

food situation in Japan.

GEN. MCCOY: Well--no doubt that can be done in a diplomatic sense.

SIR GIRJA BAJPAI: Oh, naturally it would be done with the knowledge of SCAP, because it is important to us. I am speaking now for a country which is a deficit country. The importance to us arises primarily from the continuing shortage of food not merely to meet the requirements of Japan but to meet the requirements of the world as a whole. From that point of view the deficit countries have an interest in whatever surpluses may be available in countries which are so fortunate as to have a surplus. But I just throw out that question.

GEN. MCCOY: Well, I am quite conscious of your consistent opinion and interest, and yesterday in my sitting in and conference at the State Department I particularly drew attention to your interest and hoped that I might be able before you left to be able to give some further action that might be of interest to you.

SIR GIRJA BAJPAI: Oh, I fully appreciate that, Mr. Chairman. I don't want any statement of policy now at this stage or any definition of the Government of the United States arising out of the Admiral's question about the visit of the fact-finding commission. I simply ask whether--shall we say, for example, our representative in Japan--if he felt that he had something to say on this question, could he say that to the commission?

GEN. MCCOY: Oh I have no doubt of that. And I would suggest that your Government take that up with



the State Department, hoping that that can be arranged,  
and I would think so very easily.

SIR GIRJA BAJPAI: Thank you.

GEN. MCCOY: And very properly.



ITEM 4 - JAPANESE RESEARCH AND ACTIVITY IN THE  
FIELD OF ATOMIC ENERGY (FEC-024/6)

GEN. MCCOY: I think we have had in and out action on this and I thought last week that we were prepared to pass that paper. But I understand that you have a reservation from the United Kingdom on it.

MR. GRAVES: Well, we had, Mr. Chairman, but I now have instructions and I have two comments to make which are in the nature of clarification. They are not of such a nature likely to hold up the paper but just for clarification of terms. With your permission I will just make those comments.

I am instructed to refer to paragraph 2A of the proposed policy and particularly to the words "field of atomic energy". If the term is intended to be used in the sense in which it is defined in the British Atomic Energy Act the prohibition would cover practically the whole field of nuclear physics and other activities also. We do not object to the rigid curtailment of fundamental physics research in Japan but we wish to ensure that there is consensus of opinion in the Commission as to the extent of the prohibition in order that the emergence of possible differences of opinion as to the meaning of the term shall be avoided.

And then in paragraph 2A (1) and (2) the phrase "all research or development which has for its purpose" occurs. We suggest that the words "which has for its purpose" might lead to subsequent difficulties, since it might possibly be claimed that a given branch of research which was intended for some entirely different purpose had unexpectedly given results of interest in



the field of atomic energy. In view of this I am instructed to propose that the authority appointed to supervise the implementation of this policy decision, which for the time being will no doubt be the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, should be empowered to adjudicate as to whether any proposed piece of research or development has for its purpose matters connected with atomic energy.

You see, it is just for a clarification of terms. I don't know whether you would want copies for your information. If you don't think that that is necessary, I shall ask that these comments be included in the minutes as our view on terms in the policy.

GEN. MCCOY: Admiral, have you any remarks?

ADM. RAMISHVILI: No sir. There was some small mistake or misunderstanding at the last meeting, but our position is clear now and we can approve this paper.

GEN. MCCOY: I understand, then, that you are prepared that this paper go through with a record of this in the minutes and possibly furnished with the paper itself. How about that, Mr. Secretary General? How do you suggest that that be best handled? I don't think there is any objection on the part of anybody to the clarification.

MR. JOHNSON: We would send an excerpt from the minutes which would contain the text of what Mr. Graves has read.

MR. GRAVES: That would be quite satisfactory.

MR. JOHNSON: Along with the policy decision.

MR. GRAVES: I don't suggest any more than that, Mr. Chairman.



GEN. MCCOY: Is that agreeable to all concerned?

SIR GIRJA BAJPAI: Mr. Chairman, when we considered this paper last time I was in the unfortunate position of not having yet received the views of my Government. I have those now, and with your permission I would like to submit them to you briefly.

When the paper was being considered in the appropriate committee, I gather that some representative of the War Department or the State Department stated that in Germany what you might call fundamental nuclear research is permitted, but under strict control so as to ensure that that research is not either directly or indirectly utilized for warlike purposes or purposes that might endanger the peace. My Government feels that insofar as research is permitted in Germany in these facts there is no reason why, subject to similar control and supervision, it should not be permitted in Japan. They are no more interested in rearming Japan or increasing the war potential in Japan than anybody else around this table. As a matter of fact, we are all anxious that Japan's capacity for making war should be effectively and completely curtailed. All the same-- I am not a physicist and therefore I speak with great reserve and diffidence, but we have one or two rather good physicists in India and they went into this matter and they said that this may perhaps be too far-reaching although not insofar as research in pure physics and the structure of the atom is concerned. And so I have instructions to put this point of view before the Commission, but I am not insisting that this opinion be recorded or anything of that sort.



GEN. MCCOY: Are there any other comments? How would we make the same sort of a record and excerpt of Sir Girja's remarks?

MR. JOHNSON: The same sort of excerpt.

GEN. MCCOY: Is that agreeable to you Sir Girja?

SIR GIRJA BAJPAI: Perfectly, Mr. Chairman.

GEN. MCCOY: If there is no objection, this paper will be accepted and considered passed unanimously.

ITEM 5 - PRESS ARTICLE RELATIVE TO FAR EASTERN COMMISSION POLICIES ON THE JAPANESE CONSTITUTION (PEC-103, MI-075)

GEN. MCCOY: I have just had a talk with representatives of the departments concerned, with whom I consulted off and on all day yesterday and this morning, and the consultation with the Supreme Commander is a point that still requires postponement until we hear further from him. In view of the particular interest of the Commission in this question of publication, which has concerned us all for some time, if there is anything new on the subject or anything that any Commissioner wishes to bring forward with particular emphasis at this time, I will be glad to throw the subject open once more for discussion.

SIR CARL BERENDSEN: Mr. Chairman, I am not very clear as to what the situation is. The Steering Committee recommended that the document be published. You, Sir, referred to the question of consultation with the Supreme Commander. I assume that you are referring to consultation with him on the question of publication. Well, I think that our very practice has been that we would publish but not before the



Supreme Commander had been advised on the position. Is it proposed now to defer the whole question of publication until the views of the Supreme Commander on that aspect have been received? Is that the proposal?

MR. JOHNSON: We are not consulting with him about Item 4.

GEN. MCCOY: No. This is Item 5.

SIR CARL BERENDSEN: I beg your pardon.

MR. JOHNSON: Item 4 will be taken care of automatically in the normal course.

SIR CARL BERENDSEN: That is, Item 4 is going to be published.

GEN. MCCOY: I was referring to Item 5.

SIR CARL BERENDSEN: I was just confused

GEN. MCCOY: It is Item 5 that I was referring to.

SIR CARL BERENDSEN: Oh, Item 5. Sir, may I recall the point that I have previously made, that, in view of the distorted picture, and I don't use the term with any implication of incorrectness, the inaccurate picture that has been presented to the public on this question, and in view of the press report which had so very limited circulation here but may have had a very wide circulation in Japan, as to which I have no information at all, it seems to me that we should publish, in due course, after consultation with the Supreme Commander--I am entirely in favor of that--that we should publish not only the decision on review but, indeed, all the policy decisions that have been made by the Commission. And my suggestion would be that if you wish here and there to record a decision in principle that we should publish, certainly the review paper that we should record a decision in



principle, that we should publish all the other decisions of policy on the constitution and that the Supreme Commander be consulted on each of those two aspects.

GEN. MCCOY: I thought that after--in looking over the agenda, it seemed to me it would take a very short time to cover that, in particular, in view of the embarrassed position I am in as to the action of my own Government on several of these points, I was going to ask the Commission to continue to sit in around the table to have a discussion on pretty much the lines you and I had together--that is, frank talk as to the failures and accomplishments of the Commission. That gives me the chance to do that if we put before you a little bit later the paper, the Work of the Commission. And that gives me an opportunity to ask a beginning of our review of our own work which I am going to carry on with you. I hope to do so at every meeting until we get agreed upon something which we all feel will improve our work for the coming year and take cognizance of where we failed in the past. So that, if you have that in mind, I will be glad to hear anything else on this particular point, Item 5, but with the thought that as soon as we get through the stated agenda, then we would like to have a round-the-table informal talk just off the record for helpfulness in gradually shaping up our procedure in the future. I would like to give Sir Girja a chance before he leaves to have a final word on the general subject. So, will you be thinking it over, please?

SIR GIRJA BAJPAI: I would just like to advert, Mr. Chairman, for a minute to what our colleague from



New Zealand said. If I understood him correctly, the suggestion was that we decide now, on principle, to release, after the consultation with the Supreme Commander has been completed, not merely our decision on the question of the revision of the constitution, but other policy decisions which the Commission has taken. As you will see, Mr. Chairman, under Item 7 of our agenda today, there is a paper marked FEC-108, giving a summary of the accomplishments of the Far Eastern Commission, and that sets out seriatim a list of decisions which this Commission has taken and which have been communicated to the appropriate authorities here in Washington. I take it that there would have been no objection if that paper is approved--that that can be released simultaneously with this other decision or even independently of it. But, perhaps we can consider that when we come to that paper.

SIR CARL BERENDSEN: I am more concerned, Mr. Chairman, that the actual policy decision in respect to the constitution that have been recorded by this Commission should be published than any list of papers that have been decided upon, which it seems to me would comprise the necessary corollary that we should at the same time publish the list of papers that have not been decided upon. But I have no strong views on the matter at all. I understand, Sir, that you are in consultation with the Supreme Commander on this general question of publication of the policy decisions on the constitution. I would like to see more action taken and the sooner the better, but I certainly strongly support the view that we should consult the Supreme Commander before we pub-



lish anything. Sooner or later, Sir, there can be no question whatsoever that in justice to itself the Commission must publish its policy decisions and most certainly the policy decision on review.

MAJ. PLIMBOLL: I think, Mr. Chairman, the whole Commission is agreed, possibly with the exception of your own Government and the Philippine Government, that this should be published, and the problem before us now is really mechanics of the publication as to how it is to be done. But I think the Steering Committee showed very clearly that nearly every government here thinks that it should be published.

MR. COLLINS: Mr. Chairman, I would like to associate myself with Sir Carl in the suggestion that in considering the question of publication of the review provision that we should publish all of the documents, all of the policy decisions of the Commission on the subject of the constitution. The proposal has risen specifically as a result of a newspaper article which gave a somewhat garbled version not only of the review problem but of the Commission's stand on the constitution as a whole. And I think, in justice to the Commission and to clarify the entire question, all policy decisions on the constitution should be published at the same time.

GEN. MCCOY: Well, these papers, as you very properly and naturally combine in this way of both those problems, are now being considered very seriously and very determinedly. I had just had a talk with General Hilldring before I came down here on the subject,



and I assure you that just the points that you raise are being thoroughly considered and there is not yet agreement behind the curtain. The opinion of the Commission has been very forcibly brought to the attention of my Government not only at other times but after the discussion on the Steering Committee the other day, with the assumption that this would be the attitude of the Commission here. And all I can ask is to permit me to try to work it out and present to you as soon as I can the position of my Government.

SIR CARL BERENDSEN: In the meantime, Mr. Chairman, and I don't ask it in any provocative sense, do we have any information that seems to be quite pertinent as to what was "the most authoritative source" to which that article referred and to what extent this article was published in Japan?

GEN. MCCOY: Colonel Lambert, you are my authority on the news in Japan. Have you noticed anything as the result of the article published here. Has it had its repercussions in Japan?

COL. LAMBERT: No sir.

GEN. MCCOY: You have seen the newspapers up to date?

COL. LAMBERT: Yes sir. To my knowledge there has been no widespread dissemination of that information.

MR. JOHNSON: It was only published in two places here, I understand.

SIR CARL BERENDSEN: Well, we only know of two. We know that this was a very, very minor publication here, which in itself was a startling fact.



GEN. MCCOY: Well we all caught that.

MR. JOHNSON: It was most extraordinary. There were only two places here as far as anybody has discovered.

SIR CARL BERENDSEN: And why Buffalo?

GEN. MCCOY: It must have come ~~across~~ across from Canada. (Laughter) Well, I can only assure you of my earnest desire to represent the Commission effectively and forcibly in this matter.

ITEM 6 - THE WORK OF THE COMMISSION (FEC-105/2, SC-049/2)

ITEM 7 - SUMMARY OF THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE FAR EASTERN COMMISSION (FEC-106)

GEN. MCCOY: There is before you the paper to which Sir Girja referred as simply a matter of information, and I am interested in Sir Carl's reaction as to the consideration of the papers that have not been passed. I'm sure you didn't consider that in the sense of Sir Carl. As a matter of fact, I don't think there are many but they are very important papers and I concur with Sir Carl in the hope that we can dispose of them. I am always promising you things in the future, but I have to do that because I find that it is a matter of very deep concern and long-time effort on the part of a good many different authorities of my Government and we have considerable difficulty in getting together.

SIR GIRJA BAJPAI: As the matter has come up, Mr. Chairman, perhaps you will permit me to say a word or two on the broad question of giving some synoptic publicity, as you like to put it, of the work that the Commission has done so far. Now and again at rather



rare intervals something goes forth to the press as to what this Commission has done. It may be, on consideration, that we have done so little with finality to it that we would be inviting ridicule rather than praise if we were to give something to the world of what has been achieved. But maybe, on closer examination, we will find that the opposite result would be achieved. The point I wish to submit for the consideration of the Commission, is there something to be saved by the periodical review, not merely for our own benefit but for the information of the public of what we have done and what we are doing. We live in an age of publicity. We regard the information of our peoples on all issues of policy as something fundamental and basic--as a part of the democratic system of government, and from that point of view I think there is something to be said of something more being done than a mere review within these four walls, in a paper of what has been done and what has been left undone. I just leave it at that.

GEN. MCCOY: I would like this continued when we are sitting in informal session, and in view of my request for postponement once more of that question, but assuring you that it is being discussed not only between our departments but with the Supreme Commander, as naturally we all are conscious of that.

I might add, on behalf of the Secretariat, that they have also prepared a very compendious report on this subject for the record and for reference of the Commission that will also be circulated later.

MR. JOHNSON: Yes. We expect to circulate that fairly soon. That will probably have much of what Sir



Carl mentions of the unfinished business of the Commission.

SIR CARL BERENDSEN: Mr. Chairman, as you know, I am all for publicity and I am quite unrepentant in my views that I still hold.

GEN. MCCOY: I am with you in that on the sense that I would like you to have that brought up in the informal discussion the way you did to me.

ITEM 8 - PROPOSED UNITED STATES PLAN FOR REPARATIONS CONFERENCE (FEC-081 series)

ITEM 9 - REPORT ON JAPANESE EXTERNAL ASSETS (FEC-072)

GEN. MCCOY: The last two items once more we will ask to keep on the agenda.

ITEM 10 - OTHER BUSINESS

GEN. MCCOY: And now we will proceed to Other Business before having our off-the-record discussion. Is there any other business to be brought up this morning?

Before adjourning, I would like to call your attention with great sorrow that this is the last time we will have at this table our delegate from India. Fortunately for me I have sat around a good many tables with Sir Girja in the years before this Commission and throughout the world. I remember when he first came to this country and being delighted with hearing him talk in New York on occasions, both at the Council of Foreign Relations and my own organization, the Foreign Policy Association. I think I introduced you twice in those years and I remember another dinner we had at the Knickerbocker with some of your eminent visitors from



India. That always remains in my mind as a most interesting time and as meeting a most interesting man. So that I part with our Indian delegate with great sorrow and a feeling of old friendship and continued interest, and I am sure you will join me in that feeling and very affectionate farewell.

SIR CARL BERENDSEN: Mr. Chairman, before Sir Girja says anything, might I associate myself very warmly and very sincerely with your comments on our colleague. His outstanding eloquence and his scintillating, his logical thought and his invariable good humor have, I am sure, made him not only a most acceptable but a most useful colleague around this table. And I think we can all feel a sense of deep regret that we are losing such a congenial associate.

SIR GIRJA BAJPAI: Well, Mr. Chairman, when the heart is full speech is difficult. I am not only deeply touched but overwhelmed by the expression of friendship and generous appreciation which has fallen from you and from Sir Carl Berendsen. I have done my best around this table to contribute to what is a common task, and that common task is a pacific settlement of the problem of Japan so that aggression shall not raise its head in that quarter again, and through our efforts, however, modest, please, not only ~~in~~ our part of the world but the entire world shall be so assured. We have, Sir, had our disappointments but I hope they are passing disappointments. And for the Commission I would wish a career in the future more expeditious, more fruitful in decision, and let us hope a career which you and I



and those who after us might participate in its work will look back upon with satisfaction and pride. I have, Sir, an almost irresistible trend towards irony born possibly of the cynicism that comes from travelling around the world and from participating in human affairs, especially political affairs. But I would like to say this to you all in all sincerity that, if I have been ironic at times, that irony has never been inspired by malice. I am most grateful to you all again, Mr. Chairman, you and our colleagues here, for your great consideration to me, and I shall always remember with gratitude the courtesy and indulgence and the patient hearing that I have received from every one here. I shall not say goodbye because in this world of hours, in the air age, distances have disappeared, and tasks to which the humblest may be summoned again are multiplied. So, maybe another day I shall say to you good morning. (Applause)

ADM. RAMISHVILI: Mr. Chairman, maybe this is not the appropriate time after the speech of Sir Girja, but I would like to fully endorse your statement about Sir Girja, and I would like to state, Mr. Chairman, my deep personal opinion, that having dealt with the representative of India I have proven for myself once again not only his talent but also the greatness of the great Indian people, who have produced such a brilliant man as is Sir Girja Bajpai. And I certainly regret very much his leaving. I wish that he will serve his great people even better than he did with us here in Washington.

SIR GIRJA BAJPAI: Thank you. I greatly appreciate it.

(Whereupon the meeting adjourned at 11:30 A.M.)



FAR EASTERN COMMISSION

Transcript of Forty-Fourth Meeting of the Far Eastern Commission,

Held in Main Conference Room, 2516 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.

Thursday, February 6, 1947



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REPRESENTATIVES PRESENT

Maj. Gen. Frank R. McCoy, USA (Ret.), Chairman	(United States)
His Excellency Norman J. O. Makin	(Australia)
Mr. R. E. Collins	(Canada)
His Excellency Dr. V. K. Wellington Koo	(China)
Mr. Robert Douteau	(France)
Mr. P. A. Menon	(India)
His Excellency Dr. A. Loudon	(Netherlands)
The Honorable Sir Carl Berendsen	(New Zealand)
Mr. F. Rodriguez	(Philippines)
Mr. H. A. Graves	(United Kingdom)
Rear Admiral S. S. Ramishvili	(U.S.S.R.)

SECRETARY

Mr. Nelson T. Johnson

Reporter: R. Holtz, Department of State



(The meeting convened at 10:35 A.M.)

GEN. MCCOY: Good morning, gentlemen. The session is now open.

I am glad to see our Ambassadors beginning to come back from the United Nations and other parts.

MR. MARKIN: I am very glad to be back too, Sir.

GEN. MCCOY: I hope you didn't have as hard a time as Sir Carl sitting in at fifty-one committee meetings. What are your statistics on that?

SIR CARL BERENDSEN: I think you do me an injustice. Fifty-one is an understatement--a very grave understatement.

GEN. MCCOY: Then my statistics were wrong.

SIR CARL BERENDSEN: Inadequate.

GEN. MCCOY: That sounds pretty strenuous to me. Well--at least we don't sit at night. That is helpful.

SIR CARL BERENDSEN: Or on Sundays.

GEN. MCCOY: Or on Sundays--and we fall within that time that General Marshall has stated--that no man can give a good decision after three o'clock in the afternoon.

MR. MAKIN: Well, that is a very splendid resolution.

GEN. MCCOY: At least he has been quoted that way. By the way, Mr. Ambassador, when you were talking about John Marshall the other day with interest and background, I intended to remark afterwards and forgot it that it might interest you to know that our Marshall, General Marshall, is his grand nephew.

DR. LOUDON: I know about that.

GEN. MCCOY: Yes.



ITEM 1 - APPROVAL OF THE MINUTES OF THE 43RD MEETING

GEN. MCCOY: Gentlemen, the minutes are before you for your approval or for any correction that may be required. There seems to be no correction at this time and they will be a matter of record.

ITEM 2 - DELIVERY OF REPARATIONS GOODS IN JAPAN (FEC-094/1)

GEN. MCCOY: This proposed policy decision was approved by the Steering Committee this week. The Soviet member was not prepared to discuss this paper but had no objection to its going forward to the Commission. I believe you have some comment to make now, Admiral.

ADM. RAMISHVILI: Yes, Mr. Chairman, only one word, which I think won't cause much trouble for the members, to be deleted. This word is in the very last line of the first paragraph "otherwise". We think that it is perfectly clear without this word, and besides neither of our interpreters could make a comprehensive translation of this word. We would be very glad if it is possible to delete this word without any change here and then we can approve this paper.

MR. MAKING: Might I ask, Mr. Chairman, as to whether the representative of the Soviet thinks this word is superfluous or whether there is any meaning other than the meaning that we feel is attached to that word in connection with that particular paragraph. Is it because it is regarded as unnecessary--as superfluous?

ADM. RAMISHVILI: Yes sir.



MR. MAKIN: That is the idea.

ADM. RAMISHVILI: Yes sir. We could not find the exact meaning of this word in this place. If you read this separate sentence: "The charging of these costs to the reparations accounts of recipient countries should not affect the distribution of reparations received by claimant countries." It is perfectly all right otherwise.

GEN. MCCOY: Well, this is a very important paper and I should think that we can find--

ADM. RAMISHVILI: Mr. Chairman, to make this question more clear--should the Commission decide to leave this word in, I will ask your permission to postpone consideration of this paper since this paragraph was approved by my Government without this word.

GEN. MCCOY: Yes. Well now, possibly I can, as far as the United States Government is concerned, accept your suggestion for the deletion of the word. I can see no objection to deletion of the word so long as it is recorded in the minutes that, in the view of my Government, the sense of the sentence is in no way changed by deletion.

MR. MAKING: That is right.

GEN. MCCOY: I think we can congratulate ourselves on getting almost complete agreement, and I think with that record in the minutes as to the position of the Soviet representative and also that of the United States, I think we could pass the paper this morning. Is there any objection on the part of any other member?

DR. KOO: Mr. Chairman, I do not wish to hold up this paragraph but I wish to explain our position.



This is one about which we received a number of instructions heretofore and since the receipt of those instructions there have been some changes introduced in this paragraph. Our representative in the Steering Committee raised no objection to it as it stands but subject to approval of our Government. We have telegraphed and I would like to have it understood that we still are awaiting instructions from our Government. We anticipate no difficulty, but simply as a matter of confirmation for our delegation, if possible, I would have it deferred until next week. If not, then the Commission could accept it subject to reservation on our part.

MR. MAKIN: Mr. Chairman, I should like to say that if it is that the honorable representative for China feels that he would wish to have it deferred for a week, the Australian representative would have no objection to that course being taken. Possibly to secure the unanimity that we are most anxious to achieve, it might possibly be quite a good suggestion and should be done.

SIR CARL BERENDSEN: Indeed, Mr. Chairman, it is a fact that without the concurrence of the representative of China we are not in a position to pass the paper.

GEN. MCCOY: No. The paper then, with your approval, will be postponed for another week. Is it agreeable to the Commission to delete the word "otherwise", with the explanation of the Soviet representative and the statement I read on behalf of my Government together to go in the record?



ADM. RAMISHVILI: Otherwise it would have to go to my Government.

GEN. MCCOY: So that the paper appears to be approved by all present except in China, who wishes to have it postponed until they can be confirmed in their action. It is so ordered.

ITEM 3 - ASSURED PRODUCTION CAPACITY LEVELS FOR JAPAN (FEC-083/2)

GEN. MCCOY: The Steering Committee agreed this week to forward this paper to the Commission, with reservations by the French and Soviet members. The paper is before you for any statement or discussion that may be pertinent.

MR. DOUTEAU: Well, Mr. Chairman, we have no objection to this paper being adopted by the Commission provided that our reservation will be inserted in the minutes.

GEN. MCCOY: Admiral Ramishvili, have you any further news on that paper, the Item 3, Assured Production Capacity Levels for Japan?

ADM. RAMISHVILI: Shall I inform the Commission of proposed amendments by the U.S.S.R. Government? I submit for the approval of the Commission, Mr. Chairman, two amendments which I have already mentioned in the Steering Committee. In the second paragraph of paragraph No. 1, after the words "the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers" insert the words "upon consultation with the Allied Council for Japan", and in subparagraph a of the same paragraph delete the words "in the judgment of" and just start with "The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, upon consultation with the Allied



Council for Japan, decides that the operation of these plants..." With these two amendments, Mr. Chairman, which, if it is necessary, I can shortly explain that it is the great importance which is attached by our Government on this paper which was the impulse which probably produced these amendments in order to mention this, which is already included in the Terms of Reference procedure for the discussion and implementation of important questions. With these two amendments the U.S.S.R. Government is ready to approve the whole paper, Mr. Chairman.

GEN. MCCOY: I have had, through my assistants, some preliminary discussion of these amendments. I would not ask for any definite action on the proposed amendments this morning, much as we would like to take advantage of the Soviet's approval of the paper as a very important one which we are very anxious to have action on. But I find that it brings up some basic questions in connection with the Terms of Reference for both the Advisory Commission in Japan and the Far Eastern Commission, and I have tried to get it explored with my own proper authorities and they are giving earnest consideration to it, having in mind the agreement of our assistants up to this point, and with great appreciation of the Admiral's efforts to have his Government give instructions so that we could act on this important paper. So that I shall have to take the onus of asking for postponement and consultation with my own Government, which is now being done not only here but in Tokyo. So that I will hope that I can--in the meantime be able to talk it over with the Admiral in an informal



way while we are discussing it behind the curtain. And I don't wish to bar any discussion of the thing. It might even help us both to get together on this affair, if there should be informal discussion on the points involved. I make the point just for the sake of discussion that the Terms of Reference cover the thing very well as far as the first glance that I have had at it in the sense of being meticulous and definite and as to the authorities and responsibilities of this Commission and very decidedly keeping us from interfering with the Advisory Commission in Japan or they cross-wiring with us. So that from my point of view at the moment, it simply doesn't seem<sup>a</sup>/useful thing to do, to complicate what seems to me the very clear Terms of Reference. However, with that general glance at it I would be very glad to hear anybody else express their views.

MR. GRAVES: Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question for elucidation? Is it the intention of the Soviet proposal that it should be incumbent on the Supreme Commander to consult the Allied Council in respect to all these operations?

ADM. RAMISHVILI: It is provided by the Terms of Reference, Mr. Chairman, and, as I already said, attaching great importance to this paper, the Soviet Government wants to mention this in this paper in order to have this matter undoubtedly put for the Advisory Council.

GEN. MCCOY: I get from your query that it seems to you that it would be mud in the water a good deal if the Supreme Commander were directed outside of the gen-



eral terms of his responsibility under the Terms of Reference to go into detail with everything in a technical paper like this. Is that what you mean?

MR. GRAVES: Well, I was merely asking for what is in the Soviet mind as to whether they think it is incumbent on the Supreme Commander to consult the Allied Council.

ADM. RAMISHVILI: It is incumbent by the Terms of Reference. We think that this is a very important paper and we must make reference to this already clear provision. The Supreme Commander has his own full right to act in accordance with the Terms of Reference.

GEN. MCCOY: Do I gather, just to bring out the background, that there is an implication that he has not been consulting the Council?

ADM. RAMISHVILI: No.

MR. MAKIN: Mr. Chairman, may I ask as to whether the honorable representative of the Soviet has in mind that the Supreme Commander should submit the general principle of a proposition to this Council for their advice upon it, or does it really imply the more detailed aspect of a situation. Is the Supreme Commander to be expected to elaborate every detailed feature of a question that might have to be determined, or is it just a general principle that you would wish for the Council to be consulted upon?

ADM. RAMISHVILI: May I answer, Mr. Chairman. In the Terms of Reference, paragraph 5 of the Allied Council for Japan, Section B, we have: "He will consult and advise with the Council in advance of the issuance of orders on matters of substance, the exigencies of the



situation permitting." Well in some cases he cannot do so if they are urgent matters, so this wording intends nothing more. It just includes everything which is already stated here. I cannot answer exactly the Ambassador's question as to what elaboration of the questions will be because it is again within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Commander how he brings this question and to what extent he desires to be advised. But it is merely this provision which already is in the Terms of Reference and we mean only this. We mean only what is in the Terms of Reference. I don't wish to mention the obligations of the Supreme Commander or anything about his action in implementing our decisions. This is only with reference to already existing provisions. That is my understanding of this.

GEN. MCCOY: That is just calling attention to the Terms of Reference?

ADM. RAMISHVILI: Yes, but not the calling of the attention of the Supreme Commander. Just calling the attention of ourselves. We don't intend, Mr. Chairman, to go even the slightest steps beyond this. Well--of the importance of the paper we are very satisfied and we think that it will be useful for the paper just to mention this very important--or, in other words, by this wording we qualify this paper as a substance matter, leaving the procedure, the details of it, of course, to the discretion of the Supreme Commander, or this, the exigencies of the situation permitting. Of course this is in full force, but if some urgent matter does not permit him to do so, it is still within the Terms of Reference, and by this wording we just give a ~~signal~~



qualification to this matter that it is a substance matter and it will be desirable to hear the advice from the Allied Council.

MR. RODRIGUEZ: Mr. Chairman, pursuing the point under discussion, the first amendment would, if included, make the sentence read as follows: "The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, upon consultation with the Allied Council for Japan, will designate for retention specific plants and establishments." I would wish to raise the question as to whether such an insertion may bring about a requirement that the Supreme Commander should consult with the Allied Council in the matter of designation of specific plants and establishments. If such becomes the meaning of the amendment, it will appear as if it would be an extension beyond the intent of the Terms of Reference.

ADM. RAMISHVILI: Mr. Chairman, I think that I already answered this question because we are getting down to details which, providing that we qualify this paper as a substance meaning in here because we attached a big importance to this paper, and, well, we are not going beyond the Terms of Reference, it would be more useful instead of just to read again the Terms of Reference. And I am quite sure that the Supreme Commander can handle this matter to what extent or what details he wants. So I cannot answer this question by what is meant. We can take this matter as a whole--the substance--and it will be very advisable to hear the advice of the Allied Council. How the Supreme Commander will do this--maybe he won't do this. It is within the Terms of Ref-



erence. If he don't do this he will be justified. It is perfectly all right in the circumstances. But we want to mention this.

SIR CARL BERENDSEN: Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that several matters of importance are raised by this proposed amendment. Two, in particular, I think we should now state. The first is whether this Commission has the authority to insert such a provision, and the second is whether, if it has such authority, it would be wise to exercise that authority. I would assume, without any doubt at all, if words mean anything, that if this amendment is made it will be obligatory on the Supreme Commander or incumbent, if I may use the ecclesiastical term, to consult the Allied Council before in any case he can designate a specific plant for retention. It may well be, as our Soviet colleague suggests, that it is the duty of the Supreme Commander under the Terms of Reference to consult the Allied Council on any matter of substance. This amendment, therefore, assumes that the designation of a specific plant is a matter of substance on which I would express some considerable doubt. Indeed, if the designation of a plant is a matter of substance upon which it is obligatory for the Supreme Commander to consult the Allied Council, I would be inclined to suggest that there are a number of matters of much greater substance upon which the Supreme Commander has not felt it necessary to consult the Allied Council nor the Allied Council felt it necessary to protest. I would be inclined to say that it would not in some circumstances be within the power of this Com-



mission to lay down as a matter of policy that in certain circumstances the views of the Allied Council should be taken, though I would concede at once that that is a matter on which there should be argument. But whether it would be wise for us--whether we have or have not the power to lay down a mandatory rule that the Supreme Commander shall in every case that he has designated a plant for retention consult the Allied Council, it seems to me a matter upon which we should exercise a very careful judgment. I am not happy about the Allied Council in Japan. I don't think the Allied Council in Japan has been even as successful as the Far Eastern Commission. When I said that I will be understood to have really said something definite. But, I don't think, with all respect and deference to our Soviet colleague, that anything in our power to make it necessary for the Supreme Commander to consult the Allied Council in connection with each individual problem would be either a proper act for this Commission or a wise act.

ADM. RAMISHVILI: Mr. Chairman, we have in several other papers--I would be very glad, with your permission, to ask the members of the Commission to express their views on this paper. It will be helpful.

GEN. MCCOY: It is to help us in our deliberations.

ADM. RAMISHVILI: Of course. I am listening with great interest to the opinions of the other members.

DR. KOO: Mr. Chairman, if I understood it correctly the purport of the suggested amendment of the Soviet representative is that it is the view that the Supreme Commander should act in accordance with the



Terms of Reference and I think we have a relevant sentence in the relevant paragraph of the Terms of Reference. If that is so, it seems to me that they are really fundamental. There is no difference of opinion. It is only a matter of wording, and I take it that even in the wording as it stands now, without the amendment, observance of the Terms of Reference by the Supreme Commander can always be taken for granted. It is implicit. If that point should be made a little clearer, perhaps his wishes may be met equally well by some other phrase such as I personally would prefer the word "opinion" better than "judgment" in the first place. "In the opinion of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, acting in accordance with the Terms of Reference..." That would meet the point raised by the Soviet representative. I personally think perhaps that would be better. That would dispense with any doubt as to the nature of the consultation--whether it would be obligatory, incumbent upon the Supreme Commander to consult the Council every time he issues an order. That point is clearly set out in the Terms of Reference. It is up to the discretion of the Supreme Commander. If there should be exigencies of such a character that he has to act, within the terms he can act and his decisions, it says, upon these matters shall be controlling. And so the Terms of Reference seem to already have provided for various contingencies. There are cases in which the Supreme Commander may find it necessary, in his discretion, to consult the Council. There may be other cases in which he feels he has to act. So, without specifying



the necessity of consultation in the paragraph, by a simple reference to the Terms of Reference that perhaps might answer the point which the Soviet representative has in mind. Personally I am ready to accept the paragraph as it is because I read it with the understanding that the general Terms of Reference would always be observed, and the Supreme Commander certainly has them in mind all the time.

GEN. MCCOY: Well, this has been very useful in clarifying both the position and the wording, and I can assure the Commission that we are considering it with great interest.

ITEM 4 - INTERIM PRINCIPLES FOR RESTITUTION OF IDENTIFIABLE PROPERTY CONFISCATED IN JAPAN FROM ALLIED NATIONALS (FEC-011/23)

GEN. MCCOY: This proposed policy statement was approved by the Steering Committee by a vote of 8 to 1. The Soviet member voted against the paper, the Chinese member abstained from voting, and the Indian member was absent. The Soviet member desired to provide, in the second sentence of paragraph 6, for consultation by the Supreme Commander with the Allied Council for Japan. That, I take it, is the same, exactly the same idea?

ADM. RAMISHVILI: Yes Sir. We've got to decide them together.

GEN. MCCOY: If there is no further comment, that will fall in the same category as Item 3.

ITEM 5 - SUPPLY OF FOOD FOR CIVILIAN RELIEF IN JAPAN (FEC-028/10)

GEN. MCCOY: The Steering Committee unanimously agreed on 28 January to forward enclosure "A" to the



Commission for consideration. The United States position on the proposal was reserved. That still is the case, in the sense that my Government is, with its many departments, involved in this matter of food still not able to go further. I, as representative, now state that for the moment we continue to stand on the paper presented by my Government and for the moment are not ready to concur in the amendments proposed. Is there any comment desired by any member present?

MR. MAKIN: I think, Mr. Chairman, we would like to await possibly the declarations that you feel--

GEN. MCCOY: I am sorry that I can't go further and say that our position is that we could.

MR. MAKING: We will be in a very much better position then to make our observations.

GEN. MCCOY: Yes.

ITEM 6 - FIRST ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY  
GENERAL TO THE FAR EASTERN COMMISSION  
(FEC-200)

GEN. MCCOY: I believe the word "compendious" was used in presenting this to the Commission--not for action for the moment on it. Since it is compendious you will have to have time to consider it not only from the point of view of its correctness but from any point of view that you may desire to suggest or change any of the discursive preamble or statement that accompanies the more or less statistical record. I have had occasion to read it myself but I doubt if anybody else has had the time.

ADM. RAMISHVILI: I did not read it at all, Mr. Chairman, so I ask your indulgence to let us read this



further.

GEN. MCCOY: I think this ought to be taken into consideration with our continuing discussion of the work of the Commission which we've already found useful and important.

SIR CARL BERENDSEN: Mr. Chairman, of course I haven't had an opportunity of reading this but I have run through it, and I would like to say one thing. It is an admirable document, written with the obvious intention of objectivity. But, when we have all read it, I might add my little touch of levity, when we have all read it, I haven't the faintest doubt but that all of us will wish to see some alterations made, and in my levity I might suggest that this should be made a report for the second year as that is our customary rate of progress.

GEN. MCCOY: At the rate we are going now we might have a clean sheet by another month, Sir Carl, and surprise you.

SIR CARL BERENDSEN: It would lead me to a great degree of levity, Mr. Chairman.

GEN. MCCOY: Well I might say that I more or less instigated the report and the one preliminary that was submitted to you last week, with the idea of having it considered very seriously as we go on in improving our procedure and with the hope of being able to act more quickly and with more successful liaison with the Supreme Commander, and I would hope that it won't be like so many annual reports--just put in the record without reading. I have had so many reports in my time to make and I always posed myself the question--first, is



it readable instead of just a mere prose record, and second, if it is readable, will anybody read it? And I always tried, when I rendered the report, to get it read and flowered it up. I have had so many experiences where important reports from the point of view of international commissions were completely lost in a very short time and nobody could find them in our own Government. So that I would like to have this--I think it is readable from my first blush, and being discursive and an attempt to be objective on the part of the Secretariat. It is up to us to make it so to suit our remembrance and make sure that the effort to be a clear and readable and objective report is accomplished and that we will have it as a matter of ready reference. I don't know how the best way to get it--suppose now, Sir Carl, you should read this and find that from your point of view it doesn't give a clear picture or a comprehensive picture--how would we decide--and suppose I took a different point of view.

SIR CARL BERENDSEN: Well--your point of view would prevail, Mr. Chairman.

GEN. MCCOY: I am raising that as to how we would get an effective clarification and agreement without too much time in the meeting. Would it be better to have an ad hoc committee to have the different points of view referred to and thrashed out or would you prefer to have it first put before the Commission? I must say I haven't any opinion on it. I am just fishing for one to go on. What is your opinion, Mr. Secretary General? How would you think it could be best handled so that corrections and differences of opinion could



be reconciled?

MR. JOHNSON: Corrections as to fact I think that can be done very easily.

SIR CARL BERENDSEN: You wouldn't expect any of them.

GEN. MCCOY: Suppose Sir Carl and I took a decided difference of opinion, how would that be best handled-- before the Commission or first to a committee?

MR. JOHNSON: I think a committee probably would be the most useful thing--a means of going over the thing.

GEN. MCCOY: Is there any opinion on that from any of you?

MR. MAKIN: I think, Mr. Chairman, that the idea of a committee is a good one because it is a very complete report of the deliberations of this Commission, and I feel that if we have to ourselves ensconce every phase possibly associated with this, it might take a considerable amount of time of the Commission that might be avoided if it is in a committee and which could possibly do it very much more thoroughly than the Commission as a whole, I think, because a committee would have more time possibly at its disposal to go into the details of it. I think that the idea of a committee is a very good one and I would be willing to support that idea.

GEN. MCCOY: How many? About three? Would that be enough you think, or do you think we all ought to be represented on it?

MR. MAKING: Oh, no. I don't think it is essential that everyone be on the committee. I think that possibly



a committee of six might be a good idea, and then, of course, each member will certainly peruse the document, study it, and determine upon what matters they feel should be raised, and even if they are not on that committee they would commit, no doubt, to some member of that committee their view upon it, and if later they felt a special urge to even regard it as a major circumstance to be considered they could bring it here to this Commission when the matter comes up for ratification.

DR. LOUDON: As I understand it, the Steering Committee is a more appropriate committee for action. The Steering Committee could take it to pieces and could send every piece to the appropriate committee, and it can come back to the Steering Committee and then back to the Commission. Let's be sports and give some of it to the Steering Committee.

MR. JOHNSON: That is a good idea to have it broken up and referred to the committees. It is more or less divided by subject and committees anyway and it could be broken up very easily and referred to these committees for committee correction. And is there any reason why the report shouldn't contain different ideas?

GEN. MCCOY: Well that is a good point.

SIR CARL BERENDSEN: Well, Mr. Chairman, first you have got to read it, and none of us have done that. Far be it from me to suggest a delay in anything at all, but it is a case in which I think it is not really possible to form a firm view until we know how much, if anything, there is to handle.

GEN. MCCOY: Suppose we refer it then to the



**Steering Committee.**

SIR CARL BERENDSEN: Well I have no objection. The unfortunate Steering Committee can take some more odds and ends, I suppose.

GEN. MCCOY: And then they can pass it on as they usually do.

SIR CARL BERENDSEN: They have showed a very marked capacity for doing that, Mr. Chairman.

GEN. MCCOY: If there is no objection then, the report will be referred to the Steering Committee for such action as they care to take.

SIR CARL BERENDSEN: All right, Sir.

GEN. MCCOY: Is there any necessity of referring that former, preliminary report with it?

MR. JOHNSON: I think this is enough.

GEN. MCCOY: Well, this will go to the Steering Committee for such action as they may determine proper to recommend to the Commission in due time, and it will be, I hope, at your hand in these continuing discussions as to the improvement of our procedure.

**ITEM 7 - PRESS ARTICLE RELATIVE TO FAR EASTERN COMMISSION POLICIES ON THE JAPANESE CONSTITUTION (FEC-103, MI-075)**

GEN. MCCOY: I am continuing on the agenda the Press Article Relative to Far Eastern Commission Policies on the Japanese Constitution. I can assure you that is being given the most careful consideration by my Government and in consultation with the Supreme Commander, as provided in the paper of the Commission.



ITEM 8 - THE WORK OF THE COMMISSION (FEC-105/2, SC-049/2)

GEN. MCCOY: Item 8, The Work of the Commission is under consideration with the general proposition of our continued work for the betterment of our procedure.

ITEM 9 - PROPOSED UNITED STATES PLAN FOR REPARATIONS CONFERENCE (FEC-081 series)

GEN. MCCOY: The Proposed United States Plan for Reparations Conference is still postponed.

ITEM 10 - REPORT ON JAPANESE EXTERNAL ASSETS (FEC-072)

GEN. MCCOY: The Report on Japanese External Assets is still postponed.

ITEM 11 - OTHER BUSINESS

a. Presentation of Mr. A. V. Thompson

GEN. MCCOY: Happily we have another visitor from Australia. I am glad to notice that Australians are passing by and don't forget to visit us. We have had several other distinguished men from your country, Mr. Thompson, and I would like to present Mr. A. V. Thompson, Member of the House of Representatives in Australia, who has been a member of the Legislature of South Australia for sixteen years and is now a member of the National House of Representatives from Hindmarsh, and is here visiting the Ambassador. Mr. Thompson, would you care to make any remarks?

MR. THOMPSON: Mr. Chairman, and gentlemen, on behalf of Australia I would like to say we are deeply interested in the work that you are doing here, and as a Pacific country we feel in Australia that our future welfare is bound up very deeply, indeed, with the success



that attends the work of this convention or conference or Commission, I think, to be correct, in dealing with the affairs so far as the Pacific is concerned. And I earnestly hope, Sir, that in the deliberations of this Commission expedition will be accomplished. I hope, Sir, that the delay will not be occurred by perhaps interpretation of words or meanings, but that this Commission will go forward founded on broad principles of what is right and just, believing, as we do in Australia, that in any decisions--you have had mentions of reparations, Sir. We know what the countries have suffered. I know what it has cost Australia and I know our position. But we know also that we live and hope that in the deliberations of commissions such as this the work that you accomplish will not be work that will sow the seeds of future dissension, but that it will be the means of bringing the nations of the world closer together with a better understanding of the needs of the country and a realization that a country and the welfare of the country is not based upon the big buildings and institutions it contains but upon the condition of the people and the general people living in it.

I do thank you, Sir, for this opportunity to speak and must ask to be excused if I have presumed perhaps to say more than you expected. But I am one of the people, Sir. I am one from the bottom as it were, and I say this--that the men in a country and the people in the country that are most concerned and most affected by the decision of those in authority are not the wealthy but the poor and the working section of the community. Thank you, Sir, and gentlemen, very much.



b. Proposal to Hear Remarks by Father Byrne

GEN. MCCOY: In line with Mr. Thompson's reference to the human problem, which is a basic one, I had a call the other day from Father Byrne of the Maryknoll Fathers, who have been in Japan for some years as teachers and very closely in touch with what might be called the ordinary people. He came to see me from the session with the G-2 people in the War Department, and possibly it was suggested to him that the Commission might be interested in his interpretation of public opinion in Japan. I had a very pleasant chat with him myself and sidestepped the invitation that he evidently wanted--to address the Commission, so that we are under no commitment whatsoever. But I thought that I would mention it to you as a desire on the part of a very intelligent Catholic Father who was a prisoner during the war, fortunately in Kyota rather than the other doomed cities of Japan, but who, from his own point of view and from that of the War Department, had unusual opportunities to interpret the public opinion of the Japanese people. He impressed me as a very intelligent man and I would leave it for your consideration whether I should invite him to address you or one of the committees on the subject of the interpretation of the way the Japanese feel, both during the war and since.

SIR CARL BERENDSEN: It would be a very useful thing, Mr. Chairman.

GEN. MCCOY: All I know about him--I noticed in the papers--some of you may have noticed a letter, quite an intelligent and interesting one in the local paper a week or ten days ago, in which he, under the heading,



took issue with Mr. Stimson's notable article on the atomic bomb. That is the background that I had with him when he came--called up and asked to come and see me. I had read that letter with interest, and he at least expresses himself intelligently and interestingly. So that I could invite him here next week to talk at this time after the work of our Commission is over. Is there any expression of desire or objection?

MR. MAKING: No objection, Sir. As Sir Carl has said, I think it is good to secure whatever knowledge we can from people who have had first-hand experience.

GEN. MCCOY: Well, I will invite him to appear before us, telling him that we are limited as to time.

Is there any other business, gentlemen?

e. Proposed Change in Schedule of Commission Meetings

DR. KOO: Mr. Chairman, I understand that the question of possibly changing the day of holding the weekly meeting of this Commission from Thursday to Friday was raised last meeting or the previous meeting and an exchange of views took place. I wonder if the matter has been given further consideration or whether there is any desire for further discussion. From our point of view, Thursday or Friday is a matter of choice that, from the point of view of the work of the Commission, perhaps it would be an advantage to shift from Thursday to Friday. As it is, I think--I don't know--but the strain on the Secretariat must be very great in preparing for the meeting because, for example, we received again only very late Wednesday--and such papers as are often brought for discussion in the meeting do



not reach us until late Wednesday afternoon or early Thursday morning. If the date of the meeting could be shifted until Friday, that would give an extra day for the Secretariat to prepare and also give some time to us, and I think the other representatives too, to look them over more carefully, so that when we do come to a meeting and discuss them, perhaps we could save time. The question naturally is to be decided by the Commission, but I have been wondering whether after that discussion you are prepared to give further consideration to that suggestion or not.

GEN. MCCOY: Any other remarks on that change from Thursday to Friday?

MR. MAKIN: Mr. Chairman, I have no strong feelings as to whether it is Thursday or Friday and there is much to be said for what my distinguished friend, Dr. Wellington Koo has just said about the opportunity for that day extra to be able to consider the items of the agenda that come before you and which are distributed on Wednesday. But there is another aspect that we must consider, and that is that, if we meet on Friday, then no decision or any action that is to be taken by this Commission after the meeting would really be possible until three days later, Monday, for I understand it is not usual for administrative staffs to work on Saturday. Now it means that the whole of the work of the Commission from its meeting stands still until three days later, Monday, and I am just wondering whether that is a good thing because, if a decision has got to be communicated or any action is to be taken or records to be finalized after a meeting, it is good for it to be done immediately



after a meeting and thus Friday does give an opportunity to clear up what may be the urgency of any of the work which is associated with the Commission's meeting. Thursday does give you that opportunity whereas Friday would not. I am quite sure it will meet my own personal convenience quite well to have it Friday, but I am thinking of the work of the administrative staff particularly, Doctor.

DR. KOO: I would like perhaps to hear from the Secretary General, if Thursday stands, whether the Secretariat could not make a further effort--whether that would not be asking too much to expedite the dispatching of papers. I know it has been very difficult and I know the Secretariat has been working very hard because the Steering Committee meets on Tuesday and often the Steering Committee has to discuss a great many questions and do a lot of work, and that leaves them practically a day and a half, and that is, of course, quite a problem to the Secretariat.

SIR CARL BERENDSEN: Mr. Chairman, I am impressed by what my Australian colleague says. I wonder whether we could approach it from the other end. We would have more time for the papers to be distributed by moving the Steering Committee's meetings to a day earlier. Most of these things come through the bottleneck of the Steering Committee and I don't know of any practical reason why the Steering Committee should not meet on Monday, leaving Thursday for the normal day for the Commission.

GEN. MCCOY: I think that would interfere with part of our procedure. From my point of view I would



rather see the Steering Committee meet on Tuesday because I have on Monday to get my different briefs from the experts of the past week and give instructions for the committee meetings, including the Steering Committee on Monday. Like in all changes there are reasons both ways, and certainly the point Dr. Koo brings up is a good one, and from my point of view there I would rather have a longer interval between the Steering Committee's action because then I have to go immediately to the Department to get my consideration of things, and I find that with only one day, Wednesday, between the Steering Committee and the Commission meeting on Thursday, very often if I had two days I could get the thing instead of postponing so often, when I find it almost impossible to get two or three departments' action to General Hilldring in one day. From my point of view Friday would be helpful. From the Secretariat point of view I think they would prefer to have it on Thursday. That is the reason why I want to put it on the table for round-the-table discussion, to see how it would affect all members concerned.

SIR CARL BERENDSEN: Well, would this help at all, Mr. Chairman--there seems to be a religious objection to this meeting sitting in the afternoon--would it help for the Steering Committee to sit on Monday afternoon, leaving Monday afternoon for your staff discussions, etc.?

GEN. MCCOY: I can't get my people up here in the morning because they are all engaged down in the departments. They have other assignments and I find that I have to have a late session on Monday to get them together.



MR. JOHNSON: The present arrangement is the one that is most suitable from the Secretariat's point of view. We will try to see that we do a little better by the Commission in the distribution of papers. For the Commission to meet on Friday would, as the Australian representative says, leave us with a flat two days during which we could do nothing--get nowhere and accomplish nothing.

SIR CARL BERENDSEN: There is, of course, a regrettable alternative and that is to work on Saturday.

MR. JOHNSON: Well, we could work on Saturday but could we get the others to work on Saturday?

SIR CARL BERENDSEN: There is a further suggestion by our Dutch colleague--Thursday afternoon for the meeting of the Commission.

DR. LOUDON: Two o'clock is a half day. If we can't get a whole day we will take a half day.

GEN. MCCOY: Well, I will leave that for your continued consideration. There seems to be no meeting of minds as yet.

Gentlemen, we will distribute copies of the amendments of Admiral Ramishvili for your information.

The Commission is adjourned.

(Whereupon the meeting adjourned at 12:05 P.M.)



FAR EASTERN COMMISSION

Transcript of Forty-Fifth Meeting of the Far Eastern Commission,

Held in Main Conference Room, 2516 Massachusetts Avenue, N. W.

Thursday, February 13, 1947.



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REPRESENTATIVES PRESENT

Maj Gen. Frank R. McCoy, USA (Ret.), Chairman	(United States)
His Excellency Norman J. O. Makin	(Australia)
Mr. R. E. Collins	(Canada)
His Excellency Dr. V. K. Wellington Koo	(China)
Mr. Robert Douteau	(France)
Mr. P. A. Menon	(India)
Mr. O. Reuchlin	(Netherlands)
The Honorable Sir Carl Berendsen	(New Zealand)
Mr. F. Rodriguez	(Philippines)
Mr. H. A. Graves	(United Kingdom)
Rear Admiral S. S. Ramishvili	(U.S.S.R.)

SECRETARY

Mr. Nelson T. Johnson

Reporter: R. Holtz, Department of State



(The meeting met in informal session at 10:30 A.M.)

GEN. MCCOY: Gentlemen, we will not come into formal session for the moment, but we will have a preliminary talk. This gives me an opportunity to present to you Mr. George Atcheson, with whom I think most of you are personally familiar and know that he is acting as Chairman of the corresponding international group, the Council, in Tokyo. He will be here visiting and conferring with all of us for some week or two and he is being gracious enough to give me an opportunity to have him sit in with you at your convenience. It will be convenient for him and us to have a session on Monday--the coming Monday. Is that the day?

MR. ATCHESON: Yes, that is the day.

GEN. MCCOY: From three o'clock for a couple of hours just off the record and informally. Any member of the Commission or his alternate who wishes to come and sit in with Mr. Atcheson and the rest of us is welcome.

I have been conscious for some years in my associations in the Far East of the very valuable work done by many of our missionary societies. Many of the nations are, of course, represented in that sense in the Far East and there is an American order of the Roman Catholic Church, the Maryknoll Fathers, who have done most valuable educational work in the mission field in the Far East, particularly, and with special reference to Japan. Father Byrne himself was interned in Kyoto during the war but had an opportunity, however, both before and during his internment to be very close to what might be called the run of the mill Japanese and their prob-



lems and very human attitude. It is a privilege for me to have him visit us and to talk informally for a short time before the Commission proceeds to business.

Father Byrne, will you take the floor please and give us the opportunity of hearing about Japan from your intimate background?

FR. BYRNE: Gentlemen of the Commission, I appreciate this privilege that has been accorded me, and the reason for my particularly valuing it is that I may perhaps be able to explain one particular point that has often been questioned. That is this: Is the pretended admiration of the Japanese for the American, is their apparent cooperation sincere or is it hypocrisy or camouflage?

As the war broke out some of our Fathers were interned near Kobe. I myself was given an option. We had just completed a tuberculosis sanitarium for the Japanese people and I was given the option--I happened to be the Superior of the Maryknoll Fathers in Japan and I was given the option of being interned with the other Fathers or being interned in my own little rectory by myself with no communication. So I chose the latter. I had four very quiet years there. I was supposed to have no communication with anyone. Three different kinds of police were keeping tabs on me, the local police, the Kempei (the military police), and the thought police. Sometimes they would all three come there. They kept pretty close watch on me. Nevertheless, my house being out in the suburbs of Kyoto, I was able to have visitors at night and even in the daytime as the war neared its end. At one particular point, which I certainly think is not realized by the



American public, though yourselves are specialists of Far Eastern matters and may know it quite well, but it explains that this attitude of the Japanese--their friendship for the Americans is really genuine and sincere, and that is this: I was allowed to get a Japanese newspaper, an edition of the Osaka Mainichi, every day.

Now as you know the Japanese went like a tidal wave until they got to Guadalcanal and there they stuck. After a while there began to be notices in the Japanese papers of American attempts at landings. But they were all failures. Attempts were made--other various ones in the Solomon Islands and along the Southeast coast of New Guinea. I had a little map there of the Natural Geographic Society, a map of the Southwest Pacific, and whenever there was one of these attempts at landings by the American forces I would draw a little red circle on it and put the date there. In no time at all it was very obvious that these failures were marching steadily northward. But the Japanese didn't notice that because they took for granted that the word of the government that these attempts by the Americans were failures was true. All they had to do was hold on until Hitler won in Europe and then they would have prosperity that would make amends for all they had been suffering.

That went on until Saipan. Saipan brought consternation to the Japanese--the landing at Saipan evidently was too near Japan and that landing was too large to be concealed by the government. Then all the nation woke up to the fact that they had been losing the war instead of winning. I think it is no exaggeration to say that



among the common people of Japan the loss of Saipan brought greater consternation than did the atomic bomb. After all two hundred B-29's could do as much damage, apart from the radioactive harmful effects, in five minutes as an atomic bomb will do in five seconds. And, as you know yourselves, there were cities in Japan worse destroyed than Hiroshima and Nagasaki. However, Saipan brought the startling amazement to the ordinary Japanese, and that is the man I am speaking about, the man the missionary gets to know, that they were losing the war.

There are Japanese, maybe hundreds of thousands of them, by this time working for the American Army, and, as you know, the Japanese has the oriental trait of saying what you think you want to here him say. Those who have any connection with the army or who had any connection with the previous regime that was pushing the war may be absolutely hypocritical in pretending admiration for the Americans, but I am speaking as a missionary of the ordinary rank and file that never gets into contact with the army.

Now--Saipan brought consternation, as you know, to Premier Tojo who stayed in office. He had ordered the suicides, etc., of the civilians on Saipan. He himself didn't make any attempt to commit suicide. He stayed in office for another month. Finally he got out. A Japanese university man who came to my house one night said that someone had told Tojo: "Either you resign or this is your last day on earth", and then he resigned. And shortly after Koiso went in as premier the Americans started to land on Leyte, and



there is the point I have been coming up to.

When that landing began evidently General Koiso thought they could hold the Philippines. He came on the radio night after night--by newspaper interview--by every chance he had of publicity and hammered home to the Japanese people that this isn't the battle of the Philippines; this is the battle of the war. If we lose the Philippines we have lost the war. We may hang on for a while but we are finished--hammered and hammered away at that. But, as you know, Manila was lost in January '45 and by February, I presume, there was little left of the Japanese except here and there some scattered defenses--holes, etc. By February all the rank and file of the Japanese people knew the war had been lost.

Now--the devastation came after that. It is perfectly amazing and seems incredible that the whole nation--cities of three million like Osaka, etc., should be leveled flat to the ground and the Japanese not be bitter against the ones that did it, the Americans with their B-29's. But they are not bitter, and that is for the reason that the devastation had been after the war was lost. Kyoto was not bombed. I had my air raid shelter in the front yard and it gave me some exercise digging it. All the neighbors had their own, and when the radio warning would come the people would dive into their holes, etc. Then the planes would pass over.

Very near Kyoto was Lake Biwa and the B-29's would seem to make the southern part of Lake Biwa a focus angle and they would aim at that and go east to Tokyo and Matsumoto, etc. They would pass over and the



people would come out of their holes and they would be out in the streets talking to one another, etc., and with no policemen around there they would talk rather freely. It was always the same: "Why doesn't the government surrender?" Now this was long before the surrender. We would hear over the radio where these B-29's were going. They might be going to Nagoya, and the people would say: "Why doesn't the government surrender? We can't win now. We have lost the war." The government, rather than lose face, would rather have every one of us killed and every one of our homes destroyed." Of course they didn't say that in public. The first one to say it would have been taken by the police and just been attended to. But that is what they were perpetually saying--"Why doesn't the government surrender? If the government would surrender the American bombers would stop coming." So they blamed this devastation upon their own government. And as early as April 1945 a university man who came in to have a visit with me said: "Father, we are losing the war and it is a good thing." He said, "If we would win this war the government would have us by the throats for the next hundred years." But this devastation of Japan which, as you know, is absolutely thorough is blamed by those Japanese--by the ordinary rank and file of the Japanese not on the B-29's, not on the Americans, but on that asinine government that, when the war had been settled and there was no chance of victory left, continued and refused to surrender--was ashamed to admit its mistake--ashamed to admit its failure. That is where the resentment goes. That you might say is



a negative explanation of the lack of resentment against the Americans.

Now I would say the positive explanation is the American. In the education of Japan I don't think anything has played such a part or will play such a part, quite away from schools and universities, etc., as simply the soldiers there. The Japanese had been told by the government what was going to happen--everyone would be violated--every baby butchered--everything stolen. Just as an amusing instance of what they were telling--they told my cook that when the Americans came in they were going to get all the down on the seashore, pierce their hands and sew them together in long chains and tie a rope to a tug and pull them out to sea. The Americans came in and they were supposed to be fierce avenging conquerors, you know, and they came in and just lived their ordinary natural lives and the people were amazed. The government had lied to them about the losses from Guadalcanal up to Saipan and the people found too the government had lied to them about what would happen to them if the Americans came in.

There had been here in America thousands, maybe tens of thousands altogether, of Japanese who knew the American system, knew our culture, knew our style of democracy, etc. They were students at our universities--dental students, medical students, travelers, business men. Well, they returned to Japan. Indeed, they knew the American way, but there was no way, no channel by which these thousands of Japanese who did know American ways could reach the rank and file of the people. The average Japanese--he saw visitors coming through--



tourists coming through--but he had no intimate connection with them. The average Japanese knew no more about the Americans than the man in the moon. And the Americans sort of went in there--some hundreds of thousands of them--and just by their ordinary conduct simply bowled over those Japanese. They expected to be treated with cruelty and they met considerations, they met kindness. I myself have seen American soldiers lift loads off the backs of Japanese--old men and women who were bending under them--and help them from the streetcar to the curb. I have seen many a thing of that sort--any number of instances of that sort. That we might call a positive side of winning the Japanese to liking democracy.

GEN. MCCOY: That is very interesting, Father Byrne, and I think I would like to have the Commission ask you some questions. Possibly with your experience there, there might be some interesting questions.

FR. BYRNE: I would like to mention just one little instance showing just what the Japanese think. My cook was in a streetcar one day and two Japanese soldiers were standing over her and hanging onto the straps and they got to talking and one asked: "How long were you out?" "I was in China on the continent for four years. How about yourself?" "I was out five years. They were pretty tough years." And the first Jap said: "Yes, judging by what has happened since the American soldiers landed, we should have surrendered long ago." Now, that was two returned soldiers. And a Japanese one day was describing to me what he thought of the American troops. The common troops that landed first were a different type than the chaps that go out now. They realize there is no danger. At any rate, this Japanese was trying to



tell me what he thought of the conduct of the American troops. Of course here and there you had your exceptions but they have sense not to judge the whole general body by the exceptions. He was talking Japanese and looking, searching for an adjective to describe what he thought of those American troops who came in there. He said: "Those American troops, they were--they were--they were Kami." "Kami" means divine. It is the word they apply to the divinity of the Emperor. That was his tribute to the American troops because it doesn't mean divinity at all. It just means very superior being. When you speak of the divinity of the Emperor you mean that the Emperor is divine--Oh surely. But when you ask what he means by "divinity" he is confused. He doesn't know what he means by it. He really means a very superior being. That is all. Are there any questions?

MR. MAKIN: How was the treatment, Father, of other members of your clergy in Japan? Was the treatment meted to you of common circumstance to others as well?

FR. BYRNE: No, I think I was unusually fortunate. As I say, owing to having been given the credit for constructing this tuberculosis sanitarium, they left me alone. Well, I got three telegrams through the Red Cross but I wasn't allowed to send any reply. I broke a tooth once and I was refused permission to go to a dentist. However, I went on the Q.T. However, they let me alone. These three policemen did come every day and spent hours--pretty near every day--some were there every day. But they were quite decent. Now, near Kobe there were several hundred interned and one of them now is in New York, Father Spa (?). They suf-



ferred quite a bit for some months. Under the first man in charge they couldn't even go into the rooms and take things they had. Then they got a man in charge who practically left them alone. And so they weathered it pretty well. I know many of the prisoners got awful treatment, but in the Kobe internment camp they seemed to have made out pretty well.

MR. GRAVES: Was there any notable oppression of the Japanese Christian communities during the war?

FR. BYRNE: No. The congregations were scattered by a government order sending men to different factories, you see, but the churches themselves were left quite open and quite unhampered. I am speaking for the Catholic Church. I presume it is the same for the others. But, of course, I was bottled up in my little rectory but the main church down in Kyoto was quite open and I know all through Japan there was no slightest restraint put upon religion. They left religion alone. On the other hand a certain Bishop of Osaka, Bishop Kagushi (?) was drafted as a private and set to scrubbing floors out at \_\_\_\_\_ for six months. But that was a matter of military drafting. The church itself had no restriction at all.

DR. KOO: When the man in the street complained about not surrendering in time, did he tribute any blame to the Emperor?

FR. BYRNE: No, not the slightest. They seemed to absolve the Emperor from personal blame. That shows, of course, that they don't consider him divine in our sense. But they say the Army, the Navy is deceiving the Emperor. They admit he can be deceived. They have



a real affection for that Emperor, and it is based on the conviction~~///~~they have. The Japanese word for nation is \_\_\_\_\_, which means national family, and to them the national family is at the same time the daddy and the children and daddy is the Emperor and the citizens are the children. They have a feeling that since the same dynasty has been in charge from the dawn of history, they have a feeling which they couldn't put into words that so long as the daddy is there with the children their national life will continue. They feel if the Emperor were to be dethroned they would be like orphans. They have that feeling. They are of the conviction that they have weathered many difficulties up to now and if they can continue to live as a unit, as a family unit with daddy and the children, then no matter what may be their ups and downs and calamities, they will continue to live as a nation. But if they lost the Emperor, what will happen to them as a nation? I think personally they will be something like Korea--every man is going in a different direction. Thank you for this privilege.

GEN. MCCOY: Thank you very much, Father. It has been most interesting to have you take this interest and time to help us in understanding the human problems.

I had for the first time an opportunity this morning to discuss the broad affairs of the Commission with the new Secretary of State, and find that he has already shown considerable interest and once more assured me that he would like to come up before he goes to Moscow, to sit in with the Commission in one of our sessions and has asked me to <sup>keep him</sup> reminded of that each week until he is able to come.



(The meeting convened formally at 10:55 A.M.)

GEN. MCCOY: We will now open our session.

ITEM 1 - APPROVAL OF THE MINUTES OF THE 44th MEETING

GEN. MCCOY: I put before you the minutes of the previous meeting. Are there any corrections or changes indicated? If it is your pleasure the minutes will be made a matter of record.

ITEM 2 - DELIVERY OF REPARATIONS GOODS IN JAPAN  
(FEC-094/2)

GEN. MCCOY: FEC-094/2 is a proposed policy statement as amended by the Commission on 6 February. The Chinese position was reserved. Dr. Koo?

DR. KOO: Mr. Chairman, as I expected I have received, have heard from my Government again and I am authorized to vote for the paper. But I should add, according to the wishes of my Government, that they consent to this paper in a spirit of cooperation and in the very earnest hope that considered efforts will be continued to be made by the Commission for the purpose of expediting a settlement of the reparations question as a whole.

GEN. MCCOY: Well--I think that I can assure the Commission that that will now be done with the full information to the Commission as to the successive steps, and this item now before us, Delivery of Reparations Goods in Japan, is one of the first steps. Before finishing with this important paper, my attention is called to a typographical or mechanical mistake which, in line two, reads in the paper before you "with the dismantling", and I am informed that that word "the", the qualifying word "the" was not in the original paper and should be deleted. Is there any objection to that



on the part of the delegates? If not, I will assume that the paper with the qualifying remarks of the Chinese Ambassador now meets full approval. Am I justified in that assumption? It seems to be so and the paper in question is a policy paper of the Commission, with the deletion of the word "the" in the third line so that it will now read "with dismantling, packing, transporting to a port..."

ITEM 3 - ASSURED PRODUCTION CAPACITY LEVELS FOR JAPAN (FEC-083/2 -/3)

GEN. MCCOY: Another important step in which it might be described in two papers, FEC-083/2 and /3. FEC-083/2 is an amendment proposed by the Soviet representative. I believe the paper otherwise received the approval of all concerned. That amendment was not acted upon at the last session, as I remember. It was proposed by the Soviet representative for consideration and informal discussion which has not yet been finished. However, in the consideration on the part of my Government, I am informed that <sup>in</sup> the screening of it by the United States Government there was a suggestion made for the consideration of the Commission in the Assured Production Capacity Levels for Japan. The Soviet amendment was inserted in two paragraphs--"The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers..." Now, this was proposed by the Soviet representative--"...upon consultation with the Allied Council for Japan..." being inserted between the words "Allied Powers" and "may designate". In paragraph a this same amendment was inserted. That was instead of "in the judgment of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers". That is crossed out?



DR. BLAKESLEE: Yes

GEN. MCCOY: The amendment, as submitted into this paragraph a by the Soviet representative, would then read: "The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, upon consultation with the Allied Council for Japan, decides that..." That is the amendment. "...decides that operation of these plants and establishments individually and collectively is practical in terms with current needs for their product and in terms with such conditioning factors as the availability of raw materials, power and labor." In that paragraph also the words "in the judgment of" were to be deleted. Is that a correct statement, Admiral?

ADM. RAMISHVILI: Yes sir.

GEN. MCCOY: That is the proposal of the Soviet representative. Upon consultation with my own Government, we are able to also, in part, accept the idea, but in different words, which I put before you as follows: Instead of saying "upon consultation with the Allied Council for Japan", the proposal of my Government would be, to go as far as possible in meeting the ideas and wishes of the Soviet representative, to propose the following slight change: "upon such consultation with the Allied Council as is required by the Council's Terms of Reference". We also make that alternative suggestion for the like amendment proposed by the Soviet representative in paragraph a, so that there are two proposals there either one of which, if adopted, would result in the acceptance by the Commission of the very important next step in the reparations problem. I would hope that this alternative suggestion may be considered. Having



stated the two amendments and before we go further, I will ask for a recess of a few moments to have an off-the-record talk with the Admiral. We will recess for the moment, and Dr. Blakeslee, will you and the Admiral take a little stroll together?

(The meeting recessed at 11:05 A.M.)

(The meeting reconvened at 11:10 A.M.)

GEN. MCCOY: The session is now open for further consideration of the paper with two proposed amendments. I am conscious of the fact that at the last meeting the Chinese Ambassador had a suggestion from his point of view that I would like to also have considered in our talks and efforts to find a formula. Dr. Koo, do you wish to refer to that or do you wish me to read from the minutes?

DR. KOO: Yes, if you will read from the minutes. It is on page three of the minutes.

GEN. MCCOY: At the last meeting, the minutes of the following suggestion by Dr. Koo, representing China, that "Observance of the Terms of Reference by the Supreme Commander could also be taken for granted. He thought, however, that the position of the Soviet representative might be met by rewording the first two lines of paragraph one a to read: 'In the opinion of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, acting in accordance with the Terms of Reference, operation of these plants and establishments...' Such a rewording, he thought, would call attention to the Terms of Reference but would obviate the question of whether consultation by the Supreme Commander was obligatory in regard to each order issued by the Supreme Commander. He was personally



prepared to accept the paragraph as it stood in FEC-083/2, but suggested the above rewording as a means of meeting the Soviet position." Is that a correct statement, Sir?

DR. KOO: Yes, Mr. Chairman. I wish to add that I have no--this suggestion was made simply to meet the difficulty which the Soviet representative felt that he was confronting and, as I said last time, I was prepared and I am still prepared to accept the original wording of the text as it stands. And now, with reference to the new revised formula proposed by you on behalf of the United States Government, it seems to me that it is very much in the same spirit in line with the suggestion I made and so far as the Chinese delegation is concerned we are prepared to accept the revised American formula, if that would be equally acceptable to the Soviets.

GEN. MCCOY: Are there any other Commissioners who care to comment on this important paper?

MR. GRAVES: Mr. Chairman, I wonder whether the insertion of either of these phrases, either the Chinese or the one you read out now, would not lead to further delay in almost every paper because it would seem that each paper would have to be considered and decided upon whether it contained a matter of substance, and in every paper that has to come up for decision it seems to lead to still further delays and would therefore be objectionable. My Government would very much prefer the wording as the original stood.

ADM. RAMISHVILI: Mr. Chairman, ~~in~~ the informal conversations, which you already have mentioned, and the discussions which took place in the Commission last meeting and today's exchange of opinions were very help-



ful to me. But I took the decision to refer to my Government the wording of this phrase after they ~~were~~<sup>are</sup> made officially. So I was awaiting your formal new wording of this and, as I said, we will undertake every necessary step to convey to my Government not only the proposals of your and Chinese representative but all discussions which took place here in the Commission, Mr. Chairman, and do my best to report back to the Commission, probably the next meeting the earliest time.

GEN. MCCOY: I take it then that you would like to have this postponed until you hear from your Government.

ADM. RAMISHVILI: Yes.

ITEM 4 - INTERIM PRINCIPLES FOR RESTITUTION OF IDENTIFIABLE PROPERTY CONFISCATED IN JAPAN FROM ALLIED NATIONALS (FEC-011/23)

GEN. MCCOY: The same phrasing and general discussion, Admiral, I take it, applies in your responsibility to Item 4?

ADM. RAMISHVILI: The next paper--yes.

ITEM 5 - SUPPLY OF FOOD FOR CIVILIAN RELIEF IN JAPAN (FEC-026/10)

GEN. MCCOY: Item 5, Supply of Food for Civilian Relief in Japan, FEC-026/10, I am obliged to continue for final decision of my Government, which I had hoped most hopefully would be given to you today. But I am informed that the State Department will not be ready to do that and I once more postpone that for the next meeting.



ITEM 6 - PRESS ARTICLE RELATIVE TO THE FAR EASTERN  
COMMISSION POLICIES ON THE JAPANESE  
CONSTITUTION (FEC-103, MI-075)

GEN. MCCOY: The same thing applies to Item 6.

MR. REUCHLIN: Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question with regard to Item 6. As we have Mr. Acheson here, does he have any comment on Item 6, because several questions have been asked about that?

GEN. MCCOY: I would feel that that could be taken up with him directly on Monday.

ITEM 7 - THE WORK OF THE COMMISSION (FEC-105/2,  
SC-049/2)

GEN. MCCOY: Item 7, The Work of the Commission, is continuing on the agenda for further consideration. I believe that was considered by the Steering Committee, was it not, Sir Carl, at the last meeting?

SIR CARL BERENDSEN: I was unfortunately absent at the last meeting of the Steering Committee.

DR. BLAKESLEE: Not this paper, but there was some exchange of views.

GEN. MCCOY: I was thinking of another paper. This is your paper that is still being considered with the other, and very earnestly both by my Government and my assistants, and I feel already that much of the intention of the paper is in the process of being ironed out. I am sure it will be satisfactory when we get through with it.

ITEM 8 - PROPOSED UNITED STATES PLAN FOR REPARATIONS CONFERENCE (FEC-081 series)

GEN. MCCOY: Item 8 is in the process of being solved. To go to Item 8, which we have been very silent on before the Commission for some time while the Depart-



ment has been consulting with your diplomatic representatives on the proposed plan for a reparations conference, like myself the United States Government sometimes changes its mind. If you will remember the consultations between the State Department and your diplomatic representatives was concerned with the principles under which advance transfers of Japanese reparations may be accomplished, and it was proposed some time ago and it received the earnest consideration of your governments and the reply of most of them, on further consideration I am authorized to throw this problem back into the Far Eastern Commission with the earnest urge for action, so that the United States Government will not have to take the immediate emergency directive outside the consideration of the full Commission. This paper will be circulated this afternoon. The position of the United States on this most earnest matter to help break the jam that we've been in, and I have consulted with the Chairman of the Reparations Committee, Major Plimsoll, and he asks me to call a meeting of the Reparations Committee to begin immediate and continuous consideration of this important problem tomorrow morning at 10:30 A.M. Is that correct, Major?

MAJOR PLIMSOLL: Yes, that is correct.

GEN. MCCOY: I implore the utmost Christian charity on the part of all of you for meeting this most urgent condition in the Far East, especially for the countries which were invaded by Japan.

**ITEM 9 - REPORT ON JAPANESE EXTERNAL ASSETS (FEC-072)**

GEN. MCCOY: Item 9 is continued on the agenda.



**ITEM 10 - REMARKS BY THE REVEREND P. J. BYRNE, M.M.**

GEN. MCCOY: We have already heard from the Reverend Father, so that I can almost give the benediction myself.

**ITEM 11 - OTHER BUSINESS**

GEN. MCCOY: Is there any other items of business to put before us?

ADM. RAMISHVILI: Mr. Chairman, shall we assume that the meeting on Monday at three o'clock will be a meeting without further notice of it?

GEN. MCCOY: It's not a meeting of the Commission. Any Commissioner who desires to talk informally with Mr. Atcheson will have that opportunity at three o'clock next Monday afternoon in the library on the second floor.

**ITEM 12 - PRESS RELEASE**

GEN. MCCOY: There is one point about the publication of the paper passed this morning, the Delivery of Reparations Goods in Japan. Is it your wish that the normal means of publication be undertaken after the time has been given to reach SCAP? Is it your wish that this paper be published? I assume that there are no objections.

Gentlemen, we stand adjourned.

(Whereupon the meeting adjourned at 11:30 A.M.)