12. It is well to enforce compulsory labor measures upon recruited laborers.

13. Prior to their arrival, parties concerned will keep close liaison with each other. At the regular meetings (town meetings) leaders will be encouraged to influence the mental attitude of local Japanese men and women.

14. Chinese laborers will be trained for a fixed period of time in order to lessen their national consciousness and to provide sufficient security measures.

15. Roll calls and clothing inspections will be conducted rigidly. Cooperation will be given the police in carrying out inspections at any time.

Measures to be taken by the company.

1. The company will select the place of work and quarters, will establish security measures and will make necessary preparations pertinent to management.

2. Necessary measures will be taken to prevent escapes and to prevent contacts with the outside.

3. After their arrival, sufficient rest will be given before they assume training for work.

4. The training period will be for one month. Aside from rules to be observed in marching to and from the place of work, special stress will be placed on work training.

5. Instructions and orders, and even training instructions, will not be given directly to Chinese laborers, but thru subordinate Japanese and Chinese supervisors.

6. The policy of directing the Chinese laborers will be consistent throughout. Since various orders are sometimes revised or partially disregarded by the intermediate supervisors and thus causes a loss of consistency and increases incidents, all orders which are difficult to apply from the practical point of view will be amended after due deliberation.

7. The company will take cognizance of the fact that Chinese laborers have aversion to damp ground as their housing site.

8. Contrary to the fact, a good camp will create a feeling of discomfort. Precautions will be taken in constructing quarters with low mat-rush ceiling. Fences will be strongly constructed so that contacts with the outside are prevented.

9. Japanese supervisors who accompanied the Chinese laborers will be held directly responsible and, with their aid, these objectives will be accomplished. Emphasis will be placed on security.

10. The original unit organization will be continued and controlled in order not to create any unnecessary disturbances.

11. Working hours will be the same as those in Japan. However, in order to prevent incidents, night work will not be authorized for the time being.

12. The three great holidays, 3 January of the lunar calendar, Boys' Festival Day, and Mid-autumn Festival Day will be considered as rest days.

13. Passage expense both coming and returning, will not be collected from the Chinese laborers.

14. When returning, the laborer will be returned to the place where the subject was recruited.

15. Although 30 kilograms of food per month (22 kilograms of which will be furnished by the Department of Agriculture and Forestry) will be required, actually, 27 or 28 kilograms will suffice.

16. Quantity and not the quality of food will be stressed. It is unwise to issue all of the alloted amount of food at one time.

17. Gluttony will affect work efficiency.

18. Cooking oil is essential from the standpoint of Chinese livelihood.

19. In the case of general recruited workers and skilled workers, they will be given group leave passes once or twice a month.

20. PsW and enemy deserters will not be given leaves; however, those who are of excellent character, may be allowed group excursions once or twice per month.

21. We believe that skilled workers (persons of excellent character) should be considered for individual passes; however, from the standpoint of control, it will not be sanctioned for the time being.

22. The company, in determining management plans, will consider not only the production phase but the espionage phase and the Japanese policy towards China.

23. Clothing will be of an inexpensive material, however, in the event of the laborers return to China, appropriate clothing, if possible, will be issued.

I swear that the foregoing statement is the true text of the correspondence sent by the chief of AKITA Ken Police Department and dated sometime in the later part of Jun 44 (exact date unknown)

10 Oct 47.

KUBO, Seichiro (Seal)

Opinion

The opinion of KUBO, Seichiro concerning the measures and treatment of the Chinese as set forth in the dispatch by the Chief of AKITA Ken Police Department and dated sometime in the latter part of June (Date torn and unknown.)

1. Reference orders issued to the police department concerned regarding the treatment.

Section 4. Chinese quarters will be completely isolated and contact with Japanese women, Koreans and Caucasians will be prevented. However, in order not to make the Chinese conscious of the discriminatory treatment, proper quarters should be prepared beforehand.

Section 6. Persons other than those authorized will be prohibited from entering or leaving the quarters. Contact with resident Chinese and Koreans will be strictly prohibited.

Opinion:

Sections 4 and 6 of the regulations were enforced in all of the Chinese Labor Camps in Japan. On 10 and 11 Apr 45, I, KUBO Seichiro, inspected the conditions of the Chinese interned at the NISE Mines, TAGAWA Mines and YAMANO Mines in FUKUOKA Ken. All of these camps were segregated by means of encircling walls and fences around their outer perimeter. Surveillance and control were conducted from a police box established within the compound.

Although Section 4 of the regulations was dictated by the Chief of AKITA Ken Thought Police, KAMADA (鎌田), it was not enforced at the TOA Camp of HANOKA Mines nor at CHUSAN Camp of KAJIMA Gumi since it was not considered necessary. In other words, since Chinese sick patients were prohibited from hospitalization under the regulation which prohibited their contact with Koreans and women, sick-rooms were established in each camp. However, since the sick-rooms of TOA Camp, which I supervised, were situated so far from the hospital and were so inconvenient that two months after my transfer I began to hospitalize the Chinese patients.

Section 11. In the event of contingency, measures as prescribed in the existing "Emergency Measures for Koreans" will be affected. Personnel assigned to quarters will have the proper arms held in readiness. However, these measures will be taken in utmost secrecy so as not to spread undue alarm among the daily workers.

Section 12. It is well to enforce compulsory labor measures upon the recruited laborers.

Opinion:

I, KUBO Seichiro, formulated my security plan based on section 11 of the regulations and reported it to the ODATE Police Department. However, this plan was not enforced at the 1 Jul incident. One sided action of the police department was taken. Among the policemen who participated in the incident there were some who were equipped with swords and a band of vigilants with clubs. Section 12 is consistent with the policy of wringing a soaked towel to the last drop or as HOMMA, Fusakichi (本間房吉), in charge of Foreign Affairs Section of the Home Office, in his lecture on the treatment of Chinese given at HANAOKA on 13 Jul 45 explained; the policy under Section 12 increases work efficiency threefold and gluttony lowers efficiency. I, KUBO Seichiro, who was responsible for contracting recruits was unable to abide by this policy.

2. Reference regulations on measures set forth for the companies by the police department.

Section 8. Good camps will create a feeling of discomfort. Precautions will be taken in constructing quarters with low mat-rush ceiling. Fences will be strongly constructed to prevent contact with the outside.

Section 15. Although 30 Kilograms of food per month, 22 kilograms of which will be furnished by the Department of Agriculture and Forestry, will be required; actually, 27 or 28 kilograms will suffice.

Section 16. Quantity and not the quality of food will be stressed. It is unwise to issue all of the allotted amount of food at one time.

Section 17. Gluttony will affect work efficiency.

Section 23. Clothing will be of inexpensive material; however, in the event of the laborers return to China, appropriate clothing, if possible, will be issued.

Opinion:

Regardless of the fact that the government acknowledged "30 kilograms" of staple food per person per month in its contract with the imported Chinese, it was checked at "22 kilograms". I believe that there were about 43,000 Chinese who were imported. I heard that approximately 35% of those Chinese died. (Accurate figures are kept by the secretary of Foreign Affairs Department HIRAI (平井).

A number of Chinese at the CHUSAN Camp managed by the KAJIMA Gumi were suffering from various diseases which were caused by malnutrition at the time of their importation. I, KUBO Seichiro, heard directly from the chief of HANAOKA Hospital, OUCHI, Tadashi (大内正) that the effectiveness of the various medicines was nil because the patients were suffering from malnutrition.

Yet, on 23 Aug 46, after the termination of the war, the Food Control Bureau of the Department of Agriculture and Forestry dispatched the following message to the prefectural governor of AKITA Ken.

The message: A copy. The original is kept in the Food Section of AKITA Ken. 1945 Food Number 1633, 23 Aug 45. From the Chief of Food Control Bureau to the prefectural governor of AKITA Ken. Matters pertaining to temporary ration measures for foreigners. Concerning the subject of staple food which was referred to in the previous correspondence dispatched by the General Affairs Bureau of the Department of Agriculture and Commerce under the aforementioned heading, we have made arrangements with the Food Offices concerned to furnish you an additional amount of staple food which is based on the following plan and which is a supplement to the regular allocation to your prefecture (To, Do, Fu). We take this means to inform you to take special care in the distribution of the additional food ration.

Plan:

Ration Classification	Interned Foreigners	Neutral foreigners and non-interned enemy nationals	Chinese Laborers
wheat flour per person per month	500 momme* (TN 1 momme equals 3.75 gram)	400 momme* (TN 1 momme equals 3.75 gram)	

Plan (cont.)

Ration Classification	Interned Foreigners	Neutral foreigners and non-interned enemy nationals	Chinese laborers
Potato per person	500 momme* (TN 1 momme equals 3.75 gram)	3 Kan* (TN 1 Kan equals 3.75 kilo-gram)	
Rice per day			4 go* (TN 1 go equals 0.18 litre (In addition-MANTO)

Note: This special ration will be continued for three months.

I, KUBO Seichiro, voluntarily made the foregoing statement which is an expression of my personal opinion.

10 Oct 47

KUBO Seichiro

WCT 1250 2

閣甲第三七號

昭九二月二十八日 施行

昭九年二月二十八日

内閣書記官長

昭和十九年二月二十八日

内閣書記官長

各省次官
法制局長官
情報局總裁
技術院總裁

宛（各通）

華人勞務者内地移入ノ促進ニ關スル件

標記ノ件本日次官會議ニ於テ別紙ノ通決定致候條此段通牒ニ及ビ候

案(二)

昭十九年三月二十八日

内閣官房總務課長

内閣官房參事官室
内閣官房總務課長 宛

華人勞務者内地移入ノ促進ニ關スル件

標記ノ件本日次官會議ニ於テ別紙ノ通決定相成候條命ニ依リ通牒ニ及ビ候

極秘

二月二十八日次官會議決定

華人勞務者內地移入ノ促進ニ關スル件

昭和十七年十一月二十七日閣議決定ニ係ル「華人勞務者內地移入ニ關スル件」ニ依リ實施シツツアル試驗移入ノ成績ハ概ネ良好ナルヲ以テ本件第三措置ニ基キ左記要領ニ依リ本格的移入ヲ促進セントス

第一　通則

一　本件ニ依リ內地ニ移入スル華人勞務者（以下單ニ華人勞務者ト稱ス）ノ供出又ハ其ノ斡旋ハ大使館現地軍並ニ國民政府（華北ヨリノ場合ハ華北政務委員會）指導ノ下ニ現地勞務統制機關（華北ヨリノ場合ハ華北勞工協會）ヲシテ之ニ當ラシムルコト

二　華人勞務者ハ訓練セル元俘虜又ハ元歸順兵ノ外募集ニ依ルモノトスルコト

前項ノ勞務者ハ年齡概ネ四〇才以下ノ男子ニシテ素質優良、心身健全ナル者ヲ選拔スルコトトスルモ可成三〇才以下ノ獨身男子ヲ優先的ニ選拔スル樣努力スルコト

三　華人勞務者ハ移入ニ先立チ可成一定期間（一ヶ月以內）現地ノ適當ナル機關

3

ニ於テ必要ナル訓練ヲ爲スコト

四　移入未經驗勞務者ニ付テハ內地ニ於テモ之ヲ使用スル工場事業場ヲシテ必ズ一定期間必要ナル訓練ヲ爲サシムルコト

五　華人勞務者ハ之ヲ國民動員計畫產業中鑛業、荷役業、國防土木建築業及重要工業其ノ他特ニ必要ト認ムルモノニ從事セシムルコト

尙就學地ニ付テハ可及的分散セシメザル如ク留意スルコト

六　華人勞務者ノ契約期間ハ原則トシテ二年（但シ往復途中ノ日數ヲ含マス）トシ同一人ヲ繼續使用スル場合ニ於テハ二年經過後適當ノ時期ニ於テ希望ニヨリ一時歸國セシムルコト

七　華人勞務者ハ全年度國民動員計畫ニ計上シ計畫的移入ヲ圖ルモノトスルコト

八　華人勞務者ニ對スル取扱及待遇ニ關シテハ其ノ民族性ヲ考慮シ特ニ注意ヲ拂フト共ニ業種又ハ就學地ニ依リ著シク差等ヲ生ゼザル如クスルコト

華人勞務者ノ家族送金及持歸金ニ付テハ原則トシテ特別ノ制限ヲ附セザルコト

第二　使用條件

一　華人勞務者ノ使用ヲ認ムル工場事業場（以下單ニ工場事業場ト稱ス）ハ華人勞務者ノ相當數ヲ集團的ニ就勞セシムルコトヲ條件トシ即チ直ト招請ノ上原生省マヲ選定スルコト

移入ニ關スル紐目手續ハ別ニ定ムル所ニヨルコト

二　華人勞務者ノ管理ニ付テハ特ニ左ノ諸點ニ留意ノ上華人ノ慣習ニ急激ナル變化ヲ來サザル如クスルコト

1　工場事業場ハ現地ヨリ同行セル日系指導員ヲ華人勞務者ノ直接責任者トシテマガ連絡世話ニ當ラシムルコト

2　華人勞務者ノ使用ニ當リテハ可及的供出時ノ編成ヲ利用スル如クシ且作業ニ關スル命令ハ日系指導員及華系責任者（除長又ハ坤頭）ヲ通ジマスルコトトシ華人勞務者ニ對スル直接ノ命令ハ嚴ニマヲ慎ムコト

3　華人勞務者ノ作業場所ハ朝鮮人勞務者又ハ俘虜トハ嚴ニマヲ區別スルコト

4 就學地到着後ハ充分ナル休養ヲ與ヘタル上就學セシムルコト

5 住宅ハ濕氣豫防ニ留意ノ上朝鮮人勞務者住宅ト近接セザル加ク一棟ヲ別シ設置スルコト

6 食糧ハ可成鮮人勞務者ノ通常食ヲ給スルモノトシ之ガ食糧ノ手當ニ付テハ農商省ニ於テ特別ノ措置ヲ講ズルコト

7 慰安所並ニ娯樂施設ニ付テハ工場事業場ニ於テ適當ナル施策ヲ講ズルコト

三 鮮人勞務者ノ賃金ハ內地ニ於ケル賃金ヲ模準トシ爲スモ內地ト現地ノ賃金及物價ノ間ニ甚ダシキ懸隔アル事情ナルヲ以テ相當家族ニ對スル送金及特別送金ヲ確保スル爲所要ノ措置ヲ講ズルコト

~~國家補償等積當ノ方法ヲ講ズルコト~~

~~其ノ他補償ニ關シテハ普通ノ取扱ヲ~~

賃金手當其ノ他ノ給與ノ具體的細目及之ガ支拂方法、防疫、保健、衛生、保護救濟等ニ付テハ別ニ之ヲ定ムルコト

四 就學時間ハ內地ノ例ニヨルコト

五、四大節ノ外舊正月三日並ニ端午節、仲秋節各一日ハ必ズ公休日ノ取扱ヲ爲スコト

第三　移入及送還方法

一　移入及送還ニ要スル經費ハ華務者ノ賃金ヨリ控除セザルコトトシ原則トシテ工場業主ノ負擔トスルモ差當リ要スレバ國家補償等適當ノ方途ヲ講ズルコト

二　華人華務者ノ徵發ハ日滿支間ニ於テ之ガ手配ヲ爲スコト

三　華人華務者ハ契約期間滿了後工場業主ニ於テ原則トシテ之ヲ集合地送還スルコト疾病其ノ他ノ理由ニ因リ就學ヲ繼續シ能ハザルニ至リタル華務者ニ付テモ同樣タルベキコト

第四　其ノ他

一　工場業主ハ華人華務者ノ防諜並ニ逃亡防止ニ付特段ノ配慮ヲ爲スコト

二　工場業主ハ工場ノ職員ヲ指導員トシテ現地ニ於テ訓練スル爲適當ナル措置ヲ講ズルコト

訓練完了セル指導員ハ順次圓滑ニセシメタル日系指導員ト交代セシムルモノトスルコト

三　素人青少年ノ内地ニ於ケル委託養成ニ關スル措置ニ付テハ別ニ之ヲ定ムルコト

四　國家補償ノ方法及限度等ニ付テハ別ニ之ヲ定ムルコト

参考

極秘

華人勞働者內地移入ニ關スル件

一七、一一、二七
閣議決定

第一 方針

內地ニ於ケル勞務需給ハ愈々逼迫シ來シ特ニ重筋勞働部面ニ於ケル勞力不足ノ著シキ現狀ニ鑑ミ左記要領ニ依リ華人勞務者ヲ內地ニ移入シ以テ大東亞共榮圏建設ノ遂行ニ協力セシメントス

第二 要領

一 本方策ニ依リ內地ニ移入スル華人勞務者ハ之ヲ國民動員計畫產業中鑛業、荷役、防土木建築業及其ノ他ノ工場雜役ニ使用スルコトトスルモ差當リ重要ナル鑛山、荷役及工場雜役ニ限ルコト

二 移入スル華人勞務者ハ主トシテ華北ノ勞務者ヲ以テ充ツルモ事情ニ依リ其ノ他ノ地域ヨリモ移入シ得ルコト但シ緊急要員ニ付テハ成ル可ク現地ニ於テ使用中ノ同種勞務者並ニ訓練セル元俘虜、元歸順兵ニシテ素質優良ナル者ヲ移入スル方途ヲモ考慮スルコト

三 移入スル華人勞務者ノ募集又ハ斡旋ハ華北勞工協會ヲシテ新民會其ノ他現地

14

機関トノ連絡ノ下ニ之ヲ當ラシムルコト

四 移入スル華人勞務者ハ年齢概ネ一〇歳以下ノ男子ニシテ心身健全ナル者ヲ選拔スルコトトシ家族ヲ同伴セシメザルコト

五 華人勞務者及其ノ指導者ハ移入ニ先立チ一定期間現地ノ適當ナル機関ニ於テ必要ナル訓練ヲ受スコト

六 華人勞務者ノ使用ヲ認ムル事業場ハ華人勞務者ノ相當ノ集團的ニ就學セシムルコトヲ條件トシ関係當局ノ上之ヲ選定スルコト但シ華人勞務者ヲ供給業者ニ取扱ハシムルコトハ原則トシテ認メサルコト

七 華人勞務者ノ契約經過後適當ノ時期ニ於テ希望ニ依リ一時帰國セシムルコト

八 華人勞務者ノ管理ニ關シテハ華人ノ實情ニ急激ナル變化ヲ來ササル如ク特ニ留意スルコト

九 華人勞務者ノ食事ハ米食トセズ華人勞務者ノ適當食ヲ給スルモノトシ之ガ食糧ノ手當ニ付テハ内地ニ於テ特別ノ措置ヲ講ズルコト

十 勞務者ノ所得ハ支那現地ニ於テ通常支拂ハルベキ賃銀ヲ標準トシ留守家族ニ

15

對スル送金ヲモ考慮シテ之ヲ定ムルコト

十一　華人勞務者ノ移入ノ時期、員數、輸送、防疫、防諜、等其ノ他移入ニ必要ナル具體的經目ニ付テハ關係廳協議ノ上決定スルコト

十二　華人勞務者ノ家族送金及持歸金ニ付テハ原則トシテ特別ノ制限ヲ付セザルコトトシ本方策ノ實施ニ依リ日支間國際收支ニ重大ナル影響ヲ及ボスベキ場合ニハ可能ナル範圍ニ於テ內地ヨリ支那向適當ナル裏付物資ノ給付ニ付考慮スルコト

第三　措置

本方策ノ實施ニ當リテハ之ガ成否ノ影響大ナルベキニ鑑ミ（別ニ定ムル要領）ニ依リ試驗的ニ之ヲ行ヒ其ノ成績ニ依リ漸次本方策ノ全面的實施ニ移ルモノトスル

備考

支那ニ於ケル技術勞務者不足ノ現況ニ鑑ミ本方策ノ實施ニ關聯シ別途華人壹少能勞務者ノ內地工場ニ於ケル使用ヲ認メ之ガ使用ニ付特ニ技術的訓練ニ意ヲ用

ヒ將來支那ニ於ケル基幹要件者タルベキ者ヲ養成スル措置ニ付テモ併セ考慮ス
ルコト

華人勞務者內地移入手續

第一 通則

一 華人勞務者ノ移入雇傭ヲ認ムル事業ハ國民動員實施計畫產業中左ノ事業ニシテ緊要度特ニ高キモノタルコト

(一) 鑛業（石炭山及金屬山）

(二) 國防土木建築業

(三) 重要工業（鐵鋼、造船、輕金屬、化學工業關係）

(四) 港灣及陸運荷役

(五) 其ノ他特ニ緊要ト認ムルモノ

右事業ト雖モ勞務管理適當ナラザルモノ又ハ關係官廳ノ指示ニ從ハザルモノニ對シテハ之ヲ認メザルコト

第二 移入雇傭申請ノ處理

一 縣府縣厚生省ヨリ華人勞務者ノ事業主別移入雇傭員數ノ割當豫定通報ヲ受ケタル時ハ事業主ヲシテ「華人勞務者移入雇傭願」（華人勞務者斡旋申請書）

二　正則　通（別紙樣式）ヲ所轄廳府縣經由提出セシムルコト

三　厚生省ノ割當無キモ第一ニ掲グル事業ノ事業主ニシテ華人勞務者ノ移入雇傭ヲ希望セルモノアル場合ハ前項ニ準ジ厚生省ニ稟議スルコト

四　厚生省前二項ニ依リ割當ヲ決定シタル場合ハ「華人勞務者斡旋申請書」通添附ノ上其ノ旨大東亞省ニ通報スルト共ニ事業場別割當表ヲ內務省宛送付スルコト

五　大東亞省前項ノ通報ヲ受ケタル際ハ其ノ勞務者ノ引繼輸送月日等ヲ決定シ其ノ都度厚生省ニ對シ之ヲ通報スルコト

六　厚生省前項ノ通報ヲ受ケタル際ハ關係廳府縣ヲ通ジ之ヲ事業主ニ通報シ移入勞務者ノ引繼、輸送、到着後ノ措置ニ付遺憾ナキヲ期セシムルト共ニ引率責任者（其ノ數ハ別途指示ス）ヲ選定ノ上大東亞省宛通報スルコト

第三　輸送

一　就業地國民職業指導所長ハ別途（所轄警察署ノ發行スル「渡支身分證明書」別紙樣式）ノ裏面ニ引率者タルコトヲ記入證明スルコト

二　移入勞務者ノ引繼、輸送ハ全テ隊編成ニ依ルモノナルコト

三　移入勞務者ノ引繼輸送ノ爲渡支スルニ當リテハ豫メ下船地及乘船地ヲ管轄スル各警察署、關係機關ト事前ニ充分ナル打合聯絡ヲ遂ゲ引率輸送上遺憾ナキヲ期スルコト

第四　到着後ノ措置

一　移入華人勞務者就業地ニ到着シタル時ハ事業主ヲシテ地方長官宛「勞働許可證」（明治三十二年七月　内務省令第三五二號）申請ノ手續ヲトラシムルト共ニ速ニ其ノ就業地ヲ管轄スル國民職業指導所ニ移入勞務者名簿（勞務者出身地、氏名、年令）添附輸送途中ノ概況ヲ報告セシムルコト

二　國民職業指導所ハ右ニ依リ移入勞務者數、到着勞務者數、到着年月日、輸送途中ノ異動狀況等ヲ直チニ廳府縣宛、廳府縣ハ厚生省宛報告スルコト

三　移入華人勞務者ノ異動、災害、紛擾其ノ他事件發生シタル時ハ特ニ捜索、防諜等ノ機密保持ニ留意スルト共ニ事業主ヲシテ速ニ警察署、國民職業指導所ニ報告セシムルコト

廳府縣ハ國民職業指導所及警察署ノ報告ヲ取纏メ厚生省、內務省及大東亞省ニ報告スルコト

四　事業主ヲシテ毎月末現在ヲ以テ移入華人勞務者勤勞狀況（別紙樣式）ヲ國民職業指導所ヲ經由シ翌月末日迄ニ廳府縣ニ必着スル如ク報告セシムルコト

廳府縣ハ右勤勞狀況報告ヲ事業種別ニ取纏メ且集計ノ上翌月十日迄ニ厚生省及內務省及大東亞省ニ報告スルコト

五　事業主ハ所轄警察署、國民職業指導所其ノ他關係機關ノ指示ニ從ヒ訓練施設、技術教育施設適切ナル慰安娛樂施設ヲ設クルノ外健康診斷、生活訓練其ノ他ノ保護輔導ヲ講ズルコト

第五　移動ニ關スル措置

移入華人勞務者ノ移動（出動期間ノ延長、就業場ノ變更、轉屬備）ハ原則トシテ之ヲ認メザルモノトスルモ必要已ムヲ得ザルトキハ厚生省ニ眞議ノ上之ヲ認ムルヲ得ルコト

第六　滿期歸國ニ關スル措置

出動期間満了（満了前事業ノ縮少廃止、終了ノ場合ヲ含ム）ニ依リ歸國者確定シタル時ハ次ニ依リ措置スルコト

(一) 廳府縣ハ事業主ヲシテ歸國者名簿（勞務者ノ出身地、氏名、移入年月日、斡旋年月日、斡旋機關）下船地、歸國豫定年月日等ヲ國民職業指導所及警察署ヲ經由シテ報告セシムルト共ニ別紙樣式ニ依リ厚生省、内務省及大東亞省宛報告スルコト

(二) 事業主ヲシテ引率責任者ヲ附セシメ隊組織ニ依リ第三ノ檢送ニ準ジ歸郷セシムルト共ニ國民職業指導所及警察署經由現地機關引渡完了ノ概況ヲ報告セシムルコト

(三) 引率者ノ渡支、引率證明ニ關シテハ第三ノ(一)ニ準ズルコト

極東軍事裁判所

證　明　書

第二五〇二號

典據及ビ公正ニ關スル證明

余、山石金規夫　余ガ下記ノ資格ニ於テ、即チ内閣事務官トシテ、日本政府ト公的關係ニ在ルモノナルコト、並ニ該官吏トシテ余ガ茲ニ添附セラレタル、十七頁ヨリ成ル、千九百四十四年ノ昭和十九年三月三十八日附、下記題名、即チ常務者内地移入ノ促進ニ關スル件　華人ノ文書ノ保管ニ任ジ居ルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。

余ハ更ニ添附ノ記錄及ビ文書ガ日本政府ノ公文書ナルコト、並ニ右ガ下記名稱ノ省又ハ部局ノ公式書類及ビ綴ノ一部ナルコトヲ證明ス。（若シアラバ綴番號又ハ引用、其ノ他公式書類又ハ綴ニ於ケル該文書ノ成規所在ノ公式名稱ヲモ特記スベシ）

千九百四十八年／昭和二十三年／十一月九日　内閣

理大臣官舍ニ於テ署名

當該官吏者名欄　山石金規夫

右ノ者ノ公的資格　内閣事務官

證人　上川洋

公式入手ニ關スル證明

余、HENRY SHIMOZIMA ハ、余ガ聯合國最高指揮官總司令部ニ關係アルモノナルコト、並ニ上記題氣ノ文書ハ余ガ公務上、日本政府ノ上記署名官吏ヨリ入手シタルモノナルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。

千九百四十八年／昭和二十三年／十一月九日

東京　ニ於テ署名

氏名欄　Henry Shimozima

右ノ者ノ公的資格　Chief, Legal Section WCT.

證人　John Ehrman　Legal Section

/P. 1/ /Trans. by AKITA/ 1

/Pencilled note: Appendix 4/

Circumstances Under Which

Chinese Laborers Were

Imported and Details

as to Their ~~relations~~

~~of~~ Employment

Drafted on

July 30, 1946.

By NOGI, Takayuki,

Policy and Measures

Committee on Chinese and Korean

Laborers, the Japan

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Construction Industry

Control Association.

(Ket)

Pencilled remark:-

"This has been submitted

to Defense Counsel HIRABAYA-

SHI for his information

in the way to file a

petition to Mr. Carpenter."

Circumstances under which Chinese laborers were imported and details as to their ~~relations of~~ employment.

1. Foreward.

Since the outbreak of the Pacific War, there has been an acute shortage of heavy-duty

laborers throughout ~~all~~ ~~the various~~

~~branches of~~ Japanese industries

(~~for instance,~~ such as in coal and

metal mines, in ~~the field~~

~~of~~ civil engineering and

constructional works, in

~~the~~ harbor stevedore works ~~jobs~~,

etc.).

of the various causes

~~Not few of causes may~~

of this situation, the main

be mentioned ~~as being~~

~~responsible for this~~

~~trend, but the most~~

~~decisive of all was the fact~~
cause is the conscription
~~that on account of the~~

~~draft~~ of men to military services,
of manpower, 'as a
requisitions, etc. ~~we~~
result of which the cream
~~lost the stratum~~ of the

youths and men ~~mature-aged~~

~~in our population,~~ who
had
~~possess the richest~~ experience

and ~~a~~ ~~relatively~~ high

~~working~~ efficiency in

were lost.

these industries, such a

situation, however, is an ~~seemed to be~~

~~a~~ phenomenon inevitable due to

the prevailing domestic conditions.

~~then prevailed.~~

Prior to this, ~~as~~

~~early as at~~ from the beginning of 1942,

it was decided ~~to start~~ that

a source of labor-supply ~~will~~ ~~in~~
would be available in ~~obtained from~~
KOREA, ~~As a result of which,~~
and
a substantial number of
heavy-duty laborers were
imported from KOREA to substitute
for the local laborers.
The most outstanding ~~conspicuous~~ ~~prominent~~ ~~of~~
~~the~~ instances of this ~~where~~ ~~we witnessed~~
~~this sort of~~ replacement were in
the Coal mines and ~~the~~ in

civil engineering projects,

~~in which~~ where Korean laborers

employed were almost exclusively ~~now predominantly employed~~

in the whole mining industry, ~~or in~~

~~the whole field of~~

~~projects~~ except for

~~a meagre proportion of~~

~~specially~~ certain skilled laborers.

There was, however, a

definite limit in the ~~in~~ ~~the~~

~~scope in which we could~~
importation of
~~afford to rely on~~ ~~to~~ these
~~and~~ for
Korean laborers, ~~Meanwhile,~~

~~These~~ ~~emerged~~ various circum-
arose which
stances ~~that~~ made ~~it~~ it ~~all~~
increasingly
~~the more~~ difficult to import
them indefinitely. In other
words, the conscription system that
came in effect in KOREA,
the marked development seen

in Korean industries, the rapid increase of requisitions in KOREA, measures for an increased food production, etc.; all these ~~adverse~~ conditions ~~that came forth~~ arose ~~one after another~~ in rapid succession ~~necessitated no~~ causing a ~~to~~ drastic~~ally~~ cut in the importation of Korean laborers

to JAPAN proper, and ~~have~~ ~~had~~ causing discrepancies in ~~an effect to hamper the implementation of~~ the

labor mobilization program.

~~These were~~ This was the labor ~~status~~ situation ~~we had to face~~ in the early months of 1943.

In the light of the foregoing situation, the Planning Board ~~who~~ which at the time, ~~was assigned to look after the~~ was administering labor mobilization

program and the materials and commodity mobilization program, had to study the ways and means ~~with which to successfully seek~~ to obtain a source of labor-supply in ~~the~~ NORTH CHINA, CENTRAL CHINA and the MENGKIANG ~~the MONGOLIA~~ ~~SINKIANG~~ areas; ~~and~~

For this purpose, they appointed KUMAGAI /T.N. or KUMAGAYA/ ~~/a we may call~~

~~him~~ KUMAGAYA, Ken-ichi,

ex-Director of the Social Welfare Bureau ~~Administration Board~~, who ~~then~~ was ~~still~~ then in retirement from governmental service, on a non-regular service ~~basis~~ status, and ~~engaged him in~~ assigned him the job of investigating the labor situation in those areas.

According to his report

as a ~~on the~~ result, ~~of his~~ ~~investigations,~~ there were a large number of unemployed persons in the ~~public~~ peace and order ~~and~~ ~~safety~~ zone in NORTH CHINA; in addition to which, the food situation there was intensely critical due to the ~~poor crops then harvested.~~ crop failures; and Judging from these circumstances, it was

said that it ~~was~~ is the best time ~~urged as being quite~~ as it is possible to ~~seek~~ obtain a source of labor-supply in those areas. ~~Thus, its was considered that we now faced a golden opportunity to proceed in that direction.~~

Meanwhile, Dr. AKEMICHI /phonetic/ of the NAGOYA Medical College, an authority in

the medical science of labor,

making an inspection tour

~~over~~ of the ~~above~~ same areas,

~~released~~ expressed his views on the

~~as to~~ suitability of using

~~the question~~ whether or

~~not the~~ Chinese laborer

~~is desirable to be~~

~~employed for the labor~~

~~service~~ for labor in Japan. ~~and~~ He made

it clear that such

alien laborers ~~necessarily~~ cannot ~~might not~~ necessarily be considered unfit ~~to~~ for ~~let him work as~~ laborer in ~~the mainland~~ of JAPAN. Proper. This ~~occurred~~ was ~~to be heard in or~~ around the fall of 1942.

The Government then considered in length as to the advisability of import-

ing such ~~type of~~ laborers. as a result, a Planning Board-sponsored inspection mission comprising of a number of officers in ~~the~~ government offices and various industrial bodies concerned was formed. It was ~~and~~ led by YAMANOUCHI, chief of the Planning Board, Section 2, Division 3 as head of the mission, which ~~head~~

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consisted ~~a party~~ of ten odd persons, including the officials concerned of the Home Ministry, the Greater East Asia Ministry, ~~Colonial Ministry~~, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, and the Ministry of Transportation and men selected from the control bodies in the fields ~~branches~~ of coal, mining, civil engineering and con-

structional ~~l~~ work, harbor-

conveyance and stevedore work.

This mission was dispatched,

~~was sent out.~~ ~~These~~

~~people,~~ assembling in PEKING,

toward the end of

(December, 1942, where it was to be

~~were~~ placed

under the ~~command~~ direction of

Japanese Embassy there.

~~Upon~~ Upon their arrival

in PEKING, they ~~had~~

attended

~~to sit~~ ~~in~~

a meeting sponsored by the Embassy's Labor Section to hear explanations about the labor situation in NORTH CHINA and the innate quality of the Chinese laborer. They then had intimate conferences ~~friendly talks~~ lasting for several days, and after about 40 days

of ~~on the spot~~ local inspection

tours ~~to~~ investigating

the living conditions of

the populace there and

of the ~~status~~ situation of ~~the~~ labor-training

~~exercised~~ in ~~the war-~~

prisoners of war camps in various

places, they ~~had~~ returned

to Tokyo in the early

part of March, 1943.

2. Experimental

Importation.

~~Now~~ The members of the inspection mission then presented reports to their respective superiors, ~~bearing~~ regarding the possibility of importing Chinese. The government, thus, in dealing with this ~~in turn, had thus come to~~ matter, ~~the phase of considering steps~~

~~to how they can handle this~~

~~problem. Thus,~~ had SUZUKI,

President of the Planning

Board ~~had to~~ the matter report to

~~the~~ a Cabinet ~~when it met~~

~~a~~ conference, ~~with regard to~~

~~the above point.~~ A

decision was then ~~taken~~ made to

experimentally for the time, a,

import, ~~forthwith a~~ certain

number of laborers for

coal mines as well as for stevedoring jobs, ~~on an experimental basis,~~ and contingent on the result ~~thus obtained to~~ consider the importation of an adequate number of Chinese laborers.

As a result, ~~we saw~~ 300 and 400 persons were imported respectively to each of these places:

~~to~~ the Port of FUSHIKI in April, 1943 for stevedoring jobs, and ~~to~~ the MITSUI-operated MIIKE mine in August of the same year as coal miners. ~~for these laborers~~ The government endeavored to leave nothing to be desired in ~~for in the aspect of~~

labor ~~control and~~ administration.

As to its success, each ~~Each~~ of the enterprises ~~managements~~ which hired the ~~of those interests who now made a trial of the important~~ laborers reported ~~of their~~ the possibility of ~~being able to consider a~~ further importations. Thus, it was decided at a ~~on an occasion of conference met~~ conference ~~the~~ Cabinet ~~had come to~~

~~such a decision to~~

to import in ~~the course of~~

the fiscal year of 1944, a total ~~altogether~~

of 30,000 persons for ~~to the allo-~~

~~cated to these branches~~

~~of industry:~~ ~~the~~ coal and

metal mining industries, ~~mining, the~~

shipbuilding, ~~and the~~

civil engineering, ~~and~~

construction work industries,

~~projects~~ ;

and ~~further~~ 4,000 more for steve-
dore work. ~~jobs in the same period.~~

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(3)

P. 4-5

Translated by Ishii

1.

(P.3). 3. ~~Determination~~ Establishment of Various Conditions Concerning the Importation.

(a.) Food Problem.

At first when the authorities decided ~~for~~ to ~~importing~~ import CHINESE laborers, the local authorities in China (mainly, the CHINA Affairs Board) took into special consideration ~~the~~ CHINESE customs and manners of living, and insisted on furnishing these laborers with 37 Kgs. of

wheat flour per person per month as staple food. The ~~domestic~~ government in Japan. officials (chiefly, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry), however, ~~in~~ persisted on a supply of 22 kgs. of ~~principal~~ staple food per month, in view of the ~~internal~~ domestic food situation. Conferences were held several times between these two ~~parties~~ offices, and ~~after all~~ in the end it was decided that the

~~central~~ Government would allocate 22 Kgs. of staple food for every imported CHINESE to the ~~governments of prefectures~~ local offices in prefectures where those CHINESE were imported, and the local governments would ~~add it by~~ supplement it with 8 Kgs. with cereals and other ~~foodstuffs~~ staples. Thus, ~~they came to an~~ it was agreed ~~ment~~ upon that the (CHINESE laborers) ~~should~~ be supplied with 30 Kgs. of staple food ~~per capita~~ per month; and the prefectural governments

were instructed to this effect. (It is certain ~~sure~~ that official ~~letters~~ documents were sent as regards this instruction, but they ~~are~~ haven't been located ~~cannot be found~~ ~~not available~~ ~~as~~ yet due to ~~post-war~~ after the war. They are confusion ~~disorder~~ of documents ~~Every quarters~~ being searched for by all quarters ~~are~~, (at our request.) ~~looking for them~~.)

In this regard, it is not known whether or not the prefectural ~~govern-~~ offices ~~ments~~ actually supplied ~~furnished~~ the laborers with this supplementary ammount (8 kgs.).

/P.4/

But, it is said that ~~#~~ some ~~places of enterprise~~ of the places of work were not provided with this additional supply, and the managers ~~were~~ had ~~forced~~ to purchase foodstuffs at ~~large expense~~ high costs to supplement this shortage.

It is said, also, that subsidiary foodstuffs, seasonings, etc., too, were not furnished as set forth in the written contracts. The managers made requests

for supply of these items to the prefectural ~~government~~ offices to no avail, and were able with difficulty to furnish these foodstuffs to the CHINESE laborers only by expending a huge amount ~~at immense expense~~ of money.

Regarding the food problem, HOMMA, a non-regular member of the Home Ministry, (who calls himself an authority on CHINA in ~~the matter~~ connection with CHINESE laborers), stated in the

~~Materials for~~ reference data employing ~~using~~ CHINESE

laborers, as follows:

"When we take a look at their food ~~at foodstuffs they~~

~~at~~ to-day, we find, that it ~~is~~ is so ~~there are~~ ~~such~~ fine

~~ones as~~ that they have never tasted anything

like it before.

Especially the amount of the ration

is ~~very~~ so large ~~and~~ that it seems that ~~therefore~~ many of

them ~~look~~ are unable to work well

because of ~~gastric~~ stomach dilatation caused

by over-eating."

In spite of this, at ~~the~~ places of ~~enterprise~~ work, they reported shortages.. ~~the supply was short.~~ I do not know which ~~of these two was the real case.~~ is true.

In order to examine the actual conditions, I made inspections of several ~~places of enterprise~~ work sites and heard the ~~got~~ views of persons in charge. I had prepared for further inspections to form my own opinion about the matter, when the war ended, and I ~~failed to~~ could not carry out the plan to my

regret. But, that the supply was always insufficient is fully proved by the fact that the Government, after the termination of the war, issued instructions to supplement an additional ration of 4 "GŌ" of white rice to the aforesaid ration.

The above-mentioned labor management policy of HOMMA was the golden rule of the Home Ministry officials, who instructed local governments

along this line and dispatched HOMMA to various places to ~~make the guidance~~ ~~ensure~~ see that that the instructions are carried out fully. ~~doubly sure~~.

(b.) Problem of Supply Expense and Pre-Payment.

All measures regarding the supply of CHINESE laborers, ~~from~~ their collection in CHINA, transportation, labor management during ~~the term~~ employment, their repatriation, etc., ~~sending back~~ were to be handled

solely by the North CHINA Labor Association

H.N. "KAHOKU RŌKŌ KYŌKAI."

(CHINA Affairs Board).

Accordingly, the expenses necessary to

collect laborers and to ~~carry~~ transport them

to ~~starting~~ the embarkation ports were to be paid in advance

by enterprises owners of who ~~were~~ are to receive

these laborers. As to its sum, the

Planning Board, in close contact with

the CHINA Affairs Board, set at first ~~the~~ a

figure between 550 and 600 YEN per capita.

Since this figure was recognized as being appropriate, ~~adopted to be right~~

in view of the local market prices ~~on the~~

~~spot~~ in those days, it was ~~and~~ formally

decided upon. ~~to be taken~~. However, the

prices in North CHINA gradually rose.

~~In~~ Around May and June of 1944

when CHINESE laborers were actually

imported, the prices were three times

as high. During July and August of the

~~Get this~~ Thus interested officials ~~concerned~~ from the Ministries of Greater East Asia, Finance, Interior, and Welfare deliberated over the matter and decided to ~~increase~~ set the sum of the pre-payment to one thousand YEN (per capita) as from the third quarter of 1944 (October, November and December of 1944.).

As it seemed, however, that two or three thousand YEN were needed

same year, the prices spiralled extraordinarily ~~jumped~~ and became two or three times higher, amounting to twenty or thirty times as high as that in JAPAN.

/P.5/ Such being the case, the North CHINA Labor Association found out that more than one thousand YEN were needed per a laborer, ~~when~~ in August, 1944, when it settled the pre-payment accounts for the laborers supplied ~~forwarded~~ at first.

as a matter of fact, it was decided that employers should furnish one thousand YEN, and the rest should be disbursed from the National Treasury.

Trans. by ISHISAKA

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(c) Problem of Wages.

According to the plan which were first presented by the CHINA Affairs Board to the offices in Japan Proper, concerned, it was decided that the same rate of wages for JAPANESE labourer be paid (at that time the wages for a JAPANESE labourer was ¥2.50 per day) and that ¥1.00 per day be reserved for living costs of families whom the labourers had left behind, and to reserve a sum of ¥1,500.00 in 2 years to be taken home by the laborers.

However, when I was despatched to CHINA from JAPAN at the begining of 1944 for the importation of labourers, (I went over to CHINA in Feb. of the same year at the request of the representative employers), the ~~leaders~~ directors of the NORTH CHINA Labour Association and the staff members of the ~~PEKING~~ JAPANESE Embassy at PEKING ~~told~~ stated that ~~there had been~~ no one ~~to~~ will apply for ~~the~~ work ~~with~~ at the same rate of pay ~~wages~~ as that ~~of~~ for JAPANESE labourers, ~~which~~ as had been previously ~~was formerly~~ decided; ~~and~~ that a sum of ¥1500.00 ~~which is to be taken~~ "take home

money" ~~back home~~ after two years of labor is not even sufficient ~~is not equal even to the~~ to cover the monthly cost of living ~~as compared with the high price~~ in North CHINA, ~~and~~ I was asked if it might ~~consulted by them to~~ be possible to pay ¥5.00 per day per ~~500 ¥ as the wages for a~~ labourer, ~~a day and~~ to make the labourers ~~deposit~~ save some ~~save some quantity of~~ money out of their wages to ~~be sent~~ send to their families, and to ~~be~~ take back home.

After consulting my colleagues, ~~And After consultation among those consulting with the partner who were being despatched to CHINA~~, I promised them that ~~to solve this question following~~ I shall follow the advice of the ~~leaders of~~

various Control Associations leaders in JAPAN, and that after going through ~~the~~ due formalities, I may promised to pay ¥5.00 ~~¥~~ per day ~~as the wages for a~~ per labourer. ~~per day~~ ~~and making~~ Further detailed consultations were carried ~~with the partner~~ out on the family support clause, and ~~on the details of supporting conditions of labourers~~ the contracts were signed after ~~recognis~~ ~~families~~ I gave my consent to all employment consenting to all the employment conditions in view of the situation of those days, ~~in~~ although it was ~~spite of its~~ disadvantageous to JAPAN. ~~and thus the~~ ~~contracts were exchanged.~~

Incidentally, ~~By the way~~, the above-mentioned wages ~~does~~ do not ~~contain~~ include food costs ~~and an actual~~ Meals were to ~~are to~~ be ~~given~~ supplied as daily rations by the employers ~~as the daily rations~~ ~~separately~~ apart from ~~the~~ cost of wages.

(2) Other ~~questions~~ Problems Concerning ~~to the employment~~ the Contract. ~~Conditions~~.

Besides the above-mentioned matters, there were many ~~questions~~ problems concerning ~~to the~~ employment conditions, ~~for instance~~ such as fixing of public holidays, ~~questions~~ ~~of~~ working hours, ~~period~~ term of employment; ~~an~~ ages

~~thoughts,~~ ~~problem~~ ideologies, ~~thoughts,~~ and physical strength of ~~the~~ labourers who are to be supplied, ~~imported,~~ ~~bringing of~~ clothes, beddings, cooking utensils, personal effects and ~~plaything~~ hobbies at the time of ~~importation of labourers~~ supplying laborers; organization of ~~party~~ units ~~system~~, wages and treatment of leaders and to be accorded their ~~of~~ to other ~~managers~~ managers; ~~staffs,~~ ~~right and wrong of bringing service girl~~ advisability of allowing comfort-girls to accompany the labors; disposition of ~~enquiries~~ cases of ~~treatment of the wounded who got hurt while on official~~ injuries or deaths ~~from~~ while on official or off-duty status, etc. ~~duty or on private costs.~~ However, all these questions were settled appropriately ~~reasonably solved~~ as shown in the contract,

and all the provisions ~~which are~~ described in the contract were ~~were~~ carried out. ~~into effect.~~

Translated by K. YAMADA.

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/p. 6/

4. Those ~~who were~~ concerned at the ~~on this~~ time ~~project~~.

4 Quite a number of people were ~~participated~~ connected with the importation ~~in the inception~~ of CHINESE laborors and owing to ~~the~~ changes of administra-tions, the turnover of ~~system~~ ~~changes of~~ personnel was large. ~~were carried out very often.~~ Since 1943, the Cabinet Planning Board was the nucleus ~~center~~ of this project; ~~and~~ the Welfare Ministry (took charge of allotment and placement of

laborers to the work ~~shops~~ sites), the Home Ministry (~~guidance of~~ control of public peace and supervision administration after ~~inception~~ importation), and the Foreign Ministry (~~guidance~~ direction of ~~business~~ the work of importation ~~inception~~), liason ~~to~~ with NORTH CHINA and direction ~~guidance~~ the of operation the of NORTH CHINA Labor~~s~~ Association), were the Governmental offices concerned; On the other hand, as the inception side, Ministry of Commerce and Industry (Coal, mine,

construction and building) — afterward the business was transferred to Ministry of Munitions — Ministry of Transportation (loading and unloading in port and harbor, shipbuilding) — at the beginning under the jurisdiction of Ministry of Communications — were concerned. Furthermore, those who were concerned in this project held (a) a conference relating to inception, (b)

a conference relating to subscription and payment in advance, (c) a conference relating to labor control after inception to JAPAN, (d) a conference relating to counter-measures for accident, (e) a conference relating to transportation and other conferences relating to CHINESE ~~so often~~ frequently; some of these conferences were preliminary meetings of the Governmental side, while in some of them

civil corporations joined, consequently sometimes only the civil corporations held preliminary meetings among themselves and exchanged their opinions; therefore ~~the~~ conferences were ~~was~~ held twice or three times a month in order to discuss matters prudently.

Many persons were present at the said conferences and arranged matters, but those who were concerned all the time

are as follows:

(a) Planning Board: 3rd Section of the 2nd Department

Secretary YAMANOUCHI, Head of the said Section

Administrative Officer TSURUSHIMA.

(b) Welfare Ministry: Mobilization Section, Labor Bureau.

Administrative Officer ESHITA,

Senior Clerk MISAWA,

Senior Clerk KIDA,

~~Petty Officer~~ Clerk. KŌNO.

(c) Home Ministry: Foreign Affairs Section,

the Police Bureau.

Administrative Officer HARA, Head of said

Section.

Administrative Officer YAMADA,

Senior Clerk MIYAGAWA,

Administrative Officer ŌTAKE,

~~Petty Officer~~ Clerk KOBAYASHI.

(d) Foreign Ministry (at that time Greater

East Asia Ministry): General Affairs

Section, Economic Bureau.

Investigator WATANABE,

Investigator KOJIMA,

Senior Clerk MATSUKI,

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Administrative Officer KUWABARA,

Councillor MORISHIGE.

(e) Ministry of Commerce and Industry:

Mine Bureau.

Administrative officer OKUMIYA,

"So and so" (not clear) (sic)
(unknown)

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(f) Ministry of Munitions: Labor Section,

General Mobilization Bureau.

Administrative Officer MUTO,

Administrative Officer KANAZAWA,

Administrative Officer KIKUCHI,

Administrative Officer HASUMI.

(g) Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry:

General Affairs Section, General Affairs Bureau:

Administrative Officer KIMASA,

Rice and Barley Section, Rice and

Cereals Control Bureau:

Administrative Officer "So and So." "unknown"

General Affairs Section, General Affairs Bureau,

Administrative Officer TAKEDA.

(h) JAPANESE Embassy in PEIPING:

Ambassedor, Sanetaka KUSUMOTO,

Chancellor, Fukumatsu KATAGIRI,

Non-regular Official, Kōji KASHIWABARA

(i) NORTH CHINA Laborers Association:

Director of the General Affairs Department;

Shigeru ISHIKAWA,

Director of the Mobilization Department,

Yoshirō MATSUKUMA,

Head of the Supply Section,

Yoshiaki NAGOE,

Director of the TOKYO Administrative

Bureau, Naoji MORI,

Vice-Director of same,

Kazuyoshi KIMURA.

Those who are listed above were

concerned in the present matter for a long time and must know the details of the matter, but owing to the change of the administrative system or after the cessation of the war purge, some of them were either transferred or retired; especially those who served in the JAPANESE Embassy in PEIPING and NORTH CHINA Laborers Association are missing now and no chance could be got to see them.

Translated by EBIHARA, M.

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5. Some Matters for Further Information.

A) Cause of Death of the Imported Laborers.

Since the Chinese laborers to be imported into Japan were procured in North China, a considerable number of them have died. The circumstances which brought about the death are complicated, but, generally speaking, the following may account for the high death rate.

Those who were in charge of procuring laborers by an administrative measure in North China neglected to observe the two important conditions instructed previously by the Government: namely the laborers should be

(1) those who have a sound body, strong enough to do labor.

(2) those who are not younger than 20, and not older than 45 years ~~in age~~.

Those who were actually sent included weak people, people with chronic deseases, deformed or disabled persons, and from little boys of 12 or 13 to old men of 50 or 60.

To make the matter worse, it was kept as a strict secret from them when they were commandeered that they were going to Japan to be

put to labor, and accordingly by the time they reached the embarkation port, Tangku or Tsingtao, they were already exhausted, both physically and spiritually, and many of them had fallen ill and weak. Particularly, those who were imported at the beginning of 1944 had been detained, on account of interrupted navigation, in the camp at the embarkation port for a considerable period, during which the camp was operated by the minimum appropriation fixed by the North China Laborers' Association (About 15 yen was spent per capita per day, it is said.), restricting the consumption of the staple foods to the minimum. Shortage

of foodstuffs at the place of commandeering plus this extremely aggravated treatment at the camp produced many sufferers from ~~under~~ malnutrition among them. Moreover, they were embarked on the top of other loads on coal transport-ships which were to sail in the face of ~~the~~ danger such as air-raid and mines, and the food on board the ships was also insufficient, so that many of the labores were found in a state of unconsciousness when the ships arrived at the disembark-ation port (SHIMONOSEKI or SENZAKI-KŌ). Consequently, some of them died on board the ship, or during the

transportation by land from the disembarkation port to the place of working.

In view of these circumstances, the laborers were given a considerable time for rest as well as medical treatment, after they had arrived at the place of working, but it is most regrettable that they had been too exhausted to recover and from 20 to 30 per cent of them died. This may be due to lack of good faith of the organs in charge of procuring laborers as well as to the fact that the proper steps were ~~did~~ not planned during the transportation, we believe.

B) Situation of Food Supply and the Change of Circumstances and Mode of Living for the Laborers.

The outline of the food situation was given previously. It is well known that the food situation in Japan in those days was so aggravated that the authorities could not arrange any special ration for the Chinese laborers. However, it was not altogether impossible for the employing parties to obtain considerable amount of foods outside the scope of control, if they used all possible means. Thus, the camp, the director of which took some precautionary measures to procure some extra food, succeeded in continuing their work without any grievance and with

good result, whereas the camp which was indifferent to such precautions and wholly depended on the rationed foods met, after the termination of the war, various kinds of confusions by the laborers' demand for the fulfilment of the contract.

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/ M. Furukawa /

Another fact which must be taken into consideration as well as the food condition is that the mode of living in Japan was entirely different from what they had been accustomed to in China. Not to speak of climate and nature, their living quarters were just like a prison in Japan in which they were not allowed to go out of the high-walled circles, constantly kept under surveillance of guards and they were completely deprived of their freedom. These precaution originated in the special instruction given by the Home Ministry

for security sake. The police authorities of the respective prefectural government adhered to the instruction and carried out their direction and instruction in the same way as would have been carried out upon criminals of a dangerous nature, about the accomodation of living quarters, methods of surveillance and daily life. For this purpose they usually posted seven or eight police, at least a few, and the chief of the concerned police authority used to make a tour of inspection and gave instructions. Such a remarkable change of circumstances must

have Lad considerable influence over men who had been used to free work and living in China.

It was merely the explosion of the above mentioned oppression that, after the surrender when they were notified of their freedom, special rations of food and increase of the ration, they acted so freely for joy, specially, of victorious people, that they caused several ominous incidents everywhere.

Procurement of Labour in North China and procurement through administrative measures.

First, when it was decided to import Chinese labourers, it was planned to make use of Chinese P.O.W.s consisting of soldiers of the 8th Route Army, for the purpose of engineering and construction works. But only 2000 were available for this purpose, and the rest were procured through administrative measures by the Japanese Army in China.

The business was taken by camps of P.O.Ws (in Peiping, Tsinan, Shihmen etc.) established by the Japanese Army. The P.O.Ws who were recognized

to have sound mind and body were trained for a few months as labourers at the training camps managed by the North China Labour Association. After being so qualified, the P.O.Ws. were sent for fatigue duty of the Japanese Army and chief industries in Manchuria, and the Labour Association sent ~~many trained~~ prisoners, who were given medals of peaceable people, successively to Japan. However, as the Japanese Army in China according to the progress of battle came to require more and more labourers, the procurements for Manchuria or Japan could not be carried out so well

as it was expected.

Then, the North China Labour Association devised means of procuring the labourers through the administrative measures such as assignment supply of labourers for each prefecture under North China Security Area, even compulsorily.

This resulted in recruitment ~~production~~ of infant labourers ~~labourers of infant~~ those in their dotage and even disabled to meet the required number by any means.