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MISSION #18

BANGKOK
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HEADQUARTERS XX BOMBER COMMAND

APO 493

MISSION NO. 18

COPY NO. 1

TACTICAL MISSION REPORT

BANSUE MARSHALLING YARDS, BANGKOK

27 NOVEMBER 1944

GENERAL H. H. ARNOLD
COMMANDING GENERAL
TWENTIETH AIR FORCE

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XX Bomber Command
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Date Initials

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XX BOMBER COMMAND
APO 493

TACTICAL MISSION

REPORT

Field Orders No. 18

Mission No. 18

TARGET: BANSUE MARSHALLING YARDS
BANGKOK, THAILAND

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Prepared by:

Intelligence Section
XX Bomber Command

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XX BOMBER COMMAND
APO #193

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: XX Bomber Command :
: 7 DEC 1944 F.C.S. :
: Date Initials :
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7 December 1944

SUBJECT: Report of Operations, 27 November 1944.

TO : Commanding General, Twentieth Air Force, Washington 25, D.C.

1. UNITS PARTICIPATING:

All bombardment Groups of the XX Bomber Command were ordered to participate in a medium-force daylight attack on D-day against the Bansue Marshalling Yards, Bangkok, Siam. The mission was to be staged from the rear area bases. Groups, their locations, and their Commanding Officers were as follows:

<u>Group</u>	<u>Rear Base</u>	<u>Commanding Officer</u>
40th	Chakulia	Colonel W.H. Blanchard
44th	Dudhkundi	Colonel A.L. Harvey
462nd	Piardoba	Colonel A.F. Kalberer
463th	Kharagpur	Lt. Col. V. Edmundson

2. IDENTIFICATION OF MISSION:

a. Attack No. 18.

b. Targets Planned:

(1) Primary Target: Bansue Marshalling Yards, Bangkok, Thailand (AIF Target No. 98.2-38).

(2) Secondary Target: Mergui Harbor, Burma (XX Bomber Command Target No. 82.2-B).

(3) Last Resort Target: Military Stores Area, Taungup, Burma (XX Bomber Command Target No. 82.2-C).

3. STRATEGY AND PLAN OF OPERATIONS:

a. Importance of Targets:

(1) Primary Target:

(a) Bansue is the switching point and control junction for all the traffic moving to the south and west. There are 22 tracks at the widest point, narrowing to 5 lines at the north choke point. Locomotive and car repair shops are located in four buildings near the choke point.

(b) The Bansue yard normally contains the highest count of rolling stock of any station in Bangkok.

(2) Secondary Target: Mergui is the northernmost Burman

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harbor now normally used by the enemy for ocean-going ships, and is the chief port of entry for military supplies in Burma. As many as 18 vessels of from 1000 to 2500 gross tons have been observed at Mergui in recent months. Port facilities are meager but there are a number of warehouses for the storage of supplies.

(3) Last Resort Target: Taungup is one of the principal stores areas on the west coast of Burma.

b. Details of Planning (See also Annex N, Field Orders):

(1) Operational Planning:

(a) Mission 18 was planned as a training-combat mission, the selection of D-day to be dependent on weather. The selection of the primary target was made on the recommendation of Army Air Forces, India-Burma Theater.

(b) From the anti-aircraft standpoint the best heading to this target was 135 degrees. The closest approach to this heading for which a satisfactory initial point could be found, however, was 48 degrees. Breakaway to the right was specified for better avoidance of anti-aircraft.

(c) Four assembly points, one for each group, were chosen. Determining factors were the avoidance of Mergui anti-aircraft and the accomplishment of a satisfactory turn at the IP. Diamond Island was chosen as the first turning point in order to keep the route away from the Rangoon fighter defenses and still provide a check point on the route out.

(d) Pre-dawn take-offs, requiring individual flight on the first part of the route, were scheduled in order to bring the aircraft over the target during the period for which the best weather was forecast.

(e) Bombing altitudes were lowered to 18,000 to 20,000 feet because the predicted anti-aircraft defenses were not as heavy as usual. In this way considerably greater bomb loads could be carried.

(f) Two aiming points, two Groups using each, were specified because the entire weight of bombs was not needed at one point and also because of the narrow rectangular shape of the target.

(2) Determination of Bomb Load:

(a) The Field Order directed that airplanes with center section wing tanks carry a minimum of 26 - 500-pound GP bombs (TNT or Amatol filled) and airplanes without center section wing tanks a minimum of 24. In this manner each airplane was scheduled to carry a bomb load consistent with what past performance indicated was its bomb-carrying capacity at the tactical radius indicated on the mission flight plan.

(b) Since the purpose of the attack was to impede enemy rail transportation in the area by destroying repair facilities, disrupting railroad sidings (as well as the main line in the marshalling yards), and destroying engine and rolling stock on the sidings, 500-pound GP bombs, (TNT or Amatol filled) fuzed one tenth (.1) second nose and twenty-five thousandth (.025) second tail delay were recommended and employed. It was concluded that this fuzing would be effective against the repair facilities as well as against the railway yards and rolling stock and could be expected to temporarily disorganize the movement of freight within the yards as the result of tearing up tracks, cratering the road-bed, and demolishing or overturning whatever rolling stock might be contained in the yards at the time of the attack.

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(3) Method of Bombing: Bombing was to be accomplished by 12-plane formations from pressure altitudes as follows: 40th Group, 18,000 feet; 444th Group, 21,000 feet; 462nd Group, 19,000 feet; and 468th Group, 20,000 feet. The center of the east edge of the eastern group of warehouses, adjacent to the congested rail lines, was to be the aiming point for the 40th and 462nd Groups. The 444th and 468th Groups were to use as their aiming point the center of the repair shop area at the north end of the yard near the choke point.

(4) Route to be Flown:

(a) From their rear bases all aircraft were to proceed to Diamond Island and from there to their respective assembly points. Assembly points were as follows: 40th Group - Cabusa Island; 444th Group - King Island; 462nd Group - Tavoy Island; and 468th Group - Elphinstone Island. All Groups were to use the same I. P., the river mouth at 13°21'N - 100°02'E. After bombing, all Groups were to proceed to 13°20'N - 100°40'E, and then return to their home bases using the following check points: The I.P., Tavoy Point, and Diamond Island.

(b) Aircraft of the 40th and 468th Groups were to take off beginning at 2112Z on D-day minus one. Those of the 462nd and 444th were to take off beginning at 2116Z and 2117Z respectively. With weather permitting, aircraft were to fly at 3000 feet indicated altitude until arriving at approximately 14°20'N - 96°10'E, at which point the climb to the assigned bombing altitude was to start.

(5) Other Provisions: Each Group was to furnish 15 aircraft.

4. EXECUTION OF THE MISSION (See Annexes A and K):

a. Take-off (See Annex A, Part I):

(1) Times of take-off were planned as follows: 40th - 262112Z; 444th - 262117Z; 462nd - 262116Z; 468th - 262112Z.

(2) Take-off was accomplished as follows:

<u>Group</u>	<u>Aircraft Airborne</u>	<u>First Aircraft Off</u>	<u>Last Aircraft Off</u>
40th	15	262113Z	262142Z
444th	15	262118Z	262151Z
462nd	15	262116Z	262144Z
468th	15	262112Z	262141Z
Total	60	262112Z	262151Z

(3) Weather at take-off was clear at all bases, with unlimited visibility. At Chakulia the wind was from the northeast at 6 miles per hour. At all other bases there was a north wind of from 5 to 8 miles per hour velocity.

b. Route Out (See Annex A, Parts II and III):

(1) Of the 60 aircraft airborne, 11 aircraft deviated from the planned route to the target for various reasons. Deviations by Group were as follows: 40th - 5; 444th - 2; 462nd - 2; and 468th - 2. Of the 4 aircraft that did not reach the primary target, 1 bombed the secondary target, 1 bombed the last resort target, 1 jettisoned its bombs, and 1 returned to

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base with its bomb load. Although reaching the primary target area, 1 aircraft failed to bomb the target because of an AFCE malfunction, and instead bombed a target of opportunity in the Bangkok area.

(2) Only one aircraft experienced difficulty in joining a formation. This was due to a navigational error and resulted in the aircraft bombing the primary target singly.

(3) In all, four formations of from 12 to 15 aircraft were formed at the assembly points. Only 2 aircraft joined formation with a group other than their own.

(4) Navigation on this mission was rated as good to superior.

c. Primary Target (See Annex A, parts IV, V and VII):

(1) Of the 60 aircraft airborne, 55 reached and bombed the primary target at Bangkok. The first formation over the target released its bombs at 0310Z from 21,000 feet indicated on a magnetic heading of 85°. The last aircraft over the target bombed singly at 0343Z from 20,000 feet indicated on a heading of 50° Magnetic. During this period of 33 minutes, aircraft bombed as follows: a formation of 12 aircraft bombed at 0310Z; a formation of 15 passed over the target, 2 bombing at 0316Z and leaving the formation, the remaining 13 making a second run and bombing at 0335Z; a formation of 14 bombed at 0317Z; a formation of 13 bombed at 0334Z; and the single aircraft bombed at 0343Z. In all, 1529 500-pound general-purpose bombs were dropped in the target area, a total of 764,500 pounds (382.25 short tons). Three aircraft dropped only a partial load on the primary target and subsequently jettisoned the remainder. One aircraft resorted to the emergency system when unable to open the front bomb bay doors.

(2) Weather at the target presented no difficulty, clear and unrestricted visibility prevailing beneath the formations. There were cirrus clouds of 1/10 to 2/10 coverage at 22,000 feet. Visual bombing was accomplished by all formations.

(3) The anti-aircraft (and fighter) opposition did not affect the bombing runs or cause any great error in accuracy.

(4) Bombing altitudes at the primary target ranged approximately from 18,500 to 21,400 feet. Minor deviations from the briefed axis of attack (48° Magnetic) were numerous, but no major discrepancies occurred. Of the 55 aircraft bombing the primary target, 51 or 93 per cent used an axis of attack between 45° and 54° magnetic.

d. Secondary Target:

(1) Aircraft 217 (468th) bombed the secondary target at 0252Z, dropping 24 500-pound general-purpose bombs from 20,000 feet indicated altitude. An axis of attack of 345° magnetic was used. Air speed was 190 miles per hour indicated. Visual bombing was accomplished.

(2) At the secondary target there were 1/10 to 2/10 cirrus clouds at 22,000 feet with light haze.

(3) Eight or 10 bombs were seen to hit in the water, the remainder striking the dock area.

e. Last Resort Target: Aircraft 457 (40th) on its second run over the last resort target bombed visually from 15,800 feet true altitude, dropping 30 500-pound general-purpose bombs at 0108Z. The axis of attack used was

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145° magnetic; the indicated air speed was 200 miles per hour. Results observed were reported as good, all bombs being seen to land in the target area. Two fires attended by a considerable amount of smoke were observed. Weather was CAWU.

f. Target of Opportunity: Aircraft 319 (40th) was over the primary target singly, but because of AFCE malfunctions, did not bomb. A target of opportunity (a light industrial plant northeast of Bangkok and southwest of Don Muang Airfield) was bombed from 18,800 feet true altitude at 0353Z on a heading of 149° magnetic at an indicated air speed of 195 miles per hour. Twenty-four 500-pound bombs were dropped with poor results observed.

5. ENEMY ANTI-AIRCRAFT (See Annex B):

a. Meager and generally inaccurate heavy antiaircraft fire was reported by 70 per cent (52 out of 74) of the aircraft-runs over the primary target area from 0310Z to 0353Z. Fire was reported from 0309Z to 0351Z at altitudes varying from 17,500 to 21,000 feet under CAWU conditions. In addition to the black bursts reported by the majority of the aircraft, one aircraft reported yellow and gray bursts while a second observed white heavy antiaircraft fire. Damage to 4 aircraft by flak is known, while damage to 2 others may have been caused either by flak or by bomb explosion. No intense fire was reported, and only 2 per cent of the aircraft reported moderate antiaircraft fire. Meager fire was reported by 98 per cent. Deviations were most numerous below (56 per cent), ahead (39 per cent), and to the left (52 per cent).

b. Meager and inaccurate black heavy antiaircraft fire was encountered also at Mergui and Taungup.

c. No ground-to-air rockets, smokescreens, or high-altitude balloons were reported.

d. Approximately 10 barrage balloons were reported in the vicinity of Smut Prakan (13°35'N - 100°35'E) flying at 5000 feet or lower.

e. Because of the known adequate warning net in southern Burma, it is believed that the enemy had prior warning of the attack.

f. A new type of "black puff" was observed by one aircraft in the Bangkok area. Black bursts six or seven times larger than the regular flak bursts were reported observed ahead of the formation and level with it. These puffs seemed to hang in the air as if burning for approximately 20 seconds.

6. ENEMY AIR OPPOSITION (See Annex C):

a. Opposition was rated as weak, with an enemy fighter force of 19 to 27 aircraft intercepting 31 of the 56 B-29 aircraft which bombed in the Bangkok area. A total of 52 encounters were experienced. Oscars, Tojos, Zekes, 2 Hamps, 1 or 2 Tonys, and 1 bi-plane with fixed landing gear were reported.

b. The one B-29 missing on Mission No. 18 may have been lost because of fighter-inflicted damage. For details on this aircraft, see Part IX, Annex A, "Execution of the Mission." Three B-29's sustained minor damage as a result of fighter attacks, while 2 others were damaged slightly due either to antiaircraft fire or fighter attack.

c. The majority of the encounters took place in the target area, with 86 per cent after bombs away.

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d. A change in the direction of approach from that met in the past 10 missions was noted in that the majority of the attacks were from the right quarter instead of from the front. This may indicate a trend in the enemy's tactics, since in the two previous missions some increase in the percentage of right quarter attacks was noted. As to the level of approach, 40 per cent of all encounters were high, 21 per cent level, and 39 per cent low. Only 1 coordinated attack was reported. In this attack 2 enemy aircraft took part, and there is some doubt whether or not the coordination was premeditated.

e. One B-29 reported 2 encounters with aerial bombs, but could give no details as to the methods used by the enemy.

f. Very little evasive action was taken by the B-29's and what was taken consisted only of loss of altitude after bombs away.

7. WEATHER (See Annex D):

Excellent weather conditions permitted the execution of the mission without adverse effect from weather. Satisfactory conditions existed for high-altitude visual precision bombing and for formation flying.

8. COMMUNICATIONS (See Annex E):

a. Communications for this mission were the most satisfactory yet experienced by this Command. This can be attributed in large measure to the short distance flown and the excellent weather encountered. The assigned frequencies proved highly satisfactory, offering excellent contact throughout the mission.

b. Air-to-air homing was attempted by all groups; with good to excellent results in 3 groups, and poor results in 1 group, due probably to the flight leader's transmitter being improperly set up.

c. Six radio homing beacons were used, with the average initial contact of each beacon varying from 137 to 143 miles, and with extreme initial contact as high as 700 miles for one of the beacons.

d. A small amount of skip and static was encountered on the assigned 8 megacycle frequencies during the early morning hours.

e. No violations of cryptographic security were reported.

f. Practice messages were again transmitted to aircraft in flight for the purpose of acquainting personnel with the procedures involved in passing a message from the Command Post to the aircraft. Efficiency in these practice messages may be rated as fair to good. A time study of the handling of these messages is contained in Annex E, Communications Information.

g. A total of 15 malfunctions were reported, of which 4 were repaired in flight.

9. RADAR (See Annex F):

a. Bombing of the target was accomplished primarily by visual means. Since this mission was planned, however, as a practice mission, the radar operators practiced the radar-bombsight procedure on the bombing run.

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b. Navigational problems were also performed. Ground speeds and drifts were computed by radar. Islands and check points along the route were also identified in this way.

c. Radar scope photographic results were satisfactory. A number of excellent radar scope photographs of the target area were obtained.

d. All radar systems were operational at take-off. The operational AN/APQ-13 systems over the target were above average. Three (3) auxiliary radar equipment malfunctions were reported.

10. RCM (See Annex G):

a. RCM activities were confined to searching for enemy radar stations from take-off to the target and return, and for radar fire control in the target area.

b. In the Rangoon area, both the 69-megacycle and the 80-megacycle stations were intercepted with steady signal characteristics. A permanent type of radar was indicated, rather than the "CHI" type. Several 200-megacycle signals were intercepted and later D/F'ed slightly off shore in the Gulf of Siam. They were either of the Mark II Model I Naval type on board ship, or of the Mark I Model II type on shore.

c. In the target area a strong Mark I Model I signal was intercepted. This signal went off coincident with bombs away, suggesting that it may have been damaged or destroyed. There were no other signals intercepted in the target area.

d. No enemy directed jamming or interference was experienced.

e. A monitoring of the command channel showed no violations of security.

f. That some aircraft failed to observe proper IFF procedure was observed in the monitoring of the IFF band.

g. No malfunctions of equipment occurred.

11. CENTRAL STATION FIRE CONTROL AND GUNNERY (See Annex H):

The functioning of the Central Station Fire Control equipment was reported as satisfactory for Mission No. 18. Of 275 turrets reported upon, malfunctions occurred in 7. Out of 550 machine guns, 14 developed malfunctions. During flight a total of 16,413 rounds of ammunition were fired, 8589 while test firing and 7824 during combat.

12. CAMERAS AND PHOTOGRAPHS (See Annex I):

a. Seventy-two cameras of the K-18, K-20, and K-22 types were installed in aircraft scheduled to take part in the mission. Of these, 55 photographed the primary target, and 8 photographed other targets, returning 342 usable negatives. Malfunctions were reported as 2.

b. A single B-29 of the 40th Group flew a reconnaissance mission on 27 November to take damage assessment photographs. CAVU weather conditions were encountered over all targets, and photographs of the primary, secondary, and last resort targets were returned. No anti-aircraft or enemy fighters were encountered.

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13. BATTLE LOSSES AND BATTLE DAMAGE (See Part IX, Annex A and Table V, Annex M):

a. No aircraft is definitely known to have been lost due to enemy action. However, since aircraft 452 (40th Group) is known to have sustained damage from fighter attack, there is a possibility that this missing aircraft may have been lost as a result of enemy action.

b. Nine aircraft sustained damage over the target area, 1 accident when a bomb exploded beneath it; 2 from enemy aircraft; 4 from antiaircraft; and 2 either from antiaircraft or from the exploding bomb.

14. FUNCTIONING OF EQUIPMENT (See Annex K and Table XI, Annex M):

a. Of the 60 aircraft involved in the mission, 4 failed to get over the primary target with bombs. Of these, 1 aircraft bombed the secondary target, 1 the last resort target, 1 jettisoned, and 1 brought its bombs back. One aircraft over the primary target failed to bomb because of inoperative AFCE, bombing a target of opportunity in the vicinity.

b. A total of 100 malfunctions of equipment were reported. Inoperative tachometers numbered 15 and were the most numerous. Next in number were engines running rough (9) and inoperative generators (5).

c. The average fuel consumption of aircraft bombing the primary target (based on reports from 51 aircraft) was 5265 gallons. The average gross starting weight reported was 133,000 pounds, and the average weight of bombs loaded was 15,450 pounds.

15. TARGET DAMAGE ASSESSMENT (See Annex L):

a. Primary Target:

(1) Assessment of damage was accomplished from excellent strike photography and reconnaissance obtained by the 40th Bomb Group on 27 November 1944.

(2) Analysis of the photos taken show that excellent results were achieved. Both aiming points were completely destroyed, and in addition several small buildings in the immediate vicinity of the railway shops and warehouse were destroyed and others were damaged. All rail lines were cut in one or more places. Four locomotives were destroyed, 2 probably destroyed, and 3 damaged. At least 90 rolling stock were damaged or destroyed.

(3) The Thai Cement Works also received heavy damage, probably to the rotary kilns, the most vital component of the plant.

b. Secondary Target: Provisional damage assessment obtained from strike photos only show 10 to 12 bombs bursting along the waterfront, appearing to score hits or near misses on 2 jetties. Damage to several sampans and blast damage to 2 small buildings is indicated.

For and in the absence of The Commanding General:

John E. Upston
JOHN E. UPSTON
Brigadier General, U.S.A.
Chief of Staff

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ANNEX

A

EXECUTION OF THE MISSION

- I - Information on take-offs
- II - Details of Routes
- III - Track and Vertical Flight Path*
- IV - Bombing Data **
- V - Bomb Loading
- VI - Disposition of Bombs
- VII - Formations Flown
- VIII - Navigation Report *
- IX - Mission Operational Losses
- X - Information on Landings

* Prepared by Staff Navigator.

** Page A-IV-1 prepared by Staff Bombardier

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I - TAKE-OFF INFORMATION

Mission No. 18

27 November 1944

Group	Planned First Takeoff	First A/C Off	Last A/C Off	Elapsed Time	No. of A/C Taking off	Average Take-off interval
40th	262112Z	262113Z	262142Z	29 min.	15	124 sec.
444th	262117Z	262118Z	262151Z	33 min.	15	141 sec.
462nd	262116Z	262116Z	262144Z	28 min.	15	120 sec.
468th	262112Z	262112Z	262141Z	29 min.	15	124 sec.
Overall		262112Z	262151Z	39 min.	60	40 sec.

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II - DETAILS OF ROUTES

Mission No. 18

27 November 1944

A. Planned Routes

	40th	44th	462nd	468th
Base	Chakulia	Dudhkundi	Piardoba	Kharagpur
1st Check Point	Diamond Island (15°52'N - 94°17'E)			
Assembly Point	Cabasa Island (12°19'N - 97°53'E)	King Island (12°40'N - 98°19'E)	Tavoy Island (13°04'N - 98°19'E)	Elphinstone Island (12°21'N - 97°55'E)
Initial Point	River mouth at 13°21'N - 100°02'E.			
Target	Bansue Marshalling Yards, Bangkok (13°48'N - 100°33'E)			
1st Return Check Point	13° 20' N - 100° 40' E.			
2nd Return Check Point	River mouth at 13°21'N - 100°02'E.			
3rd Return Check Point	Tavoy Point (13°32'N - 98°08'E)			
Base	Chakulia	Dudhkundi	Piardoba	Kharagpur

B. Deviations from Planned Routes

1. 40th Group:

a. A/C 457 because of a propeller governor malfunction, was forced to turn from the briefed course at 17°35'N - 92°45'E and proceed to the last resort target, which it bombed. The aircraft returned to Chakulia by direct route.

b. A/C 319 due to navigational error missed the assembly point. After spending some time in search for the assembly point, this aircraft proceeded to the primary target, which was not bombed due to an AFCE malfunction. A target of opportunity northeast of the primary target was bombed. The planned route was followed on the return flight.

c. A/C 295 flew the planned route to the primary target, which it bombed. Because of inability to close the bomb bay doors, this aircraft on return deviated from the briefed course at Diamond Island and proceeded to Chittagong.

d. A/C 313 flew the briefed course to the primary target, deviating from it upon return at Diamond Island to escort A/C 295 to Chitt-

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agong. From Chittagong this aircraft returned to Chakulia by direct route.

e. A/C 452 is presumed to have followed the briefed route to the primary target and on return to the vicinity of Diamond Island, at which point it received permission to leave the formation and to proceed to Chittagong. The aircraft commander declined an escort. This aircraft is missing. (See also Mission Operational Losses, Part IX, Annex A).

2. 444th Group;

a. A/C 226 flew the briefed route to the assembly point, where lack of power from #3 engine prevented its joining a formation of its own group. This aircraft joined with the 462nd Group, and with them bombed the primary target. On return the briefed course was left at Diamond Island, where a course was set to Cox's Bazaar due to battle damage and the need of medical attention for 2 wounded men. This aircraft returned to Dudhkundi at 1045Z on 28 November 1944.

b. A/C 378 returned to base, landing 58 minutes after take-off because of an electrical failure. Bombs were jettisoned.

3. 462nd Group;

a. A/C 311, after bombing the primary target, landed at Dum Dum Airfield on its return flight because of gasoline shortage. This aircraft returned to Piardoba the same day, landing at 1002Z.

b. A/C 359 returned to base with its bombs because of an engine failure, landing 1 hour and 28 minutes after take-off.

4. 468th Group;

a. A/C 411 flew on course and arrived 12 miles northeast of the assembly point, Elphinstone Island, circled for 38 minutes, and joined A/C 217, an element leader, following until the bomb bay doors of A/C 217 were seen to open over Mergui. At this point A/C 411 changed course to the I.P., which it reached at 0330Z, and went in to the primary target, bombing singly. Return was along the planned route.

b. A/C 217 flew the briefed course to the assembly point. Because of supercharger trouble, this aircraft proceeded to the secondary target, which it bombed, and returned to Kharagpur by direct route.


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
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AUTH: CG XX BC

INITIALS: SP/1

DATE: 30 November 44

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XX BOMBER COMMAND
APO 493

CONSOLIDATED
SPECIALIST MISSION
REPORT OF
STAFF BOMBARDIER

Date Prepared 30 November 1944

Field Orders No. 18

Date of Mission 27 November 1944

1. Visibility at the target permitted visual bombing by all formations participating. Enemy opposition in the form of anti aircraft and fighters did not constitute any great source of error since bombing results were excellent and both assigned aiming points were destroyed.
2. Dimensions of the bomb pattern laid by the 40th Group 14 airplane formation indicates considerable distance between flights laterally. The width of the bomb pattern shown on the strike photo is 4,400 feet.
3. Four aircraft of the 444th Group were damaged by an explosion shortly after bomb release. Final investigation is not complete on this occurrence.
4. The 462nd Group made two runs over the primary target at the direction of the Command Pilot in order to make a better run and tighten the formation.
5. Aircraft #456 developed mechanical failure over the target and bombardier did not have sufficient time to properly synchronize before dropping bombs. Aircraft #346 dropped on Aircraft #456 in order to cover plane on way to base.
6. Malfunctions of bombing equipment reported on this mission are as follows:
 - a. - 40th Group -

Aircraft #319 - C-1 autopilot trouble.
Aircraft #276 five bombs failed to release. No malfunction can be ascertained.
Aircraft #452 failed to release all bombs over the target and since plane is reported missing cause of malfunction cannot be determined.
 - b. - 444th Group -

Aircraft #524 was unable to open front bomb bay doors by normal system and resorted to emergency system. Electrical lead wire was found broken.
 - c. - 462nd Group -

Aircraft #329 six bombs not released. Bombs jettisoned in sea by use of radar toggle switch. No explanation of malfunction is available.
 - d. - 468th Group -

No malfunction reported.

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A. Times of Bomb Release at Primary Target

Time (Z)	40th	444th	462nd	468th	Total
0306 - 0310	-	12	-	-	12
0316 - 0320	13	1	2	-	16
0331 - 0335	-	1	12	13	26
0341 - 0345	-	-	-	1	1
Total	13	14	14	14	55

B. Bombing Altitudes at Primary Target

Altitude (feet)	40th ^a	444th ^b	462nd ^b	468th ^b	Total
18,000 - 18,499	1	1	-	-	2
18,500 - 18,999	8	-	-	-	8
19,000 - 19,499	3	1	12	-	16
19,500 - 19,999	1	-	1	-	2
20,000 - 20,499	-	-	1	14	15
20,500 - 20,999	-	4	-	-	4
21,000 - 21,499	-	8	-	-	8
Total	13	14	14	14	55
Briefed altitudes ^c	18,000'	21,000'	19,000'	20,000'	

a - Reported as true altitude

b - Reported as indicated altitude

c - Pressure Altitude

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S E C R E T

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C. Axes of Attack at Primary Target

Axes (degrees - magnetic)	40th	444th	462nd	468th	Total
40 - 44	2	-	-	-	2
45 - 49	11	11	11	-	33
50 - 54	-	2	2	14	18
55 - 59	-	-	-	-	-
60	-	-	1	-	1
Unknown	-	1	-	-	1
Total	13	14	14	14	55

Briefed Axis of Attack - 48° M.

D. Indicated Air Speeds at Primary Target

IAS (mph)	40th	444th	462nd	468th	Total
185 - 189	-	-	2	-	2
190 - 194	2	2	4	14	22
195 - 199	8	6	5	-	19
200 - 205	3	5	3	-	11
Unknown	-	1	-	-	1
Total	13	14	14	14	55

E. Aircraft Bombing Targets other than Primary Target

Group	A/C	Target	Bombs Dropped	Type of Release	Time of Release	Altitude	Axis of Attack	IAS (mph)
468th	217	S.T.	24	Visual	0252Z	20,000' I	345° M	190
40th	457	L.R.T.	30	Visual	0108Z	15,800' T	145° M	200
40th	319	T.O.*	24	Visual	0353Z	18,800' T	49° M	195

* Warehouses 1 mile southwest of Don Muang Airfield, east of the rail-road tracks, and northeast of the primary target.

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V - BOMB LOADING*

Mission No. 18

27 November 1944

No. G.P. Bombs	40th		44th		462nd		468th		Total		Average Number
	A/C	GP	A/C	GP	A/C	GP	A/C	GP	A/C	GP	
24	10	240	1	24	5	120	6	144	22	528	12,000
26	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	52	2	52	13,000
27	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	27	1	27	13,500
28	1	28	-	-	-	-	5	140	6	168	14,000
29	-	-	-	-	2	58	1	29	3	87	14,500
30	4	120	-	-	1	30	-	-	5	150	15,000
31	-	-	-	-	3	93	-	-	3	93	15,500
32	-	-	14	148	3	96	-	-	17	544	16,000
33	-	-	-	-	1	33	-	-	1	33	16,500
Total	15	388	15	472	15	430	15	392	60	1682	

* Based on aircraft airborne. "GP" indicates 500-pound general-purpose (TNT or Amatol filled) bombs fused .1 second nose and .025 second tail. Minima were 26 bombs per aircraft equipped with center section wing tanks and 24 bombs per aircraft not so equipped.

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VI - DISPOSITION OF BOMBS

Mission No. 18

27 November 1944

	40th		44th		462nd		468th		Total	
	A/C	G.P.	A/C	G.P.	A/C	G.P.	A/C	G.P.	A/C	G.P.
All targets	15	375	14	440	14	400	15	392	58	1607
On Bangkok (PT)	13	321	14	440	14	400	14	368	55	1529
On Mergui (ST)	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	24	1	24
On Taungup (LRT)	1	30	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	30
On Opp. Tgt.	1	24	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	24
Jettisoned	-	13*	1	32	-	6**	-	-	1	51
Brought Back	-	-	-	-	1	24	-	-	1	24
Totals	15	388	15	472	15	430	15	392	60	1682

* A/C 276 dropped 19 bombs on PT and jettisoned 5.
 A/C 452 dropped 22 bombs on PT and jettisoned 8.

** A/C 329 dropped 18 bombs on PT and jettisoned 6.

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VII - FORMATIONS FLOWN

Mission No. 18

27 November 1944

A. Formation Required

Aircraft were to be flown individually to the respective Group assembly points, where formations of 12 planes were to be assembled. An altitude of 3000 feet was to be maintained until approximately 14°20'N - 96°10'E, at which point the climb to bombing altitude was to begin. For the location of Group assembly points, see Part II, Section 4, of this annex.

B. Formations over the Primary Target

Formations are shown below as they were at the time of bomb release. Times, altitudes, and headings are those of the lead aircraft. These diagrams are intended to show relative positions only. "W" represents an aircraft of the 40th Group, "X" the 444th, "Y" the 462nd, and "Z" the 468th.

1. Time - 0310Z

Altitude - 21,000' I

Heading - 48° M

X - 422

X - 472

X - 464

X - 462

X - 524

X - 492

X - 451

X - 292

X - 723

X - 538

X - 411

X - 507

2. This formation made 2 runs over the primary target. The diagram below shows the position of aircraft on the first run. Two aircraft, indicated below in boxes, dropped bombs on this run. The second run is shown in diagram 5.

Time - 0316 Z

Altitude - (of a/c bombing) - 19,500' I

Heading - (of a/c bombing) - 48° M

Y - 5213

Y - 463

Y - 728

Y - 393

Y - 484

Y - 456

Y - 506

Y - 329

Y - 461

Y - 475

Y - 505

Y - 346

Y - 311

X - 226

Y - 382

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3. Time - 0317Z
Altitude - 18,900' T
Heading - 45° M

W - 587
W - 269 W - 331
W - 522
W - 297 W - 298 W - 276 W - 295
W - 322 W - 729 W - 452 W - 313
X - 375 W - 831

4. Time - 0334Z
Altitude - 20,000' I
Heading - 53° M

Z - 546
Z - 487 Z - 284
Z - 356
Z - 469 Z - 525
Z - 395 Z - 542
Z - 471 Z - 828 Z - 390 Z - 486
Z - 5208

5. This diagram shows the second run over the primary target by this formation. The first run is shown in diagram 2, above.

Time - 0335Z
Altitude - 20,250' T
Heading - 46° M

Y - 5213
Y - 463 Y - 728
Y - 393 Y - 484 Y - 505
Y - 506 Y - 329 Y - 461 Y - 475 Y - 382 X - 226
Y - 311

6. Time - 0343Z
Altitude - 20,000' I
Heading - 50° M

Z - 411

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Auth: CG, XX BC

Initials

Date 30 Nov 44

HEADQUARTERS
XX BOMBER COMMAND
MO 493

CONSOLIDATED
SPECIALIST MISSION
REPORT OF

XX BOMBER COMMAND NAVIGATION OFFICER

Date Prepared: 30 November 1944

Field Order No. 18

Date of Mission: 27 Nov 44

1. Navigation on this mission ranged from good to superior. Pre-computed celestial curves were used by navigators with excellent success expressed by individual navigators. The selection of the II and route was considered good except the 468th Group noted some confusion at the rendezvous point due to the similarity of other Islands in the vicinity.

a. Average times out and back to primary target are as follows:

	<u>N.V TIME OUT</u>	<u>N.V TIME BACK</u>
40th	5h 50m	5h 06m
444th	5h 30m	4h 50m
462nd	5h 52m	5h 17m
468th	5h 52m	4h 55m

b. Metro information furnished was generally excellent. However, individual Navigator's Sortie Reports show a wide variance in the direction and velocity of winds over the target, and route. Winds reported are in general:

<u>ONE H.L.F OUT</u>	<u>TARGET AREA</u>	<u>ONE H.L.F BACK</u>
13000'	19000'	14000'
30°10k	70°18k	143°12k

c. The following compilation of supplemental work done by navigators is listed:

<u>GROUP</u>	<u>CEL LCR'S</u>	<u>CEL FIXES</u>	<u>RADIO FIXES</u>
40th	64	13	0
444th	70	15	0
462nd	61	18	4
468th	<u>81</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>4</u>
	276	64	8

2. Comments by groups: None.

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IX - MISSION OPERATIONAL LOSSES

Mission No. 18

27 November 1944

A. Missing Aircraft

Aircraft 452 (40th Group), while in the vicinity of Diamond Island on return from the primary target, radioed the formation commander for permission to proceed to Chittagong. This aircraft had wounded personnel aboard as a result of enemy fighter attack, and could not close the bomb bay doors. The formation commander ascertained that there were no major mechanical difficulties or a shortage of gasoline, asked if an escort was needed, and, the escort being declined, gave permission for a/c 452 to proceed to Chittagong. This information was radioed to the 40th Bomb Group ground station.

At 0448Z a weak signal from a/c 452 was received by Chittagong, and was also repeated by an Air Sea Rescue aircraft at 0455Z. The messages stated that a/c 452 would land at Chittagong with wounded aboard. At 0627Z a/c 452 gave his call sign and asked for a QDM. The D.F. station at Chittagong gave a bearing of 010° at 0633Z, which was acknowledged. At 0640Z upon request from Chittagong a/c 452 gave its ETA as 0733Z and stated further that there was one dead and one wounded aboard. The last transmissions received from a/c 452 were at strength 4 (clear). No further messages were received from the aircraft. The bearing of this aircraft is known to have been 175° from Comilla and 102° from Jharsaguda at 0639Z.

At 0738Z a/c 295 landed at Chittagong on the same course from which a/c 452 had been expected. Chittagong erroneously thought that this aircraft was a/c 452 and reported that a/c 452 had landed. When the error was discovered an exhaustive search was conducted without success. B-29's, Liberators, Catalinas, PB5-A's, and surface craft of the R.A.F. and Royal Indian Navy patrolled the area from Chittagong to Diamond Island. Although active search was discontinued as of 1730Z 2 December, all surface craft in the area have been briefed to be on a continual lookout for possible survivors.

At the time it left the formation this aircraft reported no major mechanical difficulty, but it is possible that the damage sustained by enemy action was a contributing factor to its loss.

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X - INFORMATION ON LANDINGS

Mission No. 18

27 November 1944

A. Landed at XX Bomber Command Bases:

1. A/C bombing primary target:

	<u>First A/C Down</u>	<u>Last A/C Down</u>
a. 40th Group	0825Z	0912Z
b. 44th Group	0814Z	0859Z
c. 462nd Group	0835Z	0946Z
d. 468th Group	<u>0830Z</u>	<u>0853Z</u>
Over-all	0814Z	0946Z

2. A/C Failing to bomb primary target:

a. 40th Group:

- (1) A/C 457 - 270345Z - bombed last resort target.
- (2) A/C 319 - 270846Z - bombed target of opportunity.

b. 44th Group:

- (1) A/C 378 - 262214Z - jettisoned bombs.

c. 462nd Group:

- (1) A/C 359 - 262300Z - brought bombs back.

d. 468th Group:

- (1) A/C 217 - 270730Z - bombed secondary target.

B. Landed Elsewhere:

1. 40th Group: A/C 295 landed at Chittagong at 0737Z with #4 engine out.

2. 44th Group: A/C 226 landed at Cox's Bazaar at 0755Z with one engine feathered. Return was made to Dudhkundi on 28 November, landing at 1045Z.

3. 462nd Group: A/C 311 landed at Dum Dum Airfield at 0830Z due to gasoline shortage, and returned to Piardoba the same day.

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B

ANNEX

B

ENEMY ANTI-AIRCRAFT

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* * * * *
* Prepared by: *
* * * * *
* Flak Officer *
* * * * *
* XX BOMBER COMMAND *
* * * * *

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HEADQUARTERS
XX BOMBER COMMAND
APO 493

* * * * *
* S E C R E T *
By Auth of the C.G.
* XX Bomber Command *
* 7 Dec 44 J.S. *
*Date Initials *
* * * * *

3 December 1944

P R E L I M I N A R Y R E P O R T

ANTI-AIRCRAFT OPPOSITION

MISSION NUMBER 18, (DAYLIGHT), 27 NOVEMBER 1944

Primary Target - BANGKOK, Secondary Target - MERGUI
Target of Last Resort - TAUNGUP

I. ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE ENCOUNTERED

a. BANGKOK (13°45'N - 100°39'E)

Meager and generally inaccurate (although at least four aircraft were struck) heavy antiaircraft fire was reported by 70 percent (52 out of 74) of the aircraft-runs over the area from 0310Z to 0353Z. Fire was reported from 0309Z to 0351Z at altitudes varying from 17,500 to 21,000 feet under CAVU conditions. No enemy aircraft were reported on the same course and altitude except at 0316Z when no change in the accuracy and intensity of fire was noted.

Following are reports of accuracy, intensity, and deviations. The numbers indicate aircraft reporting in the affirmative while percentages are determined from the total number of reports in one direction as above, level or below.

<u>Reports of Accuracy</u>		<u>Reports of Intensity</u>	
Struck	1 (2 percent)	Intense	0 (0 percent)
Rocked	0 (0 percent)	Moderate.	1 (2 percent)
Missed51 (98 percent)	Meager.51 (98 percent)

Reports of Deviations

Above . . . 7 (10 percent)	Ahead . . 24 (39 percent)	Left . .31 (52 percent)
Level . .24 (34 percent)	Abreast . 17 (27 percent)	In Line.12 (20 percent)
Missed. .40 (56 percent)	Behind. . 21 (34 percent)	Right. .17 (28 percent)

In addition to the black bursts encountered by the majority of the aircraft, one aircraft reported yellow and gray bursts while a second aircraft observed white heavy antiaircraft fire.

Automatic weapons or light antiaircraft fire was also reported by one aircraft at 0315Z to 0316Z.

Continuously Pointed fire was used by the gun defense. The number of bursts observed averaged from ten to twenty although as many as fifty and as few as one were reported by some crew members.

Antiaircraft fire was reported as originating from the following locations:

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- a. From a site (believed 4 - 40mm guns) approximately 1/4 mile SE of the highway bridge across the river in the southern section of the city, at 0315Z-0316Z.
- b. From a 3 gun site between the River and the Bansue Marshalling Yards.

Bombing was accomplished by four formations (one formation made two runs over the area) consisting of from 12 to 15 aircraft at the following times, headings and altitudes.

<u>Formation</u>	<u>Aircraft</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Heading</u>	<u>Altitude</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
1	12	0310Z	48°	21,000'	
2	15	0316Z	48°	19,500'	2 a/c bombed
3	14	0317Z	43-48°	19,000'	
4	13	0334Z	53°	20,000'	
2	13	0335Z	50°	20,250'	Second run, bombed

In addition to the above 67 aircraft-runs over the area opposition was reported by single aircraft at odd times that could not be correlated with one of the above four formations, resulting in a total of 74 aircraft-runs.

Prior to the mission and based on photo cover up to 10 November 1944, this area was known to be defended by 15 heavy anti-aircraft guns, 10 at BANGKOK, 2 at DON MUANG A/D, and 3 at LAEM FA PHA, reference Flak Intelligence Bulletin Number B-4, 23 November 1944. The recommended route and route as flown was just outside of the maximum gun circles (probability of damage - 0) for the known 10 heavy anti-aircraft (75mm) in the southern sector of BANGKOK and well away from LAEM FA PHA, DON MUANG A/D and adjacent gun defended areas. A breakaway to the right through an undefended corridor was recommended and flown.

This course should have subjected aircraft to no accurate heavy anti-aircraft fire with all bursts occurring to the right of the aircraft. Opposition actually encountered, however, was more accurate than expected, and the majority of bursts were reported as to the left, indicating that HAA guns are sited at other than the known positions, or that the defenses consist of calibers greater than 75mm.

No definite possibility of gun-laying radar was evident through R.C.M. intercepts, extent of undercast, or characteristics of fire.

b. MERGUI (12°26'N - 98°37'E)

Meager and inaccurate black heavy anti-aircraft fire was reported by six aircraft over the area at 0252Z and 0331Z at an altitude of 20,000 feet under CAVU conditions. Deviations were generally below, behind, and to the left or right. No enemy aircraft were observed on the same course and altitude and it is believed that a Predicted Concentration type of fire was used.

c. TAUNGUP (18°52'N - 94°15'E)

Meager and inaccurate black heavy anti-aircraft fire was encountered by one aircraft at 0108Z at an altitude of 15,600 feet under CAVU conditions. Deviations were reported as level, abreast and both to the left and right with a total of 10 bursts observed. No enemy aircraft were reported on the same course and altitude.

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Five AA guns were reported 300 yards north of the north bank of the river opposite the town from crew observation. This site was identified on cover of 27 November 1944 (4MR27) as consisting of 6 heavy antiaircraft guns, probably 75mm, and is located just north of the center of the runway.

2. GROUND-TO-AIR ROCKETS, SMOKESCREENS AND HIGH-ALTITUDE BALLOONS

None reported.

3. BARRAGE BALLOONS

Crews of six aircraft reported approximately 10 barrage balloons in the vicinity of SMUT PRAKAN (13°35'N - 100°35'E) flying at an altitude of 5,000 feet or lower. The balloons were observed along the coastline at the mouth of the BANGKOK River immediately south of BANGKOK, and along the railroad tracks beside the east bank of the river at 0317Z and 0338Z.

4. DAMAGE FROM HEAVY ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE

Although only one aircraft was reported as struck through crew interrogation, subsequent examination indicated damage to four aircraft and possible damage to two aircraft as follows:

<u>GROUP</u>	<u>A/C</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>ALTITUDE</u>	<u>HDNG.</u>	<u>EXTENT</u>
40th	6276	0317Z	19,000 ft	45°	Damaged by both flak and E/A consisting of hole through radar compartment, hole through lower part of rudder, hole through cowl flap on #1 engine and through nacelle, and hole in left horizontal stabilizer.
40th	4522	0317Z	19,000 ft	45°	Damaged by both flak and E/A consisting of hole in right horizontal stabilizer, hole in leading edge of wing, and inboard of #3 nacelle, and cracked glass to the left of bombardier's head.
44th	3375	0317Z	19,000 ft	45°	Flak damage consisting of gash in cowling forward left side of #4 nacelle.
44th	4524	0310Z	21,000 ft	48°	Flak damage consisting of damage to bomb bay doors, #2 engine, radar equipment, wing tip, and leading edge of wing.
*44th	4464	0310Z	21,000 ft	48°	Small flak holes in fuel cell of #4 engine, horizontal stabilizer and fuselage.
*44th	4462	0310Z	21,000 ft	48°	Flak damage to left wing and aileron.

* May have been damaged by bomb explosion rather than flak.

5. WARNING NETS

Although Early Warning intercepts enroute to the target were few because of the low altitude of the attack, it is believed that the enemy had prior warning because of the existence of an adequate warning net in Southern BURMA.

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In addition one single-engine aircraft was sighted at 0215Z at 10,000 feet in the vicinity of MERGUI, and this aircraft remained from 4 to 5 miles ahead of the formation until reaching the river mouth at 13°21'N - 102°02'E. It is possible that this aircraft relayed warning information to the defenses in the BANGKOK Area.

The first enemy fighter attack did not occur, however, until 0315Z when the second formation (12 aircraft) had reached the area. This was six minutes after the first formation consisting of 14 aircraft had bombed. Eleven aircraft of the formation bombing at 0309Z did report meager and inaccurate heavy antiaircraft fire.

6. OBSERVATIONS

a. The crew of one aircraft of the 44th Group reported, "New type of black puffs were seen ahead of the formation in the BANGKOK Area that did not look like AA. The common type of AA explosions were seen below the formation, but black bursts were observed level with the formation and seemed to hang in the air as if burning for about 20 seconds. The puff was described as six or seven times larger than the regular flak."

b. The crew of aircraft #729 of the 40th Group observed gun flashes from the end of the airfield at TAVOY at 0440Z but no bursts were reported.

Frank L. Scott Jr
FRANK L. SCOTT, JR.,
Lt. Col., Air Corps,
Chief, Intelligence Section.

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By SG-NARA Date 11/8/05

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C

ANNEX

C

ENEMY AIR OPPOSITION

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*Prepared By:
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*   OPERATION L INTELLIGENCE UNIT
*
*       XX BOMBER CCIB AND
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I . ENEMY FIGHTER TACTICS - MISSION NO. 18

TARGET: Bangkok, Thailand.

TIME: Day Mission.

DATE: 27 November 1944.

1. general

a. An enemy fighter force of 19 to 27 aircraft intercepted 31 of the 56 B-29's which bombed in the Bangkok area, and air opposition is rated as weak. B-29's bombing other targets reported no opposition. The number and type of enemy fighters was estimated as 6-8 OSCARS, 6-8 TOJOS, 4-6 ZEKES, 1 or 2 TONY'S, 2 HUNTERS, and 1 bi-plane with fixed landing gear. Our aircraft reported 1 coordinated attack (2 E/A) and 50 single attacks making a total of 52 encounters. 3 B-29's sustained minor damage as a result of fighter attacks, while 2 others were damaged slightly due to either anti-aircraft fire or fighter attacks. 1 B-29 is missing and presumed lost, possibly as a result of air opposition. Our preliminary claims list 7 enemy aircraft destroyed, 3 probably destroyed and 6 damaged.

b. All interception occurred within 40 miles of Bangkok. The approximate locations of the encounters in relation to Bangkok is as follows: 1 encounter 40 miles southeast, 1 encounter 40 miles southwest, 5 within 20 miles and 45 in the immediate vicinity of the target. 1 B-29 was attacked before it had bombed, another was attacked during bombs away and all other encounters occurred after bombs away. The duration of the opposition was 55 minutes (0315Z to 0410Z) at altitudes between 15,000 feet and 20,600 feet.

2. Direction and Level of Approach

a. The majority (52%) of the encounters were executed by enemy aircraft attacking from the right quarter, a change from the tactics of the past 10 missions in which the majority of encounters were from the frontal quarter. Even though air opposition was weak on this mission the possibility of a trend may not be overlooked, as in Mission No. 17 with 304 encounters, the largest number reported on any mission, encounters from the right quarter were 27 per cent compared to 33 per cent from the frontal quarter. On Mission No. 16, the comparisons were close, too, with 29 per cent from the right quarter compared to 32 per cent from the front. Of the remainder on Mission No. 18, 40 per cent were from the front, 2 per cent were from the rear, and 6 per cent were from the left.

b. As to level of approach, 40 per cent of all encounters were high, 21 per cent were level, and 39 per cent were low. A change is noted here from Mission No. 17 in which approaches were predominantly high - 44 per cent.

c. A summary of directions and levels of approach for all encounters is shown in Tables No. 1 and No. 2 and in diagrammatic form on the following page.

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
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DIRECTION AND LEVEL OF APPROACH

Rear Attacks

Mission No. 18

Frontal Attacks



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Table No. 1 - Direction and Level of Approach

Direction of Attack or Pass	Front			Right Side			Rear			Left Side			Total
	11	12	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
High	1	1	6	7	4							2	21(40%)
Level	1	3	2	1	3		1						11(21%)
Low		3	4	4	6	2				1			20(39%)
Total	2	7	12	12	13	2	1			1		2	52(100%)
	21(40%)			27(52%)			1(2%)			3(6%)			

Table No. 2 - Level of Approach

Level of Approach	Front	Right Side	Rear	Left side
High	8 (38%)	11 (41%)	0	2
Level	6 (29%)	4 (15%)	1	0
Low	7 (33%)	12 (44%)	0	1
Total	21 (100%)	27 (100%)	1	3

3. Exchange of Fire: The enemy opened fire in 80 per cent of the encounters and B-29's in 88 per cent of the encounters. (The bases for these calculations excludes 7 encounters lacking data.) This percentage of enemy fire is considerably higher than that experienced in the 5 previous missions (67%, 66%, 65%, 42%, 56%). Although our aircraft opened fire in 42 per cent of the encounters at distances of 1000 yards or more it did not discourage enemy pilots from pressing their attacks and opening fire at ranges of less than 1000 yards. In 76 per cent of the attacks the enemy opened fire after approaching within the 1000 yard range. Regardless of his proximity to our aircraft the damage inflicted was minor, indicating both aggressiveness and poor marksmanship on the part of the attackers. The distances at which both the enemy and the B-29's opened fire is given in Table No. 3.

C-I-3.

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Table No. 3 - Distances Opened Fire

Distance(yards)	Enemy Fire		B-29 Fire	
	No. of Attacks	Per-cent	No. of Attacks	Per-cent
0 to 499	8	24	6	14
500 to 799	9	26	12	28
800 to 999	9	26	7	16
1000 & over	8	24	18	42
Total	34	100	43	100

4. Aggressiveness of Enemy Attacks: Japanese pilots exhibited a comparatively high degree of aggressiveness with 71 per cent of their attacks terminating within 500 yards of our aircraft and 53 per cent within 250 yards. Those attacks pressed to 100 yards or less comprise 37 per cent of the total as follows:

<u>No. of Attacks</u>	<u>Enemy Closed to (Yards)</u>
2	Thru B-29 formation
1	10
1	25
5	50
1	75
9	100

Some of the crew members described the nature of the fighter attacks as "very aggressive." All data on distance of closure is given in Table No. 4.

Table No. 4 - Distances to Which Attacks Were Pressed

<u>Distance(yards)</u>	<u>No. of Encounters</u>	<u>Percent</u>
1000 & over	2	4
800 to 999	3	6
500 to 799	10	19
250 to 499	9	18
0 to 249	27	53
Total	51*	100

* 1 encounter lacking data.

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5. Enemy Aircraft Claims: Direction and level of approach, distances at which B-29's opened fire and distances at which enemy aircraft broke away are shown in Table No. 5 for those encounters in which enemy aircraft are claimed by B-29's.

Table No. 5 - Details of Combat - Preliminary Claims

Enemy Aircraft Claimed	Claimed as	No. of B-29's in formation attacked	Direction of Approach	Level of Approach	B-29 Opened Fire (yds)	Distance at which E/A broke away or dis-integrated
TOJO	Damaged	14	7:30	low	1000	300
TOJO	Destroyed	13	11	high	500	200
TONY	Destroyed	13	3	low	500	10
ZEKE	Destroyed	13	12	low	(yes)	600
OSCAR	Damaged	13	2	high	1000	50
OSCAR	Damaged	13	4	low	1000	100
ZEKE	Destroyed	13	1	low	850	75
HAMP	Destroyed	13	11	level	800	50
OSCAR	Destroyed	13	2	high	1000	200
ZEKE	Prob. Dest.	13	12	low	1000	100
TOJO	Destroyed	13	2	low	600	400
OSCAR	Prob. Dest.	13	1	high	1200	400
OSCAR	Prob. Dest.	13	12	level	1000	150
OSCAR	Damaged	13	2	low	600	350
OSCAR	Damaged	13	3	low	350	300
TOJO	Damaged	13	3	low	1500- 1300	700

6. Aerial Bombs: Only 1 B-29 sustained aerial bomb attacks, reporting 2 such encounters. The crew observed 4-5 aerial bombs the first time and 12-15 in the second attack, but could give no details because the bombs were dropped during fighter attacks. The fighter attacks were each single plane encounters, 1 by a ZEKE, the other an OSCAR. It is not known whether these fighters dropped the bombs. Our aircraft received no damage from either of the attacks.

7. Coordinated Attacks: Only 1 coordinated attack was made by the enemy and there was some doubt about it being planned. 2 ZEKES from high at 10 and 12 o'clock attacked a B-29 in the No. 2 position in the lead element of a 13-plane formation. They closed to 100 yards and broke away in a dive. It is not known whether they opened fire.

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
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8. New or Unusual Tactics

a. A TCJO was observed flying parallel and above the formation out of gun range for 6-7 minutes. As he progressed he came gradually closer in an apparent attempt to make a sneak attack. The enemy fighter turned into the formation and attacked the No. 2 plane of the "B" (high right) element from 3 o'clock high. He opened fire at 600 yards, closed to 100 yards and broke away with a wing-over and down at 5 o'clock. This resembles the "Chow Line" plan of attack, but lacks coordination with other fighters. Diagram follows:

REAR VIEW



Note: "D" element not shown.

b. Another TCJO was seen flying parallel with the formation about 2 miles out for approximately 7 minutes. He started his attack in a dive and came up rapidly at the formation from 2:30 o'clock low. He passed under the high elements of the formation and attacked the No. 2 plane of the "D" (low left) element. TCJO opened fire at 1500 yards, closed to 600 yards and broke away in a dive. Diagram follows on next page.

G-1-6


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9. Attacks on Formation Position: The enemy displayed no preference for attacking planes in any particular position in the formations.

10. Breakaways: A variety of breakaway maneuvers was employed by the Jap fighters. Those observed were the dive, wing-over, split "S", slow roll, peel-off to the side, and climbing turn. Dives predominated and wing-overs were more frequent than the various other maneuvers.

11. Evasive Action: The only evasive action taken by our aircraft was loss of altitude after bombs away.

12. Summary

- a. Ineffectual fighter opposition.
- b. All interception within 40 miles of Bangkok.
- c. Minor damage to our aircraft.
- d. Preliminary enemy aircraft claims: 7 destroyed, 3 probably destroyed, 6 damaged.
- e. 85 per cent of the attacks from 12, 1, 2, and 3 o'clock.

C-1-7

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- f. Enemy opened fire in 80 per cent of the encounters.
- g. B-29's opened fire in 88 per cent of the encounters.
- h. Aggressive Japanese pilots; 53 per cent closed to 250 yards or less.
- i. 2 aerial bomb attacks with no hits.
- j. Only 1 coordinated attack.
- k. High and low beam attacks by TOJO.
- l. Variety of breakaway maneuvers.
- m. Very little evasive action by B-29's.

13. Enemy Aircraft Markings

<u>Color</u>	<u>Aircraft</u>	<u>Wing & Fuselage Markings</u>	<u>Tail Markings</u>
Olive-drab	OSCAR	No markings observed.	
"	TOJO	Red balls on wings and fuselage.	Bright spot or design on fin.
OD & Grey	TOJO	No markings observed.	
Black	Bi-plane (fixed gear)	No markings observed.	
"	ZEKE	No markings observed.	
"	TOJO	No markings observed.	
"	TOJO	Red circle on wing (ring, not a spot)	
Black & Grey	OSCAR	Black top, grey bottom.	
Dapple Brown	ZEKE	Red disks.	
Silver	TOJO	No markings observed.	
"	OSCAR	No markings observed.	
"	TONY	Red dot under wing.	
Camouflaged	TOJOS	No markings observed.	
Green	TOJO	White band around fuselage back of cockpit.	
Light Grey	E/A in the vicinity of Bangkok.		

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12. Enemy Aircraft Markings (continued)

<u>Color</u>	<u>Aircraft</u>	<u>Wing & Fuselage Markings</u>	<u>Tail Markings</u>
Mixed bright colors	OSCAR	Yellow stripes.	
Unreported color	ZEKE	Yellow stripes around fuselage.	
"	OSCAR	-----	Red diamond on vertical stabilizer.
"	ZEKE	White and yellow stripe on wings.	

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S E C R E T

D

ANNEX

D

WEATHER INFORMATION

- I - Weather Information
- II - Chart - weather as Forecast and Encountered
- III - Synoptic Map

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

I - WEATHER INFORMATION

Mission No. 18

27 November 1944

	As Forecast	As Encountered
Base (Take-off)	Clear. Visibility 7 miles	<u>Piardoba</u> : Clear. Wind North 8 mph, visibility unlimited. <u>Kharappur</u> : Clear. Wind North 5 mph, visibility unlimited. <u>Chakulia</u> : Clear. Wind Northeast 6 mph, visibility unlimited. <u>Dudhkundi</u> : Clear. Wind North 6 mph, visibility unlimited.
Route Out	Clear to Coast, visibility 7 miles. From coast to 16 deg N, 3/10 small cumulus base 1600', top generally 2500'. From 16 deg to assembly, 3/10 small cumulus base 1600', top generally 3500' with few swelling to 8000'. Possibly a few isolated small cumulonimbus in area. 4/10 swelling cumulus over ridge, tops to 7000'.	Clear to Coast. <u>Coast to 16 deg N</u> : Layer of scattered cumulus and/or stratocumulus averaging 2/10 coverage between 2000' and 4000'. Scattered cirrus at 20,000' beyond 18 deg N. <u>16 deg N to assembly</u> : 3/10 cumulus, tops to 4000' becoming clear with light haze at assembly point. Scattered cirrus at 21,000'. <u>Over Ridge</u> : Less than 1/10 stratocumulus in valleys. Scattered cirrus
Target Area	4/10 cirrostratus at 22,000'. 2/10 small cumulus, base 2500', top 4000'. Cumulus will increase during the morning becoming 4/10 with tops to 8000' by 0530Z. Altimeter setting: 29.83 In.	<u>Primary Target</u> : Clear below formation. 1-2/10 cirrus at 22,000'. Unrestricted visibility. <u>Secondary Target</u> : 1-2/10 cirrus at 22,000'. Light haze. <u>Last Resort Target</u> : Clear. Visibility unrestricted.
Return Route	Cumulus over ridge will increase to 5/10 with tops to 9000' by 0430Z, and scattered thunderstorms will reach 30,000' after 0530Z in this area. Otherwise return route same as outgoing.	No change over land. 2-3/10 cumulus to 7-8000' over gulf of Martaban and Bay of Bengal as far as 19 deg N with no lower clouds to base. Scattered cirrus increasing to 4/10 cirrostratus north of 18 deg N.
Base on Return	Clear and unrestricted.	<u>Piardoba</u> : 6/10 cirrus. Wind north 9 mph, visibility 6 miles in haze. <u>Kharappur</u> : 8/10 cirrus. Wind north 5 mph, visibility 8 miles. <u>Chakulia</u> : 6/10 cirrus. Wind north 6 mph, visibility 6 miles in haze. <u>Dudhkundi</u> : 8/10 cirrus. Wind north 5 mph, visibility 8 miles.
Freezing Level	17,000 feet.	

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A. Winds Aloft - Forecast

Altitude	Base to 16 deg	16 deg to Target
1000'	20 deg - 08K	20 deg - 08K
5000'	340 deg - 08K	60 deg - 08K
10,000'	320 deg - 10K	120 deg - 10K
15,000'	280 deg - 15K	110 deg - 12K
20,000'	240 deg - 25K	70 deg - 15K
25,000'	250 deg - 30K	90 deg - 18K

B. Winds Aloft - Encountered

Altitude	First Half	Second Half	Target
3000'	345 deg - 07K		
5000'	340 deg - 10K		
15,000'		100 deg - 15K	
17,000'	280 deg - 12K		
19,000'			80 deg - 13K

C. Target Temperatures

As Forecast

Altitude	Temperature
Surface	28 deg C.
5000'	20 deg C.
10,000'	12 deg C.
15,000'	3 deg C.
20,000'	-6 deg C.
25,000'	-15 deg C.

As Encountered

Altitude	Temperature
20,000'	-9 deg C.
22,000'	-9 deg C.

D-I-2

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
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
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
XX BOMBER COMMAND
 WEATHER AS FORECAST



WEATHER AS ENCOUNTERED
 ROUTE OUT



WEATHER AS ENCOUNTERED
 ROUTE BACK




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S E C R E T

E

ANNEX

E

COMMUNICATIONS INFORMATION

* * * * *

* Prepared by: *

* Communications Section *

* *

* XX Bomber Command *

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E.O. 11652, Sec 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

By NND 740120 NARS, Date OCT 21 1975

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By SG NARA Date 11/8/05

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: Auth: CG XX BC :
: Date: 1 Dec 44 :
: Initials: YJA :
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HEADQUARTERS
XX BOMBER COMMAND
APO 493

CONSOLIDATED
SPECIALIST MISSION
REPORT OF

XX BOMBER COMMAND COMMUNICATIONS (RADIO) OFFICER

Date prepared: 1 December 1944

Field Orders No: 18

Date of Mission:
27 November 1944

1. Communications for mission number eighteen were by far the most satisfactory yet experienced by this Command. This can be contributed largely to the short distance flown and the excellent weather encountered throughout the mission.

2. Once again to acquaint communications personnel with the procedures involved in passing a message from the Command Post to the aircraft Two practice messages were transmitted. A time study of the handling of these messages is contained in Annex Number 1.

3. All required traffic was handled Satisfactorily and compliance with the provisions of Tactical Doctrine by both aircraft and ground stations was excellent. A compilation of the number of messages handled is as follows:

	<u>40thGP</u>	<u>444thGP</u>	<u>462ndGP</u>	<u>468thGP</u>
a. Aborts:	0	0	1	0
b. Bombs Away:	4	1	2	3
c. Attack:	1	0	6	2
d. Position:	4	4	11	4

4. Aircraft which failed to comply with all the provisions of Tactical Doctrine and the reasons for non-compliance are as follows:

a. 40th Bomb Group

A/C 522 Radio operator sent a "Bombs Away" message representing four (4) aircraft in formation when actually his four ship element was part of a fourteen ship formation.

5. A comparative study of the readability, signal strength and noise level of the frequencies in use, divided into two (2) hour periods is as follows. Time indicated is GMT:

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GROUND STATION TO AIRCRAFT

<u>Frequency</u>	<u>2100-2300</u>	<u>2300-0100</u>	<u>0100-0300</u>	<u>0300-0500</u>	<u>0500-0700</u>
2675 kcs	S3 R3 W2	S3 R2 W2	S2 R1 W4	S1 R1 W4	-- -- --
2807.5kcs	S4 R4 W3	S3 R3 W4	-- -- --	-- -- --	-- -- --
2900 kcs	-- -- --	S5 R5 W3	S4 R4 W4	S3 R5 --	-- -- --
2955 kcs	-- -- --	S4 R4 W0	S3 R3 W0	-- -- --	-- -- --
8260 kcs	-- -- --	S5 R5 W1	S4 R4 W2	S5 R5 W2	S5 R5 W1
8310 kcs	S4 R4 W3	S4 R5 W2	S3 R4 W3	S4 R4 W3	S4 R4 W3
8495 kcs	S4 R4 W1	S3 R4 W2	S4 R4 W2	S5 R5 W3	S5 R5 W1
8545 kcs	S2 R2 W2	S1 R1 W3	S4 R5 W4	S4 R4 W2	S4 R4 W1
2215 kcs	-- -- --	-- -- --	S2 R2 W3	S3 R4 W2	S1 R1 W3
2285 kcs	* -- -- --	-- -- --	S3 R3 W2	S3 R4 W2	S2 R4 W1
2335 kcs	*				
2415 kcs	*				

Frequency 0700-0900

2675 kcs	-- -- --
2807.5kcs	-- -- --
2900 kcs	-- -- --
2955 kcs	-- -- --
8260 kcs	S5 R5 W1
8310 kcs	S5 R5 W1
8495 kcs	S5 R5 W1
8545 kcs	S4 R4 W1
2215 kcs	-- -- --
2285 kcs	S4 R4 W1
2335 kcs	*
2415 kcs	*

Due to good reception on both two and eight megacycle frequencies it was not necessary to use 12335 and 12415 kcs.

AIRCRAFT TO GROUND STATION

<u>Frequency</u>	<u>2100-2300</u>	<u>2300-0100</u>	<u>0100-0300</u>	<u>0300-0500</u>	<u>0500-0700</u>
2675 kcs	S3 R3 W3	S3 R2 W3	S2 R1 W4	W1 R1 W4	-- -- --
2807.5 kcs	S4 R4 W3	S3 R3 W3	S3 R3 W0	-- -- --	-- -- --
2900 kcs	-- -- --	-- -- --	-- -- --	-- -- --	S5 R5 W3
2955 kcs	-- -- --	S4 R4 W0	S3 R3 W0	-- -- --	-- -- --
8260 kcs	S3 R3 W3	S5 R5 W1	S4 R4 W1	S4 R5 W1	S4 R5 W1
8310 kcs	-- -- --	-- -- --	-- -- --	-- -- --	S4 R4 W3
8495 kcs	-- -- --	-- -- --	S3 R3 W0	S4 R4 W0	S4 R4 W0
8545 kcs	-- -- --	S2 R2 W2	S4 R4 W1	S4 R4 W2	S4 R4 W2
2215 kcs	-- -- --	-- -- --	S2 R2 W2	S3 R4 W2	S1 R1 W2
2285 kcs	-- -- --	-- -- --	S4 R4 W2	S4 R4 W0	S4 R4 W3
2335 kcs	*				
2415 kcs	*				

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<u>Frequency</u>	<u>0700-0900</u>
2675 kcs	-- -- --
2807.5kcs	-- -- --
2900 kcs	S4 R5 W4
2955 kcs	-- -- --
8260 kcs	S5 R5 W1
8310 kcs	S3 R5 W4
8495 kcs	S4 R4 W2
8545 kcs	S4 R4 W1
12215 kcs	S1 R1 W3
12285 kcs	-- -- --
12335 kcs	*
12415 kcs	*

* Due to good reception on both two and eight megacycle frequencies it was not necessary to use 12335 and 12415 kcs.

6. The following statistical data was compiled regarding the use of aids to air-navigation; all distances in statute miles;

a. Radio Homing Beacons

<u>Location</u>	<u>No. of A/C Reporting</u>	<u>Average Initial Contact</u>	<u>Extreme Initial Contact</u>	<u>Average Track</u>
Shakulia (AF)	14	350	700	---
Kharagpur (GK)	28	313	545	171°
Dum Dum (CM)	4	400	550	28°
Chittagong (NR)	5	363	450	132°
Dudhkundi (FN)	9	137	250	315°
piardoba (ML)	12	413	650	---

b. Radio Range

<u>Location</u>	<u>No. of A/C Reporting</u>	<u>Average Initial Contact</u>	<u>Extreme Initial Contact</u>	<u>Average Track</u>
Dum Dum (CM)	3	320	395	313°

c. It was not necessary for any Aircraft to use D/F facilities.

d. Air-to-Air homing was attempted by all Groups, with results as indicated below:

40th Group - Homing signals were transmitted at the assembly point for a period of 30 minutes on 1250 kcs. Eight aircraft picked up the signals on an average distance of 23 miles while the extreme distance was 70 miles. There were no requests for air-to-air homing.

44th Group - A/C 422 transmitted his ETA at Rendezvous point on the air-to-air homing frequency, later sending homing signals for a period of thirty minutes. Eight aircraft

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picked up the ETA message and eleven picked up the homing signals. Reports indicated that homing was successful at distances of approximately fifty to sixty miles.

462nd Group - Rendezvous was accomplished visually with no need for air-to-air homing. However, it was utilized for practice purposes with varying results. It was the opinion of several operators that the lead ship transmitter was not set up properly thereby causing poor homing signals.

468th Group - Homing signals were transmitted by A/C 6546 for a period of one hour and fifteen minutes prior to and while at the assembly point. Thirteen aircraft homed successfully from distances varying from 12 to a reported 185 miles with signal strengths from S3 to S5. Air-to-Air homing was considered excellent. Mostly contributed to the fact that the flight leader called all aircraft and informed them of the specific time they should expect to pick up his homing signals.

7. During the early morning hours a small amount of skip and static was encountered on the assigned eight megacycle frequencies. However during this period the two megacycle frequencies furnished very reliable communication. Some man-made interference was encountered on or in the vicinity of the assigned frequencies. It will be noted however in paragraph 5, above, that the assigned frequencies proved highly satisfactory, offering excellent contacts throughout the mission.

8. No violations of cryptographic security were reported.

9. Malfunctions of equipment were as follows:

a. 40th Bomb Group

- (1) A/C 6297, tail Gunner's microphone shorted out; repaired during flight.
- (2) A/C 298 radio compass kept blowing fuses; C.F.C. interphone position out; liaison receiver dynamotor burned out.
- (3) A/C 541 compass antenna lost during flight; replaced with whip.

b. 444th Bomb Group

- (1) A/C 4123 was unable to get reliable bearings on any beacon. This was due to faulty radio and was not remedied in flight.

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- (2) A/C 538 Liaison transmitter dynamotor kept shorting out. Not repaired in flight.
- (3) A/C 4492 had interphone trouble, in that "INT" and "Command" positions would override each other.
- (4) A/C 422 microphone switch out. Replaced by hand microphone.

c. 462nd Bomb Group

- (1) A/C 5213, command set output shorted into liaison set received making reception difficult.
- (2) A/C 505, Gunner's microphone switch at C.F.C position sticking.
- (3) A/C 329 had inoperative trailing wire antenna.
- (4) A/C 484, interphone dynamotor burned out. Used position 4 on command set for interphone.
- (5) A/C 346 had an excessive noise level from the inverter on No. 3 engine.

d. 468th Bomb Group

- (1) A/C 471, liaison receiver went out due to a burned out dynamotor. Not repaired in flight.
- (2) A/C 4542, compass antenna broke when ten minutes from the home base inbound. A/C was in formation so repair was deemed unnecessary.
- (3) A/C 525 liaison transmitter antenna relay stuck causing bad contact. Not repaired in flight.

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SECRET

: : : : : : : :
: SECRET :
: Auth: CG XX BC :
: Date: 1 Dec 44 :
: Initials: YSA :
: : : : : : : :

HEADQUARTERS
XX BOMBER COMMAND
APO 493

ANNEX NO. 1

TO

CONSOLIDATED
SPECIALIST MISSION
REPORT OF

XX BOMBER COMMAND COMMUNICATIONS (RADIO) OFFICER

Date prepared: 1 December 1944.

Field Order Noll8

Prepared by: P.E. Van ... Lt. Sig C Date of Mission:
27 November 1944

1. Following is a time study involving message handling time of the two practice messages that were sent on Mission Number 18.

2. The first message consisting of seven (7) groups was filed for transmission at 262258Z, and was transmitted via teletype, being receipted for by the various groups as follows:

<u>40th Group</u>	<u>444th Group</u>	<u>462nd Group</u>	<u>468th Group</u>
2300Z	2300Z	2300Z	2300Z

a. The message was encoded at the Command Post and transmitted to the Groups ready for transmittal to aircraft. A time study showing time of receipt, means by which message was received, and number of aircraft receiving message is as follows:

(1) 40th Bomb Group

<u>A/C Call Sign</u>	<u>How Received</u>	<u>Time of Receipt</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
831	Direct	2312Z	
452	"	2314Z	
729	"	2315Z	
276	"	2316Z	
279	"	2317Z	
319	"	2322Z	
587	"	2332Z	
322	"	2355Z	
331	"	2333Z	
522	"	2333Z	

Time of first transmission: 2310Z

Time of receipt by first A/C: 2312Z

Time of receipt by last A/C: 2355Z

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(2) 444th Bomb Group

<u>A/C Call Sign</u>	<u>How Received</u>	<u>Time of Receipt</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
422	Direct	2315Z	
3411	"	2316Z	
4723	"	2316Z	
375	"	2317Z	
464	"	2318Z	
517	"	2319Z	
462	Relay	2350Z	
4492	"	2315Z	- This A/C reported
226	"	2354Z	Signal Strength
292	Direct	2348Z	of SI at this time
524	"	2350Z	
451	"	2315Z	
472	"	2340Z	
538	"	2323Z	

Time of first transmission: *2313Z
Time of receipt by 1st A/C: 2315Z
Time of receipt by last A/C: 2354Z

Message was sent on all three channels at this time and repeated until 2340Z at which time all A/C which had not previously received were called individually.

(3) 462nd Bomb Group

<u>A/C Call Sign</u>	<u>How Received</u>	<u>Time of Receipt</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
506	Direct	2333Z	
329	"	2320Z	
728	"	2323Z	
505	"	0150Z	
475	"	2346Z	
463	"	2327Z	
461	"	2330Z	
5213	"	2330Z	
311	"	2330Z	
382	"	2323Z	
393	Not Received		No reason given
346	" "		Excessive engine noise
456	Not Received		No reason given
484	" "		" " "

Time of first transmission: 2302Z
Time of receipt by first A/C: 2320Z
Time of receipt by last A/C: 0150

Repeated 7 times until 0032Z

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Due to Signal Level at the time this message was transmitted it is believed that nothing but inefficiency on the part of the radio operators concerned on A/C 393, 456 and 484 can account for their non-receipt of this message.

(4) 468th Bomb Group

<u>A/C Call Sign</u>	<u>How Received</u>	<u>Time of Receipt</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
828	Direct	2330Z	
484	"	2324Z	
217	"	2345Z	
469	"	2351Z	
395	"	2352Z	
4542	"	2350Z	
411	"	0047Z	
5208	"	0032Z	
284	"	0035Z	
390	Unknown		-
525	Direct	0033Z	Message was entered on operators log but no time of receipt was given.
471	"	0040Z	
487	"	0032Z	
4546	"	2338Z	
356	Not received		

Time of first transmission: 2305Z
Time of receipt by first A/C: 2324Z
Time of receipt by last A/C: 0047Z

Note: It is suggested that future briefing emphasize that first A/C to receive a message of this type will immediately relay it by interplane frequency to other A/C.

Crew members should be made cognizant of the fact that these are merely practice messages. The primary purpose for their transmission is to train crews to a point where reception of a message the importance of which could, if not received, mean the loss of human life and equipment, is second nature

3. The second message consisting of eight groups was filed for transmission at 270121Z. It was transmitted via teletype, being received by the various groups as follows:

<u>40th Group</u>	<u>444th Group</u>	<u>462nd Group</u>	<u>468th Group</u>
0123Z	0123Z	0124Z	0123Z

a. The message was encoded at the Command Post and transmitted to the Groups ready for transmittal to aircraft. A time study showing time of receipt, means by which message was received, and number of aircraft receiving message is as follows:

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(1) 40th Group

<u>A/C Call sign</u>	<u>How Received</u>	<u>Time of Receipt</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
319	Direct	0136Z	
457	"	0137Z	
4587	"	0139Z	
522	"	0140Z	
729	"	0141Z	
313	"	0142Z	
331	"	0142Z	
407	"	0145Z	
831	"	0145Z	
4452	"	0145Z	
276	"	0146Z	
297	"	0156Z	
322	"	0157Z	

Time of first transmission: 0134Z
Time of receipt by first A/C: 0136Z
Time of receipt by last A/C: 0157Z

(2) 444th Bomb Group

<u>A/C Call Sign</u>	<u>How Received</u>	<u>Time of Receipt</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
507	Direct	0133Z	
538	"	0133Z	
524	"	0133Z	
44733	"	0134Z	
464	"	0134Z	
375	"	0134Z	
422	"	0134Z	
451	"	0135Z	
226	"	0135Z	
34111	"	0135Z	
492	"	0135Z	
472	"	0136Z	
462	"	0140Z	
292	"	0136Z	

Time of first transmission: 0126Z (repeated intermittently until 0142Z)
Time of receipt by first A/C: 0133Z
Time of receipt by last A/C: 0140Z

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(4) 462nd Bomb Group

<u>A/C Call Sign</u>	<u>How Received</u>	<u>Time of Receipt</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
393	Direct	0135Z	
506	"	0135Z	
329	Not received	-	Received heading an
456	Direct	0136Z	and was blocked by
728	"	0137Z	static
463	"	0137Z	
461	Not received	-	Received two groups
311	Direct	0134Z	and was blocked out
382	"	0139Z	by static

Time of first transmission: 0130Z (Repeated 3 times until 0230Z)
Time of receipt by first A/C: 0134Z
Time of receipt by last A/C: 0139Z

Note: Five A/C which are shown on the first message time study were not listed on the Group Specialist Report for the Second message.

(5) 468th Bomb Group

<u>A/C Call Sign</u>	<u>How Received</u>	<u>Time of Receipt</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
356	Direct	0138Z	
411	"	0123Z	
6390	"	0126Z	
469	"	0135Z	
395	"	0123Z	
486	"	0123Z	
5208	"	0125Z	
284	"	0125Z	
542	"	0125Z	
525	"	0130Z	
217	"	0133Z	
487	"	0128Z	
828	"	0132Z	
471	Not received		Receiver out
4546	" "		Sending homing signals at time of transmission

Time of first transmission: 0123Z
Time of receipt by first A/C: 0123Z
Time of receipt by last A/C: 0138Z

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S E C R E T

Annex

F

RADAR

F

- I Radar Information
- II Radar Tables

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*****  
*Prepared by: *  
* * * * *  
* RADAR SECTION *  
* XX BOMBER COLMAND *  
*****
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S E C R E T

S E C R E T

.....
.SECRET
.Auth: CG XX BC.
.Initials LSH
.Date 30 Dec 44
.....

HEADQUARTERS
XX BOMBER COMMAND
APO 493

CONSOLIDATED
SPECIALIST MISSION
REPORT OF

XX BOMBER COMMAND RADAR OFFICER

Date Prepared 3 December 1944 Field Orders No. 18
Date of Mission 27 November 1944

I - Radar Information

A - Radar Bombing

1. Bombing of the targets on this mission was accomplished primarily by visual means. The mission being planned, however, as a practice mission, the radar operators did practice the radar-bombsight procedure on the bombing run.

2. The primary target was reported very difficult to identify. This was contemplated on mission planning, due to the nature of the target and surrounding territory. The primary target area was reported identifiable by the outline of the Chao Phraya River. The initial point, the mouth of the Meklong River, was readily identifiable at an average range of thirty-one and five tenths (31.5) nautical miles.

B - Radar Navigation

Radar was again an aid in identifying many of the islands and check points along the route. The final rendezvous points were identifiable at useable ranges from twenty-eight (28) to forty-five and nine tenths (45.9) nautical miles. The average ranges to a number of check points reported along the route have been listed in Table C, Section II, Radar Navigational Ranges. Ground speeds and drift problems were also practiced on this mission.

C - Radar Scope Photography

A number of excellent radar scope photographs of the primary target area were returned. A total of nine (9) sets or sixty (60%) per cent of the number of cameras completing the mission returned photographs. Eight (8) sets or eighty-nine (89%) per cent were useable. The K-24 and K-35 were used primarily and returned the greater number of useable pictures.

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D - Radar Serviceability

1. Serviceability of the radar equipment was satisfactory. All radar equipment was operational at take-off, with ninety (90%) per cent of the AN/APQ-13 operational over the target. The number of unrepairable failures decreased from the previous mission.
2. Three (3) unrepairable failures occurred on the auxiliary equipment. One (1) was reported on the SCR-729 and two (2) on the SCR-695.
3. Table E, Section II, Radar Malfunctions, lists the type of failures occurring on the mission.

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II - RADAR TABLES

A - RADAR BOMBING DATA

DATA	40th Gp		444th Gp		462nd Gp		468th Gp		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Total A/C Bombing	15	-	14	-	14	-	15	-	58	-
A/C Bombing Bangkok (All visually) *	13	86	14	100	14	100	14	93	55	95
A/C Bombing Mergui* (All visually)	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	7	1	1.7
A/C Bombing Taungup (All visually) *	1	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1.7
A/C Bombing T O * (All visually)	1	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1.6
Total Radar Bombing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

*Percentage based on total A/C bombing.

B - PHOTOGRAPHIC RESULTS

DATA	40th Gp		444th Gp		462nd Gp		468th Gp		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
No. Cameras Install	4	-	5	-	5	-	2	-	16	-
C-3 Cameras	0	-	0	-	2	-	0	-	2	-
K-35 Cameras	0	-	2	-	1	-	2	-	5	-
K-24 Cameras	3	-	3	-	1	-	0	-	7	-
H2X Cameras	1	-	0	-	1	-	0	-	2	-
No Cameras in Abort. Early Ret & MissA/C*	0	0	1	20	0	0	0	0	1	6
No Cameras Complete Mission *	4	100	4	80	5	100	2	100	15	94
No Cameras in Radar Malfunction A/C #	1	25	1	25	2a	40	0	0	4	27
Sets of Pic Return #	3	75	1	25	3	60	2	100	9	60
No of Negatives Ret	30	-	73	-	40	-	13	-	156	-
Sets of Pic Useable #	3	100	1	100	3	100	1	50	8	89
Sets of Pic Tracing Bomb Run #	1	25	1	25	2	40	0	0	4	27

*Percentage based on cameras installed

#Percentage based on cameras completing mission

a - One (1) radar malfunction and one (1) camera malfunction

S E C R E T

C - RADAR NAVIGATIONAL RANGES

NAME OF CHECK POINT	40th Gp		444th Gp		462nd Gp		468th Gp		Total	
	Number Reporting	Average Range	Number Reporting	Average Range	Number Reporting	Average Range	Number Reporting	Average Range	Total Number Reporting	Weighted Average Range
Mapping	12	52.9	13	45.7	11	51.5	14	44.6	50	48.4
Bangkok	9	18.5	13	23.0	6	17.7	9	23.8	37	21.2
Mergui	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	50.0	1	50.0
Taungup	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Cabusa Island (FR)	11	40.7	5	40.0	1	35.0	-	-	17	40.1
King Island (FR)	1	30.0	10	40.0	1	45.0	4	21.0	16	34.9
Tavoy Island (FR)	6	51.7	8	43.0	12	48.9	6	38.0	32	45.9
Elephinstone Is. (FR)	-	-	-	-	-	-	11	28.0	11	28.0
Meklohmg River (IP)	11	39.5	14	32.0	9	27.1	13	27.3	47	31.5
Burma Coastline	5	26.6	4	45.0	-	-	9	22.0	18	28.4
Calcutta	1	45.0	-	-	3	37.3	-	-	4	39.2
Diamond Island	8	37.3	15	27.0	8	23.9	10	24.0	41	27.7
Great Canister Is.	-	-	3	38.0	-	-	-	-	3	38.0
Halliday Island	1	40.0	-	-	9	19.3	-	-	10	21.4
Hooghly River	1	40.0	-	-	2	40.0	-	-	3	40.0
Iron Island	-	-	3	40.0	-	-	1	43.0	4	40.7
New Island	-	-	-	-	-	-	7	18.0	7	18.0
Pagoba Point	3	41.7	8	33.0	3	35.6	1	25.0	15	34.7
Purian Point	-	-	9	30.0	1	30.0	5	21.0	15	27.0
Sagar Island	-	-	5	24.0	-	-	-	-	5	24.0
lbarnarekha River	2	30.0	2	18.0	-	-	-	-	4	24.0

S E C R E T

D - RADAR SERVICEABILITY

DATA	40th Gp		444th Gp		462nd Gp		468th Gp		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
A/C Airborne	15	-	15	-	15	-	15	-	60	-
AN/APQ-13 Operative at Take-off	15	100	15	100	15	100	15	100	60	100
A/C Bombing *	15	100	14	93	14	93	15	100	58	97
AN/APQ-13 Operative over Target#	13a	87	14	100	10	71	15	100	52	90
AN/APQ-13 Unrepairable Failures #										
Total Unrepairable	1	7	0	0	2	14	1	7	4	7
Partial but Operative	0	0	5	36	2	14	2	13	9	15
Total	1	7	5	36	4	28	3	20	13	22
AN/APQ-13 Repaired in Flight	1	-	1	-	1	-	0	-	3	-
SCR-729 Failures*	1	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2
SCR-695 Failures*	1	7	1b	7	0	0	0	0	2	3


* Percentage based on A/C airborne
 # Percentage based on A/C bombing
 a - A/C 6276 (40th) Enemy action destroyed RA-88
 A/C 6313 (40th) Blew fuse 30 sec. before target
 b - A/C 226 (444th) Failure due to enemy action

S E C R E T


E - RADAR MALFUNCTIONS

DATA	40th Gp	444th Gp	462nd Gp	468th Gp	Total
Malfunctions at Take-off at T	0	0	0	0	0
Malfunctions between Take-off & Target (Unrepairable)					
Inverter (Total)	0	0	1	0	1
Cables (Total)	0	0	2	0	2
Rectifier, R-88 (Total)	0	0	1	0	1
Enemy Action (Total)	1	0	0	0	1
Altitude Delay (Partial)	0	1	0	0	1
Selsyns (Partial)	0	1	0	0	1
Azimuth Stab. (Partial)	0	1	0	0	1
Pressurization (Partial)	0	1	0	0	1
Over-heating Set (Partial)	0	1	0	0	1
Low Range (Partial)	0	0	0	2	2
Total	1	5	4	2	12
Malfunctions between Target & Landing (Unrepairable)					
Antenna Tilt (Partial)	0	0	0	1	1
Total	0	0	0	1	1
Malfunctions Re-paired in Flight					
Replaced Fuse #1113	1	0	0	0	1
Synchronizer & Azim Control Box	0	1	0	0	1
Inverter	0	0	1	0	1
Total	1	1	1	0	3
Malfunctions on Auxiliary Equip. (Total)					
SCR-729 (No Sweep)	1	0	0	0	1
SCR-695 (Cable)	1	0	0	0	1
SCR-695 (Enemy Act)	0	1	0	0	1
Total	2	1	0	0	3


RADAR SCOPE PHOTOGRAPHS
BANGKOK AREA—THAILAND




COURSE 85°15'M (85°00'T)
ALTITUDE: 20,800'




13°19'30"N COURSE 85°15'M (85°00'T)
99°41'00"E ALTITUDE: 20,700'




13°20'30"N COURSE 85°15'M (85°00'T)
99°52'30"E ALTITUDE: 20,700'



13°21'00"N COURSE 85°15'M (85°00'T)
99°56'00"E ALTITUDE: 20,700'




13°21'00"N COURSE 63°15'M (63°00'T)
99°59'30"E ALTITUDE: 20,700'





13°21'30"N COURSE 46°15'M (46°00'T)
100°02'00"E ALTITUDE: 20,700'

13°23'45"N
100°06'30"E




COURSE 41°15'M (41°00'T)
ALTITUDE: 20,800'

13°05'30"N
98°15'15"E




COURSE 46°15'M (46°00'T)
ALTITUDE: 20,700'

13°25'30"N
100°08'15"E




COURSE 107°45'M (107°30'T)
ALTITUDE: 20,800'


12°59'00"N COURSE 46°15'M (46°00'T)
98°00'00"E ALTITUDE: 20,700'




13°43'00"N COURSE 46°15'M (46°00'T)
100°27'00"E ALTITUDE: 20,700'




13°41'00"N COURSE 46°15'M (46°00'T)
100°25'00"E ALTITUDE: 20,700'



13°08'15"N COURSE 46°15'M (46°00'T)
100°22'00"E ALTITUDE: 20,700'



13°35'00"N COURSE 46°15'M (46°00'T)
100°18'30"E ALTITUDE: 20,700'



13°31'15"N
100°14'30"E

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10TH PHOTO TECH. UNIT

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Authority 760063
By SS-NARA Date 11/8/05

S E C R E T

ANNEX

G

RCM INFORMATION

SECRET
G

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* * * * *  
* Prepared by: *  
* * * * *  
* RCM Section *  
* * * * *  
* XX Bomber Command *  
* * * * *  
* * * * *
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S E C R E T

S E C R E T

SECRET
Auth: CG, XX BC
Initials *msf*
Date: 3 Dec 44

HEADQUARTERS
XX BOMBER COMAND
APO 493

3 December 1944

Subject: RCM Report - Combat Mission No. 18 - Bangkok,
Thailand 27 November 44, Daylight

To : Commanding General, Twentieth Air Force
Washington 25, D. C.

A. General

RCM activities were confined to searching for enemy radar stations from take off to the target and return. Nine RCM equipped aircraft, each with one RCM Observer, participated in the mission. Frequency assignments covered early warning stations enroute to the target, radar fire control and enemy communications in the target area. Our command and IFF channels were also monitored for violations per SOP.

B. Results

1. Enroute to the target, our aircraft remained at a low altitude, which prevented intercepts of possible enemy radar stations between Akyab and Pagoda point. The first interception was made after passing Pagoda point and was the 69 MC station located South of Rangoon. The signal was weak but steady. As the aircraft gained altitude, both the 69 MC and the 80 MC stations in the Rangoon area were intercepted with good steady signal characteristics. As noted previously at Amoy and Palembang, the 80 MC signal was extremely strong, suggesting a permanent type of Radar and different than the "CHI" type.

2. In crossing the Malay Peninsula near Mergui, several 200 MC signals were intercepted and later D/F'ed slightly off shore in the Gulf of Siam. They were either of the MK II Model I Naval type, on board ship, or of the MK I Model 2 type, on shore.

3. A strong MK I Model I signal was intercepted in the target area and suddenly went off coincident with bombs away, suggesting that it may have been damaged or destroyed. There were no other signals intercepted in the target area and consequently no signals with radar fire control characteristics.

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4. Enroute home, several allied naval signals were intercepted and identified by their characteristics. A definite MK II Model I Radar was D/F'ed to 12° 52' N 95° 50' E in the Bay of Bengal. Approaching Diamond Point, the two radar stations in the Rangoon area were again intercepted, strong and steady. The 80 MC radar site being logged to 93° E. 17 N.

C. Resume of Intercepts

<u>Freq-MC</u>	<u>PRF</u>	<u>PW</u>	<u>Location & Remarks</u>
69	500	40	Rangoon Area
80	500	45	Rangoon Area - Broad Nulls prevented a good D/F
100	1300	11	Bangkok went off suddenly after bombs away
192	860	10	D/F'ed near Pecha Buri 12° 05' N. 100° E.
192	992	12	Definitely MK II Model I D/F'ed to 12° 52' N. 95° 50' E.
193	1010	6.5	D/F'ed off shore 12° 13' N. 100° 07' E. Either MK II Model I Naval type or MK I Model 2 on shore.
200	965	12	Strongest off Pagoda Point 15° 23' N. 95° 05' E.

Due to the similarity in characteristics with the two radar sites located in the Rangoon area, the following radar locations will be carried as "suspected" and verified on future missions. The two stations were D/F'ed to the Andaman Islands Area.

78	500	39	Central Andaman Island Area
68	520	29	North Andaman Island Area

D. Enemy Countermeasures

One Radar Operator reported jamming of his AN/APQ-13. The interference was coincident with an extreme amount of wide band noise experienced by the RCM Observer with his AN/APR-4. Upon investigation, it was found that other planes in the same formation reported or experienced no jamming. Therefore, the interference may be attributed to a malfunction within the aircraft and not considered intentional.

S E C R E T

-2-

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By SG NARA Date 11/8/05

S E C R E T


E. Communications and IFF Procedure

1. The command channel was monitored to determine if pilots were violating security in their conversation between planes. There were no violations of security noted.
2. Monitoring of the IFF band showed that some aircraft failed to observe the SOP. IFF signals were intercepted in the target area.

F. Equipment

1. There were no equipment malfunctions. It is possible that the drop in equipment failures is due to the change in climate.
2. Three modified D/F antennas operated in a satisfactory manner throughout the mission.

For the Commanding General:



LEO I. HERMAN
Colonel, Air Corps
Acting Adjutant General

S E C R E T

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By SG NARA Date 11/8/05

S E C R E T

ANMLX

H

GENERAL STATION FIRE CONTROL AND GUNNERY

H

* * * * *
* Prepared by: *
* Staff Gunnery Officer *
* IX Bomber Command *
* * * * *

S E C R E T

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SECRET

Auth: CG XX BC
Initials *X-274*
Date *1 Dec 44*

HEADQUARTERS
XX BOMBER COMMAND
APO 493

CONSOLIDATED
SPECIALIST MISSION
REPORT OF
STAFF GUNNERY OFFICER

Date Prepared 30 November 1944

Field Orders No. 18

Date of Mission: 27 November 1944

1. On the mission directed by Field Orders No. 18, the necessity for formation control of our airplanes was perfectly displayed. In all but one Group the formations were flown too loose and were not staggered properly, which may have accounted for damage to some of our airplanes by enemy fighters. Of enemy tactics, one Group reports a single attack by one fighter. The fighter flew parallel to the formation until it reached the two o'clock position, then turned into the formation slightly low. The Element of the formation was a bit wide, and the fighter took advantage of this to get into the formation where it used a strafing attack, doing considerable damage.

2. The functioning of the Central Fire Control equipment is considered as satisfactory.

3. The following statistical data is submitted:

	40th	444th	462nd	468th
Ammunition used test firing.	449	2,215	4,855	1,070
Ammunition used in combat.	1004	200	4,820	1,800
Malfunction of CFC system.	3	0	1	3
Total turrets on mission	65	65	70	75
Malfunction of Cal. .50MG	0	3	5	6
Total Cal. .50MG. on mission.	130	130	140	150
Total airplanes (included in report)	13	13	14	15
Total percent malfunctions all Groups CFC 2.5% Cal. .50MG. 2.5%.				

Claims by our gunners:

<u>Destroyed</u>	<u>Probably Destroyed</u>	<u>Damaged</u>
7	3	6

4. In conclusion, if our formations are flown as prescribed the maximum number of guns can be concentrated on attacking fighters from any angle. This firepower should be sufficient to destroy enemy fighters before they get close enough for their guns to be effective. In addition, if our formations are flown correctly, and we continue to receive damage to our airplanes, then we should obviously analyze the ability of our gunners.

S E C R E T

ANNEX

I

CAMERAS AND PHOTOGRAPHS

I - Cameras and Photographs

II - Photo Reconnaissance

S E C R E T

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Authority 760063

By SG NARA Date 11/8/05

Mission No. 18

I - CAMERAS AND PHOTOGRAPHS

A. Cameras Installed and Photographs Taken

27 November 1944

	40Ch			444Ch			462nd			468th			Totals for Command							
	K-18	K-20	K-22	Total	K-18	K-20	K-22	Total	K-18	K-20	K-22	Total	K-18	K-20	K-22	Total				
No. cameras installed	4	14	3	21	5	5	7	17	5	9	5	19	4	6	5	15	18	34	20	73
No. in aborting a/c	1	1	0	2	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	3	0	4
No. completing mission	3	13	3	19	5	4	7	16	5	8	5	18	4	6	5	15	17	31	20	68
No. Photographing Primary Target	3	9	2	14	5	4	7	16	5	2	5	12	2	6	5	13	15	21	19	55
No. usable negatives, Primary Target	18*	23	10	51	18	0	13	31	22	1	35	62	6	84	85	175	64	108	147	319
No. photographing other Targets	0	1	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	5	1	0	0	1	1	6	1	8
No. usable negatives, other Targets	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	23	0	0	23	23	0	0	23

* Incomplete

B. Malfunctions Reported

1. Focr vacuum system - 1
2. Sheared pin in K-20 magazine - 1

I-I-1
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S E C R E T

II - Photo Reconnaissance Aircraft

Mission No. 18

27 November 1944

A. A single B-29 of the 10th Group on 27 November flew a post-strike reconnaissance mission, to take damage assessment photographs of the primary, secondary, and last resort targets. Take-off was at 262334Z, 1 hour 43 minutes after the last take-off of the bombing aircraft. Landing was made at Chakulia at 271112Z.

B. The primary and secondary targets were photographed from 25,000 feet and the last resort target from 20,000 feet. Weather conditions over all three were CAVU.

C. No smoke was visible at the primary target, and at the last resort target visual observation showed numerous bomb craters pocketing the area.

D. No antiaircraft or enemy fighters were encountered during the flight.

E. Photographs were also taken at other points not connected with Mission No. 18, including harbor installations at Tavoy and other installations at 14°26'N - 98°51'E.

F. Good to Excellent photos were returned of the primary and the last resort targets. No photos of the secondary target showing the area of bomb damage were returned, although the island and a portion of the airfield were covered.

I-II-1

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Authority 760063

By SG-NARA Date 11/8/05

S E C R E T

ANNEX

J

BATTLE LOSSES AND BATTLE DAMAGE*

For details of Battle Damage by aircraft, see Consolidated
Mission Statistical Summary, Annex M, Table V.

J

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By SG NARA Date 11/8/05

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BATTLE LOSSES

Mission No. 17

27 November 1944

The loss of A/C 452 (40th), missing, may be due to damage sustained over the target from enemy fighters. For a full explanation of what is known about this aircraft, see Part IX, Annex A, "Execution of the Mission."

J-I-1

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S E C R E T

ANNEX

K

FUNCTIONING OF EQUIPMENT

- I - Functioning of Equipment
- II - Performance Data*

* Prepared by Operations, Plans and Training Section,
IX Bomber Command

K

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Authority 760063

By SG NARA Date 11/8/05

S E C R E T

I - FUNCTIONING OF EQUIPMENT

Mission No. 18

27 November 1944

1. A/C Airborne	60
2. Less A/C failing to get over the primary target with bombs -- mechanical reasons.	4
a. Bombed secondary target (1); A/C 217 (468th) - Supercharger malfunction.	
b. Bombed last resort target (1); A/C 457 (40th) - propeller governor malfunction.	
c. Jettisoned bombs (1); A/C 378 (444th) - electrical failure.	
d. Brought bombs back (1); A/C 359 (462nd) - engine failure.	
3. Less A/C over the primary target but failing to bomb -- mechanical reasons.	1
a. Bombed target of opportunity (1); A/C 319 (40th) - AFCE inoperative	
4. A/C bombing primary target	55

NOTE: Aircraft 456 and 346 of the 462nd Group were in a formation of 15 planes which made 2 runs over the target. These 2 aircraft, however, dropped on the first run because an engine was on fire on A/C 456. Aircraft 346 dropped its bombs in order to escort the distressed plane. The bombardier in A/C 456 was unable to make correction for the bad run, and the bombs fell 18,000 feet from the aiming point. Since a definite effort was made to place them on the primary target they cannot be considered as having been jettisoned.

K-I-1

S E C R E T

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HEADQUARTERS
XX BOMBER COMMAND
APO 493

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:SECRET :
:Auth: CG XX BC :
:Initials _____ :
:Date _____ :
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CONSOLIDATED
SPECIALISTS MISSION
REPORT OF
STAFF FLIGHT ENGINEER

Date Prepared: 30 November 1944

Field Orders No. 18
Date of Mission: 27 Nov. 1944

1. A summary of the aircraft performance is listed on the attached table.
2. The wide variation in bomb loads is due to three (3) main factors. The first of which is the percentage of older type aircraft, which are limited to 24 bombs, as compared to the newer type aircraft with center section tanks, which can carry 40 bombs. Secondly, the Group with the largest percentage of the newer type aircraft took-off at considerably heavier gross weights. Third and last is the fact that one Group carried a considerably larger load of auxiliary fuel than the other Groups, which reduced their bomb load accordingly.
3. Fuel consumption was some what higher than anticipated. However, this is due to the fact that this was a training mission and a large percentage of the crews were relatively inexperienced. Consequently the fuel consumption was higher than average.

K-II-1

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SUMMARY OF ALL GROUPS - F.O. #18
PRIMARY TARGET

Group	Over all Average	40th	444th	462nd	468th
*No. of A/C	51	11	13	13	14
Total Time	11:17	11:14	10:52	11:49	11:12
Time to Target	5:55	5:56	5:40	5:57	6:05
Fuel	5265	5110	5270	5345	5320
Ave.	5600	5500	**5475	**5600	5600
Max.	4400	4400	5030	5100	5000
Min.	605	545	595	550	715
Aux. Fuel	1050	1000	600	900	1050
Ave.	300	400	520	300	600
Max.	770	835	725	605	845
Carried	1450	1400	970	1200	1450
Burnable	400	550	525	400	475
Ave.	2470	2346	2426	2635	2460
Max.	2380	2302	2431	2440	2351
Min.	2.13	2.18	2.17	2.03	2.16
***Air Miles	19,500	18,200	20,500	19,000	19,850
Ground Miles	133,000	131,100	134,600	133,500	132,900
***Gals./Air Miles	135,250	133,500	135,250	135,000	133,300
****Ave. Bomb Alt.	129,560	129,560	131,000	130,630	131,300
Starting	15,450	13,900	17,060	16,000	14,550
Gross	18,000	16,350	17,450	18,000	15,800
Weight	13,100	13,100	13,100	13,100	13,100
Wt. of Bombs	28.3	25.4	31.3	29.4	26.7
Carried					
No. of Bombs					

* For which logs were available and for aircraft returning to their home base.
 ** Returned from target on three engines.
 *** Air miles are of questionable accuracy due to difficulty in determination.
 **** Pressure Altitude.

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SECRET

ANNEX

L

TARGET DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

* Prepared by: *
* Target Intelligence Unit *
* XX Bomber Command *

SECRET



C O N F I D E N T I A L

HEADQUARTERS
XX BOMBER COMMAND
Intelligence Section
APC 493

DAMAGE ASSESSMENT REPORT NO. 26

TARGET: Bansue Marshalling Yard, Bangkok, Siam. (13 48'N - 100 33'E).

GENERAL STATEMENT:

This report relates to damage resulting from a daylight attack on the Bansue Marshalling Yard by 55 aircraft of the XX Bomber Command on 27 November 1944. A total of 1529 500# GP were dropped. Assessment of damage was derived from excellent strike photography and reconnaissance obtained by the 40th Bomb Group on 27 November.

The bombing was accomplished by four formations consisting of 12, 14, 13 and 14 aircraft in order over the target. The first and third formations, 444th and 468th Bomb Groups, were assigned the four railway repair shops at the north end of the Yard as an aiming point, and the second and fourth formations, 40th and 462nd Bomb Groups, were assigned the large warehouse at the south end of the yard as an aiming point.

Examination of the photos showed that excellent results were achieved. Both aiming points were completely destroyed. In addition several small buildings in the immediate vicinity of the railway shops and the warehouse were destroyed and several more damaged. Numerous hits in the length and breadth of the Yard cut all lines in one or more places effectively halting internal movement. Four locomotives were destroyed, 2 probably destroyed and 3 others damaged and at least 90 rolling stock were damaged or destroyed. The housing settlement lining the yard on the west suffered heavily with some 32 houses destroyed and at least 20 damaged. The Thai Cement Works also received heavy damage, especially in the central part probably damaging the rotary kilns, most vital component of the plant. Bombs falling outside the target area destroyed approximately 15 residences and damaged 10 others.

REFERENCES: (1) 18th P.I.D. Third Phase Report No. 46.

WEIGHT OF ATTACK: 55 Aircraft, 1529 500# GP

PREVIOUS PHOTO COVER: Mission No. BN 390 684, 8 June 1944, scale 1:10,000, quality excellent.

PHOTOGRAPHY: (1) Strike photos, scale variable, quality good to excellent.
(2) XX Bomber Command, Mission No. 4MR27, 27 November 1944, scale approximately 1:12,000, quality excellent.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

C O N F I D E N T I A L

ANNEXES: (1) Photographic Annex.
(2) Bomb Plot.

DETAILS OF DAMAGE: See Annex 1.

Frank L. Scott Jr
FRANK L SCOTT, JR
Lt. Col., Air Corps
Chief, Intelligence Section

PREPARED BY: TARGET UNIT
INTELLIGENCE SECTION
5 DECEMBER 1944

C O N F I D E N T I A L

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Authority 760063

By SG NARA Date 11/8/05

C O N F I D E N T I A L

HEADQUARTERS
XX BOMBER COMMAND
Intelligence Section
APO 493

DAMAGE ASSESSMENT REPORT NO. 27 (PRELIMINARY)

TARGET: Mergui Harbor, Burma. (12 26'N - 98 35'E).

GENERAL STATEMENT:

This report relates to an attack by one aircraft of the XX Bomber Command on 27 November dropping a total of 24 500# GP bombs. This was the secondary target of the main strike directed against the Bansue Marshalling Yard, Bangkok, Siam (see D.A. Report No. 26). Assessment of damage was accomplished exclusively from strike photos and must be considered provisional. Photo reconnaissance flown several hours after the attack failed to obtain photos of the damage, although the island and a portion of the airfield at Mergui were covered.

Strike photos show a string of approximately 10-12 bombs bursting along the waterfront just west of the small stream which forms the east boundary of the town. Several of the bombs appear to have scored hits or near misses on 2 jetties. A number of small sampans are obscured by bursts and damage to several is indicated. At least two small buildings are thought to have received misses sufficiently close to cause blast damage. Approximately 7 bombs fell in the water short of the target causing no damage.

REFERENCES: Target Chart, Strategic Air Force, No. 1000-45, Feb. 1944.

WEIGHT OF ATTACK: One aircraft, 24 x 500# GP.

PHOTOGRAPHY: Strike photos, scale 1:10,500, quality excellent.

PREVIOUS PHOTO COVER: None.

ANNEXES: None.

DETAILS OF DAMAGE: None.

Frank L. Scott, Jr.
FRANK L. SCOTT, JR.
Lt. Col., Air Corps
Chief, Intelligence Section

PREPARED BY: TARGET UNIT
INTELLIGENCE SECTION
5 DECEMBER 1944

-1-


C O N F I D E N T I A L

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Authority 760063

By SG NARA Date 11/8/05

CONSOLIDATED BOMB PLOT



ANNEX 2
D.A. REPORT NO. 26
MISSION NO. 16
TARGET UNIT INTELLIGENCE SECTION
XX BOMBER COMMAND

TOTAL NUMBER OF BOMBS DROPPED 1529
TOTAL NUMBER OF BOMBS IDENTIFIED 1146
PERCENTAGE OF BOMBS IDENTIFIED 75.0

<u>AREA</u>	<u>NO. OF BOMBS IDENTIFIED</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>
0'-1,000'	514	44.8
1,000'-2,000'	401	35.0
2,000'-3,000'	125	10.9
3,000'-4,000'	26	2.3
4,000'-5,000'	24	2.1
5,000' PLUS	56	4.9
	<u>1146</u>	<u>100.0</u>

CONFIDENTIAL

82

CONFIDENTIAL
REPRODUCED BY
IOWA PHOTO TECH. UNIT

ANNEX 1
D. A. REPORT NO. 26
BANSUE MARSHALLING YARD
MISSION NO. 19

CONFIDENTIAL

TARGET: BANSUE MARSHALLING YARD, BANGKOK, SIAM (13 48N - 100 33E)

DATE : 27 NOVEMBER 1944

UNITS : 40TH, 444TH, 462ND AND 468TH BOMB GROUPS, XX BOMBER COMMAND,
MISSION NO. 18.

DETAILS OF ATTACK:

(A) BY FORMATIONS:

	1ST OVER 444TH BG	2ND OVER 40TH BG	3RD OVER 468TH BG	4TH OVER 462ND BG
TIME OVER TARGET:	0310Z	0317Z	0334Z	0335Z
NUMBER OF A/C :	12	14	13	13
ALTITUDE :	21,000'	18,900'	20,000'	20,000'
WEIGHT OF ATTACK:	376*	353*	344*	376*
HEADING :	48 M	45 M	53 M	46 M
AIMING POINT :	1**	2**	1**	2**

NOTE: * ALL BOMBS WERE 500# GP
** THE 444TH AND 468TH GROUPS WERE ASSIGNED THE CENTER OF THE FOUR RAILWAY REPAIR SHOPS AT THE NORTH END OF THE YARD AS THEIR AIMING POINT AND THE 40TH AND 462ND GROUPS WERE ASSIGNED THE LARGE WAREHOUSE AT THE SOUTH END OF THE YARD

(B) BY GROUPS:

	444TH BG	40TH BG	468TH BG	462ND BG	TOTALS
NUMBER OF A/C:	14*	13	14**	14***	55
BOMBS DROPPED:	321	440	400	368	1529

NOTE: * ONE A/C OF THE 444TH BG BOMBED WITH THE 40TH AND ONE WITH THE 462ND.
** ONE A/C OF THE 468TH BG BOMBED INDIVIDUALLY AT 0343Z
*** 2 A/C DROPPING A TOTAL OF 56 BOMBS ON THE INITIAL PASS AT 0316Z AND THE REMAINING 13 DROPPING 376 BOMBS ON THE SECOND PASS AT 0335Z

DAMAGE:

NUMBERS PRECEDING STATEMENTS BELOW REFER TO CORRESPONDING NUMBERS ON THE "AFTER" PHOTO

- (1) THE RAILWAY REPAIR SHOPS, A. P. FOR THE 444TH AND 468TH GROUPS, WERE DESTROYED AS WERE 4 LOCOMOTIVES, SEVERAL SMALL SHEDS AND PRACTICALLY ALL TRACKAGE IN THE IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF THE SHOPS.
- (2) THE LARGE WAREHOUSE, A. P. FOR THE 40TH AND 462ND GROUPS, WAS COMPLETELY DESTROYED. A SMALLER WAREHOUSE, SEVERAL SMALL SHEDS, A BOX-CAR AND A RAIL SPUR ALSO WERE DESTROYED AND ANOTHER SMALL WAREHOUSE AND A SHED WERE DAMAGED.
- (3) THE HOUSING SETTLEMENT LINING THE YARD ON THE WEST RECEIVED HEAVY DAMAGE WITH SOME 32 HOUSES DESTROYED AND AT LEAST 20 OTHERS DAMAGED.
- (4) NUMEROUS HITS IN THE YARD CUT ALL LINES IN ONE OR MORE PLACES, DAMAGED OR DESTROYED AT LEAST 90 ROLLING STOCK, PROBABLY DESTROYED 2 LOCOMOTIVES AND DAMAGED 3 OTHERS AND DESTROYED 3 OR 4 SMALL SHEDS AND A CONTROL HOUSE. ROLLING STOCK OBSERVED TOTALLED APPROXIMATELY 200 WAGONS AND 15 LOCOMOTIVES.
- (5) HITS ON THE THAI CEMENT WORKS COMPLEX MORE THAN HALF-DESTROYED A LARGE T-SHAPED STORAGE BUILDING, DAMAGED A LARGE CONVEYOR AND SEVERAL SMALL BUILDINGS NEAR THE FINISHED PRODUCTS STORAGE, AND EFFECTED HEAVY DAMAGE JUST SOUTH OF THE TWIN STACKS PROBABLY DAMAGING THE ROTARY KILNS, MOST VITAL COMPONENT OF THE WORKS.
- (6) APPROXIMATELY 15 RESIDENCES WERE DESTROYED AND 10 DAMAGED BY BOMBS FALLING OUTSIDE THE TARGET AREA.

PREPARED BY: TARGET SECTION, INT. UNIT,
XX BOMBER COMMAND

17.87

BEFORE



DURING


1ST. OVER: 444TH BOMB GROUP



2ND OVER



3RD OVER: 468TH BOMB GROUP



4TH OVER



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Authority 760063

By SG NARA Date 11/8/05

BEFORE



AFTER



(13 48N - 100 33E)

PS, XI BOMBER COMMAND,

3RD OVER 4TH OVER
468TH BG 1302ND BG

0334Z	0335Z
13	13
20,000'	20,000'
344*	376*
53 M	46 M
1**	2**

WERE ASSIGNED THE CENTER OF
OPS AT THE NORTH END OF THE
AND THE 40TH AND 462ND GROUPS
REHOUSE AT THE SOUTH END OF

TH BG	462ND BG	TOTALS
4**	14***	55
0	368	1529

OMBED WITH THE 40TH AND ONE
OMBED INDIVIDUALLY AT 0345Z
56 BOMBS ON THE INITIAL PASS
G 13 DROPPING 376 BOMBS ON THE

TO CORRESPONDING NUMBERS ON

444TH AND 468TH GROUPS, WERE
L SMALL SHEDS AND PRACTICALLY
OF THE SHOPS.

AND 462ND GROUPS, WAS CON-
SEVERAL SMALL SHEDS, A BOX-
AND ANOTHER SMALL WAREHOUSE

ON THE WEST RECEIVED HEAVY
D AT LEAST 20 OTHERS DAMAGED.

IN ONE OR MORE PLACES, DAM-
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ORE THAN HALF-DESTROYED A
O A LARGE CONVEYOR AND
ED PRODUCTS STORAGE, AND
TWIN STACKS PROBABLY DAM-
MENT OF THE WORKS.

ED AND 10 DAMAGED BY BOMBS

TARGET SECTION, INT. UNIT,
XX BOMBER COMMAND

DURING

1 ST. OVER: 444TH BOMB GROUP



2ND OVER: 40TH BOMB GROUP



3RD OVER: 468TH BOMB GROUP



4TH OVER: 462ND BOMB GROUP



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REF DU ED BY
10th PHOTO TECH UNIT

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REF DU ED BY
10th PHOTO TECH UNIT

S E C R E T

ANNEX

M

CONSOLIDATED MISSION STATISTICAL SUMMARY

* * * * *
* Prepared by: *
* Statistical Section *
* * * * *
* IX Bomber Command *
* * * * *

M

S E C R E T

SECRET

XX BOMBER COMMAND
 CONSOLIDATED MISSION STATISTICAL SUMMARY
 Mission Number Eighteen
 27 November 1944

SECRET

By Authority of the
Commanding General:

12-4-44 SR
 Date Initials

Table I and II - Aircraft Participating *

Group	Mission No.	Field Order No.	** A/C Taking Off	Airborne A/C Failing to Bomb Designated Primary Target							Time of First Takeoff	Time of Latest Return	Average Time Of Flight		
				Total No.	Percent	Reason							A/C Bombing Primary	Airborne A/C Not Bombing Primary	
						Mech.	Pers.	Wea.	Not in Form.	Misc.					Unknown
40th	18	18	15	2	13.3%	2						2113Z	0912Z	11:07	8:58
444th	18	18	15	1	6.7%	1						2118Z	0859Z	10:59	:58
462nd	18	18	15	1	6.7%	1						2116Z	0946Z	11:32	1:18
468th	18	18	15	1	6.7%	1						2112Z	0853Z	11:12	10:07
TOTAL	18	18	60	5	8.3%	5						2112Z	0946Z	11:13	6:04

* Mission was run from Rear Area bases; Tables I and II Consolidated because there was no Rear to Forward Area Movement.
 ** Field Order #18 requires each group to have 15 aircraft airborne on mission.

SECRET

S E C R E T

XX POMBER COMMAND
 CONSOLIDATED MISSION STATISTICAL SUMMARY
 Mission Number Eighteen
 27 November 1944

S E C R E T

By Authority of the
 Commanding General:
 12-4-44 SR
 Date Initials

Table III - Bombing Runs

Group	No. of A/C Bomb- ing	Target Bombed	Time of Release		Altitude of Release		Visual Bombing		Radar Bombing		On the Leader	Aircraft Dropping On	
			Earliest	Latest	Highest	Lowest	A/C Sighting For		A/C Sighting For			AFCE	Manual
							R & D	Range	R & D	Range			
40th	13	Bangkok	0316Z	0317Z	19,520	18,460	1				12	1	12
	1	Taungup	0108Z	0108Z	15,800	15,800	1					1	
	1	Opportunity	0353Z	0353Z	18,800	18,800	1						1
444th	14	Bangkok	0310Z	0335Z	21,400	18,000	1				13	1	13
462nd	14	Bangkok	0316Z	0335Z	20,250	19,000	2				12	1	13
468th	14	Bangkok	0334Z	0343Z	20,000	20,000	2				12	2	12
	1	Mergui	0252Z	0252Z	20,000	20,000	1					1	
TOTAL	55	Bangkok	0310Z	0343Z	21,400	18,000	6				49	5	50
	1	Mergui	0252Z	0252Z	20,000	20,000	1					1	
	1	Taungup	0108Z	0108Z	15,800	15,800	1					1	
	1	Opportunity	0353Z	0353Z	18,800	18,800	1						1

S E C R E T

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority 760063
 By S/NARA Date 11/8/05

S E C R E T

XX BOMBER COMMAND
 CONSOLIDATED MISSION STATISTICAL SUMMARY
 Mission Number Eighteen
 27 November 1944

S E C R E T

By Authority of the
Commanding General:

12-4-44 SR
 Date Initials

Table IV - Bomb Loading & Disposal

Group	* Type of Bombs	Bomb Loading on Airborne A/C in R. A.			On Targets				Bomb Disposal			
		Fusing		Average No. Loaded	Total Loaded	Bangkok	Mergui	Taungup	Of Opportunity	Jettisoned	Returned	Unknown
		Nose	Tail									
40th	500# G.P.	.1	.025	25.9	388	321	30	24	13			
44th	500# G.P.	.1	.025	31.4	472	440			32			
462nd	500# G.P.	.1	.025	28.7	430	400			6	24		
468th	500# G.P.	.1	.025	26.1	392	368	24					
TOTAL	500# G.P.	.1	.025	28.0	1682	1529	24	30	24	51	24	

* 500# G.P. - AN-M 43)
 AN-M 64) Actual weight may average over 500 pounds.

S E C R E T