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Congress of the United States

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Joint Committee

on the

Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack

S. Con. Res. 27

November 17, 1946

Washington, D. C.

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VOL. III

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C O N T E N T S

TESTIMONY OF

PAGE

INGLIS, Rear Admiral T. B., and
THIELEN, Colonel Bernard

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S. Con. Res. 27

Saturday, November 17, 1945.

Congress of the United States,
Joint Committee on the Investigation of Pearl Harbor
Attack,

Washington, D. C.

The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at
10:00 a.m., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office
Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas,
Brewster and Ferguson.

Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark,
Murphy, Gearhart and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, General Counsel;
Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford and John E. Masten, of
counsel, for the joint committee.

The Chairman: The committee will be in session.

When the committee adjourned yesterday the Senator from Maine, Mr. Brewster, was on the verge of cross examining the witnesses. Senator Brewster?

The chair just announced that when we adjourned yesterday the Senator from Maine was on the verge of cross examining the witnesses. You may now proceed.

Senator Brewster: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Keefe: Mr. Chairman, I would like to hear what you said. I cannot hear you.

The Chairman: I said that when the committee adjourned yesterday the Senator from Maine was on the verge of cross examining the witnesses and that he would now proceed.

Mr. Keefe: Before he proceeds may I inquire from the Chairman? There has been a lot of inquiry directed to me. May I inquire as to whether it is contemplated to hold hearings this afternoon?

The Chairman: Well, the chair would hope not, we hope we can finish these witnesses by noon, but if we do not finish them we will try to finish them by going as late as one o'clock if necessary and not adjourn at twelve as we have been. Neither house is in session today.

Go ahead, Senator.

Senator Brewster: Admiral Inglis, covering one or two points which you have not fully developed in connection with

Witness Inglis:

Questions by Sen. Brewster

the hypothetical submarine entrance into Pearl Harbor at 4:30 on the morning of December 7th, have you any further naval theory or record to that effect? You intimated that you did not consider the maps which were shown of the so-called battle area were possible authentic. I assume that you have made some explorations of that situation.

Admiral Inglis: I cannot add anything to what I said yesterday. I am not sure that I have the map which you have just mentioned in the book of battle reports precisely identified as identical with that map that I had in mind. I am not sure that we are talking about the same map.

Senator Brewster: So when you intimated that the entry, - I saw it with my own eyes, - was not on the map, did you find another map?

Admiral Inglis: It may have been a different map than the one in that book.

Senator Brewster: Yes.

Admiral Inglis: But all I can do is repeat the general statement that I made yesterday, that the best picture or estimate that we can make from the evidence available to us is that one submarine definitely did enter Pearl Harbor.

Senator Brewster: Well, that is not a matter of anybody's opinion, is it? You got the submarine, didn't you, that you captured or sunk at the time?

Witness Inglis:

Questions by Sen. Brewster

Admiral Inglis: That is right.

Senator Brewster: So that there isn't any dispute about that.

Admiral Inglis: If the Senator will permit me, I was just reviewing what I said yesterday, which was that one submarine did definitely enter Pearl Harbor. A second one may possibly have entered Pearl Harbor but we rather think it did not.

Senator Brewster: And what became of the map which was captured with the submarine at Barbers Point?

Admiral Inglis: I think that that, or a photostatic copy of it, is in the Navy archives.

Senator Brewster: And you do not agree with the interpretation of that by the Army or FBI, or by the so-called battle report account?

Admiral Inglis: I am not personally familiar with the opinion of the Army or FBI or battle reports. My own translators, after considerable research and considerable study of the Japanese symbols on that map, have decided that the evidence tends to be against the conclusion that that submarine entered the harbor.

Senator Brewster: And what is your theory of how the submarine did enter into the harbor that actually did get in there?

Witness Inglis:

Questions by Sen. Brewster

Admiral Inglis: Well, that is in the realm of speculation, Mr. Senator, but if you wish me to speculate I would speculate that the submarine probably followed a U.S. ship through the gate, the gate having been opened for the admission of a United States naval vessel.

Senator Brewster: What are the records on the ships coming in that morning?

Admiral Inglis: We haven't got that. We tried to find it and we haven't got that and I suggest that that material could better be obtained from some of the witnesses who were present at the time.

Senator Brewster: What was the arrangement between the Army and Navy about off shore patrol, what was the understanding between them?

Admiral Inglis: I don't know what the understanding was. So far as I know there was no off shore patrol conducted by the Army. There was an off shore patrol conducted by the Navy as I have described in my previous testimony.

Senator Brewster: And what was the nature of that?

Admiral Inglis: The Navy's off shore patrol?

Senator Brewster: Yes.

Admiral Inglis: It consisted of the searches by aircraft that were shown on the charts.

Senator Brewster: I am speaking now of the routine, not

Witness Inglis:

Questions by Sen. Brewster

of the ones which you have described, but of the routine throughout the weeks or months preceding that. Were there any regulations covering that in that period?

Admiral Inglis: We did not attempt to cover that prior to the 6th of December. Our presentation only took up from the 6th of December and from then on, because that is all that was in the outline.

Senator Brewster: And you are not, then, prepared to testify as to what the understanding was between the Army and Navy as to the patrol around the waters of Hawaii?

Admiral Inglis: No, sir.

Senator Brewster: What was the range of the PBY's? What was the range of the PBY bombers?

Admiral Inglis: I am just speaking off the cuff now, but as I recall it the figure was eight hundred mile radius of action. It would be something more than twice that much for the range. They would go out eight hundred miles generally on the course followed and then back again, making a triangular track.

Senator Brewster: You had some of those PBY's there at Hawaii, did you not?

Admiral Inglis: I did not hear your question.

Senator Brewster: You had some of those PBY's there at Hawaii, did you not?

Witness Inglis:

Questions by Sen. Brewster

Admiral Inglis: Oh, yes.

Senator Brewster: How many of them, do you recall?

Admiral Inglis: I am not certain. Referring to item 12 of the Navy exhibit, at Kanehoe there was a total of 36 PBY's. At Ford Island a total of 31 -- I beg your pardon, 33.

Senator Brewster: 33. That makes a total of 69 PBY's.

Admiral Inglis: I believe that is substantially correct, yes, sir.

Senator Brewster: Those were suitable at that time for this long range patrol?

Admiral Inglis: That type of plane was suitable for that type of patrol, yes, sir.

Senator Brewster: How long have you been in Intelligence, Admiral?

Admiral Inglis: How long have I been in Intelligence?

Senator Brewster: Yes.

Admiral Inglis: Since the 1st of June of this year.

Senator Brewster: Has your experience before that been any in that field or in operations?

Admiral Inglis: More in operations and communications, general service that most of us have, no unusual type of duty, except that I was a specialist in communications for a while.

Senator Brewster: And it would not require any special training to know that the Japanese had in previous wars in-

Witness Inglis:

Questions by Sen. Brewster

Engaged in these sneak attacks, would it?

Admiral Inglis: I believe that is a matter of history.

Senator Brewster: So that if there were likely to be trouble between the Japanese and the United States provoked by the United States it was altogether likely that it would be started in that way, wouldn't that be right?

Admiral Inglis: I think that would be a safe conclusion to draw, yes, sir.

Senator Brewster: And that it is rather accepted in military and naval strategy to aim at the jugular?

Admiral Inglis: I did not get the last part.

Senator Brewster: To aim at the jugular. You try to strike at the strongest spot, where you can do the most damage?

Admiral Inglis: Well, I --

Senator Brewster: Let me put it this way: Hasn't that been what the Japs have always done? In their previous wars didn't they always hit the enemy where they would do the enemy the most damage at one time in those sneak attacks?

Admiral Inglis: Of course, that is a pretty broad, general statement, Senator. I guess I could agree with you as a general statement.

Senator Brewster: Yes. So that if there were to be trouble it would be reasonable to anticipate that it might

Witness Inglis:

Questions by Sen. Brewster

come in Pearl Harbor, would that be a fair statement?

Admiral Inglis: I am afraid you are going out of my field now, sir.

Senator Brewster: Well, you are the Director of Intelligence for the Navy, so you are assumed to have a certain competency in this field. You are handling this responsibility now and you must be looking to the future.

Admiral Inglis: Well, I feel flattered at your compliment, Senator.

Senator Brewster: Well, I am quite serious. I have a very high respect for your accomplishments, I think you have exhibited them already and we are trying to learn, of course, by experience to avoid trouble hereafter.

What I am coming to is this, that if there were any reason to anticipate trouble at Pearl Harbor, where most of our Pacific fleet was concentrated, most of its striking power, it would have been possible by the use of the PBY patrol bombers readily to have ascertained whether any striking force or carrier force were approaching, would it not, by a patrol?

Admiral Inglis: I am not sure whether the number of planes available for that type of search at that time was sufficient to allow a continual search all day every day.

Senator Brewster: Well, would it have required anything more than an eight hundred mile patrol from Pearl Harbor over

Witness Inglis:

Questions by Sen. Brewster

the areas which were not covered by your shipping each day to have made it impossible for a hostile fleet to have approached?

Admiral Inglis: I think again you are getting a little bit out of my field and more into the field of aviation officers, but from my broad general experience as a naval officer I would say that probably that number of planes was not sufficient to cover all possible avenues of approach of a hostile force twenty-four --

Senator Brewster: That is not what I asked you and you are intelligent enough to answer my question.

Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, I am going to object to the questions of the Senator from Maine.

The Chairman: Let the Senator from Maine proceed in order.

Admiral Inglis: Will the Senator please repeat the question?

Senator Brewster: You ask the question. Read it.

(Whereupon the question referred to was read by the reporter as follows:

"Well, would it have required anything more than an eight hundred mile patrol from Pearl Harbor over the areas which were not covered by your shipping each day to have made it impossible for a hostile

Witness Inglis:

Questions by Sen. Brewster

fleet to have approached?")

Admiral Inglis: I beg your pardon. I did not understand the question.

Senator Brewster: I thought you did not.

Admiral Inglis: The answer to that question is "Yes", with this qualification, that again speaking now in general terms, the areas which would be hypothetically covered by your own shipping could probably not be counted upon. In other words, to carry out such a thorough search as the one you have in mind we would have to cover almost the whole 360 degree arc.

Senator Brewster: Well, that may be true, Admiral, but isn't it also true that, exactly as the Japanese planned, they would not be likely to approach through areas where our shipping were frequenting the courses?

Admiral Inglis: That is right.

Senator Brewster: They would be desirous of avoiding us.

Admiral Inglis: That is correct.

Senator Brewster: So that if at the time we abandoned our shipping on the northern route patrols had been carried out on the northern area, with the limited range of the battle planes from carriers, it would have been, let us say, at least exceedingly difficult for the Jap force to have approached?

Witness Inglis:

Questions by Sen. Brewster

Admiral Inglis: That is correct.

Senator Brewster: And, of course, that is one of the things which I think is of serious concern and in my visits to Pearl Harbor before and after it occurred there was always great discussion, the Army feeling that if it had been permitted to carry out these patrols with their long range bombers they could have detected this and the Navy holding the Army strictly accountable for the defense of Hawaii; but, as I understand, - and I will ask the counsel or you to have this verified, - it was a matter of agreement and orders that the Army were not to participate in a patrol beyond a very limited area, a hundred miles or so, I believe, while the Navy were to take care of the longer range patrol because of the existing controversy at that period which which, I am sure, both of you gentlemen are thoroughly familiar, as to the control of long range aircraft and the function and the mission which they were to perform.

Mr. Mitchell: It may help the Senator if I say that at a very early stage of the case, in fact, within the next day or two if we take the normal course, we will produce all the defense plans that show the respective duties of the Army and Navy about that reconnaissance and we have a very splendid document here prepared by General Martin, I think, in the summer of 1941 that answers every question that you

Witness Inglis:

Questions by Sen. Brewster

have asked about the patrols that could have been carried on, how many planes were required to do it and quite a complete picture of the thing that you are interested in.

We have that and it is coming in with the defense plans which show the respective duties of the Army and Navy and what was required in the way of equipment to execute it.

Senator Brewster: Well, I should be glad to have that. I did not assume that this was a matter which was in controversy in any way, as to what were the Army and Navy arrangements, so I think it is a little regrettable that the Army and Navy did not agree to give us what were the actual arrangements, unless it was at the suggestion of counsel.

Mr. Mitchell: Well, these gentlemen were only giving the facts as to the actual conditions on the day of the attack and the available equipment, and the Army and Navy plans for defense prepared during the summer of 1941, over the months prior to Pearl Harbor, being a series of plans, each of them all arranged, with these things in them that you are interested in and you will get a more accurate story from those than you would from possibly a witness who was called on another matter and has not studied it lately.

Senator Brewster: Very well, I will be very happy to waive the presentation of that until the proper time.

Admiral, I want to take one other phase, which is all I

Witness Inglis

Questions by Sen. Brewster

care, I think, to examine you about, and that is the matter of the distribution of the fleet.

You have realized, I presume, in your position that that has been one of the matters that has been much agitated in connection with this matter, as to the allocation of the fleets between the Atlantic and the Pacific, have you not, Admiral? There has been considerable discussion as to whether or not there was a good disposition.

Admiral Inglis: There has been considerable discussion, yes, sir.

Senator Brewster: And also as to the reasons for it and where the orders were developed, so that speaking from that background and your position you would gather also that that is one of the questions that will very likely be considerably discussed in this case.

Admiral Inglis: I would expect that.

Senator Brewster: Now, when the matter came up you spoke of the Pacific Fleet as being two-thirds of the Atlantic Fleet in strength.

Admiral Inglis: That is numerical strength, yes.

Senator Brewster: That is based on the unit. And you were then asked further by Senator Ferguson about the allocation of the units. I want to read you your evidence and ask you your comment on it. I read quotations from your

Witness Inglis:

Questions by Sen. Brewster

evidence on page 172:

"Admiral, you said" -- this is Senator Ferguson speaking -- "Admiral, you said that about two-thirds of our fleet was in the Pacific; is that correct?"

"Admiral Inglis: No, sir. I said that the numerical strength of the Pacific Fleet was two-thirds that of the Atlantic Fleet. The Pacific Fleet was smaller than the Atlantic Fleet."

And then after some other colloquies turning to page 173: Senator Ferguson again.

"Well, how many capital battleships were in the Atlantic?"

"Admiral Inglis: In the Atlantic Fleet were 6 battleships. In the Pacific Fleet were 9 battleships. Six in the Atlantic and nine in the Pacific."

Now, at that point it seems to me, Admiral, you were a little less than careful. Your first statement was absolutely correct. Your addition was absolutely incorrect and it occurs to me that hearing of this colloquy you must have been rather well aware of what Senator Ferguson, at least, was asking.

I will read the next page, after some further colloquies:

"Senator Ferguson: Now, how many battleships were in the Atlantic?"

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Witness Inglis:

Questions by Sen. Brewster

"Admiral Inglis: Six."

On the basis of the subsequent evidence which was finally extracted from you that statement was unqualifiedly false, is that not correct?

Admiral Inglis: I think the Senator is drawing some conclusions with respect to the --

Senator Brewster: I am quoting your testimony before this tribunal and that statement, as you have now admitted after we finally elicited the information, was unqualifiedly false.

The Chairman: If the Senator will permit --

Senator Brewster: The Chairman can do anything he likes. I am making a statement of fact.

The Chairman: Well, the chair feels that this inquiry ought to be conducted with decorum and respect and for a member of this committee to charge a witness with making an unqualifiedly false statement seems to the chair, whether it seems to other members of this committee proper, to be out of order.

Senator Brewster: I will continue the quotation:

"Senator Ferguson: Well, I read from Battle Report, Pearl Harbor to Coral Sea, which is supposed to be an official record, page 6:

"In the Atlantic there were eight battleships."

Witness Inglis:

Questions by Sen. Brewster

"Reading from page 6.

"Admiral Inglis: I can't recognize that book as being official. I have here a list of the specific ships" --

I go on:

"Admiral Inglis: I personally still don't recognize that as being official, except what you have told me now, but, if I may, Senator Ferguson, I will read the list of ships that were in the Atlantic Fleet, and the list of those in the Pacific Fleet."

Still it is apparently contemplated that we were wishing to discover the truth.

"Senator Ferguson: Yes."

You then proceeded to read the list of the two fleets. I want to go now to another page and quote. This has gone on now for five pages trying to extract the simple facts as to the disposition of our fleets, of our battleships, which is what Senator Ferguson repeatedly asked you, and he finally, and I might say at my suggestion, because I was completely bewildered by what you were trying to tell us, on page 176 Senator Ferguson says:

"How many battleships did we have in December, 1941?"

"Admiral Inglis: Fifteen, sir.

There again is a statement which, on your subsequent

Witness Inglis:

Questions by Sen. Brewster

evidence when you finally admitted the existence of the Washington and the North Carolina ready for their cruises and shakedowns, is a statement that does not correspond with what up in our part of the country would be considered as the truth.

Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

The Chairman: No, let the Senator proceed without interruption.

Senator Brewster: "Senator Ferguson: Fifteen?"

"Admiral Inglis: Fifteen that were attached to the Fleets. There were two or three that had just been completed, or were on their shakedown duty."

At last we are permitted to find out what is the answer to this conundrum.

"Senator Ferguson: Where were they?"

You then testified as to the Washington and the Nex Mexico on shakedown in the Atlantic.

All I have to say is this, Admiral, and I say it in all charity. I have served on the Naval Affairs Committee during my period in Congress; I have been interested in the Navy; we have the Navy up in Maine in large measure and everybody else is interested in it and, of course, for four years we have been dealing very definitely with preparedness and defense and I speak not only from observation but the thoughts

1918

Witness Inglis:

question: by Sen. Brewster

of most of the members of our committee involved in that task
 and of its distinguished chairman, President Truman, in re-
 gretting; profoundly that there has developed an attitude of
 mind on the part, particularly of the Navy, that does not
 seem to recognize the rights and interests of this Congress
 to receive full, frank and fair answers to the questions that
 have come up and I say particularly in the process of this
 hearing for yourself and your fellow officers and for the fu-
 ture welfare of the Navy, which is the great problem in this
 country in building up the confidence that it wants to com-
 mand, by a freer and a franker approach to the aims of myself
 and other members of the committee it would do much to increase
 that confidence that I think we all want to establish.

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Witness Inglis

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Senator Lucas: Is this going to be a lecture school,
Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman: Whatever it is, it will speak for itself.
Go ahead. Admiral, if you want to comment on that dis-
sertation you are at liberty to do so.

Admiral Inglis: May I comment in full, sir?

The Chairman: Yes.

Admiral Inglis: Mr. Chairman, the Senator from Maine
has impugned my honesty and my motives. I resent that. I
gave the facts to the best of my knowledge and belief.

The point he has brought up about the WASHINGTON and
NORTH CAROLINA, and the other ships which had not joined the
fleets was fully covered in a statement which I made yesterday
afternoon. I said in that statement that of course you might
count battleships or other ships which were still in the
blueprint stage, you might count battleships or other ships
still in the building ways, you might count battleships or
other ships which had been launched but which had not been
completed, you might count battleships or other ships which
had been commissioned but had not joined the fleet, but I
was counting the ships that had joined the fleet, and I thought
I made that quite clear in my statement.

I have done my very best in this presentation to give
all the facts to the best of my knowledge and ability. I

Witness Thielen

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1 don't believe the Navy, and certainly not the organization,
2 is attempting to withhold any evidence whatsoever. I repeatedly
3 stated I was authorized for the Navy to state that we would
4 produce any facts that we were asked to produce.
5

6 Senator Brewster: I think the record will speak for
7 itself.

8 The Chairman: Are there any further questions, Senator?

9 Senator Brewster: No.

10 The Chairman: Does any other member of the committee
11 wish to ask Admiral Inglis any questions?

12 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman.

13 The Chairman: The Senator from Michigan.

14 Senator Ferguson: I want to ask the Colonel some questions.

15 Colonel, I show you the exhibit that is in evidence here,
16 this map of the radar.

17 Colonel Thielen: Will you put the radar plot up, Captain
18 Barnes?

19 Senator Ferguson: Was the chart that is on the board here
20 made from the exhibit that you have?

21 Colonel Thielen: It was made from an exhibit which I
22 believe was identical.

23 Senator Ferguson: Have you looked for the original chart-
24 ing done of the Opans Station?

25 Colonel Thielen: Yes, sir, a radiogram was dispatched to

Witness Thielen

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

the Hawaiian Department since the last meeting asking for the original plots from all radar stations on 7 December, 1941.

Senator Ferguson: I show you a photostat that is Exhibit 3-B in evidence, and I ask you what that is.

Mr. Gesell: Exhibit 3-B in evidence where?

Mr. Keefe: Mr. Chairman, 3-B of what?

Senator Ferguson: The exhibit itself does not show, but I am of the opinion it is of the Army Exhibits. Does counsel agree with that? I shall just identify it from the mark on the paper itself.

The Vice Chairman: Mr. Chairman, just as a matter of information, I understood the Senator to say it was in evidence.

Senator Ferguson: I was reading what was on the sheet. That is on the sheet.

The Chairman: That was a part of the Army file which was yesterday put in evidence along with the Navy white folder.

Senator Ferguson: No, no.

Mr. Mitchell: Let me clear that up. The document which the Senator just produced is not in evidence in this hearing.

Senator Ferguson: That is correct.

Mr. Mitchell: I understood him referring to it as having been in evidence in some other investigation.

Senator Ferguson: I merely read off the identification numbers, what is on the blueprint itself. It is only for the

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Witness Thielen

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

purpose of identification. That expression I used is on the sheet itself.

The Chairman: If there is a memorandum on the sheet showing it is in evidence, it ought to show in what proceeding it is in evidence.

Senator Ferguson: It does not show that. I would like to make that clear for the record. Will the Colonel read what is on the corner of the sheet so the record will be clear?

Colonel Thielen: I see the statement "Exhibit 3-B in evidence".

Senator Ferguson: That is exactly what I read. That is for identification purposes.

Have you examined it?

Colonel Thielen: For the first time now.

Senator Ferguson: Will you compare it with the board and with the exhibit now in evidence?

Colonel Thielen: I have compared it, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Are they alike?

Colonel Thielen: Exhibit 3-B, so-called, appears to include the information on the board.

Senator Ferguson: That is not what I asked you. Are they alike?

The Chairman: Let the witness explain in what particular they differ, if they do differ.

Witness Thielen

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

Senator Ferguson: Cannot I have an answer to my question first? Are they alike?

The Chairman: He was in the process of answering your question, Senator, when you interrupted.

Go ahead and give your answer.

Colonel Thielen: The Exhibit 3-B in evidence, so-called, appears to include the plots referred to on the board and on the exhibit which you handed me previously, sir, and in addition appears to have other plots which were made later in the day.

Senator Ferguson: Now will you tell us how they differ? Will you give us all that is on the exhibit that I gave you this morning, Exhibit 3-B in evidence, the way it is marked?

Colonel Thielen: It contains numerous additional plots.

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Witness Thielen

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

Senator Ferguson: Will you give them to us?

Colonel Thielen: It would be very difficult to do that orally, sir. I see pips and plots all over the area.

Senator Ferguson: You mean to say you cannot give us any of them? Are your eyes not able to read them?

Colonel Thielen: Yes, sir. I start up in the upper left-hand corner and I see a spot --

Senator Ferguson: What is the time marking?

Colonel Thielen: 10:3 -- and the final digit is illegible. Below that is 10:35. Below that is 10, and then illegible and the digit 3. Below that is 10:30. Below that is 10:2 and an illegible digit. Below that is 10:27 and an illegible digit. About an inch below that is a spot with illegible digits. Below that about a half inch is a spot 10:31.

Senator Ferguson: Now, are not they illegible just simply because the photostat is not clear?

Colonel Thielen: I believe that is true, sir.

Senator Ferguson: All right, go ahead.

Colonel Thielen: That appears to conclude that plot of the 10:00 series.

Senator Ferguson: Give us the other plots.

Colonel Thielen: Which are you referring to?

Senator Ferguson: On the map, that is not on the one

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WARD A PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Thielen

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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shown to us.

Colonel Thielen: About 3 inches due north of Kaena Point, I find a single spot, and to the southeast is a dotted line, about an inch, and another spot surrounded by numerals, some of them illegible, one of which I make out as 7:50 or 7:56.

Senator Ferguson: They are to the left of what is on the chart here, 7:39?

Colonel Thielen: It would be in the neighborhood of a point on the chart marked 6:59.

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

Colonel Thielen: Below the broad arrow.

Senator Ferguson: What is the mark on this chart I gave you? 6:30?

Colonel Thielen: I read 7:50 here.

Senator Ferguson: 7:50.

Colonel Thielen: There is no indication, however, that that is the same plot as the one on the board.

Senator Ferguson: Now what else is on that chart that is not on the one on the board?

Colonel Thielen: There are --

Senator Ferguson (interposing): I am talking about the Opana chart, 3-B in evidence, so marked.

Colonel Thielen: Yes, this is marked "Opana" down in

Witness Thielen

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

the lower left-hand corner. Out to the east-northeast -- or west-northwest of Kaena Point is a series -- I should estimate the distance on this scale of about 50 miles -- is a series of arrows pointing out spots, no one of which, as near as I can make out, has a time indicated on it. South of that, in the general area off the Hawaiian Coast of the Island are a number of white dots which may be caused by faults in the photostat, or may be plots.

Senator Ferguson: Just there it is very important then to get all of the facts that we should have the original instrument and not be depending upon a photostat which can be so defective that you cannot read it; is that right?

Colonel Thielen: Since the last meeting, sir, the War Department has dispatched a radiogram to the Hawaiian Department asking for the originals of the plots of all stations on 7 December, 1941.

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Witness Thielen

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: Can you tell us why you produced the plot you did and did not give us the one in the Army Board records? I understood the evidence was to be evidence not disputed, that you were to bring in. How do you account for that?

Colonel Thielen: For one thing, sir, this appears to include all plots made during the day and not those made during the attack, with which I was dealing.

Senator Ferguson: Why did you bring in your 10:39 then?

Colonel Thielen: Because that occurs on Exhibit 4, which I clearly specified was the one from which I had taken the chart.

Senator Ferguson: Is not Exhibit 4 a plot made up by an individual and not the original evidence?

Colonel Thielen: Both plots are authenticated by Lieutenant Colonel Murphy.

Senator Ferguson: I ask you whether the one I gave you, 3-B, the Opana photostat, is not purporting to be from an original?

Colonel Thielen: That appears to be, sir.

Senator Ferguson: All right. Now I show you another photostat, Exhibit 3-A in evidence -- and I take it for granted that means it was in evidence at the Army Board, and I just use that for identification purposes -- and ask you if you

Witness Thielen

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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ever saw that?

Colonel Thielen: Yes, sir. I have not only seen that but I have had it reproduced as an Army Exhibit on page 8.

Senator Ferguson: That one is produced. Did you use that information on the chart that you gave us?

Colonel Thielen: Not on the chart of the Opana Station, sir, because the chart to which you have last referred is not the chart of the Opana Station.

Senator Ferguson: I will ask you to read the notes down in the corner and see whether part of it is not of the Opana Station.

Colonel Thielen: This says "Detector Station records at Kaena, Opana, Kaala, Shafter, Kokohead on 7 December 1941 prior to 7:00 A.M."

Senator Ferguson: Did you think we only wanted, in your verbal evidence here, the Opana Station?

Colonel Thielen: As I pointed out, Senator, the chart to which you refer was offered in evidence as Army Exhibit page 8.

Senator Ferguson: I realize that. Why did not you include the showings on this map?

Colonel Thielen: The only significance I see in this chart is that it confirms the plots earlier in the day of the Opana Station, indicating that that station was tracking

Witness Thielen

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

correctly.

Senator Ferguson: Do we understand then that we have received here on the board a corrected chart?

Colonel Thielen: By no means.

Senator Ferguson: Now I will ask you to look at page 116, that you gave me the other day as the page from which you got the evidence on this radar, about what Elliott was doing. Do you find anything on that? That is the Roberts evidence. You gave me page 116 as the report as I told you I could not find it in the report because the report did not have so many pages and then you said it was in the evidence.

Now I show you page 116 of the evidence and ask you if you find anything on that?

Colonel Thielen: I will check my documentation on that, sir. It is entirely possible that my documentation is incorrect, but I read them correctly. It is Exhibit S of the Roberts Report, page 116, affidavit of Private McDonald.

Senator Ferguson: Have you got the affidavit of Private McDonald?

Colonel Thielen: It is in the files of the War Department, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: How could he give what Elliott was going when he was the telephone operator down at the Center? Why would you rely upon his affidavit?

Witness Thielen

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

Colonel Thielen: Let me check that to see just what that referred to, sir. I see that that evidence refers to the location of the aircraft as picked up by Private Elliott and Private Lockard, which was presumably reported to Private McDonald.

Senator Ferguson: Now might I inquire from counsel whether or not they have the affidavit in the Roberts Report?

Mr. Mitchell: Well, I haven't them in court this minute.

Senator Ferguson: I am asking you whether you have them.

Mr. Mitchell: We have the Roberts record, if that is what you mean, all the exhibits in the War and Navy that the Roberts Commission is presumed to have had.

Senator Ferguson: Will counsel try and locate that affidavit for the committee?

Mr. Mitchell: My chief assistant suggested that you may have the Roberts record. We were passing these things out.

Senator Ferguson: I do not have the affidavit. I did not know there were any affidavits until the witness has been giving affidavits.

Mr. Mitchell: We will look up our records and see who has that information. What is it exactly you want, Senator Ferguson?

Senator Ferguson: I want the affidavit in the Roberts investigation.

Mr. Mitchell: All the affidavits?

Witness Thielen

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 Senator Ferguson: All the affidavits in the Roberts in-
3 vestigation.

4 Colonel Thielen: I learn that my citation in my document
5 was incorrect originally, page 116. I should have cited
6 volume 2 of the Roberts Report, pages 66 and 67, General Short's
7 testimony, as to the facts mentioned.

8 Senator Ferguson: All right. Now on this map that you
9 have given us the Opana Station shows 6:45, 6:48, 6:50, 6:51,
10 6:58, 6:48, 6:51, 6:52, and 6:59.

11 Now referring to the testimony of Elliott on page 997,
12 transcript of proceedings before the Army Pearl Harbor Board
13 on Thursday, August 17, 1944, and reading back one question:

14 "General Frank: What I am trying to ascertain is whether
15 on the morning of December 7 there was more activity than usual
16 or whether there was less activity than usual, or was it average?

17 "Sergeant Elliott: Well, sir, during our problem on
18 Sunday there was practically no activity at all.

19 "General Frank: Prior to this time?

20 "Sergeant Elliott: Prior to 7 o'clock, yes, sir. We
21 had no plots to send in to our Information Center and had no
22 targets."

23 Now how do you reconcile that evidence with what you are
24 giving the committee? I show you the original.

25 Colonel Thielen: I consider this evidence of the plot

Witness Thielen

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 authenticated by a Signal Officer responsible at this station
3 to be evidence that is worthy of being presented to the committee,
4 under my directive of giving them the facts, sir.

5 Senator Ferguson: Over and above the sworn testimony of
6 the man who did the charting, is that correct?

7 Colonel Thielen: There is no evidence that he was on the
8 set at that particular time.

9 Senator Ferguson: I am talking about Elliott.

10 Colonel Thielen: Yes, sir.

11 Senator Ferguson: Are we then going to get from the Army
12 the conclusions of some officers later on and not the eye
13 witnesses to these facts? Is that what we are getting here?

14 Mr. Mitchell: That is a question for counsel, I think.

15 Senator Ferguson: I am asking the witness.

16 The Chairman: The witness cannot answer what we are going
17 to get hereafter. As everybody has been advised, Mr. Lockard
18 and Mr. Tyler are both on the list of witnesses. They were
19 in charge, making these records, and certainly their testimony
20 will be produced here.

21 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, I correct my statement,
22 but I cannot speak for the future. I am talking about what we
23 did get.

24 Is that correct, that it was the conclusions of officers
25 rather than the testimony of eye witnesses?

Witness Thielen

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

Colonel Thielen: I see no conclusion in what purports to be and is authenticated as the record of the plots of the Opans Station.

Senator Ferguson: You do not see any --

Colonel Thielen: I do not say it is a conclusion to re-produce a plot.

Senator Ferguson: Where the witness himself, who made the chart, says there were no other targets that morning, in the statement, and you bring in the conclusion of an officer that there were?

Colonel Thielen: I do not consider it a conclusion, sir. It is a plot.

Senator Ferguson: What is it?

Colonel Thielen: It is a written record, sir. It is a plot.

Senator Ferguson: What is it?

Colonel Thielen: Lieutenant Colonel Murphy.

Senator Ferguson: What did he make it from? Did he make it from the one I gave you?

Colonel Thielen: From the records of the Opans Station. I cannot say what he saw when he made this record.

Senator Ferguson: How do you account for two records of that station then?

Colonel Thielen: One of them covers the entire day, sir.

Witness Thielen

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

and one covers the critical period.

Senator Ferguson: How could the one that followed, that covered the entire day, be any different than the one that gave them the exact period, and that is up to 7:39?

Colonel Thielen: In what way, sir?

Senator Ferguson: How could they differ? The one that covered all day, how could it be different from the one that covered it up to 7:39? I take it the 7:39 chart up to that point, would be complete up to that time, would it not?

Colonel Thielen: Yes, sir, that would be the supposition.

Senator Ferguson: Then it would not have anything on that was not on this chart. Now where do you get this 6:50 and 6:45, if this man who made the chart said he did not have any other targets on that day?

Colonel Thielen: Where do I get it, sir?

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

Colonel Thielen: I get it from the so-called historic plot.

Senator Ferguson: All right. Now will you give us when the first bomb was dropped again?

Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman suspend a minute until I can look at the report and the exhibit on which he questioned the witness?

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

Witness Thielen

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 Mr. Murphy: Will you pass them over, please?

3 The Chairman: Will he have to suspend in order to do that?

4 Mr. Murphy: No, I just made the request.

5 Senator Ferguson: I want them back. I have some other
6 questions.

7 Mr. Murphy: All right, in just a minute.

8 The Chairman: Go ahead, Senator.

9 Senator Ferguson: Will you read my last question?

10 (The question was read by the reporter.)

11 Senator Ferguson: What do your records show?

12 Colonel Thielen: The observers at Hickam Field saw
13 aircraft at 7:55 A.M. and the attack was initiated immediately,
14 presumably the first bomb dropped within a matter of seconds
15 after 7:55 A.M.

16 Senator Ferguson: 7:55 A.M. All right. How do you
17 account for the planes that came in at 7:39 to 7:55? How do
18 you account for their action from 7:39 to 7:55?

19 Colonel Thielen: Well, I am not prepared to state posi-
20 tively that those planes appearing at 7:39 off Kahuku Point
21 were the planes that appeared at Hickam Field at 7:55.

22 Senator Ferguson: How far is the point 7:39 from Hickam
23 Field?

24 Colonel Thielen: I should estimate that at approximately
25 60 miles.

Witness Thielen

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 Senator Ferguson: About 60 miles. Do you know what
3 Elliott said about how far he followed these planes in?
4 Fifteen to twenty miles, did not he say?

5 Colonel Thielen: I do not recall.

6 Senator Ferguson: Do you know what the radar was doing
7 at that time?

8 Colonel Thielen: What the radar was doing, sir?

9 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

10 Colonel Thielen: I do not believe I understand the
11 question, sir.

12 Senator Ferguson: Will you read it?

13 Colonel Thielen: I understood the words, sir, but not
14 the intent. I do not understand what is wanted.

15 Senator Ferguson: Read the question.

16 (The question was read by the reporter.)

17 Senator Ferguson: Do you know how the radar would
18 function at that time?

19 Colonel Thielen: How it would function?

20 Senator Ferguson: Yes, whether it would take it 15 or
21 20 miles from the radar itself.

22 Colonel Thielen: No, sir. I know that the lobe, so-called,
23 sent out by the radar behaves very erratically. I am not
24 technically qualified to state how it would behave at that
25 short range.

Witness Thielen

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: Have you examined Lockard's or Elliott's testimony about these targets before 7:02, during their so-called, as you call it, regular shift?

Colonel Thielen: I did not direct their attention specifically to that, no, sir. They have unquestionably read that testimony in researching this particular phase.

Senator Ferguson: As I understand it, instead of what the testimony shows you gave us a plot that was made up by Colonel Murphy.

Colonel Thielen: That is correct.

Senator Ferguson: That is the way you leave the record, and that is the way it stands, is it not?

Colonel Thielen: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: That is all.

Mr. Murphy: Now, Mr. Chairman, I would like to make just one observation.

The Chairman: Mr. Murphy.

Mr. Murphy: On the Exhibit 4 which was offered in evidence there is a statement "Record of Early Flights 7 December, 1941, obtained by Opana Detector", and then the signature of Lieutenant Colonel Murphy.

On the exhibit which the gentleman from Michigan questioned the witness about there is a notification "Opana Detector" and then some word that is illegible, "Record of Early Flights",

Witness Thielen

and then a notation which would seem to bear the initials
of some other witness.

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Witness Thielen

1 So this record, Exhibit 4, is of the early flights,
2 and this other notation by someone else appears not to be
3 on the record in question, and I wish the witness would find
4 out what the last of this notation on the lower right-hand
5 corner of Exhibit 3-B is, so we might see what the differ-
6 ence between the two exhibits is.

7 Colonel Thielen: I will endeavor to find that out, sir.
8 I learned that my researchers are familiar with that, con-
9 sulted radar experts on it, and determined that it was gener-
10 ally illegible.

11 The Chairman: All right. Any further questions?

12 Mr. Gearhart: Mr. Chairman, may I ask for information
13 from Admiral Inglis? He has been very accommodating up to
14 now. I want to follow up the Naval strength in both the
15 Pacific and Atlantic.

16 I have in my hands a rough draft of what I would like
17 to see in the record in the form of a chart. It asks for
18 the strength of the German Navy as of May 1st, additions
19 from the then Vichy France, the Italian strength, and for
20 the augmentation from Axis, Allies, or from other sources.

21 Then, in the last column, the total naval strength from
22 all sources in the Atlantic and Mediterranean.

23 I ask for that same information as of December 7, 1941.

24 Then, information to the same effect of Japanese strength

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Inglis

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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1 as of May 1, 1941, and as of December 7, 1941, in the Pacific,
2 and for American strength in the Pacific with allied augmen-
3 tation both in respect to the Asiatic Fleet and Pacific
4 Fleet.

5
6 If you can have that prepared, Admiral, and insert it
7 in the record of today's proceedings, I would appreciate it
8 very much. But if that is too short a time, I hope you can
9 get it in by Monday.

10 Mr. Mitchell: We will hand it to the Navy Department.

11 Admiral Inglis: We can have it ready for you by
12 Monday. I am afraid we cannot by today.

13 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman.

14 The Chairman: Have you concluded, Mr. Gearhart?

15 Mr. Gearhart: Yes, sir.

16 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, I ask now to put into
17 evidence these two exhibits that I handed to the witness
18 for identification, and I ask now that they be part of the
19 record.

20 Mr. Counsel, will you tell us what numbers they will
21 be?

22 Mr. Mitchell: I will mark them as soon as I have them.

23 Senator Ferguson: So they will get the correct numbers.

24 Mr. Gesell: One of them is already in evidence.

25 Mr. Mitchell: Do you want them both? We already have

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one.

Senator Ferguson: Just the large one.

Mr. Mitchell: At the request of Senator Ferguson, the document he has produced, which for identification has on it the words "Exhibit 3-B in evidence," apparently from some earlier proceedings, is now marked Exhibit 7, and offered in evidence.

The Chairman: All right.

(The document referred to was marked Exhibit 7.)

The Chairman: Any further questions?

The Vice Chairman: Mr. Chairman, in fairness to myself, as a member of the committee, I just simply want to say I do not share the views expressed or the remarks made to the Admiral who has been appearing before us as a witness. I think both of these gentlemen have acquitted themselves with great credit and distinction, and are a distinct credit to the great Services they represent.

The Chairman: Counsel will proceed now with anything further he has.

Senator Lucas: I would like to make a statement along the same line as Mr. Cooper.

The Chairman: Let me suggest that these two witnesses will be here for a while longer and at the conclusion of their testimony, it might be appropriate to have a testimonial

Witness Inglis

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

meeting with respect to the opinions of the committee with regard to this very testimony.

Senator Lucas: I want to be the first one to testify when the testimonial meeting starts.

Mr. Murphy: I would like to join in that too.

The Chairman: The Chairman wants to be in that too. Go ahead.

Mr. Mitchell: Admiral Inglis, one question. You spoke about Jap submarines entering Pearl Harbor. Are you referring to the midget submarines, so-called?

Admiral Inglis: Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell: Not the large sea-going submarines?

Admiral Inglis: Not the large sea--going submarines, no, sir.

Mr. Mitchell: As to those midget submarines, what does the record show as to how many men were in the crew?

Admiral Inglis: I believe they were manned by a crew of two men -- that is, two persons, I should say.

Mr. Mitchell: A very small vessel?

Admiral Inglis: Yes.

Mr. Mitchell: Now, Admiral, I ask you if you have brought here, at my request, all of the documents in the Navy from Japanese sources relating to the Japanese account of the attack at Pearl Harbor?

Witness Inglis

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

Admiral Inglis: Substantially everything except the communication intelligence material which I believe counsel has from other sources and not from me.

The Chairman: A little louder. We could not hear the last remark.

(The answer was read by the reporter.)

Mr. Mitchell: I do not understand. I thought you produced here all of the material from Jap sources which have made any disclosure as to what they did in respect to this attack.

Admiral Inglis: I wanted to be quite meticulous.

Mr. Mitchell: You mean the espionage documents do you?

Admiral Inglis: I mean the material you referred to as cryptic analytical.

Mr. Mitchell: Yes.

Admiral Inglis: I think you have that. You did not get it from me.

Mr. Mitchell: That is right. Now, let us look at this material and see what it is. I hand you a bundle of loose sheets in the Japanese language. What is that?

Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, does the record show clearly when counsel received these papers? Have you made clear on the record when you received these papers, counsel?

Witness Inglis

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

Mr. Mitchell: I think I received these original documents within the last 24 hours.

Senator Ferguson: About when did you get them?

Mr. Mitchell: You mean the exact hour?

Senator Ferguson: When? There are two sets of them and I would just like to know when counsel got them.

Mr. Mitchell: My assistants say these documents reached me approximately 2 p.m. yesterday afternoon.

Senator Ferguson: Two p.m. yesterday afternoon.

Has counsel had time to examine each one of them?

Mr. Mitchell: We went over them in a rough way. I have not spent much time on this document in the Japanese language, but we thought we would get back to the original source here.

Senator Ferguson: Did they give you translations?

Mr. Mitchell: They are in the papers here.

Senator Ferguson: They are among the papers?

Mr. Mitchell: Yes. May I ask him about what these are, Senator?

Senator Ferguson: Yes. I do not know.

Mr. Mitchell: I want you to know.

What is this document, this bundle of photostats here in the Japanese language? Will you state generally what that is?

Admiral Inglis: These are photostat copies of two docu-

Witness Inglis

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

ments in the Japanese language which my translators inform me are Japanese top secret operation orders No. 1 and No. 2.

Mr. Mitchell: That is a staff plan, do you mean, a staff order?

Admiral Inglis: It is a plan and an order, in effect.

Mr. Mitchell: Will you look over these other documents and just generally describe what they are.

Admiral Inglis: This first one I have is a translation of a captured document; the title is "Submarine School Notes Concerning Early War Experiences Off Hawaii."

Senator Ferguson: Could I inquire from counsel when counsel requested these documents from the Navy?

Mr. Mitchell: Well, I think these particular documents I asked him to bring in here sometime yesterday, because I understood the committee wanted all the original material on which any testimony was based.

Senator Ferguson: I understand it has not been requested by counsel prior to yesterday.

Mr. Mitchell: We had the operational order in English, the translation of it, but I did not have the Japanese rendition, if that is what you mean. I had a translation of it for some days, I think.

Senator Lucas: You should have translated them right, Mr. Mitchell.

Witness Inglis

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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2 Mr. Mitchell: I could not swear to that.

3
4 Senator Lucas: I know there are going to be a lot
5 of questions about that.

6
7 Mr. Mitchell: I do not suppose anybody can settle
8 that question.

9
10 Will you go on, Admiral -- if I may proceed uninterrupt-
11 edly.

12 The Chairman: Yes, go ahead, gentlemen..

13 Admiral Inglis: Are you ready, sir?

14 Mr. Mitchell: All right. Go ahead.

15 Admiral Inglis: The next document is entitled "Trans-
16 lation of a Captured Japanese Document. The professional
17 notebook of an ensign in the Japanese Navy." The date is
18 25 February, 1944.

19 Perhaps I should go back to the second document and say
20 that the date on that is January 12, 1941.

21 The next document that I have is dated March 2, 1943. The
22 subject is "Kuboaki, Takeo." That is obviously the name of
23 a Japanese. "Superior Class Engineer Petty Officer, interro-
24 gation of." That is the subject.
25

Witness Inglis

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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3 The next document that I have is entitled "Japanese
4 Submarine Operations at Pearl Harbor". This is an evaluation
5 prepared by Intelligence officers.

6 Mr. Keefe: Jap Intelligence officers?

7 Admiral Inglis: United States Intelligence officers.

8 The next document is entitled, "Intelligence Report".
9 The subject is, "Japan Navy Submarines". The date on this
10 is April 22. The year is not given. It might be deduced,
11 however, that the year is 1944.

12 The next document is 16 August 1943. It is marked,
13 "Interrogation Report No. 148 of Yokota, S." Yokota is the
14 family name and S the initial of the given name.

15 The next document is entitled "United States Pacific
16 Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, Weekly Intelligence Bulletin
17 of 8 December 1944".

18 The next document is dated 30 June, 1943. The subject
19 is, "ICPOA Translation of Captured Enemy Documents, Item No.
20 472, Submarine School Notes Concerning Early War Experiences
21 off Hawaii.

22 "ICPOA Translation of Captured Enemy Documents, Item
23 No. 473, Instructions to the Yatsumaki Butai".

24 "ICPOA Translation of Captured Enemy Documents, Item
25 No. 474, Places of Military Importance in the Kurile Islands."

The next document is dated 25 July, 1945, Translation

Witness Inglis

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

No. 290. Subject, "The Southern Cross by Kuramoti, Iki",
Kuramoti being the family name and Iki the given name.

The next document is a translation of combined fleet
top secret operation Order No. 1.

Mr. Mitchell: Is that a translation of the Jap script
we have here, or is supposed to be?

Admiral Inglis: This is a translation of the Japanese
script. I am informed by my translators that there are a few
corrections which they feel should be made in this document
here, and those corrections will be produced at the proper time.

We haven't got the photostatic copies now.

The next document is entitled, "Enemy Lists of Sorties
by Sub-carried Planes." There is no date on this. Its pre-
cise source is not indicated.

The next document is a memorandum dated 13 October 1945,
addressed to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 of the 5th
Marine Amphibious Corps. The subject is "Pre-war Espionage
in the Hawaiian Island", and it pertains to an interview with
Yoshio Shiga, Lieutenant Commander, Imperial Japanese Navy.
In this case Yoshio is the given name and Shiga is the family
name. That memorandum is signed by Robert N. Tate, Special
Agent of the Counter-Intelligence Corps, attached to the
496th CIC Detachment of the 5th Marine Division, and contains
several endorsements through official channels, showing its

Witness Inglis

receipt in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations yesterday, 16 November. I believe counsel ought to have the copy, which is not included in these papers, of reports submitted by the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, from headquarters at Tokyo.

Mr. Mitchell: Yes. At this point I will read into the record a paraphrase of a message dated October 6, 1945, from the Secretary of War to General MacArthur, as follows:

"The War Department has been requested to provide the Joint Congressional Committee investigating the Pearl Harbor attack with information concerning the attack available in Japanese files and records, to include Japanese agencies involved or informed of plans, date the attack was first planned, sources and nature of information on which plans and operation based, details of plans as they developed, composition of attack force, Japanese losses, routes followed by attack force before and after attack, and Japanese knowledge of damage inflicted. Request suitable measures be taken to obtain above information. Advise by cable information now available, steps open to you to obtain desired material with estimate of time required, summary of additional information as available. Air mail pertinent documents."

(9) Now in response to that message the War Department has produced three documents: One, cables from General MacArthur

Witness Inglis

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

dated the 14th of October -- this is a preliminary report -- and a further detailed report dated October 26, 1945.

Then you just spoke of another one. That last one came in last night, that was a Navy report, is that right?

Admiral Inglis: That is correct, sir. That came from the Marines through Navy channels.

Mr. Mitchell: Have you had this report from General MacArthur's headquarters in this message before you?

Admiral Inglis: Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell: And examined that?

Admiral Inglis: Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell: Now the War Department handed me last night, or early this morning, another message from General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. That means General MacArthur, Tokyo. That is dated November 8, 1945. Have you examined that?

Admiral Inglis: Yes, sir, we have also examined that.

Mr. Mitchell: How would you classify this material, as to the type of material it is? First there is an operational order and other captured documents from the Japs, is that it?

Admiral Inglis: That is correct, sir.

Mr. Mitchell: Then you have also a number of documents recording interviews of captured Japanese prisoners?

Admiral Inglis: That is correct, sir.

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Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

Witness Inglis

Mr. Mitchell: Then you have the report from General MacArthur?

Admiral Inglis: That is correct, and those are interviews of Japanese officers who were not in the status of prisoners of war.

Mr. Mitchell: Is there anything else in that file that is classified in a different way, that you can think of?

Admiral Inglis: The only remaining item is the report which originated with the Marine detachment and which was forwarded through Navy channels, and that is largely the interrogation of Lieutenant Commander Shiga, Imperial Japanese Navy.

Mr. Mitchell: Is not he a prisoner of war?

Admiral Inglis: No, sir, he is in more or less the same category as the others, an officer who was interviewed after V-J Day.

Mr. Mitchell: That is the document that came in last night, isn't it?

Admiral Inglis: That is the document that came in last night.

(10) Mr. Mitchell: Now previous to the receipt of that document, and the one of November 8 from General MacArthur, have you prepared a summary digest of these documents?

Admiral Inglis: I had, sir. I would like to add to my

Witness Inglis

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

answer to your former question that this last document which has just been presented, the one that was received last night --

Mr. Mitchell: By the Navy?

Admiral Inglis: Through Navy sources, through Navy channels.

-- also contains an endorsement, or rather a carbon copy of an endorsement from the Commandant of the 14th Naval District, which pertains to some investigations we have made out there, in an effort to corroborate or contradict some of the testimony of this Lieutenant Commander Shiga.

Mr. Mitchell: Well, since the receipt of these last two documents that came through Navy sources and Army sources within the last few hours, have you gone through them to see whether your digest requires any additions?

Admiral Inglis: I have, sir, and it does require some substantial changes and additions.

Mr. Mitchell: Have you made those?

Admiral Inglis: I have, sir.

Mr. Mitchell: You had to do that last night and this morning, is that correct?

Admiral Inglis: That is correct, sir.

Mr. Mitchell: And you have already put in motion mimeographic machines so that copies of them may be supplied?

Admiral Inglis: Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell: Now I would like to ask the Admiral if

Witness Inglis

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

you will please give your digest of these original documents that you have there.

Admiral Inglis: I would like to say, first of all, that throughout this presentation which is to follow the dates will be expressed in Japanese time. Thus the date of the attack will be given as 8 December, which is Japanese time, rather than 7 December, which is Hawaiian time. Wherever I deviate from that practice I will specifically so state, as I proceed.

With respect to that difference, we should add 19-1/2 hours to Honolulu time in order to get Tokyo time; we should add 5-1/2 hours to Honolulu time in order to get Washington time, and we should add 14 hours to Washington time in order to get Tokyo time.

I would also like to make the preliminary comment that some of the phraseology used in this presentation may sound a little strange to American ears. That is because of peculiar Japanese usage, where the Japanese are directly quoted.

The first item concerns the formulation of the plan for the attack on Pearl Harbor. It is reported that a surprise attack --

Mr. Mitchell: (Interposing) When you say "it is reported" you mean it is disclosed in these documents? Is that what you mean?

AL-8

Witness Inglis

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

Admiral Inglis: That is correct, sir. That expression "it is reported" is used advisedly, to indicate that it has not been confirmed by other sources, and we cannot guarantee its accuracy. All we have is the report.

Mr. Mitchell: You are not guaranteeing the Japs?

Admiral Inglis: No, sir.

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Witness Inglis:

It is reported that a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was originally conceived and proposed in the first part of January 1941 by Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, Commander-in-Chief Combined Fleet, who, at that time, ordered Rear Admiral Takijiro Onishi, then Chief of Staff of the 11th Air Fleet, to study the operation. In the latter part of August, 1941, Admiral Yamamoto ordered all Fleet Commanders and other key staff members to Tokyo for war games preliminary to a final formulation of operation plans for a Pacific campaign which included a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. A War Plans Conference was held continuously at the Naval War College, Tokyo, from 2 September to 13 September. On 13 September an outline containing essential points of a basic operation order, which was later to be issued as Combined Fleet Top Secret Operation Order No. 1, was completed. This Operation Order, which included detailed plans for the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, was promulgated to all fleet and task force commanders on 5 November 1941. Therefore, this date, 5 November, 1941, is to be regarded as the date on which the plan for the attack on Pearl Harbor was completed.

Operation Order No. 1 under heading of "Preparations for the Outbreak of War" states that "When the decision is made to complete over-all preparations for operations, orders will

Witness Inglis

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2 be issued establishing the approximate date (Y Day) for
3 commencement of operations and announcing "First Prepara-
4 tions for War."

5 That completes that quotation.

6 The Operation Order continues to say that "The time
7 for the Outbreak of War (X Day) will be given in an Imperial
8 General Headquarters Order." The details of the plan of the
9 attack on Pearl Harbor, as set forth in Operation Order No. 1,
10 were worked out by members of the Naval General Staff Opera-
11 tions Section, Combined Fleet Operations Staff and First
12 Air Fleet Operations Staff.

13 III. Determination of 8 December as Day of Attack.

14 Under date of 7 November 1941, Admiral Yamamoto issued
15 Combined Fleet Top Secret Operation Order No. 2 saying "First
16 Preparations for War. Y Day will be December 8." In accord-
17 ance with the definition of Y Day as given in Operation
18 Order No. 1, this establishes December 8 only as the approxi-
19 mate date for commencement of operations. An Imperial
20 Naval Order issued from the Imperial General Headquarters
21 under date of 2 December 1941 states: "The hostile actions
22 against the United States of America shall be commenced on
23 8 December." This order is in effect the announcement of X
24 Day as defined in Operation Order No. 1. Thus it becomes
25 apparent that the tentative approximate date for the attack

Witness Inglis

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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1 selected on 7 November and defined as Y Day is reaffirmed on
2 2 December as X Day. In other words, the original tentative
3 date (Y Day) and the final precise date (X Day) are in fact
4 the same date.
5

6 Mr. Mitchell: That is December 7, our time?

7 Admiral Inglis: The date of attack is December 7.

8 Mr. Mitchell: You explained in the beginning that
9 Japanese times were given, but to just point it up, I am
10 asking if that December 8 was December 7 Honolulu time.

11 Admiral Inglis: That is correct. Unless I make some
12 parenthetical, all times will be Tokyo time.

13 To repeat, in other words, the original tentative date
14 (Y Day) and the final precise date (X Day) are, in fact, the
15 same date.

16 In discussions prior to 7 November, the Imperial Head-
17 quarters Navy Section generally recognized 8 December as
18 suitable from an operational standpoint and made the decision
19 in cooperation with the leaders of the Combined Fleet. For
20 a dawn attack in the Hawaiian area in December, the 10th
21 would have been suitable from the standpoint of the dark of
22 the moon.

23 Mr. Mitchell: That you are taking from the documents,
24 it is Japanese opinion?

25 Admiral Inglis: That is correct. This is all oriented

Witness Inglis

h4

to the Japanese point of view.

However, it was expected that the United States Pacific Fleet, in accordance with its custom during maneuvers, would enter the harbor on Friday and leave on Monday (Hawaiian dates).

That is Friday and Monday, Hawaiian dates.

Therefore, Sunday (Hawaiian date) was decided on. In order to assure the success of the attack and still avoid a night attack, the take-off time of the attacking planes was to be set as near to dawn as possible (approximately one hour after sunrise).

Here I come to the deviation from the original script.

Mr. Mitchell: A deviation resulting from these last documents?

Admiral Inglis: That is correct.

The following statement is made by a Japanese officer pilot who participated in the attack on Pearl Harbor:

"On 5 October 1941, a meeting was called of all officer pilots of the carriers, aboard the AKAGI in SHIBUSHI BAY, by the Chief of Staff of the carriers, Rear Admiral Rynosuke KOSAKA. About 100 attended. They were told, very secretly, that on 7 December 1941 (Japan Time), a Japanese Naval air force would strike the American Fleet at HAWAII. Grand Admiral of the Japanese Navy, Isoroku YAMAMOTO, also addressed the group saying that although Japan never wanted to fight

Witness Inglis

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1
2 the United States they were forced to because they would
3 be defeated regardless, if the United States continued its
4 aid to China and its oil embargo. The U. S. fleet, he
5 said, was Japan's strongest enemy, so if they could strike
6 it unexpectedly at Hawaii it would be two or three months
7 before it could maneuver. By that time occupation of Borneo,
8 the Philippines, Singapore, Java, and Sumatra would be
9 complete."

10 The next title has to do with the date of leaving
11 port.

12 It is reported that on or about 14 November Cinc of
13 the Combined Fleet ordered the units of the Pearl Harbor
14 Attacking Force to assemble in Hitokappu Bay.

15 Commander Barrett, will you point to Hitokappu Bay.
16 That is the Island of Etorofu.

17 It is further reported that about 21 November the
18 situation seemed to be approaching a stage where commence-
19 ment of hostilities were inevitable. The Navy Section
20 of the Imperial General Headquarters therefore issued the
21 following order:

22 "The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet shall
23 order necessary forces to advance to the area in which they
24 are to wait in readiness and shall station them in such
25 positions that, in the event of the situation becoming such

Witness Inglis

h6
1 that commencement of hostilities be inevitable, they will
2 be able to meet the situation promptly."

3 I would like to say at this time that upon introducing
4 the subject of "Date of Leaving Port," I went back to the
5 original script as prepared a few days ago.

6 On 25 November the Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet
7 issued the following order to the Striking Force, which had,
8 since 22 November, been assembled at Hitokappu Bay.

9 (a) The Task Force, keeping its movements strictly
10 Secret and maintaining close guard against submarines and
11 aircraft, shall advance into Hawaiian waters and upon the
12 very opening of hostilities, shall attack the main force
13 of the United States Fleet in Hawaii and deal it a mortal
14 blow. The first air raid is planned for dawn of X Day
15 (exact date to be given by later order).

16
17 Upon completion of the air raid the Task Force, keeping
18 close coordination and guarding against enemy counter-attack,
19 shall speedily leave the enemy waters and then return to
20 Japan.

21 (b) Should it appear certain that Japanese-American
22 negotiations will reach an amicable settlement prior to
23 the commencement of hostile action, all the forces of the
24 Combined Fleet are to be ordered to reassemble and return
25 to their bases.

Witness Inglis

(c) The Task Force shall leave Hitokappu Bay on the morning of 26 November and advance to 42°N. and 170° E. (standing-by position) on the afternoon of 4 December, Japan time, and speedily complete refueling.

Commander Barrett, will you point to that position?

The actual time of departure was 9:00 a.m., 26 November, Japan time (1:30 p.m., 25 November, Hawaii time.

V. Date of Instructions to Execute Plan.

Combined Fleet Top Secret Operation Order No. 2, issued by Admiral Yamamoto, Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet, and dated 7 November 1941 is the basic order or instruction to Execute the Detailed Plan for the Attack on Pearl Harbor.

On 1 December the Cabinet Council approved the commencement of hostilities against the United States. On the same day, an Imperial Naval Order issued on instruction by the Imperial General Headquarters stated "Japan, under the necessity of her self-preservation and self-defense, has reached a position (sic) to declare war on the United States of America."

On 2 December an Imperial Naval Order issued under instruction from the Imperial General Headquarters stated "The hostile actions against the United States of America shall be commenced on 8 December." There is no copy of this order available nor is there conclusive evidence that

Witness Inglis

1 it constitutes the formal X Day Order referred to in Opera-
2 tions Order No. 1. Its effect, however, is clearly equi-
3 valent to the final determination of a specific time for
4 the outbreak of the war, and it may be regarded therefore
5 as a final determination of X Day.

VI. Details of Plan.

6 Hitokappy Bay was selected as the point of departure
7 from Japan because it was recognized as the most suitable
8 place for enabling the attacking force to meet any new
9 developments in the situation as well as to keep its loca-
10 tion and movements secret.

11 In formulating final plans, it was decided that a
12 torpedo attack against anchored ships in Pearl Harbor was
13 the most effective method of putting the main strength of
14 the United States Pacific Fleet in the Hawaii area out of
15 action for a long period of time. The following two
16 obstacles were considered:

17 (a) The fact that Pearl Harbor is narrow and shallow.

18 (b) The fact that Pearl Harbor was probably equipped
19 with torpedo nets.

20 In regard to point (a) it was planned to attach
21 stabilizers to the torpedoes and launch them from an
22 extremely low altitude.

23 In regard to point (b), since success could not be
24
25

Witness Inglis

counted on, a bombing attack was also employed.

I must deviate again from the text prepared the other day and refer to this last source received just yesterday.

Evidence indicates that as late as 29 November (Japan Time), the Japanese force expected to find 6 U. S. carriers in Hawaiian waters; they were aware that the USS SARATOGA was, in late November, on the West Coast of the United States and also that the USS ENTERPRISE would be "two or three days out of the attack. On 31 November, Japan Time, when the Striking force was well out to sea, it received a report that only one or two carriers were in Pearl Harbor. On 6 December, Japan Time, word was received that no carriers were in Pearl Harbor, but that 8 battleships and 15 cruisers were in the harbor. At a briefing, which took place on or about 5 December, Japan Time, each pilot was furnished a photograph of a map of Pearl Harbor on which each pilot made notes on courses, anchorage areas, or missions.

Now I return to the script of two or three days ago.

Three courses were considered for the Hawaii operation: the Northern course which was actually used, a Central course which headed east following the Hawaiian Islands, and a Southern route passing through the Marshall Islands and approaching from the South.

Witness Inglis

Commander Barrett, would you roughly indicate those three routes.

That would be the northern route (following Commander Barrett's pointer); that would be the central route, through the Mandated Islands, and the Hawaiian chain, and the southern group just out of the Mandated Islands, up to Hawaii.

On the Northern route, although it was far from the enemy (U.S.) patrol screen of land-based airplanes and there was little chance of meeting commercial vessels, the influences of weather and topography was important. Refueling at sea and navigation were difficult. On the Central and Southern routes the advantages and disadvantages were generally just the opposite to those of the Northern route. Although it may be assumed that the Central and Southern routes would be preferable for the purposes of refueling at sea, the chances of being discovered by patrol planes were great because the routes lie near Wake, Midway, Palmyra, Johnston Islands, etc. Consequently, it was hardly expected that a surprise attack could be made. The ability to refuel and the necessity of surprise were the keys to this operation. If either of them failed, the execution of the operation would have been impossible. However, the refueling problem could be overcome by training. On the other hand, a surprise attack under all circumstances could not be as-

Witness Inglis

sured by Japanese strength alone. Therefore, the Northern route was selected.

By routing the Striking Force to pass between Midway and the Aleutians, it was expected to pass outside the patrol zones of U. S. patrol planes. Moreover, screening destroyers were sent ahead of the Fleet, and in the event any vessels were encountered the main body of the Force would make a severe change of course and endeavor to avoid detection. If the Striking Force had been detected prior to X-2 Day, it was planned to have the Force return without executing the air attack. In the event of being discovered on X-1 Day, the question of whether to make an attack or to return would have been decided in accordance with the local conditions. If the attack had failed, it was planned to send the Main Force in the Island Sea out to the Pacific in order to bring in the Task Force.

I would like to remark again, that this is Japanese phraseology and may appear a little strange in its reasoning processes.

Returning now to the prepared script, item 7 is entitled "Sources of Data Used in Planning the Pearl Harbor Attack Were as Follows."

These sources -- I am speaking now from the point of view of the Japanese -- were:

Witness Inglis

Questions by: Mr. Keefe
The Vice Chairman

(A) American public broadcasts from Hawaii.

(B) Reports of Japanese Naval Attache's in Washington,
D. C.

(C) Reconnaissance submarines in Hawaiian waters prior to
the attack. A Japanese pilot states that at no time were
visual land signals used from Hawaii.

(D) Information obtained from ships which had called at
Hawaiian ports in mid-November.

Those are the only four sources which the Japanese have
admitted. We know, however, that there is a fifth source:

(E) Espionage network in Hawaiian Islands being
uncensored cable communications with Japan.

That last is from an American source, not from the
Japanese source.

Mr. Keefe: Under (C), with respect to signals, I didn't
quite catch that. It doesn't appear here.

Admiral Inglis: I beg your pardon. I am glad you
brought that up. That last sentence "a Japanese pilot
states" came from this last source which we just received
last night. That was a change in the script.

Mr. Keefe: That will be included in the mimeographed
corrected statement which we will receive later?

Admiral Inglis: That is right.

The Vice Chairman: And that goes under what?

Witness Inglis

Admiral Inglis: Under Source C.

Now, again I must deviate from the original script and quote this last document which was just received yesterday.

"A Japanese officer Pilot has reported his belief that information concerning all movements of ships into and out of PEARL HARBOR was transmitted to the fleet through coded messages broadcast over a HONOLULU Commercial Broadcasting Station. Source was certain that there was a Hawaiian Nisei -- a second generation American of Japanese descent -- who was a Japanese Naval Officer, aboard the flagship AKAGI, whose specific job was listening to these broadcasts and decoding them." Source said that in his opinion the codes were many and varied but that if, for example, it was broadcast the German attache lost one dog, it might mean that a carrier left PEARL HARBOR. If the German attache wanted a cook or houseboy, it might mean that a battleship or cruiser had entered the harbor."

Source states "that the information was conveyed on radio programs just following the news broadcasts, which he stated were at 6:30 AM. 12 Noon, and 7 PM. He was prone to think that time following the 7 PM broadcast was used since the Japanese agents would then have had an opportunity to convey information concerning a whole day's activities."

Witness Inglis

I would like to say at this time that the endorsement which the authorities at Hawaii, the FBI, ONI, and MIS, have placed on this last document indicates that they cannot find any substantiation for this plan to use Honolulu Commercial Broadcasting Station to convey information to the Japanese Task Force. They also pointed out that this procedure would not have been necessary since the Japanese Consul, who was the center of the espionage network, had full access to a direct connection via cable uncensored directly from Honolulu to Tokyo.

That completes the deviation from the original script, and I return now to item 8, which is "Details of Execution."

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Witness Inglis

VIII. Details of Execution.

Study of the Japanese plan of operation indicates the Japanese High Command made the following assumptions with regard to the United States Fleet:

(a) That the main body of the U. S. Pacific Fleet would be at anchor within Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, Sunday, Hawaii time.

(b) That a carrier force could be moved from home waters across the Pacific to within striking distance of the main islands of the Hawaiian group without undue risk of detection by American defensive reconnaissance.

(c) That should assumptions (a) or (b) be in error, a reserve group of heavy naval units could sortie from the Inland Sea to give support to the carrier striking force in a decisive engagement with the American fleet. The other task forces of the Japanese fleet (Southern Force, Northern Force, and the South Seas Force) would be available for this purpose. Implied in the plan is the assumption that, in the event of such an engagement, the combined strength of the bulk of available Japanese major fleet units would be sufficient to defeat the American fleet.

(d) A powerful carrier air strike directed against the American forces based in Hawaii could, if tactical surprise were effected, achieve the strategic result of crippling the American fleet; that such a strike could achieve also the

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Witness Inglis

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destruction of American land-based air power and thus permit the Japanese Striking Force to withdraw without damage.

The omission from the Japanese plans of provision for landings on Oahu was decided upon during discussions held on 6 and 7 September when Operation Order No. 1 was being put together. It was decided that no landing operation should be included because it would have been impossible to make preparations for such a landing in less than a month after the opening of hostilities; it was further recognized that the problems of speed and of supplies for an accompanying convoy would have made it unlikely that the initial attack could be accomplished without detection; it was further recognized that insuperable logistic problems rendered landings on the island impractical.

The complete plan of the Pearl Harbor attack was known in advance to members of the Navy General Staff, the Commanders-in-Chief and Chiefs of Staff, and staff members of the Combined Fleet Headquarters and First Air Fleet Headquarters. Part of the plan was known in advance to the Navy Minister, Navy Vice Minister, and other ranking Naval officers.

It is also reported -- again I use that expression advisedly -- it is also reported that the Emperor knew in advance only the general outline of the plan and that none of the Japanese officials ^{who} were in the United States, including

Witness Inglis

Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu, knew anything about the plan in advance.

Parenthetically again, that last sentence, referring to the knowledge or lack of knowledge of the Emperor and Nomura and Kurusu, is only based on a single report purely from recollection of a Japanese officer.

Witness Inglis

The aims of the entire Japanese campaign, including the attack on Pearl Harbor, were predicated on the desire for military conquest, security, and enhancement of the Empire by occupation of areas rich in natural resources. With regard to the Pearl Harbor attack, Operation Order No. 1 says that "In the east the American fleet will be destroyed and American lines of operation, and supply lines to the Orient, will be cut. Enemy forces will be intercepted and annihilated. Victories will be exploited to break the enemy's will to fight."

Since the American fleet and air power based in the Hawaiian area were the only obstacles of consequence, a major task force built around a carrier striking group was considered essential to conducting a successful surprise attack. Accordingly, the following allocation of forces for the Pearl Harbor attack was made: --

Refer now, please, to item 17 in the Navy folder, which gives the composition of the forces in some detail. I will summarize by saying that it consisted of:

Striking Force: Commanding Officer: CinC 1st Air Fleet,
Vice Admiral Chuichi NAGUMO.

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Witness Inglis

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BatDiv 3 (1st Section)(HIEI, KIRISHIMA)	2 BB
CarDiv 1 (KAGA)(AKAGI)	
CarDiv 2 (HIRYU, SORYU)	
CarDiv 5 (SHOKAKU, ZUIKAKU)	6 CV
CruDiv 8 (TONE, CHIKUMA)	2 CA
DesRon 1 (ABUKUMA, 4 DesDivs)	1 CL, 16 DD
11 Train Vessels	

ADVANCE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

Commanding Officer: CinC 6th Fleet, Vice Admiral Mitsumi

SHIMIZU.

ISUZU, YURA	2 CL
KATORI	1 CL-T
I-class submarines (including SubRons 1,2,3)	20 SS
(I-1,2,3,4,5,6,7,16,17,18,20,22-24,68,69,74)	
Midget submarines	5 M-SS
6 Train Vessels	

Of the 11 train vessels allotted to the Striking Force, only 3 tankers and 1 supply ship actually accompanied the force. In addition, 3 submarines of the Advance Expeditionary Force accompanied the Striking Force, the other submarines having proceeded from the Inland Sea independently of the Striking Force.

The Striking Force departed Hitokappu Bay at 9:00 a. m., 26 November, and in accordance with orders from CinC Combined

Witness Inglis

Fleet, proceeded to its destination 200 miles due north of Oahu. It was fueled en route.

At this time I would like to pause to advise the committee that the reproduction of this chart to which Commander Barrett is pointing is included in the Navy folder as Item 18.

On leaving the harbor, the Striking Force was joined by three submarines which, with several of the destroyers, took station as scouting screen. Held down by the low speed of the train vessels and the need for fuel economy, the force cruised eastward at 13 knots. Lookouts were posted but no searches or Combat Air patrols were flown. It had been anticipated that North Pacific weather would cause difficulty in refueling at sea and those ships whose capacity in relation to consumption was small were loaded with oil in drums for emergency use.

Now, off the script, the next paragraph is modified somewhat by this document which we just received yesterday through the naval channels.

The weather, however, proved uniformly calm, and fueling from the tankers was carried out as planned. A participating pilot states that the weather was foggy part of the time. On or about 2 December, all ships were darkened and Condition Two (second degree of readiness, gun crews stationed) was set.

That condition of readiness was set about 2 December.

Witness Inglis

On 4 December, Japan time, the rendezvous point (42°W., 170°E.) was reached and the combat ships of the force fueled to capacity from the tankers, which were dropped that night. The Task Force then turned southeast, probably at increased speed. The carriers HIRYU and SORYU, whose fuel capacity was small, had been oiled daily while in company with the tankers and now had to be fueled by bucket brigade from the oil drums taken on board. The cruise up to this date had been uneventful; no ships or planes had been sighted and no false alarms had been sounded. When the force was 800 miles due north of Hawaii, on 6 December, Japan time, it received from the Japanese Navy Department a radio message "Climb Mt. Niitaka"; this was the signal for the attack and the force proceeded south at 24 knots to its destination. On the night of the 7/8th of December (Japan Time) the run in was made at top speed (26 knots).

Again I would like to say that radio message concerning "Climb Mt. Niitaka" was derived from this last source which we just received yesterday.

Returning now to the original script:

The problem of defeating enemy (U.S.) radio intelligence was met by a program of deceptive traffic (false assumption of call signs, padding of circuits, etc.) to simulate the presence of a striking force, carriers and carrier air groups

Witness Inglis

in the Inland Sea. In contrast, no effort was made to mask the movements or presence of the naval forces moving southward, because physical observations of that movement were unavoidable and the radio activity of these forces would provide a desirable semblance of normalcy.

Again ad-libbing, just to be sure that there is no misunderstanding, the movement southward that the Japanese are speaking of in this connection was a movement of other forces from Japanese Empire waters south toward the French-Indo-China coast, and not the movement of the task force, the Japanese task force, from its position 400 miles north of Hawaii to its position 200 miles north of Hawaii.

Returning to the script:

Upon arrival at their destination, 200 miles due north of Oahu, the carriers of the Striking Force launched on schedule a total of 361 planes in three waves, commencing at 6:00 a. m. and ending at 7:15 a. m., 7 December, Hawaii time.

I might add here at this point, which is not in either script, the note that I have: "It was planned that the force be protected during the attack by a combat patrol of 18 fighters to be launched about 05:45"-- 5:45. That, presumably, is in addition to the 361 planes forming the attack group.

Returning now to the script:

Witness Inglis

The planes rendezvoused to the south and then flew in for coordinated attacks. In addition to the attack planes launched at this time, it was planned to launch two Type Zero reconnaissance seaplanes to execute reconnaissance of Pearl Harbor and Lahaina Anchorage just before the attack.

I must deviate again from the script which was distributed 2 or 3 days ago and say that from the source just received yesterday we derived this additional information.

Apparently, one seaplane from a cruiser took off at about 0430 Hawaii time for observation purposes at 16,404 feet altitude.

Returning now to the original script:

Upon completion of the launchings, the Force withdrew at high speed (26 or 27 knots) to the northwest. Plane recovery was effected between 10:30 a. m. and 1:30 p. m., 7 December, Hawaii time. The Striking Force then proceeded by a circuitous route to Kure, arriving 23 December, Japan time. En route Carrier Division TWO (HIRYU, SORYU), Cruiser Division EIGHT (TONE, CHIKUMA), and two destroyers (TANIKAZE, YURAKAZE) were detached on 15 December, Japan time, to serve as reinforcements for the Wake Island operation. Original plans called for the retiring task force to strike at Midway if possible, but, probably because of the presence of a United States task force south of Midway, that strike was not made.

Witness Inglis

Until completion of the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor by the Striking Force, the Advance Expeditionary Force of submarines was under command of the Striking Force commander. The precise movements of the participating submarines are not known, but it is believed that most of these units departed from home waters in late November and proceeded to the Hawaiian area via Kwajalein; a few of these submarines, delayed in leaving Japan, changed course and proceeded directly to Hawaii.

The functions assigned to the submarines of the Advance Expeditionary Force were carried out as planned in Operations Order No. 1, namely:

(a) Until X-3 some of the submarines were to reconnoiter important points in the Aleutians, Fiji, and Samoa, and were to observe and report on any strong American forces discovered.

(b) One element was assigned to patrol the route of the Striking Force in advance of the movement of that force to ensure an undetected approach.

(c) Until X-5 the remaining submarines were to surround Hawaii at extreme range while one element approached and reconnoitered without being observed.

(d) On X day the submarines in the area were to "observe and attack the American fleet in the Hawaii area; make a surprise attack on the channel leading into Pearl Harbor and attempt to close it; if the enemy moves out to fight, he will

Witness Inglis

be pursued and attacked."

During the evening of 7 December (the day before the actual attack) the force of I-class submarines took up scouting positions in allotted patrol sectors covering the waters in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor; these submarines were ordered not to attack until the Task Force strike was verified.

Between 50 and 100 miles off Pearl Harbor, 5 midget submarines were launched from specially fitted fleet submarines as a Special Attacking Force to conduct an offensive attack against American ships within the harbor and to prevent the escape of the American fleet through the harbor entrance during the scheduled air strike. Available data indicates that only one of the five midget submarines penetrated into the harbor; it inflicted no damage on American units and none of the five rejoined the Japanese force.

After the actual attack, the I-class submarines maintained their patrols in the Hawaiian area and at least one of the group (the I-7) launched its aircraft to conduct a reconnaissance of Pearl Harbor to ascertain the status of the American fleet and installations. The operation plan provided that, in the event of virtual destruction of the American fleet at Pearl Harbor, one submarine division or less would be placed between Hawaii and North America to destroy sea traffic; in fact, at least one submarine (the I-17) was dispatched to the

Witness Inglis

Oregon coast on or about 14 December. One large submarine (pilot rescue) was stationed east of Kauai.

That last also comes from this latest source, about the rescue submarine stationed east of Kauai. Kauai is northwest of Oahu. I might also say parenthetically that this is the first information we have ever had that the Japanese used the submarine rescue tactics which were later so successfully employed by our own forces.

The next subheading is "Projected Losses Compared with Actual Losses."

During the war games carried on at the Naval War College, Tokyo, from 2 to 13 September 1941, it was assumed that the Pearl Harbor Striking Force would suffer the loss of one-third of its participating units; it was specifically assumed that one AKAGI class carrier, and one SORYU class carrier would be lost. No mention is made of probable plane losses. A very slight expectation was held that some of the 5 midget submarines would be retrieved but all midget submarine personnel were prepared for death. The losses actually incurred were 27 aircraft and all of the 5 midget submarines.

The Japanese assessment of damage inflicted on the American forces was made from reports of flight personnel upon their return and from studies of photographs taken by flight personnel. No reconnaissance planes were used during the

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Witness Inglis

attack to assess results, although one plane was launched from a submarine for this purpose well after the attack had been completed; one element of fighter planes was ordered, after completing its mission, to fly as low as possible to make observations. The official Japanese estimate of damage inflicted and the contrasting actual damage inflicted is as follows:

In this table I give material both from Japanese sources and American sources. In the left-hand table is the Japanese estimate. In the right-hand table is the actual damage as reported from American sources.

The Japanese estimated that they had sunk 4 battleships; 2 cruisers, and 1 tanker.

Actually they sank 4 battleships, a converted battleship, the UTAH, and also 1 mine layer, the OVALLA.

The Japs estimated that they had heavily damaged 4 battleships and 5 cruisers.

Actually they had heavily damaged 1 battleship, 2 light cruisers, 3 destroyers, and 1 repair ship.

The Japanese estimated that they had lightly damaged 1 battleship. Actually they had slightly damaged 3 battleships.

I beg your pardon. 3 battleships, 1 light cruiser, and 1 aircraft tender.

The Japanese estimated that they had destroyed a total

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Witness Inglis
Thielen

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

of 450 aircraft. Actually they destroyed 92 Navy planes.

Perhaps the Colonel can give the number of Army planes destroyed and then we will have it all at this point.

Colonel Thielen: Yes, we have some figures on that.

The Vice Chairman: You have 105 here, Admiral.

Admiral Inglis: You mean Navy planes?

The Vice Chairman: 105 Navy.

Witness Inglis
Witness Thielen

Question by: Mr. Mitchell

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Admiral Inglis: That figure of Navy damage has been bandied about among my staff, and we have had reports all the way from something down in the 80s up to 136. The other day we gave as our best estimate 105. We have revised that to our best estimate of 102.

Colonel Thielen: Our figure was 96 Army planes lost, and I should explain that is greater than the initial reports primarily because some of the planes were cannibalized to put other aircraft in the air. But the final figure is 96 Army planes lost as the result of enemy action.

Admiral Inglis: I think it is fair to state that the Japanese estimated that they had destroy 450 planes; that they actually destroyed, in round numbers, 200 planes, perhaps a little less than 200.

Finally, it may thus be concluded that the Japanese estimate of damage to U.S. ships was highly conservative, whereas their estimate of damage to U.S. aircraft was grossly exaggerated.

Mr. Mitchell: Do you want to put up the map there, Admiral, that shows the reconnaissance?

Senator Brewster: Mr. Chairman, I note the time, and before any cross-examination, as far as we are concerned, we would wish to have an opportunity to look at the exhibits, other than the Japanese language ones -- we would not be able to

Witness Inglis

read them. There will perhaps be opportunity during the recess.

The Chairman: The Chair announced a while ago that we might run to 1 o'clock. What is the wish of the committee?

The Vice Chairman: Let us hear from counsel.

Mr. Mitchell: We are willing to stop or go on, as you please.

The Chairman: What is the desire of the committee with respect to an afternoon session?

Senator Brewster: I think we better go over to Monday morning.

Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, might I suggest that the witness has not yet concluded his direct testimony.

Senator Brewster: He has completed the statement.

Mr. Murphy: I understand counsel is now referring to some charts.

The Chairman: He had finished his statement.

Senator George: I suggest we go over to Monday.

The Chairman: He had finished reading his statement, whereupon counsel was going to ask him some questions.

Admiral Inglis: I have just two more charts.

Senator Ferguson: Could we have counsel ask his questions and then recess?

The Chairman: We can determine about the recess, but I

Witness Inglis

think in the meantime counsel should be permitted to conclude.

Senator Ferguson: Yes, that is what I mean.

The Chairman: Go ahead.

Admiral Inglis: I would like, before concluding my direct statement, to invite the attention of the committee to two charts, which are also included in the folder which has been presented to you, in reduced form.

The first one is an outline of the Island of Oahu and shows the track or path of the two attacking units. I think you can see by the chart, without any great amount of explanation from me, the track which the Japanese pilot reported that the attacking units took. That is the first one there.

The first wave is on the left. It shows how it is split up into several parts to attack various objectives.

Then, the other arrows, on the right, show the second wave. It shows how it is split up to attack three different objectives.

Now, if we could have the other chart showing the searches.

That chart is Item 19 in the folder, and the next is Item 20 -- I beg your pardon. It is the other way around.

Mr. Murphy: In order to keep the record straight may it be noted that the witness is now referring to Item 20 in the Navy folder.

Admiral Inglis: I have just completed referring to Item

20.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

WLC4

Witness Inglis

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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3 Item 19 is a reproduction of searches that were shown in
4 the previous testimony but now we have added to it, superimposed
5 on it, the track of the Japanese task force, and you will notice
6 there is one point where the track of the Japanese force over-
7 laps a searched sector. However, the best evidence that we
8 have is that by the time the search planes got out to that
9 point the Japanese task force had left the area and was on its
10 way northwestward at high speed and no contact was made.

11 That concludes my statement.

12 Mr. Gesell: One or two questions, Admiral, on the statement.

13 You stated that the plan for the attack on Pearl Harbor
14 was completed on November 5, Jap Time. I gather from that
15 you were talking, at that point, about the war plan as opposed
16 to the operational decision to put the plan into execution;
17 is that right.

18 Admiral Inglis: That is correct, sir.

19 Mr. Gesell: In other words, by the 5 of November, Jap
20 Time, the Japs had worked out how they were going to accomplish
21 this attack, but you did not mean to indicate that by that time
22 they had reached a decision of a final and binding nature to
23 attack; is that correct.

24 Admiral Inglis: That is correct.
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Witness Inglis

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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Mr. Gesell: Coming over to the order of November 25, to which you referred I think on page 4 of your statement, where you said the Commander in Chief of the combined fleet issued an order to the striking force, and directing your attention particularly to sub-paragraph B, which reads as follows:

"Should it appear certain that Japanese-American negotiations will reach an amicable settlement prior to the commencement of hostile action all the forces of the combined fleet are to be ordered to reassemble and return to their bases."

I want to ask you whether there is any evidence in any of this material that that order, and specifically the portion I just read, was ever revoked by any Japanese authorities prior to the attack?

Admiral Inglis: That order was not revoked. By inference it might be perhaps assumed that the order to climb Mt. Niitaka was, in effect, a final firm commitment.

Mr. Gesell: And when was that order received, did you say, by the striking force, to climb Mt. Niitaka?

Admiral Inglis: That was on the 6th of December Japanese time, or the 5th of December U.S. time.

Mr. Gesell: Now, what time of day, does your information disclose what time of day?

Admiral Inglis: No, sir.

Witness Inglis

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

Mr. Gesell: Will you point to the chart and indicate approximately what distance from Pearl Harbor you would estimate that the Japanese fleet was at the time that order was received?

Admiral Inglis: That will take a minute to figure out.

Mr. Gesell: All right.

The Vice Chairman: While we are waiting, could you spell that name, the name of the mountain, for us?

Admiral Inglis: Niitaka. That is N-i-i-t-a-k-a.

The best estimate that I can make is the point where that track intersects the 160 meridian.

Will you point to that, 160 west.

That is, necessarily, just pretty much of a guess, but I would say that it was at about this location, where the Japanese striking force is alleged to have received the message to climb Mt. Niitaka.

Mr. Gesell: I didn't understand whether that message was purported to have come from Tokyo.

Admiral Inglis: We understood that message came from Tokyo.

Mr. Gesell: At the point you estimated the message was received the striking force was about ready to start its direct run toward Oahu; is that correct?

Admiral Inglis: Almost, yes, sir.

Witness Inglis

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

Mr. Gesell: Now, with reference to the sources of data used in planning by the Japanese. You stated that source "E", espionage network in Hawaiian Islands, using uncensored cable communications with Japan, was a source which you had added from your own knowledge of Jap sources; is that not correct?

Admiral Inglis: Not from my own personal knowledge but from the United States records.

Mr. Gesell: You were referring, were you, to intercepted Japanese messages concerning military installations, which were classified as the "magic" material or the "ultra" material by the Navy and Army?

Admiral Inglis: The sources that I have indicated here are the FBI and ONI. These are derived from investigation reports of our agents in the Hawaiian area, not from crypt analytical material.

Mr. Gesell: I thought I understood you to use the words "crypt analytical" material when discussing that paragraph?

Admiral Inglis: Not intentionally. I said using uncensored cable communications with Japan. That would be to forward the results of the Japanese espionage. They would use uncensored cable communications.

Mr. Gesell: Mr. Chairman, we would like to direct the committee's attention to Exhibit 2 at this time, which is already in evidence, containing the Japanese messages concerning

Witness Inglis

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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2 military installations and ship movements, and particularly
3 to the section concerned with Hawaii. The committee will
4 there see a series of messages between Tokyo and Honolulu,
5 some of them translated after December 7, many of them before,
6 all of them concerned with the disposition of the fleet in the
7 Harbor, the nature of the reconnaissance, questions as to
8 whether or not torpedo nets were down, the area in which the
9 fleet conducted its regular maneuvers, and other information
10 of a direct military espionage nature.

11 I think subsequent testimony will indicate that at least
12 most of these messages were sent by cable facilities from
13 Hawaii to Tokyo or vice versa.

14 The Chairman: May I ask, do you mean commercial cable
15 facilities?

16 Mr. Gesell: Commercial cable facilities, yes, sir.

(6) 17 We would like particularly to call attention to a message
18 which appears at page 117 under the heading of "Other Messages
19 of Particular Interest", which indicates that on February 15,
20 1941 general notification was sent out concerning the nature
21 of the espionage data that was wanted from various points by
22 the Japanese authorities.

23 Now, you referred, Admiral, to "train vessels". What
24 are "train vessels"?

25 Admiral Inglis: Train vessels are what we call auxiliary

Witness Inglis

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

types, such as tankers, supply ships, repair ships.

Mr. Gesell: Now, in discussing the actual activities of the Japanese aircraft at the time of the commencement of the attack you stated that the planes rendezvoused to the south and then flew in for coordinated action. Did you mean to indicate by that that the planes came to Oahu from points in the south?

Admiral Inglis: By no means. Of course, this is Japanese language, that I have been quoting, or translations of it, but the intent of that statement was that the Japanese planes would rendezvous south of the carriers which were north of Oahu, and then proceed from that rendezvous on further south to Oahu itself.

Mr. Gesell: In other words, they would simply gather south of where the carriers were, but still north of Oahu, to make their formation for the attack?

Admiral Inglis: Correct.

Mr. Gesell: As a matter of fact, your Item No. 20 sketch indicates plainly, does it not, that, at least according to those records, the planes did come into Oahu from the north?

Admiral Inglis: Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell: I was somewhat puzzled by the time shown on Item 20 and I wanted to see if you could verify those times with the times that we have been discussing heretofore. The

Witness Inglis

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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2 times that appeared on the radar maps that the committee has
3 been considering were, of course, all Hawaiian times, starting
4 with the early pick-ups at 6 and 7 o'clock. Now, the times
5 that appear on this map, if I read it correctly, say 3:10,
6 4:10, 3:20, 4:25, and some of the notes indicate other times
7 in about that area.

8 I wonder if you could reconcile that difference for us?

9 Admiral Inglis: As I understand it, this sketch is a
10 reproduction of one drawn by the Japanese officer who was
11 interrogated and the best we can make out of that is that that
12 time given was Tokyo time.

13 If you subtract 19-1/2 hours from 3:10, that should con-
14 vert it into Hawaiian Honolulu time.

15 Senator Ferguson: What would that be, will counsel
16 inquire?

17 Mr. Gesell: I was going to make the computation, Senator.

18 Senator Brewster: It is on the map, I understand.

19 Admiral Inglis: Another way is to add 4-1/2 hours in
20 one day. That would make it at 7:40. That would make the
21 figure on the left-hand arrow 7:40 instead of 3:10.

22 Mr. Gesell: Where it appears as 3:10 that was 7:40.

23 Admiral Inglis: That is the best we could make out of
24 it, yes, sir.

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Witness Inglis:

Questions by Mr. Gesell

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2 Mr. Gesell: Now, that somewhat closely coincides, does
3 it not, with the information contained on the historical plot
4 that we have been discussing?

5 Admiral Inglis: Yes, it does.

6 Mr. Gesell: That showed that the planes were in fairly
7 close to the northern tip of the island by, I believe, 7:39?

8 Admiral Inglis: Right, sir.

9 Mr. Gesell: Now, this tract does not show any Japanese
10 air activity earlier than 3:10 or 7:40, does it?

11 Admiral Inglis: That tract does not, no, sir.

12 Mr. Gesell: Have you given in your statement all the
13 information which is available as to the preliminary scout-
14 ing activities of Jap planes prior to this main flight that
15 actually made the attack?

16 Admiral Inglis: I think we have quoted verbatim the
17 statements that these two pilots made.

18 Mr. Gesell: Now, with respect to the discussion of the
19 submarine movements --

20 Admiral Inglis: Mr. Gesell, may I interrupt a minute?

21 Mr. Gesell: Certainly.

22 Admiral Inglis: I don't think that I gave you a final
23 definitive answer to your question. My answer was that to
24 the best of my knowledge and belief we have quoted precisely
25 the translations of the statements made by the two pilots

Witness Inglis:

Questions by Mr. Gesell

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2 and also, to the best of my knowledge and belief, that is
3 the only evidence which we have.

4 Mr. Gesell: I did not mean to interrupt; I am sorry.

5 Now, with respect to the disposition of the submarine
6 forces which you have considered, you reported that at least
7 one body of the submarines went to Hawaii via Kawajalein, did
8 you not?

9 Admiral Inglis: Yes, sir.

10 Mr. Gesell: That is in the Marshall group of islands,
11 is it not?

12 Admiral Inglis: Yes, sir.

13 Mr. Gesell: Have you any information as to when those
14 submarines arrived in the areas of the Marshall Islands?

15 Admiral Inglis: No, sir.

16 Mr. Gesell: In discussing whether or not midget sub-
17 marines penetrated into the harbor you again indicated that
18 your data pointed to the fact that only one submarine had
19 penetrated into the harbor but that involved, did it not, the
20 same qualitative judgments on your part as have already been
21 considered by the committee in connection with your previous
22 statement concerning submarines in the harbor?

23 Admiral Inglis: That is correct, sir. I have nothing
24 to add regarding submarines than I stated in my previous
25 statement.

Witness Inglis:

Questions by Mr. Gesell

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2 Mr. Gesell: This is merely a repetition of your statement
3 on this score?

4 Admiral Inglis: That is right.

5 Mr. Gesell: Did the Japanese in any way report how many
6 submarines got in the harbor?

7 Admiral Inglis: We have no such report.

8 Mr. Gesell: It is known, is it not, that none of the
9 submarines returned, none of the Jap submarines returned?

10 Admiral Inglis: The Japanese admit that.

11 The Chairman: That is midgets.

12 Mr. Gesell: We are talking about the midget submarines.

13 The Chairman: That is right.

14 Admiral Inglis: The five midgets did not return.

15 Mr. Gesell: Now, you say that they were these midget
16 submarines from a mother ship. You mean that the small sub-
17 marine was inside a larger submarine, or just how did it work?

18 Admiral Inglis: Those midget submarines are carried as a
19 deck load on the larger submarine.

20 Mr. Gesell: Under water or on the surface?

21 Admiral Inglis: Under water or on the surface.

22 Mr. Gesell: In other words, the mother submarine can
23 submerge taking the midget submarine with it?

24 Admiral Inglis: That is correct, sir. Of course, with
25 some loss of military effectiveness because of the unusual

Witness Inglis:

Questions by Mr. Gesell

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2 load.

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Mr. Gesell: Yes, I imagine so.

4

Now, I wanted to ask one question of you concerning the
5 reconnaissance map item which we had, on which the track of
6 the Jap striking force was presented.

7

You stated that there was one overlap of the radius
8 shown there. I am not clear whether the reconnaissance as
9 shown on that chart is the actual distance flown by the re-
10 connaissance airplanes or whether it takes into account the
11 visual reconnaissance which would be possible from the end
12 of the radius of a flight.

13

Do you understand what I mean?

14

Admiral Inglis: I understand what you mean and I am not
15 clear on that either.

16

Mr. Gesell: The question, of course, arises, if it is
17 the former rather than the latter, whether from the terminal
18 points of the actual flight it would have been possible to
19 see the departing or incoming Jap forces. I take it the in-
20 coming clearly no; the question only relates to the departing
21 Jap forces.

22

Admiral Inglis: Of course, that is a highly speculative
23 matter from my point of view, as to just what the visibility
24 was, what the altitude of the planes was and how far they
25 could see and I am afraid I cannot answer that question except