

Doc. 3136 Evid

Folder 20

(25)

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

EVIDENTIARY DOCUMENT NUMBER 3126
TITLE: Mimeographed pamphlet entitled, "Report Made by Ambassador
KURUSU on the Negotiations Between Japan and the U.S.A."
dated 6 June 1942. Marked "State Ten Secret."
SOURCE: Foreign Ministry

MICROFILMING

Document 3126 Source: Foreign Ministry
has been microfilmed on 25 Oct 1948 for
permanent historical record.

(None) (Part) of this document had been extracted for court use.

F. MATTISON
Files Unit
Document Division

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 3126

Date: 22 August 1947

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT:

Title and Nature: Mimeographed pamphlet entitled, "Report made by Ambassador KURUSU on the Negotiations Between Japan and the U.S.A.," dated 5 June 1942. Marked "State Top Secret."

Date: 5 June 1942 Original () Copy (X) Language: Japanese
(3 Nov. 1941 - 17 Nov. 1941)

Has it been translated? Yes () No (X)

Has it been photostated? Yes () No (X)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL:

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL:

Japanese Foreign Ministry

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

KURUSU, Saburo; TOGO, Shigeru; TOJO, Fidoki; ARITA, Kachiro

CRIMES OR PHASE TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

Japanese American negotiations; Relations with the U.S.; Planning for aggressive war.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS:

This document contains Ambassador KURUSU'S confidential report of his participation in the negotiations between Japan and the United States from the time he was appointed as special envoy (3 Nov. 1941) by Foreign Minister TOGO to the completion of his mission in the United States and the opening of hostilities.

Of particular significance are statements in his account which

Doc. No. 3126
Page 1.

Doc. No. 3126

reveal KURUSU may have known that the Japanese government had fixed a certain date after which time the negotiations should be concluded.

His report is divided into four parts: (1) Mission to the United States (2) The Trans-Pacific Trip (3) Progress of the Negotiations, (4) The Situation after the Opening of the War.

In the following excerpts quoted from his report, KURUSU describes the instructions given to him by Foreign Minister TOGO and Prime Minister TOJO concerning Japanese policy to be followed in the negotiations and the importance of the time element.

(pp. 1-3)

"At midnight on 3 November 1941 I was called to the official residence of the foreign minister where I was asked by him to go over to the U.S.A. as a special envoy to make last efforts to reach an agreement.

"At that time Togo, the foreign minister explained to me that:

'The relations between Japan and U.S.A. are now in a critical situation; that is to say, the U.S.A.'s attitude is still obstinate and strong and shows no sign of compromise, while her economic pressure against Japan is becoming greater than ever.

'The courageous decision of Japan against the said U.S.A.'s attitude cannot be postponed any more and in addition to these circumstances, the affairs relating to the development of army strength on both sides are very delicate. At this juncture, even the scanty measures left to break the deadlock are becoming more narrow in content and in time. The matter of sending a special envoy to U.S.A., considering the stoppage of traffic, seemed once quite impossible; but if, fortunately, by the kind assistance of U.S.A.'s authorities, there is a possibility of crossing the Pacific by a clipper/plane, there would be a little time (though very short) in days left for the negotiations, after arrival in the U.S.A. from our calculations.'

(Kurusu continues:)

"According to the drafts of A and B of our last proposals shown to me by the foreign minister, the system was rather simple, and in the short time given, I thought through efforts of negotiations, there would be some chance of finding a way through the deadlock, or at least, of knowing the last intentions of the U.S. Government.

"Therefore, I replied to the minister that I would take up the mission."

The next day - 4 Nov. 1941.

"I visited Prime Minister Tojo in his War Ministry residence when Tojo told me, among other things that: 'I think chances of success might be 30 percent and of failure 70 percent.'

"Tojo stressed that, owing to various circumstances in negotiation, there would be no more delay permitted than the certain period of time fixed."

* * * * *

"....I visited the U.S. Ambassador and thanked him for his help in obtaining the plane seat for my trip to the U.S.A. At that time the Ambassador /Grew/ asked me whether I was carrying some new proposal or not, to which I replied, 'no' and he showed an air of disappointment and said that then there would be no need of my going to the U.S.A.

* * * * *

"I also visited ARITA/Hachiro/ ex-foreign minister....and in reply to his question I told him my feelings regarding the state of development of war operations plans." (A.N.-Might also be "I frankly expressed my opinion and the possibility that the plan of operations is being carried on.")

Rush 3 copies

Copy to Mr. Keenan
Copy to Mr. Tamm

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 3126

Date 22 August 1947

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Mimeographed pamphlet entitled, "Report made
By Ambassador KURUSU on the negotiations Between Japan and
the U.S.A.", dated 5 June 1942, Marked "State Top Secret."
Date: 5 June 1942 Original () Copy (X) Language: Japanese
(3 Nov. 1941 - 17 Nov. 1941)
Has it been translated? Yes () No (X)
Has it been photostated? Yes () No (X)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL:

Japanese Foreign Ministry

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

KURUSU, Saburo; TOGO, Shigeru; TOJO, Hideki; ARITA, Hiroshi

CRIMES OR PHASE TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

Japanese - American negotiations; Relations with the US; Planning for Aggressive War

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS

This document ~~contains~~ ^{contains} Ambassador KURUSU'S ^{confidential} ~~report~~ ^{report} of his participation in the negotiations between Japan and the United States from the time he was appointed as Special envoy (3 Nov. 1941) by the Foreign Ministry TOGO to ^{the} ~~his~~ completion of his mission in the U.S. and the opening of hostilities. His report is divided into 4 parts: (1) Mission to the U.S.A.; (2) Trans-Pacific trip; (3) Progress of negotiations; (4) The situation after the opening of the war.

Analyst:

Doc. No. 3126

E. F. Gardner

(see next page)

and ^{that} he thought ^{beforehand} his mission was ^a hard one. ~~beforehand~~

The writings in question ^{are} as follows:

2

(pp. 1-3)

"^{At} In ~~the~~ ^{on} midnight of 3rd November 1941, I was called to the official ^{residence} ~~residence~~ of the foreign minister where I was asked ^{to} go over to ^{the} U.S.A. as a Special Envoy ^{by him} to make ^{make} do last efforts in order to reach agreement.

"At that time Togo, the foreign minister, explained to me that:

"The relations between Japan and U.S.A. ^{are} ~~is~~ now in a critical situation, that is to say, ^{the} U.S.A.'s attitude is ^{still} ~~yet~~ obstinate and strong, and shows no ^{sign} ~~attitude~~ of compromise, while ^{the} ~~her~~ economic pressure ^{against} ~~toward~~ Japan is becoming ^{greater} ~~heavier~~ than ever.

"The courageous decision of Japan against the said U.S.A.'s attitude, can not be ^{postponed} ~~hesitated~~ any more and in addition to these circumstances, the affairs ^{relating} ~~of~~ development of army strength ^{on} ~~of~~ both sides are very delicate. At this juncture, even the ^{scanty} ~~measures~~ ^{are} left to break the deadlock becoming more narrow in contents and in time. ~~As~~ ^{the} matter of sending

^a
~~the~~ special Envoy to U.S.A., considering the stoppage of traffic, seemed once quite impossible, but if, fortunately, by the kind assistance of U.S.A.'s authorities, there is a possibility of crossing the Pacific by a [Clipper] plane, there would be a little time (though very short) ⁱⁿ ~~of~~ days left for the negotiations, after arrival ^{in the} at U.S.A.

(^{own} ~~the~~ calculations...)
 from ~~the~~ calculation x
 (KARUSU continues:)

And, according to the drafts of A. and B. of our last proposals ^{shown} ~~shown~~ to me by the foreign minister, the system ^{was} ~~was~~ rather simple, and in the short time ~~period~~ ^{through} given, I thought, ~~by~~ efforts of negotiation, there would be some chance of finding ~~the~~ way through the deadlock or, at least, of knowing the last intentions of ^{the} U.S. ~~of~~ government.

"Therefore, I replied to the minister, ^{that I would} ~~to~~ take up the mission."

The next days 4 Nov. 1941

On 4th Nov. 1941.

TOJO

" I visited the Prime Minister ^{TOJO} ~~the~~ ^{TOJO} Tojo in his War Ministry Residence, when ^{TOJO} Tojo told me, among other ^{things,} things that: - - - - -

" I think ^{chances of} Success might be 30 percent and the failure 70 percent."

" TOJO

~~At~~ ^{TOJO} Tojo stressed that, owing ^{to} various circumstances in negotiation, there would be no more delay than the certain period of ^{permitted} time fixed."

~~permitted~~

- - - - - * * * * *

"... I visited ^{the} U.S. Ambassador and thanked him for his help in obtaining the plane seat for my ^{trip} going ^{to} U.S.A. At that time, ^{the} Ambassador asked me whether I was carrying some new proposal or not, ^{to} ~~for~~ ^{an} which I replied, No. And he showed ~~the~~ air of disappointment and said that then, there would be no need of my going ^{and} ~~to~~ ^{the} U.S.A."

HACHIRO

" I ~~also~~ visited ARITA, ~~ex-foreign~~ minister... and ^{in reply} replying to his question I told him my feelings ^{regarding} the state of ~~development~~ ~~of~~ ~~war~~ operations. plans."

On 4 November

~~On 4th Nov.~~

Kurusu with Mr YUKI and Mr SHIMAZU flew from OIHAMA to Formosa, and ^{5 Nov.} on 5th Nov. flew from Formosa to Amoy ^{AMOI} and I arrived at Hongkong on ^{6 Nov.} 6th Nov.

From Hongkong ^{he} flew to Manila. on the same day

He continues his account:

" In Manila I saw among others, Mr SEIAR ^{(who was once war minister (Hull))} and told him my mission was a very hard work ^{one}. to which Mr SEIAR replied that my opinion was too much pessimistic ^(rather)

on 7th ² flew from ^{The Philippines} Philippine and on the way stopped ^{each} one night in GUAM and WAKE, and in ^{the} Midway Islands stopped 3 days, owing to the disorder of the plane, and on ^{the} 11th flew from Midway to Pearl Harbor.

On ^{the} 12th ² flew from Honolulu to ^{SAN FRANCISCO,} San Francisco, arriving there on ^{the} 13th.

² Arrived at New York on 15th Nov.

(He made a first ^{the} White House on ^{the} 17th.
visit to

Report made by ^{Ambassador} KURUSU
~~Ambassador~~ on the negotiations
 between Japan and U.S.A.

^{sated} Made on 5 June 1942.

Index

- MISSION TO U.S.A.
1. ~~Affairs of going over to U.S.A.~~
 2. ^{TRANS-PACIFIC TRIP} ~~Across the Pacific~~
 3. Progress of Negotiations
 4. ~~Circumstances after opening hostilities~~
~~circumstances~~ ^{the} ~~situations~~ after opening of the War

There seems ^{to be} nothing in this pamphlet which shows that KURUSU was aware of the Japanese surprise attack against U.S.A.

But in the ^{Chapter I, entitled} ~~Writings~~ ^{MISSION TO THE U.S.A.} of Affairs of going over to U.S.A., I find ~~out~~ some statements which might be construed that he might ^{have known} ~~know~~ that the Japanese government had fixed certain date ^{after} which ^{concluded} ~~the~~ negotiations should be ~~sent to an end~~.

Of particular significance are statements in his account which reveal that KURUSU ~~may~~ ^{may} have known that the Japanese government had fixed a certain date after which time the negotiations should be concluded.

His report is divided into 4 parts: (1) mission to the U.S.A. (2) The Trans-Pacific Trip (3) Progress of the negotiations (4) The Situation after the Opening of the War.

In ^{the} following excerpts quoted from his report, KURUSU describes ~~the~~ the instructions given to him by Foreign Minister TOGO and Prime Minister TOJO concerning Japanese policy ~~to~~ ^{to} be followed in the negotiations and the importance of the time element.

(typist — see attached notes and type ^{red penciled} material in brackets. ~~of~~ underline on the typewrites all indicated statements)

EXHIBIT No.

Processed but not used
I.P.S. Doc. No. 3126A

昭和十七年六月五日稿

來
栖
大
使
報
告

一、渡米ノ経緯

昭和十六年明治節夜半突如急使ニ接シ外務大臣官邸ニ赴ク。樽
 上ニ會スル者東郷外相、西次官以下対米交渉関係主管ノ局課長
 ニシテ、將ニ重要會議ヲ終ルニシ、如云席上外相ハ一應対米交渉ノ現状
 ヲ説明シ之後、不便ニ示シ、此ノ際特使トシテ渡米、交渉を結、爲最
 後ノ努力ヲ試ミ、トテ以テス。蓋シ外相ノ説明ニ依リ、日本ノ國交ハ今ヤ全
 ク危殆ニ瀕セリト云フ、外相ノ如クニシテ、即チ交渉ニ於テ米國ノ態度及
 ハ依然執拗強硬河等ニ協ノ氣勢ヲ示サズ、地方米國ノ經濟
 的壓迫ハ益々重キヲ加ヘ、事リ之ニ対処ス、キ勇斷セ、此ノ上、猶豫
 ヲ許サザル、アル大勢ニ加ヘ、彼我兵力展開ノ関係ハ亦頗ル
 機微ニシテ、此ノ際局面打算ノ爲總力ヲ残シ、且指置ニ内容の且
 時間的幅員愈ニ狭隘トナリ居リ、特使遣米、如キニ天通杜絶ノ現
 狀トシテ考ヘ、一時ハ舍テ断念ノ外モト觀念ニシ、如キ事柄ナリ云々ト云
 フニ存ス。唯外相等ノ説明ニ依リ、幸ヒ此ノ際米國側ノ協カヲ得テ、ク
 ハ「機ニ依リ、太平洋横断可能トシ、於テハ着未後僅クセリ、カサニ交渉
 ノ餘日ヲ存スルニトシ、トキ計算上ニ趣キトス、我ガノ最後案トシテ席上
 内示セリト見甲乙、両案ハ方式比較的簡單ニシテ、与ヘズ、短日時間ニ於テ
 之ノ交渉を結、如クハ以テ局面打開ノ端緒ヲ拓キ得ル、又ハカサトモ常ニ疑
 問ノ患トナリ居ル米國側終局ノ肚裏ニ安止カニ資シ得ル、キセ、ナリト判断シ、
 以テ不肖敢テ重シニ當ルヘシ旨ヲ回答ス。若シ我國ノ事始テ米國有リ
 重大事態ニ直面シ、之ノ突如ニ米國一致ヲ必要トス、キハ、言フ所ハ、

所ナカ國民各層ノ衷心ヨリ油然トシテ盛リ上リ来ルカ
如キ真ノ國民結束ハ決シテ之ヲ強壓ニホカヘカラス(國
民ノ全部ヲテ我國カ最後ノ瞬間ニ至ル迄平和保
持ノ有為ニ手段ヲ盡シタムコトヲ明知セムルニ依リテ
ノニ始テテ達成ヲ期シ得ヘキナリト本使從軍ノ主張
ナカハ事態急迫セル今日靜カニ最適ニ注者ヲ物色詮
衡スルニ邊ナキハ勿論計画セラレソアソ旅ナカハ法ニ鑑ミ
老斷練達ノ先輩ヲ頼ラスカ如キコト又至難ニシテ結
局不使於テ引受ルル外キヲ覚悟セル結果ナリ。

(以下次頁)

次本使ヨリ從來交渉經過ニ通セル適當ナル隨行書記官
 一 選擇ヲ求メ次官等協議ノ結果大体前亞米利加局第一課
 長結城司郎次氏ヲ煩ハスコトナリ、更ニ飛行機ノ座席確保ニ関
 シテハ加瀬課長ニ於テ速カニケルルニ末國大使ノ斡旋ヲ亦ル
 コトトシ茲ニ一應打合セラレシ關係重要書類ヲ受取り歸
 宅萬感ヲ胸ニシテ敬テ一唾ヲ試シ、勿レ朝末更ニ関係書類檢
 討信官ノ説明聽取ニ依リ從來比較的順調ナリシ交渉が七月
 下旬ノ我軍南部佛印進駐ニ依リ俄然行儀ニ阻リタル
 經濟及現下交渉ノ主眼 難案(一)支那撤兵問題(二)支
 那内産開放問題(三)日獨伊三國條約問題ノ三者ニ厚ク
 ル消息概略判明セルカ其間東郷外相ハ總理大臣ヲ
 經テ本使遣來件ヲ奏上、又信官ヨリハ末國大使カ
 斡旋ヲ快諾國務省ニ打電稟請セルヒ日ノ報告アリ
 午後三時ヨリ末國政府ハ本使ノ為「クリフバ」機座席ヲ
 留保スルト共ニ同機ノ定期出發期日ヲ二日間繰下シ本
 使ヲ香港ニ待ツ旨ノ回答アリ渡來ノ準備事茲ニ決
 ス 仍テ吉田日午後更ニ東郷外相ト諸般ノ打合ヲ了
 シタル末午後七時東條首相ヲ陸相官邸ニ訪問、初対面ノ
 同首相ヨリ遣來使節トシテ指示ヲ求メタルが首相ハ上奏ノ際
 本使健康ニ付畏クテ御下問アリタルヒ日ヲ謹言セラシ唯感
 泣ス、同首相ハ本使今次使命達成ヲ願ル困難ナリトス點
 ニ於テハ勿論外相ト要ル所ナキモ、尙末國ハ一兩洋作戦ノ
 用意不十分ナルコト(二)末國民ノ全部ハ未カク我ヲ支持シ
 居ラハルコト(三)護謄、錫等ノ重要國防關係物以負ノ年々
 不十分ナルコト等ニ鑑ミ濫リニ開戦ヲ欲セラルベク交渉成立ノ
 見込ハ不毛絶無ト斷スベカラス、成不口ハ先ア成功三分失

敗七分位ノ公算ナラベトナシ。唯前記交渉ノ難点大
 中撤兵ノ問題ハ断リテ讓歩ノ餘地ナキニト及諸般
 ノ關係ニ鑑ミ交渉ニ結ニ一定期間以上ノ遷延ヲ
 許ササル事情ヲカ説シタリ。仍テ本使ヨリ二三重
 要点ニ付質問シ且與全國一致ニ固スル己心憚ナ
 キ意思見ヲ開陳シタル上辭去シ。次ニ舊日知ノ末國大
 使ヲ訪問飛行機座席斡旋ノ事カヲ謝シ且暇之
 ヲ述ベタル處知同大使ハ本使カ何カ新案提案ヲ携
 行スルモノナラヤヲ質問シ本使カ之ヲ否定セルニ對シ頗
 ル失望ノ面持ヲ示シ斯ノ如クハ能クハ渡来セ
 ラルルノ要ナシト觀測セラルルニ日ヲ舊日知ノ間柄トシテ
 無遠慮ニ申述ベタルヲ以テ本使ハ事態心煩ル事名
 迫セル今日ニ於テ貴大使ノ期待セラルルカ如キ局面
 急速打南ノ妙案アリトモバ敢テ本使ノ渡来ヲ阻
 ヲ迄モナク即刻葉成四頓ニ打電セル事ナズルベキ助
 合ト思考セラルルモ。

(次下頁)

唯帝國政府トシテハ此ノ際平和保持ノ為總テヲ盡サントスル趣
 ヒ旨ニシテ例ヘバ華府ニ於ケル日米雙方ノ交渉ヲ為事者共ニ過去
 半歲餘ノ久シキニ亘リ、同一論點ヲ繰返シ論議シ來レル關係
 上其ノ觀點自然一種ノ型ニ嵌マリ來レルガ如キコト人間トシテ
 絶無ナルヲ保シ難カルベク、幸ヒ本使ノ參加ニ依リ交渉上多
 少ナリトモ新生面ヲ發見シ得ルガ如キコト或ハナキニシモ
 非ナルベシト考ヘ居ル次第ナリト應酬セル處、大使ニ納
 得スル所アリタルモノ、如シ、辭去ニ際シ舊知ノ大使夫人
 フモ招ジ來リ交々本使ト固ク握手、夫人ノ如キハ遂ニ落
 淚數行ニ及ベリ、蓋シ同大使夫妻ガ多年本邦ニ在勤
 シ日米國交増進ニ盡瘁シ來レル經緯ヲ思ヘバ同氏夫
 妻ノ胸中モ亦推測ニ難カラズ。

同夜更ニ引續キ有田前外相ヲ訪問意見ヲ交換國
 内方面ノ重大消息ヲ聽取シタル上、同氏ノ質問ニ應ジ
 作戰計畫進ニ展場合ニ関スル本使ノ心境ヲ披瀝ス。
 歸途更ニ引續キ吉田茂氏ヲモ訪問意見ヲ交換午
 前二時歸宅假睡、午前四時出發東京駅ニ向ヒ結城書
 記官、島津祕書官等ト横須賀線一番列車ヨリ追
 濱ニ至リ、少憩後海軍中型爆撃機ニ便乘一路台
 灣ニ向ヒ午後四時高雄附近ノ岡山飛行場ニ達ス。
 翼ヲ連ネタル海軍航空機ノ雄姿飛行場ヲ壓シ
 切々トシテ胸ヲ打ツモノアリ。

CHARGE OUT SLIP

DATE

22 Aug

EVIDENTIARY DOC. NO. 3126

TRIAL FILE# _____

EXHIBIT NO. _____

BACKGROUND DOC. NO. _____

FILE NO. _____

REGISTRARS _____

U.S.S.E.S. _____

DEFENSE DOC. NO. _____

Signature

[Handwritten Signature]

Room#

364

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. _____

I.P.S. No. 3126

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kaoru hereby certify

that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section,
Foreign Ministry

and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 60 pages, dated 5, June, 1942, and described as follows: "AMBASSADOR KURUSU's report"

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): _____

Foreign Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this
15th day of December, 1947.

K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: K. Urales

Chief, Archives, Section. SEAL
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, HENRY SHIMOJIMA, hereby certify

that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
15th day of Dec., 1947

Henry Shimojima
NAME

Witness: J. B. Lambert

Investigator, IPS
Official Capacity

Processed but not read

Ex. No. _____

Doc. No: 3126-A

AMBASSADOR KURUSHI'S REPORT, 5 June 1942

Foreign Office
SECRET

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Details of the visit to America.
2. Crossing of the Pacific Ocean
3. Details of the Negotiations.
4. Various conditions after the outbreak of war.

1. Details of the visit to America

At midnight on MEIJI-SETSU Anniversary (3 November/ 1941, being sent for by a special messenger unexpectedly, I went to the official residence of the Foreign Minister.

Those present upstairs were Foreign Minister TOGO, Vice-Minister NICHII and Chiefs of the bureaus or sections in charge of the matters concerning the negotiations with America and it seemed that an important conference had just been concluded. After roughly describing the present state of the negotiations with America, the Foreign Minister asked me to go to America as a special envoy to make a last effort to settle the negotiations.

According to the Minister's explanation the relations between Japan and America were, not to mince matters, in a critical state; that is, the American attitude in the negotiations was as obstinate and firm as ever, giving no evidences of compromise. On the other hand, the economic pressure of America had grown more and more serious till the circumstances did not permit any further delay 'in taking' a resolute step to meet it; besides, the relative deployments of the military forces of the two countries were taking a very delicate turn, and the little time left for solving the situation was growing less and less and the 'common' ground 'for agreement' was steadily shrinking. Sending an envoy to America, for example, must be completely given up for the time being in view of the current interruption of communications, and so on. Such were the circumstances mentioned 'by the Minister'. But according to the Foreign Minister's explanation, if it were fortunately possible to fly over the Pacific in a "Clipper" through the cooperation of the U.S. Government, it was estimated that after my arrival in the United States there would be still some more days left, scanty as they were, for negotiation. And on the other hand, as I judged that the two proposals, A and B, which had been shown in private at the meeting as the last proposals of our country, were comparatively simple in formula and that I might be able to pave the way for the solution of the situation, or might at least gain an inkling of America's final intentions which had been always a matter of doubt to

us, so I ventured to reply that I would undertake the important duty. Needless to say, the whole nation should arise as one man to face and overcome the serious situation which has been almost unprecedented in our country, but it is my long cherished opinion that true national solidarity which is to be established voluntarily by the will of all classes of the nation should not be sought by pressure, and that such solidarity may be established only when the whole people are well acquainted with the fact that our country has been doing her best to the last moment to exhaust every means for the maintenance of peace. Moreover, there wasn't, of course, time to look for the most suitable man deliberately at the critical moment, and it was also extremely difficult to trouble an elder experienced senior in view of the mode of travel planned at that time. Such being the circumstances, I came to the conclusion that there was no other way but to undertake the task myself. Then I asked him 'the Minister' to choose a suitable secretary to accompany me who was well-informed of the progress of the negotiations up to that time. The Vice-Minister and others talked the matter over, and as a result, they informally decided to trouble Shiroji YUKI, former Chief of the First Section of the Bureau of American Affairs. And as to securing seats in the airplane, Section Chief Mr. KASE was to promptly ask Ambassador Crew to use his influence. Thus, the main arrangements having been made, I received the important documents related to the matter and returned home. Having a crowd of emotions in my heart, I tried to get some sleep.

On the following morning, from a further investigation of the documents concerned and from hearing of the competent officials' explanations, I became acquainted with the outline of the circumstances under which the negotiations which had progressed comparatively well till then had come suddenly to a deadlock owing to the advance of the Japanese troops into French Indo-China and learned that the most difficult points in this negotiation lay (1) in the problem of evacuation from China (2) in the open-door problem in China, and (3) in the problem of the Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy. Meanwhile, Foreign Minister TOGO reported to the Throne through the Prime Minister that I was to be sent to the U.S.A., and by the official concerned I was informed that the Ambassador of the U.S.A. had readily consented to use his good offices and had cabled to the State Department calling for its approval regarding the said question. In the afternoon the American Government gave a reply that it would reserve a seat for me in the "Clipper" and that the plane would wait for me at Hongkong postponing her departure for two days. Now all the arrangements for my leaving for America had been completed.

Then, after having made various arrangements with Foreign Minister TOGO, I called on Premier TOJO at the War Minister's official residence and, as special envoy to America, I asked the Premier, whom I was meeting for the first time, to give his instructions. The Premier told me, recalling reverently to the mind what His Majesty had told him

at the time of his report to the Throne, that His Majesty had been graciously pleased to ask questions about my health, and I shed tears of gratitude. Of course, the Premier fell in with the Foreign Minister's view that it would be very difficult for me to accomplish my mission, but he expected that America would not wish the commencement of hostilities rashly in view of the fact that (1) the preparations for the two-ocean operations were insufficient, that (2) the whole American people had not yet approved of war, and that (3) important national defense materials such as rubber, tin, and so forth, had not sufficiently been provided for, and it was his opinion that we should not conclude that there would be absolutely no possibility of concluding the negotiations, and that the probability of success to failure was as three to seven. He then emphasized that, of the three difficult points in the negotiations, the problem on the withdrawal of troops would admit of no concession whatsoever, and that in view of the various circumstances no postponement of more than a certain period of time would be permitted for the concluding of negotiations. I said good-bye to him after asking a few questions on some important points and giving my frank views on national unity. I then made a farewell visit to the American Ambassador, an old friend of mine, to thank him for his kind services in arranging a plane seat for me. He asked me if I were taking any new proposal with me. At my answer "no", he looked much disappointed and frankly expressed the view as an old acquaintance that if such be the case, there was no necessity of my taking the trouble of going over to America. On this, I told him that if we had a capital plan that would immediately save the situation under the current acute situation as the Ambassador expected, an immediate wire to Washington would save my going to America. However, it was our Imperial Government's aim to try every possible means to maintain peace. For instance, as both the American and the Japanese negotiators in Washington had repeatedly discussed the same points at issue for more than six months in the past, we should not be able to guarantee, humanly speaking, that the points of their observation had not become stereotyped and, to my thinking, there might still be some chance that my participation would lead to a somewhat new phase.

The Ambassador seemed to have understood me. On my leaving, the Ambassador called in Mrs. Grew whom I had known for a long time and we shook hands. She was moved to tears finally. Considering that Mr. and Mrs. Grew had been in Japan for a long time endeavoring to promote the relations between America and Japan, I did not find it hard to enter into their feelings. After that, the same night, I called on ex-Foreign Minister ARITA to exchange opinions with him and heard some very important home news from him. In reply to his question I expressed my opinion as to any possible development in the military operation plan. On my way home, I further visited Mr. Shigeru YOSHIDA and after exchanging views with him, returned home at two a.m., and took a nap. At four in the morning, I left home for Tokyo Station. I went to Oppama with Secretary YUKI and confidential Secretary SPIMAZU by the first train on the Yokosuka Line. After a short rest, we got in a middle sized Navy bomber and flew straight to Formosa. At 4 p.m. we reached

Okayama Airfield near Takao. The grand spectacle of Navy planes flying side by side overawed the airfield and made a deep impression upon me.