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
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America between 1861 and 1865, in Continuation
of the Story by John Codman Ropes

By

William Roscoe Livermore

Colonel United States Army

Member of the Massachusetts Historical Society, and of the Military Historical Society
of Massachusetts; Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, etc.
Author of "The American Kriegspiel"; "Manœuvres for Infantry, Principles and
Forms," etc.

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PREFACE

THE death of John C. Ropes, twelve years ago, left unfinished his history of the Civil War. Two volumes that he had completed cover, with the exception of certain campaigns in the valley of the Mississippi, the operations of 1861 and 1862. Mr. Ropes, who was a leader of the bar and an eminent citizen of Boston, had attained a high distinction for his works on military history and particularly on the problems connected with the campaigns of Napoleon and on those of the American Civil War. The latter became the chief study of his life. Mr. Ropes had been eager to take an active part in the service, and he was bitterly disappointed to be rejected as physically disqualified. He possessed in an eminent degree the qualifications for the work of a staff officer; his inability to serve was a loss to the service. From the end of the War to the close of his life, he was interested in coming into personal relations with those who had been leaders in the struggle, Confederate as well as Federal, and the campaigns and battles were fought over again and again in the charming hospitality of his home in Mount Vernon Street, and in the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts which he founded for this purpose, and which became the model for a number of similar societies throughout the country. Mr. Ropes's legal training enabled him to gather the evidence from the conflicting accounts of the actors,

while his eminently judicial temperament helped him to weigh this evidence without bias from favor or affection. His brilliant intellect, his lively sympathy, his magnetic personality, made the style of his narrative most attractive. It was my privilege as his neighbor to discuss with him his work in all its stages. We generally agreed in our estimates of the commanders, and of their conduct of the campaigns and battles; but I was inclined to believe that he was too severe in certain of his criticisms.

His history of the Civil War had been undertaken at the instance of his friend, the publisher, Major George Haven Putnam, himself an author and a veteran of the War; and during the preparation of the two volumes that were completed and their passage through the press, Major Putnam was called into frequent consultation in regard to various details. Mr. Ropes left no memoranda for carrying on his work. At the request of Major Putnam, I have taken it up where Mr. Ropes left off.

His attractive and inspiring style was his own. I hope that it has so brightened up the subject that less effort will be required to follow the more detailed account of the period covered by the present volume. I have to approach the subject from a different standpoint. This volume treats of the critical period of the War. In the former part of this period, the Federal operations in the East and in the West were gloomy failures; in the latter, the Federal armies were everywhere victorious. A careful examination appears to show that the manner in which the troops were directed in campaign and especially in battle had more influence on the result than is generally appreciated. The military operations are therefore

narrated and discussed more fully here than in the former volumes.

The narrative has been based as far as possible upon the Official Record. It is a common impression that the reports in themselves convey intelligible and detailed accounts of the operations, and that the historian has only to select from these such material as he may need for his narrative. Most of them, however, convey no definite idea of the position of the troops to any one but the officers to whom they were addressed; and many have by themselves no value whatever to the historian. Yet, by repeatedly comparing each with the other reports and with other evidence, by the aid of the detailed maps of the battle-fields, a military expert can learn where almost every regiment was from the beginning to the end of a campaign or a battle. This is almost the only great war for which this would be possible. The Official Record of the War of the Rebellion is extensively consulted at home and abroad, and of late years especially in England, where its value is now fairly understood.

It is hoped that the references and maps in this volume will serve as a key to make the reports more intelligible. Besides the Official Reports, many accounts have been written by the commanders on each side and by others who took part in the War. Some of these are very valuable; but if not based upon memoranda made at the time, such accounts are not to be taken without caution as reliable original evidence. The most conscientious narrator finds after a short lapse of time that his recollections have been colored by the conceptions based, more or less unconsciously, upon the accounts and the discussions of others. The most valuable collection of such accounts is that pub-

lished and beautifully illustrated by the Century Co., in the *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*. The Scribners' two series, *The Campaigns of the Civil War* and *The Navy in the Civil War*, are useful both as evidence and as history; for most of the authors related the campaigns in which they took prominent parts. The *History of the Civil War* by the Comte de Paris, based upon extensive research embodying the views and criticisms of many of the commanders on each side, contains perhaps the most complete account of the War up to the end of 1863 that has ever been published; it is a work of graceful literary style showing, in its treatment, the military knowledge of the author. While valuable for what it suggests, it otherwise affords but little aid to the historian, because it was written before the Record had been published, and because the narrative is not supported by reference to the sources of information. Publications relating to the Civil War are almost without number. So far as they have come within my reach, I have consulted them, especially upon matters in which the writers had personal experience. The titles of some of those upon which my narrative is based are given in the following "List of Works Cited." The *Photographic History of the Civil War*, recently published in ten volumes by the Review of Reviews Company, has interest in presenting reproductions of photographs, taken at the time by Brady and others, showing the experience of the soldiers on both sides of the line on the march, in the field, in the hospitals, in the prisons, and elsewhere.

I have of course carefully examined the principal battle-fields, and have received much useful information from the members of the Military Commissions in charge of them. Among others, my thanks are due

to Captain W. T. Rigby, U. S. V., chairman of the Vicksburg National Military Park Commission, who went with me over the battle-fields of the Vicksburg Campaign and furnished me with maps and memoranda; to Colonel John P. Nicholson, Major C. A. Richardson, and General L. L. Lomax of the Gettysburg Commission, and Colonel E. B. Cope, the engineer, who gave me valuable information; to Major John Bigelow, U. S. A., author of *The Campaign of Chancellorsville*; to General James H. Wilson, U. S. A., General Charles Francis Adams, U. S. V., and Colonel Andrew H. Russel, U. S. A.

To distinguish the names of officers of the Confederate Army from those of the Federal, I have followed the plan adopted in Formby's *American Civil War*, and printed the former in italics in the text but not in citation matter nor in the foot-notes. The names of Confederate vessels are in italics, those of Federal vessels in Roman with quotation marks. In preparing the maps, the topography has generally been taken from those published by the Government. The troop-positions have been calculated from the evidence of the Record and other works cited. The maps contained in these works have been carefully consulted and so have the series of maps of Gettysburg prepared for the Government by Colonel John B. Bachelder, U. S. V., formerly of the Gettysburg Commission; but I have not ventured to utilize any locations taken from such sources, unless they appeared to be substantiated by the evidence.

W. R. L.



INTRODUCTION

A LARGE part of all the history that has been written relates in some way to military operations. In the opinion of many historians to-day, the condition of the people, their physical, intellectual, moral and industrial development, especially in time of peace, are the only subjects worthy of their consideration. Under the present conditions, however, peace, compatible with the demands of prosperity, honor and morality, can be maintained only by due preparation for war. The one great object of war is peace. If the history of three thousand years does not show that no lasting peace is worth having that is not based upon the ability to fight, at least half of such history has been written in vain. Warfare is barbarous. It may be inhuman. All nations should disarm; but in proper sequence. When all are armed and prepared in the proportion in which we would wish them to prosper, let all be disarmed in the same proportion, and as promptly as possible.

The present period is one of rapid development. In the struggle for existence, great nations are crowding upon each other. Universal peace will not be possible until conflicting interests shall have been adjusted. All nations but our own are preparing for defence. By neglecting to bear our share of the burden, we are insulting the rest of the civilized world upon whom we

now rely for our safety in the hope that each nation will hold the other in check, and save us from all trouble and expense. If we persist in this course, we shall soon destroy the equilibrium on which we depend. The time will soon come which will decide whether future growth shall follow the lines that we have laid down, and be guided by the principles that we hold to be sacred; or whether we shall be forced to play a minor part as servants of those who are now less favored, but who appreciate more truly the responsibility that rests upon them. It may still be in our power to ward off this catastrophe. If we take the proper measures for self-defence, weaker nations will gather around us and add to our strength.

The history of the Civil War is useful in keeping alive the military interest of the present generation so that the next may have some civil history to record. It shows that our armies, on both sides, endured as much and fought as bravely as any in the world. The troops showed, perhaps, more self-reliance and more capacity for the individual action demanded by the warfare of to-day than those of any great army of ancient or modern times. The Federal armies were finally victorious; but hundreds of thousands of lives and incalculable privations and sufferings would have been spared if the nation had been prepared for war, if the Federal armies had been better trained and their operations more skilfully conducted. The lack of training and discipline was not so apparent, because both armies suffered from it, though perhaps not always to the same degree. With regard to the conduct of grand operations, it must be remembered that the military training of the generals had mainly been confined to the life in a small post with one or two com-

panies; perhaps they had never expected to take part in a greater war than that just concluded with Mexico. In almost any war whose operations can be thoroughly analyzed, it will be found that much is lost from bad troop-leading which could have been saved if the same attention had been given heretofore as now to practice in time of peace, on the map and in the field, of the application of military principles to the varied exigencies of a campaign and a battle.

From the history of the campaigns and battles of our Civil War, one can learn much, not because those campaigns and battles were always well conducted, but because they gave rise to so many military situations, each one of which offers a useful field for the study of military problems. We are more concerned now in learning what should have been done in each case than in deciding who was most to blame for not doing it.

A leader of troops in a modern battle must be prepared to meet any move of his adversary and to secure due advantage from any error into which the opponent may fall. To form a true mental image of the course of a campaign or a battle while it is in progress, so that the movements of the troops may be wisely directed, is no easy task; and a careful study of the history of former battles and campaigns can be of great assistance. For tactical study an exact and detailed account of one battle is worth far more than a general outline of a thousand. Military science is quantitative and very complex. The strategic movements of large bodies of men are not so hard to understand and to direct as the complicated manœuvres of a battlefield. A moment of time, or a slight preponderance of force on some part

of the field, may decide the issue at that point; and the result of this combat may decide the next, until some advantage is gained that may decide the battle, the campaign, the war, and the fate of the nation.

Nearly half a century has passed since the battle of Gettysburg; twenty-four centuries, since the battle of Marathon. In many respects the art of War has changed more from Gettysburg to the present time, than from Marathon to Gettysburg. To study the dispositions and movements of the Battle of Gettysburg with a view to copying them now might prove to be a fatal error. To draw up an army of 85,000 men on open ground on a line of three or four miles in length with an average depth of nine or ten solid ranks, and in the presence of a hostile army of nearly equal strength would be to deliver it over to captivity or slaughter. The human factors, however, have not changed; and even the forms are not so different as the dimensions.

An estimate of the strength and losses of each army in each campaign and battle has been tabulated. The positions of the opposing troops from month to month in campaign, and from hour to hour in battle have been so expressed by a series of maps as to show at a glance the general course of the operations; and what each prominent commander said and thought about the situation from time to time, and his plans for meeting it, are told in the text, so that the reader may have before him the data on which to base his own judgment without reference to the comments which follow.

Only a professional soldier would care, perhaps, to make an exhaustive analysis of a battle; but the results are valuable to the general historian, and full of

interest to the untechnical reader. This is especially true of the subject of the present volume.

In the period of which this volume treats, the war for the Union became inseparably allied with the movement for the abolition of slavery in the rebellious States. There was no longer any hope of compromise. The operations were conducted upon a grander scale than those which preceded them and are full of military and dramatic interest.

In the western theatre of operations, for the conquest of the Mississippi Valley, the story begins at a time when the great river was controlled by the Southern Confederacy, from a point near that at which the Ohio enters, to one near that where both discharge their waters into the Gulf of Mexico. In this volume are related the naval exploits of Farragut, Davis and Porter; the defence of Corinth by Rosecrans, the repeated failures of Grant, and his final success in a campaign that has been compared with that of Napoleon around Ulm. The story ends with the capture of Vicksburg by Grant and of Port Hudson by Banks, when navigation was reopened and the Mississippi and its shores from its source to its mouth were in full possession of the Federal fleets and armies.

In the central theatre of operations, the story ends with the advance of the Federal Army from central Tennessee to the neighborhood of Chattanooga on the borders of Georgia.

In the eastern theatre, it begins with the great battle of Chancellorsville where Hooker with 138,000 men crossed the Rappahannock and was driven back by *Lee* with 63,000; a battle from which *Lee* won his great reputation abroad, and which is regarded by some foreign critics as the tactical masterpiece of the nine-

teenth century: and ends with Gettysburg, where the victors, who had invaded the soil of a free state and threatened Washington and the great cities of the North-east were defeated by the Federal Army under Meade, and driven back with fearful loss in the greatest battle of the war.

The period ends soon after that memorable 4th of July when the Federal armies were victorious from one end of the frontier to the other, and the close of the War appeared to be near at hand.

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Roman	Serial	Roman	Serial	Roman	Serial	Roman	Serial
I	1	X, I	10	XIII	19	XIX, II	28
II	2	X, II	11	XIV	20	XX, I	29
III	3	XI, I	12	XV	21	XX, II	30
IV	4	XI, II	13	XVI, I	22	XXI	31
V	5	XI, III	14	XVI, II	23	XXII, I	32
VI	6	XII, I	15	XVII, I	24	XXII, II	33
VII	7	XII, II	16	XVII, II	25	XXIII, I	34
VIII	8	XII, III	17	XVIII	26	XXIII, II	35
IX	9	XII, III	18	XIX, I	27		

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THE STORY OF THE CIVIL WAR.
PART III.



THE STORY OF THE CIVIL WAR.

CHAPTER I.

THE FIRST TWO ADVANCES ON VICKSBURG.

THE first two volumes of *The Story of the Civil War* have told of the operations of 1861 and 1862, excepting some of those in the States bordering on the Mississippi River. The plan for crushing the rebellion was to surround the Confederacy with the Federal Army and Navy, and so cut off all supplies from without, while the Federal Army advanced, and destroyed the Army and occupied the territory of the Confederates. After the bombardment of Fort Sumter in April, 1861, some time elapsed before the opposing forces were assembled. In the summer, the Federal armies were defeated at Bull Run in the East and at Wilson's Creek in the West. In the summer and autumn, lodgments were made by the Federal Army on the Atlantic Coast in support of the blockade by the Federal Navy. In the winter, all was quiet on the Potomac, but in the West, the Federals won the battle of Mill Springs, captured Forts Henry

and Donelson, and secured the State of Kentucky to the Union. In the spring of 1862, the Federals in the East landed on the Peninsula, and advanced as far as the outskirts of Richmond; and in the West, they won the battles of Shiloh and Pea Ridge, captured Island No. 10, and advanced as far as the northern part of Mississippi and of Arkansas. The Federal Navy entered the Mississippi River and captured New Orleans. In the summer, the tide turned. In the West, the great Federal Army that had been assembled at Corinth was broken up. In the East, Federal troops were withdrawn from the Peninsula; and a new army was assembled in Northern Virginia, and defeated at the second battle of Bull Run. In the autumn, the Confederate power reached its high-water mark for this year. Its armies invaded Maryland, Tennessee, and Kentucky, but they were soon checked at the Antietam in the East and at Perryville in the West. The Federal armies then advanced, and recovered the lost ground; the end of the year was marked by their disastrous defeat at Fredericksburg and their partial victory at Murfreesborough.

Before reviewing the situation in the winter of 1862 and 1863, we have yet to describe the campaigns in the States bordering on the Mississippi River.

Military importance of the Mississippi. In the spring of 1862, although the blockade was partially established from Chesapeake Bay to the Rio Grande and the Federal armies occupied a line reaching from the Potomac to the north of Arkansas, yet the Confederates still held the Mississippi River and its shores from Fort Pillow¹ to New Orleans, and the circuit could not be completed until the gap could be closed between the

¹ See Map I.

Federal Army in the West and the Federal fleet in the Gulf of Mexico. Supplies were constantly poured in from Mexico and carried across the Mississippi to supply the armies of the Confederacy. The States of Texas, Louisiana, and Arkansas are said to have supplied the Confederacy with most of its sugar, beef, and grain; and to have furnished 100,000 recruits for the Confederate Army. On the other hand, all the produce of the great Northwest was cut off from its natural outlet down the Mississippi River; and as the Northern armies were largely recruited from these States, many of the troops felt that they were neglecting their homes, and fighting other people's battles. The opening up of the Mississippi was therefore one of the great problems of the war. If its shores were held by the Federal Army, its waters could be occupied by the Federal Navy. The blockade of the South would be closed, and that of the Northwest would be opened; the Confederacy would be cut in two; and the river would form a new base from which the Federal armies could concentrate their forces upon each fraction in turn. The Western troops would fight with greater zeal when, in the language of President Lincoln "the father of waters flowed unvexed to the sea."

The Mississippi River from Memphis to the Gulf of Mexico flows through an alluvial basin of its own making, so low that an area of 23,000 square miles, varying in width from 12 to 80 miles, is sometimes submerged at high water. This basin is, in general, bounded by bluffs rising steeply for about 150 to 250 feet above the water. The river leaves the eastern bluffs at Memphis¹; and its general course bends slightly to S. W., S., and S. E., striking the bluffs again at Vicksburg and form-

Mississippi
River and
basin.

¹ See Map I., and map, p. 8.

ing a lenticular-shaped flat, 200 miles in length and 60 miles in its greatest width, called the Yazoo Basin. About 50 miles below Memphis, the river touches the western bluffs at Helena. Below Vicksburg it again bends to the S. W., S., and S. E., following the foot of the bluffs to Baton Rouge 130 miles in a direct line from Vicksburg. Here the river leaves the bluffs and flows S. E. through the delta proper past New Orleans to the Gulf. The river bed, however, is so tortuous that distances measured by water are nearly twice as great as if measured in a straight line. The distance by the river from Memphis to Vicksburg is about 370 miles; from Vicksburg to Baton Rouge 230, thence to New Orleans 130, and thence to the Gulf 100 miles.

From New Orleans to Baton Rouge there was nothing to oppose the passage of the Federal fleet. It could silence any defences the Confederates could improvise on this low land: and there were no forts like Jackson and St. Philip above New Orleans; but from Baton Rouge to Vicksburg, batteries could be placed on the crest of the bluffs, where the cannoneers would be more sheltered and the guns would have a plunging fire on the decks of passing vessels. A fleet could perhaps smother their fire for a while, but it could not hope to reduce them by its own fire alone. On the other hand, if an army on transports could land a sufficient force near the batteries, it could carry them and open the river to the fleet. The fleet and the transports could move faster than the enemy on land and could choose its own point of landing. North of Vicksburg, the Yazoo Basin between the river and the bluffs was marshy, heavily timbered and cut up with bayous. The Yazoo River which drains this basin, leaves the bluffs about twelve miles above Vicksburg, and empties

into the Mississippi six miles above. The Basin was almost impassable in the face of a vigilant enemy.

If the Confederates should fortify Vicksburg and mount enough heavy guns to make it imprudent for an enemy to pass, an army coming down stream on transports could not hope to reach the bluffs without ascending the river; crossing the Yazoo Basin; or landing on the right bank of the Mississippi, passing around the point opposite Vicksburg, and crossing the river below.¹ A railroad connected Vicksburg with the Wachita on the west and with Jackson, Meridian, and all the railway system of the South on the east. This was the only railway that touched the Mississippi between Memphis and New Orleans. West of the Mississippi, the Red River and its tributary the Wachita drain a large tract of fertile land in Louisiana, Arkansas, and Texas; and both are navigable for a long distance above their mouths. The Red River empties² into the Mississippi about seventy miles by water above Baton Rouge; and it was a matter of great importance to the Confederates that the navigation of this river should be open to them, and this required that they should hold the Mississippi at two points, one above and one below the mouth of Red River. Vicksburg was then the great strategic centre of all this region, of vital importance to the Confederates, and the objective point for the Federal Army.

While Grant and Halleck were advancing from Fort Donelson to Corinth,³ Admiral Davis was forcing his

¹ This as we shall see, was the position in which Grant's army found itself in the winter and spring of 1863.

² 21 R., 16; Mahan, *G. & I. W.*, 97.

³ Part II., Chap. I.

way down the Mississippi River between Halleck on the east and Curtis on the west. In this part of the river, the Confederates¹ maintained a squadron² of eight rams called the River Defence Fleet. It was protected from the Federal flotilla by the guns of Fort Pillow, which was held by *Villepigue* with about 3000 men. On the morning³ of May 10th, this flotilla of seven ironclad gunboats was moored to the shore three miles above the fort, and one mortar boat lower down the river was bombarding the fort. The Confederate rams soon appeared and the Federal gunboats came down in succession to support the mortar boats. Two of them were rammed so that they had to run on the bank to keep from sinking. Three of the Confederate rams were disabled by the fire of the Federal guns, and they drifted down under the protection of Fort Pillow. "All of these

Upper
Mississippi
River, spring
of 1862.
Battle of
Fort Pillow.



¹ Davis's *Davis*, p. 220.

² The Confederate gunboats (Mahan, *G. & I. W.*, 41) were fast river steamboats which had been strengthened at the bows with iron casing about one inch thick so as to use them as rams. Their engines were protected with cotton bales and pine bulwark; they each carried one gun. They were commanded by river captains or pilots. The Federal gunboats (Davis, 217; Mahan, *G. & I. W.*, 13) were armored. The hulls were of wood, built with a central casemate, with sides sloping at an angle of 35°, closing the wheel at the stern of the boat, and plated with 2½ inches of iron. This casemate formed a quadrilateral gundeck on which the battery of from thirteen to sixteen guns was mounted. The vessels were [propelled by a single stern wheel; most of them had their engines and boilers on deck. The heaviest guns were 10-inch Dahlgrens. The speed of these vessels was just about sufficient to stem the current of the Mississippi, and they were extremely awkward to manœuvre. The wheel and machinery were very liable to damage by the enemy's shot. The Mississippi flotilla was officered and commanded entirely from the Navy, but was under control of the War Department until the autumn of 1862. The mortar boats were small floats each carrying a single mortar.


³ Davis's *Davis*, 226; *G. & I. W.*, 43.

JUNE 1 1862

JULY 1 1862



	10,000 FEDERALS		10,000 CONFEDERATES
	5,000 "		5,000 " "
	1,000 "		1,000 " "



vessels," said Davis,¹ "might easily have been captured if we had possessed the means of towing them out of action." On the 25th, Colonel Charles Ellet, Jr., a civil engineer, arrived with seven Federal rams² of his own invention, which he made at the expense of the Quartermaster Department; and which he was authorized, with the rank of colonel, to operate in these waters, in no manner under control of the naval commander. He carried no armament but carbines and pistols, for he did not propose to destroy the enemy from afar. The Federal gunboats that ran ashore and the Confederate rams were soon repaired. Nothing but Fort Pillow kept Davis from advancing, and, like all the defences above, it must soon be abandoned as Halleck's army was already on its line of communications.

Meanwhile Curtis and Schofield in Missouri and Arkansas had kept pace with Grant and Halleck in Kentucky and Tennessee. The battle of Pea Ridge³ on the 8th of March, 1862, broke the power of the Confederates in Arkansas and Missouri. Under a special agreement with President Lincoln, the Governor of Missouri was authorized to raise a force of militia to be employed within the limits of the State. Schofield was placed

Missouri in
spring of
1862.

¹ B. & L., I, 448.

² The Federal rams (Mahan, *G. & I. W.*, 46) were designed and constructed by Col. Chas. Ellet, Jr., a civil engineer, who under authority of the War Department bought a few stern-wheel and a few side-wheel river boats, strengthened them with bulkheads, iron rods, and cross braces, and built bulkheads of oak two feet in thickness around the boilers. Ellet was himself placed in command of these rams with the rank of Colonel, and was allowed to act within the limits of Captain Davis's command without coming in any way under his control.

³ Part I., 187.

in command; and by his skill and tact, he so organized this force that Missouri was kept in a state of comparative peace; and most of the volunteers already there were sent to Corinth to reinforce Halleck. Early in June Schofield's effective force of volunteers and militia was about 17,000.¹

After the battle of Pea Ridge, *Van Dorn* withdrew the Confederate army to the Arkansas River and then moved eastward to be prepared to co-operate with *Beauregard*. On the 8th of April, immediately after the battle of Shiloh and the capture of Island No. 10, his troops embarked from Des Arc on the White River under orders from Gen. *A. S. Johnston* to join him in Tennessee. The Confederate Colonel *Snead* says²:

Arkansas was thus utterly undefended, and her people, feeling that they had been abandoned by the Confederate Government, were fast becoming despondent or apathetic. Those living to the north of the Arkansas among the mountains which rise west of the White and Black Rivers were fast submitting to the authority of the Union, and many of them were enlisting in the Union army. The slave-holders that lived in the valley of the Arkansas and on the rich alluvial lands south of that river and along the Mississippi were in despair. The governor and State officers were making ready to abandon the capital, and that part of the population which still remained loyal to the Confederacy was panic-stricken.

Curtis followed *Van Dorn* for a short distance; but early in April, by Halleck's orders, he moved down White River to Batesville, and on the 9th of May, sent Davis's and Asboth's divisions to Corinth.³ On the 31st of May he reported about 10,100 men present for

¹ 19 R., 7, 8.² 3 B. & L., 443.³ 19 R., 373, 384.

duty in the field, and 2300 in garrisons in northern Arkansas and southern Missouri.¹

On the 1st of May, 1862, after the city of New Orleans had surrendered to the Federal fleet under Farragut, Butler's army, of about 14,000 men, landed and took possession.² The forts at the mouth of the Mississippi had already surrendered. The fortifications on the Gulf, and the defences on the river and on the neighboring lakes were abandoned by the Confederates without a struggle. The New Orleans and Opelousas railway was taken and held as far as Brashear City, eighty miles west of New Orleans.³ The Confederate authority in Louisiana had virtually ceased with the fall of New Orleans.

Louisiana,
spring of
1862.

Such was the military destitution [says the Confederate general who afterwards commanded the district] that a regiment of cavalry could have ridden over the State, while innumerable rivers and bayous, navigable a large part of the year, would admit Federal gunboats to the heart of every parish.

In fact, by the first of June, when Halleck's army halted at Corinth; the Confederate power west of the Mississippi River was completely shattered.

Let us now follow the operations on the river itself and in Mississippi and eastern Louisiana, in which the Federal Navy played the leading part. The original orders from Washington required that, after the occupation of New Orleans by Butler's army,⁴ in case the expedition from Cairo had not already descended the river, Farragut

Lower
Mississippi
River, spring
of 1862.

¹ 19 R., 407.

² Irwin, 9-16; 2 B. & L. 74, 75; 6 R., 716-718.

³ Taylor, 102, 103.

⁴ Mahan, *Farragut*, 177.

should take advantage of the panic to push a strong force up the river to take all the defences in the rear, and that Butler should occupy¹ Baton Rouge as soon as possible and then endeavor to open communication with the northern column by the Mississippi.

The problem assigned to Butler and Farragut was not an easy one.

Mahan says² of the orders to ascend the river:

Although the flag-officer seems to have acquiesced in this programme in the beginning, it was probably with the expectation that the advance, up the river and against the current, required of his heavy-draught and slow-moving ships would not be very far; that the Cairo expedition, . . . would from the character of the vessels composing it, many being iron-clad, and from the advantage of the current, have progressed very far before he had taken New Orleans. . . . The question now was not one of fighting batteries. . . . To take the defences in the rear, and in their then state to drive the enemy out of them was one thing; but to hold the abandoned positions against the return of the defenders, after the fleet had passed on, required an adequate force which Butler's army, . . . could not afford. . . . It is due to the Navy Department [says Mahan]³ to say that they expected the army from the north to advance more rapidly than it did; but without seeking to assign the blame, the utterly useless penetration of the United States fleet four hundred miles into the heart of the enemy's country and its subsequent mortifying withdrawal when contrasted with the brilliant success resulting from Farragut's dash by the forts, afford a very useful lesson.

¹ 6 R., 694.

² Mahan, *Farragut*, 177-180.

³ Mahan's *Farragut*, p. 180.

On the 2d of May Farragut sent seven vessels up the river, and on the 8th Butler sent Williams with about 1400 men on transports to accompany them. Baton Rouge and Natchez surrendered; and on the 18th, the advance division of the fleet under Lee, followed by the transports with Williams, arrived off Vicksburg¹ and demanded its surrender, which was refused. Farragut arrived a few days later with the remainder of the fleet. Williams made a careful reconnoissance; and reported to Farragut that it would be impossible to land, and that he saw no chance of doing anything with the place so long as the enemy were in such force, having at their command thirty thousand men within an hour by railroad. On the 26th, the fleet opened fire on Vicksburg and its defences.

Farragut
and
Williams
ascend the
river.

The Confederates had anticipated this attack. After the loss of New Orleans,² *Lovell* withdrew his troops to Camp Moore³ on the New Orleans and Jackson Railroad, sending *M. L. Smith* with two regiments⁴ to Vicksburg.⁵ On the 12th of May *Lovell* reported 2600 men at Camp Moore⁶ and 600 at Jackson, besides the two regiments, or about 800 men, sent to Vicksburg. When *M. L. Smith* arrived,⁷ three batteries were built and a fourth begun. On the 18th, when the Federal fleet appeared, six batteries were ready. On the 26th, *Smith's* force was increased by

Lovell's
prepara-
tions.

¹ 3 B. & L., 553; Mahan, *Farragut*, 182; 21 R., 8; see Map XII, end of Book II. ² 21 R., 733. ³ See map, p. 8. ⁴ 8th La. and 27th La.

⁵ About the 20th of April *Lovell* sent to Beauregard at Corinth (R. 21, 811) to ask his assistance in occupying and fortifying Vicksburg. Beauregard had already sent an officer there to collect laborers, tools, and other supplies. Guns were sent from Pensacola by Bragg and from New Orleans by *Lovell*.

⁶ 21 R., 733.

⁷ 21 R., 6.

four or five regiments of infantry,¹ some cavalry, and a battery of artillery, to a total of about 2600 men; and during the bombardment four more batteries were built.²

The attempt to carry the place was hopeless. Farragut returned to New Orleans, leaving seven vessels to blockade the river³ and to occupy the garrison by an occasional bombardment. Williams also returned to Baton Rouge, which he occupied on the 29th. "I did not pass Vicksburg," said Farragut, "not because we could not have passed easily enough, but we would have been cut off from our supplies of coal and provisions."

Such was the situation in the region of the Mississippi on the 1st of June⁴ when McClellan's army was in sight of Richmond. *Beauregard* with about 52,000⁵ troops at Tupelo was facing Halleck⁶ with 109,000 at Corinth. *Villepigue* with about 3000 was at Fort Pillow; and *Lovell* with about 4000 at Vicksburg, Jackson, and Camp Moore was watching Butler in Louisiana with perhaps 12,000. Moreover, there was no Confederate force west of the Mississippi that could in any way interfere with Halleck's advance, and he surely could have defended Tennessee better by destroying *Beauregard's* army than by deliberately breaking up his own.

We have seen that on the 10th of June, Buell with four divisions left Corinth for Chattanooga. On the 17th, *Beauregard* sent two regiments of his army to Vicksburg,⁷ and on the same day he was obliged by ill health to turn over his duties to *Bragg*, who was soon after assigned to the

¹(26 La.?) 28 La.; 3 Miss.; 6 Miss. ²21 R., 7; 21 R., 739. ³Irwin, 21.

⁴1 B. & L., 449. ⁵11 R., 548. ⁶11 R., 235. ⁷25 R., 606.

permanent command. On the 19th, *Van Dorn*¹ was ordered to the command of Vicksburg and Western Mississippi, leaving *Price* in command² of the Army of the West. On the 22d *Breckenridge's* corps³ was sent by rail to Vicksburg with about 6000 men, and on the 27th *McCown's*⁴ division of the Army of the Mississippi, about 2500, was sent to Chattanooga.

On the 3d of June the Confederates evacuated Fort Pillow⁵; 600 troops went by boat to Vicksburg, and the rest by land to Memphis and then to Grenada.

On the 6th, Davis with five gunboats met the Confederate fleet at Memphis.⁶ The battle was watched with eager eyes by the citizens on the cliffs.

The Federal gunboats were unwieldy, but their guns were heavier than those of the Confederate rams. While the two squadrons were approaching and firing at each other, Ellet and his brother suddenly appeared with two rams between the opposing vessels. This was unexpected and at least awkward for the Confederates, who had hoped to ram the Federal gunboats before they themselves were destroyed by the Federal guns. Ellet steamed right for the first Confederate ram and sank it; two others came up, and one disabled the other in trying to ram one of Ellet's rams. The Federal gunboats closed up. Another Confederate ram was sunk and one disabled. Four fled, two were caught, and one was blown up by Federal shells. In short, of eight Confederate rams: two were sunk, one blown up, and four disabled; one by the rams, one by mistake, four by the guns, and

Upper
Mississippi,
June, 1862.
Battle of
Memphis.

¹ 25 R., 613, 616; 21 R., 758.

² 25 R., 636.

³ 25 R., 608, etc.; 21 R., 761, etc., 1120.

⁴ 25 R., 626.

⁵ 11 R., 579-80, 608.

⁶ Mahan, *G. & I. W.*, 47; *I. B. & L.*, 449; Davis's *Davis*.

one by both the rams and guns. One only escaped. Ellet's own ram was disabled, and he himself received a pistol shot in the leg, which ultimately proved to be fatal. The Confederate ram sought refuge in the Yazoo; and the Mississippi River was opened to the Federal fleet from Memphis to Vicksburg.

When Farragut arrived¹ at New Orleans, he found stringent orders from the Navy Department which required him to return to Vicksburg. As **Lower Mississippi, soon² as he could take on provisions, he June, 1862.** started back, fearing, however, that if he **Farragut and Williams** once got above Vicksburg, he would not be able to return before the next spring rise, **ascend the river.** for the season of lowest water in the Mississippi was now at hand. On the 18th of June the squadron was assembled just below Vicksburg, with seventeen schooners of the mortar flotilla under Porter. On the 6th of June³ Butler had ordered Williams to proceed to Vicksburg with Farragut and then take the town, or have it burned at all hazards, and "cut off the neck of land beyond Vicksburg⁴ by means of a trench across, making a gap about four feet deep and five feet wide." He thought that when this cut was opened, the current would scour out a wide and navigable channel. Williams's force was increased so that he could take 3200 men with him and leave perhaps 1500 to hold Baton Rouge. He arrived before Vicksburg on the 25th.⁵ On the 20th of June, Lt. Col. A. W. Ellet, a brother of the inventor, left Memphis with the rams, arrived above Vicksburg on the 24th, and opened communication with Farragut across the neck of land

¹ Mahan, *Farragut*, 183.

³ 21 R., 25.

² Mahan, *Farragut*, 184.

⁵ Irwin, XIX., Corps, 25.

⁴ See Map XII, end of Book II.

opposite the city. Farragut sent word to Davis that if his ironclad gunboats could be present they would greatly add to the chance of success without much loss of life.

Breckenridge's corps arrived on the 25th and raised the strength of the Confederates to 10,000 men. *Van Dorn* came in person on the 28th¹ and took command. The Mississippi² near Vicksburg ^{Confederate position.} flows first to the northeast and then, striking the bluffs, makes a sharp turn south and then southwest in a course nearly parallel to the first and from $\frac{1}{4}$ to 2 miles from the bluffs, which here rise to a height of 150 or 250 feet at a distance of about $\frac{1}{4}$ mile from the lower course of the river. Twenty-six guns from X-inch calibre down were at that time mounted, mostly on the bluffs, and protected by earthworks. The ground behind them was rolling and afforded good shelter from the fire of the vessels.

None of Farragut's vessels was armored. The current at this time was running at the rate of three knots, and the speed of the fleet was not over eight. On the 27th, Porter fired all day with ^{Passage of the Vicksburg batteries.} the mortars, and reported that he was ready to support the attack of the fleet. At 3 A.M., on the 28th, the heavy ships advanced in two columns; but they soon closed into one. At four, the mortars opened fire. As each battery came under the heavy fire of a ship's broadside, the cannoneers took to shelter, but as soon as the ship had passed, returned to their posts, and kept up a raking fire on the lower reach, or a direct fire on the upper. The steamers of the mortar flotilla followed for a while to help in keeping down

¹ 21 R., 9, 769.

² Mahan, G. & I. W., 93, 94.

the fire of the batteries. Owing to a misunderstanding, the three vessels which formed the rear of the column did not get by. At 6 A. M., the others anchored above Vicksburg. No impression of any consequence was made upon the forts nor were the ships materially injured.¹ Farragut reported saying:

The Department will perceive from this report that the forts can be passed, and we have done it, and can do it again as often as may be required of us. . . .

Military and naval lessons. I am satisfied . . . it is not possible to take Vicksburg without an army of twelve or fifteen thousand men. . . . The water is too low for me to go over twelve or fifteen miles above Vicksburg.

The experience of this passage was a useful lesson to guide the future operations of the Army and Navy in this locality.

On the 28th² of June Farragut reported the situation to Halleck and asked if he could not aid him to carry out the peremptory order of the President to clear the river. To this Halleck replied on the 3d of July³:

The scattered and weakened condition of my forces renders it impossible for me at the present moment to detach any to coöperate with you on Vicksburg. Probably I shall be able to do so as soon as I can get my troops more concentrated. This may delay the clearing of the river but its accomplishment will be certain in a few weeks. Allow me to congratulate you on your great successes.

In the meantime, on the 30th of June, President Lincoln telegraphed to Halleck⁴:

Would be very glad of 25,000 infantry; no artillery or cavalry; but please do not send a man if it endangers any

¹ Mahan, *Farragut*, 188.

³ 21 R., 517.

² 21 R., 514.

⁴ 25 R., 53.

place you deem it important to hold, or if it forces you to give up or weaken or delay the expedition against Chattanooga. To take and hold the railroad at or east of Cleveland, in East Tennessee, I think fully as important as the taking and holding of Richmond.

Williams, unable to carry out his instructions in regard to taking Vicksburg, set his men to work on the canal, and employed a force of about 1200 negroes to help them. Davis received ^{Federals at} Farragut's message¹ at Memphis on the 28th, ^{Vicksburg.} on the 29th, he started down the river, and on the 1st of July, arrived just above Vicksburg and joined Farragut with four gunboats and six mortar boats. The united squadrons, except those vessels which had not passed up on the 28th of June, remained together just above Vicksburg and about four miles below the mouth of the Yazoo.

It was reported that somewhere on this river, the Confederates were building a ram called the *Arkansas*, superior in armor and armament to any vessel in the Federal fleets and especially designed ^{Confederate} for ramming. Only a few months before, ^{ram "Ar-} the ironclad *Merrimac* had made sad havoc ^{kansas."} with the Federal fleet in the Chesapeake, and might have destroyed it but for the timely arrival of the little "Monitor." On the 15th² of July, a reconnoitring expedition of two of Davis's gunboats and one of Ellet's rams was sent into the Yazoo to learn how the work was progressing. When only six miles up the river, they met the *Arkansas* coming down. One gunboat was disabled, and the *Arkansas* followed the other and the ram down to the Mississippi. Both fleets were lying

¹ Davis's *Davis*, 257; 3 B. & L., 554-555.

² Mahan's *Farragut*, 191; G. & I. W., 99.

helplessly at anchor, without steam. The smoke-stack of the *Arkansas*, however, was shot away, and her speed so reduced that she could not use her ram, and could hardly steer. She drifted down with the current and passed through both fleets before they could get up steam, and took refuge under the guns of Vicksburg.

This changed the whole situation. To save the ships which lay below the town, Farragut determined to follow the *Arkansas*, and endeavor to destroy her with the guns of his squadron as it went by. It was dark, however, before his squadron was ready. He passed the batteries without inflicting or receiving any serious damage. On the 27th, Davis sent down the ironclad "Essex" with one of Ellet's rams,¹ which attacked the *Arkansas* at her moorings, without much effect. The ram rejoined the upper squadron; but the "Essex" was so slow that to return against the current would expose her too long to the fire of the batteries at Vicksburg. The "Essex" and the ram "Sumter," which had run down with Farragut on the 15th, remained with the lower squadron.

On the 9th of July, orders were received from the Navy Department for Porter to take his mortar flotilla to Hampton Roads; and on the 20th, for Farragut to get his fleet below Vicksburg, with as little injury as possible. On the 24th Farragut started for New Orleans,² leaving three gunboats with the "Essex" and the "Sumter" to look after the river between Vicksburg and Baton Rouge. Williams's troops had suffered ter-

¹ 3 B. & L., 558. Until Nov. 8th, Ellet was independent of the naval commander.

² Mahan's *Farragut*, 193.

ribly from exposure to heat in that unhealthy climate. He had brought with him 3200 men, of whom 2400 were dead or in the hospital. This alone would have forced him to leave; but under orders from Butler,¹ whose force had been reduced² by sickness and other causes from 13,500 to about 8000 men, he returned with Farragut, and landed at Baton Rouge on the 26th.² Farragut left five vessels with Williams, and went with the rest to New Orleans.

Davis was much disappointed. He had expected to blockade Vicksburg on both sides, keeping communication between the two detachments of his squadron, by building a railroad across the neck. Now that Williams had "deserted" ^{Davis goes up the Mississippi.} him, the vessels below Vicksburg would have to go to Baton Rouge or New Orleans for supplies. Davis's communications in the rear³ were threatened and could be kept open only by gunboats,⁴ forty per cent. of his men were sick, his vessels needed repair, and he returned up the river.

So ended the second attempt to capture Vicksburg. The first had failed because a detachment of a few hundred men was too weak to carry and hold a fortress in the heart of the enemy's country defended by twice its number. The second attempt failed because Butler could not send a large force up the river without endangering New Orleans and Farragut's fleet, as well as his own army, and because Halleck divided up the great army he had assembled at Corinth, so that he was too weak to co-operate with Farragut. The first two volumes have told of the failure of the administration to co-ordinate the movements of the armies in

¹ 21 R., 31.

² Irwin, 50.

³ Davis's *Davis*, 267-269.

⁴ Mahan, *Farragut*, 194.

the several theatres of operations; in another chapter we will consider the relative importance of each; suffice it now to say that if troops could not be spared for the capture of Vicksburg, the fleets should not have been allowed to make the attempt.





CHAPTER II.

CONFEDERATE ADVANCES IN MISSISSIPPI: BATON ROUGE, IUKA, AND CORINTH.

ON the 21st of July, *Bragg* began to move¹ the Confederate Army of the Mississippi, for Chattanooga, by rail via Mobile. He left *Price* with about 14,000 men,² in command of the District of the Tennessee, with orders to hold the line of the Mobile and Ohio railroad, and above all to watch Grant, and prevent him from sending reinforcements to Buell; and *Van Dorn*³ with about the same number, with orders to hold the line of the Mississippi, and also to consult freely and co-operate with *Price*, without waiting for instructions from *Bragg*.⁴ *Price* and *Van Dorn* had a hard problem before them; but they held the interior lines, and we shall see how skilfully *Van Dorn* took advantage of them to throw his forces successively on each of the armies that were surrounding him.

As soon as the Federals left Vicksburg, *Van Dorn* resolved⁵ to strike a blow before they had time to or-

¹ Part II., 394.

² 25 R., 654; 2 B. & L., 725.

³ 2 B. & L., 726; 25 R., 655, 656.

⁴ On the 16th of July, there were reported present for duty in the Army of the Mississippi, 31,200; Army of the West, 10,900; at Columbus, 3200; near Abbeville, 3400.—25 R., 648.

⁵ 21 R., 16.

ganize for a new attack. He ordered *Breckenridge* to move upon Baton Rouge with a force of 5000 men picked from the troops at Vicksburg, and added to his command a force then under *Ruggles* at Camp Moore. He also ordered the *Arkansas* to co-operate with the land forces by a simultaneous attack from the river.

**Van Dorn
takes the
offensive.**

*Breckenridge*¹ reached Camp Moore on the 28th of July, and on the 30th advanced on Baton Rouge, with his effective force reduced by sickness to about 3000 men. He halted about ten miles from the city to wait for the *Arkansas*. On the 5th of August, hearing of her approach, he advanced against Williams, who was able to bring only about 2600 men into action. He drove back the first line; but saw nothing of the *Arkansas*, which had run ashore,² leaving the Federal gunboats in undisputed command of the river where they swept the shore with their fire. *Breckenridge*, realizing that Williams could fall back under their protection, did not renew the attack. On the 6th of August, the "Essex" approached the *Arkansas* in her helpless condition, and the latter was blown up by her own commander.

**Battle of
Baton
Rouge**

Breckenridge sent *Ruggles* with some of his troops to occupy and fortify Port Hudson,³ a much stronger position on the river, twenty miles above Baton Rouge. By *Van Dorn's* orders, he left about 1000 men there, and went with about 3000 of his⁷ division to rejoin *Bragg* in Tennessee. With a handful of men, *Van Dorn* had secured 200 miles of the Mississippi


**Brecken-
ridge
occupies
Port
Hudson.**

¹ 21 R., 76.


² 3 B. & L., 558, 579; Mahan's *Farragut*, 193.

³ 21 R., 795.


AUG. 1 1862



SEPT. 12
1862



OCT. 1
1862



EXPLANATION OF SIGNS

- ☐ 10,000 FEDERALS
- ◻ 5,000 " "
- ◻ 1,000 " "
- ◻ 10,000 CONFEDERATES
- ◻ 5,000 " "
- ◻ 1,000 " "
- CITIES, TOWNS, ETC.

ABBREVIATIONS

- | | |
|-------------------|--------------------|
| DN - DANVILLE | N.M. - NEW MADRID |
| FL - FULTON | N.O. - NEW ORLEANS |
| GJ - GR. JUNCTION | PC - POCAHONTAS |
| IU - IUKA | PH. - PORT HUDSON |
| JK - JACKSON | RN - RIENZI |
| CL - COLUMBUS | TP - TUPELO |
| CR - CORINTH | VK - VICKSBURG |
| MM - MEMPHIS | |

0 25 50 75 100 125 150 MILES

and the safe navigation of the Red River, cut off all communication between Farragut and Davis, and between Butler and Grant, and had opened for the Confederates the gate to Louisiana, Texas, and Mexico.

On the 17th of July,¹ Halleck went to Washington, as General-in-Chief of the Army, and Grant was left in temporary command of the District of West Tennessee, and of the Armies of the Tennessee and of the Mississippi. In the latter part of July, Hovey's² division of about 5000 men was sent to Curtis in Arkansas, and Thomas's³ division of about 7000,⁴ to Buell in Tennessee.

Federal
Army,
July, 1862.

On the 30th of July, Grant telegraphed⁵ to Halleck, that *Bragg* was moving his troops to Chattanooga, and that *Price* was at Holly Springs and Grand Junction with about 10,000 men; and asked permission to drive him south. Halleck consented⁶:

Situation
Aug. 1,
1862.

At any rate [he said] drive them out of West Tennessee, and carefully guard the railroad from Columbus to Decatur. . . . You must judge for yourself the best use to be made of your troops. Be careful not to scatter them too much; also to hold them in readiness to reinforce Buell at Chattanooga, if necessary.

Grant was ordered⁷ to handle without gloves all active sympathizers with the rebels, and to take their property for public use, to get all the forage and supplies he could from them and make them feel the presence of war.

Grant had about 64,000 men.⁸ He could easily drive the enemy from West Tennessee. There were

¹ Part II., 386. ² 25 R., 121. ³ Part II., 388. ⁴ 22 R., 36.
⁵ 25 R., 136. ⁶ 25 R., 142. ⁷ 25 R., 150. ⁸ 25 R., 144. See map, p. 25.

perhaps no Confederate troops there except cavalry. There were about 4000 men with *Villepigue* at Abbeville and 15,000 with *Price* at Tupelo. All the rest of those whom *Bragg* had left, except the garrison of Vicksburg and a few small posts, had gone south with *Breckenridge* to Baton Rouge. Grant had, as he well knew, a fine opportunity to strike a fatal blow at the Confederate army in his front; and there was nothing to interfere with his plans, except the order to hold his men in readiness to reinforce Buell at Chattanooga.

But about the middle of August, he was required¹ to send to Buell, Davis's division² of 4000 men and Paine's of 5000. On the 2d of September, he was authorized³ to abandon the railroad east of Corinth, and required to send Granger's division of 6000 to Louisville. By the 12th of September his force was reduced to 46,000 men.

On the 11th of August, *Bragg*, thinking that the success of his movement into Kentucky depended on keeping Grant from reinforcing Buell, ordered⁴ *Price* to press the enemy closely in West Tennessee, co-operating with *Price*, and when he joined him to take command of the whole force. On the 25th, *Bragg* ordered⁵ *Price* to watch his front and strike wherever it was weakened, and on the 29th, to watch Rosecrans and prevent a junction; or if he escaped, to follow him closely. For a diversion, the Confederate cavalry⁶ made a raid as far as Bolivar and did some slight damage to the railroad. On the 11th, of September, *Price*, hearing that Rosecrans was at

¹ 23 R., 337.⁴ 25 R., 675.² 25 R., 194.⁵ 25 R., 685.³ 25 R., 193.⁶ 24 R., 120.

Iuka with 10,000 men, marched in that direction with his whole army. His cavalry arrived on the 13th¹. A small detachment, left there to cover the removal of the stores, abandoned them; and on the 14th, *Price* entered the town.

Several days² before *Price* moved, Grant, seeing that an attack upon Corinth or some other point was contemplated, moved Hurlbut from Memphis towards Brownsville, and withdrew Rosecrans's troops at Iuka to the vicinity of Corinth. On the 10th, he reported³ to Halleck:

Grant's
uncertainty.

With all the vigilance I can bring to bear I cannot determine the object of the enemy. Everything threatens an attack here, but my fear is that it is to cover some other movement. It may have been instituted to prevent sending reinforcements to Wright [on the Ohio], or to cover a movement on New Orleans by Van Dorn, or to the east on General Buell.

This shows the disadvantage of exterior lines. Grant could learn of Farragut and Butler only by the ocean route. *Van Dorn* had first thrown a handful of troops into Vicksburg, and driven back Farragut, Williams, and Davis; then he had seized Port Hudson and secured the Mississippi: and now he was coming, with all the troops he could gather, to join *Price*, and help *Bragg* to win Kentucky by attacking Grant; or if too late for that, to clear Western Tennessee of the enemy,⁴ and push on into Kentucky along the Ohio River. This was indeed a brilliant plan. *Lee* was invading Maryland, and there was a panic in the North. Although Grant's forces were even then more numerous than those of *Van Dorn* and *Price*

Van Dorn's
plans.

¹ 25 R., 702, 121.

² 24, R., 64.

³ 25 R., 213.

⁴ 25 R., 696.

together, they were somewhat scattered; and *Van Dorn* hoped to fall upon one of the fractions before the others could come up; such an attack, however, could not succeed if Grant should take the proper measures to meet it.

On the 12th¹ of September,² Rosecrans³ commanded Grant's left wing at Corinth, Rienzi, Jacinto, and Danville; Ord,⁴ the centre at Jackson⁵ and Bolivar; Sherman,⁶ the right wing at Memphis; Quinby⁷ was in reserve near Columbus⁸ and Hurlbut,⁹ on the Hatchie River near Brownsville. On the 12th, Hurlbut was ordered to Bolivar. To prevent *Price* from crossing the Tennessee, and to be ready to defend Corinth in case it should be attacked by *Price* from the east and by *Van Dorn* from the west, Grant moved Ord to that point by rail.

The Tennessee River¹⁰ to the northeast,¹¹ and Bear Creek¹² a few miles east of Iuka were formidable obstacles to the movement of troops, and Grant proposed to surround *Price*, or to drive him against these streams and rout his army, before *Van Dorn* could come to help him. As Rosecrans¹³ was familiar with the ground, Grant deferred very much to him in his plans for the approach. Ord with 8000 men was to move by rail to Burnsville and then march by the north side of the railroad and attack *Price* from the northwest; while Rosecrans was to move¹⁴ eastward from Jacinto with about 9000 men, and leave a small force to hold the Jacinto road where it turns to the

**Grant's
disposi-
tions.**

**Grant's
plans.**

¹ See map p. 25. ² 25 R., 206. ³ With 17,000 men.


⁴ With 10,000 men. ⁵ Tennessee. ⁶ With 7000 men.

⁷ With 6000 men. ⁸ Kentucky. ⁹ With 6,000 men; 25 R., 215.

¹⁰ I Grant, 410; for Iuka and Corinth see also 2 Comte de Paris, 396, and Greene's *Mississippi*, 29.

¹¹ I Grant, 410. ¹² See map, p. 28. ¹³ I Grant, 408. ¹⁴ 24 R., 64-69.

IUKA AND CORINTH



northeast, while the main force was to move on the Fulton road which comes into Iuka farther east.

Grant had made a fair estimate¹ of his enemy's strength, and had thrown between *Price's* troops and *Van Dorn's* a force about equal to both together. If he had kept Rosecrans and Ord within supporting distance of each other, he would have had a fair chance to rout *Price* and *Van Dorn* in succession; but he was more ambitious, and in his effort to follow Rosecrans's plan of surrounding 14,000 or 15,000 men with 17,000, he deliberately gave *Price* the same advantage that he had so skilfully obtained for himself. The country for some distance between the two roads on which Grant was to advance, was impassable for cavalry and almost so for infantry, and if *Price* should throw all his forces on one of Grant's columns he could probably defeat it before the other could come to its aid.

On the morning of the 18th of September, Ord moved to Burnsville. He was to get as near the enemy as possible during the day, and intrench himself so as to hold his position until the next morning. Rosecrans was to be up by the morning of the 19th on the Jacinto and Fulton roads, and the attack was to be made from all three quarters simultaneously. Grant remained at Burnsville with a detachment of about 900 men from Ord's command, and communicated with his two wings by courier. Ord met the advance of the enemy soon after leaving Burnsville, drove them back, and took up a position about six miles from Iuka. Rosecrans's march was delayed through the fault of one of the guides. Grant notified Ord, and directed² him to be in readiness to attack

Grant's
movements,
Sept. 18th.

¹ 25 R., 214.

² 1 Grant, 411.

the moment he heard the sound of guns to the south or southeast.¹

Hamilton's division of Rosecrans's column reached² Barnett's by noon of the 19th, driving the enemy's cavalry skirmishes before it; but Rosecrans, instead³ of moving part of his force on to the Fulton road from this point, turned it all up on the road leading directly to Iuka. At about 4 P.M.,⁴ Hamilton arrived within a mile and a half of Iuka and formed in two lines across the road. Stanley's division followed in the road.

Price's men soon appeared. Early in the morning of the 19th,⁵ *Price* had received dispatches from *Van Dorn*⁶ saying that he had 9000 or 10,000 men at **Price's** Holly Springs and proposing that *Price* **movements.** should march to Rienzi and thence toward Pocahontas. About 2.30 P.M. he was preparing to march, when his pickets on the Jacinto road were driven in. He sent first *Hébert's* and then *Martin's* brigade of *Little's* division to meet the enemy.

At about 4.30 P. M., they encountered Hamilton's line, forced it back a few hundred yards, captured a **Battle of** battery in the road and spiked some of the **Iuka.** guns; but when Stanley came up, the Confederate advance was checked. Just as the two remaining brigades of *Little's* division reached the field, darkness put an end to the fight.

The wind had been blowing from the north and neither Ord nor Grant heard the firing which was to be

¹ On the 19th, to divert attention from his movements on Iuka, Grant sent a brigade of Hurlbut's division to make a demonstration in the neighborhood of Grand Junction and La Grange (22 R., 72-75).

² 24 R., 72-75.

³ 2 B. & L., 734.

⁴ See map, p. 28.

⁵ 25 R., 703; 24 R., 120, 121.

⁶ Dated 17th.

the signal for Ord to advance.¹ During the night *Price* unmolested,² withdrew by the Fulton road, which Rosecrans had failed to occupy.

On the morning of the 20th,³ Rosecrans and Ord went into Iuka with but little resistance. Grant says:

I immediately rode into town and found that the enemy was not being pursued even by the cavalry. I ordered pursuit by the whole of Rosecrans's command and went on with him a few miles in person. He followed only a few miles after I left him, and then went into camp, and the pursuit was continued no further. I was disappointed at the result of the battle of Iuka, but I had so high an opinion of General Rosecrans that I found no fault at the time.⁴

Rosecrans had escaped the danger to which he had been exposed; but he had failed to cut off *Price's* retreat, and it would seem that the least he could do would be to attack his retreating column. Iuka would have been open to him, Ord would have come up, and if Grant had attacked with his whole force, he might at least have inflicted some injury on *Price's* army before it could escape.

On the 25th of September, *Price* arrived at Baldwyn,⁵ and on the 28th, at Ripley, where he met *Van Dorn*, who took command of both **Price joins Van Dorn.** armies numbering in all about 22,200 men.⁶

¹ Rosecrans had sent dispatches to Grant at Burnsville, but owing to the density of the forest they were not received until after the fight. —24 R., 67, 68. ² 24 R., 68, 122. ³ 1 Grant, 413.

⁴ The Federal losses are reported as 790; the Confederate 497 (R., 78, 123). ⁵ 24 R., 376.

⁶ The troops that came with Van Dorn were organized into a division under Lovell, which numbered about 8000 men (25 R., 711, 706, 718). *Price's* two divisions, under Hébert and Maury, numbered respectively 7100 and 5300 of all arms, and his cavalry under Armstrong and Faulkner, about 2000.

*Van Dorn*¹ thought that he could attack Corinth from the west and northwest, drive Rosecrans back on the Tennessee, and cut him off; and then that Bolivar and Jackson would easily fall. Much labor had been spent on the defences of Corinth by *Beauregard* and Halleck; but the lines were too extensive to be held by Rosecrans's forces. The only line that he could occupy was scarcely half built, and *Van Dorn* hoped to surprise him before it was ready, and before some troops posted twelve or fifteen miles from the city could be called in.

To deceive the enemy as to his destination, *Van Dorn* first marched north to Pocahontas, about 18 miles west and a little north of Corinth, and arrived there on the 1st of October.² He then turned abruptly to the east, toward Corinth, crossed the Hatchie at 4 A.M.³ on the 2d, and bivouacked that night at Chewalla. At daybreak on the 3d he resumed his march.

On the 30th of September, Grant's forces,⁴ about 54,000, were stationed as shown on the sketch.⁵

Here was the opportunity for Grant to catch *Van Dorn's* 22,000 between Rosecrans's 23,000 around Corinth, and Ord's 18,000 near Jackson. If, as seemed likely, *Van Dorn* should attack Corinth, Rosecrans should be able to hold him in check until Ord could come up on his flank or rear.

¹ 24 R., 376.

² On the 22d of September (25 R., 710), *Van Dorn's* cavalry made an incursion as far north as Bolivar, but soon retreated, followed by the Federal cavalry (1 Grant, 414).

³ 24 R., 378.

⁴ 25 R., 245.

⁵ Sherman, 7000 at Memphis; [Ord, 18,000 near Jackson; Rosecrans, 23,000 near Corinth; and Dodge, 6000 at Columbus, New Madrid; etc. (see map, p. 25).

The country around Corinth¹ is flat, or gently rolling, and except at a few clearings, covered with oaks and undergrowth for miles in all directions. By the 3d of October, six open batteries west and northwest of the town were nearly completed,² and partly connected by breastworks or protected by abatis. Rosecrans withdrew to Corinth; leaving Oliver's brigade of McKean's division on the Chewalla road, about three miles northwest of Corinth, and the rest of McKean's and Davies's divisions about a mile and a half north of the town, Hamilton's still nearer, and Stanley's south of it in reserve.³

At daybreak of the 3d, *Van Dorn* advanced. He formed line of battle about three and a half miles from Corinth, and at 10 A.M.⁴ the two armies were engaged. Oliver's brigade⁵ was driven back. Meanwhile Hamilton's and Davies's divisions advanced; but Davies's flank was turned, and he was forced to fall back. At 11, Stanley's⁶ division moved forward. McKean fell back to touch his right on Davies's left. Stanley sent⁷ Mower's brigade to Davies's support. As Davies was forced back, Hamilton gradually changed front.⁸ At about 3.30 P.M., Rosecrans ordered him to face toward the west, and to move the division around until his left reached Davies's right; and told Davies to hold his ground obstinately, saying that when he had drawn the enemy in strongly, Hamilton would swing in on their flank and rear, and close the day.

Rosecrans's
dispositions.

Battle of
Corinth,
Oct. 3d.

¹ See map at end of volume.

² Of Rosecrans's 23,000 men he had perhaps assembled 20,000 (24 R., 170). For organization, see map at end of volume.

³ 2 B. & L., 740, 743, 744.

⁴ 24 R., 378.

⁵ *Ib.*, 167.

⁶ *Ib.*, 178.

⁷ *Ib.*, 197.

⁸ *Ib.*, 208.

Here we catch a glimpse of Rosecrans's emotional nature. How could he tell that this would close the day? He had done well to detain *Van Dorn* and find his point of attack; but he did not need more than one division for this purpose, and if he had kept the rest in reserve, he could at least have prepared his position for defence. He was wrong in attempting a complicated manœuvre in such a country; whoever could handle his men best in the woods would win. Hamilton's orders were perhaps not clear, and much time was lost in explaining them. Here, as afterwards at Chickamauga, it is hard to divide the responsibility between Rosecrans and his subordinate. In trying to execute the manœuvre, Hamilton's two brigades were separated,¹ and he accomplished nothing. *Van Dorn* also was emotional: "One hour more of daylight," he says, "and victory would have soothed our grief for the loss of our gallant dead, etc."

During the night, Rosecrans fell back on the batteries²; McKean, facing west, held the extreme left; and

Stanley, facing northwest, held Batteries
 Rosecrans's
 Dispositions
 for Oct. 4th. Williams and Robinett, the Memphis rail-
 road, and the Chewalla road; Davies,³ also

facing northwest, held the centre, reaching to Battery Powell north of the town. The artillery in general was protected by the earthworks and had a good field of fire except at long range. The ground in front was obstructed by fallen timber through which the enemy could only move slowly. It afforded them a little shelter when they halted to fire on the batteries; but in advancing over it, they were as much exposed as in the open. Of the infantry, McKean's men were perhaps protected by breastworks, but Stanley's were not,

¹ 24 R., 205.

² 24 R., 168.

³ 24 R., 258.

and Davies's had only such shelter as could be improvised with such logs as were at hand.¹ Hamilton, facing east of north, was on the right; his line was thus refused; but Dillon's battery, supported by two of Sullivan's regiments, was posted in an exposed position on the prolongation of Davies's line facing west.

Rosecrans says that against his better judgment, expressed at the time, he yielded to Hamilton's wishes and allowed the occupation of this site. *Van Dorn* was coming from the west, and this battery was well placed to oppose him if he moved straight on; but if he chose to swing around and approach from the north, the battery and its supports would be helpless; its right flank was in the air, and the enemy could steal up under cover of the woods without being exposed to fire. If, indeed, Rosecrans allowed the battery to remain on this position, he should have posted Hamilton's second line in a position to protect it. Rosecrans, as we shall see, was prone to yield to advice of his subordinate commanders on the battlefield.

The Confederates slept² on their arms, within 600 yards of the Federals. During the night, *Van Dorn* sent three batteries to the ridge overlooking the town from the northwest, to open fire on the town at 4 A.M. His orders were: for *Hébert*, on the left, to mass part of his division on his left; to put *Cabell's* brigade of *Maury's* division in echelon on the left also; to move *Armstrong's* cavalry brigade across the Mobile and Ohio railroad and, if possible, to get some of his artillery in position across the road. In this order of battle, he was directed to attack at daybreak with his whole force, swinging his left flank in toward Corinth, and to advance

Van Dorn's
plan for
Oct. 4.

¹ 24 R., 258.

² 24 R., 379.

down the Purdy Ridge. *Lovell*, on the right, with *Jackson's* cavalry on the extreme right on College Hill, was to await there, or to feel his way along slowly with his sharpshooters, until *Hébert* was heavily engaged with the enemy on the left. He was then to move rapidly to the assault, and force his right inward across the low grounds southwest of town. *Maury*, with the centre, was to move at the same time quickly to the front and directly at Corinth.

Such a plan could succeed only through a blunder of the enemy. *Van Dorn's* strength was about equal to that of *Rosecrans's*, and he knew it. He was right to mass his forces on the wing he proposed to attack; but he should not have thought that this would leave him strong enough to attack and surround the other wing. We shall see, hereafter, that a similar plan was attempted by a general who knew better, but who hoped for the best.

Daylight came and there was no stir on the left. As *Hébert*, who was to begin the attack, was sick, *Price* put *Green* in command of the left wing; and it was 8 o'clock before the proper dispositions for the attack at this point were made. In the meantime, the troops of *Maury's* left became engaged with the Federal sharpshooters, and the battle was brought on, and extended along the whole centre and left wing.

Green's lines crossed the railroad, and when within 200 yards of the Federal position, moved forward at double quick, climbing over logs, brush, and fallen timber, while the Federal batteries fired upon them with great slaughter. *Gates's* and *McLain's* brigades, in the centre of *Green's* division, attacked the Federal batteries in front; while *Colbert* on the left swung around

to the right so as to face to the south, and brought on an enfilade fire on Dillon's battery and Sullivan's advance line supporting it. *Green's*¹ own brigade followed, and prolonged the attack on the right.² Sullivan's two regiments gave way, and the limbers and caissons of Dillon's battery³ came at full speed down the road leading directly in rear of Davies's right and toward the town. The horses of the limbers and caissons of Davies's artillery became unmanageable, and many of them joined in the race, all running through his reserve and throwing it into confusion. This had a very demoralizing effect upon the infantry line. The Confederates gained Fort Powell, and came in on Davies's right flank. Mersey's brigade gave way; Sweeney's was enfiladed, and fell back.⁴ The fugitives of Sullivan's advanced line came pouring on in great numbers through his second line, which fired on the enemy with great effect,⁵ and drove them back out of sight.

At about 11 A. M. *Cabell's* brigade,⁶ which had been kept in reserve, was sent forward to the support of *Gates*, who had entered the earthwork but could not hold it. *Cabell* lost his direction, struck Du Bois's brigade and the batteries between the Purdy road and the railroad, and drove them back to the town.⁷ Stanley⁸ then ordered up a regiment from his reserve near the depot, and it poured a flanking fire on some of *Cabell's* men who followed the fugitives.

Immediately after *Cabell's* brigade advanced, *Phifer* and *Moore* prolonged the line on the Confederate right. *Phifer's* brigade⁹ advanced in four columns, the right directly against Fort Robinett. *Moore's* brigade fol-

¹ 24 R., 390.² 24 R., 259.³ 24 R., 240, 259.⁴ 24 R., 260.⁵ 24 R., 231.⁶ 24 R., 402, 394.⁷ 24 R., 194.⁸ 24 R., 180.⁹ 24 R., 185.

lowed, led by Colonel *Rogers*, who rode right up to the muzzle of one of the guns of Battery Robinett, where horse and rider fell together.¹ The assailants, however, were soon driven back by the fire of the cannoneers, who retired with their rifles to the wings of the battery, by the guns of Battery Williams in the rear, and by a counter charge of two of Stanley's regiments of infantry on the right.

Meanwhile, all along the line, the Confederates had lost so heavily that only one last effort was required to scatter them. Rosecrans in person brought Confederates up his last reserves.² Sullivan's second line repulsed. wheeled to the left, charged and retook the batteries, and turned the guns on the flying enemy. Buford, on the extreme right, after shattering *Colbert's* lines with the fire of infantry and artillery, advanced and drove them back.³ Davies's reserves rallied,⁴ and his troops regained their old position. Sullivan's reserve supported them, and came upon a few men of *Cabell's*, and perhaps of *Moore's* brigade, who had ventured into Corinth, and who were met by Stanley's regiment on the right, by Sullivan's on the left, and by parts of three or four regiments left to guard the city on every side; and all were either killed or captured. All along the line the loss of the Confederates in their flight and pursuit was terrible, and their loss in morale was even greater. On their extreme right, *Lovell's* division formed⁵ on the ridge south of the railroad, and was advancing against McKean's division on the Federal left; but when *Van Dorn* saw the failure of the attack on his left and centre, he directed *Lovell* to throw *Villepigue's* brigade rapidly to the centre to cover the broken

¹ 24 R., 181.² 2 B. & L., 751; 24 R., 169.³ 24 R., 217.⁴ 24 R., 233, 260.⁵ 24 R., 405.

ranks thrown back from Corinth and to prevent a sortie. *Lovell's* whole division was then moved to the left and rear to cover the retreat of the Confederate Army. Soon after noon, the battle was ended. *Van Dorn* had neither food nor water¹ for his troops, and had to fall back on his supply train which he had left at Chewalla, where he bivouacked² on the night of the 4th.

Rosecrans's dispositions for the 4th had been well made, excepting that Dillon's battery and its supports were left in advance of the line, so that when they were outflanked, the limbers and caissons came down like a column of chariots upon the flank of Davies's line while *Price's* infantry assaulted it in front, and rolled up one brigade after another; but it is a mistake to suppose that *Price's* men forced their way in solid column through Rosecrans's line, and captured his reserve artillery. The few that reached Corinth were quickly cared for by Rosecrans's own dispositions. It is misleading to speak of the battle of Corinth as an attack upon breastworks, for much of the fighting was in the open. The Confederates lost heavily, however, from the fire of the artillery in the redoubts, when they were advancing and retreating over the ground obstructed by fallen timber. *Van Dorn* had believed that the prospect and profit of a surprise should outweigh the danger of a possible failure; but he was too sanguine; there is no good reason to believe that if *Hébert* had not been sick, the result would have been different. He was severely censured for his defeat, and Rosecrans's reputation after this battle was, perhaps, second to that of none in the Federal Army.

Rosecrans's losses for October 3d and 4th are reported³ as 355 killed, 1841 wounded, and 324 missing—total

¹ 24 R., 387.

² 24 R., 380.

³ 24 R., 176; T. L. L., 94, 95.

2520. *Van Dorn's* are estimated as 473 killed, 1997 wounded, and 1873 missing—total 4233.

Meanwhile on the 3d, Grant, having learned that *Van Dorn's* troops were moving toward Corinth, made arrangements to surround them, directing¹ **Grant closes in.** Hurlbut, at Bolivar, to march on the enemy's rear by way of Middletown and Poca-hontas, and sending McPherson with four regiments directly from Jackson to Corinth. Hurlbut started² with about 6500 men at daylight of October 4th. At sunset he had crossed the Muddy River near Poca-hontas with one brigade, driving some Confederate cavalry before him. Now was the time for a vigorous pursuit; and Grant directed Rosecrans to follow up the enemy the moment they began to retreat. But Rosecrans thought his men were too tired, the heat was intense, and they had been fighting hard for two days; at four o'clock, however, McPherson reported with a fresh brigade, McKean's division had had a day of comparative quiet, and with these troops to lead, the others could have followed. Hurlbut was closing in from the north and west; and if Rosecrans had pursued with vigor from the east, they might perhaps have captured *Van Dorn's* whole army.

On the morning of the 5th, *Van Dorn* moved on toward Poca-hontas, and Rosecrans started the pursuit; but, from ignorance of the topography, his **Van Dorn crosses the Hatchie.** divisions³ trusted to their guides and soon came together on the same road. On the night of the 5th, the head of his column was only about fourteen miles from Corinth, and its rear about seven miles. Meanwhile, at 8 A. M. of the 5th, Ord arrived and assumed command of Hurlbut's

¹ 24 R., 158.² 24 R., 305.³ 24 R., 182, 210, 261, 244.

column, which moved forward from Pocahontas, and soon met *Van Dorn's* advance guard, and drove it for five miles¹ to and across the Hatchie River at Davis's bridge² so rapidly that it had not time to burn the bridge. Ord, who led this charge in person, was wounded, and Hurlbut was again in command. *Van Dorn*,³ finding that he would be too late to secure the bridge, turned to the left, and moved up the Hatchie for about six miles to the bridge at Crum's Mills, and crossed the river on the 6th before either Hurlbut or Rosecrans's main body could overtake him. On the 6th, he burned the bridges across the Tuscumbia and the Hatchie, and moved on to Ripley. McPherson⁴ rebuilt the bridges and kept close in his rear, followed by the rest of Rosecrans's command.

When Grant ascertained that the enemy had succeeded in crossing the Hatchie, he ^{Grant stops} ordered a discontinuance of the pursuit. _{the pursuit.}

This [he says in his report⁵] I regarded, and yet regard, as absolutely necessary to the safety of our army. They could not have possibly caught the enemy before reaching his fortifications at Holly Springs, where a garrison of several thousand troops were left that were not engaged in the battle of Corinth. Our own troops would have suffered for food and suffered greatly from fatigue.

Rosecrans dissented from Grant's views about the pursuit, and asked permission to go on.⁶ Grant ordered him to halt, and submitted the matter to Halleck, who allowed Grant to exercise his judgment, but inquired why he could not reinforce Rosecrans, and pursue the enemy into Mississippi, supporting⁷ his

¹ 24 R., 302.² Where the railway crosses.³ 24 R., 380, 158.⁴ 24 R., 369.⁵ 24 R., 158.⁶ 24 R., 163.⁷ 24 R., 156.

army on the country. Grant said that an army could not subsist itself upon the country except in forage, and ordered Rosecrans back. He had overestimated the strength of the enemy's forces and fortifications, and his own experience two months later proved that he was wrong in supposing that an army could not live off the country. On the other hand, Rosecrans, though an able and intelligent officer, was impulsive, and his dispatches to Grant showed a disposition to instruct him in his duties, rather than to carry out his plans. Grant's judgment was doubtless correct in recalling him, with a view to making other arrangements for a systematic advance.

Grant says¹:


The battle was recognized by me as being a decided victory, though not so complete as I had hoped for, nor nearly so complete as I now think was within the easy grasp of the commanding officer at Corinth. Since the war it is known that the result, as it was, was a crushing blow to the enemy, and felt by him much more than it was appreciated in the North.

Thus, seventeen days after *Lee* was driven back from Maryland, and four days before *Bragg* was driven from Kentucky, *Van Dorn* was disastrously defeated in his last effort to invade Kentucky from the West. His army was shattered, and never after did the Confederates assume the offensive in Mississippi.


¹ 1 Grant, 419, 420.




NOV. 1
1862



JAN. 1
1863



DEC. 1
1862



EXPLANATION OF SIGNS

- 10,000 FEDERALS
- 5,000 "
- 1,000 "
- 10,000 CONFEDS
- 5,000 "
- ▲ 1,000 "
- CITIES, TOWNS, ETC.
- VAN DORN'S AND FORREST'S ARMS

ABBREVIATIONS

- | | | |
|-----------------|------------------|---------------|
| AB-ABBEVILLE | HS-HOLLY SPRINGS | |
| BR-BATON ROUGE | IU-IUKA | |
| BL-BOLIVAR | JK-JACKSON | PN-PONCHATOUA |
| CA-CAIRO | LG-LAGRANGE | PT-PONTOTOC |
| CL-COLUMBUS | LX-LEXINGTON | RN-RIENZI |
| CR-CORINTH | MM-MEMPHIS | TR-TRENTON |
| GJ-GR. JUNCTION | NO-NEW ORLEANS | TP-TUPELO |
| GR-GRENADA | OX-OXFORD | UC-UNION CITY |
| HM-HUMBOLDT | PH-PORT HUDSON | VK-VICKSBURG |



CHAPTER III.

THE THIRD ADVANCE ON VICKSBURG.

THE battle of Corinth relieved Grant from any further anxiety for the safety of the territory within his jurisdiction. On the 16th of October he was placed¹ in command of the Department of the Tennessee, including Northern Mississippi, and the portions of Kentucky and Tennessee west of the Tennessee River.² He had, in round numbers, about 56,700 men present for duty.³ Some of these were new levies, and Halleck promised that many more would be collected as soon as possible.⁴ Grant⁵ was holding the Mobile & Ohio Railroad north of a point twenty-five miles south of Corinth, the Mississippi Central north of Bolivar, and the Memphis & Charleston from Corinth to Bear Creek.⁶ West of

Grant in
command
of Dept. of
Tenn.

¹ 25 R., 278.

² On the 24th of October, Rosecrans, as we have seen, was placed in command of the Department of the Cumberland (Part II., 415, 419). Grant says (1 Grant, 420): "I was delighted at the promotion of General Rosecrans to a separate command, because I still believed that when independent of the command of an immediate superior the qualities which I, at the time, credited him with possessing, would show themselves. As a subordinate I found that I could not make him do as I wished, and had determined to relieve him from duty that very day."

³ The troops were divided in round numbers between the four districts of this department as follows (25 R., 297, 311): Columbus, 5900, Corinth, 23,100, Jackson, 19,800, and Memphis, 7800.

⁴ See map, p. 43.

⁵ 1 Grant, 423.

Corinth, this railroad was destroyed or held by the Confederates.

As the opening up of the Mississippi River was from the first one of the greatest objects to be attained by the Federal Army, Grant realized that with the forces under his command it would be better to protect Western Tennessee by moving on towards Vicksburg than by remaining at the posts where Halleck had left them.¹

When *Van Dorn's* repulse² was known at Richmond, Major-General *Pemberton*, who commanded the

Pemberton Department of Mississippi and Eastern Louis-
in command iana, was made a Lieutenant-General, and
of Dept. of on the 14th of October, *Van Dorn* and *Price*³
Miss. and were placed under his orders.⁴ Their armies,
E. La. estimated at 25,700 men, were holding the

line of the Tallahatchie, with advanced posts at Holly Springs and Grand Junction.

On the 26th of October, 1862, Grant wrote to Halleck⁵:

You never have suggested to me any plan of operation in this department. . . . With small re-enforcements

Grant's at Memphis I think I would be able to move
plans. down the Mississippi Central road and cause
the evacuation of Vicksburg and be able to capture or destroy all the boats in the Yazoo River.

Halleck approved of his plan of advancing upon the enemy, and said that he hoped for an active campaign on the Mississippi this fall, that he hoped to give

¹ 1 Grant, 423.

² 25 R., 726.

³ 25 R., 728.

⁴ Pemberton's forces, which had been increased by the return of exchanged prisoners (25 R., 727, etc.), may be roughly estimated 25,700 (25 R., 766, 726, 727) present for duty in the active army, 4800 (25 R., 766) at Vicksburg, and 3500 at Port Hudson, Ponchatoula, etc. (21 R., 841), perhaps 1000 at Columbus, and some militia and exchanged prisoners at Jackson.

⁵ 25 R., 296.

him 20,000 additional men in a few days,¹ and that Curtis had been directed to reinforce Helena, and that if he could not operate on Little Rock, he could threaten Grenada. Halleck also said that a large force would ascend the river from New Orleans.

On the 13th of November, Grant's cavalry entered² Holly Springs and the Confederates fell back behind the Tallahatchie. Grant's supplies³ came by rail from Columbus,⁴ and as this was a long line to maintain in an enemy's country, he established a depot at Holly Springs. He also proposed to repair the railroad from Memphis to Grenada to supply his command after reaching that point.

Grant starts.

At about this time he went to Cairo to meet Admiral Porter, who had succeeded⁵ Davis in command of the Mississippi squadron, and who, before he had left Washington, had been told by the President that General McClelland had been ordered⁶ to raise an army to prosecute the siege of Vicksburg and that the President had expressed the hope that Porter would heartily co-operate with him. McClelland had been a Democratic Congressman from Illinois, and, at the outbreak of the Rebellion, had contributed great personal and political influence to the support of the Government.⁷ He had recently commanded a division of Grant's army, but had shown no military capacity that would fit him for such a command. Porter thought that Vicksburg never would be taken if it depended upon McClelland's raising an army sufficient for the purpose; and Grant proposed that he should send Sherman down the river from Mem-

Grant meets Porter.

¹ 24 R., 467.

² 24 R., 470.

³ 1 Grant, 427.

⁴ Tenn.

⁵ Porter, 283, 284.

⁶ 25 R., 502.

⁷ 7 N. & H., 135.

phis, while he, himself, would march from Holly Springs upon Grenada.

General Pemberton [says Porter in his history¹] would naturally march from Vicksburg to stop Grant at Grenada until reinforcements could be thrown into Vicksburg from the south, and while Pemberton was thus absent with the greater part of his army Sherman and Porter could get possession of the defences of Vicksburg.

As this plan was afterwards followed, it is only fair to Grant to note that he did not propose it until he had heard of McClelland's proposition.

At this time, however, Grant's orders did not authorize such a plan. On the 15th, he sent² for Sherman³ to meet him at Columbus, and after consultation, ordered him to "join him with two divisions and march them down the Mississippi Central Railroad if he could." At about the same time, Grant received a dispatch from Halleck⁴ saying that it was not advisable to put railroads in operation south of Memphis; and that the enemy must be turned by a movement down the river from Memphis as soon as sufficient force could be collected. On the 24th, Grant reported the orders that he had given for an attack on *Pemberton*, and asked if he should countermand them.⁵ Halleck approved the movements, but added: "Do not go too far."

Curtis had made arrangements to co-operate with Grant; and Steele, who commanded at Helena, having learned that Grant was advancing, sent out a small party of cavalry⁶ and infantry⁷ under Hovey to attack *Pemberton* in flank and rear. Hovey⁸ crossed the

¹ Porter, 284. ² Grant, 427; 1 Sherman, 307. ³ At Memphis.

⁴ 24 R., 470. ⁵ 24 R., 471. ⁶ 2000. ⁷ 5000. ⁸ 24 R., 528-532.

Mississippi from Helena to Delta on the 27th, and arrived at the mouth of the Coldwater on the 28th. The cavalry under Washburn reached the Mississippi Central Railway seven miles north of Grenada on the 29th, and after doing some damage fell back on the infantry. On the 29th,¹ Grant advanced from Holly Springs. The Confederates had fortified a strong position along the Tallahatchie, but fell back when Grant and Hovey advanced. On the 2d of December Grant crossed the river, and occupied Abbeville. On the 26th of November,² Sherman started from Memphis, and on the 29th³ arrived at College Hill with three small divisions⁴ and on the 2d of December, crossed the Tallahatchie.

Grant advances to the Tallahatchie.

On the 4th, Grant reported⁵ that with his present force it would not be safe to go beyond Grenada and attempt to hold his present lines of communication, and asked if it would not be well to hold the enemy south of the Yalobusha, and move a force from Memphis and Helena on Vicksburg. He said he thought that if the Helena troops were at his command, it would be practicable to send Sherman to take them and the Memphis troops south of the mouth of the Yazoo River, and secure Vicksburg and the State of Mississippi.⁶ On the 7th of December, Halleck, who supported

Grant authorized to move as he may deem best.

¹ 24 R., 471. ² 25 R., 361, 362. ³ 1 Sherman, 308; 1 Grant 427.

⁴ 16,000 viz.: 18,252 (24 R., 471) less four regiments of infantry, one battalion of artillery, two regiments of cavalry.

⁵ 24 R., 472.

⁶ Halleck said (24 R., 473) that Bragg might cross at Decatur and attack Corinth and that Grant's main object would be to hold the line from Memphis to Corinth with as small a force as possible, while the largest number possible should be thrown upon Vicksburg with the gunboats, adding that the President might insist upon designating a separate commander for the Mississippi expedition.

Grant to the best of his ability, finally told¹ him to move his troops as he might deem best to accomplish the great object in view.

Accordingly on the 8th, he sent² Sherman back to Memphis with one of his divisions, with orders to organize the troops there and as soon as possible to move with them down the river to Vicksburg. Grant halted at Oxford with his advance seventeen miles farther south.

Grant
divides his
command.

He says in his memoirs³:

My action in sending Sherman back was expedited by a desire to get him in command of the forces separated from my direct supervision. . . .⁴ Neither my orders to General Sherman, nor the correspondence between us or between General Halleck and myself, contemplated at the time my going farther south than the Yalobusha. Pemberton's force in my front was the main part of the garrison of Vicksburg, as the force with me was the defence of the territory held by us in Western Tennessee and Kentucky. I hoped to hold Pemberton in my front while Sherman should get in his rear and into Vicksburg. The further north the enemy could be held the better. It was understood, however, between General Sherman and myself that our movements were to be co-operative; if Pemberton could not be held away from Vicksburg I was to follow him; but at that time it was not expected to abandon the railroad north of the Yalobusha. With that point as a secondary base of supplies, the possi-

¹ 24 R., 473.

² 24 R., 474; 1 Sherman, 311; 1 Grant, 429.

³ 1 Grant, 430.

⁴ "I feared the delay might bring McClelland, who was his senior and who had authority from the President and Secretary of War, to exercise that particular command,—and independently. I doubted McClelland's fitness; and I had good reason to believe that in forestalling him I was by no means giving offence to those whose authority to command was above both him and me."

bility of moving down the Yazoo until communications could be opened with the Mississippi was contemplated. It was my intention, and so understood by Sherman and his command, that if the enemy should fall back I would follow him even to the gates of Vicksburg. I intended in such an event to hold the road to Grenada on the Yalobusha and cut loose from there, expecting to establish a new base of supplies on the Yazoo, or at Vicksburg itself, with Grenada to fall back upon in case of failure. It should be remembered that at the time I speak of it had not been demonstrated that an army could operate in an enemy's territory depending upon the country for supplies.

Grant's object then was, either to capture Vicksburg by surprise or to establish a large force on the upland, where it could be in touch with the fleet, and be supplied by water without exposing the vessels to the fire of the batteries at Vicksburg. If he could get possession of Haynes's Bluff¹ on the Yazoo just north of Vicksburg, the supply boats could come up this river from the Mississippi. Grant knew that the Confederates were building batteries there, which would control the navigation of the Yazoo. In order to reduce them, he was sending Sherman with a large force down the Mississippi to attack the position in front; while he himself, with a somewhat larger one, proposed to engage the attention of *Pemberton's* army on the Yalobusha.

The division of Grant's forces was not in accordance with sound principles; for it gave *Pemberton*, who held the interior lines, an opportunity to throw Comments. all his forces upon either fraction of Grant's army.² It has been said in favor of the plan adopted, that if unsuccessful, Sherman could fall back upon the fleet on the Mississippi River, and Grant upon his base to the

¹ *I* Sherman, 310.

² See map, p. 43.

north. This, however, would not accomplish the object of the expedition. General Sherman says¹ that the essence of the whole plan was, for him to reach Vicksburg, as it were, by surprise, while Grant should hold *Pemberton's* army in check about Grenada, leaving Sherman to contend only with the smaller garrison of Vicksburg. It is hard to see how, in a hostile country, such an expedition could be fitted out and embarked without the knowledge of the enemy.

If the expedition down the Mississippi had been ready to start early in December, so as to arrive before the Yazoo Basin was overflowed,² it might have been practicable to leave only a small force to defend the line of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad; and send all the rest down the river to open up a road across the Basin, as Grant had proposed,³ and turn the right flank of *Pemberton's* position at Haynes's Bluff, or to cross the point of land on the western bank so as to land at the foot of the bluffs below Vicksburg, as recommended by an officer of his staff.⁴ Another plan, however, would be to send a large force overland; and a small force down the river, which if it did not meet with too much resistance, would move up the Yazoo, or, if this were impossible, would await the arrival of Grant from the north, or of the expedition to ascend the Mississippi from the south. Grant, as he suggests, would establish a secondary base at Grenada, and repair the railroad between that point and Memphis. Farther south, the enemy, as they fell back,

¹ Sherman, 313.

² The Mississippi River is usually at its lowest in November and December and then rises rapidly until in April it reaches at Vicksburg a height of forty-five or fifty feet.

³ 36 R., 8.

⁴ On arriving at Milliken's Bend. See p. 234.

would probably destroy the railroad, so that he could not depend upon it for his supplies; but a good wagon road leads along the divide midway between the Yazoo and the railroad, which is comparatively dry even in wet weather; in many places the fields on either side of the road are passable for wagons; and he could, as he says, cut loose from his base, live on the country, and march straight for Vicksburg driving *Pemberton's* army before him or routing it. He would then, in all probability, take Yazoo City and Haynes's Bluff in the rear, meet Porter on the Yazoo, and draw his supplies from the Mississippi. If, however, he failed, he could fall back upon Grenada, and then advance more slowly, repair the railroad, if necessary, and open up the bayous between the upper Yazoo and the Mississippi. His troops would have hard work before them, but not so hard, nor so unhealthy, as that which they endured on the banks of the Mississippi during the winter and spring. Grant's army, assembled at Grenada, would be better placed to cooperate with the Army of the Cumberland than if the greater part of it were on the banks of the Mississippi near Vicksburg. This plan is similar to that on which Grant started the campaign, and to one afterward urged by Sherman because it was in accordance with the principles of strategy. The campaigns which followed, from the first division of forces up to the surrender of Vicksburg, will perhaps be better understood by comparison with this plan.¹

¹On the 8th of December (25 R., 474) when Grant sent Sherman back, he so reported to Halleck, adding "He will have a force of about 40,000 men. Will land above Vicksburg, up the Yazoo, if practicable, and cut the Mississippi Central Railroad and the railroad running east from Vicksburg where they cross Black River." On the 9th, Halleck cautioned him not to make the Mississippi expedition

In the middle of November, while Grant was dividing his army, *Pemberton* was calling¹ for reinforcements. *The Secretary of War* told *Bragg* to do what in his judgment was necessary to save Vicksburg from capture, and asked *Holmes* in Arkansas if he could not send 10,000 troops to Vicksburg. *Bragg* thought he could not evacuate Middle Tennessee; but on the 21st of November, sent *Forrest* with 2500 cavalry to cut Grant's communications in West Tennessee,² and soon after sent³ *Vaughn's* brigade to Meridian. On the 22d, *Holmes* answered from Little Rock that he could not get to Vicksburg in less than two weeks; and that if he could protect Arkansas from the enemy on her border, he should think himself fortunate.

On the 24th of November, General *Joseph E. Johnston*⁴ was assigned to the command of the country between the Blue Ridge and the Mississippi River, including⁵ the departments of *Bragg*, *Kirby Smith*, and *Pemberton*. *Johnston* urged that *Holmes*, in Arkansas,⁶ and *Pemberton* with *Bragg's* co-operation, should unite and fall upon Grant, and defeat him; and then that *Holmes* could move to Missouri. This was the true principle to guide the strategy of the Mississippi Valley; but at that time it was impracticable. The Arkansas troops did not propose to give up their State and the prospect of conquering Missouri; and the Missouri troops who had

so large as to endanger West Tennessee. Under Grant's orders it is hard to see how he could have helped dividing his strength; but in his *Memoirs*, he distinctly speaks of the idea as his own. (1 *Grant*, 429, 430.)

¹ Nov. 18th.; 25 R., 751-2.

² 25 R., 755.

³ 25 R., 769, 773.

⁴ Who had recovered from the wounds received at Fair Oaks.

⁵ 25 R., 757; B. & L., 3, 473.

⁶ 25 R., 758.

crossed the Mississippi with *Price* were already clamoring to return.

Meanwhile, *Pemberton* called¹ into Vicksburg all troops that could be spared from Columbus, Jackson, and Ponchatoula.²

Forrest and his cavalry left Columbia, Tennessee, on the 11th³ of December, crossed the Tennessee River on the 15th, met⁴ a regiment of Federal cavalry at Lexington and routed it. Grant had sent⁵ out parties to intercept him from Fort Henry in Tennessee, and from Corinth⁶ and Oxford in Mississippi. On the 18th, *Forrest* pushed rapidly on to Jackson; and on the 20th, finding it too strong to be assailed, moved north along the line, took Humboldt, which was weakly garrisoned, and Trenton, which was feebly defended, and on the 21st arrived at Union City after taking many prisoners, damaging the railroad, and destroying the bridges and supplies all along the line.

Forrest's
raid.

On the 25th,⁷ he turned back and followed the railroad southeast from Union City. On the 31st, he was at Parker's Cross Roads, ten or twelve miles north of Lexington, where he encountered Sullivan who was pursuing him with about 4000 men.⁸ After a hard fight, *Forrest* escaped with the loss of about 600; Sullivan lost about 200. *Forrest* recrossed the Tennessee at Clifton on the 1st of January, 1863.

¹ 25 R., 763.

² He had (Dec. 1st) present for duty 24,000 of all arms on the Tallahatchie, 6000 around Vicksburg, and 6000 at Port Hudson (25 R., 766, 784).

³ 24 R., 593.

⁴ Under the celebrated Col. R. G. Ingersoll, who, with many of his men, was taken prisoner.

⁵ 25 R., 428.

⁶ 24 R., 550; 25 R., 400 ff., 457.

⁷ 24 R., 512.

⁸ 24 R., 595.

Meanwhile *Van Dorn*, anxious to redeem the reputation he had lost at Corinth, had assembled about 3000, or perhaps 3500,¹ cavalry at Pontotoc and **Van Dorn's** personally made a dash with them at Grant's **raid.** great depot at Holly Springs. Colonel Murphy, who with about 1000 fighting men commanded the post, took no steps to protect, or even to barricade the place; and did not notify a single officer of his command of the danger, although he had received a telegram from Grant that they were coming. On the morning of the 20th, *Van Dorn* appeared,² surprised Murphy's men in their beds, captured and paroled the garrison, and destroyed the accumulated stores. *Van Dorn* then moved north as far as Bolivar, and attacked³ the small garrisons of about 200 men each that were intrenched as guards to the railroad, but was repulsed at every point. On the 24th, overtaken by the Federal cavalry at Bolivar, he turned back and eluded all the detachments that Grant sent⁴ out to intercept him.

The success of these raids has been urged as a proof that Grant's plan of campaign was radically wrong, because **Comments** his army of some 40,000 men would depend **on Grant's** for its supplies upon a single-track railroad **line of** 200 miles long exposed to a flank attack from **operations.** an enemy's country.⁵ Grant was not seriously

¹ Dec. 31st, 3853 were reported (25 R., 814).

² 1 Grant, 433.

³ 25 R., 518.

⁴ 24 R., 502.

⁵ Grant's plan was very properly, to protect the depots, bridges, and those parts of the railroad that were hard to repair by small parties so strongly intrenched that they could hold out for a while; and to station at intervals along the line troops enough to overpower the raiders before they could reduce the small posts. Cavalry, of course, would be best for this service; but infantry moving by wagon or by rail could take their place if the cavalry were not at hand. Grant had so little force on the north of his line that Sullivan had to withdraw the small posts to gather a force large enough to meet Forrest.

to blame for the loss of his depot, which occurred through the treachery, or perhaps the imbecility, of the post commander. The small posts held out and the damage to the track was soon repaired. If Grant's cavalry officers had been more alert after they sighted *Van Dorn*, they would have given him little opportunity to tear up the railroad. Such are the chances of war to which the best of commanders are exposed, and they are met by providing force enough to supply such failures. But if Grant had had with him the troops that he sent down the river from Memphis; he could not only have protected his communications, but could have pushed on so vigorously that *Pemberton* could not have spared any cavalry. Nor could any large Confederate force attack Grant's line of operations on the flank without so weakening either *Bragg's* or *Pemberton's* army as to lose more than it would gain. In fact, if *Forrest's* cavalry had been at Murfreesboro, it might perhaps have turned the scale of the battle against Rosecrans. The best way to defend such a line is to push on and keep up the pressure. This principle Grant fully appreciated, but in his awkward position, did not then feel justified in applying it.

On the 18th, Grant received an order from Halleck to divide the troops¹ in his department into four army corps; saying that it was the wish of the President that McClernand's corps should constitute a part of the river expedition, and that he should have the immediate command under Grant's direction. On the same day,² Grant sent dispatches to McClernand at Springfield, Illinois, and to Sherman at Memphis; but the telegraph wires

¹ 24 R., 476.

¹ Grant, 432.

were cut, and the dispatches did not arrive in time for McClelland to join the expedition.

This order had, of course, an important bearing on Grant's future plans. Several weeks might be required to repair the railroad. His first attempt had failed. The only chance of success now was to concentrate all possible force on one line of operations or the other. The expedition down the river was now inevitable; the advance overland was therefore impracticable; and he wisely decided that his true course was to abandon it, to open the railroad from Memphis to Grand Junction, leave troops enough to defend it and to protect Western Tennessee from invasion, send the rest down the river, and go in person to command the expedition.

On the 20th of December, according to McPherson's suggestion, Grant ordered him to withdraw all the troops to the north side of the Tallahatchie;¹ and on the 21st,² asked Halleck's permission to send two more divisions to Memphis, and to join the river expedition with them, which, he said, would make it necessary to fall back to Bolivar.

He explained³ that it was perfectly impracticable to go farther south by the route he was following, depending upon the railroad for supplies, and that the country did not afford them.

He sent out his wagons to collect and bring in all supplies of forage and food from the country within fifteen miles of the railroad from his front back to Grand Junction, and was amazed at the quantity the country afforded.

Grant finds that Mississippi abounds in supplies.

¹ 25 R., 445.

² 24 R., 477.

³ 24 R., 478.

It showed [he said] that we could have subsisted off the country for two months, instead of two weeks, without going beyond the limits designated.

He says in his memoirs that, after the war, he learned¹ that *Pemberton's* retreat from the Tallahatchie was almost a panic.

Had I known of the demoralized condition of the enemy, or the fact that central Mississippi abounded in all army supplies, I would have been in pursuit of Pemberton while his cavalry was destroying the roads in my rear.

On the 21st,² Grant heard that *Bragg* was in motion for Corinth, and made preparation to meet him; but the report proved to be false, and he proceeded at once to repair the railroad back to Grand Junction and thence to Memphis.³ On the 31st,⁴ his troops were posted⁵ as shown on the map: making in all about 48,000⁶ present for duty,⁷ besides about 25,000 with Sherman. On the 10th of January, 1863, the work on the road from Holly Springs to Grand Junction and thence to Memphis was completed,⁸ and Grant moved his headquarters to Memphis. Sherman had been left to his fate owing to causes which seem to have been inherent in the plan adopted.

Grant falls
back to
Memphis.

On the 17th of November, after meeting Grant at Columbus, Sherman notified Porter that he had heard that the Confederates intended to fortify the mouth of the Yazoo, and suggested that he should send one of his ironclads

Ironclads
sent to the
Yazoo.

¹ I Grant, 434.

² 25 R., 451.

³ I Grant, 438.

⁴ 25 R., 512.

⁵ See map, p. 43.

⁶ 21,000 on the line of the Tallahatchie, 18,000 on the Memphis & Charleston Railroad, and 9000 in Northwestern Tennessee and Western Kentucky.

⁷ Apparently some 4000 at Parker's Cross Roads are not included in the return (24 R., 513).

⁸ I Grant, 438.

there to prevent it. On the 21st of November,¹ Porter sent a large force there with orders to hold the position until the army should be ready to land.

Sherman² arrived at Memphis on the 12th of December, embarked on the 20th with about 16,000³ men, and was joined at Helena by 9,000⁴ more. The whole party then moved down the river,⁵ escorted by Porter's gunboats, and arrived at Millikens Bend on the 25th.

Porter arrived in person on the 23d, and went up the Yazoo with ironclads, gunboats, tinclads, and rams. The vessels he had already sent had removed⁶ the torpedoes near the mouth of the river, and secured two landing places for the army, but not without the loss of the "Cairo," one of the best gunboats, which was sunk by a torpedo. By three days' hard labor under musketry fire from the banks, the fleet worked up to a point within range of the enemy's heavy batteries at Haynes's Bluff.

On the morning of the 25th, Sherman sent⁷ out two brigades to the Vicksburg & Shreveport Railroad, destroyed the roadway and bridges for many miles, and cut off the supplies that were coming to Vicksburg from the west. On the same day, according to his promise made to Grant, he had most of his force at the mouth of the

¹ 3 B. & L., 559, 580; 25 R., 356; Soley's *Porter*, 252, 259, 260. See Map III., at end.

² 1 Sherman, 313; 24 R., 601.

³ 25 R., 602.

⁴ 25 R., 604. From a comparison of all the published returns, it is probable that the figures in Sherman's report refer to the aggregate present; those in the text refer to those present for duty.

⁵ 25 R., 605.

⁶ *G. & I. W.*, 117, 118; 3 B. & L., 560; 25 R., 884-5.

⁷ 24 R., 605.

Yazoo, where he met Porter and the naval squadron. Sherman lost valuable time in destroying the railroad; a wise precaution in itself, but hardly consistent with the plan of surprising the enemy at the Yazoo.

Johnston had protested against weakening *Bragg's* army to reinforce *Pemberton*, and President Davis came to Chattanooga and Murfreesboro in person to decide the question. On the 18th of December, he ordered *Bragg* to send *Stevenson's* division of about 10,000 men¹ to *Pemberton*, who,² on the 1st of December, falling back before Grant, took up a position behind the Yalobusha with his headquarters at Grenada. *Vaughn's*³ brigade from *Bragg's* army arrived there on the 17th.

On the 21st,⁴ the day after Sherman left Memphis, *Pemberton*, having received information that a large fleet of gunboats and transports was moving down the Mississippi River for the supposed purpose of taking Vicksburg, sent *Vaughn's* brigade there to reinforce *Martin L. Smith*; and on the 24th, learning that gunboats had arrived at the mouth of the Yazoo, and that the transports were not far behind, sent *Gregg's*⁵ brigade there also.

The high ground called Walnut Hills and sometimes Chickasaw Bluffs, which forms the eastern boundary of the Yazoo Basin, runs a little west of south for ten or eleven miles from the Yazoo River at Haynes's Bluff to the Mississippi just north of Vicksburg.⁶ At that time, the Yazoo flowed southwest and emptied into the Mississippi

¹ Davis then went with *Johnston* to Jackson and Vicksburg, and then on the 21st to *Pemberton's* army near Grenada (25 R., 800, 801).

² 25 R., 784.

³ 25 R., 793.

⁴ 24 R., 665, 666.

⁵ See Map III., at end.

⁶ Atlas, R., 37, 4; 25 R., 879.

about six miles west of this city. The rivers and the bluff enclosed an area¹ of bottom land, densely wooded except at one or two plantations, and intersected with low swampy ground and old river beds, one of which was called Chickasaw Bayou, one Thompson's Lake; and one "The Lake." Parallel to the line of bluffs, and a few hundred yards from it, lay a line of natural obstructions extending from the Yazoo to the Mississippi. First a swamp, and then part of Chickasaw Bayou and "The Lake," containing considerable water, and not to be crossed without bridging excepting at a causeway just south of Chickasaw Bayou, a shallow place half a mile north, and a "Sand Bar" a mile south. From the end of the old beds to the Mississippi was a dense swampy wood near the Race Course, subject to overflow and intersected by deep bayous that could only be crossed by bridges. The ground thus formed a natural fortification connecting the Confederate positions at Haynes's Bluff and at Vicksburg, both of which were defended by heavy batteries.

Martin L. Smith had done all that he could to strengthen his position with rifle-pits, batteries, and abatis. On the 26th, he placed about 5400 **Confederate defences.** men under *S. D. Lee* in position to defend the points exposed. This left about 2300 of all arms to guard the city of Vicksburg and man the heavy guns.² At 12 M. *Pemberton* arrived in person.

On the 26th, the Federal fleet proceeded up the Yazoo; and in the afternoon Morgan's, Morgan L.

¹ 24 R., 672, 606; 1 Sherman, 318.

² Lee sent Col. Withers with 1200 infantry and two guns to Mrs. Lake's about a mile in front of his main line of defence.

Smith's, and Steele's divisions landed at and near Johnson's plantation, and at once sent **Federals** forward Blair's, Stuart's, and De Courcsey's **land.** brigades, respectively, to clear the roads¹ for two or three miles.²

The 27th and 28th were spent by the Federal troops in getting into position. The distance from Johnson's plantation to the Confederate position was only three or four miles; but the country was unknown. The roads were of course obstructed and defended by the enemy's advanced parties; and in the swamps and thickets intersected by bayous, it was hard for the troops to find their way or for the officers to exercise any general control. Steele's division took the wrong road and lost a day in countermarching. Morgan was very slow.³ Morgan L. Smith was obliged to remove⁴ the abatis in front of his position along the old bed under fire of the enemy in their rifle-pits on the opposite bank. A. J. Smith landed on the 27th, moved out at 8 A. M., of the 28th, and overtook Morgan L. Smith.⁵ During the early part of the day, a heavy fog enveloped⁶ the whole country.⁷

¹ 24 R., 606.

² Blair of Steele's division, and Stuart of Smith's, followed the Vicksburg road, De Courcsey of Morgan's the Chickasaw Bayou.

³ 24 R., 624, 686, 648. ⁴ 24 R., 625. ⁵ 24 R., 627. ⁶ 24 R., 607.

⁷ On the morning of the 27th Morgan's division advanced toward Mrs. Lake's, Blair came up and skirmished with Withers, Morgan L. Smith's division turned off to the right and drove the enemy's skirmishers to the main line of defence at the "Sand Bar." Blair reported to Morgan, who then attacked Withers with about 6000 men, but was held in check all day. On the same morning, Steele with Hovey's and Thayer's brigades re-embarked with orders to land above the mouth of Chickasaw Bayou and advance between this bayou and Thompson's Lake, but through a mistake of the negro guide he landed above the mouth of the lake and followed Blake's levee along its northern bank.

Meanwhile,¹ the navy made a demonstration against Haynes's Bluff, exchanging fire with the Confederate batteries for two hours to make them believe that that was the intended point of attack.

During the evening and night of the 27th, *Vaughn's* and *Gregg's* brigades arrived from Grenada, and Confederate *Barton's* brigade from *Stevenson's* division reinforced *Bragg's* army in Tennessee.² Before daylight they were moved to the front.³

Sherman ⁴ had not heard one word from Grant, who was supposed to be pushing south; nor from **Decides** Banks, who had succeeded Butler in Louisiana, and was supposed to be ascending the **to Attack.** Mississippi.

Time being everything to us [he says] I determined to assault the hills in front of Morgan on the morning of

At about noon of the 28th, Morgan drove back the enemy to his main line of defence along The Lake. In the afternoon, Morgan sent Blair to the left across Chickasaw Bayou to prepare to storm the right of the enemy's works. Early in the morning Morgan L. Smith exchanged fire with the enemy behind their rifle-pits and the levee at the Sand Bar. He was disabled, and Stuart took command. Steele, unable to advance along the causeway, was ordered to return in steamboats to support Morgan. He arrived during the night.

¹ 25 R., 884; Porter, 286.

² 24 R., 666.

³ Vaughn was assigned to the command of the left at the Race Course, Barton of the centre, fronting on the Sand Bar, and Lee of the right, reaching to Haynes's Bluff. Gregg was held in reserve.

On the morning of the 28th, a regiment was sent from Vaughn (24 R., 679) to Lee; and in the afternoon, one from Barton (24 R., 677) to Lee, and one from Gregg to Barton (24 R., 677).

On the night of the 28th, Vaughn at the Race Course had about 1400 infantry, Barton at the Sand Bar, 2250; Lee (24 R., 682) between the Sand Bar and Chickasaw Bayou, 500; at the Bayou, 2100; at Blake's Levee, 1000; and at Haynes's Bluff, 1300; Gregg in reserve, 1850; about 900 artillerymen and 34 guns all along the line, largely employed as infantry.

⁴ 24 R., 607.

the 29th—Morgan's division to carry the position to the summit of the hill; Steele's division to support him and to hold the county road. I had placed A. J. Smith in command of his own division and that of Morgan L. Smith, with orders to cross on the sand spit, undermine the steep bank of the bayou on the farther side, and carry at all events the levee parapet and first line of rifle-pits, to prevent a concentration on Morgan.

Morgan was to give the signal for the assault. De Courcey was to cross the causeway which *Lee*, it appears, had purposely left open to allure his enemy into the focus of his fire; and Blair, across the bayou on his left, to charge the works in his front. At daybreak of the 29th,¹ Morgan gave orders for Patterson, his engineer, to throw a ponton bridge across The Lake on the right² about 700 yards south of the causeway, for Lindsey's and Sheldon's brigades to cross.

At about noon the signal was given. On the extreme left, Blair found that the bed of the bayou he had to cross³ was about 100 yards in width, covered with deep water for about 15 feet, obstructed by abatis, and swept by the fire of the enemy's rifle-pits and batteries. Blair had with him about 1800 men, drawn up in two lines. When the signal for attack was given, they rushed forward across the bayou, carried the enemy's first line of rifle-pits with fearful loss, and pushed on to within a short distance of their last line.⁴

Left
attack.

On Blair's right, De Courcey's brigade,⁵ say 2000 men, advanced in two lines. The left of each line crossed the causeway, deployed in the open ground, and advanced to the attack; the right was delayed by a dense abatis.

¹ 24 R., 638.

² 24 R., 657.

³ 24 R., 655.

⁴ 24 R., 652.

⁵ 24 R., 649.

On De Courcey's right,¹ Patterson attempted repeatedly to lay the ponton bridge; but was driven back by a hot fire of musketry and shell. Before firing the signal, Morgan had ordered Lindsey with his own brigade, Sheldon's, and two regiments of Thayer's, to advance to the assault by crossing The Lake at a narrow place on the right, in case the ponton bridge was not yet built; but Lindsey found it impossible.² Meanwhile, Steele had come³ up to Morgan's support with Thayer's brigade, Hovey's following. Morgan asked Steele to turn part of the troops a little farther to the right; and Thayer with his infantry to cross the bayou, enter the enemy's works, and take the hill. Thayer crossed⁴ the bayou and advanced a short distance, followed⁵ by his leading regiment, which he then deployed on De Courcey's right. Through a misunderstanding, all the rest of Thayer's brigade turned off to the right. Hovey was too late to fight.

Blair, De Courcey, and Thayer advanced with about 2300 men. They were met in front by the fire of 1500 men in rifle-pits, and in front and flank by eight guns at short range. The Confederate fire was so severe that the assailants lay down to avoid it.⁶ Four more guns and 700 infantry then came up on *Lee's* left flank and 700 infantry on his right flank. Several hundred Federal prisoners were captured, and the rest were driven back with heavy loss.

Speaking of this attack, Sherman says in his memoirs that if Morgan had used with skill and boldness one of his brigades in addition to that of Blair, he could have

¹ 24 R., 647; 3 B. & L., 466. ² 24 R., 652, 661. ³ 24 R., 652, 661.

⁴ 24 R., 658.

⁵ 24 R., 662.

⁶ 24 R., 680-682.

made a lodgment on the bluff which would have "opened the door for our whole force to follow"; but the relative strength and the positions of the troops as shown from the Record do not warrant such an opinion. In passing a narrow defile like the causeway over the old river bed under such a fire, more troops would only be more food for powder, and tend to increase the confusion. The losses of the troops who crossed show that it is much to their credit that they advanced as far as they did.

Sherman's
criticism
answered.

On the right, Sherman urged A. J. Smith to push his attack,¹ though it had to be made across a narrow sandbar and up a narrow path in the nature of a breach, as a diversion in favor of Morgan or a real attack according to its success. The ground was swept by the fire of artillery and musketry. During Morgan's advance, one of Smith's regiments² crossed rapidly by companies, and lay under the bank of the old levee, twenty feet high and very steep, which the enemy used as rifle-pits. Their sharpshooters held out their muskets, and fired down vertically upon the men who had crossed,² and who had actually scooped out, with their hands, caves in the bank to shelter themselves against this fire. About 100 yards³ to the left, was a narrow, winding path leading up the bank wide enough for two men to march abreast. The men were ordered to undermine this bank, and make a road up it; but as it was impossible, they were withdrawn one by one under cover of the night.

Right
attack.

While this was going on, Burbridge was skirmishing across The Lake in his front in the hope of crossing on

¹ 24 R., 608.

² 1 Sherman, 320.

³ 24 R., 634.

rafts¹; and Landram was pushing his skirmishers through the entanglement of fallen timber towards Vicksburg, under the fire of *Vaughn's* sharpshooters and that of the batteries on the bluff. It was impossible for large bodies of troops to pass this entanglement.

Morgan, whose conduct Sherman had censured, in his turn accuses Sherman of losing the day by not making an attack on the right;² but the whole line was too strong to be broken unless by chance or by thorough preparation, and for this there was no opportunity, as the enemy was gaining strength every day.

**Morgan's
criticism
answered.**

In the battle of Chickasaw Bayou Sherman's losses in killed, wounded, and missing were 1776, *Pemberton's*, 207.

It is possible that if Sherman had not lost two days, he might have driven *Lee* back; but if he had then advanced, as Grant had proposed, he would have been exposed to the full force of *Pemberton's* army.

During the night of the 29th³ it rained very hard, but on the 30th it cleared off warm. After consultation, Sherman⁴ and Porter decided to make an attempt

¹ 24 R., 607.

² Morgan supports his position by a letter to him from Gen. S. D. Lee, saying: "Had Sherman moved a little faster or made his attack at the mound [or sand-bar] or at any point between the bayou and Vicksburg, he could have gone into the city." The sand-bar, however, was so narrow that numbers could not prevail, and the country between the bayou and the Mississippi was, as we have said, swampy and obstructed by fallen timber. S. D. Lee himself said in his report (24 R., 681) that it was an almost impassable barrier to the enemy, and he did not post any troops there to defend it. The reports of Pemberton and Martin L. Smith confirm the opinion which Gen. Sherman formed after a personal examination which led him to make only a diversion in this direction.

³ 24 R., 608.

⁴ 25 R., 887.

to carry the position at Haynes's Bluff by a night attack. Ten thousand men were to be landed (before daylight of Jan. 1st) right at the foot of the cliff, at the risk of the loss of the transports. New attack
planned. Meanwhile, Sherman was to attack all along the line to prevent reinforcements going up to the bluff, and, in case of success, to move all his forces to that point. A dense fog set in at midnight and lasted until morning. It was so thick that the vessels could not move through the narrow and tortuous river.

To attack Haynes's Bluff was a hazardous operation, but under the circumstances it would perhaps have been desirable to make the experiment if the weather had permitted. Comments. If successful, Sherman could land his army on the upland and possibly take Vicksburg, or, if *Pemberton* were heavily reinforced, hold the position, supported by the navy, until Grant or Banks should come up. Porter could perhaps destroy the Confederate vessels and navy yard at Yazoo City, and open communication with Grant. But the attack would probably have failed. The position was strong. *Pemberton* had already been reinforced by a brigade that was not in the battle, and fresh troops were pouring in at the rate of 2000 or 3000 men a day.

At noon of the 1st of January, 1863, it began to rain more heavily than before, and the land almost disappeared from sight. Porter¹ thought that there was no longer any chance for a successful attack Attack
abandoned. on Haynes's Bluff,² especially as the moon would not set until 5.25, and the landing must be a "daylight affair," which, in his opinion, was too hazardous to try.

¹ Porter, 287.

² 24 R., 609.

On the 5th of January, Sherman wrote¹ to Halleck:

The advantages of the position are immense—certainly three to one. 10,000 men should defeat 30,000 assailants.

Sherman's estimate of the situation. . . . I am perfectly willing to abide your judgment if I should have pushed my attack farther after learning that I was alone, and that the enemy was at liberty to concentrate at Vicksburg a large part of Pemberton's forces from Grenada.

Sherman's whole command was embarked² by sunrise of January 2d, and moved down the Yazoo to its mouth, where it found Gen. McClernand, who had just arrived, and who then took command of the expedition.

So ended the third attempt to capture Vicksburg. It is hard to divide among all concerned the responsibility for its failure. The President attached great importance to the opening of the Mississippi; and when McClernand came to Washington and offered to raise the troops from among his friends and followers in the Northwest, Lincoln perhaps looked upon them as auxiliaries or allies whose cooperation he could not expect without their leader. By accepting their services, the loyalty of the Western Democrats would be aroused and gratified. He would not let them interfere with Grant. They could not be thought do any harm, and might indeed accomplish "the great object in view." As a military measure, the fate of such a scheme was not doubtful. Halleck tried to carry out the President's wishes without losing Corinth which he had won by hard labor, and which was useful in guarding West Tennessee. Grant was loyal, and did all in his power to carry out Halleck's

¹ 24 R., 613, 614.

² 24 R., 610.

orders; but erred in adopting a middle course, and actually believing that it would succeed. When he was authorized to use the troops in his command as he deemed best to accomplish the object in view, he should have made the expedition down the river very large or very small. One fraction or the other should have been strong enough to reach its destination, either by following the overland route, or descending the river. By dividing his army in halves, and giving *Pemberton* the interior lines, he put it in *Pemberton's* power to meet each half in succession, and perhaps throw all his force on Sherman's army between Haynes's Bluff and Vicksburg while Grant himself was repairing the railroad in the north. Both Grant and Sherman escaped without serious loss, but with no material gain; and Vicksburg, which had been almost within the grasp of the Federal fleets and armies from May to December of 1862, did not finally fall until July of the following year.





CHAPTER IV.

MILITARY SITUATION IN JANUARY, 1863.

LET us now take a glance at the military situation in January, 1863, when all operations on a large scale are suspended, and consider in each region what progress the Federals have made in cutting off the supplies of the Confederates, destroying their armies, and occupying their territory; and what, from a military standpoint, are their prospects of success in the immediate future.

In the first two volumes of this series, Ropes has explained the difficulties under which the Army of the Potomac labored from the interference of President Lincoln and Secretary Stanton with McClellan's plan of operations, by which the best chance of success offered in the Peninsular campaign was thrown away. Such interference is of course fatal, but Lincoln's problem was a hard one: McClellan's loyalty to the Union cannot be doubted; but his conduct gave color to the belief that he would prefer to decide the war by a demonstration of power, rather than by shedding the blood of his own countrymen, and that he had little or no faith in the ability of the politicians to bring it to a successful conclusion. Lincoln did not believe in that kind of warfare; he thought that McClellan was too cautious, and did not think that the country required a dictator; he found

Pope too rash; the bloody assault on the fortified heights at Fredericksburg showed him that Burnside was incompetent; but he was disposed to give him another trial.

We have seen¹ that after his failure at Fredericksburg on the 13th of December, 1862, Burnside proposed to cross the Rappahannock with his army seven miles below Fredericksburg; and to send the cavalry up the river to cross at Kelly's Ford, about twenty-seven miles above, destroy the railroad track in the rear of *Lee's* army, and join the garrison of Suffolk near the mouth of the James. The cavalry had already started on the movement when Burnside received a telegram from the President, enjoining him not to take any step without first informing him. Burnside countermanded the orders, and went to Washington, where he was told by the President that some general officers of his command had represented that the army was not in condition to move. On the 5th of January,² he asked the President, either to accept his resignation, or to approve of his plan for a new campaign on the other side of the Rappahannock, of which he alone assumed the responsibility.

**Burnside's
second
attempt.**

The President³ declined to accept his resignation, and enclosed a letter from Halleck with his approval, advising the movement and saying⁴:

When the attempt at Fredericksburg was abandoned, I advised you to renew the attempt at some other point, either in whole or in part, to turn the enemy's works, or to threaten their wings or communications; in other words, to keep the enemy occupied until a favorable opportunity offered to strike a

**Halleck to
Burnside.**

¹ Part II., 469; 31 R., 78, 96.

² Swinton, 258; 2 Comte de Paris, 602; 31 R., 944, 78.

³ 31 R., 953.

⁴ 40 R., 13.

decisive blow. . . . In all our interviews I have urged that our first object was not Richmond, but the defeat or scattering of Lee's army, which threatened Washington and the line of the Upper Potomac.

With this authority, Burnside proposed to cross the Rappahannock at Banks Ford, six miles up the river, leaving one corps to guard his communications, and another to make a demonstration below. The movement began on the 20th of January,¹ 1863; but during the night, a terrible storm came on, and the soil was covered with a soft sticky paste in which the wagons, horses, and men sank deeper and deeper at every step, so that the attempt, which was known as Mud March, was abandoned.

Burnside, knowing that several of his highest officers considered him unfit to command the army, and believing that his ill success was mainly due to their insubordination, recommended that they be relieved or dismissed. To this end, he went to Washington, and saw the President, who, recognizing his incapacity, relieved Burnside himself from his command, but refused to accept his resignation.

On the 25th of January, 1863 (40 R., 3), Hooker was assigned to command of the Army of the Potomac.²

Hooker assigned to command. Burnside went to his home on leave of absence, and in March was appointed to the command of the Department of the Ohio. Hooker thought it would require all his time to place the Army of the Potomac in a proper

¹ Powell, 407.

² It is said (3 B. & L., 239) that Franklin and others were believed to be in sympathy with McClellan; Reynolds did not want the office unless with a freer hand than he could expect; Meade was suggested, but Secretary Chase aspired to be Lincoln's successor, and threw his influence in favor of Hooker on his assurance that, if successful, he would not aspire to other than military honors.

condition for field service before the coming of spring; and on his recommendation, the defences of Washington were made into a separate department under Heintzelman. The IX Army Corps was sent to Dix at Fort Monroe, and the troops at Harper's Ferry and in the Shenandoah Valley were placed under the command of Schenck with his headquarters at Baltimore. Hooker was told in regard to the operations of his own army¹:

you can best judge when and where it can move to the greatest advantage, keeping in view always the importance of covering Washington and Harper's Ferry either directly or by so operating as to be able to punish any force of the enemy sent against them.

It was surely desirable for the Federal army to advance if the weather permitted. Halleck was quite right in urging that the first objective should be *Lee's* army and not Richmond.

On the 26th Lincoln wrote to Hooker²:

I have placed you at the head of the Army of the Potomac. Of course I have done this upon what appears to be to me sufficient reasons, and yet I think it best for you to know that there are some things in regard to which I am not quite satisfied with you. I believe you to be a brave and skilful soldier, which, of course, I like. I also believe you do not mix politics with your profession, in which you are right. You have confidence in yourself, which is a valuable, if not an indispensable quality. You are ambitious, which, within reasonable bounds, does good rather than harm; but I think that during Gen. Burnside's command of the army you have taken counsel of your ambition, and thwarted him as much as you could, in which you did a great wrong to the

**Lincoln to
Hooker.**

¹ 40 R., 12.

² 40 R., 4.

country and to a most meritorious and honorable brother officer. I have heard, in such a way as to believe it, of your recently saying that both the Army and the Government needed a dictator. Of course, it was not for this, but in spite of it, that I have given you the command. Only those generals who gain successes can set up as dictators. What I now ask of you is military success and I will risk the dictatorship. The Government will support you to the utmost of its ability, which is neither more nor less than it has done and will do for all commanders. I much fear that the spirit which you have aided to infuse into the army, of criticising their commander and withholding confidence from him, will now turn upon you. I shall assist you as far as I can to put it down. Neither you nor Napoleon, if he were alive again, could get any good out of an army while such a spirit prevails in it. And now beware of rashness. Beware of rashness, but with energy and sleepless vigilance go forward and give us victories.

The reports for Jan. 31, 1863, show¹ that little ground had been gained in the East. On the banks of the Rappahannock, 150,000 Federals confronted 74,000 Confederates. Elsewhere in this region were 78,000 Federals and 4000 Confederates.² An offensive campaign against the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia was here the great object to which the efforts of the Federal Government should have been directed.

In the summer of 1862² when McClellan's army was

¹ See Map I., at end.

² The numbers present for duty were as follows: Dept. of the East, N. Y. and N. E., 2745; Middle Dept., Penn., Del., Md., etc., 29,913; Defences of Washington, 45,019; Army of the Potomac, opposite Fredericksburg, 149,323. On the Confederate side,—Dept. of W. Va., 6166; Army of N. Va., 73,984 near Fredericksburg, and 4095 in the Valley District. (40 R., 15-37, 601-603.)

moved¹ from the Peninsula, a small force was left to hold the entrances to the James and York Rivers as landing places for further operations against Richmond, and as points of support for the blockading squadron, with whose assistance they made frequent raids in the neighborhood.² The town of Suffolk lies on a narrow strip of land³ between the great Dismal Swamp and the estuary of the Nansemond River, a branch of the James River; and its occupation gave the Federals control of a large tract of country lying between the swamp and the ocean. During the autumn of 1862 this position was strongly fortified. The Confederates did not approach it until the last of January, 1863, and then only with one brigade, which was soon repulsed. Frequent incursions were made by the Federals from the stations on the Peninsula in connection with the navy. In this region in January, 1863, the presence of 18,000 Federal troops was a serious menace to the cities of Richmond and Petersburg, which were only defended by 7000 Confederates.⁴

We have seen that early in July, 1862,⁵ Burnside had been ordered from North Carolina to Virginia, leaving Foster with only a handful of men, so that he was obliged to mass them on the shores and islands where they would be protected by the navy.⁶ Confederate

¹ 3 Comte de Paris, 125.

² In September (26 R., 411) Federal troops stationed at Fort Monroe, Yorktown, Gloucester, Williamsburg, Norfolk, and Suffolk numbered about 17,600 present for duty. They were opposed by 24,000 Confederates at and about Richmond and Petersburg (26 R., 571). The numbers on each side were somewhat increased during the autumn.

³ 3 Comte de Paris, 126.

⁴ 26 R., 532, 865, 866.

⁵ Part II., 235; 2 Comte de Paris, 608.

⁶ In September his force was increased to 6600 men, who were mostly assembled at Newbern. 2 Comte de Paris, 609.

troops¹ in North Carolina had also been called away to Virginia.² During the autumn, the forces on each side were materially increased.³ In December, Foster, reinforced by a brigade from Fortress Monroe, made an incursion⁴ from Newbern to Goldsboro, destroying bridges and doing considerable damage to the Wilmington Weldon Railroad.⁵ In North Carolina 16,000 Federals confronted 28,000 Confederates.⁶

We saw that, in November, 1861, the Federal fleet and army obtained possession of the harbor of Port Royal. They occupied Hilton Head and Beaufort in South Carolina, and Tybee Island in Georgia; and the Confederates soon abandoned the seacoast and outlying islands of Georgia and of South Carolina south of Charleston, excepting Savannah which was defended by Ft. Pulaski. This fort was reduced by the Federals in April, 1862, and the mouth of the river was thus closed to blockade runners. In June, an expedition⁷ was sent from Port Royal harbor under Benham to make a demonstration against Charleston. Exceeding his orders, Benham attacked the Confederate earthworks on James Island, and was repulsed.⁸ In October, the Federals made an un-

¹ 26 R., 54.

² They had only 7500 left in September, mostly at Wilmington and Kinston.

³ Early in November, Foster made an incursion to the neighborhood of Tarboro but finding the enemy in force, withdrew to Newbern.

⁴ With about 11,000 men.

⁵ 26 R., 54.

⁶ At the end of the year the Confederate troops present for duty numbered 6000 at Goldsboro, 8000 at Magnolia, 10,000 at Cape Fear, 2000 at Kinston, 1000 at Weldon, and 1000 at Hamilton, opposed to 16,000 Federal troops mostly at Newbern (26 R., 532, 865).

⁷ Of about 10,000 men.

⁸ In July seven regiments were detached to reinforce the Army of the Potomac.

successful attempt to destroy the railroad between Charleston and Savannah.¹

In South Carolina and Georgia, 9000 Federals were opposed to some 17,000 Confederates.²

In the spring of 1862, St. Augustine and Fernandina in Florida were taken by the Federals; and their gunboats ascended the St. John's River. The Confederates abandoned all the seacoast. The Federals occupied Jacksonville for about a month, but were unable to hold it. In January, 1863, 2000 Federals in Florida confronted 1000 Confederates. We saw that Fort Pickens at Pensacola was saved to the Federals when Florida seceded. Fort Taylor at Key West, and Fort Jefferson at Tortugas were garrisoned by a few Federal troops in January, 1861, and all these forts remained in possession of the Federals throughout the war. In May, 1862, Pensacola was occupied by the Federal troops.³ Mobile was still in possession of the Confederates in 1863.⁴ In January, 1863, about 8000 troops at and near Mobile⁵ were confronted by 1500⁶ at Pensacola. As there were so few forts in the possession of the Confederates, it was a matter of vital importance to them to hold Mobile to the last.

¹ 20 R., 389.

² 20 R., 736, 757.

³ In July, 1862 (20 R., 367), the garrison of Key West was some 400 men, that of Tortugas, 200. In January they were about the same (20 R., 424, 434); the garrison of Pensacola was about 1500; those of Key West and Tortugas were not reported separately.

⁴ 21 R., 1001.

⁵ Of these 5000 were apparently at Mobile and in the harbor, 2000 at the railway crossing at Polard to watch the harbor of Mobile against an attack and the country around Pensacola against excursions from the Federals who held it, and 1000 on the Perdido River between these two stations (see 21 R., 1001, 1068).

⁶ 21 R., 627.

Along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts, we find, then, that 25,000 Federals confronted 54,000 Confederates.

Situation on Atlantic and Gulf coasts. These Federal troops not only supported the blockade, but were also ready to invade and occupy any adjoining territory that might be weakly guarded at any point from the mouth of the Chesapeake to the mouth of the Mississippi.

Here, thanks to Farragut's brilliant exploits, the Federals had obtained a strong foothold, but had not yet succeeded in pushing up the river. **Butler and Taylor in Louisiana.** After the battle of Baton Rouge,¹ on the 20th of August, Butler evacuated this city, the capital of Louisiana, and moved the troops to New Orleans. At about this time, the Confederate General *Taylor* arrived at Opelousas,² in command of the District of West Louisiana, under *Holmes*, who was still at Little Rock. *Taylor* was ordered to enroll troops in Louisiana, and a few were sent from Mobile.³ In October Butler sent *Weitzel* to dislodge them. With 2300 of his men accompanied by four light-draft gunboats under Buchanan of the navy, *Weitzel* advanced from Donaldsonville on the 26th of October: and at Labadieville, met *Mouton* and drove him back across the Teche.⁴ The water in the bayous was still too low for *Weitzel* to advance.⁵

¹ 3 B. & L., 584.

² 21 R., 802, 789, 791.

³ 21 R., 804; *Taylor*, 113; so that by October 1st he reported 3300 (21 R., 820) present for duty; of these about 1400 under *Mouton* were stationed at Thibodeaux.

⁴ 21 R., 167, 176.

⁵ To defend the bayous in the winter, *Taylor* established batteries at *Butte à la Rose*, Ft. *Beauregard* (*Taylor*, 119), *De Russy*, and *Burton*, 50 to 100 men each, and at *Bisland* (*Taylor*, 120).

On the 9th of November, 1862, Banks was assigned to the command of a new expedition to the lower Mississippi; and on the 15th¹ of December, he arrived in New Orleans and relieved Butler in command of the Department of the Gulf, bringing reinforcements from New York.² Banks's³ orders from Halleck said:

**Banks
assigned to
command.**

The first military operations which will engage your attention on your arrival at New Orleans will be the opening of the Mississippi and the reduction of Fort Morgan or Mobile City, in order to control that bay and harbor. In these expeditions you will have the co-operation of the rear-admiral commanding the naval forces in the Gulf and the Mississippi River. A military and naval expedition is organizing at Memphis and Cairo to move down the Mississippi and co-operate with you against Vicksburg and any other points which the enemy may occupy on that river. As the ranking⁴ general in the Southwest, you are authorized to assume control of any military forces from the Upper Mississippi which may come within your command. The line of division between your department and that of Major-General Grant is therefore left undecided for the present, and you will exercise superior authority as far north as you may ascend the river. The President regards the opening of the Mississippi River as the first and most important of all our military and naval operations, and it is hoped that you will not lose a moment in accomplishing it.

The reinforcements from New York raised the number present for duty in the department to more than 30,000 men.⁵ On the 4th of December the Confederates reported 3600 with headquarters at Alexandria.⁶ As Banks proposed

**Situation in
Louisiana.**

¹ 21 R., 609, 610.

² 21 R., 627.

³ 21 R., 590.

⁴ Meaning senior in rank.

⁶ 21 R., 888.

⁵ On the 31st of December the troops were divided in round numbers

to attack Port Hudson without delay, he sent Grover with a large force without transshipment to take and occupy Baton Rouge.

With regard to the Gulf of Mexico, Farragut wished that the blockade should be done inside as much as possible. Points in Western Louisiana and Texas.

Texas were seized from time to time.¹ On the 4th of October, 1862, Galveston was captured by Renshaw of the navy², and at about the same time, Corpus Christi and Sabine City.³ Blockade and occupation alternated at the several inlets during the rest of the war. In December, 1862, Farragut found that it took too much force to hold these places for him to take any more; for his outside fleet would be too much reduced to keep up the blockade and keep the river open.⁴ Renshaw asked to have troops sent to Galveston to help him hold it. Meanwhile, his squadron remained at anchor in the bay; but took no means to destroy the railroad bridge between Galveston and the mainland. At Farragut's request and Butler's recommendation⁵, Banks sent three companies of infantry there to protect loyal citizens, thinking that "the fleet made the occupation of the part of the island adjacent to the gunboats perfectly safe." On the 1st of January, 1863, *Magruder*, who had recently taken command in Texas, with 2000 men⁶ and some gunboats made of cotton-clad

as follows: At and around New Orleans (21 R., 627), 8000; at Baton Rouge, 11,000; with Weitzel near Thibodeaux, 2300. Independent commands at New Orleans and elsewhere, 9000, at Pensacola, Fla., 1500.

Early in January (21 R., 646), "finding that the enemy was preparing to strike a blow at Weitzel's small force, etc., it was increased to about 4500 men (21 R., 647), thus enabling him to move against the enemy.

¹ Soley, p. 141.

² 19 Nav. Rec., 254.

³ 19 Nav. Rec., 253.

⁴ Soley, 144.

⁵ 21 R., 201.

⁶ 21 R., 204, 209.

steamers which he filled with sharpshooters¹, attacked the squadron and garrison. Renshaw's own vessel grounded and was exploded, another was boarded, and others abandoned the blockade. The garrison surrendered. Galveston remained in possession of the Confederates² until the close of the war.

The Mexican city of Matamoras³ is situated on the Rio Grande, which of course could not be blockaded. Cargoes shipped for Matamoras were transferred to lighters at the mouth of the river, **Mexico.** and then landed on Confederate territory. In 1862, Matamoras became the seat of a flourishing trade. The interior of Texas was in possession of the Confederates throughout the war.

New Mexico and Arizona⁴ were invaded by the Confederates in the winter and spring of 1862; but thereafter they remained in possession of the **Far West.** Federals. California was faithful to the Union.

We saw that in April, Arkansas had been abandoned by the Confederate army, and left to the mercy of the enemy. On the 26th of May, "at the earnest **Hindman and Curtis** solicitation⁵ of the people," General *Hindman* was charged with its defence with full **in** power to organize troops under the new **Arkansas.** conscription law. He stopped five⁶ regiments of Texas cavalry on their way to Corinth, and soon assembled a considerable force. Curtis at Batesville was obliged to look for a new base; for the country was infested with outlaws, and his communications with Missouri were endangered.

¹ Mahan, *G. & I. W.*, 108.

² Greene, 211.

³ Soley, 37.

⁴ *B. & L.*, 103.

⁵ *19 R.*, 28.

⁶ *19 R.*, 30.

There were still in White River two gunboats, which had belonged to the Confederate flotilla at Island No. 10;¹ and on the 8th of June, by Halleck's orders, Davis sent four gunboats down the Mississippi and up the White River to capture them, so that Curtis could be supplied and reinforced by that route. The Federal gunboats,² with one regiment in transports, and with provisions for Curtis, ascended White River 170 miles from the mouth, and captured the batteries at St. Charles on the way up; but returned without opening communications with him.³

Curtis moved down the White River a short distance⁴, and then crossed over to the Cache, where he was met on the 7th of July by a small force of men⁵ whom *Hindman* had sent out to intercept him, but who, after a short fight, retreated in disorder. He then crossed the swampy country to Helena on the Mississippi, where he arrived on the 13th of July⁶. There he was safe under the protection of the fleet; but Arkansas was abandoned to the Confederates.⁷ In the latter part of July,⁸ Hovey's division⁹ was sent to Curtis at Helena. Arkansas was not under Grant's command. Had it been so, he might have used the troops at Helena to threaten *Van Dorn's* communications, or to unite with his own forces in an advance on Vicksburg.

The Confederate citizens west of the Mississippi

¹ Mahan, *G. & I. W.*, 49.

² 19 R., 114-117.

³ 19 R., 470.

⁴ 19 R., 449, 457.

⁵ About 6000 (3 B. & L., 445; 19 R., 37; 19 R., 141).

⁶ 19 R., 470.

⁷ On the 5th of August *Hindman* had enrolled about 32,000 men, of whom 20,000 were armed (19 R., 874, 875).

⁸ 25 R., 121.

⁹ Of about 5000 men.

demanded a more vigorous defence,¹ and on the 12th of August *Holmes* was placed² in command of all the region beyond the Mississippi. He assigned *Hindman*³ to command of the troops in Arkansas, who were for the most part assembled in the northwest of the State, along the line between Arkansas and Missouri.⁴

On the 24th of September,⁵ Halleck united the States of Kansas, Missouri, and Arkansas in one department, and placed Curtis, who was the senior officer, in command. Schofield retained the command in the field. On the 3d of October, he was joined by Blunt with troops from Kansas.⁶ On the 28th⁷ his forces having been increased to about 16,000, he advanced, and *Hindman* retreated to the Arkansas.

In the middle of November, when *Holmes* was asked to send troops to Vicksburg, he ordered *Hindman* to give up his "darling" project of invading Missouri; and explained to the Secretary of War⁸ that if he could protect Arkansas from the enemy on her border, he should think himself fortunate; that⁹ if he left Little Rock, there was little doubt but that the valley of the Arkansas would be taken possession of, "and with it," he said, "goes Arkansas and Louisiana, for there is nothing to subsist an army on between the Arkansas and Red Rivers, the intermediate region having been depleted by drought."

Schofield¹⁰ did not think it wise to follow *Hindman* very

¹ 19 R., 879. ² 19 R., 855, 860, 876. ³ 19 R., 888, 46.

⁴ 19 R., 884; 3 B. & L., 446; 19 R., 876. ⁵ 19 R., 18; 19 R., 654.

⁶ 3 B. & L., 447. ⁷ R., 19, 20, 21 766. ⁸ 19 R., 918.

⁹ 19 R., 928.

¹⁰ 19 R., 21.


far until a similar advance in Eastern Arkansas should open his communications with Little Rock, so that he could draw his supplies from that direction. He therefore left Blunt with one division in Northwestern Arkansas, and on the 3d of November withdrew the other two toward Springfield, where he could supply them better. On the 20th, he was obliged by sickness to leave Blunt in temporary command of the Army of the Frontier.¹

Hindman, finding that the northwestern country was exhausted, and the river too low for navigation, and deeming it important for what was to be left that Blunt should be driven out, sent² *Marmaduke* toward Cane Hill with a division of cavalry. Blunt attacked him and drove him back toward *Hindman's* main body at Van Buren. On the 3d of December *Hindman* advanced with about 11,500 men; on the same day Herron started from Springfield with the other two divisions of the Army of the Frontier to reinforce Blunt.³ Marching 110 miles in three days, *Hindman* skilfully threw himself between Herron and Blunt on the 7th, and met Herron near Prairie Grove, twelve miles from Blunt's position; but instead of attacking in force, took up a strong position across his path. Herron attacked, and Blunt came up to

¹ At the end of November, Curtis (19 R. 807) had 31,300 troops in Missouri and Northwestern Arkansas and 15,400 at Helena. Opposed to them Holmes had about 20,300 and 10,200 respectively.

² 32 R., 9, 138.

³ On the 5th of December in reply to telegrams from Richmond, Holmes answered that he expected *Hindman* to attack Schofield the next morning, that if he succeeded that part of Arkansas and the Indian country would be free and that if he failed it must be abandoned, that if he erred in not moving at once to Vicksburg it was because the telegrams presupposed the safety of Arkansas (25 R., 784). He was told that he must exercise his judgment in the matter.



his aid; his united forces, amounting to about 10,000 men, were fewer than *Hindman's*, but much better trained and equipped. The fighting lasted till dark. During the night, *Hindman* retreated toward Van Buren, and on the 28th Blunt drove him across the Arkansas River. The battle of Prairie Grove decided the fate of Arkansas. But one blow was required to put an end to the Confederate power in that border State.

On the 4th of January, 1863, when McClernand relieved Sherman of the expedition down the ^{McClernand} river, and divided his army, which he called ^{in command} the Army of the Mississippi, into two corps; ^{on the} Morgan's and A. J. Smith's divisions formed ^{Mississippi.} the First Corps, commanded by Morgan; Steele's and Stuart's divisions the Second Corps, commanded by Sherman. Sherman had recently learned of a Confederate fort on Arkansas River about forty miles from its mouth, called Arkansas Post, and that it was garrisoned by about 5000 men. Such a fort was, of course, a serious menace to the Federal operations on the Mississippi. Sherman suggested to General McClernand and Admiral Porter that it should be reduced, and asked leave to go up the Arkansas and take it.

Porter and McClernand decided to go in person, and took both army corps, three ironclads, three gunboats, two tinclads, and a ram.¹ On the 9th of January the army landed three or four ^{Expedition} miles below the fort. This was a square ^{to Arkansas} bastioned earthwork, with wooden casemates², ^{Post.} three hundred feet on a side, standing at the bend of the river,³ just high enough to be beyond the reach of

¹ 3 B. & L., 560; Mahan, *G. & I. W.*, 120.

² Mounting one nine-inch and two eight-inch columbiads and several three-inch rifles.

³ See map, p. 85.

the floods. A line of trenches connected the fort with impracticable ground a mile inland. A mile or two below the fort were some outlying trenches.

On the morning of the 10th, a gunboat and a tinclad came up, and drove the defenders of these outlying works back into the woods.¹ McClernand then advanced along the left bank. At about 3 P. M.,² to divert the enemy's attention while the land forces should get into position, Porter³ sent up the fleet to within a few hundred yards of the fort, and opened fire.⁴ In an hour, the guns in the fort were silenced, and the fleet dropped down the river.

On the 11th, at 10.30 A.M., McClernand's troops were in position about 500 yards from the enemy; and at about noon⁵ Porter⁶ sent up the gunboats, which took positions near the fort, and by 4 P.M. had silenced the guns opposed to them.⁷ Porter took a regiment of infantry on board of his flagship, a large river steamer, and moved up to the fort to make an attack of his own. Three boat guns on wheels on the upper deck completely commanded the inside of the enemy's works. The field batteries on shore⁸ commenced to fire; as soon as the firing of the fleet was heard, the infantry advanced; and after a fight of several hours,

the Confederates raised the white flag, and the Federals took possession of all the defences, after a loss of 1100 men. *Walker's* Texas division was marching from Pine Bluff to the relief of the Post when news came of the surrender.

¹ 24 R., 702.

² Porter, 289; 24 R., 704.

³ Mahan, *G. & I. W.*, 121.

⁴ *Ibid.* The ironclads fought bows on, presenting three guns each.

⁵ 24 R., 706, 704.

⁶ Porter, 291.

⁷ Mahan, *G. & I. W.*, 121.

⁸ 24 R., 706.

At the end of January *Holmes* had about 15,000¹ men in Arkansas, Grant about 13,000.

After the battle of Prairie Grove, December 7th, 1862, Schofield,² being then in St. Louis, asked Curtis to let him go down the Mississippi and join the expedition against Vicksburg. But Curtis ordered him back to the Army of the Frontier, where he says: I was compelled to lie at Springfield with a well-appointed army corps eager for active service, hundreds of miles from any hostile force, and this while the whole country was looking with intense anxiety for the movement that was to open the Mississippi to the Gulf, and the government was straining every nerve to make that movement successful.³

Situation in
Missouri.

On the 31st of January (33 R., 89, 90) Curtis reported 25,000 men present for duty in Missouri.

On the 11th of January, just as Grant had completed the railroad from Grand Junction to Memphis, he heard for the first time that McClelland had fallen back from Vicksburg and gone to Arkansas Post.

¹ Hindman's division of 6000 men at Little Rock; 2000 at Fort Smith in the northwestern part of the State; Walker's division, 5000 at Pine Bluff; Marmaduke's cavalry, 2000, near Batesville.

² Schofield's *Forty-six Years in the Army*, '64.

³ Here he wrote to Halleck, on the 31st of January (33 R., 88), suggesting that the forces under his command and others that could be spared might be made available for that purpose. "There is no considerable force of the enemy north of the Arkansas River. The war is, of course, ended in this part of the country, at least for a time to come, and I am impatient of this long idleness," and again on the 3d of February (33 R., 94), saying that he believed the interests of the service demanded his removal from this command, and adding: "The entire force of the enemy in Arkansas is at Little Rock or below that point. No force can be substituted in Northwestern Arkansas by the enemy, and it is not possible for my command to do any good by remaining here. The weather is fine and the roads in splendid condition."

Schofield says: "The immediate result of this correspondence was that some troops were sent down the river, but none of my command."

The plan of campaign required that all the Federal forces should be concentrated on Vicksburg. Grant was to send reinforcements to McClernand there, and Banks was to come up from New Orleans. The diversion to Arkansas Post seemed to Grant a "wild goose chase," and he so described it in a letter to Halleck, which soon brought a reply authorizing him to relieve McClernand from command of the expedition against Vicksburg, giving it to the next in rank, or taking it himself.

This he decided to do. When he learned through Sherman that the reduction of Arkansas Post had been necessary for the safe navigation of the Mississippi, he fully appreciated its importance; but, as McClernand had planned a campaign farther up the Arkansas, Grant recalled him; and on the 17th, met him at Napoleon at the mouth of the river, and ordered the expedition back to Millikens Bend.¹

On the 19th, he returned to Memphis to make arrangements for the defence of Western Tennessee. He left Hurlburt's corps there, and sent McPherson's corps to Vicksburg.² At Grant's suggestion, the President directed that so much of Arkansas as he might desire to control, be temporarily attached to his department. On the 29th,³ he arrived at Young's Point, and on the 30th took command of the expedition.⁴

¹ He had already heard from Porter and Sherman that the troops had no confidence in McClernand.

² 25 R., 564, 565.

³ 1 Grant, 441.

⁴ McClernand protested. Grant forwarded his letter to Washington, and was of course sustained.

The capture of Arkansas Post left his line of operations secure from any interference from the west of the Mississippi; and with Porter's fleet in control of the river above Vicksburg, the troops on the western bank were not exposed to attack from the east. Transportation was cheap and rapid. He could be reinforced by way of Memphis; and if required, he could reinforce Rosecrans in Tennessee by the same route, though not as readily as if he were advancing overland.

Grant's prospects.

On the other hand, Grant could not advance without great difficulty. The water in the Mississippi River had risen, and all the lowland in its basin was flooded. Vicksburg was so well defended that he could not carry it by assault, from the Mississippi, nor from the Yazoo. He could not approach it from the north without crossing the swampy ground of the Yazoo Basin, passable only by a few roads, easily defended at all seasons, but at this time for the greater part under water. He could not approach it from the south without first passing the batteries in his transports, or marching down overland west of the river; and in this case he would have to send his transports or barges down past the batteries to ferry his men across, and the heavy rains and breaks in the levees had flooded the country over which he would have to march.

The strategical way according to the rule, [he says]¹ would have been to go back to Memphis; establish that as a base of supplies; fortify it so that the storehouses could be held by a small garrison, and move from there along the line of railroad, repairing as we advanced, to the Yalabusha, or to Jackson, Mississippi.

Grant's plans.

¹ Grant, 443.

At this time the North had become very much discouraged. Many strong Union men believed that the war must prove a failure. The elections of 1862 had gone against the party which was for the prosecution of the war to save the Union if it took the last man and the last dollar. Voluntary enlistments had ceased throughout the greater part of the North, and the draft had been resorted to to fill up our ranks. It was my judgment at the time that to make a backward movement as long as that from Vicksburg to Memphis, would be interpreted, by many of those yet full of hope for the preservation of the Union, as a defeat, and that the draft would be resisted, desertions ensue and the power to capture and punish deserters lost. There was nothing left to be done but to *go forward to a decisive victory*. This was in my mind from the moment I took command in person at Young's Point.

Grant had in all about 104,000 men opposed to **Situation** *Pemberton's* 46,000;¹ and could readily move on the as many as he might require to the neighborhood of Vicksburg. **Mississippi.**

In the central theatre of war, we have seen that, in the summer of 1862, Chattanooga might have been **Bragg's** taken but for the lack of sound judgment **failure in** on the part of Halleck, and of adaptability on **Ky. and** the part of Buell; that, in the autumn, *Bragg's* **Tenn.** invasion of Kentucky had failed to prove as he had hoped that the citizens would rise at his call and take the arms he brought them to defend the cause of

¹ With McPherson's corps Grant would have 40,000 men on the western bank of the Mississippi near Vicksburg, 13,000 at Helena, and 51,000 on the Memphis & Charleston Railroad, and in reserve at Jackson and Columbus. (Two divisions of McPherson's corps, 13,000, had not left Memphis.)

Pemberton had 21,000 men at Vicksburg, 12,000 at Port Hudson, 6000 at Grenada, 5000 at Jackson, and 1000 at Columbus, Miss. (38 R., 20, 611), and about 1000 cavalry in the north of Mississippi.

the Confederacy.¹ The Federal army suffered sadly from lack of cavalry; but if the campaign had been conducted more skilfully, *Bragg* would not have returned from this expedition without losing most of his army.

We saw how, in December, when 10,000 men had been sent from *Bragg* to *Pemberton*, *Rosecrans* advanced to *Murfreesborough*, and in a bloody battle forced *Bragg* to retreat.² The campaign left *Rosecrans* in possession of Western and Central Tennessee excepting a small but highly cultivated region lying between *Murfreesborough* and *Chattanooga*. Here *Bragg* took up a defensive position behind *Duck River*, with *Polk's* corps at *Shelbyville*,³ *Hardee's* at *Tullahoma*, and the cavalry on his front and flanks.

Rosecrans did not advance, but repaired the railroad; and established a fortified camp at *Murfreesborough*, where he could accumulate supplies, protect them against the raids of the enemy's cavalry, and prepare for another advance. On the 20th of January, *Gordon Granger*

**Rosecrans
did not
advance.**

¹ In speaking of this "wild expedition into Kentucky," General J. E. Johnson (3 B. & L., 472) says that it could only have had the result of a raid. It was claimed in *Bragg's* favor that he "manœuvred the foe out of a large, and to us important, territory," of which Johnson says that "this advantage, if it could be called so, was of the briefest for this 'foe' drove us out of Kentucky in a few weeks, and recovered permanently the large and to us important territory."

² At *Perryville* and *Murfreesborough* alone *Bragg* lost 25,500 men. *Buell* and *Rosecrans* lost about 4000 more (T. L. L., 95, 97); but the Federal losses were more readily supplied. *Bragg* says: "Finding myself assailed in private and in public (29 R., 699) for the movement from *Murfreesboro*, . . . it becomes necessary for me to save my fair name, if I cannot stop the deluge of abuse, which will destroy my usefulness and demoralize this army." Accordingly, *Johnston* was ordered by President *Davis* to investigate, and reported that the interest of the service required that *Bragg* should not be removed.

³ *Van Horne*, 287; Part II., 433.

was ordered to take troops¹ from Louisville on the Ohio to reinforce Rosecrans. Murfreesborough was but about thirty miles by rail from Nashville on the Cumberland River. In order that Rosecrans might control the navigation of this river to bring up his supplies, Forts Donelson and Henry were transferred² to his department.

On the Confederate side, early in January, *Morgan*³ and *Forrest*⁴ returned from their raids, making *Bragg's* cavalry force twice as strong as that of Rosecrans.⁵ In February⁶ *Van Dorn* arrived with his cavalry from

Mississippi.⁷ On the 8th of January, *Wheeler* started with his brigade on a raid on Rosecrans's communications, did some damage to the railroad from Nashville, destroyed transports on the Cumberland River, and then, joined by *Forrest's* and *Wharton's* brigades⁸, advanced against Fort Donelson.⁹

To save the fort, and if possible, to intercept *Wheeler*, Rosecrans sent Davis with his division¹⁰ and a little cavalry, from Murfreesborough and Steedman with his division¹¹ from Triune in pursuit. *Wheeler* arrived on the 3d of February. The garrison fought nobly. *Wheeler* made¹² several attacks, but was repulsed with loss, and escaped just in time to avoid capture by Davis, who was following him, and Granger's troops who were just coming up the river from Louisville.

¹ Amounting to 11,000 (35 R., 7, 93).

² 35 R., 11. With their garrisons of 2000 men.

³ 29 R., 158.

⁴ 24 R., 595.

⁵ Raising it to about 10,000.

⁶ 35 R., 641.

⁷ 4500 more.

⁸ Making in all about 5000 cavalry.

⁹ Defended by about 800 infantry.

¹⁰ 34 R., 32; 1, Van Horne, 289.

¹¹ 35 R., 24, 27.

¹² 34 R., 39.

On the 31st of January, Rosecrans had in the Department of the Cumberland, 67,000¹ men, making with those of Granger, 78,000; opposed to 48,000² under *Bragg*. Rosecrans knew the approximate strength of his enemy's army. After Granger's arrival, he could resume the offensive as soon as his supplies were up, and the roads and railroads in fair condition.

The Department of the Ohio was under Wright's command with orders³ to protect the line of the railroad over which Rosecrans brought his supplies, and to keep down disturbances. Under general instructions, he sent off from time to time both men and supplies to the armies of Grant and Rosecrans, and defended the States of Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois so that these armies could advance in force into Mississippi, Alabama, and Georgia. With the forces at his command, an invasion of East Tennessee was hardly practicable. In this Department of the Ohio, besides 2600 along the Ohio River, 18,000 in Kentucky were opposed to 9000⁴ in East Tennessee under *Donelson*; in West Virginia, 7000 to 6000⁵ under *Jones*.

We shall see by referring to the general map,⁶ that on the 31st of January, 1863, the Confederate States east of the Mississippi are practically surrounded by the Federal fleets and armies, excepting between Vicksburg and Port Hudson, where supplies can be introduced from the States beyond the Mississippi, and even from abroad, by passing through Mexico. Let us now consider

¹ 35 R., 28, 11, 7, 93.

² Including Van Dorn's cavalry *en route*.

³ 35 R., 30, 644, 475.

⁴ 40 R., 603.

⁵ 35 R., 58.

⁶ Map I, at end.

whether the Federal forces are well disposed for carrying out the plan of reducing the Confederacy by cutting off all communication from abroad, and hammering at its armies until they are dispersed or destroyed; and how the Confederate forces are disposed for defeating this plan. Other general plans than this, which is known as the "Anaconda," can be better considered hereafter.

On the 31st of January, 1863, the Federal forces may then be roughly estimated at 529,600, and the Confederate forces at 259,500 men present for duty, distributed approximately as shown on the map.¹ Of course, the Federals do not know the exact number of their adversaries; but they know enough of the relative strength to guide their own plans and operations.

On the Atlantic, and the Gulf of Mexico, the blockade is supported by the Federal troops at, or near, the mouths of the rivers. The navy, of course, requires harbors and supply stations along the coast. These are protected by the army, and some of the waterways are obstructed

Atlantic and
Gulf coast.

¹ 30,000 Federals in Maryland and the Shenandoah Valley, 45,000 in the defences of Washington, and 149,300 in the Army of the Potomac, opposed to 74,000 Confederates in the Army of Virginia and 4000 in the Valley. In Southeast Virginia, 18,300 Federals opposed to 7000 Confederates; in North Carolina, 16,240 to 27,000. In South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida 10,800 to 18,100 Confederates; in Western Florida, Alabama, and Southeastern Louisiana, 31,000 to 23,600; at Vicksburg, 40,000 to 20,800; in Arkansas and Missouri, 38,000 to 15,000; in Southwestern Tennessee and Northern Mississippi, 51,000 to 13,000; in Kentucky and in Eastern and Central Tennessee, 96,000 to 57,000; in Western and Southwestern Virginia, 7000 to 6000. Away from the scene of active operations about 6000 Federals are reported in the Northern and Central States and 9000 in the Northwestern,¹ and about 7000 Confederates in Texas.

¹ 33 R., 90.

and swept by batteries on shore. The Federal troops often make incursions inland, and detain about twice as many Confederates to oppose them; for if from any point on the coast, these troops can open a way to the interior, the Federals who command the sea can quickly land a large force to invade the Confederate territory. The ports of Wilmington, Charleston, Mobile, and Galveston, however, are still held by the Confederates. The Federal navy can only make it dangerous, but not always impossible, for blockade-runners to enter.

In the East, the Army of the Potomac is opposed to the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia of about half its size; and there are in all this region about three times as many Federals ^{The frontier.} as Confederates. Along the Mississippi, there are more than twice as many, and in the valleys of the Cumberland and the Tennessee, nearly twice as many. Washington of course must be defended, and so must the loyal slave States of Missouri, Kentucky, West Virginia, and Maryland. If these States should be given up to the Confederates they could raise in them several hundred thousands of conscripts, the North would lose its self-respect, foreign nations would recognize the Confederacy, and the war might come to a speedy end. The Federal troops are well enough placed to defend the frontier. East Tennessee, however, and the mountain region adjoining it are still held by the Confederates; the people there are for the most part loyal, and we have seen how deeply President Lincoln has been affected at the thought that the Federal armies have not been able to protect them.

The first object for the Federal Government is to

destroy the Confederate armies. It can only hope to engage the enemy by attacking them at points which they must defend. One such point is Richmond, the Confederate capital, seaport, and arsenal. Another such point is Vicksburg, whose fall would open the Mississippi to the Federals, complete the blockade of the Confederacy, and cut it in two. The capture of Port Hudson would complete the blockade, and its fall would also further the capture of Vicksburg. The third point of attack is Chattanooga, whose fall would open up the mountain region, and cut in two the long railroad line from Richmond to the Mississippi. All through the first years of the war, the Confederates held most of this railroad, and transported troops and supplies from one theatre of operations to another so as to be superior at the point of contact. The Federals can make even better use of this railroad in this way, if they hold it, and can at the same time protect the friendly inhabitants; but until the Federals hold the mountain valleys of Virginia and the line of the James, they cannot utilize the railroad to as great advantage. Other points of attack are Wilmington, Charleston, and Mobile, to aid the blockade and serve as basis for advance to the interior.

Of all these points, Richmond is by far the most important, and should have precedence; its capture would be a serious blow to the Confederacy.

Relative importance. The Confederate capital had been established there to ensure the support and the protection of Virginia; without it, the Confederacy would lose in dignity and in resources. After the fall of New Orleans, Richmond is the greatest manufacturing centre in the Confederacy, and the Tredegar

Iron Works there supply much of the war material for its army. *Lee* often proposed to "swap queens" by uncovering Richmond and moving down the Shenandoah Valley to threaten Washington, Baltimore, and Philadelphia. Washington is well fortified; but Philadelphia, though remote, is entirely unprotected. For obvious reasons, the Federal Government was not disposed to make the exchange when the same object could be better attained by the destruction of *Lee's* army. This army out of the way, Richmond must yield. If its defenders fall back, they will fight to less advantage and Virginia will be lost. The garrisons of Washington and Baltimore can then spare men enough to hold the line of the James. The Federal troops on the upper Potomac can advance up the Valley of the Shenandoah and prolong the line along the Virginia & Tennessee Railroad: and the Army of the Potomac can then follow its adversary wherever he goes, and co-operate with the Army of the Cumberland in opening up East Tennessee, or with the troops along the coast in reducing the seaports so as to help the blockade and secure new bases of supplies under the protection of the navy.

To crush the Rebellion, the Federal plan requires that its armies shall concentrate at one or two points. It would be better to hold only troops enough at other points of the line to keep up an aggressive against the opposing armies, without trying to invade the hostile territory any farther than this may require. The Federal forces are strong enough to advance against Richmond in the East, and against Vicksburg in the West, and leave enough to keep up the pressure at other points excepting those along the coast which

Must concentrate one or two points.

are watched by the navy. By advancing against these points, the Federals are sure to engage the Confederate armies. The Federal armies appear to be well placed. All that is needed is good generalship; and the first object to be attained, is to be strongest at the point of contact. If an army is ten times as strong as its enemy, and is spread out over a large area and contented to lie still, the smaller army can attack each fragment in turn and destroy it. But the leader of the stronger army should be able, with part of his force, to hold the weaker in check, and with the rest to fight under conditions that make his strength still stronger.

The 1st of January, 1863, marks an era in the history of the United States of America, second only to the 4th of July, 1776. In July, 1862, soon after Congress had adjourned, President Lincoln had suggested to his Cabinet, that as a fit and necessary military measure to restore the Union, he, as Commander-in-Chief of the army and navy of the United States, should declare¹ that on the first day of January, 1863, all persons held as slaves within any State or States wherein the constitutional authority of the United States shall not then be practically recognized, submitted to, and maintained, shall then thenceforward and forever be free. In view of the reverses at Manassas and elsewhere, the announcement was postponed, in the belief that it would be properly effective only when it should follow some success of the Federal arms.

On the 22d of August, in answer to an open letter of Horace Greeley, the Editor of the *New York Tribune*, Lincoln said²:

¹ 6 N. & H., 126.

² 6 N. & H., 152.

As to the policy I "seem to be pursuing" as you say, I have not left any one in doubt. I would save the Union. I would save it the shortest way under the Constitution. . . . If there be those who would not save the Union unless at the same time they could save slavery, I do not agree with them. If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time destroy slavery, I do not agree with them. My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to save or destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave, I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves, I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some, and leaving others alone, I would also do that. What I do about slavery and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps to save the Union. . . . I have here stated my purpose according to my view of official duty; and I intend no modification of my oft-expressed personal wish that all men everywhere could be free.

Lincoln¹ held that, as Commander-in-Chief of the army and navy in time of war, he had the right to take such measure in order to subdue the enemy. The slaves, if not themselves armed, were in the service of those who were, not only as laborers and producers, but also in the field, as waiters and teamsters, and in building intrenchments and fortifications.

**Emanci-
pation
announced.**

On the 22d of September, five days after the battle of Antietam, he made the announcement that, on the first day of January, the Executive would by proclamation designate the States and parts of States, if any, in which the people thereof respectively should be in rebellion against the United States.

¹6 N. & H., 156.

The failure in December of Burnside at Fredericksburg, and of Grant on the Mississippi, had spread a gloom over the loyal States, which was only partially relieved by Rosecrans's victory at Murfreesborough. Lincoln did not hesitate, but on the 1st of January, signed the proclamation which designated the States and parts of States¹ to which it applied, adding: ²

I hereby enjoin upon the people so declared free to abate from all violence, unless in necessary self-defence; and I recommend to them that in all cases when allowed, they labor faithfully for reasonable wages. And I further declare and make known, that such persons of suitable condition, will be received into the armed service of the United States to garrison forts, positions, stations, and other places, and to man vessels of all sorts in said service. And upon this act, sincerely believed to be an act of justice, warranted by the Constitution, upon military necessity, I invoke the considerate judgment of mankind, and the gracious favor of Almighty God.

The war now took a totally different turn. All hope of compromise was at an end. There was now no possible outcome but the ruin of the nation or the conquest of the South.

Effect of the proclamation.

In Great Britain,³ the proclamation was received with demonstrations of joy. Slavery had already been abolished in the British provinces; and the factory hands in England, who suffered most from the failure of the cotton crop, drowned their anxieties in their joy at this vindication of the dignity of labor. There was now little fear that England

¹ See Map I, at end.

² 6 N. & H., 414, 426, 427.

³ 4 Rhodes, 337, ff.

would recognize a Confederacy that was founded on slavery and in revolt against a free government.

In France, however, the case was different. The third Napoleon was already trying to establish an empire in Mexico, and from this time forth, the presence on the frontier of Napoleon's forces could not be ignored.

The winter of 1863 was the turning point in the attitude of the Federal Government toward its own citizens, as well as toward those of the South. On the 15th of April, 1861, under **Recruiting in 1861.** the law of 1795, the President had called for 75,000 militia¹ for ninety days.² Their only active service was in the first campaign and battle of Bull Run. "It went to demonstrate most strikingly," says General Fry, "the inefficiency of militia called into service for short periods."

In July, Congress passed a succession of acts authorizing³ the President to accept the services of volunteers . . . in such numbers, not exceeding 1,000,000, as he might deem necessary. The people responded so readily and enthusiastically to the appeals of Congress and the Executive, that no formal call was issued.

This irregular enlistment led to great confusion which was felt in 1862, when it became necessary to make further calls. In the spring of this year, 637,000 men were in the service; **Recruiting in 1862.** Congress and the people then deemed it necessary to check the enormous current expenditures by discontinuing enlistment; and on the 3d of April, the volunteer recruiting service was closed. On the

¹ 3 M. & D., 1865-66, 7.

² 7 N. & H., 1, 2.

³ 3 M. & D., 1865-'66, 8.

6th of June it was reopened, but the enthusiasm had abated, and it was hard to fill up the ranks. On the 28th, the Governors of most of the loyal States requested the President to call at once upon the several States, for such numbers of men as might be required to crush the Rebellion. On the 4th of August a draft of 300,000 militia, to serve for nine months, was ordered by the President. The War Department¹ allotted quotas to the States according to the number previously furnished. The adjustment of quotas within the State was committed to the State authorities by order of the War Department, with the direction that they be apportioned by the Governors among the several counties, and when practicable, among the subdivisions of counties. Of the 300,000, only about 87,000 were drafted.

During the latter part of 1862, it became clear that a radical change was needed in the method of raising troops.

It was evident [says Fry] that the efforts of the government for the suppression of the rebellion would fail without
Radical resort to the unpopular, but nevertheless truly
change in republican measure of conscription.² . . . For-
method of tunately, the loyal political leaders and press
raising early realized the urgency of conscription, and,
troops. by judicious agitation, gradually reconciled the
 public to it. When the enrolment act was introduced in Congress the following winter, the patriotic people of the North were willing to see it become a law. After a protracted, searching, and animated discussion, extending through nearly the whole of the short session of the thirty-seventh Congress, the enrolment act was passed, and became a law on the 3d of March, 1863. It was the first law enacted by Congress by which the government of the

¹ 3 M. & D., 1865-'66, 11.

² 3 M. & D., 1865-66, 12.

United States appealed directly to the nation to create large armies without the intervention of the authorities of the several States.

In the Confederate service, prior to December, 1861, there was no law to enlist men¹ in the provisional army for a longer period than twelve months. Recruiting
On that date, an act of the Confederate in the Con-
Congress was approved for converting the federate
troops then in the service into three years' service.
troops, and for the enlistment for that period of
all troops thereafter. A bounty of fifty dollars was
allowed by this act. The efforts to raise troops by¹
this act were not successful; and on the 16th of
April, 1862, an act was approved which authorized
the President "to call and place in the military service,
for three years, unless the war shall have sooner ended,
all white men who are residents of the Confederate
States, between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five
years, . . . not legally exempt from military service":
and requiring that "all of the persons aforesaid who
are now in the armies of the Confederacy, and whose
term of service will expire before the end of the war,
shall be continued in service for three years from
the date of their original enlistment." On the 27th of
September, 1862, the act was modified to include
white men between the ages of thirty-five and forty-five.

"Notwithstanding the sweeping rigor of the con-
scription created by these laws," says General Fry,
"the results do not seem to have been Confederate
very satisfactory." recruiting

On the 11th of February, 1863, Lee wrote unsatisfac-
to Seddon.² tory.

¹ 3 M. & D., 1865-'66, 120.

² M. & D., 1865-'66, 121.

I think it very important to increase the strength of all our armies to the maximum by the opening of the next campaign. Details of officers and men have been sent from all brigades of this army to collect deserters and absentees. By the return of last month you will perceive that our strength is not much increased by the arrival of conscripts. Now is the time to gather all our strength, and prepare for the struggle that must take place in the next three months. I beg you to use every means in your power to fill up our ranks.

In the Federal Army, the number of men present and absent is reported¹ for January 1, 1862, as 575,900, for March 31, 637,100, and for January 1, 1863, 918,200; of this number, as we have seen, about 547,600 were "present for duty." In the Confederate Army the total numbers have been estimated from the returns² for January, 1862, 351,100, for April, 401,400, and for January, 1863, 446,600; of whom about 272,500 were present for duty.

In the Eastern armies, the Confederate infantry were hardier, accustomed to outdoor life, to subordination, and to the use of firearms. The Federals were, upon the whole, more intelligent, skilful in mechanical work, and equally self-reliant. The Confederates could outstrip their opponents on long marches, especially in obstructed country. In the central theatre, the difference was less marked; and west of the Mississippi, all were equally hardy, but the Federal troops of Missouri were better organized and trained than the Confederates of Arkansas.

The Southerners were accustomed to riding from boyhood, and the cavalry arm had a special charm for their choicest young men; but in the Federal armies

¹ 3 M. & D., 1865-'66 102.

² T. L. L., 42 ff.

east of the Mississippi, this arm was at first chosen by men who from their early training were least fitted for such service.

In the Confederate army, the men brought their own horses with them; in the Federal army, these were furnished by the Government and were as ill adapted for the work as their riders. The first year of the war proved that, for some purposes, one good cavalryman was worth more than many times his number of infantry; better horses were supplied, abler horsemen were enlisted, and the *esprit de corps* of this arm was raised. The Southern horses were soon worn out and could not be replaced, and as the war progressed the advantage was more and more on the side of the Federals.

In artillery, the Federals, from their large manufactories and mechanical skill, surpassed their opponents from the outset both in material and in men.

Both in the East and West, the Federal Army was usually well clothed, fed, and supplied. The Confederate Army was poorly clothed and miserably fed. The two armies may then be estimated as equal man for man; and, in numbers, the Federal superior to the Confederate in a ratio a little less than two to one. This superiority in numbers was, of course, by no means too great for the larger task of the invading armies.

A modern army requires money for its maintenance, as well as recruits. This, the Congress provided by the issue of legal-tender notes. The value of **Money.** gold, which was driven from circulation by these measures, was affected by the volume of paper money in circulation,¹ by military success and disaster,

¹6 N. & H., 238.

and by the speculations of the gamblers in Wall Street. In January, 1862, gold in New York was at a premium of $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. It soon fell to 1, from which it rose, on the 10th of October, to 37, and closed on the 31st of December at 34.¹

The Confederate paper money², by the very terms of its certificates, was not to be redeemed until the ratification of a treaty of peace between the United States and the Confederate States, and its value was therefore merely nominal.

The struggle between the North and the South was the natural consequence of their environment. Society

in the South crystallized around the life of the planter. From the Southern standpoint, he was the father of a great family; the

absolute owner of his slaves, whom he fed and sheltered as his cattle, chastised and cherished as his children, and for the care of whose souls and bodies he was responsible to God. The poor whites looked up to the planters, and felt little sympathy for the slaves. In contrast with this patriarchal life was the industrial activity of the North, where agriculture, commerce, and manufactures grew side by side, where large cities sprang up, wealth accumulated, and all the arts and sciences flourished.

A life of agriculture favors the growth of an aristocracy. One of agriculture combined with commerce and manufacture, that of a democracy. In the early life of the Republic, it was the pride of the American that these two civilizations could grow up side by side as a single nation; but as this nation expanded, it was clear that

¹ Comptroller's report, 1863, quoted in Bolles' *Financial History of the United States, 1861-1885*, p. 141.

² N. & H., 248.

it must develop on one line, or on the other; the Republican party proposed to solve the problem by limiting the extension of slavery leaving it intact where it already was. The Southern leaders preferred to break up the Republic; the clash came with the result that might be expected. The fight at first was not between African slavery and free labor; it was between an agricultural and a varied life, between aristocracy and democracy, between the old and the new, between stagnation and progress. The brave resistance of the South made it not only right, but prudent, for the North to weaken its enemy by declaring the slaves to be free. There was now no longer any question about the issues at stake; no longer any hope of compromise. One side or the other must yield; and, in yielding, must lay aside those cherished ideals that it held to be dearer than life.

With emancipation, the South feared all the horrors of a servile insurrection with a race of submissive servants transformed into barbarous and brutal masters. Many of the Southern leaders, like the noble and gallant *Lee*, would gladly see slavery abolished, but resisted the violent action of the North as their forefathers had resisted that of the mother country. Of the Confederate soldier, General *Alexander* says:

Effect of
proclama-
tion on the
South.

He was lean, sunburned, and bearded; often barefoot and ragged. He had neither training nor discipline, except what he acquired in the field. He had only antiquated and inferior arms until he captured better ones in battle. He had not even military ambition, but he had an incentive which was lacking to his opponents,—brave and loyal as they were,—he was fighting for his home.¹

¹ *The Confederate Soldier*, E. P. Alexander.

In the North, the proclamation awakened the fervent zeal of that large class of men who saw the false and criminal side of slavery, and recognized it as a blot upon the name of a free and independent nation. This feeling, however, was far from universal; a large number of officers and soldiers openly declared that they were fighting for the Union, and would never have enlisted in a war for the abolition of slavery. A large majority of this class hated this institution, but sympathized with the slaveholders on whom it had been imposed. Many took pride in their connection with these hospitable farmers, whose manner of living was different from their own. Some prized the Union for its name, some for its trade, some for its power; others felt that they could not exist without it and maintain the high standard on which the Republic was based, and without which it would perish. The eloquence of Webster had fostered the feeling that Liberty was inseparable from Union. Upon the issue of this war depended the success or failure of the government by the people. The American Revolution of 1776 had been followed by an uprising in Western Europe, where a great government was established which, after a series of struggles, broke down before the gold of England and the united empires of Eastern Europe. No other great republic was left on earth; and if the Union should be dissolved, the once united States of America would become puppets in the hands of the stronger nations and soon be blotted out of existence. As the war became more serious, the feeling against slavery increased, and the conviction gradually spread that slavery and free labor could not live side by side on the same continent.

To Daniel Webster is due much of the credit for the first uprising of the people of the North; but when, after long protracted warfare the hope of reconciliation was lost, and many at the North had little sympathy for the bloody policy of coercion, it was due in a large part to the tact and determination of Abraham Lincoln, that the staunch patriotism and heroic sacrifices of the loyal men at the North brought to a close the war that not only restored the Union, but abolished the great danger that had threatened it.

Webster
and
Lincoln.





CHAPTER V

THE RAPPAHANNOCK.

LINCOLN'S view of the military situation may be inferred from a memorandum he prepared for Seward in the summer of 1862.

What should be done [he says] is to hold what we have in the West, open the Mississippi, and East Tennessee, without more. A reasonable force should, in any event, be kept about Washington for its protection. Then let the country give us a hundred thousand more troops in the shortest possible time, which added to McClellan, directly or indirectly, will take Richmond without endangering any other place that we now hold, and will substantially end the war. (Lincoln's Complete Works, II., 190.)

He was right in believing that no efforts should be wasted on points of minor importance. The destruction of the Confederate Army was the primary object of the war; it was holding a line on the Rappahannock where it defended the State of Virginia and the Confederate capital, threatened Washington, forcing the Federal Government to keep there a large garrison, and might at any moment press safely and rapidly down the Valley of the Shenandoah and into the heart of Pennsylvania. Let the Federal Army drive it back from the Rappahannock

and take Richmond, and it will lose all these advantages. Washington and Pennsylvania will be safe, Virginia will be wrested from the Confederacy. The Army of the Potomac will then be reinforced by half the garrison of Washington, the railroad across the theatre of war will soon fall into the hands of Federals, East Tennessee will be recovered, West Tennessee protected, and the opening of the Mississippi will then be an easy task for the combined forces of the Federal army and navy. There can be no better way to destroy the Confederate armies than to attack in force the army that is defending the vital point. Hooker's army of twice its strength is now confronting it on the banks of the Rappahannock. There is nothing but mud to prevent him from moving, as all the country is clamoring, "On to Richmond!" If Hooker meets the enemy in the open field, he is strong enough to beat him. If *Lee* takes refuge behind his intrenchments, Hooker's superior numbers will give him the advantage which the initiative secures of increasing his own strength by fighting where he pleases.

In Hooker's letter of instructions directing him to keep in view always the importance of covering Washington and Harper's Ferry, Halleck enclosed a copy of his letter of January ^{Hooker's} instructions. to Burnside¹ (see p. 71, *ante*), saying:

I have advised a forward movement across the Rappahannock . . . to turn the enemy's works, or to threaten their wings or communications; . . . I particularly advised you to use your cavalry and light artillery upon his communications, and attempt to cut off his supplies, and engage him at an advantage. . . . The great object is to occupy the enemy, to prevent his making large detach-

¹ 40 R., 13.

ments or distant raids, and to injure him all you can with the least injury to yourself. . . . There seems to me to be many reasons why a crossing at some point be attempted. It will not do to keep your large army inactive.

Where there is no better use to make of cavalry, it may be well to send it against the enemy's communi-
Comment. cations. In this way, *Van Dorn* and *Forrest* broke up Grant's first advance on Vicksburg; and *Grierson*, by confusing *Pemberton*, helped Grant in his final advance; but we shall see that *Hooker* in 1863 and *Grant* in 1864 accomplished little by such raids, and that in each case the operations of the main body of the Federal army were seriously crippled by the absence of the cavalry. It was surely desirable for the Federal army to advance if the weather permitted. Although a crossing below *Fredericksburg* would put it in a good position for attacking *Lee* or cutting off his retreat to *Richmond*; yet on the whole it was better to cross above, where at favorable stages of the water, the rivers could be forded. This plan was followed by *Hooker*, *Meade*, and *Grant*, and was surely preferable to *Burnside's* direct assault.

In *Hooker's* testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War he says¹:

My experience of the previous winter had satisfied me that a winter campaign in that climate, and on that soil,
Hooker's would be unwise, and more likely to be ruinous
Plans. to ourselves than to the enemy. The army acting on the offensive would be more exposed, and its losses greater in men and animals, the extent of difference depending of course upon the character of the campaign. . . .

Before the second effort [of *Burnside*] ended, the winter

¹ I C. W., 1865, III.

rains set in, and all operations for a while were suspended; the army finding itself literally buried in mud from which there was no hope of extrication before spring.

With this prospect before it, taken in connection with the gloom and despondency which followed the disaster of Fredericksburg, the army was in a forlorn, deplorable condition. Reference to the letters from the army at this period, public and private, affords abundant evidence of its demoralization, and these in their turn had their effect on the friends and relatives of the soldiers at home. At the time the army was turned over to me,¹ desertions were at the rate of about 200 a day. . . . At that time perhaps a majority of the officers, especially those high in rank, were hostile to the policy of the government in the conduct of the war. The emancipation proclamation had been published a short time before, and a large element of the army had taken sides antagonistic to it. . . .

My first object was to prevent desertion, and when this was accomplished, my whole attention was directed to securing the return of absentees, and rendering those present as comfortable and contented as circumstances would allow. I granted leaves of absence and furloughs to a limited extent, and in such manner as enabled all to be absent for a few days in the course of the winter. The disloyal officers were dismissed the service as soon as evidence of the fact was brought to my knowledge. . . . Important changes were introduced into the various staff departments. . . .

¹ The cavalry was consolidated, and placed in a higher state of efficiency than had before been known in our service; and whenever the state of the roads and the river would admit of a movement, expeditions were fitted out to attack the enemy's pickets and outposts, and gather supplies from the country in their possession, my object being to encourage and stimulate in the breasts of our

¹ I C. W., 1865, 112.

men, by successes, however small, a feeling of superiority over our adversaries. In this we were eminently successful.

. . . .
Our artillery had always been superior to that of the rebels, as was also our infantry, except, perhaps, in discipline, which for reasons not necessary to mention, was probably below that of Lee's army. . . .

During the time allowed us for preparation, the army made rapid strides in discipline, instruction, and morale, and early in April was in a condition to inspire the highest expectations. Its ranks had been filled by the return of absentees. All were actuated by feelings of confidence and devotion to the cause, and I felt that it was a living army, and one well worthy of the republic.

On the 5th of February, Hooker broke up the grand divisions into which Burnside had divided the Army of the Potomac, and announced that the corps organization would be adopted in its stead.¹

General Joseph Hooker was an officer of martial bearing. He was graduated at West Point in 1837 as 2d Lieutenant of Artillery,² and served with distinction in the Mexican War. His military education and his service in the army gave him a good knowledge of company duty, organization, and administration. He does not, however, appear to have been a student of the higher branches of military science, and it is doubtful if his intellect was powerful enough to analyze and apply its principles. He had shown his ability in action as a division and corps commander, and was about to show great

¹ 40 R., 51, 176. The corps were commanded as follows: I, Reynolds, II, Couch, III, Sickles, V, Meade, VI, Sedgwick, XI, Sigel (relieved by Howard, March 31st), XII, Slocum. The cavalry was consolidated into corps under Stoneman.

² Heitman, *Historical Register of the U. S. Army*, i., 540.

talent for commanding an army in camp, and for planning an offensive campaign so far as related to the mobilization of a large army; but the successful conduct of a great battle against an adversary like *Lee* demands higher attainments. Practice in commanding large armies in battle is the privilege of a very few and if skill is to be acquired by such practice alone, without previous qualification, hosts may be sacrificed before the lesson is learned. A superior intellect, and long and hard study are required to make an efficient commander. He must study the principles of military science, and learn their application from military history; and then, to be ready for all contingencies, he must study his campaigns and battles in his head or on the map, before he is called upon to fight them in the field. There were no grand manœuvres or staff rides in America before the Civil War; but some of our officers by hard work and constant application had acquired the faculty of leading troops in action. Hooker was accredited with skill in conducting a fight under his own eye; but his mind was not equal to the task of directing and co-ordinating the operations of large bodies of troops of whose relative positions he could judge only from reports. When his adversary's movements were not what he had anticipated, he had not the skill to change his own dispositions to meet them.

On the other side of the Rappahannock, we find the Confederate army commanded by General *Robert E. Lee*, a man whom friend and foe united in praising for his mental and moral superiority; a man honored and loved in the South, as Lincoln in the North, and Washington throughout the land. As a general, *Lee* sometimes made mistakes; not

General
Lee.

like Hooker, from mental limitations, for he could estimate the probable result of the movements he directed in case his adversary should do his best; but his experience with Federal commanders had led him to believe that they would act as they had acted before, and expose their armies to the attacks which his native combativeness prompted him to make, and whose probable success, he believed, would justify the risk of a possible failure. During the winter, *Fitz. Lee*¹ says: "General *Lee* was surrounded by embarrassments, the troops were scantily clothed, rations for men and animals meagre. The shelters were poor, and through them broke the sun, rains, and winds. He could not strike his enemy, but must watch and be patient."

The Ninth Army Corps, detached from the Army of the Potomac, arrived at Newport News early in February.²

On the 18th, *Lee* sent³ *Longstreet* with *Hood's* and *Pickett's* divisions of his corps, to protect Richmond, and to collect supplies for his army in South Virginia and North Carolina, as the region around the Rappahannock was exhausted; but cautioned him to be ready to return when Hooker should threaten to cross the Rappahannock. As the Federal lines at Suffolk covered a rich tract of land in Southeastern Virginia, *Lee* authorized him, if he thought best, to take them by a sudden and vigorous attack.⁴

Longstreet was an able and brave commander who felt that he could do with troops what any man could do. He suggested that his other divisions should be sent to him, and said in one of his letters, "It seems to me

¹ Lee's *Lee*, 238.

² 26 R., 536.

³ 26 R., 871, 876, 880.

⁴ 26 R., 918, 919, 922, 923, 925-927, 943, see Map IV, at end.

that a matter of prime necessity with us is to keep the enemy out of North Carolina, and if we give him ground at all, it would be better to do so from the Rappahannock," but *Lee* had a better view of the general situation.

On the 13th of March,¹ *Getty's* division of the Ninth Corps was sent from Newport News to Suffolk. On the 18th,² *Wilcox's* and *Sturgis's* divisions were ordered to Ohio. At Suffolk, there were with Peck about 15,000 troops, and a few tug-boats and ferry-boats of light draft, armed with field-pieces and commanded by Captain *Lee* of the navy. On the 11th of April, *Longstreet* appeared in front of Suffolk,³ and on the 12th, with about 21,500 men, invested the city on the northwest, west, and south. The defence of the Nansemond below Suffolk was at first intrusted to the gunboats; but their armor was not strong enough to resist the fire of the enemy's artillery, and after hard fighting in which the navy displayed great skill and valor, they were withdrawn. The eastern bank was fortified, and *Getty's* division posted there to defend it. During the siege, *Peck's* force at Suffolk was raised⁴ to 24,000, *Longstreet's* to 23,000.⁵ To assault so strong a position with equal forces appeared hopeless.

Along the Rappahannock, *Lee's* army of some 63,000 men was encamped on the high ground south of the river from the United States Ford to Port Royal with a brigade of cavalry at Culpeper; *Hooker's* army of some 130,000, north of the river from Falmouth to Fletcher's Chapel.⁶ The Federal

Siege of
Suffolk.

Armies on
Rappahan-
nock.

¹ 26 R., 275, 558.

² 26 R., 563-5.

³ Hazard Stevens, *Siege of Suffolk*, 9 M. H. S. M.; 26 R., 1086, 915, 916, 898, 978.

⁴ 26 R., 574, 675. ⁵ 26 R., 663, 915, 1025. ⁶ See Map V, at end.

picket line extended from a point about five miles west of Fredericksburg nearly due north to Centreville, and thence to the Falls of the Upper Potomac, and as far west as Harper's Ferry.¹ The irregular warfare of this frontier has been made famous by the exploits of the Confederate partisan *Mosby*.²

On the 24th of February, to learn the strength of the Federals on the Rappahannock, *Fitz. Lee* crossed the river at Kelly's Ford with about 400 men; on the 25th he drove in the Federal pickets near Hartwood Church, and after fighting his way to within five miles of Falmouth, returned to Morrisville, and on the 26th recrossed the river.³

With regard to this reconnaissance, Major Bigelow, in *The Campaign of Chancellorsville*,⁴ says:⁵

This dash of Confederate cavalry, designated in the War Records as the Skirmish at Hartwood Church, and the manner in which it was met, . . . show that Hooker's and Heintzelman's horsemen, and their commanders, had something to learn before they would be up to the standard of Lee's. It is plain that the country beyond the Federal outposts was not adequately patrolled, and

¹ 3 B. and L., 148.


² *Mosby* thus describes the capture of a Federal officer whose tent he had entered in the night; "I said, 'General, get up—dress quick—you are a prisoner.' 'What!' 'My name is Mosby; Stuart's cavalry are in possession of this place, and General Jackson holds Centreville.' 'Is Fitz. Lee here?' 'Yes.' 'Then take me to him; we were classmates.' 'Very well; but dress quick.' Two of my men assisted him to put on his clothes. My motive in deceiving him in regard to the amount of my force was to deprive him of all hope of rescue." (3 B. & L., 148).

³ 39 R., 25; McClellan's *Stuart*, 204.

⁴ The most thorough account of a campaign of the Civil War ever published.

⁵ Bigelow, 71-73.

CAVALRY ENGAGEMENT
AT
KELLY'S FORD
APRIL 17
1863



FEDERALS

- ☐ DUFFIE
- 4. NY...4
- 6. OHIO...6
- I. R. I.I
- MCINTOSH
- 3 PENN...3
- 4 " -4'
- 16 " 16

CONFEDERATES

- F. LEE
- 1 VA....1
- 2 "2
- 3 "3
- 4 "4
- 5 "5

- RENO
- 1 U.S. 1'
- 5 U.S. 5'

that the troops were not proficient in turning out suddenly and promptly and getting on the march.¹

Averell . . . asked Hooker for an order to cross the river and settle accounts with Fitzhugh Lee. Hooker realized that no system of outposts would prove efficient protection against an aggressive and enterprising enemy who was determined to penetrate them, and that the only way to put a stop to the harassing of his pickets and alarming of his camps was to retaliate by vigorously attacking the enemy's cavalry. . . . How far Hooker sympathized with Averell's impatience to get even with Fitzhugh Lee, and how much he desired on his own part to settle the question of relative prowess and efficiency between his newly created cavalry corps and Stuart's veteran cavalry division, or to inform himself regarding the terrain and the enemy south of the Upper Rappahannock, are debatable questions.

On the 16th of March, Averell left the main body of the army with 3000 cavalry and six pieces of artillery, under orders to attack and rout or destroy the cavalry forces of the enemy under *Fitz. Lee*, which were reported to be in the vicinity of Culpeper Court-House.² Hostile cavalry, 250 or 1000, were also reported north of the river near Brentsville; and Averell unwisely detached 900 men to guard the fords, and look out for this imaginary force. He ordered his men to have their sabres sharpened, and to use them.³ The head of his column

Battle of
Kelly's
Ford.

¹ Fitzhugh Lee and Averell had been at West Point together and were warm personal friends. When Lee withdrew he left with his surgeon a note to Averell which the surgeon, as he recrossed the Federal lines, delivered to a picket. It read about as follows: "I wish you would put up your sword, leave my state, and go home. You ride a good horse, I ride a better. Yours can beat mine running. If you won't go home, return my visit, and bring me a sack of coffee." (*Glimpses of the Nation's Struggle*, 2d series, i., pp. 38-44; Bigelow, 73.)

² 39 R., 47; McClellan's *Stuart*, 205.

³ D. M. Gilman in *Glimpses of the Nation's Struggle*, 2d series, i., pp. 38-44.

arrived at Kelly's Ford¹ at about 6 A.M., and on the 17th, after several ineffectual attempts, forced a passage across the Rappahannock.² When *Fitz. Lee* at Culpeper heard of Averell's crossing, he moved down his command to meet him.³ It was after 10 A.M. when Averell advanced and went into position behind a stone wall west of the ford.

Fitz. Lee approached with five regiments of cavalry and a battery, about 1000 or 1200 in all. One regiment charged in column of fours, and swept down the line of the wall to their left, firing their pistols as they passed; but no outlet could be found and they kept on towards Wheatley's, a farmhouse on Averell's right. It was a question which should obtain possession of the buildings there; but McIntosh's men arrived first, dismounted, and waited behind a stone wall. Another of *Lee's* regiments followed, and joined in the effort to take the buildings, but both were driven back.

As soon as the Confederates had passed, Duffié formed three regiments in front of the left of the Federal position; and *Lee* moved forward again with three regiments and a battery to meet him. Then followed what was perhaps the first real sabre contest of the war in the East. Colonel Hess says, "The Virginians shouted, 'Draw your pistols you Yanks and fight like gentlemen.'" Averell brought up two or three squadrons from the reserve; while McIntosh came in on *Lee's* left flank, and Duffié charged his regiments as they came up in succession and drove them back.

After spending half an hour or more in reorganization, Averell advanced to a new position. *Lee*, finding

¹ See map, p. 119.

² *Sabres and Spurs*, Denison; *History of the 3d Penn. Cavalry*, W. B. Rawle, etc.

³ 39 R., 61, 49.

that Averell showed no disposition to attack, made a charge in line supported by the fire of his battery. The three regiments on his left, advancing over soft ground, lost their momentum before arriving within a hundred yards of Averell's men, who fired without dismounting, and drove them back in disorder. On Averell's left his men sat quietly in their saddles with drawn sabres till the enemy had approached under galling fire from his artillery to within four hundred yards, and then charged their broken ranks and drove them back in disorder. Averell pursued a short distance and then halted. Major *McClellan*, *Stuart's* chief of staff, says:¹

Now, indeed, there was an opportunity for General Averell to "rout or destroy" Fitz. Lee's brigade. . . . He could have swept that field beyond the hope of recovery. . . . Why did he not do it? Let us turn to his report for information.

[Averell's] report says²: Their skirmishers again threatened my left, and it was reported to me that infantry had been seen at a distance to my right, moving toward my rear, and the cars could be heard running on the road in rear of the enemy, probably bringing reinforcements. It was 5.30 P.M., and it was necessary to advance my cavalry upon their intrenched positions, to make a direct and desperate attack, or to withdraw across the river.

There were no intrenched positions and no reinforcements. The principal result achieved by this expedition was to give practice and confidence to the cavalry. It also proved that Averell was incompetent to command such an expedition.³

¹ McClellan's *Stuart*, 216.

² 39 R., 50.

³ Averell left with a surgeon attending two wounded officers, a sack of coffee and a note: "Dear Fitz: Here 's your coffee. How is your horse." A few weeks after, Averell received a reply: "Your two officers

About the middle of April, the Confederates organized expeditions under *Imboden* and *W. E. Jones* to start from the Shenandoah Valley and Western Virginia, to destroy the bridges and property on the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, and to collect horses, cattle, provisions, etc., for the Confederate army.¹

Early in April [says Hooker²], though the roads were still heavy, and impracticable for artillery and wagons, I believed that the army was in condition to march on the enemy, and, as I had about 40,000 nine-months and two-years men whose terms of service would soon expire, I felt it necessary to commence operations at the earliest practicable moment.

On the 12th Hooker sent, through his adjutant-general, the following order to Stoneman:

I am directed³ by the major-general commanding to inform you that you will march at 7 A.M. on the 13th instant, with all your available force except one brigade, for the purpose of turning the enemy's position on his left, and of throwing your command between him and Richmond, and isolating him from his supplies, checking his retreat, and inflicting on him every possible injury which will tend to his discomfiture

are well enough to go home, where they ought to be. Send an ambulance to Kelly's, and you can have them." A few weeks afterward, President Lincoln visited the army and seeing these notes and that of Feb. 25th, asked Averell, "Were you and General Lee friends?" "Certainly and always have been." "What would happen should you meet on the battle-field?" "One or both of us would be badly hurt or killed." After a pause Lincoln said with emotion: "Oh, my God, what a dreadful thing is a war like this, in which personal friends must slay each other, and die like fiends!" (Bigelow, 73, 101, 131.)

¹For full accounts see Bigelow, 460 ff.

²C. W., 1865, 113.

³39 R., 1066; 1 C. W., 1865, 113.

and defeat. To accomplish this, the general suggests that you ascend the Rappahannock by the different routes, keeping well out of view of the enemy . . . that you select for your place of crossing the Rappahannock some point to the west of the Orange and Alexandria railroad. . . . Let your watchword be *fight*, and let all your orders be *fight*, FIGHT, FIGHT, bearing in mind that time is as valuable to the general as rebel carcasses. . . . you may rely upon the general being in connection with you before your supplies are exhausted. . . . A brigade of infantry will march to-morrow morning at 8 o'clock for Kelly's Ford, with one battery, and a regiment to the United States and Banks's Fords, to threaten and hold those places.

Hooker says¹:

Neither the condition of the army nor the state of the roads admitted of an earlier movement, and even then I did not regard it as practicable to move trains and artillery belonging to the infantry corps over the latter; and, accordingly, as the order explains my object in moving, the cavalry was to cut the enemy's communications with his base, and when this was done, to cross the infantry below Fredericksburg and attack him or pursue, as occasion might require. As he kept but a limited amount of stores at Fredericksburg, it was believed that he would have to abandon his defences immediately in our front, and retire in the direction of Richmond. In order to appreciate the difficulties and the hazardous nature of the movement, it may be proper to add that the line of the Rappahannock² occupied by the enemy was a position of a formidable character, and, as I found it, one that I could not reasonably expect to carry by force. The river flows through a deep channel, not fordable at any point at this season of the year, and from its pre-

Hooker's
comments.

¹ C. W., 1865, 115.

² See Map VI, at end.

cipitous . . . banks it admitted of no approach except at a few points, and these had been indicated to the enemy by the unsuccessful efforts of my predecessor in command. . . . The river had been rendered impracticable of passage for a distance of fifty miles except by stratagem. In fact, the southern bank of the river may be said to have been protected by a continuous line of defence for this space, and at the only points admitting of a passage of our army two or three lines of rifle-pits had been thrown up, with epaulments for artillery. Especially was this the case at what is called Banks's Ford and the United States Ford, each of which was held by a sufficient force to defend it. Near Fredericksburg and below that city, the high banks receded from the river, leaving low or bottom land between them and the river; here the line of the enemy's defence followed the high ground and the obstacle was not so much in crossing the river as in forcing his defences afterwards. There were no fords in the river below Fredericksburg at any stage of water, and none above to where the river forks with the Rapidan practicable at this season of the year. Ten or twelve miles above the junction was Kelly's Ford, pitted and abatised, but feebly defended. Crossing at this point involved the passage of two rivers, both mountain torrents, and sensitive to the slightest rains; bridges were out of the question, as they could not be transported over the treacherous roads at the time.

On the 13th, Stoneman's command,¹ consisting of some 9900 cavalry and four batteries of horse artillery, left their winter camp² with six days' rations and five days' short forage carried on the horses and on pack mules and wagons. An extra supply for three days was sent to Bealton. The cavalry arrived at Morrisville on the night of the 13th; the infantry came up at 3 P.M. of the 14th.³ On this

Stoneman
starts.

¹ 39 R., 1057.

² See Map V, at end.

³ 40 R., 214.

day, Stoneman made demonstrations of crossing at Beverly and Kelly's Fords; and actually sent a small party across the railroad bridge over the Rappahannock, and after a slight skirmish withdrew it, meanwhile sending Davis's brigade up the river some ten miles, to cross at Sulphur Springs and outflank the detachments guarding the other fords.

During the night of the 13th, *W. H. F. Lee*,¹ who was guarding the fords from Beverly to Kelly's with about 1300 cavalry and one battery, hearing of Stoneman's approach,² had reinforced his pickets. During the night of the 14th,³ a severe rain commenced and continued for thirty-six hours, which prevented the troops from crossing the river. Davis's brigade was recalled. He had already flanked the enemy's post at Beverly Ford, and came down upon it by surprise⁴ and drove it away. Meanwhile the river had risen so high that in recrossing, some of Davis's men were obliged to swim their horses, some were drowned, and some were captured.⁵ The rain continued with short intervals of fair weather, and the river remained impassable for cavalry for nearly a fortnight.⁶ If Stoneman had been more energetic, he might have crossed his command on the 14th. He need not have waited to issue his extra supplies. If Davis did not appear, Stoneman could have crossed first and co-operated afterwards.

¹ About the 1st of April (40 R., 703) Gen. R. E. Lee, in order to reinforce his line on the Upper Rappahannock, had moved *W. H. F. Lee's* brigade, 1300 men and two batteries, say 180 men (7 S. H. S., 558), from the extreme right to Culpeper and thrown forward *Fitz. Lee's* brigade, 1600, into Loudon to collect supplies.

² 39 R., 85.

³ 39 R., 1068.

⁴ 39 R., 88.

⁵ 39 R., 85.

⁶ 39 R., 1067.

On the 19th of April, for a diversion, Hooker, sent Doubleday's division of Reynolds's corps to Port Royal. It returned on the 22d. On this day, two **Diversions.** regiments from Belle Plain crossed to Port Royal, and destroyed some Confederate property.

Hooker says¹:

As the river continued impassable until the 27th, the movement was suspended until that time. . . . As the **River falls.** season was now more advanced, and the roads firmer, with a prospect that the rainy season had ended, I concluded to change my plan and strike for the whole rebel army instead of forcing it back on its line of retreat, which was as much as I could hope to accomplish in executing my first design. As modified, the problem was to throw a sufficient infantry force to cross at Kelly's Ford, descend the Rappahannock, and knock away **Hooker's new plan.** the enemy's forces holding the United States and Banks's Fords by attacking them in rear, and as soon as these fords were opened to reinforce the marching columns sufficiently for them to continue the march upon the flank of the rebel army until his whole force was routed, and, if successful, his retreat intercepted. Simultaneous with this movement on the right, the left were to cross the Rappahannock below Fredericksburg and threaten the enemy in that quarter, including his depot of supplies, to prevent his dispatching an overwhelming force to his left. . . . Knowing² that the passage of the river would be resisted, and perhaps defeated, if brought to the knowledge of the enemy, I had taken every precaution in my power to keep it a profound secret. I had not even communicated it to my corps commanders, or the officers of my staff.

Howard³ marched with the XI Corps at sunrise of the 27th of April, followed by Slocum⁴ with

¹ C. W., 1865, 116. ² C. W., 1865, 118; 40 R., 255, 262, 264, 266.

³ 39 R., 627; 40 R., 273, 274, see Map V. ⁴ 39 R., 669.

the XII and Meade¹ with the V. All bivouacked at Hartwood Church, and on the evening of the 28th, arrived at Kellys Ford. Couch² with Hancock's and French's divisions of the II Corps marched to Banks Ford on the 28th, and sent one brigade³ and one battery to United States Ford. Gibbon's division of Couch's corps was left at its camp on Stafford Heights in plain sight of the enemy, so as to be as much in evidence as possible. Sedgwick⁴ with the VI Corps, took a position near Franklin's Crossing below Fredericksburg; Reynolds⁵ with the I at Pollock Mills Creek; Sickles⁶ with the III, an intermediate position in reserve. All these troops encamped or bivouacked behind the heights, without fires, and concealed from the observation of the enemy. The troops of all the corps marched with eight days' rations, and carried most of the small ammunition on pack mules. Only a very few wagons were allowed to go with them. The trains were parked near Banks Ford. General Hooker went to Morrisville to superintend the crossing. As soon as the flood subsided *Stuart* brought back *Fitz. Lee's* brigade to Culpeper.⁷

Hooker
moves.

For Hooker to divide his forces in the presence of the enemy may appear rash, but his movements are so carefully planned that if any part of his line is attacked, it can hold its ground, or fall back until so reinforced as to outnumber the enemy. If *Lee* retains his main force at Fredericksburg, Hooker, with the right wing, can advance and pick up

Comment.

¹ 39 R., 305; 40 R., 262, 264.

² 39 R., 305; 40 R., 266-269.

³ On the 27th, Meagher's brigade occupied Banks and United States Fords; on the 28th it was replaced at U. S. Ford by Carroll's brigade (39 R., 311, 315).

⁴ *Ib.*, 557.

⁵ *Ib.*, 253.

⁶ *Ib.*, 384.

⁷ McClellan's *Stuart*, 224 ff.

ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, APRIL 30, 1863

	Eng'r Brig. Signal Corps Artillery Res. Provost Gd.	Benham Cushing Graham Patrick	800 200 1,600 2,700		GUNS 58 10
	CORPS	DIVISIONS		BRIGADES. No. of Regts. in each	
I	Reynolds 17,100 (410)	Wadsworth Robinson Doubleday	8,300 5,700 3,100	Phelps, 4; Cutler, 5; Paul, 5; Meredith, 5; Root, 4; Baxter, 4; Leonard, 5. Rowley, 4; Stone, 3.	52
II	Couch 16,900 (346)	Hancock Gibbon French	6,600 5,500 4,800	Caldwell, 6; Meagher, 5; Zook, 4; Brooke, 3. Sully, 5; Owen, 4; Hall, 6. Carroll, 6; Hays, 4; Albright, 3.	48
III	Sickles 19,000 (424)	Birney Berry Whipple	7,700 7,700 3,600	Graham, 6; Ward, 6; Hayman, 5. Carr, 5; Revere, 6; Mott, 6. Franklin, 3; Bowman, 3; Berdan, 2.	54
V	Meade 15,900 (417)	Griffin Sykes Humphreys	8,300 4,000 3,600	Barnes, 7; McQuade, 5; Stockton, 7. Ayres, 3; Burbank, 3; O'Rourke, 3. Tyler, 4; Allabach, 4.	42
VI	Sedgwick 23,700 (478)	Brooks Howe Newton Burnham	7,600 6,000 7,600 2,500	Brown, 5; Bartlett, 5; Russell, 5. Grant, 6; Neill, 6. Shaler, 5; Eustis, 5; Wheaton, 5. Burnham, 5.	54
XI	Howard 13,500 (470)	Devens Steinwehr Schurz	4,700 4,100 4,700	Von Gilsa, 4; McLean, 5. Buschbeck, 4; Barlow, 4. Schimmelpfennig, 5; Krzyzanowski, 5.	36
XII	Slocum 13,500 (448)	Williams Geary	6,100 7,400	Knipe, 4; Ross, 4; Ruger, 5. Candy, 6; Kane, 5; Greene, 5.	28
Cav.	Stoneman 13,400 (478)	Pleasanton Averell Gregg Reserve	4,000 3,500 3,400 2,500	Davis, 4; Devin, 4. Sargent, 4; McIntosh, 3. Kilpatrick, 3; Wind- ham, 4. Buford, 5.	22
Tot.	133,000 (446)		138,300		404

ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, APRIL 30, 1863

	Artillery Res.	Pendleton	600		GUNS
	CORPS	DIVISIONS		BRIGADES No. of Regts. in each	
I	Longstreet	Anderson	8,700 (397)	Wilcox, 5; Wright, 4; Mahone, 5; Posey, 4; Perry, 3.	18
	18,650	McLaws	9,100 (459)	Wofford, 5; Semmes, 4; Kershaw, 6; Barksdale, 4.	18
		Corps. Art.	850	Alexander, Walton.	36
II	Jackson	A. P. Hill	12,000 (409)	Heth, 4; Thomas, 4; Lane, 5; McGowan, 5; Archer, 5; Pen- der, 5.	26
		Rodes	10,100 (443)	Rodes, 5; Colquitt, 5; Ramseur, 4; Doles, 4; Iverson, 4.	18
	38,700	Early	8,700 (417)	Gordon, 6; Hoke, 5; Smith, 4; Hays, 5.	18
		Colston	7,000 (332)	Paxton, 5; Jones, 5; Warren, 5; Nichols, 5.	18
		Corps. Art.	900	Crutchfield: Brown, McIntosh.	38
Cav.	4,600	Stuart	4,600 (470)	Fitz. Lee, 4; W. H. F. Lee, 6.	12
Tot.	61,950		62,550 (408)		228

These tables show the approximate numbers of officers and enlisted men present for duty in each army, etc. That for the Federals is taken directly from the Record (39 R., 320); that for the Confederates, from the report for March 31st (39 R., 696), adding to the infantry 3000 men for the number estimated to have joined during the month (Alexander, 322). The number of Confederate guns is taken from Alexander. The Federal report shows only the total for each corps; the number for each division is proportioned to the number of regiments. The figures in parentheses show the average strength of an infantry regiment. For the artillery on both sides, twenty men are estimated to each gun.

Couch, and send for Sickles and Reynolds to join him; Sedgwick is strong enough to hold his ground, or retire under the protection of his powerful artillery, until Hooker comes up on *Lee's* left flank.

If, on the other hand, *Lee* throws his main force on the right wing of the Federal army, Hooker can remain on the defensive there until he is reinforced.

At 6 P.M. on the 28th, a detachment from Howard's corps crossed the Rappahannock in boats, and drove off the Confederate pickets. The ponton bridge was completed at 10 P.M. Slocum¹ was directed to assume command of the XI and XII Corps, to cross the Rappahannock with all possible rapidity, and march without delay to the Rapidan, and seize the bridges at Germanna Ford if they were standing. Meade with the V Corps was to follow immediately and cross the Rapidan at Ely's Ford, if possible, on the 29th. A regiment of cavalry was assigned to each corps.

If Meade's passage were disputed, Slocum was directed to "knock away" the enemy to enable him to cross, and when the V Corps was across, to push on to Chancellorsville, at which point the three corps would come together and Slocum would command by virtue of his seniority.

Hooker's order to Slocum said²:

The enemy have a brigade holding United States Ford which they will abandon as soon as they hear of your approach. This will open the United States Ford to us, when a bridge will at once be thrown across the river, and afford direct communication with headquarters . . . If your cavalry is well advanced from Chancellorsville you will be able to ascertain whether or not the enemy is detaching

¹ 40 R., 273, 274; C. W., 1865, 119.

² 1 C. W., 1865, 119.

forces from behind Fredericksburg to resist your advance. If not in any considerable force, the general desires that you will endeavor to advance at all hazards, securing a position on the plank road, and uncovering Banks Ford, which is also defended by a brigade of rebel infantry and a battery. If the enemy should be greatly reinforced you will then select a strong position, and compel him to attack you on your own ground. You will have nearly 40,000 men, which is more than he can spare to send against you.

Sedgwick,¹ in command of Reynolds's, Sickles's, and his own corps, was ordered to make a demonstration in full force upon the enemy's defences on the morning of the 29th, with a view to securing the Telegraph Road. "In the event of the enemy detaching any considerable part of his force against the troops operating at the west of Fredericksburg, Sedgwick will attack and carry their works at all hazards, and establish his force on the Telegraph Road, cutting off all communication by the enemy, in order to prevent their turning his position on that road. Sedgwick's orders.

"In case the enemy should fall back on Richmond, he will pursue them with the utmost vigor, and fight them whenever and wherever he can come up with them."

During the night of the 28th-29th, the artillery² under Hunt was placed in commanding sites along the river, the bridges were moved to the river bank, and on the morning of the 29th,³ Brooks's division of Sedgwick's, and Wadsworth's of Reynolds's corps crossed in the boats and occupied the enemy's rifle-pits. The bridges were then rapidly laid under the direction of General Benham commanding the engineer brigade. Sedgwick makes crossing.

¹ C. W., 1865, 121.

² 39 R., 246.

³ 39 R., 566.

Howard and Slocum crossed the Rappahannock as directed¹ and reached the Rapidan at Germanna Ford on the 29th. They forded the river, built a bridge, and took up a strong position on the opposite side. In marching from the Rappahannock to the Rapidan, one regiment of Pleasonton's cavalry preceded each column, and one guarded the right flank of Howard's column.²

Slocum crosses the Rapidan. *Stuart*, at Culpeper, hearing of the Federal movements, at 9 P.M. on the 28th, concentrated his command at Brandy Station. *W. H. F. Lee* selected a position between Brandy Station and Kellys Ford, *Fitz. Lee* being held in reserve at Brandy Station³ with a regiment at Stevensburg. All the forenoon, *W. H. F. Lee* was skirmishing with the Federal infantry. *Stuart*, leaving one regiment in front, went with the remainder of his command directly to Madden and captured a number of prisoners and thereby ascertained the enemy's strength and the direction of their march. This information he telegraphed to Gen. *R. E. Lee*.⁴

Meade's⁵ corps crossed the Rappahannock on the 29th, Sykes's and Griffin's divisions waded across the Rapidan at Ely's Ford.⁶ On the 29th Couch moved

¹ Howard was about half across the Rappahannock at midnight of the 28th (39 R., 627); Williams (39 R., 677), commanding Slocum's corps, crossed at sunrise and led the advance. Williams crossed the Rapidan on the 29th. Howard began crossing at 11 P.M.

² 39 R., 714.

³ 39 R., 1045.

⁴ Fitz. Lee was then sent to Raccoon Ford, to cross and move around the enemy's front. *W. H. F. Lee* with two regiments was directed to move by way of Culpeper to take up the line of the Upper Rapidan, and look out for Gordonsville and the railroad.

⁵ 39 R., 505.

⁶ Humphreys's division, left on the Rappahannock to cover the passage of the trains, crossed at 8 P.M.; the pontoons were taken up at 11.30 (39 R., 545).

his two divisions to the United States Ford.¹ The distance by road from Kellys to Germanna Ford is only about ten miles; to Ely's Ford about fifteen. The roads and the weather were bad; but the troops could have marched farther if Hooker had been at the front, and required it.

On the 30th, Sykes's division of Meade's corps was sent to United States Ford, and Griffin's to Chancellorsville. The Confederates had withdrawn.

Griffin reached Chancellorsville at 11 A.M., Sykes at 1 P.M. Humphreys bivouacked on Hunting Creek, three miles from Chancellorsville, where he arrived² the next morning.

Hooker
concentrates at
Chancellorsville.

The cavalry,³ supported by Griffin's infantry, had found the enemy in some force on the road to Fredericksburg. Slocum's corps arrived at 2 P.M.⁴ and took a position in the woods on a line nearly parallel to the Plank Road with the left resting near Chancellorsville. Howard⁵ arrived at 4 P.M., and was placed on the right of Slocum. Meade⁶ bivouacked in line of battle, his right resting on Chancellorsville and his left extending in a northeasterly direction toward the river.

A ponton bridge was laid at United States Ford, and Couch crossed his corps; leaving four regiments of Hancock's⁷ division at United States Ford, and four on the road⁸ leading from the main road to Banks Ford. The rest of Hancock's and French's divisions of the corps reached Chandler's about 9 P.M.

At 1 P.M. Sickles⁹ received orders to march with his corps by the shortest road concealed from the enemy to United States Ford, to cross by 7 A.M. and report

¹ 39 R., 305.

⁴ 39 R., 669.

⁷ 39 R., 311.

² 39 R., 545.

⁵ 39 R., 627.

⁸ The old mine road.

³ 39 R., 778-9, 514, 517.

⁶ 39 R., 506.

⁹ 39 R., 384.

to Hooker. He bivouacked at Hammet's. One of the bridges¹ at each of the crossings below Fredericksburg was taken up and sent to Banks Ford.

An electric telegraph² was established between Falmouth and United States Ford, and when it was in operation, messages were transmitted from its terminals by flag signals or by couriers.

At about 2 P.M., Hooker sent a telegraphic order³ to Slocum saying: "No advance beyond Chancellorsville until columns are concentrated."

He arrived in person at Chancellorsville about 5 P.M. and published the following order:

It is with heartfelt satisfaction that the commanding general announces to the army that the operations of the last three days have determined that our enemy must either ingloriously fly, or come out from behind his defences and give us battle on our own ground, where certain destruction awaits him. The operations of the Fifth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Corps have been a succession of splendid achievements.⁴

Stuart, with the main body of his cavalry, crossed the Rapidan on the night of the 29th-30th, sending *Owen* with one regiment to get between the enemy and Fredericksburg, to impede his progress.

Early the next day⁵ *Owen* reached the Germanna road on the Fredericksburg side, and kept in Slocum's front, while *Stuart* kept on his right flank, and both fired on his column at the Wilderness Tavern, slightly delaying his march. Hearing that the enemy had already reached Chancellorsville by the Ely's Ford road, *Stuart* directed his march by Todd's Tavern for Spottsylvania

¹ 39 R., 213, 215.

³ Bache's *Meade*, 260; 40 R., 304, 305.

⁴ 39 R., 171.

² 39 R., 217.

⁵ 39 R., 1046.

Court-House. Night overtook him at Todd's Tavern, where he had a skirmish with a detachment of Federal cavalry.

Owen fell back on Anderson.

Hooker has assembled 43,000 men at Chancellorsville within eleven miles of Fredericksburg, 12,000 more are ready to cross, and direct communication has been opened with the rest of his forces **Comment.** below. But he need not stop here; the troops are not exhausted; they can easily make a longer march. Banks Ford is only about five miles farther; if he advances to this point, the distance between the two wings of his army will be lessened more than one half; the right wing will also be out of the Wilderness, the name given to the wooded land with thick undergrowth in the neighborhood of Chancellorsville; the country near Fredericksburg is somewhat more open and Hooker can here make use of his superior numbers and his superior artillery.¹

One of the first requisites for the success of Hooker's plan is that he shall learn enough of the enemy's movements to be able to unite his army in safety south of the Rappahannock. If he should keep Stoneman's 10,000 cavalry with him, instead of sending them on a wild goose chase, he could cover all the field of operations with a screen, behind which he could move his forces without the knowledge of his enemy, and learn of the approach of their troops, in time to make the proper dispositions to meet them. Moreover in a doubtful

¹ In the course of this campaign, the electric telegraph was repeatedly broken by the enemy or by the passage of Hooker's own teams. The line to Banks's Ford would be shorter. He could and should protect it by a force of mounted or dismounted men so strong that such accidents would rarely occur, and that if they did, the damage would be instantly repaired. It would even be wise to establish two lines.

conflict, his cavalry could perhaps turn the scale in his favor, and in a successful one, complete the rout of the defeated enemy. It would increase the mobility of 120,000 men, instead of eliminating 10,000 from the battle.

With Banks Ford in Hooker's possession, either wing could reinforce the other, and his army would be practically reunited. Banks Ford has thus become the key to the position, and every moment of delay on the part of Hooker gives *Lee* an opportunity to occupy and fortify the ground that covers it. Hooker has failed to make the best use of the advantage that he has gained; but he has avoided the danger of losing it altogether. By stopping at Chancellorsville, he is still master of the situation.

On April 28th, Stoneman¹ being at Warrenton Junction with the cavalry corps encamped along the Orange & Alexandria R. R., received orders to cross the Rappahannock. As a result of the recent heavy rain and the darkness of the night, the corps, which was somewhat scattered, did not reach the river until about 8 A.M. of the 29th. All day was consumed in crossing at Kellys. Averell² with his division and Davis's brigade was to "push on" in the direction of Culpeper Court-House, while Stoneman with Gregg's division and Buford's brigade was to "push on" towards Stevensburg. Averell was given to understand that he could not expect any assistance from Stoneman, who said he would push on at 4 A.M. in the direction of Richmond. Stoneman bivouacked for the night at Madden's Crossroads.³

¹ 39 R., 1057. See Map V, at end.

² 3 B. & L., 152.

³ 39 R., 1068. Stoneman's instructions of the 22d of April said (40 R., 244): "After you break through the enemy's advance lines, you

After tearing up railroads, destroying telegraphs, etc.,¹ he assembled a small part of his command at Orange Springs on the 6th of May.

will find no force in the direction of Richmond, that city itself being without a sufficient force to keep out your own command, should you advance on it. This, however, is not expected. . . . After crossing the Rapidan, the major-general suggests that you subdivide your command, and let them take different routes, and have some place of meeting on your general line of operations. These detachments can dash off to the right and left, and inflict a vast deal of mischief, and at the same time bewilder the enemy as to the course and intentions of the main body. . . . You must move quickly and make long marches."

¹ Stoneman assembled his command at Thompson's Crossroads about 10 P.M., May 2d. There, he says, "I called together all my regimental commanders, . . . and gave them to understand that we had dropped in that region of country like a shell, and that I intended to burst in every direction, expecting each piece or fragment would do as much harm and create nearly as much terror as would result from sending the whole shell." . . . Wyndham was to strike the James River; Kilpatrick, the Chickahominy; Davis, the two railroads at or near Ashland; Gregg, to follow down the South Anna. These different parties all got off by 3 A.M. on the third. After all had moved, Stoneman found himself with but about 500 men of Buford's brigade as a nucleus upon which the different parties could rally. . . . Not having heard from Averell since he left, he was fearful that he had either been driven back, or had been recalled. In either case, he thought that the forces of Lee and Hampton would be free to act, and could easily overwhelm him. . . . Wyndham, Kilpatrick, and Davis were directed either to return, or to push on and to bring up at either Yorktown or Gloucester Point. The rest were ordered to return to the reserve with Stoneman. Wyndham and Gregg returned. Kilpatrick and Davis pushed on through to Gloucester Point. On the morning of the 5th, Stoneman moved to Yancyville where he was joined by Gregg and Wyndham. . . . "The six days having now expired, during which we were assured by the commanding general that he would certainly communicate with us, we determined to make the best of our way back to the Army of the Potomac. To take the enemy by surprise and penetrate his country was easy enough; to withdraw from it was a more difficult matter." He sent Buford to threaten any force in the vicinity of Gordonsville and Rodenbough in the direction of Bowling Green, and, under cover of the night, with the main body, took the middle road leading to Orange Springs.

Averell with about 3500 men left his bivouack near Warrenton about 10 P.M. April 28th, crossed the Rappahannock¹ on the 28th and 29th, encountered the Confederate cavalry under *W. H. F. Lee* on the morning of the 30th, and drove it through Culpeper Court-House in the direction of Rapidan Station, where he arrived at 8 P.M. on the 30th. On the 1st of May he endeavored to cross the river, but without success, and at 6.30 A.M. May 2d received orders from Hooker, disgusted at his delay, directing him to return to U. S. Ford. He marched his division to Ely's Ford, where he arrived at 10.30 P.M.

Kilpatrick with another portion of Stoneman's cavalry passed down to a point within the fortifications of Richmond, doing some damage, crossed the Mattaponi to Tappahannock, and on the 7th arrived at Gloucester Point.

Davis with a part of a brigade, passing down the bank of the South Anna, marched to within 7 miles of Richmond, where he bivouacked till 8 A.M. the next morning, and then went to Gloucester. The inhabitants of Richmond were astonished; but otherwise little was accomplished by Stoneman's bombshell.

On the 28th, *Lee* heard that a strong force of all arms was moving up the Rappahannock in the direction of Kellys Ford. While Sedgwick was engaged with *Jackson's* outposts, the report came in that a force of unknown strength had made a passage at Kellys Ford. *Lee* says²:

Lee's
plans.

A considerable force crossed on these bridges [near Fredericksburg] and was massed out of view under the high banks of the river. The bridges, as well as the troops, were

¹ 39 R. 1074; 3 B. & L., 153.

² 39 R., 796.

effectually protected from our artillery by the depth of the river bed and the narrowness of the stream, while the batteries on the opposite heights completely commanded the wide plain between our lines and the river. As in the first battle of Fredericksburg, it was thought best to select positions with a view to resist the advance of the enemy, rather than incur the heavy loss that would attend any attempt to resist his crossing.

Our dispositions were accordingly made as on the former occasion. No demonstration was made opposite any other part of our lines at Fredericksburg, and the strength of the force that had crossed and its apparent indisposition to attack indicated that the principal effort of the enemy would be made in some other quarter. This impression was confirmed by intelligence received from General Stuart. . . . The routes they [the enemy] were pursuing after crossing the Rapidan converge near Chancellorsville, whence several roads lead to the rear of our position at Fredericksburg.

On the 29th *Jackson's*¹ corps was closed in to the left. *Early's*² division went into position with its right resting at Hamilton Crossing and the left at Deep Run; *D. H. Hill's* division, under *Rodes*,³ on the right as far as the mouth of Massaponax Creek, *A. P. Hill's*⁴ division and *Trimble's* division, under *Colston*,⁵ in the second line in reserve.

Lee closes
in on the
left.

On the evening of the 29th, *Perry*⁶ was moved to the height opposite Falmouth. About midnight, *Anderson* arrived in person at Chancellorsville, where he found the commands of *Mahone* and *Posey*, withdrawn from the United States Ford. *Wright*⁷ arrived with his brigade at daylight of the 30th. *Anderson*, learning that the enemy had crossed the Rapidan and were

¹ On Lee's right.

² 39 R., 1000.

³ 39 R., 939.

⁴ 39 R., 890.

⁵ 39 R., 1031.

⁶ 39 R., 849.

⁷ 39 R., 850.

approaching in strong force, retired early on the morning of the 30th, to a point near Tabernacle Church, and began to entrench. The Federal cavalry skirmished with his rear-guard as he left Chancellorsville.¹

The enemy² in our front near Fredericksburg [says Lee] continued inactive, and it was now apparent that the main attack would be made upon our flank and rear. **Lee moves** It was, therefore, determined to leave sufficient **on Hooker.** troops to hold our lines, and with the main body of our army to give battle to the approaching column. Early's division, of Jackson's corps, and Barksdale's brigade, of McLaw's division, with a part of the reserve artillery, . . . were intrusted with the defence of our position at Fredericksburg, and, at midnight of the 30th, General McLaws marched with the rest of his command towards Chancellorsville. General Jackson followed at dawn next morning with the remaining divisions of his corps.

This is the boldest and probably the wisest move for *Lee*. The 13,000 whom he has left at Fredericksburg can hold in check a much larger number of **Comment.** Hooker's left wing, while with some 50,000 men, he can hope by skilful manœuvres, to fall upon a smaller number of Hooker's right.

On the 1st of May, Hooker³ ordered an advance "for the purpose in the first instance of driving the enemy away from Banks Ford."

Hooker Meade's corps was to advance by the **orders a** River Road and the Turnpike, and Slo- **general** cum's, supported by Howard's corps, by the **advance.** Plank Road.⁴

¹ Posey (39 R., 870) was placed between the old Turnpike and the Plank Road, Mahone (39 R., 862) on his right, and Wright (39 R., 865) on his left.

² 39 R., 797.

³ 40 R., 324; C. W., 124.

⁴ In following the River Road, Meade was ordered to take a position

One division of Couch's corps was to take position at Todd's Tavern, south of Chancellorsville, and throw out strong detachments in the direction of the enemy; another division to be massed out of the road near Chancellorsville; Sickles's corps as it arrived, and Pleasonton's cavalry, not otherwise engaged, were to be held in reserve near Chancellorsville. The advance was to begin at 11 A.M.; and Hooker had hoped by 2 P.M. to take up a position in comparatively open country, two or three miles east of Chancellorsville, and announced that after the movement commenced, his headquarters would be at Tabernacle Church.

On the Confederate side, a little before sunrise, *McLaws*¹ came up and occupied the trenches on *Anderson's*² right flank. At 8 A.M. *Jackson*³ arrived. By his order, work on the intrenchments was stopped, *Wilcox* and *Perry* were ordered to rejoin *Anderson*; and at 11 A.M. *Mahone* advanced along the Turnpike and *Wright* and *Posey* along the Plank Road. As *Wofford*, *Semmes*, and *Kershaw* of *McLaws's* division arrived, they followed on the Turnpike; *Jackson*, with *Rodes's*⁴ division, on the

Both sides
advance.

to uncover Banks Ford, the left resting on the river, the right on the Plank Road (Turnpike).

Sykes's (39 R., 507) division was to advance on the old Richmond turnpike until after crossing Mott's Run, when he was to move to the left, deploy, and open communication with Griffin on his left and Slocum on his right, and when all were in position, to advance simultaneously against the enemy, supposed to be in position from the Plank Road to the river. Griffin was ordered to move down the River or Mott road until in the presence of the enemy, when he was to deploy, his left resting on the river, and his right extending towards Sykes. Humphreys was ordered to follow Griffin, to be held in reserve to reinforce Griffin or Sykes as the exigencies might require. A detachment of cavalry had been in contact with Anderson's pickets all the morning.

¹ 39 R., 797, 824. ² 39 R., 850. ³ 39 R., 797, 824. ⁴ 39 R., 939.

Plank Road. *A. P. Hill*¹ and *Colston*² followed *Rodes*.

The Federal columns also started at about 11 A.M. When Sykes³ had advanced about a mile and a half along the Turnpike, he met *Mahone*, drove him back about a mile, and took possession of a crest just in front of a heavy forest, where he opened fire with infantry and artillery. *McLaws*, with *Mahone's*, *Wofford's* and *Semmes's* brigades, outflanked Sykes's small division both right and left, and as Sykes was completely isolated from the rest of the army, as both of his flanks rested in a dense growth of forest, he "felt that his rear could be gained by a determined movement of the enemy under cover of the forest." General Warren,⁴ the chief topographical engineer of the army, who had accompanied Sykes's column, rode back to Hooker to explain the situation. Meanwhile *Slocum*⁵ on the Plank Road met the enemy's pickets about a mile from Chancellorsville, halted, and deployed. He then advanced about a mile, the flanks of his line forcing their way through a dense thicket until he reached an open plain where he came upon the head of *Jackson's* column. He had not advanced as far as Sykes, whose line of march was more direct. *Slocum* was now separated from Sykes by more than half a mile of wilderness. *Jackson* sent *Ramseur* to support *Wright* and *Posey*, and afterwards moved the rest of *Rodes's* division by the right flank into the woods on Sykes's right.

Meade, moving along the River Road with *Griffin's* and *Humphreys's* divisions of the V Corps, was separated from Sykes by two miles. Soon after 1 o'clock,

¹ 39 R., 890.

² 39 R., 1004.

³ 39 R., 525.

⁴ 39 R., 198.

⁵ 39 R., 670, 727.

Couch¹ with Hancock's division moved out on the Turnpike to support Sykes. French² started in the morning for Todd's Tavern, but halted when his line of march was crossed by Slocum's corps on the Plank Road. At 12 M. Howard³ received the order to march along the Plank Road toward Fredericksburg, and take position one mile in rear of Slocum. Before 9 A.M. Sickles⁴ had crossed at U. S. Ford, leaving Mott's brigade of Berry's division to guard the bridges and trains. He then massed his forces in the forest about a mile north of Chancellorsville.

About noon, Hooker received a report that the enemy's cavalry was near U. S. Ford, and ordered Sickles to send a brigade to Dowdall's Tavern on the Plank Road, about two miles west of Chancellorsville; and with Whipple's and Berry's divisions to establish a line of outposts with strong supports from the Plank Road to the U. S. Ford. When Warren⁵ reported to Hooker, he found that he had countermanded the order to advance, and had ordered the troops back into their positions of the night before.

Hooker
orders
retreat.

Hooker's columns should have started earlier, so as to reach the advanced position with the least possible opposition. He apparently gave the order to withdraw soon after 1 P.M. He had, at that time, good reason to suppose that *Lee* was preparing to attack with the main body of his army. He says⁶ in his evidence: "As the passageway through the forest was narrow, I was satisfied that I could not throw troops through it fast enough to resist the advance of

Comment.

¹ 39 R., 305.

² 39 R., 362.

³ 39 R., 628.

⁴ 39 R., 384.

⁵ 39 R., 198-9.

⁶ C. W., 1865, 125.

General *Lee*, and was apprehensive of being whipped in detail."¹

When Warren returned to the front, Sykes had been forced back² and Couch, coming up with Hancock to his support, was about a mile and a half from Chancellorsville, when Warren overtook them and in delivering the order for withdrawal "stated with great pain and some passion that he had entreated General Hooker not to take this most mischievous step, but in vain." Couch says:

Turning to the officers around me, Hancock, Sykes, Warren, and others, I told them what the order was, upon which they all agreed with me that the ground should not be abandoned, because of the open country in front and the commanding position. An aide . . . dispatched to General Hooker to this effect, came back in half an hour with positive orders to return. Nothing was to be done but carry out the command, though Warren suggested that I should disobey, and then he rode back to see the General.

Slocum had apparently received the order somewhat earlier than Couch, and had withdrawn so far that the Confederates who followed him were already on Han-

¹ 40 R., 328. Soon afterward, he wrote to Butterfield, May 1, 1863: "After having ordered an attack at 2 o'clock, and most of the troops in position, I suspended the attack on receipt of news from the other side of the river. Hope the enemy will feel emboldened to attack me. I did feel certain of success. If his communications are cut, he must attack me. I have a strong position. All the enemy's cavalry are on my flanks, which leads me to suppose that our dragoons will meet with no obstacle in cutting their communications." To deceive Hooker a deserter had reported that Longstreet had gone to Culpeper, which would bring him on Hooker's right and rear, and the news from the other side of the river reporting strong columns seen from balloons moving towards Chancellorsville, led him to suspect that Longstreet's corps was returning from Suffolk (40 R., 322-351).

² 3 B. & L., 159.

cock's right flank. Sykes moved back followed by Hancock. When all but two regiments had withdrawn, a third order came to Couch to "Hold on until 5 o'clock." Couch says: "Disgusted at the General's vacillation, and vexed at receiving an order of such tenor, I replied with warmth unbecoming in a subordinate: 'Tell General Hooker he is too late, the enemy are already on my right and rear. I am in full retreat.'"

French had marched only a mile on the road to Todd's Tavern, and Howard a short distance toward Slocum, when each received the order to return; but Meade had reached the Decker House, about two miles from Banks Ford, and had met with no serious opposition. He was indignant at being recalled, and afterwards cried out¹: "My God, if we can't hold the top of a hill, we certainly can't hold the bottom of it."

At 2 P.M. Hooker² sent a dispatch to General Butterfield, his Chief of Staff, whom he had left at Falmouth, saying, "From character of information have suspended attack. The enemy may attack me—I will try it. Tell Sedgwick to keep a sharp lookout, and attack if he can succeed."

As the Federal troops fell back, they were hotly pursued on the Plank Road and on the Turnpike. To the left of the Plank Road, *Wright*³ tried to get upon the Federal right flank and rear. Moving along the unfinished railroad, at 6 P.M. he reached the Welford Iron Furnace, a mile and a half southwest of Chancellorsville, where he met *Stuart*, and then pressed on through the woods and up the hill to Hazel Grove, which is the name given to a clearing one mile southwest of Chancellorsville. He

**Jackson
pursues.**

¹ Bache's *Meade*, 262.

² 40 R., 326.

³ 39 R., 865.

was there met by Williams's¹ division of Slocum's corps, and after a sharp fight, withdrew, rejoining his division on the Plank Road at 11 P.M. Firing² heard all along the Federal line during the day had shown that the enemy was feeling its front in its whole length.³

At 5 P.M., May 1st,⁴ Sedgwick at Fredericksburg received an order to make a demonstration in force at 1 o'clock that same day and to continue in that attitude until further orders; to let the demonstration be as severe as possible, but not an attack. It was already some hours after the time fixed for the movement, but the terms of the order determined him to execute it without delay. His forces had been deployed, and a demonstration begun when an order was received countermanding it.

At 1.55 A.M., May 2d, Hooker gave orders for all of the bridges at Franklin's Crossing and below to be taken up before daylight, and for Reynolds's corps to march at once with pack train to report at headquarters.⁵ Sedgwick says that the order was received at 5.25 A.M., after daylight, and could not, of course, be executed without attracting the observation of the enemy, and leaving them free to proceed against the forces under Hooker. Reynolds started soon after 7 A.M., May 2d.

"The position of the night before," to which Hooker's command fell back, extended from the bend of the Rappahannock south of the U. S. Ford, in a southwesterly direction to a point half a mile

Comment.

¹ 39 R., 678.

² 39 R., 650.

³ Toward evening, the Confederates threw shells from two pieces placed on an open space in the woods opposite Howard's position, but did no injury. One regiment was sent forward, and after a short skirmish returned and reported that the pieces had already been withdrawn.

⁴ 39 R., 558.

⁵ 39 R., 558.

southeast of Chancellorsville, and thence westerly bending a little to the north to the Turnpike, which it then followed to a point three miles west of Chancellorsville.

Hooker has been severely criticised for not pressing on with all his force, and this would have been the wisest course; but the situation was a critical one. Every effort should have been made to close the gap across which Sykes and Griffin had been unable to communicate.

Hooker need not have feared an attack on his flank or rear. As soon as Sickles crossed the river, he might have directed him down the Mine Road to Mott Run. With Meade and Slocum in the first line, Hancock and Sickles in support, and Howard and French in reserve, Hooker would have had with him across the river some 67,000 men, more than in all *Lee's* army, deployed over the front of four miles, from the river to the unfinished railroad. By such precautions, he could threaten *Lee's* flank without endangering his own army.

Had Stoneman's cavalry been present, it could surely have found employment in the front and on the right flank as well as in rear of the army.

Even as Hooker's troops are actually disposed at 1 P.M.,¹ if he does not recall them, Slocum with 13,000 will meet *Jackson* with 13,000, Sykes and Hancock with 8,000 will meet *Anderson* with 14,000, and Meade with 12,000 will move on unopposed to Banks Ford. When *Hill* and *Colston* come up with 19,000 men, if

¹ Slocum	13,000	<i>Jackson</i>	13,000
Sykes and Hancock	8,000	<i>Anderson</i>	14,000
Meade	12,000	<i>Hill</i> and <i>Colston</i>	19,000
French, Howard, and Sickles	37,000		46,000
	<u>70,000</u>		

Lee throws 20,000 men on Sykes's and Hancock's 8000, and 26,000 on Slocum's 13,000, Sykes may be forced back rapidly, and Slocum slowly; but French and Howard and Sickles can come up with 37,000 in time to turn the scale in Hooker's favor.

If *Lee* throws 25,000 or more on Meade's 12,000, he will probably drive him into the river, but then if Slocum, Couch, Howard, and Sickles push vigorously on, they may destroy the rest of *Lee*'s army, and perhaps his 25,000 also.

Warren says in his report:

Two general plans of operation were now considered.

Hooker fortifies. One was to choose a position and intrench; the other to choose one point of attack, and advance with our whole force of five corps upon it. The saving of our men and the advantage of resuming the offensive after a successful repulse favored the one; the increased *élan* of our men and the choice of our point of attack, the other. I was in favor of advancing, and urged it with more zeal than convincing argument. . . .

The advantages of the initiative in a wooded country like this, obscuring all movements, are incalculable, and so far we had improved them. It was decided to remain and make no change in the line, but to strengthen it with breastworks and abatis. . . .

The sound of the axe broke the stillness of the night along the lines of both armies.¹

After the 1st of May, there was little chance for Hooker to surround and capture all of *Lee*'s army; but the main body of his own army had crossed the Rappahannock, and was brought face to face with that of the Confederates. He still retained complete control of the situation.

**Situation
night of
May 1st.**

¹ C. W., 1865, 56-7.



CHAPTER VI

CHANCELLORSVILLE.

DESCRIBING the situation in the evening of the 1st of May, *Lee* says in his report¹:

Here the enemy had assumed a position of great natural strength, surrounded on all sides by a dense forest filled with a tangled undergrowth, in the midst of which breastworks of logs had been constructed with trees felled in front, so as to form an almost impenetrable abatis. His artillery swept the few narrow roads by which the position could be approached from the front, and commanded the adjacent woods. . . . Darkness was approaching before the strength and extent of his line could be ascertained, and as the nature of the country rendered it hazardous to attack by night, our troops were halted and formed in line of battle in front of Chancellorsville. . . .

It was . . . resolved to endeavor to turn his right flank and gain his rear, leaving a force in front to hold him in check and conceal the movement. The execution of this plan was intrusted to Lieutenant General Jackson with his three divisions. . . . Wilcox's brigade . . . during the night had been ordered back to Banks Ford.

Lee plans a flank attack.

Lee was to remain with 14,000 men to confront Hooker with 72,000,² while *Jackson* with 32,000 should make a detour of some ten or more miles to fall upon Hooker's flank and rear. It is well to concentrate your force upon one wing of your enemy's

Comment.

¹ 39 R., 797.

² Including those left near the ford.

army if he will permit it, and if the rest of his army will keep out of the way. The Russians and Austrians tried to attack Napoleon in this way at Austerlitz; but he massed his forces in the centre, attacked at the proper moment, and destroyed the allied army. No military student could fail to note the similarity to Austerlitz. In planning the flank movement, *Lee* was perfectly conscious that he was exposed to precisely the same danger; but in the belief that Hooker was not Napoleon, and that the Army of the Potomac was not equal to the Army of Northern Virginia, he took the risk of losing everything in the hope that his enemy would not seize the opportunity that he placed in his hands. *Lee* has been unjustly praised for departing from sound principles out of contempt for his enemy, or from a conviction that such an imprudent manœuvre would not be expected from so good a commander. It was safe for Hooker to divide his army to cross the river, because neither wing was so exposed that it could be attacked at a disadvantage; it was safe for *Lee* to divide his forces in marching against Hooker on the 1st of May, for his right wing was so well intrenched that it could hold its position for some time against superior numbers and fall back on Richmond if overpowered; and his left wing was strong enough to meet the enemy for a while on nearly equal terms, and take advantage of any mistake to defeat them; but on the 2d of May it was unsafe and imprudent for *Lee* again to divide his forces in the presence of superior numbers, because Hooker could have thrown all his force on each of the fragments and destroyed them in succession.

Lee should not have begun the battle by a false step of his own, but should have waited for Hooker to make one, of which he with his superior tactical ability could

take advantage; for Hooker would have been as likely to blunder if *Lee* acted wisely as he would be if *Lee* gave him a chance to destroy his army. In other respects, *Lee's* conduct of this campaign was brilliant.

Colonel Henderson of the British army, one of the most brilliant of the military writers of the present generation, says: "Chancellorsville, where 120,000 men were defeated by 70,000, is up to a certain point as much the tactical masterpiece of the nineteenth century as was *Leuthen* of the eighteenth." This, however, is a broad statement; as all of *Napoleon's* battles were fought in one or the other of these centuries.

The battle of Chancellorsville, although faulty in respect to this flank march of *Jackson's*, is nevertheless one of the most instructive to the military student of any in ancient or modern times, from the succession of kaleidoscopic changes of position from day to day and from hour to hour, in which superior tactical skill on the part of one or more of the commanders on either side might have changed the fate of the campaign; and this faulty move, which did in fact partially succeed through the stupendous blunders of Hooker and especially through the persistent negligence and blind credulity of Howard, gave rise to situations of great dramatic interest, in one of which the picturesque and noble *Jackson* was stricken down at the moment when he thought that all Hooker's army would soon be within his grasp.

At daybreak on the 2d of May, the opposing armies confronted each other as follows¹: On the Federal side, Meade with Humphreys's, Griffin's, and Sykes's divisions, 15,700, held the line along
Positions.
the Mineral Spring Road from the Rappahannock to

¹ See Map VIII, at end.

Chandler's; then Couch with French's and Hancock's divisions, 10,000, as far as the Plank Road; Slocum with Geary's division, 7400, as far as Hazel Grove; Sickles with Birney's division, 7700, to a point near the Turnpike $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles W. of Chancellorsville; and Howard with Steinwehr's, Schurz's, and Devens's divisions, 13,500, along the Turnpike to the right flank three miles W. of Chancellorsville, where two regiments of von Gilsa's brigade were thrown back so as to face to the west. Williams's division, 6000, of Slocum's corps extended obliquely from Hazel Grove, behind Birney, to the Turnpike one mile W. of Chancellorsville; Berry's and Whipple's divisions, 8800, of Sickles's corps were in reserve just north of Chancellorsville; Meagher's brigade, 1800, of Hancock's division was on the Rappahannock on Humphreys's left, Mott's brigade, 1800, of Berry's division, at U.S. Ford; and Pleasanton's cavalry, 1300, on Hunting Run. The artillery was distributed along the line, or kept in reserve near Chandler's.

On the Confederate side, *Anderson* with two of his brigades was on the Plank Road $\frac{3}{4}$ of a mile S. E. of Chancellorsville; behind them were two brigades of *Rodes's* and three of *Hill's*; immediately on their right, on the Turnpike, and $1\frac{1}{4}$ miles from Chancellorsville, was *McLaws* with three of his brigades and one of *Anderson's*; another of *Anderson's* was one mile N. E. of *McLaws*; *Wilcox's* brigade had been sent back to Banks Ford; *Rodes* with three brigades was at Aldrich's on the Plank Road; *Hill* with three, directly behind him, and *Colston* with four, a short distance behind *Hill*. Two regiments of cavalry were between the Mine Road and the Rappahannock, and the rest were on the left flank. The Confederate army of 47,000 men was practically massed on the Turnpike and the Plank

Road, where its skirmishers were in touch with those of Hancock and Geary.

At about 7 A.M., *Jackson*¹ began his march westward with *Rodes*'s division in advance, followed by *Colston*'s² and *A. P. Hill*'s.³ Turning short to the south, about half a mile beyond Aldrich's, *Jackson* marched his column by a circuitous route, through a dense forest south of Chancellorsville, often leaving the main road⁴ to avoid the deep mud. His movement was for the most part concealed by thick wood, and screened by *Fitz. Lee*'s cavalry, of which one regiment preceded the column, and two were interposed between it and the enemy's lines. At the Furnace, the 23d Georgia regiment⁵ was detached to guard the roads from the north.⁶

**Jackson
advances.**

The head of the column reached the Orange Plank Road at about 12.30,⁷ and here, *Rodes* says, "our cavalry was found skirmishing⁸ with that of the enemy, and a delay was caused by an endeavor on our part to entrap them."

At about daybreak on the morning of May 2d, Hooker made an examination of the right of the Federal line, accompanied by Howard and other commanders, and returned to Chancellorsville after pointing out to the corps commanders where he found their lines were weak.⁹

¹ (II²), 39 R., 940, 966, 975, etc. See Map VIII, at end.

² (II⁴).

³ (II¹).

⁴ H. and A., 42-3.

⁵ (II²).

⁶ About a mile south of the Furnace, the course was southwest to the Brock road, where it turned south for some distance, then almost (*Alexander*, 330) doubling back upon itself, it took a wood road running a trifle west of north nearly parallel to the Brock road itself, and coming back into it two or three miles north of the point it first entered.

⁷ Hamlin, 14.

⁸ 39 R., 940.

⁹ C. W., 1865, 125; 39 R., 628.

About 8 A.M., Birney¹ at Hazel Grove reported to Sickles that a continuous column of infantry was passing his front toward the right, and soon after 10 A.M. he fired with his rifled guns and threw the column into great confusion. Sickles says: "This continuous column²—infantry, artillery, trains, and ambulances—was observed for three hours moving apparently in a southerly direction toward Orange Court-House on the Orange & Alexandria Railroad, or Louisa Court-House, on the Virginia Central." Sickles³ at once reported these movements to Hooker, and to Howard⁴ and Slocum,⁵ inviting their co-operation provided Hooker authorized him to follow up the enemy and attack his columns.

At 9.30 A.M. Hooker⁶ sent a circular to Howard and Slocum saying:

The disposition you have made of your corps has been with a view to a front attack by the enemy. If he [the enemy] should throw himself upon your flank, he [the commanding general] wishes you to examine the ground and determine upon the positions you will take in that event in order that you may be prepared for him in whatever direction he advances. He suggests that you have heavy reserves well in hand to meet this contingency.

Hooker says that these movements were made in broad daylight, and were observed from the headquarters of the first division of the XI Corps, which was then holding the right of the army.

Sickles's artillery fire forced the column⁷ to abandon the route it was taking, but a reconnoissance showed that the movement still continued.

¹ (III¹) C. W., 1865, 34.

² 39 R., 386.

³ (III).

⁴ (XI). ⁵ (XII).

⁶ C. W., 1865, 126.

⁷ C. W., 1865, 5.

I reported to the general [says Sickles] that if he would allow me to advance the whole of Birney's division, and support it with another division of infantry, I thought I would be able to get possession of the road upon which the enemy was moving, at all events; if it was a retreat, cut them off; and if it was a demonstration on our right flank, which was the other interpretation, it would prevent any more force being sent in that direction, and in effect divide Lee's army. The general authorized me to do so, enjoining upon me, however, great caution, lest I should find myself overwhelmed by a force with which I might be unable to compete.

Sickles
authorized
to attack.

At 12 M. Birney¹ advanced, and Whipple's division² was ordered to his support.

As Hooker had determined to remain on the defensive, it was not surprising that he did not immediately attack this column. If it was a movement on his right flank, he might if he chose, wait until it had developed.

Comment.

Hooker's dispositions were good as far as they went, but they did not go far enough. He knew by 9 o'clock that a heavy column was moving, and by 11 o'clock that nearly half of *Lee's* forces had passed the Furnace. If he had started Sickles earlier, and advanced Berry³ and Williams⁴ and French⁵ toward Hazel Grove, and at the same time moved Barlow⁶ to the left, and Sykes⁷ to the front, concealing the movement from the enemy as far as possible, he would be in a position to pounce upon the Confederate right or left as might be advisable. If *Jackson* were retreating, he could cut off *Lee*, and if *Longstreet* were up, so much the better.

¹ (III¹), 39 R., 408, 386.

² (III²), 39 R., 491, 496.

³ (III²).

⁴ (XII¹).

⁵ (II²).

⁶ (XI²).

⁷ (V²).

If *Jackson* were preparing to attack Howard in front, Sickles would be on his flank. If he were making a detour, as proved to be the case, Hooker could rout *Lee* first, and *Jackson* afterwards. As soon as Birney advanced, Hooker might have cautioned Howard to resist an attack from his front, but to fall back slowly before a heavy movement upon his flank, forcing the enemy to move through the woods.

About 1 P.M. outposts of the 23d Georgia were driven in. About 2 P.M.¹ a company defending the Furnace was captured. The rest of the 23d Georgia was formed in the railroad cut, where it was joined by two companies of the 14th Tennessee.² The Confederates opened fire with a section of artillery from near the Welford House.

At about 2.20 P.M. *Thomas*³ and *Archer*,⁴ who brought up the rear of *A. P. Hill's* division, had advanced two or three miles beyond the Furnace, when, hearing that a large body of the enemy had attacked the train in their rear, *Archer* ordered back these brigades and took up a position near the artillery at the Welford House. As soon as *Anderson*⁵ observed Birney's advance, he sent *Posey*⁶ down the Furnace road to oppose it. At 2 P.M. *Wright*⁷ followed.⁸

The fire on Birney's left flank from *Posey's* brigade was galling; and Sickles ordered him to wait for the advance of Whipple's division and a brigade from Slocum's corps on his left before advancing. At about

¹ 39 R., 934, 408, 980, 924, 934, 912. ² (II $\frac{1}{2}$). ³ (II $\frac{1}{2}$).
⁴ (II $\frac{1}{2}$). ⁵ (I $\frac{1}{2}$). ⁶ (I $\frac{1}{2}$), 39 R., 870. ⁷ (I $\frac{1}{2}$).

⁸ 39 R., 867, 851. The Confederate guns at the Welford House opened fire; and Hayman formed his command near the edge of the timber. The Federal artillery replied, and after an exciting duel (39 R., 408) drove off the enemy.

4 o'clock the 23d Georgia in the railroad cut¹ was captured. At about 4.30, *Archer* and *Thomas* retired; the 14th Tennessee at 6.²

At 3 o'clock Hooker surely knew that half of *Lee's* forces had passed, and he should have made every effort to attack *Anderson*³ and *McLaws*⁴ on the right flank and then in front. He could rout, and probably destroy them. Comment.

All day, *Meade*⁵ on Hooker's left was confronted by only an insignificant force, and, if so directed, he might at any time have swept down upon *Lee's* right flank and rear while *Slocum* attacked his front and *Sickles* his left.

When *Sickles* was satisfied that it was practicable to gain the road and head off the enemy's column, he so reported to Hooker;⁶ adding that as he must expect to encounter a heavy force and a stubborn resistance, and bearing in mind Hooker's admonition to move cautiously, he should not advance farther until the supports from the XI and XII Corps closed up on *Birney's* right and left. Sickles reinforced.

At 3.30 *Slocum* received a note from *Sickles*⁷ which was at once referred to Hooker, with whose consent *Slocum* sent nearly all of *Williams's* division to the support of *Birney*.⁸

¹ 39 R., 432, 502.

² Alexander, 331.

³ (I¹). ⁴ (I²).

⁵ (V).

⁶ 39 R., 386.

⁷ 39 R., 669.

⁸ In giving the order, *Slocum* (39 R., 678) had, with or without the consent of Hooker, told *Williams* to make a detour to the left and front, move out two or three miles through the woods so as to strike the rifle-pits and other temporary works of the enemy on the flank and rear, and then sweep both sides of the Plank Road towards *Chancellorsville*.

Several times in the afternoon, *Slocum* had already advanced portions (39 R., 670, 730) of *Geary's* division to feel the enemy in his front, but finding that they were strongly posted, recalled him to hold his original line.

The interval between Birney's and Williams's¹ divisions was occupied by Whipple's, which was formed in two lines from the Furnace to Scott's Run.

At 4 P.M., Barlow's² brigade of Howard's corps was ordered to report to Sickles, and to move south along a wood-road to Sickles's right.

At 5 P.M. Pleasonton³ with his three regiments of cavalry and a battery of horse artillery, joined Sickles, and was moving over the hill toward the foundry; but, not deeming it quite time for the effective employment of cavalry in the attack, in compliance with Sickles's suggestion, he returned to the opening at Hazel Grove, formed his command, and waited until the way could be cleared for his operations. No satisfactory reason has ever been given why Pleasonton was not at the other end of *Jackson's* column.

Sickles says: "Returning to the front" (after receiving his reinforcements), "I found every indication that looked to a complete success as soon as my advance could be supported.⁴ . . . It was evident that in a few minutes five or six regiments would be cut off and fall into our hands."

Jackson's column as it advanced, was covered by half of *Fitz. Lee's* cavalry. The other half was posted on the right between *Perry's*⁵ and the river. While waiting for *Jackson* to come up, *Fitz. Lee* had made a personal reconnoissance and had located the general position of the Federal right. When *Jackson* arrived, he accompanied him through a concealed wood-road to a hill overlooking Howard's position.⁶ *Fitz. Lee* says:

¹ 39 R., 490, 387. ² 39 R., 645. ³ 39 R., 772, 774. ⁴ 39 R., 387.

⁵ (II $\frac{1}{2}$).

⁶ *Lee's Lee*, 247; 39 R., 940; H. and A., 47.

Below and but a few hundred yards distant, ran their line of battle, with abatis in front and long lines of stacked arms in the rear. Cannon in position were visible, and the soldiers were in groups, chatting, smoking, and playing cards, while others in the rear were driving up and butchering beeves. Stonewall's face bore an expression of intense interest during the five minutes he was on the hill, and the Federal position was pointed out to him. His eyes had a brilliant glow. The paint of approaching battle was coloring his cheeks, and he was radiant to find no preparation had been made to guard against a flank attack.

He made no reply to the officer with him; his lips were, however, moving, for, sitting on his horse in sight of and close to Howard's troops, he was engaged in an appeal to the God of Battles. He quickly perceived what had been suggested—that by moving to the old turnpike, a little farther to the rear, and not turning down the Plank Road as proposed, he would take Howard's line in reverse and not in front.

The head of *Jackson's* column moved along to the Turnpike, and turning to the right, formed in three lines of battle perpendicular to it and half a mile from Howard's right.¹ The whole line was to push ahead from the beginning, keeping the road for its guide. Orders were given to the second and third lines to support the first whenever necessary without waiting for special instructions. *Rodes's* division led, followed by *Colston's* and *A. P. Hill's*.² *Fitz. Lee's* cavalry and *Paxton's* brigade³ of *Colston's* division turned up the Plank Road,

Turns
Howard's
flank.

¹ 39 R., 940. See Map IX, at end.

² RODES.	Iverson.	O'Neal.	Doles.	Colquitt.
COLSTON.	Nicholls.	Jones.	Warren.	Ramseur.
A. P. HILL.	Heth.	Pender.		

³ (II $\frac{1}{2}$.)

and this brought them on the extreme right of the Confederate position.

Jackson had taken ten hours to march twelve miles and form line of battle. Alexander says¹: "There may have been, during the morning, lack of appreciation of the value, even of the minutes in an enterprise of the character now on foot."

Howard's corps, however, lay like an innocent bird while *Jackson's* column came up like an enchanting serpent, taking about two hours to open its mouth before swallowing it. For the last three hours, reports had repeatedly come to Devens and Howard that the enemy were massing in their front and flank and passing to their rear; but the messengers were, in some cases, dismissed as cowards.²

In the morning, on the extreme right of Howard's line, two regiments of von Gilsa's³ brigade of Devens's division north of the Turnpike faced to the west, and two along the Turnpike faced south. Two guns of Dieckmann's battery swept the approach by the Turnpike. Three regiments of McLean's brigade,⁴ and four guns of Dieckmann's, prolonged the line⁵ to the left, and two regiments in double column 100 yards in rear formed the division reserve.

Then came Schurz's division with three regiments deployed in line on the Turnpike and one on the Plank Road, five regiments in double column in the second line, and one a quarter of a mile in rear. Then Dilger's and Wiedrich's batteries, and Buschbeck's brigade of Steinwehr's⁶ division, with three regiments in line

¹ Alexander, 333.

² Bigelow, 286 ff.; 39 R., 633, 634, 652-654; Hamlin, 55-63, 143-145.

³ 39 R., 633.

⁴ 1 C. W., 1865, 4.

⁵ 3 B. & L., 191.

⁶ 39 R., 628, 652.

and one in reserve, near Dowdall's Tavern, where Howard had his headquarters.

Barlow's brigade before it was sent to Sickles had been massed in rear of Buschbeck's left as a general reserve for the corps. An intrenchment known as the transverse rifle-pit was built running north and south and facing west, on the high ground east of Dowdall's. Behind it the reserve artillery which arrived in the course of the day was posted.

At 4.30 P.M. the signal officer on Howard's right flank had already reported "Rebel videttes or patrol made their appearance and were fired at¹ by our advance pickets."

Jackson's
final
advance.

At about 5.15 P.M.² Jackson gave the order to advance; but it was not easy to communicate in the dense mass of undergrowth; and the main line soon came up with the skirmish line, which it then put in motion.

But Howard had made no movement to meet this attack. He says³:

With as little noise as possible, the steady advance of the enemy began. Its first lively effects, like a cloud of dust driven before a coming shower, appeared in the startled rabbits, squirrels, quail, and other game flying wildly hither and thither in evident terror, and escaping, where possible, into adjacent clearings.

Rodes's men soon encountered the fire of von Gilsa's right. Firing as they advanced, they outflanked the two regiments that were facing west.

Von Gilsa says⁴: "My brigade stood coolly and

¹ 39 R., 231.

³ 3 B. & L., 197.

² 39 R., 941.

⁴ 39 R., 636.

bravely, fired three times, and stood still after they had outflanked me already on my right. The enemy attacked now from the front and rear, and then, of course, my brave boys were obliged to fall back, the Fifty-fourth New York and the right wing of the One Hundred and Fifty-third Pennsylvania [on the right] forcing their way through the enemy's skirmishers in their rear."

Devens's
division
routed.


The two pieces of artillery in the road fired a few times, and were then run down the road in rear of the rifle-pits under the heavy fire from the front and flank. These guns were soon captured.

The retreat of von Gilsa's brigade exposed the right flank of McLean's in the rifle-pits along the road to a severe enfilading fire of artillery and musketry. McLean¹ says that his men in the rifle-pits bore the fire in their position until it was evident they must be totally destroyed if they remained. Under the circumstances, they fell back, and tried to form in rear of the regiments of the second line; but the rush of fugitives was so great as to sweep away all resistance. Dieckmann's² pieces appear to have retired without firing a shot.


The Confederate line had advanced but a short distance, and the battle had hardly more than begun,³ when *Rodes*, whose division formed *Jackson's* first line, called upon *Warren* of *Colston's* division to support him. The troops of this division were already within a few steps of the first line, and in some places mixed up with them.

As soon as *Schurz*,⁴ who had long anticipated the attack, heard the firing on Devens's right, he ordered

¹ 39 R., 637-638. ² 39 R., 639. ³ 39 R., 1004. ⁴ 39 R., 654.



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all the regiments within his reach to change front. "This," he says, "was extremely difficult for the regiments deployed in the road, hemmed Schurz in between a variety of obstacles in front driven back. and dense pine brush in their rear." Then their officers had hardly time to give a command when a confused mass of guns, caisson horses, and men came rushing down the road, and broke lengthwise through the ranks of the infantry. The whole line deployed on the Turnpike facing south was rolled up and swept away in a moment. Schurz tried to rally them behind the second line, which had changed front and was formed behind a rise of ground between the church grove and the woods from which the enemy was expected; but the scattered men of Devens's division were continually breaking through their ranks.

At 4 P.M., Howard and Steinwehr had gone off to the south with Barlow's brigade to see what was to be done with *Jackson*.¹ At about 6 P.M., shortly after his return, Howard heard the sound of battle² and galloped off for Schurz's line, showing conspicuous personal bravery in his efforts to stem the attack. Meanwhile the Confederates³ had penetrated into the woods in the rear of Schurz's right.

The position near the church grove was outflanked; and the whole line fell back to the transverse pits, which Buschbeck⁴ had already occupied as soon as he found that his left flank had been turned. The works were low, but afforded some cover. The ground in front was open and swept by their fire; but after a fight of about twenty minutes, they too were outflanked, and brought under a heavy fire from front flank, and rear.

¹ 3 B. & L., 197. ² 39 R., 630. ³ 39 R., 655, 991. ⁴ 39 R., 991.

At about 7.15, the Federal line, after a loss of over 2000 men, withdrew. Schurz halted a part of four regiments on the right of Berry's¹ division about a mile back in the woods, where they remained until about 8.30 P.M., when they retreated farther to an open space north of Chancellorsville. Buschbeck² withdrew his small brigade to the woods, halted twice and faced around, and at last reached the rear of the Federal line near Chancellorsville, where he offered to advance again to a bayonet charge.

Howard's
last line
carried.

Colston's division had been crowding up on *Rodes's*.³ The regiments, brigades, and divisions of the first and second lines were mixed up together and some had already come up from the third line. On the extreme right of the Confederate line, however, *Colquitt* had halted his brigade to resist what he supposed⁴ to be an attack on his flank. *Ramseur*, who was following him, was also kept out of the fight and both were detained on the road until 6 P.M.⁵

Fitz. Lee's cavalry and *Paxton's*⁶ brigade, forced to yield the right of way to *Colquitt*, were also blocked⁷ by his delay.

Many regiments of the Eleventh Corps were largely composed of Germans who had fought under a German general, and they were ridiculed and censured for their conduct in this fight. No troops in the world, however, could have been expected to stop the advance of three times their number, enveloping their flank as *Jackson's* men did theirs.

Howard's⁸ excuses were feeble; he said:

¹ (III²) ² 39 R., 645-646. ³ 39 R., 941, 1004. ⁴ 39 R., 942.
⁵ 39 R., 1016. ⁶ (D⁴) ⁷ 39 R., 975. ⁸ 39 R., 630.

Now as to the causes of this disaster to my corps:

1. Though constantly threatened and apprised of the moving of the enemy, yet the woods were so dense that he was able to mass a large force, whose exact whereabouts neither patrols, reconnaissances, nor scouts ascertained. He succeeded in forming a column opposite to and outflanking my right. **Howard's excuses.**

2. By the panic produced by the enemy's reverse fire, regiments and artillery were thrown suddenly upon those in position.

3. The absence of General Barlow's brigade, which I had previously located in reserve and *en échelon* with Colonel von Gilsa's, so as to cover his right flank. This was the only general reserve I had.

Hooker's 9.30 order to look out for an attack had never been revoked, and was still in force. It made no difference whether Hooker thought *Jackson* was going one way or the other. Howard should have been prepared for both contingencies as long as both were possible; and by neglect of these instructions his corps was routed. Had Barlow's brigade been present, it might perhaps have retarded the pursuit and lessened the carnage; but the general result would have been the same. Only five or six of *Jackson's* fifteen brigades were seriously engaged against five of Howard's; and the effect was due not to numbers but to position.

On the other hand, if *Colquitt*, *Ramseur*, and *Paxton* had not failed to come up, a larger part of Howard's corps would have been killed or captured.

The first and second lines of the Confederates went over the rifle-pits together; and from this time the two divisions were mingled in **Confusion** in inextricable confusion. **lines.**

On the left flank, *Iverson*, who had penetrated

to the rear of the Federal line, was now crowding in to the Turnpike. He says¹:


The second line . . . closed in with us . . . and caused great confusion, the two lines rushing forward pellmell upon the enemy, . . . no officer being able to tell what men he commanded. . . . The whole affair from the moment of attack was a wild scene of triumph on our part. Hungry men seized provisions as they passed the camps of the enemy, and rushed forward, eating, shouting, and firing.

*Hotchkiss and Allan of Jackson's staff say*²:


Onward sweep the Confederates in hot pursuit. The arms, knapsacks, and accoutrements of the fugitives fill the woods. Artillery carriages are to be seen overturned in the narrow roads, or hopelessly jammed in the impenetrable jungle. The wounded and dying, with their groans, fill the forest on every side. The day is rapidly drawing to a close: night comes to add confusion to the scene. It had been impossible in the broad daylight, owing to the intricacy of the forest, to prevent a commingling of regiments and brigades along the Confederate lines. The confusion thus produced is greatly increased by the darkness. In the brushwood so dense that it is impossible, under favorable circumstances, to see thirty yards in any direction, companies, regiments, brigades, become inextricably intermixed. Colston's . . . [and] Rodes's [divisions] . . . move on in one confused mass. The right of the Confederate line soon reaches an abatis, which has been felled to protect the approach to some works on the opposite heights. The troops, already disordered, become still more so among the felled timber. Behind this abatis some troops and artillery have been gathered to make a stand. Rodes finds it impossible to push farther until the lines can be formed. The right is halted and then the whole Confederate line. Rodes

¹ 39 R., 984, 985.

² H. and A., 50, 51.



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sends word at once to Jackson, requesting that the third line (A. P. Hill's division) be sent forward to take the advance, until the first and second lines can be reformed.

While this was being done, there was a lull in the storm of battle. Jackson had paused for a time in his pursuit; Hooker was attempting to stop and reform his flying legions. Jackson's
line halts.

On the left, a few of *Iverson's* men, who were perhaps the first of *Jackson's* swarm to reach the Turnpike, encountered a small force of Federal cavalry that charged up the road a short distance and then turned back towards Chancellorsville.

At the log works which *Williams's* division had built near the Turnpike, *Jones's* brigade surrounded and captured a few men, who had been left there as a camp guard.

On the extreme right, *Doles* formed the greater part of his brigade in good order, and pursued the Federals some five hundred yards through the pine forest, holding that position until after dark. About two hundred men advanced through the thicket to the vista north of Hazel Grove, stampeded a train of *Sickles's* corps, and then advanced to the entrance of the road into the open field, but were driven¹ off by the fire of infantry and artillery.

Rodes, riding forward on the Turnpike, satisfied² himself that the Federals had no line of battle between his troops and the "heights" of Chancellorsville. On his return, *Crutchfield*, chief of artillery of *Jackson's* corps, opened his batteries on that point.

The Federals instantly responded with a most terrific fire, which silenced the Confederate guns and swept the Turnpike so that the infantry could not

¹ 39 R., 970.

² 39 R., 941.

advance. As soon as the artillery stopped, *Lane* deployed a regiment forward as skirmishers, and formed a line of battle to the rear, with two regiments on each side of the road. *Hill's* orders to him were to push vigorously forward. He was moving his right into the line, when it came upon the flank of *Knipe's* brigade of *Williams's* division at the log works, which suffered heavily. The firing then became general all along the line. *Heth* was moved down the Turnpike to support *Lane*. *Jackson*, like *Joshua*, wanted a few more hours of daylight.

Under *Jackson's* orders, as soon as a portion¹ of *Lane's* skirmishers were deployed in front, *Rodes* commenced to withdraw his men.

Colonel *Henderson* in his life of *Stonewall Jackson*² says:

The deep darkness of the forest, the efforts of the officers to re-form the ranks, the barriers opposed by the tangled undergrowth, the difficulty of keeping the direction, brought a large portion of the troops to a standstill. At the junction of White House road the order to halt was given. . . . At this moment, shortly after eight o'clock, *Jackson* (8.15 P.M) was at *Dowdall's Tavern*. The reports from the front informed him that his first and second lines had halted; . . . *Jackson* was already planning a further movement. Sending instructions to *A. P. Hill* to relieve *Rodes* and *Colston*, and to prepare for a night attack he rode forward, almost unattended, amongst his rallying troops, and lent his aid to the efforts of the regimental officers. . . . At the point where the track to the White House and United States Ford strikes the plank road he met General *Lane* seeking his instructions for the attack. They were sufficiently brief. "Push right ahead, *Lane*,

¹ 39 R., 942.

² *Henderson*, 551.



right ahead!" As Lane galloped off to his command General Hill and some of his staff came up, and Jackson gave Hill his orders: "Press them; cut them off from the United States Ford, Hill; press them." . . . Two or three hundred yards eastward the General halted, for the ringing of axes and the words of command were distinctly audible in the enemy's lines. . . . After a few minutes, becoming impatient for the advance of Hill's division, Jackson turned and retraced his steps towards his own lines. "General," said an officer who was with him, "you should not expose yourself so much." "There is no danger, sir, the enemy is routed. Go back and tell General Hill to press on."

In the firing that resulted perhaps from the encounter of Knipe with *Lane's* men at the log works, an officer of the 18th North Carolina, mistaking the mounted men for Federal cavalry, gave the order to fire, and *Stonewall Jackson* was shot, either by this fire or by that of the enemy. He was taken to the rear under heavy fire. As he passed along, General *Pender*, whose brigade was coming down the Turnpike, sprang from his horse, expressed his regret, and added that his own lines were so much disorganized by the enemy's artillery that he feared it would be necessary to fall back. *Jackson* answered¹ feebly: "You must hold your ground, General *Pender*, you must hold out to the last, sir." *Jackson's* wound was fatal.

Jackson
wounded.

On his death-bed he said that he had intended to cut the Federals off from the United States Ford,² and, taking a position between them and the river, oblige them to attack him, adding, with a smile, "My men sometimes fail to drive the enemy from a position, but they always fail to drive us away."

¹ 2 Henderson, 557.

² 2 Henderson, 572.

To judge of his chances of success, let us first see what Hooker's men have been doing.

At about 5 P.M. Warren, chief topographical engineer, and Comstock, chief engineer, on Hooker's staff,¹

Hooker went out to examine the line, when a heavy
learns of firing of musketry began on the right.
Howard's They hastened to the spot, and met the
rout. fugitives from Howard's corps.

Warren immediately sent his aide to inform Pleasonton and Sickles of the rout of this corps. He then went to Fairview, where Best, chief of artillery of Slocum's corps, had already trained all of his available guns to meet the advancing foe. Warren assembled all the artillery he could find, and left the whole in charge of Best. Comstock went at once to inform Hooker, who, however, had heard the firing and learned of the rout from other sources.

At about 6.20 P.M.,² Hooker with his two aides sat on the veranda of the Chancellor House enjoying the summer evening. Nothing occurred to awaken the slightest anxiety. Not a sound of the fighting at the Tulley Farm or even at the Wilderness Church had reached them; when they heard the sounds of distant cannonading, one of the aides turned his glass in the direction of Dowdall's Tavern. A moment after he suddenly shouted to General Hooker, "My God, here they come!"

About the same time Meade heard of it, and moved up Sykes's division³ to a point where it covered the White House and the roads to Ely and United States Ford.

Hooker sent Berry's⁴ two brigades forward at double-

¹ 1 C. W., 1865, 57, 45.

² Hamlin, 148.

³ (V².)

⁴ (III².)

quick to the woods on the north of the road half a mile west of Chancellorsville and Hays's¹ brigade of French's division to his support. Berry formed in two lines covering the Turnpike and the road to the White House; Hays formed line in his rear facing southwest.

Berry and
Hays
advance.

Sickles was just crossing Scott's Creek on his return from the front when he received Warren's letter notifying him of the rout of the Eleventh Corps and one asking for a regiment of cavalry to report to him. The 8th Pennsylvania Cavalry was sent from Hazel Grove, and, just as it came to the Turnpike, it encountered as we have seen the first swarms of Confederates in pursuit of the XI Corps. Seeing no other means of escape, Colonel Huey, its commander, charged up the Turnpike a short distance, and then turned back toward Chancellorsville by a parallel road a few yards to the north. Several officers and men were killed.

Sickles
returns.

Sickles immediately sent orders to Whipple and Birney to return to Hazel Grove. When Whipple had advanced to take part in Sickles's attack, he had left his three batteries at Hazel Grove.² The horses were unbridled.³ Some time after the cavalry had left, a sharp musketry fire was heard in the woods in the direction of the XI Corps. Forges, battery wagons, and ambulances that had been left in the Vista galloped into the field and smashed into the batteries, but these pieces were ready for action when *Doles's*⁴ two hundred men issued from the wood in their front and encountered a storm of

¹ (II $\frac{3}{2}$.)

² In close column near the northwest corner of the field facing south.

³ M. H. S. M., 167 ff.

⁴ (II $\frac{2}{4}$.)

canister from the twenty-two pieces and the musketry fire of their support, and after a hard fight were driven back. These little incidents at Hazel Grove served as the basis of a fabulous report of Pleasanton's telling how *Stonewall Jackson's* advance was checked by the fire of artillery supported by a gallant charge of self-sacrificing cavalry.¹

At about 6.30, Slocum, whose headquarters² were at Fairview, rode out towards Howard's line, but before coming within a mile of it, met large numbers of the XI Corps retiring in disorder. He at once dispatched two staff officers with orders to Williams³ to return with his division as rapidly as possible to his original line.

Williams⁴ came at a double-quick and moved by the flank along the edge of the woods, south of the Turnpike, through which the fugitives were passing. Knipe⁵ after occupying the edge of the woods for some fifteen minutes advanced through them to the log works; but in the darkness his line of march brought him somewhat south of his original position; and Lane's⁶ men who were just coming up closed in upon his right from front, flank, and rear, and captured a large part of his brigade. Williams took up a new line along the edge of the woods.⁷

Whipple's division⁸ arrived at Hazel Grove at about 8 o'clock, Birney⁹ at about 8.30, Barlow¹⁰ at 9 P.M.

Reynolds, with the I Corps, left Fredericksburg early in the morning and arrived at the United States

¹ I C. W., 1865, 28.

² 39 R., 670.

³ (XII¹.)

⁴ 39 R., 678.

⁵ (XII¹) 39 R., 678, 686.

⁶ (II¹.)

⁷ In front of the ravine near Fairview connecting near the Plank Road with the left of Berry's division.

⁸ (III²) 39 R., 502-505.

⁹ (III¹.)

¹⁰ (XI².)

Ford at about 6 P.M. Robinson's division crossed about 7 P.M., and proceeded in the direction of Chancellorsville, driving back hundreds of fugitives of the Eleventh Corps, and moved on to take up a position on and covering the Hunting Creek or Ely Ford road, where it arrived at 1 A.M., May 3d.

Reynolds
arrives.

Doubleday's division followed immediately and at 2 A.M. took position between Sykes¹ and Robinson² on the Ely Ford road.

At 6.30 P.M.,³ May 1st, Hooker, learning that Averell with some 3500 or more of Stoneman's cavalry was at Rapidan Station, directed him to return immediately to United States Ford. Averell received the order at 6.30 A.M., May 2d, and arrived at Ely's Ford with his command at 10.30 P.M.

Early in the morning of May 2d, Hancock's⁴ line had been formed on Geary's⁵ left, running north in front of the road leading to Chandler's. It was covered by two heavy lines of skirmishers in rifle-pits under Miles.⁶

Hancock's
line.

As soon⁷ as the sound of cannon gave notice to Lee of Jackson's attack on the Federal right, his troops advanced on Hancock's intrenchments while several batteries played upon Hancock's lines until prevented by the increasing darkness. Every attack was repulsed by Miles's⁸ thin line.

Colonel Henderson⁹ says:

It must always be an interesting matter of speculation what the result would have been had Jackson accomplished his design, on the night he fell, of moving a large part

¹ (V².) ² (I².) ³ 39 R., 1080. ⁴ (II.) ⁵ (XII².)

⁶ Colonel, now Lieutenant-General N. A. Miles.

⁷ 39 R., 799.

⁸ 39 R., 826.

⁹ 2 Henderson, 573.

of his command up the White House road, and barring the only line of retreat left open to the Federals.

Hooker, it is argued, had two corps in position which had been hardly engaged, the Second and the Fifth; and another, the First, under Reynolds, was coming up. Of these, 25,000 men might possibly, could they have been manœuvred in the forest, have been sent to drive Jackson back. . . . Yet the question will always suggest itself, would not the report that a victorious enemy, of unknown strength, was pressing forward, in the darkness of the night, towards the only line of retreat, have so demoralized the Federal commander and the Federal soldiers, already shaken by the overthrow of the Eleventh Army Corps, that they would have thought only of securing their own safety? . . . Would the soldiers of the three army corps not yet engaged, who had been witnesses of the rout of Howard's divisions, have fared better, when they heard the triumphant yells of the advancing Confederates, than the hapless Germans?

It would indeed be hard to conjecture what measures Hooker might have taken if *Jackson* had pressed on towards United States Ford; but it is very probable that the soldiers of the three army corps not yet engaged would have fared better than the "hapless Germans."

Others have argued that if, at 8.15, *Jackson* had been at the head of his column when *Rodes* halted the first line, he would have pushed on at once before Hooker could gather his forces to check him; but his first line then was only a confused swarm, made up of the remnants of what had once been the first and second. In forcing its way through the wilderness, this swarm had converged upon the successive positions taken up by Howard's corps. The fragments of the right and

left wing had already met or crossed each other on the Turnpike. No man knew where to find his command; and several hours were actually required to rally and re-form. Such a swarm might have been urged forward. Some would go, and some would stay; of 11,000 men in the first and second lines, 6000 might possibly have been assembled, but these 6000 would be far less effective than 5000 fresh troops. In the dim and uncertain light of the moon, there would have been many repetitions of the accident which caused, or was supposed to have caused, the death of *Jackson*.

With modern firearms, night attacks are necessary; and well trained troops can be taught by long practice to make them with safety, at least in open ground. With untrained troops, the moral as well as the physical advantage rests with those who quietly lie in wait in positions of their own choosing.

Henderson speaks of 25,000 men who might possibly have been sent to drive *Jackson* back. The open ground at Chancellorsville and Chandler's, which lay directly across his path, was well guarded by some 32,000 infantry and 40 or 50 pieces of artillery.

Hooker could leave Hancock and Geary with 12,000 to watch *Lee* with 14,000, and with 20,000 in the centre of his position resist the advance of *Jackson's* swarms; while with his left wing of 15,000 and his right wing of 17,000, he could either reinforce his centre or attack *Jackson's* right or left.

It is *Jackson* who might have been surprised if he had advanced at 8 o'clock, and not Berry nor French nor Meade who were expecting him. If Hooker had been disposed to make the most suicidal move at this hour, it would have been hard for him to prevent his

troops from resisting this attack. It was a great credit to the Southern veterans that they had marched so long and forced their way through three or four miles of underbrush and fought so hard for three hours. But even the best of troops are disorganized by successive victories about half as much as by successive defeats. The ammunition of *Jackson's* first line was exhausted; and the second line was half disorganized. Sound military principles required that they should be replaced by the third.

The third line surely would not have been much farther advanced if *Jackson* had been at the head of his column than it actually was. In fact, it could not advance at all, in the road, without suffering fearfully from Best's artillery.

At 9.15, when *Jackson* was carried to the rear, the passage of lines had not been completed. Hooker's position was still stronger than an hour before. Reynolds was coming with 9000 men on Hooker's right, *Jackson* had then, perhaps, 4000 men ready to advance, and it is hardly possible that he could force his way to Sykes's position at Chandler's, before Reynolds and Griffin could come up with 14,000 men to the relief of Sykes's 4000.

If, however, *Jackson* should succeed in marching through the woods as he proposed, and take up a position to oblige Hooker to attack him, he would be following Hooker's tactics of the day before, but without Hooker's advantages.

Hooker could either attack him at once, or surround and destroy him at his leisure, or if he preferred, destroy *Lee* first and *Jackson* afterwards. *Jackson's* success the year before had probably encouraged him to try this plan; but the essential difference was that at Ma-

nassas the manœuvre enabled him to effect a junction with *Lee*, and here it would have insured his separation.

The military situation, then, would not justify the Confederates in following up the rout of Howard's corps by a nocturnal advance upon the United States Ford; but Henderson would defend it on moral grounds.

To answer his question whether the Federal soldiers, already shaken by the overthrow of the Eleventh Army Corps, were so demoralized that they would have thought only of securing their own safety, we must consider some phases of the problem that we would otherwise gladly overlook.

To say that the "hapless Germans of the Eleventh Corps" fought bravely, is not to say that they were equal in such an emergency to Americans, who are by nature and habit adaptable and self-reliant.¹

The feeling towards the Eleventh Corps, right or wrong, was aggravated by the shouts and expressions of fear given out by some of the fugitives, trying to save themselves in every direction, which led the American soldiers to underestimate the cause of the panic and the extent of the danger. After all these demonstrations of the "hapless Germans," the triumphant yells of the advancing Confederates would have lost, by comparison, much of their melodramatic effect.

Henderson says:

Splendid triumph as it was, the battle bore no abiding fruits, and the reason seems very clear. The voice that would

¹ General Hancock said "the Eleventh Corps had never been considered a part of the original Army of the Potomac and not much dependence had been placed upon it; and that we were about as strong, of the original Army of the Potomac, as before." (I C. W., 1865, 67.)

have urged pursuit was silent. Jackson's fall left Lee alone, bereft of his *alter ego*. . . . "They supplemented each other," said Davis, "and together with Henderson on Jackson. any fair opportunity, they were absolutely invincible."

Many a fierce battle still lay before the Army of Northern Virginia; marvellous was the skill and audacity with which Lee manoeuvred his ragged regiments in the face of overwhelming odds; fierce and unyielding were the soldiers, but with Stonewall Jackson's death the impulse of victory died away.¹

While Henderson's view of the prospects at the time of *Jackson's* death is hardly borne out by a careful examination, his estimate of the character of Character of Jackson. his hero commands the approval of serious military men. *Stonewall Jackson's* profession was founded upon his religion, and in it his whole soul was enveloped; day and night he studied new combinations and was always on the alert to apply them. He saw possibilities that would never occur to the average officer; and was always fighting imaginary battles in his head, providing for all possible contingencies. In this respect, he found his exact opposite in Hooker. Without this faculty, all the training in the world will not make a good commander. But *Jackson's* enthusiasm and imagination were not in themselves sufficient. He was always in danger of overstepping the limits of prudence, trusting to Providence to relieve him from any dilemma into which his zeal and his imagination might lead him. He required the intellect of *Lee* to keep him within bounds and direct his efforts.

Soon after *Jackson*² was wounded, *Hill*³ was also

¹ 2 Henderson, 519.

² (II.)

³ (II¹.)

disabled; and *Rodes*¹ was notified that the command devolved on him. *Rodes* withdrew all his troops except *Colquitt's*² brigade to the open ground at *Dowdall's* to re-form them. He gave the necessary orders to *Heth*³ and *Colston*⁴ and made arrangements to renew the attack in the morning, as it was agreed that the troops were not in condition to resume operations that night.⁵

On the Federal side,⁶ *Berry's* division formed in two lines north of the Turnpike. In the absence of intrenching tools, breastworks of logs were thrown up with a small abatis in front. At about 11 P.M. the enemy made an attack which in thirty minutes was repulsed by the aid of artillery.

Knipe's brigade of *Williams's* division, after retreating from the log works, prolonged the line and strengthened the position on the edge of the woods south of the Turnpike, and twice repulsed the enemy's advance with the assistance of *Best's* artillery in the rear.

Ruger's brigade⁷ in two lines extended and strengthened the line to the log works; and *Ross's* brigade⁸ connected it with the right of *Geary's* division.

¹ (II².) ² 39 R., 942, 995, 967, 974. ³ (II¹.) ⁴ (II⁴.)

⁵ At 11 o'clock *Lane* and *Pender* of *Hill's* division under *Heth* occupied *Williams's* abandoned log works on the north and south of the Turnpike. *Thomas* was formed on *Pender's* left, *Brockenborough* across the Turnpike in support of *Lane* and *Pender*, and *McGowan* in the pike behind *Brockenborough*.

The brigades of *Colston's* division were still scattered through the woods between the log works and *Dowdall's* Tavern.

Ramseur of *Rodes's* division was formed in line just east of the Tavern; *O'Neal* and *Iverson* in the transverse rifle-pits on *Ramseur's* left and *Doles* in the open ground on his right; *Colquitt* in the woods in front of *Ramseur*.

⁶ 39 R., 449.

⁷ (XII¹/₂.)

⁸ (XII¹/₂.)

After Sickles¹ arrived at Hazel Grove, he sent an aide to report to Hooker that a portion of his train and artillery were in the woods occupied by the enemy between his line of battle and the road, and that to recover these, as well as the line of the Plank Road, he would, with Hooker's sanction, make a night attack, if supported by Williams's division of Slocum's Corps and by Berry's division of his own corps, then forming a connected line.

About 11 o'clock Sickles² received permission to make this advance, and immediately directed the attack to be made on the enemy's flank in two lines of battle (with the bayonet) supported by heavy columns. He sent an officer to communicate with Berry and Williams, who returned reporting that both were ready, which was apparently incorrect. At midnight Sickles ordered Birney to advance. The night was very clear and still; the moon, nearly full, threw enough light in the woods to facilitate the advance, which was made against a fire of musketry. Some breastworks were reoccupied, which were thought to be those of Howard's corps, but proved to be those thrown up by Slocum's corps or by Sickles's corps itself before leaving for the Furnace.³

In moving through the thick undergrowth of these

¹ 39 R., 389.

² 39 R., 389.

³ Beyond were Williams's log works which extended obliquely to the left and front from the right of Sickles's line, so that after crossing them, the regiments on the right were turned against Williams's troops in their new position along the edge of the woods.

Slocum had not been informed that a night attack was contemplated, and supposed on hearing the firing that the enemy were advancing on Williams's division, and at once opened fire upon them with his artillery. Some of Williams's troops also fired upon Sickles's men when they made their appearance in their front.

close woods at midnight, there was "necessarily some disorder."¹ The left of Sickles's line² rushed upon the flank of *Lane's* brigade with loud and prolonged cheering, and encountered one or two regiments on the right flank. These were the only Confederate troops who were attacked,³ but not the only troops; for the right of Sickles's line swerved to the right, advanced against Williams's line, and fell back under a heavy fire of Federal infantry and artillery; some troops in the centre moved on to the Turnpike and returned. As Sickles had recovered the guns and caissons that had been abandoned in the Vista and a portion of Whipple's mule train, he fell back for the night somewhat in disorder to the entrenchments north of Hazel Grove.⁴

When Hooker had realized that the ground Howard had lost could not be regained, he directed Warren and Comstock to trace out a new line which he pointed out to them on the map, and to do it that night; as he would not be able to hold the one he then occupied after the enemy should renew their attack the next morning.⁵

Hooker's
new line.

At 9.30 A.M., May 2d, Hooker had telegraphed to Sedgwick⁶: "We have reliable information that all the divisions known to us as having belonged to the army at Fredericksburg, except *Ewell's* [*Early's*?], are in this vicinity." He left it to Sedgwick's discretion, whether to attack or not. At 4 P.M.⁸ he gave directions for Sedgwick to cross the river as soon as indications would

Hooker's
orders to
Sedgwick.

¹ 39 R., 409.

² 39 R., 916.

³ At about 12 o'clock McGowan came up on Lane's right and threatened Sickles's left flank.

⁴ Archer's brigade did not rejoin the division until late at night. It then formed on the right of McGowan's.

⁵ 1 C. W., 1865, 127. ⁶ (VI) 40 R., 362. ⁷ (II²). ⁸ 40 R., 363.

permit; to capture Fredericksburg with everything in it, and vigorously pursue the enemy. "The enemy is fleeing trying to save his trains. Two of Sickles's divisions are among them."¹

At 9 P.M.² Hooker sent orders for Sedgwick to cross the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg, on receipt of the order, and march on the Chancellorsville road until he connected with Hooker and to be in this vicinity at daylight.

Soon after midnight, General *Stuart*, the cavalry commander, who had been sent for, apparently at *Stuart* *Jackson's* request, arrived at the front and takes assumed command.³ On reaching the ground, command. *Stuart* says⁴:

I found that the enemy had made an attack on our right flank, but were repulsed. . . . I was also informed that there was much confusion on the right, owing to the fact that some troops mistook friends for the enemy and fired upon them. Knowing that an advance under such circumstances would be extremely hazardous, much against my inclination, I felt bound to wait for daylight.

*Jackson*⁵ had apparently authorized *Stuart* to use his discretion; and as *Lee* was with the right wing of the army, *Stuart* sent a dispatch to inform him of the state of affairs, and sent *Alexander* to select and occupy with artillery, positions along the line bearing upon the enemy's position. After *Alexander's* reconnaissance, *Stuart* was satisfied that Hazel Grove was the key to the position.⁶

¹ Sedgwick received this order at 6.30, and about an hour after, another to pursue the enemy on the Bowling Green Road (40 R., 363); which he did perhaps for a short distance (see 39 R., 558).

² 40 R., 365; C. W., 1865, 129.

³ 39 R., 942. ⁴ 39 R., 887. ⁵ 39 R., 887. ⁶ McClellan's *Stuart*, 249.

Lee says of the situation when *Stuart* took command¹: "The darkness of the night and the difficulty of moving through the woods and undergrowth rendered it advisable to defer further operations until morning." Lee's orders to Stuart.

At 3 A.M.² he wrote to *Stuart*: "It is necessary that this glorious victory thus far achieved be prosecuted with the utmost vigor, and the enemy given no time to rally."

And at 3.30 A.M.: "Keep the troops well together, and press on, on the general plan, which is to work by the right wing, turning the position of the enemy, so as to drive him from Chancellorsville, which will again unite us. Everything will be done on this side to accomplish the same object."

Lee may have thought that *Stuart's* force was farther to the north than it actually was.

At daylight on the 3d of May, Hooker occupied a position which a more efficient commander would regard as ideal.³ He had some 43,000 men intrenched at Chancellorsville and Hazel Grove, between *Lee's* 14,000 and *Stuart's* 26,000, while 42,000 more on the Mineral Spring and Ely Ford roads were ready to pounce upon *Stuart's* left flank. Situation at daylight, May 3d.

¹ 39 R., 799.

² 40 R., 769.

³ At or near Chancellorsville, Hooker, with Reynolds's, Sickles's, Meade's, Howard's, and Slocum's corps, and Hancock's and French's divisions of Couch's corps, was opposed to *Lee* on the east with Anderson's and part of McLaws's divisions of Longstreet's corps, and to *Stuart* on the west, with Rodes's, Colston's, and Heth's divisions of Jackson's corps.

At or near Fredericksburg, Sedgwick, with his corps and Gibbon's division of Couch's corps, was opposed to Early with his division of Jackson's corps and Barkdale's brigade of McLaws's division of Longstreet's corps. See Map X, at end.

Hooker's passage of the Rapidan was then complete. On the morning of the 3d of May, he might well have published a congratulatory order to his troops as he did on the 30th of April. He need not wait for a chance to fall upon *Lee's* flank as he had hoped to do, for *Lee*, prompted by contempt for his adversary, or confidence in his own superior skill, had given him a better chance to destroy the Confederate Army.

**Stuart in
Hooker's
power.**


The wisest course for *Lee* was to reunite his army if possible, and to do this, he must attack Sickles at Hazel Grove with *Stuart's* troops on one side and *Anderson's* and *McLaws's* on the other. He was right to tell *Stuart* to press to the right, and "turn if possible the fortified points in order to unite both wings of the army," but he was wrong to tell him to try to dispossess the enemy of Chancellorsville. All *Stuart's* skill would be required to extricate his troops from their exposed position, and *Lee* could not have fully understood that to push right on would place them wholly in Hooker's power.

**Wisest
course
for Lee.**


Hooker, however, lacked the essential qualities of a general. He did not attack *Stuart* because he thought¹ that, "to wrest from the enemy the position [at Dowdall's Tavern], after his batteries were established on it, would have required slender columns of infantry, which he could destroy as fast as they were thrown upon it." All this in face of the well-known fact, that *Jackson* on the 2d of May had deployed two lines of battle, nearly two miles in width, and advanced through a wide belt of this same

**Hooker
fails to act.**

¹ I C. W., 1865, 127



DRAWN FOR "THE STORY OF THE CIVIL WAR", VOL. III BY COL. W.R. LIVERMORE



wooded country. On the 3d of May, most of the fighting was in this woodland.

The situation of Jackson's corps¹ on the morning of May 3d [says Couch²] was a desperate one. . . . It only required that Hooker should brace himself up and take a reasonable, common-sense view of the state of things, when the success gained by Jackson would have been turned into an overwhelming defeat. But Hooker became very despondent. I think that his being outgeneralled by Lee had a good deal to do with his depression.

Couch's
comment.

At about four o'clock in the morning, Hooker very unwisely ordered Sickles³ to withdraw his troops to Fairview. General *Alexander* says⁴: "there has rarely been a more gratuitous gift of a battle-field." Whipple's division and the artillery led, followed by Birney's division.⁵ Barlow's brigade of Howard's corps rejoined his corps. Huntington's battery and two regiments of infantry and the cavalry were ordered to cover the retreat. During the night, Mott's brigade of Berry's division had come up, and was placed in the second line just south of the Turnpike.

Hooker
abandons
Hazel
Grove.

"As the sun lifted the mist that shrouded the field," says *Stuart*,⁶ "it was discovered that the ridge

¹ JACKSON'S CORPS, STUART:—²

Divisions	Brigades
Heth Colston Rodes	Thomas, Pender, Brock'gh, Lane, McGowan, Archer, Nicholls, Paxton, Warren, Jones, Iverson, O'Neal, Ramseur, Doles, Colquitt.

² 3 B. & L., 164.

³ 39 R., 390.

⁴ Alexander, 345.

⁵ Bowman of Whipple's division formed his brigade (39 R., 500) on the left and in front of Best's batteries and sent two regiments to support Ross on the extreme left of Williams's position.

⁶ 39 R., 887.

on the extreme right [Hazel Grove] was a fine position for concentrating artillery." He immediately ordered thirty pieces to that point. Early in the morning, he ordered *Heth*,¹ commanding the first Confederate line, to prepare to advance. As *McGowan's* and *Archer's* brigades were not perpendicular to the Turnpike, but inclined to the right and rear, *Heth* ordered them to move forward. *Archer's* brigade had advanced only a short distance, when it became hotly engaged with Sickles's men, retiring from Hazel Grove. *Stuart*² then ordered his first line to advance, and the second and third lines to follow. This was pressing toward Chancellorsville; but it was not pressing to the right, as *Lee* had ordered, and might lead to his destruction if Hooker should only give the word.

North of the Turnpike, *Pender*³ and *Thomas*,⁴ supported by two regiments of *Brockenborough's*,⁵ *Heth's* old brigade, found *Berry's*⁶ men posted behind a breast-work of logs and brush immediately in their front.

South of the Turnpike, *Lane*,⁷ supported by *Brockenborough's* other two regiments, and *McGowan's* on his right, found *Williams's* line, also intrenched. As *Stuart's* line advanced, *Archer* inclined to the right

¹ 39 R., 891. ² *Ib.*, 887. ³ *Ib.*, 935. ⁴ *Ib.*, 913. ⁵ *Ib.*, 894.

⁶ Federal troops engaged:

Corps	Divisions	Brigades
II. Couch	French	Carroll, Hays, Albright
III. Sickles	Birney Berry Whipple	Graham, Ward, Hayman Carr, Revere, Mott Franklin, Bowman
XII. Slocum	Williams Geary	Knipe, Ross, Ruger Candy, Kane, Greene

⁷ 39 R., 917.

to attack Sickles. *McGowan's* right¹ thus became separated from *Archer's*² left, and as they advanced, the interval increased; *McGowan* lost touch with *Lane*, and in trying to regain it, obliqued too far to the left and lost the alignment, so that both *McGowan* and *Lane* found that their right flanks were in the air.

At Hazel Grove, *Archer*³ arrived just in time to capture four pieces of artillery. He then tried to follow Sickles to Fairview, and attacked the intrenchments held by Williams and Geary, but was twice driven back. About thirty pieces⁴ of Confederate artillery, however, were soon brought up to Hazel Grove in position⁵ to enfilade Geary's and Best's lines and sweep the plateau of Fairview, the open ground southwest of Chancellorsville.

Lane and *McGowan*⁶ pushed through the woods with great vigor. They were successfully resisted at all points from about 6 to 7 A.M. Then a new Federal right regiment of Ross's brigade of Williams's division, posted on the Turnpike,⁷ after an hour's hard fight, broke and fled, and *Lane's* men carried their intrenchments. This exposed Berry's line to an attack in flank and rear. *Pender's* men⁸ poured into the gap and enfiladed this line, which broke off gradually from the left, regiment after regiment, and yielded its ground.⁹ General Berry fell mortally wounded at 7 A.M., and Carr¹⁰ succeeded him in command. His second line was outflanked and forced back.¹¹

Then *Pender's* brigade divided¹²; its right was twice

¹ 39 R., 891. ² *Ib.*, 925. ³ *Ib.*, 892. ⁴ *Ib.*, 823; Bigelow, 348.

⁵ 39 R., 671. ⁶ *Ib.*, 902. ⁷ *Ib.*, 917. ⁸ *Ib.*, 935.

⁹ *Ib.*, 450. ¹⁰ *Ib.*, 445. ¹¹ *Ib.*, 450, 455. ¹² *Ib.*, 935, 457.

repulsed, but *Thomas*¹ attacked Berry's breastworks in front, as *Pender* turned them on the left, and Revere, commanding² Berry's first brigade, considering himself the senior officer present, led his own men and some of Carr's to the rear. This exposed the right flank of Hays's brigade; and *Thomas* with *Pender's* left regiment hurled back its right wing³ and captured the general. The Federal right was dissolved.

South of the Turnpike, the battle took a different turn. At 7.30 A.M. Mott's brigade advanced and retook the intrenchments there.⁴ The Confederate right guns at Hazel Grove, however, kept up a driven back most vigorous fire upon the batteries 7-7.45 A.M. at Fairview, swept by their fire the plain of Fairview so that ammunition could not safely be brought up on pack mules, and enfiladed Geary's line. They also fired on Ruger's⁵ men when visible. But this line was nearly covered by the woods. As *McGowan* advanced, crossing Williams's abandoned log works, which he thought⁶ were the first Federal line, he was met in front by Ruger's fire from the hasty defences thrown up in the night, and on his exposed flank by the enfilading fire of Ruger's left, which extended beyond these defences. Soon after 7 A.M., *McGowan* was driven back to the log works which here ran northwest for about 800 yards and then north for 400 yards to the Turnpike. Ruger advanced on both sides of the long arm, and the remnants of *McGowan's* brigade were crowded into the short arm.

At 7.45, by the advance of the Confederates north of the Turnpike and of the Federals south of it,

¹ 39 R., 913.² *Ib.*, 462.³ *Ib.*, 376, 380, 935.⁴ *Ib.*, 445, 478, 680.⁵ *Ib.*, 709.⁶ *Ib.*, 902.

the opposing lines were rotated more than forty-five degrees, and on each side, the victor had exposed his left flank to the reserves of his enemy.

In fact, the Confederate left had approached to within about 700 yards of the rear of Couch's corps, which was facing east to meet an advance from Fredericksburg.

Situation
7-45 A.M.

Then the tide turned. At about 7 A.M., Hooker¹ had told French to move forward with his division, attack the enemy, and drive him through the woods. In about half an hour,² Carroll advanced and attacked *Pender* and *Thomas* on their flank. Albright followed³ in echelon on Carroll's right, while Franklin,⁴ of Sickles's corps, supporting Best's batteries, attacked the enemy in front. Ward was sent to Berry's support, but lost his way. Carroll and Albright drove *Thomas* and *Pender* "through the woods over the Plank road to and out of the log works and some 30 yards beyond." In the centre, *Lane*⁵ and *Brockenborough*,⁶ suffering severely from the fire of Mott and Ross in front, and finding their right flank exposed by Ruger's advance, were also forced back with fearful loss. The fugitives from the brigades of *Pender*,⁷ *McGowan*, and *Brockenborough*, and some from that of *Lane*, all huddled up close to the short arm of the log works six and eight deep.⁸

Confederate
left
driven back
7-45-8.20
A.M.

The real battle of Chancellorsville was not the rout of Howard's corps on the 2d of May, but this battle on the 3d, which, from the character of the region in which it was fought, has been sadly misunderstood. General *Lee* says in his report⁹:

Lee's report
of battle.

¹ 39 R., 362, 363.

² *Ib.*, 365.

³ *Ib.*, 382.

⁴ *Ib.*, 495, 497.

⁵ *Ib.*, 917.

⁶ *Ib.*, 894.

⁷ *Ib.*, 935.



⁸ *Ib.*, 1006.

⁹ *Ib.*, 799.

The breastworks at which the attack was suspended the preceding evening were carried by assault under a terrible fire of musketry and artillery. In rear of these breastworks was a barricade, from which the enemy was quickly driven. The troops on the left of the Plank road [Turnpike], pressing through the woods, attacked and broke the next line, while those on the right bravely assailed the extensive earthworks, behind which the enemy's artillery was posted. Three times were these works carried, and as often were the brave assailants compelled to abandon them.

This is the natural inference from the reports of the regimental and brigade commanders. The officers and men wandering through this wilderness knew little or nothing of where they were going or whom they were to meet. Coming upon a line of log works behind which a stray skirmisher or a straggler might have taken shelter, they thought they were capturing the enemy's stronghold. The Confederate soldiers did indeed stand up before a line of hasty intrenchments and fight as bravely as any troops in the world could fight, and, as we have seen, the Federal line was broken at one point where a regiment of raw recruits after fighting for more than half an hour broke and fled. The Confederates penetrated the gap but were driven back as they were at other parts of the line. If Berry had not been killed, or if Revere had held his ground, they would have been driven back sooner. Hays might have closed in on the right of the gap while Mott closed in on the left, and the assailants would have been surrounded instead of the defenders. For his disgraceful conduct, Revere was dismissed.

From a comparison of all the reports we can now form a better idea of the positions of all the troops



engaged than any or all of them could form at the time, and I think it will appear that after the first encounter, the Federals obtained little more protection from their intrenchments than the Confederates; that each side showed equal valor, and that when these troops wandering blindly through the Wilderness stumbled upon each other, the result of each encounter was precisely what should be expected from the relative strength and positions of the combatants.

At about 8.20 the Federals had driven back the first Confederate line 700 yards, to the position it had held the night before. It was a grave blunder on Hooker's part to send these three or four brigades into the heart of *Stuart's* corps. Behind their defences they had been well placed to resist *Stuart's* attack and to cut up his line with their fire in front while Meade and Reynolds should come down upon his flank and rear; but these brigades were now left without support.

At about 8.20 A.M. when *Colston* came¹ up with the second Confederate line they were brought to a halt. On *Stuart's* left, *Nicholls's* brigade moved² slowly on. In the centre, *Colston* sent *Warren's*³ brigade to *McGowan's* support, but instead of pushing to the right as directed, many of the men took refuge in the rear of the log works,⁴ and fired over the heads of *McGowan's*, *Lane's*,⁵ and *Pender's*⁶ men, of whom several were killed and wounded. *Paxton's*⁷ brigade was then brought from the north of the Turnpike behind the log works, where he found a large number of men, "of whom," he says, "fear had taken almost absolute possession." *Paxton* trying in vain to persuade them to go forward,

2d Confederate line
comes up
8.15-8.45
A.M.

¹ 39 R., 902.

² *Ib.*, 1037.

³ *Ib.*, 1005.

⁴ *Ib.*, 903.

⁵ *Ib.*, 917.

⁶ *Ib.*, 935.

⁷ *Ib.*, 1005, 1006, 1013.

was killed, and *Funk* succeeded him and moved on. *Jones's* brigade came up on *Paxton's* right.¹

*Rodes*² then arrived with the third line and, north of the Turnpike, drove back the single line of the Federals.

On account of the dense forest [he says], the undulating character of the ground, and the want of an adequate staff, it was not in my power, during the subsequent movements, to give a great deal of personal attention to the actions of any of my command, except *Rodes's* and *Ramseur's* brigades.

He directed each brigade commander to push forward until the enemy was encountered, and engage him vigorously, moving over friend and foe alike, if in the way. Advancing steadily with no material stoppage, except that occasioned by the tangled undergrowth, they soon came under a heavy fire from *Best's* artillery.

O'Neal, commanding *Rodes's* old brigade, was wounded; and *Rodes* in person led one of its regiments forward through the troops in front. In the passage of lines in this wilderness, the organization of the Confederate left was broken. North of the Turnpike, *Iverson*³ and *Nicholls*⁴ moved on, and drove back *Carroll* and *Albright*.

Along the Turnpike, Colonels *Hall* and *Christie* with two swarms of Confederates from *O'Neal's* and other brigades came upon *Mott's* and *Ross's* men, who were posted behind intrenchments; but who, having nearly expended their ammunition, and finding their position turned, fired a few volleys and withdrew to the Chancellor House. *Hall* and *Christie* halted and

¹ 39 R., 1028.² *Ib.*, 943.³ *Ib.*, 986.⁴ *Ib.*, 943, 944.

fired on Best's batteries on the hill and on their supports.

South of the Turnpike, Williams kept up a desperate struggle¹ almost without cessation until about 8.30 A.M. His regiments had nearly exhausted their ammunition. Ruger was ordered² to withdraw. *Funk's* assault was checked in part by the bayonet. Graham had been ordered up³ from behind the graveyard near Fairview to Ruger's support. On reaching the edge of the woods, he deployed his brigade in single line and came up behind Ruger. *Paxton's* men were forced to fall back to the log works⁴ on the right of those occupied by the fugitives of the first line; and *Jones's*⁵ brigade was driven from the log works on *Paxton's* right.

Federal
left yields
slightly
8.30-8.45
A.M.

When *Ramseur*⁶ in *Stuart's* third line came to the log works, he ordered the troops there to move forward. Not a man could be moved. With *Stuart's* permission *Ramseur* ran over them and charged the Federal line. This brought him on the front and right flank of Ruger and Graham. Ruger gradually withdrew. One of the regiments on Graham's right flank broke and ran.

Meanwhile, *Doles*⁷ should have advanced on *Ramseur's* right; but in marching through the dense wood, lost his connection. Some of the brigade moved off to Hazel Grove and joined *Archer*, while others under *Doles* himself passed around Graham's left and moved on toward the plateau of Fairview.

¹ 39 R., 680.

² *Ib.*, 709.

³ *Ib.*, 391, 414.

⁴ *Ib.*, 1014.

⁵ *Ib.*, 1028.

⁶ *Ib.*, 996, 997.

⁷ *Ib.*, 967.

At about 8 A.M., Geary's division was in the trenches exposed to a terribly raking and enfilading fire from the artillery at Hazel Grove while attacks were made¹ in front and flank by *Lee's* infantry. Thus hemmed in and in danger of being cut off, Geary was ordered to retire to the Chancellor House.

Geary falls
back 8.15-
8.45 A.M.

When *Doles*² came up, he pierced the right of Ross's and Bowman's line³ on Geary's right, took the left of it in the rear, and captured a large number of prisoners. Candy⁴ with Geary's right brigade had withdrawn,⁵ but Greene's, which was just moving back, was taken in flank and rear. *Doles* pushed on, protected by the crest of the hill, south of Best's batteries. Moving by the flank he passed up a ravine behind the graveyard at Fairview and came out near the Chancellor House in the midst of the Federal Army.

At 8.45 A.M., the opposing armies confronted each other on nearly the same general line as at 7.45, but *Stuart's* three lines had now melted into one; his left flank was much stronger than before; the troops sent out by Hooker to stop his advance might perhaps be outflanked, and Hooker's line facing west, rolled up and routed. But *Stuart* had launched his men blindly into the wilderness with only one brigade in reserve; and a few hundred yards to his left, Meade and Reynolds were waiting with 33,000 men to fall upon his flank and rear and swallow him up.⁶ His enemy could not have put him in a more helpless position; far worse than that of Howard the day before, for now all *Stuart's* corps was absolutely in Hooker's power.

Situation
8.45 A.M.

¹ 39 R., 730.



⁴ *Ib.*, 734.

² *Ib.*, 967, 968.

⁵ *Ib.*, 731.

³ *Ib.*, 500, 501.

⁶ 3 M. H. S. M., 226, 227.



Early in the morning, Humphreys's division of Meade's corps¹ was in the open ground near the Chandler House, ready to move against the enemy. Confederate Meade and Humphreys were in constant intercourse during that morning, that not a moment should be lost in moving against the enemy when Meade's orders should authorize it. Meade expressed to Hooker his opinion, that his own corps and Reynolds's corps and all the troops in that part of the field ought to be thrown forward to attack the enemy; but Hooker would neither order nor authorize it, saying that in his opinion the main battle should and would be fought on the ground occupied by these corps. At about 8.45 French sent² to ask Meade for a brigade to support him. Tyler,³ of Humphreys's division, then came down at double-quick upon the flank of *Stuart's* unprotected wing north of the Turnpike, and drove it back.

A second Confederate line of battle was assembled⁴ along Berry's breastworks and extending beyond them obliquely to the rear, so as to confront Tyler. It was formed from the brigades of *Thomas, Nicholls, Iverson, Pender, and O'Neal*. *Iverson* went for assistance to the Turnpike, where he found *Stuart*,⁵ who ordered *Colquitt's*⁶ brigade, his last reserve, forward to support the left.

Meanwhile, along the Turnpike, *Hall*,⁷ after firing for twenty minutes, charged Best's batteries, while *Christie* came up on *Hall's* left and enfiladed them. At about 9 A.M., Best, seeing his position⁸ turned, and the enemy's musketry so far advanced as to pick off his men and horses,

¹ Meade's corps: Griffin's division; Sykes's division; Humphreys's division.

² 39 R., 363.

³ *Ib.*, 551.

⁴ *Ib.*, 943, 986.

⁵ *Ib.*, 888, 987.

⁶ *Ib.*, 976.

⁷ *Ib.*, 954.

⁸ *Ib.*, 675.

was compelled to withdraw his guns to save them. His ammunition was nearly exhausted.

At about the same time, Franklin's¹ brigade withdrew to the road in his rear.

As *Iverson*² and *Thomas* and the rest north of the Turnpike fell back before Tyler, *Hall* and *Christie*, seeing their left exposed, fell back before Franklin and Mott and others whom Sickles³ had assembled, and the earthworks on the hill, vacated by Best, were retaken by the Federal troops.

South of the Turnpike, after Graham's right⁴ was turned, he was forced to fall back, and the whole line to retire.

Federal
left driven
back
8.45-9.20
A.M.

On reaching the intrenchments on the crest of the hill, he made another halt. *Ramseur*⁵ pressed on and occupied the abandoned intrenchments on Graham's right flank.

Each then enfiladed his enemy's line and threatened to turn his right flank. *Jones's* brigade had not advanced, and *Ramseur* went back and personally exhorted and ordered it to fill the gap of some five hundred yards on the right, but in vain.⁶ *Rodes* also made repeated efforts to bring up troops from the rear, but none would move up. At about this time⁷ *Stuart* came up to *Paxton's*⁸ old "Stonewall Brigade"⁹ in his usual happy manner, mounted his horse, and ordered a charge, singing in a ringing voice, "Old Joe Hooker, won't you come out of the wilderness?" An eye-witness says he could not get rid of the impression that Henry of Navarre led the charge, for everywhere the men followed his feather.

¹ 39 R., 495.

⁴ *Ib.*, 414, 415.

⁷ Lee's *Lee*, 253.

² *Ib.*, 943.

⁵ *Ib.*, 996.

⁸ 39 R., 1014.

³ *Ib.*, 392.

⁶ *Ib.*, 944.

⁹ *Ib.*, 944.

When the "Stonewall Brigade" attacked Graham in front, while *Ramseur* was trying to turn his right, the overwhelming numbers, and the exhaustion of Graham's men compelled him to retreat in considerable confusion; but the pursuit was checked by a counter charge of a portion of Hayman's¹ brigade led by Birney in person.

Still farther south, Candy's² brigade had moved back and taken a position in rear of Best's batteries; and Geary³ was in the act of forming his new front there when Hooker came up and directed him to resume his original position, and to hold it at all hazards. At Candy's approach, *Doles* withdrew to Hazel Grove. Geary returned to the trenches with Candy's brigade and two of Greene's regiments and three sections of artillery.

Meanwhile, along the Turnpike, the right of the new Confederate line again advanced and carried the earthworks; but, as the left Federal earthworks could not advance far in front of Tyler's captured flanking fire, all were again driven back to 9.30-9.45. Berry's works.

Funk,⁴ commanding the "Stonewall Brigade," seeing as he thought some confusion among the enemy, "who occupied the embrasures in the crest of the hill," ordered the brigade to charge, and took their works and recaptured several of the prisoners and one of the flags which had been taken from *Hall* and *Christie*; but Sickles rallied⁵ all the infantry in sight; and *Paxton* seeing them advance, fell back behind the intrenchments.

The Federal artillery had retired to Chancellorsville.

¹ 39 R., 392, 409, 433.

² *Ib.*, 735.

³ *Ib.*, 731.

⁴ *Ib.*, 1014.

⁵ *Ib.*, 392.

The infantry was then formed under Sickles's own supervision, and while being supplied with ammunition, took up a second position on the plain in the rear of Fairview, the front line occupying Best's earthworks.

**New
Federal
lines 10 A.M.**

On the morning of the 3d, Hancock¹ had strengthened his first line, "believing," he says, "from the experience² of the previous day and the well-known ability and gallantry of Colonel Miles, that it could be held." The line was frequently assaulted during the morning, the enemy marching their regiments up to the abatis.

**Hancock's
dispositions.**

Early in the morning, Meagher's³ brigade, that had been covering a point to the left and rear of the army, had been ordered up and posted under immediate orders of Hooker north of the Chancellor House.

Later in the morning, Hancock was directed by Couch to face his second line to the rear. Between 9 and 10 A.M., Caldwell⁴ was detached with five or six hundred men and placed under Hooker's direct orders, and the rest of Hancock's second line supported the batteries near the Chancellor House.

At daylight⁵ on May 3d Lee's line⁶ advanced; Perry's brigade was directed to gain the Catharpin road and move toward the Furnace. He found the country clear and moved up by the Furnace on the left of the line⁷; this was west of Scott's Run. At sunrise, Posey's skirmishers were pushed forward toward the Furnace, and it was dis-

**Lee advan-
ces 4-10 A.M.**

¹Hancock's division: Caldwell's, Meagher's, Zook's, Brooke's brigades.

²39 R., 313. ³39 R., 307. ⁴39 R., 319. ⁵39 R., 851.

⁶McLaws's division: Kershaw's, Semmes's, Wofford's brigades.
Anderson's division: Mahone's, Wright's, Perry's, Posey's brigades.

⁷39 R., 875.

covered that the enemy had retired. Soon afterward, *Anderson's* whole force was advanced toward Chancellorsville, *Mahone's* brigade having its right on the Plank Road; and *Wright's*, *Posey's*, and *Perry's*, successively formed a line of battle¹ on the left of, and nearly perpendicular to, that portion of the Plank Road between the Confederates and Chancellorsville. The troops pressed forward slowly, delayed by the dense thickets and tangled abatis through which they were obliged to force their way. *Wofford*² threw a portion of his command across the valley; *Kershaw* and *Semmes*, bearing to the left to unite with *Anderson*, swept around to the plains of Chancellorsville, and marched down the Plank Road to unite with *Wofford's* left. As the left of the line came up to Hazel Grove, *Archer* joined in the advance.

Geary's line, pressed hard in front, flank, and rear, was withdrawn.³

During the fight in the morning, Couch says⁴:

Upon the south porch of that mansion General Hooker stood leaning against one of its pillars, observing the fighting, looking anxious and much careworn. After the fighting commenced I doubt if any orders were given by him to the commanders on the field, unless, perhaps, to "retire when out of ammunition."⁵ None were received by me, nor were there any inquiries as to how the battle was going, along my front. On the right flank, where the fighting was desperate, the

Hooker at
Chancellor
House.

¹ 39 R., 851.

² 39 R., 826.

³ When Geary received Slocum's (39 R., 731) order to retire, he moved back slowly with Candy's brigade and two regiments of Greene's on his right. Kane's brigade and the rest of Greene's had become separated from him. Greene had obeyed the order to retire, and had fallen back (39 R., 758). Kane probably retired at 9.45.

⁴ 3 B. & L., 166.

⁵ But see above.

engaged troops were governed by the corps and division leaders. If the ear of the commanding general was, as he afterwards stated, strained to catch the sound of Sedgwick's guns, it could not have heard them in the continuous uproar that filled the air around him; but as Sedgwick, who was known to be a fighting officer, had not appeared at the time set—daylight—nor for some hours after, it was conclusive evidence that he had met with strong opposition, showing that all of Lee's army was not at Chancellorsville, so that the moment was favorable for Hooker to try his opponent's strength with every available man. Moreover, the left wing might at that very time be in jeopardy, therefore he was bound by every patriotic motive to strike hard for its relief. If he had remembered Mr. Lincoln's injunction ("Gentlemen, in your next fight put in all of your men") the face of the day would have been changed and the field won for the Union arms.

At about 9.20,¹ Hooker was still standing on the porch,² when a solid shot struck one of the pillars,

splitting it from end to end, and throwing one half of it violently towards him, the concussion rendering him senseless, and for a few moments he was thought to be dying . . . but he soon revived sufficiently from the effects of the stun to show himself to his troops, and by great force of will mounted his horse. He rode toward the White House.³

Just as he had reached the open field in front, the pain from the injury which he had received returned with such violence that he would have fallen, had not his staff rushed to his side and supported him to the ground. A blanket was spread, and he was laid upon it. Some remedy was administered, and he again revived sufficiently to be borne to a less exposed position; but scarcely had he been raised before a solid shot from one of the enemy's guns at Hazel

**Hooker
stunned.**

¹3 B. & L., 167.

²Bates, 126.

³Chandler's.

Grove struck the blanket in the identical spot where he had for the moment rested. Nearly the entire day he suffered so much pain as not to have the command of his faculties.

From the Chandler House, he sent for Couch,¹ who was second in command, and said, "Couch, I turn the command of the army over to you. You will withdraw it, and place it in the position designated on this map," pointing to a line traced on a field sketch from the Rappahannock along Mineral Spring and Ely Ford roads to Hunting Creek and then back to the Rapidan. This was at 10 A.M.² Couch immediately sent orders to the corps and division commanders to retire, his own corps, now under Hancock, to bring up the rear.

Hooker's
orders to
Couch.

Meade and Reynolds had both asked³ Hooker's permission to let their corps take part in the battle and were indignant at the result of Couch's interview.

Caldwell marched by the right flank down the road toward the U. S. Ford and halted facing the woods west of the road. About twenty minutes afterward, he was ordered by Hooker in person to conduct his brigade into the open field and through the woods from a point designated, which brought him on Tyler's left.

Caldwell⁴ advanced as far as the Confederate line in Berry's abandoned breastworks, and pushed on to the edge of the woods, but not being supported withdrew. When Tyler's⁵ ammunition was nearly exhausted, he saw *Colquitt's* brigade advancing, and extending farther to his right. He sent twice for ammunition without being able to obtain it; for Hooker⁶

¹ 3 B. & L., 169.

² 39 R., 307; 3 B. & L., 170.

³ Doubleday, 54.

⁴ 39 R., 320.

⁵ *Ib.*, 551.

⁶ *Ib.*, 508.

would not authorize him to hold his position, and French directed him to retire.

Soon after 10 A.M., *Lee* was in possession of the field.¹

In taking up the new line, Sickles's² corps was first placed at the junction of the Ely and United States

Fords roads, as a support to Meade's corps, but was afterwards moved to the front of the new line near Chandler's, connecting with Meade on the right and Couch on the left. Slocum's corps formed on the extreme left.³ Hancock was the last to withdraw. He was⁴ fighting in opposite directions, one line facing east, the other west, the two lines being about half a mile apart. Although his flank was entirely exposed, his fourteen pieces of artillery held back the enemy for a while. The artillery suffered fearfully. At 10 A.M. Hancock received the order to withdraw his forces to the new line, his division occupying the left salient toward the Chancellor House. This movement was completed about 11 A.M. A portion of his command, losing its direction, was intercepted by the enemy, and captured. Meade⁵ collected all the available batteries and put them in position around the Chandler House supported by Allabach's brigade until all the troops were withdrawn within the new line. To add to the horror of the scene,⁶ while the troops were withdrawing to the new position, the forest where they had been fight-

¹ 39 R., 800.

² 39 R., 393.

³ Williams's division of Slocum's corps was formed behind the line on the left of the Mineral Spring Road (39 R., 681). Geary took a position in rear of the new line (39 R., 671). At 9 P.M. Slocum moved his corps to the extreme left of the line (39 R., 681) near the Rappahannock.

⁴ 39 R., 314.

⁵ 39 R., 508.

⁶ Bates, 128.

ing for four or five hours took fire, and many of the wounded left on the ground were burned to death. Reynolds,¹ as we have seen, had at 1 A.M. of the 3d, taken up a position on the Ely Ford Road with Robinson's, and at 2 A.M. with Doubleday's division. At 3 A.M. Wadsworth's division crossed the river.² It was 11 P.M., May 2d, when Howard's corps was reorganized.³ Early in the morning of the 3d Schurz's division relieved Humphreys on the extreme left of the position near Scott's Dam.

Soon after 10 A.M., *Lee's* troops having been somewhat scattered by the difficulties of the ground, were re-formed preparatory to renewing the attack. *Stuart's* New Confederate men were drawn up in line of battle⁴ along the Turnpike⁵ and in the abandoned works. line 10 A.M.-3 P.M. This position was strongly fortified (see map). *Anderson's* division was placed in line⁶ on the Turnpike east of Chancellorsville.

Lee says⁷:

The enemy had withdrawn to a strong position nearer to the Rappahannock, which he had previously fortified. His superiority of numbers, the unfavorable nature of the ground, which was densely wooded, and the condition of our troops after the arduous and sanguinary conflict in which they had been engaged, rendered great caution necessary. Our preparations were just completed when further operations were arrested by intelligence received from Fredericksburg.

¹ 39 R., 255.

² (39 R., 261). Phelps's brigade (39 R., 263) on the right of the line; Cutler's as a support to Sykes (39 R., 264); Paul's on the right as a support for the first line. Meredith's brigade at 6 A.M. deployed in line of battle in rear of Sykes.

³ 39 R., 657.

⁴ 39 R., 945.

⁵ H. & A., 75.

⁶ 39 R., 851.

⁷ 39 R., 800.

We have seen that on the 29th of April, bridges were laid across the Rappahannock below Fredericksburg, and that Wadsworth's division of Reynolds's, Sedgwick crosses and Brooks's of Sedgwick's corps¹ had Rappahannock. crossed; that early in the morning of the 2d of May, Reynolds's corps left for Chancellorsville; that soon after 6.30 P.M., Sedgwick received an order to cross and pursue the enemy on the Bowling Green Road.

Burnham had crossed on the morning of the 1st of May.² Howe and Newton crossed in the evening³ of the 2d. At 8 P.M., Brooks advanced and took possession of the Bowling Green Road in front of him, preparatory to turning the Confederate right.

At 11 P.M., May 2d, Sedgwick⁴ received Hooker's order of 9 P.M. directing him to cross the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg immediately, and move Sedgwick in the direction of Chancellorsville until he ordered to attack Lee. should connect with Hooker; to attack and destroy any force on the road, and be in the vicinity of Hooker at daylight, and to send word to Gibbon⁵ to take possession of Fredericksburg.

The order to cross at Fredericksburg [says Sedgwick] found me with my entire command on the south side of the river, ready to pursue by the Bowling Green road. To recross for the purpose of crossing again at Fredericksburg where no bridges had been laid, would have occupied until long after daylight.

¹ Sedgwick's corps:

Divisions	Brigades
Newton	Wheaton, Shaler, Eustis
Howe	Neill, Grant
Brooks	Bartlett, Brown, Russell
Light division	Burnham

² 107 R., 180.

³ 39 R., 599.

⁴ 39 R., 558; 40 R., 368.

⁵ (II².)



W. W. 1863

Hooker says¹:

My object in ordering General Sedgwick forward at the time named was to relieve me from the position in which I found myself at Chancellorsville on the night of the 2d of May. I was of the opinion that if that portion of the army advanced on Lee's rear, sooner than allow his troops to remain between me and Sedgwick, Lee would take the road that Jackson had marched over on the morning of the 2d, and thus open for me a short road to Richmond, while the enemy, severed from his depot, would have to retire by the way of Gordonsville.

Hooker's
object.

Hooker, of course, gave this order under the assumption that practically all of *Lee's* forces had left Fredericksburg, and were confronting him at Chancellorsville. If this had been the case, it would have made *Lee's* defeat more certain, to have Sedgwick arrive on his rear or behind his right flank at the time Hooker attacked him in front; but Hooker must have known the danger to which Sedgwick would be exposed if *Lee* should throw his whole army upon him, while he himself remained quietly behind his intrenchments, especially if *Longstreet* should come up to *Early's* relief. The safest move would have been for Sedgwick to rejoin Hooker, moving by the north of the river.

Comment.

It was Sedgwick's duty, however, to push on vigorously. The distance from Fredericksburg to the point where he would have encountered *Lee's* troops is about nine miles over a good road and through comparatively open country.

Sedgwick's
duty.

At 11 P.M. when he received the order, his right flank was near Franklin's Crossing about two miles below Fredericksburg and his left about two miles farther

¹ I C. W., 1865, 131.

down the river.¹ It is doubtful whether his move of a mile or two down the Bowling Green Road put him to a great disadvantage, and in fact he had at least detained a considerable force of *Early's* there to oppose him.

After receiving the order, Sedgwick commenced to move by the flank in the direction of Fredericksburg, on the Bowling Green Road, Newton's division taking the advance, followed by Burnham's and Howe's divisions. The troops halted for some time on the outskirts of the town.² About 3 A.M., Newton's division resumed the march, skirmishing as it advanced; Burnham and Howe followed. About this time Warren joined Sedgwick. The moon was full, but the night was foggy.³ The head of Howe's column reached Hazel Run some time after daylight.⁴

*Early's*⁵ with 9000 infantry occupied a line six miles long from Hamilton's Crossing to a point on the river above Fredericksburg. *Barksdale's* brigade⁶ held the left half of *Early's* lines, a front of three miles from Taylor's Hill to the hill in the rear of Howison's house, and *Early's* own division⁷ the right half from Hamilton's to Deep Run, while between Deep Run and Howison's only pickets were posted protected by a cross fire of artillery. *Barksdale*⁸ had one regiment between the Marye house and the Plank Road, except three companies, which with another regiment were behind the stone wall at the Marye house, one

¹ 1 C. W., 1865, 96. ² 1 C. W., 1865, 46. ³ 3 M. H. S. M., 240.

⁴ 39 R., 599. ⁵ (II³); 7 S. H. S., 578. ⁶ (I².)

⁷ *Early's* division: Hoke's brigade; Smith's brigade; Hays's brigade; Gordon's brigade.

⁸ 39 R., 1000, 1001, 839.

regiment in front of Lee's Hill, and another still farther to the right. On the 2d, through a mistake in transmitting orders, *Early* had been directed unconditionally to move to General *Lee*; but soon after, the mistake was corrected, and he returned to his position.

Gibbon's division¹ of Hancock's corps was ordered to cross the river as soon as the bridge was ready. About midnight, it reached the river opposite Fredericksburg, just above the Lacey house, and it was² after daylight before the passage was accomplished. Sedgwick and Gibbon reach Fredericksburg.

When the head of Newton's column entered the town of Fredericksburg, four regiments from Wheaton's and Shaler's brigades were sent forward against the rifle-pits to draw the enemy's fire. It was evident³ to Sedgwick that the line of works was occupied in considerable force; and the reports from Brooks showed that it extended beyond Sedgwick's left. It was now daylight; and batteries were placed in position to shell the works.

At dawn on the 3d, *Hays's* brigade was sent to reinforce *Barksdale*. One regiment was placed on his right. The rest occupied the ridge which ends with Taylor's Hill. *Wilcox*⁴ at Banks Ford, hearing of Gibbon's crossing, ordered his brigade in the direction of Dr. Taylor's house, and sent one regiment forward in the direction of the Marye house. *Wilcox* and *Hays* opened fire on Gibbon with their artillery. Early's dispositions.

Howe⁵ was directed to move on the left of Hazel Run, and turn the enemy's right. Upon advancing as

¹ 39 R., 559.² *Ib.*, 350.³ *Ib.*, 558.⁴ *I*₁; 39 R., 855; H. & A., 78, 79.⁵ 39 R., 559.

directed, he found that the works in his front were occupied. Gibbon, moving forward to turn the left of the enemy, could not cross the canal under fire, and was compelled to halt. Sedgwick's preparations. Sedgwick was satisfied that nothing remained but to carry the works by direct assault.

At 9.15 A.M.¹ Hooker telegraphed to him: "You will hurry up your column. The enemy's right flank now rests near the Plank Road at Chancellorsville, all exposed. You will attack at once." The dispatch was repeated at 10 A.M.

Two storming columns were formed; the right column, on the Plank road and to the right of it, was commanded by Colonel Spear with two regiments of Burnham's brigade supported by Colonel Shaler with two regiments of his brigade; and the left column on the Turnpike Road was commanded by Colonel Johns with two regiments of Eustis's brigade. A line of battle was formed on the left of both, commanded by Colonel Burnham with three regiments of his division and one of Shaler's brigade.²

About 11 o'clock,³ the columns were put in motion.⁴ The artillery on the heights had no effect; for the pieces could not be depressed. When the leading regiment of the right column arrived near the rifle-pits, it received a heavy fire of musketry. Being in column of fours, the loss was heavy, and the fire caused it to waver for a few minutes, when it rallied and successfully gained the crest of the hill.

The Telegraph Road,⁵ on which the left column

¹ 40 R., p. 387; 3 M. H. S. M., 252.

² 39 R., 559.

³ 40 R., 390; 39 R., 599; 107 R., 180.

⁴ 39 R., 202.

⁵ 1 C. W., 1865, 40.

advanced, led through the enemy's works. A stone wall near the base of Marye's Hill crossed the road, extending each side of it. The column was subjected to a heavy enfilade and slant fire of musketry from the stone wall on both sides. The first charge was repulsed. The rear broke; but the column was rallied again and got up about fifty yards nearer, when it broke again, but was again rallied and pushed right ahead. A portion went off on the right and got over the wall and behind the enemy, and that gave the Federals possession of the works.

The line of battle advanced on the double-quick¹ against the rifle-pits on the left, neither halting nor firing a shot until they had driven the Confederates from their lower line of works.

At the same time, Howe advanced² in three lines against the heights on Newton's left. Three regiments³ carried the strong covered way leading from the first work on Marye's Heights to Hazel Run, and then turned to the right and rear of the works. The others carried the works at the foot of Lee's Hill and near Howison's house.

Howe carries Lee's Hill.

If at 11 P.M., Sedgwick had thrown Newton's division vigorously forward followed by Howe's, he could afford to leave Brooks's to follow more slowly while keeping up a demonstration all along the line. Newton's early arrival would have made Gibbon's crossing easier and quicker; and a vigorous attack on the Confederate position would probably have been successful. A night assault over well marked roads against a definite position like that at Marye's Heights was a very different problem from the manœuvre through the wilderness against an unknown enemy, which

Comment.

¹ 39 R., 559.

² *Ib.*, 599.

³ *Ib.*, 609; H. & A., 82.

Jackson was proposing at the time he was wounded. The loss of the assailants would have been less than in an assault by daylight. *Barksdale* with 900 men was defending a line of two miles from Hazel Run to Taylor's Hill. Gibbon, Newton, and Burnham could have assaulted with about 12,000, before *Hays* and *Wilcox* could arrive.

The final disposition that Sedgwick made of his forces at 11 A.M. was good under the existing conditions. Concealment was then out of the question. Brooks, by his demonstrations, detained a large force of *Early's* beyond Deep Run, and Gibbon, although he had failed to cross the canal, had at least succeeded in detaining *Wilcox* and *Hays* in his front; so that in the assault Newton, Burnham, and Howe with some 15,000 men were confronted by only two regiments of *Barksdale* and one of *Hays* amounting to about 1384, and artillery, along the line of about two miles, which though strongly fortified proved not to be impregnable. So rapid had been the final movement on Marye's Hill, that *Hays* and *Wilcox*, to whom application had been made for succor, had not time to march troops to *Barksdale's* aid.¹

By the capture of Marye's Heights, the Confederate forces were cut in two. *Wilcox's* brigade and the greater part of *Hays's* were left² on the north of the Plank Road. *Hays* retreated parallel to the road; and, marching around the head of the Federal advance, soon rejoined *Early*, who formed a line³ across the Telegraph Road at Cox's house about two miles back of Lee's Hill. *Wilcox*, believing that he would do better by detaining the advance of the Federals, formed his brigade in line at right angles

Early re-
treats.

¹ H. & A., 79.

² *Ib.*, 82.

³ 39 R., 1001.

to the Plank Road near Guest's house. When the Federal line advanced, *Wilcox* withdrew. He made a short stand near the toll gate, and then moved back to Salem Church, where he formed a line of battle crossing the road at right angles.¹

Hooker says:

In my judgment General Sedgwick did not obey the spirit of my order, and made no sufficient effort to obey it. His movement was delayed so long that the enemy discovered his intentions, and when that was done, he was necessarily delayed in the further execution of the order. This, it will be remembered, was while the battle was being fought on the morning of the 3d on the right, and while I was endeavoring to hold my position until I could hear of his approach.

If Hooker had decided to move Sedgwick as he proposed, he should have kept up a steady pressure upon *Lee's* forces in front of him. Hooker hoped to make his victory complete without exposing the forces under his own command to any danger; not from personal cowardice, but from a realization that he could not handle so large an army in so large an area. This he practically confessed to the President, when, after crossing the river, he said he had more troops than he could handle. After his accident at the Chancellor House, he remained in a shattered condition, at times half stupefied, and at others asleep. The charge that he was intoxicated was not borne out by the evidence. It is, of course, much to be regretted that he was not relieved. So far as he is concerned, it is hardly profitable any longer to consider his motives. There is,

¹ Four pieces of artillery were posted in the road; one company in the brick church and another in a schoolhouse to the right of the church and some sixty yards in front of the line.

in fact, no reason to suppose that his orders would have been wise, even if he had not been struck.

At 12 o'clock,¹ it would have been easy for Sedgwick to drive away all the troops around the Confederate right, and destroy the depot and transportation there. His order, however, required him to move toward Chancellorsville. Gibbon's division remained at Fredericksburg to prevent any of the enemy from crossing to the north side, and Sedgwick's corps moved out on the Plank Road. The troops had been somewhat disorganized by the assaults, and required some time to re-form. Brooks's division had not been seriously engaged, and was now given the advance. He was farthest in the rear, and it was about 3 P.M. before the column advanced. The country being open, Brooks's division was formed in two lines with skirmishers in front and artillery in the rear, a proper disposition to be ready to fight without losing time to form. Newton's division came next, but it marched by the flank along the road, which, as Warren says, made it liable to enfilading fire, and put it out of support, in a measure, of the division in advance.²

Sedgwick's orders directed him to put that division in front which was best capable of taking the lead, but these orders were clearly given to hasten the advance, and not to retard it. Neither Newton's nor Howe's men were incapacitated, and some of Newton's men had suffered no appreciable loss. It was perfectly practicable to push on as his orders required. The formation for advance was faulty. Newton's division should have been put in the best fighting formation. In the open ground on each side of the road, troops could have marched almost as rapidly

**Sedgwick
moves on.**

Comment.

¹ 39 R., 202.

² See Map XI, at end.

by the flanks of regiments as they could strung out in column of fours. Warren says that he urged a different formation.¹

About noon, when *Lee* at Chancellorsville heard of Sedgwick's progress, he ordered *McLaws* with his three brigades and *Mahone's* of *Anderson's* division to reinforce *Wilcox*, whom they met at Salem Church. The line was formed on a slight ridge on the western edge of a wood about 250 yards in width except a short distance on each side of the Turnpike, where its width was but 30 yards. The woods were thick with harsh unyielding undergrowth, with little large timber. They afforded no protection to the enemy, but retarded their advance and kept them under the fire of the defenders. These troops had not been in position long before the Federals were seen advancing up the Plank Road in line of battle. Troops were also posted in the church and in a schoolhouse near it.

**McLaws
sent to
Salem
Church.**

At about 5 P.M. on the 3d, Brooks's division arrived near Salem Church, and formed for the attack. Advancing in the woods in two lines, it was met by a vigorous fire of infantry. Bartlett² surrounded the schoolhouse, and captured the company stationed in it, but was soon forced to fall back through the woods upon the second line, behind which his brigade re-formed. Brown's brigade also advanced in two lines about one hundred yards through a dense, and in places impassable, undergrowth to within about thirty yards of the Confederate position; but was also obliged to fall back.³

**Battle of
Salem
Heights.**

Newton's division followed Brooks's in column of fours. Wheaton, whose brigades formed the advance

¹ C W., 1865, 48.

² 39 R., 581.

³ 39 R., 572, 858.

of this division, sent two regiments to the left and two to the right of the road. Brooks's troops were driven through them in confusion, and formed in rear of the batteries. Wheaton gradually retired with heavy loss. As Burnham's division and the rest of Newton's came up, they were placed on Brooks's right.¹

When Howe arrived, he was ordered to throw his division to the left to check a flank attack.² He did so and bivouacked in the road. Soon after *Wilcox* had withdrawn from Banks Ford, Benham, with the Engineer Brigade, laid a ponton bridge across the river there.

Salem Heights, as they are sometimes called, are but slightly elevated above the road to the east or west. Their possession at sunset would give Sedgwick no great advantage excepting what he would derive from routing *McLaws*; but if Hooker had advanced to meet him early in the afternoon, *Lee's* army might perhaps have been crushed between the upper and nether millstones as Hooker had proposed. Brooks with about 5000 men was confronted by at least 4000, who at some points were protected by intrenchments. The whole Confederate line at Salem Heights covered a front of two miles with about 10,000 men. Bartlett had done well to penetrate this line, and if Newton and Howe had been up to support him, Sedgwick could probably have cut it in two.

Lee's conduct in taking advantage of his interior lines by sending *McLaws* to reinforce *Wilcox* was sound and brilliant. Nothing that he could lose would compensate for the advantage he might expect to gain by blocking Sedgwick's advance.

¹ 39 R., 625; 107 R., 180.

² 39 R., 600, 603; 107 R., 180.

If Sedgwick had advanced¹ as vigorously as his orders required, he would not have arrived at Chancellorsville at daylight; but he would probably have reached Salem Church before 8 A.M. *Lee* would not then have been as well prepared to resist him; and he might possibly have arrived in time for Hooker to give the order to advance, which would have changed the face of the day.

After the fight at Salem Heights, Warren went back to Hooker, arrived about 11 P.M., and reported what had happened.² Hooker seemed to be very much exhausted, and declined to give any special instructions to Sedgwick. He said he had none to give, and gave Warren to understand that Sedgwick would have to depend upon himself.³ Warren so notified him, and said that Hooker wished him to look well to the safety of his corps, and preserve his communications with Fredericksburg and Banks Ford.⁴

Warren returns to Hooker.

At about 3 P.M., *Lee* advanced *Colston's* division from the Chancellor House⁵ to feel the enemy, when a

¹ C. W., 1865, 131.

² *Ib.*, 48; 39 R., 203.

³ 39 R., 560.

⁴ (1 C. W., 1865, 131.) Hooker says in his testimony: "On General Warren reporting to me the condition of General Sedgwick, and informing me that the enemy in his front appeared to have been reinforced, I directed General Warren to address him the following letter: 'General Sedgwick: I find everything snug here. We contracted the lines a little and repulsed the last assault with ease. General Hooker wishes them to attack him to-morrow if they will. He does not desire you to attack them again in force unless he attacks him at the same time. He says you are too far away for him to direct. Look well to the safety of your corps, and keep up communication with General Benham, at Banks's Ford and Fredericksburg. You can go to either place if you think it best to cross. Banks's Ford would bring you in supporting distance of the main body, and would be better than falling back to Fredericksburg. G. K. Warren, Brigadier General.' "

⁵ 39 R., 1007.

terrific fire of musketry, shell, and canister showed "that the enemy occupied a strong, fortified position defended by infantry on each side of the artillery." *Colston* was then ordered back. Lee at Chancellorsville. At 4 P.M., *Anderson*, with *Wright's*, *Perry's*, and *Posey's* brigades, and fourteen pieces of artillery, was sent to the River Road below United States Ford to watch that road and threaten the enemy's communications.

On the 4th, all was quiet along the new line north of Chancellorsville excepting that, in the afternoon, Hooker sent out parties to reconnoitre, which satisfied him that the enemy was in force in his front.¹ At 6 P.M.,² Reynolds sent Stone with his brigade to follow up Hunting Run in the direction of the Turnpike. It is said that Reynolds had hoped that this would bring on a fight.³ Early in the morning of the 4th, *Anderson* was sent to Salem Church, being relieved from duty by *Heth* with three brigades,⁴ which were posted near the junction of the River and Mine roads.

Sedgwick appears to have received Warren's dispatch at⁵ about 7 A.M., on the 4th. Many messages between Hooker and Sedgwick crossed each other. Expecting a movement from the direction of Fredericksburg, Sedgwick formed his line with the left resting on the river, about midway between Fredericksburg and Banks Ford, and his right where it had been placed the night before. Howe's division was thus facing east, Brooks's⁶ south, and Newton's and Burnham's⁷ west. Sedgwick

Sedgwick's
dispositions,
May 4.

¹ 39 R., 508, 255, 277, 296.

² 39 R., 255, 296.

³ Bigelow, 416.

⁴ 39 R., 829, 852; H. & A., 91.

⁵ C. W., 1865, 60, 97, 98.

⁶ 39 R., 568.

⁷ 108 R., 182.

says¹: "Thus fronting in three directions, I was compelled to wait attack, determined to hold the position until dark and then fall back upon Banks's Ford." Brooks's line was some two miles in length, with less than 6000 men upon it.

In the morning² of the 4th, *Early* advanced along the Telegraph Road and recaptured Marye's Heights. *Barksdale's* brigade was thrown into the trenches in front of the hill, *Smith's* moved across Hazel Run, and a line was formed facing up the Plank Road. *Early* waited for *McLaws*, until 11 A.M., when hearing no sound of an engagement in that direction, he advanced *Smith's* brigade, which was sharply repulsed by Neill's brigade of Howe's division. *Early*³ sent word to *McLaws* that if he would attack in front, he (*Early*) would advance and strike at the flank and rear of the enemy. *McLaws*, making some demonstration, informed *Lee* of the plan proposed, and asked for an additional force.

**Early
returns.**

In the meantime, *Lee*, finding Hooker too strong to be assailed in his new position, resolved still further to reinforce the troops in front of Sedgwick, in order, if possible, to drive him across the Rappahannock.

**Lee goes to
Salem
Heights.**

Accordingly, on the 4th, as we have seen, *Anderson* was sent with his remaining three brigades to join *McLaws*, the three divisions of *Jackson's* corps holding the position at Chancellorsville. *Anderson* reached⁴ Salem Church at 11 A.M.

Lee came⁵ in person to superintend the movements. *Anderson* was ordered to the right with his three brigades to form on the left of *Early's* division.

¹ 39 R., 560.

² 39 R., 801, 1001.

³ 39 R., 827.

⁴ 39 R., 852.

⁵ 39 R., 827.

Lee's plan was, that *Early* should attack first, and that *Anderson* and *McLaws* in turn should advance after it was known that the attack on the right had commenced, which would be indicated by the firing in that direction.

About 1 P.M. Howe had heard that the enemy was assembling a force largely outnumbering his division, immediately in rear of Fredericksburg for another attack. He therefore made arrangements so that in case his left was unable to hold its position, it could fall back some little distance behind a small covering of woods, in which he held a portion of his reserve force ready to make a flank attack.¹ His first line was held by Neill's brigade strengthened by two regiments of Grant's.

[Sedgwick says²:] General Hooker had notified me during the day that I must hold a position on the south bank of the river until the following afternoon; that he intended to advance the next day and would relieve us: that in such case my position was as good as he could desire. [At 11.50 A.M., Sedgwick wrote³:] My army is hemmed in upon the slope, covered by the guns from the north side of Banks's

Sedgwick in Ford. If I had only this army to care for, I
doubt. would withdraw it to-night. Do your operations require that I should jeopard it by retaining it here? An immediate reply is indispensable, or I may feel obliged to withdraw. [And at 1.40 P.M.:] I shall take a position near Banks's Ford and the Taylor House, at the suggestion of General Warren.

The signal for attack was fired about 5.30 P.M. *Early* advanced with a strong line of battle and attacked Howe's right and centre.⁴ His troops, however, in

¹ 39 R., 600.

³ 40 R., 412, 409.

² C. W. 1865, 97, 98.

⁴ 39 R., 1002.

their efforts to outflank the enemy, instead of advancing to the front, bore off to their right¹ toward the river; and *Hoke's* and *Hays's* brigades were thrown into confusion by coming in contact after they had crossed the Plank Road below Guest's house.² *Early's* line gained the ridge in front and struck Howe's first line on its right flank. Neill's right was overpowered, and obliged to retire³; but as the victorious swarms moved on, their own left was exposed to the fire of Howe's second line. *Early's* left was "checked, broken, and held at bay" while his right moved on.

Early
attacks
Howe's line.

Howe applied to Sedgwick⁴ for reinforcements; and Butler's battery and two regiments of Burnham's brigade were sent to his support; and at about 6 P.M. Wheaton, in reserve, moved down the Plank Road at a double-quick toward his right. At this time,⁵ *Early* had a large force in front of all of Howe's line, attempting with desperate vigor to force or turn it. His men rushed forward, and nearly gained the crest immediately in front of the right of the line.⁶ But Wheaton arrived and charged upon the flank of the enemy.⁷ Two regiments on Grant's right charged in front, and followed the enemy down the slopes through the ravine and on to the crest which had previously been held by Neill's brigade, and took many prisoners. Wheaton formed his brigade on the right of Howe's line.⁸

Early
repulsed.

Still farther to Howe's left, *Early* threatened to cut him off from the river. Howe then withdrew his right

¹ 39 R., 604.

² *Ib.*, 1002.

³ *Ib.*, 610, 605.

⁴ 39 R., 601.

⁵ *Ib.*, 605.

⁶ *Ib.*, 609.

⁷ *Ib.*, 619, 621.

⁸ 39 R., 623.

and centre, and formed a new line in the woods to the left and near the river, posting¹ Butler's battery and Burnham's two regiments on the end of the line. The Confederates, thinking that the Federal left was giving way, confidently advanced until they brought their flank opposite the woods in which Howe's troops were placed.

At the favorable moment, Grant's brigade opened its fire upon the flank of the enemy's columns, and immediately the batteries in front opened a direct fire. In a short time not a shot was heard. Darkness now came on; but soon the moon rose and again lighted up the field; and not a Confederate could be seen.

On *Early's* left, at the appointed signal,² *Wright* of *Anderson's* division moved forward by the right flank around to the right of the hill on which he had formed, and, passing up a ravine, came upon the border of the open field in rear of *Downman's* house, about 400 yards from it; and here, rapidly forming in line, charged across the fields swept by the house, and reached the woods opposite, driving the enemy's sharpshooters before him. Arriving at the skirt of the woods, he halted his command. In accordance with his orders, he remained in this position until dark, subjected to a murderous fire without being able to respond to the enemy's guns. *Posey*³ advanced to the Plank Road opposite *Guest's*. Between eight and nine o'clock, *Wright* was moved up and formed on *Posey's* left. *Perry*⁴ thought he could not advance, because *Wright* was in his way.

On the left of *Lee's* line, *McLaws* ordered *Kershaw*

¹ 39 R., 601, 606.

² 39 R., 869.

³ 39 R., 872.

⁴ 39 R., 876.

and *Wofford* to advance after it should be known that the attack on the right had commenced, which would be indicated by the firing in that direction; but they were too late to engage the enemy; for meanwhile, Sedgwick had begun to withdraw Newton's and Brooks's division to his second line near the Taylor House and Banks Ford, where, during the afternoon, Benham had built another bridge.

Lee's plan, for the right wing to attack first and turn the left of the line and for the rest in turn to join in the attack, would have been wise if he were sure that *Early* had an overwhelming force and would outflank Sedgwick, but not otherwise; for in an oblique attack, the advantage is with the side that is strongest at the point of contact.

Comment.

Early, however, failed to turn Sedgwick's left; the ambuscade which Howe had prepared was a complete success; and the arrival of the reserves added to the slaughter on his left and supported the pursuit on his right.

Lee had failed to make any serious impression upon Sedgwick's position, which was not, however, a strong one for defence; and Sedgwick wisely withdrew to the shorter line, which he could hold against all *Lee's* forces, and thus protect the bridges at Banks Ford for Hooker to cross if he so desired.

On the night of the 4th-5th, Hooker, being¹ resolved on crossing the river, called the corps commanders together, to ascertain how they felt in regard to his making what he considered a desperate move against the enemy in his front. Couch, Meade,² Sickles, Howard, and Reynolds were present. Slocum, on account of the long dis-

Hooker resolved to retreat.

¹ 1 C. W., 1865, 134.

² 3 B. & L., 171.

tance from his post, did not arrive until after the meeting was broken up. Hooker stated that his instructions compelled him to cover Washington, not to jeopardize the army, etc. Couch says: ¹

We were left by ourselves to consult, upon which Sickles made an elaborate argument, sustaining the views of the commanding general. Meade was in favor of fighting, stating that he doubted if we could get off our guns. Howard was in favor of fighting, qualifying his views by the remark that our present situation was due to the bad conduct of his corps or words to that effect. Reynolds, who was lying on the ground very much fatigued, was in favor of an advance. I had similar views to those of Meade as to getting off the guns, but said I "would favor an advance if I could designate the point of attack." Upon collecting the suffrages, Meade, Reynolds, and Howard voted squarely for an advance, Sickles and myself squarely no; upon which Hooker informed the council that he should take upon himself the responsibility of retiring the army to the other side of the river. As I stepped out of the tent Reynolds, just behind me, broke out, "What was the use of calling us together at this hour of the night when he intended to retreat anyhow?"

Hooker's friend, Colonel Bates says,² "To open a new campaign with entirely new combinations, from his present position, was, under the circumstances in which he found himself, out of the question, and he wisely determined to withdraw," as if there were any better test for a general's fitness for command than the speed with which he could form new combinations to meet the changing conditions which constantly confront him upon the battle-field.

When the human mind is overcharged with horror, it finds momentary relief in the ridiculous. There can

¹ B. & L., 171.

² Bates, 184.

be no better commentary on Hooker than Bates; no better picture of the fearful condition in which an army may be placed when its fate depends upon an officer who has not acquired the faculty of directing quickly the movements of large bodies of troops in accordance with the principles of strategy and grand tactics.

On the 5th¹ Warren and Comstock prepared a new and shorter line in the rear. The roads were put in order and a third bridge laid. A heavy rain set in about 4.30 P.M. and lasted till late at night. The movement to recross was begun by the artillery² at 7.30 P.M. and was suddenly interrupted by a rise in the river so great as to submerge the ends of the bridges on the north bank; and the velocity of the current threatened to sweep them away.

Hooker
Retreats.

Under Comstock's direction, the upper bridge was speedily taken up, and used to piece out the ends of the other two, and the passage was again made practicable. Considerable delays, however, resulted from this course.

Hooker³ received Sedgwick's dispatch of 1.50 P.M., at 1 A.M. of the 5th. Sedgwick was directed to withdraw, cover the river, and prevent any force from crossing. At 2 A.M. he replied: "General Hooker's order received, will withdraw my forces immediately."

Soon after, Hooker received a message from Sedgwick⁴ (not dated): "I shall hold my position, as ordered, on south of Rappahannock."

Sedgwick
Retreats.

Hooker replied at 1.20 A.M.⁵: "Yours received saying you should hold position. Order to withdraw countermanded. Acknowledge both." This message however was not promptly delivered, and Sedgwick replied at

¹ 39 R., 203, 204.

² 39 R., 204.

³ 40 R., 418.

⁴ 1 C. W., 1865, 133.

⁵ 40 R., 419.

3.20 A.M.: "Yours just received countermanding order to withdraw. Almost my entire command has crossed over."

Hooker says in his testimony¹: "My desire was to have General Sedgwick retain a position on the south side of the river in order that I might leave sufficient force to hold the position I was in, and with the balance of my force recross the river, march down to Banks Ford, and turn the enemy's position in my front by so doing." This he could do if he chose; but there is nothing to be said in favor of his conduct in remaining idle near Chancellorsville. With 78,400 men, he was confronting *Stuart* with 24,000, while Sedgwick with 20,500 was confronting *Lee* with 30,000.

Yet nothing could justify Sedgwick in proposing to withdraw his force, unless perhaps he thought as Couch did, that with Hooker in command, the Army of the Potomac should be kept in a safe place.

Sedgwick was an estimable officer and a brave and capable soldier, beloved by his men and respected by all. With no disposition to defeat or block Hooker's plans, he was too methodical and deliberate in his advance.

Hooker says of him²: "He was a perfectly brave man, and a good one; but when it came to manœuvring troops, or judging of positions for them, in my judgment, he was not able or expert."

On the morning of the 5th, when *Lee* learned that Sedgwick had crossed the river and removed his bridges, and that Fredericksburg was evacuated,³ he left *Early* to watch Sedgwick with his division and *Barksdale's* brigade, and sent *McLaws* and *Anderson* back to Chancellorsville, which they reached in the

¹ 1 C. W., 1865, 133.

² 1 C. W., 1865, 146.

³ 39 R., 802.

afternoon in the midst of a driving storm. Preparations were made to assail the enemy's works at daylight on the 6th, "but," says *Lee*, "on advancing our skirmishers, it was found that under cover of the storm and darkness of the night, he had retreated over the river." It was fortunate for *Lee* that he could not carry out his intention. He would probably have failed.

At about daylight of the 6th, Meade's corps, the rear-guard, started.¹ Meade says: "The troops were all crossed by 9 A.M., without any molestation from the enemy, they not following even the withdrawal of the pickets."

After a campaign of a week or ten days, Hooker had² lost 16,800 men, and inflicted upon *Lee* a loss of 13,100, greater in proportion to his numbers than his own. He had not, however, destroyed *Lee's* army nor driven it back from its point of vantage on the Rappahannock; but his own army had been driven back by half its numbers. Comment.

A careful study of this battle shows what even professional soldiers hardly realize, that when troops are launched into a wilderness like this, where they are forced to grope blindly about, a battle can still be conducted in accordance with the principles of grand tactics, and that its success or failure depends as much upon the observance of these principles as it does in the regions where most of the battles of the old world have been fought.

Hooker's passage of the Rappahannock and the Rapidan was a complete success. By the 30th of April he had stolen away from *Lee's* front without opposition, and thrown across the rivers a force large enough to

¹ 39 R., 508.

² See table, p. 228.

hold its position until so reinforced that it could attack *Lee* and perhaps rout his army, while Sedgwick completely covered Washington from a counter stroke, and was ready to join Hooker when required to give a crushing blow to the enemy. In this respect, Hooker's troops were better placed than those of Grant had been, in his overland campaign, when they were so divided that neither could attain its object, and neither could reinforce the other. Hooker had made use of his superior forces to make his strength still stronger.

After the successful passage of the rivers, a skilful commander in his place would have assembled his forces, and struck *Lee* a dangerous blow. If Stoneman's cavalry had then been in touch with the army, it would have been hard for *Lee* to escape; but Hooker had not taken thought for himself what he would do if he were attacked, and when *Lee* appeared, Hooker fell back and fortified, retaining control of the situation, which, however, from lack of confidence, he failed to exercise. *Lee* took advantage of his interior lines to throw his forces on Hooker and Sedgwick in succession, playing with them as a cat plays with his prey; but too recklessly; for if the shot which stunned Hooker had so disabled him that the command had fallen upon a capable officer, *Lee's* army would have been routed.

From this campaign Hooker lost the confidence and respect of his army and of the country, and *Lee* acquired a world-wide reputation as the greatest general of his age.

The Federal cavalry at Kelly's Ford and on Stoneman's raid learned how to use their weapons and manage their horses; but when their aid was most needed they were absent on a wild-goose chase. *Lee's* cav-

ally did good work in screening the movements of his own troops, and disclosing those of his enemy.


The artillery on both sides was effective. Hooker's batteries at Falmouth protected the approach to Washington; at Fairview on the 2d, they checked *Jackson's* advance, and on the 3d they covered Hooker's retreat. On this day, the Confederate artillery for a while commanded the battle-field.

The Army of Northern Virginia covered itself with glory; and the endurance, skill, and valor of its officers and soldiers inspired the Confederacy with new vigor and confidence.

But if Hooker and Howard had been disgracefully defeated, the Army of the Potomac had not. On the 2d, Howard's men had fought bravely as long as they saw any prospect of success. On the 3d, Couch's, Sickles's, and Slocum's men had driven back their assailants, and followed them as far as their orders would allow, while Reynolds's and Meade's were straining in the leash to join them. Sedgwick's men had stormed and carried the heights on which Burnside had wrecked his army, and on the 4th had repulsed the attack of superior numbers and entrapped the enemy who had tried to surround them. Why either wing of the army fell back, was a problem to those who had become attached to Hooker because of his good administration, and who loved Sedgwick as almost every man did who served under him.

The retreat from Chancellorsville was a heavy blow to the nation, following as it did the disastrous defeat of Burnside on the same ground, the failure of Rosecrans to follow up his success at Murfreesborough, and the repeated failures of Grant to capture or even to invest the fortress of Vicksburg. But, through all the





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CHAPTER VII.

THE FOURTH AND FIFTH ADVANCES ON VICKSBURG.

WE saw that in 1862, Williams had begun to cut a canal across the neck of land opposite Vicksburg, hoping that the current would make it wider and deeper, and the river would open for itself a new channel, so that vessels could pass without exposure to fire from the batteries at Vicksburg. On the 25th of January, 1863, Halleck told Grant¹ to direct his attention particularly to this canal, to which, he said, the President attached much importance.

The old
canal.

Grant at once sent Col. (now Maj.-Gen.) J. H. Wilson, the topographical engineer officer on his staff, by a separate boat to look over the situation. Wilson found that it could be enfiladed by guns on the bluff south of Vicksburg, and that owing to the spoon-shaped surface of the point, the water would not scour a new channel but would be spread out over the axis of the point and find its way into the interior. Wilson thought that all canal schemes were foolish, with the great Mississippi, running toward the Gulf with a broad and irresistible current, much nearer at hand.

When Grant² arrived at the camp opposite Vicksburg and saw the canal, he "lost all faith that it would

¹ 36 R., 10. See Map X at end.

² 36 R., 14.

ever lead to any practical results." It was not likely to divert the course of the river, and the lower end came out under bluffs which completely commanded it. He found that the enemy were fortified from Haynes's Bluff to Warrenton, and that there was no prospect of taking Vicksburg from the river front. The high water, however, which made the low land impassable, made innumerable bayous with which it was intersected navigable for vessels of light draft.

In a report to the War Department on the 4th of February,¹ Grant spoke of three routes for approaching Vicksburg. One by the way of Yazoo Pass into the Coldwater, Tallahatchie, and Yazoo rivers, another by Lake Providence and the network of bayous connecting it with Red River, and a third by the way of Willow and Roundaway Bayous, leaving the Mississippi at Millikens Bend and coming in at New Carthage. The object of the Yazoo Pass route was to turn the enemy's right flank; that of the Lake Providence route, to open communication with Banks in Louisiana and send him reinforcements; that of the route by Roundaway Bayou, to reach a crossing on the Mississippi below Vicksburg.

The Yazoo River formerly branched off from the Mississippi about ten miles below Helena, and entered it again five or six miles above Vicksburg; but it had been closed by a levee at its head to reclaim the land in its basin. The old bed was known as Yazoo Pass for about twenty miles from its head, and for about fifteen miles, it was only about sixty or eighty feet wide; then, as the Coldwater and

Grant loses faith in it.

Grant recommends three other routes.

Yazoo route.

¹ 36 R., 14. See Maps, pp. 229, 239; I and III at end.

Tallahatchie rivers for about one hundred and eighty miles, it was from one hundred to one hundred and eighty feet wide. All these streams were very crooked, and passed through a dense wilderness of heavy timber. The Tallahatchie joined the Yalobusha about fifty miles below Grenada to form the Yazoo River.

Porter thought that if the levee were cut, he could send his vessels through, and open a way for the army to get in the rear of Vicksburg, and Grant thought that if this route could be opened and maintained, he could move a large part of his army by water to a point beyond that from which he had fallen back in December, and then down the Yazoo by land and water to a point near Haynes's Bluff where it could open communication with the rest of the fleet and army, just as he had proposed to do by marching overland in his last unfortunate campaign.

This, however, would be a dangerous line of operations; for the troops in advancing would be scattered over a line of several hundred miles in an enemy's country and liable to be cut off at any moment. The rise and fall of the water is very irregular; and if, by any accident, the pass should be obstructed, and the water should fall a few feet, the whole flotilla might be entrapped and left high and dry. In fact, *Pemberton* could hardly wish to have his enemy in a better position to be beaten in detail.

Lake Providence is the name given to part of the old bed of the Mississippi River about forty miles in a direct line north and a little west of Vicksburg. The water in the Mississippi in this region is higher than the land west of its banks, and only kept by the levees from overflowing them. The water from Lake Provi-

dence flows through Bayou Baxter into a cypress swamp and thence through Bayou Macon and the Tensas, Washita, and Red Rivers, into the Mississippi, above Port Hudson, and 170 miles below Vicksburg. These rivers are navigable at all stages of the water. The bayous are narrow and tortuous, and the banks were covered with dense forests overhanging the channels,¹ which were filled with fallen timber.

**Lake
Providence
route.**

Grant proposed to open a channel through the swamp by cutting down the trees, dredging and sawing off the stumps under water, and then cutting the levee opposite Lake Providence to let in the waters of the Mississippi. The total length of the route from Lake Providence to Vicksburg was about four hundred miles.

Grant thought² the route bade fair to be the most practicable one for turning Vicksburg, and that less than one quarter of the digging that had been done across the point before Vicksburg would connect the Mississippi and the lake; and in all probability the current would wash a channel in a short time. If this route could be opened and maintained as far as the mouth of the Red River, he could send an army corps, say 20,000 men, to co-operate with Banks against Port Hudson. This fortress was not, like Vicksburg, protected by low land, and troops could land on the eastern bank above or below, and reach the upland behind it. Banks then would invest Port Hudson, and probably take it; the lower Mississippi would be open, part of Farragut's fleet and of Banks's army would join Grant and Porter at Vicksburg, and Grant could supply his army from New Orleans.

This long and circuitous route, however, passed

¹ I Grant, 448.

² 38 R., 33.

through the country of an active enemy, who, as Grant afterwards realized,¹ could send small bodies of men up the Washita and Tensas Rivers to "block our passage, and pick off our troops with their sharpshooters."² The route was liable to many of the same objections as that by Yazoo Pass.

Roundaway and other bayous form a continuous watercourse navigable for barges and small steamers from a point near Duckport, twelve miles by Roundaway river above, to New Carthage, twenty-four Bayou miles below, Vicksburg. route.

Grant proposed to dig a canal about three miles long to complete the route, and increase the depth of water. The total length would be about forty-six miles. He thought³ that there was no question but that this route was much more practicable than the old canal, or the Lake Providence route.⁴ It was less dependent than the others on the stage of the water. "There was a good road⁵ back of the levees, along these bayous to carry the troops, artillery and wagon trains over whenever the water receded a little, and after a few days of dry weather." The country was comparatively open, and the enemy could not block the passage.⁶

On the 13th of February, Halleck offered to send Grant four dredge-boats, and others could doubtless have been found; but he did not accept them.⁷

¹ 1 Grant, 449.

² The Confederate commander says: "From the nature of the country and the few narrow routes that exist, as well as the little breadth of the streams, I am satisfied that the whole country [along this route] is among the most defensible in the world, and that comparatively few resolute, experienced men could repel a host of invaders" (33 R., 803).

³ 36 R., 14.

⁴ 1 Grant, 457.

⁵ 1 Grant, 457.

⁶ Dana says: "He proposes to use the iron on the Vicksburg & Shreveport Railroad" (36 R., 78).

⁷ 36 R., 17.

Grant said in his report of the 6th of July, 1863¹:
“From the moment of taking command in person, Wilson’s I became satisfied that Vicksburg could plan. only be turned from the south side.”

In fact, on the very morning after Grant arrived at Milliken’s Bend to take command, Wilson² in conversation with Rawlins, the chief of staff, proposed a plan for turning Vicksburg from the south, which was “to ignore all the canal schemes; run the gunboats and transports by the batteries under the cover of darkness; march the troops overland to the bank of the river below; and then use the fleet for transferring them to the east side of the river at the first point where they could find a safe landing with a dry road to the highlands back of it; that accomplished, to march inland, scatter the enemy, and take Vicksburg in rear.”

Wilson told him of his observations at Port Royal, and of his certainty that they could run the batteries with ten boats and not lose more than two of them.

That night Wilson left for Helena and the Yazoo Pass; but after dinner Rawlins explained the plan to Grant and his assembled officers, and urged its adoption.

Sherman pronounced it impracticable; but Grant at that time gave no indication whether he was for it or against it.

There can hardly be a doubt but that, by some expedient, Grant could have found means by land or water or both, to convey his men across the peninsula opposite Vicksburg; and to this end his first efforts should have been directed from the moment he decided to send his main force down the river.

If Grant could open a route west of the Mississippi

¹ 36 R., 44.

² Letter of Gen. Wilson, Oct. 31, 1911.

to a point south of Vicksburg where troops could embark, he could send steamers and barges without troops, protected by cotton, hay, and grain, down past the batteries to ferry the troops from New Carthage to the eastern bank; he could supply them by the same route, or by barges sent down the Mississippi; and then choose his own point of landing below, gain the bluffs, and advance to the interior, or fall back on the fleet. Such a plan was indeed so practicable as to appear to many military experts preferable to that of advancing overland from the north along the line of the railroad.

It would require the cooperation of the navy; but Porter would surely have consented if Grant had put the case strongly before him; for he was fond of dangerous enterprises. He was ever ready to support Grant, and "to afford all the assistance in his power for the furtherance of the success of our arms."¹ The passage of batteries was not a new experiment on the Mississippi. The experience at Island No. 10, at Forts Jackson and St. Philip, and here at Vicksburg itself, showed that it was practicable, and at that time surely the situation demanded it.

Lincoln also thought² that Grant should "march the troops across the neck, run the batteries with the transports, and thus go below."

It would have been better if the President had not expressed so decided an interest in the old canal. Grant would then have been at liberty to select the best line of operations. As it ^{Grant tries} _{experiments.} was, he had at least to give this canal a fair trial; but he had more men than he could employ to advantage on this canal, and he did not wish to keep them idle.

¹ 36 R., 47.

² 7 N. and H., 327.

Then [he says¹] commenced a series of experiments to consume time, and to divert the attention of the enemy, of my troops and of the public generally. I, myself, never felt great confidence that any of the experiments resorted to would prove successful. Nevertheless I was always prepared to take advantage of them in case they did.

Accordingly he spent the months of February and March in working simultaneously on the old canal and on the routes by Lake Providence and Yazoo Pass. This was another unfortunate mistake in the conduct of the operations against Vicksburg.

Grant placed Sherman's corps in camp² on the levees and along the line of the canal.³ They⁴ built a dam across the upper end to keep out the water while the men were digging. It rained almost incessantly. The river continued to rise, and the water retarded⁵ their work. Dredges were sent from up the river which worked for a while to good advantage; but the enemy built new batteries on the prolongation of the canal, and mounted guns whose fire extended half-way across the peninsula⁶ so that the dredges could not work there. On the 7th of March,⁷ the dam across the upper end of the canal gave way; and the water rushed in, broke over the canal levees, swept over the country, and filled up part of the excavation. The work, however, was continued.

On the 30th of January, Grant sent a brigade to Lake Providence to begin the work on that route, and soon after, he went there in person,⁸ and thought the route bade fair to be the most practicable one for turning Vicksburg. He assigned this work to McPherson, who⁹

**Sherman
works on
old canal.**

**McPherson
on Lake
Providence
route.**

¹ I Grant, 446. ² 38 R., 9. ³ 38 R., 10 ff. ⁴ 36 R., 117.
⁵ 36 R., 17. ⁶ 36 R., 123. ⁷ 36 R., 19. ⁸ 38 R., 33. ⁹ 38 R., 59.

arrived at Lake Providence with most of his corps about the 20th of February,¹ and encamped his troops wherever they could find dry land. On the 17th of March,² the levee was cut and the water let in from the Mississippi. By the end of the month, a channel for boats of light draft was made through the swamp except for a short distance where dredging was required; but a few large trees had to be cut off under water, and a sawing machine expected from Memphis had not arrived. Grant could not, then, hope to pass the gunboats through such a channel, and if the water should fall, any force sent through it would be cut off.

On the 29th of January, Grant sent³ Wilson to cut the levee across the head of Yazoo Pass. On the 3d of February, he let in the water from the Mississippi, which was then eight and a half feet higher than that in the pass.⁴ It took several days to fill up the Yazoo Basin, and slacken the current so that it was safe for vessels to enter.

**Wilson
opens
Yazoo
Pass.**

Pemberton had anticipated an attack from this quarter, and had already sent⁵ troops to obstruct the pass by felling the trees on its banks.

Grant sent two regiments to clear them out, and Ross⁶ with his division of about 4000 men to push on and destroy the bridge at Grenada and the shipping at Yazoo City.

**Ross and
Smith enter
Yazoo Pass.**

Porter sent two ironclads, six rams, and six light draft gunboats, under Lieutenant-Commander Watson Smith, who was sick and mentally disabled, and insisted on moving very slowly. On

¹ 36 R., 18.

⁴ 36 R., 373.

² 38 R., 120.

⁵ Jan. 23d (36 R., 374).

³ 36 R., 10, 386.

⁶ 38 R., 56.

the 24th, the expedition entered the pass,¹ on the 28th the Coldwater, and on the 10th of March reached a point near the junction of the Tallahatchie and Yazoo rivers near Greenwood.

Their further advance was checked by a cotton bale² battery called Fort Pemberton, built across a narrow neck of land formed by a bend in the river and surrounded by swamps, bayous, and land rendered impassable by the overflow. The next day, the ironclads fired on the fort; but the stream was too narrow for them to act to advantage. Then, Wilson built a cotton bale battery on shore; but the ships could not silence the guns of the fort and the troops could not advance through the water under their fire, and were not prepared for extended siege operations. On the 20th, Ross, hearing that the enemy were preparing to block the passage at the mouth of the Coldwater and cut him off, started back.

On the 5th of March, as the navigation proved to be better than Grant had anticipated,³ he ordered⁴ McPherson to send **Quinby** with his division of about 6000 men⁵ to Yazoo Pass, and to follow with the rest of his corps as rapidly as possible, and effect a lodgment at Yazoo City, or the most eligible point on the Yazoo River from which to operate. McPherson would have four divisions or 24,000 men; and Grant proposed to send 6000 more. The understanding was that the gunboats would approach as near Haynes's Bluff as possible, and fire signal guns to warn the squadron in the mouth of the Yazoo of their presence.

¹ 36 R., 376; Mahan, *G. & I. W.*, 143.


³ 36 R., 45.

⁴ 38 R., 86.

² And earthwork.

⁵ 38 R., 75.





LAKE PROVIDENCE, STEELE'S BAYOU,
AND ROUNDWAY BAYOU ROUTES
ROUTE OF FEDERAL ARMY-----



On the 14th, Quinby¹ entered the pass with one brigade of his division, leaving the others to follow as soon as they could get transportation. On the 21st,² he met Ross coming up, and ordered him to return, and persuaded Foster, who had relieved Smith in command of the squadron, to turn back too. Quinby found, however, that it was neither practicable to reach the fort by land, nor, as he had hoped, to cross the river and cut off its supplies.

Meanwhile Grant had been "much exercised for the safety of Ross."³ . . . Reinforcements were of no use in a country covered with water, as they would have to remain on board of their transports. Relief had to come from another quarter."

Porter had found⁴ a pass through the woods by which he thought he could get his gunboats into the Yazoo above Haynes's Bluff, and Grant thought that, if he did so, this would "so confuse the enemy as to save Ross's force." The route lay through Steele's Bayou, Black Bayou, Deer Creek, and Rolling Fork, to the Sunflower and Yazoo Rivers. On the 15th of March, Porter started out with five ironclads, four mortar boats, and four tugs,⁵ taking with him a pilot, who led him to believe that it was a good way to get to the rear of Vicksburg. Porter forced his way through Steele's Bayou, knocking down trees three feet in diameter with the ironclads; but at Black Bayou he became entangled in the timber, and, as he could not advance until it was cut out, pulled up the trees by the roots, and wrote to Grant to send 3000 men to help him. He could only move four miles in twenty-four hours.

Porter
proposes
Steele's
Bayou route.

Porter
starts.

¹ 36 R., 407.

² 36 R., 408.

³ 1 Grant, 452; 38 R., 112.

⁴ Porter, *Nav. His.*, 303.

⁵ Soley, *Porter*, 290.

It was of course understood that the army and navy should work together; and as Grant had only three small steamers that he could use in these streams, he proposed, with their aid, to send along as many of Sherman's corps as he could transport, to follow the gunboats, clear out the channel, and see if an army corps could get through by that route to a point on the east bank of the Yazoo from which it could "act advantageously against Vicksburg." Sherman went ahead in a tug, and on the 17th overtook Porter near Hill's plantation at the junction of Black Bayou and Deer Creek and went up the creek about four miles with him.² Porter thought that "there would be no more difficulties"³ and Sherman returned to meet his troops, and clear the way for the transports to follow.

As an army could not attack Vicksburg in three little steamboats, Grant tried to limit their work to those parts of the route where troops could not march. To this end he made a crossing over a neck of land where Steele's Bayou approached within a mile of the Mississippi, and sent Sherman's troops over this route to meet the steamers that were to take them to Black Bayou; and, as these were too frail to follow, through the obstructions, the "great mud turtles," as Porter described his ironclads, the troops were to be towed up the bayou on a barge to the first dry land, near Hill's, while the transports should return for another load. Grant and Sherman explored for a better route but failed to find one.

Porter did not find Deer Creek as plain sailing as he had expected. The pilot proved to be a fraud.

¹ 36 R., 112.

² 36 R., 432, 436; 1 Sherman, 336.

³ Soley's *Porter*, 289.

Nothing heavier than a skiff had ever navigated these waters before. The turns were sharp, the channel was only a few feet wider than the vessels, and they had to be heaved¹ around the bends. They broke through bridges, forced their way through the overhanging branches of gigantic trees that swept away their boats and smokestacks, tore away rafts of old timber and sunken trees; but, after four days and nights of hard labor, the flag-ship was stopped near Rolling Fork by a bed of willows six hundred yards long, that held her as in a vise. It would have taken weeks to remove them. At last, by the united pull of all the other steamers behind her, the flag-ship was released. Meanwhile, the Confederate troops had assembled and felled trees into and across the creek.

Porter
stopped.

Porter was very much disappointed that Sherman did not come up. On the 18th, he sent him a dispatch² explaining his trouble. "Had the way been as good as represented to me," he said, "I should have been in Yazoo City by this time." He begged Sherman to send up troops and said he thought that a large force would be used to block him up, and that 10,000 troops would be required before they got through. Sherman, who received this at Black Bayou, did not realize Porter's immediate danger. He had with him hardly more than 1000 troops from Stuart's division, and thought rather of bringing up the rest than of pushing forward what he had; but when, at Hill's, at 3 A.M. of the 21st, he received a more pressing dispatch, he sent forward G. A. Smith at once, and all the troops with him, while he alone paddled down in a canoe to hurry up

Sherman
comes up.

¹ Soley's *Porter*, 291.

² 36 R., 436.

the rest. At night, he met about 2200 at Black Bayou, and conducted them¹ by lighted candles through a dense canebrake to Hill's, and the next morning, the 22d, followed Smith along the road on the east side of Deer Creek. The country there was open and highly cultivated, full of everything that "the heart of a soldier could desire."

Sherman came none too soon; for Porter had found that there was nothing to be done but to fall back and meet the army. As the vessels could not turn around, they unshipped their rudders, and bumped down stern foremost with the current, surrounded by swarms of Confederates, who kept² up such a fire that it was almost impossible for any one to show himself on deck. Twice the fleet was stopped by trees, some, three feet in diameter, which the enemy had felled, and once by a sunken coal barge. Smith helped to remove the obstructions, and drove back the enemy, who however were reinforced, and were closing in upon him just as Sherman came up and again turned the scale. Three days were consumed in backing down to the head of Black Bayou, the first point where the vessels could turn. On the 26th, the fleet anchored at the mouth of the Yazoo.³

¹ 36 R., 435.² Porter, N. H., 306.³ The opposing troops reached the field in the following order:


March	Confederate Troops	Federal Troops	Ref.
19	Ferguson 350		38 R., 674, 678.
20	Featherston 1020		36 R., 458-460
21	Featherston 400	G. A. Smith 1200	36 R., 433
22		Sherman 2200	36 R., 435
23	Featherston 500	Ewing 400	36 R., 438
	Total 2270	3800	

1 YAM
6381


VA-VICRS
UC-UNION
YR-TUREL
YR-RENT
PW-PLANT
ST-STATE

VA-NUMBER
YR-RENT


MAR 1
1863



MAY 1
1863



APR 1
1863



EXPLANATION OF SIGNS

10,000 FEDERALS
 5,000 " "
 1,000 "
 10,000 CONFED'S
 5,000 " "
 1,000 " "
 CITIES, TOWNS, ETC.
 GRIERSON'S RAID

0 25 50 100 125 M

ABBREVIATIONS

- | | | |
|------------------|------------------|----------------|
| AB-ABBEVILLE | HS-HOLLY SPRINGS | |
| B.R.-BATON ROUGE | IU-IUKA | |
| BL-BOLIVAR | JK-JACKSON | PN-PONCHATOULA |
| CA-CAIRO | LG-LAGRANGE | PT-PONTOTOC |
| CL-COLUMBUS | LX-LEXINGTON | RN-RIENZI |
| CR-CORINTH | MM-MEMPHIS | TR-TRENTON |
| GJ-GR JUNCTION | NO-NEW ORLEANS | TP-TUPELO |
| GR-GRENADA | OX-OXFORD | UC-UNION CITY |
| HM-HUMBOLOT | PH-PORT HUDSON | VK-VICKSBURG |

Although the expedition had failed, it had entered a rich and fertile tract which supplied the garrison of Vicksburg with provisions. Large stores of cotton were destroyed for fear that they might fall into Federal hands.

The Yazoo Pass and Steele's Bayou expeditions, though unwise, were not altogether visionary. It was possible that by one or both, Grant might succeed, but far from probable. The Confederates had built a raft to block the Yazoo River, and were working hard to put Yazoo City into a state of defence. In a few days, they could bring up a heavy force from Vicksburg, while Ross could only be reinforced by the route over which he had meandered. On the other hand, if, in December, Grant had kept his main force on the upland, advancing along the road from Grand Junction, or still better from Memphis, he could then without danger open up the Yazoo as an auxiliary line, and, moving down by land and water, push on to Vicksburg.

In the Steele's Bayou expedition, Porter had performed prodigies of valor and seamanship in leading his squadron of battle-ships over the fields and through thick entanglements and heavy forests. He had never expected to operate without the army; for he realized that he could not drive back a swarm of sharpshooters by his heavy guns; but might be imprisoned in his iron boxes until the enemy could make him uncomfortable. He was therefore disappointed that the troops did not come up sooner; but under the circumstances he says: "That was the end of the Steele's Bayou Expedition. The impracticability of the campaign had been fully demonstrated."

As soon as Sherman had examined the route, he saw

that this was not fit for a line of operations for an army or for an army corps, especially with only three small steamers for transports. The enemy had a quicker route¹ than he. Their boats could go from Yazoo City, or Haynes's Bluff, directly up the Sunflower, a large, good stream, to Rolling Fork, while his troops had to make their way up Steele's and Black Bayous, and then march twenty-three miles overland. Surely the possibility of success did not justify the risk of losing five of the best ironclads in the fleet. "It would have put an end," says Soley,² "to effective naval cooperation in the reduction of Vicksburg," and Grant says of the navy that "without its assistance the campaign could not have been successfully made with twice the number of men engaged. It could not have been made at all in the way it was with any number of men without such assistance."³

We have seen that *Pemberton*, learning of Grant's movements in Yazoo Basin, had sent detachments to **Pemberton** meet them. On the 11th of March,³ fearing **in February**, that the enemy might succeed in opening **March and** the canal, he sent *Bowen* with one brigade **April.** to Grand Gulf to construct batteries for the protection of the mouth of Big Black River, and as a secondary obstacle to the navigation of the Mississippi. On the 22d,⁴ five heavy guns were mounted. On the 1st of April, *Pemberton*⁵ had about 7000 men at Fort Pemberton and Grenada, 22,000 around Vicksburg, 16,000 at Port Hudson, a few at Jackson, 2000 at Columbus, and 1000, all cavalry, in the northern counties of the State, 48,000 in all.

¹ 36 R., 433.

⁴ 36 R., 250.

² Soley's *Porter*, 300.

⁵ 38 R., 702. See Map, p. 243.

³ 1 Grant, 574.

Grant says¹:

This long, dreary, and, for heavy and continuous rains and high water, unprecedented winter was one of great hardship to all engaged about Vicksburg. The river was higher than its natural banks from December, 1862, to the following April. The war had suspended peaceful pursuits in the South, further than the production of army supplies, and in consequence the levees were neglected and broken in many places and the whole country was covered with water. Troops could scarcely find dry ground on which to pitch their tents. Malarial fevers broke out among the men. Measles and small-pox also attacked them. The hospital arrangements and medical attendance were so perfect, however, that the loss of life was much less than might have been expected. Visitors to the camps went home with dismal stories to relate; Northern papers came back to the soldiers with these stories exaggerated. Because I would not divulge my ultimate plans to visitors, they pronounced me idle, incompetent and unfit to command men in an emergency, and clamored for my removal. They were not to be satisfied, many of them, with my simple removal, but named who my successor should be. McClelland, Fremont, Hunter and McClellan were all mentioned in this connection. I took no steps to answer these complaints, but continued to do my duty, as I understood it, to the best of my ability. Every one has his superstitions. One of mine is that in positions of great responsibility every one should do his duty to the best of his ability where assigned by competent authority, without application or the use of influence to change his position . . .

Federal
Army in
winter.

With all the pressure brought to bear upon them, both President Lincoln and General Halleck stood by me to the end of the campaign.

¹ Grant, 458.

Nicolay and Hay, Lincoln's private secretaries, say¹: "In a war carried on by thirty millions of free people the President who would entirely disregard popular or, as some prefer to call it, political influences, would by that fact show himself incapable of understanding or properly executing the duties of his office. McClelland was not the only soldier in the Western army who owed his appointment to such considerations. Grant and Sherman themselves were constantly favored and protected by some of the most powerful statesmen in Congress."

The Confederates still held control of the Mississippi River from Vicksburg to Port Hudson, and the garrisons of these posts derived most of their supplies from Texas and Louisiana. To cut them off from this region, on the 2d of February,² Porter sent down Colonel Ellet with the ram "Queen of the West." He started³ at 4.30 A.M., but was so delayed that it was daylight when he reached the batteries, which, however, he passed without serious injury. He then went down to the Red River, destroying Confederate transports and other property; then returned for coal, and, on the 10th, went down again with a ferryboat partly protected with iron and cotton. On the 12th Porter sent down the ironclad "Indianola," with two coal barges, which passed at night and was not struck.⁴ Porter thought that these three vessels would give him complete control of the Mississippi; but on the 14th, Ellet lost his ram to the Confederates seventy-five miles up the Red River, and escaped to the ferryboat, which then lost its rudder, so that

¹ 7 N. & H., 142.

² Porter, N. H., 296; Soley, *Porter*, 352.

³ Mahan, *G. & I. W.*, 125.

⁴ Mahan, *G. & I. W.*, 126. See Map, p. 239.

Ellet burned it, and returned to Vicksburg on a captured steamer.

The Confederates repaired the *Queen*; and with her and another ram and a cotton-clad steamer, on the night of the 24th, attacked the "Indianola," encumbered with her barges, near Palmyra Island, and disabled her. She ran into the bank, and surrendered, and the Confederates regained control of the Mississippi from Vicksburg to Port Hudson.

Confederates capture them.

The Confederates¹ sent a working party at once to repair the *Indianola*. Two days later a report came that a Federal gunboat was approaching. The *Queen* fled down the river, and the officer on the *Indianola* blew her up. The object proved to be a dummy monitor, which Porter had set adrift to draw the fire of the batteries at Vicksburg.

When Farragut at New Orleans heard that the "Indianola" had been captured, he felt that it was time for him to act. "The first object to be accomplished," he said,² "is to cripple the Southern armies by cutting off their supplies from Texas. Texas at this time is, and must continue to the end of the war to be, their main dependence for beef cattle, sheep, and Indian corn. If we can get a few vessels above Port Hudson the thing will not be an entire failure, and I am pretty confident it can be done."

Farragut determined to act.

He appealed to Banks, representing the assistance which the squadron would derive in its efforts to pass the batteries, from a demonstration made by the army. In addition to the heavy guns, there were reported as many as thirty-five field-pieces, "which," says

¹ Mahan, *G. & I. W.*, 132.

² Mahan's *Farragut*, 208.

Mahan, "at the distance the fleet would have to pass, would be very effective. If the army made a serious diversion to the rear, many of these would be withdrawn, especially if Farragut's purpose to run by did not transpire."¹

On the 14th of January² Weitzel had called Banks's attention to the necessity³ of naval cooperation in the proposed campaign:

Berwick Bay leads into Grand Lake, Grand Lake into the Atchafalaya, the Atchafalaya into Red River. . . . All Weitzel re- communications from Vicksburg and Port Hud- commends son cross this line indicated by me. By taking Atchafalaya it in the manner I propose, Vicksburg and Port route. Hudson would be a cipher to the rebels. . . . The rebels, seeing the importance of this, are now fortifying Butte-à-la-Rose, a knoll surrounded by an almost inaccessible swamp on the Atchafalaya.

On the same day Halleck⁴ wrote to Banks:

It is probable that General Grant will order a new attack upon Vicksburg in about two weeks with large reinforcements. It is hoped that you may be able to co-operate, if not by sending him assistance direct to Vicksburg, at least by keeping a large force of the enemy employed at Port Hudson. The opening of the Mississippi River is the first and great object of military and naval operations at the Southwest, and every possible effort must be made to accomplish that object, to the neglect if need be of all minor considerations. It has been suggested that steam transports could be sent up from Berwick Bay to the Mississippi above Port Hudson, the gunboats run by the forts, and the troops at Baton Rouge cross the river, march by land, and take the transports for Vicksburg in the river above Port Hudson, and thus unite with Grant's forces.

¹ Mahan's *Farragut*, 211.

² 21 R., 657.

³ 21 R., 655.

⁴ 21 R., 656.

When the capture of the "Queen of the West" and the "Indianola" put the control of these waters into the hands of the Confederates, the plan proposed by Weitzel was no longer practicable.

At 4 P.M. on the 13th of March¹ the fleet left Baton Rouge, and at 8, anchored below Port Hudson. On the 7th, Banks with about 17,000 men moved to Baton Rouge. On this day, Grover's division advanced toward Port Hudson, and on the 14th opened communications with the fleet. On this day Emory's and Augur's divisions started, and halted a short distance south and east of Port Hudson. Banks's intention was to move his artillery with a protecting force upon the Ross Landing road, which terminated on the bank of the river on the line of the lower batteries. "This," he thought,² "would give us a flank fire. . . directly into the land and water fortifications." The reconnaissances in the afternoon however developed the fact³ that the Ross Landing road did not exist.

Advance
on Port
Hudson.

It had been understood [says Banks] that the passage of the fleet was to be made in the gray of the morning and not at night; but at 5 o'clock I received a dispatch from the admiral stating that he should commence his movement at 8 o'clock in the evening. It was impossible for me to construct bridges and repair the almost impassable roads for artillery in season to co-operate with the fleet by a concentrated artillery fire. I had just left the rear of the enemy's works in conclusion of the reconnaissances of the enemy, when the fleet and batteries opened their fire at 11.30 P.M.

At Port Hudson as at Vicksburg the Mississippi makes a sharp turn from northeast to south. The

¹ 21 R., 251. See Map XIII, Book II. ² 21 R., 252. ³ 21 R., 253.

current was running from three to five knots, while the greatest speed of the "Hartford," Farragut's flagship, was not over seven knots. The bluffs are about eighty or one hundred feet high.¹ There were nineteen heavy guns mounted there, of which the heaviest were eight and ten inch² smooth bores and eighty and fifty pounder rifles. Farragut³ had with him four large ships: the "Hartford," twenty-four guns; "Richmond" twenty-four guns; "Monongahela," ten guns; "Mississippi," a side-wheel steamer, seventeen guns; the "Essex," an ironclad gunboat; four other gunboats; and five mortar boats.

At 5 P.M., Farragut received a dispatch from Banks, that his forces were at the cross-roads ready to move upon the land side defences. He replied that he hoped to pass the batteries by midnight. A gunboat was lashed to the port side of each large ship except the side-wheeler, so that, if one of the large ships became disabled, its gunboat could tow it along and be protected by its bulwarks. The mortar fleet and its gunboats were to keep up a rapid fire from the time the first gun was heard until the vessels had passed out of range. The captains were to bear in mind that the object was to run the batteries with the least possible damage to the ships, and thereby secure an efficient force for future operations.⁴ "Should any vessel be disabled so that she will be unable to pass Port Hudson, she will use the gunboat to best advantage. If the captain thinks he can get by, try it; if he thinks not, let the gunboat drop her down below the range of the batteries. . . . But I

¹ Mahan, *G. & I. W.*, 134.

² Greene, *Miss.*, 215.

³ 21 R., 1027.

⁴ Farragut's *Farragut*, No. 316.

expect all to go by who are able; and I think the best protection against the enemy's fire is a well directed fire from our own guns." A little before 10 P.M. the signal was cautiously displayed.

Admiral Farragut's son Loyall, who was on board the flag-ship, says:

The pulsation¹ of the engine and the thump! thump! of the screw, sounded painfully distinct as we neared the batteries. . . . Suddenly a rocket darted up into the air, on the right bank of the river, followed quickly by another, and almost immediately came a sharp discharge from a battery in front. . . . As the action became general, the pyrotechnic display was magnificent. . . . The enemy started bonfires at different points to perfect their aim, and these added materially to the illumination and enhanced the grandeur of the scene.

Farragut
passes
Port
Hudson.

But the smoke from the guns hung round the ships; the pilots could not see ahead, at the bend of the river, the current² caught the "Hartford" on her port bow, sweeping her round with her head toward the batteries and nearly on shore, her stem touching the ground slightly; but by her own efforts and the assistance of the "Albatross" she was backed clear. Then, the "Albatross" backing and the "Hartford" going ahead "strong" with her engines, her head was fairly pointed up the stream, and she passed up without serious injury. The next ship, the "Richmond," struck by a shot on her safety-valve, was unmanageable and towed out of range by her gunboat. The "Monongahela" and "Kineo" came next. The "Kineo's" rudder was struck and disabled. In the dense smoke, the pilots lost their way; and both vessels ran aground on the spit

¹ Farragut's *Farragut*, 317.

² Mahan, *G. & I. W.*, 135.

opposite the town; but the "Kineo" backed off and pulled off the "Monongahela" and drifted downstream, while the "Monongahela" went on until her crank pin heated, and she drifted too. The "Mississippi" struck on the shoal at the river bend, and was abandoned and burned.

On the morning of the 15th, Farragut¹ tried in vain to exchange signals with Banks, and then went up the Mississippi with the "Hartford" and "Albatross." Banks crossed the point opposite Port Hudson with small detachments; but seeing no vessels above, returned on the 24th² to New Orleans.

With the "Hartford" and the "Albatross," Farragut could blockade the navigation of Red River, and cut off most of the supplies for Vicksburg and Port Hudson; but as he could not guard the whole stretch of the river between those points, he wrote to Porter, asking for an ironclad and two rams from his fleet. On the 20th³ of March, he came within a few miles of Vicksburg, and communicated with Grant, who sent him coal by setting a barge adrift in the river, which floated down at night, and was picked up by boats below.

Porter was absent on the Steele's Bayou expedition, but General Ellet sent down the "Lancaster" and the "Switzerland," two of his rams.⁴ They started before daylight, March 25th, but did not get past all the batteries until after sunrise. The "Lancaster," a very rotten boat, was totally destroyed. The "Switzerland" was injured, but floated down with the current. On the 27th of March, Farragut, with the "Hartford," "Albatross,"

Return to
mouth of
Red River.

¹ *G. & I. W.*, 139.

² Irwin, 83, 88.

³ Mahan's *Farragut*, 226.

⁴ 36 R., 476.

and "Switzerland," started down the river. From the 2d to the 30th of April,¹ he remained near the mouth of the Red River.

After Farragut had passed Port Hudson, Banks prepared to advance by the line of the Atchafalaya as before. Leaving Augur with 7900 men at Baton Rouge to watch Port Hudson, and T. W. Sherman with 9200 at New Orleans, he sent Emory with 6600 and Grover with 5300, to reinforce Weitzel, who had 4700 at Berwick Bay.² To oppose him and to watch McClernand, Taylor had about 6000 men, of whom 4000 or 5000 were confronting Weitzel.³

On the 28th of March, the Federal gunboat "Diana" was captured⁴ while reconnoitring Taylor's position on the Teche.⁵ This with the *Queen of the West* and the *Webb* which had been brought down the Atchafalaya gave Taylor three gunboats.

On the 9th of April, Weitzel and Emory crossed Berwick Bay, and on the 11th, advanced and drove in Taylor's pickets toward Bisland, masking the preparations which Grover was making, for a turning movement designed to intercept Taylor's retreat.

On the morning of the 12th, Grover started up Grand Lake. Banks advanced with Emory and Weitzel,⁶ and drove Taylor back to Bisland, where he had intrenched a line across the road and across Bayou Teche, on which the *Diana* was in position, to enfilade the approaching lines. On the 13th, Banks disabled her with his artillery fire, and during the night, having heard that Grover had landed above, gave orders to carry the works by assault at day-

¹ Mahan's *Farragut*, 229.

² 21 R., 711.

³ 21 R., 1043, 1042, 391.

⁴ Irwin, 88.

⁵ Taylor, 128.

⁶ 21 R., 296.

light, and then pursue the enemy promptly and vigorously.

Grover's instructions¹ were to land and march² on Franklin, to cut off *Taylor's* retreat, or to attack him

in the rear as circumstances might suggest.

Grover turns The flotilla, composed of four gunboats

Taylor's position. under Lieutenant-Commander Cooke, assisted the army transports in moving Grover,

besides standing ready to protect him with its guns.

At noon a gunboat got aground and four hours were lost in vain attempts to get her off. It was daylight on

the morning of the 13th when a practicable landing was found three or four miles above Irish Bend on the Teche.

Taylor,³ learning that a gunboat and several trans-

ports of the enemy had been seen in Grand Lake, sent

Reily with about 1200 men of all arms⁴ to oppose their landing, but only the cavalry and artillery arrived in

time to meet Grover, who, under cover of the gunboats,

completed his landing at 4 P.M. Grover had with

him as many men as *Taylor*, and if he had pushed on

boldly for about eight miles, he could have reached

Franklin and held the road over which *Taylor* must

retreat.⁵ But he stopped half-way, and bivouacked

in Irish Bend. *Reily* fell back with his whole command⁶

to a point a mile and a half below Franklin, leaving

Grover in possession of the road, if he chose to take it.

At midnight *Taylor* began his retreat, leaving a

rear-guard of mounted men to hold the works until

daybreak, and then joined *Reily's* command

Taylor escapes. and moved it to the lower end of Irish Bend,

where he took up a strong position across

Grover's road so narrow that Grover could make no

¹ 21 R., 297.

⁴ 21 R., 389.

² Irwin, 104.

⁵ Irwin, 108.

³ 21 R., 389.

⁶ 21 R., 391.

use of his superior numbers, and detained him until the rest of his own forces came up, pursued by Weitzel and Emory.

Taylor escaped to New Iberia, Opelousas, and Alexandria.¹ Many of his men, passing through their own country, deserted, and remained at their homes. Some of the Texans returned to Texas.² Banks³ reached Opelousas on the 20th. *Taylor* destroyed three of his gunboats. The flotilla under Cooke destroyed the other,⁴ and on the 20th, captured *Butte à la Rose*.

On the 9th of February, the command of *E. Kirby Smith*,⁵ embracing the Departments of West Louisiana and Texas, was extended to embrace the Trans-Mississippi Department, of which *Holmes* in Arkansas remained in command under *Smith*.

Situation in
Arkansas.

On the 6th of March, *Holmes* wrote to President Davis, that he thought it very doubtful whether he should be able to subsist his command until another crop was made on the Arkansas River, and that southern Missouri and the Indian country were in the same state of devastation. He must move somewhere. "The question is where to go."⁶

No military operations of any importance were

¹ 21 R., 393, 394.

² 8 M. H. S. M., 33.

³ 21 R., 298.

⁴ 21 R., 707; 21 R., 299.

⁵ 33 R., 772, 786, 787.

⁶ 33 R., 796; 33 R., 802. On the 18th, Secretary Seddon wrote to Kirby Smith:

"The army is stated to have dwindled, by desertion, sickness, and death . . . to some 15,000 or 18,000, who are disaffected and hopeless, and who are threatened with positive starvation. . . . The people are represented as in a state of consternation, multitudes suffering from want of subsistence, and yet exposed, from gangs of lawless marauders and deserters, to being plundered of the little they have."

undertaken in February, March, or April by the Confederates in Arkansas.¹

On the 14th of April,² *Kirby Smith*, hearing that *McClelland* had occupied Richmond, La., ordered *Walker's* division, some 6700 men, from Arkansas to be in readiness to meet him if necessary. *Walker* started on the 24th.³ There were present for duty in Arkansas on the 31st of March, 20,700 men, on the 30th of April, 19,100 men.⁴

In Missouri, *Curtis*, who commanded the department, was excessively radical in his treatment of Southern sympathizers, whereas *Schofield* was more politic. On the 10th of March, E. V. *Sumner* was sent to relieve *Curtis*, and early in April,⁵ *Schofield* was relieved, and sent to report to *Rosecrans* in Tennessee. *Sumner* died⁶ on the way to St. Louis, and on the 13th, *Schofield* was ordered to relieve *Curtis* in command of the Department of the Missouri.⁷ In February, 34,000 Federals were reported for duty in Missouri and Arkansas besides those attached to *Grant's* command, in March, 31,000, and in April, 27,000.

During the winter and spring, while *Grant's* army was penned up on the levees of the Mississippi, or digging its way through the bayous in its efforts to reach Vicksburg, *Rosecrans's* army was resting quietly in and around *Murfreesborough* waiting for cavalry supplies and dry roads.


Changes in
Missouri.

Situation in
Tennessee.

¹ After the middle of April, *Marmaduke* with about 5000 men, mostly mounted, made a raid (33 R., 285) into the southeastern part of Missouri as far as the Federal depot at Cape Girardeau, which he reached on the 25th; but finding it fortified and well defended, he was unable to capture it; and retreated to Arkansas closely pursued by the Federal cavalry. ² 33 R., 810, 828, 832; 21 R., 1041.

³ *Walker's Texas Division*, by a Private Soldier, p. 79.

⁴ 33 R., 810, 832. ⁵ 33 R., 204. ⁶ 3 B. and L., 454. ⁷ 33 R., 277.



CENTRAL TENNESSEE

THE STORY OF THE CIVIL WAR IN THE SOUTHWEST

K E N T U C K Y

G E O R G I A

A L A B A M A

M O S S I S S I P P I

L O U I S I A N A

We left the Confederate cavalry under *Wheeler* at Fort Donelson where on the 3d of February it was repulsed from its attack on the garrison, just as Granger's troops were coming up to reinforce Rosecrans.

After a vain attempt to intercept *Wheeler's* retreat, Rosecrans's troops, 81,800 in number, were disposed as follows: At and around Murfreesborough, 47,500; at Nashville, 6500; at Triune and La Vergne, 6700; at Gallatin, 2700; at Clarkesville, 2200; at Franklin, 2600; at Carthage, 3000; in Cavalry division, 5000; Engineers, etc., 1900; in the forts, 2300.

Opposed to him *Bragg* had 48,800, viz.: At and around Shelbyville, 21,800; at Bridgeport, 800; at Tullahoma, 12,900; *Wheeler's* Cav. at McMinnville, etc., 6500; with *Van Dorn* at Columbia, etc., 6800.

Early in March,¹ Rosecrans sent out three expeditions to cooperate, and to learn the strength and position of the enemy. One on the 3d, from Franklin toward Rally Hill and Columbia, consisting of 2200 infantry and 600 cavalry and a battery of artillery under command of Colonel Colburn; one on the 4th,² from Murfreesborough towards Rover,³ consisting of Sheridan's division of about 4500 infantry, and Minty's cavalry of about 900 men⁴; and one from Triune toward Chapel Hill, consisting of Steedman with his division of 6700 infantry.

At about the same time, *Van Dorn*, who was guarding the left wing of *Bragg's* army with about 6800 cavalry, was also making a reconnaissance, and on the 4th, his advance met Coburn about four miles south of Franklin and was driven back. *Van Dorn* took up a strong position⁵ on a woody ridge crossing the road a

¹ 34 R., 73; ¹ Van Horne, 290. See Map, p. 257. ² ¹ Sheridan, 256.

³ 34 R., 127.

⁴ 34 R., 129.

⁵ 34 R., 87.

short distance south of Thompson's station.¹ Coburn, instead of feeling his way cautiously, advanced to within 200 yards before realizing the enemy's strength, so that all his force became involved in a hot fight and 1400 were taken prisoners.

The other expeditions were more successful. On the 4th, the enemy were² surprised and routed by Minty at Rover and Unionville, and by Steedman at Chapel Hill.

On the 5th of March,³ Granger, hearing of Coburn's disaster, and resolved to "strike a blow back," went by rail from Nashville to Franklin, where he met Sheridan and Minty; and then advanced, and drove *Van Dorn* back to Columbia.⁴ On the 6th, R. W. Johnson with two brigades from Murfreesborough⁵ drove the Confederates from Middleton.

On the 18th of March, Colonel Hall was sent from Murfreesborough with a brigade of about 1500 men⁶

Minor Operations to April. to make a reconnoissance toward the north-east where *Morgan's* cavalry was operating. At Statesville on the 19th, he met some

Confederate cavalry, and being satisfied that a large force was massed in the vicinity, fell back the next morning to "a fine position near Milton." There he was overtaken and surrounded by *Morgan* with about 2500 cavalry, who were repulsed in every assault, and only left the field after a three hours' fight. On the 25th of March, *Forrest* captured a blockhouse at Brentwood, and took several hundred prisoners.⁷

On the 3d of April, Stanley with two brigades of cavalry supported by infantry⁸ attacked *Morgan's* cavalry near Liberty, and drove it back.

¹ 34 R., 116.² 34 R., 127.³ 35 R., 109.⁴ 34 R., 142-144.⁵ 34 R., 136.⁶ 34 R., 152.⁷ 34 R., 176-194.⁸ 34 R., 207.

In April, while Hurlbut was sending out expeditions from Memphis, Grand Junction, and Corinth, to create a diversion in favor of Grant, who, as we shall see, was to cross the Mississippi River; Rosecrans sent one, under Colonel Streight, consisting of about 1700 men to be mounted on horses or mules, to cut¹ the Georgia Railroad south of Dalton so as to impede the forwarding of ammunition and supplies to *Bragg's* army, and to destroy manufactories and depots of supply. On the 19th, Streight joined Dodge, who came to his support from Corinth, and followed him as far as Tuscumbia. Three hundred of Streight's men were on foot, but by the 29th, he had collected animals enough to mount them. He was then at Day's Gap between Moulton and Bluntsville. The next morning he was overtaken by *Forrest*,² who attacked him, but was driven back in disorder. Streight moved on through Bluntsville to Gadsden on the Coosa River closely pursued by *Forrest*, who was repeatedly ambushed and repulsed. But Streight's men and animals were worn out, and many fell behind and were captured. At fifteen miles beyond Gadsden he was obliged to halt. There he learned that most of his ammunition was worthless on account of having been wet in fording the streams. From this point³ he sent out a detachment, and destroyed the Round Mountain Iron Works, one of the principal factories of munitions of war in the South. On the 3d of May, he was surrounded, and he surrendered his men and animals to *Forrest*. This expedition proved that something more than untrained mounted men was required to make good cavalry.

¹ 34 R., 281. See Map I at end.

² 34 R., 288.

³ Cist, *Army of the Cumberland*, 146.

Early in April, *Van Dorn*¹ with about 7000 cavalry attacked Granger at Franklin, but was driven back.

On the 20th² J. F. Reynolds with about 7000 men made an expedition to McMinnville, where he surprised and almost captured *Morgan*, destroyed the supplies he had collected there, and some bridges and trestle work on the railroad from McMinnville to Manchester.

All through the winter and spring Rosecrans kept telegraphing for cavalry, for horses to mount them, and

Rosecrans
wants
cavalry. for arms and saddles to equip them.³ On the 20th of April⁴ Stanton replied that the Government was doing all in its power to supply them, and that it was not necessary

to remind it every hour of its duty. Rosecrans was authorized to mount his infantry under the contract system of purchase; but the quartermaster could not get horses as fast as they were required.

By the 22d of March, when Grant received the reports from Porter and Sherman,⁵ and saw that there was

Grant de-
cides to try
Lake Provi-
dence. "little prospect of success for either the Yazoo Pass or the Steeles Bayou expedition," he gave orders for collecting his troops to attack Haynes's Bluff; but the

next day, believing that the Lake Providence route was a success, he decided to try it. He asked⁶ Farragut when he returned down the river, to inform Banks that he was making a passage from the Mississippi at Lake Providence by way of Bayou Macon to the Red River, that he had sent for steamers to navigate it, and that if they should arrive, and Porter should get the boats out of the Yazoo, he could send a force of say 20,000 effective men, to cooperate with Banks

¹ 34 R., 222.² 34 R., 267.³ 35 R., 33, 232, 245, 247.⁴ 35 R., 255.⁵ 38 R., 127.⁶ 38 R., 131.

on Port Hudson. This they could easily reduce, and come up the river, and maintain a position on high land near enough to Vicksburg until they could be reinforced from the west side of the river. He explained the plan to Porter, and asked him if it would not be advisable to get out all the forces from the Yazoo Basin to use them for this purpose.¹

A day or two after, Grant decided to try the route by Roundaway Bayou. On the 28th of March,² the troops which had gone down through Yazoo Pass were ordered back.

On the 29th, Grant notified Porter that he was about to occupy New Carthage with troops, and to open the bayous from Millikens Bend to that place for the passage of flats. He could then run the batteries with steamers enough to land troops with the aid of flats either at Grand Gulf or Warrenton. He suggested the importance of putting one or two gunboats below Vicksburg to cut off the enemy's intercourse with the west bank of the river, and to insure landing troops on the east bank. Without the aid of gunboats, he said, it would hardly be worth while to send troops to New Carthage, or to open the passage. To this, Porter at once replied that he was ready to cooperate in the matter of landing troops on the other side, but that if he did send vessels below, they would be the best he had, and that there would be nothing left to attack Haynes's Bluff, in case it should be deemed necessary to try it. Porter says that the Confederates had strengthened their left flank as far down the river as Grand Gulf, thinking perhaps that gunboats might pass the batteries at Vicksburg, pass up the Black River, and gain the rear of the besieged city by arriving at Jackson,

**Decides on
Roundaway
Bayou route**

¹ 38 R., 132.

² 38 R., 151.

“a thing,” says Porter, “much more easily done than getting through Steele’s Bayou.”¹ Grant and Porter both thought that if such frail boats as the “Queen of the West” and the “Switzerland” could pass in open day-light,² there was no reason why the transports could not pass at night under the lee of the ironclads.

On the 1st of April,³ Grant made a reconnaissance of Haynes’s Bluff, and found that an attack would be attended with great loss of life, if not with defeat. He so reported to Halleck⁴ and said that there was a system of bayous navigable for barges and small steamers passing around by Richmond to New Carthage; that the dredges were then engaged in cutting a canal from Millikens Bend into these bayous. His expectation was for a portion of the naval fleet to run the batteries of Vicksburg whilst the army moved by this new route. Once there, he would probably move either to Warrenton or to Grand Gulf, where there were good roads to Jackson and the Black River Bridge. This he said was the only move he then saw as practicable, and he hoped it would meet with Halleck’s approval. He renewed his request⁵ to Porter to prepare for running the “blockade” at as early a day as possible.

At Grant’s request, Porter sent Ellet’s marine brigade up the Tennessee to cooperate with Dodge.⁶

On the 10th of April, Grant received a letter from Halleck,⁷ advising that his forces and those of Banks should be brought into cooperation as early as possible.⁸ Grant then sent word to Banks that he was concentrating his forces at Grand Gulf, and would send an army corps to Bayou Sara to cooperate with him on Port Hudson.

**Reports plan
to Halleck.**

**Grant to
cooperate
with Banks.**

¹ Porter, *N. H.*, 308. ² Porter, *Nav. His.*, 309. ³ 38 R., 168.
⁴ 36 R., 24, 26. ⁵ 38 R., 168. ⁶ 38 R., 172. ⁷ 36 R., 25, 73. ⁸ 38 R., 192.

Meanwhile on the 31st of March, McClernand began to move his troops.¹ On April 4th, he arrived at Smith's plantation near New Carthage, where he found that there was a break in the main levee. The water in the bayou there, for several hundred yards, was only two or three feet deep. The roads were overflowed, and McClernand had to cross his men in boats which he collected or built for the purpose. **McClernand moves down.**

On the 12th,² Grant ordered him to get possession of Grand Gulf at the earliest practicable moment, to concentrate his corps there, and, as soon as transportation could be got through for them, to move down the river to Bayou Sara to operate with Banks against Port Hudson.

Porter decided to pass the batteries on the night of the 16th. The transports were protected, under Porter's direction, with hay, grain, and cotton. The weak points on the sides of the ironclads were protected by logs. Each vessel had a coal barge, or an unarmored vessel, lashed to it on the side away from the enemy. The ships mounted seventy-nine guns, from eleven-inch down,³ the batteries on shore thirty-one pieces of heavy artillery,⁴ while thirteen pieces of light artillery were placed in position to prevent a landing. The fleet started at 10 P.M., the flagship "Benton" leading, the others following at distances of fifty yards.⁵ The vessels were to drift down with the current, and only use their engines to keep in position. As they passed

Porter passes Vicksburg.

¹ 36 R., 139, 140.

² 38 R., 188.

³ Mahan, *G. & I. W.*, 155.

⁴ 14 rifled guns, from 7.44-inch to 18-pounder; 16 smooth bore, from 10-inch to 32-pounder; and one ten-inch mortar (37 R., 336).

⁵ Porter, *Nav. His.*, 310. See Map XII at end of Book II.

the first battery, the Confederates set fire to some buildings on the west shore of the river, lighted tar barrels on the east shore, and opened fire from their batteries and rifle-pits, to which the vessels replied, coming as close to them as possible. The fleet was moving so slowly that most of the vessels, when they¹ struck the eddy, made a turn, and one made two turns, under the enemy's fire. One of the transports was sunk, and another was disabled, but taken in tow by one of the ironclads and saved. Although the squadron was under fire two hours and a half, the vessels were struck in the hull but sixty-eight times by shot and shells, and were not seriously injured. At 2.30 A.M., the fleet was safely anchored at New Carthage.

Several gunboats² had been left at the mouth of the Yazoo to take care of the upper Mississippi, and to look out for the rams that were building at Yazoo City.

On the 17th, Grant went to New Carthage, and met Porter and the fleet. Finding that it would take too long to move the army to New Carthage in small boats,³ he decided to repair a road leading around Bayou Vidal to Perkins's plantation about twelve miles below, by building bridges over some bayous that it crossed. He then returned to Millikens, and on the 20th, gave the final order for the movement of his troops.

On the 13th, the water had been let into the new canal; on the 20th, two small steamers with barges passed through; and, after a few days, they reached New Carthage.⁴ Four dredges were kept at work day and night deepening the

**New canal
opened.**

¹ Mahan, *G. & I. W.*, 157. ² Porter, *Nav. His.*, 312. ³ Grant, 466.

⁴ 36 R., 125. Inasmuch as troops were marching down by the road at the time these vessels passed through the canal, it follows that if the work had been started earlier, when the water was higher, the canal could have been made deep enough to float heavier craft.

channel. Soon after, the water began to fall, but the roads were then practicable for infantry and artillery.

On the night of the 22d,¹ Grant sent six more transports, protected as before, down past the batteries, taking in tow twelve barges loaded with forage and rations. Five transports and six barges reached New Carthage.

On the 24th, Grant and Porter, on a gunboat, made a reconnoissance of Grand Gulf; and Wilson found that the eastern bank was flooded² from Warrenton to Grand Gulf, and could only be crossed by a narrow road enfiladed by a hostile battery. **Grant moves to Hard Times.** It was therefore decided to make a combined attack on Grand Gulf. The plan was³ that the Navy should silence the heavy guns of the enemy, and the troops be landed under the cover of the gunboats, and carry the place by storm.

McClermand's⁴ corps was assembled at Perkins's on the 28th, and moved in two trips by steamers and barges, to Hard Times, about fifteen miles below, and nearly opposite Grand Gulf. On the evening of the 28th, McPherson with the third division of his corps arrived at Perkins's plantation⁵; and, on the 29th, marched overland around Lake St. Joseph to Hard Times.

About 10,000 of McClermand's corps, as many as the transports would carry, were embarked, and moved down to a point near Grand Gulf on the 29th. At 8 A.M., Porter commenced the attack. **Porter attacks Grand Gulf.** Five ironclads fired on the lower battery, and two, on the upper. After three hours, the fire from the lower battery ceased.⁶ The

¹ 36 R., 47.² 36 R., 126.³ 36 R., 48.⁴ 36 R., 142.⁵ 36 R., 634.⁶ Porter. *N. H.*, 314.

ironclads at the upper battery suffered heavily. Then, all concentrated their fire on this battery with good effect.

By 1 P.M., after a fierce fight, Grant and Porter were convinced that the fortifications¹ were too strong to be taken from the water side. The batteries
Grant marches around. were so high that the gunners could fall back under heavy fire and return to their guns when the transports came up to land the troops. The whole range of hills was lined with rifle-pits. Grant, therefore, decided to land the troops at Hard Times, and send the empty transports past the batteries by night. This was successfully done under cover of the fleet, which got under way at 8 P.M.² and engaged the batteries as the transports passed. The troops marched across the point opposite Grand Gulf to De Schroon's.³

To divert *Pemberton's* attention from the true point of attack, and to deprive him of one of his chief sources of supply, Steele's division of Sherman's
Steele's diversion. corps went up the river to Greenville, about the first of April; and then followed down⁴ Deer Creek nearly to Rolling Fork, destroyed large stores of provisions; and on the 10th, returned to Greenville.

At about the same time, Hurlbut⁵ sent a cavalry expedition to make a dash through the length of Mississippi, cutting the Southern Mississippi
Hurlbut's diversions. Railroad; and covered its advance by a system of movements along his entire front from Memphis to Corinth.⁶

¹ 36 R., 48.² Mahan, *G. & I. W.* 162.³ 36 R., 142.⁴ 36 R., 501, 29, 71; 38 R., 158, 173.⁵ 36 R., 520.

⁶ In connection with a similar movement of 1800 cavalry, which, as we have seen Rosecrans was sending from Tusculumbia to Alabama and Georgia. On the 17th of April, Dodge (38 R., 202) moved out from

On the 17th,¹ Grierson left La Grange with 1800 cavalry, and moved south, sending out detachments to the right and left which diverted the enemy's attention, and broke up a long stretch of the Mobile & Ohio Railroad. Grierson's
raid.

With the rest of his command, about 1000 men, he kept on to the south, and, on the 24th, destroyed the Southern Mississippi Railroad at Newton, and captured trains loaded with military supplies. Hearing that large forces of the enemy had been sent out to intercept his return, he moved on to the south,² and tried to get in touch with Grant at Grand Gulf.³ Failing in that he marched for Baton Rouge, and driving off or eluding the parties sent out to intercept him, arrived there on the 2nd of May, and reported for duty to Banks. He had marched over 600 miles in less than sixteen days, killed and wounded about 100 of the enemy, captured 500 men and 1000 horses and mules, destroyed 50 or 60 miles of railroad and telegraph, breaking *Pemberton's* communications and, as it was reported to Grant,⁴ had knocked the heart out of the State.

Corinth with 5000 men to Bear Creek, to support Streight. W. Sooy Smith with 1500, from La Grange via Holly Springs to Coldwater, to attack Chalmers in flank and rear, and on the 18th, Bryant, with about 1500 from Memphis, to attack him in front.

¹ 36 R., 522.

² Resting a while near Montrose on the 25th and hearing that a fight was expected at Grand Gulf, he then turned west, and destroyed the New Orleans & Jackson Railroad and some Confederate ordnance and provisions as he passed.

³ On the 29th near Union Church he came upon Wirt Adams, who had been sent out with cavalry and artillery to intercept him, made a feint to the west, and then moved southeast to Brookhaven, and turned south, following the railroad as far as Summit.

⁴ 36 R., 34.

Grierson's movements confused *Pemberton* as to the point of attack, and led him to divide his forces. To complete his distraction, while McPherson and Breeze's was moving from Millikens to New Carthage, Sherman¹ with Blair's division of his corps, and Captain Breeze with two iron-clads and several small vessels, made a demonstration against Haynes's Bluff, moving up the Yazoo on the 29th, and on the next morning engaging the enemy's batteries in a fierce fight for four hours. Towards evening, Sherman disembarked his troops, and Breeze renewed the fight and kept it up until dark, when the troops re-embarked. The next day the demonstration was repeated.

Early in April, *Pemberton* sent *Moore's* brigade from Fort Pemberton to Vicksburg, and, as Banks had withdrawn from Baton Rouge, sent *Buford's* and *Rust's* brigades from Port Hudson to Jackson.² On the 7th³ of April, *Pemberton* received an order from *Johnston* to send reinforcements to *Bragg* in Tennessee if existing circumstances would admit of it. *Pemberton* saw *Ellet's* marine brigade and several transports going up the Mississippi⁴ and thought that *Grant*⁵ had given up his designs on Vicksburg, and was sending reinforcements to *Rosecrans*. Accordingly, on the 13th, he ordered *Tilghman's* brigade from Grenada, and *Rust's* and *Buford's* brigades to Tullahoma. *Rust* was soon relieved,⁶ and his brigade was divided between *Tilghman* and *Buford*.

On the 17th, when *Porter* had run the batteries, *Pemberton* was alarmed. *Buford* had started, but

¹ 36 R., 576 ff.² 38 R., 720; 36, R., 250.³ 38 R., 714.⁴ 36 R., 251.⁵ 38 R., 719.⁶ 38 R., 746.

Pemberton telegraphed to *Johnston*,¹ who then ordered them all back. Some of *Buford's* men had already reached Chattanooga; *Tilghman* was halted near Jackson. *Pemberton* reinforced *Bowen* at Grand Gulf with *Green's* brigade except two regiments² from Big Black Bridge, and 800³ men from Jackson; and directed him⁴ to call in three regiments which he had sent across the Mississippi to retard *McClelland's* advance. On the 20th, he ordered *Stevenson*⁵ at Vicksburg to hold 5000 men in readiness to march to Warrenton, or Grand Gulf; but told *Bowen* not to make requisition for them unless absolutely necessary for the safety of his position. *Tracy's* brigade from Vicksburg reached Grand Gulf on the 30th, and *Baldwin's* brigade crossed the Big Black at Hankinson's Ferry on the same day. On the 29th, *Tilghman* moved with two regiments to Big Black Bridge.

Pemberton
alarmed.

By these weak and dilatory measures *Pemberton* failed to meet Grant in force when he arrived. On the 28th,⁶ he telegraphed to *Johnston* that the enemy were in force at Hard Times with barges and transports indicating a purpose to attack Grand Gulf with a view to Vicksburg; but he took no serious measures to oppose their landing. He said: "It was indispensable to maintain a sufficient force to hold a line of over twenty miles, from Snyder's Mill, [near Haynes's Bluff] to Warrenton," that the force at Hard Times and afloat on transports threatened Warrenton, as well as Grand Gulf; and that it would have been unwise for him to concentrate his whole force south and east of the Big Black to support *Bowen*.

Comment.

¹ 38 R., 751, 753, 760, 761. ² 38 R., 753, 761. ³ 38 R., 753, 761.

⁴ 36 R., 251, 252. ⁵ 38 R., 772. ⁶ 36 R., 328, 329; 38 R., 797.

This is true; but as *Pemberton* himself suggests, "an army large enough to defend itself on this side of the river would consume some time in crossing"; so that, without endangering Haynes's Bluff, he might have placed a strong force where it could move to either Warrenton or Grand Gulf before Grant could land troops enough to oppose it, and so have forced Grant to land at a point lower down the river, or otherwise have delayed his advance until his own reinforcements could come up. If either Grant or Sherman moved far from the fleet before a large force had landed, *Pemberton* would have a chance to defeat him. He did not appreciate the value of agility in military operations, especially in the defence of a river.

Early on the morning of the 30th of April, Grant crossed McClernand's corps and two brigades of McPherson's to Bruinsburg. After repeated failures for which he was not wholly responsible, he had secured a foothold on the east bank of the Mississippi. "When this was effected," he says,¹ "I felt a degree of relief scarcely ever equalled since. Vicksburg was not taken it is true nor were its defenders demoralized by any of our previous moves. I was now in the enemy's country, with a vast river and the stronghold of Vicksburg between me and my base of supplies. But I was on dry ground on the same side of the river as the enemy. All the campaigns, labors, hardships, and exposures from the month of December previous to this time that had been made and endured, were for the accomplishment of this one object."

Grant
crosses the
Mississippi.

¹ Grant, 480.

