

ARE WE BOUND BY OUR TREATIES ?

A PLEA

FOR THE

PRINCES OF INDIA.

BY

JOHN SULLIVAN, ESQ.

"I would sacrifice Gwalior, or every frontier of India ten times over, in order to preserve our character for scrupulous good faith."

Duke of Wellington's Dispatches, p. 167.

LONDON:

EFFINGHAM WILSON, CORNHILL.

1853.

A PLEA FOR THE PRINCES OF INDIA.

IT was in the indignant language which I have taken for a motto, that our illustrious Duke rebuked his noble brother when he found that he was disposed to tamper with the public faith. He was the same in the early as in the latter part of his career—an inflexible adherent to principle. He set his face as a flint against all attempts that were made to lure him from the plain path of rectitude. When he had still fame and fortune to win, he laboured with as much anxiety to ward off that war with the Mahrattas, in which he laid the foundation of his greatness, as if he had already attained to both. He insisted upon it, that the treaty, which he had concluded with the Mahratta powers, should be construed in the sense in which he knew that they had understood it. The very hint of an intention to violate a public engagement threw him off his equilibrium—"I am disgusted beyond measure," he says, "with the whole concern; and I would give a large sum to have nothing to do with the treaties of peace, and if I could now get rid of

“all anxiety on the subject. All parties were de-
 “lighted with the peace, but the demon of ambition
 “appears now to have pervaded all; and each
 “endeavours by framing constructions, to gain as
 “much as he can—I declare that I am dispirited
 “and disgusted with this transaction, beyond mea-
 “sure.”* He acted, indeed, upon the homely
 maxim, that “honesty is the best policy.” “What,”
 he said again, “brought me successfully through
 “the last campaign—but strict adherence to Bri-
 “tish good faith—and what success could I hope
 “for in any future operations if I were to tarnish
 “that faith.”

This great man, “though dead yet speaketh”—and it is for the British public and the British Parliament now to determine whether that voice, which spurned the acquisition of even a single inch of ground by twisting the meaning of a treaty—shall be heard, or whether we shall follow the inspirations of those who are seeking to acquire principalities by trampling upon treaties by wholesale. A decree has gone forth from the Government of India, to confiscate for our own benefit, as opportunities may offer, the territories of the Princes of India who are allied to us by solemn treaties, and we are at this moment employed in copying the blackest page in Louis Napoleon’s black book. His plea for confiscating the property of the

* Selections from Dispatches, p. 159—161.

Orleans family was, that they held it in defiance of the fundamental laws of the French monarchy; our plea is our power; and as he tempted the Army and the Church to acquiesce in his spoliations, by promising them a share of the plunder; so an appeal is made to our cupidity, by asserting, that if we seize upon the territories and revenues of our allies, we shall be the richest power that has ever existed in India, and our subjects, the lightest taxed. We have now only one-half of the revenues, it is said, and we are in debt and difficulties, let us take the remainder, and we shall have an overflowing treasury.

Our case is this. When, early in the eighteenth century, the Mughul Empire was broken up, there was a general rush made at the fragments; each Provincial Governor seized upon his province, and made it a kingdom—so that when we first appeared upon the political stage, we found that Empire already divided into several large independent states,* with a multitude of inferior states, more or less dependent upon them, and all recognizing the Emperor of Delhi as their nominal head. The battle of Plassy, and the subsequent grant of the Dewany of Bengal, by Shah Aulum, gave us a place amongst those sovereigns; and the successful results of our various contests with them conferred

* 1. The Nizam; 2. The Mahratta Confederacy; 3. Mysore; 4. Oude; 5. Bengal; 6. the Rajpoot States.

upon us all the rights of conquerors. We availed ourselves of those rights, we dictated our terms to the vanquished, we took such portions of their territory as suited us, leaving them the remainder; we then entered into fresh relations with them, treating with them upon a footing of perfect equality—as independent Sovereign States—and those treaties embraced their heirs and successors. In this way we dealt with those who had been our enemies—but there is a mass of Princes and Chiefs who have always been our friends, and to them we are bound by treaties of perpetual amity and protection.

Up to a comparatively late period those treaties were scrupulously observed; we ~~recognised~~ their heirs—whether heirs natural, heirs adopted, or heirs collateral; and in the failure of heirs, we professed ourselves ready to recognize those who might be called to the Sovereignty by the general voice of the people, upon the avowed principle, that it was inconsistent with the general policy of the British Government to interfere with the internal administration of the states in alliance with it. It was in 1841 that we first put in a claim to determine whether the territory of Holkar; whose ancestor had raised himself to the status of a Sovereign Prince before we had attained to that rank in Hindostan—and whom we had recognized as such by several treaties—would escheat to the British Government, from failure of heirs natural, or

whether those who claimed to be heirs, *adoptive or collateral*, should be recognized as heirs.

The manifestation of a strong feeling on the part of the people on behalf of their national sovereignty, and some misunderstanding on the part of the diplomatic agent employed in the negotiations, baffled us in our attempt to introduce what was designated as an "important line of policy"—the principal feature of which was the reduction, under the threat of forfeiture, of the state of Holkar from the rank of independent sovereignty into that of vassalage, with a view to our eventual succession to the domain. The right of the nearest of blood to succeed was admitted, and he still enjoys his inheritance.

But the smaller principalities of Colaba, Mundaveo, and Sattara, were not so fortunate; the new "line of policy" was followed with respect to them. Upon a failure of heirs of the body, we incorporated them with our territory as escheats to the "Lord Paramount," and in pursuance of the same policy, and by virtue of the same pretensions, we have commenced upon an extirpation of a race of Princes, who have had root in the soil of Hindostan for more than 1800 years—the Princes of a people (the Rajpoots) whose heroic achievements in defence of their fatherland have never been exceeded—a people who struggled successfully for

their independence for 500 years—who were reduced to a dependence, rather nominal than real, under the early Moghul Emperors—who were the main instruments in raising that Empire to its greatness—whose possessions have been preserved to them by all the dynasties that have preceded ours, and the integrity of whose possessions we have guaranteed by the most solemn treaties. Our pretensions, however, by no means stop here; we claim the right of seizing upon any state that may have been founded upon conquest, provided that we have the might to do so. We have, it is said, the better title, if we have only the “stronger sword.” The Ameers of Scinde “had no other right to their territory than that of the sword, and we having the better sword, were perfectly justified in appropriating it if we chose, without reference to our particular quarrel with them.”*

As Lords Paramount of Hindostan, we claim then a reversionary right to all the territory within the Indus, and we shall be perfectly justified, it is

* “Now the Beloochee Chiefs had no other right to the territory than that of the sword, and we having the better sword, were perfectly justified in taking it from them, if we chose, without reference to the particular quarrel between Sir Charles (Napier) and the Chiefs: we have seen how, and with what obligations, we acquired our present territory; and have also noted, the origin of the Native States, and judge how far they have any right better than that of those *who may conquer and succeed them.*”—Campbell's Modern India, pp. 138—148.

said, in taking all the countries between the Yellow Sea and the Black Sea from their original conquerors, provided we are able to do so. And yet, seriously putting forth these pretensions, we reproach the Americans with their razzia upon Mexico, the Russians with their aggressions upon Circassia, and the French with their conquest of Algeria!

Is it politic in the present state of the world to put this "*tu quoque*" into the mouth of those powers, and to give them a warrant for taxing us not only with inordinate ambition, but with a wholesale breach of treaties, for they know, though we may choose to forget it, that, (for example,) we had solemnly bound ourselves by treaty not even to covet an inch of the dominions of those Ameers of Scinde, which it is now contended—we had a right at any time to take from them by virtue of our superior strength. Is it not time, then, to ask "Are we bound by our treaties?"

It is in the first instance by ignoring those treaties, and all the acts done for a series of years under these treaties—then by confounding Sovereign States, with their vassals—Suzerains, with their feudatories, in a common mass, that we assume a title to deal at our pleasure with the possessions of the Princes in alliance with us, as Lords Paramount of Hindostan. We claim to have succeeded to all the prerogatives of the Mogul Emperors; but we forget, in the first place, that those Emperors reduced the princes whom they conquered, from sovereignty

to vassalage—that they recognized no sovereignty but their own—that the vanquished Rajpoot Princes, for example, made a surrender of their kingdoms to the Emperor, receiving them back with a grant upon each lapse, thereby acknowledging him as their Lord Paramount; and we forget that we have stripped ourselves of all such arbitrary prerogatives by treaties, in which we have strictly, and minutely defined and limited our own rights, and the rights of those with whom we have treated—that we have formally recognized, and treated with these Princes as independent Sovereigns—have formally by the same treaties, disclaimed all right to interfere with their territories, and have pledged ourselves to defend them from all enemies. But, in the face of those treaties, we now claim a right of appropriating the territories so guaranteed, to our own use, whenever we may determine, that the Sovereign Princes our allies, have died without heirs.

When a question of this kind, or any question relating to India, is proposed for our consideration, it behoves us to examine it under a fivefold aspect.

Firstly, Is it just?

Secondly, Will it improve the character of the people? or will it deteriorate that character?

Thirdly, Will it conciliate their affections? or will it alienate them?

Fourthly, Will it consolidate our power, or will it weaken it?

Fifthly, Will it enrich, or will it impoverish us?

Now, if strong presumptive proof can be adduced

that the confiscation of the Native States will add to, rather than diminish our burdens, there is hope, that upon purely financial considerations, we may be induced not to violate the national faith, by laying violent hands on the possessions of those whom we are solemnly pledged to protect and to uphold.

Is there then any real ground for believing that we should be richer if we possessed all the territory and all the revenues of India, than we are now, with one-half of it? We have, within the last ten years, extinguished three Native States, viz: : Scinde, Lahore, and Sattara—and our financial account stands with them thus :

	Rupees
Estimated Surplus of the Punjab	14,00,000
Deficiency in Scinde	<u>20,00,000</u>
Ditto, Sattara	<u>3,00,000</u>
Net loss by acquisition	9,00,000*

But this by no means tells the whole story. The Rajah of Lahore was by treaty bound to pay us a tribute of twenty lacs per annum ; and the Amcerra of Scinde a tribute of three lacs—so that instead of receiving twenty-three lacs, net revenue; from those states, we are actually paying nine lacs for their support, exclusive of the military charges,

* See Appendix to Commons' Report, p. 467.

which, on Scinde alone, are estimated at twenty lacs.*

It may be argued, that whether for profit or loss, we had no alternative but to take Scinde and the Punjab, and that for the security of our empire we must bear whatever burden they bring upon us,—but no such reason could be assigned for seizing upon Sattara, or can be assigned for the seizure of the principalities, which remain in possession of their owners. Revenue was the main object of our appropriation of Sattara—and Sattara already entails a charge upon the general revenues of India. † We certainly were not prepared to find that the “annexation of Sattara would entail a charge upon the general revenues of India”—say, the authorities. ‡ We have been chanting the same dirge for nearly a century—great expectations from every acquisition of territory, and corresponding disappointment—all proceeding from the same cause—viz. that our charges invariably grow faster than our receipts; and the same cause is in sensible operation in the Punjab at this moment—for while it is estimated that there will be an increase of revenue of fourteen lacs of rupees, there is an estimated increase of charge of thirty-eight lacs. † Lord.

* See Appendix to Commons' Report, p. 468. † Ibid.

‡ Punjab	1849-50	1851-52, Estimated
Revenue . . .	1,16,08,950	1,30,05,000
Charges . . .	44,02,559	96,22,000
Net excess of Charge		38,14,441

Hardinge was deterred from annexing the Punjab after its first conquest, from an apprehension that it would not pay. If we were to trust to popular books, we should say, that his Lordship's fears were vain indeed, for we are assured in them, that "our "new acquisitions" show a surplus of £1,190,633,* but unfortunately, we must fall back for authentic information upon the official accounts. They reveal to us a considerable and a growing deficiency, and books and accounts join in telling us the same story—viz. "that whereas the whole expenses in "India, exclusive of the debt, were formerly 66 per "cent—they are now 76 per cent on the revenues."†

It is pretty clear, therefore, that we shall not be the ~~riches~~ for robbing our helpless allies of their possessions; and if the opinions of the Duke, and of those who were associated with him in the public service in India, Munro, Elphinstone, and Malcolm are to be trusted, their extinction will gradually undermine our strength.‡ Will it ameliorate the condition of the people, conciliate their affections, or improve their character? If England was to be conquered by Russia to-morrow, if the estates of all its proprietors were to be confiscated, if stipendiary agents were to be placed in charge of them, if the rents were to be remitted to the public treasury, if all offices, civil and military, were filled with Russians,

* Campbell's Modern India, p. 439.

† Ibid.

‡ See Appendix A.

and no Englishman allowed to hold any post higher than that of judge of a county court, would such a revolution better us materially or morally? would it rivet us in attachment to our conquerors? *“Mutato nomine;”* this is precisely the process that is followed when we confiscate a native state. The representative of the ancient proprietor is provided for by a pension, which is sometimes permanent, at others temporary, all who belonged to him, or who were dependent upon him, are suddenly reduced to beggary; and a large portion of the rents and revenues which went to support the ancient aristocracy of the country are transferred to the pockets of our own countrymen.

It is only by trampling upon the chartered, as well as upon the natural and hereditary rights of the Princes of India that we can extinguish the native states. None but purely English readers need to be informed that, the adoption of a son, in failure of heirs of his body, is not only the privilege, but the religious duty of every Hindoo; no Hindoo, therefore, except by accident or by criminal neglect, can die without heirs. It is by this practice of adoption that the Rajpoot states have been perpetuated from a remote period up to the present moment. It has “secured their political existence, while successive “dynasties of Affghans and Moguls, during 800 “years, have left but the wreck of splendid names, “a Rajpoot prince never dies—he disappears to be “regenerated, *‘Le Roi est mort—vive le Roi,’* is

“a phrase the precise value of which is there well understood. Neither the Crown nor the greater fiefs are ever without heirs; adoption is the preservative of names and titles; the great fiefs of Rajpootana can never become extinct.”*

No attempt was ever made by us to trench upon the “indestructible principle” by which native states are perpetuated until in 1841, when upon the prospect of the death of Jungajee Scindiah, the Sovereign of Gwalior, the Governor-General, indicated an intention to interfere in the succession—as he actually did interfere in the succession to the Holkar Sovereignty in 1844, upon the assumption that the adoption of a successor by the reigning Prince, or by his widow, required the confirmation of the British Government.

Such a pretension had never before been advanced, neither had the right of a Sovereign Prince to adopt a successor to his territory been questioned.

In 1825, the question of the rights of succession in native states came formally before the British Government in India, in the shape of a question as to whether the Sovereign Princes of these states had a right—not to adopt an heir, for that right had never been brought into doubt; but whether they had a right to adopt, to the prejudice of a collateral heir—and this question was agitated because as that

* Tod's Annals of Rajpootan, Vol. I. p. 100.

Government was bound by treaty to support the rightful heir—it was absolutely necessary that they should ascertain who the rightful heir was.

The question was accordingly submitted to a tribunal of *Pundits*, and they having pronounced that the adoption of a son was valid against the claims of collateral heirs—the British Government came to a formal resolution, that “Sovereign Princes in their own right have, by Hindoo law, a right to adopt, in failure of heirs male of the body, to the exclusion of collateral heirs; and that the British Government is bound to acknowledge the adoption, provided that it be regular, and not in violation of the Hindoo law;” and in accordance with their resolution—no less than fifteen instances of succession by adoption were recognized by the British Government between the years 1826 and 1848, seven of which were made by reigning princes, seven by the widows or mothers of deceased princes, and one by election of the leading chiefs of the Principality, in accordance with an opinion of the late Lord Metcalfe, that when there is a “total failure of heirs, it is probably more consistent with right that the people should elect a Sovereign for themselves, than that the Principality should lapse to the Paramount State; that State, in fact, having no right in such case, but what it assumes in virtue of its power.”

These independent rights of succession had been exercised with our concurrence, by Sovereigns of

all classes, not merely by those whom we acknowledge to be “absolute and despotic monarchs”—such as Scindiah—but by those also, who, though absolute rulers in their own dominions, stand in a relation of political dependence upon us; acknowledging our supremacy by treaty, and in token of this supremacy, paying us tribute. So far was the British Government from having pretended, up to a late period, to question these rights, that we find it expressing a wish “that all the Sovereign Princes of the country, who had no issue, should name their successors during their lifetime;”* and as a practice recognizing the succession “which should appear to be most agreeable to the Prince and to the people, or to the latter, on the demise of the former,”† although quite aware that the recognition of the ruler *de facto* implied a total renunciation of all reversionary right on their part of succession under any contingency. The British Government ruled at the same time—that whether those who were not Sovereign Princes had a right to name a successor, must depend upon the nature of our engagements with them.

These proceedings, extending over a period of nearly thirty years, originated with the Government abroad—were approved by the Court of Directors, and confirmed by the Board of Control. On a

* See Par. Pa. A.D. 1850, No. 50, p. 185.

† Ibid. p. 125.

sudden all these authorities turned round upon themselves, and authoritatively declared, that there were no independent Sovereigns in India—that all the Princes of India were feudatories of the British Government—that upon the failure of lineal heirs, their principalities lapsed to the British Government, as the “Paramount State,” and they proceeded to act upon this new dictum by seizing upon the principalities of Mundavee, Colaba, and Sattara.

No new light had broken in upon the subject—no fresh fact had occurred to make their former decision questionable; they arrived at their new judgment by simply ignoring their former one, and all the acts and proceedings arising out of it: and, at the same time, by ignoring the treaties by which they had solemnly guaranteed the territories of those Princes to their descendants in perpetuity.

In 1825 the Government of India had, as we have seen, formally recognized the right of “Sovereign Princes, in their own right, and professing the Hindoo religion to adopt a son, to the exclusion of collateral heirs, as of the supposed reversionary right of the Paramount power;” and in 1849 they determined that the Rajah of Sattara, who was a Hindoo Prince, *de jure* and *de facto* by birth—and a Sovereign actually reigning, had no right to adopt—and with a treaty under their eyes, in which we had ceded the territory of Sattara to the Rajah, ‘his heirs, and successors, in perpetual sovereignty,’

they declared that they were “under no plèdge “direct or constructive”* to continue the territory to his heirs and successors—and annexed it to their own dominions.

This was done with the usual exuberant profession of a wish to act in the matter “with the purest “integrity, and in the most scrupulous observance “of good faith. If even a shadow of doubt can “be shewn, the claim should,” it is said, “at once “be abandoned.”

At the moment that the British Government was making this ostentatious profession of their determination to abandon their claim, if a doubt could be cast upon its justice, they had under their eyes a reasoned opinion of Sir George Clerk, the Governor of Bombay, that they had no right whatever to the territory.—that the British Government had ceded it in perpetuity to the Rajah of Sattara, his heirs and successors, and that it belonged, therefore, clearly to his heirs; they had at the same time before them a declaration from the political agent Mr. Frere, that there were those who would be able, and who were ready, to establish their rights as heirs under the treaty before any court of justice. They were entreated to allow these claimants to be heard—they were urged to refer to Mr. Elphinstone, who had made the treaty, and to Captain Grant Duff, who had been engaged officially in explaining it to the

* See Par. Pa, A.D. 1849, No. 83, p. 9.

first Rajah, for information as to the meaning of the terms used in it, if any doubt could be entertained of their meaning. "But to me," said Sir George Clerk, "they appear to be remarkably distinct and "perspicuous." That Government, however, who were so anxious to act with unspotted integrity, and scrupulous good-faith—turned their backs upon these appeals to their justice—they refused to hear the claimants—they declined to refer to the negotiators of the treaty—they seized upon the territory; and the authorities at home—in a despatch of a dozen lines, in which there is not the slightest reference to the right—solemnly and repeatedly recognized by themselves—of a Hindoo Sovereign to adopt an heir, and only a passing allusion to the treaty, by which they had ceded it to him and his heirs for ever, sanctioned the confiscation for their own benefit of a principality which yielded a revenue of near £200,000. a-year.

If this had been a transaction between individuals—if a powerful man had laid claim to the property of his weaker neighbour, professing at the same time loudly his determination to relinquish it if a doubt should be breathed of its justice, and if, upon proof being tendered that the claim was altogether unfounded, he had proceeded to enforce it, we should not scruple to brand the individual so acting as a hypocrite, as well as a tyrant. The hypocrisy is not the less, or the tyranny a jot abated, because they are shared amongst many.

Are we then bound by our Treaties? This will appear to be a pertinent question, when it is known that there are between two and three hundred native states in India, great and small—independent states, and dependent states—sovereignties and feudatories whose territories embrace an area of upwards of 700,000 square miles, with a population of more than 50 millions of souls, and a revenue of ten millions sterling, all of whom are destined to gradual extinction, simply by virtue of our power, and in contempt of a mass of treaties, by which we have pledged ourselves to maintain them as native states.

For example, we are at this moment employed in extirpating the little principality of Kerowlee, one of the Rajpoot states, which has been rooted in the soil of Hindostan for centuries; which was an independent state in the time of the Mogul Emperors, a state to which we are pledged by a solemn treaty, the first article of which runs thus:—

“There shall be perpetual friendship, alliance,
 “and unity of interest between the British Govern-
 “ment on the one hand, and the Rajah of Kerowlee
 “and his descendants on the other:”* and by way of fulfilling this engagement of “perpetual friendship” to his descendants, we have determined—the last Prince having died without heirs of his own body—that his race is extinct, that he has no descendants, although there is an heir by adoption, who, according to the laws of the country, stands in the place

* See Treaty, dated 9 November, 1817.

of an heir by blood—an adoption made by virtue of a right inherent in a Hindoo Prince, as recognized repeatedly by ourselves, and which was recognized in this very state of Kerowlee no longer ago than the year 1848, when the Rajah having died with an entire failure of male heirs; the family adopted a son, who was acknowledged by us as his successor.*

Setting aside by violence the rights of this adopted son—setting aside the rights of collateral heirs—setting aside our own dictum by which we have declared it to be “more consistent with the right that the people should elect a Sovereign in failure of heirs natural and adopted,” than that the state should lapse to us, as the Paramount Power—abrogating the treaty by which we pledged “perpetual friendship to the Rajah of Kerowlee and his *descendants*”—and by which we acknowledged the Rajah to be absolute ruler of his own dominions, and covenanted that “the British jurisdiction should not be introduced therein.” We now claim to be heirs to the lapsed territory, by virtue of certain powers, which we claim as successors to the Emperor of Delhi.†

* See Par. Pa. A. D. 1850, No. 50, p. 209.

† As these sheets are passing thorough the press, I learn that the Court of Directors, by a majority, have determined to withdraw the claim put forth by the Government in India to the territory of Kerowlee. But whether the decision of that Government shall override the decision of the nominal Governors of India, will depend upon the fiat of the real Governors, the Board of Control.

A similar claim to override the inherent rights of the Native Princes, and to abrogate our treaties with them, was thus summarily brushed away in 1842, by the then Governor-General, Lord Auckland. "In viewing this question,"* said his Lordship, "I would at once put aside any reference to the prerogatives claimed and exercised by the Emperor of Delhi, or of any *supposed rights* which it has been thought might be assumed by us, because they were habitually enforced by those Sovereigns, or by others, who have at different times held supreme rule within the various provinces of the Empire. I would look only to the terms and spirit of the treaties or engagements which we have formed with the several states of India—and bring forward no other demand than such as, in reference to those engagements, may be indisputably consistent with good faith." And Lord Auckland was as good as his word—for when an insidious attempt† was made soon afterwards to rob the Rajah of Oorcha of his rights as an independent Sovereign, on the ground, that under the Mogul Emperors, the Rajah would not have been permitted to nominate an heir to his possessions without the sanction of the superior power. He thus dealt with it.‡ "I cannot for a moment admit the doctrine that, because the view of policy

* The right of the widow of the Rajah of Kishongurh to adopt a son without authority from her deceased husband.—Par. Pa. p. 183.

† Par. Pa. p. 144.

‡ P. 146.

“upon which we may have formed engagements
 “with Native Princes may have been by circum-
 “stances materially altered, we are not to act
 “scrupulously up to the terms and spirit of those
 “engagements. I have referred to our treaty with
 “the Rajah of Oorcha, concluded on the 23rd of
 “December, 1812, and I find that its preamble
 “commences in these words: The Rajah of Oorcha
 “is one of the Chiefs of Bundelcund, by whom,
 “and his ancestors, his present possessions have
 “been held in successive generations during a long
 “course of years, without paying tribute or ac-
 “knowledging vassalage to any other power. And
 “the treaty formed with the Rajah is designated as
 “one of friendship and alliance: the territory
 “which from ancient times has descended to the
 “Rajah by inheritance, and is now in his possession,
 “being guaranteed to the said Rajah and *to his heirs*
 “*and successors, upon words so distinct and positive*
 “*as these, I hold it to be impossible to raise a ques-*
 “*tion,* and I am of opinion, therefore, that the
 “Rajah of Oorcha must be regarded as one of
 “those Sovereign rulers who, according to the very
 “proper rule laid down in the letter of Sir Charles
 “Metcalfe of 28th October, 1837, is entitled to
 “make an adoption in his own discretion, which the
 “British Government is bound to acknowledge,
 “provided that such adoption be regular and not
 “in violation of Hindoo Law.”

Here we have the Governor-General, Lord Auck-
 land's judgment in the case—Prerogative *versus*

Treaty, He does not admit, that we have inherited any rights from the Emperor of Delhi, but he says, that treaties override our "supposed rights." He is as stiff as to the obligations of treaties, as was the Duke—and like that illustrious man, was determined to be guided entirely by their obvious meaning. Is it not marvellous that the Governor-General of this day, backed by the authorities at home, who had concurred in Lord Auckland's judgment, should now determine, that we are warranted by virtue of those supposed rights, and in the face of our treaties, to possess ourselves of all the Native States of India, whenever their occupants may die without natural heirs? Treaties couched in terms as distinct and unquestionable as that upon which Lord Auckland grounded his decision—treaties which guarantee those states to the reigning Princes, their heirs and successors?

But, though the authorities of to-day, at home and abroad, are of one mind as to our right to despoil the Princes of their estates, they are as wide as the poles asunder on the grounds upon which they rest that right. One section of the Court of Directors, asserts* that no dependent principality can pass to an adopted heir without the consent of the Paramount Power—another section admits, that sovereigns in the ordinary acceptation of the term, although dependent—the Rajpoot States, for instance—"are unquestionably competent to adopt "successors to their royal rights,"† whilst the

* P.P. p. 9.

† P.P. p. 145.

Governor-General of the day, in the face of the recognition of his predecessors, denies that there are any Sovereign States at all "in their own right,"* although, in the very paper in which this assertion is made, he says—the question for him to determine is, "whether the State of Sattara shall be *continued as an independent State*," Lord Hastings, the creator of that state, having placed it "on the same footing of independence as that of "our other allies."

It is in this way that the most sacred rights are trifled with. The parties thus agreeing as to their right to spoil, but disagreeing as to the ground of their right, have only to read the treaties to be satisfied that the "status" of the Prince has nothing to do with our obligations—that we are bound by those treaties to a perpetual guarantee to the "heirs and successors" of him with whom we made the treaty—be they princes or be they peasants.

But even if no such* treaties existed, we should have no right to touch those Principalities—we did not create them, neither did the Emperor of Delhi—they had been called into existence for centuries before the Mussulman touched the soil of Hindostan. Upon the downfall of the Mogul Empire, they recovered their original independence; it was as independent Sovereigns that we first treated with them, and it was as Hindoo Sovereigns, in their own right—and not by virtue of our treaties—that we

* See Par. Pa. A.D. 1849, No. 83, p. 80.

recognized their right to name successors to their sovereignties.

The Mogul Emperors early in the sixteenth century conquered the Rajpoot states, and reduced them to the condition of vassals—as vassals they made a nominal surrender of their kingdoms to the Emperor—receiving them back, with a grant (sumnud), which was renewed on each lessee, thereby acknowledging him as their Lord Paramount.* But we have never conquered the Rajpoot States—they have never been our enemies—we have been linked in close amity with them ever since the connexion began, and we are pledged that this friendship shall continue from generation to generation. We now claim the right, however, to deal with our friends, as the Mogul Emperors dealt with their enemies. If we have derived any rights at all from those potentates—they are plenary rights—we have a right not only to refuse to recognize adopted heirs, but we have a right to insist that upon every lapse, the heir by blood shall receive investiture from us as the Lord Paramount. We have as good a right to refuse the investiture of an heir by blood as we have to refuse the recognition of an heir by adoption—but although the Mogul Emperors, by *conquest* had the right to do both, they never exercised that right. The incontestable proof being the existence of those States at this day—an existence which has been perpetuated by

* Tod's Annals of Rajasthan; vol. 1.

the practice of adoption; the failure of heirs by blood being a common occurrence in Hindoo dynasties.

It is avowedly with an intention of extinguishing those dynasties—dynasties which have existed, perhaps, from the time of Alexander—dynasties which were spared by all the Mussulman Sovereigns—that the humane, enlightened, and Conservative British Government is now employed. It is the settled purpose of that Government to extirpate the ancient aristocracy from the land—an aristocracy in comparison of which, in point of antiquity, every family in England is modern; and as, by the laws of equal inheritance, there can be no permanent accumulation of landed property in the hands of individuals—to reduce India to a State—in which the Governor-General shall represent the Sovereign, the English officials, the aristocracy, and a hundred millions of people, be reduced to the condition of the “lower orders.” The object of this fearful revolution is avowedly, money, and this object is to be attained by trampling upon treaties which, as Lord Auckland said, “speak a language which cannot be mistaken.”

It is by virtue of treaties and grants from the Native powers, that the British hold all their possessions in the East. Is it worthy of a great Government—is it consistent with common honesty, is it politic to put one interpretation upon treaties, by which we receive territory, and another inter-

pretation upon treaties, by which we cede territory, when precisely the same terms are used in both?

The terms in which the Native Princes cede territory to us, is cession to the East India Company, their heirs, and successors in perpetual sovereignty. We dictate these terms to the Native powers as the strongest which language will furnish, to convey a complete and unalterable alienation of territory from them to us. The grantors know, and we know, that when a conveyance in these terms has once passed, the territory is ours for ever—and that the original owners can on no pretence reclaim it. For example, in 1801, the Nabob of Oude ceded “in perpetual sovereignty to the East India Company” those provinces which form the largest portion of the Government of Agra. In 1813 we ceded to the Nabob of Oude, “his heirs and successors in perpetual sovereignty,” in consideration of a million sterling paid in hard cash—certain districts which we had conquered from the Rajah of Nepaul. In 1818 we ceded “in perpetual sovereignty to the Rajah of Sattara, his heirs and successors,” certain districts specified in a schedule in 1839. We renewed this treaty in precisely the same terms, and in 1848 we ruled that “perpetual sovereignty” had no meaning—that “heirs and successors” meant only heirs by blood—and that by the law and custom of India we had a right to the territory as an escheat, upon the failure of such heirs. By the same dictum, we

may seize upon the territory which we sold to the Nabob of Oude for a consideration infinitely above its value—should he die without heirs of his own blood, for the only title he has to that territory, is our treaty, by which we cede that territory to him, his heirs, and successors.

Is this, again we may ask, worthy of a great Government—is it honest—is it politic? If the French were to trick territory in Algeria out of an Arab Sheik, after this fashion, what should we say to them? and what a lesson we are teaching to our Native Allies. It happens, that in the treaty by which the Nabob of Oude ceded half his dominions to us in 1801, no mention is made of “heirs and successors”—the cession is confined to the East India Company. Now, that Company may die to-morrow — and if the Nabob, borrowing a leaf out of our book, was to demand the restoration of the territory upon the plea that his cession had been to the East India Company only, what answer could we give him? But the Mussulman Prince would scorn such an evasion. He knows, that when he ceded the territory in perpetuity, he had done with it for ever, and had made it the absolute property of that Company.

When the Queen desires to limit a peerage to “heirs male of the body,” does she employ the terms “heirs and successors?”* When we wish,

* Parl. Papers, A.D. 1850, No. 50.

in our treaties with the native Princes to limit succession in the same way, do we employ these terms? No: there was under the eyes of the Indian authorities when they came to this decision a treaty which they had recently concluded with Ghoolab Sing, the Rajah of Cashmere, in which, in order to limit the succession, they cede certain territory to him, and the "heirs male of his body"—there was before them, also, a correspondence* in which the Governor-General, with a view to cut off the right of adoption in the family of Holkar, had attempted to introduce a clause into a new treaty, which he wished to force upon that State, in which the future succession was expressly to be limited to "heirs male of the body." It is only when we are bent upon seizing the territory of a weak neighbour that we force a sense upon the terms "heirs and successors." Moreover, in order to facilitate our designs upon the possessions of our allies, we have advanced another monstrous doctrine—viz., that a treaty made with a native Prince in his own language, and explained to him in his own language, is to be construed in our language, of which he is entirely ignorant.† For example, in the treaty with the Rajah of Kerowlee, whose principality we are now seeking to confis-

* If "heirs and successors" means "heirs of the body," what terms are we to use if we wish to make a grant which is to extend beyond "such heirs?"

† Par. Papers, p. 1. March, 1849, p. 65, 72, 82.

cate, the English terms employed are the “Rajah of Kerowlee and his descendants;” in the English sense, “descendants” were those who descend from the body only; but the corresponding term in the native language embraces, with reference to the universal practice amongst Hindoos, those who may be descendants by adoption, as well as heirs by blood—not that the Rajah’s right of adoption depends upon the wording of our treaty. As a Sovereign Prince who had “held his possessions for successive generations, during a long course of years,” for centuries before we had territorial power in India, the Rajah, by our own formal recognition, had an inherent right to adopt a descendant, and our treaty with him is only an additional guarantee of that right.

And, as if to pour contempt upon all rights, the Court of Directors, in the first instance, and the Board of Control afterwards, actually sanction the strange assertion made by the Government abroad—made with a view to fortify our attack upon the principality of Sattara—that the usurping Minister of the Rajah of Sattara was the Suzerain of his own Sovereign—that as that Rajah would not have been permitted to adopt a son without the sanction of his Lord Paramount, the Peishwa—so we, as the successors of that Lord Paramount, had a right to refuse our sanction to his adoption. “This power, it is said,* “the British Government possesses by

* Par. Papers, p. 1, March, 1849, p 71—81.

“virtue of its authority, as the Sovereign State over
 “Sattara, a position which it holds *equally* as suc-
 “cessor of the Emperors of Delhi, and as the suc-
 “cessors by conquest of the *Peishwas, the virtual*
 “*Sovereigns of the Rajahs of Sattara,*” This was
 presuming, with a vengeance upon the ignorance of
 Englishmen in the affairs of India; for every person
 of ordinary information in those affairs knows that
 the Peishwas, from the moment of their usur-
 pation, up to the latest period of their existence,
 recognized the Rajahs of Sattara as their Sovereigns.

Every one ordinarily instructed in those affairs
 knows, also, that the Emperors of Delhi recognized
 no Sovereignties in Hindostan but their own—that
 they refused the “royal title” to those who retained
 their independence as well as to those whom they had
 conquered; that they called them all Jagheerdars,
 Zemindars, and, in many instances, that they
 annexed the territories of the vanquished to their
 own dominions. It is freely admitted that as “con-
 querors of their conquerors,” we had full power to
 deal with our enemies as they did with their’s; we
 might, for example, have confiscated the whole
 territory of the Mahratta powers, after our successful
 contests with them in 1803 and in 1817, or we might
 have reduced Scindiah, Holkar, and the Rajah of
 Berar to the status of vassals, limiting their rights
 of succession as we pleased. But it pleased us to
 do otherwise, to maintain them as Sovereign

Princes—to treat with them as Sovereign Princes—and to bind ourselves to them, their heirs and successors by solemn treaties. We now claim a right not only of voiding our treaties with those who were once our enemies as “bad bargains,” but to trample upon the inherent rights, and to set aside treaties with those who have always been our bosom friends.

Not content with acquiring fresh territory by these means, we have already violated in one instance, and are seeking to violate in others our treaties with those whose territories we have long since taken. For example, in 1800, we extorted from the Nabob of Surat, who had been our faithful ally for nearly half a century, his territory, upon condition that we should pay to “him and to his heirs and successors” a specified portion of the revenues in perpetuity. Although the most solemn pledge was given by the gentleman* who negotiated the treaty on the part of the British Government, that that Government gave by its treaty “a security for an honourable provision to himself, his family, and descendants, from generation to generation, greater than they had ever yet had—that that Government had by that instrument become bound in perpetuity to the support of the Nabob and his family.” Yet, upon the death of the heir of this Nabob, without sons, the British Government

* See Par. Papers, No. 27, presented to the House of Commons, relating to East India affairs.

stopped payment, upon the plea that “heirs and successors in the treaty,” meant “heirs male” only, and that they were not bound to continue the provision to heirs female—viz. to the grand-daughter of the Prince with whom we had made the treaty.

What an example of “British faith” is this: We extorted the surrender of his inheritance from a friend, upon condition of paying a fixed annuity to his descendants from generation to generation; and at the second generation, we determined that a grand-daughter is not a descendant, refused to continue the payment, and reduced her to beggary, and this under a treaty which professes to have been made in order to strengthen and confirm a long existing friendship between the parties.

At every turn the question presents itself: ‘Are we bound by our treaties?’ and it becomes the more pressing as we are now urged to deal with other princely families, to whom we are bound by treaties, as we have done with the family of Surat.*

All these treaties are founded upon a *quid pro quo*—either for services rendered, or for territory surrendered, as examples: In 1802, we extorted from the infant Nabob of Arcot, his territory, upon con-

* Extract from treaty with Surat.

“Article I. The friendship subsisting between the Hon. East India Company and the Nabob of Surat, is hereby strengthened and confirmed.”

dition of paying to him and to his heirs, a fixed portion of its revenues, and a certain sum for the support of the families of his ancestors. It was under the shelter of the name of one of these ancestors, that we fought our battles with the French, and established our ascendancy in the Carnatic. And that ancestor was formally recognized as Sovereign of the Carnatic, by English and French, at the Peace of Paris in 1763. We now call the existing Prince "the descendant of a deputy Governor, established by ourselves"---and think it very hard that we have to pay him out of his *own* territory four times "as much as the Prince Consort of the United Kingdom."*

Mir Jaffier was our confederate against the infamous Suraja Dowlah, the Nabob of Bengal. In conformity with our engagements, we placed him upon the vacant Musnud after the battle of Plassy, and when we assumed charge of the territory, we stipulated by treaty to pay to him and his heirs a fixed sum out of the revenues, and this is now called, "an absurdly large pension to the descendants of Mir Jaffier, a temporary governor created by us."

In 1802 we seized upon the little principality of Tanjore, which had been for a century and a half in the family of the Rajah, binding ourselves by treaty to pay him a certain portion of its revenues; this is

* Campbell's Modern India, p. 154.

now said to be: "an allowance to the descendants
"of a petty military chief."

Upon the conquest of Mysore in 1799, in order to facilitate the settlement of the country, we became guarantees to a treaty, by which the Rajah of Mysore bound himself to pay a certain sum in perpetuity for the support of the families of Hyder and Tippoo. We have since taken possession of Mysore, and are therefore become principals as well as guarantees to the treaty. This however is called "an allowance to the descendants of an upstart
"usurper, our bitterest enemy, who fought to the
"last, and with whom no terms were made."

This mention of Hyder Ali as an upstart usurper, in contradistinction, it is supposed, to the ancient and legitimate rule of the East India Company over India, brings with it some awkward recollections, for no fact is better established in history than this, viz. that Hyder's "bitter enmity" to us arose out of our breach of our solemn engagements with him, a breach which was as ungrateful as it was gross. In 1769 he dictated a treaty to us, at the gates of Madras, when he had us at his mercy, by which we engaged to assist him with a certain force whenever and by whomsoever he should be attacked, In 1773 he claimed the stipulated aid; we evaded the demand; he repeated it, and such was his anxiety to make his engagements with us a reality, that he offered to bribe us into a performance of these by

grants of money and territory ; and it was not until he had exhausted every effort to prevail upon us to fulfil the treaty that he denounced us as incorrigibly faithless ; threw himself into the arms of the French, and descended into the Carnatic with fire and sword.

The war which followed this invasion, was the parent of those which gave us the supremacy in India ; and now that Hyder's bitter enmity against us is sought to be made a pretext for robbing his descendants of what we have engaged to pay them, it is fitting, we should be reminded that we drove him who was anxious to be our friend, and who, in the judgment of those* who were competent to form an opinion, would have been a faithful ally, into hostility, because we refused to fulfil the obligations of a formal treaty. It was this contempt of treaties that induced Hyder to draw the sword against us ; and is not he, who wantonly provokes an aggression, as guilty as the aggressor ?

The name of the King of Delhi stands at the head of our pension list, and appended to it is this remark : " the only pension, for the amount of " which there is reasonable ground ;" we may well say so, indeed, when we call to mind our dealings with the King of Delhi. To the uninstructed in these dealings, it must have appeared unaccountable, that the King Shah Aulum, when he was at the

* See Wilks' History of Mysore, vol. ii. chap. xxi. for an account of these transactions.

very lowest ebb of his fortunes, blind, aged, decrepit, a prisoner, steeped in poverty and misery, should have received the brilliant overtures which were made to him by Lord Wellesley in 1803, with something of mistrust. He was then an important political card, and Lord Wellesley offered him a munificent provision for himself and family, and a treatment in every respect corresponding to his rank and dignity, if he would throw himself upon the protection of the British Government. "Perhaps they will forget their promises," was the significant remark which he made, when signifying his determination to accept the invitation. The poor old man carried his mind back half a century, when *they* had indeed forgotten their promises, by depriving him in the first instance of his territory, and afterwards of his revenue, his only means of support, both of which we had solemnly guaranteed to him by two separate treaties, in return for his munificent grant to us of an empire, which Clive said, would make the East India Company the richest corporation in the world.* The poor King was soon to have proof that there was ground for his mistrust; Lord Wellesley had promised to settle upon him and his descendants a territory round the city of Delhi, as a Crown domain, but before this cession could be made, he had

* The historians, Messrs. Mill and Thornton, agree in repro-
bating these transactions.

ceased to be of any political importance; Lord Wellesley's successors, therefore, putting their own interpretation upon their predecessor's engagement, determined that it would be fulfilled by granting the King a stipend in money, very inferior in amount to what the domain would have produced; and not content with turning a deaf ear to the entreaties of his successors, that the obligation should be fulfilled in the sense in which the King was made to understand it,—the Government in India has more than once attempted to trench upon these limited rights.

But not content with withholding payment for territory which we have already taken from our allies, upon promise of payment, we now threaten to take what we have been paid for not taking. After having gradually increased our demands upon the Nabob of Oude for subsidy from twenty-five lacs of rupees to seventy-six lacs—after having extorted* from him in nine years thirty-four lacs per annum more than he was bound by treaty to pay us—after having saddled him with an enormous

* It appeared that during the nine years preceding 1787, the Nabob had paid to the Company, under different titles, at the rate of eighty-four lacs per annum, though by the treaty of 1775 he had bound himself to pay 31,21,000, and by that of 1781, 34,20,000. In other words, "unjustifiable extortions to the amount of thirty-four lacs per annum had been practised on that dependent Prince." Mill's History of India, vol. v. p. 316.

establishment,* and drained his territory of specie, we in 1801 coerced him into the surrender of more than one half of his dominions, in commutation of *all* demands upon him for “imperial purposes,” guaranteeing to him and to his posterity the remaining half. But in utter forgetfulness of that final bargain, we wheedled him out of more than two millions and a half sterling in 1815, and of another million and a half in 1825, when our own treasury was exhausted, and our credit at the lowest ebb.† These were called loans, and were repaid in a

* “The numbers, influence, and enormous amount of the salaries, pensions and emoluments of the Company’s service, civil and military, in the Vizier’s service, have become an intolerable burthen upon the revenue and authority of his Excellency, and exposed us to the envy and resentment of the whole country, by excluding the native servants and adherents of the Vizier from the rewards of their services and attachment.” Warren Hastings’ Life, vol. ii.

† “The Treasuries of the three Presidencies,” said Governor-General Lord Hastings, upon this occasion, “were in so unfurnished a condition, that the insufficiency of funds in them to meet any unusual charges—and many menaced us—excited considerable uneasiness. At that period the low credit of the bonds which had at different times been issued as the securities for monies borrowed, made eventual recurrence to a loan seriously discouraging in contemplation.”

“Luckily I was on such frank terms with the Nabob Vizier as that I could frankly explain to him my circumstances * * * so that the Honourable Company was accommodated with above two and a half millions sterling, on my simple receipt.” Par. Pa. 1832. Public, p. 42.

manner that was little advantageous to the lender.* And it is this Prince, whose territory we have appropriated, and whose revenues have been poured with such unexampled profusion into our Exchequer, in times of need, that we now threaten with extinction because he “contributes nothing to the expenses of the State.”

Are we then bound by our treaties? Yes—if there is advantage in keeping them. No—if there is advantage in breaking them. This is, in fact, our language. The opinion is pretty unanimous, that the misgovernment of the territories of Oude and Hydrabad, of which we hear so much, is owing to a system under which there is a pageant king, and a British resident, who is described by a Governor-General,† as more “than king;” as “clothed with a degree of state equal to that of royalty itself, as acting the part rather of a schoolmaster and dictator than of the minister of a friendly power,” ex-

* “Of the two millions which his father had left, the king had lent one to Lord Hastings to carry on the Nepaul war. For this he was to receive interest, but unfortunately for him, he accepted instead of all payment a grant of fresh territory under the Himalaya mountains, which is entirely unproductive, being either savage wilderness, or occupied by a race of mountaineers who pay no taxes without being compelled, and whom he has not the means of compelling.” “He lent the British Government all the money that would have enabled him to ease the people of their burdens.”—Bishop Heber’s Travels, p. 81—87.

† Lord W. Bentinck, Minute, July 30, 1830.

exercising a jurisdiction “which is totally incompatible with the royal dignity and authority.” It was thought by the same Governor-General that it “would be for the comfort of the sovereign, for the advantage of good government, and for the real interests of both,” that the sovereign should be relieved from this “more than king;” but would not this be an infraction of the treaty was the question which occurred, and which overruled the proposed reform. But how easy to modify or cancel a treaty when both the parties agree to it; agree, that it is productive of nothing but mischief? “Had it not been for our connexion with Oude, although misrule might have attained as great a height, it would not have been of equal duration. It is the British Government which, by a systematic suppression of all attempts at resistance, has prolonged to the present time a state of disorganization, which can no where attain permanence, except where the shortsightedness and rapacity of a semi-barbarous Government, is armed with the military strength of a civilized one.”* We shall not scruple, when the opportunity offers, of seizing upon the territories of this prince in gross violation of our treaty, but we “strain at the gnat,” when it is proposed

* Despatch of Court of Directors to Government of India, 1st October, 1828. P. P. 1832, p. 468.

to modify that treaty so as to relieve the sovereign from the thralldom in which he is held, and the people from the oppression under which they labour.

It has been remarked by the historian, Mr. Mill,* that “several remarkable instances stand in our history of a sort of epidemical frenzy in abusing our enemies, that scarcely was Tippoo ever spoken of but under the description of a hideous monster, disfigured by almost every vice which renders human nature, in the exercise of power, an object of dread and abhorrence.” This wholesale defamation of the native princes is one of the engines we make use of for undermining their power, and of this we have a notable instance in the passage which follows.

“If, however, we turn our eyes to the present Mohammedan Kingdoms of India, and examine the character of the Princes and the condition of the people subject to their sway, we may fairly draw a parallel between ancient and modern times, under circumstances and relations nearly similar. We behold Kings even of our own creation sunk in sloth and debauchery, and emulating the vices of a Caligula† or a Com-

* History of India, vol. v. p. 457.

† When we bring impartial witnesses into the box, they give rather a different character of those so called “Caligulas and Commodi.”—See Appendix B.

“ modus. Under such rulers we cannot wonder
 “ that the fountains of justices are corrupted; that
 “ the state revenues are never collected without
 “ violence and outrage; that villages are burnt,
 “ and their inhabitants mutilated or sold into
 “ slavery; that the officials, so far from affording
 “ protection, are themselves the chief robbers and
 “ usurpers; that parasites and eunuchs revel in the
 “ spoil of plundered provinces, and that the poor
 “ find no redress against the oppressor’s wrong and
 “ proud man’s contumely. When we witness these
 “ scenes under our eyes, where the supremacy of
 “ the British Government, the benefit of its ex-
 “ ample, and the dread of its interference might
 “ be expected to operate as a check upon the pro-
 “ gress of misrule, can we be surprised that former
 “ Princes, when free from such restraints, should
 “ have studied still less to preserve the people com-
 “ mitted to their charge in wealth, peace, and
 “ prosperity.”* These are the words of the gen-
 tleman who stands at the Governor-General’s
 right hand, his political secretary and adviser.
 Can we wonder that that functionary, new to India,
 and immersed from the moment of his arrival in
 wars, and all that belong to wars, should receive
 this declamation for Gospel, and that his language

* Biographical Index to the Historians of Mohammedan India,
 by H. M. Elliot, Esq., Foreign Secretary to the Government of
 India.

should be, “away with such fellows from the face
 “of the earth; let us pull down these Kings from
 “the thrones we have given them; let us extinguish
 “the Native States, that we may give good Go-
 “vernment to the people.” It is so much easier,
 and so much pleasanter to receive this description
 of native rule as undoubted truth than to test it,
 that most Englishmen will take it for granted that
 the native rulers whom we now seek to uproot, are
 “Kings of our own creation,” and that we are
 dealing only justly in resuming gifts which have
 been so grossly abused. Not one in one hundred
 will take the trouble to inquire whether this cha-
 racter of the native sovereigns who preceded the
 kings of our creation, is warranted by authentic
 history, or whether it is directly opposed to it.* And
 as these princes cannot be heard in their own defence,
 it seems only just to inform the English reader
 that there are no Mahomedan Kings in India of
 our creation—that those here referred to were firmly
 established as Sovereign Princes long before we
 appeared upon the stage—that we restored two of
 the ancient princes of the country to the possessions
 of their ancestors, only to pull them down again at
 the first favourable moment†—that those whom we
 are now seeking to subvert were rooted as princes

* For the character of native sovereigns, and the state of India
 under their rule, see Appendix B.

† The Rajahs of Mysore and Sattara.

in the soil of Hindoostan when our ancestors were in the woods. We may also, with great propriety, on behalf of those Sovereigns who are the subjects of this “frenzy of abuse,” ask Englishmen to turn over the first pages of our own history in India, and judge for themselves whether anything is to be found in Mahomedan or Hindoo history more discreditable than the recital which follows:—

“The English,” says the historian of India, “were the first to draw the sword (in India) and from no higher inducement than the promise of a trifling settlement upon the Coromandel Coast. It was Shajee (a pretender to the throne of Tanjore) that first craved the assistance of the English; and it was after having corresponded for years with Pertaub Sing as King of Tanjore—after having offered him the friendship of the English nation, and after having courted his assistance against the French—that the English rulers now, without so much as a pretence of any provocation, and without the allegation of any other motive than the advantage of possessing Devicottah, despatched an army to dethrone him.” Our Governor’s letters to Pertaub Sing “were full of friendly professions;” we made two unsuccessful attacks on the place, when Pertaub Sing ceded it, with a territory round it, and we, on our “part, not only renounced the support of him for whom we had pretended to fight, as the true and lawful king, but agreed to secure his person, in order that he

“ might give no further molestation to Pertaub
 “ Sing. It is even asserted, that but for the hu-
 “ manity of Boscawen (our Admiral) the Shahjee
 “ would have been delivered into the hands of Per-
 “ taub Sing. He found means to make his escape
 “ from the English, who imprisoned his uncle, and
 “ kept him in confinement for nine years, till he
 “ was released by the French when they took Fort
 “ St. David in 1758.”*

It was probably a recollection of this precious morsel of history, amongst other such doings, that led Clive to declare, when he determined to apply to the Emperor Shah Aulum for the grant of the Dewanee of Bengal, that “the Princes of India
 “ must conclude our views to be boundless; they
 “ have seen such instances of our ambition, that
 “ they cannot suppose us capable of moderation.”
 “ I can only say,” he writes upon another occasion,
 “ that such a scene of anarchy, corruption, and ex-
 “ portion, was never seen or heard of in any country
 “ but Bengal; the three provinces of Bengal, Ba-
 “ har, and Orissa, producing a revenue of £3,000,000
 “ sterling, have been under the absolute manage-
 “ ment of the Company’s servants, ever since Meer
 “ Jaffier’s restoration to the Soohabship; and they
 “ have, both civil and military, exacted and levied
 “ contributions from every man of power and con-

* See Dr. Wilson’s edition of Mill’s History. Dr. Wilson makes no comment upon this narrative; we may regard it therefore as unimpeachable.

“sequence, from the Nabob down to the lowest
 “Zemindar. The trade has been carried on by
 “free merchants, acting as Gomantahs, to the Com-
 “pany's servants, who, under the sanction of their
 “names, have committed actions, which make the
 “name of the English stink in the nostrils of a
 “Gentoo and a Mussulman, and the Company's
 “servants have interfered with the revenues of the
 “Nabob, turned out and put in the officers of the
 “Government at their pleasure, and made every
 “one pay for their preferment.”

*These were the “examples” which the British
 Government set to the Native Governments, when
 it entered upon the political stage of India. Had
 things mended in the space of twenty years? War-
 ren Hastings' account of our doings in Oude has
 been already recited. Hear him again upon our
 general conduct towards the Native Princes.

“I fear that our encroaching spirit, and the inso-
 “lence with which it has been exerted, has caused
 “our alliance to be as much dreaded by all the
 “powers of Hindostan, as our arms. Our encroach-
 “ing spirit, and the uncontrolled and even pro-
 “tected licentiousness of individuals have done
 “more injury to our national reputation, than our
 “arms and the credit of our strength have raised it.
 “Every power in India dreads a connexion with us,
 “which they see attended, with such mortifying
 “humiliations, to those who have availed them-
 “selves of it.”

If such things do not occur now, it is because they have been made highly penal, and because we pay handsomely to prevent "bribery, corruption, and extortion." But were there not events in the Afghan war which should make every Englishman blush, and were not our doings in Scinde, as exposed only the other day by Lord Jocelyn in his place in the House of Commons, as foul as anything that ever was done by a native Government, and blacker still, when we consider them as the deeds of a Christian Government, and done in the middle of the 19th century;—deeds "known not only in Scinde, but throughout Central Asia, not confined to Mahomedan Asia; Central Africa re-echoes this story of violence and wrong."*

These and many other such passages in our Indian history would be thrown in our teeth by the Native Princes, if they could be heard, and in answer to our confident boastings, that our territorial greatness has been thrust upon us, and that we have never been guilty of an aggressive war; they would point to the language of Clive and Hastings, and to the Afghan and Scinde wars.

These founders of our empire—we may remark in passing—knew nothing of that "moderation," of which we hear so much at the present day, as the characteristic of our Indian rule. Events may have compelled us to enter upon wars, although no fact is better established in history than that the parent

* Lord Jocelyn's Speech, p. 23.

of the wars, which gave us supremacy over India, originated in our own gross breach of faith,* but events have not compelled us to despoil our friends, neither is acquisition of territory the necessary consequence of a just war.

It was not from motives of moderation, but from a carefully weighed policy, that Clive was induced to restore the Nabob of Oude to his dominions after the victory gained at Culpee in 1765. It was from the same motives that Lord Cornwallis was led to take only half of Tippoo's dominions and a ransom of three millions sterling, when he might have taken the whole, in 1792.

Was it "moderation" in Lord Wellesley when he took what remained of Tippoo's territory in 1799;† when he took what suited him of the territory of the Peishwah of Scindiah, and of the Rajah of Berar in 1803; or when he took all

* "But of what avail were treaties: of the treaty of 1769, they, the English, have broken every article." Hyder might have been rendered in the early part of his career, a firm and efficient ally of the English Government, and a clear view of his own interests would probably have rendered him faithful, if treated with fidelity. Hyder had just ground to complain of the English Government.

"He (Hyder) spoke very openly and without reserve, and said, "that the Europeans had broken their several engagements and promises, but that, nevertheless, he was willing to live at peace." Wilks' History of Mysore, vol. ii. p: 125—375.

† Part was given to the Nizam, and part to the Rajah of Mysore, but all eventually fell into our hands.

the territory of some, and half the territory of others of his "friends and allies?" We have it upon the authority of the great Duke, that the "demon of ambition" had got amongst the British authorities on that occasion, Lord Hastings most justly punished the foul perfidy of the Peishwah when he confiscated the whole of his dominions after the war of 1817, and most justly dethroned his ally, the Rajah of Berar, taking only a portion of his territory, and of the territory of Holkar; and as he would have been warranted in taking the whole, we may say that he used his victory with moderation.

We took from the King of Burmah all the territory that we wanted, and made him pay as much as it was possible to extract from him.

We charged the Rajah of Mysore with misgovernment, and took possession of all his territory.

We came into collision with the Rajah of Coorg, and took all his territory.

We were turned out of Affghanistan in a hurry, and had no opportunity of acquiring territory.

We drove the Ameers of Scinde into hostilities, and punished them by taking all their territory.

It was from motives, political and financial, that we only took a portion of the Sikh territory in 1846; we took the whole in 1849, and in so doing did we not violate the most sacred obligations? It is in the order of Providence that sons should suffer for the sins of their parents, wards for the misdoings of

their guardians ; and Dhuleep Sing, the infant Rajah of Lahore, fell under that general law when his guardians waged war with the British Government in 1845. But this is perhaps the first instance on record in which a guardian has visited his own misdeeds upon his ward. The British Government was the self-constituted guardian of the Rajah, and the regent of his kingdom ; a rebellion was provoked by the agents of the guardian, it was acknowledged by the guardian to be a rebellion against the government of his ward, and the guardian punished that ward by confiscating his dominions and his diamonds to his own use !

Do we find any proof of this alleged moderation and good faith, in the fact that in order to cover a demand of forty lacs which we had upon our ally the Nizam for subsidy, we took from him territory of the value of sixty lacs ? that having made a subsidiary treaty with him in 1800, by which we engaged to furnish him with* so many men for so much money, we in 1818, of our own *proprio motu*, turned that engagement into a "controlling treaty," in order to furnish ourselves with a pretext for diminishing the stipulated number of men ; saddling him at the same time with the permanent maintenance of another body of troops, which he was bound by treaty to produce only in war, and now threatening him with confiscation of territory, because he has failed in the payment of this con-

* P.P. Pol. Appendix, 1832, p. 132.

tingent? Or do we find it in the fact, that having gradually raised our demands for subsidy upon our ally the Nabob of Oude from fifty to seventy lacs, we commuted our demands for territory estimated at the value of 135 lacs. The threatened annihilation of both those Princes, upon the ground that they contribute nothing to the public exchequer, makes it necessary that our previous dealings should be known—that we should know also the significant and melancholy fact, that the decline of both those states is to be dated from the moment that we became closely connected with them.* Do we then find any proof of this moderation in our proclaimed determination to seize upon all the territory that still remains in the hands of our allies? We assume to have a right to do this as the Lord Paramount of India; but the duty of a Lord Paramount is to protect, and we assume this title with a view to destroy. We are bound by treaties to “protect” the states, which we are now employed in annihilating.

We have seen that the Governor-General Lord Auckland solemnly decided that our treaties override our assumed prerogatives, and that the words, “heirs and successors,” in those treaties, cannot, by straining language to the utmost, be made to mean only “heirs by blood,” but that they give the parties with whom the treaties are made a clear right to adopt a successor; and now, as the warrant for our meditated spoliation, the Governor-

* P.P. Pol Report, 1832, p 107, and Appendix, p. 174.

General of the present day rules, that prerogatives over-ride treaties, that "heirs and successors" mean only heirs by blood, "and that the parties interested in the treaties have no right to adopt a successor;" nay, it is even proposed to regulate the rights of succession to Hindoo sovereignties by the English law of real property. "The proprietor of an entailed estate cannot," it is said,* "adopt an heir to the exclusion of the next in succession," and therefore we have a right to seize upon sovereignties which were in existence as sovereignties long before the first Mussulman invasion of India, whenever the Sovereign may die without male heirs, as standing next in succession to an entailed estate.

And yet, if any one shall venture to say, that this is trifling with the most solemn obligations, or, borrowing the language of Clive and Hastings, shall venture to assert that we have given such proofs of ambition, that the princes of India cannot suppose us capable of moderation,—he is liable to be set down either as a hired advocate, or a man of distempered mind. Nevertheless, as those against whom this aggression is meditated are not to be heard in their own defence—as the characters of all Native rulers and of all Native governments are systematically assailed, in order to reconcile the public mind to the meditated spoliation—it behoves those who love fair dealing, to look back into history, in order to ascertain whether our pretensions

* Campbell's Modern India, p. 170.

to exemplary moderation and stubborn good faith rest upon any solid foundation: whether, rather, that be not true which has been asserted of us by high authority,* that we have “sometimes contracted engagements as if they were never to be fulfilled, and sometimes fulfilled them as if they had never been contracted.”

We must remember that our own story is told by a hundred pens, and by a thousand tongues. A Resident complains that a Native State is misgoverned, and we displace the Native Governor without stopping to inquire whether the misgovernment has been produced by him or by a system under which there is one who, as Lord W. Bentinck tells us, is “more than King”—who is at once the King’s dictator and schoolmaster. Nay, if any one over whom we have power should venture to lift up his voice in the behalf of these Princes, and should dare to question the justice of our proceedings, his punishment is prompt and signal. Of this we have a striking example in the case of Captain Cunningham, who was dismissed from his political office ostensibly, because in writing his interesting History of the Sikhs, he had made use of the public records which were in his charge, but really because he had used these records—with permission as he thought—in support of his opinion, that we had done our best to provoke the Sikhs to

* The late Sir H. Russell. See P.P. Pol. Appendix, p. 139.

attack us, and that according to the law of nations they had a fair pretext for war. Unhappily, the voices which are raised in the Court of Directors on behalf of the Native Princes of India are not heard; because it is thought to be for the benefit of that great country that its ostensible governors should carry on their proceedings with closed doors—not only that there should be a secret department, in which a Minister of the Crown may rule a great empire in a mask—but that all the departments of the Government should be shrouded in secrecy.

Occasionally, however, through the medium of Parliamentary returns, their opinions ooze out; and it is satisfactory to find a section of the Directors echoing the opinions, long since given, by Clive and Warren Hastings, of Munro and Malcolm, Elphinstone and Metcalfe, against the policy of bringing the whole of India under our direct sway.

But there is another party deeply interested in this question, and that is the people of our own territory. The proposed annexation of the Native States is said to be that India may be the richest empire in the world, and its people the most lightly taxed; but we have seen, from the examples of Scinde, Sattara, and the Punjab, that while Revenue is the professed object, debt is the sure consequence of these spoliations; and it is upon the people of India that this debt falls. It is the British Govern-

ment which has entailed upon the people of India a national debt—the interest upon which, amounting to nearly two and a half millions per annum, presses so heavily upon our finances, as to make it necessary for us to fasten upon the people many most objectionable taxes, and prevents us from expending what we ought upon public works.* It is questionable, indeed, whether we have ever gained a shilling by exchanging tribute for territory. The Nabob of Oude, for instance, was bound to pay us a tribute of seventy-six lacs of rupees per annum, and in lieu of it we took a territory of the value of one hundred and thirty-five lacs.

By the papers, which were laid before Parliament in 1832, it appeared that in twenty years from the date of the cession, the revenue of that territory had declined at the rate of a lac of rupees a year, and we learn from the papers which have been recently produced, that the land revenue of the North West Provinces, which are made up of these cessions from Oude and conquests from Scindiah, is actually on the decline.† But the mere outturn of the revenue, by no means shews the real result. When we take territory, the European element is employed, in its administration,

* The little Rajpoot state of Mewar, which we are watching for an opportunity to absorb, spent more than a million sterling upon one work, the magnificent lake of Rajimunder, a larger sum than we spend for all India in a course of years.

† Appendix to report from Commons' Committee, p. 450:

and it is not only the high salaries which we pay to European agents, but the pensions, furloughs, allowances, &c. which they fall back upon, that eats up our finances. Of this we have a striking proof, in the fact, that the charge for pensions, &c. has increased within the last twenty years, from £400,000 to £600,000 per annum.

To say therefore that we take our neighbour's territory in order to lessen the taxation of our own subjects, is the greatest of delusions. All the native states, which we propose to extinguish, already contribute to the general defence of the empire, either in men or money.* If our real object is revenue we shall be sure to obtain it by increasing our demands upon them, for they will strain every nerve to satisfy those demands, rather than afford us a pretext for depriving them of their possessions.

We have now, it is said, "reached the natural limits of India, and have nothing to hope or fear from advance of our frontier. If we manage well and keep out of debt we are in no immediate danger of bankruptcy."† Hardly was the ink dry on this passage, than we managed to plunge into a new war, which, while it will carry our frontier nobody knows where, will assuredly add immensely to our debt, and if experience is to be our guide,

* Amount of Tribute . . .	1,06,54,891	rupees
Military Resources . . .	398,918	men
Contingent Forces . . .	36,311	„

† Campbell's Modern India, p. 417-18.

the easy remedy, by which it is proposed to relieve us, viz. the appropriation of the revenue of the native states—our allies—will assuredly aggravate the disease. “By incorporating Sattara with our possessions, we shall increase the revenue of our state,” said the Governor-General, in 1848. “We certainly were not prepared to find that the annexation of Sattara would prove a drain upon the general revenues of India,” says the Court of Directors in 1852. But unfortunately, whatever the effect of these appropriations may be upon the public treasury, it is invariably beneficial to a multitude of private exchequers. Whether Scinde, Sattara, or the Punjab, entail a deficit or produce a surplus, the allowances of those who administer them are punctually paid, and pensions are provided for them, whenever they choose to retire. Our private interests then are in conflict with the public interest; it is our interest as individuals to extend our dominions, even over rocks and deserts, it is our public interest to take no territory that will not yield us a clear net revenue.

Is it matter of wonder then that we should look with an “eye of covetousness” upon the state of Oude, which embraces 25,000 square miles of the finest territory in India, or upon the state of Hyderabad, which is four times as large; that public servants in India should paint the sovereigns of those states in dark colours, and in order to make all native rule odious, that English readers should be led to

believe, that even the great Acbar and his immediate successors were no better than Caligulas and Commodi?

It is not, however, only for purposes of revenue, but that we may give the people the benefit of our institutions, that we propose to extend British rule over the Native States.* The people, if we were to consult them, might perhaps tell us that they preferred the native government even of a Caligula, with its risks and prizes, to our theoretically good government, with its securities and its blanks; theoretically good, for its practical working is thus graphically described by a weighty authority:—

“ We seem to have accomplished a revolution in
 “ the state of society, which has by some unexpected
 “ fatality proved detrimental to general morals, and
 “ by no means conducive to the convenience of our
 “ Government. Since the first establishment of a
 “ Zilla Court in the year 1780, and from the regular
 “ organization of them in the year 1793, a few

* I cannot conceive it possible for any one to dispute the policy of taking advantage of every just opportunity which presents itself for consolidating the territories that already belong to us, by taking possession of states which may lapse in the midst of them; for thus getting rid of these petty intervening principalities, which may be made a means of annoyance, but which can never, I venture to think, be a source of strength, for adding to the resources of the public treasury, and for extending the uniform application of our system of government to those whose best interests we sincerely believe will be promoted thereby.—*P.P.*, March 1850, p. 80.

“ progeny has grown up under our hand, and the
 “ principal features which shew themselves in a
 “ generation thus formed beneath the shade of our
 “ regulations, are a spirit of litigation which our
 “ judicial establishments cannot meet, and a morality
 “ certainly much deteriorated.

“ If in the system, or the practical execution of
 “ it, we should be found to have relaxed many ties
 “ of moral or religious restraint on the conduct of
 “ individuals—to have destroyed the influence of
 “ former institutions, without substituting any check
 “ in their place—to have given loose to the most
 “ forward passions of human nature, and dissolved
 “ the wholesome controul of public opinion and
 “ private censure, we shall be forced to ac-
 “ knowledge that our regulations have been pro-
 “ ductive of a state of things which imperiously
 “ calls on us to provide an immediate remedy for
 “ so serious a mischief.”*

This is not the language of a jaundiced witness, but of a Governor-General,† pronouncing *ex cathedra* a reluctant judgment upon the effect of our institutions. Such as they were then, such they are now; and the people of the Native States, upon whom we wish to impose them, may join in the aspiration of a subject of the King of Oude, who, when asked by Bishop Heber whether he wished

* Parliamentary Papers, East India Affairs, p. 157.

† Lord Hastings.

to become a subject of the British Government, exclaimed, "Of all misfortunes, keep me from that." So fearful indeed were all the Native States of having the yoke of "our institutions" imposed upon them, that their exemption from it was made an express stipulation in all our treaties.

In its determination to confiscate all the Native States when an opportunity offers, the Conservative British Government has entered upon a revolutionary course, unexampled, perhaps, in history. With the ancient Native sovereignties* will fall all that remains of territorial and official aristocracy in India, and the whole native population will, by degrees, be reduced to a dead level, and the effect of the wholesale breach of treaties by which this melancholy change is to be effected, will there-

* "The Rana of Mewar still possesses nearly the same extent of territory which his ancestors held when the conqueror of Ghuzni first crossed the blue waters of the Indus to invade India, while the other families now ruling in the north-west of Rajahstan, are the relics of ancient dynasties driven from their pristine seats of power, or their junior branches who have erected their own fortunes; this circumstance adds to the dignity of the Ranas, and is the cause of the homage they receive, notwithstanding the diminution of their power. Though we cannot give the Princes of Mewar an ancestor in the Persian Nawrashan, nor assert so confidently, as Sir T. Roe, his claims to descent from the celebrated Poirus, the opponent of Alexander, we can carry him into regions of antiquity more remote than the Persian, and which would satisfy the most fastidious in respect of ancestry. Tod's Annals of Rajhistan, vol. i. p. 212.

fore be to impoverish and to degrade the people, and to alienate their affections from British rule.

We propose, indeed, to take every thing and to give nothing. "The native governments," said Sir Thomas Munro,* "had a class of richer gentry, " composed of Jagheardars and Emendars, and of " all the higher civil and military offices. These, " with the principal merchants and ryots, formed " a large body, wealthy, or at least easy in their " circumstances. The Jagheers and Enams of one " prince were often resumed by another, and the civil " and military officers were liable to frequent removal; " but as they were replaced by others, and as new " Jagheers and new Enams were replaced by others, " and as new Jagheers and Enams were granted to " new claimants, these changes had the effect of " continually throwing into the country a supply of " men, whose wealth enabled them to encourage " its cultivation and manufactures. These advan- " tages have almost entirely ceased under our go- " vernment. All the civil and military offices of " any importance are now held by Europeans, " whose savings go to their own country, and the " Jagheers and Enams which are resumed, or which " lapse to government only in a very small degree." And yet while pursuing a system, the tendency of which is to lower the character of a whole people, we profess to be extremely anxious to improve that

* Life, volume iii.

character by education. "Our present system of
 "government," says the same sagacious observer,*
 "by excluding all natives from power, and trust,
 "and emolument, is much more effectual in de-
 "pressing than all our laws and school books can
 "do in elevating their character. We are working
 "against our own designs, and we can expect to
 "make no progress while we work with a feeble
 "instrument to improve, and a powerful one to
 "deteriorate."

"No conceit more wild and absurd than this was
 "ever engendered in the darkest ages; for what is
 "in every age and every country the great stimulus
 "to the pursuit of knowledge, but the prospect of
 "fame, or wealth, or power, or what is even the
 "use of great attainments, if they are not to be
 "devoted to their noblest purpose, the service of
 "the community, by employing those who possess
 "them, according to their respective qualifications
 "in the various duties of the public administration
 "of the country. How can we expect that the
 "Hindoos will be eager in the pursuit of science
 "unless they have the same inducements as in
 "other countries? If superior acquirements do
 "not open the road to distinction, it is idle to sup-
 "pose that the Hindoo would lose his time in
 "seeking them; and even if he did so, his pro-
 "ficiency, under the doctrine of exclusion from

* Life, vol. ii. p. 58.

" office, would serve no other purpose than to shew
 " him more clearly the fallen state of himself and
 " his countrymen. He would not study what he
 " knew could be of no ultimate benefit to himself,
 " he would learn only those things which were in
 " demand, and which were likely to be useful
 " to him; namely, writing and accounts. There
 " might be some exceptions, but they would
 " be few; some few natives living at the principal
 " settlements, and passing much of their time among
 " Europeans, might either from a real love of lite-
 " rature, from vanity, or some other cause, study
 " their books; and if they made some progress, it
 " would be greatly exaggerated, and would be
 " hailed as the dawn of the great day of light
 " and science about to be spread all over India.
 " But there always has been, and always will be a
 " few such men among the natives, without making
 " any change in the body of the people. Our books
 " alone will do little or nothing; dry simple litera-
 " ture will never improve the character of a nation.
 " To produce this effect, it must open the road to
 " wealth, and honour, and public employment.
 " Without the prospect of such reward, no attain-
 " ments in science will ever raise the character of a
 " people."

In the quarter of a century which has elapsed
 since this passage was written we have been steadily
 at work in narrowing this road to "wealth and
 honour," and we are now employed in blocking it

up altogether. Not content with proclaiming our intention to exclude them from every high office in our own territory, till they are "christianised and civilized;" not content with confiscating the Jagheers and Emans which have been granted to natives by former Governments, we have now marked whole sovereignties for our prey, and this that we may open fresh fields of employment for our own countrymen. Five native states have fallen within the last ten years. If we put on one side of the account what the natives have gained by the few offices that have been lately opened to them, with what they have lost by the extermination of these states, we shall find the net loss to be immense, and what the native loses the Englishman gains. Upon the extermination of a native state, the Englishman takes the place of the sovereign, under the name of Commissioner; three or four of his associates displace as many dozen of the native official aristocracy; while some hundreds of our troops take the place of the many thousands that every native chief supports. The little court disappears—trade languishes—the capital decays—the people are impoverished—the Englishman flourishes, and acts like a sponge, drawing up riches from the banks of the Ganges, and squeezing them down upon the banks of the Thames.

Whether this system is to go on—whether our proclaimed intention of absorbing all the native states is to be carried out—whether the aggressive

policy of the present ruler of India, and of those in the Court of Directors who support him, is to be sustained—or whether the conservative policy which has been so strongly recommended by all eminent Indian statesmen, headed by the great Duke, and advocated by another party in the Court, is to be re-established, depends entirely upon the new President of the Board of Control, who, for the benefit of India, is called, like the majority of his immediate predecessors, to exercise despotic authority over that great empire, with a total unpreparedness for such a high function.*

Before he decides upon this important question, therefore, it may be as well to call his attention to another important phasis of it.

Aurunzebe undermined the foundations of the Mogul empire by attacking the religion of the great mass of his subjects. Next to attacks upon his religion, the Hindoo is most sensitive to attacks upon his ancestral rights; and in refusing to recognise the right of a Hindoo prince to adopt a successor, in order that his inheritance may lapse to us, we are striking a deadly blow at both, and striking that blow in the most offensive manner; viz., by declaring that those who have been sovereign princes

* Seven Presidents of the Board of Control in ten years; five of whom had never given a thought to India, until they were called to the chair. What an irresistible argument for the appointment of a permanent Council, to check, and advise the man who is intrusted with such enormous power.

from a remote age—who have been recognised as such by all dynasties, and specially by ourselves in our treaties—are only our vassals, and that we have a right to deal with them as such. We first degrade, in order that we may have a right to injure them.

Can we thus insult a high-spirited people with impunity? The disunion amongst the princes and classes of India has always been a source of our strength; but by the blow which we are now aiming at their rights and at their independence, we are offering Hindoos and Mussulmen, Mahrattas and Rajpoots, encouragement to combine against us. Whether the Rajpoot states shall be a tower of defence, or a source of imminent danger, depends entirely upon the way with which we deal with the question, “Are we bound by our treaties?”

It has been remarked by the highest authority* in everything that respects these states, that “danger both external and internal is inseparably connected with Rajpootana; and according to the policy we pursue towards this cluster of petty sovereignties, will its amount be increased or diminished. If the spirit of the treaties be upheld, it is no exaggeration to say that, within a few years of prosperity, we could oppose to any enemy upon this one only vulnerable frontier, at

* Colonel Tod, P.P. 1832, Appendix, p. 80.

“ least 50,000 Rajpoots, headed by their respective
 “ princes, who would die in our defence. This is
 “ asserted from a thorough knowledge of their cha-
 “ racter and history. The Rajpoots want no change ;
 “ they only desire the recognition and inviolability
 “ of their independence ; but we must bear in
 “ mind that mere parchment obligations are good
 “ for little in the hour of danger. It is for others
 “ to decide whether they will sap the foundation of
 “ rule by a passive indifference to the feelings of
 “ race ; or whether, by acts of kindness, generosity,
 “ and politic forbearance, they will ensure the ex-
 “ ertion of all their moral and physical energies in
 “ one common cause with us.”

Shall we then make fast friends of this high-
 spirited and warlike race, by upholding our treaties,
 and respecting their independence, or shall we make
 them our deadly enemies, by violating both ? And
 in weighing this question, we must remember that in
 order to keep India at all, we are obliged to hold it
 by a strong military grasp ; that our chief military
 instrument is the sepoy ; and that a very large
 portion of the Bengal and Bombay armies are Raj-
 poots, whose feelings of clanship are as strong as
 those of Highlanders, and who still retain a lively
 recollection of the ancient grandeur of their race.
 If we sap the foundation of our rule by acts of in-
 justice to the Rajpoot princes, we shall surely awake
 a sympathy for them in the hearts of a large part
 of the native army ; and the greatest of Indian au-

thorities has told us what the consequence will be, whenever our native army is roused to a sense of its own strength.* Wages are rapidly rising; and the time may come when we may find it difficult, pay what we will, to provide the 50,000 Europeans who are required for the service of India, and to them we could alone look for the preservation of our power—if the native army should at any time be induced to hesitate in its allegiance. But as the Mogul Empire was easily overturned when once the Hindoo mind was alienated from its rulers, so ours would soon fall if we were to endeavour to govern by physical force alone, that force being a foreign army. For the natives, whatever we may think, “are not held in subjection by any opinion that we “are wiser or better than they are, or that we “govern them better than they would be governed “by one of their own colour and religion. Our “strength consists not in any mysterious or unseen “force, but in an organised government and a well “officered army.” *Alienate the affections of the army and our empire totters to its fall.*

But no such catastrophe is to be apprehended if the British public and the British Parliament should say yes, to the question which has been propounded, “Are we bound by our treaties?” Fortunately no reading of Blue-books, no particular Indian knowledge is necessary to enable them

* See Appendix.

thoroughly to understand it. Its merits lie in a small compass, and may be stated thus.

It is the religious duty of Hindoo princes to adopt an heir, in failure of heirs of their own body. Hindoo dynasties have been perpetuated from generation to generation, through a long course of ages by the exercise of this right.

This right was formally recognised by the British Government in 1825, and recognised fifteen successive times between the years 1825 and 1848.

An attempt was made in 1841 to question it, which was nipt in the bud, as we have seen by the Governor-General Lord Auckland, who declared the right to be "unquestionable," and that no rights which we might assume as successors of the Mogul Emperors, could void our treaties; and in 1841, the British Government intimated its wish "that all the sovereign princes of India who had no issue should name their successors during their lifetime."

This is the case of the sovereign princes of India, so far as it rests upon their inherent rights.

With all these princes we have entered into treaties—the language of these treaties varies but little, with some it runs thus—"There shall be perpetual friendship, alliance, and amity of interests between the two States from generation to generation."

* *Treaty with the Rajah of Kerowlee, 9th Nov. 1818.*

Or thus, "There shall be perpetual friendship, alliance, and unity of interest between the British Government on the one hand and Moha Rao Omed Sing, and his heirs and successors on the other."

When the British Government cedes territory, or when territory is ceded to it, the language of the treaties is a cession in "perpetual Sovereignty." As examples: By treaty concluded between the British Government, the Peishwah, and the Nizam, on the 28th April, 1804, the province of Cuttack is ceded "in perpetual sovereignty, to the East India Company."

The territory to the westward of the river Windah, is ceded to the Nizam "in perpetual sovereignty."

The fort and city and territory of Ahmednugur is ceded to the Peishwah "in perpetual sovereignty."

The territory within the Doab is ceded to the Company "in perpetual sovereignty."

By a treaty concluded with the Rajah of Sattara in 1819, the British Government ceded certain districts to the Rajah of Sattara, "his heirs and successors in perpetual sovereignty."

Now if Her Majesty wished to create a title which should never die, or if Parliament intended to confer a grant in perpetuity—what more appropriate, or what more comprehensive terms for the accomplishment of the objects could be used than

“ heirs and successors,” “ descendants from generation to generation in perpetuity;” and strong and unmistakeable as such terms would be in an English grant, they are, if possible, stronger when the grant is made to an Indian Prince, whose duty it is to adopt an heir, if he has none of his body, and who can never therefore, except from his own default, want for heirs.

Shall we, then, agree with the present Governor-General, Lord Dalhousie, and say that in a treaty with an Indian prince, the terms, “ heirs and successors,” must be taken in their ordinary sense, as limiting the grant to “ heirs male of the body ? ” or shall we agree with his predecessor, Lord Auckland, and say, that the words must be taken in their ordinary sense, and that by no strain of language can this be made to mean merely “ heirs male of the body ? ”

We shall certainly agree with both the [Noble Lords that the words must be “ read in their ordinary sense, in the sense in which they are employed in *other treaties between states.*” * “ Upon words so distinct and positive as these (heirs and successors),” said Lord Auckland, in commenting upon our treaty with the Rajah of Oomba, “ I hold it to be impossible to raise a question.” The sense in which one Noble Lord read them, was, that they went beyond “ heirs male of the body ; ” and they gave the Rajah an understood right to adopt a suc-

* P. P. March 1, p. 82.

cessor; by the other Noble Lord, that they limited the succession to heirs male of the body, and debarred him from the right of adoption. If the ordinary reading of "heirs and successors, in treaties with other states," be as Lord Dalhousie says it is, "heirs male of the body," then the treaties made by other states with her Majesty's ancestors are no longer binding; then are the treaties made by her Majesty's ancestors with the sovereigns of Spain no longer in force, for heirs female, according to this interpretation, do not come within the category of heirs and successors.

Will the British Parliament and the British public, then, permit the Government of India thus to torture the plain language of treaties, and to insult our common sense, in order that they may, as opportunity offers, rob the princes of India of their rights, and of their kingdoms?

It is "only in this way we are told that we can hope gradually to extinguish the native states which consume so large a portion of the revenue of the country."* With the view to the accomplishment of this object, shall the Indian Government be permitted to say that when they *receive* territory in perpetuity from an Indian prince; the cession is in reality what it is in name—a cession—for ever; and that when that government *grants* a territory in perpetuity to a native prince, his heirs and successors, the grant shall cease at our plea-

sure; that when we, by treaty, guarantee the territory of a native prince to himself, from generation to generation, we are loosed from our engagement whenever a prince may die without heirs male of his body?

Three hundred princes and chiefs, to whom we have dictated our treaties, wait with trembling anxiety an answer to this question. They want to know whether their posterity are to be what their ancestors have been, Princes; or whether, under the "benign" British Government, they are to become pensioners first, and beggars afterwards. Is that "benign" government, which boasts so much of its conservative principles, to be permitted to revolutionize Hindoostan, after this fashion to root out of the land all the princes and all that remains of its ancient aristocracy—an aristocracy that, with few exceptions, has existed from time out of mind?

If the British Parliament and the British public should say "such things shall not be," there is a still more pinching question behind—will they order what has been already taken unjustly to be restored?

In 1839 we dethroned the first Rajah of Satara, upon the strength of evidence which we would not permit him to see.

In 1843 we seized upon a large territory from the Ameers of Scinde, upon the strength of certain letters, which we would not permit them to see.

In the years 1845 and 1848 we took up our trea-

ties with the second Rajah of Sattara, with the Chiefs of Cabala and of Mandavie, and determined that a cession in perpetuity and guarantees to heirs and successors meant only pledges to "heirs male of the body," and, while professing an earnest desire to do no injustice, sternly refused to hear those who it was said could, if heard, have sustained their rights against us in any court of justice.

And, lastly, having driven the officers of our ward, the infant Rajah of Lahore, into rebellion, when the country was under our uncontrolled rule, as regent and guardian, we punished our ward by the confiscation of his territory to our own use! Shall we then hold fast these possessions, or shall we imitate one bright example that our Indian annals afford us, and restore what we ought never to have taken. In 1782 we were the means of depriving a Rajah of Tanjore of his rights; many years afterwards we discovered our error, and in redressing it used the following noble language:—

“Adverting to the right of the Company to interfere originally with respect to the succession of Tanjore, it is observed, that the same right called upon them, under existing circumstances, to review the whole subject; and that if it should appear that the decision of Government had been procured by imposition and intrigue, by which the legal heir had been deprived of his rights, a declaration to that effect, followed by his restitu-

“ tion, would be more honourable to British justice,
 “ and more calculated to promote our political
 “ character and interests than to suffer the con-
 “ tinuance of an imposition obtained at our hands
 “ by sinister and undue means. It would manifest
 “ to the world that the principle of British justice
 “ is ever true to itself, and that if those intrusted
 “ with its administration should be betrayed into
 “ error (an event not impossible even from the in-
 “ tegrity of their own minds), when truth shall
 “ have made its way, the hour of retribution must
 “ come, and the honour of the British name be
 “ completely vindicated.”

We have seen that these ill-gotten possessions entail a heavy loss upon our Exchequer; that instead of receiving aid from them, our own subjects are taxed to make good their deficits. It may be convenient for us to say, that we can never recede with safety, however unjustly we may have advanced; but it is not true. We recede when it suits us, as we did in 1806, when, having got into what was considered at the time an awkward position, we abandoned it, tore up our treaties without the least scruple, and left our friends at the mercy of their enemies.

If then, with these facts before us, and upon full proof of the injustice that has been done, we should refuse to follow the example that has been adduced, and redress it, the verdict against us must be, that in matters oriental this nation has no con-

science, and that it is not a follower of him who said—

“ I would sacrifice Gwallior, and every frontier
“ of India ten times over, rather than violate British
“ good faith.”

APPENDIX A.

Letter addressed to the Most Noble the Marquis of Dalhousie, Governor-General of India, &c., on the sovereign Rights of the Princes of India, in 1850.

MY LORD,—In your Lordship's minute of the 30th August, 1848, in which you assign your reasons for refusing to recognise the adopted son of Appa Sahib, late Rajah of Sattara, as his successor in that principality, you assert it "to be established as a general rule, beyond cavil or doubt, that while adoption by a prince of any individual is valid so far as to constitute him heir to the adopter's private possessions, it is of no power or effect whatever in constituting him heir to the principality, or to sovereign rights, until the adoption so made has received the sanction of the sovereign power, with whom it rests to give or to refuse it." And your Lordship states, that it was exclusively from the papers then before you—that is, upon the minutes of the members of the Bombay Government—that you came to that conclusion.

Now, the principle thus announced by your Lordship is of the highest importance, not merely because it constitutes the foundation of your resolution regarding the unhappy Sattara dynasty, but far more, because, if maintained, it will necessarily lead you to a similar decision as to the numerous principalities of central India—a decision, I confidently assert, utterly at variance with justice and good faith, fatal to the moral strength of the British name, rendering the most solemn treaties of the East India Company a snare and a mockery, and justifying, if it do not occasion, among many millions of a brave and warlike people, a feeling wholly destructive of all security for the peace, not to say the existence, of our Indian empire. You adopted this principle, while yet new to Indian affairs, exclusively on the authority of those on whose judgment you might then not unnaturally rely, but of whose qualifications to advise the supreme Government in such a case,

you now doubtless are more accurately informed, since it seems probable that the immediate pressure of current business, that admitted no delay, may have prevented that careful research into the subject which you would otherwise have directed. But, above all, since your Lordship can no longer be ignorant, that the rule which you consider to be established beyond "all cavil or doubt," is in direct conflict with the deliberate and often-reiterated judgment of your predecessors, I feel that, humble as I am, I need offer no apology for thus publicly calling upon you *carefully and candidly to revise the conclusion which you have so unhappily and (with all respect I must say it) incautiously adopted.*

I make this call with the more confidence, because in the minute to which I have referred, while grievously mistaking the real merits of the question before you, you nevertheless announced the wholesome general principle, that "the British Government is bound in duty as well as policy to act on every occasion of acquiring territory or revenue, with the purest integrity and with the most scrupulous observance of good faith, and that where even a shadow of doubt can be shown, the claim should at once be abandoned;" and I will not insult you by questioning for a moment the good faith in which this avowal was made, however much I may feel astonished that it should find a place in such a document, and however strongly it may evince, that the fairest intentions and the highest talents may fail to secure their possessor from being guilty of gross injustice when combined with despotic power. But, accepting this declaration in its plain and simple meaning, and utterly rejecting the notion that it can be a mere cover for designs of violence and spoliation, I entreat your Lordship to observe that the papers which have lately been printed by order of the House of Commons, demonstrate, in the clearest manner, that the rule which your predecessors pronounced to have been established "beyond all cavil or doubt," and upon which they repeatedly acted, was, that *every* Sovereign Prince in India has an inherent right to adopt a successor to his sovereign rights, and that the British Government is as much bound to recognise such right, as a judge is bound to enforce the law, without any, the slightest pretence to the power of arbitrarily withholding the right which it confers upon

those who sue for its protection. You will accordingly find that, in conformity with this rule, your predecessors, Lord Amherst, Lords W. Bentinck, Auckland, and Metcalfe, recognised, between the years 1826 and 1846, seven adoptions made by reigning Sovereign Princes, and seven made either by the widows or mothers of deceased princes. Furthermore, in one instance, where there was an entire failure of heirs, a succession made by election of the chiefs and people of the State, was instantly recognised, in accordance with a rule which had been laid down by Lord Metcalfe in October, 1837, and adopted by the Government of India of that day, viz., "That where there is a total failure of heirs, it is probably more consistent with right that the people should elect a Sovereign, than that the principality should lapse to the Paramount state, that state, in fact, having no rights in such a case but what it assumes by virtue of its power."

The same papers will shew your Lordship that all pretensions to deal with the Native Princes and Chiefs of India, by virtue of certain powers which your Lordship, in your judgment upon the Sattara adoption, assumed to have devolved upon the British Government, as successors of the emperors of Delhi, had been formally abandoned by your predecessors, and that it had been ruled by them, with the sanction of the Home Authorities, that in all our dealings with these princes, "we are to look only to the terms and spirit of our treaties and engagements which we have formed with them, and bring forward no other demand than such as in reference to those engagements may be indisputably consistent with good faith." And that when a question arose as to the sense in which the words "heirs and successors" should be interpreted in our treaty with the Rajah of Orcha, Lord Auckland at once determined it to mean "heirs by adoption," as well as "heirs natural," observing, that "upon words so distinct and positive, it was impossible to raise a question." Thus construing that treaty, and all other treaties similarly worded, in the teeth of the construction which your Lordship put upon the same words in the treaty with Sattara, where you determined that the words "heirs and successors" must be read in their ordinary sense, in the sense in which they are employed in other treaties between states, that is, as meaning only 'heirs natural.' " The same

papers will shew your Lordship the serious error into which you fell, in assuming that the Rajah of Sattara had "obtained larger powers in respect of adoption than are enjoyed by old established states," the right which he claimed being precisely the same that had been invariably recognized to all other Sovereign Princes, viz., the right to adopt a successor to his royal rights, in failure of heirs of his body—a right which, strange to say, is unequivocally admitted in the papers which authorized you to confiscate the principality of Sattara, upon the ground that the Rajah had no such right: "for," says the minute which bears the signature of a majority of the Court of Directors, by whose vote that measure was carried, "it is freely admitted that if the Rajah were created a sovereign in the ordinary acceptation of the term, he was unquestionably competent to adopt a successor to his royal rights, as well as an heir to his private estate." The conclusion, I leave it to your Lordship to draw, seeing that you have unequivocally admitted that the late Rajah was such a sovereign as is contemplated in that paper; for in the very first paragraph of your Lordship's minute you designated him, with great truth and propriety, as an independent Sovereign. Recurring, then, to your Lordship's frank avowal, that no claim to territory or revenue ought to be enforced, of which the validity is doubtful, I venture to ask your Lordship, whether, with the proof now before you, that your confiscation of the principality of Sattara was in the teeth of the law and custom of India, as laid down and repeatedly acted upon by your predecessors, in accordance, I believe, with the judgment of every officer entitled to pronounce an opinion on the subject—amongst them, that distinguished man, Mr. M. Elphinstone, who framed the original treaty with the Rajah.—I venture, I say, humbly, but firmly to ask, whether your Lordship can honestly maintain that territory and revenue so acquired can be retained, consistently with that "pure integrity, and scrupulous good faith," which you say should characterise all the dealings of the British Government with the Princes of India?

I have the honour to be,

With great respect,

Your Lordship's most obedient servant,

JOHN SULLIVAN.

No. 2.

ON THE IMPOLICY OF SUBVERTING THE NATIVE STATES OF INDIA.

The Duke of Wellington.

“ In my opinion, the extension of our territory and influence has been greater than our means. Besides, we have added to the number and description of our enemies, by depriving of employment those who heretofore found it in the service of Tippoo and of the Nizam. Wherever we spread ourselves, particularly if we aggrandize ourselves at the expense of the Mahrattas, we increase this evil; we throw out of employment and means of subsistence all who have hitherto managed the revenue, commanded, or served, in the armies, or have plundered the country. These people become additional enemies, at the same time that by the extension of our territory, our means of supporting our government and of defending ourselves are proportionally decreased.” *

Sir Thomas Munro.

“ Even if all India could be brought under the British dominion, it is very questionable whether such a change, either as it regards the natives or ourselves, ought to be desired. One effect of such a conquest would be that the Indian army, having no longer any warlike neighbours to combat, would gradually lose its military habits and discipline, and that the native troops would have leisure to feel their own strength, and for want of other employment to turn it against their European masters. But even if we could be secured against every internal commotion, and could retain the country quietly in subjection, I doubt much *if the condition of the people would be better than under their native Princes.* The strength of the British government enables it to put down every rebellion, to repel every foreign invasion, and to give to its subjects a degree of protection which those of no native power enjoy. Its laws and institutions also afford them a security from domestic oppression unknown in those states; but these advantages are dearly bought. They are purchased by the sacrifice of

* Life of Sir Thomas Munro, vol. i. p. 266.

independence, of national character, and of whatever renders a people respectable. The natives of the British provinces may, without fear, pursue their different occupations, as traders, meerassadars, or husbandmen, and enjoy the fruits of their labour in tranquillity; but none of them can aspire to anything beyond this mere animal state of thriving in peace: none of them can look forward to any share in the legislation, or civil, or military government of their country. It is from men who either hold, or who are eligible, to public office, that natives take their character; where no such men exist, there can be no energy in any other class of the community. The effect of this state of things is observable in all the British provinces, whose inhabitants are certainly the most *subject race* in India. No elevation of character can be expected among men, who, in the military line, cannot attain to any rank above that of Subahdar (captain), where they are as much below an (English) Ensign as an Ensign is below the Commander-in-Chief; and who in the civil line can hope for nothing beyond some petty, judicial, or revenue office, in which they may by corrupt means make up for their slender salary. The consequence, therefore, of the conquest of India by the British arms would be, in place of raising, *to debase the whole people*. There is, perhaps, no example of any conquest, in which the natives have been so completely excluded from all share of the government of their country as British India. Among all the disorders of the native States, the field is open for every man to raise himself, and hence among them, there is a spirit of emulation, of restless enterprise, and independence, far preferable to the servility of our Indian subjects. The existence of independent native States is also useful in drawing off the turbulent and disaffected among our native troops.*

* *Sir John Malcolm.*

“I am decidedly of opinion that the tranquillity, not to say *the security of our vast Oriental possessions is involved in the preservation of the native principalities which are dependent upon us for protection*. These are also so obviously at our mercy, so entirely within our grasp,

* *Life of Sir Thomas Munro, vol. ii, p. 466.*

That besides the other and great benefits which we derive from those alliances, their co-existence with our rule is of itself a *source of political strength, the value of which will never be known till it is lost.* They shew the possibility of a native state subsisting even in the heart of our own territories, and their condition mitigates in some degree the bad effects of that too general impression, that our sovereignty is incompatible with the maintenance of native Princes and Chiefs. I shall not stop in this place to examine into the truth or otherwise of the notion, that we have sought occasion to reduce our allies to the condition of stipendiaries, after having made use of them to serve our own purposes. It is in many cases untrue, and in all exaggerated; but it is very general, and forms one of the most leading, most plausible, and most popular grounds of combination against our power. This I have had ample opportunities of knowing to be a fact; and I am further convinced, that though our revenue may increase, *the permanence of our power will be hazarded in proportion as the territories of native Princes and Chiefs fall under our direct rule.* Considering as I do, from all my experience, that it is our policy to maintain as long as we can all Native States now existing, and through them, and by other means to support and maintain native Chiefs and an Aristocracy throughout the empire of India; I do think *that every means should be used to avert* what I should consider as one of the greatest calamities, in a political point of view, that could arise to our empire, viz. the whole of India becoming subject to our direct rule. There are now none of the latter who can venture to contend against us in the field. They are incapable from their actual condition of any dangerous combinations with each other, and they absorb many elements of sedition and rebellion. It is further to be observed on this part of the subject, that, that the respect which the natives give to men of high birth, with claims upon their allegiance, contributes greatly to the preservation of the general peace. Such afford an example to their countrymen of submission to the rule of foreigners—they check the rise of those bold military adventurers, with which India has, and ever will abound, but who will never have the field widely opened to their enterprizes, until our impolicy has annihilated, or suffered to die of their own act, those high Princes and

Chiefs, who, though diminished in power, have still the hereditary attachment and obedience of millions of those classes, who are from habits and courage alike suited to maintain, or to disturb, the public peace."

"Our relations with the Government of Mysore, are of that delicate texture which must make them require constant attention. The smallest departure from any of these fundamental principles upon which they are grounded, will infallibly lead to their ultimate dissolution; but while they are respected, this connexion will form the *bulwark of our strength in the South of India*, and it may, in the course of events, be a consideration of policy to *increase, instead of diminishing, the limits of a state which*, while it affords us resources fully equal to the same extent of our own dominions, is exempt from some of the objections of rule to which these are subject, and particularly to that popular and in some degree true, one, of not giving sufficient employment to the different classes of military inhabitants."

Mr. Elphinstone.

"It appears to me (said Mr. Elphinstone) to be our interest as well as our duty, to use every means to preserve the allied governments; it is also our interest to keep up the number of independent powers: their territories afford a refuge to all those whose habits of war, intrigue, or depredation, make them incapable of remaining quiet in ours; and the contrast of our Government has a favourable effect on our subjects, who, while they feel the evils they are actually exposed to, are apt to forget the greater ones from which they have been delivered. If the existence of independent powers gives occasional employment to our armies, it is far from being a disadvantage."

Sir Henry Russell.

"The danger that we have most to dread in India lies entirely at home. A well conducted rebellion of our native subjects, or an extensive disaffection of our native troops, is the event by which our power is most likely to be shaken; and the sphere of this danger is necessarily enlarged by every enlargement of our territory. The increase of our subjects, and still more of our native troops, is an increase

not of our strength but of our weakness; between them and us there never can be community of feeling. We must always continue foreigners; and the object of that jealousy and dislike, which a foreign rule never ceases to excite.”*

General Walker.

“To the imbecile and powerless state to which we have reduced the native Governments we must ascribe all the disorders that have lately disturbed the country. The first effect of their unsuccessful contests with us was the necessary discharge of a great part of their armies, who no longer finding regular pay and subsistence, and having arms in their hands have been obliged to maintain themselves by robbery and violence: The same thing would have happened in Europe after the defeat and dispersion of the French armies, had not the spirit of licentiousness and rapine been restrained by the presence of the forces which the allies have kept on foot. By reducing the native powers to this weak and degraded state, we have deprived them of the ability, and perhaps of the inclination, of crushing disturbances, which they may think more hurtful to us than to themselves. They may hope from anarchy and insurrection to recover their losses.

“In this mixture of authority and dependence, it would be in vain to look for any solid or sincere alliance. They all feel a yoke which they would be glad to embrace any favourable opportunity of throwing off. *The sentiment of hostility is deeply rooted, and must remain so long as the causes exist that produced it.* Those who are bound to us apparently by the strongest ties of confederacy feel that the treaties concluded with us have not been between independent states, but between a sovereign and his vassals.

“They perceive in signing these treaties they have consigned themselves to a state of degrading dependence. The moment, therefore, that any power appears which affords a promise of being able to cope with ours they will instantly range themselves on its side. It is certain that we shall never have to contend with such a power. France, we may be well aware, is viewing our predominance in the East Indies with an eye of perpetual jealousy; and though she may be at present too busy, or too weak, to make any

* Letters to Mr. Villiers, Appendix to Political Report, 1832.

great exertion for the recovery of her former influence, she will certainly avail herself of the first moment of leisure to accomplish that favourite object. It is in vain to hope that we can long exclude her from India. China, Siam, Ava, Persia, and Arabia are open to her enterprise and her ambition. In time and repose she will find ships. Her former passions will regain their influence. But is there no other enemy to dread besides France? May not the policy of Russia be again directed towards India? The barbarous nations that intervene would rather be disposed to augment her power than to oppose her progress. The ambition of Persia may be excited to invade this rich prize, and constant danger must be apprehended from the warlike hordes which extend from Tartary to this frontier.

“It has been by this route that every invader has entered India, from the time of Alexander down to that of Nader Shah. Instead of a weak and mercenary government in this direction, *the security of India would require an independent and powerful state.*”

APPENDIX B.

No. 1.

*Sketch of the State of India under its Native Sovereigns,
from Mr. M. Elphinstone's History of India.*

The Hindoos of the age of Menu, who were contemporary with the age of Homer, were in advance of the Greeks of that age; their institutions were less rude, their conduct to their enemies more humane, their general learning much more considerable, and in the knowledge of the being and the nature of God, they were already in possession of a light which was but faintly perceived even by the loftiest intellects of the best days of Athens.

Their cloths in fineness of texture have never yet been approached in any other country; the brilliancy and permanency of their dyes have not yet been equalled in Europe; manufactures in silk were known to them at a

very early period, and gold and silver brocade were the favourite, perhaps the original manufactures of India. They had a good system of agriculture, and were familiar with the use of the drill plough, and practised a rotation of crops.

Their works for irrigation are upon a great scale; they have reservoirs of vast extent and magnificent embankments, both in respect to elevation and solidity, some of which form lakes many miles in circumference, and water great tracks of country. In the earliest times they had a thriving commerce, and the abundance of articles proves that there was an open trade between the different parts of India. There was considerable traffic also between the coast of Coromandel and the Eastern Inlands in the first century after Christ.

“The historians of Java give a distinct account of a numerous body of Hindoos from that coast who civilized the inhabitants of that island.” The proofs of this immigration are to be found in the numerous and magnificent Hindoo remains which still exist in Java, and in the language used for historical, and religious, and practical compositions which is a dialect of Sanskrit. Java, indeed, at the end of the fourth century was found almost peopled by Hindoos, who sailed from Ganges to Ceylon, and from Ceylon to Java, and from Java to China, in ships manned by crews who professed the Brahminical religion. All the descriptions of the parts of India which were visited by the Greeks give the idea of a country teeming with population, and enjoying the highest degree of prosperity. There were 1500 cities between the *Hydraspes* and the *Hyphasis*, while the numerous commercial cities and ports of trade, mentioned in the “*Periplus*” attest the progress of the Hindoos in a department which more than any other shews the advanced condition of a nation. The soldiers who opposed Alexander were in constant pay during war and peace; their bravery is always spoken of by the Greeks, as superior to that of any other nations with whom they had contended in Asia; their policy was excellent; justice was cheaply and speedily administered mainly through the instrumentality of Panchayets or Juries, and their system of finance rested upon the solid basis of the right of the Government to a portion of the produce of the soil. Their chariots were drawn in war by horses, on

a march by oxen. *Strabo* makes mention of royal roads and milestones. Wheel carriages appear to have been in use in the times of Menu.

From the earliest Hindoo times, indeed to the decline of the Mogul empire, the great roads were objects of much attention to the Government; and we learn from the "*Periplus*" that large quantities of goods were brought down in carts from *Teigora and Plethora*, two cities of great extent, situated on the Godavery, to the coast about about 300 years before Christ. A large part of India was under the sceptre of a Prince named Asoca, the extent of whose dominions is proved by the remote points at which his boundary columns are erected, and the same monuments bear testimony to the civilized character of his government, since they contain orders for establishing hospitals and dispensaries throughout his empire, as well as for planting trees, and digging wells along the public highways.* *Vicramaditya*, a contemporary of the first Cæsar, was the powerful sovereign of a civilized and populous country half a century before the commencement of the Christian era.

The Hindu, as well as the Mahomedan writers, who describe the conquest of India in the 11th century, dwell in terms of the highest admiration on the extent and magnificence of Kanoj, the capital of a kingdom of that name, which included the territory of modern Oude. In the 4th century nearly the whole of India was brought, and remained for a short period under the Mussulman rule. It is described by "*Iba Batula*," the Mahomedan traveller, as a most flourishing empire, its capital Delhi, with its walls and mosques, "as without an equal on earth." One of its sovereigns, *Firoz Toghlok*, was the projector of that magnificent canal which united the Jumna with the rivers of the Punjaub, a work that has been partially, and it is to be hoped, will be completely restored by the British Government. Fifty dams across rivers to promote irrigation; forty mosques, thirty colleges, one hundred caravansaries, thirty reservoirs, a hundred hospitals, a hundred public baths, and a hundred and fifty bridges, besides many other edifices for pleasure and ornament, were the fruits of the long and prosperous reign of this able and munificent Prince.

* *Elphinstone*, vol. i. p. 393-4.

He moreover fixed the revenues in such a manner as to leave little discretion to the Government agents, and gave publicity and precision to the demands of the State, and established an admirable and well-regulated horse and foot post from the frontiers to the capital.

Historians and travellers, Mahomedan and Christians, unite in bearing testimony to the prosperous condition of India during the 13th, 14th, and 15th centuries.

The historian of Firoz Shah, who wrote in 1351, expatiates on the happy state of the ryots, upon the goodness of their homes and furniture. His reign, though not brilliant in other respects, was distinguished for the enlightened spirit of his regulations, and the extent and utility of his public works. He limited the number of capital punishments, and put a stop to the use of torture and the practice of mutilation, which last prohibition was the more meritorious, as it was at variance with the Mahomedan law.*

Mido de Conti, who travelled in India about 1420, speaks highly of what he saw in Guzerat, and found the banks of the Ganges covered with towns amidst most beautiful gardens and orchards. He passed four famous cities before he reached Nurrazen, which he describes as a powerful place, filled with gold, silver, and precious stones.

These accounts are corroborated by two Mussulmen, who travelled in the first part of the 16th century. The former describes Cambay as a remarkably well built city, in a beautiful and fertile country, filled with merchants of all nations, and with artizans and manufactures like those of Flanders.

In the early part of the 16th century, the Moguls appeared on the scene; and Baber, the first of the sovereigns of that dynasty, although disliking his adopted country, speaks of Hindostan as a rich and noble region, abounding in gold and silver, of its swarming population, and the innumerable workmen that were to be found in every trade and profession. Nor was this prosperity confined to the territories under Mussulman rule. The Hindoo kingdom of Bijanagar, the principalities of Malabar and Madura, were in an equally flourishing condition.

We have the testimony of Sir Thomas Roe, of Tavernier, and of Pietro Valli, that there was rather an increase than

* Elphinstone, vol. ii. p. 71.

a diminution of the wealth, prosperity, and good government of India during the reigns of Acbar, Jchangár, Shah Jehán, and the principal part of the reign of Aurungzebe.

It owed much of this prosperity to the personal characters of its rulers. There were many most distinguished men both amongst the Patán and the Mogul dynasties—amongst them Kutt-u-deen, in the 13th century, the most powerful monarch of the former race, was generally beloved for the frankness and generosity of his disposition, and left a permanent reputation as a just and virtuous ruler. And in the same century reigned the Sultána Regia, who was endowed, says the historian Ferishtah, with every princely virtue. She evinced all the qualities of a just and able sovereign, and those who scrutinised her actions most severely could find no fault in her, except that she was a woman. Jelal-u-deen, of the house of Khilji, who reigned in the year 1288, was celebrated for his clemency, magnanimity, and love of literature; and his nephew, Ala-u-din, for his military talents.

Baber, the first sovereign of the Mogul dynasty, was a frank kind-hearted man, who devoted himself to the improvement of his adopted country. Besides the business of his kingdom, he was constantly employed in forming aqueducts, reservoirs, as well as in introducing new fruits, and other productions of remote countries. His successor, Humáyun, was free from vices and violent passions, and more inclined to ease than ambition. He bore the sad reverses of his fortune with a cheerfulness that approached to magnanimity.

The author of these reverses was "Sher Khan," who wrested the empire from him. He is said to have been a prince of consummate prudence and ability. He was the author of many benevolent measures, which he carried out with signal wisdom, and notwithstanding his short reign, and his constant activity in the field, he brought his territories into the highest order, and introduced many improvements into his civil government, the most important of which was the survey and fixed assessment upon the land. He made a high road, planted with rows of trees for shade extending for four months' journey from Bengal to the Western Rhofas near the Indus, with caravansaries at every stage, and wells at every mile and a half, and provisions

for the poor at every caravansary, with servants to attend travellers. His second son, "Jelab Khan," was a man of known abilities, distinguished as a soldier and an improver.

The heroic courage, energy, and talent of Hemu, the Hindoo minister of his worthless successor, Mahomed Sha, are celebrated in Oriental history.

It is almost superfluous to dwell upon the character of the celebrated Acbar, who was equally great in the cabinet and in the field, and renowned for his toleration, liberality, clemency, courage, temperance, industry, and largeness of mind. He perfected the financial reforms which had been commenced in those provinces by Shir Shah. He abolished many vexatious taxes, and his instructions to his revenue officers shewed his anxiety for a liberal administration, and for the ease and comfort of his subjects.

The Italian traveller, Pietro del Valle, who wrote in the last year of the reign of Jehanger, Acbar's son, A.D. 1623, bears this testimony to the character of that prince, and to the condition of the people under his rule:—"Generally all live much after a genteel way, and they do it securely; as well, because the king does not prosecute his subjects with false accusations nor deprive them of anything when he sees them live splendidly and with the appearance of riches (as is often done in other Mahomedan countries), as because the Indians are inclined to those vanities."

But the reign of Shah Jehan, the grandson of Acbar, was the most prosperous ever known in India. His own dominions enjoyed almost uninterrupted tranquillity and good government; and although Sir Thomas Roe was struck with astonishment at the profusion of wealth which was displayed when he visited the emperor in his camp in 1615, in which at least two acres were covered with silk, gold carpets and hangings, as rich as velvet embossed with gold and precious stones could make them, yet we have the testimony of Tavernier that he who caused the celebrated peacock throne to be constructed, who, at the festival of his accession, scattered amongst the bystanders money and precious things equal to his own weight, "reigned not so much as a king over his subjects, but rather as a father over his family." His vigilance over his internal government was unremitting, and for order and arrangement of his territory and the good administration of every department of the state, no prince that ever reigned

in India could be compared to Shah Jehan. The whole of his civil and military arrangements presented an astonishing picture of magnificence and good order, where unwieldy numbers were managed without disturbance, and economy was attended to in the midst of profusion.

All his vast undertakings were managed with so much economy, that after defraying the expenses of his great expeditions to Candahar, his wars in Balk, and other heavy charges, and maintaining a regular army of 200,000 horse, Shah Jehan left a treasure, which some reckoned at near six, others at twenty-four millions in coin, besides his vast accumulations in wrought gold and silver, and in jewels.

His treatment of his people was beneficent and paternal, and his liberal sentiments towards those around him, cannot be better shewn than by the confidence which he so generously reposed in his sons.

So stable was the foundation upon which this prosperity rested that the empire continued to be in a flourishing condition for a large portion of the long, intolerant, and oppressive reign of Aurungzebe, and notwithstanding the misgovernment which followed in the next thirty years, under a series of weak and wicked princes, and the commotions which attended the breaking up of the empire, the enormous wealth which Nadir Shah was enabled to carry away with him when he quitted Delhi in 1739, is proof that the country was still in a comparatively prosperous condition.

Of the character of the Hindoo sovereigns who were the contemporaries of the Mussulman emperors in the 14th and 15th centuries we know nothing; but we know that their territories had attained to a pitch of power and splendour which had not been surpassed by their ancestors. We know also that the principal administrators of the Mussulman dynasties, with rare exceptions, were Hindoos—that they were entrusted with the command of armies, and with the regulation of the finances. The “robber” Sevajee, who entered upon the scene in the latter part of the 16th century, and who shook the Mogul empire to its foundations, during the reign of Aurungzebe, was an able statesman, as well as a skilful general. His civil government was regular, and he was vigorous in exacting from his provincial and his village officers obedience to the

rules which he laid down for the protection of the people. His enemies bear witness to his anxiety to mitigate the evils of war by humane regulations, which were strictly enforced. Altogether this "robber hero" left a character which has never since been equalled, or even approached, by any of his countrymen. Amongst many distinguished Princes of the Bahman dynasty, who ruled the Deccan during the 15th and 16th centuries, Mulik Amber was conspicuous. With the assistance of his Hindoo Ministers, he introduced great and systematic reforms into his dominions, and converted an arbitrary demand upon the land into a fixed assessment. So intimate indeed were the relations between the two races in those times, that both Moguls and Patans intermarried with Hindoos. The armies of Hindoo Princes were sometimes commanded by Mussulmen, and Mussulmen armies by Hindoos; and such were their notions of mutual toleration, that we find the Hindoo Rajah of Bijanayger in the 15th century building a mosque for his Mussulman subjects. The effort made by the intolerant bigotry of Aurungzebe to separate the races, and to reduce the Hindoo again to a state of a conquered and infidel people, was a main cause of the downfall of the empire. During the reigns of his predecessors, the Hindoo Princes, although conquered, had been permitted to retain their hereditary jurisdiction, and were not interfered with in the ordinary course of their administration. They served the empire, therefore, with a zealous attachment, which made them to be considered as the props of the monarchy. His order to exclude them from office, and his revival of the poll-tax upon infidels, and other encroachments upon their rights, alienated their affections, and made them in their hearts zealous patrons of the Mahrattas.

Nadir Shah finally quitted Hindostan in 1739; and in 1756 Clive won the battle of Plassey, which virtually made us masters of the richest and most populous division of the empire. Of the flourishing state of Bengal and Behar, of the northern circars, and of that part of country round Madras, called the "Jagheer," when those possessions fell into our hands, we have unimpeachable evidence.*

Elphinstone's History of India, vol. ii.

On the State of Bengal under its Native Sovereigns.

Those who think most favourably of Lord Cornwallis's system, see in the increased population, cultivation, and internal commerce, what has certainly occurred — which they deny could have been experienced under the former regulations of the government; they even deny the possibility of such effects being produced under what is understood to have been either the Mahomedan or the Hindoo system of government.

To so unfounded a prejudice, it might be sufficient to oppose the evidence of public works of ornament and use abounding throughout India, some of which recall the stupendous works of the ancient world, and could have been effected only under tranquil and prosperous governments, but on this point I am happy to be supported in the opinion of Mr. Hamilton, formerly Sanscrit Professor, whose knowledge of the history and literature of India give particular weight to his opinion.

“I hope,” says that gentleman, “that I shall not appear inconsistent if I state my conviction that at the time of the Mahomedan invasion, Hindostan had reached a higher degree of order, riches, and population, than it has since attained.” I beg it may not be imagined that I in any degree entertain the opinion that Bengal was misgoverned until the English obtained possession of it. The high state of prosperity in which they found it would, to every unprejudiced mind, sufficiently repel so gross a calumny. For my own part, I not only agree with Mr. Hamilton in regard to the effects which have been produced under former governments, but perhaps go farther than he does, in thinking the system under which those effects were produced to be still the system best adapted to the genius and condition of the people, and that our deviations from it have been attended with inconveniences to the government, and evils to the people, which go far to countervail any good to either, that can be ascribed exclusively to the change.”—*Mr. Davis, for many years in high office in Bengal, and a Director.*

*State of Mysore, and of the adjoining Territory, under
Tippoo Sultaun, A.D. 1790.*

“ When a person, travelling through a strange country finds it well cultivated, populous, with industrious inhabitants, cities newly founded, commerce extending, towns increasing, and every thing flourishing, so as to indicate happiness, he will naturally conclude it to be under a form of government congenial to the minds of the people. This is a picture of Tippoo’s country, and this is our conclusion respecting its government. It has fallen to our lot to tarry some time in Tippoo’s dominions, and to travel through them as much, if not more, than any other officer in the field during the war; and we have reason to suppose his subjects to be as happy as those of any other sovereign for we do not recollect of any complaints or murmurings among them; although, had causes existed, no time would have been more favourable for their utterance, because the enemies of Tippoo were in power, and would have been gratified by any aspersion of his character. The inhabitants of the conquered countries submitted with apparent resignation to the direction of their conquerors, but by no means as if relieved from an oppressive yoke in their former government; on the contrary, no sooner did an opportunity offer than they scouted their new masters, and gladly returned to their loyalty again.”* Whether from the operation of the system established by Hyder, from the principles which Tippoo adopted for his own conduct, or from his dominions having suffered little by invasion for many years, or from the effect of these several causes united, his country was found everywhere full of inhabitants, and apparently cultivated to the utmost extent of which the soil was capable, while the discipline and fidelity of his troops in the field, until their last overthrow, were testimonies, equally strong, of the excellent regulations which existed in his army. His government, though strict and arbitrary, was the despotism of a strict and able sovereign, who nourishes, not oppresses, the subjects who are to be the means of his future aggrandisement; and his cruelties were, in general, inflicted only on those whom he considered as his enemies.”†

* Moore’s Narrative of the War with Tippoo Sultaun, p. 201.

† Durom’s Narrative, p. 249.

No. 4.

State of Peishwah's Territory, A. D. 1803.

“It has not happened to me ever to see countries better cultivated and more abounding in all produce of the soil, as well as in commercial wealth, than the southern Mahratta districts, when I accompanied the present Duke of Wellington to that country in the year 1803. I particularly here allude to those large tracts near the borders of the Kistnah. Poonah, the capital of the Peishwah, was a very wealthy and thriving commercial town, and there was as much cultivation in the Deccan as it was possible an arid and unfruitful country could admit.”—Sir John Malcolm (*vide* evidence, Common's Committee, p. 41).

No. 5.

State of Malwa.

“With respect to Malwa, I saw it in a state of ruin, caused by the occupancy, for a period of more than half a century, of that fine country by the Mahratta armies, the Pindarries, and, indeed, the assembled predatory hordes of all India. Yet, even at that period, I was perfectly surprised at the difference that exists between a distant view of such countries, and a nearer examination of their actual condition. I had ample means afforded to me, as the person appointed to occupy that territory, and to conduct its civil, military, and political administration, to learn all that the records of Government could teach, and to obtain from other sources full information of this country; and I certainly entered upon my duties with the complete conviction that commerce would be unknown, and that credit could not exist in a province which had long possessed, from its position, the transit trade between the rich provinces of western India and the whole of the north-west provinces of Hindostan, as well as the more eastern ones of Saugur and Bundelcund. I found, to my surprise, that in correspondence with the first commercial and monied men of Rajpootana, Bundelcund, and Hindostan, as well as with those of Goozerat, dealings in money to a large amount had continually taken place at Oogain and other cities, where soucars or bankers of character and credit were in a flourishing state, and that goods to a great amount had not only continually passed through the province, but that the insurance offices which exist through

all parts of India, and include the principal monied men, had never stopped their operations, though premiums rose, at a period of danger, to a high amount. The native Governments of Malwa, when tranquillity was established through our arms, wanted nothing but that which the attachment of the natives of India to their native soil soon supplied them with, a return of the inhabitants. And I do not believe that in that country the introduction of our direct rule could have contributed more, nor indeed so much, to the prosperity of the commercial and agricultural interests, as the re-establishment of the efficient rule of its former princes and chiefs, who, though protected from attack, are quite free in their internal administration from our interference. With respect to the southern Mahratta districts, of whose prosperity I have before spoken, if I refer, as I must, to their condition before the last few years of Bajee Row's misrule, I do not think that either their commercial or agricultural interests are likely to be improved under our rule, except in that greatest of blessings, exemption from wars which, while under our protection, they equally enjoy; and I must unhesitatingly state, that the provinces belonging to the family of 'Putwurden,' and some other chiefs on the banks of the Kistna, present a greater agricultural and commercial prosperity than almost any I know in India. I refer this to their system of administration which, though there may be at periods exactions, is, on the whole, mild and paternal; to the knowledgo, and almost devotion of the Hindoos to all agricultural pursuits; to their better understanding, or, at least, better practice than us in many parts of the administration, particularly in raising towns and villages to prosperity from the encouragement given to monied men and to the introduction of capital; and, above all, to Jagheerdars (Kandownos) residing on their estates, and these provinces being administered by men of rank, who live and die on the soil, and are usually succeeded in office by their sons or near relatives. If these men exact money at times in an arbitrary manner, all their expenditure, as well as all they receive, is limited to their own provinces; but, above all causes which promote prosperity, is the invariable support given to the village and other native institutions, and to the employment, far beyond what our system admits, of all classes of the population."—Sir John Malcolm,

State of Rampore (Rohilcund) under Native Rule.

“ In passing through the Rampore territory, we could not fail to notice the high state of cultivation to which it has attained, when compared with the surrounding country; scarcely a spot of land is neglected: and although the season was by no means favourable, the whole district seems to be covered with an abundant harvest. As we have no reason to conclude from the description we had received of the present Regent, that this state of prosperity had been produced by any personal exertions on his part, we were solicitous to trace its source, and to discover whether, in the nature of the tenures, the mode of arrangement or otherwise, there were any peculiar circumstances which it might be useful for us to advert to in the course of executing the duty entrusted to us. The management of the Nawaub Fyz-oolah Khan is celebrated throughout the country. It was the management of an enlightened and liberal landlord, who devoted his time and attention, and employed his own capital in promoting the prosperity of his country. When works of magnitude were required which could not be accomplished by the efforts of the individual, the means of undertaking them were supplied by his bounty. Watercourses were constructed, the rivulets were sometimes made to overflow and fertilize the adjacent districts, and the paternal care of a popular chief was constantly exerted to afford protection to his subjects, to stimulate their exertions, to direct their labours to useful objects, and to promote by every means the success of the undertaking.”

“ If the comparison for the same territory be made between the management of the Rohillas and that of our own government, *it is painful to think that the balance of advantage is clearly in favour of the former.* After seven years possession of the country, it appears by the report that the revenue has increased only by two lacs of rupees, or £20,000. The papers laid before Parliament shew that in twenty years which have since elapsed, the collective revenues of Rohilcund, and the other districts forming the

ceded provinces of Oude, had actually declined £200,000 per annum.”

“ We could not fail, however, to observe the singular difference which the application of greater capital and greater industry is capable of producing in the state of contiguous lands. While the surrounding country seemed to have been visited by a desolating calamity, the lands of the Rajahs Diaram and Bugwaut Sing, under every disadvantage of season, were covered with crops produced by a better husbandry or by greater labour.” It should here be explained, that the neighbouring lands alluded to in the report consisted of *British territory, already five years in our occupation.*”*

No. 7.

State of Holkar's territory under the Government of Allia Bacc.

“ The success of Allia Bacc in the internal administration of her dominions was altogether wonderful. * * * The undisturbed internal tranquillity of the country was even more remarkable than its exemption from foreign attack. This was equally produced by her manner of treating the peaceable as well as the more turbulent and predatory classes; she was indulgent to the former, and although strict and severe, just and considerate towards the latter. . . . The fond object of her life was to promote the prosperity of all around her; she rejoiced, we are told, when she saw bankers, merchants, farmers, and cultivators rise to affluence, and so far from deeming their increased wealth a ground of exaction, she considered it a legitimate claim of increased favour and protection . . . There would be no end to a minute detail of the measures of her internal policy. It is sufficient to observe she has become by general suffrage the model of good government in Malwa. . . . She built several forts, and at that of Jaum constructed a road with great labour and cost over the Vindhya range, where it is almost perpendicular. . . . Among the princes of her own nation it would have been looked upon as sacrilege to have become her enemy, or indeed not to have defended her against any hostile

* Appendix to Political Report, 1832, pp. 36, 37.

attempt. She was considered by all in the same light. The Nizam of the Deckan and Tippoo Sultan hold her in the same respect as the Peishwah, and Mahomedans joined with the Hindoos in prayer for her long life and prosperity.

“In the most sober view that can be taken of her character, she certainly appears within her limited sphere to have been one of the purest and most exemplary rulers that ever existed, and she affords a striking example of the practical benefit a mind may receive from preferring worldly duties under a deep sense of responsibility to its Creator.”*

No. 8.

State of Bhurtpore under its Native Sovereigns.

“The country, though still bare of wood, has more scattered trees than we had seen for many days back; and notwithstanding that the soil is sandy, and only irrigated from wells, it is one of the best cultivated and watered tracts which I have seen in India. The crops of corn now on the ground were really beautiful; that of cotton, though gone by, shewed marks of having been a very good one. What is a sure proof of wealth, I saw several sugar mills, and large pieces of ground where the cane had just been cleared; and, contrary to the usual habits of India, where the cultivators keep as far as they can from the highway, to avoid the various molestations to which they are exposed from thieves and travellers, there was often a narrow pathway winding through the green wheat and mustard crops, and even this was crossed continually by the channels which conveyed water to the furrows.

“The population did not seem great; but the villages which we saw were apparently in good condition and repair, and the whole afforded so pleasing a picture of industry, and was so much superior to anything which I have been led to expect in Rajpootana, or which I had seen in the Company's territories since leaving the southern parts of Rohilcund, that I was led to suppose that either the Rajah of Bhurtpore was an extremely exemplary and

* Malcolm's History of Central India, vol. i. pp. 170, 195.

parental governor, or that the system of management adopted in the British provinces was in some way or other less favourable to the improvement and happiness of the country than that of some of the native states.”*

No. 9.

State of Oude.

“ We set out at half-past three, and for some time lost our way, there being no road than such tracks as are seen across ploughed fields in England, the whole country being cultivated, though not enclosed, and much intersected by small ravines and nullahs.

I was pleased, and surprised, after all I had heard of Oude, to find the country so completely under the plough, since were the oppression as great, as is sometimes stated, I cannot think that we should witness so considerable a population, and so much industry, yet that sufficient anarchy and misrule exist, the events of yesterday afforded sufficient reason for supposing.

“ We found invariable civility, and good natured people backing their carts and elephants to make room for us, and displaying, on the whole, a far greater spirit of hospitality and accommodation than ten foreigners would have met with in London.

“ The present king is fond of literary and philosophical pursuits.

“ Saadat Ali, himself a man of talent and acquirements, fond of business, and well qualified for it; but, in his latter days, unhappily addicted to drunkenness, left him a country, with six millions of people, a fertile soil, a most compact position, and upwards of two millions of ready money in the treasury, with a well regulated system of finance, a peasantry tolerably well contented, no army to maintain, except for police or parade, and every thing likely to produce an auspicious reign.

“ I can bear witness certainly to the truth of the king’s statement, that his territories are really in a far better state of cultivation than I had expected to find them. From Lucknow to Sandee, where I am now writing, the country is as populous and well cultivated as most of the Com-

* Bishop Heber’s Journal, vol. ii. p. 361.

pany's provinces. I cannot, therefore, but suspect that the misfortunes and anarchy of Oude are somewhat overrated." —P. 89.

"He was fond of study, and in all points of oriental philology and philosophy, is really reckoned a learned man, besides having a strong taste in its mechanics and chemistry.

"Like our James I., he is said to be naturally just and kind hearted; and with all those who have access to him he is extremely popular. No single act of violence and oppression has ever been ascribed to him, or supposed to be perpetrated with his knowledge; and his errors have been a want of economy in his expenses, a want of accessibility to his subjects, a blind confidence in favourites, and, as will be seen, an unfortunate, though not very unnatural, attachment to different points of etiquette and prerogative."* He is described by Lord Hastings as a sovereign admirable for uprightness, humanity, and mild elevation.

No. 10.

State of Sattara under the Rajah Pertaub Sing.

"We have been highly gratified by the information; from time to time, transmitted to us by our Government on the subject of your Highness's exemplary fulfilment of the duties of that elevated situation, in which it has pleased Providence to place you.

"A course of conduct so suitable to your Highness's exalted station, and so well calculated to promote the prosperity of your dominions, and the happiness of your people, as that which you have wisely and uniformly pursued, while it reflects the highest honour on your own character, has imparted to our minds the feelings of unqualified satisfaction and pleasure. The liberality, also, which you have displayed in executing, at your own cost, various public works of great utility, and which has so greatly raised your reputation in the eyes of the princes and people of India, gives you an additional claim to our approbation, respect, and applause.

* Bishop Heber's Journal, vol. ii. pp. 77-79.

“Impressed with these sentiments, the Court of Directors of the East India Company have unanimously resolved to transmit to you a sword, which will be presented to you through the Government of Bombay, and which we trust you will receive with satisfaction, as a token of their high esteem and regard.*

No. 11.

State of Bengal after Twenty Years British rule.

Extract from Lord Cornwallis' Minute, 2nd August, 1789.

“I am sorry to be obliged to say, that the agriculture and internal commerce have for many years been gradually declining, and that at present, excepting the class of Shrufts and Bunyans, who reside almost entirely in great towns, the inhabitants of these provinces were advancing hastily to a general state of poverty and wretchedness.”†

*No. 12.

Present Condition of the Agricultural Population of Bengal.

• “No one has ever attempted to contradict the fact that the condition of the Bengal peasantry is almost as wretched and degraded as it is possible to conceive, living in the most miserable hovels, scarcely fit for a dog's kennel, covered with tattered rags, and unable, in too many instances, to procure more than a single meal a day for himself and family. The Bengal ryot knows nothing of the most ordinary comforts of life. We speak without exaggeration when we affirm, that if the real condition of those who raise the harvest, which yields between three and four millions a year, was fully known it would make the ears of one who heard thereof tingle.”—*Friend of India*, April 1, 1852.

* Letter of the Court of Directors, Par. Pa. A.D. 1813, No. 569, p. 126B.

† Mill, vol. v. p. 473.

APPENDIX C.

*Sir Thomas Munro on the Consequences of Disaffection
in the Native Army.*

“ They (the sepoy) will learn to compare their own low allowances and humble rank with those of their European Officers—to examine the ground on which the wide difference rests—to estimate their own strength and resources, and to believe that it is their duty to shake off a foreign yoke, and to secure for themselves the honours and emoluments which their country yields.

“ Their assemblage in garrisons and cantonments will render it easy for them to consult together regarding their plans; they will have no difficulty in finding leaders qualified to direct them; their patience, their habits of discipline, and their experience in war, will hold out the fairest prospects of success; they will be stimulated by the love of power and independence, and by ambition and avarice, to carry their designs into execution. The attempt, no doubt, would be dangerous, but when the contest is for so rich a stake, they would not be deterred from the danger. They might fail in their first attempt, but even their failure would not, as under a national government, confirm our power, but shake it to its very foundation.

“ In such a contest we are not to expect any aid from the people. The native army would be joined by all that numerous and active class of men formerly belonging to the revenue and police departments, who are now unemployed, and by many now in office, who look for higher situations; and by means of these men they would easily render themselves masters of the open country, and of its revenue: the great mass of the people would remain quiet.

“ The merchants and shopkeepers, from having found facilities given to trade which they never before experienced might wish us success, but they would do more. The heads of villages, who have at their disposal the most warlike part of the inhabitants, would be more likely to join their countrymen than to support our cause. They

have, it is true, when under their native rulers, often shewn a strong desire to be transferred to our dominion, but this feeling arose from temporary causes. The immediate pressure of a weak and rapacious government, and the hope of bettering themselves by a change. But they have now tried our government, and found that, though they are protected in their persons and their property, they have lost many of the emoluments which they derived from a lax revenue system under their native chiefs, and also much of their former authority and consideration among the inhabitants, by the establishment of our judicial courts and European Magistrates and Collectors. The hope of regaining their former rank and influence would, therefore, render a great part of them well disposed to form any plan for our overthrow. We delude ourselves if we believe that gratitude for the protection they have received, or attachment to our mild government, would induce any considerable body of the people to side with us in a struggle with the native army.*

* Life, vol. II. p. 32.

THE END.



