wheel of civilization and power has turned from the Orient to the Occident. All the states of Europe are now creditor states, and the rise of the value of gold means a gain to them. England, especially, receives interest and tribute from half the world; and it is to her interest that she should receive it in gold rather than in silver. Moreover, the destinies of the continent are now-a-days wielded by the financiers of Europe. If ministers like Balfour, who believe in Bimetallism, dare to speak a word against the existing single standard, financiers will ask them to walk out of office. Poets associate iniquity with Mammon, and these financiers are the aptest illustration of the subject.

The connection, which this discussion about Monometallism and Bimetallism has with the currency of our country, is very interesting. The Law of 1835 established *silver* Monometallism in this country, and mints became open to the coinage of silver. As silver ceased to be currency in Europe after 1873, immense quantities of it began to float in the market; and these began to find an inlet in countries which used silver money. Moreover, the supply of silver being immensely greater than the demand, it greatly fell in value. Not only did India, therefore, find to her surprise that large quantities of silver had crept in the country, but also that this silver had greatly fallen in value. Compared with silver, again, gold began to rise all over the world. India was,

therefore, obliged to pay a greater amount of Rupees for her imports than in former times, because, a Rupee, which had previously exchanged for two shillings, now began to exchange for a shilling and two pence. There was again, an uncertainty involved in the trade of India with other countries on account of the constant fluctuations in the value of the Rupee, and this uncertainty tended to diminish her trade, and to hamper the flow of British capital into the country. But India received "the most unkindest cut of all" in the so-called "Home-charges". It had been promised that these would be paid in gold, and India had to suffer a heavy indemnity by the rise in the value of the metal.

All these causes led to the Act of 1893 of the Indian Government whose avowed object was the artificial appreciation of the Rupee. This act made both gold and silver coins legal tender, and fixed the relative value of the Rupee and the Pound. It declared that, thenceforth, a pound was equivalent to fifteen Rupees only. It closed the mint either to gold or to silver coinage; this meant that no individual could obtain coins for his bullion, even after paying the Seignorage; nor could he obtain a pound from the mint even after paying fifteen Rupees. This closing of the mint "has been likened to a *coup d'etat* and has been said to be an extraordinary exercise of arbitrary power." But we must pass over all the economic and political controversies of which that arbitrary action has been the occasion, as being too near us to be judged correctly. The object of the closing of the mints was not at first obtained. Before the passing of the Act, a Rupee had been equivalent to 1s. and 2d. only; but it required three or four years for the Rupee to rise to 1s. and 4d.; from that time, indeed, the Rupee had kept up its value with but slight oscillations. Though the rise in the value of the Rupee has been a curse to borrowers, still it must not be forgotten that the closing of the mint, by



discouraging the coinage of silver, has also indirectly discouraged the importation of silver bullion. The Act of 1893 has partly given us *desideratum* of all currency, namely, its stability, though the "limping Bimetallism" which it has introduced cannot be so beneficial to us as pure Bimetallism. May the day come when the greed of the financiers and the creditor-states makes room for the considerations of equity and justice, and when Universal Bimetallism is gloriously re-established!

Conclusion

Thus far have I dealt with the three points selected for the paper of this morning. I should now like to note in brief the important changes that our contact with the West has introduced in the Economics of this country. It has taught us the principle of Nationality, of which the Swadeshi movement is only one phase. It has made us aware of the magnificent achievements of mechanical genius. It has taught us that unless we acquire the Science of the Westerns, we must lag behind in the race of material progress. And though this progress cannot be regarded as the highest form of progress, still no one can deny that it has its own advantages. The teachings of the Western Socialists have found their practical illustration in India, so far as they concern with the nationalisation of land, and the successful management of the railways, the Telegraphs and the Postal Department by the State.

But our contact with the West has not failed to bring on economic evils in its train. Our finance has been modelled on the lines of Western nations; and our national debt of 200 millions is an evil which India never knew before. The Liberty–Equality theory of Europe has not failed to approach India; and it is striking at the root of the caste system, and depriving us of its economic advantages. Napoleon said of this theory that if it found a nation of granite, it would reduce it to powder. Our contact with the West has moreover

introduced ' Strikes' in this country, which India never knew before, because her economic system was not based on competition and freedom, but on custom and protection. India has, again, seen the introduction of Banking and Credit on a large scale, with all its attendant boons and curses ; and we even now hear of panics and the breaking of banks, as in the case of the Arbuthnot failure a few months ago. And lastly, our contact with Europe and the theory of the survival of the fittest have forced on us machines and engines, vomiting forth huge clouds of jetblack smoke, which also were foreign to ancient India. And if, these machines have contributed to the relief of man's estate, let it not be forgotten that they have been a curse to Nature, a curse to the labouring class, and a curse to the sense of the Aesthetic. They have shown that civilisation is not an unmixed good. Sismondi has pointed it out ; Kingsley has pointed it out ; Ruskin and Disraeli have pointed it out. And I would very willingly err in such company, even if I were required to denounce outright the merits of material civilisation.

N. B. This essay was read before the Essay Society and has been re-written with some additions for the Quarterly.

III

GREEK AND SANSKRIT : A COMPARATIVE STUDY

§ 1 Introduction

In these days when classical scholars are bestowing deserved attention on the Græco-Indian problem*, and are proving the indebtedness of either the one country or the other, it may not be amiss to do a little sidework and consider the close similarities of the Greek and Sanskrit *languages*. The Græco—Indian problem is a matter of peculiar interest. The striking similarities of the pre-Socratic cosmogonies of Greece and the Paurāṇic cosmogonies of India, of Neo-Platonic mysticism and Yogic ecstasy, of the legend—conceptions in the Iliad and the Rāmāyaṇa, of astronomical names and conceptions like Jāmitra and δῆμιτρον, and in general the analogies of sculpture and dramaturgy in Greece and India—all these and more have turned the attention of classical scholars to the question of 'priority' in all these departments of human activity. Various theories have been advanced to prove the indebtedness of either the one country or the other. In our present Essay, however, we are immediately concerned with the very close resemblance existing between the two noblest *languages* of the world—Greek and Sanskrit. We shall notice *this* especially in this Essay, leaving the problem of philosophical resemblance to some future date.

Indeed, there have been enthusiasts even here, certain critics maintaining that the Sanskrit language "surpasses the Greek in all those perfections of form which have been hitherto considered the exclusive property of the latter" (Bopp), others holding that Sanskrit does but make poor show in com-

*I refer to such valuable attempts as Prof. H. G. Raulinson's forthcoming book on " *The Intercourse between India and the Western world* " published by Oxford University Press.

parison with Greek and going even to the length of saying that it is an unworthy "forgery" of the Greek language (Dugald Stewart). To both we answer that the worth of a language is not to be judged from the many grammatical "forms" which it can keep in service, but from the *literature* it embodies. It is merely admiring the rind, and not the kernel, to say that such and such a language can command such a lengthy list of forms. It is the soul and not the body which is worth loving, and he must be a poor admirer who loves the graces of the body, and not the beauty of the soul.

And considered from the point of view of literature, it is very difficult to say which of the Literatures bears away the palm. That is a question which I leave to more competent critics to decide. I shall be here directly concerned with the extremely close resemblances to Sanskrit language which can be observed even in a partial study of Greek. It is not without significance that when Western scholars first began the study of Sanskrit, they should have deemed that an entirely new and unoccupied field had opened up before them; and it is to the European study of 'Sanskrit' that the origin of Comparative Philology is to be traced. Indian scholars, on the other side, may have the same kind of feeling when they begin the study of the Greek language and it is their duty to contribute *their* quota to the study of Comparative Philology. Indeed, Philology has been generally supposed by people to be a subject almost as dry as dust; and as much of this censure is due to their own ignorance of other languages than their own, as to the usual habit of Philologers of not clothing their thoughts in flesh and blood. I shall, therefore, try to place before my readers as clearly and simply as possible the many points of resemblance between the two Languages; but I cannot help feeling that in the present attempt I may not be able to enlist the sympathies of those Greek scho-

lars who do not or will not learn Sanskrit, and also of those Sanskrit scholars who do not or will not learn Greek.

My apology for this Essay is that, in the first place when so much labour has been spent on showing the resemblances of Greek and *Latin*, comparatively little has been done to show the not *less* wonderful resemblances of Greek and *Sanskrit*. In the second place, though the problem of common *roots* has been handled ably in such books as Baly's *Eur-Aryan Roots*, not much has been done to note the points of *grammar*. Thirdly, there is no *concise* statement of the resemblances of Greek and Sanskrit. Bopp has intermixed reflections on so many other languages, that a scholar who wants to note the resemblances of Greek and Sanskrit only, does not know the wood for the trees in Bopp. I thought therefore that a concise and clear statement of the *salient* points might interest both Greek and Sanskrit scholars. I may add that the essay is based on an independent study of the languages. Indian scholars have been standing too much on other people's legs, especially on the legs of Germans. And an independent way of thinking will give the needed corrective to the there-is-a-lion-in-the-path policy of Indians.

I will make one or two more remarks before I come to the subject proper. I have throughout used the Greek and Devanāgarī characters instead of the usual Roman. It is as bad a policy to print Devanāgarī in Roman characters as, for example, to write Greek in Roman characters (which is, by the way, sometimes done by printers for want of type). If European scholars cannot read Devanāgarī fluently, why, they must cultivate the habit of reading the same. Do not Indian scholars at first find it difficult to read the German or the Greek alphabet? European scholars must pay the price of learning a new alphabet, before they begin the study of a language. The second remark that I wish to make is that it is

only the *Classical* Sanskrit Grammar that is being mainly compared in this Essay with the Greek and not the *Vedic* Grammar (except in the treatment of *accents*, which do not exist in classical Sanskrit). The Vedic Grammar was only a grammar *in the making*; and we cannot compare the established forms of Greek with those of a grammar which was only in the making.

§ 2 Alphabet

The alphabets of the two languages may be set forth in the following comparative scheme :—

अ	आ	इ	ई	उ	ऊ	ऋ	ॠ	ऌ	ॡ	ए	ऐ	ओ	औ	अं	अः
υ	α	ι	η	υ	ε	α, ο, ω, ου,
		क	ख	ग	घ	ङ	च	छ	ज	झ	ञ	ट	ठ	ड	ध
		κ	χ	γ
		च	छ	ज	झ	ञ
	
		द	ध	न	त	थ	द	ध
		द	ध	न	त	थ	द	ध
	
		प	फ	ब	भ	म
		π	φ	β
यू	इ	ल	व	श	ष	स	ह
...	ρ	λ	Ϝ	!
		ळ	क्ष	ज्ञ
	

The four Sanskrit vowels ऋ ॠ ऌ ॡ appear in no other language, for the simple fact that they are not *needed*. Speaking from the purely utilitarian point of view, their place can well be taken by ऀ and ॢ respectively. Every European knows by experience how hard it is for him to accustom him-

self to the pronunciation of these strange vowels. Hence, it is meet that they do not appear in Greek.

ऐ and औ ought to be merely *diphthongs* as they are treated in Greek, and not *pure vowels*.

ओ can be rendered into Greek by *o* or ω , but more properly by the latter; and there is no vowel sound corresponding to the *o* in Sanskrit.

अं and अः are no vowels at all, and are not recognised by Pāṇini; their places can be taken by the nasal and the aspirate respectively.

Among the consonants, it may be noticed that there is no consonant in Greek except the $\zeta = झ$, to take the place of the soft aspirates in Sanskrit viz. घ, झ, ढ, ध, भ.

In Greek, no difference is made between the dentals and the linguals and they are fused together.

It may be noticed that γ before κ , γ , χ or ξ corresponds to the Sanskrit ढ.

No palatal exists in Greek except the ζ .

In Greek, there are no consonants answering to the Sanskrit य, श, ष, ङ and the double consonant ज्ञ. The Digamma of Greek (ϕ) corresponds to the Sanskrit व, the aspirate breathing does the work of ह. The double consonant $\xi (= \kappa + \sigma)$ is exactly the क्ष ($क + ख$) of Sanskrit. And though there is no conjunct consonant in Greek for ज्ञ, it has got a ψ , for which, except a coinable प्स, there is no recognised conjunct consonant in Sanskrit.

One may notice by comparing the two sets of alphabet, how very near the Greek alphabet is to the Sanskrit, much nearer than it is for example to the Latin, German and French alphabets. The division into Gutturals, Linguals, Labials etc. exists naturally in Greek, and can only be artificially imposed

upon the Latin alphabet; and thus it greatly resembles the divisions of Sanskrit Alphabets in the same groups.

§ 3 Accents

We now come to a very fundamental part of the Greek system viz. the accents. And the similarity and the difference of the Greek and Sanskrit accents have not been, to the best of my knowledge, previously noticed in detail. All, who have even a tolerable knowledge of the Vedas, know how integral a part the accents form in the Vedic system. The accents gradually dropped out of use; and what we have now is an accentless Sanskrit. It may be noticed that though it is customary even now to mark the accents in Greek *composition* (otherwise it would not be a scholarly composition at all), in pronunciation (e. g. in the English pronunciation of Greek) the accents are entirely ignored. And the time will surely come when the accents will be considered a mere encumbrance, a mere lumber, and will drop out of use even in composition. This seems to be what has happened in the evolution of the Sanskrit language, and writers like Mammata, the author of the *Kāvya-Prakāśa*, have said वेदे एव न काव्ये स्वरः अर्थविशेषप्रतीतिकृत् (Ullāsa II) : “ In the Vedas only and not in Classical literature are accents to make us conscious of a particular meaning.”

But both in Greek and Sanskrit, the origin of the accents is to be sought for in the necessity of showing to the unlettered many the particular pitch at which a letter was to be uttered. The Greeks actually did this for the sake of the ‘barbarians’; the Indians might have done it for the untutored inlanders. Another reason for the Indian accent was the prevention of text-corruption, by compelling a particular accent for a particular word, especially, when the Literature could only exist on the lips of people.

This soon degenerated in India, and we find a circumflex uttered at a higher pitch than the acute ! This never was so

in Greece. The acute retained its proper dignity and supremacy.

It may also be noticed that logically there can be only three accents, the acute with a high pitch, the grave with a low pitch, and the circumflex, representing a fusion of the two. This was what happened both in Greece and India. In Greek, the acute was marked ' ; in Sanskrit, it was curiously left *unmarked*. [By the bye, it may here be mentioned that Whitney has done real service to the cause of Sanskrit accents by *marking* them in the Greek fashion throughout his very learned grammar]. In Greek, the grave was marked ` ; in Sanskrit, it was marked with a line below. The circumflex in Greek was marked ^ ; in Sanskrit, it was marked with a vertical stroke above. It was this latter method of marking a circumflex with a vertical stroke in Sanskrit, that must have led to the undesirable higher pitch of the circumflex, to which reference has been made above.

But while the Greeks did not divide the circumflex into different varieties, this was what actually happened in India. The Indian circumflex was first divided into two varieties, the independent or organic circumflex, and the dependent or accessory circumflex. Then, each of these was divided into different sub-varieties; and these are too complicated to mention.

One point, however, which is common to the Greek circumflex and the Indian organic circumflex may be mentioned. The Indian organic circumflex, which maintained its character in all situations, could be on a *long* vowel or on a *short* vowel; thus रायो ३ वनिः or अस्त्र १ न्तः in the former case the numeral 3 was put, in the latter, the numeral 1. The Greek circumflex could, exactly like the Indian organic circumflex of the variety 3, exist only on a vowel *long* by nature or a diphthong. To the variety 1 of the organic

circumflex, and to the dependent circumflex, there is no parallel to be found in Greek.

Logically, again, in either language, there could be only *one* acute accent in a word. This was what happened both in Greek and Sanskrit. But there might be *short* forms, which might not claim their due of an acute accent. This also is the same in both languages, and in the case of *identical* forms. Thus while the Greek pronominal forms $\mu\epsilon, \mu\omicron\upsilon, \mu\omicron\iota, \sigma\epsilon, \sigma\omicron\upsilon, \sigma\omicron\iota,$ are entirely accentless, in the sense that they throw their accent on to the preceding word, their equivalent pronominal forms in Sanskrit are also accentless e. g. मा, मे, नौ, नः, त्वा, ते, वां, वः. While the *short* Greek words $\pi\omicron\upsilon, \pi\omicron\iota, \pi\omicron\tau\epsilon, \gamma\epsilon, \tau\epsilon, \nu\omicron\upsilon, \omicron\grave{\eta}, \omicron\grave{\iota}$ are also accentless, the *short* Sanskrit words च, वा, उ, स्म, इव, चित्, ह, are also without accent. The Greek Enclitics and Proclitics merge in the Sanskrit Atona proper.

But there is one peculiarity in Sanskrit which must be noticed. No word in Greek can have *two* acute accents. There *are* words in Sanskrit, especially the dual compounds, and infinitive datives in त्वै which have two acute accents, simply for the fact that the words take time in pronunciation; e.g. छावापृथिवी, अपभर्तवै. Just as the abnormally short forms have no accent, the abnormally long forms might claim two! This is an accent with a revenge.

In both languages, there is a change of accents, one into another, according to the necessities of declension, conjugation, or position in a sentence involving crasis or contraction. But while in Sanskrit, the acute never changes and holds always its imperial place, in Greek it changes into circumflex and even into grave. It changes into circumflex when e. g. $\tau\mu\acute{\eta}$ becomes $\tau\mu\grave{\eta}\varsigma$ and $\tau\mu\grave{\eta}$ i. e. in Genitive and Dative. It changes into grave when e. g. $\acute{\alpha}\pi\acute{o}$ $\tau\acute{o}\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon$ becomes $\alpha\pi\grave{o}$ $\tau\acute{o}\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon$. The only accents which change in Sanskrit are the grave and the circumflex (dependent). They both change into one another; and never do they become acute or vice

versa. In तेन for example, the grave न becomes circumflex; and in तेने ते the circumflex न of the former becomes again grave, by the necessities of position, into the details of which we need not enter at this place.

In crasis, however, there is an important difference in Greek and Sanskrit. In Greek, when crasis takes place, the accent of the first word disappears, and that of the latter takes its place; as κεί for κεί ἐί. In Sanskrit, the acute is always powerful irrespective of position.

The Verbs and Vocatives do retain an acute accent in Greek; in Sanskrit, both lose their acute accent. It seems that while Greek is right in the case of the verb, it is wrong in the case of the Vocative, which being treated like an interjection, ought, as in Sanskrit, to have no acute accent. Similarly, the Sanskrit usage for the *verb* seems to have no justification.

Moreover, the general process of the Greek accent may be described as a movement backwards, just as that of the Sanskrit accent is a movement forwards. The tendency in Greek, as is well-known, is to throw the accent as far back as possible; as λέγω and λέγεται; ἀνθρώπου, and ἀνθρώποι; the tendency in Sanskrit is to throw the accent as much further as possible; e. g. तु॒त्ता (the ता being accented). To this same tendency is to be traced the phenomenon of each of the later enclitics in Greek to throw the acute accent on to the preceding syllable, as ἐί τίς μοί φησί ποτέ, and the phenomenon of monotone (or as Pāṇini calls it एकश्रुति) of preceding grave accents in Sanskrit throwing the burden on to the later graves e. g. सु॒दशी'कसं॒दक, in which क throws its burden on to सं, and सं to द, until a halt comes as in सु॒दशी'कसं॒दगा॒त्राम्. There is only one exception to the above in the case of the possessive compounds in Sanskrit where accent is thrown backwards i. e. on the first member of the compound; thus, for example, the possessive compound सूर्य॑तेजस, "possessing the brightness of

the Sun " has the acute accent on स्र् ; while the same compound, if genitive, has the accent on ज.

§ 4 Sandhi

The so-called Elision, Contraction and Crasis in Greek are but different aspects of the same phenomenon, which is most appositely described by the Sanskrit word Sandhi (= combination). It is remarkable that this combination takes place both in the case of vowels and in the case of consonants in both languages, and the combinations also are identical. Thus, the student of Sanskrit may see remarkable coincidences to Sanskrit in the following Greek contractions :—

$\alpha + \epsilon = \bar{\alpha}$ cf.	तव + इन्द्रः	= तवेन्द्रः
$\alpha + \eta = \bar{\alpha}$ cf.	तव + ईशः	= तवेशः
$\alpha + \omicron = \omega$ cf.	हित + उपदेशः	= हितोपदेशः
$\alpha + \omega = \omega$ cf.	तव + ओष्ठः	= तवौष्ठः
$\epsilon + \eta = \eta$ cf.	रति + ईशः	= रतीशः

These are vowel-combinations. The consonantal combinations we shall have due occasion to notice further on, while we shall have to speak of consonantal declension and conjugation. The coincidences there will be found still more remarkable.

§ 5 Article

It is the duty of a philologist not only to notice the resemblances, but also the *differences* in the case of the languages under consideration. In so doing, he gives due attention to the respective genius of the languages, which made them develop in a particular way. Such a difference presents itself in the case of the Article. Out of the three classical languages, Sanskrit, Latin and Greek, it is only the Greek which shows the existence of the article; the first two have no article. Thus, while the function of the article is served in Sanskrit by the demonstrative pronoun, and while

the Latin *mensa* = table, *a* table, and *the* table, there is a distinct Definite Article in Greek, and has all the three genders : ὁ ἡ τὸ, and all the cases of the noun. But, even Greek does not show the existence of the Indefinite article, which is a particular feature of the modern languages of Europe: German, French and English. One does not know how to account for the existence of the Definite Article in Greek, while it is not to be found in the sister classical languages, Sanskrit and Latin.

§ 6 Declension

(1) We now come to the first of the two pillars of any Grammatical System, namely, the Declension of nouns, and the Conjugation of verbs. And here we might begin with the consideration of *cases*. Of all the languages of the world, Sanskrit shows the largest variety of cases; other languages show a comparatively smaller number. Thus, while Sanskrit shows 8 cases, Latin shows 6, Greek shows 5, and German and French only 4; while there is absolutely no declension proper in English, and there are no cases (the Nominative case in English is the so-called designation of the Subject, and the Accusative, of the Object; but because there is no variation of form in these, we might either say that there are no cases in English, or if at all, only one case). It may be noticed that in whatever language the cases are lacking, the function of these is served by prepositions. The Sanskrit cases are:—

Nominative.		Ablative.
Accusative.		Genitive.
Instrumental.		Locative.
Dative.		Vocative.

Of these, the Instrumental and Locative are lacking in Latin; (though there formerly existed a Locative in Latin, it has now dropped out). These together with the Ablative are lack-

ing in Greek. These three together with the Vocative are lacking in French and German.

We see from the above that a language retains only those cases which are vital to its existence, and we also see that the unused cases, following the law of Natural Selection, drop out in course of time. The four fundamental cases, therefore, seem to be the Nominative, Accusative, Dative and Genitive. The Vocative is properly no case; it is an interjection, often identical in form with the Nominative. The Instrumental, as in Greek, may safely merge in the Dative; *e. g.* the sentence "he kills the man *with* a stone" may be rendered by the Dative; τὸν ἄνθρωπον λίθῳ ἀποκτείνει. The Ablative may safely merge in the Genitive, as it has actually done in Greek, and as it already shows a tendency in Sanskrit to be often identical in form with the Genitive, *e. g.* सुहृदः is both Ablative and Genitive Singular. The Locative again may be identical with the Genitive, as in Greek and Latin. In the latter, the Locative forms *Romae* and *Corinthi* are the same as the Genitive forms. One very interesting consequence follows from this merging of the Locative in the Genitive in the Greek language. As we shall notice later on, the Genitive Absolute in Greek has striking similarities to the Genitive Absolute in Sanskrit; but, it may be noticed that there is a Locative Absolute also in Sanskrit. Now as there is no Locative in Greek, there is no Locative Absolute also; and as the Locative has merged in the Genitive, the Locative Absolute of Greek merges in the Genitive Absolute.

(2) With regard to *Number*, it may be noticed that Greek and Sanskrit are at one in having a Dual, and in this respect they differ from all other languages. Thus, there is no dual in Latin, German and French; and even Pāli and Prākṛit, which are otherwise so similar to Sanskrit, in this case follow the Latin in refusing to admit the dual. The origin of the dual in both Greek and Sanskrit is to be traced to the necessity of characterising things which necessa-

rily go in *pairs*, as the eyes, the ears, the hands and the feet ; and as these cannot be pluralised (unless it were in the case of Śiva who had got three eyes, and in the case of Rāvaṇa who had got 20 eyes, 20 ears, 20 hands and 20 feet, and to boot, 10 heads), it was found necessary to invent a new kind of number altogether. The dual has existed even from the times of the Veda, where a prominent use seems to have been made of it e. g. अश्विनौ, मित्रावरुणौ, द्यावापृथिवी, the last once more illustrating what we have said above that the dual necessarily was used about things like “ the heaven and the earth ” which went in *pairs* in human thought.

Another thing to be noticed both in Greek and Sanskrit is that when once the dual was introduced in the case of nouns, it was necessary to introduce it in the case of verbs also, as otherwise a *dual* subject might have a *plural* verb. Hence, we find the dual even in the case of verbs both in Greek and Sanskrit.

(3) Coming to Declension proper, we might divide it into vowel declension and consonantal declension, according as the stem ended in a vowel or in a consonant. In either case, in the latter possibly more than in the former, the resemblances between Greek and Sanskrit are very remarkable.

In the former case, as well as in the latter, the case terminations are almost identical with those in Sanskrit :—

ς for Nom :	Sing	corresponds to	स्
ν for Acc :	„	„	म्
ος for Gen :	„	„	स्य or स्
α or ω for Dat :	„	„	ए or य

So far in the case of Masculine nouns.

The feminine *consonantal* nouns are to be exactly declined like the masculine consonantals, both in Greek and Sanskrit, thus ὁ φύλαξ and ἡ μάστιξ are to be similarly declined, as well as भूमृत् *m* and दृषद् *f*.

The vowel feminines of the 1st declension in Greek end in $\bar{\alpha}$ or η , as $\lambda\bar{\iota}\rho\bar{\alpha}$ and $\tau\eta\mu\eta$, corresponding exactly to the vowel feminines of Sanskrit ending in आ and ई as भार्या and दासी, the Paninian terminations being टप् and डीप् or डीप्.

The Neuter of the second declension in Greek ends in ν (both for Nom : and Acc :) as $\tau\theta\delta\bar{\omega}\rho\theta\nu$, $\tau\theta\delta\bar{\omega}\rho\theta\nu$, corresponding exactly to the neuter of Sanskrit ending in स्, (both for Nom : and Acc :) as वनं, वनं.

The Neuter consonantals of the third declension in Greek take no termination for Nom : Voc : Acc : , and in other cases are similar to the Masculine, corresponding exactly to the neuter consonantals in Sanskrit, which take no termination for Nom : Voc : Acc : and in other cases are similar to the masculine. Thus $\sigma\bar{\omega}\mu\alpha$, $\sigma\bar{\omega}\mu\alpha$, $\sigma\bar{\omega}\mu\alpha$, $\sigma\acute{\omega}\mu\alpha\tau\omicron\varsigma$, $\sigma\acute{\omega}\mu\alpha\tau\iota$ correspond to गच्छत्, गच्छत्, गच्छत्, गच्छतः and गच्छते.

But more striking than any of the above resemblances are those which consonantal stems display in both the languages while *fusing* with succeeding consonantal terminations. Thus—

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \kappa + s, \gamma + s, \chi + s = \xi \\ \kappa + s, \gamma + s, \chi + s = \xi \\ \phi\acute{\upsilon}\lambda\alpha\xi\iota, \mu\acute{\alpha}\sigma\tau\iota\xi\iota, \acute{\omicron}\nu\theta\xi\iota \text{ corresponding to वाञ्छु} \\ \pi + s, \beta + s, \phi + s = \phi \\ \rho + s, \beta + s, \phi + s = \phi \\ \text{as in } \phi\lambda\epsilon\psi\iota \text{ and असु} \end{array} \right.$$

But while

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \tau, \theta \text{ and } \delta \text{ are dropped before } s \text{ in Greek,} \\ \text{स् is ,, after त्, थ्, द् in Sk. in} \\ \text{the Nom} \\ \text{and not ,, ,, ,, in the:} \\ \text{Loc:} \end{array} \right.$$

Thus $\lambda\alpha\mu\pi\acute{\alpha}\varsigma$ and $\lambda\alpha\mu\pi\acute{\alpha}\varsigma\iota$ may be contrasted with दृषत् and दृषत्सु , the स् being dropped in the first case and not dropped in the latter.

Other consonantal fusings we shall have occasion to notice under the heading Conjugation.

§ 7. Comparatives and Superlatives

In the comparison of adjectives again, we meet with resemblances which are extremely noteworthy :

The general terminations in Greek for forming Comparatives and Superlatives are $\tau\epsilon\rho\sigma$ and $\tau\alpha\tau\sigma$ corresponding to the Sanskrit तर and तम (how the म in the latter came to take the place of τ is a mystery !). Thus,

$\sigma\phi\acute{o}\varsigma$	$\sigma\phi\acute{\omega}\tau\epsilon\rho\sigma$	$\sigma\phi\acute{\omega}\tau\alpha\tau\sigma$
विद्वस्	विद्वत्तर	विद्वत्तम

But in Sanskrit, the terminations तर and तम are not restricted to adjectives as in Greek ; they are sometimes applied even

(a) to substantives :—

नृ	नृतर	नृतम
स्त्री	स्त्रीतरा	स्त्रीतमा

(b) to verbs (in the form of तराम् and तमाम्) :—

पचति	पचतितराम्	पचतितमाम्
cooks	cooks better	cooks best

(c) to pronouns :—

किं	कतर	कतम
which,	which of the two,	which of the many

(d) to nouns with case inflections :—

पूर्वाद्धे	पूर्वाद्धेतर	पूर्वाद्धेतम
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(e) and to adverbs, which finds a parallel in Greek :—

कथं	कथंतराम्	कथंतमाम्
नीचैः	नीचैस्तराम्	नीचैस्तमाम्
σοφῶς	σοφώτερον	σοφώτατα
σωφρόνως	σωφρονέστερον	σωφρονέστατα

Then, there is a second method of forming comparatives and superlatives in Greek by adding the terminations $\omega\nu$ and $\iota\sigma\tau\omicron\varsigma$, corresponding exactly to ईयान् and इष्ट; thus,

ἡδύς	ἡδέων	ἡδίστος
गुरु	गरीयान्	गरिष्ठ

These in both languages are *special* comparatives and superlatives.

In addition to the two methods above, there is a third arbitrary method of forming degrees of comparison quite irresponsibly : thus,

ἀγαθός	{	αμείνων	ἀριστος
	{	βελτίων	βέλτιστος
वृद्ध	{	श्रेयस्	श्रेष्ठ
	{	ज्यायस्	ज्येष्ठ

It may be noticed in these that it is not the terminations that are arbitrary, but only the *stem* assumed in either language, to which the terminations are applied.

§ 8: Numerals

We next come to the Numerals. The similarities noticed in the pronunciation of Numerals has been one of the stock arguments of philologists in favour of pointing out the common origin of languages. Thus, for example, the similar forms pointed out in the three languages, namely,

Sanskrit:	दश	एकादश	द्वादश	त्रयोदश
Greek:	δέκα	ένδεκα	δώδεκα	τρεῖς-δέκα
Latin:	decem	undecim	duodecim	tredecim

have been one of the chief foundations of comparative Philology. These similarities are not interesting grammatically, but, as I said, historically. One can scarcely deny the common origin of the Indo-European languages after a consideration of these.

But it is not this aspect that I want here to lay chief stress on ; it is neither that ordinals corresponding to these cardinals are similar in all the languages; but it is rather the fact that the human mind is seen in its constructive activity in the formation of the *adverbial* numerals. But this mind can go no further in this case than three or four paces, and then it leans on a crutch. Thus for example compare the following :—

<i>Greek</i>	<i>Sanskrit</i>	<i>Latin</i>	<i>German</i>	<i>French</i>
ἅπαξ	सकृत्	semel	ein mal	une fois
δῖς	द्विः	bis	zwei „	deux „
τρίς	त्रिः	ter	drei „	trois „
τετράκις	चतुः	quater	vier „	quatu „
πεντάκις	पंचकृत्वः	quinqües-eus	fünf „	cinq „

corresponding respectively to the English :—

once, twice,^e thrice, four times, five times. In Greek, the human mind takes three paces and then leans on the crutch of *κις*; in Sanskrit and Latin it takes four paces, and then leans on *कृत्वस्* and *eus* respectively; in German and French, it is absolutely lame and reclines on the crutch (*mal* and *fois*) from the beginning; in English, as in Greek, it goes three paces and then substitutes the ever-recurring “times.” The reason for this phenomenon is obviously that it is only the first 3 or 4 forms which are in constant *use* in any language; and in further forms, there is the grammatical red tape!

§ 9 Conjugation

(1) When we come to Conjugation, we come to even greater similarities than have been noticed in the foregoing pages.

The Auxiliary verb in both languages is identical, the stems being $\acute{\epsilon}\sigma$ and अस् respectively. The forms also which it undergoes are very often the same. For example

$\acute{\epsilon}\iota\mu\acute{\iota}$	is equivalent to	अस्मि.
$\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\acute{\iota}$	„	अस्ति.
$\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu$	„	स्मः
$\iota\sigma\alpha\nu$	„	आसन्.

In other forms, there is a difference.

(2) In Greek, as in Sanskrit, there are *three* voices : the active, the middle, and the passive, corresponding respectively to परस्मैपद, आत्मनेपद and what Whitney calls the य-class. Whitney, however, takes the passive not to be a Voice but a Conjugation; and in his opinion there are two voices in Sanskrit “as in Greek” (Whitney’s Grammar P. 200) ! However that might be, the passive of Greek is exactly the य-class of Sanskrit.

Now, exactly as in Greek, there are many roots in Sanskrit which belong to both the active and the middle voices; while there are others which belong to only the middle (i. e. आत्मनेपद). These latter in Greek are wellknown as Deponent verbs, in as much as they have “laid aside” their Active forms.

Now, a peculiarity of Sanskrit must here be noticed. Particular prepositions in combination with particular verbs change the voice of the verb altogether; e. g. गम् which is Active becomes Middle when the preposition सं precedes; on the other hand, रम् which is Middle becomes Active when the prepositions वि, आ and परि precede. Thus we see how prepositions have the power to deprive verbs of their original voice.

It may also be noticed that in Greek, as in Sanskrit, the terminations of the Middle and the Passive are exactly

and always identical. Nay, most of the *forms* themselves are identical in many cases. Scholars may recall to mind the many cases of the identity of the Middle and Passive forms of both Greek and Sanskrit roots.

Not only this, even the senses that are meant to be conveyed by the Active and the Middle Voices in Greek and Sanskrit are identical. Thus, in either language, the Active was meant to have a transitive meaning, as throwing the action on to others, and the Middle was meant to have a reflexive meaning, as throwing the action back to oneself. This meaning is absolutely clear in the very significant epithets परस्मैपदं (= परस्मै पदं) and आत्मनेपदं (= आत्मने पदं) that were invented by Sanskrit grammarians. This seems to have been the original foundation of the difference between the two kinds of voices in both languages; but while Greek has very nearly retained even now this important difference, it has been almost entirely effaced in Sanskrit, especially in the Epics, where the necessities of versification have often compelled the use of a wrong voice. The difference of voice, compelling a difference of meaning, can be beautifully illustrated from two Greek infinitives: While τιθέναι νόμους (Active = परस्मैपद) can be used of a despot who enacts laws for *others*, we can only use τίθεσθαι νόμους (Middle = आत्मनेपद) of a self-governing nation, which enacts laws *for itself*. Thus we see that the original difference between Active and Middle has been retained in Greek.

There is again another difference between Greek and Sanskrit. In Sanskrit, the difference of voice in the case of Roots is extended in part to the participles, but never to the infinitives; in Greek, it is extended to the participles and even to the infinitives. Thus,

	Pr. p.	P. p.	Infin.
गम् (Active)	गच्छत्	गत	गन्तुं
रम् (Middle)	रममाण	रत	रन्तुं

while,

λύω (Active)	λύων	λύσας	λύειν
λύω (Middle)	λύόμενος	λύσάμενος	λυεσθαι

गन्तुं and रन्तुं must always end in तुं; but λύειν and λυεσθαι do not both end in ειν.

(3) In Greek, there are two varieties of Future, two varieties of Perfect and two varieties of Aorist; in Sanskrit, similarly, we have two varieties of Future, two varieties of Perfect, but *classically* speaking, the appalling number of 7 varieties of Aorist. The beginner may well be confused at this menacing number of 7 varieties, and Whitney has done excellent service to the cause of Aorist by simplifying the varieties, and grouping them under only three heads: the simple, the reduplicative, and the sigmatic (= sibilant). The cause for this large number of specialised tenses is to be found in the fact that the languages were widening, and it was necessary to restrict and group the tenses under different classes each with a common feature.

(4) But there is one tense in Sanskrit which does not occur in any other language including Greek and Latin, except perhaps in German; and it is the *Conditional* (लृङ्). It is used when things might have, but have not happened. It stands to the future as the Imperfect stands to the present. The classical example of Conditional in Sanskrit is:—सुवृष्टिश्चेदभविष्यत्तदा सुभिक्षमभविष्यत्:—

“If there had been abundant rain, there would have been plenty,” indicating that there was *not* abundant rain, and therefore there was *not* plenty.

A similar use of the Conditional is to be found in German, e. g. “The soldiers would have been killed in the first battle” might be translated:—

“Die Soldaten würden in der ersten Schlacht getödtet worden sein” implying that they were *not* killed.

In this case, Greek does not present us with a parallel to the Sanskrit usage.

(5) It is a custom with Greek grammarians to divide the majority of Greek verbs into two conjugations, those ending in ω and $\mu\iota$, and to put down the other Greek verbs as Irregular verbs. This entirely obscures the proper classification of verbs. No attempt has been hitherto made, so far as the present writer knows, of bringing the Greek classification in a line with the Sanskrit classification into 10 Gaṇas or classes. The conjugations in Greek have been hitherto divided on the fundamentum divisionis of the terminations ω and $\mu\iota$; we have in the present essay divided them according to the signs like ϵ , nil, reduplication, $\nu\upsilon$ etc. that the verbs take, thus bringing the Greek system in a line with Sanskrit. To verbs of the 1st conjugation in Sanskrit, whose sign is अ (अप्) are similar such irregular verbs in Greek as $\gamma\alpha\mu\acute{\epsilon}\omega$, $\delta\omicron\kappa\acute{\epsilon}\omega$, whose sign is ϵ . To verbs of the 2nd conjugation in Sanskrit, whose sign is 'nil', are similar the majority of Greek verbs which take terminations directly, such as $\phi\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\gamma\omega$, $\pi\epsilon\acute{\iota}\theta\omega$, $\lambda\epsilon\acute{\iota}\pi\omega$. To the 3rd conjugation in Sanskrit, whose distinctive sign is the Reduplication even in the present, correspond such verbs as $\tau\acute{\iota}\theta\eta\mu\iota$ and $\delta\acute{\iota}\delta\omega\mu\iota$. The 4th and the 6th conjugation in Sanskrit are so very similar to the 1st, for all *Conjugational* purposes, that one may not attempt to classify Greek verbs under these heads, when similar verbs have been there shown to exist, corresponding to the 1st conjugation in Sanskrit. To the 5th conjugation in Sanskrit whose sign is ऋ (ऋप्), correspond many such Greek verbs as $\delta\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\gamma\upsilon\mu\iota$, whose sign is exactly the same ($\nu\upsilon = \text{ऋ}$). The 7th and 9th conjugations in Sanskrit, which have the sign न् or न् (अम्), नी or ना (आ), may correspond to such irregular verbs in Greek as take $\nu, \nu\epsilon$ and $\alpha\nu$ after the stem, such as $\delta\acute{\alpha}\kappa\nu\omega$, $\acute{\upsilon}\pi\iota\sigma\kappa\nu\acute{\epsilon}\omicron\mu\alpha\iota$, and $\alpha\acute{\iota}\sigma\theta\acute{\alpha}\nu\omicron\mu\alpha\iota$. The 8th conjugation in Sanskrit whose sign is उ has so few roots belonging to it that Greek may be excused if it does not show

a parallel. And the 10th of Sanskrit conjugations is too much like the 1st, 4th and 6th to demand a different class of roots from Greek. Indeed, if we were to hunt down the Greek roots, we can find lists of roots corresponding to each of these four conjugations.

Moreover, Greek presents us with verbs such as $\pi\acute{\alpha}\sigma\kappa\omega$ and $\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\rho\acute{\iota}\sigma\kappa\omega$, and $\beta\iota\beta\rho\acute{\omega}\sigma\kappa\omega$ and $\gamma\iota\gamma\nu\acute{\omega}\sigma\kappa\omega$, the first two unreduplicated, and the latter two reduplicated, but all having the distinctive appendage $\sigma\kappa$, which marks such roots as being very close to the Sanskrit *Desideratives*, in form at least, if not in meaning, the latter being also reduplicated, and having the mark स् , as चिकीर्षति , जिघांसति , even unreduplicated desideratives being found in Sanskrit as रिप्सते , and धिप्सति , corresponding to the first two Greek verbs mentioned above, while verbs like मीमांसते are also to be found in Sanskrit, which have a reduplicative form, but no reduplicative sense.

(6) We have said above that the consonantal combinations that take place in the conjugation of Greek verbs are very similar to the consonantal combinations in Sanskrit. Thus:—

(a) Before all terminations beginning with μ , a labial becomes μ , and a guttural becomes γ ;

e. g. $\left\{ \begin{array}{ll} \gamma\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\rho\alpha\mu\mu\alpha\iota & \text{from stem } \gamma\rho\alpha\phi \\ \text{अम्मयं} & \text{from अप् + मयं} \end{array} \right.$

Also, $\left\{ \begin{array}{ll} \pi\acute{\epsilon}\pi\lambda\epsilon\gamma\mu\alpha\iota & \text{from stem } \pi\lambda\epsilon\kappa \\ (\gamma = \text{ग or झ}) & \\ \text{प्राङ्मुख, or प्राग्मुख,} & \text{from प्राक् + मुख} \end{array} \right.$

But while a dental before μ in Greek becomes σ , in Sanskrit, it becomes the nasal न् :—

$\left\{ \begin{array}{ll} \text{e. g. } \pi\acute{\epsilon}\pi\epsilon\iota\sigma\mu\alpha\iota & \text{from stem } \pi\iota\theta \\ \text{contrast तन्मय} & \text{from तत् + मय} \end{array} \right.$

Occasionally, however, before क् and प् , the dental त् becomes स् in Sanskrit, cf. तस्कर , and बृहस्पति .

(b) With all terminations beginning with σ , as in the consonantal *declension*, a guttural becomes ξ , and a labial becomes ψ :—

e. g. { $\pi\acute{\epsilon}\pi\lambda\epsilon\xi\alpha\iota$ from stem $\pi\lambda\epsilon\kappa$
 { वाक्षु from वाक् + सु
 And { $\psi\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\rho\alpha\sigma\psi\alpha\iota$ from stem $\gamma\rho\alpha\phi$
 { अप्सु from अप् + सु

But, while in Greek, a dental is dropped before σ , it is not dropped in Sanskrit :—

e. g. { $\pi\acute{\epsilon}\pi\epsilon\iota\sigma\alpha\iota$ for $\pi\epsilon\pi\epsilon\iota\theta\sigma\alpha\iota$
 { दृषत्सु for दृषत् + सु

(c) Before τ , in both languages, a guttural becomes κ , and a labial becomes π :—

e. g. { $\tau\acute{\epsilon}\tau\alpha\kappa\tau\alpha\iota$ for $\tau\acute{\epsilon}\tau\alpha\gamma\tau\alpha\iota$
 { वाक्त्तति for वाग् + तति
 And { $\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\rho\alpha\pi\tau\alpha\iota$ for $\gamma\epsilon\gamma\rho\alpha\phi\tau\alpha\iota$
 { अप्तेजसी for अप् + तेजसी

(d) Before θ , in both languages, a guttural becomes χ , and a labial becomes ϕ (which are the corresponding aspirate letters), a usage which is contrary to Sanskrit :—

e. g. $\pi\acute{\epsilon}\pi\lambda\epsilon\chi\theta\epsilon$ for $\pi\epsilon\pi\lambda\epsilon\kappa\theta\epsilon$
 And $\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\epsilon\iota\phi\theta\epsilon$ for $\lambda\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\iota\pi\theta\epsilon$

In both the cases considered in (c) and (d), as in (a), the dental in Greek is *always* changed to σ , a usage which is contrary to Sanskrit :—

e. g. { $\pi\acute{\epsilon}\pi\epsilon\iota\sigma\tau\alpha\iota$ for $\pi\epsilon\pi\epsilon\iota\theta\tau\alpha\iota$
 And { $\pi\acute{\epsilon}\pi\epsilon\iota\sigma\theta\epsilon$ for $\pi\epsilon\pi\epsilon\iota\theta\theta\epsilon$

It may be noticed that only in the case (b), that is before σ , the dental is entirely dropped ; Greek would not allow two “ σ ” s to come together ; in every other case, the dental, by a strange affinity, becomes σ ; from this conversely, it may be argued that the Greek σ itself is *dental in nature*, as has been recognised by Pāṇini in calling स् “दन्त्य.”

In Sanskrit, not merely is a dental not dropped before ऋ, but if possible, another dental is added : thus the elision in Greek is avenged in Sanskrit; e. g. तान्+सहते becomes, in addition to तान्सहते, also तान्सहते. It may be seen from the latter that another ऋ is added, thus again corroborating that σ is dental in nature.

(7) We now come to the most striking similarities of all in the two languages. No one, who considers the following with a little attention, can fail to observe that Sanskrit and Greek *must* have had a common origin.

In both the languages the Imperfect and the Aorist are formed by the augment ε, corresponding exactly to the Sanskrit अ. And again, in both languages, *the Perfect is formed by Reduplication*, a feature which marks Greek and Sanskrit as cognate with each other as apart from other languages.

(A) In the case of roots beginning with a consonant, the ε or अ is regularly added as a sign of the Imperfect or Aorist e. g. ἔτυπτο (Imp.) and ἔλυσσεν (Aorist). In the case of a root beginning with a vowel, in either language, long vowels and diphthongs are substituted for the combination of the augment and the vowel ;

e. g.

{	ἀγω	ἤγον (Imp).
{	अर्चति	आर्चत्
{	εὐρίσκω	ἠύρισκον (Imp).
{	ईक्षते	ऐक्षत्

Then again, in either language, verbs compounded with a Preposition *have the Augment between the Preposition and the Verb* : (this incidentally shows that prepositions are really of the nature of *ad*-verbs and do not form an organic part of the verb, a point which will be noticed later on) :—

{	είσ-φέρ-ω	είσ-ε-φέρ-ον
	προσ-άγω	προσ-ήγουν
	अधि + अर्चति	अधि + आर्चत् = अध्यार्चत्
	प्रति + ईक्षते	प्रति + ऐक्षत् = प्रत्यैक्षत्

In Greek, the final vowel of the preposition is elided before the Augment ; but in Sanskrit, it combines with the Augment ; e. g.

απο-φέρω	απ-έ-φερον
उप + ऐक्षत्	उपैक्षत्

In Greek *περί* and *πρό* are exceptions to the above rule, and never elide their vowels, but as in Sanskrit, combine them with the Augment :—

e.g.	προβαίνω	προῦβαινον
		(= προ-έ-βαινον)

(B) We next come to the phenomenon of Reduplication. The genesis of Reduplication is to be found in its utility as a mark of completed action, which is the meaning given to the Perfect in both the languages. Hence, Reduplication and the Perfect tense go hand in hand in the two languages.

(a) Reduplication in either language consists in the repetition of the first consonant of the root, *plus* the radical vowel in Sanskrit, and a uniform *ε* in Greek. Thus *बुध्* when reduplicated becomes *बुबुध्*, and the stem *λυ* when reduplicated becomes *λελυ*. In Attic Reduplication, however, we do find as in Sanskrit the first *Syllable* repeated:

ἐλαύνω	—	ἐλήλακα
ἐλέγχω	—	ἐλήλεγμαι

(b) In either language, the hard aspirates are represented in reduplication by their

corresponding hard unaspirates ; thus *e. g.* द् by द्, ख् by च् and फ् by प् ; and θ by τ, x by κ, φ by π : (it may be noticed that the substitute of च् for ख् is arbitrary : the proper substitute ought to have been फ्. But it may be remembered that च् and फ् are both hard unaspirates). Thus, खन् becomes चखान and θύω becomes τέθουκα.

(c) In Sanskrit, the soft aspirate takes the soft unaspirate, as भिद् becomes विभिद्. In Greek, no soft aspirates exist except the ζ (see Section §2 above) ; and this takes an Augment instead of a Reduplication, *e. g.* ζητε becomes ἐζήτηκα. We may here compare Panini's अभ्यासे झलां चरः ।

(d) When verbs begin with two consonants instead of one, or with a double consonant, the general practice in Greek is to use the Augment instead of Reduplication, as ἔσταλακα from stem στελ ; of Sanskrit to repeat sometimes the first consonant and sometimes the second *e.g.* क्षिप्-चिक्षिप् ; स्था-तस्था.

(e) But the Greek practice of reduplicating a mute when followed by a *liquid* (in the case of two consonants coming together) find an exact parallel in Sanskrit :—

γράφω

γέγραφα

कुञ्ज

चुकुञ्ज

(f) In both languages, when roots begin with a vowel, the *general* practice is to have the *Augment* instead of the Reduplication ;

e. g. ὀρθόω in Perfect becomes ὠρθωκα
 अद् ” आद्

There are further rules in Sanskrit on this point, and they only indicate a greater “differentiation.”

- (g) When a preposition comes before a verb, then the reduplication like the augment, comes between the preposition and the verb: and this rule is identical in Greek and Sanskrit.

πρασ-γράφω प्रास-γέ-γραφα
 प्रति-गम् प्रति-ज-गाम

- (h) The reduplication of the Perfect is retained in both languages even in the Perfect Participle :—

γράφω γέγραφα γεγραφώς
 गम् जगाम जग्मिक्स

the terminations ως and वस् being identical.

Unfortunately, the Pluperfect, the Perfect Subjunctive, the Perfect, Optative, the Perfect Infinitive are lacking in Sanskrit; otherwise, as in Greek, they would have also retained the reduplication. By the bye, we do here find the superiority of Greek to classical, if not Vedic, Sanskrit in the construction of a variety of forms, which are not even contemplated in Sanskrit.

- (i) In general, it may be said that the 1st Greek perfect has no parallel in Sanskrit, as its peculiar sign is κ. The 2nd Greek perfect corresponds to the 1st Sanskrit perfect, as in these the terminations are applied directly. And again, the 2nd Sanskrit perfect has no parallel in Greek, as it is formed in combination with चकार, आस or बभूव.

(8) We thus see that in Greek as in Sanskrit, the Reduplication is an essential element of the Perfect. But in either language it accompanies even the *present* tense of some verbs; e. g. as in Greek τίστημι, δίδωμι. These have been shown above (5) to correspond to the 3rd conjugation in Sanskrit, which also forms its present by Reduplication, e. g. ह्रा becomes जहाति, भृ becomes विभर्ति. Then again, it is a sign of such other verbs in Greek as βιβρώσκω and γινώσκω, which because they have both a reduplication, and the mark σκ, may be said to exactly correspond to Sanskrit Desideratives, as चिकीर्षति, बुभूषति, which have both a reduplication and the mark स्र.

Beyond the three instances mentioned above, the Reduplication in Sanskrit *Aorist* for a variety of verbs, and in Sanskrit *Frequentatives* does not find a parallel in Greek, e. g. अरीरिपम्, अजीजनम्; चर्करीति and अटाव्यते. It may be noticed that the Frequentative Reduplication is very arbitrary and corresponds to the Attic Reduplication in Greek.

It may be seen that the Reduplication is peculiarly expressive of frequency: hence, it is very suitable for the Frequentatives; thus, अटाव्यते may be significantly used of wandering frequently, and ceaselessly; सास्मर्यते of remembering frequently and so on. There are no Frequentatives in Greek, hence the Reduplication is not to be met with in Greek in this connection.

(9) This prepares us to make a few more supplementary remarks on the subject of conjugation, before we finish this part of the subject.

(a) We have seen that there *are* Desideratives in Greek, we may now observe that there are even Denominatives in Greek. We know what an important part Denominatives play in Sanskrit. One very often meets with such forms as पुत्रीयति, रोमथायते, अप्सरायते, राजानति which have the sense of

behaving or being like the person or thing expressed by the noun. The Greek Denominatives do not seem to have this meaning: they are only verbs formed from corresponding nouns; thus, σημαίνω = to signify comes from the noun σημα (τ-) = sign; δικάζω = to judge from the noun δίκη = justice.

(b) To the Causal of Sanskrit, there does not seem to be any parallel formation in Greek. Indeed, the Sanskrit Causal itself is so very like the 10th Conjugation, that one of the two has no right to exist separately. But because the Causal conveys a peculiar meaning—that of an action being *caused* by another—we had rather drop out the 10th Conjugation, so far as the *Conjugation* of verbs is concerned.

(c) We have seen that there are no Frequentatives in Greek; similarly there is not also the so-called Benedictive mood of Sanskrit. Indeed the Benedictive mood also has no right to exist in Sanskrit, seeing how very similar in meaning, and also in formation, it is to the Potential or Optative. Indeed, Pāṇini himself seems to have recognised this in as much as he combined the Optative (विधिलिङ्) with the Benedictive (or as Whitney calls it the Precative) (आशीर्लिङ्) under the common appellation of लिङ्. Moreover the extreme similarity of the terminations involved might well enable us to argue for its non-requirement. Hence, it is no wonder that Greek does not show it: it can *do* with the Optative.

(d) But, on the other hand, as we have mentioned above, Sanskrit does not show the Pluperfect, the Perfect Subjunctive, the Perfect Optative, the Perfect Infinitive, and also the Aorist Imperative, the Future Optative, and the Perfect, Future or Aorist Infinitive of Greek.

(e) However, one important thing remains to be noticed. There is a Subjunctive in Sanskrit, corresponding to the Greek Subjunctive, but it is only to be found in the Vedas (लेट्). In classical Sanskrit literature, it has almost disappeared; but

in Greek, it retains its full vitality. Moreover, it may be noticed that the terminations of the Subjunctive both in Greek and Sanskrit are almost exactly similar to the terminations of the Present : (in Sanskrit, the *first* personal terminations of the Subjunctive are, however, more akin to those of the Imperative than of the Present).

(*f*) There is again a similarity between Greek and Sanskrit in making σ the distinctive sign of the future ; e. g. $\lambda\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\omega$ the future of $\lambda\acute{\upsilon}\omega$, and करिष्यामि the future of कृ.

(*g*) This σ again occurs in the I Aorist of Greek and the Sigmatic Aorist of Sanskrit, but in this case, the root is preceded by an Augment ($\acute{\epsilon}$ in Greek and अ in Sanskrit—the same as the Imperfect Augment); e. g. $\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\upsilon\sigma\alpha$ is 1st Aorist of $\lambda\acute{\upsilon}\omega$ and अकार्षीत् is the Sigmatic Aorist of कृ.

(*h*) Lastly, the present, future and perfect participles both of Greek and Sanskrit are declined like corresponding adjectives ; e. g. $\lambda\acute{\upsilon}\omega\nu$ like $\acute{\epsilon}\kappa\acute{\omega}\nu$; and जग्मिन्वस् like विद्मस्.

§ 10 Syntax

(I) We now come to the subject of Syntax ; and, here also, we find a great deal of resemblance.

(*a*) In Greek as in Sanskrit, we very often find adjectives, used simply with the article and without the noun, to denote a general class of persons. [In Sanskrit, however, the article, being non-existent, is not found.] We may, translate “ the good men ” as simply $\acute{o}\acute{\iota}$ $\alpha\gamma\alpha\theta\acute{o}\acute{\iota}$ in Greek and सन्तः in Sanskrit. In either case, there is no noun.

(*b*) In either language, the duration of time is expressed by the Accusative. Thus “ He remains for three days ” may be translated in Greek $\tau\rho\epsilon\acute{\iota}\varsigma$ $\eta\acute{\mu}\acute{\epsilon}\rho\alpha\varsigma$ $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\epsilon\iota$, and in Sanskrit त्रीणि दिनानि तिष्ठति, in either case the accusative being used.

(*c*) The examples quoted in (*b*) may also incidentally show that the nominatives of the personal pronouns are seldom

used in both the languages. In either language, again, they are used when emphasis is required to be shown. Thus, "he says he is writing", when it is without any emphasis, may be translated in Greek *φησὶ γράφειν* simply, and लिखतीति वक्ति in Sanskrit, in either case the personal pronouns being omitted. On the other hand, "I gave the money to the man", when there is emphasis on "I" is to be translated *ἐγὼ ἔδωκα τὰ χρήματα τῷ ἀνδρὶ*, and in Sanskrit also the अहं cannot be omitted.

(d) It seems that it is to the above fact that the entire disappearance in Greek of the *Nominative* of the third personal pronoun is due. Thus, there are properly speaking, no equivalents to "he, she, it" in Greek. In Sanskrit, we have equivalents for these सः, सा, तत्, and they can be used when required.

(e) Speaking of the pronouns, we might next notice that *ἐγὼ* in its declension takes double forms viz :

ἐμέ, μέ; ἐμοῦ, μοῦ; ἐμό, μό in the Accusative, Genitive and Dative cases respectively. And in Sanskrit, although there are other cases, such as the Instrumental, Ablative, and Locative, the pronoun अहं, equivalent to the Greek *ἐγὼ*, takes double forms which are strikingly similar to the above only in the Accusative, Genitive and Dative exactly as in Greek, viz :

मां, मा; मम, मे; मद्यं, मे

(f) The next things to be noticed about these double forms are, that the first set of forms, viz : *ἐμέ, ἐμοῦ, ἐμό* and मां, मम and मद्यं are more emphatic than the second set of forms viz. ; *μέ, μοῦ, μό* and मा, मे and मे; and that in either language, the latter set of abbreviated forms are not grammatically allowed to come, at the beginning of sentences, or even at the beginning of any quarter of a verse; e. g. मे मित्रं would not be allowed at the beginning of a sentence. It has been again already observed, while speaking of accents.

(§ 3), that all these shorter forms are enclitics and lose their accent in both languages.

(g) Then again, in Sanskrit, the particles च, तु, हि cannot begin a sentence; similarly in Greek, their exact equivalents τε, δε, γαρ, must also come second.

(h) We must also notice one or two striking *differences* between the usages of Greek and Sanskrit. In Sanskrit, the verb always agrees with its subject in number; thus a plural subject has a plural verb, and a singular subject a singular verb. In Greek, the usage is often reversed. A subject in the neuter *plural* takes very curiously a *singular* verb, except when living things are indicated; e. g. " the gifts are praised " must be translated τὰ δῶρα ἐπαινέται, while " the children run " is to be translated τὰ τέκνα τρέχουσιν. While, a singular collective noun *may* take a plural verb as in English: thus, " the majority voted for war " may be translated τὸ πλῆθος ἐψηφίσαντο πολεμεῖν. We may compare the English usage: " Government *are* very sorry to learn this ".

(i) One more difference may be noticed by way of illustration. In Greek, price and value are always expressed by the Genitive. " I value reputation highly " is to be translated δόξαν πολλοῦ τιμῶ, while contrast कियता मूल्येन क्रीतं पुस्तकं? = " At what price was the book bought " ? where the Instrumental is used.

(j) In Greek, there are no compounds as in Sanskrit. If we go back to the Veda, we will find as few and as simple compounds as possible. It is in the later Sanskrit that the compounds become more and more numerous and more and more complex and we find such long strings of words joined together as have been the particular characteristic of works like the Kādambarī. While the compounds have this virtue in them, that they enable writers to express themselves very briefly, they have also this grave defect that they impede the

course of narration, by applying the brake every time and in general dam the flow of prose. If not much prose is to be found in Sanskrit, it is to be attributed specially to the large importance attached to the use of compounds. The compounds may be serviceable within a certain limit; but there is always the danger that the limit may be passed, and the writer may produce "cobwebs of learning, admirable for their fineness of structure, but of no substance and profit".

It is very meet that Greek does not show compounds: it is better that a language should have no compounds, than that it should have compounds which would stop the progress of the language. Indeed these compounds are not to be met with in any other language except possibly German, where we occasionally meet with genitive and possessive compounds. The reader will easily recall to mind such genitive compounds in German as *Frühlingslied* = spring-song, where the 's' is retained, and may compare such compounds with षष्ठीअलुक् compounds in Sanskrit like दास्याःपुत्रः।

(k) But though, there are not द्वंद्व, कर्मधारय and बहुव्रीहि compounds in Greek, which form a peculiar feature of Sanskrit, we often meet Greek prepositions compounded with verbs as in Sanskrit. But as we have seen, these prepositions are only of the nature of ad-verbs, and they always yield before the Augment or Reduplication e. g. *συν-έ-λεγον* and *πρασ-γέ-γραφα*. Thus it is only incidentally that they have come to be compounded with verbs, as they may also go with nouns and pro-nouns (कर्मप्रवचनीय). That they are only contingently attached to verbs may be seen from the fact that even when they go along with verbs, they govern the very case of the nouns, which they would have governed if they had not been attached to the nouns; e. g. in *Παρεκομίζοντο τήν Ἑλλάδα* we find the Accusative, which we would have found if the preposition had been used alone. Again, we find in Greek as in Sanskrit, that particular prepositions must always govern particular cases.

Thus, *ἐς* must take Accusative, *κατά* Genitive or Accusative, and *πρός* Genitive, Dative, or Accusative. Similarly *अन* takes Accusative, *प्रति* Accusative and Ablative, and *विना* Accusative, Instrumental or Ablative. But there is a special use of prepositions in Sanskrit which must be noticed. When they go along with verbs, they often change the voice of the verb altogether, as has been already pointed out ; we cannot, for example, say *संगच्छति*. And in such cases, they cannot be put apart from the verbs. In all other cases, we find the preposition used apart from the verb, very often in the Veda (cf. *समन्निमिन्धतेनराः*) but very rarely in classical Sanskrit, especially when the preposition has once been acknowledged as an organic part of the compound verb.

(2) We now come to some important matters. We have seen that there is an Imperfect, two Perfects, and two Aorists in Greek, corresponding to an Imperfect, two Perfects, and 3 (Whitney) or 7 (orthodox) Aorists in Sanskrit. Now when any language has so many different tenses to express merely the pastness of an action, it is natural that the grammarian's mind should work on these and find out subtle differences. Now in both languages, we find the Perfect used exactly in the same sense : that of completed action : " I have come ". But both languages find out subtle differences in the use of the Imperfect and the Aorist. Greek distinguishes the Imperfect from the Aorist, the first signifying the non-fulfilment of an action : " I was coming " ; the second showing the immediate fulfilment of it : " I came ". When this fulfilment itself becomes a matter of the past, and some time has elapsed after it, we have the Perfect. Sanskrit distinguishes the Imperfect from the Aorist in almost the same way, the first showing a matter of yesterday (*अनद्यतने अपरोक्षे लुङ्*) e. g. *अरुणद्यवनः साकेतं*; the second showing a matter of to-day (*अद्यतने अपरोक्षे लुङ्*) e. g. *प्रातः पाकं अकार्षीत्*. When some time has

elapsed after this, we have in Sanskrit also the right of using the Perfect (परोक्षे लिट्) e. g. यशोधनो धेनुमृषेर्मुमोच.

But though, in Sanskrit, such subtle distinctions were made by *grammarians*, what we find in actual use is a promiscuous huddling up of the tenses. They have all been supposed to be exchangeable with one another for all practical purposes. Nay, even the Sanskrit past participle can take the place of any of these, and Sanskrit writers are generally found to use the past participle in preference to any of the tenses, the principal reason being that it is formed more easily, and more easily remembered.

(3) Next, we must proceed to explain certain verbal forms in Sanskrit, which often cause confusion to a Greek Scholar. Let us consider the following forms :—

गच्छन् Present parti- ciple : <i>going</i>	गत Past parti- ciple : <i>gone</i>	जग्मिन्वस् Perfect parti- ciple : <i>has gone</i>	गन्तुं Infinitive : <i>to go</i>	गत्वा Absolu- tive : <i>having gone</i>
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To the first corresponds the present participle in Greek e. g. λύων ; to the second, the Aorist participle λύσας ; to the third, the perfect participle λελοκώς ; to the fourth, the Greek Infinitive ; but *for the last, the Absolute, we have no parallel formation in Greek* ; it may be expressed either by the present participle, or more grammatically, by the perfect participle.

(4) We must make a note of the Greek and Sanskrit Infinitives. While the Greek Infinitive has often the sense of a verbal noun and can be used both as subject and object of a verb, the Sanskrit Infinitive can be very rarely used in this way ; more often than not, it is *not* used in this way. For example, while we have ἡδὺ πολλοὺς ἐχθροὺς ἔχειν = is it pleasant to have many enemies? and βούλεται τοὺς πολίτας πολεμικοὺς εἶναι = he wishes the citizens to be warlike, the Sanskrit Infinitive has always a *dative* sense, and therefore, cannot be used as sub-

ject or object; e.g. पारसीकांस्ततो जेतुं प्रतस्थे स्थलवर्त्मना (here जेतुं = in order to conquer). But if we hunt down the Sanskrit usages, we can sometimes alight on such constructions : न युक्तं अशोको वामपादेन ताडयितुं = "It is not proper to kick the Aśoka tree with the left foot", where the sense of ताडयितुं is that of subject; and न पृथग्जनवच्छुचो वशं वशिनामुत्तमं गंतुमर्हसि = "O best of self-controlled men, you do not deserve to fall a prey to grief like an ordinary man" where गंतुं has the sense of an object. But this use is rare in Sanskrit. It may, however, be remembered that when the Infinitive is used in the sense of a subject in Greek, it may be preceded by the neuter article (thus clearly showing that it is treated as a verbal noun); but the article must not be prefixed when used in the sense of an object, e. g. τὸ μαθηθῆναι καλεπὸν ἐστίν = to learn is difficult; and βούλεται ἐλθεῖν = he wishes to go.

(5) It may also be noticed that there is a great similarity in Greek and Sanskrit in the treatment of negatives. The Greek words to express negations are μή and οὐ the Sanskrit are मा and न. μή is exactly the same as मा, not merely in its form, but also in its use. It is very curious to observe that the proper use of μή and मा in both languages is with the *Imperative* and *Subjunctive*, while that of οὐ and न is with the *Indicative*; but while the genius of the Greek language would extend the use of μή with *Optatives* expressing a wish, and with *Substantival Infinitives*, Sanskrit would extend the use of मा to the *Optative* and *Future* in the sense of 'lest', and with the *present participle* to express a 'curse'. On the whole, the use of the two particles is exceedingly similar. Scholars in either language may recall instances where μή and मा are used in the senses above indicated.

We may however note one peculiar use of the particles. They are both used with the *Aorist Subjunctive* in the sense of *Imperative*; the use of मा in this sense is only to be found

in the Veda, as the Subjunctive exists only there; (with the simple Aorist, however, its use is common enough in classical literature, cf. मा निषाद प्रतिष्ठां त्वमगमः शाश्वतीः समाः). For example, मा कर्तु and μή/κλέψῃς τοῦτο τὸ ἀργύριον both express prohibition, and have the sense of Imperative.

(6) We have next to notice the peculiarities of Indirect construction in the two languages. In Greek, the particle used to signify Indirect construction is ὅτι corresponding exactly to the Sanskrit particle इति, which is also used to signify Indirect construction. But we may notice the following differences :—

(a) In Greek, the Indirect construction can very often be brought about by the help of the mere Infinitive; in Sanskrit the particle इति is necessary.

(b) In Greek, the particle ὅτι precedes the verb reported; in Sanskrit, it must follow it. Thus "he says that he is writing" is to be translated in Greek λέγει ὅτι γράφει, and in Sanskrit वक्ति लिखतीति, ὅτι preceding γράφει and इति following लिखति. Compare also हंतीति पलायते.

(c) In Greek, after *primary* verbs, the mood and tense of the verb reported is retained; while after *secondary* verbs, it may either be retained or changed to the corresponding tense of the optative mood. In Sanskrit, it *must* always be retained. Thus, "he says that he wrote" is to be translated in Greek λέγει ὅτι ἔγραψεν, and in Sanskrit वदति अलिखामिति the original tense being retained. While, "he said that he was writing" = he said "I am writing"

= either ἔλεγεν ὅτι γράφει }
= or ἔλεγεν ὅτι γράφει }

and = अवदत् लिखामीति, the original tense being retained in Sanskrit, but being optionally changed in Greek.

(d) Lastly, it may be noticed that the person reported

also changes in Greek but not in Sanskrit. Thus, from the last two examples, we can see

ἔλεγε ὅτι γράφει = he said : " *he* is writing".

अवदत् लिखामीति = he said : " *I* am writing".

(7) One more striking usage may be noticed, before we finish the subject of Syntax. This is the phenomenon known as the Genitive Absolute in both Greek and Sanskrit. We have seen that there is no Locative in Greek : hence, there is not also in Greek, what is called in Sanskrit grammar, the Locative Absolute. But the Greek Genitive Absolute performs the functions of both the Genitive and the Locative Absolutes in Sanskrit. Hence, one need not be sorry not to find the Locative Absolute in Greek. The Genitive Absolute then in Greek has principally the following two senses :—

(a) the sense of " although ", " in spite of "; " Although many soldiers were present, nothing was being done " = πολλῶν στρατιωτῶν παρόντων οὐδέν ἐπράσσετο. In this sense, the Greek Genitive Absolute is identical with the Sanskrit Genitive Absolute :— " Notwithstanding that Rākshasa was looking on, the Nandas were slaughtered like beasts " = नन्दाः पशव इव हताः पश्यतो राक्षसस्य ।

(b) the sense of " when " :—" when the victory was announced, the citizens rejoiced " = τῆς νίκης ἀγγελθείσης, ἃ πολῖται ἔχαίρον. In this sense, the Greek Genitive Absolute is identical with the Sanskrit *Locative* Absolute :— " when thou art king, how can evil befall the subjects? " = नाथे कुतस्त्वय्यशुभं प्रजानाम् ।

§ 11 Conclusion

Any one who has followed us throughout the discussion of the points of grammar hitherto treated must be struck by the great resemblances which the two languages show. There have been indeed differences ; and we have been careful to note these along with the resemblances. It is impossible to

argue or to prove that any two languages in the world are entirely *identical* : in fact, they would, in such a case, cease to be *two* languages. Our treatment has been entirely *genetic*, at the same time it has been *critical*. We have always inquired into the genesis of grammatical usage, and have often tried to show how any particular usage stands to reason. The comparative treatment of Greek and Sanskrit undertaken in this essay will not fail to impress the reader that Greek and Sanskrit are by no means less similar than Greek and Latin. This was the point that we wanted to prove. A comparative grammar, in extenso, of Greek and Sanskrit remains to be written. Let us hope that anybody who undertakes the task will find at least some things in this essay which will be helpful to him. We believe we have *for the first time drawn out at great length the striking analogies of Accents and Conjugations* in Greek and Sanskrit.

But it is not seldom that people look askance at the philologist. The resemblances which he shows are supposed to be merely accidental ; the differences which he may point out are supposed to be vital. In spite of such censure, we may say that it is the philologist alone who can do some useful work in illuminating the pages of ancient history, no record of which is left to us except mere language. He brings to light the history which remains shrouded in language, and thus the philologist is the exponent of the customs and manners of nations, of which history proper has nothing to tell.

The most important service, however, which Comparative Philology has done to the cause of research has been to show the *common origin* of nations and languages, so far removed in these days as Greek and Indian. The striking similarities in language exhibited by Greek and Sanskrit, for example, cannot be explained except on the hypothesis of common origin. (1) The *plagiarism* theory of Dugald Stewart need only be mentioned to be refuted. (2) The

theory of *independent parallelism*, though applicable in part to philosophy, can hardly be supposed to suit the similarities of the languages. (3) The theory of *occasional contact*, wherever that might have been, in Alexandria, Babylon, Bactria, or the Punjab, might serve to explain only a few similarities of vocabulary as *σάνταλον* and चंदन, *σινδών* and Satin, *Ἰαῤῥων* and यवन, *δραχμή* and दाम, *διάμετρον* and जामित्र, but does not touch the grammatical substructure of the languages. (4) It is to the credit of Comparative Philology that it first showed beyond dispute, that the great similarities of many of the Indo-European languages cannot be explained except on the hypothesis of a prolonged and continued common stay together of the nations, which seem to have now parted for ever. Thus it reinforces from an altogether different standpoint the conclusion of *common origin* reached by Geologic and Vedic scholars. Philology may be laughed at by those who pride themselves on their absolute ignorance of languages: those who *do* know languages cannot consistently deny the historical importance of philology: while those who may newly take to the study of the different languages will begin to see things in a new perspective, and to quote the words of Charles V, with every new-learnt language, they may even "win a new soul."

IV THE ART OF BIOGRAPHY

The necessity of Biography. It is the sacred duty of every generation to rescue the Past from oblivion. We must gather up the bones of our ancestors which lie bleaching on the sands of Time, and bury them with an honourable epitaph. For, it is an inevitable law of nature that unless there is the solid foundation of the Past, no secure edifice of the Future can be raised. Those, who do not look at the Past cannot devise means for the Future ; and unless the Future is built on the Past, it will be raised merely on stubble. Hence arises the necessity of doing justice to the memory of the dead. 'Fame', said Cicero, 'is the rightful possession of the dead,' and whoever refuses to give the proper share of Fame to the dead is a robber. Men must wail like the swans of fiction upon the shears of Atropos, and carry the medals to a Temple where they would be consecrated, instead of dropping them, like other birds, in the river of Lethe.

Having thus discussed the necessity of Biography, let us now investigate its peculiar characteristics ; and first let us see what it is not. And here, let us distinguish Biography from History, on the one hand, and Fiction, on the other, with both of which it is liable to be inter-mixed.

History and Biography. Now, in the first place, History and Biography are not identical, though some people suppose that the history of a nation is but the history of its great men. This latter is, of course, an exaggerated statement, and it is made for the sake of magnifying the importance of Biography. Though we might suppose that historical events are interesting only in connection with the feelings of men, and that, therefore History reduces itself to Biography, it is only a part of the truth. There is much in the life of a nation which is not wholly

represented in the life of a national hero, or, for the matter of that, in the lives of many heroes together. It is the connecting link of these several lives, namely the life of the whole instead of the lives of the individual heroes, which gives History its existence and its importance. Indeed, History is to a Nation, what Biography is to a man: History, in other words, is the Biography of a nation. History and Biography agree in this that each of them is a kind of Philosophy teaching by experience; but while History refers mainly to events, Biography refers to persons; while History arranges the action of many persons in a due perspective, Biography focusses its attention on the actions of one man; while History is without a formal beginning and a formal end, because it always begins and ends abruptly, Biography is enclosed between the two sharp limits of the birth and death of the hero. While History has to concern itself with senate-houses and battle-fields, Biography works in a humbler sphere—with the qualities of the hero, and if with actions, only so far as they illustrate those qualities. While an historical account of Alexander would concern itself mainly with the battles he fought, and the conquests he made, a biographical notice of him would lay special emphasis on his 'personal' qualities, and his achievements, only so far as they illustrate those qualities. Biography, in a sense, is but a part of History: while Biography is linear, History is solid; or to vary the metaphor, Biography is only one limb of the body politic of History which is an 'organic' whole of innumerable biographies put together.

Biography and Fiction. We have made the distinction between History and Biography at this length, in order to be able to define the exact nature of Biography. We must similarly make a distinction between Biography and Fiction, because, as experience teaches, the historical persons of great note come to gather a mist of myth round them, and the

mythical persons become so real that they almost become historical ; and so, Biography and Fiction shade off into each other. The history of King Rama and King Arthur is veiled in their mythology ; while Shylock and Othello have become almost historical. Novels have been supposed to be fictitious ' biography ', and dramas acted ' biography ' ; but this is a misuse of the term. The subject of biography must be a historical, real person ; and we can no more talk of the biography of Gulliver than of a quadrilateral triangle. It is impossible that a fictitious person can have a biography ; and it is on that account that though works of fiction abound in the world, very few good biographies really exist ; for which, in the first form of composition, the imagination of the writer is untrammelled, in the latter, the writer has to speak out bold and severe truth. A continuous dose of imaginative reading turns out to be most irksome to a reasonable man, and the pleasures of fancy pall upon his sense, because he is all the while aware of the unreality of his story, but a biography pleases him more, even though it is not as glorious as a novel or a drama.

The Masters of Biography. We have said above that good biographies are rare : this is so, because the art of Biography is so very difficult to cultivate. We have indeed masters in this form of art, as we have elsewhere ; but they can be counted up on the fingers. The most notable names in this connection are those of Xenophon and Plutarch in the ancient world and Boswell, Southey, Lockhart, Froude and Morley in the modern world. There are very peculiar difficulties with regard to this form of composition, which make the art so very difficult to cultivate. In the first place, it is very difficult to write the life of a contemporary ; because, thereby, one " might walk upon ashes, under which the fire has not been extinguished " . We might admire too much, or condemn too

much, as we are too much steeped in blood, and are not guided by the dry light of reason. If we, however, defer the business of writing a biography till after the death of the hero, we might find that the incidents have become insignificant, being of a volatile character. Other difficulties of a similar kind might present themselves before a biographer, and he might thereby think himself powerless. But the difficulties are by no means insurmountable; and we shall see, by an exhaustive consideration of the qualities of the great biographers we have mentioned, wherein consists the real art of biography, which, when cultivated to the fullest extent, might produce a most successful biographer.

The intellectual equipment of the Biographer. We can look at the art of biography from two points of view: firstly, from the point of view of the intellectual equipment of the biographer; and secondly, from the point of view of the construction of the Biography.

1. Personal knowledge. With regard to the intellectual equipment of the biographer, we may say that the first essential condition of the biographer is the personal knowledge of the hero. The biographer must have come into a long and first-hand contact with his hero; and then alone he can produce a good, reliable and interesting biography.

It is true that this element of personal knowledge is lacking in Plutarch, in Southey's life of Nelson, and in Forster's life of Goldsmith; but it must be remembered that that is the principal element which contributes to the charm of Boswell's life of Johnson, Lockhart's life of Scott, or Morley's life of Gladstone.

2. Self-abnegation. The second requisite of a biographer is that he must have a complete abnegation of self. He must not loom largely before the eyes of the reader in the biography which he undertakes. He must be content to take a back-seat, and he must try to bring his hero into the foreground. We might here

contrast Macaulay, who is never content to place himself in the background. He must stamp every one of his lives by his own impressions. Boswell, on the other hand, is the typical example of self-abnegation in the art of biography—perhaps to an excess. When a friend asked Goldsmith who was this cur that always followed in the heels of Johnson, Goldsmith made a mild retort by saying that Boswell was not a cur; he was only a bur, having the faculty of sticking. The ideal biographer, therefore, must not have the slavishness of a cur, but must needs have the persistence of a bur. Boswell attended Johnson so closely that even Johnson himself once said to Boswell, "Sir, you seem to have got only two subjects, you and me".

3. Assiduity. The third requisite of an ideal biographer is that he must have a wonderful assiduity; just as Boswell used to arrange meetings for Johnson, and question and cross-question him until there seemed to be no end to his labour; or when he wanted to collect some materials for Johnson's life, or to verify a date, he would run over half of London until he had satisfied himself.

4. Love of truth. The fourth, and a very important, requisite of a biographer is that he must be strictly impartial. Just as a historian must needs be veracious, so a biographer must needs be impartial. The hero must be painted as he was, without leaving any scars or wounds. There must be entire absence of prejudice in a biographer; otherwise, we might find very distorted images, as we find in Macaulay's Atterbury, and Shakespeare's Richard III. Atterbury is represented by Macaulay as an impostor in literature, and a traitor in politics—which is far from the truth. Nor is Shakespeare so faithful to history when he represents Richard as a diabolical person, as a man whose mind exactly corresponded to the distortions of his body. "Dogs bark at me,

when I halt by them." Moreover, it is good in the interest of virtue that the defects of great men be pointed out. A knowledge of the defects of great men acts as an incentive to virtue, by showing us how they tried to overcome them. Otherwise, as Dr. Johnson says, a merely bright side would produce despondency in us, by showing greatness to be entirely perfect, and therefore, above emulation. But it must be remembered that the weaknesses incident to greatness should not be so exhibited, that greatness might be remembered only for its defects. The evil that men do should not be allowed to live after them, nor the good to be interred with their bones. We must, to vary the original expression, write virtues in brass, and vices in water. Nor should we allow our style to make amends for our misrepresentations, as Macaulay does, his greatest defect being that he is so pleasing. Lastly, even though the biographer must not hide faults, he must do so in a real spirit of admiration. Of course, the two qualities 'impartiality' and 'admiration' seem to be contradictory to each other; but the contradiction is only apparent.

5. **A spirit of Admiration.** One *can* expose defects, and at the same time, do so in a spirit of admiration, as Boswell actually did. Macaulay finds fault with Boswell for having been infected with the disease of admiration; but it is not Boswell who is so much to blame as Macaulay. It was because Macaulay had not got himself inoculated with the germs of admiration, that he found fault with the admiration-infected Boswell. It is given to us to love and to be wise, and to admire a man "on this side of the grave as much as any", and at the same time be conscious of his defects.

The construction of Biography. This is the intellectual and moral outfit of an ideal biographer. With this he must proceed to the construction of a Biography. And here, as elsewhere, there is a distinction between an Artisan and an Artist, between a mechanical and an artistic biographer.

Gray seems not to have advanced far ahead of the mechanical conception of biography when he says that "any fool may write a valuable book by chance". It is not any fool who may make the remark; the remark itself requires an art. And similarly, we see that the construction of a good biography cannot be made merely by chance; it requires a great deal of natural aptitude and labour. Boswell stands so high among the biographers, because he had an innate capacity for biography which he developed by modest self-abnegation, and persistent labour. Any man who wishes to approach the inimitable Boswell must not only have his intellectual outfit but also his real art of biographical construction.

1. **Collection of materials.** The very first thing, to which he must devote his attention, is the collection of true and important material. Sometimes, this does not become possible, as in the case of Kālidāsa and Shakespeare, "who grew immortal in their own despite". A judicious investigation, a wise collection, and a careful condensation of these materials is necessary for producing an interest in the mind of the reader. Otherwise, if the writer persists in a "heavy succession of long quotations of disinteresting passages," it has, as Dr. Warbourton says, a very bad impression on the mind of the reader. Whenever an actual contact with the hero of the biography has been possible during his lifetime, all possible attempts must be made to preserve his conversation, his correspondence, his diaries, which, more than his works, serve to lay bare the heart of the hero in its full entirety. It is only in private that the mind of a man is really opened, and whenever there are more than two persons, we may suspect the parties of insincerity. So, attempts must be made to get to the knowledge of the private moments of great men. The writer must not forget to gather materials with respect to the family and the times of the man, for it is on the background

of these alone that the picture of a man can be faithfully painted.

2. **Critical form.** Secondly, the biographer must remember that his biography does not assume the form of a mere chronicle or a mere memoir, or a mere panegyric or a mere invective. The biographer has to do more than merely relate events, or bestow praise, or throw censure. He has to combine all these in an organic whole, and take a thoroughly comparative and critical view.

3. **Minuteness of detail.** Thirdly, no details ought to be too minute for a biographer. He must pay attention to the trifles in Biography, and must not fail to describe Caesar's baldness, Cicero's involuntary twitchings of the nose, Demosthenes's stammer, or Scott's lameness.

4. **Experimental method of determining character.** Fourthly, he must so arrange his materials, that at the same time he advances his own individual opinion, he must leave room for his readers to form their own if they like. He must not thrust his opinions with regard to the hero on the mind of the reader, but should advance his material in such a way that the readers may inductively come to have their own estimate of the character of the man.

5. **Life-like presentation.** Fifthly, there must be a life-like presentation of the hero. There must not be a dry narration in a life; what is wanted in a life is *life*. The personal interest in the hero must be kept up to the very end, and a certain amount of individuality must be shown as residing in the hero.

6. **Weaving chronology with criticism.** And lastly, it must be remembered that a Biography must not concern itself merely with actions or events, but must discuss

the doctrine, the character, and the influence of the hero. Great skill is required in combining description with argument, narration with philosophy, or chronicles with criticism. These are the qualities which are peculiar to the art of Biography, as distinguished from the art of composition in general. And a beautiful style, a sense of proportion and an aim at unity—which are the requisites of any kind of composition—would still more serve to add to the beauty of a Biography.

Autobiography. We must not forget to make mention of a species of Biography, which has still greater difficulties of its own—we mean Autobiography. A person who sets himself to write his own life is, first of all, charged with having too great an idea of his own importance. He might be tempted, it is supposed, to exaggerate his merits; or if he is considered honest enough, he might be thought too modest to describe his achievements. The danger lies in the fact that an autobiographer might say either too little or too much with regard to himself. If he says too little, his biography might degenerate into a mere chronicle of events; if he says too much, he might resemble a “hero ranting on the stage.” People are almost in feverish haste to read the autobiography of a person, whom they have personally known. They suppose it is always interesting—devilishly interesting—to see others in a difficult position, especially when that difficulty concerns itself with exposition or estimate of one’s character by oneself. Thus while a person is the best judge of himself, and has the great advantage of complete personal knowledge, he is, on the other hand, placed in a very delicate position of having to expose his own merit’s or defects. There are persons like Tukārāma and Bunyan, who, in a state of religious fervour, have applied the worst epithets to themselves; but they cannot, therefore, be called “soul-despis-

ing, soul-murdering, soul-damning, thoughtless wretches". We can account for their self-depreciation, not by saying that they were entirely stainless before their state of probation, but by saying that they had the greatest 'consciousness' of their sin, though the quantity of sin be small. Besides, an autobiographer is judged, most of all, by the coincidence of his thoughts as depicted in his work, with the motives as imprinted in his actions. All these considerations might well dissuade a man from writing an account of himself; moreover, an autobiography is bound to be incomplete, as an autobiographer cannot do justice to the account of his death. We see, therefore, why it was that though Dr. Johnson recommended that autobiographies should be written, he never wrote one himself; nay, he even destroyed the stray remarks which he had made with regard to himself in his diaries and memoranda. We also see why it was that though Scott and Southey had begun their own biographies, they ultimately abandoned the task as hopeless. We indeed have some celebrated pieces of autobiography as in the confessions of St. Augustine, in De Quincey's Opium-eater, or in Rousseau's Confessions; we also have the formal autobiographies of Mill and Herbert Spencer, of Benjamin Franklin, or in modern times, of Max Muller and Mrs. Besant. Whenever the autobiographer intends not to place his own self before the notice of the public, but has the disinterested intention of showing them the evolution of his own thought and character and that too for the benefit of the public, his intention is admirable; but in a majority of cases we find that the consideration of self, though apparently insignificant, is really the most important motive. The life of a man ought to be best seen in his works and in his actions; and no separate monument in the form of an autobiography is needed to enshrine him in the hearts of the public. Though men might die, they might still live in their works, which have been aptly described as the precious life-blood of master-

spirits embalmed and treasured up to a life beyond life. And it is this life after death which is far more covetable than the artificial life of autobiography.

We have seen therefore that autobiographies do not stand in good taste; they might be either disguises or apologies, and are therefore either partial or pitiable. But this does not mean that no attempts at 'biography' should be made. We have said above that nothing is more sacred than doing justice to the memory of the dead. Scarcely can we see a nobler example than that of a disciple doing justice to the memory of his master, or of an admiring friend consecrating a great man in the Temple of Fame. Great men might live and die silently; and it is the duty of their admiring disciples to let the world know of its greatest men. It is the very men who spurn greatness, that have the germs of real greatness in them; and knowing them by this mark, a wondering admirer might attend upon them, observe them in season and out of season, collect the necessary materials, and cause the whole world one day to ring with peals of applause.

The moral purpose of Biography—the final cause. It is such a man as can understand the moral purpose for which all heroes exist in this world; and it is such a man alone, who can take the opportunity of giving an impetus to man's evolution by celebrating the moral qualities of his hero. He can remind men that they can make their own lives sublime; he can make them understand the motive power of Biography in guiding and influencing their conduct. He alone can bring to light the romance that lies enclosed in human life; and he can show how the inventive life of Edison, the imaginative life of Shakespeare, and the philosophic, active life of Śankarāchārya far transcend the limits and dreams of fiction. He can bring cheer to desolate homes; he can infuse energy in dispirited minds; he

can brandish the torch of light and knowledge where there was darkness and ignorance. Nobility of thought or action spreads like wild fire; and from the ashes of one Phoenix will surely rise another beautiful and more youthful form. It is this impetus to moral and intellectual development, to active and speculative work which is the end and final cause of all Biography; and a Biographer who does not recognise the importance of it, and does not correspondingly mould the shape of his Biography, scarcely deserves his name.

V AN IDEAL CRITIC

Necessity of the existence of criticism.

That God has not been kind enough to bestow perfection on any institution, that everything has its own peculiar defects, that the conditions of Time, Place and Circumstances produce different temperaments in different men, that these defects and these conditions are the intrinsic and the extrinsic causes of true criticism, that prejudice, jealousy, animosity are the causes of false criticism or deliberate misrepresentation; all these facts are as clear as broad daylight. Politics, Economics, Art, Literature are all of them liable to criticism; because none of them furnishes exact subjects for their respective sciences. The excellence of Mathematics over all these subjects lies in this, that there can be no two opinions about mathematical disquisitions, while about other subjects, there can be. The science of Mathematics, therefore, lies without the domain of criticism and unlike other subjects has its exact laws to obey; hence it was that Aristotle said long ago that "no science but Mathematics can be perfect," and that "all other subjects are liable to criticism." As pointed out above, Time, Place and Circumstances play a great part in differentiating the temperaments of men; and this difference of temperament, and consequently of opinion, lead to criticism. Thus the internal defects of all the branches of knowledge except Mathematics and the above named omnipresent conditions are the great foundations on which all true criticism reposes. But in the channel of criticism as a whole are imperceptibly mixed the streams of true and false criticism; and it is the prerogative of genius to distinguish between the two.

An Ideal Critic.

By an 'ideal critic' we mean one in whom are embodied the virtues of critics without their vices, their merits without

their defects. An 'ideal' critic may be impossible to find in the 'real' world; but we are not concerned with this question here. We are here to portray a critic who is, as it were, a personification of all the virtues of true criticism.

Requisites of an ideal critic or laws of true criticism.

The first requisite of an ideal critic is that he must have a thorough knowledge of the subject he is going to criticise, whether it be History, Economics, Art or Literature. Unless he is thoroughly acquainted with the subject and unless he can penetrate into its innermost recesses and intricacies it is impossible for a man to become a good critic. A subject for criticism may be compared to a dark room which may be full of pearls or diamonds or which may perhaps be a resort of scorpions or serpents. A good critic should bring his lamp of 'knowledge' into the dark room to see and investigate whether it yields good 'fruit' or evil.

The second requisite of an ideal critic is that he must have an unbiassed temperament; he must not be prepossessed in favour of or prejudiced against any particular subject. He must not come to a subject with his mind already prepared to pronounce his verdict for or against it. He must take the subject as it is and must weigh it dispassionately in the even balance of mind; and 'if it be tried and found wanting' he may discard it.

An ideal critic must again beware of deliberate misrepresentation. Histories are often misrepresented by writers who, in so doing, seek either their own interest or the glory of their party. The Hallam Macaulay school is charged by conservative writers like Ranke with having deliberately shown up history in false colours. Whether this is true or otherwise, it is certainly a fact that historians do sometimes find their own interest in misrepresentation and this an ideal critic must take care to avoid.

The fourth requisite of true criticism is that proper attention should be paid to time, place and circumstances; as Bacon says: "The times be first considered wherein the things first began." In this connection, it may be said that a critic must beware of "proleptic criticism." An ideal critic should not judge things as they are at one period of time by their development in a later age. A historian like Macaulay should not judge Charles II by the constitutional development of the time of Queen Victoria. Shakespeare's grammar ought not to be judged by the grammatical development of modern times. Again speaking of 'place', what may be true in one locality may not hold in another; and so of 'circumstances.' Indian Art should not be judged by the standards of European Art. The beauties of Kālidāsa are not to be judged by the standard of the beauties of Shakespeare. And Indian Society is not to be judged by the standards of English Society.

The fifth and the most important requisite of an ideal critic is that he should look on both sides of the picture; Macaulay very aptly says in his life of Bacon, "Those judge him partially who look only on one side of his character: as a man or as a philosopher." On this point there are two schools of philosophers who hold different opinions. One school says that true criticism chiefly lies in exposing defects; the other maintains that it lies in praising merits and concealing defects. But both schools hold extreme opinions; the ship of one school splits on the rock of Scylla; and that of the other is forcibly made to rotate in the whirlpool of Charybdis. The 'ship of judgement' must go carefully ahead, avoiding both extremes with great care, and thus enjoy the advantage of the 'golden mean.' As a matter of fact, an ideal critic must state both sides of the question and must judge them by their relative merits. With all due deference to Addison, and Pope (Essay on Criticism) who maintained the second opinion, we may say

that they erred in that "it was not given to them to love and to be wise"; while the first school erred in that "it was not given to them to depreciate and to be wise." But Pope and Addison need not be sorry for this ; though it is true that "it is not given to man to hate or love and to be wise," still it is given to man "to love on this side idolatry as much as any".

The sixth and the last requisite of an ideal critic is that he should acknowledge his error when he is made to understand that he has been in error. A frank acknowledgement of one's error is the noblest duty that one can do. "Truth's greatest enemy is confusion and its greatest friend, the discovery of Error." And thus when criticism acknowledges Error, it will bring Truth to light, will make 'knowledge' repose on a sound basis and will thus tend to the "Glory of God and the relief of Man's Estate."

VI THE POSITIVE SCIENCES OF THE ANCIENT HINDUS.*

Dr. Brajendranath Seal has written a valuable book on the scientific notions of the ancient Hindus, and has discussed the various aspects of ancient Indian scientific reflection on such widely different subjects as Mechanics, Chemistry, Botany, Zoology, Physiology, and Methodology. In his long-continued researches in these subjects the author has thrown into relief the contributions that were made to them by Indian thinkers and scientists. The University of Calcutta could have selected no fitter person for the George V Professorship of Philosophy than one, who, deeply imbued with the philosophic and scientific principles of the West, has been trying to apply them to ancient Indian thought.

In an early part of the book (pp. 7-8), Dr. Seal shows how the Sāmkhya idea of Evolution closely resembled that of Spencer. Evolution, said the Sāmkhyas, was differentiation in integration. In other words, "the process of Evolution consists in the development of the differentiated (वैषम्य) within the undifferentiated (साम्यावस्था), of the determinate (विशेष) within the indeterminate (अविशेष), of the coherent (युतसिद्ध) within the incoherent (अयुतसिद्ध)." This, according to the author, comes remarkably near to the modern idea of Evolution. And even though the Sāmkhyas did not formally enunciate a law of that kind in so many words, the thought underlay the whole of their philosophy that, as Dr. Seal puts it, "increasing differentiation proceeds *pari passu* with increasing integration within the evolving whole, so that by this two-fold process, what was in incoherent, indeterminate,

* By Dr. Brajendranath Seal, M. A., Ph. D., pp. viii 295, 12s. 6d. net (Longmans).

homogeneous whole evolves into a coherent, determinate, heterogeneous whole ”.

Dr. Seal next goes on to point out (p. 79 note) against Mr. Spottiswoode how Bhāskarāchārya (*circa* 1150 A. D.) was a precursor of Newton in the conception of the Differential Calculus and its application to Astronomy, acknowledging, however, that his “ claim on behalf to Bhāskara is limited to the historically earlier imperfect form of the Calculus.” Nevertheless, he says that Bhāskara took a very bold step in recognising as his unit of time, the Truti, such an infinitesimally small magnitude as a thirtyfour-thousandth part of a second. We entirely agree with Dr. Seal when he establishes by an important quotation that there is more justification for saying that Bhāskara applied the Calculus to astronomical problems than that Archimedes used the conception of a rudimentary process of Integration. Bhāskara in his *Siddhānta-S'iromaṇi* distinguishes between *Sthūlagati* and *Sūkshmagati*; *Sthūlagati* takes only finite time into consideration; while *Sūkshmagati* makes unmistakable reference to indefinitely small portions of time. It is only if we make a distinction between these two kinds of motion, says Bhāskara, that we shall be able to explain why the motion of the moon is not uniform from moment to moment: यतश्चंद्रगतिः महत्त्वात् प्रतिक्षणं समा न भवति अतस्तदर्थं अयं विशेषोऽभिहितः । Nothing, says Dr. Seal, can be clearer than this conception of “ momentary ” motion, which involves in it the application of the infinitesimal calculus to time.

When the author goes on to discuss the data of ancient Indian Botany, his remarks are not so convincing when, for example, he speaks (p. 175) of the Hindu Scriptures definitely teaching the doctrine of a latent consciousness in plants. We are inclined to hold that the ascription of consciousness to the plant-world in the old ages was an indication of a mere unanalysed “ animistic ” view of nature, instead of being

based on experimental research as in modern times; and it would be reading too much in the old doctrine, if we interpreted it as being a matter of theory. Animism in its early stages proceeds on the relation of analogy, and it is only by an analogical inference, as Avenarius informs us, that a mind-meaning comes to be projected in the Universe, and in its extreme form animism becomes a hylozoism.

The ancient Indian classification of animals to which Dr. Seal next turns his attention is very interesting indeed, and represents much original work. It is usual in books on Zoology to find different kinds of classification according to the different standpoints from which the animal kingdom may be surveyed; but the one thread which runs through all of them, namely the tracing of the gradual progress from the lowest invertebrate to man is also to be met with in the final scheme of classification, which Dr. Seal has suggested on a review of the various schemes of classification put forth by Indian authors such as Charaka, Praśastapāda, Patanjali, Suśruta, and, more than anybody else, the very clever Jain analyst—Umāsvait (*circa* 40 A. D.).

In his chapter on Hindu Physiology, the author brings anatomical information given in books on Yoga and the Tantras to supplement the information in books on Medicine proper. It was in the Yoga and the Tantric books that the importance of the “cerebro-spinal” system came to be definitely recognised. There the seat of consciousness is no longer regarded as in the heart but is associated with the brain. There the various Chakras which correspond to the modern plexuses come to be recognised. While the most interesting fact of all is that the Yogic and Tantric books first definitely recognised the existence of the “sympathetic spinal” system, they enumerated the various spinal nerves and the connected sympathetic chain and ganglia,—a decided advance over the old anatomists. Dr. Seal deserves much credit for having

so clearly brought out the idea. Dr. Seal adopts a nomenclature which we only regard as unfortunate, (and this is a point which was brought to my notice by Dr. N. G. Sardesai), when we look at it from the point of view of the somewhat definite conclusions arrived at by Dr. Gananath Sen in his Pratyaksha Śārīra. Dr. Seal throughout uses the word Śiras for arteries, and Dhamanis for veins (vide pp. 212-213). This entirely upsets the conclusions of Dr. Gananatha Sen. Dr. Sen has very cleverly pointed out in the Sanskrit introduction to his book (pp. 62-65) that the word Śiras must have been used as the equivalent of the veins, inasmuch as the writers on Hindu Medicine spoke of Śirāvyadha, which could mean only discharge of *venous* blood, in other words, venesection; the term could scarcely be applied to the discharge of *arterial* blood. Then again, says Dr. Sen, the fact that the word Dhamanis was used as the equivalent of the arteries may be seen from the following important quotation from Suśruta, तस्य च हृदयं स्थानं, स हृदयाच्चतुर्विंशतिं धमनीरनुप्रविश्योर्ध्वगा दशदशचाधोगामिन्यः चतस्रः तिर्यग्गाः कृत्स्नं शरीरमहरहस्तर्पयति वर्द्धयति धारयति यापयति जीवयति चादृष्टहेतुकेन कर्मणा । This function could scarcely be attributed to the veins. True, there is very often a misuse of both the words Śiras and Dhamanis (as Dr. Sen points out on pp. 64-65) in the great works on medicine, but on a general consensus of the passages, we may arrive at the conclusion that the word *Śiras in Hindu Medicine stands for veins, and Dhamanis for arteries.* We may also refer to Dr. Anna Moreshwar Kunte's Strīroga-vijñāna (p. 5) for a similar conclusion. He also points out that the Śiras are those blood-vessels which carry Dushta-Śoṇita, and the Dhamanis are those which carry Jiva-Śoṇita. Dr. Seal should change this unfortunate terminology in a second edition.

One of the most interesting points raised in the book concerns the ancient Indian ideas about questions of heredity and the transmission of characteristics. The author quotes Suśruta to prove that he held the doctrine of palingenesis

instead of epigenesis. "As the sprouting bamboo-seed contains in miniature the entire structure of the bamboo, as the mango-blossom contains the stone, the pulp, and the fibres, though from their excessive minuteness they are indistinguishable in the blossom, even such is the case with the fertilised ovum"; in other words, the fertilised ovum everywhere develops by palingenesis : all the organs are potentially present in it at the same time and unfold in a certain order. Moreover, it is exceedingly interesting to read how Charaka approvingly quotes Atreya's doctrine of germ-plasm : diseases and infirmities are transmitted to the offspring only when the germ-plasm of the parent has been affected, and never otherwise. It is due to this that blindness may not be transmitted, but leprosy may : दंपत्योः कुष्ठबाहुल्याद्दृष्टशोणितशुक्रयोः । यदपत्यं तयोर्जातं ज्ञेयं तदपि कुष्ठितम् ॥

In regard to Methodology, Dr. Seal finds (p. 290) that the Indian Neo Logic, in spite of its arid dialectics, "possesses a great *logical* value in the conception, to which we are made familiar in it, of quantification on a connotative basis, a great *scientific* value in the investigation of the varieties of Vyāpti and Upādhi, and a great *epistemological* value in the precise determination of the various relations of Knowledge and Being with even greater rigidity and minuteness than in Hegel's Logic of Being, and Essence." We think that the praise that is bestowed upon the Neo-Logic of India is exaggerated. The very great network of Avachchedakas that is woven in the New Logic of India, in our opinion, absolutely mars the pristine purity of ancient Indian Logic. It only reminds us of what Bacon said about the Logic of the Schoolmen that it was like a cobweb, admirable indeed for the fineness of its texture, but absolutely of no substance or profit. There may be occasional grains of wheat, but they are so few and far between that they are wholly submerged in the chaotic mass of the husk-rinds that surround them.

On the whole, we may say that Dr. Seal's book is a positive contribution to the interpretation of Indian thought, and we welcome it as putting in a very succinct fashion, before all those who may be interested in Indian thought, the salient points of the scientific reflection of ancient India. We must, however, guard ourselves against one possible misconception. The scientific thought that is presented in the book is, on the whole, the thought of Indian authors right up to 1000 A. D. and in some cases even later. As Dr. Seal himself acknowledges on the first page of his book, the reflections embodied in it pertain, on the whole, to the age of Philosophic Systems, and not to the age of the Brāhmaṇas or the Upanishads. So we must be very careful how we compare the results of Hindu science with those of Greek science. Dr. Seal says that "a comparative estimate of Greek and Hindu science may now be undertaken with some measure of success—and finality", (Preface p. iv), but, if we just compare the dates of ancient Greek thought, and the thought of Indian Philosophic Systems, the task is not as easy as may otherwise be supposed. The task will become easier only after a careful demarcation of the chronology of Indian philosophic systems, and the interpreter of Indian Philosophy must, for a long time to come, have to depend on the help of the Indian antiquarian. Anyhow, we assure Dr. Seal that we are awaiting with keen impatience his "Studies in Comparative Philosophy," to which his present book is to serve as a mere prolegomenon.

There is, however, one fundamental criticism concerning the limitations of ancient Indian scientific method. Notwithstanding their great skill in observation, the ancient Indians did not use the method of experiment. To quote a letter on this point from Mr. B. G. Tilak: "This method was utterly unknown till Bacon and Descartes pointed out its importance; and to my mind, this is the important difference between the

ancient and the modern scientific thought. Dr. Seal has not quoted a single instance to prove that the method of questioning nature by experiment was known to the ancient Hindus. They *observed* that when a stone was dropped in water, it produced a widening circle of waves, and *imagined* that the same happened in the atmosphere when a sound was uttered. But not having learnt the art of experimenting, they could not go further. This to my mind is the main difference between the ancient and modern scientific thought". A similar criticism has been raised by Dr. Mann.

It only remains for us to indicate some of the minor blemishes in the book. When on page 143, Dr. Seal is illustrating the case of rebound after impact, he speaks of a "mortar rebounding after striking the pestle" as a typical illustration of such a kind of motion. We think Dr. Seal meant a "pestle rebounding after striking the mortar," which is also clear from the quotation from Praśastapāda :
 उल्लखमुसल्योरभिघाताख्यः संयोगे मुसलगतवेगमपेक्षमाणः मुसले उत्पतनकर्म करोति।
 Then, secondly, as Dr. Seal acknowledges on page 129, the system of transliteration adopted in Chapters II to VI of his book is different from that adopted in Chapters I and VII. We know the reason why this change was allowed to stay; but in a work which does not come forth as a mere collection of essays, but as an organic whole, this change of system is scarcely justifiable. Lastly, there is unfortunately no Index of names and subjects added to the book, even though the book is published by such a veteran firm as Messrs. Longmans. We need hardly tell Dr. Seal that an Index is absolutely necessary in any great work of these times; the categorical imperative of research demands it; even Mr. Bradley feels the necessity of an Index for his Appearance and Reality. An exhaustive Index will bring the contents of the book under the control of the reader.

VII

INDIAN PHILOSOPHY*

It is a year since Prof. Radhakrishnan's first volume of "Indian Philosophy" saw the light of day. We have been inordinately late in reviewing this great book; in the first place, because, the book was so full of information that it needed time to go through the whole of it; and in the second place, because, the present reviewer's point of view was so much like that of Prof. Radhakrishnan himself, that he could not know exactly how to review it. Prof. Radhakrishnan's book is a very illuminating survey of the progress of Indian Philosophy from the times of the Vedas to the formation of the four schools in the Buddhistic fold. We eagerly expect Prof. Radhakrishnan's Vol. II, on Indian Philosophy and we hope that it will be as illuminating as the Volume under review. Prof. Radhakrishnan's style is simple and lucid; but it is at the same time so concise and penetrating that one must needs read the whole of the book thoroughly before one can form a correct estimate of the value of the work. There are no short-cuts to the knowledge of Indian Thought, and one must study a book like Radhakrishnan's to possess a full philosophical knowledge of the whole period. Indeed Prof. Radhakrishnan comes to the study of Indian Thought from his knowledge of the Contemporary Philosophies of the West, and it is almost impossible to find another man who would be able to give a correct philosophical estimate of the progress of Indian Thought in terms of European Philosophy. That is the special feature of Prof. Radhakrishnan's book, and in reading him one does not feel one is reading any arid accounts of philosophical problems, couched in their dry and unsequential contexts, that have scarcely any value for one who

* Indian Philosophy by Professor Radhakrishnan, Calcutta University, George Allen and Unwin, 21s. net.

wants to estimate the significance of philosophical theories for life, thought, and action.

In the opening chapters of his work, Prof. Radhakrishnan discusses the significance of Vedic and Upanishadic Thought. As regards the Vedic deities, Prof. Radhakrishnan understands them correctly as personifications of forces of Nature, and he does not take that view of the Vedic deities, for example, which has been taken by "the great scholar-mystic, Mr. Aurobindo Ghose." In a series of articles contributed to the "Arya," Mr. Aurobindo Ghose suggested that the Vedic Religion must be understood as a mystery religion corresponding to the Orphic or Eleusinian religions of Greece. Beneath the concrete and material presentation of the Vedic Deities, according to Aurobindo Ghose, there lies a spiritual and psychological significance which is concealed from the profane, but is revealed only to the initiated. This is a view which Prof. Radhakrishnan commends as a bold and suggestive view no doubt, but which could, at the same time, not be understood as a correct view, inasmuch as the Vedic hymns manifestly contain a number of petitions to the deities, supplications for material comforts, entreaties for protection and victory, which are the characteristics of any early anthropology. When we come to the Upanishads, it is a different matter altogether. Prof. Radhakrishnan discusses very cleverly all the ethical, psychological and metaphysical bearings of Upanishadic Philosophy. His sections on the "Ethics of the Upanishads" and on the "Religious Consciousness" are particularly very illuminating. We are told how the highest ideal of Upanishadic Ethics consists in moral activity being taken over into the perfect life. "Morality has a meaning only in the imperfect world, where man is struggling to realise his highest nature Moral activity is not an end in itself. It is to be taken over into the

perfect life..... In this state the Individual Being is absorbed in the Supreme. This alone has transcendental worth, but the moral struggle as preparing the way for it is not useless" (p. 230). We think that nobody has stated the case of Upanishadic Philosophy better than Professor Radhakrishnan has done. In his chapter on the Religious Consciousness, we are told how "in Religion the will of man is set over against the will of God. If the two are one, then there is no morality. If the two are different, then God becomes limited and finite" (p. 233). This is how, according to Prof. Radhakrishnan, the Upanishads teach that we have to transcend the limitations of ordinary religion and rise to "that highest religion which insists on meditation and morality and worship of God in spirit and in truth" (p. 233).

The second part of Prof. Radhakrishnan's work is devoted to a discussion of the three great systems of Thought—the Pluralistic Realism of the Jainas, the Ethical Idealism of Buddhism, and the Theism of the Bhagavadgita. Prof. Radhakrishnan points out cleverly in his estimate of the value of Jain logic that the great defect in their doctrine consists in a belief in Ultimate Relativity, in entire obliviscence of the fact that "the theory of relativity cannot be sustained without the hypothesis of an absolute" (p. 305). "A careful consideration of (the theory of) Kevalajnāna or the knowledge possessed by the free," says Prof. Radhakrishnan, "will tell us that the Jaina theory, by implication, accepts the method of intuition and the philosophy of absolutism" (p. 307). Then again Prof. Radhakrishnan finds a significant defect in Jainism, in its denial of God, and in, at the same time, its belief in devotion to the Tirthankaras. "Personal love is to be burnt up in the glow of asceticism. But weak man is obliged to develop a sort of devotion towards the great Tirthankaras, however much strict logic

may prohibit it" (p. 331). Finally, Prof. Radhakrishnan suggests how the Jaina view of Reality is almost the same as the Leibnitzian. As Jainism looks upon the universe as full of Jivas, Leibnitz thought that the world was full of Monads: "In the smallest particles of matter there is a world of living creatures, entelechies or souls. Each portion of matter may be conceived as like a garden full of plants, or like a pond full of fishes." But Prof. Radhakrishnan also points out that an Ultimate Pluralism cannot be sustained. "Even Kumārila agrees that the soul has a natural capacity for grasping all things, and there are ways and means by which we can develop this capacity. If we emphasise this aspect of Jaina philosophy and remember that there is intuitional knowledge of the Kevalin,.....we are led to a monism absolute and unlimited,.....and it is only by stopping short at a half-way house that Jainism is able to set forth a pluralistic realism" (p. 340).

Another system of thought, which arose at the same time as Jainism, but which is of far greater consequence for thought than Jainism itself, was the Philosophy of Buddhism. Prof. Radhakrishnan points out how, just as the ethical age of the Stoics and Epicureans followed the age of Aristotle in Greek Philosophy, so the age of Jainism and Buddhism followed that of the Upanishads in the development of Indian Thought (p. 357). The most characteristic feature of Buddhism is the Philosophy of Change. Prof. Radhakrishnan likens it cleverly to the philosophy of Bergson. "A wonderful philosophy of Dynamism was formulated by Buddha twenty-five hundred years ago, a philosophy which is being recreated for us by the discoveries of modern science and the adventures of modern thought" (p. 367). "Life," said Buddha, "is only a series of manifestations. There is no Being that changes; there is only a self changing, Pratīyasamutpāda, the origin

of one thing in dependence on another" (p. 371). This is the most characteristic feature of Buddhism. It also leads to the corollary that the Atman as an entity does not exist. Prof. Radhakrishnan points out how Nāgārjuna in his commentary on the Prajñāpāramita Sūtra tells us that the Tathāgata taught both the doctrines, the doctrine of soul as well as the doctrine of Not-Soul. "When he preached that the Atman exists and is to be the receiver of misery or happiness in the successive lives as the reward of its Karma, his object was to save men from falling into the heresy of nihilism. When he taught that there is no Atman in the sense of a creator or a perceiver or a free agent, apart from the conventional name given to the aggregate of the five Skandhas, his object was to save men from falling into the opposite heresy of eternalism" (p. 389). It is this denial of an eternal verity behind all things which is the chiefest defect of Buddhism. A true Nemesis of this denial of Atman in Buddhism came upon them in their final worship of man. "We cannot worship Buddha, because he is no more; and so we worship his relics and doctrines" (p. 448). This is indeed the fate of all the religions which try to deny God. The founders of such religions ultimately usurp the place of God with what justification a mystical philosophy alone cannot judge.

Prof. Radhakrishnan's account of the Bhagavadgītā is very full, accurate and profound. The Gītā was indeed an application of the Upanishadic ideal to the new situation which had arisen at the time of the Mahābhārata (p. 530). Having discussed the date of the Bhagavadgītā, and having pointed out that it might be taken to be the fifth century B. c., Radhakrishnan goes on to give us the varied teachings of the Bhagavadgītā. He points out that the Ethics of Bhagavadgītā must be taken to be definitely based upon its Metaphysics. Having discussed the nature of Reality, Prof. Radhakrishnan proceeds to discuss the conception of the World

of Change in the Bhagavadgītā, and ends by giving a very succinct and illuminating account of the three Mārgas of the Bhagavadgītā, the Jñānamārga, the Bhaktimārga and the Karmamārga. We heartily recommend Prof. Radhakrishnan's treatment of the Bhagavadgītā to all those who care for a modern presentation of the thought of their great ancient poem.

In the concluding chapter of his book, Prof. Radhakrishnan discusses the later phases of the development of Buddhism. If the doctrines belonging to the age before Asoka may be said to represent early Buddhism, those in the time of Asoka may be said to constitute the Hīnayāna doctrine, and those after Asoka the Mahāyāna Doctrine (p. 589). The Hīnayāna doctrine wronged the spiritual side of man, and its negative philosophy was not competent to constitute a popular religion (p. 590). Hence the origin of Māhayānism. Prof. Radhakrishnan discusses fully the doctrines of the four schools of Mahāyāna Buddhism. He brilliantly describes their philosophical and epistemological importance when he tells us on p. 667 that " the Vaibhāṣikas started with a dualistic metaphysics, and looked upon knowledge as a direct awareness of objects. The Sautrāntikas made ideas the media through which reality is apprehended, and thus raised a screen between mind and things. The Yogācāras quite consistently abolished the things behind the images, and reduced all experience to a series of ideas in their mind. The Mādhyamikas, in a more daring and logical manner, dissolved mind also into a mere idea, and left us with loose units of ideas and perceptions about which we can say nothing definite." On the ethical side, Buddhism illustrates the difficulty of a moral philosophy without a spiritual basis (p. 608). " Buddhism failed to bring to India a real spiritual deliverance inspite of the fact that it laid powerful emphasis on a severely simple life of pure goodness.... The real secret of the

failure of Buddhism is its neglect of the mystical side of man's nature." To say that it was violently exterminated out of India is, as Prof. Radhakrishnan points out, a pure myth. Its downfall was due to the fact that it became ultimately indistinguishable from the other flourishing forms of Hinduism, namely Vaishnavism, S'aivism and Tantrism. In spite, however, of its failure, we must remember that the spirit which breathes in the twelfth Edict of Asoka is a permanent monument to its greatness: "There should be no praising of one's sect and decrying of other sects, but on the contrary, a rendering of honour to other sects for whatever cause honour may be due to them." If this spirit pervades our everyday activities, if it becomes the foundation-stone of our philosophies and religions, if our politics come to be based upon such a principle, the world will soon be habitable, for God will come to live in it.

VIII

STUDIES IN VEDANTA.*

1. This posthumous work of the late Rao Bahadur V. J. Kirtikar, which his grandson Mr. M. R. Jayakar, Bar-at-Law, Bombay, has edited, is a unique specimen among works on Vedānta which have been lately written. It is wonderful what great critical insight Mr. Kirtikar brings to bear upon his studies in Vedānta, and with what skill he compares the leading ideas of the Vedānta with those obtaining in Western Philosophy. The main trend of Mr. Kirtikar's work is a sustained *tu quoque* argument against those who are battling against Indian Vedānta, calling it pantheism, acosmism, determinism, atheism, immoralism, and what not. Mr. Kirtikar pays these critics in their own coin, and tells us that if the fundamental theories of the Vedānta do not hold, neither do the fundamental philosophical principles of Western philosophy itself. If Vedānta is a mis-theory, similarly are all the theories of the Eleatics, of Plato, of Spinoza, and of Hegel. Let not a Hegelian interpreter stand and say to the world that Hegelianism is right, and Vedānta is wrong. Let no Spinozistic commentator dub Indian Philosophy as Acosmism and Atheism, and save the theories of his own favoured author. It is not possible simultaneously to extol Plato and Parmenides and to condemn Vedānta. Mr. Kirtikar points out very accurately and exhaustively, by a consideration of the theories and arguments of the Hegelian critics of the last decade of the last century and the first decade of the present, that if Hegelianism is right, Vedāntism is right, and probably even more right than Hegelianism, because more spiritual. In point of luminosity of

* By V. J. Kirtikar, edited by M. R. Jayakar, Bombay, D. B. Tara-porewala Sons & Co., 1924, pp. viii + 194 + xxviii.

style and cleverness of criticism, Mr. Kirtikar's work reminds one of Adamson's works on the Development of Greek and Modern Philosophy. It is as simple, as lucid, as trenchant and as critical. Mr. Jayakar's task has been also no less formidable. To hunt out all the references in the various works on Indian Philosophy to support the arguments of Mr. Kirtikar is no small task, and Mr. Jayakar has done the editor's duty quite admirably. It would seem *prima facie* impossible among jurists to find two such men who are so up-to-date and critical in their handling of philosophical problems, but both Kirtikar and Jayakar have to be warmly congratulated upon having set a lesson to those whose life-business is to teach philosophy but whose actual work is anything but philosophical. One expects the other volumes of Mr. Kirtikar, namely, on the Philosophy of Shankarāchārya, to come out under the able editorship of Mr. Jayakar in a very short time, and it is hoped that when these volumes come out, Mr. Jayakar would not merely have fulfilled his duty to his grandfather, but have given a good account of himself and established a position for both in the philosophical world. Mr. Jayakar is already known as a great lawyer; but as the present work shows, he is not a whit less as a philosopher. It is rare to find such commixture of philosophy and jurisprudence as in the author of the work who was late a judge of His Majesty's High Court of Judicature at Bombay, and the editor of the present work who occupies a foremost place at present in the Bombay Bar.

2. Every true Vedāntin's interest in his system of philosophy must be of the practical type. His theory must play a subordinate role to his praxis, and so it happens in the case of Messrs. Kirtikar and Jayakar. Vedānta is to be valued only so far as its upshot in social and political matters is concerned. Nobody can be called a true Vedāntin unless he practically utilises his convictions in the affairs of the

practical world; and if we are to judge of Messrs. Kirtikar and Jayakar from that point of view, the present reviewer thinks they surely stand the test. What is the value of the Vedāntin who is not noble in his behaviour, who is not self-sacrificing, who does not see equality among all men, who is not free from passions and prejudices, and whose consecration of life is not for the realisation of the kingdom of God among men? But a practical life must itself be based on a true philosophical foundation, and it is from this point of view that "the Studies in Vedānta" must be judged. Mr. Kirtikar enters quite accurately into all the fundamental problems of philosophy and discusses at length the Metaphysics of the Vedānta, the Ethics of the Vedānta and finally the Mysticism of the Vedānta. These are the three great divisions in which the work might be said to fall. It were much to be wished that the last two chapters of the book namely on 'Nescience' and on 'Being and Not-Being' came immediately after the third chapter, namely on the 'Great Enigma'. The two last chapters we have mentioned concern themselves with the problem of Māyā, and therefore could have been more fitly incorporated immediately after the third chapter—which fact, we hope, might deserve the attention of the Editor as soon as a second edition is called for. Mr. Kirtikar wrote his articles for the Press and they appeared at different times in different magazines; but the thread that runs through them all is quite visible, and it seems as if Mr. Kirtikar had pre-planned his work on Vedānta and sent off different articles as different offshoots at different periods in the magazines. As we have said the three great divisions of the work would be the Metaphysics of the Vedānta, the Ethics of the Vedānta, and the Mysticism of the Vedānta. Under these heads therefore we shall now try to review the book.

3. After having given the leading ideas of the Vedānta in chapter I, Mr. Kirtikar goes on in the IInd chapter entitled the 'Vedānta and its Hegelian Critics' to justify the Vedāntic position against its opponents in the circle of the Absolute Idealists, and shows that these critics who are living in glass-houses should not throw stones. This chapter namely 'the Vedānta and its Hegelian Critics' is the most important of all the chapters of the book, wherein Mr. Kirtikar's powers of argument and presentation are at their best. As regards the charge that the Brahman of the Vedāntin is merely an empty abstraction or an infinite blank, Mr. Kirtikar points out that Brahman is regarded both as the supreme "Samavāyī" and "Upadāna" Kāraṇa, leading to the necessary recognition of the idea of Becoming in Vedānta Philosophy, which justifies it against all those critics who would regard the Vedānta as offering us merely a block universe, in which there is no change and becoming. Mr. Kirtikar points out that the Hegelian conception of the Infinite returning upon itself has reference to its return from self-externalisation into a higher unity with its own self again. For human beings this means the idea that the Individual Soul must die to live a larger Self, an idea which is not unfamiliar to the Vedānta (p. 15). "If the Brahman of Indian Vedānta is a false and empty abstraction", says Mr. Kirtikar (p. 27), "the idea of Absolute Being in the Hegelian system would be no less so." Prof. Seth accuses Hegel of having transformed his logical Absolute into a metaphysical existence by a leap across "the ugly broad ditch which dialectic is powerless to bridge". The only justification of the Hegelian system would be to regard the Absolute as a logical abstraction first, which then comes back upon itself through experiential realisation of its own spiritual nature, and Mr. Kirtikar points out that if one feels the presence of the Infinite in every sense-perception of the external objects, this Infinite

can hardly be said to be a merely logical and therefore an empty abstraction. He quotes the opinion of Mr. James from the Varieties of Religious Experience that the description of Atman as "No, No," which seems to be a no-function on the surface, is in essence a denial made on behalf of a deeper "Yes" (p. 28). Real Vedāntism is essentially Mysticism. To be able to describe God in any positive terms means only the affirmation of negation. Mr. Kirtikar quotes Eckhart who tells us "if we are to say God is good, it is not true; for it involves I am good and God is not good. But it may also imply that I am even better than God, for whatever is good may become better, and whatever may become better, may become best. Now God is not good, for he cannot become better, and if He cannot become better, He cannot become best. Similarly if I say that God is wise, it is not true, for I am wiser than God. If I also say God is a Being, it is not true". The only justification for any assertion about God would be in maintaining a mystic *epoche*. "If thou wilt be without sin, prate not about God", says St. Augustine, "If I had a God whom I could understand, I would never hold Him to be a God" says another great mystic philosopher. It is for this reason that the Vedāntic description of God in terms of "Neti, Neti" also involves no room for regarding Him as a bare logical and empty abstraction.

4. The point of great difficulty in an Absolutistic system of Metaphysics is the consideration of the place of Creation. Should we regard Nature as God Himself, or should we regard it as God's Emanation? This is the point which Mr. Kirtikar goes on to discuss in his third chapter entitled the Great Enigma. He points out that the Indian Vedānta is not unique in its theory of Emanation. It has found favour with some of the most eminent Christian philosophers and German mystics, such as Thomas Aquinas, Eckhart, and Tauler (p. 37), and Mr. Kirtikar insists, that according to the Indian Vedāntin, the

conception of creation is quite an unscientific one, in as much as it involves a creation out of nothing, and then a separation of the Creator from His Creation (p. 37). Very cleverly he brings out the analogy between the Māyā of the Vedānta and the infinite modes in the system of Spinoza—a sort of connecting link between substance and creation (p. 39). It is along with this chapter on the Great Enigma that we recommend the last two chapters of the book, namely on Nescience and Being and Not-Being, be incorporated in a later edition. In the chapter on Nescience Mr. Kirtikar goes on to discuss the various theories about the doctrine of Māyā namely that it may be regarded either as Nature, or as Mystery, or as constituting the innate forms of the human intellect, viz., time, space, causality, or yet as the principle of Individuation, and finally as an erroneous imposition of the attributes of one upon the other (pp. 178 and 179). Mr. Kirtikar sums up in a very clever fashion all the different ideas in the Upanishads and the Bhagavadgītā about Nescience and Avidyā, when he says that “Plurality is due to Nescience; that Nescience is the seed of all manifestation; that Names and Forms are presented by Nescience; that the elements and the body are the product of Nescience; that all that is knowable is of the nature of Nescience, and so on” (pp. 179 and 180). He goes back to the Purushasūkta and the Nāsadiya Sūkta (p. 184) to determine the character of this Asat, and comes to the Upanishadic passage where we are told that originally verily all this was Asat and later on Sat rose from it (p. 188). The ultimate implication of the theory of Māyā according to Mr. Kirtikar is only that the Universe has no reality independent of and apart from Brahman, and that if this is a wrong notion, the Eleatic philosophers of Greece were likewise guilty of it (p. 194). Thus the metaphysical justification of the doctrine of Māyā lies in the denial of the separateness of the existence of the Universe from God.

5. There is a very original chapter on Knowing and Being in Mr. Kirtikar's book which gives us an insight into Indian epistemology. Of course, from the mystical point of view, Knowing is as Dr. Buck has put it only progressive becoming — a continual transformation of the motives, ideals and perceptions of man (p. 58). But apart from this mystical interpretation of "Knowledge", philosophy has to take cognition of its properly epistemological aspect, and though Ferrier points out that the ancient Greeks were wrong in having tried to solve the problem of Being before they solved the problem of Knowledge, Indian philosophy, says Mr. Kirtikar, need not be charged with having neglected the consideration of Knowledge before it went to the metaphysical solution of Reality. According to Vedānta, the fundamental presupposition of all knowledge is, in the Cartesian fashion, the Self itself. Mr. Kirtikar points out cleverly that the Upanishads have called the Self "pratibodhavidita" that is, known only by experience. He tells us that the Self must thus be regarded as the root of all the experience, as that which makes experience possible (p. 52). The highest mystical realisation of the Self occurs when the Self becomes almost, as Max Muller calls it, an "Aestheton", an object which is "felt" on account of man's constant contact with it (p. 52). But this is the mystical side of epistemology. As regards theory of Knowledge proper, Mr. Kirtikar points out that the crowning truths of Western Epistemology may be said to be in the words of Ferrier that (1) every cognition is the synthesis of the Self and the Not-Self, of the subject and the object, and (2) that there is only one Absolute Existence existent, which is strictly "necessary". As regards these fundamental truths of Western philosophy, Mr. Kirtikar points out that the synthesis of subject and object which Western epistemology requires is merely a minimum of Knowledge, implying the possibility of the indefinite enlar-

gement and expansion of both the terms. Both the terms in this series may indeed go on expanding till they become co-extensive (p. 56). And as regards the other point, namely that the Absolute must be regarded as a " necessary " existence, Mr. Kirtikar quotes the opinion of Dr. Calderwood that the Absolute must, on the contrary, be regarded as that which is " free " from all necessary relations (p. 54), but that it may enter into relations, provided that the relations themselves are not a necessary condition of its existence. In a different chapter Mr. Kirtikar quotes the opinion of Plotinus as regards the nature of Truth, that it cannot be called an agreement of our apprehension of an external object with the object itself, but that on the other hand, it is the agreement of the mind with itself (p. 88). Finally, as regards the cognition of the Absolute, Mr. Kirtikar turns again to the two paths, namely those of Pravritti and Nivritti, the first involving the phenomenal heterisation of the Absolute in the Universe, and the other implying the self-return of the Self upon itself. In fact, he introduces the theory of the Vyāvahārika and the Pāramārthika truths which gives to phenomena the things which belong to phenomena, and to noumena the things which belong to them.

6. A very important chapter in Mr. Kirtikar's book is Chapter V, wherein he discusses the relation of Tattvamasi, or ' That thou art ', with Western thought. Under this head, he considers various objections that are brought to the identification of the Individual and Universal Souls. In the first place, he discusses the objection that it is blasphemous to claim complete identity with the Absolute. In the second place, he disposes of the objection that the theory involves the fictitious character of the Individual Soul. Thirdly, he considers whether Vedāntism like all Pantheism could in any real sense be antitheistic and immoral. Fourthly, he

considers whether it would lead to a quietistic sort of life, when the philosopher becomes practically useless to the development of man or of society. Finally, he considers whether mystic Vedāntism is either unphilosophical or irreligious. He quotes Rev. Charles Kingsley who has the candour to admit that, however startling the idea of "deification" may appear to the Christian readers of the present time, they are bound to acknowledge that their own sacred writings and the utterances of their Saints countenance such an idea (p. 82). And as regards the objection that the ideal of Tattvamasi involves the annihilation of the individual soul, he quotes Plotinus and Erigena to show how the individual souls do not lose their identity in God, but preserve it in a higher state of being, "just as iron when it becomes red-hot, seems to be turned into pure fire, but remains no less iron than before" (p. 83). It is wonderful, says Mr. Kirtikar, that the Absolute Idealists should have continued to stigmatise oriental Pantheism as antitheistic when they themselves have been charged as being pantheists by the Christian philosophers themselves. He points out how Flint and Upton have charged Hegelianism itself as unmitigated pantheism, and how this kind of pantheism could be seen in the writer of the Old Testament himself who could find no place to flee to from the presence of God, as well as in Giordano Bruno and Servitus, the last of whom was burnt alive by Calvin when he told him that "this bench, this table, and all that we see around us is of the substance of God".

7. Mr. Kirtikar goes on to treat of Vedāntic Ethics in Chapter VII of his book. He begins by pointing out the difference between Parā and Aparā Vidyā, and says that Ethics and Morality belong to the world of sense-experience, and that they have justification only so far as the sensuous world is concerned. When the principle of "Abheda" which

the Vedānta teaches tells man that though apparently he may be an independent individual, there is still the presence of the universal spirit in him, which leads to the recognition of the existence of that principle in all human beings as well as the Universe, an immediate corollary of which is for the Vedāntin's practical life an absence of all egoity, an absence of all distinction between friend and foe, an absence of all attachment to earthly possessions. "No room is thus left for selfish passions to exercise their sway, and in their place come abnegation, contentment, renunciation, sacrifice, equanimity, truthfulness, a desire to injure none, love, compassion, forgiveness, charity, humility and peace" (p. 114). But when the noumenal point is reached, as Shankara points out, the world appears to be melting away like the imagery of a dream. "Of what value is the contemplation of the world at that high stage? Of what value is a toy-elephant to one who understands that it is a toy? Of what value is a diagram to one who is face to face with the original reality?" (p. 126).

8. Finally, Mr. Kirtikar goes on to sum up in chapter IX all the implications of a mystical theory of reality. Mysticism involves that Matter is to be regarded as only the last and densest expression of Spirit; that man has an affinity with all that exists; that man is only a microcosm of the macrocosm; that he is at one with the Eternal; that identity can be experienced only by the Pure and Righteous; that this brings in its train a high ethical standard for the acquisition of Divine illumination; that the disentanglement from the meshes of the world which Mysticism teaches is no more than what was taught by both Matthew and Luke that "unless a man hates his father and mother and wife and children and probably his own life also, he cannot walk in the path of God". Mr. Kirtikar's point of view is that to understand the philosophy of Mysticism, one must necessarily study the Upanishads, just as Inge had said that to

understand introspective Mysticism at its best, one must necessarily read the *Theologia Germanica*. The fact that there is a continued unanimity in the experiences of the mystics of all ages is sufficient justification of the reality of mystic experience. Even an idealist like Caird has to acknowledge in justification of his interpretation of the passage "It is not I, but Christ that lives in me" the ultimate negation of the existence of the individual soul when it has attained to the perfection of its own nature (p. 162), and a radical empiricist like James has to admit, as the result of his introspective analysis that looking back at his own experiences it seemed as if they converged to a kind of insight, the keynote of which was reconciliation. "It is as if the opposites of the world whose contradictoriness makes all our difficulties and troubles were melted into unity. Not only do these experiences, as contrasted species, belong to one and the same genus, but one of the species, the nobler and the better one, is itself the genus, and so soaks up and absorbs its opposite into itself" (pp. 163, 164).

9. We can see from the above how very widely-read Mr. Kirtikar was, what insight he had in Vedāntism, how he could compare different points of view from Eastern and Western thought, what a lucid style he could write, what a life he held out to his own ideal and the ideal of those who were like him, and how finally for all these reasons the work under review is a work of exceedingly high value for the student of comparative thought. We only wish that Mr. Jayakar is enabled to add to this Volume, at no distant date, a series of other works on the Life and Teachings of Shankarāchārya from the pen of the late Mr. Kirtikar.

IX

BUDDHA AND THE GOSPEL OF BUDDHISM*

Messrs. Harrap have really added to the existing literature on Buddhism a work of sterling merit and simplicity. Dr. Ananda Coomarswamy has been known to the world of letters as a man who carries aloft the banner of Indian renaissance. By his works on Indian Art, on National Idealism, and on the myths of the Hindus and the Buddhists, he has been well-known wherever Indian culture is prized. In the work under review, Dr. Coomarswamy breaks new ground and gives us a fascinating study of the Founder and the Doctrine of Buddhism. All students of Buddhism know how the works already extant on Buddhism are full of odds and ends, of enumerations instead of doctrines, and those too given in a quaint, dry style. Mr. and Mrs. Rhys Davids are learned, but they are far from being luminous. Dr. Kern's book is a veritable encyclopaedia. The translations of Buddhistic works are full of curious turns of thought, and many a reader of them may bear us out when we say that in them we lose the wood for the trees. A simple, luminous explanation of Buddhism was wanting, and we congratulate Dr. Coomarswamy on having given one to the world. Barring a few defects of print and (if we may presume to urge against a great modern artist) of illustration likewise, Dr. Coomarswamy's work may be said to be eminent. The very frontispiece of the work—which purports to give us the image of Buddha under the temptation of Mara and which must therefore represent Buddha as being assailed with deadly missiles by arrogant hideous elementals—is utterly false to nature when

* By Ananda Coomarswamy, D. Sc., pp. viii + 370. 15/- Net.
Harrap and Co., London.

we consider that, what he actually gives us, is the picture of a lascivious loving lad who is more fit for the strategems and spoils of love than for the conquest of the great tempter and his powerful coterie. The few defects of print, such as "*Their* lies a profound significance in the discovery of Asiatic thought" (p. vi), and "Retre t" (p. 77) and a few others must be carefully corrected in a second edition.

The work under review is most systematically divided in five parts. In the first Dr. Coomarswamy gives quite a lucid and readable account of the life of Buddha. In the second, he discusses the fundamental ideas underlying the Buddhistic Philosophy. He discusses the Buddhistic ideas of Right Action, Reincarnation, and Annihilation, and goes on to consider the social side of Buddhism in its attitude to woman and to work. In part three, he considers the three *Motifs* that underlie the Buddhistic Philosophy. He considers the nature of the Vedānta, Sāmkhya and Yoga Philosophies, and shows how Buddhism springs from them. It is also in this same part that Dr. Coomarswamy writes a fundamentally important note on the relation of Buddhism to Brahmanism. In part four, he considers the later developments of Buddhism in the so called Mahāyāna School. In part five he discusses the literature and the art of Buddhism. A brief bibliography follows and then a short glossary of terms that are used in the book. A serviceable index winds up the whole book.

We shall consider more in detail one or two important points discussed by Dr. Coomarswamy. We have said above that his discussion of the relation of Buddhism to Brahmanism is very important and interesting. Dr. Coomarswamy points out that there are greater similarities between the two systems than are apparent at first sight. He refuses to believe that there is any true opposition between the two systems.

Between themselves they constitute "from the beginning one general movement, or closely related movements" (p. 220). The distinctions between them are "merely temperamental: fundamentally there is absolute agreement between them, that bondage consists in the thought of I and mine, and that this bondage may be broken only for those in whom all craving is extinct" (p. 221). The author points out that the *Anatta-vada* of the Buddhists must not be understood as a reaction against the Upanishadic Atmanism. The Buddhistic and the Upanishadic Philosophers understood quite different things by the words Atta and Atman (p. 199). The Buddha could hardly be regarded as having understood the precise significance of the Upanishadic Brahman (n.) as he always uses the word Brahman (m.). The Buddhists and the Upanishadic Philosophers must further be at one in their ethical doctrine of the mean, their doctrine of Becoming and Destruction, and in their recognition of their inability to determine the actual state of the soul after death.

In the section on Mahāyānism again, Dr. Coomarswamy makes a very careful and interesting comparison between the doctrines of the Hīnayāna and the Mahāyāna. He refuses to call Mahāyānism a mere degradation of the earlier doctrine. It was "an overflowing of Buddhism from the limits of the Order into the life of the world" (p. 228). If Hīnayānism was a doctrine of knowledge, Mahāyānism was a doctrine of love (p. 226). If the earlier doctrine insisted on the ideal of the Arhatta, the later doctrine insisted on the ideal of the Bodhi Sattva (p. 229). Then again, the later doctrine was distinguished from the earlier doctrine by its mystical theology. It is this last aspect in relation to the Tantrism of India, and the Mykyoism of Japan, which awaits a careful and detailed research. Dr. Coomarswamy does point out the relation of Mahāyānism to Ch'an or Zen Buddhism of China and Japan

with their special insistence on the efficacy of Dhyāna or Jñāna. But the subject is too interesting to be treated in passing or slightly, and we wish some clever Japanese Scholar would take up the work.

The final chapters in the book leave nothing to be desired. There is a complete and careful bibliography of Pāli and Sanskrit works on Buddhism with a full indication of their contents, while the sections on Buddhistic Art constitute a very important introduction to more detailed works on the subject which have seen the light of day quite recently. On the whole, if Dr. Coomarswamy has not put forth much research in the book it is not his intention to do so; it is more than amply repaid by his lucid and luminous exposition of the subject. Only that part of philosophy lives which is embodied in literature.

X

ELEMENTS OF CONSTRUCTIVE PHILOSOPHY*

We need scarcely introduce Dr. Mackenzie to our readers. His "Manual of Ethics" and his "Outlines of Metaphysics" have been frequently used in the early years of a philosophic curriculum all the world over. His "Outlines of Social Philosophy" reviewed elsewhere in this journal is another of the same kind of popular books written by the author. His "Elements of Constructive Philosophy" is a little bit more ambitious, though even here, we find that the necessities of a text book have been steadily kept in view and not those of any original contributions in the domain of thought. Dr. Mackenzie tells us that he has been busy with the book for more than a quarter of a century and that it was written primarily in order to clear his own views on the subject of philosophy. This last sentence is a very clear indication of the humility which continually underlies the thought of Dr. Mackenzie. He never rushes forth with any strange and startling ideas; but is always careful to set forth moderate opinions with a tentativeness of programme and cautiousness of execution. The very last sentences of his book "The cosmos, it would appear, is extremely complex. We can do little more than guess at its structure, and our guesses may be pretty wide of the mark. Nevertheless it is worthwhile to try" are characteristic of the whole philosophic demeanour of Dr. Mackenzie. He may not dazzle us with brilliance as Prof. James; he may not create a sensation in us by Bradleyan paradoxes; he is no orator as Royce is; he speaks straight on, he is so lucid that he may be understood by quite a novice in philosophy; while all through his book he

* By Dr. J. S. Mackenzie, pp. 487. George Allen & Unwin. 1918.

throws off hints which must give the learner further material for thought. We welcome Dr. Mackenzie not as any very great and original contributor to thought but as a systematiser of it.

The book under review is divided into three parts. In the first the author discusses logico-epistemological problems and carries us, as he calls it, from doubt to belief. In the second part he takes us from nature to spirit, discussing questions like causation, quantity and quality and then going on to a discussion of questions like value, freedom, personality and spiritual unity. In the last he takes us over from chaos to cosmos, discussing contingency, change and evil, elaborating the conception of a cosmos and explaining the religious aspect of philosophy.

We have said above that Dr. Mackenzie's book would be very eminently suitable to undergraduate classes in philosophy; and one wonders why the Indian Universities should not prescribe it as a text-book in Metaphysics. How long are our students to read the time-worn "Outlines of Philosophy" by Watson or the "Introduction to Philosophy" by Kulpe? Taylor's "Elements of Metaphysics" is becoming antiquated, as it takes no account of Pragmatism and Humanism and certain recent developments in Idealism. Dr. Mackenzie's book is very much more up to date. Its simplicity is striking. The skill with which he handles various problems is remarkable. His analysis of the various problems is very acute. Look, for example, at the way in which he analyses the conception of Order (pp. 106-116) and the modes of Unity (pp. 231-246). The manner in which he describes the various Orders, spatial, temporal, qualitative causal, organic, moral and logical, as well as the various modes of Unity such as the mechanical, chemical, organic, conscious and spiritual is very illuminating. The very moderateness with which he states his opinions and the fulness of

treatment which he impartially gives to points of view that differ from his own constitute an important reason why the book under review should be welcome to all under-graduates in philosophy.

Dr. Mackenzie tells us that his general argument may be taken as being in sympathy with the realistic tendencies of modern thought. Modern Realism has tended to sweep away the last remnants of a subjectivistic bias in philosophy. "It does not appear true", says Dr. Mackenzie, "that their (realists) main contentions are in any way opposed to such an idealism as that of Plato; and I doubt whether they are really opposed to that of Hegel, at least as interpreted by Edward Caird and Dr. Bosanquet" (p. 2). If the phrase idealistic realism be not a contradiction in terms, Dr. Mackenzie's point of view is that of an idealistic realist. "Realism", says Dr. Mackenzie, enables us to get rid of a solipsistic bias which has been the bane of all subjectivist philosophies (p. 265). There are realisms and realisms. Not all realism, says Dr. Mackenzie, is materialistic. "More often those who are called realists are dualists. Sometimes they are essentially agnostics. Sometimes they are hardly distinguished from idealists except by their tendency towards Pluralism. Their most general characteristic is opposition to subjectivism" (p. 163). Nothing would prevent us, according to the writer, from positing an idealistic realism; while "The insistence on the reality of universals brings the new Realism pretty close to such an Idealism as that of Plato" (p. 162). A question arises, however, as to whether the Philosophy of the Vedānta should be called realistic. Dr. Mackenzie quotes the opinion of professor Royce, according to whom the Indian Vedānta is the extreme opposite of Realism; but himself urges that as upholders of the Absolute one, which is not dependent upon anybody's


consciousness, the Vedāntists have a right to be called realists. The very Māyā, of which they speak, is objective even though it is illusory (p. 162 n.). We entirely agree with Dr. Mackenzie in this interpretation of the Vedāntic doctrine of Māyā.

In his discussion of the problem of Space and Time, Prof. Mackenzie agrees substantially with Kant in regarding them as forms of human perception, but he quarrels with the position of Kant in refusing to make an absolute distinction between outer and inner sense. This distinction, he says, has only a relative validity. "It is true that when we attend specially to the subjective aspect of our experience, time is more prominent than space; and that, when we attend specially to the objective aspect, space tends to become relatively (more) prominent. But it does not appear that the distinction ought to be made more emphatic than this" (p. 359). As regards the question of eternity, Prof. Mackenzie makes an important distinction between two different views of eternity, one according to which eternity is to be understood as merely the infinite extension of time both backwards and forwards, which makes time absolutely real; and another according to which eternity is to be understood as mere timelessness which would make time unreal (pp.449-450). The question of the ultimate nature of time assumes a great importance when we begin to discuss its relation to conscious life. Our consciousness seems to be *in* time but is it therefore *of* time? Prof. Mackenzie says that though our conscious life involves time, it transcends time: "A story or drama ... has a time of its own, and yet may be an eternal object of contemplation for those who are interested in it. This is (equally) true of the great drama of human history" (p. 450). Human life is really eternal, though a part seems projected in time.

Prof. Mackenzie's discussion of the finite and the infinite

is made merely from the moral standpoint. He does not enter into the mathematical investigations of infinity made by writers like Mr. Bertrand Russell (cf. his "Our Knowledge of the External World"). He acknowledges that his knowledge of mathematics is not sufficient for such a discussion (p. 402), but we may say at once that the moral colour that he gives to the discussion is of great significance. As his habit is, Prof. Mackenzie introduces us here to certain recent pronouncements on the subject, as for example, the very felicitous illustrations of the map and the mirrors in "The World and the Individual". Prof. Mackenzie makes large quotations from his article on Infinity in the "Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics". He inquires into the so-called infinite attributes of God such as knowledge, power and goodness and shows that these conceptions are hard to interpret. If infinite knowledge means the knowledge of an endless number of things, this will make God merely "a glorified calculating boy." If we interpret infinite power McTaggart-wise as the capacity of bringing about anything, as for example, making black white, such a conception becomes meaningless, and we would be reduced to the primeval chaos of Anaximander once more; finally if by infinite goodness we understand that the goodness of God is extended merely to a number of cases, it seems that we have more reason to speak of inexhaustible goodness rather than infinite goodness (pp. 421-424).

Descartes said that the doubt implied the doubter. Prof. Mackenzie says that the belief implies the believer. The fact that beliefs exist, says Prof. Mackenzie, implies that there are conscious beings (p. 56). But the more important question for philosophy is not whether the selves exist, but whether they exist ultimately. In short, the question is, can we say that there is a personal immortality? Prof. Mackenzie brings out the conflict between Messrs. McTaggart and Bosanquet, and points to the conclusion that persons are not entirely per-



sonal, but that there is a universal element in each of them, and hence the question of "personal" immortality must come to be somewhat modified (p. 340). Are Napoleon, Byron, Fichte, to be regarded as persons, or as types of humanity—Napoleon with his military ambition, Byron with his literary pride, and Fichte with his egoistic philosophy? Prof. Mackenzie inclines to the view that they should be regarded more as types of humanity than as individuals. "We may accept the dictum of Comte that the individual is abstraction, and that humanity as a whole is the only complete reality" (p. 328). And if Napoleon, Byron and Fichte are more than persons, what about the Buddha and the Christ? They proclaim a universal Kingdom welded together by love, and have more right to be regarded as types of humanity than the persons above named who had at least an egoistic impulse in them (p. 328).

We are thus insensibly brought to Dr. Mackenzie's conception of the spiritual unity of the world. What is the nature of this Whole? Is it personal or impersonal? Dr. Mackenzie takes the view that we ought to regard it as suprapersonal. After having considered a number of different conceptions of God (pp. 434-436), Dr. Mackenzie comes to set forth his own conception: "If even the best human beings may be said to transcend the limitations of a merely individual personality, it certainly seems reasonable to suppose that the unity of a cosmos must involve at least a similar transcendency" (p. 436). Prof. Mackenzie thinks that the true view of the Absolute must come near to the Indian conception of Brahman (p. 436). God must come to be regarded as *causa sui*, thus checking the finite regress of causation. He must come to be regarded as superconscious, thus snapping the chains of the infinite regress of thought. He must come to be regarded as supramoral, who is beyond all evil. If a noted author can afford to be *super grammaticum* why can

we not afford the Supreme as *super moralitatem?*(p. 389). "God could be regarded more appropriately as Perfection or Beauty than as Goodness is...concerned mainly with the guardianship of values that have been already achieved and established.... Goodness in any such sense as this could hardly be ascribed to the Cosmos... It might in this sense be said to be beyond good and evil" (pp. 442-443). If Dr. Bosanquet is right in saying that the standard of value does not itself possess value, will it be unfair to say that the form of Good is not itself good? (p. 443).

What then about the world which God has created? This must be regarded as a dream, and its author must be regarded as a Dreamer. We could even regard him as a Poet. "Instead of (the Platonic) Demiurge, let us think of God rather as a Poet or a Dreamer. If we were to assume that the phenomenal universe is the dream or imaginative construction of a great spirit, we might suppose that it has a coherent significance to which every part is relevant; and we might suppose also that it persists eternally. It may be objected that in that case it would be true to say that it is *only a dream*, and *not a reality*. But is not a dream real? We commonly think of our dreams as unreal because they lack the kind of coherence that belongs to what we call the world of fact. A thoroughly coherent dream would be perfectly real, especially if it could be supposed to persist eternally" (p. 381). It thus comes about that the world is merely the coherent and the eternal dream of the dreaming God.

Prof. Mackenzie's general philosophical position may be called "cosmism". It is neither Pluralism nor Singularism (p. 369). "Cosmism is the general doctrine that there is a system of reality which contains both unity and difference" (p. 370). The cosmos is thus an intelligible whole which makes room for both Singularism and Pluralism inside it. The question arises, could this be on Dr. Mackenzie's principles a

mere dream? Why should we not regard, why should not Dr. Mackenzie regard, God as a *super* dreamer? What room is there in a mere dream for "the continuous unfolding of a plan that has eternal significance and beauty?" (p. 451) Dr. Mackenzie tries to reconcile the Vedantic idea of a dream with an anti-subjectivistic realistic idealism! That is his so-called cosmism. And at the end of his book he comes to offer certain solutions of some ultimate problems from the standpoint of his cosmism. He tells us that contingency arises from the downward path in the life of spirit, which involves disruption and an appearance of disorder (p. 453). Change is merely the conception of the downward and upward path which, in Heraclitian fashion, gives rise to eternal cycles (p. 454). Evil is just the necessary antecedent to the apprehension and realisation of perfection and is therefore annulled in the completed issue (p. 454). There is neither God, nor Freedom, nor Immortality in the sense in which they have been understood to exist (p. 478). Prof. Mackenzie reiterates the Bradleyan epigram that a God who should be capable of existence could be no God at all; Freedom as meaning the complete independence of the individuals against the structure of the cosmos cannot be reasonably maintained; Immortality in the sense of the indefinite persistence of individuals, has and has not a meaning and is therefore probable and improbable. The task of philosophy, according to Dr. Mackenzie, is not to set forth ready-made doctrines, but to inspire men with a disquietude for truth. Philosophy is not a flowing stream, but a turbulent whirlpool. We leave our readers to form their own judgment about this view of philosophy.

The point of greatest importance, however, for the readers of this review is the very keen interest which Prof. Mackenzie evinces in the understanding and interpretation of Indian thought. He says it is very strange—is it not? — that the

thought of India should have been disregarded in England, while it should have been so closely studied in Germany. "It is not altogether creditable to us, as the nation to which the protection of Indian civilization has fallen, that we have done so little towards the interpretation and appreciation of this great religious movement. Here, as in so many other directions, the Germans have accomplished very much more" (p. 475). Here and there, a struggling writer finds that the gems of oriental speculation are worthy of his careful inspection. In our universities about six times as much Western Philosophy as Indian is taught, if the latter is taught at all. The spectacle is unbearable. It is this consideration which makes us appreciate the services of Dr. Mackenzie in giving to Indian thought its due. Dr. Mackenzie gives an important discussion of the Vedāntic attitude to reality and urges certain objections (pp. 459-69). It would be too much for us to consider the value of these objections in this short review. But we may at least congratulate Dr. Mackenzie for laying stress on the religious aspect of Indian Philosophy, and in saying so in more than one place his cosmism takes a form which is analogous to that of Brahmanism (pp. 475-76). Prof. Mackenzie acknowledges that many recent Western philosophers are approximating to the views taken by ancient Indian thinkers (p. 475), but we wish that the value of Indian thought should be appreciated more widely in the West than has been the case for a long time past.

CARLYLE

A Critical Review

Introduction: Thomas Carlyle is one of the greatest men that England and the Nineteenth Century have produced. As man of letters, as historian, and as philosopher, Carlyle stands before us as an intellectual colossus, before whom other men of his age and country seem almost pigmies. And as Carlyle excels in all these departments collectively, so he excels in each of them severally. There are few books written in the nineteenth century which, from the literary point of view, can compare with Carlyle's brilliant lectures on 'Heroes and Hero-worship.' His 'French Revolution' is an historical masterpiece of such excellence that George Saintsbury is obliged to say about it: "Carlyle's French Revolution is the French Revolution as it happened, as it was; the French Revolution of the others is the French Revolution dug up in lifeless fragments by excellent persons with the newest patent pickaxes."* And as regards Carlyle's philosophic penetration, the present writer does not know of any single book produced in the last century which contains as much philosophic insight as is to be found in the seemingly wayward lucubrations of the hero of 'Sartor Resartus'. Carlyle combines in himself in quite a unique way the different roles of *litterateur*, historian, and philosopher, and nowhere is his favourite doctrine of the essential unity of genius, the doctrine that a hero is a hero at all points, so well exhibited as in his own personality.

Carlyle's personal life: Carlyle was born at Ecclefechan on the 4th of December 1795. The son of a stone-mason, he

* *Corrected Impressions*, p. 54.

was sent to the village school in 1800, and to the grammar school at Annan in 1806, whence in 1811 he went to the University of Edinburgh, having walked the eighty miles from Ecclefechan to Edinburgh to save coach-hire. In 1814 Carlyle returned to his old school at Annan as teacher of mathematics, and in 1816 became a school-master at Kirkcaldy. But neither teaching, nor divinity, nor law, to which Carlyle successively turned, suited his abilities and ambitions. He took to writing articles for Brewster's Encyclopaedia, and became private tutor to the Bullers in 1822. In 1826 he married Miss Jane Welsh, after "a long courtship which was Platonic enough at first, devoted to bookish matters chiefly," but which "gradually drifted into sentiment, with rugged insistence on the wooer's part, receding hesitations and final capitulation on the lady's".* Jane Welsh had a small property at Craigenputtock: (Hawk's Hill), a bleak and solitary farm in the moorlands of Dumfriesshire, where husband and wife settled after their marriage, and lived for six years. It was here that a certain "sky-messenger from America," †Ralph Waldo Emerson, paid Carlyle a visit which was to be the origin of a life-long friendship. Carlyle's father, who died in 1832, had told his son before his death that it was a pity that he should live in such seclusion with nothing but the eye of Omniscience to see him, and he with such a gift to speak! Carlyle accordingly removed in 1834 to a house in Cheyne Row, Chelsea, which was his abode for the next half-century. It was here that Carlyle became the nucleus of literary London. In 1866, he was made Lord Rector of his old University in Edinburgh, but, following in the wake of his great triumph, came to him the sad news of his wife's death. Carlyle never recovered from the blow, even though he lived for fifteen years longer. He declined the Grand Cross of the Bath, which

* *Heroes*, ed. Murch, p. XV.

† Carlyle: *Reminiscences*.

Disraeli offered to him, but accepted in 1874 the Prussian *Ordre pour le Merite*. He died in 1881, and though he could have obtained a place in Westminster Abbey, he was, according to his own dying wishes, buried at Ecclefechan beside his father and mother.

Carlyle's literary life: Such in short is the personal life-history of that great spiritual teacher, Thomas Carlyle. It has been said that the life-story of a great man is contained not so much in his personal history as in his spiritual history; and so the present writer does not make any apology for having summarily dismissed the external facts of Carlyle's life. As regards the literary work of Carlyle, space scarcely allows a more detailed treatment. His earliest productions were the 'Life of Schiller' and a translation of Goethe's 'Wilhelm Meister' in 1824, the first fruits of Carlyle's studies in German literature, which he carried on from the very beginning of his literary career. In 1827, appeared his translation of 'Specimens of German Romance,' and 'Essays on Goethe, Werner, Heine' and others. In 1828, Carlyle wrote his 'Essay on Burns' for the Edinburgh Review, and in 1829, his 'Essay on Voltaire' and 'Novalis' for the Foreign Review, and 'Signs of the Times' for the Edinburgh Review. It was in 1830 that Carlyle began to show his real literary power in the composition of that "strange piece on clothes", 'Sartor Resartus', which has been fitly termed an "apocalypse of soul." Yet the MS was rejected by almost every publisher, the author being obliged to carry it about with him, as he put it, "from one terrified owl to another," and did not see the light of day till 1834, in Fraser's Magazine. In 1831 Carlyle contributed his 'Essay on Characteristics' to the Edinburgh Review, and soon after appeared his 'Essays on Johnson, Cagliostro, Diderot and others' in various reviews, which prepared the way for his 'French Revolution and Heroes.' The story of the first volume of his 'French Revolution', which was lent to John Stuart Mill, accidentally burnt by his

maid, and subsequently rewritten, is familiar to everybody. Carlyle completed in 1837 his 'History of the French Revolution' which, as the author said, came "more direct and flaming from the heart of a living man than any other book written for a hundred years," and which forced people like Macaulay and Hallam to recognise its author as a historian of no mean order. Carlyle's friends, now dazzled by the literary power exhibited by this eccentric Scotchman, arranged for four courses of lectures to be delivered by him. Accordingly, Carlyle delivered a course of six lectures on 'German Literature' in 1837, twelve lectures on the 'History of Literature' in 1838, six lectures on the 'Revolutions of Modern Europe' in 1839, and again six lectures on 'Heroes, Hero-worship, and the Heroic in History' in 1840, which last appeared in book form in 1841. In 1839 Carlyle had published his 'Chartism', which lay "on the border line between the old modified Radicalism of *Sartor* and the less modified Conservatism of his later years.* In 1843 Carlyle wrote his 'Past and Present' as a partial reply to his own *Chartism* : "it was inspired by the miserable condition of England's unemployed poor; its panacea for industrial ills is the organisation of labour under efficient captains, and an approximate analogy to such an institution appears to be found in the well-ordered monastic life of the mediaeval convent at St. Edmundsbury under the single headship of its abbot; while the book is an expression of Carlyle's political theory that the welfare of the masses depends upon the paternal rule of 'the best and bravest' in the land (a sort of aristocracy of worth)."[†] Carlyle wrote his 'Letters and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell' in two volumes in 1845, rehabilitating the great Protector in the estimation of the people, a thing he had already attempted

* Nichol : *Carlyle*, E. M. L., p. 77.

† *Heroes*, ed. Murch, p. xxii

in his *Heroes*, and freeing him from the charges of the "fanatic hypocrite" theorists. The 'Latter-Day Pamphlets', which appeared in 1850, contained severe attacks on the mercantile and utilitarian spirit of the age, and a powerful criticism of the propositions of the "Pig-Philosophy". Carlyle's graceful prose elegy on his deceased friend, Sterling, appeared in 1851 in his 'Life of Sterling'. His last great work, the 'History of Frederick the Great', in six volumes, was completed in 1865, but the applause which it won for him was disproportionate to the enormous labour which he had spent on it. Carlyle's 'Reminiscences,' which appeared in 1867, show signs of intellectual decadence, being written at the age of seventy-two. Such, in brief, was the literary career of Thomas Carlyle, which, as has been said, "effectively compresses in thirty-seven volumes his golden gospel of silence!"

Circumstances under which the Essays were written:

We are however, for the present, concerned not so much with Carlyle's literary life as a whole as with his two essays 'Signs of the Times' and 'Characteristics'. We must review the circumstances under which these essays came to be written in order later to be able to appreciate the doctrines that Carlyle advanced in them. The reader of Froude's 'Life of Carlyle' knows how Jeffrey, about the year 1829, was on the eve of retiring from the editorship of the Edinburgh Review, and how he thought of recommending Carlyle for the post, if only Carlyle would "renounce his mysticism, burn his Goethe, and subscribe to the articles of the Whig faith". Carlyle was obdurate and he would not renounce his principles even though it were for the editorship of the Edinburgh Review, which was a much coveted post in those days of its glory and power. Jeffrey then asked for a parting contribution from Carlyle for his last number. Carlyle accordingly wrote 'Signs of the Times,' "a most signal outrage...on the 'Philosophy of Progress' which was

preached so continuously from the Edinburgh pulpit.”* Carlyle wrote in his diary of August 5th, 1829, his own opinion about his essay: “Bad in general, but the best I could make it under such incubus influences” (sc. Jeffrey’s). As Jeffrey was to go out of office, and to be succeeded by the cautious Macvey Napier, Carlyle imagined that his article on ‘Signs of the Times’ would be the last of its kind to appear in the Edinburgh Review. It was therefore with great hesitation that he sent his article on ‘Characteristics’ to Macvey Napier two years later, that is, in 1831. In his journal of December 23rd, 1831, Carlyle gives his estimate of the essay: “Baddish, with a certain beginning of deeper insight in it.” In his letter to his brother John he writes as follows:—

“I have had such a bout as never man had in finishing a kind of paper for Macvey. I called the thing ‘Characteristics’... Whether Napier will have it or not is uncertain to me, but no matter,.....for the thing has some truth in it, and could find vent elsewhere. It is Teufelsdröckhish, and preaches from this text: ‘The healthy know not of their health, but only the sick’...John Mill (read the MS) with fears that ‘the world would take some time to see what meaning was in it’. ‘Perhaps all eternity’, I answered”. As events proved, Napier accepted the essay most gratefully. “He confessed that he could not understand it; but everything which Carlyle wrote, he said, had the indisputable stamp of genius upon it, and was therefore most welcome to the Edinburgh Review.” † On June 6th, 1832, Carlyle wrote in his Journal:

“Unspeakable is the importance of man to man. A tailor at Thornhill, who had vehemently laid to heart the ‘Characteristics’ was also a glad phenomenon to me. Let a million voices cry out, ‘How clever!’.....it is still nothing; let one voice cry

* Froude: *Carlyle's Early Life*, II. 60.

† Froude: *Carlyle's Early Life*, II. 253.

out 'How true!', it lends us quite a new force and encouragement".

On the whole, we may say that Carlyle's 'Essays on Signs of the Times and Characteristics', which were among the earliest of his productions, were also the first to be received with warm approbation by an increasing circle of literary admirers; while it was in 'Characteristics', as in the contemporaneous production *Sartor*, that Fichte's influence on Carlyle was predominantly seen. Carlyle owed the very title of his essay to Fichte, who had published his 'Grundzüge des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters (Characteristics of the Present Age)' in 1806 the resemblance being so close in the incisive attacks which both made on the 18th century, that Fichte's book would have passed for Carlyle's 'Characteristics', if, as Garnett says, it had had "humour and symbol".

Carlyle's style : early and later : It has been said, not without justification, that the style of Carlyle in these early essays of his does not show marks of a fully developed "Carlylese". Carlyle is here only feeling his way; and the artificialities of his later style, his neologisms, such as 'mis-sight', 'politicising', and 'attemptabilities'; his compound-words, such as 'divine-infernal', 'fanatic-hypocrite', and 'angel-plumage'; his personifications, such as 'Immensities', 'Silences' and 'Veracities'; his comparatives and superlatives, such as 'hopefuller', 'fatallest', and 'indispensablest'; and lastly his visions, apostrophes, hyperboles, interjections, and interrogations—all these are almost wholly absent in these early essays of his. But nevertheless the child is father of the man, and we already see in this early work the beginnings of the greatness of his style. As Carlyle has himself assured us, a style is more like a skin than a coat : it cannot be put off and on : in fact, it cannot be plucked off without flaying and death.

The following, among others, are the noteworthy points in connection with a rudimentary Carlylese exhibited in the Essays under consideration :—

1. **Plurals** :— Raphaels, Angelos, Mozarts, Roger Bacons, Keplers, Newtons.
2. **Simile** :— “Reasonable men deal with it (i.e. panic), as the Londoners do with their fogs... go cautiously out into the groping crowd, and patiently carry lanterns at noon; knowing, by a well-grounded faith, that the Sun is still in existence, and will one day reappear”.
3. **Metaphor**:—“Our worthy friends mistook the slumbering Leviathan for an island; often as they had been assured that Intolerance was, and could be, nothing but a Monster ...But now their Leviathan has suddenly dived under; and they can no longer be fastened in the stream of time.” Also the metaphor of the beehive.
4. **Humour**:— a. “The Nurembergers were to build a wood-and-leather man, ‘who should reason as well as most country persons.’ Vaucanson did indeed make a wooden duck, that seemed to eat and digest; but that bold scheme of the Nurembergers remained for a more modern virtuoso.”
 b. “The building of the lofty rhyme is like any other masonry or brick-laying: we have theories of its rise, height, decline and fall – which latter, it would seem, is now near, among all people.”

5. **Sarcasm:**—a. “Some quite other than Newton stands in his Museum, his Scientific Institution, and behind whole batteries of retorts, digesters and galvanic piles imperatively ‘interrogates Nature’,—who, however, shows no haste to answer.”

b. “whereby the languishing spirit of Art may be strengthened as by the more generous diet of a Public Kitchen.”

c. “Thought, he (Dr. Cabanis) is inclined to hold, is still secreted by the brain; but then Poetry and Religion (and it is really worth knowing) are a product of the smaller intestines.”

d. “The whole Life of Society must now be carried on by drugs; doctor after doctor appears with his nostrum, of Co-operative Societies, Universal Suffrage, Repression of Population, Vote by Ballot. To such height has the dyspepsia of Society reached.”

6. **Satire:**—a. “What cackling and strutting must we not often hear and see, when, in some shape of academical prolusion, maiden speech, review article, this or the other well-fledged goose has produced its goose-egg, of quite measurable value, were it the pink of its whole kind; and wonders why all mortals do not wonder!”

b. (In Mr. Hope’s new Book of Genesis)
“the First Cause is figured as a huge Circle, with nothing to do but radiate

gravitation towards its centre; and so construct a Universe wherein all, from the lowest cucumber with its coolness up to the highest seraph with his love, were but gravitation, direct or reflex, in more or less central globes!... the perhaps absurdest Book written in our century by a thinking man... a shameful Abortion."

7. Euphemism:— "at one in the morning, Time for him (Schlegel) had merged itself in Eternity; he was, as we say, no more."

8. Power of Description } "Most of us, looking back on young years, may remember seasons of a light, aerial translucency and elasticity and perfect freedom; the body had not yet become the prison-house of the soul, but was its vehicle and implement, ... altogether pliant to its bidding. We knew not that we had limbs; we only lifted, hurled, and leapt; through eye and ear, and all avenues of sense came clear unimpeded tidings from without, and from within issued clear victorious force; we stood as in the centre of Nature, giving and receiving, in harmony with it all."

9. Imagery:—a. "He preaches it aloud and rushes courageously forth with it,—if there is a multitude huzzaing at his back; yet ever keeps looking over his shoulder, and the

instant the huzzaing languishes, he too stops short."

- b. A man who has wisdom is stronger "than all men that have it not, and stands among them with a quite ethereal, angelic power, as with a sword out of Heaven's own armoury, sky-tempered, which no buckler and no tower of brass, will finally withstand."

We may thus see some of the salient features of Carlyle's style displayed even in his early productions. For a fuller treatment, the reader may be referred to Minto's excellent 'Manual of Prose Literature'. We may see that Carlyle's humour is of that "protean quality" which "shines over his serious thought like sunshine over the sea," while his satire is like a fusillade, like Burns' words, which he compares to cannon-balls, and like those of Luther, which he calls half-battles.* About Carlyle's power of painting, we may call to mind what Emerson said, namely that he had "portrait-eating, portrait-painting eyes," and J.C. Shairp's remark, that he was an "artist, not of the Raphael or Leonardo order, but of the Rembrandt, or even of the Michael-Angelo type, forceful, rugged, gnarled, lurid, titanic."† It was only later that Carlyle fully evolved a style which was called by Macaulay "the half-German jargon of the present day."‡ Its chief characteristics could not be described better than in Carlyle's own words about the style of Teufelsdröckh :

"His burning thoughts step forth in fit burning words, like so many full-formed Minervas, issuing amid flame and splendour from Jove's head; a rich idiomatic diction, picturesque allusions, fiery poetic emphasis, or quaint tricky

* Nichol: *Carlyle* E.M.L. pp. 182-183.

† *Aspects of Poetry*: Prose Poets.

‡ *Essay on Addison*.

turns; all the graces and terrors of a wild imagination, wedded to the clearest intellect, alternate in beautiful vicissitude. Were it not that sheer sleeping and soporific passages, circumlocutions, repetitions, touches even of pure doting jargon, so often intervene! On the whole, Professor Teufelsdröckh is not a cultivated writer. Of his sentences perhaps not more than nine-tenths stand straight on their legs; the remainder are in quite angular attitudes, buttressed up by props (of parentheses and dashes);...a few even sprawl out helplessly on all sides, quite broken-backed and dismembered. Nevertheless...there lies in him a singular attraction".*

Germ of later speculation: Just as there is much in the early style of Carlyle's essays which is indicative of his later style, so there is much in the thought of his early work which is prophetic of his later speculation.

1. When, for example, Carlyle says that the poorest Day that passes over us is the conflux of two Eternities, and that it is made up of currents that issue from the remotest Past, and flow onwards into the remotest Future, we are put in mind of an almost identical utterance in *Sartor* :

"That living flood...knowest thou whence it is coming, whither it is going? *Aus der Ewigkeit, zu der Ewigkeit hin*: From Eternity onwards to Eternity. Bk. 1. Ch. 3.

2. The passage where Carlyle derides the idea of bottling up the Force of Gravity, to be sold by retail in gas-jars, is suggestive of another in 'The Hero as Divinity':

"Force, Force, everywhere Force!... Atheistic science babbles poorly of it, with scientific nomenclatures, experiments and what not, as if it were a poor dead thing, to be bottled-up in Leyden jars and sold over counters."

3. The passage where Carlyle describes the attempt made to "account" for the personality of such a great

* *Sartor Resartus*.

man as Luther by attributing his appearance to the force of circumstances, is comparable to a very similar passage again in his 'Hero as Divinity' :

"Show our critics a great man, a Luther for example; they begin to what they call 'account' for him,.....take the dimensions of him. He was the 'creature of the Time' they say; the Time called him forth, the Time did everything, he nothing! This seems to me but melancholy work.....Alas, we have known Times *call* loudly enough for their great man; but not find him when they called! He was not there; Providence had not sent him; the Time, *calling* its loudest, had to go down to confusion and wreck, because he would not come when called."

4. When Carlyle speaks of the true Church of England as lying in the Editors of its Newspapers, he is voicing the same sentiment as we find in the following passages :

a. "There is no Church, sayest thou? The voice of prophecy has gone dumb? This is even what I dispute...Hast thou not still Preaching enough? A Preaching Friar settles himself in every village; and builds a pulpit, which he calls Newspaper...Look well, thou seest everywhere a new Clergy of the Mendicant Orders...Hast thou well considered all that lies in this immeasurable froth-ocean we name Literature? Fragments of a genuine Church-Homiletic lie scattered there, which Time will assort: nay fractions even of a Liturgy could I point out..." *

b. "Fragments of real 'Church Liturgy' and 'Body of Homilies' strangely disguised from the common eye, are to be found weltering in that huge froth-ocean of Printed Speech we loosely call Literature." Books are our Church too.†

* *Sartor Resartus* : Organic Filaments.

† *Hero as Man of Letters*.

5. When, at the close of his essay on 'Signs of the Times,' Carlyle says that the only solid reformation that man can accomplish is what he begins and perfects on himself, he is giving utterance to a sentiment similar to that which he expresses in 'The Hero as Man of Letters':

"Men speak too much about the world . . . That mania of saving worlds is itself a piece of the Eighteenth Century with its windy sentimentalism. Let us not follow it too far. For the saving of the *world* I will trust confidently to the Maker of the world; and look a little to my own saving, which I am more competent to."

6. In the passage where Carlyle speaks of the bottomless boundless Deep, whereon all human things fearfully and wonderfully swim, and whereon Nature will have us walk and build as if the film that supported us there were no film but a solid rock-foundation, the idea is exactly similar to that contained in the Sartor :

'Stately they tread the Earth, as if it were a firm substance: fool! the Earth is but a film; it cracks in twain, and warrior and war-horse sink beyond plummet's sounding... A little while ago, they were not—a little while and they are not, their very ashes are not... Thus, like a God-created, fire-breathing Spirit-host, we emerge from the Inane; haste stormfully across the astonished Earth, then plunge again into the Inane... But whence?—O Heaven, whither? Sense knows not; Faith knows not; only that it is through Mystery, to Mystery, from God and to God'.*

7. When he speaks of Hope, the author of *Anastasius*, as the heroic seeker of light, though not bringer thereof, we are reminded of a passage in 'The Hero as Man of Letters' where Carlyle is speaking about Johnson, Rousseau and Burns:

**Sartor Resartus* : Natural Supernaturalism.

“Alas, these men did not conquer like Goethe; they fought bravely and fell. They were not heroic bringers of the light, but heroic seekers of it. It is rather the tombs of three literary Heroes that I have to show you.”

8. Lastly, when Carlyle is discussing his favourite idea of progressive change, be it in “Poetry Worship, Art, or Society,” when he is illustrating it by saying how Phlogiston gives place to Oxygen, Epicycle to Ellipse, and Paganism to Catholicism, and shewing how in short “the Present is the living sum-total of the whole past”, he is prophetic of his later speculation :

“Curious ! this law of mutation,...and how, though all dies and even gods die, yet all death is but a phoenix fire-death, and new-birth: into the Greater and the Better ! It is the fundamental Law of Being for a creature made of Time, living in this Place of Hope The whole Past, as I keep repeating, is the possession of the Present ; the Past had always something *true*, and is a precious possession.”*

The age of Mechanism : So far we have noted some of the latter points of speculation which have been implicit in Carlyle from the very beginning. We now come to treat in detail the main points of Carlyle’s thought as they are advanced in the two Essays, ‘Signs of the Times’ and ‘Characteristics’. In a way, we may say that the two Essays form a unity, inasmuch as both of them concern themselves with finding out the chief features of the age about which Carlyle is writing. What is treated under the names of the *Mechanics* and the *Dynamics* of spiritual life in the one Essay comes to be looked at in the other from the standpoint of *Consciousness* and *Unconsciousness*: And so, even though the underlying current of thought is identical in the two Essays, the

* *Hero as Divinity.*

first is a severe attack on the Age of Mechanism, while the second contains a powerful advocacy of the Theory of Unconsciousness. To begin with the first, Carlyle's one aim is to decry the Age of Mechanism and its achievements. Our true Deity, he says, is Mechanism. We allow Mechanism to infect all our activity from that of the Cartwright to that of the Codemaker. We boast of our scientific achievements; we imagine that if the suitable machine be given, we can put a cow at one end and bring out a buffalo at the other. Thus does Mechanism affect all human activities.

1. Carlyle describes in a striking way how Mechanism affects all our *Industry* :

“The living artisan is driven from his workshop to make room for a speedier inanimate one. The shuttle drops from the fingers of the weaver, and falls into iron fingers that ply it faster. The sailor furls his sail, and lays down his oar; and bids a strong unwearied servant, on vaporous wings, bear him through the waters.....Even the horse is stripped of his harness, and finds a fleet firehorse yoked in his stead. Nay, we have an artist that hatches chickens by steam; the very brood-hen is to be superseded !”

2. We do not rest content with the powers which Mechanism confers on us in the scientific domain; we think it can help us in all other spheres of activity as well. “We are Giants in physical power; in a deeper than metaphorical sense, we are Titans, that strive, by heaping mountain on mountain, to conquer Heaven also”. Thus we imagine that the Science of *Education* is merely a Mechanical business. We ignore all differences of individual aptitude, and aim at securing a wholesale uniformity in education; we “stand leashed together, uniform in dress and movement, like the rowers of some boundless galley”. For what, indeed, are the Lancastrian Machines and the Hamiltonian Machines, if not attempts for securing

an absolute uniformity in education?

3. The same is the case with *Poetry*. We imagine that Poetry is no affair of Inspiration but only of intellectual Masonry, as if the building of the rhyme is like any other kind of brick-laying!

4. In *Social work*, we believe that if we only hold public meetings, form committees, issue prospectuses, publish periodicals, and eat public dinners, such Mechanism will enable us to make any institution a success.

5. Not less is our *Religion* affected by Mechanism. What, after all, is our Bible Society, which professes a heavenly structure, but "is found, on inquiry, to be altogether an earthly contrivance: supported by collection of moneys, by fomenting of vanities, by puffing, intrigue and chickane, but a machine for converting the heathen?"

6. Lastly, our *Philosophy* itself has taken an entirely, mechanical direction. Locke in England, Holbach in Germany, and Cabanis in France are some interesting types of Mechanical Philosophers. The outcome of their philosophy would be to make us believe that as thought is the secretion of the brain, poetry and religion are merely a secretion of the lower intestines!

Spiritual Dynamism: The fact is that mere Mechanism is altogether incompetent to enable us to explain the spiritual side of man's nature. There is Dynamism in man's nature—(Carlyle borrows the phrase from Novalis)—as well as a Mechanism. To define the limits of these two departments would be by its nature an impossible attempt. Only in the right coordination of the two, and the vigorous forwarding of both, does our true line of action lie. Undue cultivation of the Dynamical would lead to visionary fanaticism; undue cultivation of the Mechanical will destroy all moral force, the

parent of all other force. And so, even though we must combine Dynamics and Mechanics, we must remember that Dynamics is the soul of Mechanics :

“How did Christianity arise and spread abroad among men? Was it by institutions, and establishments, and well-arranged systems of mechanism? It arose in the mystic deeps of man’s soul; and was spread abroad by ... altogether natural and individual efforts; and flew like hallowed fire, from heart to heart, till all were purified and illuminated by it Here again was no Mechanism; man’s highest attainment was accomplished Dynamically, not Mechanically.”

It is curious that this criticism of Mechanism comes, from a man like Carlyle, who, as David Masson says :

“was by no means destitute of the *mechanical* talent in matters to which he chose to set his mind or hand. He was, if I may mention such a small particular in such a context, one of the neatest-handed men I ever knew in tying up say a book-parcel, always doing it with the utmost economy of paper and string, the utmost security of knot, and yet the finest elegance of shape and general effect. A good deal of this deftness ran through his daily life.”* Anyhow, the fact remains, that to Carlyle it is the *dynamical* sphere of man’s life which remains as the eternal source of “all wonders, all poesies, religions, and philosophies.”

The Doctrine of Unconsciousness: Just as Carlyle’s essay on the ‘Signs of the Times’ is the apotheosis of Dynamism, so his second essay, on ‘Characteristics,’ is the apotheosis of *Unconsciousness*. The ancients made Silence a God, says Carlyle, for it is the element of all god-hood, infinitude, and transcendental greatness. The whole of the ‘Essay on Characteristics’ is Carlyle’s commentary on his favourite idea of the exaltation of silence over speech: “The Perfect, the

* *Carlyle Personally and in his Writings*, pp. 109-110

Great," he says, " is a mystery to itself, knows not itself Unconsciousness is the sign of creation; Consciousness at best that of manufacture". The insignificant, the empty, is usually the loud; and, after the manner of a drum, is loud even because of its emptiness". Carlyle expresses this same idea elsewhere: in *Sartor*, he commends the Swiss inscription which says "*Sprechen ist silbern, Schweigen ist golden*," which Carlyle expresses in his own way when he says "Speech is of Time, Silence of Eternity."* In 'Heroes and Hero-worship' he fondly dwells upon his favourite idea of the Empire of Silence:

" Ah yes,...The Great *silent* men! Looking round on the noisy inanity of the world,...one loves to reflect on the great Empire of Silence. The noble silent men, scattered here and there,...silently thinking; silently working; whom no Morning Newspaper makes mention of! They are the salt of the Earth. "§

This same fact of Unconsciousness makes itself manifest in various spheres. 1. In the *Physical* sphere, the truly healthy man is he who for his own part has no consciousness of having a system. The healthy know not of their health but only the sick. And hence, the most healthy period of our life is our childhood when we knew not that we had limbs, we only lifted, hurled, and leapt, when, in a word, our body had not yet become the prisonhouse of the soul 2. In the *Intellectual* sphere, says Carlyle, Consciousness is the sign of disease and a man of true genius is he who is not aware of being a genius. Shakespeare, thus, was a man of superior genius, because he took no airs for writing "Hamlet"; Milton, on the other hand, is more conscious of his genius, which is therefore an inferior one 3. In the *Moral* sphere, we must make it a point

* *Sartor Resartus* III. 3. *Symbols*.

§ Hero as King.

not to let our left hand know what our right hand doeth : as soon as we whisper to our heart "how worthy is this action," it has at the same moment become worthless. Carlyle insists upon having a clear conscience, but as soon as we have become aware of its clearness, it has at the very moment become turbid. As Carlyle puts it, to *say* that we have a clear conscience is to utter a solecism. 4. Lastly, in the *Social* sphere, as elsewhere, unconsciousness is always the sign of health ; while the intensely self-conscious state of modern Society shows that it has already become diseased :

"It is not in the vigorous ages of :a Roman Republic that Treatises of the Commonwealth are written : while the Decii are rushing with devoted bodies on the enemies of Rome, what need of preaching Patriotism ? The virtue of Patriotism has already sunk from its pristine all-transcendent condition, before it has received a name...If the mystic significance of the state...dwells vitally in every heart, how should it stand self-questioning?"
 "The ages of Heroism are not ages of Moral Philosophy."

Criticism of theory of Unconsciousness : So much about Carlyle's vindication of his idea of Unconscious virtue. By an irony of fate, it has so happened that the very idea which Descartes is so much praised for having introduced into philosophy, namely that of self-consciousness, is ruthlessly attacked by Carlyle in the interests of his theory of Intuition. 1. Carlyle denies outright the right of Intellect to question itself, to study itself, to listen to itself. He forgets that it is the very struggle which Intellect makes to understand itself, the very writhing which it experiences in the labour of doubt, that prepares the way for the birth of truth. All Philosophy would be at an end if we once deny to Intellect the right to writhe in pain. What is, after all, Carlyle's own progress from the *Everlasting No* through the *Centre of Indifference* to the *Everlasting Yea*, but a writhing

onwards to birth in truth? 2. Then again, if consciousness is a disease, all manner of consciousness must be a disease, including the consciousness of an unmistakable flame-image which guides Carlyle's hero through the labyrinths of the world. 3. Lastly, as Mazzini points out, Carlyle is entirely mistaken when he says that real genius is an unconscious one:

"Genius is not, generally speaking, unconscious of what... it is capable. It is not the suspended harp which sounds (as the statue of Memnon...sounds in the Sun, at the changing unforeseen breath of wind that sweeps across its strings)... Caesar, Christopher Columbus, were not unconscious: Dante, when, at the opening of the twenty-fifth chapter of the *Paradiso*, he hurled at his enemies that sublime menace...; Kepler when he wrote 'My book will await its reader: has not God waited six thousand years—before He created a man to contemplate His works?'; Shakespeare himself, when he wrote 'And nothing stands; and yet, to times in hope, my verse shall stand' these men were not unconscious."^{*}

As Carlyle himself acknowledges, the curious relations of the Voluntary and Conscious to the Involuntary and Unconscious lead us into deep questions of psychology and physiology, and we may end this review of Carlyle's doctrine of Unconsciousness by pointing out that it paved the way for the audacious theory of von Hartmann which he expressed in his famous work '*Die Philosophie des Unbewussten*' (The Philosophy of the Unconscious) in 1868.

The meaning of Utilitarianism: We have discussed so far two chief ideas underlying the essays under review, namely, the criticism of Mechanism, and the vindication of Unconsciousness. If any system of thought erred most according to Carlyle in preaching a gospel of mechanism and consciousness, it was that which went under the name of

* *Genius of the Writings of Carlyle.*

Utilitarianism. And as Utilitarian Philosophy claims so much attention from Carlyle, we must begin by briefly discussing what Utilitarianism is, before we proceed to discuss Carlyle's vehement attacks on it. The great Bentham said in his 'Principles of Morals and Legislation' published in 1784 that in all our actions, pleasure and pain were our only motives, that man was by his very nature under the governance of these two sovereign masters, that the principle of utility subjected every thing to these two motives, that he who pretended to withdraw himself from this subjection knew not what he said, that man's only object was ever to seek pleasure and to shun pain even at the very instant when he rejected the greatest pleasures or embraced pains the most acute, that these eternal and irresistible sentiments deserved to be the great study of the moralist and the legislator, that pleasures were to be chosen according to their intensity, duration, certainty, propinquity, fecundity, purity and extent, that in the distribution of pleasures everybody was to count for only one and nobody for more than one, and that the moral good consisted in the summation of the interests of all men, in fact, it was the greatest good of the greatest number. This was the theory of ethics which Bentham preached, and which came to be called Utilitarianism. It was not till later, in 1863, that the disciple of Bentham, John Stuart Mill, was able to put the copestone on his master's theory in his famous *Utilitarianism*, declaring once for all that it was a physical and a metaphysical impossibility that man should desire anything but pleasure, that practised self-consciousness and self-observation tell us that we *do* desire nothing but pleasure, that pleasures differ not only in respect of quantity but also in respect of quality, that, after all, the sense of dignity inherent in man would incline him rather to remain a Socrates dissatisfied than a pig satisfied, that, finally, the formal proof of Utilitarianism is that as each person's happiness is a good to

that person so collective happiness is a good to the aggregate of all persons.

Fusillade on Utilitarianism: It is not our business to discuss the many defects, implicit and explicit, in the argument of Bentham and Mill : that we leave to students of ethics. Our principal business is to draw attention to the furious attack that *Carlyle* made on this system of thought. Utilitarianism was always a red rag to Carlyle. He said that the consideration of utility had been weighing on these philosophers "like a night-mare dream." * The Utilitarians would "identify their Soul" with their "Stomach".¹ They would regard their Soul, he said, varying the metaphor, as "a kind of Hay-balance for weighing pleasures and pains on". Their philosophy was wholly "a steam-engine philosophy, the God of it being Gravitation and Hunger".² It was worse than witchcraft, for while the latter worshipped at least a living devil, the former worshipped a "dead iron devil". Virtue to them was no longer worship of the Beautiful and Good ; it was a kind of "new Phallus-worship".³ Their moral criterion was Public Opinion, which superinduced in individual morals a new kind of social necessitarianism :

" ' Superior morality ' is properly rather an ' inferior criminality ', produced not by greater love of Virtue, but by greater perfection of Police ; and of that far subtler and stronger Police called Public Opinion. This last watches over us with its Argus eyes more keenly than ever, but the ' inward eye ' seems heavy with sleep...Wonderful Force of Public Opinion ! We must act and walk in all points as it prescribes ; follow the traffic it bids us, realise...the degree of influence it

* *Essay on Johnson.*

¹ *Sartor Resartus.*

² *Hero as Man of Letters.*

³ *Carlyle's Life In London* 1, 221.

expects of us, *or* we shall be lightly esteemed ... Thus, while civil liberty is more and more secured to us, our moral liberty is all but lost. Practically considered, our creed is Fatalism !”

Carlyle denounced Utilitarianism as a kind of “Pig-philosophy”, whose propositions he says, are “that the Universe is an immeasurable Swine’s trough, that moral evil is unattainability of Pig’s wash, that Justice is one’s own share of the general Swine’s-trough, and such others—hrumph” ! * The Utilitarians, says Carlyle, are struggling with a hopeless problem—“Given a world of knaves, to produce an honesty from their united action”—a sentiment which he very often repeats, as for example, in his ‘Hero as King’, saying that “vulpine knowingness” is unable yet to solve the problem with all its practical deftness. Utilitarianism, in fact, is a kind of heroism with its eyes put out ! “Benthamism is an eyeless Heroism : the Human Species, like a hapless blinded Samson grinding in the Philistine Mill, clasps convulsively the pillars of its Mill; brings huge ruin down, but ultimately deliverance withal.”† Carlyle says that this system of thought was directly responsible for consummating “the Age of spiritual paralysis”, as he chooses to call the Eighteenth century, “which has nothing grand in it except that grand Universal Suicide named French Revolution, by which it terminated its otherwise worthless existence with at least one worthy act.”‡ With or without justification, and certainly in blissful ignorance of the beneficial effects exercised by Utilitarianism on political reforms, Carlyle in his usual metaphorical style calls Utilitarianism “a whole Pandora’s box of miseries”, and varying the metaphor, “a kind of Phalaris’-bull” of their own contriving wherein the

* *Latter-day Pamphlets.*

† *Hero as Man of Letters.*

‡ *Frederick the Great.*

inventors of the theory sat penned up in throes of death-tormentation.¹

Significance of the Individual: Carlyle made it his life-business to clamour against all systems of thought which would reduce man to a kind of mere automation. He stood up for the unimpeachable divine sanctuary within the heart of man. "Let us respect" he said "the sacred mystery of a Person: rush not irreverently into man's Holy of Holies". He stood up for the Person's absolute right to freedom, which was to Carlyle not mere political freedom, but a higher kind of heavenly freedom; he championed the cause of that mysterious self-impulse in man, Heaven-inspired and partaking of the Infinite, which was captiously questioned in the finite dialects of philosophy. To him, the individual was of infinite worth:

"It is a calumny on men to say that they are roused to heroic action by...sugar-plums. In the meanest mortal there lies something nobler. The poor swearing soldier, hired to be shot, has his 'honour of a soldier', different from drill-regulations and the shilling a day. It is not to taste sweet things, but to...vindicate himself under God's Heaven as a god-made Man, that the poorest son of Adam dimly longs. Show him the way of doing that, the dullest day-drudge kindles into a hero."²

One man, says Carlyle, who possesses this higher spiritual wisdom "is stronger, not than ten men that have it not; or than ten thousand, but than *all* men that have it not, and stands among them with a quite ethereal, angelic power, as with a sword out of Heaven's own armoury, sky-tempered, which no buckler, and no tower of brass, will finally withstand". It is on account of this spiritual element in man that he can

¹ *Hero as Man of Letters.*

² *Hero as Prophet.*

stand as against a whole Institution, and can be of more use to Society than a whole Institution :

“ Shall we say . . . that Science and Art are indebted principally to the founders of Schools and Universities? Did not Science originate rather in the obscure closets of the Roger Bacons, Keplers, Newtons? . . . Again were Homer and Shakespeare members of any beneficed guild? . . . No; Science and Art have been the free gift of Nature. How did Christianity arise and spread abroad among men? Was it by institutions and . . . well arranged systems of mechanism? . . . It arose in the mystic deeps of man’s soul, . . . and flew, like hallowed fire, from heart to heart, till all were purified and illuminated by it”.

It is this almost exaggerated importance which Carlyle ascribes to the individual which paves the way for another very characteristic theory of Carlyle, later developed in ‘ Heroes and Hero-worship ’, that the History of a Nation is but the Biography of its great men. Carlyle is inclined so far to raise the Individual above Humanity that he appears wholly to sink Humanity under the Individual ; and, yet, such is the irony of fate, says Frederick Harrison, that humanity, which Carlyle’s long life was devoted to deriding, honours him still in his death, “ as a brother of rare genius and mighty purpose.”* Mazzini has so very beautifully put the criticism of Carlyle’s theory on this point that we take the liberty of quoting it in detail :

“ We have begun to suspect that there is upon Earth something greater, more holy, more divine than the individual, namely Humanity, the collective Being always advancing towards God, of which, as Emerson says, each Individual is one more incarnation. Mr. Carlyle comprehends only the Individual; the true sense of the unity of the human race escapes him...

* Frederick Harrison : *The Choice of Books*, p. 199.

The great religious idea, the continued development of Humanity... finds but a feeble echo... in his soul... The nationality of Italy in his eyes is the glory of having produced: Dante and Christopher Columbus; the nationality of Germany that of having given birth to Luther, to Goethe... The shadow thrown by these gigantic men appears to eclipse from his view every trace of the national thought of which these men were only the interpreters or prophets. History is not the Biography of great men ... The great men of the earth are but the markingstones on the road to humanity: they are the priests of its religion. What priest is equal in the balance to the whole religion of which he is a minister?" *

Views about Society : And yet, by a strange inconsistency, Carlyle never appears wholly to ignore the high significance of Society. Every Society, he says, reposes on a spiritual principle, all its laws and politics are prescribed by an *Idea*, which has in it something of a religious, paramount, quite infinite character. The functions of Society are divine in their origin; man joins himself with man, and soul acts on soul in quite a mystic miraculous way: the lightning spark of thought kindled in the solitary mind awakes its express likeness in another mind, and all blaze up together in combined fire. Thus arise Literature, and Politics, and the crown and all-supporting keystone of the fabric, Religion. The high significance of Society is to be seen in the fact that it is in Society that our morality takes its origin, it is Society which makes inter-subjective intercourse, and therewith morality, possible. That representation of Society which would make it equivalent to a mere Machine is entirely a misrepresentation of facts :

"We term it...the Machine of Society...Considered merely as a metaphor, all this is well enough; but here, as in so many

*Genius of the Writings of Carlyle.

other cases, the 'foam hardens into a shell' and the shadow we have wantonly evoked stands terrible before us and will not depart at our bidding'. A true representation of Society is that which tells us that it is an Organism :

" I like, too, that representation they have of the Tree Igdrasil. All Life is figured by them as a Tree. Igdrasil...is the Tree of Existence...I find no similitude so true as this of a Tree. Beautiful; altogether beautiful and great. The 'Machine of the Universe'—alas, do but think of that in contrast... Tree and Machine,...I, for my share, declare the world to be no Machine!...The old Norse Heathen had a truer notion of God's-world than these poor Machine-Sceptics".*

In fact, Society, like the Universe, is an Individual, the vital articulation of many individuals into a new collective Individual, wherein *our* individual life becomes doubly and trebly alive. To figure Society as endowed with life is scarcely a metaphor; it has its periods of sickness and vigour, of youth, manhood, decrepitude, dissolution, and new birth. Such is Society, says Carlyle, the standing wonder of our existence, the most important of man's attainments on this Earth, and veritably a region of the supernatural.

Political opinions : Having considered so far Carlyle's views about Society, it behoves us now to pass on to another important subject, his views on political questions. It has been said about Carlyle that he began life as a Radical, and ended as a Conservative, that he is a typical illustration of political conversion, namely from extreme Radicalism to extreme Conservatism. This view entirely distorts the true secret of Carlyle's political opinions. He was not first a Radical, and then a Conservative : he was rather what we may call a Radical-Conservative from the beginning to the end of his career. Mr.

* *Hero as Divinity and Hero as Man of Letters.*

Nichol aptly remarks that there is a vein of Conservatism in his early Radicalism, and a Revolutionary streak in his later Conservatism.* His case was like that of no other; he was, as Emerson puts it, quite a new thinker that had been let loose upon the planet. This is the secret of the fact that Carlyle furnished weapons for so many sects and so many parties :

“He was a Bedouin, as he said of himself, a rough child of the desert. His hand had been against every man, and every man’s hand against him. He had offended men of all political parties, and every professor of a recognised form of religion. He had offended Tories by his Radicalism, and Radicals by his scorn of their Formulas. He had offended High Churchmen by his Protestantism, and Low Churchmen by his evident Unorthodoxy.” **

Carlyle attacked the mob, as much as he attacked the rich men. His contempt of the mob was a result of the exaggerated importance which he ascribed to his hero; and, to him, provided “a people went the right road, it mattered little whether they were driven, or whether they chose it for themselves.” † About the rich men, he said that they were the gods of this lower world, who “sit aloft on glittering thrones, less happy than Epicurus, gods, but as indolent, as impotent, while the boundless chaos of Ignorance and Hunger welter terrific in its dark fury under their feet.” This also shows how powerfully Carlyle pleaded on behalf of the working classes when occasion required it :

“It was he who made the ‘Condition of England question’ the question of the day, and his strictures upon idle aristocracies sank deeply into the public mind and gave currency to the conviction that social advantages involve social duties, and that

* *Carlyle E. M. L.*, p. 193

** Froude: *Carlyle’s Life in London*, I. 309.

† Evans: *Carlyle Masters of Literature*) xliii

those who have inherited wealth and power are called upon to do something to justify their position." * Carlyle's Radical-Conservatism, we thus see, is exemplified in the alternate praise and blame that he bestowed on Democracies and Aristocracies. As a typical illustration of this attitude, we may notice his definition of the French Revolution as Truth clad in Hell-Fire. The principles on which the French Revolution took its stand were true and good; but infinitely diabolic was the misery caused by the Revolution. As an instance of Carlyle's views about utilitarian attempts for the reconstruction of English politics, we may notice the severe attacks he made on Bentham's theory that if we only contrive the fabric of Law aright, Freedom will of herself come and inhabit the state, and "under her healing wings every noxious influence will wither, every good and salutary one more and more expand." Not everything, said Carlyle, is to be obtained by mere codification. Scarcely less severe are his attacks on mere paper constitutions, on universal suffrage, on vote by ballot. Fail to get the proper man to govern you, said Carlyle, though you had Parliaments in every village, you would be still in a perilous condition. And what was the remedy which Carlyle proposed to enable us to find out the right kind of man for Governor? Was it by a kind of Divine Right that any particular person was to be the Ruler of a nation? Such a theory of Divine Right, said Carlyle, was a theory of Diabolic Wrong :

"To assert that in whatever man you choose to lay hold of,...and clapt a round piece of metal on the head of, and called King, — there straightway came to reside a divine virtue, so that he became a kind of god...this,—what can we do with this but leave it to rot silently in the Public Libraries?"¹

* Evans : *ibid*, xliii.

¹*Hero as King*.

If then the Divine Right of kings is an absurd theory, what theory does Carlyle himself propose? What according to him is the Ideal of a political Constitution? To this question, Carlyle proposes three different though somewhat analogous, answers.

I. At one time, he says that it is the *Ablest Man* that ought to be put at the top of affairs. The true explanation of social explosions like the French Revolution is that we have "put the too *Un-able* Man at the head of affairs! the too ignoble, unvaliant, fatuous man ... unable Simulacrum of Ability, *quack*, in a word":

"The finding of your *Ablemen*, and getting him invested with the symbols of ability, with dignity, worship (worthship) royalty, knighthood, or whatever we call it ... is the business, well or ill accomplished, of all social procedure whatsoever in this world! Hustings-speeches, Parliamentary motions, Reform Bills ... all mean at heart this; or else nothing!" *

2. A second ideal which Carlyle proposes is a kind of *Theocracy*. It has been supposed, says Carlyle, that the unforgivable offence in Reformers like Knox is that they wish to set up Priests over the head of Kings; in other words, that they strive for a Theocracy or Government of God. People may shrug their shoulders, and say that this is a mere "devout imagination"! What, after all, is this ideal of Theocracy but an expression of the Biblical prayer "Thy kingdom come", and what does it mean but that Kings, and Prime Ministers, and all manner of Great Men, should walk according to the Gospel of God, and understand that this Law is supreme over all others?

"Theocracy, Government of God, is precisely the thing to be struggled for! All Prophets, zealous Priests are there for that purpose. Hildebrand wished a Theocracy; Cromwell

*Hero as King.

wished it, fought for it; Mahomet attained it . . . All true Reformers, as I said, are by the nature of them Priests and strive for a Theocracy." *

3. A third ideal which Carlyle sets up in Platonic fashion is that of the *Philosopher-King* :

"By far the most interesting fact I hear about the Chinese is...this, namely, that they do attempt to make their Men of Letters their Governors!...The man of intellect at the top of affairs: this is the aim of all constitutions and revolutions, if they have any aim. For the man of true intellect... is the noble-hearted man withal, the true, just, humane and valiant man. Get *him* for governor, all is got; fail to get him, though you had Constitutions plentiful as blackberries, and a Parliament in every village, there is nothing yet got! —" ¹

Criticism of literary men : Such is the high estimation in which Carlyle holds the man of letters. To him, Literature is the eye of a Nation; it is the Apocalypse of Nature which reveals to us the open secret; it alone of all others has a truly thaumaturgic influence. It constitutes not merely our Church, but our Parliament, as well as our University². It is in fact a branch of Religion, and participates in its character. Holding Literature in such high estimation, Carlyle was distressed to find that his age had fallen far below the literary ideal which his imagination had set up. He complains of a great deal of puffing in Literature, which had made Literature merely a Babylon—the mother of Abominations; of the prevalent fashion of view-hunting, or the description of scenery for its own sake; of the practice of Reviewing, which betokens, he says, an entirely diseased, because self-conscious, condition of Literature. And he stands up as an apostle of

* *Hero as Priest.*

¹ *Hero as Man of Letters.*

² *Hero as Man of Letters.*

Beauty, as opposed to Strength, which latter, he says, has been unfortunately the standard of perfection in contemporary Literature :

“But what is the song they sing? Is it a tone of the Memnon Statue, breathing music as the *light* first touches it? A ‘liquid wisdom’ disclosing to our sense the deep, infinite harmonies of Nature and man’s soul? Also, no! It is not a matin or vesper hymn to the Spirit of Beauty, but a fierce clashing of cymbals,...Poetry itself has no eye for the Invisible. Beauty is no longer the god it worships... We praise a work, not as ‘true’ but as ‘strong’—All this, it has been well observed is the ‘maximum of the Barbarous’, the symptom, not of vigorous refinement, but of luxurious corruption”.

The worst sinner in this respect, according to Carlyle, was Byron. But there are other literary men as well whom Carlyle feels no scruple in attacking mercilessly. Prof. Saintsbury has said that when Carlyle described a man *in history*, it was “absolutely impossible for him to miss hitting off that man to the life. The result was Gibbon without his obstinate superficiality, and Thucydides without his disappointing asceticism in rhetoric and eloquence”; but “to his own contemporaries, he was often foolishly and scandalously unjust.”* This remark will be amply borne out if we compare Carlyle’s opinions about the men in history whom he admired and the men of his age whom he hated. To take one out of numerous illustrations, we know in how high a strain Carlyle speaks about “the sphere-harmony of a Shakespeare, the cathedral-music of a Milton, and the genuine lark-notes of a Burns—skylark, starting from the humble furrow, far overhead into the blue depths, and singing to us so genuinely there!”¹

* *Corrected Impressions*, pp. 52-53.

¹ *Hero as Man of Letters*.

Contrast, however, the narrowness of judgment which Carlyle exhibits in speaking of his contemporaries :

“ He judges Lamb as the spoilt child of Cockney circles, as the Baptist in his garment of camel’s hair might have judged some favourite courtier cracking jokes for the amusement of Herodias’ daughter. And of Scott, though he strives to do justice to the pride of all Scotchmen, and admits Scott’s merit in breathing life into the past, his real judgment is based upon the maxim that literature must have higher aims ‘ than that of harmlessly amusing indolent languid men ’. Scott was not one who had gone through spiritual convulsions, but ... a prosperous easy-going gentleman, who found out the art of ‘ writing impromptu novels to buy farms with’, and who can therefore by no means claim the entire devotion of the rigorous ascetic prophet, to whom happiness is inconceivable except as the reward of victorious conflicts with the deadly enemies of the soul.” †

About De Quincey and Newman, Carlyle entertained equally poor opinions : it was of the latter that he said that “ he had not the intellect of a moderate-sized rabbit.” Johnson, Rousseau, and Byron he calls “ tombs of heroes ” instead of actual heroes, mere whited sepulchres of literary greatness. As for Mill, it was enough for Carlyle that he and his fellows believed in the mechanism of government, and especially in government by majorities—“ the most absurd superstition which had ever bewitched the human imagination—at least, outside Africa ! ” He talked of Shelley as “ filling the earth with inarticulate wail ; like the infinite, inarticulate grief of forsaken infants.” Of Hazlitt he said that in respect of his critical skill, he must “ wander on God’s verdant earth, like the unblest on burning deserts ; passionately dig wells, and draw up only the dry quick-sand ; believe that he is seeking

† Leslie Stephen : *Hours in a Library*, III. 284.

Truth, yet only wrestle among endless Sophisms, doing desperate battle as with spectre-hosts ; and die and make no sign !". But it was Byron, who, more than any other of his contemporaries, incurred Carlyle's vehement and passionate criticism. Carlyle speaks of Byron as "in melodious tones, 'cursing his day' ; he mistakes earthborn passionate Desire for heaven-inspired Freewill ; without heavenly load-star, rushes madly into the dance of meteoric lights that hover on the mad Mahlstrom, and goes down among its eddies." Curiously inconsistent with this is the opinion which Carlyle expressed about Byron on hearing the news of Byron's death :

"Alas, poor Byron ! the news of his death came upon my heart like a mass of lead ; and yet, the thought of it sends a painful twinge through all my being, as if I had lost a brother. O God ! that so many souls of mud and clay should fill up their base existence to its utmost bound ; and this, the noblest spirit in Europe, should sink before half his course was run... Had he been spared to the age three-score and ten, what might he not... have been." *

One of the reasons for the alternate praise and blame which Carlyle bestowed on Byron is to be found in the fact that their outlook upon the world was to a great extent identical, but while Carlyle conquered, Byron fought and fell ; as Mr. John Morley says :

"Carlylism is the male of Byronism. It is Byronism with thew and sinew, bass pipe and shaggy bosom. There is the same grievous complaint against the time and its men and its spirit, something even of the same contemptuous despair, the same sense of the puniness of man in the centre of a cruel and frowning universe . . . while in Byron, the outcome of this is rebellion, in Carlyle its outcome is reverence . . . The prophet,

* Froude : *Carlyle's Early Life* I. 221.

who never wearies of declaring that 'only in bowing down before the Higher does man feel himself exalted' touched solemn organ notes, that awoke a response from dim religious depths, never reached by the stormy wailings of the Byronic lyre ... We cannot wonder that Byronism was routed from the field."*

German Influence on Carlyle: Carlyle is even greater as a Philosopher than as a Man of Letters.† It may be urged against Carlyle that he never formulated any definite system of thought like Aristotle, or Kant, or Hegel; but if by a 'Philosopher' we mean one who teaches men to realise that behind all things Natural there is a region of the Supernatural, who enables them to see that behind Shows there is Substance, and who persuades them to penetrate through Appearance to Reality, then Carlyle was eminently a Philosopher. Spencer boasted at a later date that, as a philosopher, he was singularly immune from all intellectual contagion with his predecessors. This could hardly be said of Carlyle. His philosophic temperament was a kind of mixed yarn; his mind was replete with the philosophic speculations of all his predecessors, in philosophy. Occupying, as he did, the vantage-ground of a perfect knowledge of the doctrine of his predecessors, Carlyle could stand forth courageously

* Morley : *Miscellanies* I. 162.

† It would require more space than we could allow, if we were to institute a comparison between the literary genius of Carlyle and that of other great literary men. We may only remark that the reader may find ample material on this head in the following books : Garnett's 'Life of Carlyle' p. 176 (Comparison between Carlyle and Dante, Rousseau and Aristophanes); Nichol's 'Thomas Carlyle' pp. 229-230 (Carlyle and Plato); Hugh Walker's 'Age of Tennyson' pp. 119-120 (Carlyle and Macaulay); Matthew Arnold's 'Discourses in America' pp. 162 ff, 196 ff (Carlyle and Emerson); while the best comparison that we can make of Carlyle is with fire-breathing philosophers like himself such as Herakleitos and Nietzsche.

before the world, advocating a dynamical spiritualism as against a mechanical materialism. Carlyle's mind was greatly influenced in this direction by German Philosophy. The traditions of English and French Philosophy were entirely repugnant to the mind of Carlyle; consider, for example, the severe criticism which he passes on Hume and Cabanis. The English and French materialism would have served for ever to rivet the inquiring mind in the Everlasting No; the Gospel of German Idealism came to Carlyle's aid in carrying him over to the Everlasting Yea! The successive unfoldment of spiritual Idealism in the masterminds of Germany such as Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Schiller, Novalis, Richter, Schopenhauer, and Goethe influenced Carlyle's mind in a way which was only indicative of the mighty influence which German thought was to exercise over the world of letters. We see already Kant's influence on Carlyle when, in the essays under review, Carlyle borrows from Kant his favourite conception of Space and Time as merely form of the human mind, as well as when he talks of the progress which philosophy makes from Dogmatism through Scepticism to Criticism. To Fichte, as Adamson* has pointed out, Carlyle owed his whole doctrine of the Divine Idea of the world, the doctrine namely that the world of appearance is the embodiment of the divine idea or life, that "all appearance from the starry sky to the grass of the field, but especially the Appearance of Man and his work, is but the *vesture* ... that renders it visible"; † nay, as Prof. Adamson goes on to point out the whole of Carlyle's 'Sartor Resartus' and 'Characteristics' are works entirely imbued with Fichtean spirit. It was as an extreme result of the Subjective Idealism which Carlyle inherited from Fichte that he advanced his great 'Doctrine of Apparitions', an English version of the Doctrine of Māyā :

* *Fichte* (Blackwood's Philosophical Classics).

† *Hero as Poet*.

“Again, could anything be more miraculous than an actual authentic Ghost? The English Johnson longed, all his life, to see one; but could not, though he went to Cock Lane, and thence to the church-vaults, and tapped on coffins. Foolish Doctor!...Did he never so much as look into Himself? The good Doctor was a Ghost, as actual and authentic as heart could wish; well nigh a million of Ghosts were travelling the streets by his side...This is no metaphor, it is a simple scientific *fact*: we start out of Nothingness, take figure and are Apparitions,...we squeak and jibber in our discordant screech-owlish debatings,...till the scent of the morning air summons us to our still Home. Where now is Alexander of Macedon?...Napoleon too, and his Moscow Retreats and Austerlitz campaigns! Was it all other than the veriest Spectre-hunt, which has now, with its howling tumult that made Night hideous, flitted away? Ghosts! There are nigh a thousand million walking the Earth openly at noontide; some half-hundred have vanished from it, some half-hundred have arisen in it, ere thy watch ticks once. O Heaven! it is mysterious, it is awful to consider that we not only carry each a future Ghost within him, but are, in very deed, Ghosts!...Thus like a God-created fire-breathing Spirithost, we emerge from the Inane; haste stormfully across the astonished Earth; then plunge again into the Inane

We are such stuff
As dreams are made of, and our little life
Is rounded with a sleep”! ¹

As regards Hegel’s influence on Carlyle, we see it in Carlyle’s acceptance of the Hegelian method of the Dialectic, one of the central points in Hegelianism, in his assertion that thought must needs be Doubt and Inquiry before it can again be Affirmation and Precept; and again in Carlyle’s

¹ *Sartor Resartus*: Natural Supernaturalism.

acceptance of the idealistic doctrine of Hegel that Reality is Thought :

“It is the *Thought* of man; the true thaumaturgic virtue; by which man works all things whatsoever. All that he does, and brings to pass, is the vesture of a Thought. This London City, with all its houses, palaces, steam-engines, cathedralswhat is it but a Thought, but millions of Thoughts made into One;—a huge immeasurable Spirit of Thought embodied in brick, in iron, smoke, dust, Palaces, Parliaments... and the rest of it ! Not a brick was made but some man had to *think* of the making of that brick.”⁺

To Jean Paul Richter whom Carlyle in his essay calls an intellectual Colossus, Carlyle is indebted for his “higher pantheism” and his assertion that every thing we meet with in this world is either God-like or God, that God is made visible to us through every blade of grass as through every star, that in fact, every object is verily “a window through which we may look into Infinitude itself.” The influence which the god-intoxicated Novalis exercised on Carlyle is to be seen in the very high significance which Carlyle ascribed to man: as St. Chrysostom puts it, the true *Shekinah* is man !

“The essence of our being, the mystery in us that calls itself ‘I’,—ah, what words have for such things?—is a breath of Heaven ; the Highest Being reveals himself in man... ‘There is but one: Temple in the Universe’, says the devout Novalis, ‘and that is the Body of Man. Nothing is holier than that high form. Bending before man is a reverence done to this Revelation in the Flesh...’ We are the miracle of miracles,—the great inscrutable mystery of God.”* Finally, the influence which Goethe exercised over Carlyle can never be over-estimated: it was Goethe whom Carlyle called his spiritual guide and

⁺ *Hero as Man of Letters.*

* *Hero as Divinity.*

“saviour.” He was, according to Carlyle, the Ideal Man of Letters, to whom other Literary men only approximated more or less. It was he who really lived a life in the Divine Idea of the World, in sight of a continual vision of the inward divine mystery; and about whom Carlyle has said things which have never been hitherto said by one man about another:

“‘But there is no Religion’? reiterates the Professor. ‘Fool! I tell thee, there is. Hast thou well considered all that lies in this immeasurable froth-ocean we name Literature? Fragments of a genuine Church-Homiletic lie scattered there, which time will assort: nay fractions even of a *Liturgy* could I point out. And knowest thou no Prophet, even in the vesture, environment, and dialect of this age? None to whom the Godlike had revealed itself...and by him been again prophetically revealed: in whose inspired melody,.....Man’s Life again begins, were it but afar off, to be divine? Knowest thou none such? I know him, and name him—Goethe.’”* Is it not then wonderful to find that the poet whom Carlyle regarded as a heavenly angel is maliciously maligned by Mazzini as having been merely the evil genius of Carlyle? Says Mazzini:

“I have frequently had occasion to name Goethe in the course of these pages. In fact, the evil genius of Goethe hovers over the trilogy of Carlyle, and many times, as I read, I could fancy I saw the chilling glance and Mephistophelian smile of the man...upon whose ear the sound of the cannonade that opened the mighty war between Kings and Peoples struck merely.....as a noise, *curious enough as if it were compounded of the humming of tops, the gurgling of water and the whistle of birds.* To the influence of Goethe we may ascribe the constant disposition to crush the human being by contrasting and comparing him with the Infinite, as if the true greatness of man did not consist precisely in his *consciousness* of the Infinite

* *Sartor Resartus* III,7.

which surrounds him without impeding his *action*; as if the Eternity which is before and behind us were not also *within* us."†

We have seen hitherto the formative influence which German Idealism exercised on Carlyle's thought. It is customary in modern times to contrast Idealism with Pragmatism as points of view which cannot be focussed together. And yet is it not wonderful to see that though Carlyle was an Idealist of the spiritual type, he was also a Pragmatist in many of the distinctive points of his teaching? Prof. William James said that 'Pragmatism' was only a new name for some old ways of thinking; and if Kant's 'Critique of Practical Reason' could enable us to rank Kant as a forerunner of Pragmatism, and if Mill, to whom Prof. James dedicated his book on Pragmatism, is also to be regarded in many respects as a Pragmatist, there is no reason why we should not regard Carlyle himself as one of the very first men who gave an impetus to the pragmatic way of thinking.

(1) Consider for example Carlyle's doctrine that truth is always in the making, and that there is no absolute truth but only relative truth :

"As Phlogiston is displaced by Oxygen, and the Epicycles of Ptolemy by the Ellipses of Kepler; so does Paganism give place to Catholicism, Tyranny to Monarchy. . . . Perfection is always approaching, never arrived; Truth, in the words of Schiller, *immer wird, nie ist*; never is, always is *a-being*".

(2) Then again, compare Carlyle's utterance in regard to formulas or hypotheses which come "claiming" truth :

"We may say, all artificial things are, at the starting of them, *true* . . . Formulas fashion themselves as Paths do, as beaten High-ways leading towards some sacred . . . object,

† Mazzini : *On Carlyle's French Revolution*.

wither many men are bent. Consider it. One man, full of heart-felt earnest impulse, has articulated the dim-struggling thought that dwelt in...many hearts...these are his foot-steps, the beginning of a 'Path.' And now see : the second man travels naturally in the footsteps of his foregoer,... yet with improvements,...at all events with enlargements, the Path ever *widening* itself as more travel it;—till at last there is a broad Highway whereon the whole world may travel and drive. While there remains a City or Shrine, or any Reality to drive to, at the farther end, the Highway shall be right welcome! When the City is gone, we will forsake the Highway. In this manner all Institutions...have come into existence, and gone out of existence.”*


In fact, Carlyle's test of truth is utility or satisfaction. Paganism 'satisfied' the heart of the old Norsemen and was so far true; but this lesser truth paved the way for the greater truth of Christianity; and yet, says Carlyle, we are not at the absolute terminus of truth:

“You are raised high above it, to large free scope of vision; but you too are not yet at the top. No, your notion too, so much enlarged, is but a partial, imperfect one;...after thousands of years of ever-new expansion, man will find himself but struggling to comprehend again a part of it: the thing is larger than man, not to be comprehended by him; an Infinite thing.”†

And yet so much of the old truth remains that without it the higher truth would not *be*; the far distant cloudy imbroglio of Paganism is no longer a reality, yet it *was* one; if Paganism had not been there already, Christianity itself would not have been; the whole Past is the possession of the Present, and is always a precious possession; we only stand on the shoulders of our ancestors; “all death is: but a phoenix

* *Hero as Man of Letters.*

† *Hero as Divinity.*



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fire-death, and new birth into the Greater and the Better." *
3. Then again, another pragmatic feature of Carlyle's philosophy is the greater importance which he attaches to Action than to Thought: he complains that "the Thought conducts not to the Deed; but in boundless chaos engenders monstrosities phantasms, fire-breathing chimeras." This is exactly in the spirit of Mr. Schiller who complains that the *proton pseudos* of A-priorism is that it perpetrates a *chōrismos* between knowing and feeling, that it relentlessly separates *theoria* from *praxis*, that it allows the passionless Intellect to hover unconcerned above the bloodstained battle-field of activity, and even to suck a ghoulish and parasitic sustenance from the life blood of practical striving. † 4. Lastly, we see the same condemnation of a dehumanized Logic in Carlyle as in Schiller and the Pragmatists generally:

"The Euphuist of our day differs much from his pleasant predecessors. An intellectual dapperling of these times boasts chiefly of his irresistible perspicacity, his "dwelling in the daylight of truth," and so forth; which on examination, turns out to be a dwelling in the *rush-light* of closet-logic". "Of Logic, and its limits, there were much to be said and examined. One fact, however, . . . has long been familiar: that the man of Logic and the man of insight are quite separable In practical matters, for example, has it not become almost proverbial that the man of logic cannot prosper? His vital intellectual force lies dormant or extinct, his whole force is mechanical, conscious Nay, in mere speculation itself, the most ineffectual of all characters is your dialectic man-at-arms; were he armed cap-a-pie in syllogistic mail of proof, and perfect master of logic-fence, how little does it avail him! Consider the old School-men, and their

* *Hero as Divinity.*

† *Personal Idealism* : Axioms as Postulates.

pilgrimage toward Truth : the faithfulest endeavour, incessant unwearied motion only no progress : nothing but antic feats of one limb poised against the other ; there they balanced, somersetted, and made postures ; at best gyrated swiftly... like Spinning Dervishes, and ended where they began."

Attack on Metaphysics : Not less severe is Carlyle's attack on Metaphysics. All system-builders, he says, are but builders of logical card-castles. All our systems and theories are but so many froth-eddies or sand-banks, which from time to time Nature casts up and washes away. This is in the very spirit of Herakleitos who said that Time was playing draughts like a child, building castles on the sea-shore for the purpose of throwing them down again. Such transitory sand-castles are our metaphysical systems. Not even the worst enemies of metaphysics have condemned it so much as the metaphysical Carlyle himself :

"The disease of Metaphysics...is a perennial one. In all ages, those questions of Death and Immortality, Origin of Evil, Freedom and Necessity, must...make their appearance. And ever unsuccessfully : for what Theorem of the Infinite can the Finite render complete?...Metaphysical Speculation, as it begins in No or Nothingness, so it must needs end in Nothingness; circulates and must circulate in endless vortices; creating, swallowing—itself !" "Metaphysics is the attempt of the mind to rise above the mind... Hopeless struggle !... What strength of sinew, or athletic skill, will enable the stoutest athlete to fold his own body in his arms, and by lifting, lift up *himself*? The Irish Saint swam the Channel, 'carrying his head in his teeth'; but the feat has never been imitated !"

The only defence of Metaphysics according to Carlyle is, that though it is a necessary evil, it is yet the forerunner of much good: the fever of Metaphysics burns itself out, but burns

out thereby the impurities that caused it, thus restoring the soul-politic once more to clearness and health. We thus see that Carlyle weighs Metaphysics in the balance, and finds it wanting. The healthy understanding, he says, is not the intellectual, but the intuitive. In Bergsonian fashion, he subordinates Intellect to Intuition. He belongs emphatically to the imaginative as opposed to the intellectual type of philosophers. He speaks of Inspiration and Intuition, instead of Intellect and Reason :

“Underneath the region of argument... lies the region of meditation : here, in its quiet mysterious depths, dwells what vital force is in us.... Thus, if the Debator, ... whom we rank as the lowest of thinkers, knows what he has done, and how he did it, the Artist whom we rank as the highest, knows not; must speak of inspiration...and call his work the gift of a divinity.”

The difference between the man of Inspiration and the man of Intellect is that while the first solves his problems in the flash-light of an immediate intuition, the second hovers round them with his irrefragable tools, and hits at them to find that he is merely attacking a cloudland. It is this great insistence on the power of Inspiration which has led some critics to regard Carlyle rather as a prophet than as a philosopher.

Mysticism and Agnosticism : Closely connected with Carlyle's doctrine of Intuition is the great fact of his Mysticism. Carlyle is a mystic from the beginning to the end of his literary career. He finds the reign of mystery everywhere. From the most insignificant blade of grass to shining Canopus, every object is as a window which gives us a glimpse into the nature of Infinitude. Mystery is everywhere. Whence is it that we come? Whither is it that we are bound? “Sense knows not, Faith knows not; only that it is through Mystery to Mystery, from God and to God.”

“Thou wilt have no Mystery and Mysticism; wilt walk through thy world... by the hand-lamp of what I call Attorney-Logic; and ‘explain’ all ‘account’ for all or believe nothing of it? Nay, thou wilt attempt laughter; whoso recognises the unfathomable all-pervading domain of Mystery, which is everywhere under our feet and among our hands; to whom the Universe is an Oracle and Temple, as well as a Kitchen and Cattle-stall, —he shall be a delirious Mystic. ... Retire into private places with thy foolish cackle; or what were better, give it up, and weep, not that the reign of wonder is done.... but that thou hitherto wert a Dilettante and sandblind Pedant.” “Thus, were it not miraculous, could I stretch forth my hand and clutch the Sun? Yet thou seest me daily stretch forth my hand and therewith clutch many a thing, and swing it hither and thither. Art thou a grown baby, then, to fancy that the Miracle lies in miles of distance, and not to see that the true inexplicable God-revealing Miracle lies in this, that I can stretch forth my hand at all? ”*

Such Mysticism very often goes hand in hand with Spiritual Agnosticism, and we see that Carlyle is a Spiritual Agnostic as well :

“About the grand course of Providence and his final purposes with us, we can know nothing, or almost nothing mystery is everywhere around us”. “What he (man) can altogether know and comprehend, is essentially the mechanical, small ; the great is ever...essentially the mysterious, and only the surface of it can be understood. But Nature, it might seem, strives, like a kind mother, to hide from us even this, that She is a mystery. She will have us rest on her beautiful and awful bosom as if it were our secure home.....So cunningly does Nature...guide man safe on his wondrous path,

* *Sartor Resartus.*

not more by endowing him with vision, than, at the right place, with blindness !”.

Science, says Carlyle, has done much for us, but it is a poor science that would hide from us the infinite ocean of nescience, on which all science swims as a mere superficial film. Man is but a minnow in the creek; what can he understand of the immeasurable Ocean which is gliding on in its mysterious course through Aeons and Aeons? And yet, according to Carlyle, it is granted to man to pass from the Creek and come in sight of the illimitable ocean, pass, in short, from the *Everlasting No* to the *Everlasting Yea*, if only he is fortunate enough to have a kind of spiritual New-birth, a kind of “Baphometric Fire-baptism,” known in religious terminology as the phenomenon of Conversion. Such an experience alone can make a person feel that he has become a new man, and the important part which this fact of Conversion played in the whole life of Carlyle himself is described by Mr. Wallace in words which can never be surpassed :

“ Practical mysticism, finally adopted as a creed on the fateful day of spiritual ‘new birth’ in Leith Walk, was the centre and secret, if not the Alpha and Omega, of Carlyle. It dominated his life and conduct; it is the adequate explanation of his glorious inconsistencies in religion, politics, ethics, and economics...It explains the splendour of his vision, the pungency of his satire, and ... the ‘conflagration’ of his prose-poetry. Accept the first principles of this mysticism, . . . and acquiescence in the Carlylian gospel of hero-worship. . . . is virtually inevitable. Agree that ‘life is but a thawing ice-board on a sea with sunny shore’, that men are but the earthly vestures of spiritual forces, and the most famous of Carlyle’s purple patches stand forth as articles of faith. ”*

Attitude towards Religion: Taking his stand on the vantage-ground of Mysticism, Carlyle was bound to assign to

* Chambers’ Encyclopaedia of Literature : *Carlyle*, p. 406.

Religion the highest place among man's activities here below. He calls Religion the crown and the key-stone of the fabric of society. As regards the connection between Philosophy and Religion, Carlyle reverses the usual opinion about their relation, and puts Philosophy on an altogether lower level than Religion. In the ancient condition of society, he says, Religion was everywhere, and Philosophy lay peaceably hid under it. In modern times, on the other hand, Religion has been continually dissipating itself into systems of Metaphysics, and threatens to disappear like a river in deserts of barren sand. The vital unity of thought is being lost, and disunion and mutual collision is the order of the day. One of the chief features of such a condition is the prevalence of a utilitarian atheism. Unbelief, says Carlyle, is affecting the very pulpit itself; and despite the appearance of myriads of clergy, the canker of atheism is all but universal. Religion is no longer a thousand-voiced Psalm from the heart of man to his invisible Father, but is merely a prudential feeling of utility grounded on calculation, where by a smaller quantum of earthly enjoyment may be exchanged for a larger quantum of celestial enjoyment. Carlyle most mercilessly attacks all kinds of atheistic speculation :

“He who has in him an enmity to God and goes about patronising unveracities, and rotten delusions, with him, whatever his seeming extent of worldly prosperity, I would advise no nation, nor statesman, nor man, to be prompt in clapping-up an alliance. He will not come to good : have no trade with him. With him your only fit trade is, Duel to the death, when the time comes for that!”* Scarcely in any better plight than Atheism does Deism stand : to suppose that “the Almighty Maker is like a clockmaker that once, in old immemorial ages, having made his Horologe of a Universe, sits ever since and

* *Frederick the Great* Vol. iv.

sees it go,† or allows it to run round his finger (*am Finger laufen liesse*), is scarcely a better theory than Atheism. Such a theory goes under the pretentious title of a Theism, in spite of the fact that it makes God a mere distant Simulacrum. "Fool! The Eternal is no Simulacrum. God is not only There, but Here or Nowhere!" Carlyle would wholly reject Christianity if it identified itself with such a Simulacrum-Deism; he would equally reject it if it identified itself with a mere Revealed Theology; but Christianity, to Carlyle, is more than this. It centres round the fascinating personality of Christ, whom Carlyle held in the highest estimation. It is the Religion of Sorrow, and Purification, and Grace, which are eminently suitable to the mystic temperament. It is on account of these elements, which Christianity holds in solution, that Carlyle calls Christianity "the crowning glory, the very life and soul, of our whole modern culture." One may not for a moment believe that the essence of Christianity lies in its Metaphysic, in its being a Supernatural Revelation, as Masson contends; it is rather its divine Ethic which constitutes the soul of Christianity. And if Carlyle loved Christianity for its Ethic, and rejected its Metaphysic, this is surely no ground for objection against Carlyle's doctrine. Carlyle exhibits the same attitude towards Christianity which, in modern times, has been exhibited by the world-famous Eucken. Carlyle does not recognize religions, but Religion. "To which of these Three Religions do you specially adhere?" inquires Meister of his Teacher. "To all the three!" answers the other: "To all the three; for they by their *union* first constitute the True Religion." Carlyle is one of the greatest High-Priests in the temple of Universal Religion. His most fervent prayer is that which Pope has voiced:

† *Past and Present.*

“ Father of all, in every age,
 In every clime, adored
 By saint, by savage, and by sage,
 Jehovah, Jove, or Lord !
 Thou great First Cause, least understood,
 Who all my sense confined
 To know but this,---that Thou art good
 And that myself am blind.”

Such is Carlyle's mystic conception of God. His reiterated advice to his fellow-mortals was : “ There is a God, there is a God, there is a God.” “ Not even did the Koran of Mahomet”, says David Masson, “ fulminate this message more incessantly in the ears, or burn it more glowingly into the hearts, of the previously atheistic Arabs whom the inspired camel-driver sought to rouse, than did the series of Carlyle's writings fulminate it and try to make it blaze in a . . . generation where . . . atheism was . . . all but universal.” * Carlyle himself, like Novalis, was a god-intoxicated man ; and when he called his highest First principle by the name “ Eternities ” or “ Silences ”, he only wished to express that it was impossible to assign God any name whatsoever : “ Personal ! Impersonal ! One ! Three ! What meaning can any mortal attach to these words in reference to such an Object ? *Wer darf Ihn Nennen ?* I dare not, and do not.” And yet even though the First Principle is unnameable, Carlyle says that our attitude towards it must be one of faith :

“ It is by Faith that man removes mountains...In the thickest gloom, there burnt a lamp to guide him. Faith gave him...a world of Strength wherewith to front a world of Difficulty. With Faith, we can do all, and dare all, and life itself has a thousand times been joyfully given away. ”

It is no wonder that Carlyle's doctrine of Inspiration should make his Mysticism end in a Faith-philosophy, his whole doct-

* *Carlyle Personally and in his Writings*, p. 81.

rine in this connexion being happily termed by David Masson "a Fervid Theism."

Is Carlyle a pessimist? A fervid Theism must necessarily go hand in hand with optimism, and yet Carlyle has been accused of being an incurable pessimist. Leslie Stephen says that his gloomy outlook upon the world sprang merely from a defective digestion.* Matthew Arnold quotes Carlyle himself to prove that the "self-shrouded life" which he led was due to his dyspepsia.† There are again Carlyle's utterances in Schopenhauerian spirit which ask us to look upon Life as a mere "disease, a working incited by suffering; action from passion." Carlyle himself tells us that it is only rarely that Life is "the diapason of a heavenly melody", oftenest it is the "fierce-jar of disruptions and convulsions". In the spirit of the ancient Stoic philosopher, he warns us not to forget that we are to die, being "forever in the neighbourhood of an inevitable Death". He complains like Hamlet that he was ever born in a time which is sick and out of joint. He looks down upon the achievements of Science, and likens them to "a whited sepulchre; outwardly all pomp and strength; but inwardly full of horror... and dead-men's bones". Man boasts, says Carlyle, that he has subdued this Planet, and yet he reaps no profit whatsoever from the victory. We might multiply instances to illustrate the so-called "pessimism" of Carlyle, and yet it would be doing Carlyle a gross injustice if we looked merely at the "gloomy shadows," and not at the "bright lights" of his philosophy. His pessimism was of that inevitable kind through which every sincere seeker of truth has necessarily to pass. Pessimism is the eternal background of an optimism which is really worthy of the name. "The ground of my existence" says Carlyle "is black as death; too black, when all

* *Hours in a Library* III. 305.

† *Discourses in America* p. 197.

void too ; but at times there paint themselves on it pictures of gold, and rain-bow, and lightning ; all the brighter for the black ground I suppose." Carlyle tells us that the darkest hour is always nearest the dawn, and that therefore the darkest hour itself is an infinitely cheering sigh that a new and brighter era is evolving itself for us. It may be the twelfth hour of the night, birds of darkness may be on the wing, spectres may uproar, and the dead walk, and yet let us rest assured, says Carlyle, that Eternal Providence *will* cause the day to dawn ; nay, he is sure that streaks of a dayspring are already in the east: it *is* dawning ; and when the time shall be fulfilled, it *will* be day. Can this be called pessimism ? If Carlyle was a pessimist, he was only a pessimist who was fashioning himself into an Optimist : we may call him a pessimist on the anvil. Let us, for the sake of illustration, cast a glance at the way in which Carlyle looks at the problem of evil. He duly recognised that suffering, contradiction, error have a perennial abode in this Earth, that evil, what we *call* evil, must ever exist while man exists, and yet he teaches that we could not be perfect except through suffering, that "virtue is the daughter of pain," that evil, in short, is "the dark disordered material out of which man's Freewill has to create an edifice of order and good". Carlyle's optimism is of the same kind as Browning's, according to which goodness, joy, and perfection of life can only be achieved through conflict with evil, pain, and defect, and which teaches that evil is only the *means* for the realization of good : "Out of all Evil comes Good; no Good that is possible, but shall one day be real". And is there any escape which Carlyle suggests from the thralldom of evil ? What is the ultimate nature of evil, asks Carlyle ? Is not evil after all an illusion a mere negation ? Are we not fettered by chains of our own reasoning ? And can we not, then, rend them asunder if we only will ? If error and contradiction and suffering like some glass-bell encircle and

imprison us; "if the soul looks forth on a fair heavenly country which it cannot reach, and pines, and,..... is ready to perish,—yet the bell is but of glass; 'one bold stroke to break the bell in pieces, and thou art delivered !' "

Gospel of work: The greatest proof, however, of Carlyle's Optimism lies in his incessant preaching of the gospel of work. He advises us not to deal too much in vaticination: our duty is not to *see* what lies at a distance, but to *do* the work which lies nearest us. "Man is sent hither not to question, but to work: 'the end of man' it was long ago written, 'is an Action, not a Thought' ". Carlyle teaches us not to idle away our life in mere sentimentalism:

"The barrenest of all mortals is the Sentimentalist: Does he not lie there as a perpetual lesson of despair and type of bed ridvaletudinarian impotence. His is emphatically a virtue, that has become, through every fibre, conscious of itself; it is all sick, and feels as if it were made of glass and durst not touch or be touched ".

If Carlyle were a pessimist, he would have been glad to welcome the "valetudinarian sentimentalism" which he so much condemns. In that famous passage in 'Sartor Resartus,' Carlyle tells us how infinitely significant is the function of Labour in words which must be burnt into our heart:

"Two men I honour, and no third. First, the toilworn Craftsman that with earth-made implement laboriously conquers the Earth, and makes her man's. Venerable to me is the hard Hand; crooked, coarse; wherein notwithstanding lies a cunning virtue, indefeasibly royal, as of the Sceptre of this Planet ...Hardly-entreated Brother! For us was thy back so bent, for us were thy straight limbs and fingers so deformed: thou wert our Conscript on whom the lot fell, and fighting our battles wert so marred. Thy body, like thy soul, was not to know freedom. Yet toil on, toil on: *thou* art in thy duty, be

out of it who may; thou toilest for the altogether indispensable, for daily bread.

A second man I honour, and still more highly : Him who is seen toiling for the spiritually indispensable; not daily bread, but the bread of Life. Is not he too in his duty endeavouring towards Harmony ;...If the poor and humble toil that we have Food, must not the high and glorious toil for him in return, that he have Light, have Guidance, Freedom, Immortality?— These two, in all their degrees, I honour : all else is chaff and dust, which let the wind blow whither it listeth.

Unspeakably touching is it, however, when I find both dignities united; and he that must toil outwardly for the lowest of man's wants, is also toiling inwardly for the highest. Sublimier in this world know I nothing than a Peasant Saint, could such now anywhere be met with. Such a one will take thee back to Nazareth itself !” *

Such is Carlyle's gospel of work. There can be no greater proof of this optimism than the single fact that he urges us ever to toil on, in the physical or the spiritual sphere as the case may be. He does not teach us like Schopenhauer to root out “the will to live”; nor does he teach us like Hegesias to commit suicide: he has no ambition to gain the title of a *peisithanatos*. He teaches us a sublime optimism. Let us remember, he says, that “here on earth we are as soldiers, fighting in a foreign land; that understand not the plan of the campaign, and have no need to understand it; seeing well what is at our hand to be done. Let us do it like Soldiers; with submission, with courage, with a heroic joy.” Never before has a spiritual optimism been more effectively preached.

General Survey: If we are now to take a general survey of Carlyle's doctrine, we might be astonished to see how the estimates have varied. M. Taine speaks of Carlyle's marvel-

* *Sartor Resartus*: Book III. Chap. 4: Helotage.

lous and sickly philosophy, his contorted and prophetic history, his sinister and furious politics, all couched in an exaggerated and demoniac style.¹ Hutton speaks of him as "in faith a Calvinistic sceptic, ... in politics a pioneer of Democracy, ... in literature a rugged sort of Poet... a paradoxical figure, solitary, proud, defiant, vivid."** On the other hand, Emerson looks upon Carlyle as a seer who would have whole nations for his pupils and praisers, and as a new intellectual Orb whose rare light he had been privileged to see even before the Easterners had seen it.* And Masson declares that his love for Carlyle fell just short of idolatry: "For I loved the man, and do honour his memory, on this side idolatry, as much as any."@ It is natural that such divergent opinions should prevail about a great man like Carlyle: never are any two pictures of the Alps entirely identical. The significant fact, however, is that none of the critics of Carlyle have denied him the dignity and sublimity of the Alps. As a critic of Carlyle puts it, "the first moment that Carlyle's spell was felt is remembered as the first sight of the Alps or of the Sea." Carlyle was as dignified as the Alps, and as immovable; if he was harsh of word, he was mellow of heart; if he severely handled the mob, he wept for them. No better words could describe Carlyle than those which he has himself employed about Luther: he was an "unsubduable granite, piercing far and wide into the Heavens; yet in the clefts of it fountains, green beautiful valleys with flowers!" The marks which Carlyle found in his Hero, we may amply find in Carlyle himself. He was great in nothing so much as in his sincerity. 'Like Luther,' says Mazzini, 'Carlyle hurls his inkstand at the head of the devil... but he does it with such sincerity, such *naivete* and good will, that the devil himself could not be displeased at it.' Other

¹ *History of English Literature* Book V. Chap. IV. 476.

** *Modern Guides of English Thought in Matters of Faith* p. 45

* *Emerson to Carlyle* (1872).

@ *Carlyle Personally and in his Writings*.

marks of his Hero, Carlyle possessed in an eminent degree. He himself lived in the Divine Idea of the world: he was unconscious of his greatness; he was the creator of a new literary era; and he came in such unmistakable insight of the divine Flame-Image, that he returned like the Philosopher of the Cave to tell his people that they lived in mere magic shadow-shows, and that, if they merely would, they might catch a glimpse of the eternal Sun of spiritual life; not as reflected in water, nor as imaged in a mirror, but in its own absolute region of glory and power.

XII

MY REMINISCENCES OF PRINCIPAL BAIN

Occasion for writing: When the Editor of the Deccan College Quarterly asked me to contribute an article on Principal Bain the first thought that arose in me was that I might not be able to do full justice to the many-sided intelligence and activity of such a personality. Yet on a second thought it seemed to me that I was not merely bound to contribute my mite towards an all-round appreciation of Mr. Bain but that, in a peculiar way, by having come into contact with him for a longer time than most other students of the Deccan College, and by virtue of having cherished feelings of an almost hero-like appreciation of him, I might be expected to say something about him which might not be unworthy of consideration. It is with this intention, therefore, that I am paying this almost last tribute to Mr. Bain on the eve of his retirement from the Deccan College.

Mr. Bain, a Real Professor: When I first entered the Deccan College in the year 1903 Mr. Bain was only a Professor of History and Political Economy. He did not then possess the dignity of a Principal. At that time Mr. Bain used to come to the college on a cycle and his lectures used to commence precisely at 11-30 A. M. If ever he was late in coming to the college he used to tell us that it was the unfortunate railway gate between the Camp and the college which detained him there. In my day while I was yet in the Previous class, he used to lecture to us on Greek History. I remember very well how I was perfectly unable to follow Mr. Bain for almost the whole of the first term. Mr. Bain used to so much overshoot the mark that the experience of not being able to follow him was not peculiar to me, but might be attested to by many of the students of the day, if these are called upon to bear witness in this connection. As it

happened, Mr. Bain was not a mere Tutor; he was in the fullest sense of the word a Professor and it was impossible for almost any First Year student to appreciate Mr. Bain when he discoursed to us on so many incidents in Greek History.

Mr. Bain on Free Trade: It was quite otherwise when I came to the B. A. class. It was then that Mr. Bain's real abilities came to be appreciated. It was likewise in the B.A. class that Mr. Bain did his best work. Generations of students from the year 1892 onwards, when Mr. Bain joined the Deccan College, can bear testimony to the very eloquent and the very learned discourses of Mr. Bain to the B.A. class on various topics. He taught us how to study and criticise from a 'point of view'. Mr. Bain was definitely a Conservative, and there was no limit to the censure that he would pour on the Whigs and the Liberals. The first he called rascals, the second idiots. It is unfortunate that I do not know what Mr. Bain must now be saying in the class about the Bolsheviks. The *laissez faire* system was his principal enemy in Economics. The whole list of the free-trade politicians he used to condemn as being "friends of every country except their own". Every one knows how very graphically he described Fawcett as an ass. He here used to narrate how God at the time of creation gave the name of 'donkey' to the 'ducky-darling', how this donkey was very oblivious of the name that the Almighty Maker had conferred upon it, how returning oft to its Maker it asked him its name and how ultimately the Maker being entirely weary of being obliged to tell it its name time after time christened it ASS. Mr. Fawcett was such an ass: it was impossible for him to bear in mind the verdict of history that free-trade ever proved an un-mixed evil, that the only way to economic and national greatness was through Protection. In any case one may confidently assert that Mr. Bain's lectures were so very illuminating even from a literary point of view that he might be said to have

taught us more literature and for the matter of that, even more philosophy than our Professors of literature and philosophy themselves. In listening to Mr. Bain's profound lectures, in attending to the many quotations from the Classics with which he used to adorn his arguments, in following him through the mazes of his peculiar style one was oft reminded of the lucubrations of Herr Teufelsdröckh. Mr. Bain had always an individuality about him. He taught us for the first time what independent thinking meant. This trait of independence in Mr. Bain has been noticed by generations of his students not merely in the class-room but also in all of his writings. Only the other day one remembers how he wrote a strong letter to the Times, consigning to the gallows all the poppies of England, ministerial and otherwise, who spoke on behalf of free trade. Mr. Bain has been very often delighted to find that his predictions have come out true, thus, in Aristotelian fashion, testifying to the 'scientific' value of his thoughts.

His ready Wit: Mr. Bain's ready wit has always been remarkable. Once upon a time while he was discoursing on Fawcett a sparrow flew into the class-room and was unable to find its way out. 'Thus', said Mr. Bain, 'is Mr. Fawcett, who rushes headlong into an argument but is unable to find the way out!' Mr. Bain never wrote a clear and legible hand. The only apology that he would give for his indifferent hand-writing would be that all great men always wrote a bad hand! On one occasion he told us how there have been only three great men in the course of English History, the names of all of them beginning with B. The first, he said, was Bolingbroke; the second was Beaconsfield; the third he left us to imagine who he was! Finally one remembers how on one occasion, in the year 1905, when a student had begun to snore while the class was going on, Mr. Bain silently crept behind him from the platform and held the student by the ears when the student suddenly woke up in

consternation, Mr. Bain saying to him that he had no objection to his sleeping but he must not snore !

Mr. Bain, an Actor? One remembers also how on one occasion when a student of the B.A. class in my time who is now a Professor in a college, had written an article on Kālidāsa vs. Shakespeare, trying to prove in his own way the superiority of Kālidāsa over Shakespeare, Mr. Bain came to the class quite full of Shakespearean ideas. We remember very well how Mr. Bain discoursed to us that day entirely on the dramatic art of Shakespeare. Kālidāsa, he said, could not be compared with Shakespeare. The one was a poet, the other a dramatist, *par excellence*. It was as if one might compare Homer and Shakespeare or for the matter of that even Milton and Shakespeare. We all forgot that that hour was reserved for History, and we remember very well we enjoyed that day a great literary and dramatic treat. In representing to us the madness of King Lear, when blood flowed to his cheeks and the whole face became ruddy, Mr. Bain acted the part of King Lear saying "Pray you, undo this button". Mr. Bain drew so much applause from the class that he had to confess that time was when it almost seemed that he would have been an actor.

Mr. Bain as Principal : We must now come to speak of Mr. Bain as Principal of the Deccan College. It is inevitable that we should be obliged here to institute a comparison between him and Dr. Selby. There is an old proverb which tells us that one must be either a Platonist or an Aristotelian. One must, therefore, admire either Dr. Selby or Mr. Bain ! It may be permitted however to escape between the horns of the dilemma. While Dr. Selby is remembered for the discipline that he introduced in the college and for the convenient positions that he secured for his students, Mr. Bain will be

remembered for the impetus that he gave to thought as well as for his intrinsic greatness. Intellectually speaking Dr. Selby never wrote anything save some annotations to Bacon and Burke and a short abstract of Aristotle's Metaphysics. Mr. Bain's achievements in the intellectual field have been truly remarkable. Dr. Selby was a firm believer in form and routine. Mr. Bain never wore a gown even in Principal Selby's time and with his usual freedom of unconventionality abolished it altogether from the college as soon as Dr. Selby went away.

A Humorous Public Speaker : Mr. Bain has always been a humorous public speaker. We remember very well how a few years ago when their Excellencies Lord and Lady Willingdon had come to address the Deccan College on the occasion of an anniversary day, Mr. Bain with the fulness of an oriental imagination compared His Excellency to a cloud on whom hung Her Excellency like a lightning bedecked in rainbow colours. On another occasion when Mrs. Sarojini Naidu had gone to the Deccan College for an address accompanied by Mrs. Paranjapye, Mr. Bain introduced the two ladies to the audience by observing that while on his right hand there was Śri, the Goddess of wealth, on his left was to be seen Saraswati, the Goddess of learning. On a third occasion, at the time of the opening of the Bhandarkar Institute, Mr. Bain in making a speech introductory to the presentation of the commemoration volume to Sir Ramakrishna Bhandarkar, said very wittily that the secretaries must thank themselves for not having included a German article in the volume for otherwise as the world-war was raging on, the secretaries would have certainly been hanged for their offence!

High Ideals about University Education : Mr. Bain has shown his independence nowhere more than in his relations with the Bombay University. We must remember that Mr. Bain has been one of the best products of the Oxford

University. With the education that Mr. Bain received at Oxford, with his personal acquaintance with many an eminent Oxford Professor and with the fulness of his knowledge of the methods of research, it is quite excusable that Mr. Bain should think of the Bombay University as nothing better than a School writ large. This opinion is not peculiar to Mr. Bain. Another English friend of mine who came here only a few years ago and who has like-wise been imbued with the spirit of Western culture and Western methods of research spoke to me one day as to how insignificant the Bombay University looked to him as compared with the great centres of learning in the West. It cannot be gainsaid that our ideal of a Professorship here in India has been a very low one. Every new-fangled young man who joins a college obtains the dignified title of a Professor. It is ignored that a professorship is to be conferred upon one only after a long term of original work. One remembers very well how Mr. T. Case, the teacher of Mr. Bain himself, had to wait for an inordinately long time before he could get a Professorship. In India learning is judged not by intrinsic merit but by the fuss that one makes. To be an educationist is regarded as on a higher level than to be a Professor. Our Ideals have sunk low. We do not want to put in substantial work. And it is no wonder that when a man like Mr. Bain comes amongst us he should open our eyes to the true meaning of University culture.

Mr. Bain on the Tutorial System : Only the other day we know how severely Mr. Bain criticised the tutorial system. I, for one, have been in entire agreement with Mr. Bain in his condemnation of this much-belauded system of turning out great scholars. As a method of turning out mediocrities no method could be more sublime. But if the ideal of University culture is to turn out great and original scholars, equipped in methods of scientific research, we want something more than mere cram-shops. There is evidently something to be said for the contention of the Governor-in-coun-

oil that the tutorial system brings the teacher and the taught into more personal contact with each other. But we must remember that the ideal of education is not merely moral but also intellectual. And, from this point of view, while the tutorial system gives us merely bus-horses on the one hand, it gives us docile and innocent sheep on the other. Even in the West, the tutorial system is always combined with the Professorial and the attempt to introduce in India merely the Tutorial without the Professorial system would end only in making education one-sided. It is only in the combination of the Tutorial with the Professorial system of education that we could secure the harmony of the moral and the intellectual sides of education.

Mr. Bain, a Linguist : Mr. Bain has been a great linguist. It is really wonderful that he should have cultivated a speaking acquaintance with many European and Indian languages. His knowledge of the Classics is unquestionable. A few years ago when I had sent a small pamphlet of mine on the Ephesian Philosopher Heracleitos, to Principal James of the Presidency college, Calcutta, he wrote me back in very enthusiastic terms saying that a worthier judge of that essay would be his old college chum, Principal Bain himself. This small incident is sufficient to show the great veneration in which Mr. Bain is held even by his contemporaries. Apart from the Classics, however, Mr. Bain knows the French and the Russian languages very well. It seems that Mr. Bain is almost the only person in India who knows Russian. Mr. Bain has also known the German, the Italian, and the Spanish as well as the Marathi, the Hindustani and the Sanskrit languages. We shall have presently to speak about his attainments in Oriental culture. Mr. Bain told me one day how it became possible for him to learn so many languages within such a short period. "Take a famous book like the Bible", he said, "which is most accurately translated in many languages, and then compare the original with the translations in the seve-

ral languages. Proceed very cautiously for the first few chapters, marking every word and phrase and construction. Soon you will find that you have entered into the heart of the language". We commend this interlinear method of learning foreign languages to every student who aspires to be a linguist.

His Attitude to Philosophy: Mr. Bain's attitude to philosophy has been remarkable. He regards Modern Philosophy as elaborate nonsense. He himself has been a Realist, and his Realisation of the Possible has been approvingly referred to in the eleventh edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica. Mr. Bain's greatest philosopher has evidently been Aristotle. While we were in our college days, we somehow thought among ourselves that Mr. Bain would produce a great work on the philosophy of Aristotle. One is not quite sure whether Mr. Bain ever entertained that idea. But it may be said *a priori* that Mr. Bain would have produced a great work on Aristotle if he had chosen to do so. It is unfortunate that no great work exists in the English language on the Metaphysics of Aristotle. It is curious that while all the other works of Aristotle have found eminent expositors, his Metaphysics should have been without any serious commentary. It has for some time past been my intention to do something in that direction and it was with this idea in view that I so much desired to be under the guidance of Mr. Bain for some time to come. I know of no other man in India who has devoted so much attention to Aristotle as Mr. Bain himself. As it is, however, one must be content with one's lot and be prepared to work single-handed in a region where one could otherwise have found eminent support. The only point in which Mr. Bain may be found to disagree with Aristotle is in his conception of God as the Thought of Thought. Mr. Bain is a positivist so far as the idea of God is concerned. He would believe only in the artificial evolution of the idea of God from a primordial belief in fetishes. My own conception

of God would be much nearer that of Aristotle than that of Mr. Bain. There are vestiges of an intellectual mysticism in Aristotle which I wish he had advanced further. As it is, a mystical philosophy has much more to do with a view like that of Aristotle than with a positivistic or agnostic one like that of Mr. Bain.

His Attainments in Oriental Culture: One wonders, however, why Mr. Bain should have chosen not to tread on the path of classical scholarship for which he was exceptionally well-fitted. It seems that he intended to make a variation in the traditional path of scholarship and thus chose to work in a direction in which, as events have proved, there has scarcely been his equal. He found that the aesthetic side of Oriental culture had hitherto found no exponent. German scholarship with its extensive and erudite treatises brought to light only one side of Oriental culture. It was reserved for Mr. Bain with his great powers of imagination and with his rare faculty of appreciation to so bring to light the artistic and aesthetic side of Indian culture that not merely the Keeper of the British Museum would relegate his excellent Indian stories to the section on Oriental Translations, but oriental readers themselves, including my own self felt while reading his stories that they were, after all, as the author called them, translations of manuscripts that he had most accidentally discovered. This belief was encouraged by the fact that the college of which Mr. Bain had the honour to be the Principal was known all the literary world over as a repository of most precious manuscripts in the realm of Oriental scholarship. It is the rare aesthetic quality of Principal Bain's Oriental writings which will enable him to survive when his official compeers will long have ceased to be remembered. We warmly congratulate Messrs. Methuen on having strung the necklace of Mr. Bain's jewels of Indian stories.

Mr. Bain, an Ornament to C. I. E. One questions after all whether such a man deserved no more than a mere Companionship of the Indian Empire. When I first read in the papers that a C.I.E. was conferred on Mr. Bain, the first thought that arose in me was that instead of the C.I.E. being an ornament to Mr. Bain, Mr Bain himself was an ornament to the Order of the Companions of the Indian Empire. I did not think it worth while to write to Mr. Bain congratulating him on his C.I.E. It was as if somebody should have congratulated me on having eminently passed the school leaving examination! Titles have a subjective more than an objective value. They show not the greatness of the man on whom they are conferred but the powers of appreciation of those who confer them. Could any of the Senators of our Bombay University have pointed out a man who by virtue of his being a great intellectual colossus deserved an LL.D. more than Mr. Bain himself? And yet a cheap LL.D. is conferred on people, merely on the motion of one Senator or another, for the simple reason that these people succeed in managing during the time of tenure of their office the affairs of a not very great institution! The sun of intellectual appreciation has set and we are moving in the twilight of fussiness. People somehow seem to care for the affairs of the moment and what would stand in relief on the background of Time seems to escape their appreciation.

A Veritable Sanyasin: The days are gone when we used to have amongst us people of the calibre of Sir Edwin Arnold and Sir Alexander Grant. The one deservedly obtained a reputation for his *Light of Asia*. The other, as soon as he left the Bombay Presidency, was transferred to the Professorship of the Edinburgh University for his scholarly edition of Aristotle's *Ethica*. These have been our lights in the educational sphere in the past. Mr. Bain deserves more than anybody else to stand in that galaxy. He very often reminds me of the philosopher Heracleitos. He is

grim in his wild isolation, but shines like a star of the first magnitude. His manners are rough, but his heart is mellow. Through the rocky valleys of his external demeanour flow the rivers of generosity and affection. The Indian ideal of a Sanyasin, *pace* Mrs. Bain, seems to have caught the imagination of our worthy Principal. He would be seen in the mornings in his solitary house, clad in a robe like that of a Sanyasin, ready to receive and exchange thoughts with his old pupils. In Mr. Bain we have had one of the best fruits of English scholarship. I do not believe in the platitude that no man is indispensable. It would be impossible for a long time to come to adequately fill the place of Mr. Bain. Mr. Bain has shown us the possibilities of a life solely devoted to the cause of learning. Let us receive the torch from him and hand it down from one generation to another in our dear old college.

XIII

THE "LONDON TIMES" AND THE BENGAL PARTITION

To the Editor of the "Maharatta".

Sir,

Will you kindly publish in your esteemed paper the following few lines on a question which is so vitally connected with the interests of the whole of India?

The London *Times* in its issue of 14th April 1906 has very generously spared a few lines on the question of the Bengal Partition. It represents the official side of the matter and has therefore no sympathy with the view the people at large have to put forth. It says that the partition of Bengal was entirely an 'administrative readjustment;' that the break up of Bengal into two portions was of no greater consequence than 'breaking up of a populous town into two or more electoral districts' or creating 'two county councils in one large country'. It pretends to represent that on account of the partition 'the Mussulmans of Eastern Bengal have obtained full equality of opportunity with the Hindus.' It boasts that one of the glories of British administration has been 'the equality of justice to the various races and creeds'. In order to account for the unfair treatment dealt to the Hindus in Eastern Bengal and Assam, it puts forth the ridiculous excuse that it has been wholly due to 'oversight' and not at all to 'wilful neglect'. It goes on to say that before partition 'Dacca had dwindled to a half of its former size and the development of Chittagong had been seriously retarded;' that Eastern Bengal as a whole was treated as a 'poor relative' of Calcutta; that its Government was 'run in the interests of the Calcutta office-seekers'; that 'service in Eastern Bengal was regarded as a sort of exile'; and that in order to put an end to all such unhappy and undesirable things, the only remedy that

could be applied was the one which 'Lord Curzon had the sagacity to perceive and the courage to apply'. The *Times* bestows a panegyric on the Boswell of Gladstone* for having 'refused in spite of interested clamour and no little pressure to reverse the wise decision arrive at by Lord Curzon and Lord Minto'. In spite of all these outsidéd considerations, the *Times* is not wholly dead to the 'genuine sentiment' that prevails in Bengal; it makes some allowance for this sentiment, but falsely represents that it is only of 'a hundredth part of the entire population which is vocal and noisy,' and the other ninety nine parts neither "know, nor care anything about the matter". It rages and it chafes, and in a meanly vituperative tone it thus flies into a brilliant peroration. "But sentiment becomes *suspect* when we are aware of the self-seeking it cloaks: and still more does it become suspect when an agitation is got up in its name which is carried on by calumny and misrepresentation. But it becomes absolutely *contemptible* when the so-called 'patriots' and sentimentalists cannot fight out their own battle, but demoralise students and school boys, to the danger of their future, by inciting them to the *dirty* work of a *dishonest* agitation".

Ever since the time when Bengal was partitioned, we have been expecting the sage opinion of the *Times* on this much vexed and thorny subject; and though late, we are glad to observe that it has come at last. But a long period of time, we had considered, was a necessary factor of wise judgment and deliberate thought, and that it would also serve to pacify a rage and to mitigate the intensity of vituperation. Our expectations have however, turned out false. Even after a mature deliberation, prejudice seems to have led the *Times* astray and to pronounce

* 'Boswell of Gladstone' means the biographer of Gladstone, so styled because Boswell is regarded as one of the greatest biographers. Here the reference is to John Morley who wrote the biography of Gladstone. Mr. Morley was Secretary for India from 1905 to 1910.—*Compiler*

a false verdict on the case; its arguments have been fallacious and it seems to rage and howl in agony. "Administrative re-adjustment" is no appropriate justification of the Partition; instead of cutting Bengal into two portions and appointing a Lieutenant-Governor to each the Government could have better managed the business, had it given an Assistant to the original Lieutenant-Governor. As a matter of fact the partition of Bengal seems to resemble the partition of France into mathematical compartments by the Revolution of 1789. Both were deliberate and short-sighted policies, and both serve to raise a howl of agony in the land. Nor does the partition of Bengal as the *Times* says, resemble the breaking up of a populous town into two or more electoral districts. It is here that the *Times* makes a fundamental fallacy; it is here that the origin of the error lies. The partition of Bengal does *not* resemble the partition of a populous town; the one is political, the other is electoral; the one is on a large scale, the other on a small scale; the one serves to differentiate the Hindus from the Mohammedans and to deal a death blow to the root conception of their unity; the other does in no way meddle with the unity of the electors. Then, again, the *Times* credits the British administration with an equality of justice to the various *races* and *creeds*. No statement can be more deliberately false; the British Government does not do equal justice to the European and to the Indian; it appoints the one on posts at the top of the ladder; it leaves the other to perish in the dust at the last rung; it gives special privileges to the Christians; and it leaves the Hindus and the Mohammedans to take best care of themselves. The *Times* lays the unfair treatment of the Hindus in Eastern Bengal at the door of "oversight", rather than "wilful neglect". We answer that if such a conduct be called an "oversight", the gravest crimes will be enthroned on the paramount seat of justice; and that a Lieutenant-Governor, who commits such mistakes by oversight, does not deserve to be cre-

dited with the acumen of a just statesman. He is at best a tyrant. Then again the *Times* says that the Bengal Partition was necessary to mete out a fair amount of treatment to Eastern Bengal. There is a certain amount of truth in this statement, but the *Times* totally forgets that in a highly organised state of affairs there must be some cities that are destined to rise in importance in course of time and others that are doomed to meet a contrary fate. We admit that this is a sort of protective policy to Eastern Bengal, but then the importance of this protection is much exaggerated, when we cast up the account and balance the advantages with the disadvantages. Mr. Morley again does not deserve to be panegyricised for his having supported the "scheme on the spot"; he has not been "sympathetic" to the ruled. It is all well for him to proclaim at the top of his voice that "sympathy to the governed is the keynote of wise administration". But when he comes to put this sage adage into practice, he fails miserably; he is then the Secretary of State for India and not a mellifluous writer. He writes as an author what he does not put into practice as a Secretary of State. The *Times* has touched the chord of "genuine sentiment" among the Bengalis; it says that only a hundredth part of the Bengalis are vocal and noisy about the matter. The best way to answer this false statement is to implore the Editor of the *Times* to come and see the state of affairs in Bengal and not only in Bengal but throughout the length and breadth of India. If he comes here and sees what is going on in India, why, we feel assured he will find that the sentiment has pervaded the whole Indian nation from lowest strata to its highest ranks. Lastly the *Times* loses all consciousness and for better or for worse attacks the 'patriots' and sentimentalists for not confining agitation to themselves but for engaging students in the same "dirty work of a dishonest agitation". Let the *Times* look at the students in

England and in Russia on the one hand and those in India on the other; how intractable the former are, and how manageable the other; how the former not only engage in all political agitation, but play a game of dangerous havoc; how the latter enlist themselves in the arena of agitation, but in what a law-abiding manner!

To conclude, then, it is Lord Curzon himself, who has by an irony of fortune, conferred a lasting benefit on India. It is he who has sown the seed of discontent in India, which, by a strange accident, has turned out to be a seed of much political productive power. It is he who has conjured up the spirit of nationality now walking solemnly on the plains of India, crying, "Protection" and letting slip the dogs of agitation. Thus does "good sometimes come out of evil".

Yours faithfully,

R. D. R.



