

10 February 1939: Resigned from Private Secretary to War Minister  
in Imperial Headquarters,

Appointed Chief of General Staff of Japanese  
Army stationed in Mongol,

Resigned from following Posts:

Member of Execution Committee on Construction of  
Fortresses.

Member of Entrance Examination Committee of Military  
Paymasters' Academy.

Member of Deliberation Committee on Mobilization  
of Military and Naval Munition Industries.

Member of Operation Committee on Properties of  
Military Mutual Benefit Society.

15 October 1941 : Promoted to Lieutenant General

18 March 1943 : Appointed to Commander of 18th Division

SUBJECT: Information on Purges furnished  
by G-2, GHQ, SCAP

→ TANAKA, Shinichi fell into Category B as a career Army man.

2. Definitions of the categories referred to above are to be found in appendix A of SCAPIN 550, subject: "Removal and Exclusion of Undesirable Personnel From Public Office," 4 January 1946. This may be ascertain in Room 300 for your information.

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SUBJECT: INFORMATION ON PURGES

1. The following information is presented to the reasons for being purged furnished by G-2, GHQ, SCAP:

5 copies  
ABE, Nobuyuki falls into three categories of the purge directive: Category B because he was a career Army man; Category D because he was president of Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society, and director of DAINIPPON KOA DOMEI (Great Japan, East Asia League); and Category F because he was Governor General of Korea.

6 copies  
AOKI, Kazuo fell into Category B as a career Army man; Category D as Vice-president of Imperial Rule Assistance Association; and Category G as financial advisor to the Nanking Puppet Government, president of Cabinet Planning Board, Minister without Portfolio in the Tojo Cabinet, and Minister of the Great East Asia Ministry in the Tojo Cabinet.

6 copies  
MINAMI, Jiro fell into Category A as a suspected war criminal; Category B as a career Army man; Category D as President of the Political Association of Great Japan; Category F as Governor General of Korea; and Category G as a member of the Privy Council.

6 copies  
OSHIMA, Hiroshi fell into Category A as a suspected war criminal; Category B as a career Army man; Category G as Ambassador to Germany.

6 copies  
✓ SUZUKI, Kantaro fell into Category B as a Career Navy man; Category D as President of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association; and Category G as a President of the Privy Council both in 1944 and in 1945; and as Prime Minister concurrently Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Greater Asia in 1945.

3 copies  
TANAKA, Shinichi fell into Category B as a career Army man.

1 copy  
of each  
2. Definitions of the categories referred to above are to be found in appendix A of SCAPIN 550, subject: "Removal and Exclusion of Undesirable Personnel From Public Office," 4 January 1946. This may be ascertain in Room 300 for your information.

TANAKA, Shinichi

Def. Doc. 1323

AFFIDAVIT

1. I, Tanaka Shinichi, am a former Lieutenant-General. My present residence is No. 2042, Mizusawa-Mura Yokoseko, Mie-gun, Mie Prefecture.
2. I held the office of chief of the First Department (operations) in the General Staff Office from 12 October 1940 to December 1942.
3. The following is my deposition regarding operations plans against the Soviet Union and the proposed expansion of armaments in Manchuria in 1941, in planning which I took part.

TANAKA, Shinichi

19 Feb 47

Gave copy of Curriculum Vitae to Mr. Dunigan; to be returned to us.

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et, al.

- vs -

ARAKI, Sadao

*See for testimony R 26982-27037*

A F F I D A V I T

I, TANAKA, Shinichi, state under oath as follows:

1. My present address is Suizawa-mura, Miyo-gun, Miyo Prefecture. I was from October 1940 until 7 December 1942 the Director of the First Division of the General Staff in charge of operational matters.

2. I testified last time before this Tribunal that in the peace time operational plan of 1941 no concrete plans for attacking Hongkong, Singapore, etc. were included. Besides this peace time operational plan the Japanese Army made during the period between January and May 1941 no concrete plans or preparations for occupying Singapore, Hongkong and the Philippines or one of these places. No study worth mentioning was even made.

3. The General Staff received neither from Germany nor from Mr. Oshima directly or indirectly any suggestions or influences in drafting and deciding the operational plans or any one of them including the attacks on British Malay, Singapore, Hongkong, the Philippines, Netherlands East Indies and the Southern regions. Nor was there any case that the General

Def. Doc. No. 2542



Staff concerning these plans or any one of them asked directly or indirectly through Ambassador Oshima for opinion, suggestions or assistance from Germany. Also, Mr. Oshima never recommended to the General Staff preparations or carrying out of these operational plans or any one of them.

On this 29 day of August, 1947

At Tokyo

DEPONENT TANAKA Shinichi (seal)

I SHIMAUCHI Tatsuoki hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness...

On the same date

At the same place.

Witness: (signed) SHIMAUCHI Tatsuoki  
(seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

TANAKA Shinichi (seal)



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TANAKA - Direct

DIRECT EXAMINATION OF TANAKA, Shinichi  
BY MR. BLEWETT

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26,982  
26,984

The witness identified Exhibit No. 3027 as his affidavit and verified it. \* The affidavit stated that the witness was Chief of Operational Planning in the General Staff from October 12, 1940 to December 7, 1942. In the conference for the 1941 peacetime operations plan held in 1940 \* the Chief of Staff adopted a draft for southern operations almost identical with the previous year. It was purely a technical provision for defense, an annual program being part of the general peacetime national defense plan. This draft has been burned. Under that plan, a major part of Japan's peacetime operations plan for defensive operation plans against the Soviet consisted of defensive preparations, in point of quantity as well as quality.

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26,987

The first thing to be done in each year's plan was to define an outline of anti-Soviet defense plan. Only when this was finished was the operational plan for the south considered. It was deemed secondary and supplementary. There was no stress on it. It was some- times nothing more than a paper plan. \* There was nothing concrete in operational preparations for the south. The plan for 1941 was of the same nature. \* According to this program, if a war broke out with the U.S., measures were to be limited to occupying the Philippines and Guam and the capture of U.S. military bases in the Far East. It never had any detailed plan or preparation against possible attack from the mainland of the U.S. which might be expected to follow. An anti- American operational plan would have included a possible overall attack by main U.S. forces and with the extended scope of the plan, would have been wider and more complicated.

26,988

The question when and where the war would end would have been the key point to be decided beforehand. The Japanese plan never referred to this essential point and touched only on operations against U.S. bases in the Far East. Even offensive actions against Hawaii were not taken into account. This was due to the fact that priority was given to the defensive plan and Japan's \* national power could not stand such operations. Also Japan's sole aim was to drive away imminent threats. It was unnecessary further to wage war with the U.S. As to Britain, while it was true that Japan had the idea in case of war to capture the military bases such as Singapore or Hong Kong, there were no concrete plans prepared for this. Burma, India, Australia, etc., were never contemplated. The same was true as to the NEI. Actual conditions did not allow for the planning of simultaneous operations against more than two countries including the U.S., Britain, and Netherlands. She did

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26,989 not have sufficient forces or national resources. Inasmuch as it was very difficult to foresee the development of such a many-sided war, it was admitted that in case they would have to somehow combine the separate plans \* into an overall plan. The Supreme Command had the idea of taking some political measures for not launching such simultaneous operations. This strategy meant that in the beginning, Japan would check the attack passively and then take an offensive and maintain an offensive attitude. According to progress, it might be necessary to cope with the offensive of the enemy by giving up fruitless passiveness and turn to effective counterattack.

26,990 Due to insufficiency of preparation, this could not be expected in 1941 and it was quite clear at the beginning of that year that they would be unable to carry out the passive formula during that year. It was admitted that preparations had been completed only through steady \* continual efforts over a long period because of Japan's poor condition. The incompleteness of preparation meant complete impossibility to make operations. These facts show that the plan for the year and its preparatory programs could not meet the requirements of the defensive operational plan for 1941. The peacetime operations program for 1941 was decided by the General Staff but further study was never tried to frame a concrete policy. There was no permanent Army headquarters on a permanent footing in charge of executing southern operations in case of crisis. The divisions had not yet been designated.

26,991 The care of the peacetime plan for 1941 lay in Japan's basic policy \* to avoid any overall war with other countries so that Japan could devote her whole efforts to solving the China incident. They were to try to bring the southern problems to a prompt settlement by something short of war and they were to block the so-called Aid-Chiang routes of the third powers. These were the points that General SUGIYAMA, the Chief of Staff, pointed out as essential for operational plans when he instructed the witness and General TSUKADA, Vice Chief of the General Staff.

26,992 In the winter of 1941 at the draft conference of a plan for the next year, the forces needed for war time emergency was estimated at 48 divisions. If they were divided into a few groups to be \* dispatched each to one quarter, about thirty divisions for anti-Soviet defense, about ten for China operations, five for guarding against the U.S. and Britain and a few in reserve for Imperial Headquarters, there would have been a big shortage in every quarter. This was true, especially with regard to transportation, communication and fuel. On anticipating a

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crisis with the U.S. and Britain, considerable increase was needed in all Army quarters for defensive purposes in this direction amounting to at least a little more than ten divisions in the early period. They, therefore, should have had prepared about ten divisions for China, a little more than twenty for the Soviet and a few in reserve for Imperial Headquarters. The Chief of Staff recognized that the shortage of forces and materials would be much more acute and such a war would compel Japan to leave the China incident completely fruitless.

26,993  
26,994

He concluded that Japan should keep up a policy of averting a wholesale war both politically and strategically. \* The witness understood that the War Minister had agreed with the Chief. \* In an interview with the Vice Chief of Staff, the question was how the strategy of Japan would be affected by the conclusion of the Tripartite Alliance. A discussion was held in November 1940. The Vice Chief's view was that Japan should by every means avert any resort to arms insofar as justice and prestige could be maintained, however, imminent the compulsion of the pact. The witness agreed.

26,995

This conclusion was reached from a purely strategic point of view. The decision of resorting to arms or not was left to state policy. The question of whether or not the U.S. was attacked was a matter of future judgment to be decided in relation with the circumstances at that time from a fair and independent view. They must keep up this attitude \* and make due judgment in view of the whole destiny of Japan. If Japan were attacked by the U.S., Germany would give military aid of some sort. However, since Germany was absorbed in the European war and her military power was not limitless and in view of the fact that Germany was not a big naval power and was remote from Eastern Asia, the Army could not expect strategic aid from Germany.

26,996

If Germany was attacked by the U.S., Japan would be obliged to aid by arms. She could not afford to engage in military operations against the U.S. solely to aid Germany. She had to devote herself to independent operations to keep a general national defense. In case of a war between the U.S. and Germany, they should find some measures to meet the circumstances, especially when the Japanese Army had no surplus force. \* The Chief of Staff approved this conclusion and in an agreement with the Vice Chief made clear that the 1941 peacetime operations should be established independently, and should not be restricted or given any support from outside and should not be influenced in strategy by the Tripartite Pact. The witness recognized that the preparations for the 1941 peacetime operations plans were lacking in thoroughness

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26,997 because the southern operations for defense were left out of consideration and the areas were untouched or without defense. Even the study of the defense of the south was incomplete as to organization, equipment, materials and training of forces for landing and tropical operation. Although the most urgent need was to reform the organization and equipment of part of the forces and give them special training for use in the south \* against the U.S. and Britain as provided in the plan, it could not be expected that they would be finished even crudely by the Summer of 1941.

26,998 In the 1941 mobilization plan, emphasis was laid on completing defense in Manchuria against the Soviet, by reorganizing each division to adapt it to continental operations, especially in North Manchuria. The organization and equipment was opposite in nature to those for the south. Transport goods for each division was of a great amount and a majority of horses for transport and communication were to be Manchurian ponies. This makes clear that Japan laid greater stress on defense operations against the Soviet than on those against the U.S. and Britain even in April 1941. As for Army airplanes, only 60 or 70% out of the original mobilization plan was expected to be reached before August 1941. Heavy bombers originally designed \* for the Manchurian-Soviet frontier had only a small flying range and were not well fitted for the south. On the whole, aviation facilities were not available for the south.

26,999 Only a small amount of ammunition was piled up for the south during the spring and summer of 1941 and an additional amount was accumulated in September and October until December, and at that time it reached in total barely to the amount available for ten divisions. This accumulation was not calculated into preparations based on the 1941 plan, but was carried out chiefly after determining national policy. The preparations in the 1941 plan meant reorganization and training of divisions to fit them for defense in the south, study of tropical tactics, landing tactics and the collection of information and strategic materials. They were essential matters of study for planning a peacetime national defense and were not the prerequisites \* for war against the U.S., Britain and Holland. It was too late in beginning and not rapid in progress. In addition, information about the south was incomplete and no bases were prepared for aviation, sea transport and communications.

Even passive and defensive operations were hard to put into effect, and more difficult than this was the plan to make a responsive attack after defensive actions or an instant counterattack. They tried

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27,000 to meet at least the minimum requirements of defensive preparations to make up for shortages. There were many difficulties due to the want of military funds and materials and the insufficiency of the investigation. It was not before September that preparations in organizing forces and materials were first launched. They were applications from those originally \* prepared for defense against the Soviets or some modifications for meeting an emergency. On July 2, 1941, immediately after the Imperial Conference, the Chief and Vice Chief of Staff explained to chiefs of all sections the problem of the U.S. and Britain. He stressed the need of propelling the once-fixed policy and the study and preparation for moving into south FIC.

27,001 Fixed principles as to solving the China incident were not to be changed fundamentally but they should strengthen pressure on Chungking from the south and check the aid routes to China. If circumstances permit, they should exercise belligerent rights against China and take over hostile foreign settlements and devote utmost vigilance to every circumstance. \* Pressure on Chungking had to be effected by practical application of policies established toward FIC. It was urgent to dispose of the hostile foreign settlements in China since they were a great obstacle to settling the incident. It was most desirable to solve it diplomatically, but if they couldn't they would have to take them over by force through the New China Central government. There would then be some danger of strained relations between U.S. and Britain and something more serious than occupying south FIC might happen. Therefore, they must never be hasty in the solution.

27,002 This was the reason why the foreign settlements were to be taken over, if the case required it. They must be ready if the worst comes not to evade a defensive war against the Anglo-Americans. The southern policy was made up on the basis of the once-fixed national policy and aimed at advancing troops into south FIC. This confirmed the need of maintaining readiness for war against the U.S. and Britain, but it did not mean \* Japan was determined on war. It only meant that if Japan was interfered with by the U.S. and Britain from executing her policy towards Siam and FIC through peaceful and diplomatic means, she would not shun self-defense operations there. Every effort was to be made to avoid armed forces entering Siam. As to the meaning of not evading war with Britain and the U.S., it was understood from the Imperial Conference and the Navy that they expected that Japan would successfully carry out her policy in peace towards FIC and Siam without causing any trouble.

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The expression that Japan was not afraid of war meant only that she would not be in danger of stimulating a war by taking a policy toward FIC. However, any interference or challenge from the Anglo-Americans might cause an unexpected situation and they should make careful preparation for carrying out a policy towards FIC and getting ready for the worst.

27,003

They also foresaw in the Army a future time when defensive operations would be greatly enlarged to permit more careful consideration of southern problems, as the preparations were not ready as compared with those against the Soviet and China. In view of the situation of the enlarging of Japan's sphere of defense, the first step was a practical study of operations plan against the U.S. and Britain from various points of view.

27,004

The war between Germany and the Soviet made the relations between Japan and the Soviet extremely pointed. U.S. aid to the Soviet and construction by the U.S. of military bases in the Soviet territory were making Soviet relations more serious. Special consideration must be given this in connection with Anglo-American problems.

At the conference, every member expressed the desire to carry out a peaceful advance following international treaties as far as possible. TOJO disclosed his intention to do his best not to cause any trouble at the time of advance. The Supreme Command calculating on this intended to send the Imperial guard division from south China to FIC to complete the advance. They had decided to use the investigations made in June and establish intimate cooperation and communication between the War Ministry and Staff, especially in adjusting relations between politics and operations.

27,005

The Chief of Staff who had agreed with the Government and Army late in June 1941 pointed out that the aim of the advance to the south was to cut Chinese routes and contribute to establishing Japanese economic autonomy. He stressed that they should first secure friendship and reliance from FIC. He also stated that the central authorities and troops on the spot should pay full respect to sovereignty and territorial integrity of France with the understanding that the Embassy in FIC and troops on the spot must not fail to make control and communication and a decisive measure for control must be taken among the stationed troops. Every common soldier must be fully aware that any misunderstanding should be avoided due to differences in manner, customs and language.

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- 27,006 As to the possibility of a peaceful advance into south FIC, SUGIYAMA clarified his views in July that Japan did not take FIC for an enemy and the advance was not a military occupation. He stated that it was a favorable chance for France to admit a peaceful advance on condition that they be convinced of the purpose of Japan. This would not be an easy task.
- 27,007 Early in July he learned that Britain might march into FIC beforehand since she knew Japan's intention. Anxiety would prevail if this caused any incident at the time of occupation. He believed that if Japan's attitude was just and fair and firm there would not be any trouble with the British armies. The invasion of north FIC by China at this time is a matter of great concern for the authorities of the Army and for the forces in south China and FIC. Early in July they learned \* that three China divisions formerly stationed near the border had received an order to enter FIC. To meet this, the operations section made a secret study to reinforce one infantry regiment and to dispatch one division then in Canton. Early in 1941, the General Staff gave out information that Chinese forces amounting to four armies, or sixteen divisions, were stationed facing FIC, in Chinese territory adjacent to the northeastern border of FIC. At the end of July when the advance of troops into south FIC was put into effect, the Vice Chief of Staff and the Chief of Operations were urged by the Chief of Staff to promote the study.
- 27,008 The results of the investigation \* were the preparations at the time were put into practice within the limits of the fixed plan established early in the year. They were studies in various fields of operations, defensive plans to meet a critical situation and new investigations and preparations for defending FIC on the principle of the mutual defense agreement. Detailed accounts of preparations were made within the established policy including training, equipment, supplies and sanitation. There was an urgent need to make up for the loss suffered in the China operation. The decision of July 2 and the French-Japanese cooperation had its aim in protecting that area from the U.S. and Britain. The matter had never been thought of in past operational plans. It was a new thing requiring totally different study and preparation.
- 27,009 The armed forces in FIC after the southern occupation amounted to one brigade and one flying corps \* for north FIC and one division was assigned for defending FIC from invasion by the U.S., Britain and De Gaulle or other aggressions from China. In order not to interfere with the diplomatic negotiations, no other forces except airdrome engineers were stationed there. The General Staff left further

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27,010 matters to the Army on the spot. While construction and installation of communications were going on under the agreement, other measures were taken into consideration. It was likely the Japanese operational measures for self-defense against the U.S. and Britain which might follow the agreement with FIC would cover the main areas such as Manila and the Philippines and would develop into military operations needed to defend Japan. There was need of a further study \* of the operational plan of a future situation.

The Chief of Staff requested the Vice Chief and Operations Chief to make a study of the plan, including operations in the tropics, the sea, the air and landings in areas such as the Philippines, Malay, Java, etc. The Chief of the second section was asked to collect information on military affairs in the south and the Chief of the third section was instructed to speed up his study on war materials for ocean and landing operation.

27,011 In early September 1941, the Chief of Staff explained the items in the national policy relating to Britain and the U.S. The gist was that it was a request for reconsideration of the operations plan and the furtherance for making of a new start in operational preparations \* to cope with the situation. The policy of September 6 reflects a strong consciousness of the critical importance of national defense.

27,012 The question of how to cope with the present critical situation, especially U.S., British and Dutch offensive actions towards Japan and how to cope with the daily diminishing of national strength in the face of pressure were questions which Japan must answer. To solve these even if Japan fell into the worst possible situation, it has been decided to pursue diplomacy and war preparations with an attitude of making efforts for peace but ready to fight if it failed. For this purpose, it was decided that while seeking the objectives of the negotiations within the time limit, completion of war preparations within a time limit should be made to meet eventualities \* if war was unavoidable. The nation's position on peace or war was to be decided in early October. This decision was not one resolving on war, but was to bring about a new turn in the situation through diplomacy. The hastening of defensive war preparations was directed against defensive actions against Japan with a will not to evade war if it could not be averted. The primary principle of the decision is to attain the objective through diplomacy.



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27014

\* There were fundamental differences between the decision of July 2 and September 6. With respect to the cause of conflict between Japan, U. S. and Britain, the earlier decision was limited to Siam and FIC, while the later decision reflects that the area of friction had become greatly enlarged and more serious as a result of the ABD offensive against Japan, the embargo, and the situation as to Japan's national strength resilience. Japan was to demand by sheer force of circumstances that the U. S. and Britain refrain from interfering in and obstructing the solution of the \* China Incident, and from threatening Japan's national defense, and should offer cooperation for raw materials. Japan was to demand recognition of special relations with FIC, non-establishment of military interests in Siam, NEI, China, and the Soviet Far East, and the confirmation that there would be no military reinforcement in the Far East. The later decision also provided that Japan would agree to concessions considerably as a return.

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27016

Military operations under the earlier decision was to carry out measures re FIC, while in the later case Japan's self-preservation and defense would be the motive. The area of operations under the latter decision expanded widely from the earlier decision, which deemed FIC as the center. There was a difference in strategic concept. The situation on strategic material, oil, was completely different from the July \* decision. The much feared danger signal that national defense would become powerless was seen in this single item.

Since the decision was a demand for acceleration of operational preparations directed toward the south, the General Staff had to complete the actual plan on an overall basis. The fixed annual peacetime plan and supplementation made after July 2 had to be further accelerated and necessary operational preparations begun anew. The Supreme Command felt that the annual plan for 1941 was insufficient, incomplete and impractical, and the preparations betray weakness and lack of thoroughness. In view of this situation, the Chief of Staff had given directions to the Vice-Chief and Chief of the First Division that the policy decision of September 6 was an order for completion of operational preparations on a general scale regardless of whether they are offensive or defensive in nature.

27017

As a first operational formula, \* Japan shall in the early stage passively counter the attacks of the ABD forces, singly or jointly, and then turn to the offensive to secure the defense of the land. They must recognize that they cannot avoid carrying out continuously operations for self-preservation and defense, and that these preparations should be completed.

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27018

As for a second operational formula, although that will counter the attacks, they shall without falling into a defensive position undertake repelling action by counter-attacking from the outset and then carry out the strategy of the first formula. The choice of formula will be determined by the domestic and external situation at the time hostilities begin, and by the degree of completion of national policy in meeting that situation, and naval and military preparation. The conditions surrounding the navy will have a decisive importance. For the Army, it was directed that regardless of circumstances, \* its objective was to carry out operations, which, if possible, would immediately repel the initial attack, and various preparations and studies were to be carried forward with this in view.

There was no alternative than to take defensive operations at first. While they must undertake to perfect all emergency measures in planning the strategy of defense, they must, as operational preparations are completed, make it their principle to plan and prepare urgent matters in an orderly manner so that there will be no miscarriage in the execution of their defensive or offensive strategy. This has become the important subject of study, especially of the Supreme Command. There is a possibility of an initial attack by the enemy before completion of preparations by the latter part of October, and this must be considered by operational authorities.

27019

About the middle of September, the General Staff decided on a plan of defensive strategy to be \* adopted for the time being in the south, based on the September national policy decision. The views were that the defensive strategy to be taken by Japan is to vary according to the progress of operational preparations, but it will on the whole be on a very small scale. Its primary object will be defense of FIC from enemy attack. From present preparations, they cannot engage in operations elsewhere than the south, and in such event grave difficulties would arise in defense of Japan and protection of transportation.

Since this would amount to a great failure in national defense, they should quickly abandon such a passive operational formula and turn to a passive offensive, which requires speedy progress in preparations, which would permit a change to emergency operational command for self-preservation and defense.

27020

In case such operations are unavoidably \* given rise to, the principle of operational command as is deemed proper shall be established in accordance with the actual state of preparations. No directions in advance are necessary to be given to the forces in FIC. This is regarded as disadvantageous.

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27021

Since the General Staff was constantly apprehensive that there might be a possible attack by the U. S. and Britain, they considered it highly necessary to prepare fully against it, and there was great concern in the defensive operational command. On November 6, 1941, Imperial Headquarters sent to the Southern Army an order to prepare for capture of strategic points in the southern region. This order permitted in the event of an initial attack by the ABD, or one of them, that the attack be met with forces for purposes of self defense. An order issued on December 1, 1941, Imperial Headquarters \* directed that in the event of a serious initial U. S. - British attack, the commander, in cooperation with the Navy, should begin an offensive and go ahead with operations at a proper time. These orders were issued out of deep concern over a possible initial attack by the enemy, and there was grave apprehension over a British invasion of Siam.

In the middle of September, in connection with matters under the jurisdiction of the War Ministry and of the High Command, all matters were vigorously advanced through cooperation, but delay could not be avoided due to lack of materials and shipping.

27022

Although it was the General Staff plan to release units of the 5th and 18th divisions from China for use in FIC, their recovery and perfection, especially in preparations which would accord with the needs of operations in the south, were insufficient. \* These divisions were first to be returned to Japan and demobilized, but in view of the south situation they were made to stand by in China.

These divisions had been on duty and maintaining public peace and safety in China, and were primarily engaged in military training. Even in case of an incident, it would require nearly two months before they could actually engage in defensive actions, the time being needed to complete concentration, transportation, and other preparations.

27023

\* Several other divisions were scheduled to be transferred to the south in accordance with future requirements, as well as three other divisions in Japan proper and Formosa. Ammunition for ten battle divisions was scheduled to be stocked in Formosa and FIC, and the first stock pile was to be created in Formosa about the end of September. Its execution was doubtful because of shipping shortage. Conditions were such that if all difficulties were overcome, the accumulation could not be completed until the end of December. The ammunition was to be stocked for general operations, and not as equipment for the forces. The witness' subordinates learned this from contact with the War Ministry, which was concerned with this matter.

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27024 At this time the standard amount of ammunition to be used in the south was deemed to be one and one-half times the general standard, \* and this was the basis for stock-piling set up.

In the middle of September part of the forces were sent to the south from Manchuria and Japan. This included one division, a tank regiment, an anti-tank unit, air force ground crews, signal corps, and supply forces for South China, tank regiment, independent anti-tank unit, air corps, artillery corps, signal corps, and supply forces for Formosa, and an independent mixed regiment, air force ground crews and supply forces for FIC.

From about this time aviation and shipping installations were being reinforced or created in Formosa, FIC and south China, and supply bases were being established there. Requisitioning of shipping and equipping of ships was begun or facilitated, and the training of army and air forces for use in operations was accelerated.

27025

\* The witness, in the meantime, learned from the War Ministry Replenishment Bureau about the actual situation to preparations pertaining to liquid fuels. The situation was that assuming Japan continued the China Incident through 1942 under the present situation, her aviation gas and heavy oil in 1943, after deducting the amount to be consumed for those two years, would be extremely small and sufficient only to meet the needs of about one year of military operations. The reserve of heavy oil for the Navy was only sufficient for about half a year. Domestically produced crude oil, synthetic crude oil, alcohol, etc. were far from sufficient, and there was no prospect of obtaining synthetic oil in great volume. If the present situation remained unchanged during two years, the defensive strength would diminish to a state of complete powerlessness.

27026

\* In the Army Section of Imperial Headquarters, the over-all operation plan against ABD was being formulated from past studies, experience, and data, but the Chief of Staff conceived of the plan to capture strategic points in the South to establish Japan's self-preservation and defense, by severing the ABCD encirclement immediately if Japan was challenged after the early part of October 1941, and issued directions for the study of initial operations against ABD. This plan was approved by the General Staff late in October, and was established as the plan in the middle of November. This, however, did not mean that the Army had, in the early part of October, intended to capture key points in the South. It merely indicated the course of development of the study of plans of operations. It was only a natural expression to cope with the extremely difficult task of adjusting U. S. relations and the strengthening of encirclement.

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It was only the result of a study of the means with which to meet the situation in which Japan might be unavoidably compelled to act for self-defense. The preparations based on the decision of September 6, were to be suspended if peace was decided as the national policy at the conference scheduled for early October. If a decision for war was adopted, formal preparations were to be vigorously pushed and completed by the end of that month, but preparations did not progress as rapidly as had been expected, because the decision was not made in early October as scheduled and the period of indecision continued until the TOJO Cabinet in the middle of October. From shortly after the TOJO Cabinet until early November, Japan's policy toward the U. S. and Britain was returned to a clean slate.

27028

Operational preparations were unavoidably slowed down, or their effectuation held up. Mobilization of troops, requisitioning of shipping, and establishment of bases was greatly retarded. Later operational preparations proceeded full scale after the Liaison Conference in early November.

27029

Japanese foreign policy and operational preparations, based on the decision as a result of the conference of September 6, 1941, was coordinated. On the day before the Conference of September 6, a complete agreement was reached between the Premier and the Army and Navy Chiefs of the Supreme Command, that the first principle of national policy was to obtain Japan's objectives diplomatically and from the theoretical standpoint, clause 2 of the decision should come before Clause 1, and war was to be resorted to only if absolutely unavoidable. The essence of the \* decision lay in diplomatic relations. Full consideration was to be paid in carrying out preparations so as not to hinder diplomacy. Therefore, additional armed forces to be sent to FIC were to be limited only to air force ground crews. The necessary mobilization was to be suspended if diplomatic negotiations improved.

27030

These items were to be decided by consultation between the Chief of Staff and War Ministers. All operational preparations were to be carried out on the principle that it would not impede or disturb diplomacy. The explanations made by the Chief and Vice-Chief of Staff on November 5, 1941, to the \* chiefs of divisions of the General Staff, stated that at the Liaison Conferences held in October and November prior to November 5, it was recognized that the relations with the U. S. were approaching the final stage where they had to choose between peace and war, but it was agreed to continue to effect a diplomatic settlement while maintaining the two-fold policy of diplomacy and war preparations as a means of tiding over the crisis. There was, however, a time limit on both.

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27031 Preparations were to be carried forward with the idea that if a settlement could not be reached diplomatically, then an appeal would be made to arms as a last resort and the preparations would be on a full scale. It was explained that the decision was the same as that of September 6, in that a decision for war was not made. As to the completion of preparations, the Chief expressed the view that the goal for \* completion should be the end of November or the beginning of December.

Full scale preparations were launched after November 5 on this two-fold principle. In addition to the vigorous advance of preparations hitherto made, mobilization and deployment, ship requisitioning and establishment of bases were carried out with utmost effort. The Army's preparations for the initial phase were being completed with the end of November as the goal.

27032 Over-all operations of the Army against ABD were studied and discussed in parallel with the diplomatic efforts. Late in October it became a final plan, and it was \* formally adopted in the middle of November. The establishment of the plan of operations for the General Army for the south and other armies under it took place later.

The organization of operational armies and the order pertaining to important personnel, including the Supreme Commander of the Southern Army, were issued on November 6, and on the same day Imperial Headquarters ordered the operational preparations of the Southern Army. Its gist was that the Supreme Commander should prepare for capture of key areas in the South, from bases in FIC, South China, Formosa, and the Southwest Pacific, using his main forces in cooperation with the Navy. If attacked by ABD forces, he could meet the attack with his forces.

27033 On November 8, an agreement for joint operations was concluded between Headquarters Southern General Army and the combined fleet. On November 15, Imperial Headquarters \* notified the Southern Army of the outline to be followed in capturing and occupying key areas in the South. The areas to be so occupied were the Philippines, Malaya, NEI, and part of South Burma. The stability of Siam and FIC were to be maintained with all possible effort.

After November 5, operational army corps left for their areas of service from Japan, China, and Formosa. They were to be returned when the negotiations with the U. S. were settled. The Chief of Staff gave direct instructions to TERAUCHI on this, and the latter acknowledged it. Preparations for supply were nearing completion after the middle of November.

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27034 All these preparations were not the result of a decision for war. If the negotiations were successful, \* all preparations were to be halted. There was complete agreement between the General Staff, War Ministry, and Navy Supreme Command on this. Suspension of preparations was very difficult and required coolness and boldness of will and speedy and organized handling of business. The Chief of Staff was confident about this.

The original and copies of the operation plans for the South were destroyed by fire, but the outline was as given above and was to be abandoned if diplomatic negotiations were settled before war broke out. The areas of operations in the South were to be the Philippines, Guam, Hong Kong, Malaya, Burma, Java, Sumatra, Borneo, Celebes, the Bismarck Islands and Dutch Timor.

27035 Operations were to be begun simultaneously against the Philippines and Malaya \* by close cooperation between the Army and the Navy. The forces to be employed were to consist of 11 divisions, 9 tank regiments, 2 aviation corps, and other units. The 14th Army, with two divisions was assigned to the Philippines. The 15th, with two divisions, was to maintain stability in Siam and operations in Burma. The 16th, with three divisions, was sent to the NEI. The 25th, with four divisions, were to engage against Malaya and Singapore. The air force had two air corps as its mainstay. The 23rd Army, under the China Expeditionary Forces, was to operate in Hong Kong. Detachments in the Southern Sea area, under Imperial Headquarters, was assigned against Guam \* and the Bismarck Islands, and another division was to maintain stability in FIC.

27036

The date to begin was to be fixed after decision for war was made. The operational plan and preparations of the Japanese Army varied in the scale of objective, degree of precision and strength in accord with the international situation and the demands of defense in the period from spring to early winter in 1941. It was only a stipulation of operational technique and not a war plan. The Japanese Supreme Command had nothing which could be called a war program in time of peace. This is also true of the Japanese Government.

DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SHIMANOUCHI,  
 Counsel for OSHIMA.

27037

\* The witness stated that the General Staff, from October 1940 to December 1942, never conveyed its operational plans to OSHIMA, and the witness himself did not personally convey that information individually. These plans were revealed, even in the General Staff, only to those especially connected with them.

THERE WAS NO CROSS-EXAMINATION OF THE WITNESS.

Ex 3027

Corrected  
copy

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.

- vs -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al.

unduly prolix  
object + last 2 sentences -

SWORN DEPOSITION

DEPONENT: TANAKA, Shinichi

1. Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows:

My name is Tanaka, Shinichi. I am an ex-Lieutenant-General and now live at 2042 Yokoseko, Mizusawa-mura, Miye-gun, in Miye Prefecture.

I was on duty as chief of the first section (operational planning) in the General Staff Office from 12 October 1940 to 7 December 1942. Now I shall depose here about the operational plan and preparations against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands in which I took part in the past.

2. First I shall explain the operational plan and preparations for the year 1941. In the conference for the 1941's peace-time operations plan held in the winter of 1940, the Chief of the General Staff adopted a draft for the Southern operations, which was almost the same in contents with that of the previous year. In other words, the draft was a purely technical provision for defensive operations, a program which the Supreme Command used to make annually as a part of general peace-time national defence plan. This draft has been burned and is not available for the present. However, I am sure I can tell the following facts according to my recollections.

a. A major part of the peacetime operations plan for the Japanese army consisted of defensive preparations against the Soviet Union, in point of quantity as well as quality.

attach by ex. 1 + 2  
pp 18, 19, 20



Therefore in deciding upon an annual peacetime operational plan, the thing to be done first of all was usually to define an outline of the anti-Soviet defensive plan (its rough projects, forces and materials needed for it, etc.) laying aside all other considerations for the time being. It was only after this was finished that the operational plan for the South came up for consideration.

It was as it were secondary and supplementary in importance. No stress was laid upon it, sometimes it was nothing more than a paper plan in rough and abstract form. It was not too much to say that nothing concrete was found in the operational preparations for the South. The plan projected for the year 1941 was also of the same nature.

b. According to the design in the above program, if a war should break out between Japan and the United States, measures to be taken were limited to the occupation of the Philippines and Guam and in consequence the capture of American military bases in the Far East. It never contained in any sense detailed plans or preparations against possible attack from the mainland of the United States which might have been expected to follow as a necessary consequence in such an event.

An Anti-American operational plan would have been projected as against a possible over-all attack by the main forces of the United States. If it were so, the extent and scope of the plan would have been wider and more complicated in anticipation of a protracted war. In this case the question when and where would be the end of the war would have been a key point to decide beforehand.

The Japanese operations plan, however, never referred to this essential point and touched only upon operations against the American military bases in the Far East. Even offensive actions against Hawaii, not to speak of the mainland, was not taken into account in the plan. The reasons were that priority was given to the defensive plan and moreover that our national power could not stand such operations. Another important reason was that Japan's sole aim was to drive away the imminent threats. It was entirely unnecessary further to wage war with the United States. This was the fundamental attitude of the Japanese army in making up the year 1941's plan and had been so in the annual programs that preceded it. As to Britain the following was the measures to be worked out by 1941's plan, in case a war should break out with her: It is true that we had the idea, in case of war to capture first her military bases in the Far East, such as Singapore or Hongkong, but no concrete plans were prepared for that. *Burma,* India, Australia and other British territories were never contemplated in the plan. It was the same also with the Netherlands East Indies. The actual conditions did not

allow Japan to plan simultaneous operations against more than two countries including the United States, Britain and the Netherlands, as she has not sufficient military forces and national resources to venture such a war. On the other hand, inasmuch as it was very difficult to foresee the development of such a many-sided war it was admitted that in such a case we should have somehow to combine the separate plans originally designed as against individual nations into an over-all plan of operation. The Supreme Command, however, had of course an idea to take some political measures as far as possible not to launch such simultaneous operations.

c. The above mentioned strategy meant that we should, at the outset of war, check their attack in a passive way for a while and afterwards take an offensive and thus maintain defensive attitude. Of course, we expected that, according to the progress of operations, in some cases it might be necessary to cope with the offensive of the enemy, to give up fruitless passiveness and to turn to an effective counter attack as soon as possible.

However, in view of the insufficiency of operational preparations that could be expected within 1941, it was quite clear at the beginning of that year that not only in the earlier months but also as late as at the end of the year we would be still unable even to carry out the passive formulae of operation, not to speak of checking at once an offensive attack from some country. In this connection, detailed accounts shall be given in a later paragraph.

It was generally admitted that the preparations had to be completed only through steady and continual efforts over a long period, because of Japan's poor condition in strategic resources war funds and munitions production. It was because we had no capacity to meet the need of a crisis, if once it happened, with drastic measures on a grand scale. So the incompleteness of preparations meant complete impossibility to make operations. These facts clearly show that the plan for the year together with its preparatory programs could not meet even the requirements of the ~~defense~~ plan for 1941. (This sentence is not clear)

*defensive operational*  
d. The peacetime operations program for 1941 was drafted and decided upon by the General Staff Office as stated in the foregoing explanations, but a further study was never attempted for framing a concrete policy. No permanent army headquarters had yet come into being standing on a permanent foothold to be in charge of execution of Southern operations in case of a crisis. Even divisions necessary for the operation *had* not yet been designated.

3. Here I am going to explain some facts in relation to the drafting of peacetime operational plan for 1941.

a. The care of the peacetime operational plan for 1941 lay in the basic policy of Japan to: avoid, in view of the current state of things both within and without, any over-all war with other countries so that Japan might devote all her efforts to the solution of the China Incident; to try to bring the South Problems then pending between Japan and other countries to a prompt settlement by some means short of war; and above all to block the so-called Aid-Chiang routes of the Third Powers. These were the points which General Sugiyama Gen., Chief of the General Staff, who was in charge of command over the General Staff Office as whole and of national defense and tactics pointed out as essential to the drafting of operational plans, when he gave an instruction to me, chief of the first section (in charge of operations) as well as to Lt.-General Tsukada, Osamu, vice-chief of the General Staff Office (who was in charge of controlling general affairs and of adjusting policy and strategy).

b. Why war should be averted from strategical points of view was clear from the following circumstances: In the winter of 1941 at the drafting conference of the plan for the following year, the number of forces needed for war-time emergency was estimated by the War Ministry at forty-eight divisions in total. If they were divided into a few groups which would be dispatched each for one quarter, namely about thirty divisions for anti-Soviet defence, about ten divisions for the China operations five divisions for guarding against the United States and Britain and a few divisions in reserve for the Imperial Headquarters, there would have been no doubt big shortage of forces in every quarter. It was true especially with regard to the amount of tanks, motor-cars, communication facilities and liquid fuels. Further, in anticipation of a crisis with the United States and Britain in the future, considerable increase was required above all in the number of army corps for defensive purposes in this direction, amounting to at least a little more than ten divisions in the early period of emergency. Therefore, there should have been prepared about ten divisions for the China operations, a little more than twenty divisions for the anti-Soviet defense and a few in reserve for the Imperial Headquarters. The Chief of the General Staff recognized that, in such a case, shortage of armed forces and war materials would be much more acute and such a war would compel us to leave the China Incident completely fruitless. The chief further concluded that Japan should keep up a policy to avert a wholesale war from the viewpoints of both politics and strategy. In this respect, I understood, the War Minister also had agreed in opinion with the chief..

(c) Besides, in framing the plan, the following matters underwent special examination in an interview I had with the Vice-Chief of the General Staff in my capacity as Chief of the Operations Section of the General Staff. The question was in what the strategy of the Japanese Army would be affected by the conclusion of a Tripartite Alliance Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy. The discussion was held in November of 1940, and the result was as given below:

*Tripartite Pact*  
The general view held by the Vice-Chief was mainly that Japan should by every means avert any resort to arms in so far as the justice and fame of our nation be maintained, however imminent the compulsion of the Tripartite Pact. I agreed with him on this point. The conclusion, of course, was a result of consideration from a purely strategical point of view. The final decision whether to resort to arms or not was a matter left to our state policy. The question whether or not any of the contracting parties to the Tripartite Pact was really attacked by the United States, was a matter for future judgment which was to be decided in relation with the circumstances at that time and from a fair and independent viewpoint. We ought to keep up this attitude with a firm belief and make a due judgment in view of the whole destiny of our nation. In case Japan should be attacked from the United States, Germany would, of course, give us a military aid of some sort. However, considering the fact that Germany was then absorbed in the European wars and that her military power was never limitless and besides in view of the circumstance that Germany was not a big naval power and situated remote from East Asia and the Western Pacific, (an expected battlefield in case of a war between Japan and the United States), the Japanese Army could not expect a strategical aid from Germany. On the other hand, in case Germany should be attacked by the United States, Japan would be obliged to give aid to Germany by arms. Japan, however, could not afford to engage in military operations against the United States exclusively for the purpose of aiding Germany. On the contrary, she had to devote herself to her own independent operations in order to complete a general national defense. In case a war should break out between the United States and Germany, we should find out some measures or other to meet the circumstance. It was especially the case at that time when the Japanese Army had no surplus in armed forces.

These were the gist of the conclusion.

The Chief of the General Staff approved the above conclusion and made clear his views in agreement with the Vice-Chief that the 1941 peacetime operations plan should be designed and established from an independent viewpoint; that it should not be restricted or given any support from outside; and that it should not be influenced in strategy by the conclusion of a Tripartite Alliance Pact. The 1941 peacetime operations plan was founded upon this principle.

C. As to preparations accompanying the 1941 peacetime operations plan, I recognized that they were lacking in thoroughness, for the Southern operations (for defense) were left out of consideration in the plan and therefore these areas remained untouched or without defense.

(a) For the South, even the study prerequisite for the defense of that area was left incomplete or untouched as to organization, equipment, materials and training of forces to be employed for landing and tropical operations.

For although the most urgent and immediate need of the time was to reform the organization and equipment of a part of army forces and give them special training so that they might be used for the Southern operations against the United States and Britain as provided in the peacetime national defense plan, it could hardly be expected that

these preparations would be finished even in their crude form by the summer of 1941, if it be set about at once.

In the 1941 mobilization plan, emphasis was laid on the completion of defense in Manchuria against the Soviet by reorganizing each division so as to adapt it to operations in continental climate, especially in the cold wildernesses of North Manchuria. The organization and equipment thus prepared for the troops were entirely opposite in nature to those for the South. Particularly, transport goods to be accommodate for each division was of a great amount, and a majority of horses for transport and communication was expected to be Manchurian ponies. From this it was clear that the Japanese Army laid greater stress upon the defensive operations against the Soviet Union than upon those against the United States and Britain, even at the beginning of the period covered by the 1941 operations and mobilization plan, that is, in April 1941. As for the equipment of army airplanes, only sixty or seventy percent out of the original mobilization plan was expected to be reached before August, 1941. Among them, especially, heavy bombers which had been originally designed for defensive purposes for the Manchurian-Soviet frontier, had but a small flying range and were not well fitted for Southern operations. As stated in the above paragraph, aviation facilities on the whole were not available for Southern operations.

(b) As regards the stock of ammunitions for operational purposes, only a small amount was piled up for the Southern operations during the period between the spring and the summer of 1941. At the end of September and later in October, there was accumulated an additional amount and afterwards, until December, it reached in total barely to the amount available for some ten divisions at the most. The accumulation, however, had not been calculated in the aforesaid preparations which had been based upon 1941's peacetime operations plan, but it was carried out chiefly after the determination of national policy.

(c) As mentioned before, the preparations in the 1941 plan meant chiefly: reorganization and training of several divisions so as to fit them for the guard and defense in the South; study of tactics in the tropics; study of landing tactics; collection of information and strategical materials. They were essential matters of study for framing a peacetime national defense and were not the prerequisites for the execution of wars against the United States, Britain and Holland. Moreover, it was too late in commencement and was not rapid in progress. In addition to this, information concerning the South, particularly military conditions, weather, topography, land and marine meteorology were found incomplete and no bases were prepared for aviation, sea-transport and communication activities.

(d) In view of the actual condition as above stated as well as the expected progress of preparations within the designated year, even passive and defensive operations were hard to put into effect. Much more difficult was the plan to make a responsive attack after defensive actions or an instant counter-attack against the enemy's offensive.

We tried, however, to meet at least the minimum requirements of defensive preparations in an effort to make up for such shortages in the preparations.

There were many difficulties found in the way of execution due to the want of military funds and materials in the Army Ministry and the insufficiency of investigation by the Supreme Command. It was not before September of the year that preparations in organizing armed forces and war materials were first launched. They were to a greater extent

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applications from those originally prepared for the defense against the Soviets, or some such modifications for meeting an emergency.

III. I shall state here about the plan and preparations which were adopted after the decision on a national policy was arrived at as a result of the Imperial Conference on 2 July 1941, (Exhibit 588).

A. On 2 July, immediately after the decision of a national policy, the Chief and Vice-Chief of the General Staff gave the following explanations to the chiefs of all sections in his staff in connection with the problem of the United States and Britain, which had been fully discussed at the Conference. Above all, he stressed the need of propelling the once-fixed policy and accordingly the study and preparations for moving into South French Indo-China.

(a) The fixed principles should not be changed fundamentally as to the solution of the China Incident. We should however, strengthen pressure upon Chungking from the South and check up the routes for helping Chiang Kai-shek. While, on the other hand, if circumstances admit, we should exercise belligerent rights against Chungking and take over hostile foreign settlements into our hands. We must pay utmost vigilance to every circumstance, especially to the United States and Britain, in taking up such measures. The pressure upon Chungking from the South had to be effected also by the practical application of policies already established toward French Indo-China. It was an urgent need to dispose of the hostile foreign settlements in China, as they were presenting a great obstacle in the way of settling the China Incident. It was more desirable to solve it through diplomatic means, but, if circumstances do not admit, we should have to take them over by force through the New Central Government of China. In that case, there would be some danger of strained relations with the Anglo-Americans. Something more serious than the occupation of South French Indo-China might happen in diplomatic relations with those countries. Therefore, we must never be in haste in the solution. This was the reason why foreign settlements in China were decided to be taken over, if the case required it. Anyhow we must be ready, if the worst comes, not to evade a defensive war against the Anglo-Americans. //

(b) The Southern policy was made up generally on the basis of the once-fixed national policy and aimed at the advancement of troops into South French Indo-China. The policy especially confirmed the need of maintaining readiness for a war against the United States and Britain. Nevertheless, it did not mean Japan was determined to make a war. It only admitted that, if Japan should suffer a military interference from the United States and Great Britain in the way of executing her policy toward Siam and French Indo-China through peaceful and diplomatic means, she would never shun operations for self-defense in those areas. In that case, every effort was to be paid to avoid armed forces entering Siam. As to the real purport of the expression of "not to evade war towards Britain and America" in the above decision, it has been understood from the atmosphere of the Imperial Conference itself and the real intention of the Navy, that by them it was expected that Japan would successfully carry out her policy in peace toward French Indo-China and Siam, without causing any trouble with the Anglo-Americans, if she paid possible efforts for the cause. The expression that Japan was not afraid of war with the United States and

~~Britain meant only that we would not be in danger of stimulating a war by taking a policy toward French Indo-China; however, any interference or challenge from Anglo-Americans, if they were turned toward us, might cause an unexpected situation; thus, we should make a careful preparation for carrying out a policy toward French Indo-China and should have a firm determination to get ready for the worst. We also foresaw a future time on the side of the Army, when our defensive activities would be greatly enlarged to permit us a more careful consideration of Southern problems, as our preparations were not ready as compared with those against the Soviet Union and China. Anyhow, in view of the situation where Japan's sphere of defense was enlarged up to French Indo-China, the first step to be taken was a practical study of operations plan against the United States and Britain from various points of view.~~

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(c) The outbreak of war between Germany and the Soviet Union was making extremely pointed the relations between Japan and the Union. In addition American aid to the Soviet Union and the construction of military bases by the United States in the Soviet territory in the Far East were making the Japanese-Soviet relations more intricate and serious. In this respect, special consideration must be given in connection with the Anglo-American problems.

(d) In the conference held on 2 July, every member in attendance expressed the same desire to carry out a peaceful advancement following the international treaties as far as possible. The War Minister also disclosed his intention to do his best in order not to cause any trouble at the time of advancement, as had happened formerly in North French Indo-China last autumn. The Supreme Command, calculating on this intended to dispatch the Imperial Guard Division then stationed in South China to French Indo-China in order to complete the advancement. For this cause, we decided to make good use of the results of investigation made last June and establish and intimate cooperation and communication between the War Ministry and the Army General Staff, especially in adjusting the relations between politics and military operations.

(a) The Chief of the General Staff, who had agreed in view with the Government and the Army General Staff late in June 1941, pointed out that the aim of advancement of South French Indo-China, was both to cut the Chiang Kai-shek route formerly established there and thus to contribute to the establishment of economic autonomy of Japan. He further stressed that with this in view, we should first of all secure friendship and reliance from French Indo-China. Moreover, he stated to the following effect:

Both the Central authorities of the Army and the troops on the spot should pay full respect to the sovereignty and territorial integrity and other rights of France with an understanding that the Japanese Embassy in French Indo-China and the troops on the spot must not fail to make control and communication between themselves, and in connection with this a decisive measure for control must be taken among the stationed troops. Even common soldiers must be fully aware that every misunderstanding or disagreement should be avoided by both peoples due to the difference in manners, customs and languages of the two nations. This he emphasized at the conference for the mapping out of the advancement program.

B. I give the following as a supplement to the above statement in relations to the stationing of troops in South French Indo-China.

(a) As to the possibility of peaceful advancement into South French Indo-China, General Sugiyama, the Chief of the General Staff, clarified his view early in July that Japan did not take French Indo-China for an enemy and the advancement was not of a military occupation. He concluded that there was a favorable prospect on the side of France to admit a peaceful advance, on condition that we could convince them of the purpose of our stationing of troops, though it would not be an easy task. Early in July, it was informed that Britain might march into French Indo-China beforehand, as she was aware of our intention to make advancement there. Anxiety would prevail among us if this would cause any untoward accident at the time of our occupation. The Chief believed that our attitude, if maintained just, fair and firm, would not give rise to any trouble by the conduct of British Armies.



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(b) The invasion of Chinese Armies into North French Indo-China was at this time a matter of great concern for the Central authorities of the Army and for the dispatched forces stationed in South China and French Indo-China. Early in July, information reached us that three divisions of Chungking's Army, hitherto stationed near the border

between China and French Indo-China, received an order to enter into French Indo-China. In order to meet this situation, the first section of the General Staff made a secret study of a plan of reinforcing one regiment of infantry, if needed temporarily, and moreover even to despatch one division then stationed in Canton. On the other hand, early in 1941, the General Staff gave out information to the effect that Chinese forces amounting to four armies or about 16 divisions were stationed in face of French Indo-China, in the districts of Lungchow, Tsinghsi and Mengtze, Chinese territories adjacent to the districts of Langson and Laokay, situated at the northeast border of French Indo-China.

*advance-  
ment of  
troops  
into*

C. As already mentioned, the Chief of the General Staff asked on 2 July 1941, shortly after the Imperial Conference, to make a thorough investigation upon the strategy toward the United States and Britain. Following this, at the end of July, when the occupation of South French Indo-China was put into operation, the Vice-Chief of the General Staff and the Chief of the first section were urged by the Chief of the General Staff for the promotion of the study. The results of the investigation at that time were like below:

(a) The preparations generally required at the time, were put into practice within the limits of the already-fixed plan established early in the year. They were: -- studies in various fields of operations, studies of defensive plans to meet a critical situation on the basis of the peacetime annual plan; and new investigations and preparations for the defense of French Indo-China on the principle of Franco-Japanese Mutual Defense Agreement.

Detailed accounts of preparations were made also within the scope of the established policy including the promotion of training, equipments, supplies and sanitation. It was an urgent need to make up for the loss suffered in the operations in China.

(b) The decision of national policy reached on 2 July and its consequent result, the Franco-Japanese military cooperation for the mutual defense of French Indo-China, had its aim in the protection of that area from the United States and Britain. The matter had never been imagined in the past annual operations plans. It was a new theme claiming a totally different study and preparations on the part of the General Staff. Our armed forces stationed in French Indo-China after the occupation of the Southern part of that area amounted to one brigade and one flying corps (two companies) for North French Indo-China and one division (in order not to interfere with the Japanese-American diplomatic negotiations, no forces except the airdrome engineers corps were stationed there in addition to the above one division) were assigned for the defense of French Indo-China from the threat of invasion by the United States, Britain and De Gaulle regime or the invasion or other aggressions by the Chinese forces. The General Staff, not going farther beyond the limit of an informal study on the reinforcement of units which had been reserved for crisis in China and Formosa, left further measures to the Army on the spot. While, construction of air bases and installation of communication facilities were going on according to the provisions of official agreement reached between Japan and France, other measures were also taken into consideration as shown in the above statement.

(c) It was likely that Japanese operational measures for self-defense against the United States and Britain which might follow the mutual defense agreement with French Indo-China or other similar circumstances, would naturally cover the main areas (such as Malay, the Philippines), and would develop into military operations necessary for defending the Japanese homeland. Therefore, it became a pressing need to propel a further study in the operational plan in anticipation of a future situation. The Chief of the General Staff then requested the Vice-Chief and the Chief of the First Section to promote the study on the plan,

including the study of operations in the tropics, on the sea, in the air and of landing in areas such as the Philippines, Malay, Java, Sumatra, Borneo, Bismark Islands, Guam, etc. Likewise, the Chief of the Second Section was asked to collect informations and materials on military affairs in the South and the Chief of the Third Section was given an instruction to speed up a study on the war materials for ocean and landing operations.

IV. I shall now explain matters in connection with the operations plan and preparations after the decision on national policy made as a result of the Imperial Conference on 6 September 1941. (EXHIBIT 588)

A. In early September 1941 the Chief of the Army General Staff at a meeting attended by the Vice Chief of Staff and chiefs of departments explained the items in the above-mentioned national policy which related to the United States and Great Britain, the gist being as follows:

In short, it was a request for reconsideration of the operations plan and the furtherance of or the making of a new start in the operational preparations in order to cope with the situation.

1. The national policy decided on 6 September reflects a strong consciousness of the critical importance of national defense. In other words, the question of how to cope with the present critical situation, especially the offensive actions of the United States, Britain and the Netherlands toward Japan and of how to cope with the reality of the daily diminishing resilience of our national strength in the face of the Anglo-American freezing of our assets, especially the embargo on oil, the complete loss of which is now but a matter of time -- how to cope with this critically grave situation and how to save the fate of the nation -- these are questions

which our country must answer. In order to solve these questions and in crying need as our country is of measures to surmount the difficulties, even in the event of our falling into the worst possible situation, it has been decided to pursue our diplomacy in all seriousness on the two-fold policy of diplomacy and war preparations with an attitude of making efforts for peace, but ready to fight if peace fails. This is what the national policy decision provides for. For this purpose it was decided that, while seeking the attainment of the objectives of the negotiations with a time limit on the one hand, completion of war preparations with a time limit shall be made with a resolve to meet possible eventualities when war against the United States (Great Britain and the Netherlands) is unavoidable from the standpoint of self-preservation and self-defense. The nation's position on peace or war is to be decided in the early part of October (1941). These are the matters the aforementioned national policy decision provides for. In short, the decision on national policy both in name and in fact is not a decision resolving on war, but a decision whose object is to bring about a new turn in the situation through diplomacy. The hastening of defensive war preparations is directed against the offensive actions of the Powers against Japan with a will and <sup>not to load war</sup> resolve to fight in case war cannot be averted.

It should be emphasized that the primary principal of the decision is to attain our objective through diplomacy.

2. In comparing the decision of 2 July and that of 6 September there are differences in the fundamental points.

(a) With respect to what might be the cause for conflict between Japan and the United States and Great Britain the earlier decision was limited to the problem of Siam and French Indo-China, especially the latter, where as the later decision reflects the fact that the area and actuality of friction between Japan and the United States and Great Britain have become greatly enlarged and far more serious as a result of the American-British-Dutch offensive against Japan, the embargo and the situation with regard to the resilience of Japanese national strength. In other words, Japan was to demand by sheer force of circumstances that the United States and Great Britain refrain from interfering in and obstructing the solution of China Incident, and from threatening Japan's national defense, and offer their cooperation in acquiring raw materials. She further was to demand of the United States and Great Britain recognition of the special relations between Japan and French Indo-China, the non-establishment of military interests in ~~the territories of~~ Siam, the Netherland East Indies, China and the Soviet Far East, and confirmation that there will be no military reinforcements in the Far East. Moreover, the later decision also provided that Japan naturally would agree to concessions to a considerable degree in return for the foregoing demands.

(b) Should by any chance military operations be undertaken under the earlier decision, the objective was to carry out measures concerning French Indo-China, while in the later case, the nation's self-preservation and self-defense would be the motive.

(c) Whereas the former decision considered French Indo-China as essentially the center of the area of operations, the area of operations under the latter would expand widely.

(d) Accordingly, it is only natural that there should be differences in the strategical concept.

(e) The situation regarding the strategic material, oil is ~~great change~~ completely different from what it was at the time of the July decision. Now the much feared danger signal that our national defense would be rendered powerless can be seen in this single item. (~~See IV~~ Refer to IV, F).

3. As this decision on national policy is a demand for acceleration of operational preparations directed toward the South, the General Staff is required urgently to complete the actual plan on an overall basis. In connection with operational preparations the fixed annual peacetime plan and the supplementation made after 2 July, shall be further accelerated and perfected. In addition necessary operational preparations shall be begun anew. The Supreme Command feels especially the need for a deep reconsideration of the fact

that the annual plan for the year 1941 is insufficient, incomplete and impractical and the accompanying preparations for defense betrays weakness and lack of thoroughness, In view of the situation, the chief of the General Staff have given directions to the Vice-Chief and the chief of the First Division on the following matter as an operational formula to be newly adopted. It is, in substance, that the national policy decision of 6 September is an order for the completion of operational preparations on a general scale regardless of whether or not they are offensive or defensive in nature. As the first operational formula to be adopted, Japan shall in the early stage counter passively the attacks of the American, British and Dutch forces singly or severally and then after completing operational preparations turn to the offensive to secure the defense of our land. In such a case we must recognize that we cannot avoid carrying out continuously operations necessary for our self-preservation and defense, and preparations toward this end shall be completed. As to the second operational formula, although we shall counter the attacks of the opposing party, we shall without falling into a defensive position undertake repulsive actions by counter-attacking from the very outset and then carry out the strategy indicated in the first formula, as to which of the above two we should rely on or whether other plans



(such as special defense in some particular spot) should be adopted, the choice would naturally be determined by the situation within and without our country at the time of the commencement of hostilities and the degree of completion of our national policy in meeting that situation as well as the state of our military and naval preparations. At such a time the various conditions surrounding the navy would have a decisive importance. As for the army Supreme Command, it was directed that whatever may be the circumstances, the army's objective was to carry out operations which, if possible would immediately repulse the opposition's initial attack and that various studies and preparations be carried forward with this in view.

4. Although the formula of operations to be adopted and the aim of preparations to be ~~advance~~ <sup>attained</sup> are, as stated above, there is no alternative at present than to undertake defensive operations at first. In other words, while on the one hand we must undertake to perfect all emergency measures in planning and preparing our strategy of defense, we must, on the other as operational preparations are gradually pushed to completion make it our principle to plan and prepare urgent matters in an orderly manner so that there will be no miscarriage in the execution of our defensive or offensive strategy which ever it may be. This, from this day on ward, has become the important subject of study especially of the

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Supreme Command. At the same time, the possibility of ~~initial~~ an initial attack by the opposition before the completion of Japanese preparations by the latter part of October, is a matter worthy of deep caution and prudent consideration on the part of the operation authorities.

B. About the middle of September, the General Staff decided upon a plan of defensive strategy to be adopted for the time being in the South, based upon the September national policy decision and prepared according to the following mental attitude:

1. The defensive strategy for the South to be taken by the Japanese army shall vary according to the stage of progress of operational preparations, but on the whole, it shall be on a very small scale. In the final analysis its primary object will be the defense of French Indo-China itself from the attack of the opposition. From the actual state of our present operational preparations we cannot engage in operations in other areas in the Southern region. Hence, in such an event grave difficulties would arise in the defense of Japanese territory and protection of our marine transportation.

2. As such operations as the foregoing amounts to a great failure from the standpoint of national defense, we should quickly abandon such a passive and harmful operational formula and turn from a purely defensive position to a passive offensive. This requires speedy progress in our operational preparations such as would permit a change over to emergency operational command for our self-preservation and defense.

3. In case such operations are unavoidably given rise to, much

against our wishes, the principle of operational command and other methods as are deemed proper shall be established in accordance with the actual state of progress of operational preparations. In this connection, no directions in advance are deemed necessary to be given to the forces on the spot (forces stationed in French Indo-china). This is regarded as disadvantageous to us.

C. Since about this time, <sup>(e.g. middle Sep 1941)</sup> the General Staff, was constantly apprehensive lest there be a possible attack initiated by the United States and Great Britain, considered it highly necessary to prepare fully against it. Hence there was great concern in our defensive operational command in this period when preparations for operations in the South were incomplete. On 6 November, 1941, the Imperial Headquarters sent to the Supreme Commander of the Southern Army an order to prepare for the capture of strategic points in the Southern Region.

This order permitted him, in the event of an initial attack by the armed forces of the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands or one of them, to meet the attack with the forces under his command for purposes of self-defense. In an order issued on 1, December, 1941 the Imperial Headquarters directed that in the event of a serious initial Anglo-American attack the Supreme Commander shall, in cooperation with the navy, commence

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offensive <sup>(go ahead)</sup> ~~(occupational)~~ operations at a proper time. As can  
thus be seen, these orders were issued out of a deep concern  
over a possible initial attack by the United States and Great  
Britain. There were also grave apprehensions over a possible  
British invasion of Siam. //

D. The state of operational preparations about the middle of September was generally as follows: In connection with the preparations both under the jurisdiction of the War Ministry and the joint jurisdiction of the Ministry and <sup>High Command</sup> ~~its sub-divisions~~ all matters were vigorously advanced through cooperation between them, but delay could not be avoided. This was principally due to lack of materials and shipping.

1. Although it was the plan of the General Staff gradually to release units of the 5th and 18th divisions from the China operations for employment in the French Indo-China area, their education, training and equipment having recovered to some extent about this time to enable them to engage in operations, yet their recovery and perfection, especially preparations which would accord with the requirements of operations in the South were far from sufficient. (These divisions were at first being concentrated for return to Japan and demobilization, but in view of the situation in the South, Their return Home was called off and they were made to stand by in China.)

These divisions had been on duty maintaining public peace and safety in China (near Shanghai and Canton). In addition, they were primarily engaged in military training. Even in case an incident with the United States and Great Britain should suddenly occur and these divisions are dispatched to cope with it, they would require nearly two months before they could actually engage in defensive actions, the time being necessary to complete concentration, transportation and other various preparations.

In addition, to the above, several more divisions engaged in the China operations were scheduled to be transferred to the Southern operations in accordance with future requirements, as well as three additional divisions in Japan proper and Formosa.

2. Ammunition for the Southern operations for approximately 10 divisions to engage in battle was scheduled to be stocked up in Formosa and French Indo-China and it was planned that as a part of the scheme the first stock pile be created in Formosa about the end of September, but its execution was extremely doubtful because of the shortage of shipping. Conditions were such that even if all difficulties were overcome in transporting and accumulating the entire stock, the accumulation could not be completed until the end of December. The ammunition to be stocked up was for general operations and not as equipment for the forces. My subordinates were able to learn of the above from their contacts with the various bureaus of the War Ministry which were concerned with these matters. Moreover, about this time the Standard amount of ammunition to be used for the Southern operations was considered to be one and one-half times the general standard and it was on this standard that the basis for the stock-piling of ammunition was set up.

3. After the middle of September, 1941, a part of our forces was despatched to the South from Manchuria and the Japanese Homeland. The newly despatched forces were: One division a tank regiment an independent anti-tank unit, air force ground crews, signal corps, and

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supply forces for South China, a tank corps headquarters, a tank regiment, an independent anti-tank-unit, an air corps, artillery corps, signal corps, and supply forces for Formosa; and an independent mixed regiment, air force ground crews and supply forces for French Indo-China.



4. Since about this time, aviation and shipping installations were being reinforced or newly created in <sup>Formosa</sup> French Indo-China and South China; supply bases were being established in South China, Formosa and French Indo-China; the requisitioning of shipping and the ~~camouflaging and arming~~ <sup>fitting out and equipping</sup> of ships were begun or their effectuation being facilitated; and necessary training of army corps and air forces intended for use in the operations was being accelerated.

E. In the meantime, I learned from the Replenishment Bureau of the War Ministry about the actual situation relative to preparations pertaining to liquid fuels, the gist being as follows:

Assuming that Japan would continue the China Incident through 1941 and 1942 generally under the international situation now prevailing, her holdings of aviation gasoline and heavy oil in 1943 after deducting the amount expected to be consumed in these two years would be extremely small and sufficient to meet the requirements of no more than one year of military operations. The reserve of heavy oil especially is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the Navy to conduct decisive operations for no more than half a year. The foregoing estimates are based on the total reserves within Japan. Furthermore domestically produced crude oil, synthetic crude oil, alcohol etc., are far from sufficient to have any effect on the general situation, while with respect to synthetic oil there was no prospect of obtaining them in great volume. In other words if the present conditions remained unchanged during the two years, it was clear that our defensive strength would

diminish as a matter of ~~course~~ to a state of complete powerlessness..

F. In the Army department of the Imperial Headquarters an overall operation plan against the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands was being formulated on the basis of past studies, experience and collected data, but the chief of the General Staff conceived of the plan of operations to capture strategic points in the Southern Region in order to establish Japan's position of self preservation and defense by breaking through and severing the ABCD encirclement immediately in the event Japan is provoked and challenged after the early part of October 1941 and on this basis issued directions for the formulation and study of initial operations against the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands. This draft plan obtained the approval of the General Staff late in October, and in the middle of November, was definitely established as a plan both in name and in fact. The foregoing does not mean, however, that the Japanese army, had after the early part of October, the intention to capture key points in the Southern Region or that there was such a possibility. It merely indicated the course of development of the study of plans of operation. At the same time, it was but a natural expression to cope with the situation caused by extreme difficulty of adjusting Japanese-American relations and the strengthening of the encirclement of Japan in East Asia. Moreover, it was but a result of a study of means by which to meet a situation in which Japan might be compelled unavoidably

to act for her self defense even at the risk of throwing herself into the very jaws of death.

G. The preparations started on the basis of decision of 6 September, 1941, were to be suspended, in the event peace was decided as the national policy on the occasion for the decision for peace or war which was scheduled to be made in early October. If, on the contrary, a decision for war was adopted at that time, formal preparations were to be vigorously pushed forward and completed by the end of the same month. However, the preparations actually did not progress as rapidly as had been expected. This was because the decision for peace or war as a national policy had not been made on early October as scheduled and a period of indecision continued until the advent of the TOJO Cabinet in the middle of October. Then from shortly after the formation of the TOJO Cabinet until early in November, Japan's policy vis a vis the United States and Great Britain had been returned to a clean slate. Meanwhile operational preparations in this period were unavoidably slowed down or their effectuation held in obedience. In this period the mobilization of troops, the requisitioning of shipping, and the establishment of military bases were greatly retarded. However, as I will state, later, operational preparations proceeded on a full scale after the Liaison Conference in early November indicated the outline of national policy.

H. Japanese foreign policy and operational preparations based upon the decision made as a result of the Imperial Conference on 6 September, 1941, were coordinated according to the following consideration:

1. On the day before the Imperial Conference on 6 September, a complete mutual agreement was reached between the Prime Minister and the Army and Navy chiefs of the Supreme Command on the point that the first principle of the National policy decision was to obtain Japan's objectives through diplomatic negotiations and therefore from the theoretical standpoint Clause Two of the decision should come before Clause One and that war was not desired but was to be resorted to only if absolutely unavoidable, that the essence of the decision lied in diplomatic negotiations.

2. Full consideration should be paid in the carrying out of preparations so as not to hinder the diplomatic negotiation. With this in view the armed forces to be sent into South French Indo-China in addition to those already stationed there should be limited only to ground crews of the air force.

3. Necessary mobilization to follow the decision on national policy of 6 September was, even after it was put into effect, to be suspended, if the diplomatic negotiations made a turn for the better. The foregoing items, 1 and 2, were to be decided by the consultation between the chief of the General Staff and the War Minister.

4. All operational preparations were <sup>to</sup> be carried <sup>out</sup> ~~made~~ on the principle that it will not to impede or obstruct the diplomatic negotiations.

V. I shall now speak of matters relating to the operational plan and preparations after the adoption of Proposals A and B, vis a vis, the United States reached after the Imperial Conference of 5 November, 1941.

A. The explanations made by the Chief and Vice Chief of the Army General Staff on the same day, 5 November 1941, to the chiefs of various divisions of the General Staff Office, were in substance as follows:

At the Liaison Conferences held daily from the latter part of October to the early part of November, prior to the decision of 5 November, it was recognized that the relations between Japan and the United States were at last approaching the final stage where a choice had to be made between peace or war, but it was agreed that efforts will be continued to effect a diplomatic settlement while maintaining, as heretofore, the two-fold policy of diplomacy and war preparations as a means of tiding over the critical situation. However, there was a time limit on both the diplomatic steps and war preparations. Operational preparations were to be carried forward with the resolve that if a settlement could not be reached through diplomatic negotiations, then an appeal to arms would be made as a last resort and preparations hereafter were to be on a full scale. The decision was explained as being the same as that of 6 September in that a resolution for war was not made. With regard to when operational preparations should be completed, the Chief of Staff on this same occasion, expressed the view that that goal should be set for the end of November or beginning of December.

B. With the intensification of a crisis in the relations between the two countries, full scale preparations were launched after 5 November on the two-fold principle of diplomacy and preparations with the intention to leave no stone unturned in the consideration of measures with which to cope with the worst eventuality. I am familiar with these matters as they were in my line of duty and their gist is as follows:

(1) In addition to the vigorous advancement of the preparations, which were hitherto being made, mobilization and deployment of troops, requisitioning of ships and the establishment of military bases were carried out with the utmost effort. The Army's operational preparations for the initial phase of operations were being completed with the end of November as the goal.

(2) The overall plan of operations of the Army Department of the Imperial Headquarters against the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands were under study and discussion parallel with the government's diplomatic efforts. It was late in October that it became a final plan and it was formally adopted both in name and in fact in the middle of November (about the 15th). (See C below). The establishment of the plan of operations for the General Army for the Southern Region and other armies under it in the field took place later.

(3) The organization of operational armies, namely, the order of battle of the Southern Army and the order pertaining to important personnel including the Supreme Commander of the Southern Army and others under him were issued on 6 November, and on the same day an Imperial Headquarters order concerning the operational preparations of the Southern Army was transmitted. The gist was that the Supreme Commander shall prepare for the capture of key areas in the South from bases in French Indo-China,

I am familiar with these matters as they were in my line of duty and their gist is as follows:

(1) In addition to the vigorous advancement of the preparations, which were hitherto being made, mobilization and deployment of troops, requisitioning of ships and the establishment

South China, Formosa and the Southwest Pacific Islands, employing his main forces and in cooperation with the Navy. In case he is attacked by American, British and Dutch forces, he is empowered to meet the attack with the forces under his command.

(4) On 8 November, in Tokyo, an agreement for joint operations was made between the Headquarters of the Southern General Army and the combined fleet.

(5) On 15 November the Imperial Headquarters notified the Supreme Commander of the Southern Army of the outline to be followed in the operations to capture and occupy key areas in the South. The areas to be captured and occupied were the Philippine Islands, British Malaya, the Dutch East Indies and a part of southern Burma. It was further directed that the stability of Siam and French Indo-China be maintained with all possible effort.

(6) It was after 5 November that operational army corps to serve under the Southern General Army left for their areas of service from Japan, China, and Formosa. These army corps were to be returned home at any time, when the negotiations between Japan and the United States reached a settlement. In this connection, the Chief of the Army General Staff gave direct instructions to Gen. TERAUCHI, the Supreme Commander of the Southern Army, and the latter readily acknowledged it.

(7) As to the supply, the necessary preparations were generally nearing completion after the middle of November.

(8) All the full scale war preparations stated above were not the result of a decision for war. Hence, if the Japanese-American negotiations were successfully consummated, all the preparations were to be halted and returned to a clean slate. In this respect there was a complete agreement between the General Staff and the War Ministry as well as the Naval Supreme Command. The suspension of preparations was a matter of considerable difficulty and required coolness and boldness of will and speedy and organized handling of business relating thereto. At that time the Chief of the General Staff was full of confidence in this respect.

C. Although both the original and copies of the operational plan for the Southern Region which was established in the middle of November, 1941, were destroyed by fire, the general outline thereof which I retain in my memory is as follows:

may 94 (1) The outline of the plan is given in paragraph 1 and onward, but it is to be borne in mind that it was to be abandoned if the diplomatic negotiations reached a settlement before the outbreak of war.

(2) The areas of operations in the South were to be the Philippine Islands, Guam, Hong-kong, British Malaya, Burma, Java, Sumatra, Borneo, Celebes, the Bismark Islands and Dutch Timor.

(3) Operations were to be commenced simultaneously against the Philippines and British Malaya through close cooperation between the Army and Navy and completed in the shortest possible time.

(4) Armed forces to be employed in the operations were to consist of 11 divisions, 9 tank regiments, 2 aviation corps and other units under the army's direct command. The division of these forces into army corps and their areas of assignment were scheduled as follows:

The 14th Army of the Southern Army, consisting of two divisions as its mainstay and assigned to the Philippines area; the 15th Army,

consisting of two divisions was assigned to maintain stability in Siam and operations in Burma; the 16th Army, consisting of three divisions (of which two divisions were to be transferred after the end of other operations) were assigned to the Netherlands Indies area; the 25th Army, consisting of four divisions, was assigned to engage in operations against Malaya and Singapore; the air force was to consist of two air corps as its mainstay; the 23rd Army under the command of the China Expeditionary Forces, was assigned to operations in the Hong-Kong area, with one division as its mainstay; detachments in the Southern sea area under the directed command of the Imperial Headquarters were to consist of three infantry battalions as their mainstay and assigned to operations against Guam, the Bismark Islands, etc., and another division was to be assigned to maintain stability in French Indo-China.

(5) The date for the commencement of operations was to be fixed after the decision for war was made. As set forth above, the operational plan and preparations of the Japanese Army varied in the scale of their objective, the degree of precision and their strength in accordance with the relaxation or intensification of the international situation and the demands of defense during the period between spring and early winter in 1941. In every case it was a stipulation of operational technique and naturally not a war plan. Moreover the Japanese Supreme Command had nothing which can be called a war program in time of peace. The same was the case with the Japanese Government. This concludes my testimony.

On this 16th day of May, 1947, at IMTFE.

DEPONENT                      TANAKA, Shinichi (seal)

I, KIYOSE, Ichiro, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date - At Tokyo.

Witness: (signed) KIYOSE, Ichiro (seal)

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, MIYAMA, Yozo, who occupy the post of The Chief of Archives Section, 1st Demobilization Office, Demobilization Bureau, hereby certify that the following 4 documents ~~were~~ burnt at the termination of War and that they are in the custody of 1st Demobilization Office Documents are as follows:

The plan of Imperial Military Operation of 16th year of Showa. (1941)

The command concerning, "Preparation for attack on Important Southern Regions" which was issued by the Imperial Headquarters Supreme Commander of the Southern Area Army, on the 6th of November 16th year of Showa (1941)

Operational order concerning "Attack on Important Southern Regions with holding plan of Attack" which was issued by the Imperial Headquarters to the Supreme Commander of the Southern Area Army, on the 15th of November 16th year of Showa (1941).

Imperial Headquarter order concerning opening of hostility, on the 1st of December, 16th year of Showa (1941).

Certified at Tokyo

on the 25 day of July, 1947.

MIYAMA, Yozo  
Chief of the Archives Section,  
the 1st Demobilization Bureau.

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

at the same place,

on the same date

Witness:

KIYOSE, Ichiro

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ERRATA SHEET

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TANAKA, SHINICHI

<u>PAGE</u>	<u>LINE</u>	
2	✓ 3rd line fr. bottom	Add "Burma" before "India"
3	✓ 9th line fr. bottom	change "defense plan" into "defensive operational plan; strike out (This sentence is not clear)
3	✓ last line	insert "had" between operation and not.
9	✓ 14	Change "occupation of" to "advancement of troops into"
12	✓ last line	Change "resolve to fight" to "not to evade war".
11	✓ end of first paragraph	insert (Exhibit 588)
13	✓ 6th line fr. bottom	delete "the territories of"
14	✓ 11-12	"material oil is great change completely different" shall read "strategic material, oil is completely different"
16	✓ Para #4 line 2	delete "advance" add "attained"
14	✓ 15	"Lee IV" should be stricken out.
15	✓ 9	Change "complition" to completion"
17	✓ 1st line	delete "initial"
18	✓ 6	change "very" to "vary"
20	✓ 1st	change "(occupational)" to "go ahead"
21	✓ 4th	change "its Sub-divisions" to "High Command"
22	✓ 7th fr. bottom	change "fine" to "time"
24	✓ 2nd	insert after "in" "Formosa"
24	✓ 5	change "camouflaging and arriving" to "fitting out and equipping"
25	✓ 7	change "selfs" to "self"
27	✓ 2nd fr. bottom	insert after "were" "to" and delete "made" and insert "out"

PAGE   LINE

29      3

change "attached" to "attacked"

PAGE   LINE

29      3

change "attached" to "attacked"

Donaka Shunichi 1661

I Operational Plans. 1940 for 1941

pp 1-6

II Glass factory, Inf. Conf. 4

2 July 1941

pp 7-8

Operations in French Indo. China  
might lead to necessity of defense  
war v. U.S. & Great Br. (7A)

III Strategy v. U.S. - started after  
Inf. Conference 2 July 1941 -  
pp 9-10

IV Plans after <sup>my</sup> confers 6 Sept  
CX 588 p 11 -

It was not a decision to fight  
(see p 12) but a decision "not to  
evade war" in case war cannot  
be ~~avoided~~ <sup>averted</sup>.

compares decisions of 2 July  
with 6 Sept.  
talks include Boulder Field

ff 13-14

air needed. 7.14

operational Plan ~~etc~~  
Conference 5 Nov 1941

ff 28 -

Page

DIRECT EXAMINATION OF TANAKA, SHINICHI.

23302 \* The witness stated that he lived in Mie Pre-  
23303 fecture. \* He identified exhibit No. 2676 as his affi-  
davit and verified it. The affidavit stated that the  
witness was chief of the First Operations Department in  
23304 the General Staff from October 12, 1940, to December 7,  
1942. \* In accordance with the custom, the Army's plan  
of operations against the Soviet for 1941 was formed in  
the winter of 1940, and technically prescribed the opera-  
tions necessary to defeat Japan, Manchuria, and Korea, and  
the basic principle consisted in shifting from a protracted  
defensive to the offensive. In the beginning of November,  
1941, SUGIYAMA, Chief of Staff responsible for national  
defense and tactics, indicated to the Vice Chief and the  
witness that in drawing up and deliberating on operations  
plans against the Soviet, they should adhere strictly to  
23305 the national policy established in regard to \* adjusting  
Russo-Japanese diplomatic relations and the policy shown  
to the Kwantung Army in August 1940; that is, the basic  
policy of reserving a part of the army against Soviet  
attack and to maintain peace in the north. The witness  
was informed by SUGIYAMA that he and the War Minister had  
reached complete agreement on the fundamental principle.

23306 The Intelligence Division came to the conclusion  
that in the winter of 1941 the Kwantung Army had ten  
divisions and 500 planes, as against 30 Russian Sharp-  
shooter Divisions in the Far East, and 2500 planes, which  
was the main strength of the Soviet Army in the Far East.  
If the two Japanese divisions in Korea and the four Russian  
divisions \* in the Siberian military district were added,  
Japan would have twelve divisions against 34 for the Soviet.  
Usually the Soviet had aimed at maintaining three times  
the strength of the Kwantung Army, but the growing number  
of airplanes and tanks tended to increase the fighting  
power of her strength against Japan, and the Russian  
strength was judged to be about 50 divisions.

With the progress of the various five year plans  
Soviet preparation for mobilization, concentration, and  
engagement in war increased the speed of its effectuation,  
and would have been completed, it was believed, in three or  
four months. Japan had to take precautions, because even  
in peace the Soviet Army of the Far East had adopted a  
quasi-wartime organization and more than 100 long-range  
bombers were in a position to raid Tokyo and other areas.

Page

23306

23307

Of the total mobilized strength of the Soviet Union, there were 150 sharpshooter divisions, of which 50 \* were in the Far East. Even in the cast of a two front war, let alone a one front one in the Far East, it had to be considered that more strength would be available to the Soviet in the Far East. Russia was also in a more advantageous position in regard to supply of strength after hostilities opened. In addition to 4500 first-line planes she had 2,000 second-line ones instantly available as first-line craft. Judging from the fact that in the Russo-Finnish war in 1939 Russia carried on operations on a line of communications over 200 kilometres in 50 degrees below zero, and in view of the efficiency of her supply at Nomonhan, they could not make light of the Soviet capacity to supply.

23308

The total Japanese war-time strength for 1941, approved by the War Ministry, consisted of 48 divisions, and if its employment in war-time was estimated at about 30 divisions against Russia, ten in China, and about five against Anglo-Americans and a few in reserve, it was evident that there would be considerable shortage \* in every quarter, especially with respect to aircraft, tanks, rear services and liquid fuel. With only 30 divisions it would be difficult for Japan to take the offensive and overcome the Soviet Army, which it was estimated would reach 50 divisions at the beginning. After consultation and investigations with the War Ministry on the relative rapidity of concentrating forces and the capacity for production and supply, it was concluded that Japan was in a more difficult position to take the initiative.

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If relations with the U. S. and Britain grew more strained, they would have to estimate more than ten divisions against these powers, about ten for China, more than 20 against Russia, and a few for reserve, and it was feared in such a case there would be little hope for Japan to succeed in a protracted defensive struggle. The strategic danger from this wide disparity in numerical strength between Japan and Russia \* was aggravated by the fact that a basic defense organization against the Soviet had not been established because of lack of peacetime strength of the Kwantung Army. These circumstances suggested that even if Japan carried out operations most favorably she would come to a standstill strategically and would be at a loss to end the war. \* This was the result of First Department investigations.

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Immediately before assuming office, SUGIYAMA, who had inspected Manchuria in the autumn of 1940, reported that even on the eastern borders, to which the Kwantung Army attached greatest importance, strength of the divisions was so weak that only about 60 soldiers of each company were available for emergency, to say nothing of division shortage. Though fortifications had been completed in the front, there was no vertical depth on the second and third lines, and if an emergency arose these lines would easily be broken. The division commanders on the spot had stated that in the early stages it would be most difficult to resist Russian attacks for three months, and impossible to do so for more than four. There were many defects, especially in the air force.

23311

The Chief of Staff \* approved the results of these investigations, and concluded that the policy of totally avoiding war be adhered to from a strategic standpoint, since should a war break out Japan's shortage of fighting power not only endangered the operations, but would force Japan to leave the China Incident unsettled. Further, if the U. S. and Britain should become involved there would be little or no hope of success for Japan, particularly with respect to air forces. They therefore decided that Japan should adhere to strategically avoiding war totally. On this point the witness thought the Chief was in complete agreement with the War Minister.

23312

The witness approved the conclusion of the First Section, that the Kwantung Army with forces at the most 60 to 70% of Russian forces, would be obliged to employ defensive strategy in the early periods. The details were, the troop strength \* relationship, and the fact that concentration and transportation of forces and materials would compel Japan definitely to adopt a defensive strategy; to secure a troop strength of 30 wartime divisions Japan would be required to transport 20 from Japan and China to reinforce the ten in Manchuria, although the forces to be drawn were actually engaged in China operations. In other words, 70% of Japanese wartime strength against Russia and war material needed rapid increase in transportation, even if circumstances were most favorable and railway and shipping were orderly and smoothly, it would take about 140 days for mobilization to complete the whole strength of the Kwantung Army. Even if they hurried it would take 120 days to change to the offensive and begin on the eastern border area.

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They therefore took the indisputable conclusion \* that the Soviet would take the initiative in starting the offensive during this period. The Kwantung Army was therefore obliged to take as the basis of its operational plan that it adopt a passive strategy at the beginning, check the Russians for a long time by a delaying type of defense, make every effort to speed preparations for battle, and shift to the offense in the east about the fifth month after the outbreak.

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In taking this decision, they did not consider the practical claims of the Kwantung Army that there would be one or two months preparation for battle after concentration of forces. According to the judgement of the Second Section, it would take a longer time for the Kwantung Army to complete preparations for beginning the attack if they took into account the Soviet well-developed intelligence net, the real conditions of peace in Manchuria and the existence of superior Russian air forces \* which could destroy transportation. Furthermore, the Russian forces in the Far East retained a high standard of organization in ordinary times, and were far superior in speed of concentration. It was clearly indicated that Japan would face a prepared attack from Russia with her operations unprepared, irrespective of whether it was to the west, east, or north. They had to pay serious attention to the inevitability and intenseness of early air-raids on Japan and Manchuria. They reached the conclusion that it would take a much longer time than the planned estimate to transport Japanese forces, and that this period would constitute a grave crisis in operations against Russia.

23315

According to the First Section investigations, the Kwantung Army should shift to an offensive following delaying defense in the early period, and should especially in the eastern area sweep and destroy \* the long-range bomber bases in the southern Maritime Province to complete the defense of Japan. This was a minimum from the defense standpoint, and explains why Japan must take the offensive without falling into mere defense compelling it to stay on the borders for a long time. As the war situation developed, she should open an offensive movement on other borders to complete her defense and to carry out operations needed to end the war.



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In the eastern border areas the offensive would require about two months after changing over to the attack. During that time Japanese forces would check Russia's attack in the north while in the west they would withdraw if necessary to the line of the Great Hsingan Mountains to obtain time. With the completion of organization of a passive offensive in the east, they would again attack in the northern area of Blagoveschensk. A strength of ten divisions of ground forces and the main strength of the air forces \* had to be transferred from the eastern to the northern front after the seventh or eighth month of hostilities. According to the investigations made with the transportation and communication section, the transfer of forces to the north would take about three months under most favorable conditions. It was therefore figured that the concentration for an attack in the north would continue until the end of the tenth or 11th month. The success and completion of concentration would be greatly influenced by the war situation and extent of Russian air-raids. The most important problem was preparing munitions for the attack in the north. After consultation with the War Ministry in August 1941, the program was to prepare and store munitions for two battles of eight months each in Manchuria, but it was felt it would be exhausted by the seventh month after beginning when the battle in the eastern area occurred.

23317

The ammunition for transition to the attack in the north had to depend on new production after hostilities began. \* The preparation of ammunition for a total of 60 divisions, that is, two battles for 20 divisions in the north and west, and one for one battle for other forces in Kwantung, would require seventeen months even if extreme economy was practised. The attack on the north would be decisively curbed by this, and production and supply of ordinance other than munition would be a circumstance postponing the attack.

23318

In the north Japan would face a Russian begun attack from the beginning, and would not take an offensive for at least a year. During the interim there would be many changes. The conclusion was that the realization of attack in the north was very doubtful. The chief and vice-chief of staff approved these conditions and ordered that they form the basis of annual operations plans. They were asked to investigate a policy to speed up the time of shifting to the attack in the east and not to weaken the aggressive \* spirit of the Kwantung Army in the early delaying type of defensive operations.

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The Chief further asked that all plans should be based on the fact that operations in the Far East should be considered overseas ones to Russia, compared to colonial operations. As to Japan, they were interior operations around her very heart. According to his own inspections, defensive operations at the spot were serious and required the strengthening of the guard organization of the Kwantung Army. He therefore indicated that the system of 16 divisions in Manchuria required to be realized. This had to have the consent of the War Ministry, and the Ministry had to get the government's consent to the outline of materials and expenditure. It having connections with diplomacy, they were asked to continue investigations therefore.

23319 In forming operational plans for 1941, the Tripartite Pact had no influence. Both the Chief and \* the Vice Chief held the view that the Pact neither contributed to nor influenced the operations plans of 1941. If a war with Russia broke out, Japan would not expect operational assistance from Germany and Italy, and did not feel obligated to help them in case of war with Russia. No one then dreamed of a Russo-German war breaking out.

23320 Immediately after the outbreak of the China Incident on August 1937, the Russo-Chinese Non-Aggression Pact was signed. It was not then clear whether there was a military treaty attached, but in 1939 there was a secret agreement. A Russo-Chinese trade pact was concluded with the chief aim of supplying China with arms. In March 1939, following Stalin's address, Molotov's policy of assisting China was confirmed. Considering this series of facts, the principle of two-front operations \* in the east and west, the five-year plans which included industrialization and militarization of the Far East, and the Russian attitude toward the anti-Comintern Pact and Tripartite Pact, it was concluded that Russia in the future would interfere with Japan.

23321 \* Immediately after the decision on national policy, the Chief and Vice-Chief of Staff gave an explanation of Japan's relations with the Soviet. There will be the most favorable situation for Japan, since it will rectify the Soviet menace to the Far East, prevent Germany from mustering power to threaten the Far East, and realize cooperation among the three. The resort to arms is aimed at settling the northern problem. If the problem could be settled diplomatically with armed forces in the background, it would be desirable.

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The long-term and protracted use of arms must be strictly decided. This idea presupposes the evasion of large-scale operations in a concrete form. Therefore military preparations against the Soviet is not preparations for war, and resort to arms is not yet decided.

23322

Japan's northern defense, Sakhalin and northern waters will be rationally solved. It is hoped ultimately by establishing a demilitarized zone in the border regions that disputes will end. Sakhalin and fisheries problem will be solved and Japan freed of menace, even if a German Soviet war broke out, the Tripartite Pact does not oblige Japan to give aid to German operations, and Japan's actions are not restricted. This national policy is not the deciding factor for using arms against the Soviet. It only stipulated that preparations must be made in view of possible need for arms in accordance with future developments. They had made no commitment on mistakes of Germany.

23323

In hastening preparations for a possible war with Britain and the U. S. and the policy to be adopted toward Russia, the elimination of obstacles to maintaining the basic policy toward U. S. and Britain was a restraining influence in drawing up measures against Russia. The question of use arms was looked on as most important, and an order was issued to the Vice-Chief and the Department Heads requiring \* careful examination.

23324

The judgements of the second part, covering the period from the beginning of the German-Soviet war to the end of July 1941, was that the development of the war could not be easily predicted, and there is no little fear of protraction. The report of TATEKAWA to the Foreign Ministry and that of the military attaches in the Soviet contain the same opinion. Germany's declaration as to the end of the war must be carefully considered. While the transportation to European Russia of Soviet forces in the Far East will take place, abandonment of the Far East is inconceivable. This will restrict the transportation of forces to the west and will not allow the cutting of actual strength by half. If it is halved, 15 divisions will be left east of Lake Baikal and the hasty use of arms would inevitably result in an unexpected emergency. To settle northern problems it is necessary to concentrate sufficient forces in Manchuria. Requiring particular consideration \* is a possible conflict between Japan, U. S., and Britain, in view of the difficulty in negotiations since the outbreak of the Russo-German War.

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The Soviet attitude toward Japan must be strictly watched, since the Soviet, long a menace to Japan, had entered into a state of war with Germany, an ally. Closer rapprochement between the U. S., Britain, and the Soviet, might give impetus to U. S.-Soviet military cooperation and in the advance of American air forces to the Far East.

They must take into consideration confusion in the Soviet and lack of peace and order in Manchuria, and they must strengthen defense, vigilance and war preparations in Manchuria as self-defense whether or not they intend to settle the northern problem.

23325

The change in relations with the U. S. \* and the attendant change in future relations, along with the affairs in the Soviet, is the most important item in deciding Japan's defense policy against the Soviet. According to Ambassador TATEKAWA in Moscow, the Soviet will not yield to Germany, and compromise is inconceivable. The war will be protracted, communism being vehement nationalism and patriotism. There is fear that the Soviet may take positive steps in the Far East in case she should be strongly supported by the U. S. and Britain.

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The relations with the U. S. suddenly became worse with the freezing of Japanese assets and on the agreement with France for joint defense of FIC. It was therefore judged that they must consider the measures for settling the northern problem in view of the situation as at the end of July 1941. At the beginning of July 1941, the Chief intended to send \* more troops to Manchuria after he had compared the actual Soviet strength with the Kwantung Army and judged the future of Soviet moves, taking into consideration relations with the U. S. and Britain. After consultation with the War Ministry, reinforcements by two divisions was decided on in early July.

The agreement provided that in view of the situation, especially the smallness of reinforcements for Manchuria, it seemed more urgent to reserve the hope of military preparation to settle the northern problem and to streamline the 16 division system with the long-pending object of defense and vigilance. If the opportunity became ripe to settle the northern problem, this would be a preliminary step. The result was the reinforcement of the army in Manchuria, the so-called Kwantung Army Special Maneuver.

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23327 It was the desire of both the War Minister and the Chief of Staff \* to drive home the idea that it did not mean commencement of military operations. Frontier incidents were to be avoided.

23328 From the end of July 1941 they began to study a plan against the Soviet different from that of 1941. This was necessitated by the declaration of July 2 of the national policy to prepare for war with the U. S. and Britain, if unavoidable. In consideration of the previously mentioned matters and the change of the times, the Chief again ordered the Vice-Chief and his Division Chief to settle the new operation plan against the Soviet, as well as the plans against Britain and the U. S. which were correlated with it. Because the Chief came to consider that if operations against the U. S. and Britain were to be taken into consideration at all, a considerable increase in strength for defense \* against the Soviet was unavoidable they concluded that they could not help reducing the scope of defense operations against the Soviet to some 20 divisions.

Nevertheless the policy was unchanged on the principle that operations would be based on self-defense to insure defense of Japan by a protracted defensive and passive offensive. The result of the studies was that strict vigilance be maintained relying on existing strength, the defence would be further reinforced and utmost efforts made to prevent war from breaking out. If the Soviet challenged they would immediately send reinforcements, destroying instantly enemy air forces from the Far East, to rapidly destroy their air forces in the Southern Maritime Province. Time elapsed while these studies were going on.

23329 The reinforcements of the Kwantung Army in the summer of 1941 \* or the Special Maneuver was meant to complete the 16 division system in line with the former study. Both the War Ministry and Staff held the opinion that this purported to rectify and strengthen the Kwantung Army defence and guard system, which had many defects and implied preliminary measures to be used in case the policy of July 2 developed. This was decided on through the agreement between the Ministry and the Staff, subsequently approved by the government, to contributing to carrying out peace-time duties of the Kwantung Army. Its peace-time duty is to defend Manchukuo and Kwantung.

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23330      Aside from this, in 1939 the Staff had assigned a part of the army to maintain peace in the north as against the Soviet, thus establishing the principle of the duties and actions of the Kwantung Army. In July 1941 Imperial Headquarters instructed the commander of the Kwantung Army that the purpose of the reinforcements, the so-called \* Special Maneuvers, was to strengthen preparation against the Soviet. The Kwantung Army main strength at the time was ten divisions, plus two not completely organized and 500 airplanes. Intelligence deemed it not more than 30% of the Soviet Far Eastern forces. Unless the 16 division system, the minimum requirement for defense materialized, peace in the north could never be maintained, according to SUGIYAMA.

23331      The main features of the Special Maneuver included reinforcement of the divisions in Manchuria, the sending of two divisions, the additional dispatch of forces under the direct control of the Kwantung Army such as air forces and artillery, and additional supplies, the organization of defense headquarters to command all independent garrisons in Manchuria, \* establishment of the 20th Army Corps Headquarters, and increased munitions. All matters required by these items were considered and dealt with. For the mobilization required emergency enlistment was adopted, and each unit was placed on the basis of full equipment, but not on a war-time basis. This was the substance of the Special Maneuver and did not imply a war program, operational or strategic plans.

23332      \* Its execution took from July to October 1941. At the end of 1941 the Kwantung Army strength consisted of 13 divisions, two having been sent from Japan Proper and two others organized in Manchuria, one of which was diverted to south China, and other units, so the total strength of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria was a little over 600,000.

The air forces had some 700 serviceable planes but since many had been transferred, 280 remained at the end of 1941. This strength contained not only the increase under the Special Maneuver program, but also that realized in 1941 by the previously established unrelated program. The organization of two divisions in Manchuria belonged to the previous program.

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23333

\* The Special Maneuver was placed under routine control of the Vice Chief, after having been decided on at a conference with the War Ministry. Steps for each question were decided and disposed of each time without waiting for the overall plan of execution.

Even after the Special Maneuver had been carried out, the army's defensive and guard preparations along the frontiers was weak, and it was feared whether Japan's defensive operations could be conducted as provided in the operational plan on the basis of 15 divisions in case of a Soviet attack. Around November 1941, when part of the Soviet Far Eastern Army was sent to Europe, its strength consisted of 33 divisions, four other divisions, some 1500 planes and 1300 tanks. The Kwantung Army was estimated as inferior by 50%, even after reinforcements by the Special Maneuver.

23334

In the middle of August 1944, \* the General Staff estimated that the frontier districts would likely be stabilized, and there would be no sign of military cooperation in the Far East between the U. S. and the Soviet. The Soviet would not challenge Japan for the time being. In the middle of August, the Chief of Staff approved this estimate of the situation and acknowledged that there would be little chance of the Soviet Army taking a defiant attitude if the Special Maneuver were perfectly carried out. The War Minister also consented. It was therefore decided not to slacken the Kwantung Army preparedness and to spur execution of the Special Maneuver as much as possible, preparing for the coming winter. Surveillance of executing the established plan for maintaining peace in the north was further tightened to avoid incidents on the frontiers, \* and efforts were made for defense and self-protection with utmost precautions not to arouse friction and adherence to a policy of peace at any cost.

23335

The plan in the north included steps such as withdrawing outposts in districts where trouble was likely to start, while forbidding the forces to advance, to dispense with defense duties in areas where frontiers were disputed or actions difficult, and by localizing frontier troubles in case they arose. Efforts were made thus to maintain peace in the north. While reinforcement was being made, delay due to shortage of transportation, the cold season in Manchuria finally necessitated abandonment of part of the plan.

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23336 Later the unsatisfactory negotiations with the U. S. and Britain worsened the situation, and with the new national policy in the beginning of September a considerable proportion of Manchurian strength was withdrawn and diverted to South China, Formosa, and FIC. The chief forces diverted were one division and considerable tanks, heavy artillery, \* anti-aircraft guns, auxiliary forces, air corps headquarters, fighters, and light and heavy bombers.

23337 The Special Maneuver was not meant to be a preparation for aggression against the Soviet. Since the main emphasis of national policy had come to be directed against the U. S. and Britain under the decision of September 6, Japan not only clung to its policy of peace toward the Soviet, but reduced precautions and preparations against the Soviet. The units transferred to the south included, one division, three tank regiments, 5 heavy artillery regiments, 20-odd anti-aircraft artillery companies, \* 3 air brigade headquarters, 4 fighter regiments, 3 light bomber and 2 heavy bomber regiments, 5 scout plane squadrons and some ground service units.

After July 1941, the Japanese Army in China was planning the Changsha operations for September and October, and operations to restore peace and order in the triangular area of Nanking, and operations for aerial advance into interior China. At the Liaison Conference in the middle of November 1941, the decision was reached that in the event of war against the U. S. and Britain they should by all means avoid making enemies of other countries, and especially from entering into war against the Soviet. They should try to make a reconciliation between Germany and the Soviet, if they were so disposed, win the Soviet over to the Axis camp, and thus adjust relations between Japan and the Soviet.

23338 \* The order issued by Imperial Headquarters to the Commander of the Kwantung Army December 3, 1941, stated that it was the intention to capture major points in the southern regions and dispose of the China Incident, in the meantime making utmost efforts to prevent war against the Soviet. The Kwantung Army will carry out its duties of defending Manchukuo and Kwantung, and preparing for defense operations against the Soviet to meet any development. In settling boundary disputes, efforts will be made to localize the affair. In special areas, armed force defense may be dispensed with if the situation demanded.



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23339 The witness was informed by the Chief of Staff that at the Liaison Conference at the end of November, it was agreed that although on \* outbreak of war with the U. S. and Britain, it was hardly probable that Russia would take positive action against Japan, which was possible if the U. S. would utilize Russian territory for military bases and that Russia would act in various ways against Japan, and that according to later developments it was also possible that the Soviet would wage war against Japan. However, concrete measures were not decided on excepting a defensive plan against the Soviet.

23340 The Chief decided that the 1942 operational plan against the Soviet should be drafted along the line of the previous year's plan, and generally based on the policy that the Kwantung Army maintain its disposition but assume strict precautionary measures, strengthen defenses and strive to the utmost to prevent an outbreak. In case the U. S. and Russia jointly challenge Japan from the north or Russia should independently challenge, without delay Japan should send divisions from Japan and China to destroy \* Russian air forces in the Far East, especially the Maritime Province. The objective was not to fulfill a minimum defensive requirement by assuming passive offensive in place of protracted defensive operations.

23341 The plan was decided on the basis of a separate plan against Russia studied since July 1941, and matters relating to the War Ministry were decided after consultation with it. According to intelligence, Russian strength in the Far East at the beginning of 1942 was a total of 23 divisions, including one tank and three cavalry. In addition there were twelve divisions south of Habarovsk. The Air Forces had a total of 1200, including 60 heavy bombers, 80 long-range bombers, \* 330 light bombers, 450 fighters, 60 assault planes, and 200 seaplanes.

The Kwantung Army had 13 divisions and 500 airplanes, of which 250 were operational, including 50 heavy bombers, 100 light ones, and 130 fighters. The Japanese ground forces were less than 60% of the Russians.

The Liaison Conference of March 1942 decided to conduct necessary operations against vital spots outside occupied areas to hasten the end of the war by forcing the U. S. and Britain into passive defense, to strive for prompt settlement of the China Incident, taking advantage of operations in the south, and to prevent the occurrence

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23342 of a new incident with Russia and strengthen precautionary measures against war with Russia. According to the estimate \* of the Kwantung Army, the Russian strength consisted of 23 divisions, 20 of which were sharpshooter, 1300 tanks and 1200 airplanes. The lowering in their fighting standard was perceptible, but the entire fighting personnel totalled over 800,000. The Kwantung Army had only 14 divisions of 600,000 men and about 600 airplanes. The Kwantung Army was about 60% of the Russian forces.

23343 \* In May 1942, Imperial Headquarters was considering operations against the Aleutians, Fiji, Samoa, New Caledonia, and Eastern New Guinea, as operations against the outer strategic points in the Pacific. However, the operations carried out were the Aleutians, Midway, and New Guinea. After that spring, Imperial Headquarters was conducting various studies to conduct a future offensive, with the occupation of Chungking as the objective.

23344 As to the offensive into the inland of China to reduce Chungking, a definite plan was formed in the General Staff, and it was agreed that whether it be put into execution was to be finally settled in the autumn of 1942. The nucleus for this operation was to be 15 divisions. Of the necessary strength and equipment, two divisions, 200 planes, two-thirds of the motor vehicles and communications, and all river crossing material were to be taken from \* Manchuria, and the greater part of fuel and ammunition were to be taken from there for the Kwantung Army. The personnel to be transferred totalled 200,000. The plan was abandoned in December 1942, because of adverse developments around Guadalcanal.

23345 Japanese strength was transferred to the southeast of the Pacific from posts, including Manchuria, to cope with the U. S. counter-attack around the Solomons and Guadalcanal after August, 1942. This made it all the more urgent to prevent outbreak of an incident against Russia, so that absolute peace might be maintained. According to intelligence at the end of 1942, the strength of the Kwantung Army was 14 divisions and 500 planes against the Soviet's 20 divisions and 1,000 planes. Japan's strength was 70% of Russia's, with Russia continuing to maintain a superior strength. \* With respect to operational plans against outer strategic points in the Pacific and the reduction of Chungking, the Staff was worried that they might endanger the execution of passive defensive operations of the Kwantung Army against Russia in reference to military strength, especially planes, tanks, vehicles, rear corps, munitions, and liquid fuel.

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CROSS-EXAMINATION OF TANAKA, S.  
by Colonel Ivanov

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The witness wrote that he had been appointed in October 1940 Chief of the First Division of the General Staff by the person holding the power of appointment, the Minister of War. He did not know why he was dismissed as chief in 1942, but he did not think that he would have been dismissed because of disagreement on matters pertaining to war guidance and war plans with TOJO and SUGIYAMA. \* He worked under both TOJO and SUGIYAMA, but never engaged in the formulation of aggressive war plans or the prosecution thereof.

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By order of the Chief of Staff he drew up the operation plans in 1941 and 1942 against the Soviet, Malaya, Java, Borneo, Netherlands East Indies, and the Philippines. He did not have any documents bearing on the plans he wrote about in his affidavit. They are primarily written from his accurate memory.

23,356

He contended in his affidavit that Japan was threatened by the Soviet Union in 1941. \* Despite the fact that in the autumn of 1941 the German troops were attempting to cease Moscow and Leningrad, there were reasons to believe this. There were sufficient reasons why Japan felt a Soviet threat in 1942, even when the Germans had reached Stalingrad and created grave danger for the Soviet in the west. The war in 1942 had entered a state of protracted attrition as a result of the Soviet winter offensive.

23,357

Japan in her war against the United States and Britain entered on extreme and serious difficulties following the defeat at Midway in June 1942. At this period the military alliance of the United States, Britain and the Soviet was very strong and they feared and estimated in accordance with the situation that either the Soviet alone, or the Soviet combined with the United States, might attack Japan from the north. He admitted \* that the period up to the end of 1942 was a very hard one for the Soviet Union, but the Soviet-German war was already a protracted one. It is true that the estimate of the Chief of Staff in August 1942 was that it was very unlikely that the Soviet would start war against Japan by August 1942. It was an estimate that the danger would be relaxed tentatively and temporarily because of winter and the freezing in the north which would prevent active operation.

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He could not recall that in July 1941 Japan decided to start secret preparations for a war against the Soviet. When asked whether he had heard of Exhibit 779, the resolution of the Imperial Conference, July 2, 1941, which provided that while they would not intervene in the Soviet-German war, Japan would take voluntary measures by secretly preparing arms against the Soviet, continue diplomatic negotiations, and as the war progressed favorably to Japan they would execute arms to solve the northern problems. The witness stated he heard of the decision from the Chief of Staff at the time. It was not a mistake. However, he also received an explanation from the Chief at that time that the decision did not relate to a preparation for war against the Soviet.

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The so-called Kan-Toku-En of July 1941 was not preparation for war against the Soviet but the reinforcement of defenses against the Soviet. When asked whether it was not the Kwantung and Korean armies which would have to be used according to the decision of the conference of July 2nd, the witness stated that if the situation arose which would require the exercise of armed force, the Kwantung and Korean armies would have been used as a matter of course.

23,360

The operation plans of 1941 provided that reinforcements be sent from Japan and China. When asked whether the Kan-Toku-En was not to prepare in the shortest possible time to strengthen the Kwantung Army for war against the Soviet, the witness stated its purpose was to reinforce and strengthen the \* defensive organization of the Army, which had been extremely weak. It was not a war preparation. It was a plan for reinforcing troop strength to carry out the purposes referred to and not an operational war plan. It included no operational items.

23,361

When asked which organ, the General Staff or War Ministry, drafted the instructions sent in 1941 to UMEZU with respect to measures for strengthening the fighting power of the Army for a war against the Soviet, the witness stated the matter was not clear to him and he would like it explained. He had not stated anything in his affidavit with reference to strengthening offensive preparations against the Soviet.

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23,362

In effecting the Kan-Toku-En it is true that the first replacement and second replacement reserves were called up. He stated that he had not said in his affidavit that this was an emergency or extraordinary mobilization. It should not be called mobilization, but a temporary muster order or temporary calling up. In the Japanese Army the word mobilization was used when the organization is changed from a peacetime to a wartime footing. In the Kan-Toku-En the Army was not placed on a war footing. It was not a mobilization. \* It was true that the calling up of the reserves for replenishing of the Kwantung Army was about the same time when the Soviet-German war started.

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When he was read an excerpt from Exhibit 830, a telegram sent July 5, 1941 by Kretschmar to Berlin, in which he spoke of the calling up of the reservists and the drafting of materials going on in Japan, the witness stated that that telegram was absolutely \* not based on fact. He was impressed by the manner in which the telegram was written, and it gives the impression that Japan was about to join in the German-Soviet war, which was not so. The mobilization of 900,000 or 500,000 mentioned was not based on facts at all.

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It also stated that Japanese males from 28 to 42 throughout the nation were mobilized. This was a complete distortion. All call-ups were effected within the scope and requirements of the Kan-Toku-En.

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When it was pointed out that this same excerpt stated that since about July 10th they had been transporting troops and reservists from Japan and the goal was Seishin and Rashin for troops and reservists and Tientsin and Shanghai for reservists; and since the middle of July preparations for billeting and arrival of troops in Manchuria were being made, \* the witness stated that Section 6 of his affidavit as reread by the prosecutor, was devoted to the Kan-Toku-En. He had written about it and it was written as read, but he also recognized that there was great divergence between the telegram referred to and what he had stated in his affidavit. He stated that all measures of the Kan-Toku-En named in his affidavit and in the telegram coincided, but there are differences.

First, the telegram was written on the premise that the Kan-Toku-En was a preparation for war against the Soviet, whereas its real purpose in Japan was passive and negative in

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23,369 nature and it was for the purpose of reinforcing the defense and vigilance of Japanese troops. \* He further stated that there were important vital differences, such as the great difference in the number of troops to be sent to Manchuria.

23,370 The order on the Kan-Toku-Kn issued in July 1941  
 23,371 was issued by the Imperial Headquarters, \* but the order was drafted by the Chief of Staff, who consulted with the War Minister. Following the drafting of the order, the Chief of Staff consulted the War Minister.

On hearing the passage from his affidavit read to him he could not say that there had been any contradiction to what he had stated so far. While he thought the use of the words "war operational plans" would invite misunderstanding, it was a fact that the General Staff Office drew up annual plans with regard to possible war against the Soviet.

23,372 Asked why he had failed to mention in his affidavit what Soviet cities it was planned to seize at the first stage of war and in the second stage \* with respect to the plan drafted from the beginning of 1941, the witness stated he had stated at length the reasons for the operational plans drawn up at the beginning of 1941. He had explained the basis on which the plans were drawn up because he felt that by understanding them he would convey a better understanding of Japan and her situation.

23,373 When asked what Soviet cities the Japanese troops were planning to seize as provided in the plan of 1941, the witness stated he would like to say it appears from the question that Japan was planning an aggressive war. That is not so. \* This was an operational plan after war broke out. After a war broke out and the operational plan took effect, Japan was to strike an offensive eastward and to destroy the bases for long-range bombing.

Reference being made to the testimony of Colonel SEJIMA, in which he laid out the plan of the Kwantung Army for 1941, which provided for taking many Soviet cities, the witness was asked whether when he used the term protracted defense in his affidavit he meant this plan of seizure of Soviet territory, the witness stated this was not so. At the beginning of operations

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Japan will take a position for protracted defensive operations in the frontier district of Manchuria and Russia.

23,375

As to the operational plan for the fiscal year 1942, the witness recalled that the outline was drawn by the General Staff and the Kwantung Army directed to act in accordance with the outline and prepare the details.

23,376

The witness stated he knew General MATSUMURA, former chief of the Russian Sector of the 2nd Section of the 2nd Division of the General Staff and later vice-chief of the Kwantung Army. \*

23,377

When the witness was asked whether he called the operations for seizing the Maritime Province, as mentioned, passive offensive, and did he not understand that under the terms of actual offensive it would be the seizure of the Siberian Urals, the witness stated that whether the offensive was negative or passive would be merely a form of strategy, but the occupation of the Maritime Province is negative, as was that of the Urals and other areas. That has no connection with the matter. At the outset of operations the Japanese were to take a stand for protracted defense. Meanwhile, \* following the completion of operational preparations new action would be taken. This was called a peaceful offensive and was the operation to be taken by the Kwantung Army.

23,378

The question of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere is a political one, with which the General Staff had no connection. When it was pointed out that in Exhibit 675A HASHIMOTO had included the Soviet Far East in the Greater East Asia Sphere, or at least in the sphere of influence, \* and the witness was asked whether the operations plans did not reflect in some nature these intentions, the witness stated that these opinions and views were not reflected in the operations plans of the General Staff. HASHIMOTO was just one of the common people, a civilian, and had no position of leadership or influence at the time.

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23,380

They were formulating operation plans for defensive purposes against various countries. He stated that operation plans never existed as regards Australia. \* The Philippines was included in the annual plans drawn for the fiscal year 1941. There were no plans against the Netherland

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East Indies, Java and Burma. The idea of operations existed against Malaya.

When asked whether the General Staff did not during the last two decades draft plans for attacking the Soviet Union and seizure of Soviet territory, the witness stated that he did not know all about the twenty years. He went to the General Staff for the first time in 1940. When he read the documents there he found no evidence for any plans against the Soviet during the past twenty years and discovered to what extent the staff had made every possible effort for defensive purposes while being apprehensive of Japan's situation in the face of Soviet strength.

23,385

The troops transferred from the Kwantung Army late in the autumn of 1941 to the southern regions were: 1 division, 3 tank regiments, 5 artillery regiments, 24 anti-aircraft companies, 3 air corps headquarters, 4 fighter squadrons, 3 light bomber squadrons, 2 heavy bomber squadrons, 5 reconnaissance companies, and ground crews. There were also some others.

23,386

When asked as to the number of units and types of plans in the Far East in the beginning of 1942, the witness stated that what he said in his affidavit was not an estimate. This is intelligence, in possession of the 2nd Division of the General Staff and the estimate made by the staff with regard to Soviet air strength in the Far East was 1200 planes, which was broken down to 60 heavy bombers, 80 long distance, 330 light, 450 fighters, 60 assault and 200 seaplanes. At present he had no documentary data on the units of the Soviet Army in the Far East for 1940-42. These figures came from his very reliable, accurate memory. At the end of the war he had a number of conversations \* and talks with his subordinates on these matters, which confirmed his memory. The responsibility for drafting plans for war rests with the Chief of Staff.

23,387

23,389

From Exhibit 705, the affidavit of TOMINAGA, it was stated that in the plan \* the time of opening war was not indicated because it had to be decided by the Emperor after discussion in the Supreme Council. The plan was preserved after Imperial sanction in the Operations Section of the 1st Department of General Staff Headquarters. A copy of the plan was sent to the Kwantung Army. A senior officer went with it and handed it to the commander of the Kwantung Army to put into practice. It was sent to the Kwantung Army in beginning of April 1940.



4 June 1947

MEMORANDUM

TO : Mr. Edward P. Monaghan, Chief, Investigative Division, IPS.  
FROM : Lester G. Danigan.  
SUBJECT: TANAKA, Shinichi.

Case #235 relates to the above-named individual although the first name in that file is spelled "SHIZUICHI."

TANAKA was interrogated on 10 June 1946, and a copy of the interrogation is contained in Case #448, Serial #20. Another interrogation of the same individual on 10 June 1946, and a copy thereof, appears in Case #448, and although it bears no serial number is between #38 and #39. A copy of the same interrogation as is contained in Case #448, Serial #20, appears in the file of the defendant MUTO, which is Case #319. None of these interrogations appear in TANAKA's file, Case #235.

It is suggested that copies of these interrogations be placed in the file pertaining to TANAKA or a memorandum setting forth where such interrogations may be found be placed in TANAKA's file, Case #235.

Copy to: ✓ Mr. David H. Sutton

LCD/nb

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

2 June 1947

MEMORANDUM

TO : Russian Division  
FROM : D. N. Sutton  
SUBJECT: TANAKA, Shinichi  
Def. Doc. No. 1323

I hand you herewith a copy of the interrogation of TANAKA, Shinichi dated 10 June 1946. This is found in case file No. 448, serial No. 20. A copy of this also appears in the case file of the defendant MUTC, No. 319. Mr. Lopez interrogated TANAKA on both 10 June and 11 June 1946.

The affidavit of TANAKA, Shinichi was introduced when he was presented as a witness by the Prosecution on 24 January 1947, IPS Doc. No. 2925, Exhibit No. 2244. In the affidavit there is contained a substantial portion of the facts which appeared in the interrogations of TANAKA. Although cross-examined at some length by the Defense, TANAKA maintained the position taken in his affidavit. His testimony appears in the record at pages 16140 - 16174. I call your attention to this as I know you would not wish at this time to refer to any part of the interrogation which contains the same substance as was contained in the affidavit presented by the Prosecution at the time we put this witness on the stand.

D. N. Sutton,  
Assistant Counsel

Enc.

cc: Mr. Tavenner  
Mr. Lopez  
Mr. Dunigan

David —

Better look up Shunichi Tanaka's appidami which we introduced in the Muto phase (GPS Doc. No. 2925). Let's not spoil it. Pet

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

29 May 1947

MEMORANDUM

TO : Russian Division  
FROM : D. N. Sutton  
SUBJECT: TANAKA, Shinichi  
Def. Doc. No. 1323

In connection with the above witness who was summoned on behalf of Tojo, I hand you herewith the following:

1. Report by Mr. Dunigan dated 17 April 1947.
2. Memorandum from Mr. Dunigan dated 29 May 1947.

If there is anything further that you wish done in connection with this witness, please let me know and we shall be glad to do it.

D. N. Sutton,  
Assistant Counsel

Encl. (2)

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DIRECT EXAMINATION OF TANAKA, *Shinichi*  
By Mr. Levin.

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\* The witness stated that he lived in Mie Prefecture. He identified exhibit No. 2488 as his affidavit, and stated its contents were true.

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\* The affidavit stated that the witness had occupied the post of chief of the Military Affairs Section, War Service Bureau in the War Ministry, from March 1937 to February 1939, and was in charge of organization, equipment, budget, mobilization, and reinforcement of forces, under the director. He took his post in the middle of March, 1937.

20670

Minister of War SUGIYAMA told him that the time had come to try to avoid all foreign troubles and to complete national defense; that the army was to modify its armament and improve and complete its materials, and that the military affairs section should make special efforts to improve \* organization and equipment.

The army had no plan of operations for war with China before the Incident. As chief of his section, he never received any report concerning mobilization and operational preparation necessary for operations against China, either from the general staff or the War Ministry. This meant that the General Staff had no prepared plan at the time. Since a plan had to necessarily be accompanied by strength, munitions, and expenditure, this could not be had without the approval of the War Ministry, and the Chief of Military Affairs would have been informed of this. This was all the more true because he had arrived at his post at the end of the fiscal year.

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\* From a point of the situation in China, in view of strength, munition, and materials, it was almost impossible to attempt operations in China. In 1937, Japan had a peace-time strength of 17 divisions and a war-time one of 30. The General Staff and the War Minister thought it dangerous for the Army to operate in China with the fighting strength available, since China had a force of 20 million and a vast land.

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They were greatly concerned with Russia's military preparations. According to information, the Russians had a standing peace-time strength of 28 sniper divisions, 45 cavalry, 6 mechanized brigades, and 1900 aircraft for the Far East, including the Siberian Military District, together with \* 10 cavalry divisions and some mechanized units and air units for Outer Mongolia. She had a minimum of 31 to 50 divisions, whose mobilization, concentration and reinforcement were secure. It was thought dangerous to operate in China under such circumstances.

When the Incident broke out, the General Staff explained that the present Incident was liable to turn into a protracted war between Japan and China and they could only use 11 divisions in operations, or 15 total. However, if they used half of their war-time strength in the China area for a long time it would be a serious crisis for national defense. Every measure must be taken for immediate settlement.

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20674

Since he was present when this explanation was made, he knew \* that the War Minister agreed. \* Production and maintenance of munitions were very difficult. According to the Mobilization Plans Bureau, it was difficult to mobilize and send 15 divisions and to maintain operations in the Incident at the time, in view of supply. The Army had only 8 months stock for 15 divisions, and they could hardly hope by munitions mobilization to meet consumption of 15 divisions in eight or nine months, and a continuous supply was impossible. If they could have used all of their arms and brought munitions mobilization to a maximum, they could never meet operational consumption. This is especially true with special materials. If they were to go to a protracted war with China, it was not sufficient to use all their stock in China operations since they would be at a loss \* for self-defense against any other country. With their anticipated munitions mobilization and a guaranteed supply of 70% for the estimated war-time strength for the final year, they planned to be able to mobilize in ten months after they began. However, far more materials were expected to be used, and it was extremely difficult to maintain operations.

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20676

The Incident was not planned. There was establishment of the non-enlargement and non-exercise of military strength. On July 8 they immediately determined the general policy of non-enlargement, and informed the chief of staff of the army to that effect. \* On July 8 or 9, the Imperial Government started the non-enlargement policy, desiring a smooth settlement through China's reconsideration, and decided to take proper measures for self-preservation, though it was too early to send more forces. He heard this from Lt. Gen. USHIROKU, Director of the War Service Bureau.

On July 9 the General Staff instructed the army to negotiate with the Hopei-Chahar authorities to settle the Incident, by avoiding reference to political issues and to approve the Political Committee and to fulfill the demands as soon as possible, such as suspension of stationing Chinese on the left bank near the bridge, the guarantee and the punishing of those responsible.

General MATSUI, D., Chief of the Special Service Agency at Peiping, negotiated with the Chinese and it appeared that an agreement would be reached. However, the Chinese ordered four divisions of the central army near Suchow to march to the frontier of Honan, and their air forces to move out. There was no indication that the conflicting situation would be mitigated, and the forces of North China were strengthening themselves. Illegal firing was being repeated.

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If the state of affairs had continued, the Japanese in Peking and Tientsin would have been faced with unavoidable danger. The General Staff was compelled to decide \* that the authorities in Peking and Tientsin and the Nanking Government were preparing for armed hostilities against Japan. The lives and property of the Japanese are on the verge of utmost danger. They must therefore send a minimum number of forces to the area to protect the residents. A grave situation is arising in other areas which calls for careful protection of nationals.

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20679

On July 11 the government made it clear that they were compelled to send forces to North China to cope with anti-Japanese armed actions. On learning of the Hopei-Chahar Government's acceptance of Japan's proposal, they took steps to reserve preparation for mobilization and dispatch. Orders were issued \* by GHQ with government approval to send only part of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria and of the Korean Army. This was taken to assure the achievement of peace-time duty in China under an aggravated situation.

20680

According to his information, on July 13 the Cabinet Conference felt that it was extremely doubtful whether Nanking was sincere in trying to settle the matter. Her forces were advancing hurriedly to the north, and anti-Japanism was continued. In North China, Shanghai, and Chingtao, the situation was very dangerous for the Japanese. It was therefore advisable, in accordance with the localization policy, to pay strict and constant attention, urging on the one hand the Hopei-Chahar Government to fulfill stipulated terms, and abstaining from provoking the Chinese. \* Based on this policy, the General Staff and the War Ministry decided on the policy for settling the North China Incident on July 13.

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\* This policy was that all measures would be taken to avoid expanding to an all-out war, and they would adhere to the principle of localization. It was desirable to accept the terms proposed by the Chinese 29th Army and signed on the 11th, and to see that the Chinese fulfilled them. With respect to mobilization of homeland forces, this should be decided in the light of the future. If the Chinese neglect the terms and show no sincerity, or if Nanking removes their army forces to the north for attack, Japan must take resolute steps.

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It is necessary for the garrison in China to receive the recognition of central headquarters. With respect to the mobilization, the \* government acknowledged on July 9 that mobilization and dispatch of divisions might be necessary to meet the emergency, although not at first considered necessary. Considering the dangerous position of the Japanese residents in the Peking and Tientsin district, the increased prepara-



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20683

tions for fighting by the Chinese, and the insincerity of the Hopei-Chahar authorities in negotiating the advancement of the Chinese Central Army, on July 11 the Japanese Government announced the dispatch of troops. On the afternoon of July 11 the Hopei authorities accepted the proposal, and the mobilization and dispatch of troops was discontinued. On July 13 the policy was decided to deal with the North China Incident \* that the mobilization of divisions would be considered according to circumstances.

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Up to July 15 there was an increasing concentration of Chinese armies, activity of the Canton air forces, and delay of actual withdrawal of the Chinese Army forces which had been accepted by an agreement. Furthermore, further construction was continued and more army forces concentrated. It was therefore decided that the mobilization discontinued on July 16 or 17 should be prepared so as to be practicable whenever necessary after July 19. The proper officials proceeded with preparations. The authorities decided to persevere on the basis of the Hopei-Chahar authorities' acceptance, despite the fact that Chiang Kai-shek had shown his determination against Japan on July 19. On July 22, due to the acceptance by the Hopei authorities \* preparation for mobilization was postponed.

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After the incident of July 25 and 26, the condition in North China became finally serious. A report was sent stating that Japan had decided on a program on July 27 to mobilize and send armies to eliminate the threat of Chinese forces to the lives of Japanese and to transport and communications, and for the self-defense of the troops. These were emergency operations with peace-time formation and equipment not suitable and insufficient for operations.

There was no expression by the authorities of GHQ whether further mobilization would be carried out except for this one. \* The Minister and Vice-Minister of war and the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau maintained a most passive attitude, while higher officers adopted the policy of watching future events.

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When the Shanghai Incident broke out, two divisions were sent, and when it became necessary to protect Tsintao a plan for one division was set up, and then when it became necessary to carry out operations in Paoting, hasty mobilization was begun. The action was carried out as circumstances required. After the outbreak of the October 1937 Incident, 15 divisions were mobilized and sent on eight different occasions. There were roughly altogether 4 divisions in July, 7 in August, and 4 in September and October.

20686 In 1938, before Hankao and Canton, the divisions \* reached 23, but there were several which were organized in the fighting zone as circumstances required. The number of soldiers decreased in each division and its equipment was lowered.

To point out the lack of unity and non-planning, he would mention the capture of Nanking. The witness was first informed by the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau that the General Staff did not intend to realize it, and the War Minister agreed. Due to the tendency of the war and the desire to seize the opportunity to terminate the Incident, the decision to capture Nanking was decided on December 1, 1937, and the order issued.

20687 \* In May, 1938, an agreement between the War Minister and the Vice-Chief of Staff was not reached until immediately before the decision to carry out operations. The point at issue was that if it were possible to preserve contact between North and Central China by securing the important area of Hsu-Chow and to supply needed army strength, or whether this would be in anticipation of settling the Incident in accordance with the policy of non-expansion. Finally agreement was arrived at due to strategic demand in light of the entire situation.

20688 Decision for Hankow and Kuangtung was not made so quickly. In September 1938 it was decided to carry out the Hankow operation about October 1938 to capture Kuangtung. \* The Army budget in the ordinary session of the Diet for 1938 had not anticipated military operations, and there was inconvenience in the matter of expenses for the year.

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20689 The witness was connected with the military budget. After October, 1937, prospects were entertained for ending positive operations against China, and plans and preparations were promoted for adjusting and extracting from the military strength in China, on the premise that the Incident would be concluded shortly. At the end of 1937 there were 16 divisions in China. This was to be reduced to ten. In the units to remain in China, reservists were to be relieved. \* This was to start from early spring, 1938. The all-round withdrawal of armed forces was planned. Both department quarters and outpost authorities were unanimous on this.

The budget of the ordinary session was based on the premise that the military strength in China was to be reduced by half the repatriated troops, and no positive action for troops continued to be stationed. The situation did not develop favorably. Peace negotiations failed after Nanking and Hsu-Chow, and Hankow and Kwantung made necessary the total abandonment of adjustment of military strength, and in 1938 and 1939 there was an enormous deficiency in the budget.

20690 \* On July 11, 1937, the witness was asked by his superiors to negotiate with the Finance Ministry about expenditures of the forces sent to Korea and Manchuria to meet current expenses from a reserve fund and to open a three month's budget for the troops that had been sent. After negotiations it was reduced to two months, and this budget was presented at an extraordinary session of the Diet and passed. At a session in September, a budget for four months from October to January for 11 divisions was passed.

These budgets were prepared in accordance with the number of expeditionary forces without making a wholesale estimation for a long period in expectation of protraction of the incident.

20691 \* Lt. Col. WACHI, a staff officer of the expeditionary forces in China, made a favorable report to the Minister of War in the witness' presence. He reported that the policy of non-aggravation was thoroughly disseminated to the commanders and forces in North China.

Page

For instance, transportation of Japanese troops was prohibited on the railway, and a Japanese soldier in uniform could not use the Fengtai-Peking railway. The soldiers also submitted to customs and search by China Military Police.

20692

\* Every gate in Peking was closed by the Chinese 37th Division, and machine guns were turned on Japanese houses. Despite their being in a position to go into action immediately against any Chinese bombardment, they were operating on orders of the Army headquarters in Tientsin. They had refrained from carrying the wounded into the castle and left the bodies of the dead as they were. They wanted to prohibit anything which would provoke magnification.

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He reported that anti-Japanese sentiment was high among the Chinese officers and soldiers. The Chinese in Pingtsin felt that the 29th Army had won at Marco Polo and the Japanese Army had completely withdrawn, \* and that the Central Operations Staff had moved to Paoting.

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General TERAUCHI, in North China, told him in October, 1937, that the Supreme Command had made the technique of leading actual operations difficult by not showing beforehand the general purpose of operations and points of operation. They had only given the purpose and time of each local operation. The Supreme Command would facilitate matters if they showed the general scope and purpose of operations and leave details to the local commanders; but since the case was an Incident and had no bearing on policy they needed to sacrifice perfection in technique to preserving the localization policy. In the future, both local and central commands must seriously consider the methods \* which would relieve the disadvantage to actual operations due to the localization policy.

20695

In July, 1937, it was decided that the various incidents, together with the lack of sincerity on the part of the Hopei-Chahar authorities to carry out the agreement, and the aggressive actions of the Chinese, made it necessary to mobilize in the homeland. \* On July 26, the General Staff notified the witness that they had firmly avoided mobilization, but the actual situation admitted no delay.

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20696

The Chief of the First Department of the General Staff, who was the strongest opponent of mobilization, admitted on the 26th its necessity for self-defense. On the 27th the War Ministry recognized its unavoidability. A draft was prepared for the Cabinet concerning mobilization of three divisions and was approved, and on the same day the War Minister issued orders, after a Bureau Chiefs meeting, the witness was informed by the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau that on the 27th of July they had decided to mobilize three home divisions; and to maintain the policy of localization and settlement \* on the spot even in case of the outbreak of a self-protective battle. They would do their best not to bring about a situation requiring soldiers to Tsingtao and Shanghai to protect Japanese residents, and to do no damage to personnel of third powers.

20697

The Minister explained that any action in the area would be purely self-defensive and not contradictory to the localization policy. Even if forces were needed in Shanghai or Tsingtao to protect Japanese, it would never run counter to this policy. Japanese forces had acted in strict conformity with the localization of military movements, and would do \* so in the future. He also learned that the Chinese were ordered mobilized on the evening of the 27th, and that the Chief of Staff approved the application of the Army in China to take action against the Chinese 29th Army. He also ordered that actual shooting be limited to the line of the Yungting River.

20698

The witness was informed by his chief that at the five Ministers' meeting held on July 20, they had debated the advisability of the policy to improve the situation by taking means to clarify observance of the principle of equal opportunity in North China to satisfy the western powers, and on the plan to withdraw forces in the area sent from Manchuria and Korea, and to take diplomatic means for solving pending questions. This conference was held between the Prime, Foreign, \* War, Navy, and Finance Ministers. He also heard at the end of July that there was an opinion in the General Staff to neutralize the situation by moving all Japanese forces back to Tientsin to settle the incident, and then to have a personal interview between KONOYE and Chaing Kai-Shek. The Chinese attitude was against this, and it was not realized.

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20699

After the OYAMA Incident at Shanghai on August 10, 1937, the witness received a report from the Chief of the First Section of the Navy Ministry. It stated that the Japanese in Shanghai would not take further steps until they were assured of the sincerity of the Chinese by negotiating, and circumstances might require preparations for sending troops. The Government authorities were of the \* opinion that adequate measures to protect the residents should be taken after the circumstances of the OYAMA Incident came to light, but it was worth-while studying the proposal for preparations for eventual mobilization. On the 13th the Cabinet took up a plan to send troops, and on the 14th this was reconsidered. On the 15th a statement was made by the Government whereby it was decided to send forces to Shanghai of two divisions to protect the Japanese. The words "dispatched force" was used to show it had nothing to do with pure military operations. Mobilization was ordered August 15.

About Tsingtao, he heard that at the Cabinet it was said that the situation was calm and it was possible to maintain the status quo provided nothing disturbed it, but some measure must be taken to protect residents in case of the worst.

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About August 15 or 16, the General Staff decided that China had decided on a policy of over-all military operations. This was based on a report that headquarters had been established on August 15, making Chiang Kai-shek supreme commander of all forces and that the country had been divided into four war zones and general mobilization ordered. On the 16th or 17th of August, the witness was notified that the Cabinet had decided that it was difficult to settle the affair with a policy of localization, since the Chinese had decided on a long war. The utmost efforts should be made to restrict the war to a minimum in time, strategically, and territorially.

20701

Since the original object of Shanghai operations lay in protecting the Japanese residents, \* they had to be confined to a minimum. To prevent a general clash and to avoid trouble with others, Japan first sent less than two divisions temporarily.

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20702 The difference between China and Japan was so great that the situation was not favorable. The Supreme Command first sent five battalions from the first of November to the beginning of December, and five divisions from North China. In addition, in the beginning of November, three divisions landed at Hangchow and later one division landed elsewhere. The battle continued for three months, and in the middle of November the Chinese made a retreat to the northwest. The fact that Japan was obliged to use forces in such a way was considered a strategic error, and shows the circumstances under which Japan was curbed \* by her own policy of localization. SUGIYAMA, ex-Minister of War who became Commander of the North China Expeditionary Army, pointed this out, saying that the delay in occupying Shanghai prolonged the Incident, but the fundamental cause was numerical shortage and military shortages of materials. The Japanese policy of solving the Incident in a short time should have been carried out more thoroughly.

20703 The headquarters of the Shanghai Expeditionary Force was reorganized into the Central China Expeditionary Force, and was entrusted with the duty of operating in Shanghai to settle the Incident. They wanted to find an opportunity to settle any operations near Shanghai, and had no intentions of capturing Nanking. After the battle near Shanghai \* the forces were stationed not to advance beyond the line of Changshu-Soochow-Kashing, so as not to unnecessarily provoke Nanking. He later heard that confidential instructions had been given to forces not to enlarge operations further west than Wusih and Fuchow.

The Imperial Headquarters Ordinance was enacted on November 17, 1937, and Imperial Headquarters established on November 20. Munitions mobilization program began that month, but no order for national mobilization had yet been put in force.

The General Mobilization Law was promulgated in March, 1938. For the first time, in May, 1938, part of that law was applied to the China Incident.

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CROSS-EXAMINATION OF TANAKA, S.  
by Mr. Tavenner

20,705

The witness stated that the War Service Bureau was a Department of the War Ministry, in charge of organization of military forces, regarding their equipment, mobilization, replacement, and policy with regard to national defense. Prior to March 1937 he served as Chief of the Military Service Section for about a year.

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When he stated in his affidavit that a plan of operation against China could not be realized by the General Staff without the approval and cooperation of the War Ministry, he meant that matters concerning the strength of forces and materials necessary for operations is a function of the War Ministry. This means that the General Staff, without the cooperation of the War Ministry, would be unable to draft operational plans or to carry them out. Plans could not even be made without their approval, cooperation, and functioning.

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The strength of a Japanese division \* in peace time was between 10,000 and 12,000. The witness stated he had not said there were 20,000,000 troops; but that there were 2,000,000 Chinese troops. \* He further stated that he did not testify that there were 45 Russian cavalry divisions, but 4.5 divisions.

20,709

He stated there were other errors in his affidavit. The affidavit had been read with respect to a decision on government policy as though he had said the policy was decided either in July or August. The date should be July 7 or 8.

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In connection with the Captain OYAMA incident, the affidavit read as though it took place on August 10, 1932, and it should be 1937.

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The source of his information on the strength of Russian troops was the staff office in Tokyo, but he did not know the source of their information. He stated that the conclusion was reached that it would be dangerous and undesirable to carry out operations in China in light of the military strength of the U.S.S.R. right after the outbreak \* of the Marco Polo incident.



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When asked whether Japan had not in fact entered into a treaty with Germany which was a military alliance against Russia in November 1936, he said he did not know whether such a military alliance was signed or not, that there was no Japanese-German alliance directed against the Soviet Union.

20,713

When asked when it was first decided it was dangerous to attack the Soviet Union without first subduing the forces of the National Government of China, the witness stated that the conclusion reached was not that the forces of China should be subdued before taking up matters with the Soviet Union; the conclusion reached was that to carry on a full scale war against China in itself was very dangerous \* for Japan, and in addition, if war were waged, the existence of Russia made it even more dangerous for Japan. When asked whether he did not consider that before becoming involved in war with the U.S.S.R. it was imperative to defeat China, he said this was a matter on the national policy level, and in his position it was not for him to decide or think of such a matter. It was outside his scope. He believed, however, that the national policy of the time was not to wage war against the Soviet Union, and it is unbelievable that the forces of China should be defeated for that purpose.

20,714

20,715

When asked whether the order \* of the General Staff for immediate settlement in July 1937 was made before directions were given to conduct negotiations with the Hopei-Chahar political group, the witness stated that negotiations with the Hopei-Chahar Regime began immediately after the outbreak and the explanation of the Staff to seek immediate settlement was conducted parallel with the negotiation.

20,716

He had not said that there was a possibility of a headon, protracted war with China. He had testified that there were some misgivings that such a situation might arise. The explanation was made that at the same time these negotiations were being conducted, there was a possibility of a head-on collision. He stated he did not have ideas of an all-out war with China as early as July 8 or 9, but the General Staff explained it that way.

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20,717

The witness stated that the troops sent on July 11 were not sent from Japan but were forces from the armies in Korea and Manchuria. No replacements were made to the Korean or Manchurian forces. When it was pointed out in his affidavit that he mentioned expenditures of the forces which were sent to Korea and Manchuria, \* he said those expenditures were the ones necessary for the forces which were sent from Korea and Manchuria as expenditures in North China. The language section said that the affidavit translation should be - about the expenditures of Japanese forces in Korea and Manchuria. \* According to the language section the original did not say where these forces came from. The witness insisted that it meant forces sent from Korea and Manchuria.

20,718

20,720

20,721

The witness said, however, that when troops in Japan were mobilized on July 27, he believes troops were sent from Japan to China. Three divisions were sent. He denied that he said in his affidavit that four divisions were sent. \* After the passage was again read to him, he said the troops sent on July 27 were definitely three divisions.

20,722

The Chief of Staff of the Army at the time at the front was Lt. General HASHIMOTO, his Vice Chief of Staff \* was Lt. General IMAI. What he meant by referring to documents was the telegram sent by the Vice Chief of Staff. The original was circulated after it had been sent and he saw it. The witness stated that the four divisions mentioned in his affidavit as being sent in July were the three divisions sent from Japan on July 27, and the one division sent from Korea on July 11.

20,723

When asked what documents he was referring to with respect to the order of the General Staff of July 9, \* he said the original of such order was circulated in those sections where it was considered necessary. When asked why directions were given to negotiate with the Hopei-Chahar Political Committee, he said he did not know much about it, but believed that since immediate settlement was sought it was better to conduct negotiations on the spot. He further believed that the Hopei-Chahar Regime at the time possessed the authority and ability to settle the incident. He did not know clearly whether the chief motivation was the fact that SAKURAI, a member of the Japanese Garrison Army, was the advisor to the political group and the Chinese Army.

Page

20,724

When asked whether he knew that no directions were given to negotiate with the National Government, he stated he believed it natural that since the order was sent to the Japanese forces in North China that they would conduct negotiations with the local Chinese authorities. He said that he had heard that the Chinese Foreign Minister on July 12 proposed to the Japanese that mutual concessions be made, but since this was not closely related to his duties, he did not know much about it.

20,725

When asked how he knew so much about the Hopei-Chahar negotiation and knew nothing about the Nanking Government, he stated that under his work he was quite interested in what was going on with regard to the Hopei-Chahar Regime because it was a matter of very grave concern for the military. \* Negotiations with the Central Government were a governmental matter with regard to policies and diplomacy. He was not familiar with the nature of this and did not know about those negotiations.

20,726

When asked whether such negotiations were had by the Japanese Government, he said he heard that negotiations were conducted in Nanking on July 18 or 19. When asked whether this was not based on a letter from Nanking suggesting settlement diplomatically and mutual withdrawal of troops to original positions, he said he had not seen anything that would give him an idea as to the contents of such a letter. He merely heard that such negotiations took place. He had heard \* that such a proposition was made. He did not know whether there were any negotiations by Japan after the receipt of this letter.

20,727

He had heard that Japan made overtures to Nanking that the Chinese cease immediately all warlike activities and Nanking not interfere in the North China negotiations for a local settlement. It was this communication \* which gave rise to the letter from Nanking referred to.

20,728

He had not heard that Japan had demanded recognition of Manchukuo and he did not believe that such a proposal was made. He had no recollection of whether Japan considered making such a proposal and had no time to think of such matters. He had not heard of any proposal of a military alliance as condition for settlement. If so, he would have heard of it, but he \* had not.

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20,729

USHIROKU was Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau and the witness's superior. When asked whether he meant that the order of Chinese divisions to march toward the frontier occurred at the same time as the illegal firing, the witness stated that he heard from the General Staff Office that the ordering of four Chinese divisions near Suchow to march to the frontier, and the illegal firing, \* occurred about the same time, successively. He did not know whether they occurred at exactly the same time, but both occurred about the 10th.

Asked whether he was contending that the action of sending troops on July 11 to Manchuria and Korea was based on the Chinese troop movement, he stated that in view of the fact that the lives of Japanese in the Peiping-Tientsin area were endangered because of this act of China, the government on July 11 issued a statement of policy and in accordance with this the decision to send troops from Manchuria and Korea was made.

20,731

As a result of reinforcement of Chinese troops, the position of Japanese garrison troops in the Peiping-Tientsin area became dangerous and resulted in the lives of the Japanese nationals being in utmost danger. This was the reason for sending the barest minimum of troops. Since the Chinese troops in the area were strongly anti-Japanese, there was a danger that there would be a critical situation arise as to the lives of Japanese nationals. The Japanese forces were between 6000 and 7000, while the Chinese troops without reinforcements had totalled 50,000 to 60,000.

20,732

His statement that the Chinese divisions were being marched north on July 10 was based on information gathered by the General Staff. He denied the statement that no Chinese troops were sent north until after Japanese action sending troops to China and after they had been sent from Manchuria and Korea. Even prior to Japan's decision, the General Staff had gathered information that Chinese troops had been ordered to march north.

He did not know definitely how far the border of Honan Province was from Peiping, but he did not believe it was as much as 300 miles.