

INTERR OF KIDO - (21 Jan)

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INTERROGATION OF
(Marquis) KIDO, KOICHI

DATE AND TIME: 21 January 1946, 1415 - 1630 hours
PLACE : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan
PRESENT : (Marquis) KIDO, Koichi
Mr. Henry R. Sackett, Interrogator
Lt. Fred F. Suzukawa, Interpreter
(Miss) S. M. Betar, Stenographer
Questions by: Mr. Sackett

Oath of Interpreter

Do you solemnly swear by Almighty God that you will truly and accurately interpret and translate from English into Japanese and from Japanese into English, as may be required of you, in this proceeding?

Lt. Suzukawa: I do.

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- Q We have a new interpreter as the other young man couldn't be here, but we will proceed the same as before. We are going through your diary, if you remember. I think we were talking about your entries on September 10, 1931. In your diary on that date you refer to Mr. TANI as head of the Asiatic Bureau. What was the Asiatic Bureau?
- A The Asiatic Bureau was a bureau of the Foreign Ministry and it handled the China matter.
- Q Generally speaking, what did it do with reference to China in those days?
- A It handled all matters concerning China. Before, it was divided into administrative sections. It later was divided into a European Section, American Section and Asiatic Section

Q It was a division of foreign offices? Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q In your diary of September 10, you indicate that Mr. TANI told you about the China affair, as he understood it at that time. What do you recall as having been said?

A At that time, there were many disturbances by the Chinese and the Japanese. Therefore, he told me that what would happen in the future was inconceivable.

Q In other words, at that time, he was anticipating that there might be some trouble?

A And that at that time, the Foreign Ministry explained about the rights of self-preservation.

Q Do you mean by that that he explained it might be necessary for the Japanese to defend their nationals in China?

A Yes, such a thing has also been anticipated.

Q And what, if anything, did he say to you with reference to the Army creating incidents in China in those days?

A Those things were not heard of very much.

Q That developed later, is that right?

A Yes.

Q Who was Mr. Oda?

A He was my friend.

Q Was he in government service?

A No, he was a member of the House of Peers at that time.

Q What other government offices did Mr. TANI hold in later years?

A He was the Chief of the Intelligence Bureau of the Cabinet and later on he was Ambassador to China. He is still Ambassador to China.

Q Was Mr. OKABE the former Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper?

A Yes

- Q He was your predecessor as Secretary to the Lord Keeper? Is that right?
- A Yes.
- Q What offices, if any, did Okabe hold in the Government in later years?
- A At the last, during Tojo's Cabinet, he was the Minister of Education.
- Q Did he hold any other governmental offices, do you recall?
- A Before, he was an official in the Foreign Ministry.
- Q Your diary indicates that on or about the 10th of September, the Emperor called the Minister of War in with reference to the March affair and that about that time you talked with Vice Minister Kobayashi and he told you what the Emperor discussed with the War Minister. Do you recall what that was?
- A At that time, he was very sorry to have caused anxiety to the Emperor.
- Q What else did he say?
- A I have no recollection of these things. This [indicating diary] pertains to the Navy.
- Q I don't understand what you mean by "This pertains to the Navy."
- A Because the Navy did not participate in the March Incident and there was no special discussion of the affair.
- Q It was my understanding that there was a general plot on behalf of the Army to try to take over political authority. That was reported to the Emperor and the Emperor called in the War Minister and discussed it with him. What was the Emperor's attitude and what did he discuss?
- A There was no report given to the Emperor at that time and the War Minister had denied such a report. Therefore, it was only a caution or admonition by the Emperor to follow the regulations of the Army. Therefore, the March Incident, even up until today is not known publicly.

Q Who was the particular War Minister that the Emperor admonished at that time?

A Perhaps it was MINAMI.

Q Would you tell us in your own words, after reading your entry in your diary as of September 19, just what happened on that day with reference to the Manchurian Incident?

A I had heard, as written here in the diary, that the Manchurian Incident had occurred. Therefore, I stopped my schedule of playing golf and went to the office and heard the details of the news from the Chief Aide-de-Camp.

Q What did he tell you that you recall?

A At that time, detailed information was not available.

Q What did he tell you?

A I have no accurate recollection, and because the situation was complex or troublesome, I referred the matter to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, who was living at Kamakura at that time.

Q What did you tell him on that day?

A I do not remember the exact content but I reported what the Chief Aide-de-camp told me.

Q Do you remember what the Chief Aide-de-camp said about what happened in Manchuria that day?

A I have no special recollection but I believe that he just told me of the Mukden Incident and that Manchuria was occupied.

Q Was he critical of the Army's action or did he approve what had taken place in his conversation with you.

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A NARA is a mild man/is not the type of a man to be critical. His story was simple and terse.

Q What, if anything, did the Lord Keeper have to say when you reported it to him?

A I only remember that he remarked that this was a regrettable incident and that it would become troublesome.

Q Did you then discuss that with the Lord Keeper - that fear?

- A I have no minute recollection but I believe I did.
- Q Do you remember what the Lord Keeper's attitude was as to what might be done?
- A There was no discussion as to what to do on the part of the Lord Keeper.
- Q The Prime Minister went to see the Emperor at that time, too, did he not?
- A Yes.
- Q What was the nature of the conversation between the Prime Minister and the Emperor as you learned it?
- A As I have written in the diary, the situation would become aggravating and the matter will be solved when we have gained superiority.
- Q That was the Emperor's attitude, is that right?
- A This was the advice given by the Cabinet and the Emperor advised that such a policy be taken.
- Q In other words, that was the attitude that the Cabinet recommended to the Emperor?
- A Yes.
- Q That the matter be brought to a conclusion as rapidly as possible and not be permitted to enlarge. Is that right?
- A Yes .
- Q Later on that day, according to your diary, you had a talk with Baron HARADA, who seemed to be very much concerned about the Army's attitude.
- A According to what the Prime Minister said to Harada, the Army's attitude was adamant and therefore I did not know whether they would conform to our decision and was very much worried in that respect.
- Q In other words, both you and Harada were fearful that the Army would want to enlarge the Incident and move on in and take control of Manchuria.

- A Yes, that was worried over and had been to the concern of the Prime Minister.
- Q And that was WAKATSUKI at that time?
- A Yes.
- Q At that particular moment, who were the leaders in the Army that you gentlemen were fearful would enlarge the Mukden Incident? Who were the individual men you were afraid of?
- A They were the staff officers of the Kwantung Army.
- Q Do you recall what their names were or the outstanding men in that group of staff officers that you were afraid would enlarge this incident?
- A The staff officer by the name of ISHIWARA was very adamant in his stand.
- Q What was his Army rank, do you recall, at that time, approximately?
- A He was either a lieutenant-colonel or a colonel.
- Q And how did you know that he was particularly troublesome at that time? What made you fear that particular individual?
- A I have no absolute knowledge of him but I heard as Chief of the Operations Section that he was very vigorous and positive in his action.
- Q What did he advocate?
- A He was more or less the center of all rumors which emanated concerning the Mukden trouble.
- Q Did he make speeches in those days?
- A The militarist does not make public speeches.
- Q Where did you get this information that he was the leader of the military movement in Manchuria?
- A That became clear from the stories in the newspapers, correspondents and other sources.
- Q What did this Colonel become later on in the Army service?

A He went up to Division Commander which is the same as lieutenant-colonel. Right now, he is retired.

Q Did he ever become a government official?

A No.

Q Who else besides this officer were noted for their activities in Manchuria in those days?

A The staff section was strong in this. I do not have any information.

Q You mean the staff in the Kwantung Army?

A Yes, the staff section of the Kwantung Army.

Q What was the War Minister, Minamis', attitude about the Mukden Incident at the time it took place?

A He agreed to the plan presented in the Cabinet meeting to the Emperor but he was fearful that we would not be able to carry it out.

Q That plan was to minimize the incident? Is that what you refer to?

A Yes.

Q In taking that position was he opposing the will of the Army?

A As far as his going against the will of the Kwantung Army, it is not very clear, but it has been feared that the Kwantung Army may not conform to such a plan.

Q Was the attitude of the General Staff in Tokyo the same or different to the attitude of the Kwantung Army staff?

A On that matter, I have no accurate recollection.

Q As a matter of fact, the military activity in Mukden took place without the prior sanction of the Emperor, did it not?

A That was a measure of self-defense which arose spontaneously, so I believe such a thing was not done.

Q Normally, before starting a military campaign, you would have to have the sanction or approval of the Emperor, wouldn't you?

A Yes.

- Q But your thought was that the Mukden Incident was in self-defense and took place on the spur of the moment without prior sanction? Is that right?
- A I believe it was so. I have no accurate recollection.
- Q Is that your impression of what took place?
- A My impression is that it occurred suddenly.
- Q In your diary, under date of September 21, you have some notations which would indicate that Baron HARADA, at least, was concerned with what was going to happen when the Chief of the General Staff reported to the Emperor. What do you recall about that?
- A I have no recollection.
- Q Wasn't Prince SAIONJI fearful that there might be some friction between the Emperor and Chief of Staff when the report was made?
- A Everything is not clear on this matter. I cannot recollect anything.
- Q Do you mean you really can't remember or you prefer not to say?
- A I don't remember.
- Q If you get something where you just would rather not say, I wish you would tell me so so that I can appreciate the situation, will you do that?
- A If I remembered the details of this part, I would willingly give the details but since I have no recollection of it, I cannot give it.
- Q What is your personal understanding in the light of what has happened and what you have learned since, as to what actually took place around September 19, 1931, known as the Mukden Incident. Tell us in your own words what took place in view of all your knowledge.
- A From before, Mukden had been considered to be a problem child and that numerous incidents would arise in the future. When this Incident arose, I thought surely this was a very burdensome matter coming into our hands. The Prime Minister in the Cabinet meeting has desired to solve the Incident as early as possible but he was not sure whether it could be solved at all. The Cabinet measure concerning it, did not progress smoothly and therefore the Incident became enlarged. I was very much concerned but I could not do anything beyond my office or the responsibility which I had in my official capacity.

- Q What did you do?
- A I had no other recourse but to follow the developments of the situation.
- Q What, if anything, did the Government do to try to minimize the event and keep it from spreading?
- A The Government has endeavored to do its utmost in that respect but the militarists went right ahead and consequently the matter became more and more aggravated.
- Q What did the Government do to try to stop the scope of the Incident?
- A The details are beyond my recollection but the fact that the Cabinet had made definite suggestions to the war Minister has come to my attention.
- Q What suggestions did they make that you recollect?
- A I have no recollection.
- Q Do you know to whom the suggestions were made to? What individual? Was it the Minister of War?
- A It was the War Minister.
- Q And, what was his attitude when he was approached toward minimizing this thing? What did he say?
- A The War Minister tried to follow according to what the Cabinet wanted him but unfortunately the Staff Officers took matters in their own hands and more or less .
- Q The Staff officers in Tokyo?
- A The Staff officers in Tokyo and in the Kwantung Army.
- Q In other words, the top staff officers in Tokyo backed up the officers in the Kwantung Army, didn't they?
- A I believe so, but I am not sure about it.
- Q What individuals, Marquis, at that stage, would you say were responsible for expanding the Mukden Incident instead of following the recommendations of the Government?
- A I believe that a portion of the War Ministry and the Staff Headquarters were responsible..

Q Alright, what individuals in the War Ministry were responsible?

A I forget their names.

Q You must remember some people who stood out head and shoulders above others in those days against the opposition that you thought were responsible? Who were they?

A Generally, the person responsible is the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau.

Q Who was he in those days?

A I have no recollection who he was. If I investigated the matter pertaining to him, I might be able to find out.

Q You do recall that the Government wanted to limit the Incident while the Chief of Military Affairs Bureau wanted at that time to move in and expand the incident. Is that right?

A I can only say that such a thing is true.

Q I take it from what you say you were one of those in the Government who wanted to minimize and limit this thing and you were being opposed by another faction. I think you would have some recollection who your opposition was instead of just in general terms. Don't you remember those who stood up against you, people whom you had to pacify and win over to your point?

A I really do not remember their names.

Q Well, how can I find out who they were. Where do you suggest I go to find out who those men were who represented the opposition to those with whom you were.

A Among the people, I feel that there are a great number that were opposed to the policy and especially among the Rightists and I do not know their names at all.

Q To clarify my points to you. In our conversation, all the way through, we sooner or later come to point where we talk about the opposition in terms of "they". They wanted to do this and they wanted to do that. The word "they" doesn't convey anything very definite in terms of individuals. I want to know what "they" means. All I want to know is who can tell me who "they" are, if you can't.

- A Persons like OKAWA SHUMEI were very positive and vigorous in their stand.
- Q What was Okawa Shumei's position in the Government in those days?
- A He was a civilian.
- Q What group or organization did he head at that time?
- A He had a Rightists organization under him but I forgot its name.
- Q Did he favor the Army group or the Government group?
- A Army group.
- Q Even though he was a rightist, he favored the Army?
- A Yes.
- Q Is he still alive?
- A Yes.
- Q Do you think he would have been acquainted with the Army attitude at that time?
- A I feel that he does but since I am not acquainted with him, I do not know.
- Q He was the same OKAWA who was involved in the March 1931 plot? Isn't that right?
- A Yes.
- Q What did this Okawa say or do along September 1931 that indicated to you he was lined up with the Army?
- A At that time, I heard nothing about what he did or anything like that.
- Q What makes you think he was lined up with the Army, then?
- A It was because I have heard he was supporting an organization that had such a policy.
- Q Were those Army organizations?

A They were civilian organizations.

Q You don't remember the names of the organizations?

A No, their names change occasionally.

Q You indicated in your diary you thought it would be well for the elder statesmen to come to Tokyo in those days. Why did you advocate that?

A It is because the situation had become terrible and it is hard to tell what we have in the future so I think it is better that they come to Tokyo. If the Cabinet took a strong attitude against the Army, it was felt that the Cabinet would fall.

Q In other words, in Japanese politics, had the Cabinet fallen because of a dispute with the Army, it would be better for the elder statesmen to be in Tokyo to select a new Cabinet?

A Yes.

Q In other words, the presence of the elder statesmen in Tokyo was needed to help form a new cabinet if the existing cabinet fell? Is that a correct statement?

A Yes.

Q And the situation was so critical that you, at least, felt that the elder statesmen should be present because the Cabinet might fall any moment?

A It did not reach the situation where the cabinet might fall any moment.

Q But you were fearful that it might?

A Yes. I felt that it would have been better if the Cabinet went to such an extent as to be strong in their attitude toward the Army.

Q Who was Mr. HAYASHI? He is mentioned on September 23 in your diary?

A He is HAYASHI, Katsura and he was Chief of the Maintenance Section.

Q Of the Army?

A Of the War Ministry.

Q Is that "maintenance" or "mobilization" section?

A Maintenance.

Q Generally speaking, what would his duties be?

A I have no accurate information pertaining to the War Ministry.

Q Was he an officer?

A I believe he was at least a Major General.

Q On that date we are talking about, you had conversation with him with reference to the Manchurian Incident. Do you recall his explanation of what took place?

A He said that the situation concerning the demolition of that railway was not clear.

Q As a matter of fact, the railroad never was bombed, was it - it developed later on? Is that correct?

A I never heard such news. There was a rumor to the effect that the bombing plot was done by the Japanese and that was never found out to the end.

Q Where did you hear that rumor that the Japanese had created the incident in order to be able to move in?

A I heard such a thing from the newspapers.

Q At about the time that the incident took place or long afterwards?

A The Incident happened on the 18th and this was written on the 23rd so on the 23rd such a rumor appeared so I asked about the bombing incident, especially.....

Q You asked HAYASHI?

A Yes, and since he did not know about it, I felt very much indignant.

Q You think he knew about it but refused to tell you?

A I do not feel so but everything was muddled up. Since hardly time elapsed since the actual incident, the investigation was not done.

- Q As of September 23, 1931, you mean?
- A Yes.
- Q Were you and your friends in the Government in those days very suspicious that the Army might create an incident in order to become more active in Manchuria?
- A Yes, there was such a worry.
- Q You would not have been surprised if they had created an incident during that time because of their conduct in March, April and summer of 1931? Is that right?
- A I did not anticipate it but upon hearing the rumor, I felt that maybe they might do such a thing.
- Q There were other incidents on or about that period of time in addition to the railroad bombing that happened in Manchuria, weren't there?
- A Yes.
- Q And were those incidents created by the Japanese Army personnel rather than the Chinese?
- A There were rumors to the effect that the Japanese did commit those things but the actual facts were not known. There were stories to that effect.
- Q The activities of the Kwantung Army, you will agree with me, won't you, were all out of proportion to ordinary self-defense of Japanese nationals ?
- A At the beginning, I thought they were acting in self-defense but later on I felt they had gone out of the scope of self-defense.
- Q I appreciate the fact that everyone in the Government didn't favor what took place in Manchuria and I'm interested in knowing what you understand to be the true situation.
- A Yes, it is as you say.
- Q What did Mr. SAITO, the director of the South Manchurian Railroad have to say about the Incident? You mention him in your diary as of September 23.

- A SAITO was a bureau chief in the Foreign Ministry and he also was director of the Manchurian Railway.
- Q What did he have to say about what was going on in Manchuria?
- A He just spoke about the Manchurian situation and I have no recollection of the details.
- Q You and your close friends, such as KONOYE and HARADA got together and talked quite often in those days about the situation in Manchuria, did you not?
- A Yes.
- Q Was anything ever said about the likelihood of the Manchurian situation violating Japanese treaties?
- A Yes, naturally, we were very much concerned about it.
- Q You and Prince KONOYE and HARADA were familiar with the nine-power treaties and other such treaties, were you not?
- A Yes.
- Q What was the nature of your discussion in those days as to the effect of the Manchurian Incident being in violation of the Japanese treaties? What did you have to say about it? What was the nature of your discussions?
- A We would discuss the fact that disregard of the Pact will make other countries distrust Japan.
- Q And did you at that time feel that the Manchurian Incident was a violation of the Treaty?
- A At the beginning, they were saying it was self-defense so the situation was not clear and the Government also said that it was made in self-defense so I have no recollection as to arguing in that respect.
- Q But it was discussed among your friends and government officials as to whether it was self-defense?
- A Later on, since this matter of self-defense became more and more involved, we felt that everything might be leading up to a violation.
- Q You felt that the original incident might have been in self-defense but when the Army group insisted on taking a stronger and stronger attitude, you certainly realized that you were approaching the point where the Treaty was being violated?
- A Yes.

- Q They went so far so that the time came when they violated the nine-power Treaty, didn't they?
- A I felt that way but the Government's attitude toward it was not clear.
- Q When you say "government", are you referring to the Cabinet?
- A I am referring to the Foreign Ministry and to the individual stories and reports.
- Q What was the Lord Keeper's attitude in those days as to whether or not this amounted to a violation of the Treaty?
- A He felt that we must solve the Incident quickly because the Lord Keeper was an advocate of abiding by treaties and he was very much concerned over the matter.
- Q He didn't want to take chances on wanting to have to construe this as a violation of the Treaty, is that it?
- A Yes, he desired there wouldn't be any violation of the Treaty or any construal in that respect.
- Q You will agree with me, won't you, that the amount of force that was eventually used and the action taken in Manchuria was entirely inconsistent with self-defense, wasn't it?
- A I felt that the situation developed to a point where it was outside the scope of self-defense.
- Q What was the Emperor's attitude with reference to this self-defense theory. Did he think it was self-defense or did he come to the conclusion finally that it got past that stage?
- A I heard that the Emperor occasionally asked that the situation be solved immediately but since I did not contact the Emperor at that time, I do not know.
- Q Did you attend any Cabinet meetings in those days or other meeting of government officials where the relative merits of self-defense were discussed pro and con?
- A I have not had occasion to participate in a Cabinet meeting.
- Q How about meetings with the Lord Keeper himself, attended by other Government officials, was this question of self-defense discussed at those meetings?

A There was no such occasions.

Q There was a faction or factions in Japan in those days that felt that Manchuria should be brought in to the Japanese Empire, were there not?

A There were organizations advocating such things, that Manchuria be part of the Japanese Empire but there were more advocating that Manchuria become an independent country - that is, among the civilians.

Q Do you recall who the outstanding leaders were that advocated bringing Manchuria into the sphere of Japanese influence?

A Such sentiment was highly prevalent among the military groups and among civilians. Persons like OKAWA was very much in the limelight.

Q In your mind, this man OKAWA stands out as a leader advocating expanding into Manchuria, is that right?

A It appears so. I have no direct connection so I do not know accurately.

Q I think I asked you the other day what OKAWA did in Government service or civilian service?

A In the Government, he didn't do anything. He had no post. He may have been connected with the Manchurian railway, but I am not sure.

Q The Government that was set up in Manchuria eventually and which was recognized by Japan was really a Government that was controlled by the Japanese, wasn't it?

A Yes, it actually had the final word and it was instituted by Japan, itself.

Q And was more or less controlled by Japan, wasn't it?

A Yes.

Q It was not a free, independent government in the ordinary sense of the word. There can be no dispute about that from the record, is that right. Weren't there people in the Government at the time that the independence of Manchuria was recognized that felt that such action was a violation of the Nine-Power Treaty?

A Around that time, that matter wasn't of much concern - or, it wasn't a problem.

Q Why not?

A It is because events moved so fast.

Q Do you mean by that that Japan or the Japanese Government was indifferent to the fact that it might be violating one of its treaties or didn't care that it was violating a treaty?

A Those things were not clear?

Q Wasn't there anyone in the Japanese Government who came to the front and pointed out that there were treaty obligations that perhaps the Japanese should respect?

A I have no recollection of anyone coming out to the fore from the Cabinet.

Q Do you mean that the Government just paid no attention to the fact that it had signed a treaty that might be violated.

A I have heard that there was some concern as to whether they were violating treaties or not but since events moved so fast and the military had stepped down, it was/perceptible whether they were. **not**

Q You don't think the militarists mentioned the fact that the treaty might be violated? They just passed over the whole treaty picture?

A I believe that it consequently became so and I believe that the Army were giving various explanations - but I have no recollection.

Q You think the Army did recognize that there was a Treaty and they were trying to explain away their action, then?

A Yes, I believe that they were standing behind the assertion of self-defense.

Q Which many thinking people in the government became to realize was not a true situation? Is that right?

A Members of the Foreign Ministry were very much worried in that respect and I did not hear about any positive statements but I did hear individual statement to that respect.

Q Do you recall from whom you heard individual statements and what you heard?

A A person like Mr. TANI of the Foreign Ministry made such a story.

- Q What did he say?
- A I have no accurate recollection.
- Q What was the gist of what he said - the nature of it?
- A He was saying that the question of whether it is a violation of the Treaty or not will soon come up but that the Army was hiding behind the assertion of self-defense.
- Q What was Prime Minister SHIDEHARA's attitude in those days with reference to treaty violations?
- A I never heard.
- Q Later on, INUKAI was both Premier and Foreign Minister. What was his attitude with reference to the treaties?
- A I never heard anything with respect to that.
- Q I notice in your diary entry of September 29, you mention the question of the "freedom of the prerogative of the supreme command". What were you thinking about when you wrote that?
- A At the time of the London Conference, there was a rumor to the effect that the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal has violated the prerogative of the supreme command, which later proved entirely false and we felt that the dispatch of troops to the Yangtze involved the question of prerogatives.
- Q The prerogative of the supreme command is apparently some sort of a principle in Japanese affairs. What does it mean? What sort of prerogatives does the supreme command have?
- A Under the Japanese Government system, the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Navy is functioning independently of the Cabinet.
- Q And as such, they have the right to make decisions on military matters without first consulting the Cabinet? Is that what you mean?
- A Yes, the Chief of Staff of the Army and Navy can act independently. Only in matters such as budget do they conform with the Cabinet.
- Q In other words, if the Army and the Navy conclude that military action should be taken, there is no way that the Government or the Cabinet can prevent such action? Is that right?

- A It doesn't mean that their action can not be stopped but their authorities are separate.
- Q How could it be stopped? By what mechanical procedure could military action on behalf of the Army and Navy be stopped by the Cabinet, for example?
- A Since the Minister of War is in the Cabinet, the Cabinet, through the Minister of War can take appropriate action. In the matter of operations and in the exercise of matters of the troops, the Cabinet has no authority or no hand in it.
- Q In other words, the Cabinet has nothing to say as to the details of military operations but as to whether a military campaign is started or not, the Cabinet does have some voice?
- A In the use of force outside the country, the Cabinet has the power of expressing its will. I am not absolutely positive as to the details of the matter of prerogatives of the supreme command and I advise you to ask someone who knows.
- Q You do mention in your diary that the Chief of the Army Staff suggested to the Prime Minister that the Government should not interfere with the Army. What do you remember about that? Who was it that said that and what did he say?
- A I have heard such a story from around HARADA and I have no recollection and from the Cabinet, I have also heard a story in that respect.
- Q Do you mean by that that the Chief of Staff indicated that it wanted to run its affairs and didn't want any interference from the Government?
- A Because if the Cabinet stopped to mix in the problems, they would become more difficult so he said that it is desired that the Cabinet do not become involved.
- Q In other words, the Chief of Staff of the Army, in effect, said "Let the Army run this Manchurian Incident and let us alone"?
- A It was not as strong as saying "leave everything to us" but "everything is in my authority and I will exercise it and don't become meddlesome too much".
- Q I notice in your diary, September 30, you have a notation that "We cannot trust the activities of the Metropolitan Police". What were you referring to and why couldn't you trust them?

- A Mr. TAKUNO, at that time, criticized the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and I felt that he had connection with the Metropolitan Police Board and that is why I made the statement.
- Q What were you fearful that the Metropolitan Police might do in the case of the Lord of the Privy Seal?
- A It was not that the Metropolitan Police Board would take positive action but that their control is inadequate.
- Q You mean by that you were afraid the police wouldn't protect or couldn't be trusted to protect the Lord Keeper if he were in danger?
- A Yes, I was worried in that respect.
- Q Who was it that the Lord Keeper was fearing might cause him personal harm?
- A He was fearful that he would be attacked by the Rightists organization during the Manchurian Incident as he took the stand against them.
- Q And by Rightists organizations, you have in mind people who favored a strong centralized or totalitarian government? Is that a fair statement?
- A Yes, it is those totalitarian organizations and after the Manchurian Incident, numerous organizations arose which advocated such policies.
- Q OKAWA was one of such persons?
- A I don't know to what extent but I feel he was such a person.
- Q You can't recall the names of any of the others?
- A There are numerous others but I cannot remember them now. If you go and inquire about it at the Metropolitan Police Board, you can find out.
- Q In other words, you think that the officials in charge of the Metropolitan Police would be able to disclose who were the leaders of this movement for a strong centralized government?
- A The Metropolitan Police Board had been keeping track of such things and therefore they have all the information but I do not know if they will hand over such information.
- Q Do you mean the present Metropolitan Police Board or the Metropolitan Police Board of 1931 would have that information?

A Such material should exist but it may have been burned.

Q In other words, it was part of the function of the Metropolitan Police Board to keep an accurate check on organizations and individuals who were advocating a change in the form of government?

A They were supposed to have.

Q It was part of their job to do that?

A Yes, that was their job and also the Home Ministry's Bureau of Public Order. The Home Ministry handled all such matters covering the entire nation. The Metropolitan Police Board handles it just in Tokyo.

Q Those records, if they exist, would be where insofar as the Metropolitan Police Board is concerned?

A I am not sure about it but I believe it should be held by the Metropolitan Police Board Headquarters here in Tokyo.

Q And the other information in the Home Ministry would be with the papers and documents of the Home Ministry if they haven't been destroyed? Is that right?

A Yes.

Q In other words, it was the job of the Bureau of the Home Ministry to keep tab on all organizations and individuals who were advocating reforms in the Government? There should be a written record of their names and activities if they haven't been destroyed. Is that right?

A That is, supposing?

Q Which would be more accurate than your memory?

A Yes.

Q Do you know as a matter of fact whether or not they have been destroyed?

A I have no idea.

Q Do you know of any orders which were issued to have them destroyed?

A I never heard anything about it.

Q Do you recall who was at the head of the Metropolitan Police in Tokyo back in 1931 when you were concerned about the personal welfare of the Lord Keeper?

- A I do not remember exactly who he was.
- Q You remember you didn't trust them in those days but you don't remember any names. Is that right?
- A It is because the Chief of the Metropolitan Police Board changes with the Cabinet that I have no recollection.
- Q By October of 1931, you personally had become convinced there was a definite plot in the Army to eliminate the political parties and form a dictatorship? Is that right?
- A Yes, just as in the March Incident, it was urged that the existing government be destroyed and a totalitarian government be set in, and one group of politicians did not fully realize the extent of this feeling. They were much concerned about the fact.
- Q You, yourself, felt much concerned about what was going on and you felt that there was a definite plot? Is that right?
- A Yes, I was very much concerned and wondered if there was a way whereby the existing government would not be destroyed and that everything will be settled amicably and well.
- Q But what took place in Manchuria tended to verify your feelings that the Army was plotting to change the political system in Japan?
- A It was not known to what extent they actually wanted to destroy the Government but it was known they wanted to institute a dictatorship.
- Q You recognized the trend in those days and were very much concerned about ^{there} being a radical change in the Japanese system?
- A And because the two major political parties of Japan at that time did not fully realize the magnitude of the situation, they were more or less indifferent. I was very much worried.
- Q You sensed this trend partly from what happened in the March Plot and partly from the way the Army conducted itself in Manchuria?
- A Yes, because everything began to become clear.

Certificate of Interpreter

I, Fred F. Suzukawa, 0-2030605
(name) (Serial Number)

being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of 22 pages, is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Fred F. Suzukawa
2nd Lt AUS

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 8 day of August, 1946.

[Signature]
(Name and Rank)

Duly Detailed Investigating Officer,
International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP.

Certificate of Stenographer

I, S. M. Betar hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

S. M. Betar

Certificate of Interrogator.

I, (~~was~~) Henry H. Sackett, _____,

and _____,

certify that on _____ day of 21 January, 1946, personally appeared before me (~~us~~) Marquis Koichi Kido, and according to Fred Suzukawa, Interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

Tokyo, Japan
Place

8 August 1946
Date

[Signature]