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ROKA
EXPANSION
PROGRAM

93480

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KMAG

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FILE NO.

SUBJECT ROK Army Expansion Program 93480

TO ~~G-1~~ ~~G-4~~ G-2

FROM JSPOG

DATE 16 Dec 1952

COMMENT NO. 1
Lt Col Babcock, 605

For your information and file, there is attached a copy of a brochure prepared by KMAG at the time of General Eisenhower's Korean visit which gives statistical information in respect to the proposed expansion program for the ROK Army.

1 Incl
Cy of ROKA Expansion
Program

for G. C. M.

DD FORM 1 FEB 50 96 REPLACES NME FORM 96, 1 OCT 48, WHICH MAY BE USED.

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

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Dep for Navy ( )
Scty Div Gp ( )
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Sp Asst Radio ( )
Sp Asst 441 CIC ( )
Sp Asst Fiscal ( )
Sp Asst Comd Rpt ( )

Adm Officer ( )
Mil Pers ( )
Civ Pers ( )
Pers Sgt Maj ( )
Files ( )
T/S Control O ( )
Message Center ( )
Supply ( )
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Intelligence Div ( )
Security Div ( )
441st CIC ( )
500 MI Svc Gp ( )
FEC/LG ( )
Doc Res ( )
SSO ( )
Japanese Liaison ( )
Action Center ( )

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INDEX

Section I - ROKA Expansion Program

ROKA Troop Program	Tab A
Projected ROKA Activation Program	Tab B
Proposed ROKA Division Activation Schedule	Tab C
KMAG Expansion	Tab D
Manpower Limitations Affecting ROKA	Tab E
ROK Budgetary Support of ROKA	Tab F
Comparative Costs, ROKA - US Division	Tab G
Equipment Comparison, ROKA - US Division	Tab H
Comparative Costs, ROKA - US Soldier	Tab I

Section II - General Data

Population Statistics	Tab J
Registration of Males 17 - 40	Tab K
Educational Level, Draft Registrants	Tab L
Educational Level, ROKA	Tab M
Grade Distribution, ROKA	Tab N
Officer Qualifications, Typical ROKA Division	Tab O
Average Monthly Strength, ROKA	Tab P
ROKA Units Activated Since 1 July 1951	Tab Q
RTC Input	Tab R
ROKA Casualties	Tab S
KMAG Organization, ROKA Division	Tab T
ROKA Division Organization	Tab U
Personnel Comparison, US - ROKA Division	Tab V
Training and School System ROKA	Tab W
Cumulative Output ROKA Service Schools	Tab X
ROKA Officers at US Schools	Tab Y
Pay and Allowances, ROKA	Tab Z
KATUSA, Strength and Assignment	Tab AA
Korean Service Corps	Tab BB

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FORWARD

The charts and narrative contained in Section I of this folder summarize the proposed expansion of the ROK Army to a total strength of 639,194, including 20 divisions, which is the program recommended by FECOM to the Department of the Army.

Numbered 1 through 9 to correspond with the briefing prepared by KMAG, these charts include a comparison of the old (10 division) ROKA Troop Program with the interim 12 division program and the recommended 20 divisions, together with the proposed activation schedule by which this expansion can be accomplished. The extent to which the Republic of Korea can support this expansion, both from a manpower and a budgetary standpoint, is presented together with comparative equipment costs of ROKA and US divisions and comparative costs of supporting a ROK and US soldier of equal grade and service.

In summary, while the presentation shows that the proposed expansion program must be almost wholly supported by the United States from a cost standpoint, its accomplishment is possible at billions of dollars less cost than a similar program involving US units.

Section II is included here as background material, and has been designed to clarify questions that might arise in a discussion of the proposed ROKA expansion.

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SECTION I

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ROKA TROOP PROGRAMS



	OLD (10 DIV)	INTERIM (12 DIV)	RECOMMENDED (20 DIV
TOTAL	362,946	415,120	639,194

NON-EFFECTIVES

SERVICE ELEMENTS

COMBAT ELEMENTS

PATIENTS	36,000
NON-ORG STUDENTS	10,000
GEN PRISONERS	4,000
REPLACEMENTS	105,600
PIPELINE	12,000
INTERPRETERS	3,400
UNALLOCATED SPACES	10,149
TOTAL NON-EFFECTIVES	181,149*

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Chart 1

ROKA Troop Programs

This chart shows a comparison of the old (10 division) ROKA Troop Program with the recently authorized interim (12 division) program and the FECOM recommended 20 division program.

The elements included in the non-effective figure are the same in each case, only the numbers varying. With the exception of replacements, the non-effective figure included in the 20 division program is arrived at by a proportionate increase in the actual number of non-effectives now included in ROKA. The replacement figure of 105,600 is based on an induction rate of 1100 per day and a 16-week training program. Non-organic students are those who are sent to schools prior to being assigned to units. A pipeline factor is necessary because in the ROK Army, individuals in transit between units are dropped from the morning report of the losing unit upon departure and are not picked up on the gaining unit's morning report until they actually arrive. In other words, the ROK Army does not have an EDCSA system as in the American Army. The other non-effective categories are self-explanatory.

When the 20 division program is completed, the ROKA division slice will be 31,960 as compared with a US world-wide division slice of 60,000. However, these figures are misleading due to the fact that a substantial percentage of ROKA service support is furnished by US units. Thus, the percentage of service troops to combat troops in ROKA is only 35% as compared with a percentage of 74% in the US Army in a combat area such as Korea.

We have no way of determining the exact percentage of ROKA service support furnished by US units. Quartermaster, Signal, Medical and Engineer support is usually provided by ROKA. Most complex items of equipment, however, are serviced entirely by US technical services, including electronics equipment, heavy Ordnance, Engineer and TC equipment.

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PROJECTED ROKA ACTIVATION PROGRAM
(CUMULATIVE TOTALS)



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Chart 2

Projected ROKA Activation Program

This chart depicts the projected ROKA activation program separated according to combat and service elements and also shows the remainder of the previous activation program still to be completed. All three of these factors must be considered in determining the personnel needed to support the program and the time required to complete it.

It will be noted that the bulk of the proposed program is made up of combat elements requiring 146,425 spaces. The new service elements require 38,999 spaces and only 20,169 spaces are needed to complete the previous activation program. The latter figure includes both combat and service elements but principally the latter.

The combat portion of the proposed activation program is covered more fully by a later chart.

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PROPOSED ROKA DIVISION ACTIVATION PROGRAM

INFANTRY DIVISIONS (— DIVARTY)

12th* 10 NOV — 31 DEC
15th* 10 DEC — 31 JAN
"A" 28 FEB — 20 JUNE
"B" 28 MAR — 18 JULY
"C" 25 APR — 15 AUG
"D" 27 JUNE — 17 OCT
"E" 25 JULY — 14 NOV
"F" 22 AUG — 12 DEC
"G" 24 OCT — 13 FEB
"H" 21 NOV — 13 MAR

DIVISION ARTILLERY

** 12th FA Gp 73d & 75th FA Bns (105) 15 NOV — 7 MAR
15th FA Gp 76th & 77th FA Bns (105) 15 DEC — 4 APR
78th & 79th FA Bns (105) 19 JAN — 9 MAY
100th & 101st FA Bns (155) 16 FEB — 6 JUNE
FA Gp (2) 105 Bns 16 MAR — 4 JULY
FA Gp (2) 105 Bns 13 APR — 1 AUG
FA Gp (2) 105 Bns 11 MAY — 29 AUG
FA Gp (2) 105 Bns 15 JUNE — 3 OCT
FA Gp (2) 105 Bns 13 JULY — 31 OCT
FA Gp (2) 105 Bns 17 AUG — 5 DEC
FA Gp (2) 105 Bns 14 SEPT — 2 JAN
FA Gp (2) 105 Bns 12 OCT — 30 JAN
(2) 105 FA Bns (2) 155 FA Bns 16 NOV — 6 MAR
(2) 105 FA Bns (2) 155 FA Bns 14 DEC — 3 APR
(2) 105 FA Bns (2) 155 FA Bns 11 JAN — 1 MAY
(2) 105 FA Bns (2) 155 FA Bns 15 FEB — 5 JUNE

* ACTIVATED 8 NOV 1952 ** ACTIVATED 15 NOV 1952

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ROKA STRENGTH & UN-US SUPPORT LEVELS



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Chart 3

Proposed ROKA Division Activation Schedule

This chart shows the proposed activation schedule for the additional 10 divisions and the artillery in the expansion program, as well as the length of the training period of each unit. The division activation schedule is based on two assumptions: That three division training sites will be used and that full equipment will be made available by the time each division begins training. Since it is known that necessary equipment will not be available prior to 28 February 1953, it is proposed to resume the division activation program on that date.

The 12th and 15th Divisions were activated 8 November, although the latter will not be actually organized until just prior to starting its training program on 10 December. The training program for these two divisions covers a period of only 7 weeks. It can be compressed in this manner because the divisions are largely formed of units already in existence. The training program for each of the remaining eight divisions will be of 16 weeks duration, since no existing units are available to be incorporated into these divisions.

The 12th Field Artillery Group, consisting of a group headquarters (later to become a Div-arty Headquarters) and two 105mm battalions was activated 15 November and will complete training 7 March 53. It and the next succeeding three groups are those authorized under the interim program, the field artillery portion of which will accordingly be completed 6 June. The remaining 32 battalions are included in the FECOM recommended total expansion program. The training period for each field artillery group is 16 weeks. The artillery training program will be conducted by the Artillery School of the Korean Army Training Center at Kwangju.

Summarizing, the division activation program runs from 8 Nov 52 to 21 Nov 53, with the last division becoming operational on 13 March 54. The artillery portion of the program extends from 15 Nov 52, the date the first group was activated, to 5 June 54 when the last two battalions become operational.

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KMAG PERSONNEL EXPANSION



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Chart 4

KMAG Expansion

In order to furnish necessary advisory support for the recommended ROKA expansion program, a considerable increase in KMAG strength will be necessary.

The present KMAG ceiling is 1,918, although this figure is not enough to provide advisors for all of the ROKA units now in existence. A new Table of Distribution recommending a ceiling of 2,401 was accordingly submitted to EUSAK on 9 September 1952. The recommended interim strength of 2,580 includes this 2,401 plus 179 spaces to take care of the interim program. The proposed total KMAG strength of 3,864 will be sufficient to take care of the recommended expansion of ROKA to its full strength of 639,194.

It should be emphasized that the recommended KMAG total strength represents a maximum figure and includes advisor spaces for a training and school system operating at peak capacity in addition to advisor spaces for all of the new units. As the expansion program nears completion, it will be possible to reduce RTC and school input, and KMAG personnel requirements can also be reduced from this maximum figure. However, the exact amount of the reduction cannot be determined at the present time.

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ROK MANPOWER LIMITATIONS AFFECTING ROKA



(MAXIMUM WARTIME ATTRITION 40 % PER ANNUM ANNUAL REPLACEMENT FACTOR 118,000.)

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Chart 5

The ROK Manpower Limitations Affecting ROKA

There is a definite limit to the maximum size army that can be supported by the Republic of Korea from a manpower standpoint under a wartime attrition rate.

At the present time, all Korean males between the ages of 17 and 40 are required to register for selective service, but present ROKA policy is to confine inductions to the 18-26 year group; as far as possible no men older than 30 years are being inducted.

Assuming that the war lasts two years and a 40% wartime attrition factor applies, the Republic of Korea can support a maximum army of 650,000 (Column 2). If the war lasts as long as three years with a similar attrition rate, the 30-35 year age group will also have to be inducted in order to maintain the recommended 639,000 man army (Column 3).

Finally, the chart shows that if the war lasts over three years and if the same attrition rate continues, the 639,000 man army cannot be maintained even by utilizing the entire 17-40 age group, unless physical standards are lowered. In short, the recommended 639,000 man ROK Army is considered the maximum which the Republic of Korea can maintain over any extended period of time. This was pointed out by the Chief, KMAG, in his August Command Report in which he stated that the maximum army which the Republic of Korea could support was approximately 600,000 men.

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ROK BUDGETARY SUPPORT OF ROKA (PER ANNUM)



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Chart 6

ROK Budgetary Support of ROKA (Per Annum)

In April, 1952, a board composed of representatives of FECOM, EUSAK, Japan Logistical Command, 2d Logistical Command and KMAG determined that the total costs of a ROK Army of 362,946 men for the ROK fiscal year 1952 would be $937,712,242. (The ROK fiscal year 1952 runs from 1 April 52 through 31 March 1953). Of this amount, the ROK government has appropriated $88,357,440, or 9.4%, leaving a balance of $849,354,802 to be assumed by the United States.

When it became evident that the strength of the army would exceed 362,946, ROKA requested the ROK government to pass a supplemental appropriation which would increase its support of the army to $96,975,798. It is believed that this supplemental appropriation will be made available. Since the total annual cost of a 415,120 man army is estimated to be $1,082,036, the cost to the United States of this size army is expected to be $982,060,502.

To support as far as possible the recommended 20 division army of 639,194 men, ROKA has requested the ROK government to increase its FY 1953 appropriation for the army to $234,401,651. The total annual cost of this size army is estimated to be $1,596,294,000 and the cost to the United States would be $1,361,892,349. ROKA would be contributing 14.7% of the total cost. However, it is believed by this headquarters that ROKA's figure of $234,401,651 is unrealistic and the maximum which can be contributed by the ROK government is approximately $100,000,000. This would reduce the portion of the total cost paid by the ROK government to approximately 6.2%.

The total cost figures for the 415,120 strength and 639,194 strength armies are estimates determined by increasing the known cost of the 362,946 man army on a percentage basis and are probably low because of the greater proportion of expensive ordnance included in the larger armies. Exact cost figures are not available to this headquarters.

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COMPARATIVE EQUIPMENT COSTS, ROKA-US DIVISIONS



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Chart 7

Comparative Costs, ROKA - US Divisions

This chart depicts the comparative costs of equipping a ROKA and US division. Because of the great disparity in the costs of the Ordnance equipment included and the equipment supplied by the remaining technical services, it is necessary to show two scales on the chart, the first in hundreds of thousands of dollars covering the Signal, Engineer, Transportation, Quartermaster, Chemical and Medical items and the second in millions of dollars covering the cost of Ordnance items and the total equipment costs.

Since the ROK division includes no anti-aircraft artillery, its cost is not included in the total shown for a US division. If the cost of AAA equipment was included, the cost of equipping a US division would be increased by approximately 10 million dollars over the figure shown on the chart.

The exact comparative costs are as follows:

	US Division (AAA)	ROKA Division
Signal	2,610,652.29	677,040.87
Engineer	1,316,046.99	390,846.74
Transportation	610,558.36	65,782.26
QM	551,093.37	200,874.00
Chemical	344,932.11	304,411.86
Medical	169,971.40	71,575.26
Ordnance	54,275,546.19	6,658,682.05
TOTALS	59,878,800.71	8,369,212.84

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EQUIPMENT COMPARISON
ROKA-US DIVISIONS



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Chart 8

Equipment Comparison, ROKA - US Divisions

This chart gives a cross section comparison of equipment authorized in US and ROKA divisions, and also shows the actual number of such items on hand in the average ROK division. With the exception of engineer tractors, actual items on hand are far short of even the small amounts authorized the ROKA division.

Because of the great variance in the amounts of the items considered, it has been necessary to use four scales on this chart. It should be noted that the left scale applies only to the carbines and M1 rifles, the left center scale to the two types of trucks, the right center scale to the signal equipment and the extreme right scale only to the eingineer tractors.

On a percentage basis, the ROK division is authorized only 20% as many ¼ ton trucks, 78% as many carbines and M1 rifles, 52% as many radios, 75% as many telephones and 33% as many engineer tractors as a US division.

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COMPARISON OF ESTIMATED BASIC SUPPORT COSTS

PER YEAR PER SOLDIER — US ARMY & ROK ARMY—REAR AREA





CLOTHING COSTS BASED ON INITIAL ISSUE FOR SUMMER AND WINTER
ROKA COSTS CONVERTED AT RATE OF 6,000 WON PER DOLLAR

SOURCE OF CLOTHING STATISTICS : KMAG Quartermaster
SOURCE OF U.S. FOOD, QUARTERS & PAY : KMAG Comptroller
PREPARED BY : KMAG G-4 Plans

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Chart 9

Comparative Costs - US and ROKA Soldier

There are many factors affecting the cost of supporting a soldier and there is a great difference in opinion as to what items should be considered in computing the cost.

For purposes of this comparison the U. S. soldier is considered to be a corporal with more than two years but less than four years service, with two dependents, and stationed in the ZI. Items considered are pay, quarters allowance, food and clothing allowance. It should be noted that the clothing figure represents only initial issues. The yearly allowance for replacement has not been considered.

The ROKA soldier is also considered to be a corporal. Items considered are food, pay, cigarettes and soap, and clothing. In the case of the ROKA soldier the clothing figure represents a complete issue of both winter and summer clothing as there are no experience figures or allowances for replacement.

Comparative costs are as follows:

	U. S. Soldier	ROKA Soldier
Pay	$1,559.40	$ 8.00
Quarters	923.40	----
Food	432.00	100.72
Clothing	214.51	77.05
Cigarettes and Soap	----	8.10
Total	$3,129.31	$193.87

The above are considered to be the basic direct support items of a soldier. Individual arms and equipment, transportation, overseas and hazard pay, length of service and number of dependents are all factors which vary from time to time and place to place and which preclude setting up an exact figure and considering it to be a truly representative support figure.

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SECTION II

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POPULATION STATISTICS
REPUBLIC OF KOREA

1952

AGE GROUP	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL
0-9	2,852,947	2,898,956	5,751,903
10-19	2,225,522	2,166,250	4,391,772
20-29	1,398,737	1,603,545	3,002,282
30-39	1,206,895	1,247,489	2,454,384
40-49	935,664	949,644	1,885,308
50-59	702,485	703,757	1,406,242
60-69	420,098	452,362	872,460
70-79	138,712	168,587	307,299
808 OVER	30,373	41,090	71,463
GRAND TOTAL	9,911,433	10,231,680	20,143,113

SOURCE: DND, ROK

POPULATION OF NORTH KOREA IS ESTIMATED TO BE 9,102,371.

(BASED ON PUBLISHED 1949 CENSUS FIGURES WHICH ARE THE LATEST AVAILABLE)

SECURITY INFORMATION

SOURCE: AC/S G-2, KMAG

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Population North Korea and South Korea

This chart presents known population statistics of the Republic of Korea as well as the estimated population of North Korea.

The upper portion of the chart portrays the total male and female population of South Korea broken out into 10 year increments. It is particularly interesting to note that the total number of males and females in each age group closely approximate each other in number, and that there are only 320,247 more females in the total population than males. The present excess of females has reversed a trend established in the census of 1944 at which time there were 2% more males than females.

The groups of most interest to military planners are the 10-19; the 20-29; and the 30-39 age groups inasmuch as these are the ones which must be used to determine the maximum size ROK Army which can be supported during the next ten years.

Within the 10-19 age group there are 999,252 males between the ages of 15-19 which comprises only 44.9% of the 2,225,522 total available within the group. This would appear to imply that there is a mortality rate of approximately 5.1% within the 10-15 age group, which does not appear to be too high for this particular age group inasmuch as the annual death rate has been established at 2% against total population, as compared to a birth rate of 4%.

Experience at Reception and Induction Centers and ASUs has established that 40.3% of all individuals called for induction will be rejected for military service. The highest percentage of rejections are for tuberculosis and other type lung diseases which account for 45% of all rejects. In this connection it is also interesting to note that the ROKA Surgeon General has estimated that 36% of the total Korean population is infected with tuberculosis.

In view of the established 40.3% reject rate, coupled with an assumed 5% mortality rate, it is estimated that there are approximately 118,000 physically qualified males a year who will become available for induction during the next ten years. After a period of five years therefore, at which time the present 25-30 age group will be exhausted this 118,000 physically qualified males becomes the governing factor in determining the maximum size Army which can be supported with available manpower. The female population could be used to increase the maximum size army, if deemed advisable and so decided.

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Population North Korea and South Korea (Cont'd)

There is a steady decline in the total number of males and females in each progressively older age group, which is considered normal in Asiatic populations. The total population of South Korea as indicated here is 20,143,113 and consists of 9,911,433 males and 10,231,680 females.

The population of North Korea is estimated to be 9,102,371 by the KMAG G2. This is based on published 1949 census figures which are the latest available. As a matter of interest, however, ROKA has estimated the North Korean population to be 7,555,924. This figure has been determined by taking the 1949 census figures and deducting estimated death and POW casualties from the war.

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REGISTRATION OF MALES 17 - 40



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Draft Registration By Age Groups

This chart graphically depicts by age group the 2,295,430 males registered for the draft in Korea.

All males between the ages of 17 and 40 are required by Korean law to register for the draft. The ROK Department of Defense attempts to maintain conscription within the 20-26 age group; however, when a Provincial Area Service Unit is unable to meet its quotas from within the 20-26 age group, the ASUs are authorized to conscript next from the 18-28 age group and as a last resort from 17-30 age group. During recent months, the majority of draftees have been taken from the 18-28 age group because of the fact that the 20-26 age group has been almost exhausted in some Provinces.

Males falling within the 30-40 age group are conscripted for service with the Korean Service Corps, a quasi-military organization which furnishes labor support for UN combat units as well as certain UN service units. No further discussion on the KSC will be given at this time, inasmuch as a following chart will explain the functions and strength of the KSC in detail.

You will note that the highest single age group is that currently 17 years of age which comprises 126,006 males. It is the policy of the Korean government not to conscript males below 18 years of age, although they are required to register upon reaching age 17. The sharp decline in available manpower between the ages of 20 and 26 is occasioned by the fact that the policy has been to maintain conscription within the 20-26 age group insofar as possible, and a large number of this group have already been called for military service. The number of registered males starts to rise sharply after passing age 26, reaching a peak of approximately 109,000 in the 28 and 29 age groups. It starts to decline as you go into the 30 to 40 age group, reaching a low of 69,391 in age group 40.

There are a total of 2,295,430 males registered for the draft. Of this number, 897,414 males fall within the 17-26 age group which represents 39.2% of the total; the 27-30 age group comprises 427,746 males representing 18.6% of the total; and, the 31-40 age group comprises 970,270 males representing 42.2% of the total. Of this total registration, however, experience has determined that an average of 40.3% will be rejected as physically unfit for military service. After applying this 40.3% reject rate there are a total of 791,121 males available for induction within the 17-30 age group; and, 579,252 males available for induction in the 31-40 age group.

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EDUCATIONAL LEVEL, DRAFT REGISTRANTS

ANNUAL REGISTRATION APRIL 1952

EDUCATION	NUMBER	PERCENTAGE
ILLITERATE	1,239,743	54.0
PRIMARY SCHOOL (6 YRS)	683,653	29.8
ATTENDED JR HIGH SCHOOL (3 YRS NON-GRAD)	90,737	4.0
JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES	101,157	4.4
ATTENDED SENIOR HIGH SCHOOL (3 YRS NON-GRAD)	49,037	2.2
SENIOR HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES (4 YRS)	87,312	3.8
ATTENDED UNIVERSITY (NON-GRAD)	21,716	.9
UNIVERSITY GRADUATE	22,057	.9
TOTALS	2,295,430	100.0
AVERAGE NUMBER REJECTS (PHYSICALLY DISQUALIFIED)	925,058	40.3
AVAILABLE FOR INDUCTION	1,370,372	59.7

—*—

QUALIFIED FOR COMMISSION (JR HIGH SCHOOL GRAD & ABOVE)	281,279	
AVERAGE NUMBER REJECTS (PHYSICALLY DISQUALIFIED)	113,355	40.3
AVAILABLE FOR COMMISSION	167,924	
ESTIMATED REJECTS - UNACCEPTABLE AS OFFICERS	67,170	40.0
NET AVAILABLE FOR COMMISSION	100,754	4.39 (OF TOTAL REGISTRATION)

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Educational Level, Draft Registration

This chart graphically portrays the educational attainment levels of the 2,295,430 Korean males, between the ages of 17-40, registered for the draft during the annual nation-wide registration in April 1952.

You will note that illiterates comprise the largest portion, representing 54% of the total registration. Although the number of illiterates is quite high it is interesting to note that only 42.6% of the enlisted personnel in the Army are illiterates. The comparatively lower percentage of illiterates in the Army is accounted for by the fact that a big percentage of the illiterates come from rural areas, and most ASU's have been drafting larger numbers of individuals from the urban centers of population.

The next largest group of draft registrants are primary school graduates having completed 6 years of education. This group comprises 29.8% of the total registration. You will note further that 4% of the total have attended 3 years of Junior High School and that an additional 4.4% have graduated from Junior High School. It is interesting to compare the number of High School graduates representing 3.8% with the lesser number of non-graduates which represent only 2.2% of the total. As you can see, the number of individuals attending Universities is quite small, and these individuals almost without exception, are professional people such as doctors, lawyers or engineers.

Experience at Reception and Induction Centers and ASU's has established that 40.3% of all individuals called for induction will be rejected for Military Service. Tuberculosis and other lung diseases account for 45% of total rejects; physical defects requiring surgical repair account for an additional 34.8%; eye, ear, nose and throat defects for 8.8%; and miscellaneous diseases such as venereal and skin diseases, and neuropsychiatric conditions (1.6%) account for the balance of 11.4%. Although physical defects requiring remedial surgery account for 34.8% of the total rejected, it is unlikely that the majority of individuals will ever have necessary surgical repair because of the extreme shortage of civilian medical facilities and the high expense involved.

In view of the 40.4% reject factor therefore, only 1,370,372 males between the ages of 17 and 40 may be considered as available for active Military Service.

As a means of determining leadership potential from among those registered for the draft, you will note that at the bottom of the chart the number of individuals available for commissions has been indicated. In order to be eligible for a commission an individual must have graduated from Junior High School. There are a total of 281,279 draft

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Educational Level, Draft Registration (Cont'd)

registrants who meet this requirement. After applying the 40.3% reject factor a total of 167,924 males remain available to the considered for commission. Experience has again dictated, however, that 40% of the applicants for commissions will be rejected because of lack of leadership potential, CIC checks, or unacceptability as officers. After application of this factor, there are 100,754 individuals who may be considered as the net number available for commission from among the 2,295,430 males registered for the draft.

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EDUCATIONAL LEVEL, REPUBLIC OF KOREA ARMY

AS OF 30 OCTOBER 1952

EDUCATION	OFF	PERCENTAGE	EM	PERCENTAGE
ILLITERATE			162,577	42·65
PRIMARY SCHOOL (NON-GRADUATE)			36,519	9·58
PRIMARY SCHOOL GRADUATE (6 YRS)	1,661	7·25	118,181	30·99
ATTENDED JR HIGH SCHOOL (3 YRS)	3,742	16·75	28,044	7·35
JR HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE (4 YRS)	10,952	47.50	31,669	8.30
ATTENDED SENIOR HIGH SCHOOL (3 YRS)	782	3.70	392	0.11
SENIOR HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE (4 YRS)	1,141	4.98	511	0.14
ATTENDED UNIVERSITY (NON-GRADUATE)	2,045	8.84	2,604	0.69
UNIVERSITY GRADUATE (4 YRS)	2,541	10.98	738	0.19
TOTALS	23,134	100.00	381,235	100.00

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Educational Spread, ROKA Officers And Enlisted Men

This chart graphically portrays the educational levels of officers and enlisted personnel in the ROK Army as of 30 October 1952.

Within the officer bracket, it is interesting to note that the largest percentage of officers have only completed Junior High School, and represent 47.5% of the total, while the next largest percentage completed 3 years of Junior High School and represent 16.75% of the total. The next largest group are University Graduates while only a comparatively small percentage have graduated from High School.

Within the enlisted bracket 42.6% are illiterates. Although this might seem high it is interesting to note that illiterates comprise 54% of the total number registered for the draft. The comparatively lower percentage of illiterates in the Army is accounted for by the fact that a larger percentage of illiterates come from rural areas, and most ASU's have been drafting larger number of individuals from the urban centers of population. The next larger group are primary school graduates comprising almost 31% of the total.

Great progress is being made to lower the illiterate rate in the ROK Army, and all units conduct courses of Korean Language instruction during off duty hours. This program has been carried even to the front line units, and is believed to be most effective. It is impossible to evaluate the effects of the program at this time inasmuch as no entries have been made on individual records. ROKA has recently directed however, that reports of completion of these courses be submitted to ROKA Headquarters and that entries be made on individual records both in the field and TAG office ROKA.

An enlisted man must have completed Junior High School in order to be eligible for a commission. There are a total of 35,914 enlisted personnel eligible to compete for a commission, however, experience has dictated that 40% of the applicants for commissions will be rejected because of lack of leadership potential or unacceptability as officers. In view of this factor therefore, only 21,548 of this number may be considered as officer material.

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GRADE BREAKOUT ROKA

AS OF 25 OCTOBER 1952

LT GEN	5		
MAJ GEN	12		
BRIG GEN	41		
COLONEL	227		
LT COLONEL	791		
MAJOR	1332		
CAPT	4502		
1st LT	7750		
2nd LT	7569		
TOTAL OFFICERS		22229	
WARRANT OFFICERS		883	
1st SGT	1533		
M/SGT	6328		
T/SGT	12757		
S/SGT	29112		
SGT	63150		
CPL	67300		
PFC	94242		
PVT	15443		
RCT	32803		
TOTAL ENLISTED		322668	
CADETS		4009	
TOTAL ROKA		349789	
CIVILIAN TRAINEES		44877	
GRAND TOTAL ROKA			394666

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ROKA Grade Breakout

This chart graphically portrays the actual grade breakout of officers and enlisted men in the ROK Army as of 25 October 1952. Although this is not the latest strength figure available it is the latest grade breakout available inasmuch as such reports are compiled by hand in the ROKA AG Section, and the time lag for submission of reports from the field requires all permanent strength reports to stay three (3) weeks behind.

You will note that ROKA had a total of 22,229 officers on 25 October. There are a total of 58 Generals consisting of 5 Lieutenant Generals, 12 Major Generals, and 41 Brigadier Generals. Of the 5 Lieutenant Generals one is now Chief of Staff, ROKA, one is Deputy Commander of the IX US Corps, 2 are Corps Commanders, and one is attending C&GSC in the United States. The other General officers are assigned throughout ROKA as Division Commanders, Deputy Commanders, Service Unit and Training Installation Commanders, and Staff officers. Recommendations for promotions of an additional 13 officers to the grade of Brigadier General, 3 officers to the grade of Major General, and one officer (C&GSC Commandant) to the grade of Lieutenant General are now pending. Officers may be promoted at anytime to the grade of General officer, however, promotions of other officers are accomplished twice a year in March and September. All promotions are based upon selections of promotion boards and must be approved by C/S, ROKA, DND, and the President prior to issuance of orders. ROKA requests KMAG and EUSAK concurrence prior to recommending promotions to General officer grade.

There are only 883 Warrant Officers in ROKA which appears to be comparatively small, however, this is accounted for by the fact that all Warrant Officers are eligible for direct commissions and are usually called upon to accept commissions when ROKA accelerates its officer procurement program from time to time.

There were a total of 322,668 enlisted personnel in ROKA on 25 October 1952 of which 47,730 were 1st three graders. Authority to promote to the 1st three NCO grades is retained at Headquarters ROKA. Such promotions are accomplished in accordance with overall grade authorizations upon recommendations of unit commanders. Authority for promotions of enlisted men to the lower NCO grades is delegated to unit commanders, who are authorized to promote on the basis of TO&E vacancies.

The 4009 cadets shown on this chart consists of 373 cadets now attending the Korean Military Academy, and 3,636 cadets attending OCS.

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ROKA Grade Breakout (Cont'd)

In addition to the foregoing, ROKA had a total of 44,877 civilian trainees undergoing training. Under current procedures all inductees are sworn in as civilian trainees, and are not carried in the ROKA strength. Upon completion of 8 weeks training, all civilian trainees are sworn into the Army, and are thereafter charged in ROKA strength. You will note that, including civilian trainees, the grand total strength of ROKA on 25 October 1952 was 394,666.

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OFFICERS QUALIFICATIONS
A TYPICAL ROKA DIVISION

	AUTHORIZED	AVERAGE ASSIGNED	SOURCE OF COMMISSION		OFF. BASIC	OFF. ADVANCED	US SV SCH	TOTAL SCH TRAINED
			D/C OR OCS PRIOR TO MAY 1951	OCS SUBSEQUENT TO MAY 1951				
FIELD GRADE	100	47	46	1	1	23	3	27
COMPANY GRADE	656	680	453	227	123	1	7	131
TOTALS	756	727	499	228	124	24	10	158

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Officer Qualifications, Typical of ROKA Division

This chart graphically portrays the average military qualifications of officers assigned to a typical ROKA Division.

There are a total of 100 field grade officers authorized to each ROK division, whereas there are an average of only 47 assigned against this authorization. Of the average 47 field grade officers assigned, 46 received a direct commission or were graduated from ROKA OCS prior to May 1951, and only one graduated from ROKA OCS subsequent to May 1951. The date of May 1951 is significant because prior to that time the only source from which officers could be obtained was either by direct commission or from a short 6 weeks, then later 12 weeks, officer candidate course conducted at The ROKA Infantry School. After May 1951, all new officers with the exception of the professional services, were required to attend OCS prior to being commissioned. OCS courses were established for all branches of the service and were lengthened to twenty-four weeks. The programs of instruction in all schools including OCS are now adapted from US Service Schools, and have been revised to correct deficiencies, provide more realism, insure maximum emphasis on the lessons learned in combat, and to emphasize leadership training. Improved OCS and officers courses at Branch Material Schools have resulted in providing aggressive officers imbued with professional know-how, and instilled with the will to fight.

In addition, an average of 27 of the 47 field grade officers assigned have attended officer courses at Branch Material Schools subsequent to May 1951. An average of one field grade officer has graduated from the ROKA Officer Basic Class; 23 have graduated from the ROKA Officer Advanced Class; and 3 have attended US Service Schools.

There are a total of 656 company grade officers authorized to each ROK Division with an average of 680 assigned against this authorization. The overages in assignments of company grade officers partially offsets the shortages of field grade officers you noted above. Of the average number of 680 officers assigned, 453 received a direct commission or were graduated from OCS prior to May 1951, and 227 were graduated from the improved OCS subsequent to May 1951. Of the total of the 680 average number of company grade officers assigned, 131 have attended officer courses at Branch Material Schools subsequent to May 1951. An average of 123 have graduated from the ROKA Officer Basic Class; one has graduated from the ROKA Officers Advanced Class; and seven have attended US Service Schools.

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Officer Qualifications, Typical of ROKA Division (Cont'd)

In conclusion, there are an average of 727 officers assigned to the typical ROKA Division as compared to an authorization of 756 officers. Of the total assigned, 499 were commissioned prior to May 1951, 228 subsequent to May 1951, and a total of 158 of those assigned have received additional officer training in ROKA and US Service Schools subsequent to May 1951.

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AVERAGE MONTHLY STRENGTH OF ROKA

JUNE 1950 — NOVEMBER 1952



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ROKA Buildup - Average Monthly Strengths

This chart graphically portrays the monthly buildup of ROKA strength from the outbreak of hostilities on 25 June 1950 through the end of October 1952.

There has been a steady and progressive rise in the strength of the ROK Army since the beginning of the Korean conflict. There are only four monthly periods when the losses of the ROK Army have exceeded the gains. During the first month of the conflict the exceedingly heavy casualties forced a reduction of overall strength and input of inductees was not sufficient to offset the loss. In February, April and August of 1951, KIA and MIA casualties, coupled with disability discharges from the Army also forced a drop in overall strength.

Of particular interest is the total net gain in personnel since 25 June 1950. There has been a net gain of 18,037 officers and 285,926 enlisted personnel (including Civilian Trainees) over and above actual losses totalling 6,297 officers and 276,730 enlisted personnel. The magnitude of the ROKA procurement and training programs can easily be seen when net gains are compared to actual losses.

The Civilian Trainee Program was started in July 1952, at which time the need was foreseen for a buildup of ROKA military manpower. Under this program, the Korean government swears all inductees into military service as Civilian Trainees, in order to provide a trained backlog of personnel for the ROK Army and to offset expected losses. Civilian Trainees are sworn into the army upon completion of 8 weeks training and are not carried in the strength of the Army until that time. This program has proven to be of inestimable value in offsetting the large casualty losses during the heavy fighting of the past two months and also in providing fillers for forming new units included in the expansion program.

In conclusion, you will note that the ROK Army has grown from a strength of 94,974 consisting of 6,240 officers and 88,734 enlisted personnel on 25 June 1950 to a strength of 398,937 consisting of 24,277 officers, 329,659 enlisted personnel, and 45,001 Civilian Trainees on 30 October 1952.

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STRENGTH OF ROKA UNITS

ACTIVATED 1 JULY 1951 TO 31 OCTOBER 1952



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ROKA Units Activated Since 1 July 1951

This chart reflects the buildup in units as well as in strength by showing the number of activations during the period 1 July 1951 through 31 October 1952. July 1951 actually marks the beginning of the ROKA revitalization.

During this period more Artillery units were activated than for any other branch in implementing the plan to provide div-artys for each of the 10 ROK divisions. Most of the major training installations were also activated in this period.

The chart is graduated to show personnel in thousands, by branch.

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INPUT OF REPLACEMENTS TO RTC's

DATE	DAILY INPUT INCREASED TO RTC 1	RTC 2	TOTAL	COMPLETED 14 WEEKS	COMPLETED 16 WEEKS
15 OCT 52	600	200	800	21 JAN 53	4 FEB 53
25 OCT 52	600	300	900	31 JAN 53	14 FEB 53
15 NOV 52	600	500	1100	21 FEB 53	7 MAR 53
15 DEC 52	700	500	1200	23 MAR 53	6 APR 53

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RTC Input

This chart shows the daily input of trainees at each of the replacement training centers. Successive increases are shown as they were implemented for the 700 daily in effect during September and the first half of October 1952, to the current 1100. On 15 December the rate will go to 1200 in order to generate fillers and replacements required for the proposed expansion program.

Dates of completion of training by the initial increments are shown in two columns, reflecting a 14 as well as a 16-week training cycle.

The 14-week cycle has been put into effect to immediately provide fillers for the newly activated units and at the same time maintain an adequate flow of replacement to front line units.

If the entire expansion program is approved as planned, basic training will remain a 14-week cycle until mid-February 1954, when all unit commitments will have been filled. By that time, provided there is no radical change in either the casualty or hospital returnee rates, a pool of replacements will have been built up to offset the two week suspension of output required in changing back to a 16-week cycle.

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ROKA CASUALTIES



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ROKA Casualties by Month

This chart graphically portrays ROKA casualties since the beginning of the Korean conflict.

The upper portion of the chart indicates total cumulative battle and non-battle casualties, by month, from 25 June 1950 to the end of October 1952. You will note that the ROK Army had cumulated a total of 380,000 casualties by the end of October 1952.

The lower portion of the chart indicates battle and non-battle casualties during any given month. The solid black portion of each bar represents the number of actual battle casualties and includes all personnel killed, wounded, or missing in action. The striped portion of each bar represents non-battle casualties and includes all personnel incapacitated as a result of disease and non-battle injuries.

Immediately below each bar segment of the chart the particular month has been indicated and in the box immediately below this the average strength of the army for the particular month is shown in order to afford a quick comparison of total casualties as compared to actual strength.

It is interesting to note that the largest battle casualties occurred in the earliest months of the conflict (June 1950 thru May 1951) and that it was only when heavy action broke out in October 1952 that battle casualties increased significantly. However, when one compares the actual casualties with the average strength of the army during any given month, it is evident that the intensified training and re-training program of the ROK Army has paid big dividends in the form of lowered casualty rates. During the period June 1950 to May 1951 the daily average for battle casualties was 456 and for non-battle casualties was 133, representing an 8.7% monthly casualty rate as compared to the total average strength of the army during that period. During the past 12 months the daily average for battle casualties was 73 and non-battle casualties was 203 which represents a 2.5% monthly casualty rate as compared to the total average strength of the army during the period.

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ORGANIZATION CHART

KMAG DIVISION HEADQUARTERS

OFFICERS	15
ENLISTED	13
TOTAL	28
ATTACHED FROM KMAG (SIGNAL EM)	16
TOTAL	44



* ATTACHED FROM KMAG HQ.

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Organization Chart--KMAG--Division Headquarters

This chart shows distribution of the 44 Americans within a ROKA division, starting with a Senior Advisor and his principal assistants, a G1-G4 Advisor and a G2-G3 Advisor. There is one Engineer, Signal and Ordnance Advisor. The one Field Artillery Battalion currently organic has three advisors, one per Battery as required. There are two Officer Advisors with each Infantry regiment plus two Enlisted Men. Those enlisted men working under the G1-G4 Advisor comprise the housekeeping detachment for the KMAG people of the division. Other enlisted personnel include a clerk-typist, a G3 operations sergeant, and two assistant Signal advisors. Sixteen enlisted men are attached from the KMAG Signal section to operate a parallel communications system as far down as regiment. An Air Force Tactical Air Control Party is attached as the situation dictates.

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ORGANIZATIONAL CHART-INFANTRY DIVISION



	STRENGTH
FULL STRENGTH U.S. INF. DIV.	18,855
LESS: 36-0 2-WO AAA (AW) 735	773
36-0 8-WO TANK 639; 6-0 1-WO TANK 142; 6-0 1-WO TANK 142; 6-0 1-WO TANK 142	1,130
6-0 1-WO HV MORT 184; 6-0 1-WO HV MORT 184	382
6-0 1-WO REPL CO 34; 0-0 2-WO BAND 68	111
TOTAL:	2,396
REDUCED TOTAL - U.S. INF. DIVISION	16,459
ROKA INF. DIVISION	14,442

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Organization - ROKA Infantry Division

In the spring of 1951, the Secretary of Army made a trip to the Far East Command. When he departed Korea, he left an expressed directive that everything possible be done to make the Korean Army a self-sustaining force. The Commanding General, EUSAK, and Chief, KMAG, have bent every effort to implement that directive. One of the principal items the Army Commander felt must be done was to reorganize the Infantry Division to fit the Secretary's directive. Accordingly, KMAG prepared a new T/O & E for a ROK Infantry Division. This T/O & E has been approved and the ROKA divisions reorganized in accordance with its provisions. The division is organized as you see here, except that the full Div-Arty (-AAA) has not yet been made organic. At the present time each division has one light battalion assigned. The aggregate personnel total with full Artillery will be 14,442 per division, compared with 18,855 in a US division.

The Infantry division, ROKA, is generally organized along the same lines as the US Infantry division. The T/O & E is designed to strike an optimum balance between maximum firepower and the problems of supply, resupply and replacement of equipment and ammunition. The rugged nature of the terrain in Korea, the lack of roads, and the limited railroad system dictate the necessity for an Infantry division which travels almost entirely on foot and supplies the forward elements by porters. Commensurate with this premise, heavy items of equipment and the number of vehicles have been greatly reduced. No tank units are included in the ROKA Infantry division. Because of the mountainous Korean terrain, extensive irrigation and lack of roads, any attack by enemy armor will be canalized. Tank units will be dispatched by Corps to division according to the tactical situation. Heavy mortar companies are not included in the ROKA infantry regiments because of the size of the weapons and the weight and bulk of the ammunition presents a very difficult transportation and supply problem in rough terrain. A heavy mortar company is provided at division level to provide the volume of fire at reduced range necessary for close-in support in critical areas. Elimination of these elements from the ROKA Infantry Division and further reductions of personnel and equipment permit a corresponding reduction in maintenance and support elements of the division. Organizational changes in these units are consistent with the requirements which will have to be met, based upon past combat experience in Korea.

The Infantry regiment is quite similar to the US Infantry regiment, except for the addition of a reconnaissance company and the deletion of the heavy mortar company and tank company.

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Organization - ROKA Infantry Division (Cont'd)

The primary mission of the regimental reconnaissance company is screening the regimental front with a secondary mission of providing additional security for rear areas and the MSR's when the situation requires it. This company performs the missions of the regimental intelligence and reconnaissance platoon of the US Infantry regiment, but in the ROKA regiment, this mission is amplified.

In preparing the T/O & E for the ROKA Infantry division, it was considered desirable and necessary to eliminate much heavy complicated equipment normally found in a US division. This was believed necessary for three reasons: first, the terrain over which the ROKA must fight; second, the capabilities and limitations of the ROKA soldier; and third; the prohibitive cost that would be placed on the ROK Government in the post war period. Therefore, a large number of vehicles and radios have been eliminated from the Tables of Equipment.

To compare the proposed ROKA division with a U.S. Infantry division, those major units not found in the ROKA division have been deducted from the U. S. division. These units consist of the AAA battalion, the tank battalion, the three regimental tank companies, two heavy mortar companies, and replacement company and the band, a total of 2,396 personnel. The reduced total of the U.S. Infantry division then is 16,459 which will compare favorably with ROKA division strength of 14,442.

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COMPARISON OF PERSONNEL U.S. AND ROKA DIVISIONS

BRANCH OF SERVICE	OFFICERS US	OFFICERS ROKA	ENLISTED MEN US	ENLISTED MEN ROKA	TOTAL	
					US	ROKA
INFANTRY	408	425	10,455	9,285	10,863	9,710
MEDICAL	98	57	856	655	954	712
MILITARY POLICE	7	7	175	175	182	182
SIGNAL	11	10	350	223	361	233
ORDNANCE	11	12	287	184	298	196
QUARTERMASTER	11	9	236	109	247	1[illegible]8
ARTILLERY	254	181	3,213	2,406	3,467	2,587
ENGINEER	38	29	911	543	949	5,2[illegible]
ADJUTANT GENERAL	5	6	68	38	73	44
FINANCE	2	5	19	17	21	22
TRANSPORTATION	0	1	0	0	0	1
JUDGE ADVOCATE	5	6	3	10	8	16
INSPECTOR GENERAL	2	3	3	4	5	7
CHEMICAL	2	2	4	4	6	6
ARMOR	66	0	634	0	700	0
CHAPLAIN	18	0	0	0	18	0
	938	753	17,214	13,653	18,152	14,406
GENERAL OFFICERS	3	3			3	3
WARRANT OFFICERS	161	33			161	33
GRAND TOTAL	941	756	17,214	13,653	18,316	14,442

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Personnel Comparison, ROKA and US Divisions

This chart presents a comparison of officer and enlisted personnel, by branch of service, authorized to typical US and ROKA Divisions.

The TO/E for the ROKA Division, which comprises an aggregate of 14,442 personnel, is very similar to that of the US Infantry division, and is designed to obtain maximum fire power for frontline units, and to provide for supply and resupply of combat elements. Heavy items of equipment and vehicles have been greatly reduced throughout the division. There are no tank units, and only one heavy mortar company in the division. Tank Battalions will be committed to Corps as the tactical situation demands. The ROK Division is now authorized three 105mm howitzer battalions, and one 155mm howitzer battalion, which is the same as the US Divisions, but is not authorized an anti-aircraft artillery battalion as is the US division. The heavy mortar company, in conjunction with units of division artillery, can provide the volume of fire necessary for close-in support in critical areas. These departures from the US type division have resulted in a net reduction of 3874 personnel, which has permitted a corresponding reduction in maintenance and support elements of the division.

These reductions of personnel are easily discernible on this chart. You will note that there is an appreciable reduction in the numbers of personnel authorized in practically all branches of the service. The ROK Infantry has only 89.3% of the Infantry personnel authorized the US Division, 74.6% of the medical personnel, 74.6% of the Artillery personnel, and 60.3% of the Engineer personnel. Exceptions are the Finance, Transportation, Judge Advocate and Inspector General Corps where small increases are authorized; and the Military Police and Chemical Corps which have the same authorization as the US division.

In general, the ROKA division has only 78.8% of the personnel of the US division. It is interesting to note however, that the estimated firepower of the ROK division is approximately 83.3% of the firepower of the US division, and that organizational and personnel changes in all units are consistent with requirements as determined by combat experience in Korea.

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TRAINING & SCHOOL SYSTEM

REPUBLIC OF KOREA ARMY



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ROKA Training and School System

Two replacement training centers, 10 branch service schools, a military academy, command and general staff college, a unit training center, a band school and an intelligence school make up the ROKA training and school system.

In order to provide adequate control of all training installations within ROKA, the Chief of Staff of the Korean Army has command jurisdiction over the entire ROKA replacement training and school system. However, within the artillery, technical and administrative services, the Chief of Staff, ROKA, has delegated to each Chief of Branch the responsibility for developing and implementing the training programs of the respective branch school. The Infantry School and all replacement training centers are under the direct supervision of G3, ROKA, who acts as the Chief of Branch for Infantry.

Replacement Training Center #1 (located on Cheju-do) had a capacity of 48,000 which is being expanded to almost 70,000 based on a training program of 16 weeks. RTC #2, at Nonsan, had a capacity of 14,400 currently being expanded to 38,000. The overall capacity of the ROKA replacement system will increase from the 30,000 to 35,000 capacity of January 1952 to a maximum capacity of over 100,000 in December 1952.

On the chart, you will notice that the Infantry, Artillery and Signal Schools are under the Korean Army Training Center (KATC), located at Kwangju, which serves as a coordinating headquarters and station complement for the three schools.

All schools and training centers, except UTC, are located in the southern part of the peninsula. These locations have been selected for obvious reasons.

Administrative schools are located in the vicinity of Taegu, the location of ROKA Headquarters, where close supervision of their training can be accomplished by Army Headquarters personnel. This also permits supervision of those schools without an assigned advisor. The technical service schools are located in the vicinity of Pusan, where numerous active supply installations can be utilized in the conduct of practical on-the-job instruction. In addition, the proximity of major supply points facilitates logistical support.

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CUMULATIVE OUTPUT OF ROKA SERVICE SCHOOLS

1 NOV 1952



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Cumulative Output - ROKA Schools and Replacement Training Centers

Through October 1952, a total of 379,366 ROKA personnel had completed training at one or more of the basic training centers or branch service schools. The greater portion of the output has, of course, been from Replacement Training Center #1, on Cheju-do. In addition to its capacity being more than that of RTC #2, it also commenced operations a full year earlier.

Output by installation:

RTC #1	230,765
RTC #2	34,642
Infantry School	21,584
Artillery School	24,135
Signal School	13,874
Engineer School	32,985
Ordnance School	3,282
Quartermaster School	3,933
Finance School	1,538
Adjutant General School	1,793
Medical Field Service School	5,686
Military Police School	2,969
Intelligence School	1,969
Band School	300
Command & General Staff College	29
Korean Military Academy	(First Output in 1954)

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ROKA OFFICERS AT U.S. ARMY SERVICE SCHOOLS

SCHOOL	ATTENDED IN FY 52	ALLOCATION FOR FY 53
ENGINEER	6	* 89
ARTILLERY	* 214	* 148
INFANTRY	* 317	* 201
MEDICAL	4	64
ORDNANCE	13	0
QUARTERMASTER	4	12
SIGNAL	11	12
ADJUTANT GENERAL	6	4
FINANCE	0	2
ARMORED	14	14
MILITARY POLICE	2	8
TRANSPORTATION	1	2
COMMAND & GENERAL STAFF	2	6
ORIENTATION VISITS	0	6
CBR	0	10
ARMED FORCES INFO OFF	0	1
TOTAL	594	579

* INCLUDES INTERPRETERS

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ROKA Officer Attendance at US Army Service Schools

Operations of the Korean Army during the present conflict have demonstrated the urgent necessity for training the officer corps at all levels. The greatest part of this training has been accomplished within the Korean Army School System. To establish a firmer basis on which to build this system, a nucleus of well trained Korean Army officers is a requisite. One of the sources for such officers are graduates of US Army Service Schools. The few Korean Army officers who graduated from US Army service schools prior to the war were invaluable in establishing the present Korean Army school system. Consequently, in November 1950, K M A G requested allocation of quotas to US service schools deemed necessary to form this nucleus of professional soldiers. During FY 52, 569 students completed courses at 12 US schools. Twenty-five Interpreters, 15 to aid instructors at Fort Benning and 10 at Fort Sill, brought the total attendance in FY 52 to 594.

Allocations approved for FY 53 under the Mutual Security Training Program include courses at four additional US schools, with total spaces for 540 students, 6 orientation visits and 33 interpreters. A request was made in September 1952 for an additional special class at the Infantry and Artillery schools to begin in 1953. If approved, it will increase the FY 53 attendance by 250 students.

Requirements for FY 54, submitted during October 1952, are currently being reviewed in light of the proposed expansion.

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ROKA MONTHLY PAY & ALLOWANCE



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ROKA Monthly Pay & Allowance

This chart depicts the pay scale in effect for all grades in the Republic of Korea Army. The upper portion of each bar down through Technical Sergeant represents a gratuitous issue of rice for dependents of married personnel shown in terms of money. Deductions for taxes, bonds and disabled soldier benefits are shown in the dotted section and the solid portion represents actual cash payment. Computed at the official rate of 6,000 Won to the dollar a Lt General can take home less than $10, a colonel $8 and a private 50¢. The maximum salary, including rice, is $62. An obvious result of such a pay scale will be to discourage the army as a career.

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KATUSA PERSONNEL STRENGTH BY UNITS

UNITS	PEAK STRENGTH 15 OCT 1951	STRENGTH 1 NOV 1952 O *	EM	TOTAL
8TH ARMY UNITS	9,519	63	1,246	1,309
2D LOG COMD		13	484	497
I CORPS				87
IX CORPS				230
X CORPS	1,879	14	257	271
2ND INF DIV	4,465	7	2,208	2,215
3D INF DIV	9,550	6	2,447	2,453
7TH INF DIV	7,417	7	1,749	1,756
24TH INF DIV	3,674			
25TH INF DIV	4,154			1,431
40TH INF DIV				1,940
45TH INF DIV				1,832
2D ENGR GP				783
59TH ORD GP				435
60TH ORD GP				687
52D ORD AMMO GP				108
8226TH SIG GP				349
5TH RCT				348
555TH FA BN				51
BELGIAN BN				116
32D ENGR GP				53
TOTALS	40,658	110	16,941	17,051

* ADMINISTRATIVE ONLY

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Korean Augmentation to United States Army

KATUSA is the name given to Korean soldiers who augment American combat and service units. These soldiers are not laborers, but are an assigned augmentation performing regular MOS duties interspersed in US squads. platoons and companies. Pay and allowances are supplied by the Republic of Korea Government and accounted for by the Chief of Finance, ROKA. Logistical support, including rations and gratuitous issue of Quartermaster items, is furnished by EUSAK. US medical treatment is provided for KATUSA, including emergency surgery. Further evacuation is to ROKA hospitals at which time KATUSA troops are dropped from morning reports of units concerned to Detachment of Patients, ROKA.

This chart shows the KATUSA personnel strength, and the units to which they are assigned. Use of KATUSA was recently expanded by EUSAK to include their assignment to other UN units. You will note that at least one, the Belgian Battalion, has taken advantage of this augmentation.

KATUSA replacements are drawn from the normal ROKA replacement pool by EUSAK requisition through KMAG to Chief of Staff, ROKA.

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KOREAN SERVICE CORPS

UNIT	AUTHORIZED	ASSIGNED
I US CORPS	25,000	24,987
I ROK CORPS	3,000	
II ROK CORPS	5,000	4,754
IX US CORPS	21,000	20,405
X US CORPS	20,000	19,133
32D ENGR CONS GROUP	2,000	1,691
21ST TRANS MED PORT	400	358
171ST EVAC HOSPITAL	600	533
KSC CENTERS AND DETACHMENTS	2,100	2,086
* UNALLOCATED SPACES	30,900	
	100,000	73,947

* KSC STRENGTH INCREASED FROM 75,000 TO 100,000 EFFECTIVE 1 DECEMBER 1952

EUSAK FURNISHES PAY, CLOTHING, EQUIPMENT, RATIONS, HOUSING AND MEDICAL SUPPORT TO ALL KSC TROOPS.

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Korean Service Corps

The Korean Service Corps was instituted 14 July 1951 by EUSAK as organized labor units for UN forces. As a nucleus the 101st, 103d and 105th ROKA Reserve Divisions were redesignated Korean Service Divisions. One division was assigned to each of the three US Corps.

Primary functions are pack transportation of supplies and equipment to front line units, construction of fortifications, etc.

Strength authorization was initially 60,000, which was increased to 75,000 in February 1952. In April 1952, the 200th KS Brigade was added to the corps to provide labor for II ROK Corps.

This chart shows the current assignment of KSC personnel to UN units: I US Corps has the 101st KS Division almost 25,000; IX US corps has the 105th Division of 20,000; X US Corps has the 103d, 19,000. Miscellaneous EUSAK units using KSC labor include the 32d Engineer Construction Group in Seoul, approximately 1700, the 21st Transportation Medium Port, Inchon, 350, 171st Evacuation Hospital, Taejon, 500. KSC reception and separation centers employ approximately 2,000.

EUSAK plans to increase the authorized strength to 100,000 in December and at that time to allocate 3,000 to I ROK Corps.

KMAG was originally responsible for furnishing advisors to KSC, two to each division and one to the brigade. EUSAK assumed full responsibility in April 1952 and the T/D spaces were transferred to US Corps. KMAG is still charged with the liaison with ROKA Military Affairs Section in the procurement of laborers.

EUSAK is responsible for the pay, clothing, equipment, feeding, housing and medical care of all KSC personnel. ROKA is responsible for pay, food and maintenance of civilian laborers with ROK divisions.

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