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LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. HELEN MEARS

SERIAL	FROM-	DATE	TO-	SYNOPSIS
1.	Saturday Even. Post	18 Jun	Editorial	"We're Giving Japan 'Democracy' etc." by Helen Mears
2.	ESS (Cohen)	20 Jun	Memorandum .	Helen Mears
3.	Sat. Even. Post	30 Jun	Editorial	Gen. MacArthur Protests Post Editorial
4.	Ben Hibbs, Editor		Gen. MacArthur	Will publish protest
5.	Gen. MacArthur	6 Jul	Ben Hibbs	Thanks for courtesy of reply
6.	Houghton Mifflin	8 Jul	GHQ	Application for permission to publish MIRROR FOR AMERICANS in Japanese
7.	Gen. MacArthur	6 Aug	Houghton Mifflin (Thompson)	Reasons for rejection of appli-
8.	Lovell Thompson	18 Aug	Gen. MacArthur	Regrets decision; if situation later warrants, please inform
9.	Helen Mears	18 Jan	Gen. MacArthur	Unless receive direct denial will quote from letter denying right of publication of book.
10.	SatEvePost	29Apr50	Editorial	"Russians Making Most of "Imperialist Rule" in Japan" 'by Helen Mears.

NOTE:

Editorial "The Russians are Making the Most of our 'Imperialist Rule' in Japan'"

By: Helen Mears

Published: SATURDAY EVENING POST, 29 April 1950

Filed: Item 9, "SATURDAY EVENING POST" File

541, HOTEL LATHAM January 18,1950 4 EAST 28 STREET NEW YORK CITY 16 Dear General MacArthur, My publisher, Houghton Mifflin Co, has sent me a copy of your letter denying the right to publication in Japan of my book "Mirror for Americans-Japan". I can not, of course, agree either with the principle of censorship or the specific charges against my book on which you base your right to censor. I may wish to discuss your censorship in print and in that case would wish to quote directly from your letter. Unless I receive from you a direct denial of my right to so quote from the letter, I shall assume that you have no objections. Sincerely Helen Mears General Douglas MacArthur GHQ/SCAP APO 500 San Francisco, Cal.

Hew Means HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY 2 Park Street, Boston August 18, 1949 General Douglas MacArthur General Headquarters Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers Office of the Supreme Commander A.P.O. 500 c/o Postmaster San Francisco, California Dear General MacArthur: Thank you for your letter of the 6th. I regret your decision. I found much truth in MIRROR FOR AMERICANS, and, though in reading the book, I felt that much should be added in explanation and that if much were added the reader might reach different conclusions after his reading, nonetheless the things that are said by Miss Mears will be said sooner or later in Japan, and it seems to me better that they should be said now by an American who honestly believes that their consideration will assist us in the resolving of our problems, than that they should be said later by some neo-fascist who is only interested in the breakdown of governmental authority. If later this situation in Japan seems to you to be sufficiently stable to warrant publication of such a book, I hope you will so inform us. Thank you again for your considered reply to our request. Sincerely, (sgd) Lovell Thompson Vice-president LT: mh

Theen miano HOUGHTON HIPFLIN COMPANY 2 Park Street, Boston August 18, 1949 General Douglas MacArthur General Headquarters Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers Office of the Supreme Commander c/e Postmester San Francisco, California Dear General MacArthur: Thank you for your letter of the 6th. I regret your decision. I found much truth in MIRROR FOR AMERICANS, and, though in reading the book. I felt that much should be added in explanation and that if much were added the reader might reach different conclusions after his reading, mometheless the things that are said by Mass Mears will be said soomer or later in Japan, and it seems to me better that they should be said now by an American who honestly believes that their consideration will assist us in the resolving of our problems, than that they should be said later by some nec-fascist who is only interested in the breakdown of governmental authority. If later this situation in Japan seems to you to be sufficiently stable to warrant publication of such a book, I hope you will so inform us. Thank you again for your considered reply to our request. Sincerely, (sgd) Lovell Thompson Vice-president LPamh

Mears, Hile 6 August 1949 Mr. Lovell Thompson c/o Houghton Mifflin Company 2 Park Street Boston, 7. Massachusetts Dear Mr. Thompson: Your letter of July 8, 1949 requesting permission to assign to the firm of Akatsuki Shobo, Tokyo, Japan the right to translate and publish in the Japanese language Mirror for Americans: Japan, by Helen Mears has been given careful consideration by the appropriate section of my Headquarters which recommended that the authority sought be denied. Because of my abhorrence of any form of censorship or the restriction of the freedom of expression I undertook, personally, to review the book in order to test the necessity for such denial. In so doing I was shocked to discover expressed therein a point of view calculated to impair the public faith in the integrity of the historic part played by the United States in the events related to the causes and conduct of the Pacific War. While as a medium of searching self criticism the right to publication of such a point of view within the United States cannot be questioned, there appears no justification whatsoever for its publication in Occupied Japan. To the contrary were such action permitted its effect would be to impair the honor and prestige of the United States in the eyes of many Japanese unable to distinguish between fact and propaganda and possibly swayed by the power of an American viewpoint, particularly when presented under the sponsorship of so distinguished and responsible a publishing house as yours. The book propagates a point of view which some few Japanese probably entertain and many more might -- one which accords moral justification to Japan's attitude and actions in the decade preceding her surrender. Its denunciation of the policies and actions of the United States finds no counterpart in any other post-war writings. Indeed, in the technique of slanting, misrepresentation and perversion of historical record, not even the propaganda emanating from Soviet sources has surpassed it. Specifically, the book from beginning to end is a constant effort to propagate the theses that (1) the United States and not Japan was primarily responsible for the attack on Pearl Harbor and ensuing Pacific War; (2) Japan was never a military threat to the United States; (3) United States conduct of the Pacific War was unjustifiably brutal; (4) the United States decision to occupy Japan was directed at enslavement of the Japanese people and extermination of a large percentage thereof; and (5) the United States participation in the Pacific War was in fact shameful assistance to European nations in their re-conquest of Asia.

The bias, distortion and vehemence with which these theses are supported in the book are illustrated in the following sample excerpts:

"It seems evident that Pearl Harbor was not the cause of our war with Japan, but only a move in a war America and Japan were already waging against each other. The question of 'Why did Japan attack us,' therefore, must be supplemented by the question of 'Why were we already waging war against Japan,' if we want to solve the riddle of Pearl Harbor." (p. 16)

"To kill two thousand civilians (as was done by the Japanese in a Philippine village) during the hysteria of a losing battle is a terrible crime. But is it more terrible than the act of a powerful people, not fighting a last-ditch fight, but after the war had already been won, in fact if not in name, in unleashing a new weapon that killed or injured over one hundred and twenty thousand civilians in a split second?" (p. 22)

"...our decision to occupy Japan carried with it intentions of repression of a whole people and their civilization which go far beyond anything we have, up to now, considered legitimate acts of war, or reparation. The program means 'punishment' and 'restraint' on such a broad and sweeping scale that—regardless of our intentions—if it is carried through as proposed, it will mean the destruction of much of Japan's traditional civilization, virtual serfdom of the Japanese people, and the certain extermination of a very large percentage of the population.... In punishing Japan, however, all the people—men, women and children, are included in a blanket condemnation based on evidence compiled from wartime emotional propaganda and never re-examined. Our right to punish the whole Japanese people rests on extremely shaky grounds..." (p. 53)

"It is not easy to see how we can justly punish the Japanese for 'fighting to defend their vital interests' since we claim it as our right to do this. It is even less easy to see how we can justly punish the Japanese on the charge that they tried to 'conquer the world' when our own official records accept as sincere the Japanese disclaimer of any such intention. Nor is it easy to see how we can justly punish them on the grounds that Pearl Harbor was an 'unprovoked' attack in an attempt to conquer the United States when our own records document the fact that it was nothing of the sort, but was instead a counter-attack against an economic war which we had been waging against them." (p. 58)

"Our exaggeraged propaganda served to conceal the fact that much of our wartime fear of the Japanese military prowess was not based on objective reality. The Japanese military was never a 'memace to the safety of the United States.'" (p. 64)

"In March 1945, however, despite the evidence that Japan's aggressive power was destroyed, we began our saturation firebomb raids with a mass attack on Tokyo, and by July we had reduced the Japanese Air Force and Navy to such a state of impotence that General LeMay, 'in a gesture of contempt for the enemy war leaders and their ability to defend Japan,' dropped leaflets on eleven Japanese cities, explaining that 'within a few days' each of these cities would be bombed. Calling attention to 'America's well-known humanitarianism,' the General told the people to get out of the cities. In July also, Admiral Halset set set out on an 'unchallenged rampage,' cruising along the coast cities close enough to bombard with naval guns." (p. 71)

"From the facts of our losses under such conditions (on Iwo Jima and Okinawa) and the vastly greater Japanese losses, we have built up a phony picture of a 'warrior race,' forgetting that to defend unsuccessfully, scattered island territories is a very different sort of operation from invading and conquering a powerful distant continent. This exaggerated picture, however, was used as a basis for deciding policy -- both for fighting the war and planning the peace.... In indicating the Japanese as a militaristic race, we have reasoned in reverse. We used the fact of our own superior power as proof of Japanese fanaticism. We even used the atom bomb as further proof. We made the baseless charge that we needed to use a powerful new weapon in order completely to subdue them. And then considered our act in using the bomb as further proof of our charge. If we Americans want peace in the future we should be somewhat more critical of the conduct of our foreign policy. It is not only the Japanese people who can be 'misled' into the appearance of desire for world conquest." (pp. 77-78)

"...even at best the Japanese soldier led a spartan life... The Japanese soldier--whether officers or men--were not pampered with Coca-Cola and turkey, flown in for Thanksgiving. They didn't fly ice cream up into the stratosphere to freeze. They didn't cool beer by pouring gasoline over it. The Japanese were as hard pressed for everything as we were oversupplied..." (p. 88)

"If the Japanese set out to conquer the world in 1931, it is certain that we and the British and Dutch and French must be marked down as collaborators in this enterprise... We built up a small-scale 'menace' and then went after it as though it were a major one." (p. 95)

"And the atom bombs which we used against the Japanese were used, not in a war against Japan for Japan already has been overwhelm-ingly defeated, but in a political war against Russia. And our Occupation is a device for carrying out certain political and economic objectives which are connected with the Japanese only in the sense that they (like the Chamorros) happened to inhabit some strategically placed islands." (p. 109)

HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY 2 Park Street, Boston, 7, Mass. July 8, 1949 General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers Civil Information and Education Section APO 500 c/o Postmaster, San Francisco Dear Sirs: We are the publishers of MIRROR FOR AMERICANS-JAPAN by Helen Mears, and have authorized Dr. Franz J. Horch, 325 East 57th Street, New York, 22, New York, to represent us in the sale of the translation rights of this work. We hereby apply for permission to enter into a contract with the Japanese publishing firm of Akatsuki-Shobo (Editor-in-Chief, Mr. Hirowo Nakaoka) a, Jimboh-Cho, 7-chome, Kanda, Chiyoda-Ku, Tokyo, Japan, granting them the right to translate and publish the said work in volume form in the Japanese language. Very truly yours, HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY (signed) Lovell Thompson Vice-President LT/CR

ROUTINE - UNCLASSIFIED

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6 July 1949

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FROM:

SCAP

TO:

MR BEN HIBBS, EDITOR
THE SATURDAY EVENING POST
INDEPENDENCE SQUARE
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA

2/5763 MY THANKS FOR THE PROMPT COURTESY OF YOUR REPLY AND APPRECIATION FOR THE FAIRNESS OF YOUR ACTION. SIGNED MACARTHUR

OFFICIAL:

R. M. LEVY Colonel, AGD Adjutant General

Copies to: CinC (Return)

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PHILADELPHIA PENN MJ93/SFA35 54 5 11 43M
GENERAL OF THE ARMY DOUGLAS MACARTHUR SCAP TOKYO

WE WILL PUBLISH YOUR PROTEST OUR JULY THIRTIETH ISSUE ALTHOUGH WE
BY NO MEANS AGREE WITH ALL YOU SAY. INCIDENTALLY WE HAVE PUBLISHED
MANY LAUDATORY ARTICLES ON VARIOUS PHASES JAPANESE OCCUPATION AND
HAVE OTHERS COMING UP BY NORA WALN GENERAL EICHELBERBER AND OTHERS
BEN HIBBS

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS GOVERNMENT SOCKION

2 July 1948

MEMORANDUM FORS General Back, Signal Officer

Please transmit the following message without classification and request report on time of delivery to addressee or his personal representative:

"Mr. Ben Hibbs, Editor"
The Satunday Evening Post
Independence Square
Philadelphia, 5, Penna.

"I have just read the article appearing on the Editorial page of your issue of June 18th by Miss Helen Means, entitled, "We're Giving Japan Domocraey, But She Can't Barn Her Living," and request that, in the public interest, you give this message equal prominence in an early future issue.

occolusions some color of authenticity, you comment: 'Hiss Mears recently spent four months in Japan as a member of a labor advisory committee.' This is deceptive as Miss Mears has not been in Japan since July 1946 and hence has no personal knowledge of Japan's progress during the past three years of Compation. Actually, practically everything discussed occurred after her departure.

"Apart from this, the burden of complaint appears to rest upon the premises that; the 'huge' Japanese budget (estimated to be the equivalent of two billion in United States dellars—a modest budget, indeed, as judged by present world standards) is 'largely' due to the very high cost of the Occupation and our reform programs; and that, a constitution guaranteeing, as pointed out 'the utmost in individual liberty,' a protective labor standards law encouraging and protecting the growth in Japan of a free trade union movement, an economic readjustment to make possible the growth in Japan of free private competitive enterprise, a redistribution of land convership to eradicate the abuses of a feudalistic system of land tenure and remove one of the root causes of mass unrest in Asia, an emlightened system of public education, and enfranchisement of the Japanese woman, constitute such an economic burden upon Japan that again to use your words 'these liberated people can no longer same oven a pre-war standard of living."

"Your first premise dealing with the costs of Occupation is both unrealistic and misleading, in that it ignores the fact that through feed
and other relief supplies alone the United States is contributing to the
Japanese economy far more than enough to belance the cost to the Japanese
of the Occupation, even if the latter were a direct drain upon the Japanese
ese councmy which it is not. For a great part of the Occupation cest as
pointed out by you is reflected in Japanese labor and personal services,
equivalent to a public works program, relieving an unemployment problem
which otherwise would be much more acute, and shelter for Occupation persennel and activities which may cause inconvenience to some Japanese but
has no appreciable impact upon the Japanese economy.

This premise might well be reconciled with a failure to comprehend the facts bearing upon the conclusion reached, but the second premise is far more difficult of reconciliation with the distinguished record and illustrious heritage of your great journal. For by it you treat those human liberties drawn from the imputable American concepts to which your interpretable foundar, Benjamin Franklin, contributed so greatly as in effect burdensome commodities to be bestowed or suppressed, accepted or rejected, expanded or contracted, in strict accordance with the economic stature of the people involved. This is a strange concept, indeed, which happily was not within the minds of Benjamin Franklin and his illustrious compatriets at the time the American way of life first was charted. Otherwise, in all probability, we would still occupy a colonial status and civilization would have failed to record much of its enlightened progress of the century just passed.

"Equally fallacious is your conclusion that because of the allegedly burdensome economic impact of these freedoms Japan 'can't earn her living." The conclusion finds its complete refutation in progress thus far made toward economic stability under which, despite the prostrate economy left in the wales of war and disaster and generally unfavorable post-war conditions of world trade, Japanese industrial production has recovered desisively toward its average pro-war level—a record equalled by few if any of the war-visited countries of the earth. In consonance with the historic development of the United States under the agis of equal opportunity, individual liberty and personal dignity, progress toward Japanese self support continues steady and unchated largely because of those very freedoms which you challenge—progress which, provided external conditions parmit competitive foreign trade, points to the achievement in Japan of complete economic self sufficiency by the year 1952.

"Your final reference to the Communists flaughing their heads off is still more puzzling. No such laughter has been detected here, but rather the despair of complete frustration due to the first and enthusiastic Japaness absorption of these very liberties which are so symically derided. But it must be a source of deep Communist satisfaction to see American concepts and ideals and institutions thus belittled and progress in the discharge of American commitments abread so disparaged in responsible and highly respected quarters such as yours. Douglas MacArthur."

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS Economic and Scientific Section APO 500 TC/rk 20 June 1949 MEMORANDUM: SUBJECT: Mrs. Helen Mears 1. Helen Mears is an amateur sociologist, lecturer, and free lance writer who was a member of the Labor Advisory Committee which visited Japan from February through July 1946. Mrs. Mears was in Japan also in 1936. She has not returned to Japan since 1946. 2. The Labor Advisory Committee was selected by the Army Department upon request from SCAP. The request was made in November 1945 and was initiated by Col. R. C. Kramer, then Chief of ESS. Membership of the Committee included the following: Frederick Eberling, Professor, Vanderbilt University (Chairman); Paul L. Stanchfield, Deputy Chairman; Benjamin Aaron, War Labor Board; John Abersold, Professor, University of Pennsylvania, Wharton School of Business; Tillman Sogge, Bureau of the Budget; Oscar Weigert, Department of Labor; John J. Murphy, New England Regional Director, AFL; Leonard Appel, National Labor Relations Board; Edward Hollander, Labor Department; Fletcher Wellemyer and Lyle Garlock, United States Employment Service, and Helen Mears. Mr. Eberling never actually came to Japan. 3. The report of the Committee was concurred in by all the members, but Mrs. Mears wrote her own supplementary report which emphasized primarily the establishment of a women's section in GHQ, SCAP, to be staffed by women for the purpose of giving the problem of emancipation of the Japanese women sufficient attention. Mrs. Mears' relationships with the remainder of the Committee were generally bad. She accused them on repeated occasions of disregarding her view and of ignoring her because of her sex. The other members of the Committee, on the other hand, had little respect for Mrs. Mears' abilities as an economist and pointed out the following examples in support of their opinion: A. Mrs. Mears alleged that the Japanese, prewar, were discriminated against because the exchange rate was two to one and that since to a Japanese a yen had the same value as a dollar had to an American, the Japanese had to pay twice as much for their imports as the Americans did. b. On one occasion Mrs. Mears point/out as evidence of the inflation that at that time the Japanese were paying \$5 for an egg. When it was indicated that the Japanese were paying five yen and not five dollars, Mrs. Mears replied that a yen to a Japanese is the equivalent of a dollar to an

- 4. Prior to her arrival in Japan, Mrs. Mears was the author of one book entitled "The Year of the Wild Boar" (1940), generally considered as an interesting, sympathetic picture of Japanese daily life. Since her departure from Japan she has written several brief articles for the New Yorker on life of occupationnaires and one book, "Mirror for Americans" (1948), which took the view that the United States was equally responsible for starting the war as Japan. She also maintained that the Americans were trying to reform Japan in their own image without any appreciation of the virtues of the Japanese or the faults of the United States.
- 5. Mrs. Mears has never been sympathetic to the Occupation reform program in any of its aspects, taking the view in 1946 that Japanese society was perfectly all right, that were it not for international pressure prewar Japan would never have waged war, and that Americans were not capable of reforming Japan in any event. Her two year delay in criticizing the Occupation publicly may be attributed in part to the determination expressed to her by most of the other members of the Labor Advisory Committee at the time of their visit to Japan that they would all castigate her publicly were she to venture into print.
- 6. Mrs. Mears is generally regarded by well-informed persons on Japan as well-meaning, sympathetic to the Japanese, and a good technician in matters of writing, but wholly ignorant in economics and economic analysis, with a tendency towards irresponsible statements. It is not believed that her views will influence government circles, specialists in Japanese matters or economists generally.

EDITORIALS

THE SATURDAY EVENING POST

June 18, 1949

WE'RE GIVING JAPAN 'DEMOCRACY', BUT SHE CAN'T EARN HER LIVING

By HELEN MEARS

In Japan we have on our hands, and are responsible for, a bankrupt nation of more than 80,000,000 people, which can support only a fraction of its population and is existing today at a semistarvation level on a dole from us. We've given these people a new constitution guaranteeing the utmost in individual liberty. We've given them a brand-new Labor Ministry, a new protective Labor Standards Law considerably more liberal than even our own Wagner Act. We've broken up their big-business corporations and enforced a system for redistributing land ownership. We've revised their educational system, raised the compulsory school term to nine years, and given women the vote. The only thing that's wrong is that these liberated people can no longer earn even a prewar standard of living.

For instance, early in the occupation we energetically encouraged Japanese workers to form unions and fight aggressively for higher wages and other benefits. The Japanese did so, and wages rose with phenomenal rapidity. But the situation for Japanese labor is worse than ever before. Why? Because there has been, and is, such a drastic shortage of all consumer's goods and raw materials that there has been a wildcat inflation. In 1934 an average family of four could live comfortably by Japanese standards on 50 yen a month; today they need 12,600 yen a mongh just to get by. This is being liberated the hard way.

Utopia is expensive. To run our reform programs the Japanese Government had to set up not only the entirely new Labor Ministry but literally dozens of special bureaus, and agencies which had to be staffed, equipped and paid. The government also had to take over responsibility for various welfare programs which traditionally had been the responsibility of business. The government also had to put on its payroll hundreds of thousands of Japanese who work directly on occupation projects—as servants, or construction workers for housing and airfields. Recently we ordered them to take some of the bureaucrats off the payroll, and the government has announced a plan to dismiss around 750,000. Since there are no other jobs for most of them, some sort of relief program will have to be set up. Another is being set up to take care of the rising dismissals from industry.

Japanese government budgets during the occupation have been phenomenal. During the early '30's a typical budget was around 1,750,000,000 yen, including costs of their armed services. Their latest announced budget is 704,000,000,000 yen, which is around \$2,000,000,000 at today's exchange rate. At the 1935 excahange rate it would have been over \$200,000,000,000. These huge budgets are largely due to the very high cost of the occupation and our reform programs.

Where the government will get the revenue to keep going is a mystery. Traditionally

Japan has supported around half her population and run her government by profits from for foreign trade, everseas enterprises, and services like shipping. Allied policy has destroyed all these sources of income. Under the conditions that exist today, Japan cannot produce to sell at a profit, and so cannot pay for her essential imports plus the high cost of shipping. So far we've made up the difference and charged it against the Japanese Government, hoping that sometime inthe future they'll be able to pay it back. In a sense, of course, they have already paid it back by supplying us, for occupation needs, from their short-supply materials—such as coal, lumber and cement, and the other numerous and expensive services for occupation requirements.

Early in the occupation General MacArthur told the Japanese that our policies were intended to promote the "dignity and the well-being and happiness of the individual." Up to now, our policies have so conspicuously failed to do this that General MacArthur finally issued another statement in which he told the Japanese that when we say "democracy" we don't mean a decent standard of living. Democracy, the general said, is a "spiritual commodity" that "springs from hardship, struggle and toil." Maybe the general is right, but we can't expect the communists not to laugh their heads off.

Editors Note: Miss Mears recently spent four months in Japan as a member of a labor advisory committee. She is the author of Mirror for Americans: Japan (Houghton, Mifflin).