

Page

DIRECT EXAMINATION OF NARITA, Katsushiro,
by Mr. Blakeney.

35387 * The witness identified and verified exhibit 3614 as his
35388 affidavit. * The affidavit stated that the witness served in the first
section of the European-Asiatic Bureau from June 1934 to January 1938;
in the Embassy in Berlin from March to October 1938; in the embassy in
Hsingking from December 1938 to August 1940; as senior secretary and
later chief of the first section of the European-Asiatic Bureau from
August 1940 to November 1942; and as chief of the personnel section
from November 1942 to August 1945.

35389 For over three years of his first service in the First Section
* The Bureau Director was TOGO. In this period there were numerous
Japanese-Soviet problems. TOGO's practice as bureau director in charge
of Soviet affairs was to protest stiffly against any Soviet delicts, but
to be equally stern in reprimanding those on the Japanese side guilty of
improper practices. They got many requests from the war ministry or
the ambassador in Hsingking, who was concurrently C-in-C of the Kwantung
Army, to make protests to the USSR concerning border incidents. These
requests were routed through the first section, were quite numerous,
and many were seen and managed by the witness, and many were not.
Requests were sometimes made orally by the war ministry to his section.
TOGO frequently said that before making the protest further investigation
35390 would * have to be made to give assurance that the fault was not on the
Japanese side, and in such cases had such instructions for further
investigation sent to the Hsingking embassy or war ministry. He often
suggested to the war ministry and Kwantung Army that they mend their
ways and refrain from committing wrongs themselves if they wished the
Japanese position to be strong when there were cases of Soviet faults.
TOGO also admonished military authorities concerning other cases of
Soviet-Japanese or Soviet-Manchukuoan disputes.

35391 Business men operating concessions in Sakhalin and Japanese
fishermen operating in Soviet waters under fisheries agreements, fre-
quently complained to the foreign ministry, through the first section,
of Soviet oppression. TOGO often told them in the witness' presence
that there was fault on their side too, and that they were exaggerating
or concealing facts, and were generally not devoting their sincere
efforts to compliance with their concession contracts or fishery rights.
* On these occasions when they asked the ministry to take a strong
stand against the USSR, TOGO would tell them that they were attempting
unduly to depend on government protection, and that only when the USSR
had acted in a clearly illegal manner could they expect government
help.

During this period the conclusion of the anti-Comintern Pact
had a cooling effect on Soviet-Japanese relations. Although it was the
European-Asiatic Bureau under TOGO which had to manage the foreign
ministry's work in connection with its conclusion, he heard then that

December 14, 1947 1947
 DEFENSE-TOGO - SUZUKI - Cross
 NARITA - Direct

Page
 Page

3533 TOGO's opinion was that the conclusion of a political agreement for
 coping with an ideology was meaningless. TOGO strongly opposed streng-
 35392 thening the anti-Comintern Pact, or anything in the nature of a German-
 Japanese-Italian alliance, and immediately on learning of the negotiations
 he presented his views to the foreign minister to that effect. The
 witness learned that his opinion was that Nazi foreign policy would
 eventually bring Germany into conflict with the Soviet, Britain, and
 other countries, and that such an alliance not only would not contribute
 to solving the China Affair, but would involve Japan in Europe and
 eventually world turmoils. TOGO's attitude toward the alliance, and his
 unresponsiveness to German suggestions of closer cooperation in economic
 matters relating to China, led to deterioration of his relations with
 Ribbentrop and intensified opposition from military and naval circles
 to whom his presence in Berlin appeared an obstacle to realizing their
 desire for closer German-Japanese collaboration.

35393 It was this attitude and opposition from military circles at
 which the witness learned brought about his removal from Berlin and
 Moscow. What the witness learned then and reported to TOGO in a letter
 of 6 December 1938, he identified as exhibit 3614-A. * Exhibit 3614-A
 stated that the witness was supposed to have been informed that TOGO
 was actively working in Moscow, while in Tokyo he was informed that the
 choice of ambassadors to Britain was difficult, and Foreign Minister
 UGAKI said it would be good if TOGO went to London, but if he did so the
 problem would arise of promoting OSHIMA to the ambassadorship. When the
 army started to work for transferring the ambassador to Berlin, UGAKI
 35394 * was said to have seen no necessity for the transfer, for the ambassador
 at that time had not failed. However, malicious telegrams were sent from
 Major-General KASAHARA and Naval Attache KOJIMA, stating that TOGO was
 extremely unpopular with German authorities and higher officials such
 as Ribbentrop paid no attention to him, and at the time of the Czecho-
 Slovakian problem all the ambassadors of friendly nations went to
 Munich except TOGO.

Moreover, it began to be urged that OSHIMA should be used for
 the negotiations. The pressure of the military had thus prevailed. It
 seemed therefore that the telegrams from Berlin pointing out OSHIMA's
 disqualification had hardly been utilized by foreign office authorities.
 stated that in 1933 he met Hwang Fu in Peking. Hwang Fu
 was The affidavit continued, and the witness added that this
 information came from the director of the European-Asiatic Bureau, who
 was familiar with the matter. Hwang Fu was around the question of how
 to restore relations between Japan and China. Hwang Fu
 indicated there were three points around which the two
 countries should make efforts for restoring relations
 emphasizing that if these points were carried out, it would
 be possible.

NARITA, Katsushirō

Social Status and Domicile: TOKYO Prefecture, military class.

Date of Birth: Oct 5, 1904

* * * * *

- 1917 Apr. Entered 1st Middle School of TOKYO Prefecture.
- 1922 Mar. Finished the Middle School Course.
- 1922 Apr. Entered Class A, Literary Course of 1st High School.
- 1925 Mar. Graduated from Class A, Literary course of the said school.
- 1925 Apr. Entered Political Science Department, Law College TOKYO Imperial University.
- 1927 Nov. 7 Passed Higher Civil Service Examination for Diplomatic Service.
- 1928 Mar. 31 Graduated from Political Science Department, Law College, TOKYO Imperial University;
Appointed a clerk of Foreign Ministry;
Granted 5th Grade Salary (Foreign Ministry);
Ordered to stay in Britain (Foreign Ministry).
- 1928 July 17 Left TOKYO.
- 1928 Aug. 30 Arrived at port in London.
- 1929 Sep. 9 Appointed Diplomatic Probationer;
Received 7th Rank of Higher Civil Service (Cabinet);
Granted 4th Grade Salary (Foreign Ministry);
Ordered to stay in Britain (Foreign Ministry).
- 1929 Nov. 12 Appointed member of the suite to Delegate Plenipotentiary to London Naval Conference. (Cabinet)
- 1929 Oct. 1 Conferred 7th Court Rank, Junior Grade.
- 1931 Jan. 29 Ordered to stay in U.S.S.R. (Foreign Ministry).
- 1931 Jun 30 Granted 3rd Grade Salary (Foreign Ministry).
- 1931 Nov. 2 Awarded a silver cup for services in conclusion of London Naval Treaty.

1932 Jun 30 Granted 2nd Grade Salary (Foreign Ministry);
Received 6th Rank of Higher Civil Service (Cabinet).

1932 Jul. 15 Conferred 7th Court Rank, Senior Grade.

1934 Jun. 30 Appointed Administrative Official of Foreign Ministry;
Received 6th Rank of Higher Civil Service (Cabinet);
Granted 7th Grade Salary;
Ordered to serve in 1st Section of Europe and Asia Bureau
(Foreign Ministry)

1935 June 11 Appointed Secretary of Relief Investigation Committee.
(Cabinet)

1935 July 1 Granted 6th Grade Salary (Foreign Ministry).

1935 Dec. 23 Received 5th Rank of Higher Civil Service (Cabinet).

1936 Jan. 15 Conferred 6th Court Rank, Junior Grade.

1936 July 1 Granted 5th Grade Salary (Foreign Ministry).

1937 Jul 30 Relieved as Secretary of Relief Investigation Committee.
(Cabinet)

1937 Dec. 27 Appointed 3rd Secretary to the Embassy;
Received 5th Rank of Higher Civil Service (Cabinet);
Granted 1st Grade Salary;
Ordered to stay in Germany (Foreign Ministry).

1938 Sep. 17 Ordered to stay in Manchoukuo (Foreign Ministry).

1939 Dec. 27 Appointed 2nd Secretary to the Embassy;
Received 4th Rank of Higher Civil Service (Cabinet);
Granted 2nd Grade Salary;
Ordered to stay in Manchoukuo (Foreign Ministry).

1940 Feb. 1 Conferred 6th Court Rank, Senior Grade.

1940 Aug. 19 Appointed Administrative Official of Foreign Ministry;
Received 4th Rank of Higher Civil Service (Cabinet);
Granted 3rd Grade Salary;
Ordered to serve in 1st Section of Europe and Asia
Bureau (Foreign Ministry).

1940 Oct. 12 Appointed Secretary of Foreign Ministry.
Received 4th Rank of Higher Civil Service (Cabinet);
Granted 3rd Grade Salary;
Appointed Chief of 1st Section, Europe and Asia Bureau
(Foreign Ministry).

1940 Dec. 24 Appointed concurrently Secretary of Railway Ministry;
Received 4th Rank of Higher Civil Service (Cabinet);
Ordered to serve in Transportation Bureau (Railway Ministry)

1941 Jan. 13 Appointed concurrently Secretary of Agriculture and Forestry Ministry;
Received 4th Rank of Higher Civil Service (Cabinet);
Ordered to serve in Fisheries Bureau (Agriculture and Forestry Ministry).

1941 June 30 Granted 2nd Grade Salary (Foreign Ministry).

1941 July 8 Awarded the Order of the Sacred Treasure, 6th Order of Merit.

1942 Sep. 30 Received 3rd Rank of Higher Civil Service (main duty) (Cabinet);
Granted 1st Grade Salary (Foreign Ministry).

1942 Nov. 1 Appointed Chief of Personnel Section of Minister's Secretariat (Foreign Ministry);
(Secretary of Railway Ministry was renamed Railway Official according to the Imperial Ordinance for Administration Simplification.)

1942 Nov. 28 Relieved of the additional post as Secretary of Agriculture and Forestry Ministry (Cabinet).

1942 Oct. 11 Relieved of additional duty (Cabinet).

1943 Feb. 4 Appointed standing member of Higher Civil Service Examination Committee (Cabinet);
Appointed standing member of Higher Civil Service Examination Committee, Section II (Cabinet).

1940 Apr. 29 Awarded the Order of the Sacred Treasure, 5th Order of Merit for services in China Incident.

1945 Aug. 26 Appointed Councillor of Foreign Ministry;
Received 2nd Rank of Higher Civil Service (Cabinet).

1945 Sep. 28 Appointed Investigator of Foreign Ministry;
Received 2nd Rank of Higher Civil Service (Cabinet).

1945 Sep. 15 Conferred 5th Court Rank, Senior Grade.

1946 Jan. 19 Appointed Councillor of Foreign Ministry and concurrently Liaison Official of Central Liaison Office;
Received 2nd Rank of Higher Civil Service (Cabinet).

1946 Feb. 1 Relieved of additional duty (Cabinet).

1945 Oct. 30 Awarded the Order of the Sacred Treasure, 4th Order of Merit.

1946 Apr. 1 Became Administrative Official of Foreign Ministry according to Imperial Ordinance No. 193 of 1946.

1947 Sep. 30 Granted 26th Grade Salary (Foreign Ministry)

Qualifications examined /T.N. under the purge directive/

Def. Doc. 2744 (Tōgō)

International Military Tribunal for the Far East

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI Sadao, et al

- Defendants -

A F F I D A V I T
NARITA KATSUSHIRŌ



Having first duly sworn an oath as on the attached sheet, in accordance with the procedure prevailing in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

1. I entered the service of the Japanese Foreign Ministry in 1928. I served in the First Section of the European-Asiatic Bureau from June 1934 to January 1938; in Berlin as Third Secretary of the Embassy, March-October 1938; in Hsingking, as Third and Second Secretary of the Embassy, from December 1938 to August 1940; as senior secretary, later Chief, of the First Section, European-Asiatic Bureau, from August 1940 to November 1942; and as Chief of the Personnel Section from November 1942 to August 1945.

2. For something over three years of the time of my first service in the First Section of the European-Asiatic Bureau of the Ministry the Bureau Director was Mr. Tōgō Shigenori. It was a period when there were numerous Japanese-Soviet problems, mostly growing out of the development of Manchoukuo, such as boundary disputes and other disputes with Soviet nationals in Manchoukuo and agitation against the Red menace. Mr. Tōgō's practice as bureau director in charge of Soviet affairs was to protest stiffly against any Soviet delicts, but to be equally stern in reprimanding those on the Japanese side who were guilty of improper practices. For example, we used to get many requests from the Ministry of War or the Ambassador in Hsingking, (who was concurrently the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army) to make protests to the U S S R concerning border incidents reported by the Kwantung Army. These requests, which came either as telegrams direct from Hsingking or in the form of copies of telegrams to the War Ministry forwarded to us by them, were routed through the First Section of the European-Asiatic Bureau, which had to do with Russian affairs; they were quite numerous, many of them were seen and managed by me, many were not. Requests were sometimes made orally by the War Ministry to officials in our section. Bureau Director Tōgō frequently said that before making the protests further investigation would have to be made to give assurance that the fault was not on the Japanese side, and in such cases had instructions for such further investigation sent to the Hsingking Embassy or requests therefor sent to the War Ministry. In such cases he often suggested to the War Ministry and the Kwantung Army that they mend their ways and refrain from committing wrongs themselves, if they wished the Japanese position to be strong when there were cases of Soviet faults. Mr. Tōgō also issued many admonitions to the military authorities, through the Embassy at Hsingking or the War Ministry, concerning other cases of Soviet-Japanese or Soviet-Manchoukuoan disputes.

3. Our businessmen operating concessions in Sakhalin, and Japanese fishermen operating in Soviet waters under the fisheries agreements, made frequent complaints to the Foreign Ministry, through the First Section of the European-Asiatic Bureau, of Soviet oppression. Mr. Tōgō often told them in my presence that there was fault on their side, too: that they were exaggerating their cases or concealing some of the facts, were making undue profits out of their own laborers, and in general were not devoting their sincerest efforts to compliance with their concession contracts or fisheries rights. On these occasions when they asked the Foreign Ministry to take a strong stand against the U S S R Mr. Tōgō was accustomed to tell them that they were attempting to depend unduly on governmental protection, and that only when the U S S R had acted in a manner clearly illegal could they expect the government to help them.

4. During the period mentioned above the conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Pact had a cooling effect on Soviet-Japanese relations. Although it was the European-Asiatic Bureau, headed by Mr. Tōgō, which under the Government's decision of the policy of entering into such a pact had to manage the Foreign Ministry's work in connection with its conclusion, I heard at that time that Mr. Tōgō's opinion was that the conclusion of a political agreement for the purpose of coping with an ideology was meaningless.

5. After I arrived at the Berlin Embassy to serve as Third Secretary, in March 1938, I learned that our Military Attaché, General Ōshima, was reported to be working for the strengthening of the Anti-Comintern Pact. Although the details were not known to the Embassy staff, we did know that the Military Attaché was negotiating directly with Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, without informing the Ambassador. Ambassador Tōgō was strongly opposed to the strengthening of the Anti-Comintern Pact, or anything in the nature of a German-Japanese-Italian alliance, and immediately upon learning of the negotiations which were in progress he presented to the Foreign Minister his views to that effect. His opinion as I then learned it, from his dispatches to the Foreign Minister and his explanations to me and other members of the staff, was that the Nazi foreign policy would sooner or later bring Germany into conflict with the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France and other countries, and that such a pact of alliance with Germany and Italy not only would not contribute to the solution of the China Affair but would involve Japan in the turmoil of Europe and eventually of the world. Ambassador Tōgō's attitude toward the Japanese-German alliance, as well as his unresponsiveness to German suggestions of closer cooperation in economic matters relating to China, led to deterioration of his relations with Foreign Minister Ribbentrop as well as to intensified opposition from our military and naval circles, to whom his continued presence in Berlin appeared as an obstacle to realization of their desire of closer German-Japanese collaboration.

6. It was this attitude of Ambassador Tōgō's and this opposition from military circles which, as I learned upon my return to Japan in November 1938, had brought about his removal from Berlin to Moscow. What I learned at that time I reported to Mr. Tōgō in a letter of 6 December 1938, which I have been shown and can identify as Defense Document no. 2852. I can add nothing more to that recital except to say that my information came from the Director of the European-Asiatic Bureau of the Foreign Ministry, who was familiar with the matter.

7. As Chief of the First Section of the European-Asiatic Bureau during Mr. Tōgō's first term as foreign minister I was familiar with his attitude toward the U S S R, owing to my official connection with matters involving Japanese-Soviet relations. From the time that he assumed office Mr. Tōgō worked assiduously for the strict and faithful observance, by both parties, of the neutrality then prevailing between Japan and the Soviet Union. Thus on 22 November 1941 the Foreign Minister called in the Soviet Ambassador, Smetanin, and reminded him that on 5 and 13 August the Ambassador had had conversations with Admiral Toyoda, the then foreign minister, at which time he had given the assurance that the U S S R would remain faithful to the Neutrality Pact and would grant no military bases on Soviet soil to foreign powers. Mr. Tōgō then asked Mr. Smetanin to confirm that that policy of the Soviet Union remained unchanged, and that the Neutrality Pact would continue to be for the U S S R, as well as for Japan, the foundation of relations between the two countries. On 1 December Mr. Smetanin gave, "by order of the Soviet Government", the assurance requested; and again on 6 December, "by order of Foreign Minister Molotov", he reaffirmed that the Neutrality Pact formed the basis of the Soviet Union's policy toward Japan.

8. During the period from the outbreak of the Pacific War to the beginning of September 1942, there were several questions in connection with the navigation of Soviet vessels, etc. Our Navy had established the so-called "sea-defence zones" out of the necessity for coast defence, and decided to restrict, to a certain extent, the navigation in these areas of general craft and to give certain advices concerning the navigation of foreign vessels through specified areas. The Foreign Ministry took the step, on such occasions, of notifying the Soviet Embassy at Tokyo beforehand, in compliance with the request of the Navy Ministry, of the measures to be taken by the Japanese Navy in this connection, and, when there arose questions such as detention of a Soviet vessel, made efforts for their speedy settlement through release or some other means.

Some Soviet vessels were damaged, and some even sank, in areas where there were hostilities. On all such occasions, the Foreign Ministry did its utmost to accord, regardless of the causes of the incidents, all facilities possible for the protection or the repatriation of the crews, as well as for other means of settlement.

9. Throughout Mr. Tōgō's second term as Foreign Minister I was chief of the Foreign Ministry's Personnel Section. During this time military circles intimated the desirability of removing our ambassador to the U S S R, Mr. Satō Naotake, who was alleged to be "insufficiently positive" in his attitude toward the Soviet Union and the war. I brought up the question with Mr. Tōgō, but he told me that if Ambassador Satō were removed from the U S S R it would be to a post in Europe where he would be able to get in touch with the Governments of the United States and Great Britain with a view to ending the war. With this explanation, he told me to study the question of the possibility of appointing as minister one who was then serving as ambassador, having in mind that the post to which Ambassador Satō would have had to be sent would have been Sweden, Switzerland or the Vatican, where our diplomatic representations were only legations. Soon thereafter I made a report to him on this subject. These discussions were held soon after Foreign Minister

Def. Doc. 2744

Tōgō took office--in April of 1945, I think--but for some reason nothing further came of the idea, principally because soon afterward projects for ending the war through the intermediation of the U S S R were set in motion.

10. While in the office of Chief of the Personnel Section, Foreign Minister's Secretariat, I was personally in charge of the examination of the services of Foreign Ministry officials for the grant of awards in connection with the China Affair and I conducted the negotiation with the Board of Decorations in this connection. At that time, the Foreign Ministry had two fixed standards to be applied in this examination of services. The one was a list of important matters taking place during the China Affair in which the Foreign Ministry was more or less concerned (as examples, the negotiations with the Chinese Government directly after the outbreak of the Affair, the protection and withdrawal of Japanese residents, the negotiations concerning third Powers concessions in China, the political negotiations with the Governments of third Powers, etc.), and examination was made of the services of the various officials relating to each of the matters enumerated, which were not limited to those that had direct connection with the China Affair. The other standard was a table of official posts graded in accordance with their importance in connection with the China Affair. The careers of officials were considered in the light of this table, and long service (especially at a critical period) in an important post justified a person's receiving a certain grade of award.

11. In Mr. Tōgō's case, the Board of Decorations agreed, according to the first standard, that his services in the negotiation of the truce of Nomorhan deserved the reception of an award as the Foreign Ministry had recommended. I remember that he had already been put in the category of those who deserved the bestowal of decorations, according to the second standard, for the fact that he had successively held, during the period subjected to the examination--that is, the period from 7 July 1937 to 29 April 1940--the most important posts other than those in China, such as Director of the Bureau of European-Asiatic Affairs, Ambassador to Germany and Ambassador to the Soviet Union.

As for the Grand Cordon of the Rising Sun, this is not the highest decoration. Neither was it bestowed upon Mr. Tōgō for any special reason. It was only ~~the fact~~ ^{because of} that he had already been decorated with the First Class Order of the Sacred Treasure on the occasion of the periodical awards of May 1941, prior to the final decision on the awards in connection with services during the period of the China Affair, and he was awarded the next higher decoration in grade, that is, the Grand Cordon of the Rising Sun.

O A T H

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Narita Katsushirō (seal)

On this 30th day of October, 1947

At Tokyo

Deponent Narita Katsushirō

I, Nishi Haruhiko, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At Tokyo

Witness: Nishi Haruhiko (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Nishi Haruhiko, of the Defense, hereby certify that I am conversant with the English and Japanese languages, and that the foregoing is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

Nishi Haruhiko (seal)

Tokyo
4 November 1947