

The
OPEN COURT

Devoted to the Science of Religion,
the Religion of Science, and the Extension
of the Religious Parliament Idea

FOUNDED BY EDWARD C. HEGELER

APRIL, 1929

“←—————→”
VOLUME XLIII NUMBER 875

Price 20 Cents

The Open Court Publishing Company

Wieboldt Hall, 339 East Chicago Avenue
Chicago, Illinois

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS

5750 ELLIS AVE., CHICAGO

THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY OF EQUALITY

By T. V. Smith

Equality, in its present vague status, has lost much of the meaning that the founders of this country attached to it. In this book Mr. Smith has set out, in effect, to rescue from oblivion whatever truth the earlier doctrine contained.

"Professor Smith writes as a philosopher and an historian. His reasoning is sound, his information accurate and his style clear and virile. The volume is a notable contribution to our political philosophy."—*The New Republic*.

\$3.00, postpaid \$3.15

THE DEMOCRATIC WAY OF LIFE

By T. V. Smith

T. V. Smith in this book re-endows "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity,"—slogans of a goal that has never been reached—with some of the spirit of the days when they were magic words. Here is a brilliant commentary upon democracy as a way of life.

\$1.75, postpaid \$1.85

AESTHETICS OF THE NOVEL

By Van Meter Ames

The fact that there is a decided relationship between literature and philosophy has been singularly ignored by past writers. Mr. Ames, believing that literary criticism cannot be sound unless it is placed on a philosophical basis, in this book has successfully correlated both subjects. He has studied the novel by means of a theory of aesthetics which he has worked out from the general standpoint of pragmatism.

\$2.50, postpaid \$2.60

CURRENT CHRISTIAN THINKING

By Gerald B. Smith

In this book, the author takes account of the outstanding forms of religious belief, and he shows their relation to the whole progress of Current Christian thought.

"Mr. Smith presents an excellent survey of the state of religious thinking in the United States today. His sections on Fundamentalism, Modernism and the controversy over evolution are especially good."—*American Mercury*.

\$2.00, postpaid \$2.10

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS

5832 Ellis Avenue - - Chicago

THE OPEN COURT

Volume XLIII (No. 4)

APRIL, 1929

Number 875

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
<i>Frontispiece.</i> HELL, THE GODDESS OF THE NETHER WORLD.	
<i>The Legend of Lucifer.</i> MAXIMILIAN RUDWIN.....	193
<i>Chinoiserie and Vers Libre.</i> ARTHUR E. CHRISTY.....	209
<i>Immortality as a Biologist Sees It.</i> R. A. HEFNER.....	219
<i>Tragedy, Death and Decay.</i> ROBERT SPARKS WALKER.....	228
<i>The Aesthetic Writings of Schiller.</i> BIRGER R. HEADSTROM.....	235
<i>The Growth of the Messianic Idea.</i> H. OSCHEROWITZ.....	244

Published monthly by
THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING COMPANY

337 East Chicago Avenue
Chicago, Illinois

Subscription rates: \$2.00 a year; 20c a copy. Remittances may be made by personal checks, drafts, post-office or express money orders, payable to the Open Court Publishing Company, Chicago.

While the publishers do not hold themselves responsible for manuscripts sent to them, they endeavor to use the greatest care in returning those not found available, if postage is sent. As a precaution against loss, mistakes, or delay, they request that the name and address of the author be placed at the head of every manuscript (and not on a separate slip) and that all manuscripts and correspondence concerning them be addressed to the Open Court Publishing Company and not to individuals.

Address all correspondence to the Open Court Publishing Company, 337 East Chicago Ave., Chicago.

Entered as Second-Class matter March 26, 1897, at the Post Office at Chicago, Illinois, under Act of March 3, 1879.

Copyright by The Open Court Publishing Company, 1928.
Printed in the United States of America.

KANT'S INAUGURAL DISSERTATION


and

EARLY WRITINGS ON SPACE

translated by

JOHN HANDYSIDE

Cloth, \$2.00




CONTENTS


Thoughts on the True Estimation of Living Forces
(Selected Passages)

On the First Ground of the Distinction of Regions in Space

Dissertation on the Form and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible World



The paper here printed was designed to be an introduction to Kant's early writings, particularly those which deal with space and the methods employed in mathematical science. It is a helpful introduction to the *Critique of Pure Reason* and is quite indispensable to any genuine understanding of Kant's mental history.



THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING COMPANY

Chicago

London

JOURNAL of PHILOSOPHY

This periodical is the organ of active philosophical discussion in the United States. There is no similar journal in the field of scientific philosophy. It is issued fortnightly and permits the quick publication of short contributions, prompt reviews and timely discussions.

*Edited by Professors F. J. E. Woodbridge,
W. T. Bush, and H. W. Schneider,
of Columbia University*

515 WEST 116TH STREET, NEW YORK

\$4 a Year, 26 Numbers

20 Cents a Copy

TABOO IN THE HEBREW SCRIPTURES

By JACOB SINGER

Cloth, \$2.00

The author treats the early taboos from the viewpoint of Social Anthropology and shows how primitive fears were transformed into factors of social control, by regulating the food and drink, by defining the relations between sexes and by isolating the priest, the king, the warrior and other persons and places in which "mana" or "sacred electricity" resides. These prohibitions were retained thru the process of rationalization and idealization. A study of the early man's emotional reactions and mental processes throws light on the legal codes, the ethical concepts and the theological ideology of the Hebrew Scriptures.



THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING COMPANY

Chicago, Illinois

A HISTORY OF MATHEMATICAL NOTATIONS

in two volumes

\$12.00


by

FLORIAN CAJORI

Volume I—Elementary Mathematics

Volume II—Advanced Mathematics


Price, Cloth, \$6.00 each



This study emphasizes the difficulty experienced even in ordinary arithmetic and algebra in reaching a common world-language. The only hope for rapid approach of uniformity in mathematical symbolism lies in international co-operation through representative committees.

Any phase of the growth of mathematical notation is an interesting study, but the chief educational lesson to be derived is that notation always grows too slowly. The moral which this points for twentieth-century teachers is that they should assist in hastening new improvements.

For many centuries there has been a conflict between individual judgments, on the use of mathematical symbols. On the one side are those who, in geometry for instance, would employ hardly any mathematical symbols; on the other side are those who insist on the use of ideographs and pictographs almost to the exclusion of ordinary writing. The real merits or defects of the two extreme views cannot be ascertained by *a priori* argument; they rest upon experience and must therefore be sought in the study of the history of our science.




THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING COMPANY

Chicago


London

AMERICAN MATHEMATICAL SOCIETY

COLLOQUIUM SERIES



- G. C. Evans, The Logarithmic Potential. Discontinuous Dirichlet and Neumann Problems. 1927. 150 pp. \$2.00.
- E. T. Bell, Algebraic Arithmetic. 1927. 180 pp. \$2.50.
- L. P. Eisenhart, Non-Riemannian Geometry. 1927. 184 pp. \$2.50.
- G. D. Birkhoff, Dynamical Systems. 1928. 295 pp. \$3.00.



EARLIER ISSUES

(Circular giving full titles sent on request).

Evanston Lectures, \$1.25.

Chicago Congress Papers, \$4.00.

Boston Lectures, \$2.75.


Madison Lectures, \$2.50.

Princeton Lectures, \$2.50

Cambridge Lectures:

Part I (Evans), \$2.00.

Part II (Veblen), \$2.00.



Orders may be sent to the American Mathematical Society,
501 West 116th Street, New York City, or to

THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING COMPANY

337 East Chicago Avenue

Chicago, Illinois

ORIGIN OF MENTAL SPECIES

Henry J. Derbyshire

An investigation into the origin, growth, development and variation of mental species with especial reference to their relation to nature and the Absolute.

This work extends the investigations of Darwin and the evolutionary school into the higher attenuations of the physiological functions and their relation to mind. By classifying them in their natural and obvious order under the names, Feeling mind, Thinking mind and Metaphysical Mind it suggests a norm for the study of mind.

Price \$2.50



THE BOOK STALL

209 E. Second Street

Flint, Michigan

THE BUDDHIST ANNUAL OF CEYLON

Vol. III. No. 2 $\frac{\text{B. E. 2472}}{\text{C. E. 1928}}$

An Annual covering the principal activities in the Orient during the year 1927-28. An awakened interest in Buddhism is shown by the development of the study of Oriental Religions in United States and England.

Partial Contents of the Volume

A Buddhist Legend in Europe by F. L. Woodward
Buddhism in England by Christmas Humphreys
The Buddha's Discovery of Love by Albert J. Edmunds
The Active Life of a Buddhist by the Hon. Dr. W. A. De Silva
Illusions and Disillusions by Prof. A. Brodrick-Bullock
Buddhism and the Modern World by the late Ananda Metteyya
Realty by Prof. E. J. Mills
Notes and News

Price \$1.00

We also have a few back numbers of the Annual on hand for those who wish to complete their files.

THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING COMPANY

Wieboldt Hall, School of Commerce

337 East Chicago Avenue

Chicago



Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2009 with funding from
CARLI: Consortium of Academic and Research Libraries in Illinois



HEL, THE GODDESS OF THE NETHER WORLD
By Johannes Gehrts

Frontispiece to The Open Court.

THE OPEN COURT

A MONTHLY MAGAZINE

Devoted to the Science of Religion, the Religion of Science, and
the Extension of the Religious Parliament Idea.

Copyright by THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING COMPANY, 1929

Volume XLIII (No.4) APRIL, 1929

Number 875

THE LEGEND OF LUCIFER¹

BY MAXIMILIAN RUDWIN

THE legend of Lucifer has no biblical basis. The ancient Hebrews knew of no devil whatever. Satan in the Old Testament is no devil in the accepted meaning of the word. He was originally not an adversary but an adjutant of the Almighty. Satan was a member of the celestial court and stood high in the councils of Jehovah. He belonged to the assembly of the sons of God, but sat on the opposition bench. He was a sort of prosecuting attorney attached to the judgment seat of the Eternal (*cf.* 1 Kings xx. 1-23; Job ii. 1-6).

A certain group of historians of religion maintain that the Devil is the creation of Christianity. Just as the French philosophers of the eighteenth century held that the theologians had invented the Lord, they affirm that the Devil has been expressly created by the priests for the greater glory of God. Lucifer, they claim, has been limned after the Lord as His left hand, so to speak. They call to witness the Church fathers, who baptized Beelzebub as *simia Dei*. The Christian Devil is, in their opinion, *sui generis*, without precedent. Satan is, according to this view, all by himself and has nothing to do with the evil spirits of the ethnic religions. These students of religion fail to see that no discontinuity exists in the evolution of human beliefs and institutions. In fact, the belief in a movement of rebellion within the family of gods is common to the

¹Two mythological accounts of the origin of the demons and evil spirits may be mentioned in connection with our discussion. According to a belief current among the ancient Norsemen, the demons were produced by the ash-tree named Iggdrasil, also called the tree of life, the roots of which reach to the lowest depths of the underworld. A curious Jewish tradition teaches that the Devil and woman had a common origin in Adam's rib. Old Nick is believed by certain rabbins to have come out of the hole left by the removal of the rib from Adam before it was closed.

mythologies of all races. The opposition of Lucifer to the Lord has an analogy in that of Vrita to Indra in Hindu mythology, of Ahriman to Ormuzd in Persian mythology, of Set to Horus in Egyptian mythology, of Prometheus to Zeus in Greek mythology and of Loki to the gods of Asgardh in Scandinavian mythology. The conception of the imprisoned empyrean rebel may also be found in many of the ancient ethnic religions. Ahriman, who fought against Ormuzd, was bound for a thousand years; Prometheus, who assailed Zeus, was chained to a rock in the Caucasus; and Loki, the calumniator of the northern gods, was strapped down with thongs of iron in Nastrond (hell), out of which he will come in the "twilight of the gods" to do battle with them and their servants in Valhalla. He will at last be slain by the son of Balder, and then there will be a new heaven and a new earth, and Allfather will reign once more.

The fact of the matter is that the Devil is as old as is man himself. He may be traced back to the animistic conception of Nature, which saw behind natural events active creative spirits. With primitive man to think of good and evil powers was to personify them. The good events were believed by him to be animated by good spirits, the bad events by evil spirits. In a later stage of the evolution of the human mind, the demons behind good acts were subordinated to a good god, and the demons behind evil acts were subordinated to an evil spirit. In this manner, the Devil entered into human thought and has remained to this day. The Fiend is thus the incarnation of human frenzy. The human mind fell a prey to its own fear.

As far as the Devil of the Christian religion is concerned, his ancestry reaches back into the history of religions. He seems to hail from India where he tempted the Buddha, and whence he migrated to Persia in the person of Ahriman. The Jews learned to know him during their Babylonian captivity under Zoroastrian kings, blended him with their own Satan, who, as has already been stated, originally had no sulphurous odor whatever. After having thus turned Satan into a regular Devil, the Jews handed him over to the Christians, who, sad to say, show themselves no more grateful for Satan than for the Savior, whom they likewise owe to the sons of Israel.

But Satan, as we know him, is not of pure Semitic stock. During

the triumphal march of Christianity through the European countries, he assimilated many of the characteristics of the discarded gods of the old religions. All the rich wealth of ideas which the primitive European peoples associated with their ancient good and evil spirits, they ultimately distributed over the Christian Pantheon. A certain detail of dress, trait of character or trick of manner shows how Satan, in wandering over the face of the earth, has caught a trace of this or that local spirit. The Devil's identification with the uncouth Northern giants was especially momentous for the transformation of his character. It brought down the stern Satan of Judea from the height of his terrible power to the plane of pictured grotesqueness. The Devil, as he has come down to us from the Middle Ages, is a *mélange* of various elements. "He is at once," as it has been said, "of Jewish, Christian, heathen, elfish, gigantic and spectral stock."²

The New Testament account of a war in heaven which resulted in the defeat of Satan and his fall like a lightning from heaven (Luk. x, 18; *cf.* Rev. ix, 1) was not derived from the Old Testament, which has no hint whatever of a rebellion and expulsion of angels from heaven. This belief was brought back by the Jews from their Babylonian sojourn and first finds expression in the non-canonical Hebrew writings, particularly in the Book of Enoch. It is from the Old Testament apocrypha that this idea found its way into the New Testament.

The Gospel writers also identified Beelzebub (=Baal-Zebub), the fly-god of the Pœnicians, with Satan, (*cf.* Matth. xii, 24), inasmuch as the latter was modelled after the Persian Ahriman, who entered the world in the form of a fly.

The substitution of Lucifer for Satan as the rebel angel is a contribution by the Church fathers. It is the result of a wrongly interpreted biblical passage. The prophet compares the king of Babylon, on account of the worldly splendor by which he was surrounded prior to his death, to Lucifer ("light-bearer"), the Latin equivalent of the Semitic term for the "morning-star," *i. e.* the planet Venus when it appears above the Eastern horizon prior to day-break. Just as the brilliancy of Lucifer ("day-star" A. V.) surpasses that of all other stars in the firmament, so the splendor of the king of Babylon surpasses that of all other Oriental monarchs.

² *Cf.* Jacob and Wilhelm Grimm: *Teutonic Mythology*. Translated from the German. 4 vols., London, 1880-1888.

Eusebius of Cæsaria, Tertullian, Jerome, and Gregory the Great erroneously understood the passage: "How art thou fallen from heaven, O Lucifer, son of the morning, how art thou cut down to the ground, which didst weaken the nations" (Is. xiv, 12) to refer to the fall of the rebel angel. In consequence of this misinterpretation, the name of Lucifer has been used as a synonym for Satan. The two, however, were not generally identified until the time of St. Anselm, archbishop of Canterbury (1034-1093), who, in his treatise, *Dialogus de casu Diaboli*, has considerably elaborated the account of the Devil's fall from heaven.³ In popular belief, however, Lucifer and Satan are not blended, though they are thoroughly in agreement.

*
* *
*

The legend of the rebellion and expulsion of Lucifer, as formulated by Jewish and Christian writers, is as follows:

Lucifer was the chief in the hierarchy of heaven. He was pre-eminent among all created beings in beauty, power and wisdom. What better description can be given of him than the following portrait penned, according to patristic exegesis, by the prophet:

"Thou sealest up the sun, full of wisdom, and perfect in beauty. Thou hast been in Eden, the garden of God; every precious stone was thy covering, the sardius, topaz, the diamond, the beryl, the onyx, and the jasper, the sapphire, the emerald, and the carbuncle, and gold: the workmanship of thy tabrets and of thy pipes was prepared in thee in the day that thou wast created. Thou art the anointed cherub that covereth; and I have set thee so: thou wast the holy mountain of God: thou hast walked up and down in the midst of the stones of fire. Thou wast perfect in thy ways from the day that thou wast created, till iniquity was found in thee. By the multitude of thy merchandise they have filled the midst of thee with violence, and thou hast sinned: therefore I will cast thee as profane out of the mountain of God: and I will destroy thee. O covering cherub, from the midst of the stones of fire. Thine heart was lifted up because of thy beauty, thou hast corrupted thy wisdom by reason of thy brightness: I will cast thee to the ground, I will lay thee before kings, that they may behold thee" (Ez. xxvii, 12-17).

³ Reprinted in J. P. Migne's *Patrologia latina*, vol. CLVIII, col. 325-343.



WAR IN HEAVEN

After the Revelation of St. John
(By Albrecht Dürer)

To this "anointed cherub" was apparently allotted power and dominion over the earth; and even after his fall and exclusion from his old domain, he still seems to retain a part of his power and ancient title to sovereignty (Luk. iv, 6; *cf.* also John xiv, 30; II Cor. iv, 4; Eph. ii, 2).

The downfall of the Devil is, according to Church authority, attributed to self-conceit. From the fact that "the Devil sinneth from the beginning" (I John iii, 8) and that "Pride is the beginning of all sin" (Ecclesiasticus x, 15), it was inferred that the Devil's sin was pride. Eusebius, in the third century, advanced *superbia* as the motive of the Devil's rebellion, to which Nazianzus, in the following century, added envy. This accounts for the familiar phrase "as proud as Lucifer." Cædmon, in his poem on the fall of Satan, sees the cause of the revolt of Satan in pride and ambition. Marlowe, following tradition, also affirms that Lucifer fell, "by aspiring pride and insolence" (*Dr. Faustus* iii. 68). We recall Coleridge's quatrain:

"He saw a cottage with a double coach-house,
A cottage of gentility,
And the Devil did grin, for his darling sin
Is pride that apes humility."

Various versions exist in the writings of the rabbis and Church fathers as to the way in which Lucifer's conceit showed itself. According to certain authorities, Lucifer's sin, which brought tribulation into the fair world, consisted in the fact that, in the haughtiness of his heart, he refused to bow before the Great White Throne. Others hold that his audacity went so far as to attempt to seat himself on it, and still others ascribe to him the bold project of seizing it and thus usurping the power of the Most High.⁴

In the medieval mysteries, Lucifer, as the governor of the heavens, is represented as seated next to the Eternal, who warns the high official of heaven: "Touch not my throne by none assent." But as soon as the Lord leaves his seat, Lucifer, swelling with pride, sits down on the throne of heaven. The arch-angel Michael, indignant over the audacious act of Lucifer, takes up arms against

⁴ In *De partu virginis* written by Sannazaro, the "Christian Virgil," in 1526, Satan is also represented as attempting to usurp the throne of heaven.

him and finally succeeds in driving him out of heaven down into the dark and dismal dwelling reserved for him from all eternity. The Mont St. Michel on the Norman coast is the eternal monument to the victorious leader of the hosts of heaven in the war against the rebel angel.⁵



THE FALLEN LUCIFER (After Dore)

According to the Talmud, Satan's sin lay not in his rivalry with God but in his envy of man. When Adam was created, so say the rabbis, all the angels had to bow to the new king of the earth, but Satan refused; and when threatened with the wrath of the Lord, he replied: "If He breaks out in wrath against me, I will exalt my

⁵ An interesting treatment of this legend is Maupassant's story "Légende du Mont St. Michel" (1888).

throne above His, and I will be higher than the Most High." At once God flung Satan and his host out of heaven, down to the earth. From that moment dates the enmity between Satan and Jehovah.⁶ The Koran has a similar account of the revolt of Eblis against Allah. When Allah created man, so runs the Mohammedan version of the war in heaven, he called all the angels to worship this crowning work of His hands. Eblis, in his great conceit, refused to worship Adam and was banished from heaven for failing to obey the command of Allah.⁷ Irenæus is of the opinion that the angels rebelled as soon as they learned of the proposed creation of man. "When the angels were informed," says this father of the Church, "of God's intention to create man after His own image. . . . they envied man's happiness and so revolted." The orthodox teaching, however, is that man's creation followed the Devil's rebellion. Adam was created by the Lord to fill the vacancy caused in the celestial choir-stalls by the fall of the angels. This act of substitution increased still further the Devil's hatred toward the Deity, and the temptation of Eve in the Garden of Eden was a successful effort on the Devil's part to balk the will of the Lord.

There have, however, been writers who advanced other reasons for the Devil's difference with the Deity. The German mystic Jacob Boehme, as far back as the seventeenth century, relates that when Satan was asked to explain the cause of God's enmity to him and his consequent downfall, he replied in justification of his act: "I wanted to be an author." Like the son of many a good family, he was driven out, he claims, for having had literary ambitions.⁸ Anatole France suggests that Satan was banished from heaven for the reason that he wished to think for himself instead of accepting everything on authority. "Thought," says this latterday diabolist in his book, *le Puits de Sainte-Claire* (1895), "led Satan to revolt."

The Devil's fall from heaven according to legend, occurred on the first of August. A description of the anniversary festival of this great occasion, when all the devils appear in gala dress, is given by Heywood in his comedy *The Play called the Four P. P.* (1543-1547).

⁶ Cf. Louis Ginzberg: *The Legends of the Jews* (4 vols., Philadelphia, 1909-1925), I, 64. In Voldel's *Lucifer*, the revolt of the angels is also caused by their jealousy of the privileges enjoyed by man.

⁷ Cf. M. D. Conway, *Demonology and Devil-Lore* (2 vols., London, 1879), II, 143.

⁸ The word "author" is used in this connection in its current meaning.

*
* * *

The legend of Lucifer, as solving the problem of the origin of evil and of the birth of man, and as presaging the goal of human destiny, has always been a matter of great human concern, and a subject full of fascination for the poet. Nearly all the great minds of Christendom have attempted to treat this theme. Beginning with the account of the Creation by the Spanish monk Dracontius, the Latin poem of Avitus, Bishop of Vienne, in his work *De laudibus Dei* (5th century), which carries the history of the world from Creation through the fall of man to the Flood and the Exodus, and the transcript of the biblical text of creation by the old English poet Cædmon of the seventh century, we have had at different periods various treatments of this subject. The medieval passion plays in the end reached back to the creation and fall of the angels and the temptation of man which necessitated his salvation through Christ. In the seventeenth century, the Netherland imagination was fired with this theme. The youthful Hugo Grotius was the first to attempt it in his *Adamus exil.*, a Latin drama, written in 1601, which is supposed to have given hints to Milton. Two other Dutchmen of that period, both far greater poets than Grotius, were also attracted by this subject-matter. The distinguished Jacob Cats treated it in his idyll "Gront-Houwelick" (the Fundamental Marriage of Adam and Eve),⁹ and Vondel in his tragedy of *Lucifer* (1654). So many poets of so many different nations during that period chose this subject of such historical and symbolical significance. In addition to the poets just mentioned we may refer to the following: the Scotchman Andrew Ramsay, the Spaniard Azevedo, the Portuguese Camoens, the Frenchman Du Bartas and the Englishmen Phineas Fletcher and John Milton.

The Puritan poet surpassed all his predecessors in his treatment of this old subject. He overlaid the original story with a wealth of invention and imagery. It may be said without any exaggeration that he produced the greatest of all modern epics. What fascinates us primarily in his poem is the personality of the Prince of Darkness. "The finest thing in connection with this [Milton's] Paradise," says Taine, in his *Histoire de la littérature anglaise* (1863), "is Hell; and in this history of God, the chief part is taken by the

⁹ This story is the first of a long poem, which bears the title of *Trouwing* and which was published in 1637.

Devil." It is generally agreed that the hero of *Paradise Lost* (1667-1674) is none other than Satan. Daniel Defoe, in his *Political History of the Devil* (1726), remarks that "Mr. Milton has indeed made a fine poem, but it is a devil of a history." The Miltonic Satan is the greatest personification of evil in all Christian poems. In the opinion of many critics, there is no poetic character, ancient or modern, that equals Milton's Satan in grandeur. The irreconcilable and irremediable archangel is an incomparable creation,—a mighty angel fallen! The reader cannot but be affected by a sense of sorrow for this fall.

It is a curious fact, indeed, that Milton, who started out in his poem "to justify the ways of God to men" (*Par. Lost* i. 26), ended by conferring lustre upon Lucifer. The Puritan poet portrays the Devil with such a passionate concern that the reader is not at a loss where to find the author's sympathies. The fact of the matter is that Milton himself was, as William Blake has said it, "of the Devil's party without knowing it."¹⁰

Milton's Satan is a great spirit fallen from heaven and clothed with a certain tragic dignity. The emperean rebel in *Paradise Lost* still holds his glory and his star. The ridiculous Devil of our ancestors has become in Milton's hands a giant and a hero. He is not the stupid good-natured lout of the medieval peasant. Nor does he answer to the feathered clown of the medieval mystery plays. He is really an epic, majestic figure, a Promethean character, who vainly but valiantly opposes a power which he knows he can never conquer.

It must be admitted, though, that this conception of Satan is not wholly original with Milton. The Devil had already been drawn by Avitus as an imposing figure reminding one of the Miltonic hero. In the Eger Passion play of 1516, we also have an approach to a higher dramatic conception of the Devil, that of a glorious, large hearted rebel Satan.

Milton's Satan is usually regarded as the mighty fallen, majesty in ruin, something to be admired and feared. We must, however, not overlook his awful grief, his wild despair. Milton knew how to render in words of surpassing beauty the impressive sorrow and the introspective pangs of the Archangel ruined. The expression of

¹⁰ "The reason Milton wrote in fetters when he wrote of angels and God and at liberty when of devils and hell, is because he was a true poet and of the Devil's party without knowing it" (William Blake).

human emotions which Milton imparts to his Satan when this fallen angel descends into his doleful domain to summon his infernal council has aroused the admiration of readers to this day. Satan's pity for the sad plight of the spirits who fell with him, and his compassion for man, to whom he must bring destruction, are lines in *Paradise Lost* which cannot be easily forgotten.

In what beautiful terms is Satan's self-condemnation clothed by Milton! The poet follows tradition in describing Satan's punishment in hell (*Par. Lost* ii. 88). But this material pain is in Milton very insignificant as compared with the Devil's spiritual sufferings. It is the inward torments on which Milton lays chief emphasis, and this inner pain shows itself in the face of his Fiend. "Myself am Hell," Satan cries in the anguish of his soul (*ibid.*, iv. 75). What gnaws at his heart is not a serpent, but "the thought both of lost happiness and lasting pain" (*ibid.*, i. 54-55).

The pain of Milton's Satan is psychical rather than physical. His is the boundless horror and despair of one who has known "eternal joys" and is now condemned to everlasting banishment. Marlowe's Mephistopheles also complains of moral rather than material sufferings. His torment is to be hopelessly bound in the constraint of serfdom to evil. There is a suggestion of peculiar horror in the tortured protest which bursts from his lips when asked as to his condition:

"Think'st thou that I, that saw the face of God,
And tasted the eternal joys of heaven,
Am not tormented with ten thousand hells,
In being depriv'd of everlasting bliss?
O Faustus! leave these frivolous demands,
Which strike a terror to my fainting soul!" (iii. 78-83).

The idea of the repentant rebel is also not original with Milton. It is of pre-Christian origin and was also acquired by the Jews from the Persians. The writer of the Book of the Secrets of Enoch (written between 30 B. C. and 50 A. D.) already represents the apostatized angels as "weeping unceasingly." This conception is also found in the apocryphal Vision of St. Paul. In his lamentations over his expulsion from heaven in the medieval mystery plays, Satan has often given a very poetic expression to his deep yearning for the heaven which he has lost. In the Eger Passion Play, the Devil ex-

presses his willingness to perform the most terrible penance if he can but obtain his forgiveness. A modern version of Satan's *de profundis* has been given us by Frieda Schanz:


Der Teufel hat immer mit frechem Munde
Den Himmel verflucht und Gott verklagt.
Aber einmal in wunderbarer Stunde
Hat er gesagt:
"Und läge der Himmel noch tausendmal weiter
Ueber dem Höllenmoor
Und führte eine glühende Leiter
Zu ihm empoor,
Jede Sprosse aus eisernen Dornenzweigen,
Jeder Schritt unausdenkbares Weh und Grau'n,
Tausend Legionen Jahre möchte ich steigen,
Um nur einmal Sein Angesicht zu schau'n."

It does not seem, though, that Satan is wholly satisfied with Milton's account of the events that led to his expulsion from heaven. The reader will recall Bernard Shaw's account of Satan's indignation over the Miltonic version of the celestial war. "The Englishman described me as being expelled from Heaven by cannon and gun-powder, and to this day every Briton believes that the whole of this silly story is in the Bible. What else he says, I do not know, for it is all in a long poem which neither I nor any one else ever succeeded in wading through" (*Man and Superman*, 1905).

Milton's delineation of the lesser lights of hell is not less to be admired. In *Paradise Lost* there is a distinct differentiation of demons. The personality of each devil reveals itself. Baal is not merely a devil; he is the particular devil Baal. Beelzebub, we feel, is distinct from Belial; Moloch is not Mammon, nor is Dagon, Rimmon. Milton's devils are not metaphysical abstractions. A personal devil is always a lot more interesting than an abstraction. Even his allegorical figures are living symbols. The demons in *Paradise Lost* are not ugly beasts. They have no horns, no tails. Nor are they wicked men, either. But they act in a manner which men can understand. The Devil should not be human, but he must have enough in common with human nature to play a part intelligible to human beings. In the artistic treatment of diabolical material,

the chief difficulty lies in preserving the just mean between the devil-character and the imparted element of humanity.

Milton had many imitators, all of whom fell far short of their model. Klopstock tried to give to Germany what Milton had given to his country. His *Messias* (1748-1773), which treats of the Christian system of salvation, was intended to parallel the epic of the Puritan poet. But his Satan is so much below Milton's Satan that we blush to think how this Satan of Klopstock could ever sustain a conversation with the Satan of Milton or even appear in his



Milton's Satan (After Dore)

company. He has neither the greatness of intellect nor the charm of personality with which Satan was clothed by Milton. The Devil of Klopstock is indeed a Miltonic Devil, "but oh how fallen! how changed!" (*Par. Lost* i 84). It will be recalled that when somebody once called Klopstock the "German Milton," Coleridge promptly retorted that Klopstock was a very German Milton.¹¹

The subject of Satan's revolt has not failed of fascination even for the writers of the modern period, which has discarded the Devil into the limbo of ancient superstitions and in which his very mention, far from causing men to cross themselves, brings a smile on

¹¹ Albrecht von Haller's play *Vom Ursprung des Uebels* (1734) likewise contains many reminiscences of Milton's *Paradise Lost*. A tragedy called *Lucifer* was also published, in 1717, by a Jesuit father in Silesia Manz Noel.

their faces. It cannot be denied that most of our ideas in this realm of thought are quite different from the views that the contemporaries of Milton entertained. The tremendous belief in the personality of the Devil that had grown up during the Middle Ages flourished just as vigorously in the middle of the seventeenth century. Milton himself fully believed in the existence of the diabolical beings whom he described. He was as firm, although not as fantastic, a believer in a real, personal Devil as Luther was. We never think of doubting Milton. "As well might we doubt the reality of those scorching fires of hell that had left their marks on the face of Dante; or of the fearful sights and sounds that beset Christian on his way through the Valley of the Shadow of Death." Even Christopher Marlowe, in telling the story of the bargain between Faustus and Mephistopheles, believed that he narrated established facts. The conception of the Devil of a Marlowe, a Milton, a Bunyan, still represents the seriousness of the medieval fear of the Fiend. These men lived in an age of faith in which angels and demons were not abstract figures, but living realities. In our modern times, however, heaven and hell have lost their "local habitation," and angels and demons are considered as figments of the human imagination.

Contrary to all expectation, however, the legend of Lucifer has not ceased to exert a strong attraction upon the mind of man to this day. As a matter of fact, the Devil has perhaps received his greatest elaboration in modern times at the hands of writers who believed in him no more than Shakespeare did in the ghost of Hamlet's father. The treatment of this ancient legend, however, differs radically from that given to it by the poets of former times. It has been reserved for the last century to bring about a reversal of poetic judgment with regard to the events which supposedly happened in the heavens in the dim beginnings of history. It must not be forgotten that the accounts of the celestial war given by the rabbins and Church fathers came from partisans of heaven. The other party could perhaps furnish a different version of those events. Samuel Butler has remarked in his *Note-Books*, published posthumously in 1912, that we have never heard the Devil's side of the case because God has written all the books. It is apparent that he was not familiar with the writings of a number of men in different European countries who constituted themselves, during the last

century, as the spokesmen of the Devil and advocated a revision of his process. These *advocati Diaboli* endeavored to show that the Devil was after all not so black as he has always been painted.

During the period of the Romantic revolt in all European countries Satan was considered as a Prometheus of Christian mythology. He was hailed as the vindicator of reason, of freedom of thought, and of an unfettered humanity. The French Romantics saw in Satan the greatest enthusiast for the liberty and spontaneity of genius, the sublimest and supremest incarnation of the spirit of individualism, the greatest symbol of protest against tyranny, celestial or terrestrial. They predicted the day when Satan would return to his former glory in heaven.

Satan received ample vindication in England from such poets as Byron, Shelley, Swinburne and James Thomson. Byron portrayed Lucifer as a rebel against celestial injustice. Shelley took his transmuted Lucifer from Milton's Satan, and deified him a little more. The imagination of the poet of *Prometheus Unbound* (1820) made of the Devil the benefactor of man and the light of the world. George Du Maurier averred that no tongue had yet uttered what might be said for the adversary of the Almighty.

In Germany, as far back as the eighteenth century, Count Stolberg, in his *Iambs* (1783-1784), celebrated Lucifer as the Morning-Star, the Light-Bearer, to whom man is indebted for truth and enlightenment. Richard Dehmel's pantomimic drama *Lucifer* (1899) is a glorification of the Devil, whom the poet calls by such beautiful epithets as *Glansbringer*, *Gluthüter*, *Lichtschöpfer*, *Mutwecker*, *Weltbegeistrer*.

In Scandinavia, August Strindberg, in his play, *Lucifer or God* (1877), reverses the roles between the Almighty and His adversary. Lucifer is represented in this play as a compound of Apollo, Prometheus and Christ. This divinization of the Devil has for its counterpart the diabolization of the Deity.

In Italy, Carducci, in his *Hymn to Satan* (1863), describes the Devil clothed with such mighty and beautiful splendor that his glory almost compels the knee to bend. This bold writer represents Satan as "the immortal enemy of autocracy and the banner-bearer of the great reformers and innovators of all ages." His contemporary, Rapisardi, similarly celebrates, in *Lucifer* (1877), the Devil as the bringer of light to the world.

The last to report on the revolt of the angels is Anatole France, who, in his book *la Révolte des anges* (1914), presents us with an account of a second angelic rebellion against the Ruler of the Heavens. This work contains also a new version of the first war in the skies. A number of the inhabitants of heaven, who were hurled down to earth, form a conspiracy to storm the heavens and set up Satan as ruler. After having organized their forces and equipped them with the most modern instruments of war, the leaders of the revolt seek out Satan by the waters of the Ganges and offer him the leadership. But he who first raised the flag of rebellion in heaven refuses to lead another attack against the celestial citadel. In a dream he has seen himself becoming as harsh, as intolerant and as greedy of adulation as his eternal enemy Jehovah. The successful rebel would only turn a reactionary. He will rather remain the oppressed than become an oppressor.

CHINOISERIE AND VERS LIBRE

BY ARTHUR E. CHRISTY

ONE of the results of our rising contemporary interest in the ethnic cultures of the world is the very obvious debt our poets owe to the Orient. The individual poet may be conscious or not of this indebtedness, but the leaders of the new movement have recognized it, and written of it. It is my purpose to compare the spirit and general poetic theory of modern English prosody with the Oriental, from which it is assumed much has been derived.

No river can be traced to any single source. Its water comes from numerous fields and woods and springs, slowly filtering down to join in a score of streams, which in turn join to make a river. In the history of English poetry, no single origin can be designated as strictly the only source of any movement. Generally, in each literary generation, one may witness a growth of oratorical and discursive writings, followed by a reaction in favor of concision. This is true of most literatures; the pendulum is never still.

The significant thing in our present discussion of the poetic relations of the East and West is that the reactions of English and American poets from the profuseness of the Victorian vogue to the concision of modern imagistic and vers libre movements was developing simultaneously with Occidental interest in the Pacific-Asian religions and literatures. There appears to be an identity of interest between the Oriental and the modern Occidental. Their affinity is marked. To the initiated eye the potency of the Oriental leaven is everywhere evident, in the output of the founders of the vers libre movement, the imagists, and subsequent contemporary poets. Everywhere appear poems after the Chinese manner, adaptations, parodies, translations spurious and accurate, attempts to capture the subtle method, or the fragile thought, or the psychology of the Oriental. This stream of Orientalism in English poetry has

been welcomed by the leaders whenever they have understood its significance and beauty fully. Some poets have had a mere superficial liking for the methods and work of the Oriental, their own work in turn showing the results of this superficiality. Others have sincerely studied the language and philosophy of the people. From such work much may be expected.

II

The first English translator from Chinese poetry, and the first to prophesy of its results, was Sir John Davis, the first governor of Hong Kong. He gave to the English speaking world its initial insight into Chinese poetry when he published *The Poetry of The Chinese* in 1829. In it he wrote this prophecy:

"As our gardens have already been indebted to China for a few choice flowers, who knows but our poetry may some day lie under a similar obligation?"

A half century later, in 1883, before Lafcadio Hearn had made Japan the land of his adoption, he wrote of his interest in Oriental verse and prophesied in the editorial columns of the *New Orleans Times-Democrat*:

"The ideas of the Orient are only now being fully understood and appreciated; they are certainly destined to influence Occidental thought more than superficially. The flowers of Western idealism will be marvellously improved by crossing with Eastern literary growths."

But the words of Harriet Monroe, editor of *Poetry*, and high priestess of the new movement, who wrote when it was well under way, will best show the rise of a consciousness among the poets themselves of the affinity existing between their methods and the Oriental:

"This Oriental influence is to be welcomed because it flows from deep and original streams of poetic art. We should not be afraid to learn from it, and in much of the work of the imagists and other radical groups, we find a more or less conscious, and more or less effective yielding to that influence. We find something of the Oriental directness of vision and simplicity of diction; also now and then a hint of the unobtrusive Oriental perfection of form and delicacy of feeling."

Thus the rise of Orientalism in modern English poetry was foretold and welcomed.

III

There is no better way I know of, to take a just measure of the extent this influence has been effective, than to consider the cardinal principles governing the writing of the new poetry and to draw parallels between these and the Oriental. There one may see where the differences and similarities lie.

Since Amy Lowell has done most of the pleading for imagism and the new school, the six rules she laid down in the preface to one of the first anthologies of the movement, entitled *Some Imagist Poets*, may well be used as a basis of comparison. The principles of imagism, she tells us, "are not new; they have fallen into desuetude. They are the essentials of all great poetry, indeed of all great literature. . . ."

The first principle was—"To use the language of common speech, but to employ always the exact word, never the nearly exact, nor the merely decorative word." Every school boy now knows that the phrase "language of common speech" is an echo of Wordsworth's *Preface to The Lyrical Ballads*, but the remainder of the rule shows well enough, paradoxical as it may seem, why the new school found an affinity in the Chinese and Japanese. In the revolt against the merely decorative word, in the search for the word with its sharp edges undulled by much mouthing and meaningless association, they found in the simplicity of the Chinese image, the root-idea of the character, an answer to their desires.

There is no similarity between the poetic method of the Chinese and the English. The poet of the latter culture has traditionally tried to make of his poem "an orchestra of words." I know of nothing in Chinese or Japanese poetry that can be compared to Tennyson's *Lotos Eaters* or Poe's *Bells*. The Chinese poet strove for his sound effect, but it was based on "tones" of the language and a strict adherence to the rules of stressed and unstressed syllables. These are distinguished in poetry by two tones. They are either flat, that is, pronounced with level or even utterance, or deflected upwards or downwards or cut short. The latter correspond crudely to our accented syllables in Greek and Latin. The Chinese poet constructs the most ordinary stanza with an ear for the utmost symmetry, as, for instance, if A stands for stressed and B for unstressed syllable, it will run as follows:

A A B B A
 B B A A B
 B B B A A
 A A A B B

John Erskine has pointed out that there are even now diverging language movements in English poetry. The cadence of American speech is no longer that of the English, and since it was from the English models that the best American poets fifty years ago learned the cadence of both their speech and verse, it is not surprising that the American ear today detects a strange, almost foreign note in the fall of the lines of such poets as Tennyson, Lowell and Longfellow. Americans speak with more directness, with less subtlety and delay. Our conversation is a series of hammer strokes. We seem hungry for verse the cadence of which will be native to our ears.

One of the reasons why our poets find such a fascination in Oriental verse may be discovered here. The monosyllabic, steady, hammerstroke fall of words captivates their ear—if they know of Chinese and Japanese poetry in the original. Few of them do. And yet, by and large, there is the paradox that the Chinese literary renaissance is turning from that in which our modern English poetic renaissance finds such inspiration. We must look elsewhere for the source of the poetic sympathy between East and West. The language of Chinese classical poetry, in which Western interest has been centered, is not the language of common speech. Commonly designated as the "wen-li," it is the language of the sages and pedantic scholars, a language without inflection, a language of terse, concentrated root-ideas.

The story is told of Browning's introduction to a Chinese ambassador in London. Browning affably enquired of him what style of poetry he most affected and was answered the *enigmatical*. "We felt," he says in telling the tale, "doubly friends after that." Not only the Chinese literary language, but the poetry itself, with its classic allusions, is enigmatical. It does not employ the vernacular of the common man. Furthermore, it constantly uses the conventions of the ancients, and eschews realism and the commonplace. The source of the poetic sympathy between the East and West is not to be found in the first of Miss Lowell's principles.

IV

The second rule was—"To create new rhythms—as the expression of new moods—and not to employ old rhythms, which merely echo old moods. We do not insist upon 'free verse' as the only method of writing poetry. We fight for it as a principle of liberty. We believe that the individuality of a poet may often be better expressed in free verse than in conventional forms. In poetry a new cadence means a new idea."

On this principle I can again see no common ground on which the new spirits of the West may meet with the classical poets of the East. Chinese poetry is iron bound in laws and principles, with never the freedom exercised in the history of English prosody. The art of poetry in China has had a long evolution. It has been raised through the centuries by the genius of its makers to a standard of excellence which can be favorably compared with that of any civilization. But the Chinese have also developed the most rigid and traditional patterns and verse forms. The character of the language has determined some of the structural peculiarities of its verse. In early times four words to a line was the rule, but any number up to eight was allowable. Even one word lines were found. The stanza was usually in the form of a quatrain, although it could consist of any number of lines up to sixteen or seventeen. Every line did not rhyme, although rhyme was considered an essential part of all verse. Blank verse in the Miltonic sense was unknown. It may moreover be noticed that in connection with the structure of Chinese poems, the sense generally runs in couplets, and the moral or finale of the thought is given in the last two lines, much in the same way as in Shakespeare's sonnets the concluding lines sum up the sense of the whole.

The complaint frequently made against Victorian poetry, by our contemporary poetic radicals is that it is vague, that its eloquence springs from pomposity and verbiage, that it has no individuality or personality of its own, because everything, diction and rhythm, all are subservient to a definite pattern. It was to be free from the many rules and formulae which encumbered poetry that Miss Lowell led the fight as "a principle of liberty." These innovators then turned to Chinese and Japanese poetry, thinking that there would be found the embodiment of their ideas. The interest was first centered in the Japanese hokku, later in the uta, and now in

the many forms of Chinese poetry. These forms, they declared were the prototypes of many new ideas among their contemporaries. Yet these forms were bound by the most rigid of century-old formulae and rules. The Chinese and Japanese are turning from them in their own renaissance. Consistency should have kept our Western poets from a whole hearted turning from one iron bound system of prosody to another. Possibly it was but a passing fancy, a fad. Still there was sufficient charm in this poetry of the East to attract our best minds. It of necessity was something more than form, for here the two systems are diametrically opposed.

V

Miss Lowell's third rule was—"To allow absolute freedom in the choice of subject. . . ."

Other than the prejudices and taboos of conventional society, no acts of parliament control the poets' choice of subject. This is true of any literature. However, few writers are able to transcend their own times. Anyone who will read consistently in Chinese poetry cannot but be impressed with the ever present farewell poem written when leaving for a foreign province upon some mission of state, or the ubiquitous drinking song, conventional types that run through the entire history of Chinese literature. These were the most common and were molded by circumstance. But there are other impressive aspects. A love of birds, flowers and clouds, of mists, waters, hills and the moon are ever present characteristics of Chinese poetry and art in every age. Nature—the universe is the Chinese poet's field. And he exercises the widest liberty in indulging his passion for the things of nature. What he produces is not primitive or elemental in feeling, nor is it mere enjoyment of the sensuous. If a comparison may be permitted, he is more Wordsworthian than Keatsian. His poetry is a chastened and subdued product of reflection, for he regards Nature not merely as a physical phenomenon with sensuously enjoyable qualities, but as an animating soul which is in intimate relation with life itself. For him spirit interpenetrates matter. He is a thoroughgoing mystic. He is not satisfied with merely a faithful reproduction or presentation of what he sees and feels, although he does this supremely well. His desire is to render Nature's more subtle and essential aspects, for in them he believes he finds the way towards an appreciation of the laws of our being and the universe as a whole.

The Chinese poet obtained his view of the cosmos from Lao Tzu, the founder of Taoism. With it is possibly an infiltration of the monism which came from India through Buddhism. But Confucius also had a hand in molding the poet. Confucius' insistence on this world and the benefits of practical propriety exerted a tremendous influence on the common people, and the poet did not escape it. In him is traceable the influence of these three religions. He devotes himself to this world, its cosmic laws, its sensuous beauties, and the serious problems of statecraft and social propriety enjoined by Confucius. But he constantly aspired to a larger vision of things. He felt the limitations of a regulated life; he strove to relate his own existence to a more comprehensive whole. Here he resorted to the philosophy of Lao Tzu which conceived of Nature as an infinite process of self creation, one stage of development succeeding another more perfect in its greater proximity to the ultimate reality. To Lao Tzu the way to solve human life was to do nothing, to be carried along by the mighty current of the cosmos. The way, he said, to clear the world of its dirt and muddy aspect was identically the way one cleared a bucket of muddy water. Agitation, an attempt to be rid of the impurities, merely prolonged their evil influence and presence. The thing to do was to do nothing. The sediment would settle to the bottom, the water would clear itself. So with man and his world. With a wise passivity the eternal Way would exert itself.

But the humanizing influence of Confucius who was preoccupied with man himself, and declared that man began where Nature left off, was accepted by many of the poets. This acceptance saved them from the inevitable passivity of a consistent following of Lao Tzu. The merging of these two views of life sometimes produced a poetry of great profundity. Their imaginations synthesized the idyllic view which Taoism tends to exalt, with a human element and an interest in a phenomenal world, as well as cosmic principles. The Chinese poets varied in the degree and intensity with which these views predominated, but the result in many cases was a great and deep poetry. In constant touch with the Over-Soul, and with their feet planted firmly on the ground, they had a universe in which to breathe and write. Many made use of their privileges and opportunities.

There is no wonder that the modern Occidental poets, few of whom have managed to keep in touch with the empyrean and the

world at the same time, yearned for the freedom and air in which the Chinese poets breathed and wrote.

VI

The remaining three precepts laid down by Miss Lowell may be discussed together. They were:

"4. To present an image (hence the name: Imagist). We are not a school of painters, but we believe that poetry should render particulars exactly and not deal in vague generalities, however magnificent and sonorous. . . .

"5. To produce poetry that is hard and clear, never blurred nor indefinite.

"6. Finally, most of us believe that concentration is the very essence of poetry."

It was quite natural that English poetry, which had long been under the influence of periphrastic verbosity, should find much to admire in the brief and concise images of Oriental verse. It was equally natural that the Chinese themselves should react from that which had long been petrified by an over-emphasis upon a contentless formalism. Arthur Waley has pointed out that the bane of Chinese poetry was classic allusion. In general, however, Chinese poetry at its best is in the lyric form. Their poets anticipated Edgar Allan Poe in the thought that there in reality could be no such thing as a *long* poem. When we examine the Chinese lyric at its best, what impresses us is the unusual economy of words with which the most elusive thoughts are expressed. The number of words to a verse varies from three to nine, the most common being five and seven, four such verses often going to make up a complete poem. The form, then is far more restricted than the sonnet. But within the limit of such verses a skillful artist is able to reveal his whole personality, and the intensity and magnitude of the mood which possessed him when he wrote. Every poem he composes is the expression of a whole range of feelings which he has pondered over and recollected in tranquility. What he aims at is not the pure expression of his feelings, because he knows that too much spontaneity in such expression without due regard to their careful adjustment and synthesis is apt to be crude and finally to defeat its own end; for an excessive outpouring of the natural temperament would soon exhaust itself.

The Chinese critics have told him from time immemorial that

the primary interest in poetry is to be found in the feelings and passions. He subjects, however, these feelings and passions to the imaginative reason. When they emerge, they are no longer in their original state of crudity; they have been suffused, transmuted, refined. The product is new and rich in content. His feelings and passions have been delicately fused together and unified. Furthermore, in expressing them, he has taken care not to give a complete account of that with which he deals: he leaves it to the reader to create in his own mind that impression of completeness and totality which he wishes to give. The reader is not a passive recipient: the Chinese poet expects him to be a creative artist himself, willing to be personally as much attached to the poem as the poet.

The poem, the link between the poet and his reader, is thought of as something supple and flexible, consisting of only a few flashes of insight or intuition into the mysteries of life and nature. It is a comprehension of the underlying forces of human nature, of the cosmos, which the poet wishes to attain. All he does is to express a few of the significant phases of the understanding he has attained. From these the reader constructs for himself the complete experience which these phases represent. This is best represented in the poetic form most commonly known as the "stop-short," a four line poem. In it, the poet leads his reader up to the gates of Infinity, as it were; it is for the reader himself to go through those gates.

A great deal of poetic appreciation thus depends on the reader. He must be sensitive to all fine touches; he must be susceptible to the delicate impressions furnished to him; above all, he must be a poet himself, to build for himself from the casual notes presented to him, the beauty and real meaning of the original experience. The Chinese do not consider it the poet's function to give a careful account of his experiences. In order to feel the real intensity and power of that experience, they say, the reader himself must be in direct contact with it, he must be as it were a human Aeolian harp, delicately catching the notes which the poet lets loose, and in turn rendering them again into mellow music and harmony.

This very quality, I think it is, which attracts the Western imagists and vers librists. It has infinite variety and power, and an inexhaustible charm extremely elusive to the understanding. A poetic gem of this sort, dealing with the essence of life, may be interpreted both by the reader and the poet to embody so much

truth and beauty that the more they ponder over it, the more they find it limitless and unfathomable. The poem suggests far more than it says—the very quality for which most moderns desperately strive. It is all the while simple, the substance with which it deals apparently sensuous, and yet there is a profundity and an intimate contact with cosmic, ultimate reality, which it reveals only in parts, allowing the reader himself to comprehend the whole. One will look far before a higher type of lyric poetry is found.

Returning once again to the rules laid down by Miss Lowell, we find that the Chinese poet might almost have consciously followed the injunction to “present an image, not vague generalities, however magnificent or sonorous.” He gives us our image. And it is also “hard and clear, never blurred and indefinite.” Miss Lowell would also have concentration, for it is “the essence of poetry.” The Chinese poet, through the nature of his language, has concentrated with a vengeance.

The elements which have been infused into our poetry from the East are not principally matters of form and meter, although we have experimented with the hokku, uta, and stop-short. The things we have received are chaste simplicity, unaffectedness, directness, and delicacy of feeling. Kipling's declaration that the East and West would never meet is being disproven, for the twain *are* meeting—in poetry. But the East did not send us missionaries, telling of its poetic wealth. The West stumbled upon it and fell in love with it.

IMMORTALITY AS A BIOLOGIST SEES IT

BY R. A. HEFNER

THE mysteries of life and the fears of death have actuated the activities of man since the first fragmentary records of his existence and, without doubt, dominated the behavior of his prehuman ancestors in a manner similar to observable reactions of modern animals. Three activities, (a) self preservation which retains life, (b) food getting which sustains life, and (c) reproduction which perpetuates life, constitute practically the sum-total of animal existence. With the dawn of reason, these primitive instincts were conditioned by studied desires and the fear of death was alleviated by conceptions of immortality.

The older ideas of immortality probably preceded any notion of a soul or spirit and the *body* was supposed to continue its existence in some realm beyond the earthly life. Thus the burial of food, weapons, a horse, and even the servants and wives of the deceased was practiced wholly or in part by many primitive peoples. The idea of the soul or spirit seems to have arisen spontaneously in many creeds. The immortality of the soul was for a time considered with the resurrection of the body, but the rising tide of observation which marked the late Middle Ages, discountenanced the restoration of a body which had decayed and dissociated into its constituent elements, and the conception of an immortal soul and a temporal body gained general recognition in the Renaissance, though not without attendant danger to its early adherents. Descartes and Pascal were of one judicious opinion in the expression that, "The soul is not a part of the body and therefore does not perish with the body, and since it is not conceivably capable of perishing in any other manner, it must be immortal"; a splendid argument to those who grant the premises leading to the conclusion. Rosseau cites the necessity of an after life to give

restitution for the earthly trials of the just and the triumphs of the wicked. The ideas of these three philosophers are quite generally held by Christian adherents today, but the Catholics and many Protestants still drone a meaningless credo in which the resurrection of the body is included.

But whether immortality be that of body or soul, the place of the after life is ever a region where earthly desires and pleasures are continued and amplified; in witness of which, consider the Happy Hunting Ground of the American Indian, the peaceful Nirvana of the lethargic Hindu, the seventy heavenly wives of the sensual son of the desert as promised by Mohammed, and the golden streets and pearly gates of the avaricious Hebrew. It is to be presumed that the money grabbing propensities of the modern Christian have held him faithful to the Jewish vision in spite of the allurements of rival sects?

Historically, the idea of immortality seems to have prevailed nearly all religions. Confucius mentions a heaven but is non-committal regarding immortality. His teachings are, however, more properly a philosophical system than a religion. In five tedious pages of characteristic Hindu harangue, Buddha declines to explain whether or not the world is eternal, whether or not the soul and body are one, and whether or not there is an existence after death; this without any admission of ignorance on his part and the reputation of the Enlightened One remains unscathed. Creation or a creator are likewise ignored by Buddha and his transmigrations of the soul end in Nirvana, an extinction of existence and hence no immortality. Herodotus recounts an elaborate belief in transmigration among the Egyptians during the fifth century B. C. Here the soul was supposed to pass through all types of animals and return to man during a course of 3000 years. The influence of some of the Egyptian beliefs was to be noted among the Greeks whose ideas of Hades for departed souls were vague and ill-defined. The Epicurean school denied all after life and proceeded to live accordingly. Plato, by a queer twist of the philosophy of dualism, makes Socrates to say, "Since for each life there is death, for each death there must be life." Cicero voices a Roman conception of a soul which was imperishable and separate from the body, and the Roman dead were often burned by way of disposal.

The long struggle between science and the firmly entrenched

dogmas of Medieval religion is a familiar story which needs no recounting here. The church has conceded many points formerly contested, but the nature of such concessions might be well summarized in the following extracts from the Catholic Vatican Council of 1870. "The Church has the divine right and duty of proscribing false science, lest any should be ensnared by philosophy and vain fallacy. All Christians are forbidden to defend as legitimate conclusions of science such opinions as are known to be contrary to the teachings of faith, more especially if they have been condemned by the Church. . . . The Church does not forbid that any science should in its own circle use its own principles and methods; but while recognizing this liberty, it is vigilantly on the alert lest sciences, by opposing the divine teaching, should take to themselves errors, or, skirmishing beyond their own spheres, should usurp and disturb the functions of faith."

Thus would be closed to science the only avenues whereby an approach to evidences of an immortality might be made. Religion would ask us to accept immortality through faith in revelation, but revelation has no place in scientific procedure: the lust for first causes would demand an investigation and analysis of the revelator, so the only method of approach is through the forbidding door of psychical investigation. The practices and results of such investigations are at present so connected and infused with chicanery of every sort that sensible or scientific conclusion can hardly be deduced.

It is not the purpose of this paper to go into detail concerning the postulates of probability of an imperishable soul which survives the body. A word from Dr. Leighton, Professor of Philosophy at The Ohio State University, summarizes a rather extensive philosophical view of these contentions. "The possibility of the continued existence of the self after bodily dissolution clearly depends on the nonidentity of the conscious or spiritual individual with the body. . . . The self, as an active synthesizing principle, is an immaterial, rational, or spiritual individual which is so intimately associated with the body as to form with it a complex individual whole. The mental self is partially dependent on the body and *perhaps* partially independent of it. From this standpoint individual immortality is *possible*." This quotation is passed with the remark that the question here raised does not admit of scien-

tific treatment. To the scientific mind there is absolutely no evidence to indicate the material continuity of any part of the living body, nor is it possible for the present informant to conceive of the continuity of any self, personality, spirit, or separate activity without the material attributes which we associate with life. If, then, religion and philosophy can do no better than to create a doubt as to the non-existence of an immortality, where shall we turn for the evidence which man has long sought? May not biology, that science which deals specifically with the many intricate processes of life, be entrusted with the problems which concern its perpetuation?

Although founded upon a vast collection of specific investigations, the ultimate philosophies of biology are of necessity generalized. Therefore, any evidence of immortality from this source must be collectively applicable to various species rather than to groups or individuals. Not for one moment does biology tolerate that colossal egotism which makes of man the life apart, and reaches its culmination in the creation of manlike gods who determine the course of the universe. To paraphrase a familiar line, "Hath not a man eyes, limbs, organs, dimensions, senses, affections, passions? Is he not fed with like food, hurt by like weapons, subject to like diseases, healed by like potions, warmed and cooled by the same summer and winter as are other creatures of the animal kingdom?" Or to modernize the statement, is not man burned by the same acids, suffocated by the same gases, shocked by the same voltages, or buoyed up in water according to the infallible principle of Archimedes? Why then should life, the sum of the chemical and physical reactions of an organism, find in man any expression different from that found elsewhere in the living world?

To our previous objections for considering the individual as a unit for immortality, must be added the biological question as to the nature of the individual. Is a tree an individual? If so, what of its numerous twigs which may each reproduce the whole if thrust into moist soil? The hydra, a tiny animal familiar to all students of elementary biology, may be cut into twelve pieces each of which will become a complete hydra, and even a fragment of a leaf of a Begonia plant will send up several entire plants. Is not the fertile egg or seed the new individual? From a single egg may develop a dozen or more tapeworms, each with its own problem of individuality, since its recurring segments may each have a complete set of

the sex organs which constitute the major portion of a mature section. The egg of the armadillo develops into quadruplets, always of the same sex, and how familiar are the identical twins, likewise from a single egg, in human families. If such twins are individuals, what of Siamese twins or two headed monstrosities not infrequently reported in human and other mammalian births?

Biologically we must consider every living organism the present representative of a continuing stream of life proceeding from a single source or many sources in the veiled, mysterious past and extending in unbroken line to its recent expression. But not without change. The physical basis of every living thing is *protoplasm*, that unstable and complicated material which causes Huxley to remark, "Paradoxically, the most constant feature of living material is its eternal changefulness." There must be in this remarkable, changing protoplasm some exceeding stable element which determines the continuity of a species through periods of time that blur into vague eons. Many *Globigerina*, small, one celled, beautifully shelled animals, found in all seas today, are identical in form of shell to those which formed the chalk cliffs of England, millions of year ago, and Baltic amber (fossil resin) estimated to be six million years of age, contains perfectly preserved specimens of ants so like modern species that only an expert can detect differences. Any part of the protoplasm which determines this relative fixity of species must of necessity proceed from generation to generation and *per se* becomes the agent of immortality.

This continuity of material is best observed in its simplest form as found among one celled organisms or *Protozoa*. Here the common method of reproduction is simple division of *fission*. One cell divides to form two smaller organisms which grow to the size of the original cell, this again divides and so *ad infinitum*, or at least for over nineteen thousand generations as Dr. Woodruff of Yale has demonstrated for a particular Protozoan, *Paramecium*. Here, then, we have an actual immortality since life is continuous through all generations and natural death is unknown. Fortunately, accidental deaths are frequent as Dr. Woodruff estimates that his *Paramecia*, had all been able to live and reproduce by fission during the sixteen years he has observed them, would now exceed the bulk of the earth by several thousand times. But among the many celled animals or *Metazoa*, simple division gives way to the formation of

specialized reproduction or *germ* cells, usually enclosed within the the body of *somatic* cells. In some lowly organisms any cell may apparently become specialized and perform functions of reproduction, but early in the animal series, particular groups of cells assume the reproductory role. Might we not better date the fall of man from that remote period when he sacrificed his actual immortality by becoming a Metazoan, rather than to some comparatively recent indiscretion in his choice of fruits?

The elaboration of a temporal body from the reproductive tissues is the common procedure among multicellular animals. This body may vary from the fragile, watery form of a jellyfish to the enormous, complicated bodies of some vertebrates. But in any instance the body is a temporary structure and the products of the generative organs are unique in their potential immortality. When these products are united in the act of fertilization the resulting fertile egg or seed is a new individual, capable of producing other reproductive cells in an infinite series. The question as to the origin of the body cells might well be raised at this point. Are not such body cells likewise derived from germinal tissue and hence immortal? All cells must of necessity arise from the fertilized egg or seed in organisms employing sexual reproduction. But in the complicated processes of differentiation which lead to specialized organs, such somatic cells lose the power of reproduction and are hence end products of living material. Death is the price of specialization.

But even the germ cells do not yield the ultimate secret of our immortality. Fragments of the microscopic sperm and pollen cells perish in the process of fertilization. The eggs of birds and the seeds of plants are largely food material which will be absorbed by the growing embryo. Only by an examination of the architecture of the germinal tissues can we hope to discover the ultimate units of immortality. Briefly described, the egg or female germ cell consists of the essential parts of a typical cell plus a varying amount of yolk or food material. The essential cell parts of a *cell wall* enclosing the *cytoplasm*, a semifluid substance of varying amount and the recognized seat of many cellular activities. Embedded in this cytoplasm is a *nucleus*, composed of a fluid bearing granules of dark staining *chromatin* enmeshed in fibers. The sperm or male germ cell is many times smaller than the egg, has no yolk material,

and comparatively little cytoplasm, but is equal to the egg in the amount of nuclear substance.

On account of the great difference in the amount of cytoplasm exhibited in the egg and sperm of a given species and for other reasons which we may ignore in this brief sketch, the cytoplasm is rejected as the possible carrier of the heredity units wherein we seek our immortality. The nucleus, by reason of its constant and similar size in sperm and egg and because of its peculiar behavior at critical periods in the life of both germ and body cells, is considered the seat of the perpetual units. If such self-perpetuating units be within the nucleus, it is apparent that they must be capable of reproduction and transfer at each division of the cell into similar or dissimilar components. The behavior of the chromatin of a dividing cell meets this requirement; this chromatin becomes threadlike, then breaks into definite units called *chromosomes*. These split equally and the halves are distributed to the new cells arising as a result of division. But the ultimate unit of immortality is not yet defined. The next step in our search takes us beyond the range of direct observation and into the field of experimentation. Chromosomes are conceived to be made up of numerous smaller units known as *genes*. A gene may be defined as that portion of a cell which is responsible for an hereditary characteristic. Thus, for each character in the makeup of an organism there is in general a corresponding gene in most somatic cells and all the germ cells. The proofs for this contention are involved and will have to be treated briefly. Let us consider a group of characteristics which we usually regard as racial traits. According to the unit character conception of heredity, the straight hair, black hair, sparse beard, slant eyes, and high cheek bones of the oriental races are all due to specific genes in specific chromosomes, found in the fertilized egg from which the individual arises. Likewise the antitheses of these traits, as found in the Nordic peoples, are also due to similar genes in exactly the same regions as those mentioned for the oriental race. Now what will occur in crossing of races? Since every individual is double in his inheritance, having received a complete set of chromosomes from each parent, the hybrid of two races will have contrasting genes for many traits. Of the contrasting traits, some will blend and others will appear in their entirety or be completely masked. The racial

colors black and white blend to form the mulatto; the slant eyes of the oriental appear in the Mongolian-Caucasian hybrid; the blue eyes of the Nordic are masked by the brown eyes of the Mediterranean peoples when these groups blend. In the mating of these hybrids the original racial characteristics appear in a definite ratio. All of these problems lend themselves to ready solution when we study the behavior of the chromosomes of the germ cells preceding and during the initiation of a new individual in the form of the fertilized egg or seed.

Let it be understood that the gene as a unit is indiscernible and therefore a hypothetical structure. Certain knots of material appear definitely on many chromosomes at particular stages. These are termed *chromatophores* but efforts to associate their presence with specific genes have met with dubious success. Three questions relative to the gene hypothesis are especially deserving of our attention.

(1) What is the nature of the gene? To this query the *geneticists* are admittedly in the dark. Certainly the basis is chemical and molecular but any attempt at analysis is lost in the mysteries of protoplasm. Whatever their chemical nature, the constituent molecules must be exceedingly stable to pass unchanged through thousands of cell divisions in each of a succession of individuals reaching through remote geological epochs. On the other hand our second question deals with the instability of the gene.

(2) Since new traits and hence variations are essential to the conceptions of evolution which now dominate the sciences of the animate world, whence these changes if not from new genes? Many variations are known to be due to chromosome deficiencies and thus to accidental loss of genes. Breaks in chromosomes, extra chromosomes in the germ cell, triple sets of chromosomes and other abnormalities have registered their influence on the resulting organism. As to the actual addition of new genes, such must occur, but no conclusive explanation of their source is at present acceptable.

(3) If this hypothetical gene be our ultimate unit of immortality, what adjustments in our philosophical conceptions of life are essential to the acceptance of this view? Individuals become mere incidents in the scheme of life; mere rocks and banks which confine the stream yet without which the stream would not exist. The *summum bonum* of philosophical endeavor becomes not the suppression of desires of the humble Buddhist nor the doing of an ill-

defined good of the pious Christian but the perpetuation of those racial or individual traits worthy of continuity. The abolition of the religious conception of an after life where awards and inflictions are duly applied, is not a question whose merits properly fall within the scope of this discussion. If we accept William James' statement that religion *is* the hope of immortality, the disruption of the above idea would not be without far-reaching consequences.

The cult of the geneticist owns no published or publicly acclaimed creed. Were such to be expressed in the light of present knowledge, it might well follow, "Believing that these traits which I possess by reason of my inheritance are worthy of continued racial expression, I transmit them to my offspring, in the fervent hope of their further perpetuation for the good of mankind." Those who ascribe to this belief may supplement the words of Cornelia and say of their children, "These are my jewels, my life, and my immortality."

TRAGEDY, DEATH, AND DECAY

BY ROBERT SPARKS WALKER

ONE cannot find a treasure until it has been lost. When I was engaged in business and was forced to charge off so many hundred dollars at the close of each year, this question invariably came to me: Is it possible to make money unless some one is losing it? The question cannot be proved by test, because money will always be lost. We shall have to get rid of the bankrupt courts and change the nature of fire and floods, and even the very natures of many human beings before we can give it a fair trial.

With tragedies happening daily, many of which might be avoided, we can always depend on them calling for their quota of human lives. Often in our forgetfulness, we unconsciously become so selfish that it requires the most serious tragedy to arouse us to a sense of duty to our fellowmen. Sometimes I feel that we are permanently stupid, and that there are few, if any good movements launched and brought to a success but what have had their births in tragedy. Tragedy! the thoughts of it is the one single thing that will cause people to rise up and act with reasonable speed to do an unselfish act to protect the life and the virtue of another.

A few weeks ago, I went over a great battleground which covers many acres of land. During the three days fighting there, thousands of men lost their lives. For many years visitors have been coming from far and near to visit the place. As I stood on that great battle-field and watched strangers silently viewing the once bloody spots, this question arose spontaneously: After all, what is the one thing that brings people here?

There were thousands of men engaged on both sides in that conflict, and for three days each side struggled hard to conquer the other. If during that time there had not been a single life lost, although the Nation had won a most decisive victory, I dare say

that to-day the spot would not contain a single marker or monument, and the old battlefield would scarcely attract passing notice. But when in any great conflict men give their lives heroically, then and there that place becomes sacred ground for the generations of people that follow.

Life in itself is dependent on tragedy. For example, our physical bodies are entirely dependent on the simple green leaf. The green leaf is the one thing that may truthfully be said to stand firmly between man and eternity. The green leaf is the only thing under heaven that can take out of the earth that which is not food and convert it into a product that will sustain life. But as repulsive as the thoughts may be to some people, before a green leaf thrives, it must be connected directly with the relics and remains of the tragedies of the ages! If the naked eye is growing dim, then it becomes necessary to employ the microscope to see what this earthly fertile bed of soil contains, which is so constantly being reworked for the preservation of all animal life. Each particle adds its unimpeachable testimony to the facts in the case, and its history connects it somewhere with a tragedy the date of which may have been lost in the mists of the past. Do you agree with me when we examine together just a handful of what we regard as the precious leaf mold?

I found it in the shady wood,
Where oaks and maples long have stood,
And there the sable mass all lay
With not a hint of stone or clay;
The tender rootlets modest stole
Throughout the mold and took their toll;
And here and there I sometimes found
Small holes where beetles left the ground.

What can this fertile leaf mold be?
A fragrant bit of history,
That's printed plain in letters bold,
With illustrations pure as gold;
It once had life and beauty too,
It once had breath, and then could do
In wisdom's way with Nature's wit,
The work that God assigned to it.

Into a handful let us look:
 Here are some leaves from last year's book
 That felt the breeze on maple trees,
 And here's a twig killed by a freeze;
 A thousand insects' lives have run,
 And here's a sparrow's skeleton,
 In this black mass that quiet lay
 A-yielding fast to death's decay.

No leaf mold rich on earth can be
 Unless stern death runs wild and free;
 Impossible is life on earth
 Without cold death to give it birth;
 Out of it all there shall arise
 More creatures stronger that comprise
 The good of all returned to dust
 Where Nature long has held her trust.

And as I hold this rich leaf mold
 Before my eyes, a phantom bold
 Of mold composed of thoughts and deeds
 Comes marching up and ne'er recedes;
 This ghost of mine,—deeds of the past,—
 In memory decaying fast,
 Is fertile food for purer thought,
 And noble deeds unselfish wrought.

In giving lectures on Nature subjects, I have often referred to an old tree as a creation that furnishes the best example of what an unselfish life should be. Yet when a tree is thrown under the spotlight of reason, then its altruism takes flight and disappears as stealthily as a shadow. It is true that the old tree gives its foliage back to the soil for the nourishment of new crops, and for making beds that animals may be kept warm and comfortable. It is true that it feeds and sustains animal life, and that its wood supplies fuel that keeps families from being snuffed out by blizzards. It is true that the body of the tree is sacrificed in the construction of homes, of vehicles, of ships and other useful devices. In a way the tree furnishes a good example how that a human being may spend his life unselfishly, but it is altruistic because the Creator has willed it so.

However, a tree sometimes really becomes altruistic. Altruism

is merely the performance of some act, the purpose of which is for the sole benefit of some other creature beside the actor. The performance of this act must draw on the energies and the resources of the doer, causing the creature to make a sacrifice from which it must not hope nor expect to receive any material reward.

The most of the vegetable citizens perform such acts, but it is tragedy that compels them to do it. For example, the one prominent altruistic act performed by the white oak tree is that of feeding and housing a small insect. This little wasp-like creature makes the well known Woolsovver gall that is so often seen in summer on the white oak tree. It is a beautiful creation, indeed. In the hatching and the development of these galls on the twigs of the white oak, the tree is compelled to do something exclusively for the welfare of another creature. This is just what the white oak does, and to me the tragedy of a gall on any tree or plant is not short of being a miracle. The physical creation known as the Woolsovver gall possesses an individual beauty that is not excelled by many flowers. The same thing is true of some of the other galls.

On the other hand, I regard as the greatest miracle in the human family is the sudden awakening of a man or woman, who forgets self, and turns his or her attention and resources, unselfishly to the welfare of the remainder of humanity. But it must be repeated, that it sometimes requires the hand of tragedy to arouse men from their deep selfish slumber.

Tragedy in the material world has a brother in the spiritual world. Tragedy in the former is a necessity to the latter, no matter how much we dread to face it. It has been so arranged that we cannot see beyond the bounds of the sepulcher, that the human soul may attain its fullest and finest development. In the meanwhile, the person into whose life tragedy enters, there is an afterglow of beauty that is wholly impossible without its experience.

Tragedy lurks about us, and in our efforts to prevent it, and in our attempts to heal the wounds and assuage the grief of those who have fallen within its wake, there is born within us what is known as pity, mercy, sympathy, humility, service, and unselfishness. Out of all these there is born that most precious of all treasures,—immortality!

And Death Came.

II

"Which one dear? Which one?" I doubled the question as I looked wonderingly into my young companion's blue eyes less than a year after we had been passing on life's trail together. I say "trail" because we did not often walk over smooth roads and paved highways, for ours were the meadows and the woods, among brambles where the birds and wild flowers stay.

We realized that unless by some fatal accident, that one of us would likely be compelled to go alone. The dread of separation was equally shared between us, for neither of us was really happy when not in the other's company.

She was well and strong, and so was I, but still we knew that according to the laws of Nature, that one of us would likely sooner or later be forced to look on the other through sorrowful eyes. And, we agreed that when that fateful moment came that we would meet it bravely, still we hoped that the dark hour might be delayed until both of us had reached the foot of the hill where all paths end naturally.

It was easy for us to help each other plan for the changed life that was certain to follow. At intervals for twenty years we discussed the question, and while we were sane enough to admit that such a thing was possible, yet it did seem that it would not strike us, for were we both not strong, happy, and young? Twenty years of unbroken affections between two persons and, life without the other becomes an unthinkable suggestion. But we were willing to go and, if perchance it was she, I was to hold her hand and kiss her as she passed out of my life to join our first born and wait with him until I caught up as they journeyed together on the trail in the Great Beyond.

Well, twenty years of uninterrupted happiness and our honeymoon was not well begun, but this morning the life cord suddenly snapped and how strange I felt when I sat on the bed by her side fondling for the last time a warm hand I had been holding so long, from which I was conscious that life was rapidly passing! Each time I caressed that soft hand in mine a wedding ring left its deep impression in the palm of my hand, which from sorrow seemed itself frantic. She could not speak, and probably was not conscious that I was living up to my agreement. Just two weeks previous, we little dreamed that this ordeal was on the way.

How often she asked me a few days before if I thought that we had taken our last tramp in the fields and woodlands together? To be among the wild flowers and hear the voice of the birds was one of her greatest delights. The answer clogged my throat.

This morning Death came and answered that question for me. Before my own eyes he took from me my rarest and dearest treasure. "Which one, dear?" That old, old question has been answered for us. It came, and our early strange question's answer places on me that most sorrowful task which we hoped would not come early in life.

All that she ever said that was so sensible to make me brave in this hour comes up before me, but how differently it sounds this morning! How difficult it is for me to think, feel, and do as we have planned in the event of a separation like this! All is silent. Now I must fall on faith and faith alone to bridge my feet across the strange chasm that will lead me safely across the abyss to where she has been transplanted. It is a dream pure and simple, and I find myself constantly trying to convince myself of this fact.

III

You have watched the form of a dear one as she departs until a turn in the road, to the right or to the left, when the strange curve swallows her form. When I saw that she was leaving me forever, as well as I loved the beauty spots of the earth and all the good things that life holds, I was desperately desirous of joining her on the adventure. How I did long to clasp her hand in mine and go romping along the winding path that leads into eternity as we had been doing on our tramps into the fragrant woodlands on earth! She did not dread to go alone except for leaving me and her boy behind. Not to have both by her side was the only unnaturalness of the journey.

She was gone. Gone forever. I was left standing on a desert island with eyes firmly fixed on space where I had seen her last. I tried to go to the same haunts where we had so often gone together. Out in the yard I see the Spiderwort that she and I dug with our own hands on a gravelly hillside two years before and transplanted. To me, this morning, this wild flower has a soul, for there surely is something about it that makes it immortal today. And, close by grows the clump of Robin's Plantain which she brought in from the woods, and somehow I can see images of her

face copied in this wild flower which also seems strangely immortalized!

Today the blue jay flew to the persimmon tree that grows in the front yard, and in my mind, how greatly he has grown in importance, for she always admired him and his beautiful dress. Despite the accusations brought against him, she was never able to see anything except the good, the pure, and the beauty in his life as she did her neighbors. To me the blue jay is dearer than he has ever been before.

The wren, the catbird, the mockingbird, the bluebird, the vesper sparrow, the robin, the cardinal, and the wood thrush can not come to me this morning without being exceedingly magnified in my estimation. How ardently she loved them, and now I find myself adoring even the mention of their names! The earth, where I know she has often stood, and where her hands have worked the soil for the flower beds, is holy ground. I go through the yard seeking the places where I know her feet have often pressed. How I do like to look at the spots where she liked to be, and I find myself being magically drawn into the nooks that were so dear to her.

This morning, I hate more than I ever did all forms of vice, all the ugly, all that is untrue, all forms of hypocrisy, I suppose for her sake. Whatever she disliked, I care not to think about, but whatever she loved is strangely associated with love eternal.

The first few hours each morning, I
 Am normal, but soon as the day
 Wears wearily along, and I
 Can hear her soft footsteps as they
 Come gently tripping to my room
 Up stairs, but never enter in,
 The memory of her becomes
 So burdensome that I am plunged
 Into a mental stupor; yet
 I like to live amidst old haunts
 Of hers, for there's a sweetness in
 The comatose atmosphere: but
 What I cannot endure, is to
 Go to the woods, or church alone,
 For there I am so strangely conscious
 That pains from my old wounds become
 Unbearable, because the anaesthetic
 Has not the strength to put me to sleep.

THE AESTHETIC WRITINGS OF SCHILLER

BY BIRGER R. HEADSTROM

WHEN Schiller turned to Kant, he hoped to find in the Kantian philosophy an escape from the conflict between the principles of art and his creative impulses, to which his early philosophic studies had given rise, and to regain, as well, his inner life and artistic spontaneity which they had destroyed. Exactly how he felt about the matter can be seen from a letter to Körner, in which he says: "I am full of eagerness for some poetic task and particularly my pen is itching to be at 'Wallenstein.' Really it is only in art itself that I feel my strength. In theorizing I have to plague myself all the while about principles. There I am only a dilettante. But it is precisely for the sake of artistic creation that I wish to philosophize. Criticism must repair the damage it has done me. And it has done me great damage indeed; for I miss in myself these many years that boldness, that living fire, that was mine before I knew a rule. Now I see myself in the act of creating and fashioning; I observe the play of inspiration, and my imagination works less freely, since it is conscious of being watched. But if I once reach the point where artistic procedure becomes natural, like education for the well-nurtured man, then my fancy will get back its old freedom, and know no bounds but those of its own making." In short, what he sought, and did find, was a poetical *modus vivendi* between natural impulse and artistic rule.

It was at the academy at Stuttgart that Schiller obtained, from the "Institutes" of Ferguson, his first ideas on aesthetic philosophy. For Ferguson, in whom there was no distinction between the moral and aesthetic domain, all truth is beauty, "the most natural beauty in the world being honesty and moral truth." Also, for him, perfection was made to depend on harmony and proportion; moral beauty upon the harmony of the individual soul with the general scheme

of things; while wrong action was equally looked upon as imperfection. And virtue, inclining toward the general harmony, meant, necessarily, happiness. Such were the thoughts that defined Schiller's early philosophic writings, as the letters of Julius and Raphael, and the second book of *The Ghostseer*. But towards the end of his first year at Weimar, a new field of exploration was opened to him. For the author of *The Gods of Greece* and *The Artists* as one of the essential factors in human perfectibility, had assumed such vast proportions of importance that he felt it of the gravest concern to understand it, this feeling, in fact, largely influencing him to utilize the Danish pension to a thorough study of the Kantian aesthetics.

A course of lectures on the theory of tragedy was the initial result of this interest in art, and though they were never published their general import is contained in the two essays, "On the Rational Basis of Pleasure in Tragic Themes," and "On the Tragic Art." In the former, Schiller began by first contending that art has no higher aim than the giving of pleasure, saying that its aim is not morality but "free pleasure," by "free" meaning subject to no law but its own, and that if morality becomes its final aim it ceases to be "free." He then passed on to a discussion of the problem of our experiencing pleasure in painful representations. To him, all pleasure descends from the perception of *Zweckmässigkeit* (the quality of adaptability to the furtherance of an end); and as man meant to be happy, human suffering must be a "maladaptation" which affects pain. Since, however, we are incited to activity by this pain, reason recognizes in it a higher "adaptation" and therefore knowing it is good for us we take pleasure in our own pain. From which he arrived at the conclusion that the effect of tragedy is dependent upon the proportion in which this higher sense of adaptation is present.

The gist of this argument is that aesthetic judgments are considered to be dependent upon concepts of the mind, the reason, with its various abstractions, being viewed as the prior and dominating factor. In the other of the two essays we find, nevertheless, that emotional excitement may give pleasure in and of itself; and though numerous illustrations are given which indicate that Schiller did not neglect the non-rational element in the pleasure afforded by

tragedy, yet he attached little importance to it for he claimed that we are acquainted with only two sources of pleasure, the satisfaction of the inclination for happiness and the fulfillment of moral laws. After struggling with such hazy abstractions, he finally attempted a practical discussion of tragedy gradually coming to regard its sole aim as being the excitation of "sympathy."

By the year 1793, Schiller had become familiar with aesthetic speculations and moreover had found what he considered as a weak point in the system of Kant, that if it were futile to try to establish an objective criterion of beauty all aesthetic judgments must necessarily be reduced to a matter of taste,—a most undesirable conclusion. To Kant, the aesthetic faculty came under the jurisdiction of the "judgment," a judgment, according to him, being teleologic if implying a pre-existing notion to which the objective is expected to conform, aesthetic if the object gives rise directly to pleasure or pain; in other words, though we have an interest in the good and the agreeable, the beautiful is that which pleases us without appealing to any interest. However, this is merely its character under the category of quality, for under that of quantity it is universal pleasure, while under that of relation it is a form of adaptation. And, finally, under modality it is "necessary" because of the *sensus communis* of mankind, that is, it is determined rather by their agreement in taste than by any objective criterion.

Aesthetics, then, for Kant was a subjective matter. To him, it was not so much as what made objects beautiful, but rather as to how we "judge" them to be beautiful; in short, the essence of beauty was to please without reference to any intellectual concept such as objective attributes of form, proportion, harmony, etc. The fault with this is that a judgment which has no connection with the intellect is not a judgment but a feeling, but despite this he had, at least, the merit of distinctly showing the necessity of distinguishing more clearly between the beautiful and the good and agreeable. Furthermore, though insisting that beauty could not depend upon a mental concept, he recognized "adaptation," notwithstanding its being a concept of the mind, as a form of beauty, meeting this inconsistency, however, by making a distinction between free beauty (*pulchritudo vaga*) and adherent beauty (*pulchritudo adhaerens*). And, lastly, though he held that the highest use of beauty is to

symbolize moral truth, he claimed, at the same time, that pure beauty was impossible in a moral action since it does not please in and of itself.

With such a philosophy, Schiller could not be satisfied. In a letter to the Prince of Augustenburg, dated the 9th of February, 1793, he clearly expressed his attitude by saying in part: "When I consider how closely our feeling for the beautiful and the great is connected with the noblest part of our being, it is impossible for me to regard this feeling as a mere subjective play of the emotional faculty, capable of none but empirical rules. It seems to me that beauty too, as well as truth and right, must rest upon eternal foundations, and that the original laws of the reason must also be the laws of taste. It is true that the circumstance of our feeling beauty and not cognizing it seems to cut off all hope of our finding a universal law for it, because every judgment emanating from this source is a judgment of experience. As a rule people accept an explanation of beauty only because it harmonizes in particular cases with the verdict of feeling, whereas, if there were really such a thing as the cognition of beauty from principles, we should trust the verdict of feeling because it coincides with our explanation of the beautiful. Instead of testing and correcting our feelings by means of principles, we test aesthetic principles by our feelings."

In a series of letters to Körner, Schiller now set about to solve the problem which Kant had regarded as impossible of solution. Although he agreed with the latter's view that beauty cannot depend upon a mental concept,—the feeling of pleasure is the prior fact, he could not, at the same time, shake off the conviction that beauty must in some way fall under the laws of reason. He escaped from this difficulty, however, by removing the aesthetic faculty from the jurisdiction of Kant's "judgment" and giving it to the "practical reason," his argument being that the practical reason must have freedom just as well as the "pure reason" rationality, for freedom is the form instinctively applied by the practical reason upon the presentation of an object, and is satisfied when, and only when, the object is free and autonomous. Furthermore, practical reason, upon the presentation of an object, can discard all concepts of the pure reason and if then the object appears free, autonomous, it is satisfied, the effect thus produced is pleasurable and we call it beauty.

However, as Schiller pointed out, it is all a question of appearance for the object is not free as freedom is only possible in the supersensual world, yet the practical reason imputes this freedom to it. Hence he arrived to his solution that beauty is freedom in the appearance (*Freiheit in der Erscheinung*).

This doctrine Schiller applied, in a letter of February 23, 1793, to an exposition of the relation between nature and art. According to the theory, the problem of an artist is to convey, in the representation of the object, the suggestion of freedom, which he can only do by making it appear to follow its own law; and which it must have and obey while seemingly free, this law (the basis of our impression of freedom) being that revealed by technique. Following Kant's saying that nature is beautiful when it looks like art, and art beautiful when it looks like nature, Schiller employed a large number of illustrations in support of his theory, finally concluding by saying: "Therefore the empire of taste is the empire of freedom: the beautiful world of sense being the happiest symbol of what the moral world should be, and every beautiful object about me being a happy citizen who calls out: Be free like me."

Schiller was aware though that this criterion of beauty was after all an idea of the reason, a difficulty which he promised to meet, but unfortunately his aesthetic correspondence with Körner was not continued. In May and June of the same year, that is, 1793, he was led to test his theory of beauty in the human form, in an essay on Winsomeness and Dignity, by Kant's dictum that there is no pure beauty to the human form because the human form expresses the moral dignity of human nature which is but an idea of the reason. As an illustration of his point, he made use of the girdle of Venus, saying that though Venus was pure beauty on coming from the hand of nature, her girdle made her "winsome;" winsomeness being then something distinct from beauty, something transferable, movable: defined as beauty of motion, as the element of beauty which is not possessed by nature but which is produced by the object. Schiller then went on to make a distinction between architectonic and technical beauty, the former being a beautiful presentation of the aims of nature, while the latter refers only to the aims themselves. And it is the former with which the aesthetic faculty is concerned, for in the contemplation of an object it is alone affected by its appear-

ance which it isolates irrespective of purpose or adaptation, though at the same time freedom is imputed to it by the reason. In a word, when the object is a human form this imputed freedom, by which it appears to assert its own autonomous personality, and which is furthermore added to the beauty which nature creates by the law-governed adaptation of means to an end, is winsomeness.

Fully satisfied that beauty consists of the two elements, sensuous pleasure, and rational gratification, caused by personality, and the adaptation to an end, Schiller next considered the questions of moral beauty and ideal of character. Of Kant's insistence upon the categorical imperative of duty, he disapproved, for a man, he claimed, above all else must be free, the slavery of duty being to him no better than any other kind of slavery. Inclination to duty is, however, virtue, the ideal being found in a perfect state of balance between the sensuous nature and the rational. And as winsomeness is the expression of a beautiful soul, so he defined "dignity" as the expression of a lofty mind,—the expression of that intellectual freedom which controls the impulses by moral strength, and manifested in suffering ($\pi\acute{\alpha}\delta\omicron\varsigma$) as winsomeness in behavior ($\gamma\delta\omicron\varsigma$).

Following this essay, Schiller next published *On the Sublime*, in which was included a special chapter "On the Pathetic" and "Scattered Reflections on Various Aesthetic Subjects." Two other papers "On the Artistic Use of the Vulgar and the Low," and a second disquisition "On the Sublime," though written during the same period were not, however, published until 1801. Like Kant, he defined the sublime as the impression produced by an object which excites in man's sensuous nature a feeling of weakness and dependence, and at the same time in his rational nature a feeling of freedom and superiority. He objected though to the former's terminology, and proposed instead, for Kant's terms of the mathematical and dynamic which he had given to the two kinds of sublime, the names of the theoretical and the practical, by the former meaning that which tends to overawe the mind, by the latter that which tends to overawe the feeling. But the most important phase of the practical sublime is the subject of tragic pathos, and here Schiller took the view that the final aim of art is the representation of the supersensuous, declaring that the essence of tragic pathos is

the representation of moral superiority under the strain of suffering. The spectacle of suffering is in itself no end, for the sensuous has inherently no aesthetic value; it is the moral resistance alone that is of any account, the suffering being needed only to prove the necessity of resistance. In short, the hero's sufferings must appear real in order that he may receive proper credit for his moral triumph.

In his discussions on the sublime and the pathetic, Schiller felt at many times that he was on the point of being carried away into the region of barren speculation, and to offset this tendency he thought it necessary to present his ideas in a popular form as well as to show their relation to the practical concerns of human life. It was this thought that finally led him to undertake a series of letters to the Prince of Augustenburg, declaring, in a letter of July 13, 1793, that the political dream of the century, of recreating society upon a foundation of pure reason, had dissolved into thin air for "man" had failed to show himself fit for freedom. Though his chains might be removed, he was still a slave,—a slave to unruly passion, despite what the century had done for the enlightenment of his mind; and what was needed was evidently rather a discipline of the feelings. In 1795, Schiller published, in the *Horen*, his "Letters on Aesthetic Education" of which his letters to the Prince had formed the basis, and which serve as the most agreeable expression of his aesthetic philosophy. The first ten were devoted to a discussion of the spirit of the age and to demonstrate the necessity of some form of educational process by which mankind could be prepared for the higher state of freeman, the problem being, in a word, the transformation of the state-ruled-by-force into a state-ruled-by-reason. To attain this end it was necessary that man should first learn how to overcome the despotism of sense, which leads to savagery, and the supineness of mind, which leads to barbarism, the savage, Schiller defining, as a man whose feelings control his principles, and a barbarian as a man whose principles destroy his feelings. The man *comme il faut* must not only establish but preserve a state of balance between his sensuous and rational natures. But how was this to be done? For neither the state nor philosophy could help him as the former treated him as if he had no reason, the latter as if he had no feelings. For the poet, his salvation lay, then, only in the aesthetic sense, the love of beauty.

To show how the aesthetic sense could accomplish this Schiller had recourse of two ultimate instincts or bents of mankind which he called the "thing-bent" (*Sachtrieb*) and the "form-bent" (*Formtrieb*), the problem of culture being to bring them into harmony. As a means to this latter end, he then made use of the "play-bent" or "Spieltrieb," his idea being that in the moment of aesthetic contemplation both the sensuous and rational instincts find their reckoning; that is, the act of escaping from the pull of thought and feeling to a mental state which satisfies both without yielding to either was analogous to the act of playing, the word meaning, as he employed it, a surrender to the illusion of art. Play being thus symbolic of the highest self-realization, man becomes completely man only in playing.

Schiller then went on to say that the natural corrective to the emotional excess which leads to savagery is what he called like Kant *schmelzende Schönheit* (melting beauty); while the antidote to the mental inertness which leads to barbarism is *energische Schönheit* (energizing beauty, that is, the sublime), the aesthetic state being recognized as being neutral as far as it concerns the influencing of the will. But it is because of this that it is valuable morally, for when a man is under the exclusive domination of either principles or feelings he is in danger of becoming a slave, and must be redrawn to the neutral zone of freedom. "In a word," said Schiller, "there is no other way of making the sensuous man rational except by first making him aesthetic." The pith of all this is that sanity and refinement being exigencies good art serves to realize them and in so doing indirectly furthers progress in right living and right thinking, a seemingly small result to have been obtained by so much laborious logic-chopping, yet after all the value of the "Letters" is not to be found in the logic-chopping nor in "the dreadful array of first principles, the forest huge of terminology and definitions where the panting intellect of weaker men wanders as in pathless thickets and at length sinks powerless to the earth, oppressed with fatigue and suffocated with scholastic miasma,"¹ but rather in their wealth of suggestive comment.

In conclusion, we have only to mention his later minor papers as "On the Necessary Limits of the Beautiful," in which he took

¹ Carlyle's Life of Schiller.

the view that the philosopher, aiming at truth, should not try to write beautifully, for being concerned rather with fact and logic the lure of beauty may endanger truth by relaxing the mind, just as it may relax the will and endanger morality, this latter thought being carried still further in his essays "On the Dangers of Aesthetic Culture" and "On the Moral Benefit of Aesthetic Culture" which are, however, merely an extension of ideas contained in the "Letters."

THE GROWTH OF THE MESSIANIC IDEA

BY DR. H. OSCHEROWITZ

I. THE PROBLEM AND METHOD.

IN any discussion of the Messianic idea the first problem is one of delimitation. To what phenomena in history may the term Messianic be significantly applied? The proper distinction between the messianic idea as an answer to the hopes of the future and other ideas found in the eschatological literature must be made. To do this the messianic idea, regardless of how closely it may be directly or indirectly related to other phenomena, must be made to stand out in significant contrast. It is true that any concept has a technical content, which may in another period be replaced or modified. It is furthermore true that a technical concept is surrounded by a fringe of ideas which are not *directly* related to it. So, for example, many ideas are called "socialistic" which have nothing to do with socialism in any narrow sense of the term. Similarly there has been the growth of the messianic idea in both the narrower and the wider sense. To determine then what is messianic, and what is not, depends largely on how we select our material. We may first try to get a technical core of the concept and follow that through its history to the exclusion of other material. We may, secondly, suggest similarly with other allied phenomena thus broadening the scope of the concept. Thirdly, we may include phenomena which suggested by the "original" or narrower concept.

The Discussion of the Method.

The method employed by Gressman, Gunkel, Jeremias and Oesterly, showing the similarity between the messianic idea of the Jews, the idea of a "Heilbringer" is valuable for a comparative study of religion, but its weakness lies in the fact that it apparently

gives more significance to a *general* concept than to a particular phenomenon which has its own distinctive characteristics. What shall be done in the following pages is to show, if possible, the growth and crystallization of the concept in its narrower aspect, its use and its decay, omitting all the outer fringe of ideas which ought to be classified as eschatological, not as messianic, and all attenuated similarities, as suggested by Oesterly, who identifies the messianic idea of "Heilbringer." He makes messiahs of Marduk and Osiris. He discusses Indra in India, but fails to discuss Rama and Krishna. He relates the "helper-gods" of the Zuni and Algonquin Indians to the Hebrew messiah. Those figures discussed are, however, characterized more by their differences than by their similarities. In nearly all these cases the only common element in them is that they "help" men and when we recall that that element is really the criterion of a god the whole attempt loses force, and falls off into the meaningless void of a single general concept. The term messiah is in this method applied to all religious figures who are obviously and outstandingly beneficent. The Jewish Messiah was not Messiah because he was outstandingly beneficent. He was beneficent because he was Messiah. But what was he as Messiah?

The word Messiah means the "anointed one." It is derived from the word *mashah* which means "to smear." It was used both in a religious and non-religious sense. In Jeremiah xxii. 14, it is used in painting a house vermilion. In other places it means to smear or wipe for the purposes of consecration (Gen. xxxi. 13; and especially Exod. xvix. 36, xxx. 26-29 and Dan. ix. 24). In the sense in which it later became classical or technical it applies to the "smearing" of persons to consecrate them. As such the term is used of kings or future kings, prophets and priests. We read that Samuel anointed Saul (I Sam. xii. 3) and David (I Sam. xvi. 13) and we also read that Cyrus was anointed (Isaiah xiv. 1). Having been anointed the fact is made into a title and the personal is Messiah, i. e. "the anointed." Similarly Elijah is anointed by Elisha (I Kings xxvi. 16). Isaiah feels himself to be "anointed" by the Lord (Isaiah lxi. 1). The priesthood is also anointed (Lev. iv. 5; vii. 36; Exod. xi. 13, 15; Numbers iii. 3). Whether anointing had a long religious history among the Hebrews is an open question. Robertson Smith thinks it was an intermediate stage between the eating of the whole

animal and "the later fire rituals."¹ According to Gressman the religion of the Hebrews, in the early Caananite period, was soaked with Phoenecian and Caananite culture, so that all elements of the "holy" or "sacred" are lacking in the Genesis account.² Yahveh appears to men, Abraham and Lot, wrestles with Jacob and no calamities befall them as they did to the carrier of the ark. The problem remains:—Were these stories written *late* under Caananite influence or was the early period in Canaan one either of Caananite rationalism and superculture or practical simplicity? The answer to the question is irrelevant to a degree. We know at any rate that those anointed and consecrated in this early pre-Davidic period were Messiahs. They were special servants of the Lord, of Jehovah. As such the concept of Messiah was vague and nebulous. Moreover, the idea of a personal Messiah who had more than purely local scope was unknown. The Messianic idea was not yet tied up to eschatology.

There exists the problem:—Was the Messianic idea any more than suggested by such passages which refer to the anointing of Saul and David? Was there any real pre-Davidic eschatology? Gressman argues that there was. He insists that the idea of the Messiah was earlier than the prophets. He argues from the prophecy in Isaiah vii. 14, and believes that without the idea of a divine saviour child the prophecy is not understandable and that this idea permeated the ancient world long before David and was known also in Palestine and among the Hebrews generally. To this whole theory held by Gunkel, Gressman and Jeremias it may be said that while such passages as Isaiah vii. 14f may not be clear they do not *demand* the assumption made by these writers. There is no proof of direct borrowing and lastly, it is just as difficult to apply the theory of the strange or mysterious saviour child as it is to get along with a simply naturalistic interpretation. Later prophecy does not give any hint in the way of an elaboration or a name so that any direct foreign origin can be traced. In direct contrast it may be said that the whole tone of the historical accounts and the early prophetic writings suggest the absence of such a mythological concept. Whether Isaiah vii. 14 is "understandable" or not the first *evidence*

¹ Robertson Smith, *Religion of the Semites*, 1894, p. 282f.

² Gressman, *Ursprung der Israelitisch Judischen Eschatologie*, p. 129.

of a personal Messiah subsequent to the early idea of a consecrated person is linked up with the name of David.

After the kingdom, which had been solidly welded together by David, who had been "anointed by Judah" (II Sam. ii. 7) and held together by Solomon, was divided after the death of Solomon, the prosperity which the whole land had enjoyed declined and lean years followed. To those who came later, the decline in brilliance and the increase of corruption made the Davidic period stand out by contrast. The interest in the Davidic dynasty was kept alive. Just what the strength of this movement was it is difficult to say. In Amos the backward view is already present (if the last verses of Amos are authentic or from the time of Amos). There is, however, nothing "mythological" or mysterious about Amos (Amos ix. 11). He prophesies that Jahveh will restore the "tabernacle of David" and for purely materialistic reasons, that Edom may be subjugated and the war wasted cities rebuilt. There is no trace of a necessity for a personal Messiah. In Hosea there is the first direct reference to a Davidic successor (Hosea iii. 5) who in the latter days will be sought when the people turn once more to Jehovah. The reference seems, however, to be rather casual, not laden with the sound of formal eschatology.

From the time of Amos to Isaiah two facts became indelibly fixed in the minds of the Jahvehistic prophets, the corrupt conditions of social structure which needed "saving" from complete collapse and the need for a reign by a strong king who would be a popular hero, such as was typified by David, whose memory was still alive and being kept so by the Jahvists. There is nothing to indicate that the Messianic idea had become greatly crystallized from the time of Hosea to Isaiah but the chief elements were already present. The Messiah was to be a saviour, a king and a descendant of Jesse.

In Isaiah the Messianic idea reaches its classical form. It is true that Isaiah was still living in the narrowly bounded world, that his imagination did not picture the glory of Yahveh, the universality of his power and did not anticipate the time when the nearness of Jahveh would turn into a remoteness as the extent of the world dawned upon his worshippers. Nevertheless, the situation gave to Isaiah the essential elements of the idea of the personal

Messiah. The changes henceforth were in the manner in which the Messiah was to function and his endowments.

Whether the three passages referring to a personal Messiah in Isaiah indicate the development of his mind, scholarship has not revealed, for the dates of the three passages are uncertain. In Isaiah vii. 14, there is the bare mention of a child to be born of a young woman and to be called Immanuel. In Isaiah ix. 6, we find either an elaboration or a new idea. The child is called "Wonderful, Counsellor, Everlasting-Father, Mighty God, Prince of Peace." The title "Mighty God" is unique for the Old Testament, and "Everlasting Father" is unusual for the period. Unlike vii. 14, there is definite mention that the child shall occupy the throne of David though the passage does not say precisely that he falls in the Davidic descent. Isaiah seems to have had the idea of a human-divine figure in mind and here the suggestion that there was borrowing, perhaps unconsciously, may be justified. It is to be noted, however, that the passage in itself quite striking, is not directly referred to in the Old Testament, nor in the Apocalypses or in the New Testament. The passage seems not to have exerted any influence on later thought. Far more important, though less striking, is Isaiah ii. 1f. This passage had considerable influence on later Messianic thought. The term branch which Isaiah used became in the course of the succeeding century a technical Messianic term (Jer. xxiii. 5).

The prophecy in Micah v. 2 refers to the birth of a Messianic king but omits mention of all Davidic connections. The prediction that he will be born in Bethlehem Ephrathah gives the prophecy a touch of the "mysterious" and suggests foreign influences or the possibility of its being a later interpolation.

The century after Isaiah saw the defeat of prophetic ideals and the suppression of prophetic activity. Not until Josiah institutes the Deuteronomic reform does light once more flash in the darkness. But the light was only a flash. The destruction of Judah was imminent and came with unflinching certainty. Jeremiah lived through the whole terrible time. Yet if we look for his contribution to Messianic thought we find it almost nil. He has faith that Yahveh will eventually prosper the Davidic dynasty but he does not intensely visualize even in his deepest gloom the coming of a personal Messiah. He speaks of the Branch which is to grow up out of the Davidic line (Jer. xxiii. 5; xxxiii. 15) but he is also anxious

to assert immediately that there will never be a dearth of priests. Jeremiah's whole faith is in Yahveh. He will save Isreal. The Davidic kings will never be absent but these coming kings are never referred to as in Isaiah ix. 6 as extraordinary persons. Yahveh will restore and save Israel; the Davidic kings will rule.

The Exile was begun and after a time the exiles were allowed by Cyrus, "the anointed one" to return home. Ezekiel returned with them. The whole current of thought during the exile was not Messianic. Isaiah spoke about the "suffering servant" (Isaiah 52:53). The editor of Amos (Amos ix. 11-15) saw a new era in the land of Israel and Ezekiel saw not only the restoration but the healing of the old breach between North and South. If the attitude of Ezekiel can be called Messianic it is so only in a wider impersonal sense. The same is true of Isaiah and the editor of Amos. Ezekiel was a priest, and if not expressly, at least inwardly suspicious of the more self assertive nationalism of the older Isaiah. His references to the Davidic dynasty (Ez. xxxiv. 23 and xxxvii. 24) were like Jeremiah's secondary to Yahveh. Yahveh will save. A new heart and a new spirit is what Yahveh will give them, not a saviour.

In Haggai we find not a new situation but for the first time an expressed confidence in an individual by Yahveh. The work of the destruction of the enemies of Israel is not completed, but Yahveh's day will come and then he will choose Zerubabel as ruler in the new age. He is the specially chosen servant of Yahveh, so prophesied Haggai and Zerubabel was a "son" of David. But whether Haggai was an opponent of the priesthood which is unlikely and played up Zerubabel is unlikely. At any rate, the crown fell to Joshua, a priest, while Zerubabel disappears from the narrative entirely. To Joshua is given the technical title of the "branch." Thus in this period the idea of the Messiah was still flexible enough or the pressure of the immediate politico-social situation was sufficiently great, so that a priest could replace a king as Messiah (Haggai ii. 21-23; Zach. vi. 12).

With Malachi, the last of the Old Testament prophets, the idea of messenger or forerunner appears. This forerunner is to precede the coming of Yahveh to the temple. It is an idea that affected all the later history of the Messianic idea, for it is made to carry over and apply to the Messiah instead of Yahveh himself. At this

period the Messiah himself was very probably, as Goodspeed suggests, the messenger.³

With "Emmet" we can say that while the eschatological elements of the Old testament were plentiful, an "expectation of the Messiah in a strict sense, occupied a comparatively subordinate place." Before David there is no intimation of a Messiah of a Babylonian or Egyptian complexion. After David and the Golden Age there is a general tendency to look back with longing eyes to the "good old times" but no idea of a personal Messiah appears until the time of Isaiah, but even here it is not exploited. It remains unimportant and negligible. Yahveh himself was thought of as the saviour. The idea of the permanent renewal of Davidic rule persisted, new branches of the line were to grow out of the mutilated stem, but the individual, personal character, the coming of a definite person or messenger from Yahveh had not yet developed. Emmet thinks that the idea of a personal, unusually endowed Messiah was a popular belief.⁴ Ezekiel, he thinks, emphasizes Yahveh to counteract the action of the popular idea.

A word about Daniel's reference to the "son of man." In Dan. vii. 13 we have originally no intention of a personal Messiah. At the time of the writing the figure was introduced as familiar. Its meaning in the time of Daniel is uncertain. It became clearer in the post Old Testament period. Daniel pinned his faith not in a Messiah but in the pious, consecrated souls.

II. POST-OLD TESTAMENT PERIOD.

We have seen that there was a general hope for a better future but that there were very few references to a personal Messiah in the literature. How widespread the hope for a Messiah was among the masses is difficult to say. The same disinterestedness on the part of the intellectuals and literary men seems to have continued after the Old Testament was closed. "Baldensperger" and others even go so far as to say that the idea was on the wane.⁵ They point to the fact that the Apocrypha hardly mentions a personal Messiah.⁶ The idea of a kingdom and another golden age persists, of course, but the idea of a personal Messiah is largely ignored. The Apocry-

³ Goodspeed, *Israel's Messianic Hope*, Macmillan, 1900.

⁴ Emmet, *Messiah*.

⁵ Baldensperger, Wilhelm, *Die messianische Hoffnung des Judentums*.

⁶ Schürer: *Geschichte des Jüdischen Volkes*.

pha seems to mention a personal Messiah only twice (in Esdras and I Maccabees xiv. 41).

The Messiah is mentioned in the Apocalyptic literature but this, it is to be noticed, is to a large extent popular, and He is also mentioned by the "Hellenistic" writers. The Sadducees on the other hand, who had no need of a Messiah, and the Pharisees who were more interested in law and the rule of the priesthood show us how unimportant the Messianic hope must have been and by whom it was fostered. A survey of the literature shows us how little concentrated attention was given to the Messianic idea.

In the Sibyllian Oracles III, 49 (168-151 B. C.) and III, 652-994, the references are, however, very short. The Messianic king is a servant of Yahveh's who will engage in war to end war. In a later book, V, the Messiah is a king who destroys Nero (130 A. D.). In "Enoch" little is said. The Messiah appears after the judgment as a white bull. The enemies of Israel and all heathendom worship him. (Enoch 83-90) (166-161 B. C.).

In the "Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs" we find again the priestly character of the Messiah and his Levitic descent. But in the "Testament of Judah" we find him descended from Judah (xxiv. 5f). The Psalms of Solomon were written when Pompey ruled at Rome, 70-40 B. C. The Messiah is Davidic. Here the idea of the "anointed one" comes again to the fore. He conquers the nations, not on horseback but by the power of his word. He is sinless and holy, made powerful by the Holy Ghost. In the Apocalypse of Baruch written in the last decades of the first century A. D. the Messiah appears mysteriously from heaven to judge the nations after the "wars of the last days." The Messiah is the warrior, the slayer and ruler of the Gentiles. In the Fourth book of Ezra the nations rise against the Messiah at his coming but he will stand on the Mount of Zion and crush his foes. The heavenly city will be revealed and the ten tribes of Israel will receive their sacred land. The Messiah will rule 400 years and then die, as will all the people. After seven days the just will be resurrected and a new world be given to them.

The philosopher Philo makes mention of a warrior hero, and Josephus also, but shows no vital interest in him.

III. THE RISE OF RATIONALISM.

At the beginning of the second century we find the non-Jewish author of the *Philosophumena* writing of the Messiah: "He will belong to the Davidic family but will not be born of a virgin and the Holy Ghost, but of man and woman, as all others are born. He, they believe, will be their king, a war-like and mighty man, who will gather the Jews to battle with all peoples. He will make Jerusalem his capital and restore it to its old condition, and also its inhabitants who will rule and sacrifice there in security for a long time. Then they will be attacked and in the war the Messiah will be killed by the sword. Shortly thereafter the end of the world will come by fire, and the judgment will follow."⁷ This, in general, with some variations was the conception of the Messiah after the fall of Jerusalem. As time went on and the Jewish state became a memory the speculations on the time and conditions of his coming, and on the nature of the Messianic age increased. On the whole there was an essential agreement as to his nature. As we see in the passage above the Jews defended their conception against the Christian idea of Christ, against a Virgin birth, and against the idea that the Messiah had any share whatever in the godhead.

There were three phases of the Messianic speculations that stood out quite prominently; first, the restoration of political independence; second, the miraculous ushering in of the Messianic era; and third, the relationship of the Messianic hope to immortality. Political independence became the great hope again even though the political "Messiahs" became fewer. The Messianic age always had its beginning in Jerusalem in the fancies of the Rabbis. Fancy, however, ran wild. Daniel was assiduously studied for the date of its appearance, and the miraculous events preceding the appearance became so much a part of the speculations that when Julian, the Apostate, offered to restore Jerusalem, the Jews were not interested because the restoration was not cataclysmic. These hopes, however fanciful, were nevertheless a means of sustaining the courage of the Jews throughout the Dark Ages. They enabled them to endure persecution, not with resignation, but with pride, and even scorn for his persecutors, for eventually he would be the master.

⁷ *Schürer, Ibid.*, p. 521-2.

IV. THE INFLUENCE OF ARABIAN RATIONALISM.

The rise of Islam and Arabic culture was accompanied by a revival of activity on the part of Pseudo-messiahs among whom Isaac ben Yahub, Al Rai and Serenas are to be mentioned. But of far greater importance is the revolt against the Rabbis and their literal and materialistic interpretation of the Talmud. The Talmud for a long time fell into a period of disrepute and the revolt against the authority of the Rabbis became widespread. The Renaissance that was taking place had its influence more widely among the Jews than among the Christians. The Sufists and the Mutazalite with their rationalistic interpretation of the Koran taught the Jews to interpret the Talmud in the same way. Fancy ranged free but not any longer on a materialistic basis, for behind even the wildest speculations there was the desire to *explain*, which is so characteristic of periods of super-culture. The speculations deal, however, almost entirely with the Messianic age and not with the person of the Messiah. The "Book of Zerubabel" written by an Italian Jew introduces some fresh material. The Messiah is the "son of Joseph" and called Mehemiah ben Hushiel, and Elijah, the son of Armilas, and the anti-Messiah is the son of Satan and a marble statue. The mother of the Messiah is also introduced, Hephzibah, with the statement "my desire is in her." She will appear five years before the Messiah and slay two kings with the staff of Aaron which is being secretly preserved.

Beginning with the writings of Rabbi Jehudah Halevi (1080-1142) we find a new note, one which was to become of ultimate importance in the history of later Judaism. We find reflections upon the meaning and status of Judaism in God's plan for the world and its salvation. In later centuries this was to result in a disappearance of the Messianic belief.

By far the most important figure in the Middle Ages was Maimonides who was big enough to give a dignified rational account of the Messianic age. There will be no miraculous intervention in the affairs of nature. The Messiah will be a great king in Palestine who will rule the nations as they shall live in peace. Living conditions will be made less hard and men will be able to devote themselves to wisdom instead of war. There will be no immortality.

The Messiah too will die and will be succeeded by his son. The righteous will prosper, the wicked will fall. The Messianic age will be a natural but a god fearing age. Maimonides set the tendency which rationalism largely followed throughout the Middle Ages.

V. DEVELOPMENT IN THE KABBALAH.

The Aristotelianized Judaism of Maimonides and the rationalistic study of Talmud were, however, no food for the people nor even for the intellectuals in periods of bitter persecution. The sustenance they needed was found in mysticism and in the "spiritualistic" speculations of Kabbalists. Among the Kabbalists there was a wide range of differences. Rabbi Moses ben Nahman (1195-1270) was cool and rationalistic, never giving way to the fanciful speculations which sought to understand the advent of the Messianic age by the juxtaposition of numbers. He reiterated the old claim that belief in a messiah was not essential to Judaism though he himself was a believer. Others, however, were more imaginative and active. Abraham Abulafia of Judea (1240-1291) announced himself as Messiah. Moses de Leon (1250-1305) brought out a book called Zohar which became the most widespread hand-book of Messianic speculations and even replaced for the time being in large circles the Talmud as a sacred book. Later came another assertion from Albo (1380-1444) that the belief in the Messiah was not essential, but in a century like the fourteenth when the Jews suffered unspeakably such a view could not become dominant. In the fifteenth century it was severely criticized by Don Isaac ben Judah Abarbanel (1437-1509) who though rationalistic enough in his belief regarding the nature of the Messiah, nevertheless engaged in Kabbalistic speculations as to the date of his coming, which he set at 1530, thereby facilitating the rise of "Laemlein" of Germany, who declared himself to be the forerunner of the Messiah.

The terrible persecution of the Jews was somewhat relieved by the rise of Protestantism and the kindly attitude of Luther. In the seventeenth century, the Jewish speculations on the Messianic age very often were approved by Christian speculations upon the coming of Christ. Such was the case with Menasseh ben Israel (1604-1657) whose speculations had a great influence upon Cromwellian

politics in England. In the East Sabbatai Zebi, also a brilliant Kabbalist, born in Smyrna in 1621, began his colorful career as a pseudo-Messiah. According to the Sabbatians the Messiah possesses a divine personality and is a part of the "original soul" and the first man, also that he is the son of God and the daughter of Zorah, thus establishing a trinity. The last great figure who posed as Messiah was Jankier Frank (1726-1791) who combined Mohammedian, Catholic, and Jewish ideas with the personality of a charlatan. He had no influence, however, on Messianic thought.

VI. THE PERIOD OF REFORM. MODERN JUDAISM.

The Eighteenth Century was the dawn of a new era. The Enlightenment, with its wider point of view, had its influence on Judaism and produced the great figure of Moses Mendelssohn. The spirit of liberalism drawn from the well of the French Encyclopedists began to breathe a new and truly modern life into Judaism so that it was eventually to escape in part some of the pitfalls that Christianity had fallen into. Napoleon assembled the great Jewish Synod and aided the Jews to a new and freer self consciousness. Hopes ran high, many of which were to be dashed to pieces. Two parties arose which took a position with respect to the Messianic hope. One party regarded the new political freedom as a solution for all the problems of the Jews and renounced the Messianic idea. David Friedlander in 1882 wrote urging that all prayers with a Messianic tendency be abolished and that the Jews serve their various adopted countries. The other party found no real relief in equal political rights and still looked forward to the coming of the Messiah, who would grant them not only equal political rights but also their own king in a divinely ordained Jewish kingdom.

Samson Raphael Hirsh (1808-1888) the great orthodox leader of the nineteenth century, suggested the compromise which was the revival of the spirit of Maimonides and Halevi. He urged the Jews to interpret their nationalism in a spiritual sense rather than as a state which is to exist for materialistic benefits. Israel whether distributed among the states of the world or possessing a state of its own is God's means of revealing himself to humanity for the achievement of a universal brotherhood. Zacharias Frankel (1801-1875) thought Hirsch's theory too abstract but though he was a

firm believer in the Messianic hope, he had no definite ideas on the subject and those that he had he changed quite often.

After the establishment of the reform society at Frankfort a. Main in 1843, discussion was continued at the various Rabbinical Conferences. In Pittsburgh in 1885, the Conference decided that the restoration of the Jewish State under the rule of descendants of David was not a part of the Messianic hope, that the destruction of the Second Jewish Commonwealth gave the Jews their real spiritual mission, and that the belief in a bodily resurrection was not essential.

Messianic interpretations of the status of the Jews in their new found freedom continued, however, and it was in a messianic strain of thought that the Zionist movement was introduced. The idea became widespread that the Messianic era will be introduced only after Palestine was reinhabited by the Jews. The Zionist movement, however, was supported by all strands. In any case the Messianic hope today extends beyond the materialistic interest of the Jewish people, and its spiritual interpretation dominates both the orthodox and the liberal parties of Judaism.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW

Edited by

WILLIAM A. HAMMOND AND FRANK THILLY

Of the Sage School of Philosophy, Cornell University

September, 1928

Clarke's Ethical Philosophy (II).....	Ernest Albee
Objective Uncertainty and Human Faith.....	David F. Swenson
Peirce's Place in American Philosophy.....	J. H. Muirhead
The Philosophy of Plotinus.....	John Watson
Review of Books.....	

Ralph Barton Perry, General Theory of Value: by Albert L. Hammond—Joseph Alexander Leighton, The Individual and the Social Order: by William Ernest Hocking—Herbert Wildon Carr, Changing Backgrounds in Religion and Ethics: by Edgar Sheffield Brightman—Carl F. Taeusch, Professional and Business Ethics: by Philip G. Fox.

Notes

John Dewey. E. B. McGilvary. Union Académique Internationale. D. Luther Evans.

Published Bi-Monthly

LONGMANS, GREEN & CO.

Lancaster, Pa.

55 Fifth Avenue, New York

Single Numbers \$1.00 (5s.)

Per Annum \$5.00 (25s.)

Publishers: DAVID NUTT, London—G. E. STECHERT CO., New York—FELIX ALCAN,
Paris—Akad, Verlagsgesellschaft, Leipzig—NICOLA ZANICHELLI, Bologna—
RUIZ HERMANOS, Madrid—RENASCENCA PORTUGUESA,
Porto—THE MARUZEN COMPANY, Tokyo.

“SCIENTIA”

INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF SCIENTIFIC SYNTHESIS

Published every month (each number containing 100 to 120 pages)

Editor: EUGENIO RIGNANO

- IS THE ONLY REVIEW** the contributors to which are really international.
- IS THE ONLY REVIEW** that has a really world-wide circulation.
- IS THE ONLY REVIEW** of scientific synthesis and unification that deals with the fundamental questions of all sciences: the history of the sciences, mathematics, astronomy, geology, physics, chemistry, biology, psychology and sociology.
- IS THE ONLY REVIEW** that by means of enquiries among the most eminent scientists and authors of all countries (*On the philosophical principles of the various sciences; On the most fundamental astronomical and physical questions of current interest, and in particular on relativity; On the contribution that the different countries have given to the development of various branches of knowledge; On the more important biological questions, and in particular on vitalism; On the social question; On the great international questions raised by the World War*), studies all the main problems discussed in intellectual circles all over the world, and represents at the same time the first attempt at an international organization of philosophical and scientific progress.
- IS THE ONLY REVIEW** that among its contributors can boast of the most illustrious men of science in the whole world. A list of more than 350 of these is given in each number.

The articles are published in the language of their authors, and every number has a *supplement containing the French translation of all the articles that are not French*. The review is thus completely accessible to those who know only French. (*Write for a free copy to the General Secretary of "Scientia," Milan, sending 12 cents in stamps of your country, merely to cover packing and postage.*)

SUBSCRIPTION: \$10.00, Post free Office: Via A. De Togni 12, Milan (116)

General Secretary: DR. PAOLO BONETTI.

SCIENCE PROGRESS

A QUARTERLY REVIEW OF SCIENTIFIC
THOUGHT, WORK, AND AFFAIRS

Edited by Lieut.-Col. Sir RONALD ROSS
K.C.B., K.C.M.G., F.R.S., N.L., D.Sc., LL.D., M.D., F.R.C.S.

Published at the beginning of JANUARY, APRIL, JULY, OCTOBER

Each number consists of about 192 pages, contributed by authorities in their respective subjects. Illustrated. 6s net. Annual Subscription, including postage, 25s, 6d.

SCIENCE PROGRESS owes its origin to an endeavor to found a scientific journal containing original papers and summaries of the present state of knowledge in all branches of science. The necessity for such a journal is to be found in the fact that with the specialization which necessarily accompanies the modern development of scientific thought and work, it is increasingly difficult for even the professional man of science to keep in touch with the trend of thought and the progress achieved in subjects other than those in which his immediate interests lie. This difficulty is felt by teachers and students in colleges and schools, and by the general educated public interested in scientific questions. SCIENCE PROGRESS claims to have filled this want.

JOHN MURRAY

Albemarle Street

London, W-1