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Fukudome  
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14 December 1945

INTERROGATION OF SHIGERU FUKUDOME

Conducted by Lt. Alexander

Others Present: Mr. Shuichi Mizota, Naval interpreter  
Mr. Wada, interpreter  
Mr. Henry Sackett  
Mr. Robt. M. Donihi  
Miss Sally Betae, STENOGRAPHER

- Q What is the address of Admiral Fukudome in Singapore?
- A His present address is the ex-Japanese cruiser, Takao, Singapore.
- Q Does he transact his business from the cruiser?
- A Yes. He has established his headquarters and residence there in accordance with orders from the British Naval Authorities.
- Q What is his official capacity there in Singapore?
- A His present duties are to take charge of the collection of all Japanese Army and Naval personnel and civilians in certain specified areas, to take care of their transportation, supply of provisions, and their repatriation to Japan. In this work he is under the orders of General Mountbatten, the British Commander. In this work he is under the command of the British Naval Authorities, who in turn receive their instructions from General Mountbatten.
- Q When did the Admiral graduate from the Naval Academy?
- A In 1912.
- Q Give a brief summary of his naval career since his graduation from the Academy, giving the highlights, leaving out the routine fleet assignments.
- A He graduated from the Naval Academy in 1912. He became Lt. Cmmdr in 1924. Up to that time, aside from routine fleet duties, he spent one year in the United States and one year as instructor at the Naval Academy. After becoming Lt. Cmdr, he became a student at the Naval War College for two years. Then, he was assigned as navigation staff officer to the training squadron. Upon his return from that voyage, he was assigned to the Naval General Staff as a staff officer for 3-1/2 years. In 1927, he became Cmdr, after which he was assigned to the naval personnel bureau for two years, followed by a one-year trip to Europe and the United States. In 1934, he was promoted to

captain and joined the Fleet Staff. After that, he was a staff officer with the Naval General Staff for three years. Shortly after the outbreak of the China incident, he became Deputy Chief of Staff of the China Seas Fleet for a period of about eight months. In '38, he became commanding officer of the battleship Nagato, which position he held for one year. Then, he became Rear-Admiral and was assigned to the Combined Fleet under Admiral Yamamoto as Chief of Staff. This covered a period from the latter part of '39 to '41. Then he returned to the Naval General Staff as Operations Chief. After that he once more returned to the Combined Fleet as Chief of Staff for one year, this time serving under Commander Koga. During this assignment, on Apr 1 '44, he was injured in an air crash and was returned to Tokyo on sick leave for about three months. In June '44, he became Commander in Chief of the 2d Air Fleet. Then, in Jan 16, '45, he went to Singapore as Commander in Chief of the 10th Area Fleet, Concurrently holding the positions of Commander in Chief of the 13th Air Fleet and also of the First South Expeditionary Fleet.

- Q What duties did he have as staff officer during the three years that he served as staff officer of the General Staff?
- A The first year, he was chief of the 2nd Section, which is concerned with training, and the second and third years, he was Chief of the First Section, which has charge of operations.
- Q As Deputy Chief of Staff of the China Seas Fleet, what in his opinion made the war with China go so slowly?
- A The China incident was primarily the Army's war and your question is so broad in its implications that it is difficult to give a satisfactory answer, but generally speaking, he thinks the reason for the lack of progress is because there appeared to be no set policy. In other words, There was a faction which thought that the war should be brought to a close as soon as an opportunity presented itself and there were some who felt that it should continue. There was no determined policy. It was because of that policy that the sending of our troops or forces was not positive, but sort of trickled through little by little.
- Q What part did the Navy play in the China incident? Did they transport troops, or what?
- A The primary part played by the Navy was (1) blockade of the China Coast; and, (2) support and cooperation with the Army in operations along the Yangtze River.
- Q You mentioned a moment ago the fact that one reason that the war went so slowly was the fact that there was no set policy and that there were two factions - one pushing for the conclusion of the war at a good opportunity and the other and the other clamoring for its continuance. What part did or would the Navy have in it - did the Navy think it was better to go on with the China incident, or if a good opportunity presented itself, would the Navy have shared in that opinion?

A Ever since the Manchurian incident, the feeling in Navy circles, especially in central headquarters, wanted to get out as soon as possible. That is to say, he would not minimize the responsibility of the Navy toward the outside nor toward the Japanese people, although they did not want to go on, they could not stop fighting.

Q We understand that the Navy was committed since the national policy committed them to it but why would the Navy feel along those line unofficially and why did they want to withdraw?

A Beginning with the Manchurian incident and continuing through the China incident, the fleet felt that by getting into these two troubles, our forces were getting their feet deeper and deeper into the mire and if continued long enough, it would lead eventually to war with the U. S. This feeling was not confined to the Navy but was held also by all intelligent men in Japan who had any knowledge of the foreign relations of the period. The Navy did not have confidence in the event of war with the U.S. and for that reason all top level naval officers, both in Tokyo and with the Fleet, feared any trend of event that might eventually lead into a war with the US and they were afraid that the China incident was just such an event. By way of illustrating that feeling of the top level of our Navy circle, he recalls that when he was Chief of Staff of the Combined Fleet under Admiral Yamamoto, the Admiral used to tell him of the fear he had of circumstances that might lead up to war with the U.S. and that was one reason that Admiral Yamamoto had, at the risk of his life, opposed our tie-up with the Axis powers. He was afraid that that would eventually lead up to a Japanese-American war.

Q Was the tie-up between Japan and the Axis powers due primarily to the influence of the Army or was it the Cabinet and the foreign minister?

A Not having been in Tokyo at the time, he does not know the delicate points involved, but he thinks that it would be correct to say that it was the support of the Army as a whole primarily.

Q What effect did the Navy have on the establishment of foreign policy? Did they have any influence?

A He is afraid that the Naval influence on the determination of foreign policy was a very weak one. That is, <sup>not</sup> to say, however, that the Naval Minister as a member of the Cabinet was not responsible for whatever policy was adopted.

Q He made the statement a moment ago that when he was under Admiral Yamamoto, in talking with him, he gained the impression that Admiral Yamamoto was fearful of the outbreak of war with the U.S. It has been reported to us that Yamamoto stated that in event of war with the U.S., he did not think that the Fleet would be able to carry on the fight for more than 1-1/2 years. What was the statement of Adm. Yamamoto based on. Was it the fact that the oil supply was low, or what?

A He himself never heard the Admiral's statement regarding the period of 1-1/2 years in which the war may be carried on, but he believes that Admiral Yamamoto based that statement, if true, upon the study he made of our naval strength and its equipment at the time of his opposition to the three-power pact; that is, with Germany and Italy. At that time, he was Vice Minister of Navy and he strongly opposed that pact because of his feeling that it would lead in time to war with the U. S., in which war, because of our insufficient strength, he had no confidence in the turn out.

Q Does he know where we can locate a copy of the studies made by Admiral Yamamoto regarding your naval strength?

A During the time that Admiral Yamamoto was Vice Minister ~~of the Navy~~, ~~he was in~~ and in the Navy Department, he was on the Navy General Staff, and his studies were carried on entirely independent of each other. Whether any of that material is left, he does not know.

Q Does he know of anyone that can tell us where it might be available?

A The Minister (?) at that time was Admiral Yonai and Admiral Seimi ~~Iney~~ Inouye was Chief of the Bureau of Military Affairs. It is quite possible that Admiral ~~Yonai~~ Yamamoto made the study and had discussions with these two officers who might know that. He does not know. Incidentally, he adds that the three Admirals, Yonai, Inouye and Yamamoto, were all strongly opposed to the Axis tie-up and quit as a result of their opposition.

Q As a result of the alliance with the Axis powers, did <sup>the</sup> Admiral himself feel that such a move was likely to result in eventual war with the U.S.?

A He was in Tokyo at the time the question of the three-power pact was being hotly argued but he shared the feeling that it might eventually lead up to war with the U.S.

Q When did he first feel that war with the U.S. was inevitable?

A When Admiral Nomura was asked to take the post of Ambassador in Washington, he at first objected, saying that there would be no good in his going. In other words, he thought the situation was beyond him and it was only upon the Navy's strong persuasion that he finally accepted. The Navy was counting heavily on him to improve the situation and there was at one time in '41, when certain reports regarding developments in Washington brought to our notice caused Admiral Nagano to rejoice in the belief that things were changing for the better, but when that proved to be without basis, then he ~~fe~~ felt that the time had come when war with the U.S. could not possibly be avoided. That, he believed, was some time in October.

Q What were these certain developments that he mentions/?

A He does not remember what the event was but three problems which were most serious at that time was the question of abrogation of the Treaty with Germany, and withdrawal of our troops from China and French Indo-China, and he believes that the report which caused rejoicing on the part of Admiral Nagano was a report from Washington, more specifically, Admiral Nomura,

informing us as to the extent of concession on our part which might make it possible for an amicable agreement to be reached with the U.S., a concession which we thought we could make.

Q What was the concession that was mentioned there that he thought would be acceptable to Japan?

A That, he does not remember. He thinks it was the concession connected with the abrogation of the Treaty with Germany and the withdrawal of troops from China and French Indo-China.

Q Was he aware of the events that took place at the Sept. 6, '41 Imperial Conference? (The meeting was attended by Prince Konoye, the Emperor, General Tojo, Foreign Minister Toyata (?), the Navy Minister and Chief of Naval Staff of Admiral Nagano.)

A He does not remember what the substance of that Imperial Conference was but since it was early in Sept., he believes it must have had to do with the question of foreign policy toward the U.S., and hence looking for a peaceful solution of outstanding problems.

Q At the Sept 6 Imperial Conference, the Army and Navy proposed to the Emperor that in the event by the middle of October that it was apparent that the negotiations in Washington were not going to be successful, Japan should go to war with the U.S. That was at the suggestion of Army and Navy and I wonder if the Admiral, in conferences prior to Sept. 6, heard any planning regarding the ultimatum that the Army and Navy were to give to the Emperor at that meeting?

A He does not remember that at this Imperial Conference of Sept 6 a proposal was made by the Army and Navy that in the event diplomatic negotiations with Washington did not prove successful by the middle of Oct. we should go to war. <sup>Because</sup> of the position that he held at that time, if such a proposal had been made, he thinks he would have known, and if made the proposal would have been made by the Army and Navy Ministers, but he does not recall if such a proposal was made so he wonders if it was something in the nature of a light suggestion.

Q Apparently before the Army and Navy would make such a proposal to the Emperor, they were fully prepared to back it up and had made extensive plans and preparations and he would have been consulted. The original proposal, as presented to the Emperor, to go to war by the middle of October in the event negotiations were unsuccessful, was later modified. The last report on it was to the effect that in the event negotiations were not going to be successful, they should make preparations for going to war but not actually go to war the middle of October. He was an umpire at the Naval Games held between the 3rd and 13th of Sept. '41. What were his duties as umpire at those games?

A This exercise was held at the Naval-War College. He believes that it was one of the annual exercises and not an extraordinary one. The plans for it were started in June and was participated in by operations officers built from the fleets and naval staffs, the object being to unify plans to maintain equipment at the top level and to promote training. The part that the umpire plays is to get the answers. Hypothetical problems are presented to two sides. The umpire opens up the answers of the two sides and decides which side is victorious.

Q Included in the hypothetical problems - was the problem worked out of the attack on Pearl Harbor, coordinated with a strike against the Philippines?

A All the problems presented at that exercise were taken from the annual operations plans which the Naval General Staff prepares annually, and since the attack on Pearl Harbor had never been up to that time included in those annual plans, that attack did not come up as a problem at that exercise. However, a very small group under Vice Admiral Nagumo suggested the Pearl Harbor attack as a possibility and, however, under very confidential conditions, and hence was known only to a small number besides Admiral Yamamoto. The attack on the Philippines, however, had always been a part of the annual operational plans and hence was presented as a problem but the principal problem had to do with the interceptional operations in waters relatively close to Japan as that had been the nucleus of these annual operational plans. The Admiral, himself, attended the small gathering which for a short time discussed the question of Pearl Harbor but that discussion did not go to the extent of considering a positive attack against Pearl Harbor. Rather, they discussed the possibilities of using the various kinds of ships in the event that an attack should take place. In other words, the question of routes for advance toward Hawaii, and the question as to whether so small a vessel as a destroyer could be used in making that attack. In other words, the questions discussed were principally technical questions of that kind.

Q When Admiral Nagumo made this proposal or suggested this plan, was his suggestion the result of a prior study that Nagumo had made?

A He does not know to what degree Vice Admiral Nagumo had studied the question of attack on Pearl Harbor but as everybody known now, the idea of the Pearl Harbor attack originated with Admiral Yamamoto. The idea was in his mind from some time prior and he had discussed it, especially with Vice Admiral Onishi in whom he had great confidence as an air officer. Admiral Nagumo at that time was commanding the air fleet and was in constant touch with Admiral Yamamoto, so he must have heard of the plans that Yamamoto had, and to what extent those plans had been transmitted to Admiral Nagumo.

Q The Admiral stated that he was a member of a small group before whom the proposal was laid. Who were the other members of that group?

A The small group represented three groups. One was Admiral Nagumo's staff headed by Vice Admiral R. Kusaka, Chief of Staff. From the Combined Fleet, there was the Chief of Staff Admiral Ugaki, since dead, and Rear-Admiral Kuroshima. The third group was from the Naval General Staff, of which Admiral Fukudome was one with two or three others. It is possible that Rear-Admiral Tomioka was one. The latter group of which he was one were there merely as listeners.

Q Where was this plan proposed?

A This took place at the Naval-War College at the time of the exercises and as already stated the discussion was confined to technical questions. It was some time after that, the possibility of attacking Pearl Harbor came to the surface in a more concrete form.

Q Was this the first time they knew that plans had been made or were being made to attack the U.S.?

A No, that was not the first time. He knew more or less that Admiral Yamamoto had this question in mind and was studying it with Admiral Onishi but only as a possibility in the case war should break out between the U.S. and Japan. But this, however, was the first time that there was any discussion.

Q When was the first time that the Admiral actually knew that war with the U.S. would break out?

A The decision to start was taken at the last Imperial Conference which he believes was on Nov. 30. Decision to start ~~operation~~ preparations for war, however, had been taken about one month earlier and instructions from the Imperial General staff to Admiral Yamamoto regarding the duties of the combined fleet in the event of war had been issued to him 1-1/2 months or 2 months earlier and it was only after the Order had reached the Fleet that the question of attack on Pearl Harbor became the question of concrete study on the part of the Fleet.

Q When were instructions from the Imperial General Staff sent to Admiral Yamamoto in the event of war?

A 1-1/2 months or 2 months before Dec. 8.

Q The actual decision for preparation for war was made approximately the last of Oct.? Is that correct?

A Yes, the latter part of Oct - perhaps early November.

Q Rather than ask pointed questions of each phase, I believe it would be more profitable for the Admiral to tell us all about who knew of these plans that had been made - the plans to attack the U.S.?

A That order was in the nature of instructions regarding the final Order that would be sent when the decision to go to war should be adopted. In other words, it was a preliminary instruction and consequently was made known only to the upper level of the Naval General Staff, especially those concerned with operations. It would include all in the Operations Section of the Naval General Staff.

Q Now about Combined Fleet Ultra-Secret Operations Order No. 1 - what part of the plan did he work on?

A He doesn't know what the substance of that order was. Can that be the one issued around Nov. 10 to begin preparation?

Q It is entirely possible that could be that same Order. It was issued from Admiral Yamamoto's Flag Ship, the Nagato, and gave instructions to operating arms and signal facilities, communications, etc. Is that the one he has in mind?

A The Imperial Gen Staff issues order to the Combined Fleet as to the Fleet's duties upon the outbreak of war. How those duties should be discharged is left to the discretion of the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet, subject, however, to the approval of the Imperial Gen Staff and he believes that the Secret Order in question had to do with the commencement of preparations. If such is the case, he does not remember the details but he thinks he can give the general line.

Q Ask him to give the general outline of the orders as he remembers them.

A He thinks that that Order was to the various Fleet units to advance to their standby positions, Admiral Nagumo's air fleet to proceed to Hokkaido and the Submarine Div to the Marshalls. About this time, Admiral Yamamoto sent his Chief of Staff, Ugaki to ~~talk~~ Tokyo to discuss with the Naval General Staff a fleet plan regarding the Hawaiian attack which would be carried out in performance of the fleet duty. Minor details of the development were discussed by the fleet staff members and Admiral Ugaki's subordinates of the Naval General Staff, but the principal discussions were carried on by Admiral Ugaki and Admiral Ito, who was Deputy Chief of Naval General Staff, and Admiral Fukudome, himself, so that with regard to that discussion he may be able to impart to you some facts which you have not heard from any other source.

Q In an operation of that size (Pearl Harbor), taking into consideration the element of surprise necessary for the success of the Mission, what plans did he hear as to how they were going to handle the declaration of war?

A All he recalls definitely in that connection was the decision made that notice would be given before the attack should be launched. In other words, no attack without a declaration of war. He does not remember how much time was to be allowed or what the substance of that notice was, that being a matter for the Government. The Naval General Staff, of course, did not want too much time allowance there, but specified no period. The matter was decided probably in the top liaison meetings that were held from time to time,



which meetings were attended always by the Chief of Naval General Staff and sometimes also by a deputy chief. He believes that the officer who had charge of the Naval Section in determination of this question was the Deputy Chief, Admiral Ito, but since he is not alive, it is possible that Admiral Nagumo, the Chief of the Naval General Staff might know, but he questions it because ~~was-h~~ he had nothing to do with details.

Q Can he think of anyone else who might know the details of that?  
Can he think of anyone else who would logically have been in on those discussions?

A It is possible that Vice-Admiral T. Oka, who was then the Chief of the Bureau of Military Affairs might know since he served in the capacity of secretary to the Liaison Conference and would represent the Navy in the negotiations with the Foreign Office regarding the procedure for notifying the United States.

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Those in attendance the same with the exception of Mr. Wada, interpreter, who was replaced by Commander Carr, interpreter.

Q Let us go back to the meeting with Vice-Admiral Nagumo, who suggested the attack on Pearl Harbor - the period between Sept 13 and Dec 8. I want to develop a little more exactly what was discussed.

A As he recalls, those discussions were based on the premise of an attack on Pearl Harbor. Rather, the questions discussed were technical questions that have to be solved in the event such an attack were to be made, principally with regard to the employment of destroyers, which it was considered necessary in such an operation. Since our destroyers had been designed for use primarily in waters close to Japan, that is short-range, would it be possible to re-fuel in northern Pacific waters in mid-winter. That is not to say, however, that we carried out the study of meteorological - ogical conditions, etc. Discussions were based more on the personal expressions of the members present. Just who said what, he does not remember.

Q What was the general consensus of opinion as to the feasibility of refueling in northern waters?

A He thinks that those discussions did not reach a stage of conclusion on that subject. Later on, when Vice Admiral Ujaki, Chief of Staff of Fleet came to Tokyo, that was one of the important questions discussed.

Q When was it that Admiral Ujaki came to Tokyo?

A He believes that it was just before the 20th of Oct that Admiral Ujaki came up with the plan of operations which had been drawn up by the Fleet in compliance with the Order of the Imperial General Headquarters, issued some time during the first part of Oct regarding the duties of the Fleet in the event of war. As a matter of fact, Admiral Ujaki came to Tokyo twice and Admiral Ito, the Deputy Chief of Naval General Staff, went to the Fleet once and although there was some difference of opinion at first

between the Fleet and the Naval General Staff as regards the plans for the attack on Hawaii, they were smoothed out as a result of the discussions held between the two bodies on these three occasions and the final plan for the attack on Pearl Harbor was thus adopted.

Q Back to the Admiral Nagumo meeting - was it decided what route the task force should follow?

A No, far from it. As already stated, it was merely technical discussion of various aspects without covering the entire plan. The first time that the complete picture of the plan was presented was when Admiral Ujaki came the first time to Tokyo.

Q Were any special technicalities discussed at the meeting, like shallow water bombing and torpedo employment?

A No, such a question was not taken up at the conference in question. However, the suggestion regarding shallow water bombing and torpedo employment came up on some other occasion - just when, he does not remember, but as a technical problem that was studied particularly by Admiral Onishi, who was our leading naval authority of air and it was he who transferred this study to the Department of Naval Aeronautics for them to design and produce a type of torpedo that would be successful for use in shallow water. It is possible that Admiral Onishi might have given some suggestion as to the design. On that question, he believes that the facts are best known to Admiral Kusaka.

Q Were there any discussions regarding the employment of midget submarines?

A He doesn't think that was discussed.

Q Did all of this discussion take place at one meeting with Admiral Kusaka or did discussions take place at different times?

A It took place only once and he believes that was after the completion of the chart exercises.

Q Where did that meeting actually take place?

A One room in the Naval War College.

Q Was that room used for any other purposes? Did they have any of their regular games in it or was that room set aside for meetings of that particular group?

A It was one of the rooms devoted to this chart exercise - one of a group arranged along a row, each room perhaps slightly larger than this one.

Q After they had discussed the plan, what decisions were made? What was the result of the meeting itself?

A No decision whatever was taken. He, himself, was a mere listener. All decisions were taken subsequent to that meeting.

Q Does he know of any decision made by any one as a result of that meeting?

A About the only decision that might be said to have resulted directly from this discussion was a decision on the part of the fleet to continue the study of the employment of destroyers in an attack on Hawaii.

Q You mentioned a few moments ago that Admiral Ujaki returned to Tokyo on Oct. 20 at which time he made a complete study of the situation and had complete plans to attack Hawaii. Did he (Fukudome) attend any meetings wherein Admiral Ujaki's plan was discussed?

A As he stated this morning, there were many detailed points to be discussed. All of those were taken up by the staff officers on the two sides of the Fleet and General Staff. The principal questions were discussed at the meetings attended by Admiral Ujaki, Admiral Ito, Deputy Chief, and Admiral Fukudome, himself.

Q When did these meetings take place - of the upper three?

A Around the 20th of Oct.

Q Here in Tokyo?

A Yes.

Q After they had discussed the various plans, what were the final decisions that came out of those meetings?

A No definite decision came out of Admiral Ujaki's first visit to Tokyo, principally for the reason that the General Staff was opposed to the Fleet's plan and that opposition became so clear cut that Admiral Ujaki returned to the fleet to make a report. That was followed up by Admiral Ito's visit to the Fleet in the latter part of Oct for further discussion on the Pearl Harbor plan. That might not have been his sole purpose. He may have had other business but that was the principal object of his visit to the Fleet, followed by Admiral Ujaki's second visit to Tokyo, also before the end of October and it was as a result of these two meetings - exchanges of visits, that the final plan was adopted.

Q When was the final plan actually adopted?

A At the/very end of October or the very first of November.

Q That was the plan to attack Pearl Harbor as drawn up by the Combined Fleet?

A Yes. That plan was drawn up by the fleet in pursuance to the Imperial General Headquarters' order issued some time earlier as a preliminary order setting forth the fleet's duties in the event of war; those duties being; namely, destruction of the enemy fleet and cooperation with the Army in the taking and occupation of the southern areas. The plan which was finally adopted was in pursuance of the first of those two duties; namely, the destruction of the enemy fleet.

Q When was the preliminary order published? The preparation order, you might say.

A Around the 10th of Oct., he believes. Somewhere between a month and a half or two months before the commencement of the war. Specific dates such as that may be obtainable from the younger staff officers of that time who are now in Tokyo. He, himself, just recalled the exact time.

Q Does he remember any of the younger officers by name that he thinks might be able to furnish us information on that?

A Rear-Admiral Tamioka, who was then Chief of the Operations Section might remember. He is now in Tokyo with his office at the Navy War College.

MR. MIZOTA: Admiral Fukudome desires to make a comment at this point. There is one point that is not clear in his <sup>[Fukudome]</sup> mind. That is with reference to the order of the visits to Tokyo of Admiral Ujaki and Ito. He thinks that the order as he gave it is the right one, but he is not quite certain.

Q Does he know what the points were that were not acceptable in Admiral Ujaki's first plan?

A The principal reason for the opposition of the Naval General Staff to the plan which Admiral Ujaki brought to Tokyo was that the staff did not have confidence regarding the chance of success of the attack on Pearl Harbor. As he stated earlier, the Naval General Staff drew up an annual operational plan and in that plan an attack on Pearl Harbor was never included as taking place as a first step in the war because the studies made by the General Staff had revealed small chances of success. It was considered possible, rather, as a later step in the war; That is, the attack to be undertaken after our Fleet had carried out a successful fleet engagement against your fleet. The plan which we had drawn up from year to year always visualized what we call the "Interception Operation Plan" in which our fleet was to await your attack in waters relatively close to Japan. A second reason for the opposition was from the standpoint of maintaining secrecy of this attack. We gravely questioned whether such a heavy fleet movement could be kept secret long enough to assure the success of its execution. If it should encounter any ship other than a friendly ship, our presence might be communicated to your fleet at once. The possibility of meeting a Soviet ship, even, would give rise to that very danger as we did not look upon Soviet ships as

friendly ships. In addition, we knew that you were carrying out extensive scouting from Hawaii so that in all probability our task force would be discovered a day ahead of that planned for the attack, and consequently would be attacked first, and while our task force could strike back, there would be losses on our side also and even if the loss on the two sides were to be about equal, for instance, 30 vessels on our side and 30 vessels on yours, your loss would be relatively light as compared with the loss of your fleet force. The loss of 30 vessels on our side would constitute a very serious loss to our fleet strength. Another reason for the opposition was the problem of refueling the destroyers. On the basis of our study of meteorological statistics in the northern Pacific in that season of the year we thought that was an extremely difficult problem, especially as the destroyers, owing to their ship cruising radius, would have to be refueled at least three times before reaching their destination. One additional reason was the political effect. It was necessary for the fleet to start preparation at least 20 days in advance and during that time we were still relying on the success of Ambassador Namura's efforts in Washington. As he has already stated, Ambassador Namura had gone to Washington because the Navy had prevailed upon him to go and under such circumstances the Navy feared that the commencement of preparation for the attack on Pearl Harbor as much as 20 days ahead might result in defeating our Ambassador's efforts in Washington. By way of summary, he states that when Admiral Ito called on Admiral Yamamoto at the fleet, he told him in brief that if the idea of waiting in waters close to Japan to carry out our traditional interception operation, wouldn't it be better for you to take the entire fleet into Hawaiian waters with the view to drawing your fleet out for a decisive engagement before undertaking this attack on Pearl Harbor. But in the end, the Naval General Staff finally gave its consent for the fleet plan.

Q Now, how did the final approved plan overcome the problem of secrecy. What point in the second plan differed from the first plan that made the plan to attack Pearl Harbor initially a feasible one?

A On the point of secrecy, the decision was that there should be a declaration of war at a suitable time and then the attack would be started. Admiral Yamamoto apparently felt more worried about maintaining secrecy. He thought the fleet movement could be kept secret. He felt little danger of encountering ships on the route that he had selected. The destroyer refueling problem was a difficult one to be sure but not absolutely impossible. Admiral Yamamoto recognized the importance of not interfering with Ambassador Namura's efforts in Washington and did not wish to take any step that would handicap the Ambassador. He, therefore, made it clear that he would hold himself in readiness to withdraw the task force at any time if there appeared prospect of the negotiations in Washington proving successful. As regards the chances of being discovered by your scouting planes, that objection was over-ridden by the argument that while we might be struck, we could also strike back. Admiral Yamamoto was very insistent on the adoption of his plan because he said that if the main strength of the U. S. fleet was in or around Hawaii keeping an eye on our movements from the flank at all times, it would be extremely difficult for the fleet to accomplish the whole of its duties, including that of cooperating with the Army in holding the raw materials areas to the South. He felt so strongly on this point in fact that he threatened to resign if his plan were to be rejected by the

Naval General Staff. He had studied the problems involved from all angles with subordinates in whom he had confidence. Since he insisted so strongly and the more so as there was no one as fitted to head the fleet, and in whom all officers and men had such confidence, Admiral Nagano finally said that while he himself did not relish the idea of such a risky operation and undertaking at the very outset, he would agree as Yamamoto is so insistent. That consent was given subject to the condition that the fleet maintain its movement in absolute secrecy; that they do nothing that might interfere with the negotiations in Washington, and that it be preceded by a declaration of war.

MR. MIZOTA: He has said that the fleet wanted to do this and the fleet wanted to do that. He has not said this with the intention of giving the impression that the fleet was responsible. He gave you the steps that were taken before the final decision was made. After all, as long as Imperial General Headquarters gave consent, the final responsibility must remain with Imperial General Hdqts.

Q Who was present at the meeting where the final plan was approved -- where Admiral Nagano consented to the plan that secrecy of the fleet was to be maintained, etc.?

A It was not a conference at all. What happened was that Admiral Ito, Deputy Chief, got together the results of the various conferences that had dealt with the fleet and that was where the decision was given. Prior to that, important matters had been reported to Admiral Nagano. It was after the adoption to Admiral Nagano's approval that this condition regarding the declaration of war was transferred. Whether it was through Admiral Nagano or through Admiral Ito to liaison conferences, or from the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, he does not remember through which channel this condition regarding the declaration of war went to the foreign office. It was one of those three channels. These three conditions were determined by the last Deputy Chief, Admiral Ito. Admiral Ito took the condition to Admiral Nagano and requested that they be made conditions before the acceptance of the plan. The conditions were transmitted to Admiral Ujaki by Admiral Ito and not by Admiral Nagano, and later on when the final decision was taken on the attack on Pearl Harbor and Admiral Ujaki came to Tokyo on the orders, he believes that Ito gave the conditions to Nagano directly.

Q He mentioned the fact that the declaration of war was to be served at a "suitable time". What was the opinion along that line? What constituted a "suitable time".?

A About all he remembers definitely is that this condition regarding appropriate time was fixed. His memory is very hazy on the other aspects of that question as regards the substance of the notice, the procedure by which it should be given to the U.S. and as regards the exact time that should be allowed to elapse between said notice and the attack. <sup>Whether</sup> Admiral Ito took the necessary step to the foreign office upon instructions from Admiral Nagano or whether the decision was made in the Liaison Conference or whether as a result of discussion between Ito and Chief of Military Affairs Bureau, he does not remember.

Q Who attended this Conference? Who would normally attend the liaison conferences?

A It was not strictly speaking a liaison conference between the Government and the high command, the high command being represented by the Army and Navy general staffs, accompanied sometimes by deputy chiefs. These meetings were attended in all cases by the two staff chiefs, by the Army and Navy ministers and the Prime Minister and depending upon the question discussed, sometimes by other cabinet ministers, principally the foreign minister and the Treasury minister. Others in attendance were the chief cabinet secretary and the chiefs of the Army and Navy Bureau of Military Affairs, the last three serving in secretarial capacity to the liaison conference.

Q We have the final written plan with the condition regarding the serving of a declaration of war attached to it. A decision had to be made when the declaration of war would be served. Where was the decision made - at what conferences - or, who would know of that decision? At what point along the line was the decision made?

A Aside from the fact that that condition was attached, he does not know the details at all and he thinks the only way you can get it - as to who in the Navy fixed that - is to interrogate Admiral Nagano, then Chief of Naval General Staff, the Navy Minister of the time and Admiral Oka, who was Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau. The three together might be able to give you the information you desire. Afterwards, he heard of the results; namely, that the notice did not get to you in time and that the attack was already going when our Ambassador took the note to Mr. Hull. There are here now in Tokyo several members of the staff who were below him but since he does not know and feels that the decision was made above his level, he feels that his subordinates would not know either.

Q What was the designation of the final written plan giving final details for the attack?

A He believes the designation was "Combined Fleet Secret Order No. x".

Q Does he have a copy or know where one is obtainable?

A There must have been a copy at Fleet Headquarters and also with several divisions, as well as a copy at central headquarters. Whether they are still there or not, he does not know.

Q Did he ever actually see a copy?

A Yes.

Q He doesn't have a copy presently?

A No, he does not have, unfortunately.

Q What was the substance of that plan according to his best recollection?

*Hokkaido*  
A The final order was in three parts: First, preparatory movement; Second, the second preparatory movement; and third, the attack. The first order, issued early in November, was for Admiral Nagumo's Air Fleet to proceed to Okido and the Submarine Division to the Marshalls, those points being the standbys. The order for the second preparatory movement, issued, he believes, immediately after the final decision was taken on November 30, was for Nagumo's Air Fleet to a rendez-vous at a point 600 or 800 (he does not remember) miles northwest of Hawaii and the Submarine Division to proceed from the Marshall to about the same point or a little farther toward Hawaii, and third, which was the order for attack, which was issued on December 3d or 4th. The date of the issuance of the third order is not definite. He said the third or fourth - it might have been the fourth or fifth. The second order, he is certain was issued after the final decision to commence hostilities was adopted on November 30. Even at that time the Navy had not given up hope of the negotiations in Washington proving successful so that when Admiral Yamamoto came to Tokyo on Dec. 3d or 2d to get final orders, he was told by Nagano he must be ready at all times to call back the fleet in case conditions in Washington should warrant such withdrawal.

Q What part of this plan, if any, did the Admiral work on?

A Through the whole of it. In other words, the Naval General Staff issues a general order to the fleet regarding its duties; namely, the destruction of the enemy fleet, and the fleet works out the plan necessary for carrying out that order and the plan comes back to the General Staff for approval of the Chief. In that process throughout, he had connection with it.

Q How did the plan take care of the possibility of discovery of the task force, say between 500 and 1000 miles from Hawaii. What provision did the plan have in that event?

A The order from Admiral Yamamoto to Admiral Nagano commanding the task force - he does not know whether that was a written or verbal order - was to the effect that should the task force be discovered after it had come sufficiently close to Hawaii to make a counter-attack against your fleet in Hawaii possible. That is, they were ready to receive attack first but if they were close enough to strike back at Hawaii to go ahead and render the counter-attack but should the discovery take place while still so far away from Hawaii that counter-attack from our task force would be considered impossible, then to turn back.

Q Without firing a single shot?

A He thinks that this order contemplated all means of discovery, whether by Marines, merchant ship, or airplane.



- Q And if they were discovered to far away for them to counter-attack the task force, were they to turn back to Japan or take elusive action?
- A To come back to Japan.
- Q In event discovery was made within counter-attacking distance of Hawaii, in the case of a ship, for instance, what was to be done to the American ship?
- A A merchant ship?
- Q Yes, a merchant ship.
- A He believes that if there was to be a meeting anywhere with a ship of enemy character, the fleet was to turn back.
- Q At any point?
- A At any point.
- Q You don't mean at any point - even at striking distance?
- A You are right, Sir. If an enemy ship were encountered from which they could not deliver a counter-thrust, then they would turn back, but Admiral Yamamoto had insisted that according to his plan, the route that he had chosen was one upon which there was very little likelihood of encountering a ship of that character and he had chosen that route for that reason.
- Q But surely in a plan so complete in all details, provision for the possibility of discovery was made. What provision was made in the event the fleet was discovered, say 300 to 600 miles from Hawaii?
- A He does not ~~knew~~ remember whether or not the order touched upon that point at all. He does not remember having seen a provision of that kind but under the circumstances, he believes that if an enemy ship had been discovered from a point where attack on Pearl Harbor was possible, the commanding officer by his own estimate of the situation would have attacked the ship simultaneously.
- Q Evidently the element of surprise was considered vital to the <sup>success of the</sup> attack? How did they carry on through to achieve the element of surprise?
- A That is a point upon which the Naval General Staff felt great concern because it meant the sending out of large forces at long before the date fixed for the attack and similar movement in the past had not always been kept secret. There were chances of wires being sent to the U.S. and there was the additional chance of encountering enemy ships or of being discovered by scouting planes. Those were the reasons for the opposition by the Naval General Staff. But, as already stated, Admiral Yamamoto felt confident that his fleet movement could be kept secret, especially on the routes which he had chosen. As for discovery by scouts, he was prepared for that and felt that he could strike back. He felt so confident on this point that he stated that if we can't carry out an

operation of this scale successfully, we certainly can't expect to fight this war successfully. This, he heard from Admiral Ito.

Q Did he or any of the other planners count on the attack actually starting before the defenses at Hawaii could receive any alert notice?

A Hypothetically at least, this plan was based upon the presumption that we should not be discovered until the moment of the commencement of the attack.

Q In other words, the defenses at Pearl Harbor would have no advance alert until the first plane actually struck?

A Since he does not remember or did not know exactly how much time allowance was to be made for the declaration of war, he cannot say whether it was intended to notify Washington in time to transmit that notice to Hawaii before the commencement of the attack. So far as the fleet was concerned, they were ready and expected to be discovered by your scouts and while the General Staff considered such discovery to be seriously disadvantageous, Admiral Yamamoto took the view that it was not so serious since they could, even after such discovery, make their thrust against Pearl Harbor.

Q If the task force had been discovered before the planes had actually been launched, I don't see how in the world they could have had the remotest idea of success if the defenses were fully alerted, interceptory planes were in the air, the fleet itself would have had sufficient time to up anchor and deploy. I don't see how they could have had the slightest chance of counter-attacking.

A As a result of Admiral Yamamoto's minute study of all possibilities, he appears to have come to the conclusion that at any point where our fleet was likely to be discovered, by your scouts, there would be adequate chance for our planes to take off and counter-attack your ships either within the Harbor or if they had sufficient warning to leave the harbor to strike outside, in any case to have the chance to strike back. Of course, this being war, it is conceivable we might have been discovered at some remote point where the counter-thrust might not have been possible.

Q In other words, they were depending on their course they followed on getting them close enough to Hawaii without discovery so that in case they were discovered subsequently, they would have time to get their planes in the air and counter-attack before the defenses in Pearl Harbor had time to do any damage in return.

A The moon was taken into consideration and it was planned to start the planes off the carrier early in the morning to make the attack as early in the morning as possible. It was anticipated that once the planes had taken off, they would be discovered shortly afterwards. But even after such discovery, they could get in to deliver the attack against your fleet whether they were in the Harbor or out and if discovery was made in time, some of your ships might come out with the intention of making a counter-attack

against our task force but there again it was taken into consideration that even though we might suffer, we would still be able to make considerable damage on your side. The discovery by your scouts which we were ready for was not so much or discovery of the task force the day before the attack as discovery of the planes once they had taken off.

Q When they were actually on the way?

A Yes. He has only the general idea on this plan. On the details of the execution of the plan, he believes the best informed officer is Vice-Admiral Kusaka, who was an aide to Admiral Nagano, Chief of Staff.

\*\*\* R E C E S S \*\*\*\*

INTERROGATION CONTINUED UNTIL THE MORNING OF 17 DEC. '45 @ 9:00 A.M.

Present: Admiral Fukudome  
Mr. Mizota  
Lt. Alexander

Q It appears that the Admiral made two trips to the U.S. I am not clear as to the time each trip was made. Will you clarify that in particular for me, please?

A The first time was in 1922. The second trip was made in 1933.

Q What was the nature of the trip in 1922?

A The trip in 1922 was for two purposes: First, being a navigation officer, he was instructed to spend a little time at the New York plant of the Sperry Gyroscope Compass Company. The second purpose was to bring back the tanker Kamoi, which was being built for us in Philadelphia - to bring that back to Japan as the chief officer.

Q He was to take command of the Kamoi?

A Yes, as the navigation officer. Altogether the stay was less than ten months.

Q What was the nature of his duties while he was stationed at the Sperry Gyroscope Company?

A He was really a student there at the Sperry Gyroscope Compass School. He was there as a student. He has no doubt but what his name is on the students' roster there, if you should look into it.

Q About his trip in '33 to Europe and the U.S. What was the purpose of that?

A The second trip was in the nature of a reward for meritorious service in the past. This is a trip given each year to about ten officers of the rank of captain. No particular assignment is given - just a general study of the countries to which they go. In his own particular case, he had a special desire to make a study of Soviet Russia, if possible, and therefore come back to Japan by way of Siberia. But unfortunately they would only give him a visa for a two-day's visit there so he got only as far as Leningrad and had to turn back to Europe again. He went first across the Pacific and through the United States....the trip was hurried and was not more than a sight-seeing trip. Then he went across the Atlantic to Europe. After returning from the short visit into ~~the~~ Soviet Russia, he went down to Italy and went back by boat through the Indian Ocean. This, too, was a visit of about ten months altogether.

Q On his last visit to Europe and the U.S., what countries did he touch in Europe?

A From America to England, visiting Scotland, Ireland, Belgium, Holland, France, where he spent a short time, then into Germany and Poland from which he wished to go into Soviet Russia but they would not let him in immediately. So he went on to Denmark, Sweden and Finland and from Finland he was given a two-day's visa to visit as far as Leningrad, after which he visited the small Baltic States, then back into Germany, Switzerland and finally Italy where he took a boat home.

Q Did this group of which he was a member remain together or did they branch off on individual trips?

A In that particular year, these ten left in two different groups. There were five in his group and all five members stuck together more or less but some wanted to see foreign countries that others did not want to see; for instance, when he went to Russia, others stayed in Germany.

Q Was he at <sup>any</sup> ~~either~~ time on either one of his trips approached by any intelligent agents of the Japanese government?

A About the only contacts in that land were with our naval attaches and naval inspectors upon whom these travelers largely depended on for guidance and assistance in the course of their travels. Aside from that they would make calls at the embassies and legations to pay their respects. At London, for instance, he paid an official call on Ambassador Musdaya and he was later invited back to dinner.

Q What was ever said by whom when and in whose presence relative to serving the declaration of war notice on the U.S.?

A His position at that time was not high enough to entitle him to attend any meetings where such important problems were discussed as he was not entitled even to attend the liaison conferences which we have mentioned before.

the naval representatives at those conferences being Chief of the Naval General Staff and assistants, accompanied by the Deputy Chief. The only thing of which he is certain in that connection is that the decision to declare war was made on November 30 or the day following and that decisive meeting was followed by almost daily liaison conferences so that the procedure for giving notice of the declaration of war to the U.S. must have been decided subsequent to that meeting although it might have been discussed at the very meeting where the decision to declare war was adopted. For definite information on this point, you would have to see someone more, whom we would call senior statesmen who were entitled to sit in on the liaison meetings. He does ~~not~~ remember that among the decisions taken at that time was that notice must be given prior to the commencement of the attack. Just how much time was to be allowed or the method by which the notice was to be given, he was not informed and consequently does not know. He does not remember the facts at all. The three representatives of the Navy who always attended the liaison conferences were the Navy Minister, the chief of the Naval General Staff, and the Chief of the Naval Military Affairs Bureau and sometimes the Deputy Chief of the Naval General Staff. If the Chief of the Naval General Staff, who was Admiral Nagano should say that "I make the decision" that is a different question but he doubts very much if Nagano would know such details because they are decided usually by his subordinates. He believes that the man who would have this information was the Deputy Chief.

Q Who was the Deputy Chief of Staff at that time?

A Vice-Admiral S. Ito. He is inclined to believe that the procedure or the plan for the giving of notice of the declaration of war would be drawn up by the Imperial General Staff, passed on from there to the Prime Minister for his final decision, who in turn would pass it on to the foreign minister for execution.

Q Does he from direct knowledge or hearsay know exactly how the serving of the declaration of war notice on the U.S. was actually accomplished?

A No, he does not remember even the substance of the declaration, nor does he remember who in the Imperial General Staff took it to whom in the foreign office. Subsequent to that, it must have gone to Washington to our Ambassador in the form of a telegram from the foreign minister but what the substance of that message was, he does not know. As he stated on a former occasion when final discussion was held between Admiral Ujaki, Chief of Staff of Commanding Fleet and the Deputy Chief of the Naval General Staff about the attack on Pearl Harbor, the plan was finally adopted subject to the condition that notice be given before the attack and the time of the attack was decided at that time. So if subsequent to that the Deputy Chief of the Naval General Staff was the individual who carried on the subsequent negotiations regarding the declaration of war notice, he must have kept that time in mind and the time fixed for the attack was made known only to those high up in the Imperial General Staff, and on the Navy side, the Chief of Staff, the Deputy Chief and himself. On the Army side, notice must have been given regarding the time to the Chief of the Army General Staff and

perhaps to the Deputy Chief as well. He questions that this information was passed on to the ministers but since the foreign minister took care of the last step of giving the notice to Washington, he must have had some information on that - at least of the time which elapsed between the notice and the attack.

Q For the three days preceding the actual attack, what staff or other meetings did the Admiral attend?

A How many days prior to the attack did you say?

Q About three days.

Q By the fifth, he thinks that the plans had been so definitely formulated that there were no meetings worth mentioning between that time and the morning of the 8th. During those three days he was watching principally the movements of the fleet which was going to take part in the attack, possibly from the standpoint of operations with special emphasis on such matters for instance as the necessity of calling the task force back should the force encounter a ship of enemy nature on the way.

Q What meetings did he attend or what orders did he receive or issue on the 8th of Dec.?

A The only meeting he recalls having had on the 8th was a call that he received from the Chief of the Second Section of the Army General Staff. This Section has charge of information-to decide the question of announcing the results of the attack. The Navy was ~~not~~ in no hurry to make the announcement but the Army was anxious to announce results as soon as possible. In addition to that he recalls that the Chief of the Navy General Staff, Admiral Nagano, called at the Imperial Palace to report to the Emperor on the outcome of the attack and it is also possible - he does not remember exactly - that a cabinet meeting was held in order to enable the Navy and Army ministers to report on the situation to the Prime Minister and the other members of the Cabinet. This also he is not sure about but he thinks it was also on the 8th that a cabinet meeting was held for the purpose of drawing up the Imperial rescript on the opening of hostilities. The draft was then transmitted to the Imperial General Staff for its approval. The announcement was made on that day. He thinks the draft was made and approved on the same day. As respects orders, he received none and issued none on the 8th.

A When was the first time and how was the first time he actually learned that the attack had been carried out?

A He doesn't remember the exact hour. He was still in bed at the Navy Club. He believes it was somewhere between four and five o'clock in the morning when he was informed that the message had come from the fleet saying "Attack successful".

Q He was informed by whom?

A It was some staff officer from the Naval General Staff. There is a direct telephone communication between the General Staff Headquarters in the Navy Dept. and the Navy Club. It might have been Admiral Tomioka who brought the news to

him as he was also staying at the Navy Club at that time.

Q Did he ~~remember~~ learn directly or indirectly of any discussions, orders, or even rumors relative to exactly how the transmittal of the declaration of war was served.?

A The only thing he has ever heard in that connection is the fact that although decision had been definitely taken, notice must be given before the attack could be commenced, and that there was some slip between Tokyo and Washington when our Ambassador went to the State Dept to hand the notice to Mr. Hull, that either Mr. Hull was just given the information of the attack, or he had already gotten the news before Namura had arrived at the State Dept and was further told that the reason for the delay in Admiral Namura's call on Mr. Hull was due to delay in the translation of the message sent from Tokyo. What in turn caused that delay, he does not know. He is rather vague on this part but he recalls having heard that the reason for the delay in the translation of the message was that the day having been Sunday, either later Saturday evening or early Sunday morning, either all of the Embassy staff or the members who have charge of this Section were not there or arrived late at the Embassy. He thinks that there can be no doubt but what the message reached the Embassy in good time but the delay came after that.

Will you ask the Admiral

Q / If there is anything he cares to add to his statement along any line that he has covered, or if there is anything he has thought of over the week-end that he would like to include in the record.

A You mean with particular reference to the declaration of war?

Q With particular reference to the declaration of war, or any point we have touched.

A There are a few points on which the Admiral finds cause for regret on his part. Among them, the death of General Sugiyama, the Chief of the Army General Staff, which makes it impossible for you to get accurate information from the Army staff with reference to the High Command and also the death of Vice Admiral Ito, the Deputy Chief of the Naval General Staff, in whom Admiral Nagano had placed utmost confidence. Admiral Ito was the man who handled most of these delicate problems. Had he been alive he would be able to furnish you with much of the information you desire. As for Admiral Nagano himself, he thinks that Nagano is an impulsive type, inclined to say that "I'll take care of it" ~~even and-assume-responsibility~~ even regarding matters the details of which he does not really grasp and say I'll take care of it and assume responsibility for it so that he hopes that should you have occasion to question him to bear that fact in mind. Because of that aspect of Admiral Nagano's character, you may find in his replies points that do not jibe exactly with statements he has made..

Flowery exchange of compliments followed.

END.

INTERROGATION RESUMED ON 19 DECEMBER, 1945 at 1000 hours

Present: Mr. Keenan  
Lt. Alexander  
Mr. Henry Sackett  
Mr. Lowe  
CoM. Carr  
Mr. Mizota

Q Will you ask the Admiral what was the purpose of the Board of Field Marshals and Fleet Admirals?

A There is a set of regulations governing the Board of Field Marshals and Fleet Admirals which fixes the powers and functions of the said Board. I am not acquainted with the substance of those regulations, however. Its principal function, I believe, is to serve as a body for answering questions - the highest body for answering any questions put to it by the Emperor.

Q Where can a set of those regulations be obtained?

A He feels quite certain that a copy can be obtained in the Navy Department because there is nothing secret about it at all.

Q In what department of the Navy Department would that be filed?

A He believes through the secretariat of the ministry....or probably the simplest channel would be through the Naval Liaison Office.

Q He stated that in his opinion, the purpose of the Board of <sup>Field</sup> Fleet Marshals and Fleet Admirals was to answer questions propounded by the Emperor - questions along what line - dealing specifically with policy matters or the War and Navy Departments?

A Yes, the Board of Field Marshals and Fleet Admirals gives replies to questions submitted to it by the Emperor on matters relating to military affairs. Recalling certain instances where questions have been put to the said Board in the past, he mentions that at the time of the London Naval Disarmament Conference of 1930 when there was strong opposition in Japan against what was considered disadvantageous terms of the said Treaty, the Army and the Navy Departments submitted to the Emperor its plan for its future naval and army program which was considered necessary to cope with the new situation. The Emperor in turn sent those programs to the Board of Field Marshals and Fleet Admirals asking whether the said Board considered that those programs were adequate. The same thing happened, he was informed, at the end of the war. There was a certain section of opinion opposed to ending the hostilities so the Emperor put the same question to the Board again and asked for its advice as to the advantages and disadvantages of bringing the war to an end. Also, in connection with continuous military preparations that are submitted from time to time by the Army and Navy Departments to the Emperor, he consults the Board as regards to the suitability of those preparations. This Board of Field Marshals and Fleet Admirals corresponds to the Privy Council which acts



as an advisory board on matters political. There is, however, a great difference between the two in that the Board of Field Marshals and Fleet Admirals have little actual influence and there was for a time opinion opposed to the creation of fleet admirals and field marshals from among commoners. An opinion favoring the restriction of appointment to this high office can be traced to three princes of imperial blood; namely, Prince Kaiin, Nashimoto, and Prince Fushimi, the last being a fleet admiral and the first two being field marshals.

Q I suppose that those meetings were held by physical contact with the Emperor. Is the Emperor present at those meetings?

A He can't say definitely but he believes that the Emperor attends the meetings.

Q Was the Admiral one of the fleet admirals at any time?

A No, he has never been a fleet admiral - he was only in the lower rank of vice-admiral

Q Did they ever have him take any one else's place in the absence of the fleet admirals at the meetings?

A No, no one sits in as proxy for a field marshal or a fleet admiral.

Q Who were the fleet admirals during 1930 to 1931?

A Admiral Togo was one and he believes that Admiral Ito was still alive at that time - he is not certain.

Q The old Admiral Togo?

A Yes.

Q And in 1941, who were the fleet admirals?

A Prince Fushimi was the only one.

Q How is the fleet admiral designated - does he have a fleet - or is it just a rank?

A Merely rank, both in the Army and Navy.

Q Was Yamamoto ever a fleet admiral?

A He was promoted to that rank after his death.

Q And the Prince ~~Fuishi~~ Fushimi, how does he arrive at the title of "prince" - what does that exactly denote?

A He is a prince of imperial blood and he has been in the navy service ever since his youth.

Q He is still alive?

A Yes

Q In Tokyo?

A In Tokyo.

Q Does he live at the Imperial Palace - is he a member of the household?

A He has a palace of his own. His palace was destroyed in one of the air raids and he is now living in some temporary residence.

Q A moment ago the statement was made that there was some opposition to the forming of fleet admirals and field marshals and the comment was made that it had little actual influence. To me that statement seems inconsistent when taken in view of the importance of the questions propounded to the Board by the Emperor. Will you ask the Admiral to please explain that?

A Perhaps that is due to a mistake in my translation (Mizota). The opposition was not so much to the continued existence of the Board, as such, but rather to the creation of any field marshals and fleet admirals for the reason that the principal qualification for appointment to that high rank was meritorious service in actual warfare and as we had not participated in any war for some time prior to this war, members of the two services who have had qualifications disappeared. Therefore, there was opposition to the creation of new members to that Board from commoners, the princes of imperial blood being given special treatment in that respect. Up to the beginning of the war, we had no commoner who was a member of the Board and it was only some time after the commencement of war that new members were created - persons such as Fleet Admiral Nagano, Generals Sugiyama, Hata, Terauchi and the two Admirals Yamamoto and Koga, the last two having been elevated to that rank after death.

Q With respect to the remark that the Board had little actual influence - will you ask him to clarify that statement a little?

A The reason for his making the statement that it had little actual influence is because since prior to the war for many years its members were made up ~~of~~ exclusively of princes of imperial blood. It was a question of actual power and ability and in actual practice, the function of that Board was more or less incorporated in the function of the Supreme Military Council of which there was one for the Army and one for the Navy.

Q Is that called "Supreme Military Council"?

A Yes - or Supreme War Council, I believe. This body acts as an advisory board in answering questions propounded to it by the Emperor and also it serves as an advisory board to the Navy Department itself. The meetings of this Supreme War Council are not attended by the Emperor.

- Q Back to the Board of Field Marshals and Fleet Admirals. He stated a moment ago that the Emperor consulted this Board with regard to the ending of hostilities. Did the Emperor also consult the Board of Field Marshals and Fleet Admirals with regard to the decision to declare war against the U.S.?
- A He thinks not.
- Q Did the Emperor consult the Board with reference to preparations for war against the U.S.?
- A He does not remember whether there was any meeting of the Board of Field Marshals and Fleet Admirals shortly before the commencement of the war. He believes that there was not.
- Q Does the Admiral remember the incident of last September or early October in '41 when a responsible officer, I'm using this term carefully, of the Japanese Navy publicly announced that the Japanese Navy was itching to fight with the U.S. Navy. Does he recall that incident?
- A Not only did he not hear of any such incident but he does not believe that a Japanese Naval officer in a position of responsibility would have, in those days, made such an irresponsible statement because the atmosphere in responsible circles of the Navy about that time was that they wanted to be prepared for war as well as for peace. That is, if there was to be war, they had to be prepared, but they were working more strongly for the avoidance of war.
- Q I would like to ask him if he knew of an incident just prior to the fall of the Konoye Cabinet. There was a conference of the leading members of the Privy Council and of the Japanese armed forces which had been summoned by the Emperor, who inquired if they were prepared to pursue a policy which would guarantee that there would be no war with the U.S. I am now reading from a memorandum dated Oct. 25, '41 by Ambassador Grew in the State Department papers. The memorandum goes on to say that "the representatives of the Army and Navy who attended this conference did not reply to the Emperor's question, whereupon the latter, with a reference to the progressive policy pursued by the Emperor Meiji, his grandfather, in an unprecedented action ordered the armed forces to obey his wishes. The Emperor's definite stand necessitated the selection of a Prime Minister who would be in a position effectively to control the Army, the ensuing resignation of Prince Konoye and the appointment of General Tojo, who while remaining in the Army active list, is committed to a policy of attempting to conclude successfully the current Japanese-American conversations." Does he know of such an incident? Can the Admiral throw any light on that statement?

A The Konoye Cabinet resigned because of its responsibility to carry out successfully the policy for avoiding war with the U.S. and it is clear that the Emperor was at all times doing his utmost to avoid war with America. He has never heard of the incident that you mention but it is quite possible that the Emperor might have made such a statement about that time because even at the conference of Nov. 30 when the final decision to go to war was made, the Emperor even on that occasion made reference to a poem by Emperor Meiji. The exact words of the Poem he does not remember but the meaning was that "since the people of all the world are brothers, why must there be war?"

Q I want to ask further about a matter which was called to our attention in a memorandum of comment by Ambassador Grew, dated Oct. 25, '41 in Tokyo, in which he says, speaking of an informant in a high position, "I have no reason to doubt the informant's statement that the Emperor is for the first time actively engaged in the formulation of policy in Japan and the announced aim of reaching an agreement with the U.S. is true, some more positive attempt by General Tojo and the new Foreign Minister to render the current conversations more concrete than has heretofore been the case may be anticipated". I am asking him with that background, if he recalls any comments among the Navy Chiefs or the Army marshals, or assistants, about the Emperor finally taking a position of being actively engaged in formulating the policy of Japan? I want to cover this field thoroughly in my questions.

A No, he does not know that the Emperor begun to take ~~an~~ aggressive steps in connection with the formulation of Japan's policy at that time. But he does know that upon the formation of Tojo's cabinet, Tojo was ordered by the Emperor to study ways and means whereby war might be avoided and that General Tojo in turn submitted to the Army and Navy services this problem to be studied - "how war can be avoided" - and that this problem was the first problem with which the two services had to deal during the early days of the Tojo Cabinet.

Q Does he care to comment and state whom he considers the strongest character with the most influence in the Japanese Navy in Sept and October 1941?

A He believes that the Naval officer whom the entire Navy decided as Navy Minister at that time was Admiral Yamamoto for its first choice. Its second choice, he believes, was Admiral Yonai, and third choice, Admiral S. Toyoda.

Q When did Tojo's Cabinet begin to function? Was in on Dec. 2, '41?

A He doesn't remember the exact date but he thinks it was between the 15th and 20th of Oct. - around the 18th.

Q Who had control between the date of the resignation of Konoye on Oct. 16 '41 and Dec. 2, '41 when the year book shows that the Tojo Cabinet first came into legal existence?

A You mean in the intervening time between the resignation of the Konoye Cabinet and the resumption of the Tojo Cabinet?

Q Yes

A Until the appointment of the new Prime Minister, the retiring Prime Minister is ordered by the Emperor to continue performing the duties of his office.

COM. CARR If I may interject a word - I think there is some misunderstanding with regard to "legal Existence" - as to what "legal existence" means. The Cabinet came in in Oct. but was not in legal existence because when the Emperor receives a new cabinet after it has been formed, it is already in legal existence with the investiture and that happened between the 18th and 20th of Oct of that year.

A When they are called in by the Emperor for assignments to their respective posts - given their portfolios - or invested - that is when the Cabinet comes into legal existence - so that in the time in question, Konoye continued acting as Prime Minister until investiture of the Tojo Cabinet formally took place.

Q Was the Admiral in Tokyo waters in Oct. of '41 - or in any part of it - or at a Naval base nearby?

A He was in the City of Tokyo.

Q Was he in the City of Tokyo on Dec 7 or 8th '41?

A Yes

Q Was he acquainted with the movements <sup>of the</sup> detail of the Japanese Navy on the preceding 30 days before Dec. 8th?

A One month - beginning early in November to early December.

Q Does he know of Prince Takam<sup>a</sup>tsu? Does he know of him or who he is?

A Of course he does.

Q Does he know where Prince Takam<sup>a</sup>tsu is now?

A He should be in Tokyo now.

If I may interject a word, I think there is some misunderstanding with regard to "legal existence" - as to what "legal existence" means. The Cabinet ~~came~~ members were chosen by the premier on say the 16th of October, but this cabinet had no legal existence until the ceremony of investiture by the Emperor, which occurred between the 18th and 20th of October of that year.

Q Does he know whether or not it was commonly understood that Prince Takamatsu was one of the close advisors of the Emperor on political matters?

A He does not know what the exact situation between the Emperor and the Prince was but he has heard that owing to the illness of the next younger brother of the Emperor, Prince Chichibu, Prince Takamatsu, being of strong character, was acting in an advisory capacity to the Emperor. However, he does not know to what extent the Emperor acted upon the advice of the Prince because in most cases the Emperor acted upon the advice of competent advisory organizations.

Q Does he know whether or not Prince Takamatsu was thought to be desirous of continuing friendly relations with the United States or otherwise.

A At that time Prince Takamatsu was nominally a member of the Naval General Staff and hence one of the Admiral's subordinates and consequently had occasion to see and talk with him frequently. He therefore knows that similar to the Emperor himself, Prince Takamatsu was also very strongly opposed to this war.

Q How about Prince Higashikuni?

A He cannot say with any degree of certainty at all since he had practically no contact with the Prince who was an army officer but he is inclined to think in common with all princes of Imperial blood, who were about the Emperor, he also was opposed to the war.

Q The Japanese Navy would not take its instructions from anyone in the Japanese Army, would it? The head of the Japanese Navy would be whom - chief commanding officer to the Emperor?

A The Navy Minister is the highest navy officer.

Q Was it a fact, to his knowledge, that the head of the Japanese Navy of operations would take his orders instructions from the Japanese Naval Minister as a matter of fact as well as a matter of form? Who would be the next naval officer in priority to the Navy Minister - in the chain of command?

A The vice-naval minister comes next to the Minister.

Q Then, who is next in the chain of command?

A There is no individual who comes next in command under the vice-minister because it divides up into bureaus.

- Q Who was the vice-naval minister in '41 - in Oct or Nov.?
- A Vice-Admiral Sawamoto
- Q And the name of the Naval Minister?
- A In the Konoye Cabinet it was Admiral Oikawa and in the Tojo Cabinet, Admiral Shimada.
- Q Obviously, the instructions leading the Japanese fleet towards Pearl Harbor had to be issued pursuant to orders which were given or known by the Naval Minister. Isn't that true?
- A There is little difference lying in the chain. The order issued to the fleet to proceed toward Pearl Harbor being an operational order is issued by the Imperial General Staff of which the Navy Minister is a responsible member, consequently, he had knowledge of that order.  
did
- Q But would that movement start before or subsequent to the actual fall of the Konoye Cabinet?
- A What do you mean, sir?
- Q The motion of the ships toward Pearl Harbor. As I understand it, they were going out in that direction equipped to bomb Pearl Harbor but were not to do so until they received a specific code message. Is that correct?
- A No, the movement ~~would-have-to-be-known-by-the-Naval-Mini~~ of the fleet did not begin until after the fall of the Konoye Cabinet, sometime, he thinks, in November.
- Q And that movement would have to be known by the Naval Minister, would it not?
- A He would naturally know that such a movement was on as a responsible member of the Imperial General Staff, but he might not be acquainted with all the minor details.
- Q That would be Admiral Shimada?
- A Yes
- Q Who was vice minister to Shimada?
- A Vice Admiral Sawamoto continued as vice-minister under Admiral Shimada.
- Q Was that one of the two fleets? How was that designated? How would he designate that part of the fleet? Did they have Fleets No. 1, 2, and 3, etc? What was the break down of the fleets with reference to that particular group - the designation of the group that sailed to attack Hawaii? Who was in command of the fleet as it sailed out?

A Vice Admiral Nagano.

Q How was that designated as a unit?

A He believes that it was called the "First Air Fleet" (Daiichi Kokukantai). The First Air Fleet constituted the nucleus of that attack. It was a division supplemented or strengthened by individual units from other fleets.

Q And the supreme operations commander was Yamamoto? What was his title?

A Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet was Yamamoto.

Q That is, of all ships and airplane carriers?

A Yes, including all fleet units.

Q And, of course, he would have to know about the movement before it was carried out?

A Yes, since he is the one who issues the orders, he would have to have all the information on the movements of the ships.

Q Would the chain of command go upwards from Yamamoto to the Vice-Naval Minister - to the Naval Minister and then to the Prime Minister?

A No, that is not correct. The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet is directly under the command of the Emperor although the order comes through the Imperial General Staff, hence the Chief of Naval General Staff.

Q How would the Emperor issue his orders? Through what chain?

A Orders concerning fleet operations are drafted by the Naval Section of the Imperial General Staff; namely, the Navy General Staff. Then it is submitted to the Emperor for his approval after which it is issued to the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet with the understanding that it has been approved by the Emperor.

Q Then the Emperor has to approve a movement of a fleet to commence hostilities against another nation before any action is taken?

A Prior to the commencement of the war, the order concerning the movement of the fleet was issued in three steps: First, an order to the fleet to move to a certain area, such as the Marshalls and Hokkaido; second, to move to standby positions; and third, ordering the attack on Hawaii. With respect to all three steps, approval of the Emperor was obtained.

Q Would you clear up again what seems confusing to us? Would the Admiral describe what constitutes the Naval General Staff - of what offices it consists?



A The Naval General Staff which upon the commencement of the war became the Naval Section of the Imperial General Staff is headed by the Chief of the Naval General Staff, whose position is that of the principal naval staff officer to the Emperor.

Q Who was that in Nov. '41?

A Admiral Nagano. The Naval General Staff assigns to the fleet its duty in the war after having submitted it to the Emperor for his sanction, consequently the Emperor is informed of the main points of fleet duties, such, for instance as the destruction of the enemy fleet, though perhaps with no details of the movements.

Q The Emperor would have a veto power, would he not?

A In all matter relating to war, military aspects of war, the highest individuals responsible are the two service ministers and the Chiefs of the Army General Staff and the Naval General Staff. With respect to naval operations, therefore, the highest responsible officer is the naval General Staff and when he submits a plan to the Emperor, he does so after consultation with the other three. Upon his submission for imperial sanction, however, that sanction is never denied or is any revision made in the plan submitted because the individual officer who submits the plan to the Emperor is the officer responsible not only to the Emperor himself but to the Japanese people as well.

Q But it has to be submitted for approval to the Emperor. It could not be carried out without being submitted to the Emperor, could it?

A No. No order can be issued without the sanction of the Emperor.

Q Are those sanctions of the Emperor given orally or in writing?

A The application for the sanction is usually in writing and the Emperor's signature to that application constitutes his sanction.

Q So, the answer is in writing?

A Yes - but there are occasions when it can be given orally.

Q What would Admiral Shimada do if Admiral Yamamoto issued one instruction and the Emperor issued a contrary one?

A If it became his duty to take the measure necessary in case such a situation arose, which actually never arose because Yamamoto never issued an order except on the basis of an order coming from the Navy General Staff and the official channel....if such a situation arose, however, he would hold the Chief of the Naval General Staff primarily responsible and there would arise then the question of the resignation of the Chief as well as of the Admiral of the Combined Fleet; namely Admiral Yamamoto.

Q The Emperor, of course, would call for the resignation of any subordinate, included the Admiral of the Combined Fleet, would he not?

A Of course, physically, that is possible but in actual practice since the Commanding Chief of the Combined Fleet is appointed upon the recommendation of the Navy Minister who is the highest officer responsible for questions of personnel, he would have to assume the responsibility for bringing about Admiral Yamamoto's resignation.

Q Is it not a fact that the naval minister that is the member of the cabinet must be approved by the Navy - or some group in the Navy?

A Usually the Navy Minister is appointed upon the recommendation of his predecessor in office, the one who is going out. But as exceptions, when there were special difficulties in finding a suitable man, the Prime Minister requests the senior naval officers to recommend someone who enjoys the confidence and popularity among the Navy as a whole.

Q Is there not a constitutional provision which requires that the Minister of the Navy be an active officer on the Naval staff?

A Yes, there is a provision to such an effect but not a constitutional one.

Q Where?

A He thinks it is in the regulations governing the Cabinet.

Q Were they regulations of the Diet or of the Emperor?

A Those regulations were drawn up and passed by the Diet and submitted to the Emperor after approval of the Privy Council.

Q Submitted to the Emperor for approval or just observation?

A Yes, for imperial sanction.

Q And without imperial sanction, they do not have force of law?

A Lacking imperial sanction, of course, it could not take effect but he does not think there has been an instance ever known when that sanction has been refused because should it be refused, it would have to be followed by the resignation of all the responsible persons who approved it before it got to the Emperor; namely those of the Cabinet and Privy Council.

Q I understand that it is his belief that the Emperor was opposed to this war?

A Exactly.

Q Someone had to decide whether there would be war or peace?

A Yes, and that person was the Prime Minister.

Q So, the final decision of the attack on Pearl Harbor came from the Prime Minister.

A No. The final order for the attack on Pearl Harbor came from the high command. In other words, from the Imperial General Headquarters but the relevant questions connected with that, such as the question of giving notification of war, came from the Prime Minister.

Q But the actual decision to go to war, he says, is not made by the Prime Minister. Is that correct?

A No, sir. The high command could not issue the final order for the attack on Pearl Harbor before there was a last decision to go to war. That decision was made by the Prime Minister. The decision to go to war was made by the Prime Minister - but the last order for attack came from the High Command.

Q As a matter of law, we have already found it required, at least technically, the approval of the Emperor to go to war?

A The decision to go to war - not the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Q Yes?

A Technically, yes, since the decision was made at the Imperial Conference, in the presence of the Emperor, and all decisions had to be explained to the Emperor by the officers and officials.

Q And if the Emperor refused the recommendation of the ministers to go to war, then the Cabinet, practically, would fall and a new cabinet would be chosen?

A Whether it is merely because of the long custom of our country when the highest responsible officers submits a question of that kind to the Emperor, his sanction has never been refused. He has expressed his wishes with regard to certain aspects of the questions but has never happened in toto. Should it happen, it would result in the fall of the cabinet. it

Q As a practical matter, Admiral Yamamoto was not in favor of war, Admiral Fukudome believes?

A He was a very strong opponent.

Q I want to get the names correctly. The Naval Minister was Shimada. Does he know what Shimada's views were on the war?

A He believes that in common with the main current of opinion in the Navy, Admiral Shimada was also opposed to the war but he further believes that Admiral Shimada was not of sufficiently strong character to be able to come out and say "I'm opposed". A part of the Navy strongly favored the appointment of Admiral Toyoda who would have been more outspoken in his opposition but he was not appointed owing to General Tojo himself.

Admiral Toyoda was actually called to Tokyo with the possibility of his appointment to the Naval ministry but because of the Prime Minister's strong opposition, Admiral Shimada got the appointment himself. That appointment was based upon the Navy's policy to avoid trouble or open conflict with the Army.

Q Was Toyoda a vice-admiral?

A At the time, he was Commander-in-Chief of Kure, a naval station.

Q Who was next in the chain to Shimada?

A Vice-Admiral Sawamoto.

Q What are Nagano's views, briefly?

A Admiral Nagano was a strong opponent of this war. Furthermore, he was opposed to the Manchurian incident, the China incident, and the three-power pact.

Q What was his position? Chief of Naval General Staff?

A Yes. He was a very close associate of Admiral <sup>NOMURA</sup> Namuro, who went to Washington as our ambassador. It so happened that when Admiral Namuro was first asked to take the post in Washington, he said it was already too late; that he couldn't do any good by going, and it was principally through Nagano's pressure that he undertook this mission and Namuro agreed.

Q What was the highest position held in the Navy by Ambassador Namuro before he became ambassador?

A Member of the Supreme War Council.

Q How many members are there to that?

A ~~The-difference~~ It differs at times but the Navy has usually 5 or 6 members. The army around 10.

Q That is the Supreme War Council?

A Yes.

Q Are its powers great, practically - as to policy?

A Yes, it is considerable inasmuch as it is the highest advisory body on matters military and naval both to the Emperor and to the Navy.

Q Were Tojo's views pretty well known as to whether he was for war or peace before he became Premier in Oct. '41?

A Would "attitude" be as good a word?

Q Yes

A He does not know that Tojo's personal attitude was generally known but certainly the attitude of the main current in the Army was known and for that reason it was felt that whether the future should be determined for peace or war the question could not be settled unless a representative of the Army organized the cabinet as prime minister.

Q There was no doubt about Admiral Yamamoto's views as being contra-war?

A Yes. It was known very definitely and for that reason the Navy would have liked at the time to have made him Navy Minister but had they done so, they don't believe he could have lived. He would have lost his life.

Q What was the crowd behind the Army? Can he give us a better description? Who would be so bold as to reach up and take the life of a man so well known and so highly regarded as Yamamoto? They could not have been a small and inconsequential group in a large empire like Japan?

A That is very difficult to say aside from stating merely that they are what might be termed as the "rightist group" - the kind who always join the body which is the most powerful at the time and which would prove most profitable to them. It is true that when Admiral Yamamoto was vice-minister under Admiral Yonai, his life was threatened by ~~just~~ <sup>such</sup> groups.

Q But such individuals do not remain anonymous when they have great power in a strongly organized nation or an empire like Japan. Can't we know who some of those individuals were? They certainly must have been known. We are not asking for proof of what they said from this witness but we would like to know who they were if he really wishes to help his own Nation and ourselves - and us who would like to reconstruct Japan. We would like to know who the individuals were without binding him so we can make future inquiries. We do not expect him to offer us proof at this time but we think he should have known who some of them were for they were too powerful to remain anonymous.

A No, he is not able to give you names of any leading individuals in this group for one reason because he, himself, through most of his naval career was in the Naval General Staff as distinguished from the Navy Department, which is primarily concerned with the more political aspects, whereas the General Staff is concerned with operations. But he believes that if such organizations as Shimpeitai and Ketsumaitan could be looked into, the leaders of such organizations might be gotten hold of. The man who was recognized as the leader of all such movements was, of course, Mitsuru Toyama. He, however, was a man of good understanding. 39

Q Is he alive?

A No, he is dead.

Q Whoever these individuals were, ask the Admiral if they were not sufficiently powerful to drive Japan in a way different than the Emperor himself desired it to go?

A Yes, and he says that at the time when he talked such matters over with individual army officers, they, too, were not in favor of war necessarily but it just seemed to be the general atmosphere that tended to push the country towards war so that he uses the term "fate" or "destiny" that the country went in that direction. He holds the very strong stand that without withdrawing our troops from China and without terminating the tie-up with Germany and Italy, we could not avoid war - and on those two points the Army absolutely refused to give in.

Q What about the newspapers? Did they have much power with the Japanese people, in his opinion?

A He believes that the newspapers of the time instead of trying to serve as a break against this strong movement, went right along with the main current.

Q Was it not true or a fact that some members of the Army felt that if the decision was delayed beyond Nov. or Dec. '41, that the question of war supplies and munitions would become increasingly difficult for Japan? Was that a part of their decision, in his opinion, to go to war?

A Yes, looking at it from the angle of operations, the Army believes the longer the war should be delayed, the greater would be the disadvantages and that view was shared by the Navy also, if war had to come.

Q Tojo was a member of Konoye's cabinet. Was he Minister of War in Konoye's Cabinet?

A Yes, he was Minister of War.

Q And the Naval Minister was Oikawa?

A Yes.

Q What, in your opinion, caused Konoye's Cabinet to fall and Tojo's Cabinet to come into existence - briefly?

A Since it was clear that the Emperor was at all times opposed to the war, Konoye's Cabinet resigned because of its inability to prevent the situation in the country from going in the direction of war.

Q Was that because he couldn't get the Government in Washington to agree to the Japanese remaining in force in China and because they couldn't come to some more definite agreeable understanding about the Tripartite Agreement?

A Yes, it amounts to that ----

Q Plus the fact that there was an embargo on oil?

A May I continue the last question? It was felt that war could not be avoided unless we accepted some of the conditions or terms offered by the American Government at the time but since the situation here was that we could not persuade the Army to give up their insistence on maintaining a force in China and also continuing the pact with Germany and Italy, the Konoye cabinet resigned

Q Really, it was the strong influence or demand from the Army that made Konoye get out?

A Yes, briefly stated. I think since it was the result of the collision with the Army, he resigned because he could not prevail over the Army.

Q Was there any belief around the Naval circles that the U.S. itself would commence hostilities against Japan or was threatening to unless some things could be solved that were points of difficulty?

A No, he does not believe there was any feeling in the Japanese Navy that ~~if-we-were-not-to-start~~ America would start war. There was, however, constantly, the feeling that should the Chinese Incident continue long enough, we would reach a situation where war would take place, by which side it might be started, we did not know and that was ~~for~~ the reason for the Navy's opposition to the war with China in the first place.

--- RECESS -----

Interrogation resumed at 1450 Hours.

Present: Col. Carr  
Lt. Alexander  
Mr. Henry Sackett  
Mr. Donihi

Q It seems impossible for a man of Admiral Yamamoto's standing to be in danger of his life because of the views he held and it not be a matter of fairly common knowledge as to who the individuals were opposing the Admiral's stand. Admiral Fukudome stated that Yamamoto took several stands at the risk of his life. What we want to find out for our own purposes is to discover more about the subject. Who some of those persons were that Admiral Yamamoto feared would take his life. We would like to run down this lead as much as possible. Perhaps the Admiral can recall some conversations, hearsay, or just anything that might improve his memory on that subject. Will you ask the Admiral, if during lunch-time he was able to recall any that would shed any light on the identity of the individuals who threatened Admiral Yamamoto with his life in the event this contingency occurred?

A No, he was not able to recall any incident or event which would throw light as to who the individuals were who planned the assassination of Admiral Yamamoto in those days. Generally speaking, there were a large number of these reactionary groups, all more or less attached to the Army because the Army was the absolute force at that time, groups that would do anything if paid the price. If he were to name prominent individual leaders of such groups, he might mention Toyama, whom he mentioned this morning, probably the leader of the leading group. Another would be Hashimoto, first name, Kingoro, who was a prominent reactionary. Another would be Sasakawa, first name, Ryochi. Another, Yoshio Kodama and Amano, Tatsuo. One other would be Kagyana, whose first name is Masaharu or it might be Masayuka. Of these individuals, the leader of the group which might have been connected with the threat to take Admiral Yamamoto's life was Amano Tatsuo and one concerning whom he was certain there was no connection with the threat against Yamamoto was Sasakawa.

Q Were these groups designated under any special name or just a group of officers with the same threats and inclinations?

A It is possible that the members of these organizations might have themselves used a certain designation in reference to their organization but the only one of which he knows as being known to the general public was the one led by Toyama, "Kokuryukai", which generally is translated "Black Dragon Society".

Q What political parties were these groups attached to?  
They were

A / Sort of extra-diet groups, protecting the interests of the political party but since they went out of power and the Army came in, they attached themselves to the Army group.

Q Who were some of the other members or leaders of Kokuryukai?

A One was Kuzuu, first name, Yoshahasa. He believes this man is already in your hands.

Q Can you think of any others connected with that?

A He thinks Hashimoto is more or less independent. This Kuzuu was more or less Toyama's right-hand man and upon his death, assumed leadership. Aside from that, he does not remember any others.

Q The other men - how many of those are living now?

A He thinks all but Toyama are living. He doesn't know about Amano but believes he is still alive.

Q What about Kodama?

A Another one who exercised some influence about the time of the war commenced was Iwata, first name, Fumio. This man, however, had no connection with the attempt on Yamamoto's life.



Q Now, this threat on Admiral Yamamoto's life. Was that ever reduced to writing? Did he ever receive a definite threat that his life was in danger?

A No, he himself has never seen anything on paper but heard directly from Yamamoto himself that during the days of his vice-ministry, his life was threatened many times in connection with his opposition to the alliance with Germany and Italy.

Q Did the Admiral ever hear Yamamoto mention any names in connection with these threats on his life?

A He has a hazy memory of recollecting he heard one or two names and he believes that Amano was one of them but he is not at all certain.

Q When you say Yamamoto was vice-minister, you mean vice-minister of Navy?

A Yes.

Q Were all these Army men, whose names you mentioned, soldiers?

A The only professional soldier was Hashimoto.

Q It has always been my understanding that in '41 there was a group of young army officers who were greatly in favor of war, is that true?

A You mean about the time of the alliance with Germany?

Q Yes

A He thinks it can be said that there was a group or groups of young officers in those days who had the idea that if Japan could tie up in an alliance with Germany, that we need fear nothing, not even war with the United States or Great Britain and that in time became the principal activating spirit in the Army, which finally pushed the country into war.

Q As things developed, wasn't it true that certain of those young army officers became leaders in the Army in the carrying on of the war and if so, who were they?

A He thinks it would not be very far wrong to say that all the officers in positions of responsibility in Army central headquarters belong to that school of thought. In other words, that those who graduated from the military academy, followed by graduation from the Army Staff College attain these positions of responsibility in central headquarters and all of them have the same idea so that it might be said that those at the top, such as for instance, the Army Minister and the Chief of Staff the Army General Staff are really moved or influenced by those under them. And, if you insist/getting names of individual officers of that kind, it means practically all of them, he might give you that of Lt. Gen. Kenryo Sato and also Lt. Gen Muto, who was Chief of the Bureau of Military Affairs of the time.

Q Would Tojo himself come into that category?

A How General Tojo really felt himself, of course, he does not know but from all that he could judge from his actions and outward appearance, he believes that General Tojo was representative of this group.

Q As a matter of fact, it was the educational policy, the teachings of these academies that Japan should expand by fighting wars. Is that true?

A Yes, in a measure he would blame the educational system of the Army in that they did not try to teach them to search for means of solving Japan's problem of population and food by means other than that of war. He doesn't accuse them of going so far as to say that war is the only way that the problems could be solved but they failed to teach them to look for other methods. In other words, a peaceful solution of the problems.

Q Did the same educational policy hold true in the naval schools which he attended?

A This is a matter upon which he touched at an earlier meeting but in pre-Meiji days, military education in Japan consisted of instruction not only upon when and how to fight but when not to fight. Since the Meiji restoration, however, half of that was lost sight of and emphasis was laid upon how to fight, in the employment of military forces, and not upon how to avoid war as they should have been taught. Education in the naval academy was not entirely free from this defect either but the difference in results between the Army and Navy arose from the fact that naval candidates had reached the age, they were all high school graduates, when taken into the academy, when common sense and power of judgment and self-control is much higher developed than in the case of the students in the military schools.

Q But you would say that underlying the educational program in both the Army and Navy was the thought that sooner or later Japan would have to expand by means of war?

A It would probably be more accurate to say that, as you can see from the history of Japan, especially since the Meiji restoration, the very rapid increase in population caused the country to reach a stage where it was seriously over-populated and that our efforts to solve that problem by peaceful means, such, for instance, as immigration, failed with the result that the situation had to be overcome; that is, the problem solved by means of war, such as in the case of the Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War, followed by the Manchurian Incident, etc. So it was not so much the idea of fighting a war aggressively in order to expand overseas but that we could not solve the national problems otherwise than by going to war. That appeared to be at the basis of the educational policy as it actually turned out.

Q In other words, because of the population problem, it was a policy of the educational program and eventually the Government to expand by war. The pressure was brought about by the population situation. Because of that situation existing, it developed the policy of the educational program and later the policy of the Government to solve that problem by war?

A Because of the defect in the educational method already mentioned, the students, lacking in their power of judgment based on morality, came to think in very simple terms that war was the means for solving Japan's problem, especially because Japan had happened to solve certain of its problems through the Russo-Japanese War and the Sino-Japanese War and since those who came to hold that erroneous belief were the very ones who had actual military power, especially the Army, they falsely came to control the entirely Army and in time, the Government.

Q As I understand the Admiral, Prince Konoye, the Emperor and certain others didn't favor war. How did they propose to solve the problem?

A He does not think that the Navy had any concrete policy but the idea which principally prevailed in Navy circles was that the Nation's problem of population and food should be solved by peaceful means, by bringing raw materials ~~in~~ from the South into the country to feed our industry and through that industry to produce sufficient goods to feed the people in Japan.

Q In view of the fact that Japan was principally a maritime nation, how did the Army get the upper hand over the Navy in the control of the country.

A He thinks the principal explanation for that is the fact that the Army had its strong line here while the Navy was scattered over the waters outside of Japan proper. Another possible explanation is the fact that the wars fought in the past for solving Japan's problems were fought principally by land forces rather than by the Navy so that not only the Army but the public in general got the idea that the Army was the primary service and the Navy, the secondary.

Q In other words, the Navy was the defensive Group of the nation while the Army had the offensive cast.

A Yes, he thinks it comes down to that.

Q Tell me, who comprises the membership of the Imperial General Headquarters - the office holders?

A The two principal members from the standpoint of responsibility are the Chief of the Naval General Staff and the Army General Staff, and under them they have necessary staff members, consisting of the deputy chief and heads of various bureaus and sections. I should mention as important members along with the two chiefs of staff, the two service ministers.

Q The principal members of the Imperial General Headquarters were the Army and Navy ministers and the Army and Navy Chiefs of Staff?

A Yes.

Q Did that organization have its existence for a long time back, or did that arise out of the last great war?

A He thinks it had its origin as far back as the time of the Russo-Japanese War.

Q The Prime Minister, as such was not a member of the Imperial General Headquarters?

A He is not a member of it.

Q It was strictly a military organization, then?

A Yes

Q As I understood the Admiral this morning, the top chain of command in the Navy is the Minister of the Navy, under him, the Chief of Staff, and under him the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet. Is that a correct summary of the command?

A No, that is not the line of command at all. The Navy Minister, the Chief of the Naval General Staff, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet are on an equal level, all directly under the Emperor in all matters of general administration and personnel. The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet receives his orders from the Navy Minister and on matters relating to naval fleet operations, the order of the Imperial General Staff is transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet through the Naval General Staff.

Q Are the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet, the Chief of Staff, and the Navy Minister all on an equal level?

A No, they are on the same level so that the Chief of the Naval General Staff cannot order the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet to do anything. He merely transmits what is the Emperor's orders in the shape of an order from the Imperial General Headquarters to the Commander-in-Chief.

Q I wasn't clear as to what necessarily had to transpire in order for the Japanese Government to decide to go to war....just the question of going to war. I wish the Admiral would explain again what steps have to take place or better yet what steps did take place in order for the Government to make the decision to go to war.

A The steps which were taken in the decision to go to war, as taken prior to this war, also at the time of the Sino-Japanese and the Russo-Japanese War was made at Imperial Conferences, attended by high officers in responsible positions; namely, cabinet members, President of the Privy Council, and Chiefs of the Army and Navy General Staffs. In the presence of the Emperor, arguments for and against the war are discussed, and the conclusion resulting from those discussions are drawn up by the Prime Minister and then passed on for further discussion in the Imperial General Staff and also at the Cabinet meeting as a result of which the final decision is drawn up, submitted to the Emperor for his approval and when the imperial sanction is given, that is the final decision.

Q How is such an imperial conference called in the first instance. Who calls them?

A Such imperial conference is convened by the Prime Minister with the permission of the Emperor.

Q And is the decision at that first imperial conference made by a vote - such as a majority vote? How is the consensus of opinion arrived at?

A The final decision at the imperial conference is made by the Prime Minister upon the basis of the arguments pro and con advanced by the various members present and he heard with reference to this conference that no member argued that we must fight this war and that no member argued that he was absolutely opposed to the war with the possible exception of the President of the Privy Council, Harra, but he also came to say that if such is the situation, maybe it can't be helped. The majority of the members who spoke up were of the mind that perhaps this war cannot be avoided.

Q But no formal vote is ever taken?

A No.

Q Then the imperial conference is called by the Prime Minister if he thinks the war question is sufficiently important, at which time he arrives at a consensus of opinion as to whether war should be declared or not. Then, you indicate that the matter is referred to Imperial General Headquarters. Why should it be referred to them if the chiefs of staff of the Army and Navy have considered it?

A Pardon me, I think I dropped one point in the answer of your last question. The two chiefs of staff do not take part in the discussion of the question as to whether war should be declared or not. In connection with that question they give their views as to how the forces should be used in event of war.

Q Is the matter of going to war after it has been decided/then referred to Imperial General Headquarters to pass on the same question or for operational purposes. say by the Imperial Conf.

A It is really more in the nature of a notice to the Imperial General Staff.

What comes out of the Imperial Conference is not so much a decision as a conclusion which the Prime Minister draws on the basis of the arguments he has heard from various members. Perhaps the term you use, "consensus" is right.

Q The decision of the Imperial Conference is final, then. It is the first step in the process of the declaration of war?

A Yes. Then it is passed on to the cabinet meeting and then to the Imperial General Staff.

Q As soon as the Imperial conference decides the first step in the question of war, then the matter is referred to Imperial General Staff for consideration. I would like to ask, does this staff have the power to veto or put an end to the thought of declaring war by saying "we are not prepared" or something similar, thereby stopping the matter at that point?

A No, the Imperial General Staff has no power, either to deny or even revise the conclusion reached by the Imperial Conference for the reason that the chiefs of the two staffs have already expressed their opinion as regards the military angle at the imperial conference.

Q I got the impression that they didn't participate in the conference?

A They give their advice from the military angle.

- Q Why is the matter then referred to the Imperial General Headquarters if the ministers were already present at the imperial conference and expressed their views? Why does it go back to them again?
- A He thinks it is more or less a formality or a notice....this is the way we are going to decide.
- Q Then they are being advised that a movement is on foot to declare war?
- A Yes.
- Q As I understand it, the question that is being discussed on whether the country goes to war or not goes to the Prime Minister of the Cabinet? Is that right?
- A Yes, he thinks it is not a mistake to say that.
- Q What is the purpose of referring to the Cabinet? What authority or power do they have?
- A What is decided at the cabinet meeting is probably the wording or the language to be used in the application to the Emperor for his sanction. The procedure and the expressions to be used in the application for imperial sanction is decided there.
- Q Most of the cabinet members would have already attended the original imperial conference, wouldn't they?
- A Yes, all members.
- Q For all practical purposes, when the decision is made at the original imperial conference, the question is decided right then and there and the reference to the chiefs of staff and the Emperor is mere formality. Is that right?
- A Yes, it might be said that way.
- Q Maybe "formality" is not the word - but it is a way of working out the details?
- A Yes
- Q Then, after the matter is referred to the cabinet for wording of the presentation of the statement to the Emperor, the question of declaring war is presented formally to the emperor. Is that true?
- A Yes.
- Q Why is it presented formally to the Emperor?

A Apparently because that is the way it is arranged in Japan. The presence of the Emperor at the imperial conference does not mean he gives his approval on the spot. He expresses his desires or views but he does not give his approval there. It is drawn up by the Prime Minister, placed in writing and then formally submitted to the Emperor. That is true of all other questions discussed before the Emperor. He does not give his approval on the spot. He gives his sanction later when the matter is formally presented. The Admiral, however, is not the best authority to question on this matter. You could get a far better answer from the secretary of the cabinet.

Q In other words, at the original imperial conference, the Emperor is present but he does not bind himself by his presence to any decision that is made there to declare war but reserves the right to decide it at a later date when it is presented formally? Is that true?

A He thinks it is not so much a question of the right being reserved to the Emperor to pass upon it at a later date as the fact that some time is required for straightening out the question, such as the determination of the exact wording, putting it into writing, etc. and to allow sufficient time for that.

Q But it is necessary for the formal papers, after the details have been worked out, to be presented to the Emperor for final approval?

A Yes, that is absolutely necessary.

Q And war could not have been declared in the last instance or any instance under Japan's procedure, unless the Emperor at that stage gave his approval?

A That is true but under the custom or tradition in our country, when the official in the highest position of responsibility; namely, the Prime Minister, submits his application to the Emperor for imperial sanction, he is never refused.

Q In other words, he theoretically has the power but always approves the wishes of the Prime Minister. Is that true?

A That is true and consequently there may be instances where a thing is not always determined exactly in accordance with the Emperor's own personal views in the matter.

Q Because of custom?

A Since it is not a matter of law, I suppose it would be.

Q At the imperial conference that was called for the purpose of deciding whether or not to declare war on the U.S. practically all of those present, the Minister, Chiefs of Staff, and others, concluded in favor of the declaration of war. That wouldn't necessarily always be the situation. Suppose there was strenuous opposition to the war in some sections. How would they express themselves at this meeting if no vote were taken?



A I think what would transpire in such a case would be that the Prime Minister would change the members for someone who would hold views more in accordance with his own or resign.

Q In other words, then, the man that really decides whether the Empire goes to war or not is the Prime Minister in the final analysis, isn't it?

A Yes.

Q In the case of this war, it was Mr. Tojo in the final analysis who decided whether or not war should come about?

A He thinks so.

Q I wasn't/clear on what you said about the participation of the Chiefs of the Army and Navy at the imperial conference. Is there some limit on what they can do at this conference?

A In case of an imperial conference held for the purpose of deciding whether or not to go to war, the chiefs of the two staffs are empowered to express their opinion only as regards the prospects regarding the deployment of forces, , army and navy operations, etc. They have no voice in determining whether or not the country is to go to war - merely in the event decision is made to go to war....

Q Would the Minister of War have a voice in deciding that question?

A Yes, of course.

Q I want to ask a hypothetical question - one that may not have happened. From what you say, the most powerful man, when it comes to deciding whether the Empire shall go to war or not was the Prime Minister. If someone present at the Imperial Conference, some cabinet member, did not agree, he could remove him and appoint a new cabinet member. Also once the decision is made by the Prime Minister and submitted to the Emperor, the Emperor would not veto it. What would you do if the Prime Minister wanted to go to war and a lot of other people did not want to go to war. How would you prevent that from taking place - from going to war?

A Yes, I recognize that such a situation is theoretically possible but in actual practice, if the Prime Minister finds that a majority or even a large number of his cabinet members are opposed to him, he would resign and he believes in the case of this particular war, that if a large number of Tojo's particular cabinet had been opposed to war, the cabinet would have resigned and we would not have had war.

Q In a case when you are deciding whether or not you are going to war, the most important ministers making that decision are the War Minister and Naval Minister, as well as the Home Minister, is it not?

A No, the Admiral believes that the most important ministers are the Army, Naval, Foreign Office and Treasury Minister.

Q But in the Tojo Cabinet that was formed in Oct '41, Tojo appointed himself both War and Home Minister.

A The answer to your last question is "Yes" and perhaps he should add to his answer of the previous question, the Home Minister, as well.

Q So at the time decision was made at the Imperial Conference to declare war on the U. S. and Great Britain, General Tojo spoke with a great deal of authority, both as Prime Minister, Minister of War and Home Minister. Did he not?

A Yes.

Q You will agree with me that probably General Tojo had as much to do with the declaration of war as any one in the Government, won't you?

A Yes, he has no doubt but that he is more responsible than anyone else in the Government.

Q He was the leader of the movement to declare this war, was he not?

A The movement toward war can be traced very far back, but he thinks the last leader was Tojo.

Q Will you tell us what you recall or know about how the last Konoye Cabinet fell and how Tojo was appointed as successor to Konoye?

A The Konoye Cabinet held itself responsible for preventing the situation from developing to a stage where there would be war with the U.S. and it resigned because it was unable to prevent that development and because ~~it~~ as it was said at the time, it could not discharge its responsibility toward the Emperor.

Q Was that resignation voluntary on the part of Konoye, or was it a fact that the Army put a lot of pressure on him to resign?

A It was as a result of the collision with the Army; that is because he could not get the Army to comply with his wishes.

Q What particular person in the Army did Konoye collide with. Was it Tojo?

A He was one of the leaders of that opinion.

Q You will agree with me that if we were looking for some one person to fix the blame for having brought about this last war, that General Tojo would certainly fall in that category, wouldn't he?

A Personally, he feels sorry for General Tojo but he thinks there can be no doubt that that if the war were to be pinned on one individual, he would be the person responsible.

Q I'm not asking for your own personal opinion but what honestly appears to you from the facts. Would you say that was the case from the facts as they appear?

A Yes.

Q Some little time back we were talking about the officers' groups in the Army, at which time General Muto's name was mentioned. What influence did Col. Takamatsu have at that time?

A Takamatsu was a colonel and serving as secretary to Tojo at that time. The ~~office~~ Admiral did not think that he was an officer of outstanding ability but he probably was widely known because of his position as secretary to General Tojo.

Q As secretary to Tojo, does the Admiral feel that he wielded any influence on Tojo?

A He thinks not.

Q What was his opinion of General Mazaki?

A General Mazaki, of course, was some time his senior and he was under the impression that General Mazaki was more or less a representative of that Army clique but while in Singapore, he heard an address made by the General over the radio around Nov. 15 in which he expressed his views regarding the military clique saying that he had at all times been opposed to its policies; that he was opposed to the war, and that now that we had come to our present power, he ~~opposed to the~~ hoped the allied forces would be able to do what we had not been able to do - to destroy the military clique. He does not know whether that belief was held by General Mazaki at all times but nevertheless that is what he stated over the radio.

Q Would he care to add any others to the name of Tojo as being primarily responsible for the war?

A Individuals?

Q Individuals, organizations, or individuals by <sup>virtue</sup> ~~reason~~ of the positions they held.

A The Admiral is inclined to take the view that a large section of the Japanese population are responsible in that many of them, especially representatives of newspapers, commentators, politicians and industrialists, while criticising the action of the Army, trailed along with the Army because to do so meant, perhaps, promotion or ~~employment~~ improvement in social position, personal wealth, etc. A few perhaps, cooperated positively with the Army but the majority while criticising, supported the Army in its actions. If he were to name outstanding individuals among these, he might mention, Shariki, who was President of the newspaper "Yomiuri" and among the industrialists, Arkawa. The Navy cannot entirely be free of blame because while the Navy criticised the Army, they were not able to stop the Army's action and finally got dragged along into it. There was, however, one exception in Navy circles. This man was Admiral Suetesgu, who was a strong proponent of this war. Another Admiral who was opposed at first but came to hold a different view some time after the war had started and expressed views regard it was Admiral S. Takahashi.

Q Will you ask the Admiral whether ornot he can name any member of Tojo's cabinet who was opposed to this war or his policy of war?

A The three who strongly opposed war at the beginning were Togo, Foreign Minister, the Treasury Minister, Kaya and Admiral Shiida, the Naval Minister, but none were able to push through with ~~eh~~ their opposition.

Q Then it necessarily follows that all of the balance of the Cabinet at that time were in favor of Tojo's policy?

A Of course, he did not attend any meeting of the Cabinet so what he says may not be authoritative but he is under the impressions that others were willing to go along with Tojo from the beginning.

Q After was had been declared, I take it that the three he has named as not participating in Tojo's policy at the outset came in as a result of the general trend of <sup>the</sup> Japanese war, after they had enetered into war with the U.S.?

A Yes.

Q Was there uniformity of agreement in the Cabinet at that time?

A Yes, he has heard that by the time war was actually started, the opinion that prevailed in the Cabinet was that whether we liked it or not, it couldn't be avoided, so it had to be fought.

Q That is particularly true of the three men, then?

A Yes.

Q And as to the others that were participants in the planning, as far as he knows, I know he is not an authority.

A He thinks there is a great difference in the degree to which they participated in the planning. For instance, such members as Ino, the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, Hashida, the educational Minister, and Iwamura, the Justice Minister, participated to a far smaller degree as some of the others; for instance, Suzuki, since he was President of the Planning Board and Kishi, Minister of Commerce and Industry.

Q Are there any others that he would consider strong advocates of Tojo's policy - stronger than others, I mean?

A No, he does not know.

Q But he considers then, that Tojo, together with Kishi and Suzuki were the strong advocates of the policy at that time; that is stronger than the balance of the cabinet?

A Yes, he thinks that Suzuki and Kishi, and one more, Hoshino, who was Chief Secretary of the Cabinet, were the three confidantes of Tojo in the Cabinet - and perhaps Tani, President of the Information Bureau.

Q Would you ask the Admiral who was the keeper of the Privy Seal at that time?

A Kido, at that time.

Q From his position in office, would he not have closer access to the Emperor's ear than possibly any other man in the political government at that time?

A Yes.

Q It would follow from that that in his position and advisory capacity to the Emperor, it would be necessary almost that his thoughts and those of the Prime Minister, in this instance, Tojo, would be concerted in the same direction - that is in the same policy before war would necessarily follow. But would you say it would be unlikely that his views and Tojo's would differ before war would be declared?

A No, he thinks not. He does not agree with you, because the Keeper of the Privy Seal's function is not to stop an opinion of the Prime Minister from being submitted to the Emperor but rather ~~that~~ ~~as-an-advisory~~ as one in an advisory capacity, not one to make a recommendation as to what shall be.

Q Who was ~~keep~~ President of the Privy Council at that time?

A Dr. Hara

Q And what, if the Admiral knows, was his opinion in the policy in connection with that of Tojo's?

A In view of the fact that more than any one else present at the Imperial Conference, Dr. Hara express an opinion contrary to that of Tojo, he believes that Dr. Hara must have been opposed very strongly to Tojo's policy.

Q What was Tojo's connection with the East Asia Restoration?

A ~~XXXXXXXX~~ Do you have in mind "KOWA" - which is the development of Asia? He believes that was one of the organizations opposed to Tojo's policy.

Q Perhaps there was a mistake in the translation from the Japanese - wherever this name came from. Why did the Admiral make the statement with regard to Shariki and Arkawa?

A He had no particular reason for mentioning those two names aside from the fact that they occurred to him as having been prominent at the time. Whether they were responsible to a greater degree than the others, he does not know.

Q What positions did Admiral Suetesgu and Admiral Takahashi hold?

A Admiral Suetesgu was long on the retired list and the only official position he held after retirement was as Home Minister for a short period. He was a prominent member of the organization Dai Asia Kyokai, which is "Greater Asia Society", in connection with whose meetings, he used to make speeches, air his views in newspapers and magazines.

Q Now about Admiral Takahashi?

A Admiral Takahashi, toward the end of his active career, <sup>he</sup> was Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet for a period. After retirement and after the beginning of this war, he went about making speeches, calling on the people to fight. He believes that he made these speeches upon being requested to do so by Admiral-~~Shiia~~ Shiada, the Naval Minister, in order to uplift the Nation's morale.

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