This thesis analyzes Egyptian political culture and the directive effect which it has upon political development, elite recruitment and the nature of political participation. The pervasive nature of Islam and the centrality of kinship remain the basic factors in determining the nature of political participation in Egypt's non-institutional and personalist politics. The basis of Sadat's control, like that of his predecessor, rests with his...
continued support of the regime's conditional guardian, the military, and his ability to manage an intricate network of political clients. Despite the forces of modernization, political influence in Egypt rests with the traditional leadership of the rural elite and their urban family linkages. As such, a major threat to the regime's internal stability would not likely arise without the support of traditional rural elites, whose interests are strongly represented in the military. The masses are likely to resort to extra-legal activities only when fundamental values are threatened. Such threats are limited to any deterioration in the government's identification with Islam, a reduction in the already marginal standard of living or any perceived threat to continued Egyptian independence from any foreign power including the United States or Israel.
Political Culture and the Nature of Political Participation in Egypt

by

David J. Anthony
Captain, United States Army
B.S., Temple University, 1970

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
June 1980
ABSTRACT

This thesis analyzes Egyptian political culture and the directive effect which it has upon political development, elite recruitment and the nature of political participation. The pervasive nature of Islam and the centrality of kinship remain the basic factors in determining the nature of political participation in Egypt's non-institutional and personalist politics. The basis of Sadat's control, like that of his predecessor, rests with his continued support of the regime's conditional guardian, the military, and his ability to manage an intricate network of political clients. Despite the forces of modernization, political influence in Egypt rests with the traditional leadership of the rural elite and their urban family linkages. As such, a major threat to the regime's internal stability would not likely arise without the support of traditional rural elites, whose interests are strongly represented in the military. The masses are likely to resort to extra-legal activities only when fundamental values are threatened. Such threats are limited to any deterioration in the government's identification with Islam, a reduction in the already marginal standard of living or any perceived threat to continued Egyptian independence from any foreign power including the United States or Israel.
**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

I. INTRODUCTION ----------------------------------------------- 7

II. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK -------------------------------------- 12
   A. THE PERSPECTIVE OF POLITICAL CULTURE ------------------- 12
   B. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE --------------------------------- 14
   C. SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE ------------------------ 21
   D. POLITICAL CULTURE AND THE EGYPTIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM ----- 40

III. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT UNDER NASIR ------------------------ 50
   A. THE LIBERATION RALLY AND THE NATIONAL UNION ----------- 52
   B. DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT ---------------------- 57
   C. THE ARAB SOCIALIST UNION ------------------------------- 59
   D. NASIR AND THE POLITICAL CULTURE ------------------------- 69

IV. THE SADAT ERA: CONSISTENCY OR CHANGE ---------------------- 73
   A. CONSOLIDATION OF POWER ---------------------------------- 73
   B. THE RAMADAN WAR ---------------------------------------- 75
   C. THE "OPENING" AND LIBERALIZATION ------------------------ 76

V. FROM NASIR TO SADAT: MILITARY ROLE OR RULE --------------- 89
   A. THE MILITARY UNDER NASIR ------------------------------- 90
      1. The 1952 Coup d'Etat and the Consolidation of Power ---- 90
      2. Military as a Fighting Force: Foreign Policy Implications --- 96
      3. Military Intelligence and Security --------------------- 101
      4. Military Role in the Bureaucracy ---------------------- 104
      5. Military as a Competing Center of Political Power ---- 107
I. INTRODUCTION

This thesis examines the nature of political participation within Egyptian domestic politics in the post-revolutionary period from 1952 to the present. During the period under study, the major change in Egyptian political development was the emergence of a new modernizing elite of military officers under the leadership of Gamal Abd al-Nasir. Nasir's personalist rule was characterized by non-institutional authority patterns, despite the existence of a series of single-party structures. Upon his succession to power, Anwar al-Sadat initiated a policy of limited liberalization that included the re-establishment of competitive party politics and the development of a "state of institutions." It is anticipated that Sadat's reforms are aimed at restricting political participation within institutions that he can personally control and use to delimit the pervasive role of the military or other challengers to his regime.

Participation will be analyzed in relation to the applicability of the so-called "implicit theory of evolutionary democracy" within Egyptian political development.¹ Recent

¹The "implicit theory of evolutionary democracy" argues that the modernization process puts demands on the political system for the gradual attainment of universal participation. These demands on the political system are usually referred to as the "participation crisis." For further discussion of this concept, see Leonard Binder, "Political Recruitment and Participation in Egypt," in Political Parties and Political Development, pp. 217-240, ed. by Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner (Princeton: Princeton Press, 1966).
changes in Egyptian political party structures will be analyzed to determine the potential effects on levels of political participation. The development of Egyptian political party structures has been chosen as the focus of investigation, not because of any causal relationship on political development, but rather as an arena in which to understand authority structures and levels of political participation within the political culture. For the purposes of this study, political participation is defined as any voluntary individual or group action, successful or unsuccessful, intended to influence the choice of public policy, the administration of public affairs or the choice of political leaders at any level of government. The definition is intentionally broad, because Egyptian politics operates on a continuum ranging from formal institutional frameworks to the informal and extra-legal extreme. This study demonstrates that the most meaningful type of participation in determining "who gets what, when and how" in Egypt is that type of participation referred to as interpersonal relationships and clientelism. While the party structures have played a minimal role in policy making, they have enhanced elite access and interest articulation, especially at the subnational level.

The emphasis on political culture as a basis for analysis is due to the relative non-applicability of current Western theories of political development that fail to consider the permanence of certain social and cultural factors in non-Western states. While commentators of Middle Eastern politics
invariably caution the reader that things work differently in the Middle East, they nonetheless fail to explain why and usually proceed to apply Western political concepts on a comparative basis without consideration of political culture. This problem is particularly evident in studies of political participation and political parties in authoritarian non-Western states.

The most promising comparative theories of political development seem to be those that emphasize the universal aspects of political systems on an interdisciplinary basis. Yet, even these studies by virtue of their universal nature can only be of limited value when applied to political development within individual states. A secondary contention of this study is that only by applying the concept of political culture to the broadly defined variables of Western political development theory can the distance between macro-level comparative theories and micro-level case studies be bridged.

---

2These theorists include members of the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council whose works have been published since 1963 in Princeton University's Studies in Political Development series and contributors to the Little, Brown and Company's series on comparative politics under the editorship of Gabriel Almond.


Most studies of political development in authoritarian states are primarily concerned with charismatic leadership and political elites at the national level. With few exceptions, political parties are analyzed in terms of their utility to the regime for purposes of spreading ideology, legitimizing the leadership and mobilizing resources for attaining the regime's goals of modernization.

The term "political culture" as used in this study is derived from Gabriel Almond's observation that "every political system is embedded in a particular pattern of orientation to political actions" [Almond 1956]. Almond's initial concept has been refined by Lucian Pye, Sidney Verba, Leonard Binder and others of the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council to "consist of the system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols and values which defines the situation in which political action takes place" [Pye and Verba 1965, p. 513]. By encompassing both the political ideals and operating norms (rules of the game) of both leaders and citizenry, political culture is more inclusive than such terms as political style or operational code, and has widely replaced notions of national character, modal personality, etc. Viewed in such a manner, political culture is a system of political control which regulates patterns of association and influence. To establish an appropriate analytical framework and an adequate understanding of the traditional political culture, a synthesis of
interdisciplinary source data including works on cultural and social anthropology, sociology, Islamic studies, social psychology and political history is presented. It is evident that in any modernizing state such as Egypt several "political cultures" may exist at the same time. The conceptualization applied in this study is designed to account for these divergent political influences in terms of their capacity to influence the regime, and the regime's capacity to integrate divergent interests through such means as ideology, legitimizing strategies, patron-client networks or repression.
II. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

A. THE PERSPECTIVE OF POLITICAL CULTURE

Political culture, like the general cultural system which it reflects, is transmitted through political socialization. Political-cultural values are gradually internalized within the society and political behavior is largely reflective of these learned values, despite the forces of political coercion and centralized power. In this sense, political culture is the psychological dimension of the political system. It refers to those values, beliefs, attitudes and skills that are current in the entire population (mass political culture), as well as to those special propensities to attitudes and behavior that are found within certain elements of the society (political subcultures). As traditional societies are confronted with the forces of social change, cultural conflict and modernization, the political values of various elements within the society are altered. This process affects the establishment of certain subcultures, the most notable being the modernizing elite.

In many developing states, the modernizing elite have emerged as the ruling elite and have promoted their own particular orientation to politics in order to legitimize their leadership. Halpern viewed the political party as a means to create a viable political culture by binding together charisma, organization, ideology and accountability [Halpern 1963].
These forces combine to a greater or lesser extent to form a complex symbolic system which becomes the political culture of the ruling elite. Political culture is shared, although not uniformly, and it functions as both a product and determinant of the political system. In authoritarian states or states in which the political culture could best be typified as parochial or subject (as opposed to participant), the political system emphasizes not only basic beliefs, but also a system of internal behavioral controls that determine patterns of political interaction. Patterns of social trust or distrust on the personal and group level are significant factors for political interaction in that they affect conceptions of authority and collective identity. The political culture approach is particularly applicable to the study of Egyptian political development because of the non-institutional nature of Egyptian politics, pertinent social, psychological and religious influences prevalent within the society's traditional orientation to authority, and the centrality of informal groups to the political process.

The analytical approach of this study incorporates other instructive but not necessarily systematic or complete methods of analysis - charismatic leadership, patron-client analysis, institutional analysis, etc., - by determining their applicability to Egypt's political culture. The significance of these approaches to the understanding of Egyptian politics is not that they describe Egyptian politics plausibly, but
rather that they emphasize political traits, ideals and operating norms that have been internalized into the political consciousness. The origin of these political ideals is diverse: they result from Pharaonic/Coptic-Christian, Arabic-Muslim and Western cultural influences. The intent of this chapter is not to isolate the sources of Egypt's culture or to define the complex process of cultural borrowing and amalgamation that has taken place, but rather to provide some indication of the politically significant factors that have evolved.

B. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Egyptian political history is characterized by a long tradition of centralized administration. Due in part to Egypt's geography, which has limited sedentary life along two strait lines running parallel to the Mediterranean and the Nile, the area has been historically easy to rule and administer. Egyptian society has always been "hydraulic" - dependent on large-scale irrigation and flood control for its very existence [Wittfogel 1957, p. 2f]. Since time immemorial, Egypt has had a strong centralized administration that controlled the flood waters of the Nile and organized irrigation. Government in Egypt, dating back to the Pharaonic period, has been bureaucratically oriented and autocratic. The tradition of autocratic centralized administration and the society's dependence on the Nile provides some basis for understanding Egyptian quietism, acceptance of de facto rulers and the
historic distrust of government. Although incomplete because there is no consideration given to the influence of 
the Islamic concept of authority, the Lacoutures also empha-
size the impact of political geography:

The conqueror is usually received in Egypt with open arms; defeat is 'nationalized' and as often as not treated as a 'liberation'. This seeming opportunism does not mean that Egyptian patriotism is of no account... What is really involved is this people's inner dynamism, which is less inclined to rise against tyranny as the land and river make it dependent on whoever controls the dykes and dams [Lacoutures 1958, p. 12].

From the ancient rule of the pharaohs to the British-influenced monarchies of this century, there is a marked absence of institutional authority patterns. What has prevailed instead has been a ruling caste of Mameluk, Ottoman, Albanian, French and British influentials who established and centralized their control largely through the patronage of traditional leaders such as umad (village headmen), ulama (learned doctors of religion) and tribal shuyukh (leaders). Authority was historically determined by land-based wealth and access to central government elites. As a result, "the leadership role that was institutionalized was that of benevolent patron" [Springborg 1975, p. 85]. Even the reforms of the 19th century which strengthened the authority of the village umdah (headman) maintained this pattern. As Gabriel Baer and others have noted, the village umad always repre-
sented the central government to the villagers, rather than representing the villagers to the central government [Baer
However, this does not mean that the umad were government functionaries. The government needed the umdah's services and power as much as he needed recognition and support. The recognition of an umdah's authority, which was based on family status, by the government was little more than an affirmation of the traditional political culture.  

One result of this centralism has been an almost complete suppression of municipal enterprise in Egypt. This historically centralized autocracy has accustomed Egyptians to believe that they, either as individuals or as represented by village or municipal leaders, had no function of articulating interests. As Issawi noted, the belief is that only the central government can initiate changes and the "rapacity of the governors has led to a profound distrust of the government, the effects of which are still visible" [Issawi 1963, p. 7].

This situation remained the same until Khedive Isma'il formed a consultive Assembly of Notables in 1866 which was largely composed of umad. While Binder interprets the assembly as evidence of Egypt's participation crisis, it is evident that this group was by no means a representative body and could be described more accurately as a counter-elite of rural notables [Binder 1966, p. 222].

After the British occupation of Egypt in 1882, a number of advisory assemblies with limited influence continued to meet, yet no political party emerged until 1907. The first parties to emerge, including Mustafa Kamil's National Party and Sa'd Zaghlul's Wafd Party, were primarily concerned with ending the British occupation. These parties were actually conspiratorial bodies, political "clubs" rather than parties, and were largely comprised of urban leaders. The Wafd Party, although not representative of all classes, was able to associate itself with a growing national resentment of British control. The official dissolution of the Ottoman Empire after World War I and the prospect of independence from the British spurred large-scale demonstrations, riots and assassinations from 1919 to 1922, when the British unilaterally declared the sovereign independence of Egypt, subject to retention of certain British privileges, which in fact amounted to continued British hegemony.

Egypt was thus established as a constitutional monarchy under the Constitution of 1923. Zaghlul's Wafd Party won a sweeping victory in the elections of 1924, but the rural middle class strongly represented with the Wafd benefited very little from its power. By contrast, a new class of absentee landowners, merchants, financiers and urban professionals were the direct beneficiaries of Wafd policies under Mustafa al-Nahhas, Zaghlul's successor [Binder 1966, p. 225].
Under the monarchy of King Fuad and his successor, King Farouk, there was a considerable struggle between the palace and the Wafd. The new middle class became disenchanted with the Wafd's inability to effect needed domestic reforms and the British presence became more and more of an affront [Halpern 1963, pp. 306-307]. Political alienation and demonstrations in the cities became frequent, and elements of the new middle class began to conspire against the system. Aristocratic groups within the Wafd who had masterminded the 1922 compromise organized themselves into the Liberal Constitutionalist Party, which never gained popular support, but the king and the British supported their interests. Other parties, such as the Saadist Party and the Union Party emerged, and were used with the Liberal Constitutionalists as counter-forces to the Wafd by the king. Some of these factions favored the interests of the large landowners and urban industrialists and others were intensely united against continued British presence. The remainder of the Wafd Party was concerned about maintaining its stature and power and aligned with the king.

Pre-revolutionary villages were bound politically and economically to the king through personal ties with large landowners [Ayrout 1963]. Ordinary villagers were economically dependent on landlords, creditors and merchants. Villagers had no political choices, since party competition for votes was determined by the actual distribution of political influence in each community, and this influence was invariably in the hands of the large landowners. The umad used personal
contacts to strengthen their positions against potential local challengers and to obtain personal economic and political advantages. At the same time, there developed several conspiratorial organizations including the Muslim Brethren, the Communist Party, the Young Egypt Movement and a clandestine revolutionary organization within the military known as the Free Officers' Movement.

The pattern that emerged and was to prevail until the 1952 coup d'état was the political competition of three forces: the king, the Wafd and the British, with the last holding ultimate authority. The king had twice dissolved the parliament in the 1920's and in 1930 the constitution was annulled. Anglo-Egyptian negotiations on a treaty to replace the unilateral British declaration of 1922 failed in 1924, 1927, and 1929, but the Italian conquest of Ethiopia in 1935 provided reason enough for the British to make concessions. The elections of 1935 returned the Wafd to power and a defense agreement was signed in 1936. The Treaty of 1936 hardly represented the realization of all of Egypt's nationalist demands, but it formally ended the occupation. British troops would be withdrawn to the Suez and Sinai as Egypt's defense capabilities improved; the capitulations would be removed;

---

6 The text and a recent view of Egyptian politics in the inter-war years is found in Afaf al-Sayyid-Marsot, Egypt's Liberal Experiment: 1922-1936 (Berkeley: Univ. of Cal. Press, 1977), pp. 253-263.
and control of its security forces was returned to Egypt for the first time since 1882. While the British reserved the right to reoccupy Egypt in case of outside attack, they were responsive to the Wafd government and supported modest reforms, such as opening the Military Academy to all classes.

With the outbreak of World War II, the British did not hesitate to claim their wartime rights and more under the 1936 treaty. Egypt's refusal to declare war on the Axis powers, and King Farouk's appointment of the pro-Italian Ali Maher as prime minister caused the British to intervene more than ever into Egypt's internal politics. The British forced the expulsion of General Aziz Ali, the Army Chief of Staff, due to his well-known German sympathies, and in 1942, forcibly demanded the replacement of Maher with Wafdist leader Nahhas in what has become known as the Abdin Palace coup. The imposition of a Wafdist government by British military ultimatum dealt a final blow to Egyptian inspiration with the Wafd.

After Egypt had received its independence in 1922 and increasingly so in the 1930's, the Wafd came to be associated with large landowners and urban elites; it became the party of the pashas. The basic pre-revolutionary historical experience was that the adoption of European liberal ideas and political institutions was foreign to even those Egyptians who participated in them. The establishment and functioning of parliamentary assemblies and political parties demonstrated
these differences. Khedive Isma'il never intended to share power with the initial Assembly of Notables that he organized. Its function was at most consultative, much in the same way a tribal shaikh (leader) was advised by his tribal council. 7 The development of political parties betrayed traditional patterns of authority in attempting to act as loyal opposition. Growing nationalism and intense resentment of the British were the only factors that attracted influential support for the Wafd. Familial and personal ties among traditional elites were the means by which support for the Wafd had been mobilized. It later became obvious that what was thought to be widespread populist support was in fact unified traditional support.

C. SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

In Egypt's transitional society, religion is still the most important expression of basic values, attitudes and assumptions found in its culture. This is not unique within Egypt, because of the pervasive nature of Islam as a religious, social and political force. The centrality of Islam to the political culture is in its effect on the formation of attitudes toward authority and participation within the political system. A corollary effect is due to the particular social structure that was and is fostered in Islamic societies. The

7See the chapter on constitutionalism and democracy in Majid Khadduri, Political Trends in the Arab World (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), pp. 28-54.
role of the family as the basic unit of political socialization is not only manifest in its specific role of transmitting political values, but also in the particular way in which authority is expressed. As noted by Almond and Verba, individuals tend to generalize from roles in family, school, religion and job to the performance of political roles [Almond and Verba 1963, p. 323-330]. In Egypt, authoritarian and participatory expectations within the family are especially pertinent to politics. Islam's strong dogmatic religious authority (absoluteness of truth) and directive authority (comprehensiveness of its regulations) have conditioned the Muslim to unquestioning faith and obedience - to submission to the will of god. It is only in Islam's lack of institutional authority and its promotion of egalitarian values that Islam's authoritarian effects have been mitigated by forces favorable to the development of a participant political system. Egypt's long history of foreign control and its exposure to Western political values have reinforced both of these divergent forces of authoritarianism and egalitarianism. In the practical application of politics, the authoritarian influence has consistently been a much more pervasive force.

Egyptian political culture can not be understood without examining the psychological and societal factors that in large

\[\text{See the analysis of Islam in terms of its dogmatic, directive and institutional authority in Donald E. Smith, Religion and Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1970): pp. 175-178, 267-272.}\]
part dictate the arena in which politics takes place. Defining politics in its simplest terms makes this understanding clearer: politics is simply who gets what, when and how [Lasswell 1936]. Islam and kinship are the two factors that have most affected and continue to affect the development of political culture in Egypt.

A Morroe Berger once noted, "during thirteen hundred years of Islamic civilization there was loyalty to family and religious community, perhaps even to profession or trade, but certainly not to the political unit of city or state" [Berger 1962, p. 295]. In fact, during most of Egyptian Islamic history, there has been insufficient differentiation between political and religious leadership to allow for the development of civic or political loyalty.

The Qur'an and the hadith (the usages and sayings of the prophet Mohammed) provide the basis for an Islamic political philosophy containing two fundamental components: an uncompromising doctrine of civic obedience and a precedent for political consensus. Of particular importance for political development and legitimacy within this philosophy is the marked absence of an institutional basis for the society. Sunnite Islamic traditions make no distinction between temporal and religious authority. Since the khalifa (caliph) derived his authority from Islam (Qur'an and sunnah), and because the prophet directed that those who rule should not be abused, no institutional checks on the absolute authority
of rulers developed [Lewy 1968, p. 3]. Modifications of this concept of absolute authority developed based on the Qur'anic principle of consultation (shura), which has often been interpreted as a basis for representative and participatory government.\(^9\) Despite the existence of advisory tribal councils, the tribal shaikh's authority was never shared.

In traditional Islamic society, there was no effort to demand active participation, despite the tendency for tribes to "invariably view central authority as an alien force" [Khadduri 1970, p. 47]. The authoritarian influences in Islamic doctrine, reinforced by centuries of life under authoritarian family and political rule, provide the basis for understanding the authoritarian nature of the Arab personality [Berger 1962, pp. 154-185]. Contrarily, the docility of the Egyptian fellah (peasant) indicates the existence of a modal personality. These behavior patterns, despite arguments by some religious apologists that Islam is inherently democratic, have shown in practice that Islam has been an impediment to the development of democratic institutions.\(^10\) The concept of consultation was never institutionally developed into anything more than the political use of traditional religious ijma' (consensus) into acquiescent agreement. The implications for political development within a culture that promotes authoritarian

---

\(^9\) For example, see Qur'an, XLII, 36.

leadership and an apolitical or politically apathetic citizenry are extremely pessimistic. The post-revolutionary Egyptian attempt to mobilize a politically apathetic citizenry has been limited by the regime's reluctance to relinquish effective power. Egypt's modernizing leaders have repeatedly "invited criticism and debate, but the invitation has always been prefaced with the warning that the system will not countenance rivals" [Holt 1968, p. 386].

The most promising explanation of why Egyptian leaders cannot accept opposition and why the citizenry acquiesces is the psychological view that Egyptians internalize the role of the father and the mother in their personal relationships [Pye and Verba 1965, pp. 408-411]. The father dominates the family and his success is measured in terms of maintaining the prestige and status of the family; the mother submits to authority and is not the guardian of the family's prestige, but rather its points of greatest vulnerability. The ambivalence in roles is intertwined with the concept of "honor and shame," which posits that the moral aim of Arabs is the preservation of their honor, which is dependent upon how other Arabs see them. This dependence makes them outwardly-oriented and largely conforming, which affects

---

11 For an excellent discussion of the participation crisis, see Myron Weiner, "Political Participation: Crisis of the Political Process," in Binder, Crises and Sequences, pp. 159-204.

their orientation toward politics significantly. The social anthropologist Hamad Ammar identified a prevailing Egyptian personality type, which he called the "fahlawi personality" [Ammar 1954]. The personality type is characterized by quick adaptability to the decrees of authority figures, resulting in a preoccupation with untruth, and a series of psychological complexes. Raphael Patai distorts this theme to the extent where the Arab is portrayed as an inhumane religious fanatic, concerned with gaining power and authority, yet unable to attain it because of shame and the imprecise nature of the language [Patai 1973]. While the characteristics of the Arab personality, especially honor and shame, are fundamental in understanding Egyptian political culture, the political inferences are unclear and often overexaggerated.13 Perhaps the most even analysis is that of Binder, who derives the following bases for Egyptian political culture:

In the first place, the kind of society which Egyptians want is one that reflects the virtues taught in the family and one which understands the essence of national community in family terms. Second, all persons in positions of authority tend to be assimilated to the role and character of the father. The individual who finds himself in a position of authority has already internalized the model of the father as a goal to which maturation and achievement of adult status will lead him, but he may find that the strategies of the mother are more helpful in subordinate roles. Third, equalitarian relations cannot be conceived of outside a framework of keen rivalries. Fourth, formalism and prestige are still rated higher than achievement. Fifth, authority and power are

13 For a similar opinion, see Michael C. Hudson, Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), pp. 52-53.
thought to be aspects of personality and not attributes of certain roles. Sixth, matters of personal feelings, social adjustments and sex are all associated with the idea of shame. Seventh, sharing of confidences and especially lifting the veil of secrecy from any of the symbols of shame are grave and stupid mistakes which can only weaken the individual in his social dealings. [Pye and Verba 1965, pp. 410-411]

The previously stated premise emphasizing the importance of Islam and kinship in the development of Egyptian political culture does not discount the impact that such factors of migration, urbanization, mass communications, industrialization and education have on the development of political culture in Egypt, but rather that the importance of these factors of modernization is in how they affect kinship and religion, and their associated authority patterns. Theories associated with Karl Deutsch, Daniel Lerner and others emphasizing the direct impact of these factors on political participation are not applicable to the Middle East in general, or to Egypt in particular.14

Kinship can be characterized by four components: patriarchal authority, patrilineal descent, patrilocal residence and preferred kin-group endogamy. The kinship ties among family members are extensive and produce a network of social relations that directly affect Egyptian politics at the national and subnational level. In the basic family unit

the father is the authority figure and within his extended family or clan there is an equally clear relationship with the traditional shaikh. The often quoted Arab statement, "my brother and I against my cousin; my cousin and I against the stranger," accurately explains the prominence of family in social and political relationships even today. Studies of Egyptian politics at national and subnational levels alike indicate that politicians manipulate the lineage-marriage system to obtain political support, socioeconomic security and derived status. With a proper understanding of kinship, the propensity for nepotism among Egyptians can be viewed as a natural, moral and socially correct obligation. A second and related basic concept of Egyptian social and political relationships is the predominance of family loyalties based on the personal relationships developed between different family leaders. Since these loyalties are renewed and often


changed for reasons of economic or political expediency, Egyptian politics becomes factionalized.  

Because of this factionalization and the impact of the factors of modernization, family prestige and status have been affected. The concept of family as the sole basis for analysis of Egyptian politics, even at the village level, is no longer adequate. One approach developed by Richard Antoun has been expanded for the purposes of this study to explain political participation at national and subnational level [Antoun and Harik 1972, pp. 118-162]. The following modified hypothesis explains how various other factors pertinent to political competition and participation affect political culture:

The level and type of political participation in Egyptian politics is critically influenced by the existence of a political community of social control, the intensity of its activity and the location of its boundaries.

The particular usage of the term "political community" is defined as that area within which there is competition for control of key institutions. For example, at local level, the community would be those villages that have village councils, agricultural cooperative boards, combined units, etc.  

18 For a historical explanation of factionalism, see Manfred Halpern, Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa (Princeton: Princeton Press, 1963), pp. 18-19.

19 Since 1960, smaller villages often come under the administration of a larger village where such institutions are located. These villages are subordinate to kism (county seats) which are subordinate to one of 26 governorates. See Mohammed Nassouhy, "Local Autonomy under National Planning: The Egyptian Experience." Ph.D. dis., Univ. of S. Calif., 1965.
The term "social control" refers to those formal and informal institutions that internalize and conform members of the political community to local norms. The use of the term "boundaries" is included to distinguish those areas where outside influences affect the competition, such as the position of the army affecting a national decision regarding domestic politics or a national development program affecting village politics.

Within this framework the effect of the modernization factors on kinship and subsequently on the political culture become more understandable. The impact of education perhaps more than any other factor of modernization has affected the status of traditional families. In a detailed case study of the village of Kafr el-Elow, Fakhouri notes that the number of university educated men within a hamula or clan has become important in village politics because "education has replaced the size of the clan as a determinant of family status and prestige" [Fakhouri 1972, p. 119]. While Fakhouri's analysis appears correct for Kafr el-Elow, it may not be so in other villages because of a difference in social control. For example, a study of small villages in the governorate of Beni Suef by Hassan indicated that despite the land reforms of the 1950s and 1960s, which altered the status of many umad, and the abolishment of the traditional village government to include the position of umdah, the same individual still controls the village [Hassan 1966, p. 42]. The umdah's
family was found to control 800 afdina (one feddan equals 1.04 acres) of land and eight of the ten members of the village council were members of his hamula. Another detailed study of a village of 6,000 near Damanhur in Beheira Governorate indicated that the Samad family who controlled the village for over 100 years had lost all influence as did many other traditional leaders in the village, yet education did not appear to be a factor [Harik 1974].

As in other developing nations, the impact of education on political development in Egypt is largely a function of the expanded social and economic roles of university graduates. The educational system has also provided Egypt with a sort of cultural dichotomy. The traditional element in this dichotomy is the Islamic educational system which included the elementary Qur'an memorizing school (kuttab), the mosque school (madrasah) and the ancient university of Al-Azhar, whose students are graduated as 'ulama'. Modern secular education which began during the Mohammed Ali period is the second element. As Kerr's analysis of education and political development in Egypt indicates, modern secular educational measures did not supplant traditional learning, but rather produced cultural ambivalence within intellectual circles:

A considerable number of students from the traditional system, however, found their way into the modern one by being sent to Europe or enrolling in one of the higher professional or technical schools in Egypt. A number of such persons, hybrid products of two contrasting cultural traditions, have made
interesting contributions to the intellectual and political life of Egypt over the last century, reflecting the tensions and conflicts of the two traditions in a manner that reveals something of the complexity of present-day political and social attitudes that are sometimes encountered among educated Egyptians. Mohammed Abduh and Sa'd Zaghlul are perhaps the best known past figures to represent this cultural ambivalence to the outside world; within Egypt such types are commonplace [Kerr 1965, p. 171].

Formal education is regarded as a means of social and economic mobility and it has been specifically connected with the notion of equality and opportunity that has been actively promoted by the post-revolutionary ruling elite. Mass education which began in the 1950s has contributed to the unification of cultural life by reducing the number of students attending foreign schools [Kerr 1965, p. 183]. The "Egyptianization" of French and British schools in 1956 and the nationalization of all foreign schools in 1962 has no doubt enhanced cultural unification, but a cultural gap still remains between the graduates of Al-Azhar and those of modern secular schools. This gap continues to exist despite government efforts in the 1960s to modernize the longstanding curriculum of Al-Azhar. There is certainly no consensus even among university educated persons in Egypt that Islamic culture is being made obsolete by modern or secular culture. Apologetics who insist that there is no conflict between Islamic heritage and the

20 Despite the usage "modern schools," educational practices continue to emphasize the authority of the teacher, formal curricula, discipline, rote learning and routine.
modern advocates of science, statutory law, democracy and socialism have not convinced many segments of the population. Such arguments have made it more difficult for the ruling elite to look forward and outward rather than backward and inward. The cultural attainments of both Pharaonic Egypt and the Islamic Empires during their eras of ascendancy were remarkable, and these legacies are a source of confidence and pride. However, the decline of these empires and Egypt's relatively decadent position in today's world also constitute social and psychological burdens.

Education makes Egyptian students more aware of their heritage, enhances their self-conscious dignity and their economic and social aspirations. The inability of many graduates to find economically and professionally satisfactory jobs has made university students and graduates an increasingly revolutionary force. Student demonstrations and political agitation became much more intense since World War II to the extent that both Nasir and Sadat have resorted to the stationing of troops on university campuses. Nasir's so-called "cultural revolution" was more accurately an attempt to mobilize students to aspire to the modernizing goals of the regime through the educational system. Daniel Lerner has described a similar use of the communications media to attempt to raise the productive capacity of the Egyptian masses through political indoctrination while simultaneously attempting to limit the undesirable political consequences of mass social consciousness [Lerner 1958, p. 251].
A content analysis of Egyptian textbooks which were revised in 1958 and 1959 provides an example of the extent to which the regime used education as a means of political socialization:

Socialism is articulated as a Muslim theory of socialism. The head of state is described as one responsible for the maintenance of social justice and civil order; he appoints and directs high administrators, directs the economy and forms foreign policy. The people choose him and he should submit to consultation (shura), but his power comes from Allah [Carré 1972, pp. 536-543].

The presentation of the regime's political values in Islamic terms continues to be a prevalent method of legitimation. Article 19 of the Egyptian Constitution of 1971 prescribes religious instruction in the public schools, and its application specifically ties political and religious education in the traditional Islamic sense. In the religious texts now used, 72 percent of the interpretative content is devoted to political and social matters [Borthwick 1979, p. 159 and Carré 1972, p. 536]. The success of using the educational media to integrate intellectuals and masses alike into the regime's particular political subculture is very tentative unless the society realizes its goals of economic and social mobility. As noted by most analysts of Egyptian political development, the establishment of a well integrated and progressive political culture is dependent upon the regime's ability to successfully confront Egypt's severe economic problems, which affect most social and political questions in Egypt.
Education has certainly increased the social mobility and political awareness of Egyptians of peasant origin and provided a catalyst to the influence of the middle class or what Binder has called the "political class." Another aspect of education has been the formation and influence of educational cliques, especially at national level. A dufaa refers to a group within a graduating class from a university, technical or military school that generally studied the same subject [Springborg 1975, p. 97]. Springborg's study of political elites indicates that dufaa members develop strong loyalties, and that the dufaa provides a means of recruitment into preferred government jobs. Since the majority of the political elites are recruited from the military or public sector, the dufaa is vital for access to the political elite. For graduates lacking family influence, the dufaa provides a means of derived influence. The most apparently successful dufaa was that of the original Free Officers formed at the Military Academy in Cairo in 1940, which included Nasir, Sadat and nine others, who later jointly seized power in July 1952 and formed the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC).

Another even stronger affiliation group known as a shilla is prominent in Egyptian society and consists of a small group of friends who cooperate with each other for attainment of mutual goals, especially those related to career

enhancement. The shilla provides relatively permanent loyalties as opposed to temporary factions and alliances, and can arise from associates within formal organizations, dufaa, occupational groups or families. Shilal may form the basis for large political alliances since each member of a shilla may contribute his clientage network and family connections to the alliance [Springborg 1975, pp. 99-104].

These affiliations or groups largely integrate influentials along horizontal lines, leaving no organizational basis for vertical loyalties [Moore 1974]. Yet, given the prominence of personal relationship, it is natural that vertical alliances would be made on a personal basis of patron to client. Dekmejian's study of national political leadership under Nasir and alliances between the RCC and other shilal within the military and the bureaucracy provides a firm basis for existence of a network of patron-client relationships integrated along vertical lines [Dekmejian 1971]. Springborg's study of elites indicates that clientelism also exists at subnational level and cites examples at municipal level. In fact, he states, "the degree of integration and stable community politics achieved in Egypt is due largely to patron-client relationships . . . vertical loyalties in informal authority structures provide Egyptian urban politics with an adequate functional substitute" [Springborg 1975, p. 90].

---

22 Bureaucratic shilal are discussed in Springborg, Political Elites, pp. 99-104.
Since the patron-client relationships affect the influence of subordinate shilal, the maintenance of strong patronage is more important politically. Formal and informal organizations and institutions such as the Peoples' Assembly and political parties provide an arena for personal relationships and facilitate communication between clientage networks. The ultimate step in verifying alliances and clientage is still inter-family marriage. Sadat's brother-in-law, Mahmoud Abu Wafia, was appointed to major party positions within the Arab Socialist Union. The marriage of Sadat's daughter into the aristocratic Osman family has verified another association. Industrialist Osman Ahmad Osman has been a close political confidant of Sadat and a major benefactor of Sadat's economic liberalization (infitah) policies. Amal Osman has been appointed to a cabinet ministry [Bill and Leiden 1979, p. 232].

President Sadat's strong loyalties with Sayyid Marei, previous Secretary-General of the ASU and Speaker of the Peoples' Assembly, is understandable since Sadat's other daughter is married to Marei's son. This relationship was strengthened in 1975 when a constitutional amendment introduced by Sadat provided that the speaker of the assembly replace the president in case of death or resignation. Springborg's case study of the Marei family in the pre-revolutionary and post-revolutionary periods provides a good example of the persistence of political influence based on
family ownership of land and Sayyid Marei's personal relationship with both Nasir and Sadat.23 A similar ethnographic study of the Delta region by Robert Fernea indicates that the Delta's economic importance to the central government has caused a great deal of central government interest in the politics of most of these villages, again with a limiting effect on family-based village influences [Fernea 1972, pp. 75-102].

Few generalizations can be made about village politics, yet available studies do provide enough confirming data to support some preliminary findings. The social and political structure of small non-industrialized villages of about 10,000 or less is likely to be based on a limited number of hamula. The village councils and political party councils in these villages tend to reflect the relative power and influence of the competing families. In his study of rural institutions in 1974, Myafield found that in small villages the "concept of competing candidates vying for ten positions on the local ASU Committee of Ten was still alien to a society where family structure largely determines leadership positions" [Mayfield 1974, p. 115]. In these villages, family elders are likely to meet to determine the committee members by consensus.

Other factors that have affected kinship and altered the political culture within Egyptian villages and municipalities are migration, urbanization and industrialization. Of these factors, migration appears to have the least effect on changes in political participation, since the majority of migrants are unskilled workers with a comparatively low level of political awareness. Most migrants settle with others of the same village and locate employment through them when possible; however, the migrant community lacks the prestige and familial hierarchy of the village [Binder 1969, p. 416]. Available data indicates that about 40 percent of the unskilled migrants in cities are members of their village migrant associations, but these associations rarely involve themselves in municipal politics [Peterson 1971 and Zeid 1979].

The simultaneous industrialization and urbanization of traditional villages has a more significant role. Fakhouri's case study of Kafr el-Elow, which he describes as an "urban-industrialized village with a folk-peasant base," provides some notable insights since the village is located near Egypt's industrial complex at Helwan, and the village has six identifiable hamula [Fakhouri 1972]. Three general effects were noted:

First, that the village's industrial occupation structure has a large percentage of skilled workers and professionals, and this segment and the youth are interested and concerned with politics; secondly, that kinship ties have been weakened but still exist; and thirdly, that villagers have adapted their behavior to reduce conflict between traditional and modern life styles [Fakhouri 1972, pp. 124-125].
Family influence is slowly giving way to identification with various voluntary associations. Moore has argued that urban society is actually structured by these associations, even though they have not exhibited autonomous political influence [Moore 1974]. Studies of professional syndicates, voluntary religious associations and benevolent societies demonstrate that the leadership of many of these associations have been co-opted into the clientage system of the regime. The linkage of these associations to the regime is usually through personal relationships with members of various bureaucratic agencies [Reid 1974 and Springborg 1978]. Binder's analysis of the rural elite demonstrates that there is also a family connection between the leadership of urban voluntary associations, especially professional syndicates, and the traditional rural elite [Binder 1978, p. 104]. The pattern that is emerging in urban areas is one in which the political impact of deteriorating family influences is moderated by family linkages between urban and rural elites. Since more members of Egypt's rural elite families are seeking professional and government careers, this moderating influence should continue.

D. POLITICAL CULTURE AND THE EGYPTIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM

Egypt's mass political culture derives from a synthesis of Pharaonic/Coptic-Christian, Arabaic-Muslim and Western influences and can be characterized by several common features, some of which are curiously divergent and inconsistent.
Mayfield and others have noted that Egypt's political culture is fragmented between traditional and modern concepts of authority and political action [Mayfield 1971]. While the existence of both traditional and modern influences is certainly to be expected in any transitional state, Egypt's political culture is further fragmented within both the traditional and modern spheres. It has already been shown that the average Egyptian has internalized certain values or orientations to politics that are contradictory, and that there is evidence of a basic modal personality. These "dualities" appear to be equally apparent when analyzing various features of the Egyptian political culture. Dessouki has identified three basic features: (1) idealization of the past; (2) privatism, skepticism and self-concern; and (3) acceptance of a centralized and authoritarian administration [Dessouki 1971].

The idealization of the past is best described by von Grunebaum's concept of cultural classicism:

(1) The past (or merely an alien) phase of cultural development is recognized as a complete and perfect realization of human potentialities.
(2) This realization is appropriated as a legitimate inheritance or possession.
(3) The possibility is admitted that the present may be recast in terms of past perfection.
(4) The aspiration of the past is accepted as exemplary and as binding on the present [von Grunebaum 1962, p. 72].

For the Egyptian and many Muslims, history is consulted to yield the glories of the past which may be taken as a warranty for a similarly glorious future [Chejne 1960]. The
past, especially the period of the orthodox caliphate (632 A.D. - 661 A.D.) is seen as an image of what the world should be [Hourani 1962, p. 8]. However, the Egyptian also views Pharaonic/Coptic history as a source of pride, honor and self-consciousness. Many words, festivals, and social and religious practices have survived from the Pharaonic period and are shared by both Muslims and Copts [Lane 1842]. The Egyptian is thus amenable to the themes of both the Pharaonic/Coptic and the Islamic past.

Nasir alternated between the themes of Egyptianism and Arabism during his regime. The 1952 coup d'etat and the eventual evacuation of the British were nationalist, "Egyptian" victories. Nasir later evoked the Arab nature of Egypt in Islamic terms. Yet, the Egyptian identification was not abandoned during the period of Arabism as evidenced by Egypt's "natural role" as leader of the Arab Nation. Egypt's expanded role in the ill-fated union with Syria was a major cause for its demise. After the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, Nasir effected a subtle shift from Arabism back to Egyptian nationalism and re-opened the debate on the "Egyptian personality" [Dekmejian 1971, p. 265].

Since 1973, Sadat has emphasized

---

Egyptianism to legitimize a foreign policy that became increasingly independent of Arabism. To legitimize this shift, the regime has emphasized that Egyptian nationalism is a political and cultural force, while Egypt's identification with Arabism is undeniable but strictly cultural. The duality that is apparent is one between an identification with Egyptian nationalism and Arab nationalism as the political focus of national identity. It is instructive to note that both Nasir and Sadat have relied upon the masses' idealization of the Islamic past to promote things modern. New programs and policies continue to be introduced and promoted in Islamic terms, carefully defining their bases in the Islamic past, and often legitimized through the issuance of a supportive fatwa.

The basic Islamic identification of Egypt is so pervasive that no political leader would dare challenge it directly. The response of both Nasir and Sadat to simultaneous forces of fundamentalism and secularism has been to tighten state control of religion and to promote "modernist Islam." Modernism attempts to reaffirm and re-evaluate the significance of the Qur'an, hadith, and the shari'ah for modern life, and to stress the underlying concepts of Islamic jurisprudence

including **maslaha** (the public good) and **ijtihad** (independent juristic judgment) [Humphreys 1979]. By bringing the awqaf, shari'ah courts, voluntary religious associations and Al-Azhar under state control, Nasir sought to espouse a version of Islam that would appeal to both the conservative masses and the religious middle class, and legitimize his goals of modernization [Berger 1970]. By expanding state control in the name of religion, Nasir was also intent on undercutting the Muslim Brethren. Sadat has promoted a similar policy of control and deference to religion. The Constitution of 1971 states that "Islam is the religion of the state" and that the "principles of the Islamic shari'ah are a major source of legislation" [Flanz and Blaustein 1972, Art. 2]. Sadat has taken measures to implement a law promulgated in 1960 which places Egypt's 4,000 public mosques, 15,000 private mosques and thousands of **zawiyah** (prayer rooms) under the administration of the government controlled Ministry of Awqaf [Borthwick 1979, p. 157]. Sadat's slogan that "Egypt must rely on faith and science" is indicative not only of his preference for modernist Islam, but also of his realization that there can be no break in Egypt's religious-political synthesis. The legitimacy of the state, the identity of the Egyptian nation and the character of the citizenry are firmly based in Islam. The growth of religious sentiment among Muslims and Copts, especially among the youth, and the growth of Sufi brotherhoods in Egypt confirms religion's
continued centrality in Egyptian political culture [Borthwick 1979, Brodin 1978, and Gilsenan 1973].

Dessouki's second and third features of Egyptian mass political culture are themselves inconsistent and contradictory. Privatism, skepticism and self-concern depict the average Egyptian's disregard for public and official matters. Government is viewed as illegitimately maintained by power and force. Centuries of misrule and oppression are kept alive in the popular sayings of the people [Issawi 1963, pp. 6-9]. At the same time, government has an awesome quality, because it has been the major source of organized social power and no class or group outside the government possesses enough strength to successfully threaten it. Consequently, behavior has been characterized by political quietism and acceptance of centralized and authoritarian de facto governments. These values provide evidence for a cultural acceptance of a two-class theory of Egyptian politics - one class that is in power and one that is not. The make-up of these two segments of Egyptian society and the nature and scope of their interaction is particularly basic to understanding the political culture. As previously noted, Egypt's rulers have centralized their control largely through the patronage of traditional leaders (umad, ulama and shuyukh) and the relationship of the rulers

---

and the traditional leaders was not without reciprocities. The traditional leadership group functioned as intermediaries of the government, brokers between the rulers and the masses. As such, the central government was dependent upon the umdah system.

The traditional leadership was thus part of the ruling class, or what Mosca called the "second strata of the ruling class" - the strata without which the leadership could not rule [Meisel 1962, p. 217].\(^{27}\) The clientage of the traditional leadership to the central government provided a vertical and non-institutional basis of political control. Traditional leaders solidified their political control through the maintenance of long-established subordinate clientage networks and horizontal linkages to the ulama and shuyukh of other large land-owning families. The ambivalence between acceptance and mistrust of government resulted in a political system in which the acceptance of the government by the masses was largely a measure of their acceptance of the traditional leadership which represented the government to the masses at the local level. Patron-client linkages between the government and the umd and between the umd and the fellahin were dependent on the patron's ability and willingness to meet the reciprocal expectations of his clients, which

\(^{27}\) Binder's analysis of Egypt's rural elite empirically demonstrates that the pre-revolutionary second-stratem has not only maintained its influence, but has also been the source of Egypt's post-revolutionary elite. Binder, Moment of Enthusiasm.
are inherent in any patronage system. Gabriel Baer's refutation of the docility of the Egyptian fellahin is based on instances in which such reciprocities were disregarded [Baer 1969, pp. 93-108]. Documented instances of political protest by the masses, both urban and rural, demonstrate that the masses are likely to resort to extra-legal activities when certain fundamental aspects of their life are seriously threatened. These aspects are limited to their strong identification with Islam, to any deterioration of their already marginal standard of living and any threat to continued Egyptian independence from a foreign power. It is likely that the masses would react similarly to more peripheral issues if presented as a threat to those fundamental concerns, especially if such actions were supported by traditional leaders, heads of voluntary associations or a charismatic national leader such as Nasir.

The mass political culture, and the basically inconsistent orientations to politics and authority which it includes, have had a directive effect on the type of political system and leadership that has evolved since the 1952 coup d'état. The directive nature of Egypt's political culture is due to the durability of values and behavioral norms that have proven almost invulnerable to radical change. The non-institutional nature of Egyptian politics with its proclivity for personal patronage and ingroup-outgroup rivalry is more accurately an internalized orientation to political action than a description of the post-revolutionary regime. Despite Nasir's
success in eliminating the political power of a number of large and powerful landowners through agrarian reform, his efforts to undermine the umdah system by creating parallel one-party and local government structures were largely unsuccessful. The umdah system found itself reinforced as the source of new elites for Nasir's enlarged military-bureaucratic system and as a source of predictable authority in rural Egypt when compared to the inconsequential and ephemeral character of new government structures.

Nasir's authority and control was limited by the same factor that restricted previous rulers. His control was limited by the reciprocal relationship of the patronage system. With the expansion of governmental structures, the significance of the brokerage function of clients also expands to the extent that control through the patron-client nexus alone is no longer possible [Lemarchand and Legg 1972, p. 154]. Clients begin to operate at cross-purposes or at least independently of formal institutional roles. Horizontal associational ties (shilal) reinforce the traditional means of security and mobility through familial or kinship groups. As Moore's analysis of Egyptian shilal notes, the shilla member eventually becomes his own man - not dependent on any one patron, but rather on the system of interpersonal relationships [Moore 1977, p. 263].

28 Moore's contention is strongly supported by Robert Springborg's analysis of the career of Sayyid Marei in The Ties That Bind.
The limitation placed upon the authority of the Egyptian leader by the political culture conceptually precludes a true authoritarian or totalitarian political system. The reciprocity of the patronage system relegates the would-be authoritarian leader to the patrimonial category. Max Weber's typology of the patrimonial ruler is one who rules through an administrative structure which emerges as an extension of the kinship group, so that administrators are tied to the ruler through bonds of paternal authority. Access to the person of the ruler determines influence and can be obtained through direct interpersonal relations or through an intermediary or series of intermediaries [Weber 1947, pp. 341-358]. The Egyptian political system is more typically a modern patrimonial system in which the post-revolutionary regime has attempted to alter the political culture by trying to mobilize the citizenry to support its goals of modernization. The remaining sections of this study address the extent to which Nasir and Sadat have been successful in attaining these goals and the effect of their policies upon political participation and elite access within the political culture.
III. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT UNDER NASIR

The conspiratorial grouping of nationalist officers known as the Society of Free Officers originated sometime during World War II and established regular meetings in 1944, but became seriously organized into interlocking secret cells only after 1949 [Sadat 1957, p. 38]. After the Arab defeat in the 1948 Palestine War in a largely unorganized effort, the mood in Egypt was violent but nationalistic. Popular unrest was widespread, with a "total of forty-nine workers' strikes in 1951 alone and several bloody peasant uprisings" [Baker 1978, p. 27]. Guerrilla attacks against British forces near Suez became more frequent, and in January 1952, the British surrounded a police station in Ismailia and demanded the surrender of guerrilla forces; the post refused, resulting in a massacre. The following day, Black Saturday, frenzied mobs, supposedly led by the Muslim Brethren, burned the center of Cairo, concentrating on British property and buildings associated with foreign interests.

During the evening of 22-23 July 1952, the Free Officers with troops under their command marched on the General Headquarters and seized control in an almost bloodless coup d'état. The first of three stated goals was attained: (1) overthrow of the monarchy; (2) reform the social and political system by eliminating the power of the ancien régime of wealthy

50
landowners and umad; and (3) secure a final evacuation of the British from Egypt.

From its inception the coup was elitist. Within the military structure, the Free Officer movement was limited to junior and mid-range officers and headed by a nucleus of ten to fourteen officers. The inner core of officers were linked by personal, non-institutional ties (shilla) and each member had formed secondary groups of officers. Shortly after seizing power, the revolutionary government endeavored to remove the power of the ancien regime of landowners and powerful influentials. To accomplish this stated goal of the revolution, agrarian land reform was enacted and political parties were banned in 1953. The expectation by the Free Officers that the Egyptian people would rally behind the new regime after the overthrow of the monarchy was not realized, and the need to establish a firm basis of popular support became obvious [Nasir 1955]. The Land Tenure System Law of 1952 placed a ceiling on landholdings over 200 afdina, resulting in an estimated redistribution of only 150,000 afdina by the end of 1955.29 The major success of the agrarian reform was that it regulated the tenant-landlord relationship and eventually established local cooperative structures with peasant representation on advisory boards from village to

29Jame P. Mayfield, Local Institutions and Egyptian Rural Development (Ithaca: Cornell Press, 1974), p. 20. Authorized land holdings were reduced to 100 afdina in 1962 under the provisions of the National Charter, and further reduced to 50 afdina in 1970.
governorate level. The expectation that the distribution of land to landless peasants would increase productivity and solidify popular support was not realized.

A. THE LIBERATION RALLY AND THE NATIONAL UNION

The Liberation Rally was established in January of 1953 as a single-party structure to mobilize support for Nasir immediately following his victory over the figurehead and symbolic leader of the Revolution, General Naguib and his Wafdist supporters. The Rally aimed at associating the masses with the regime, which by now proclaimed a sweeping revolution; it was also designed to create an alternative to the disbanded political parties and the Muslim Brethren. It served to support Nasir against Naguib and it was the regime's main instrument in purging trade unions and student associations of opposition [Dessouki 1978, p. 11].

The Rally was loosely organized, devoid of ideology and required only an expression of loyalty to the RCC. The Rally has been judged as a total failure at mobilizing national popular support; however, the Rally may have had a different effect at the local level. 30

Iliya Hariks' detailed case study of Shubra el-Gedida provides evidence that the Liberation Rally acted as a conduit for the development of a village counter-elite that eventually succeeded in overthrowing the controlling Samad

30 Binder has argued that the failure of the Liberation Rally actually enhanced the participation crisis. See Political Parties, p. 220.
family in 1959 [Harik 1974, pp. 68-80]. By exposing the Samad family's connections with the ancien regime, an opposition group with no previous experience with institutional politics was able to control the new local party branch of the Liberation Rally. While the party gave the opposition leader, Mohammad Kura, no specific functions, it did establish his official prestige and facilitated his influence by permitting official contact with governorate leaders. Kura received support from the peasants serving on the cooperative board and expanded his influence throughout the village and in neighboring villages by forming personal contacts. The effect of the Liberation Rally on political participation in Shubra was to significantly increase participation in the recruitment of local leadership and secondly, to increase the level of symbolic competition at village level.

The character of Nasir's Egypt in the early years of the regime (1952-1955) was one of highly personal control through the direct use of the military. The military, as a national institution, became the new ruling elite. However, Nasir's goals of modernization and the recognized need for political mobilization to support the regime's development programs somewhat moderated the direct role that the military played in the early years of the regime. 31

__________________________

31 The role of the military is discussed in Chapter V.
The Constitution of 1956 provided for the establishment of the National Union to replace the Liberation Rally. The National Union was placed under the leadership of a party executive committee which was comprised of three Free Officers. Firm restrictions were placed on participation at national level by the executive committee, which was tasked to review and approve all candidates for elections to the newly constituted Peoples' Assembly. In preparation for the initial election, 2,528 candidates were screened and almost half were rejected [Dawisha 1976, p. 118]. Through this process, previous affiliations between the regime and local influential were solidified [Harik 1973, p. 86]. The function of the newly elected 350-member assembly proved to be little more than ceremonial. Nasir stated that he relied on the National Union "to get to know the problems of the masses and to allow them to get in touch with the government and ask for solutions to these problems." The use of the National Union as a channel of communication proved no more successful than its use as an organization for political mobilization.

At the subnational level, the contest for National Union party leadership was to be determined by local party elections.


33British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of Weekly Broadcasts: The Middle East, July 24, 1959, p. 28.
The basic committee of the Union was to be a Committee of Ten; the central party organization did not name, endorse or screen candidates as was the practice at national level.

Harik's study of Shubra indicates that the future political aspirations of the Samad and Kura blocs were determined by the local elections held in July of 1959 [Harik 1974, p. 69]. The Kura bloc won a majority of six committee seats making it possible for four of their allies to become municipal councillors. Mohammed Kura was elected by the committee to be a district delegate and eventually as a governorate delegate. He was elected to the National Congress in 1960 as the Beheira Governorate representative, and his brother, Sayyid Kura, was appointed mayor of Shubra by the Beheira governor. Nasir's call for a special congress to be elected in 1961 to discuss future political organizations resulted in the confirmation of the Kura leadership, but also evidenced the growing power of agrarian reform peasants headed by Ali al-Shawi, a peasant and secretary of the agrarian reform cooperative of Shubra. Mohammed Kura and Ali al-Shawi were elected to represent the district at the special Peoples' Congress. The Shubra experience indicates that the National Union did provide local leaders with a means to influence village-wide policy and to establish political contacts outside the community. The lack of effective centralized party control and the failure of the national regime to provide institutional power to the governorates allowed village leadership to operate with relative autonomy.
In those villages where the initial reforms of the Nasir regime failed to effect the control of the village umdah or wealthy landowners, the effect of the decentralized nature of the National Union was dysfunctional. By providing the traditional leader increased autonomy and a mechanism for establishing new personal contacts at district and governorate level, the Union in fact provided some new legitimacy and solidified the traditional leader's position. If the previously discussed generalizations about village political development are accurate, it is likely that the Shubra experience was typical only in those villages where early reforms challenged the traditional leadership and provided the impetus for development of an opposition bloc. Harik's conclusion that "members of the local party branch in Subra enjoyed the freedom to select their own officers and to form competing political groups within the organization" should not be interpreted as evidence of grass roots democracy, but rather within the context of the political culture presented. The change in effective leadership was actually from the Samad family to the Kura family. While the party structure and the agrarian cooperative structure provided the arena, the change was effected through personal and family relationships and alliances. Rather than the reforms creating a change in political culture with implications for increased participation, it would be more accurate to posit that the traditional political culture, operating in the arena of the imposed
one-party structure, directed a change in leadership since the Samad family lost its perceived status and authority due to its close association with the ancien régime. The successful use of the party structure by the Kuras improved the prestige of the public office-holder and party official.

The lack of detailed planning, ideology and control at governorate level and below caused the National Union, like its predecessor, to be ineffective at mobilizing support. Given Egypt's proclivity for personal relationships and affiliations, it is likely that an almost direct link exists from the national leadership to the village despite the presence of a large and cumbersome bureaucracy and the party structure. The most significant effect of the National Union and the assembly upon the political culture was that it provided a conduit for extended affiliations to be formed. The lack of subnational party control allowed traditional rural elites to continue to operate in relative autonomy. A similar lack of centralized control was also apparent in the local government structure.

B. DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT

The Constitution of 1956 provided for a new local government with elected bodies, which was established four years later by Local Government Law No. 124 of 1960.34 The local

government system is an important variable in evaluating political participation and the one-party system, because of the multiplicity of function between the government and the party and because the local government structure provides for additional political representation at village level and for its implementation of party policies.

Law 124 provides for provincial (governorate) councils headed by governors appointed by the President of the Republic and for town and village councils comprised of elected, selected and ex officio members. The Arab Socialist Union's (ASU) Executive Committee elects a number of representatives not to exceed ten from its own membership to the village council. The village council also includes two members selected by the Ministry of Local Government with the advice of the governor and six ex officio members representing the Ministries of Education, Health, Agriculture, Housing and Public Utilities and Interior. The village council is presided over by a mayor (chairman) who is appointed by the Ministry of Local Government from among the members of the village council with the consent of the local ASU.

While the practice of appointing ex officio and selected members indicates a high degree of centralized control, the


36For a detailed discussion of the functions of Village Councils, see Nassouhy, Local Autonomy, chap. 9.
central government did not give governorates sufficient power and responsibility to effectively limit local autonomy [Heaphey 1966]. However, as Nassouhy points out, the governorates do exercise effective authority in fiscal matters by requiring that local councils submit budgets for approval. The central government's failure to limit local autonomy provides an example of the reciprocities inherent in the patron-client relationship between national and subnational elites. With the exception of certain large landowners, Nasir's various measures to expand state control did not eliminate the political and economic influence of the umdah.

C. THE ARAB SOCIALIST UNION

The secession of Syria from the United Arab Republic in 1961 coincided with Nasir's adoption of a socialist ideology and a growing realization for the need to expedite the achievement of developmental goals through another mobilization party. Under Nasir's direction, a preparatory committee met to decide the representative formula for a Congress of Popular Forces (special Peoples' Assembly) that would be charged with developing a socialist charter. The Congress of Popular Forces, based on an occupational or corporative representation of 50 percent farmers and workers, met in May of 1962 to review a draft national charter prepared by Nasir. The National Charter was approved without amendment and issued in December 1962. It declared that the Arab
Socialist Union was to be the nation's single political organization and reaffirmed official party supremacy over the bureaucracy. The structure of the ASU contained two innovations:

(1) Fifty percent of all seats within ASU committees were filled with farmers or workers as defined in the charter. This also included the Peoples' Assembly.

(2) The charter provided for elected ASU basic units in state-controlled enterprises, factories, ministries and business firms [Antoun and Harik 1972, p. 377].

At national level, the new party consisted of an appointed general secretariat and a supreme executive council. Nasir continued to dictate national policy, which was implemented through the cabinet and civil and party bureaucrats. The party was loosely coordinated, and party officers at the governorate level had little direct influence on party organizations at the village level. Figure I depicts the formal structure of the ASU from 1963 to 1965.

The effect of the new ASU at local level was first realized during the elections of 1963. The number of seats on the party committee had increased from ten to twenty; 50 percent of the seats were restricted to farmers or workers. Harik's case study shows that these changes did affect the traditional leadership. In Shubra, there were three slates and a number of independents competing for party positions. The Kuras won only eight seats, agrarian reform peasants won seven seats and independents won five. Both Shawi and Kura ran for office in the 1964 Peoples' Assembly elections along with
four others, but due to their factional rivalries, Shawi and Kura refused to run on the same slate which would have assured their election. As Harik recounts, they were both defeated [Harik 1974, p. 77].
The short term effect of the ASU on political participation was to expand the influence of politically active peasants and workers and to expand the level of their representation in governmental organizations, state-controlled enterprises, factories, business, and cooperative associations. However, the ASU's inability to motivate citizens toward developmental national goals from 1962 to 1965 provided increasing evidence to Nasir that even the newly formed ASU was ineffective. A series of nationalization decrees were issued between 1960-1963 which extended government control over the economy, and several economic planning committees within the bureaucracy were established to direct economic development. 37

Despite the official subservience of the bureaucracy to the all three single-party organizations, the bureaucracy flourished. Nasir expressed dissatisfaction with the growing independence of the bureaucracy, and he publicly attacked influential bureaucratic leaders during a speech before the Peoples' Assembly in March 1964, emphasizing that he "would not allow them to imagine themselves as a new class inheriting the privileges of the old capitalists" [Antoun and Harik 1972, pp. 302-303]. The role of "watchdog over the bureaucracy" assigned to the ASU in 1965 expressed Nasir's concern over

the influence of the bureaucratic elite. Local Government Law 124, for example, vastly increased the penetration and influence of several bureaucratic agencies by directing its representatives to be ex officio and voting members of village councils.

Nasir directed that the ASU be revitalized in 1965 by involving the citizenry in active support of the regime's goals of modernization and the regime's official ideology. To accomplish this mobilization, former Prime Minister Ali Sabri, a hard-line leftist, was appointed Secretary-General of the ASU. Sabri established a hierarchy of authority within the party by establishing a system of appointing party cadre and ending the direct elections of ASU party leaders at subnational level. The mobilization program created party controlled "leadership groups" at subnational level, which challenged local governmental leadership and established four local activities: political education through new district-level socialist training institutes, supervision of local ASU corporate basic units and committees, community development self-help projects, and the creation of ASU Youth Organizations [Harik 1974, pp. 84-100].

The previously constituted Committee of Twenty at village level was not abolished but rather bypassed by the new reform. The leadership group was created to coordinate various organizations and factions in the community with ASU representation and to effect developmental projects desired by the regime. Normally, the leadership group consisted of the
mayor, village doctor, village agronomist and villagers with leadership potential; the leadership group chairman was usually selected from village workers or cultivators, but not from village officials [Antoun and Harik 1972, p. 307]. Again, contrary to announced objectives, the new ASU form increased bureaucratic influence by providing its subnational representatives with an expanded area of official involvement.

Case studies of Kafr el-Elow, Shubra and other villages indicate that the mobilization drive undermined the influence of traditional leaders. In Beheira Province, the First Secretary of the Executive Bureau undercut village opposition by prohibiting village natives from becoming mayor in their hometowns and through careful recruitment of cadres for the leadership groups [Harik 1974, pp. 84-100]. In Shubra, Mayor Sayyid Kura was replaced by Ahmad Amir, a college graduate and employee of the Ministry of Local Government in another town in Beheira Province. He became leader of the mobilization drive largely through his activities in the Youth Organization and in association with the village socialist institute.

In forming the leadership group in 1966, district party leaders bypassed Sayyid Kura, leader of the Committee of Twenty, and accepted Amir's recommendations for secretary and members of the leadership group. Two peasants, both associated with Amir, were appointed as secretary and assistant secretary of the leadership group. Both individuals were from small patrilinial kinship groups, and both owned less
than four afdina of land. Amir's position allowed him to overcome the local opposition of the two previously powerful blocs: the Kuras and Shawi's agrarian reform peasants. Neither group was represented in the leadership group which consisted of 45 members.

The effects of the mobilization program were to strengthen and coordinate party leadership at the subnational level; to create local political opportunities and expand political activity, especially among the youth; and in some cases, to replace local leaders with a new cadre of clients linked to the patronage of district and province-level party leaders. The mobilization program promoted local involvement in development projects and increased political awareness, but the scope of awareness was community bound. Fakhouri's study of Kafr el-Elow indicates that villagers did not identify the ASU with socialist ideology, but rather with the "good works" and self-help programs that it fostered, especially as related to education and employment [Fakhouri 1972, p. 108]. Other studies indicate that villagers understood only those aspects of ideology that directly related to the conditions of village life. For example, their understanding of socialism might be expressed by relating development activities such as a new road or construction of schools to the central government [Harik 1971]. The ASU promoted subnational autonomy with considerable local influence exercised by district party cadre, but the impact of this on village politics is
difficult to assess since the mobilization period was ended before it really began to take hold. In comparison with the two previous parties, this period of ASU activity has been the most successful in terms of its national objective of getting the citizenry involved in developmental projects sponsored by the regime.

Sabri's creation of a new clientage of middle-class influentials could only have been done with Nasir's compliance. It is likely that Nasir's intention was to use the ASU structure as a counterweight to the increased independence of elites within the bureaucracy and the military. Their reactions to the ASU provides more evidence.

Amer voiced his dissatisfaction in 1965, and attacked the basic principle of the single-party system [Sadat 1978, pp. 168-169]. Amer's position was supported by the technocratic elite and by the Ministry of the Interior. The rivalry between the "centers of power" continued until the demise of Amer in 1967 and Sabri in 1971.

The ASU itself began to threaten Nasir's ability to retain control. By the Fall of 1967, Nasir's proclamations regarding the ASU claimed that it was being exploited as a base for rival political power. The demise of the mobilization program, subsequent to the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, is most often explained in terms of the need for Nasir to reassert himself personally

after the Egyptian defeat, to establish a "government of reconstruction" or to establish a consensus in the wake of national crisis by returning to the election of party officers. The basis for these arguments is that serious rioting broke out in Helwan, Alexandria and Cairo in February and March 1968 over the leniency of legal action taken against certain military officers for their actions during the Six-Day War [Mansfield 1973, pp. 310-313]. The argument contends that demonstrators also demanded freedom of the press and dissolution of the ASU, thus forcing Nasir to recognize the extra-legal political participation. Nasir's "30 March Program" to revitalize the revolution through the reinstatement of elections was thus interpreted as a recapitulation by Nasir to the political demands of the masses.

While this argument is plausible, it is totally inconsistent with the political culture. It is more likely that Nasir's intent was to reassert his personal authority over the ASU. That is to say, the mobilization program was abandoned due to its success, rather than its failure. At a time when Nasir needed to reassert his authority, he abandoned the activists of the new party organization which was becoming more unified and threatening. Realizing that elections would re-establish the influence of a traditional and competing elite whose support he could be assured, Nasir launched the "30 March Program." Although problematic, this argument accounts for a political culture that is built on ingroup-outgroup
rivalry and expedient alliances at national level, a political culture characteristic of clientelism and personal relationships and not of mass participation.

"Demobilization" began in the fall of 1967 when Nasir disbanded the activist Youth Organization of the ASU [Harik 1973]. By June of 1968, the party organization was restored to its basic 1963 formal party structure; the Peoples' Assembly was restored and new elections began. The new party elections provided Nasir a supportive ASU Supreme Executive Committee of three elected RCC members and five appointed members.

The local elections of 1968 in Shubra were contested between three political blocs: the Kuras, the agrarian reform peasants and the old leadership group cadre under Amir [Harik 1974]. The results restored the Kuras to office with four seats on the Committee of Ten; the agrarian reform peasants won two seats and included Shawi, and four seats were won by independents none of whom were associated with Amir. In Shubra, the demobilization of the ASU effected "retraditionalization" in party leadership and Mayor Amir was removed from office by the district.

At the subnational level, political activism, competition and autonomy are acceptable to the regime provided political interests remain community-bound. Fostering "political participation at the local level has proven to be a useful device of authoritarian regimes for encouraging support
without the growth of political demands;" however, in Egypt's patrimonial system, local autonomy is a necessary device.\(^{39}\)

D. NASIR AND THE POLITICAL CULTURE

Nasir's effect upon the political culture was to verify, even intensify, the norms of traditional political control through heightened emphasis upon both vertical (patron-client) and horizontal (\textit{shilla}) associational ties. Nasir's personal style of rule required him to continually monitor shifting affiliations and potential opposition. The military officer corps, characterized as nationalistic and modern, became the principal source of the political and bureaucratic elite. With the primary purpose of insuring his regime, Nasir placed trusted clients in key positions within the military, the bureaucracy and the party structure and established an intricate intelligence and security apparatus.\(^{40}\) The social origin of Egypt's new elite was the rural middle class, which included most of the traditional leadership of the pre-revolutionary \textit{umdah} system.

The rural notability's domination of Nasir's organizational structures, especially the National Union and the ASU, was


\(^{40}\)Nasir's intelligence and security apparatus is discussed in Chapter V.
accomplished by both the government's failure to mobilize the countryside, and in areas where political awareness was heightened, by the traditional leaders' success in dominating the local party structures. The umdah with his combination of landed wealth, administrative influence and horizontal ties remained in a position of sufficient local influence to acquire reciprocal vertical linkages. While agricultural wealth remained the primary basis of influence, the factors of modernization reduced the prominence of family influence. However, Egypt's rural notables have maintained their political and economic influence by family links with the military, the bureaucracy and the free professions [Binder 1978, pp. 226-227].

Largely through Nasir's successful and activist foreign policy, he emerged as a true charismatic leader in the "Weberian" sense. Nonetheless, he was unable to undermine the umdah system or routinize charisma through various single-party structures [Entelis 1974]. The limitation of Nasir's charismatic authority can only be understood with respect to Egypt's political culture. As this analysis has shown:

(1) Egyptian political culture is directive.

(2) It values and in many ways demands that its leader be charismatic - that he replicate the qualities of the prophet and the tribal shaikh.

(3) The leader's authority is a measure of his personality. It can not be routinized through institutional structures.

(4) The internalized duality of mistrust and acceptance precludes truly totalitarian leadership.
(5) The degree to which the leader moves between authoritarian and patrimonial leadership is a function of his ability to attain and maintain charisma.

The implication of these findings for political participation is not entirely clear. Participation in Egypt is usually limited to elite access, interest articulation through vertical interpersonal relations and possibly incremental decision-making within formal institutions because of strong horizontal ties. Strong charismatic leadership is dysfunctional to a participant political culture because the polity depends on the leader to solve problems and acquiesces to his judgments. Although political participation would expand under a more patrimonial leader, the nature of participation in Egypt would continue to be limited and non-institutional, despite the existence of formal institutions such as parties, parliaments, unions and syndicates. In Egypt, there is no precedent for sharing power or allowing anything but supportive opposition, and the only opposition movements that have ever gained ascendancy in Egypt have been conspiratorial in nature. It is unlikely that a participant political culture will emerge under either a strong charismatic leader or a weak patrimonial leader. The political legacy that Nasir passed on after his death in 1970 was one that

41 See Shawky Zeidan's analysis of charisma and participation in Egypt in which he posits that charisma can be used to impede or promote participation. "Charismatic Leadership and Political Participation: The Case of Nasir's Egypt," Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 2 (Winter 1978): 63-79.
was dependent upon personal control and non-institutional authority; one in which true opposition could not be tolerated; and one with no basis upon which to transfer legitimacy.
IV. THE SADAT ERA: CONSISTENCY OR CHANGE

A. CONSOLIDATION OF POWER

There was no legitimate heir apparent when Nasir died. Sadat's appointment as sole vice-president in 1969 provided him his only legitimacy; Zakariyya Muhyi al-Din, recommended by Nasir as his successor when Nasir resigned temporarily in 1967, had since lost much of his stature; and Ali Sabri had been weakened when Nasir demobilized the ASU. The Supreme Executive Committee (SEC) of the ASU decided among themselves that Sadat should assume the presidency, with the understanding that his authority was to be largely representative of the committee which included Muhyi al-Din, Sabri, Abd al-Latif al-Baghdadi and Sami Sharaf. Sadat's first act independent of the committee was his order in December of 1970 to return land sequestered by the government since 1961 to its rightful owners. A second event which had serious implications for the ASU was Sadat's announcement that he had reached an agreement for the union of Egypt, Libya and Syria. Ali Sabri, Sadat's main opponent in the Executive Committee, saw this as an opportunity to unseat Sadat, because neither the union issue nor its draft constitution were popular within the ASU or the assembly [Burrell and Kelidar 1977, p. 16]. Sabri's opposition forced Sadat to bring the issue to a SEC vote, which was split 3-3 due to the absence of one member. Sadat called upon Interior Minister Gum'a to exercise an
ex-officio vote, and Gum'a sided with Sabri [Waterbury 1978, p. 4]. Sadat, losing the support of Gum'a and Minister of War Mohammed Fawzi, whom he had originally appointed on Heikal's advice, seized the initiative. Sadat turned to two professional army officers for support, Chief of Staff General Sadiq and Commander of the Presidential Guard General Nassif; Sadat also secured the support of Mamduh Salim, officially the Governor of Alexandria, but unofficially second in command of Gum'a's security apparatus [Heikal 1975, p. 134]. Heikal reported that Sadat discussed his intention to dismiss Sabri with the Soviet Ambassador the day before the committee vote, in an effort to insure the Soviets that Sabri's dismissal was not intended to signal a change in Egyptian-Soviet relations [Heikal 1975, p. 128]. It is possible that Sadat proposed the Egyptian-Soviet Treaty of Friendship (signed just weeks later) during this meeting. Sadat announced the dismissal of Sabri, and the remaining members of the SEC resigned in protest. The entire group of conspirators, totalling ninety-one, were arrested and later sentenced [Baker 1978, p. 126]. With his victory over Sabri, the so-called "Corrective Revolution," Sadat consolidated his rule. Although the details of the Sadat-Sabri showdown remain questionable, the political influence of the military and

42 See the details of Fawzi's appointment in Mohammed Heikal, Road to Ramadan (New York: Quandrangle, 1975), pp. 125-127.
security forces as "insurers of the regime" can not be disputed. The incident also underscores the validity or patron-client approaches to Egyptian politics, complete with transient alliances and rival factions.

B. THE RAMADAN WAR

Sadat proclaimed 1971 as the "year of decision," the year in which he would solve the stalemate with Israel, but no solutions were forthcoming. The "no-war, no-peace" situation since 1967 became increasingly untenable. U.S. satisfaction with Israeli dominance in the Six-Day War was such that little pressure could be exerted to generate a settlement. U.S.-Soviet interest seemingly converged on keeping Mid-East tensions reduced. Domestically, nationalist sentiment to regain captured territory began to challenge Sadat openly. In a 1972 memorandum to Sadat from ten prominent politicains and military officers, including Baghdadi and Air Force General Madkuri al-Izz, demands were made for Sadat to restore Egypt's position between the superpowers, limit dependence on the Soviets and end the Israeli occupation.43 War Minister Sadiq supported the memorandum and pressured Sadat to decrease the Soviet influence, yet demanded additional military hardware to mount an offensive against Israel [Amos 1979, pp. 104-105]. Sadat finally dismissed Sadiq, along with

43 The text of this memorandum, describing the decadence of Egypt's domestic situation, is contained in Burrell and Kelidar, pp. 17-18.
his deputy, the navy commander and one division commander [Haddad 1973, p. 183]. The evidence strongly suggests that Sadat's expulsion of between 15,000-20,000 Soviet advisers in July of 1972 was largely due to military pressure.

Convinced of the necessity for war, Sadat fostered a conciliation with King Faisal of Saudi Arabia and Hafiz al-Assad of Syria and the confrontation states. The Egyptian Army planned and rehearsed its attack; communication and logistic networks were established - the war was launched to the world's surprise. Despite the encirclement of the Egyptian Third Army toward the end of the war, the October War was a tremendous success for Egypt. The military regained its stature and Sadat greatly enhanced his own legitimacy and prestige as the "Hero of the Crossing."

C. THE "OPENING" AND LIBERALIZATION

After Sadat's "Corrective Revolution" in 1971, he accelerated his earlier liberalization policy, freeing hundreds of political prisoners and reinstating public officials who had lost their jobs through arbitrary decisions. A new constitution enacted in 1971 confirmed the supremacy of the Peoples' Assembly over the ASU and emphasized the rule of law. The constitution also provided for the continued autonomy of the local government, which in effect indicated Sadat's verification of the regime's linkage with the rural elite. Article 162 states, "local popular councils will be formed
gradually through direct elections as administrative units." Article 162 also confirms the gradual transfer of power to local councils and the election of council chairmen (mayors) from among the council membership.

In May 1972, Sadat began building his "state of institutions" by calling for committee debate on the future of the ASU. Although no changes were immediately forthcoming, these debates would be resumed nationally in 1974. The liberalized atmosphere in which these debates took place reflected a new concern with democratic forms within intellectual and certain political circles. The Peoples' Assembly began to assume an increased role in policy scrutiny and criticism which Sadat allowed to continue [Mater 1973]. Likewise, the ASU elections of 1972 were characterized by a larger number of competing candidates, indicating that the ASU was gradually being accepted as a legitimate agency for elite access and increased participation at the national level. Studies of several villages originally conducted in the early 1960s and replicated in 1973 and 1974 indicate that local village leaders were able to function in an autonomous manner within the structure of the ASU, and that they could do so in ways not inconsistent with the traditional political culture.

---

44 Excerpts of these debates were published in Al-Tali'a, May-June 1972, some of which are available in JPRS-MENA, Jun-July, 1972.

45 Compare the divergent conclusion in James B. Mayfield, Local Institutions, pp. 140-144 with those in his earlier work, Rural Politics in Nasser's Egypt (Austin: Univ. of Texas Press, 1971), pp. 253-259.
In the wake of the October War and impelled by desperate economic conditions, high military expenditures and a large external debt, Sadat developed a new strategy. The strategy was indeed new, because it accounted for U.S.-Soviet detente and the successful use of the "oil weapon" during the war. Sadat's "October Paper," presented to a joint ASU-Peoples' Assembly meeting in April of 1974, contained the basic formula:

By diversifying the economy Egypt could attract Arab and Western capital investment and Western technology, thereby providing new employment opportunities and economic growth. [UAR 1974]

Sadat's "economic opening" or infitah policy imposed certain domestic and diplomatic imperatives. To attract large-scale Western investment, Sadat would have to loosen the Soviet connection and create regional stability through a negotiated settlement acceptable to Israel (i.e., U.S. sponsored). Sadat initiated exploratory efforts to obtain arms (a domestic imperative) in 1974 and 1975 from the U.S., Italy, France and Britain. 46

The second major initiative of Sadat's internal policies after the October War has been political liberalization. In August 1974, Sadat presented a document known as the "Paper on the Evolution of the ASU" to an ad hoc "Listening Committee." The paper was to be the basis of a "national dialogue" regarding the ASU and contained recommendations that the president

46 The military aspects of Sadat's policies are discussed in Chapter V.
be separated from the ASU leadership, that several forums of opinion be reflected in the ASU and the press, that all party elections be direct elections, and that ASU membership be optional [Waterbury 1978, pp. 252-253]. Listening Committee hearings were conducted during September 1974 with various groups including: professors, students, feminists, labor unions, the press, professional unions and associations including doctors, writers and businessmen, and several meetings were held with various village peasants. In line with Sadat's policy of keeping the military apolitical, it is not surprising that military representatives did not participate in the hearings. The major findings of the committee were vaguely expressed in Al-Ahram in December 1974, and wittingly or unwittingly, very closely resembled Sadat's initial suggestions. 47

As early as the Spring of 1975, the quasi-official press began to reflect the political spectrum in their editorial opinion. 48 Three minbar (literally meaning "mosque pulpits" in Arabic) of opinion gradually developed modest but recognizable platforms. In January of 1976, Sadat convened a Commission on the Future of Political Action and based on its

47 Al-Ahram, 18 December 1974.

48 The leftist press was represented by Al-Ahali, Rose al-Yussef (weekly) and Al-Tali'a (monthly); the right primarily by Akhbar, Akhbar al-Yom and Al-Musawwar; and the center by Al-Ahram and Al-Gumhuriyya. The terms left, right and center do not equate to Western usage.
findings, Sadat proposed the institutionalization of three platforms within the ASU: the left, the right and the center. The left platform, known as the National Progressive Union Grouping, was a Marxist, neo-Nasirist oriented group favoring emphasis on public sector investment and has criticized Sadat's "open-door economic policy" as premature; the center platform, the Egyptian Arab Socialist Organization, supported current government policy and stressed Sadat's gradual liberalization programs and a mixed economy; the Social Liberalists comprised the right platform and stressed private enterprise-capitalism and the de-emphasis of cooperative production and marketing [Burrell and Kelidar 1977, pp. 30-44].

Preparations for the October 1976 Peoples' Assembly elections were characterized by a great deal of intraparty debate, with the majority of representatives making known their platform affiliation. Although Egyptian national elections in the past have merely renewed the political legitimacy of incumbents and confirmed new alliances, the October 1976 elections were unusually competitive with some 1,660 persons vying for 350 seats [Clarity 1976]. The elections, which have been described as free and open, established a strong majority of 280 seats for the centrists; the right won twelve seats and the left won two. Independent candidates accounted for 48 seats. The remaining eight seats, traditionally appointed by the president, were awarded to representatives of the Coptic minority.
In his inaugural speech after re-election in November 1976, Sadat announced that the three platforms would be recognized as political parties within the ASU general organization [Tanner 1976]. The government passed a "Political Parties Law" which established the requirements for obtaining party status. 49

Upon the enactment of the Political Parties Law, two groups expressed interest: a small group of military officers and the pre-revolutionary Wafd Party. The army officers were forced to withdraw their request under threat of courts-martial by Defense Minister Gamasi, thus confirming Sadat's expressed policy toward military political activity [Tanner 1976]. Under the leadership of Fu'ad al-Din, the Wafd applied for party status after having met the requirements of the law, which included affiliation with at least twenty representatives in the Peoples' Assembly. Indicating that the "New-Wafd's" program was in compliance with the social gains of the 1952 Revolution and that its program was not associated with that of the pre-revolutionary party, the application was approved in February 1978. Approval of the Wafd had been the subject of much debate, since Sadat often stated his dislike of the "party of the pashas." The acceptance of the party caused a realignment of parliamentary seats

---

with the Wafd gaining the support of twenty-four deputies.\textsuperscript{50}

By May of 1978, it became apparent to the Sadat regime that the National Progressive Grouping and the Wafd Party were directing their efforts towards blocking legislation introduced by the government and endorsed by the centrist Egypt Party.\textsuperscript{51} The administration viewed these efforts and their opposition to Sadat's peace settlement as violations of the Political Parties Law, and as a real challenge to Egyptian political stability and social peace. At a time when Sadat was receiving severe criticism from other Arab states because of his peace initiative with Israel, further internal political agitation could not be tolerated. In order to remove adversary political party leaders without compromising his personally sponsored "democratic experiment," Sadat devised a scheme to hold a national referendum to determine if current Wafdist and National Progressive Grouping party leaders should be permitted to remain in office. The May 1978 referendum was approved by 98 percent of the voters, and verified Sadat's tight personal control.\textsuperscript{52}


Sadat's technique of engineering the removal of troublesome political opponents in the name of the people, and at the same time, confirming his desire for a controlled form of political party opposition within Egyptian politics was effective, yet not fully successful. Rather than assume the leadership of a "supportive opposition," the Wafd dissolved itself in June 1978. The short history of the New-Wafd provides an illustration of the limited development of Egyptian party politics and the continuity of a political culture that will not allow true opposition to develop institutionally or otherwise.

In August 1978, Sadat announced the formation of the National Democratic Party (NDP) under his own leadership, rendered the ASU structure defunct, and provided the NDP constituent committee with some principles to guide the development of the party's platform. The party's formation was aimed at consolidating political support among the Egypt Party, which merged with the NDP, independent representatives, and some representatives previously aligned with the Wafd. In an address to the parliamentary body of the NDP, Sadat reaffirmed the democratic measures of the "October Revolution" and expressed the need for a consolidated opposition party.


Shortly thereafter, a right-of-center opposition party, the Social Labor Party, was formed by Ibrahim Shukri. In the June 1979 Peoples' Assembly elections, Sadat's new NDP won 89 percent of the vote. Numerous irregularities were reported in the highly equivocal elections.

Sadat's political liberalization policies and his purported institutionalization of competitive party politics are unquestionably suspect. The political aspects of Sadat's "turn to the West" have been viewed as mere props, designed to convince potential foreign investors that Egypt's new look is more than rhetoric, and to alleviate any suspicion of future nationalizations and sequestrations [Burrell and Kelidz 1977, pp. 22-23]. On the surface, such an analysis is plausible, but it does not account for the gradual implementation of Sadat's "democratic experiment," nor is it consistent with the regime's effort to restrict party politics to supportive parties. It is not likely that potential investors, especially Western investors, would view techniques such as the referendum of May 1978, or the election results of June 1979, as examples of "evolutionary democracy." More significantly, such an analysis fails to consider the permanence of Egyptian political culture, one in which political power

---

55 Of the 365 contested seats, the NDP won 326; Independents, 10; Socialist Labor/Social Liberalist, 29; and National Progressive Grouping, 0. Ten seats were appointed to representative Coptic leaders. See Stanley Reed, "Egypt after the Elections," MEED Arab Report, July 4, 1979, pp. 5-6.
has never been institutionalized. Sadat is a master at eliminating political opposition. His concerns for improving social justice and eliminating inefficiency are consistent with the traditional authority pattern of benevolent patron. The practical application of Sadat's "state of institutions" is that it provides arenas in which he can manipulate clients in such a way as to increase his own control.

In January 1977, Egypt lifted consumer food subsidies under pressure from Arab creditors and the International Monetary Fund. The government's action caused widespread rioting and demonstrations in Cairo, and other cities, which were eventually brought under control by the police and the army. The government was forced to restore the subsidies, and blamed the rioting on subversive groups within Egypt, including the outlawed Communist Party, and foreign support from Libya. Sadat declared a state of emergency and proposed a Referendum on Safeguarding National Unity, which received the expected widespread approval, and legitimized Sadat's crackdown on the left. Over 2,000 citizens were arrested, although only thirty-six were brought to trial. During the Spring of 1977, the press was brought under tighter control by the direct appointment

of supportive journalists to managerial and editorial positions on leading newspapers.  

Efforts to unite several of Egypt's opposition groups into a National Front against Sadat have been headed by ex-Army Commander-in-Chief General Sa'd al-Din al-Shadhili and Abd al-Majid Farid. Shadhili has reportedly enlisted the support of various internal opposition groups with the marked exception of the Muslim Brethren, and has secured assistance from Syria, Libya and Algeria. The National Front has been particularly critical of Sadat's peace initiatives and improved relations with the US, and Shadhili has announced his intention to oust Sadat by revolutionary means if necessary. The National Front's inability to secure the support of the Muslim Brethren largely reduces their potential impact.

The Islamic right is much more capable of disrupting domestic stability as evidenced by the regime's cautious


approach to Islamic opposition. The recent increase in Muslim fundamentalist violence against the Coptic minority, estimated at ten percent of the population, is directly related to the peace process. Relations with Israel and increased ties with the U.S. are interpreted as evidence of Coptic/Christian ascendancy in Egypt [Finnegan 1980]. Despite the Copts' perception of being "politically underprivileged," Sadat has significantly increased the number of Christians in highly placed government service compared to the number appointed by Nasir [Dessouki 1978, p. 63 and Brodin 1978].

The economic beneficiaries of Sadat's infitah policy, which were represented by the now defunct Wafd Party, are yet another set of potential challengers to Sadat's ability to maintain control [Choucri and Eckhaus 1979].

The establishment of the Egyptian multi-party system has aroused a great deal of political interest and likely broadened political participation, yet it has not been capable of generating loyal opposition. Sadat carefully devised a democratic form under the tutelage of the ASU's Executive Committee and now under the NDP's Political Bureau, which he controls through traditional patronage relationships.

Examples include Musa Sabri, editor of Al-Akhbar; Kamal al-Mallakh, editorial writer for Al-Ahram, Foreign Minister Boutros Boutros Ghali and Deputy Prime Minister Fikri Makram Ubayd.

Sadat's liberalization policies may be genuinely aimed at promoting social and economic justice and at reducing inefficiency, but they are by no means democratic. Though Sadat appears intent on building his "state of institutions," his ability to remain in control rests largely with the continued suppression of real opposition and the support of the military.

Sadat has brought "liberalized" institutions, syndicates and associations under his control by appointing supportive clients, and when deemed necessary, by restricting his liberalization policies for the sake of "national unity." Sadat's recent cabinet reshuffle of May 1980 and his assumption of the position of prime minister is indicative of his need to assert more personal control and demonstrate that something is being done to combat Egypt's economic problems. Likewise, Sadat's unilateral suspension of the Camp David autonomy negotiations three weeks before the 26 May 1980 deadline for reaching an agreement with Israel was designed not only to increase U.S. resolve to assert pressure on Israel, but also to soften the domestic reaction to Sadat's failure to obtain an agreement in accordance with the treaty timetable.61

61Cabinet members appointed on 14 May 1980 are listed in the Middle East Economic Digest, 16 May 1980, p. 15. For details of Sadat's suspension of the autonomy talks, see New York Times, 8, 15 and 16 May 1980.
V. FROM NASIR TO SADAT: MILITARY ROLE OR RULE

Egyptian politics since the Free Officers' coup d'etat in 1952 have been characterized by such terms as interventionist, praetorian, even "stratiocratic," all of which assert direct control by a core of military elites. Once in control, military officers have attempted to perpetuate their rule and attain their goals of modernization by establishing what Samuel Huntington has called a "community without politics, a consensus by command" [Huntington 1978, p. 244]. The principal architect had been Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir. Through his placement of trusted military officers in virtually all key positions within the government structure, and by establishment of an intricate security apparatus, Nasir established a regime that was, at least in the opinion of one operative, "virtually coup-proof" [Copeland 1969, p. 235].

Shortly after assuming power upon the death of Nasir in 1970, Anwar al-Sadat began a policy of limited liberalization. Sequestered lands were returned to their original owners, and hundreds of political prisoners were freed. Sadat announced that he would build a "state of institutions," and in 1972, promoted open debate on the future of the Arab Socialist Union (ASU). 62 Sadat has continued his policy of

62 Excerpts of these debates were published in Al-Tali'a, Al-Ahram, and Egyptian Gazette, May-June, 1972. English translations of selected excerpts are contained in FBIS and JPRS.
liberalization and slowly dismantled many of Nasir's networks of control. These changes and an increase in the level of access to important positions by technocrats and experts apparently indicate a less pervasive role for the military under Sadat.

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the changing role of the Egyptian military in politics, to determine if apparent modifications in elite access actually represent a shift in power, and to determine the limits within which the military is likely to remain restive.

A. THE MILITARY UNDER NASIR

1. The 1952 Coup d'Etat and the Consolidation of Power

During the evening of 22-23 July 1952, the Free Officers, with troops under their command, marched on the General Headquarters and seized control; government buildings, telephone exchanges, and radio stations were secured; and armor and infantry units were stationed along the road to Suez. Notes were sent to foreign envoys warning them not to interfere in a "purely internal affair" [Mansfield 1978, p. 286]. By morning the swift and almost bloodless coup d'etat was complete.

From its inception the coup was elitist. Within the military structure, the Free Officer movement was limited to junior and mid-range officers, with a nucleus of ten to fourteen officers. The Free Officers maintained what appears to have been limited contact with several civilian groups prior to
the takeover, including the Muslim Brethren, the Wafd, Young Egypt, and the Marxists; however, they did not act in concert with these groups. The inner core of officers was linked by personal, non-institutional ties, and each member headed secondary groups of officers, each estimated to be as large as twenty-five. The fact that there was no involvement by supportive civilian groups and that no effort was made to tap the "revolutionary situation" of the masses demonstrated by numerous riots and the events of Black Saturday, suggests a conscious decision on the part of the Free Officers to restrict popular participation. In his Philosophy of the Revolution, Nasir purports that the Free Officers were prepared to relinquish the reins of government [Nasir 1954, pp. 31-32]. Yet, one biographer reports that Nasir ordered no publicity be given to the Free Officers except for General Naguib, and that "if we had the sense to let an older man like Naguib be the figurehead, we could retain our unity" [St. John 1960, p. 113]. Although problematic, it seems the initial intent was to maintain control.

A second emphasis was unity within the inner circle of officers and its eventual corollary, an effort to establish a strong national and unified army. Nasir stated that the

63 According to Sadat, General Aziz Ali al-Misri and General Fouad Sadek were approached to assume the role of symbolic leader before, and in preference to, General Naguib. See Revolt on the Nile (New York: John Wiley, 1957), pp. 30-31.
"political ideas of the Free Officers differed," and in order to avoid a split in the movement, they decided against drawing up a precise political program.\textsuperscript{64} Unity of the army was given substance when more than four hundred officers were purged, including all colonels and above with only two exceptions [Smith 1977, p. 42]. While the Free Officers assumed political positions, vacant military posts were filled by military officers considered reliable and competent; only Abdul Hakim Amer received an accelerated promotion to general, thereby preserving the military's organizational integrity [Be'eri 1970, p. 106]. Nasir's suspicion of organized political groups, characterized by the banning of political parties in 1953 and the Muslim Brethren in 1954, was not limited to civilian groups. In 1954, Nasir stated: "I have made a careful study of the army. And I have concluded that each officer has at least five others with him a hundred percent. And each of those has five others, and so on" [Wynn 1959, p. 61].

Nasir's suspicion of the military and his trust in Amer (only Nasir and Amer knew the names of all Free Officer members) became apparent in Nasir's early problems with Naguib, who became increasingly desirous of power, and who had the backing of the cavalry through Free Officer Khalid Muhyi al-Din.\footnote{Al Ahram interview with Nasir in June, 1953. The lack of doctrine, program, and political organization were confirmed by Nasir in The Charter of National Action, 1961.}
According to St. John's account, Nasir conceded the presidency and premiership of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) to Naguib, but demanded that Amer be appointed to Naguib's current position as commander-in-chief and that Nasir himself control the Ministry of the Interior, arguing "that he and he alone had been watching the machinations and plotting of the opposition; he could do it better if he had the machinery of security under his direct control" [St. John 1960, p. 159]. By February 1954, Naguib seriously confronted Nasir in two public challenges: (1) Naguib resigned, which caused a public furor that returned him to office; (2) Naguib announced a return to parliamentary government and scheduled elections in June. With the backing of the military and police, Nasir assumed the premiership of the RCC in March 1954, installed a new cabinet that excluded Muhyi al-Din, and cancelled the elections.

The social origins of the military elite have been the subject of considerable study.65 Generally, the elite were the sons of peasant and urban middle classes, but not bourgeoisie in the European sense. Naguib stated that the "officers' corps was largely composed of the sons of civil servants and soldiers and the grandsons of peasants" [Naguib 1955, pp. 14-15]. Be'eri's study of a sample of 87 Egyptian officers that fought during the 1948 Palestine War confirms

these social backgrounds. Regardless of whether or not the new military ruling elite is described as a "new middle class," either in liaison with, or in control of, other middle class elements of merchants and bureaucrats, they have not been "agents" of class. The ruling military elite conceive of themselves more as a secular, modernizing corporate group than as a class-conscious group. The larger the elite group became, the more diversified its economic and social background became.

With the appointment of Nasir's first cabinet, many members of which were Free Officers, there was also a "massive infusion of officers into key bureaucratic positions for purposes of control and supervision" [Dekmejian 1971, p. 170]. Through this influx of officers into leadership positions during the first few years of his regime, Nasir had pre-empted all political activity in Egypt [Holt, 1968]. Heavy reliance on military and security personnel allowed the regime to govern without identifying or allying itself openly with any particular social class. While this allowed for increased flexibility, the insulation of the regime from the society was later recognized as a detriment. In the early years of the regime "civilian support was not crucial to the military" [Perlmutter 1977, p. 159].

66 For a brief comparison of the concepts of class according to Binder, Halpern, Huntington, etc., see Amos Perlmutter, "Egypt and the Myth of the New Middle Class: A Comparative Analysis," Comparative Studies in Society and History 10 (October, 1967), pp. 46-65.
By the end of 1954, Nasir had consolidated his power, initiated social reform, and managed to secure an agreement with the British to remove all their forces from Suez by 1956. The early years of the regime established a number of trends which would in large measure continue to characterize the regime until his death in 1970:

(1) He established a generally non-ideological military elite that was both secular and modern.

(2) The suspicion surrounding the activities of the Free Officers and Nasir's desire to monitor security personally signalled the future establishment of an extensive security and intelligence apparatus.

(3) Control of the military was essential; its leaders would be selected based on loyalty above all else.

(4) Nasir's rule was highly personal and non-institutional. Political power was to be enhanced through direct relationship with Nasir or one of his "trusted clients." Separate sources of political power, such as parties, were repressed.

(5) Through its positions of power within the government and the bureaucracy, the new military elite began to direct change and "modernization from above." The important nationalist influence of the military and its loosely defined linkage to the rural middle class, enhanced its use as a conscious and deliberate agent of change.

The character of Nasir's Egypt in the early years of the regime (1952-1955) was one of highly personal control through direct use of the military. The military as a national institution, in fact, became the new ruling elite. 67 However,

this immense penetration of military control was not immutable: in short, Egypt did not remain a praetorian society. Nasir's goals of modernization and the recognized need for political mobilization to support the regime's development programs precluded the dominant, if not single, role that the military played in the early years of the regime. While the military's role in politics continued to be pervasive, it was neither centralized nor complete. Nasir promoted this broadening of political influence himself, relying on the military as needed to retain control. An analysis of the role of the military during this period is difficult because its influence was diffuse. A functional analysis in the areas of defense, foreign policy, internal security and domestic politics must be combined with the aspects of elitism and clientage, because of the lack of an institutional basis for power and Nasir's emphasis on personalist rule.

2. Military as a Fighting Force: Foreign Policy Implications

The striking victory of the Israeli Army in the Palestine War of 1948, and later revelations of royal complicity in the sale of defective arms, shocked Nasir and his fellow junior officers. Disgusted with the incompetence of senior officers, Nasir stated:

68 For a similar opinion, see Michael C. Hudson, Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), pp. 244-247.
Engaging in many different kinds of tyranny and corruption, they were fawning and subservient to the British Military Mission, and a disgrace to the uniform they wore. They spent money that belonged to the Egyptian army on food and drink for themselves [St. John 1960, p. 36].

After the coup d'état in 1952, development of the armed forces and the acquisition of modern weapons were given high priority. Nasir wanted to develop a competent and loyal army. Nasir had secured initial approval of military assistance from the United States in November of 1954, but a major "retaliatory" Israeli raid into Gaza, which destroyed the Egyptian army headquarters and inflicted heavy casualties, hastened the need for arms [Safran 1969, p. 106]. U.S. insistence on Egyptian participation in a Western security arrangement as a precondition for arms deliveries brought about the Czechoslovakian arms deal in 1955. Immediately following the U.S. reversal of a previous decision to underwrite a World Bank loan to enlarge the Aswan Dam, Nasir defiantly nationalized the Suez Canal, tremendously enhancing his popularity in Egypt and securing the leadership of the Arab world. Despite heavy losses in the 1956 Sinai Campaign

69 Although Nasir's stated need for arms was to defend Egypt against Israel, a second reason was probably to counteract the military advantage that would accrue to Iraq by virtue of its entrance into the Baghdad Pact.

70 The nationalization was legal under international law since the nationalization law provided equitable compensation to shareholders. See Republic of Egypt, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, White Paper on the Nationalization of the Suez Maritime Canal Company (Cairo: Gov't. Press, 1956).
that followed, the Egyptian Army and Nasir emerged from the Suez crisis with increased prominence. Nasir must have realized that it was American diplomacy, and not Egyptian prowess, that delivered him from Suez unscathed.

Equipment improvements in the military continued with defense outlays (expressed as a percentage of GNP) increasing from 3.9 percent in 1952, to 6 percent in 1961, to 9 percent in 1965, and stabilizing after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War at 13 percent by 1969. Soviet training missions were expanded, equipment deliveries increased, and by mid-1967, total Soviet arms shipments were estimated at $1.5 billion (U.S.); the Egyptian military had increased from 80,000 in 1952 to 220,000 in 1967 [Nyrop 1976, p. 386]. Internal inequities in military service were improved by the National Military Service Law of 1955, which eliminated bodaliyya (payment in lieu of military service), thereby improving the education level of the military. Both Nasir and Amer promoted professional and non-political development within the military. Young, professional officers were promoted; "division commanders were clearly non-political, professional officers," according to Perlmutter's analysis [Perlmutter 1974, p. 143].

It is likely that the significant growth of the military in terms of personnel and defense expenditures reflected

---

not only Nasir's belief in a strong functional military, but also a role for the military in pursuance of his activist foreign policy. The largest and best-equipped military in the Arab world undoubtedly enhanced Egypt's position of regional leadership. Nasir emphasized the utility of Egypt's military power as an instrument of foreign policy, both symbolically and eventually through intervention.

The ill-fated union with Syria provided the first use of the military as a foreign policy resource. The Egyptian military with a large complement of civilian bureaucrats was not only involved in the retraining of the Syrian military, but also directed, supervised, and restructured its civil administration [Kerr 1972, pp. 205-206]. The failure of the union with Syria was quickly followed by Egyptian military intervention in the Yemeni Civil War. Involvement in Yemen intensified the already-strained relations with Saudi Arabia, which supported the royalist forces. What was probably designed to be a quick and decisive victory for Egyptian forces, and a means of regaining status lost by the Syrian secession, turned into "Egypt's Vietnam."

In 1965, Nasir agreed to conclude a mutual defense agreement with Syria, possibly as a first step in re-unification. The arrangement was viewed as a major deterrent to Israeli intervention in Syria and Jordan, based on the prestige of the Egyptian military. As Malcolm Kerr noted, the Arab
masses viewed the Egyptian military "as the eventual spearhead of a future liberation of Palestine" [Kerr 1972, p. 206]. Syria's reckless prods along the Israeli border and Jordan's taunting about "Egypt's hiding behind the U.N. Emergency Force (UNEF) in Sinai" eventually forced Nasir to request the withdrawal of the UNEF and close the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping.

Israel's overwhelming victory starkly revealed the inadequacies of the Arab armies, especially the Egyptian Army. Nasir's actual policy of moderation toward Israel before 1967 gave way to the militant public rhetoric that had long been emanating from Radio Cairo and the Egyptian press. Nasir turned inward to domestic problems, despite his desire to regain captured lands. Nasir was forced to rely on the Soviets to rebuild the military, and to demonstrate the latent dangers of the stalemated truce. Nasir launched the War of Attrition, which he kept on a manageable scale, but by escalating the level of violence, Nasir secured superpower interest. In January of 1970, Nasir finally secured surface-to-air missiles and Soviet crews to man them in an attempt to raise the stakes to a level that would result in a Soviet and American-sponsored ceasefire [Heikal 1978, pp. 191-8]. The War of Attrition ended with the ceasefire agreed upon in August, 1970.

The 1967 Arab-Israeli War demonstrated military weaknesses and restricted the military's political influence. Initially, Nasir accepted full blame for the 1967 disaster, but retracted
his statement and demanded the resignations of 30 senior officers [Smith 1977, p. 49]. Field Marshall Amer, Minister of War Badran, and seven of the eight full generals resigned. A purge of over 300 officers followed. Nasir directed a reorganization of the armed forces, a significant increase in their size, and enhanced the role of Soviet experts by insisting that their advice was binding.72 The War of Attrition did little to restore the reputation of the military as a competent fighting force.

3. Military Intelligence and Security

In his autobiography, In Search of Identity, Anwar al-Sadat stated:

By nature Nasser tended to suspect others....Worse yet, as a result of his preoccupation with "security" and of the doubts that preyed on his mind, regrettably, grave mistakes were committed in Egypt against man's humanity [Sadat 1977, pp. 90-91].

With the primary purpose of insuring his regime, Nasir established an intricate intelligence and internal security network complete with concentration camps, incidence of torture, and widespread repression.73 The security apparatus, in comparison to other ministries in which ex-officers were


employed, was predominately military. By 1961, more than 3,400 of the 4,100 employees in the Ministry of the Interior were either active or retired military officers [Hurewitz 1969, p. 134]. The Ministry of the Interior, with its 20,000-man Republican Guard, was controlled by Free Officer Gum'a during much of Nasir's reign. All police functions were placed under the Ministry of the Interior in 1952 under a Police Reform Law [Nyrop 1976, p. 337]. Yet, this was only one of five major organizations: others included the Ministry of Presidential Affairs (secret service) under Sami Sharaf; the security section of the War Ministry; the General Intelligence Department under Salah Nasir with purview over intelligence collection, counter-espionage and special operations; and a large political intelligence branch in the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) after its founding in 1962.\footnote{See Nyrop, p. 353; John Waterbury, Egypt: Burdens of the Past, Options for the Future (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978), p. 238; and R. Michael Burrell and Abbas Kelidar, "Egypt: The Dilemma of a Nation," The Washington Papers, 5, 48 (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1977), p. 14.} In addition, intelligence and security functions were performed by the Ministry of Information and the branches of the armed forces under the War Ministry. All these organizations reported directly through their chiefs to Nasir, except the services of the War Ministry and subordinate elements, which reported to Amer. The number of agencies itself indicates the prominence of the internal security function, reliance upon a system of checks and balances, and upon the multiplicity of sources in
intelligence gathering. Political opposition discovered by these agencies was normally curtailed with little information released in the press; however, potential opposition within the military was handled by transfer of position, service in the diplomatic corps, etc., evidently a policy upon which Nasir and Amer concurred. Nasir explained the policy on this basis:

> If I begin purging the army, I run the risk of alienating big blocks of men. In the end, I would undermine my own position and invite a *coup d'etat* against my regime [Wynn 1959, p. 61].

Coordination between the agencies was unlikely. One incident among three services arose in 1965 out of a military intelligence report of a vast network of communist infiltrators in the ASU youth group; 75 arrests resulted. Nasir ordered the Minister of the Interior to investigate the charges independently; they were not confirmed. Nasir then ordered the prisoners released and reinstated [Mahfouz 1972, p. 193].

The GID is the agency usually considered responsible for intelligence gathering and special operations abroad, including the subversion and overthrow of governments. Nasir was suspected of having agents operating at various times in Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon. A related subversive technique initiated by Nasir to oppose Iraq's entrance into the Baghdad Pact was his policy of talking directly to the people through radio and press, bypassing
the head of state completely. This technique became more widespread in the name of Arab unity and was finally justified as policy by Heikal in 1962 as part of the Arab revolution in which all peoples formed one nation. The lasting detriment of this policy was explained by Kerr:

It means that every Arab leader needs to bend his words and visible actions toward a non-existent state of affairs....It means every Arab state's affairs becomes the legitimate business of every other's [Kerr 1972, p. 31].

4. **Military Role in the Bureaucracy**

The ineffectiveness of the Egyptian bureaucracy did not begin with the infusion of the military into civil service; however, corruption and inefficiency have expanded with the growth of the bureaucracy from a size of one-quarter million in 1952 to over a million by 1970 [Nyrop 1976, p. 173]. The prominence of officers at the upper levels of the bureaucracy was merely symptomatic: "the army came to represent for Nasir a personal pool for far-reaching extramilitary tasks" [Baker 1978, p. 55]. About one thousand officers had entered into crucial economic and administrative positions by 1967, and provided "the majority of ministers, provincial governors, ambassadors and newspaper editors in Egypt" [Be'eri 1970, p. 429]. The effect of the military within the bureaucracy was to stabilize Nasir's regime administratively and to insure the military's domination for appropriations. Nonetheless, their performance within the bureaucracy has not been militaristic or unresponsive to non-military requirements [Berger 1960, p. 21].
Those who view the bureaucracy as a non-political, "tightly controlled structure" fail to explain the continued inadequacies of the civil service in implementing specific projects directed by Nasir personally.\textsuperscript{75} The influential view of James Heapley is that the elites viewed Egypt as a large organization in which rapid economic development was administered rather than politically promoted [Heapley 1966]. The state, it is argued, was oriented toward solving problems of the state, as opposed to a political concept in which the state would solve the problems of conflicting interests through reconciliation.

While this explanation is instructive, it assumes that governmental decrees or proclamations are important in Egyptian domestic politics, and does not consider the number of proclamations that are made post-facto, to provide credibility for actions that were taken on a pragmatic basis. An explanation that does not consider rival political elements within the bureaucracy itself and one that excludes the considerable stature, if not influence, of personally appointed clients, is oversimplified. In a political system that maximized the need to maintain favor with Nasir, leading bureaucrats could be easily exposed as ineffective by rivals who used their institutional followings to thwart the programs of their opponents. Heikal indicated that rival centers of

\textsuperscript{75}See, for example, Perlmutter, \textit{Comparative Studies}, pp. 61-62.
power within the civil service were a cause of tension in the regime's relationship with the bureaucracy. Baker's analysis of the bureaucracy accounts for rival power within the expanding state apparatus and within new organizations created by Nasir. He describes the various elements as fiefdoms in an overall system he calls "bureaucratic feudalism" [Baker 1978, pp. 71-89].

Nasir created several new independent administrative structures including the Council for Production, Ministry of Industry, Economic Organization, Suez Canal Authority, High Dam Organization, and Organization for Land Improvement and Desert Reclamation. These bodies were staffed with competent technocrats with backgrounds in engineering, economics, etc., and have been the most successful organizations in achieving their modernization goals. A similar trend was established to fill leading roles within the public sector, and after the nationalizations in the early sixties, thirty-eight public corporations were formed. All but one were headed by competent civilian managers with doctorates [Baker 1978, p. 179]. This trend toward reliance on technocrats is best described as a trend toward efficiency, not independence, since Nasir retained control of top-level appointments. The early emphasis upon military manpower was later modified for the sake of efficiency. The level of institutional

76 *Al-Ahram*, 13 March 1964.
military influence within the bureaucracy is difficult to determine, because of two counteracting developments which began in the 1960's.

In 1962, employment of all university graduates within the government was guaranteed by law, resulting in the unnecessary overstaffing of governmental structures, but reducing the level of institutional military influence within the bureaucracy. At this time, many Egyptians viewed the military as a stepping stone to lucrative posts in the bureaucracy. The military has fostered this trend by encouraging officers to undertake training in nonmilitary subjects. Many officers were detached from active duty to attend universities, and in 1961, the military established a military-technical institute with a "seven-year curriculum designed to train managerial staffs" [Malik 1968, p. 176]. While these policies promoted movement into the civilian fields, they also emphasized the trend toward efficiency.

5. Military as a Competing Center of Political Power

By the late 1950's Nasir had become increasingly disillusioned with the bureaucracy and the National Union. After the Syrian secession when socialist ideology was officially pronounced, Nasir decided to launch the "new socialist direction" through a mobilization party. In the wake of the new socialist decrees, Nasir reportedly had his first serious encounter with Amer, who felt the decrees were "disquieting to the Army" [Baker 1978, p. 92]. Shans Badran corroborated
this view during his trial in 1968 (Badran was tried for treason in attempting to reinstate Amer after Nasir removed him subsequent to the 1967 defeat), when he said Nasir wanted to restrict Amer's total control (possibly through the ASU) of the army, and that Amer threatened resignation, which Nasir could not afford to accept. Heikal explained in Al Ahram that "in 1962 there was a peaceful coup d'etat. From the time of that coup the state powers began to suffer from a phenomenon of pluralism." Sadat has claimed that "Amer actually wanted to take over" and that Nasir told him that he was worried about Amer's hold on the military [Sadat 1978, pp. 168-169]. It would seem that Amer and Nasir had reached an understanding, since there were no other documented disagreements between them until after the 1967 defeat.

A rivalry developed between Amer and Ali Sabri, a leftist appointed by Nasir as Secretary-General of the ASU in 1965. Sabri established a hierarchy of authority within the party by ending direct elections and establishing a system of appointing party cadre. Amer voiced his dissatisfaction with the ASU in 1965, attacking the basic principle of the one-party system. The reactions of the technocratic

---

77 See the account of the trial by E. Primakov, "March 30 Program," New Times 17 (1968): 5.

78 See Heikals' editorial in Al-Ahram, April 5, 1968. Trans. available in JPRS.

elite and the Ministry of the Interior also challenged the ASU, which was gaining increased power relative to the other centers of power. The rivalry between centers of power was reflected in a series of over one hundred articles published by Sabri in Al-Gumhuriyyah before the war in 1967. The articles attacked technocrats, highly placed bureaucrats, and the military. In an article written in March of 1967, Sabri called for an increased political role for soldiers and policemen. The infighting continued until the demise of Amer in 1967 and Sabri in 1971.

Nasir's utilization of the ASU as the "new vanguard of the revolution" (previously Nasir referred to the Army in this manner) to oppose the bureaucratic and military centers of power eventually grew to be a significant challenge in itself. By the autumn of 1967, Nasir's proclamations regarding the ASU claimed that it was being exploited as a base for rival political power. 80

The allusion to client-patron politics among Nasir, Sabri, and Amer indicates that the Army has played another significant role in Egypt, as a rival center of political power. Nasir was placed in a precarious situation regarding the military: not only was the military the guarantor of his regime, but also the element most capable of supplanting him. Nasir's political liability in accepting Amer's resignation

80 Al-Ahram, 11 August 1967.
in 1962 was based on Amer's personal control of other powerful leaders in the military. Nasir attempted to balance conflict between Amer and Sabri so as to strengthen his own position. Nasir did not become the captive of the military or the ASU, but he was dependent on several key clients, who became increasingly difficult for him to control.

B. SADAT'S REGIME: CONTINUITY OR CHANGE

The position of the military toward Sadat's "Western-directed" policies has been generally supportive, but not without incidents. The first sign of discontent was a public demonstration in Cairo staged by officers from the Third Army in January of 1974, who protested the first disengagement agreement. Several officers were arrested, and the commanders of the Second and Third Armies dismissed. A rebellion occurred among cadets at the military academy in April of 1974, but opposition became more substantial when the Soviets suspended arms deliveries in July [Burrell and Kelidar 1977, p. 25]. The second disengagement agreement led to the arrest of several officers for conspiring against the regime, and the chief of the Army Intelligence Service, Abdel Tawfiq, whose service did not uncover the plot, was dismissed in September of 1975. The major military opponent of the Camp Daid peace process has been ex-army commander, General Shadhili, now head of the opposition's National Front with the headquarters in Damascus.
Despite these incidents, the military has provided firm support for Sadat's peace initiative. Nonetheless, Sadat's exhaustive attempts to solicit Western arms and the first priority accorded to defense in the 1979 budget indicate that continued support will largely depend on Sadat's ability to acquire sufficient quantities of sophisticated arms for the military. This need has been exacerbated by the massive Soviet resupply of arms to Syria after the October War, and by more recent deliveries to Libya. In the spring of 1976 Sadat held a series of meetings with senior air force and navy commanders who had complained about the lack of spare parts. According to a western military source, he did not calm their fears.

During Sadat's trip to Washington in May of 1977, he secured a $200 million arms package (transport and observation aircraft, and communications equipment), and in July, the U.S. administration announced approval for the training of Egyptian officers in the U.S. These first assurances of U.S. military support were far short of the desires of the Egyptian military, but Senate approval in May 1978, of the


"package deal," which included fifty F-5E jet fighters for Egypt, was a substantial victory for Sadat. In the Autumn of 1978, Egypt signed an agreement with China to provide spare parts and forty outdated MIG-19 fighter aircraft, but more significantly, reached agreement during the Camp David talks on a large-scale supply of arms credits from the U.S., estimated at $1.5 billion. Defense Secretary Harold Brown announced this credit in March of 1979 as a "new military support arrangement with Egypt," and twelve F-4 Phantom fighter-bombers were delivered in time for Egypt's annual military review in October of 1979. Egyptian domestic arms production has been slowed by the withdrawal of Arab state support for the Arab Organization for Industrialization; however, Egypt has formed its own organization, EOI, and had announced that it will continue co-production agreements under contract with the U.S., France, and Britain. In January of 1980, the Carter Administration decided to supply Egypt with more sophisticated U.S. weapons including an estimated 40 F-16s or 24 F-15s and M60A3 tanks. Carter has asked Congress to approve $350 million in loans in FY81 and $800 million in FY82 to finance these purchases. Despite a slow start,

84 An-Nahar Arab Report and Memo, November 27, 1978, p. 3. Aircraft were delivered by June 1979 when another agreement was reached for forty additional MIG-19's. See An-Nahar Arab Report and Memo, July 2, 1979.


Sadat has been able to deliver the Western arms and spare parts demanded by the military. Future support of the military will in large measure depend on his continued ability to provide the military with modern weaponry.

In 1971, Sadat dismantled the intelligence and security apparatus within the ASU and dramatically burned tape recordings in public [Binder 1978, p. 392]. It is also likely that similar organizations within the Ministry of Information have been dissolved; however, the GID, secret service, military intelligence department, and the intelligence and security sections of the Ministry of the Interior remain intact. It appears that Sadat has established increased centralized control over these agencies, since they have recognizably modified their previous modus operandi, and now have a rather low profile. Operations vigorously continue under new leadership appointed by Sadat in all four agencies, but the repressive techniques common during Nasir's regime have been much less pronounced. The most recent State Department Report on Human Rights, released in February of 1979, states:

In 1970 President Sadat succeeded the extremely authoritarian Nasir regime. Repudiating its excesses, he sharply curbed the activities of the secret police, has permitted greatly increased freedom of expression and set a course of liberalization in the political, economic and social spheres of Egyptian life. Torture is strictly forbidden under Egyptian law and to the best of the Department of State's knowledge has not recently been practiced...Arbitrary arrest and imprisonment no longer take place.87

Military officer access to the highest civilian government positions under Sadat has been reduced, limited essentially to cabinet ministries of war, war production, and positions within the foreign service ministry. Table I indicates the reduction in direct military involvement within the cabinet. However, this reduction should not be equated with reduced military influence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cabinet of</th>
<th>Military of</th>
<th>Cabinet of</th>
<th>Military of</th>
<th>Cabinet of</th>
<th>Military of</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table I. MILITARY COMPONENTS OF EGYPTIAN CABINETS

Sadat's vice-president is ex-Air Force Commander Husni Mubarak. While Sadat has continued Nasir's style of direct appointments into high-level bureaucratic and managerial positions, he has appointed civilian technocrats. In launching the infitah policy, Sadat turned to the educated elite, to such men as Aziz Higazi, Abdel-Kaissouny, Hamed Sayeh, and Abdel-Meguid. While Nasir relied on civilian

---

managers within many public sector corporations, Sadat has expanded their predominance in remaining public sector companies [Baker 1978, p. 179]. Sadat's economic reforms have also produced a resurgence of the former *ancien régime* within the private sector, although their access to political power is limited. To date, the main benefactors of Sadat's "opening" have been the emerging technocratic elite. Students and military officers continue to move into mid-level jobs within the bureaucracy, and Sadat's rule has not significantly improved its efficiency.

In his relationship with the military, Sadat has tried to limit its potential for exercising autonomous political power, yet enhancing its reputation symbolically and materially. Sadat has exploited the success of the October War to restore the prestige of the military with the public, and then has sought to exploit that renewed prestige to enhance his own position. After the October War, the entire military command was called to a special commemorative session of the Peoples' Assembly, during which Sadat, in full military dress, decorated leading officers and honored the dead. Sadat staged a massive military parade in October of 1974, the first since 1967, and has continued these parades annually to commemorate the success of the October War. Senior military commanders are always promoted publicly during special sessions of the assembly.
The most recent series of promotions, in May of 1979, indicated another aspect of Sadat's technique.\textsuperscript{89} As leading military figures are removed from positions of importance, they are retained in unofficial capacities such as presidential advisers. Promotion of such advisers as General Gamasi and General Fahmi is designed to maintain their loyalty and allow Sadat the option of reappointing them to more active positions.\textsuperscript{90} Sadat has used military prestige in announcing major policies and critical decisions, such as the replacement of the last RCC member, Hussein Shafi, with Husni Mubarak in 1975. A more recent example is the great prominence given to the military backing Sadat's trip to Jerusalem in 1977. The words of incumbent Commander-in-Chief Gamasi were widely quoted:

The armed forces are aware of the dimensions and responsibilities of the present situation, and are closely watching your courageous step toward a just peace. So march ahead, Mr. President, with the blessings of God, and you have, from all members of the armed forces, greetings, esteem, and prayers for success [Baker, 1978, p. 153].

C. THE MILITARY AS A CONDITIONAL GUARDIAN

The role of the military in Egypt has changed both in scope and degree since the coup d'etat in 1952. These changes have not been limited to the Sadat era, nor have they been


\textsuperscript{90}Gamasi was promoted to field marshal and Fahmi to full general. \textit{Ibid.}
so dramatic as to eliminate previous functions or add new ones. The early years of Nasir's reign were indeed prae-
torian. Through direct military rule and a massive infusion of military elites into positions of leadership throughout the society, Nasir established firm personal control. Yet, as Nasir sought to implement his goals of forced modernization, the ruling military elite became less unitary, and civilian technocrats with needed expertise became more necessary and prevalent. By the early 1960's, a mixed civil-
military elite had emerged, still strongly controlled by Nasir through personal ties. The military remained a dominant influence that Nasir eventually sought to contain through his personal control and through rival centers of power, including an extensive intelligence and security apparatus and the Arab Socialist Union under Ali Sabri.

The trend toward less reliance upon the military as a source of elite manpower became more pronounced under Sadat. His policy of infitah required increased reliance upon compet-
tent, educated elites. Technocrat, professional, and indus-
trialist access into positions of influence is continuing, so that the current regime is best characterized as a civil-
military coalition, which includes technocrats, medium landholders and officers, all of whom remain under Sadat's personal control.

Nasir relied upon the military and his intricate security apparatus to insure his regime and to actively repress his
opposition. Sadat established increased control over the security apparatus and reduced its overt excesses. The function of insuring the regime by the military and security apparatus continues, but with a new low-key emphasis.

Nasir sought to establish a powerful army and relied upon its prestige in inter-Arab politics. Pursuit of advanced weaponry became essential to Nasir's foreign policy. The symbolic use of Egypt's military prowess eventually gave way to military intervention and finally to war with Israel in 1967. Sadat's success in rebuilding the military into a competent fighting force was essential to his continued reign. The October War was Sadat's salvation since it established his prestige and restored Egypt's honor, a necessary precondition to any peace settlement. The success of Sadat's strategy of turning to the West to solve Egypt's economic problems in no small way depends upon his ability to maintain the military as a well-equipped, modern force. Sadat is keeping the army busy with expanded development projects such as road building and land reclamation, but senior professional military officers continue to pressure the regime for new arms.91

91 Since 1974, the public development functions of the military have expanded. Projects such as the development of public works, road and engineering projects, reclamation of land and irrigation projects continue to keep the army busy. See Morris Janowitz, Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing Nations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), p. 153.
In the last years of his regime, Nasir was challenged by the military as a separate center of political power. Sadat's technique of rotating powerful military leaders before they became powerful enough to effect his removal is apparent. Sadat has actively pursued a policy of professional, non-political development within the military, and has reduced the number of key military personnel within the cabinet. The continued success of this delicate balancing act is dependent upon Sadat's ability to keep the military satisfied and upon adept perceptions regarding the limits of his independence.

At a minimum, Sadat will need to insure the continued supply of sophisticated arms in the requisite number and to obtain at least acquiescence from key military leaders on major policy decisions. The continued enhancement of the prestige of the officer corps through perquisites and public deference is expected to continue.

The solidarity of the Egyptian military should not be over-emphasized, and the watchful eye of the intelligence and security apparatus must remain open. In today's Egypt, Sadat's power retains a very personal face and depends upon its conditional guardian, the military.
VI. CONCLUSIONS

The application of political culture as a framework for the study of politics in Egypt is essential for proper understanding, because political culture provides some answers about why things are different in this particular state. The prominence of family and Islamic tradition remain at the heart of Egyptian politics. Factors such as education, urbanization, industrialization and migration have certainly affected domestic politics, but their effects can best be understood by determining how they modify traditional bases of authority to produce an observable result. The family is no longer the sole basis for prestige and status, yet family and personal relationships remain the core units of political action. Egyptian political culture has a restrictive and directive quality, not only upon the masses, but also upon the ruling elite.

The one-party system established by the post-revolutionary regime has modified traditional authority patterns and levels of political participation. The changes that resulted from the removal of the top level of the ancien regime were much more significant at subnational level. New government and party positions created a demand for additional political representation. Initially, these institutional positions were not politically important, but they did provide officeholders with a political education and an opportunity to,
increase their stature and influence through access to higher level influentials. This exposure was contained at the national level, but allowed to flourish at a subnational level. The establishment of the Arab Socialist Union in 1962 with its corporative structure again increased the scope of the politically active. When the ASU was abruptly reformed into a mobilization party in the mid-1960s, the consequence at local level was to further expand the scope of participation. While these changes in participation levels are significant in terms of elite access, the nature of participation remained basically the same. Both at the national and subnational level, family relationships, associatinal ties, inter-family marriages and patron-client networks retained their importance. The traditional umdah system had certainly undergone some cosmetic change, but the traditional participants have retained their linkage with the central government and remain Egypt's "second stratem."

Political party structures have not been significant in political socialization except for a brief period during the mobilization program of Ali Sabri. Egypt's party system has been more relevant for political development at the subnational level where a degree of autonomy developed and reinforced the influence of traditional leaders under the regimes of both Nasir and Sadat. The increase in political awareness and participation should not be confused with evolutionary democratic growth despite the official rhetoric.
Democracy is based on sharing power, loyal opposition and majority rule. These concepts are alien to a polity whose political culture is based on centralized control, mistrust, reciprocities and ingroup-outgroup rivalries.

A second basic level of political development can be determined by analyzing the degree to which the official ideology has penetrated the political culture. The case studies of villages referenced throughout this study show that the average fellah recognizes such terms as socialism, Arab nationalism and infitah, but that he relates the official ideology only in terms of the "good works" that affect him personally and locally through his family, his religion, his status, his occupation and his stomach. Only with such things as a new school, a better road or continued food subsidies, can he identify. The Egyptian political culture has predisposed the masses to resist efforts at mobilization, whether directed by an authoritarian leader and his brand of revolutionary ideology or a patrimonial leader under the guise of pluralism.

Institutions provide a third focus. Institutional participation levels provide the highest degree of known political involvement as evidenced through membership in political parties, cooperatives, unions and various other associations; however, this level of analysis is the least meaningful in respect to Egyptian political culture for several reasons. First of all, institutions are merely arenas in which
politically relevant interpersonal relationships develop. Families, associational ties and inter-family marriage continue to cement political support. Unfortunately, the institutional level of analysis is the most open to analysis; it is the level that has been most often researched, despite the fact that such institutions are foreign to the political culture.

The fourth level of analysis is the extent of extra-legal participation, which provides an understanding of certain aspects of the political culture.\textsuperscript{92} This category includes organized ideological movements such as the Muslim Brethren and the Communist Party, factional outgroup movements such as the National Front and mass demonstrations of dissatisfaction with the government. The conspiratorial nature of these opposition groups is as much a part of the political culture as is the leadership's refusal to share political power. Such groups have the same non-institutional bases for control as do the supportive political institutions of the regime. Such groups are incapable of functional loyal opposition.

Nasir had a limited number of powerful clients who gained considerable autonomy within their own center of power. Eventually, they became powerful enough to restrict Nasir's control. As Waterbury aptly noted, "the true brilliance of

\textsuperscript{92}This type of participation is discussed in detail in Samuel P. Huntington, \textit{Political Order in Changing Societies} (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1968).
Sadat's performance is that he gives the impression of not running the show" [Waterbury 1975, p. 15]. Sadat's method of control is also based on personal loyalties, but they are intentionally less permanent than Nasir's had been. Having had the advantage of observing Nasir's regime over a long period of time, it is likely that Sadat realized one of its major internal weaknesses: strong powerful personalities such as Amer, Sabri, Gum'a and Sharaf tend to develop their own loyal supporters and as such, become increasingly difficult to control. Sadat's style of personal control is characterized by decentralizing rivalries institutionally, rotation of powerful elites from their locus of power, and strong control of the military and security apparatus. Sadat's "state of institutions" consists of the executive, the press, the assembly, the party system, the bureaucracy and the military. Each institution is organizationally weak and lacks unity of effort; rivals within each institution are permitted, in fact, encouraged to in-fight by Sadat's personal assignment of key competing figures; and each institution is closely monitored, so that when individuals become strong, they are spotted early, and if necessary, replaced. The system allows for Sadat's control without his direct involvement, and it provides a healthy watchdog effect of policy scrutiny within each institution. Such an understanding of Sadat's concept of control, while certainly incomplete and problematic, does provide plausible explanations
for many of Sadat's otherwise incomprehensible personnel changes. The military provides such examples. General Sadiq and General Nassif secured Sadat's position in the Ali Sabri episode in 1971, but in his new position as Minister of War, Sadiq became a strong potential threat and was dismissed. The appointment of Air Force General Husni Mubarak as vice-president over General Gamasi, one of the planners of the 1973 War, provides another example where the stronger individual was removed to a position of less access (adviser to the president). Similar fate befell Prime Minister Salim, who was replaced by Prime Minister Mustafa Khalil in 1979. Rival influentials could be found in several institutions and ministries, such as Mubarak and Khalil in the executive, and Boutros Ghali and Usama Bazz in the Foreign Ministry. Sadat has expanded the arena of political influence by promoting activity in the assembly, among professional syndicates, technocrats and industrialists and within the party system; however, the function of these groups in decision-making is limited to interest articulation and restricted to their particular sphere of influence. Through his system of personnel management, techniques such as the May 1978 referendum, and low-key intelligence and security operations, Sadat maintains personal control. Sadat's latest cabinet reshuffle of May 1980 in which he assumed the position of

---

prime minister and elevated the status of General Kamal Hassan Ali and Ali Abdel-Meguid, demonstrates Sadat's need to assert more positive control. While Sadat has attempted to stay "above politics" in the tradition of Tunisia's Bourguiba and prefers to direct his clientage without continuous personal involvement, Egypt's worsening domestic problems have and will continue to force an occasional reassertion of his outward, personal and direct control. Sadat's policies, like those of Nasir, must carefully defer to the values of the political culture, strongly represented in the rural middle class and the military.
null
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Arab Press Service Diplomat.

Arab Report and Memo.

Arab World Weekly.


Cairo Domestic News Service.


Christian Science Monitor.


Egyptian Gazette.


Foreign Broadcast Information Service.


Hakim, Tawfiq al, Under the Sun of Thought, Cairo, 1938.

Hakim, Tawfiq al, Return of Awareness, Beirut, 1974.


Hanson, Bent, "Arab Socialism in Egypt," World Development 3 (April 1975): 201-211.


Hassan, Mohammed Lufti, "Village in Abishna," Al-Tali'a, September 1966, p. 42.


Joint Publications Research Service.


Khalid, Khalid Mohammed, Min Huna Nabda' (From Here We Start), Trans. by Ismael R. al-Faruqi, 3d ed., Washington: American Council of the Learned, 1953.


Lane, Edward W., Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians, London: Ward, Lock and Bowden, 1842.


Middle East Economic Digest.

Middle East Intelligence Survey.


Qur'an.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Initial Distribution List</th>
<th>Copies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Defense Technical Information Center</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cameron Station</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alexandria, Virginia 22314</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Library, Code 0142</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Naval Postgraduate School</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Monterey, California 93940</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Department Chairman, Code 56</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Department of National Security Affairs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Naval Postgraduate School</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Monterey, California 93940</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Professor John W. Amos II, Code 56Am</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Department of National Security Affairs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Naval Postgraduate School</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Monterey, California 93940</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Professor Kamil T. Said, Code 56Sa</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Department of National Security Affairs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Naval Postgraduate School</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Monterey, California 93940</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Professor Morroe Berger</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Center for Near Eastern Studies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Princeton University</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Princeton, New Jersey 08540</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Marquat Memorial Library</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28307</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tunis (FSI)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S. Department of State</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Washington, D.C. 20520</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Thesis
A5625
C.1

Anthony

Political culture
and the nature of
political participation in Egypt.