

the Prime Minister, pointed out that the Japanese press was highly critical of such "ridiculous conduct." He added: "Such behavior is especially regrettable since the subject under debate was the coming peace treaty,--a matter that should have been discussed in a calm, objective manner." Others pointed out that at times the interpellators' questions and the Prime Minister's replies were completely inaudible because of the tumult on the floor of the House.

In this connection, on 29 January, the Democratic Liberal Party had introduced a motion calling for disciplinary action against two members of the House: Susumu Kobayashi, Social Renovationist, and Jiro Kita, Farmers' Co-operative Party.

Kobayashi was cited for running up to Speaker Shidehara's chair on the platform during an interpellation and menacing the Speaker for allowing the interpellator to continue beyond his authorized time limit. When a member of the Social Renovation Party apologized for his colleague's actions, the Democratic Liberals withdrew their motion for discipline.

Kita was charged with violating a time limit placed on his interpellation. Kita, however, died on the same day that the motion for disciplinary action against him was filed.

Opposition Parties United Against "Tyranny"  
of Democratic Liberals -- Mainichi

The Tokyo daily Mainichi on 31 January reported that the opposition parties had formed an "Opposition Consultative Association" to wage a strong offensive against the "tyranny of the Democratic Liberal Party which resorts to its numerical superiority in the House of Representatives."

According to the account, it was agreed on 30 January that all minor parties, including the Communists, would present a united front against the Democratic Liberals in the Diet deliberations of such controversial questions as the wage base issue, the national railway wage arbitration plan, and the public monopoly corporation wage arbitration proposal.



House of Councillors Election  
Scheduled for 4 June

The Government, after a conference with executives of the Democratic Liberal Party, on 24 January scheduled tentatively the date of the House of Councillors election for 6 June.

On 26 January, following consultation with House of Councillors members, the date was moved up to 4 June in the belief that more voters would turn out on the earlier date which falls on a Sunday. This date is still tentative, since the definitive date would be promulgated through a Cabinet Order.

One half of the 250 members of the House of Councillors will have their terms of office expire on 2 May,--the date of the close of the Seventh Diet. The Election Law requires the holding of an election upon the lapse of between 31 and 35 days following the expiration of term of office.

Shoji Designated Vice Speaker Pro Tem  
of House of Representatives

The plenary session of the House of Representatives on 25 January named Ichiro Shoji as Acting Vice Speaker of the House to serve for Nobuyuki Iwanoto, who is currently in the United States with the Diet delegation (see this report above, under SCAP STATEMENTS).

Shoji, Democratic Liberal Party member from Miyagi Prefecture, is 57 years old; a former prefectural assemblyman, and Parliamentary Vice Minister of Welfare, and has served four previous terms in the House of Representatives.

Representative Kita Dies

Jiro Kita, thirty-two year old Farmers' Cooperative, elected to the House of Representatives from Hokkaido, died suddenly on the morning of 29 January after suffering a heart attack.

The death of Kita reduced the Farmers' Cooperative Party's strength in the House of Representatives to seven members.



## POLITICAL PARTIES

### Developments in the Conservative Merger Movement

The conservative merger issue which had lingered for over half a year, and which during that time had resulted in few definite developments, in January directly influenced the resignations of State Minister Kozaemon Kimura and Parliamentary Vice-Minister An Yoshida for Postal Services.

Kimura, an advocate of Democratic Party reunification, had released a statement in November setting forth his views on the closely related conservative merger and Democratic Party reunification issues. Later, Kimura was joined by Yoshida, another coalition faction Democrat, who also believed that prior to a Democratic Liberal-Democratic Party merger, the two factions of the Democratic Party -- the coalition faction and the opposition faction -- should first reunite. (See Review of Government and Politics in Japan, November and December 1949). Following repeated attempts to impress their viewpoints on conservative merger proponents, all of which apparently failed, Kimura on 20 January tendered his resignation to Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida. Two days later, An Yoshida resigned from his Government post, and Takeshi Hara, another coalitionist Democrat, simultaneously resigned from the chairmanship of the House of Representatives' Education Committee. On 23 January, the opposition faction of the Democratic Party formally accepted applications from Kimura, An Yoshida, Hara, Hisashi Amano, Yuji Komatsu, <sup>and</sup> Toshinaga Yamamoto, all of whom had resigned from the coalition group. The addition of Kimura, Yoshida, Amano, Hara, Komatsu, and Yamamoto increased the opposition faction's representation in the House of Representatives to 43.

The resignation of Kimura did not come as a surprise to Japan's political circles since he had publicly declared on several occasions that he would resign should it serve to benefit his attempts for reuniting the Democratic Party. On 17 January, Kimura told the press that his original beliefs as set forth in his so-called "Kimura plan" remained unchanged. Then, on the following day, Kimura in another press interview declared that although he intended to leave the Government, he would continue his support of the Yoshida Administration.



State Minister Ichiro Honda on 24 January was named to replace Kimura as chairman of the Local Autonomy Board. The Government on 27 January, announced the appointment of Shinzo Tsubokawa to succeed An Yoshida as the Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Postal Services.

The resignations of Kimura and An Yoshida raised some question over the status of other coalition Democrats serving in the Yoshida Administration and their attitudes toward the merger issue. International Trade and Industry Minister Heitaro Inagaki, who was believed to be a close associate of Kimura, declared on 18 January in a press interview that although he concurred with Kimura's unification opinions, he would not act in concert with Kimura. Inagaki explained that since he was a member of the House of Councillors, his position differed somewhat from Kimura's, a House of Representatives member. (The Democrats in the House of Councillors had not divided into coalitionist and opposition factions at the time of formation of the Third Yoshida Cabinet in February 1949). Inagaki, in his statement, which came following a conference with Kimura, emphasized that although both would definitely oppose the proposed Democratic-Democratic Liberal merger, they would remain unchanged in their support of Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida.

On 9 January, Inagaki had stated that participation by him in the merger would alienate away from the Government other Democrats in the House of Councillors.

Earlier in the month, State Minister Ichiro Honda, who subsequently was Kimura's replacement as Chairman of the Local Autonomy Board, told reporters in Nagasaki on 10 January that he personally believed the merger movement to be premature. Honda expected that in the event of a Democratic-Democratic Liberal merger, 20 coalition Democrats would be lost to the Opposition, thereby hampering rather than favoring the hoped for Democratic Liberal Party expansion. Honda's viewpoints somewhat paralleled those expressed by Inagaki.

The failure of the merger to be realized in January stemmed largely from the unrelenting opposition to the merger voiced by Democratic Liberal Party ranking members Bamboku Ono and Kijuro Shidehara. Together with their followers, they represented a serious block in the Democratic Liberal Party to Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, concurrently party president, Secretary-General



Kosen Hirokawa, Chairman Jiro Hoshijima of the Executive Officers' Board, and other Democratic Liberals who favored the merger. Both Ono and Shidehara were especially bitter towards the inclusion of Democratic Party President Ken Inukai in the merger movement. On 10 January, Ono declared that although he was not necessarily opposed to the principle of a political conservative merger prior to and in preparation for a Japanese peace treaty conference, he could not approve the proposed program for uniting the Democratic Liberal Party with Inukai's followers in the Democratic Party. Ono reaffirmed his contention that the establishment of a second strong conservative party would prove more advantageous for Japan than one such party. Then Ono warned the merger advocates with the statement: "Yoshida and Hirokawa seem to believe that I, one of the sponsors of the Liberal Party, predecessor to the Democratic Liberal Party, will not dare to split the party." "Such complacency," he continued, "is unjustified." This apparently was Ono's reply to the report made by Hirokawa to Yoshida on 6 January that Ono and Shidehara would not leave the Democratic Liberal Party in a protest against the proposed merger.

Meanwhile, Kijuro Shidehara, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, together with his followers joined Ono in the merger protest, although he refused to take part in a joint drive with Ono. Shidehara's opposition to the merger largely stemmed from his personal antagonism to Ken Inukai and his inclusion in the conservative merger movement. On 11 January, in a press interview Shidehara stated: "I am afraid that a very serious situation might develop within our party should the Prime Minister permit the entry of Inukai in the face of strong opposition." Shidehara continued: "I am not entertaining any apprehension about the Prime Minister's political beliefs or ability...I am opposing Inukai's entry merely because I am thinking of the future good of the party and of Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida himself." On 2 January, Shidehara had declared that even should he concede on the merger issue, Yoshida's "distressful position" would not be alleviated.

Shidehara was joined in his stand on the merger largely by followers from the Democratic Liberal Party's former Doshi Club. Included among those who gave active support to Shidehara were Manitsu Tanaka, Sukeichi Ozaki, Vice-Speaker of the House of Representatives Nobuyuki Iwanoto, Saburo Okoshi,



Tokuya Furihata, Takeo Yamamoto, and Yoshio Kawabata. These members of the House of Representatives held frequent conferences with leading advocates of the conservative merger in an attempt, not so much to defeat the merger, as to convey their definite disapproval of Inukai.

Another obstacle developed for the merger advocates when Vice President Kisaku Matsushima of the House of Councillors told reporters in Fukuoka on 14 January that he strongly objected to any conservative amalgamation which included the Democratic Party president. Matsushima expressed the belief that a large segment of the Democratic Liberal Party opposed Inukai, and that should the Prime Minister insist upon his participation in the merger, a sharp split would occur among the rank and file party members.

Failing by other means to quiet the unrest in his party, President Shigeru Yoshida on 17 January established a Democratic Liberal Party Conservative Merger Policy Special Committee which, according to Yoshida, would not be charged with the propriety of the merger, but would merely lay down the lines for realizing it. In addition to appointing himself chairman of the committee, Yoshida selected as committee members: Joji Hayashi (Deputy Prime Minister and concurrently Welfare Minister), Shuji Masutani (Construction Minister), Manitsu Tanaka (Shidehara's right-hand man), Etsujiro Uehara, Jiro Hoshijima, Kozen Hirokawa, and Eisaku Sato (Chairman of the Democratic Liberal Party Diet Policy Committee). With the creation of this committee, it was expected that the merger movement would be stepped up. However, as of the end of January, the committee had failed to conduct even a single business session due largely to an agreement reached on 24 January between Yoshida, Kaneshichi Masuda (Chief Cabinet Secretary), Hirokawa, Hoshijima, Ryugo Hashimoto (Deputy Secretary-General of the Democratic Liberal Party), and Hideo Sudo to shelve the merger issue until such time as intra-party dissension should have subsided.

In addressing the Democratic Liberal Party special national convention preparatory committee on 16 January, Prime Minister Yoshida expressed his firm determination to have the merger issue settled by the time of the House of Councillors' election scheduled for June. The Prime Minister declared that the unification of Japan's conservative political forces was in line with her "final" efforts towards the successful conclusion of a peace treaty. Yoshida



continued: "This year marks an important page in Japan's history.... As I said in my New Year statement, Japan must proceed with large expectations and actual deeds toward the reconstruction of the country." These reconstruction efforts which were launched four years ago, said Yoshida, called for a conservative amalgamation. Then, in touching upon the public reaction to the merger maneuvers, Yoshida attacked the nation's newspapers for having presented a distorted picture of a Democratic Liberal Party torn by internal factional strife. Yoshida expressed the belief that the general populace was indifferent to the issues involved, and he even suspected that the entire matter had developed into a laughing matter as far as they were concerned. In conclusion, the Prime Minister asked his followers to forsake once and for all their "sentimental" reasons for opposing the merger. On 13 January, Yoshida was quoted by reporters as having stated: "It is one year and a half since I began calling upon my friends in the political world in an effort to unite ourselves... As a politician and as president of a political party, I cannot camouflage my intentions... I must bring this intention to a fruitful conclusion."

Yoshida's selection of himself as chairman of the special merger committee did result in some criticisms being raised by party members. Shidehara's statement made on 17 January, however, was considered significant. Shidehara stated: "Some people may criticize Prime Minister Yoshida for having made himself chairman of the committee, but I don't share their views... I am confident that the Prime Minister will lead the committee with justice and fair play." Yoshida, himself, on 19 January stated before the party's Executive Board: "Criticism is being raised by some against my assumption of the chairmanship of the Conservative Merger Policy Special Committee, but I have no intentions of taking advantage of my new position... I personally thought that it would be more convenient if I accepted the post to settle the merger affair."

The creation of the Conservative Merger Policy Special Committee was welcomed by the majority of the Democratic Liberal Party leaders. Deputy Prime Minister Joji Hayashi aptly summed up the general feeling when he told reporters in Nagoya on 17 January that the creation of the committee gave



definite shape to the issue which had not previously been discussed. He added: "Settlement of the merger question may be delayed somewhat...but I am certain that it is now definite."

Prior to establishing the Conservative Merger Policy Special Committee, Yoshida had brushed aside a "broad conservative merger" compromise proposal advanced by Jiro Hoshijima. Hirokawa on 6 January, following a conference with the Prime Minister, told reporters that Yoshida had expressed his intentions of pushing through his original merger plans without being deterred by any compromise ideas. Previously, Hoshijima had advanced to other Democratic Liberal Party leaders a plan to include in the merger movement several members from the New Political Council, the Social Renovation Party, the Farmers' Cooperative Party, the People's Cooperative Party, the Kosei Club, the opposition faction of the Democratic Party, and the Social Democratic Party. Behind Hoshijima's proposed plan was the hope that such party leaders as Ono and Shidehara would cast aside their opposition to the merger movement and offer their cooperation. An indication that Hoshijima's plan would not have received the cooperation of the parties mentioned was noted in the statement issued by Shiro Nakano and Tadashi Kodaira on behalf of the Farmers' Cooperative Party. Nakano and Kodaira, in their statement which was issued on 7 January, declared that their party had no intentions whatsoever of joining the conservative ranks. They attacked the "fealers" as a pure Democratic Liberal publicity stunt. They, furthermore, denounced the merger movement as conflicting with the interests of the nation's farmers. Yutaro Takayama of the People's Cooperative Party who was mentioned in Hoshijima's program denied on 11 January that he had any intentions of joining the Democratic Liberal camp.

The unrelenting refusal of the merger opponents to concede to the merger advocates, in addition to causing an indefinite postponement of the merger, also nearly resulted in the resignations of Hirokawa, Hoshijima, and Sato. All three were reported to have expressed on 19 January their desires to resign but were persuaded by Prime Minister Yoshida to remain at their posts. Nevertheless, talk continued during January on a possible replacement of Hirokawa. Despite reports that Ono and Hirokawa had reached an "Understanding" on 11 January towards ending their "feud", Ono continued his demands



for Hirokawa's removal. On 10 January, Ono told reporters that he favored the selection of Deputy Prime Minister Hayashi for the secretary-general's post. He stated that he would not back Construction Minister Masutani. Strangely, it was Hayashi who on the preceding day had announced his support of Masutani, the appointment of whom, he believed, would erase Ono's feelings toward Hirokawa. Hayashi declared on 9 January that, with the appointment of Masutani, Ono would concur with a Hirokawa promotion to the Cabinet. However, Hirokawa himself had earlier promised that he would never accept a Cabinet post unless Ono first received a similar appointment.

The coalition faction of the Democratic Party remained relatively on the sidelines during January apparently content to await a final Democratic Liberal decision on the merger. Coalition faction Secretary-General Shigeru Hori declared on 17 January that his party would resort to a "wait-and-see" policy pending a conclusion by the Democratic Liberal Conservative Merger Policy Special Committee. On 15 January, Hori told the faction's Executive Board officers that the Democratic merger policy had remained unchanged since December. Later, he told reporters that approximately 80 percent of the coalition Democrats favored the proposed merger.

#### Little Development Made Toward "Progressive" Parties Merger

The "progressive" middle-of-the-road political party movement resulted in a few developments during January. Representatives of the Democratic opposition faction and the People's Cooperative Party on 26 January reached an agreement which included the following provisions:

1. Negotiations to be continued until a "progressive people's political party" should be brought into being.
2. The new party should be based on middle class interests.
3. The party should not include any right-wing Social Democrats.
4. A campaign program for the House of Councillors' election should be completed before the end of March.

Simultaneously, the opposition Democrats had issued "feelers" for a grand coalition of all Opposition parties with the exception of the Communist.



Despite favorable replies from the New Political Council, and the right and neutral wing factions of the Social Democratic Party, the Democrats cancelled their proposal on 27 January. They felt that by excluding the Communist Party, left-wing Social Democrats would refuse to cooperate, thereby reducing the coalition's effective strength.

#### Democratic Liberal Party

The Democratic Liberal Party on 20 January held its third national convention since the party's founding. The convention which was originally scheduled to last for two days adjourned on the opening day after having unanimously adopted a party platform, a statement of policies, a party declaration, and a modification of party regulations. It marked one of the most orderly political conventions staged in Japan since the end of the Pacific War. Perhaps one reason for this was the convention's failure to tackle two delicate issues -- the election of party officers and the conservative merger. Not a single word was spoken during the convention about the proposed merger of the Democratic Liberal Party with the coalition faction of the Democratic Party or the expected re-election of party executive officers. The party's convention preparatory committee prior to the convention omitted the two issues from the convention agenda. The convention delegates, however, did fix the expiration date of 19 February on the term of office for the party officers.

The convention which was held in Tokyo was opened by the party's Deputy Secretary-General Yoshio Watanabe. Following Watanabe's opening address, Muneaki Tsuchikura was named convention chairman and Toranosuke Miura, Kakugoro Tomimaga, Giichi Ozeki, and Yutaka Terao were selected as vice-chairmen. The selection of convention officials was followed by Secretary-General Kozen Hirokawa's report on party activities during the preceding year.

Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida in his address as party president claimed that the policies of the Democratic Liberal Party had resulted in a stabilized Japan undreamed of at the time of Japan's surrender. Yoshida stated that the nation's economy, industrial life, and international trade had all benefited by the "vigorous enforcement of the policies of our party." "I am increasingly confident," spoke Yoshida, "that the stabilization of our



political and economic life will expedite a peace conference for Japan and ultimately contribute to the peace of the world." "We can have hopes for the future," Yoshida added by citing its first balanced budget and the progress being achieved towards substantial tax reductions.

The party president called upon Japan to collaborate with the "stabilized" nations of the world. He declared that to carry on relations with "confused" nations such as China would only plunge the entire world into a similar state.

In conclusion, Yoshida called upon the party members to unite themselves "to live up to the expectations of the nation and the world."

The complete texts of the party declaration, new party platform, and statement of policies follow:

#### Declaration

"The time for peace treaty is at hand, and the present year is the very time to look forward to peaceful independence of the Japanese. Autonomy and independence is the motivating power of rehabilitation of our country's fortunes, and the fountainhead of the development of the Japanese.

"The world relations have recently grown greatly intensified in the degree of strain which are believed to exert a great influence upon the cause of our country. However, it is our bounden duty to accelerate the peace by making our best efforts toward political and economic stabilization, not being swayed in any way either by temporary joy or sorrow.

"The mission of our party should be to make contribution toward the world progress at large governing ourselves by the key-note of modern liberalism, and by planning for our sound and wholesome progress through the harmony and unity of national interests at home and by discharging our responsibility as a member of international group and as a democratic country laying stress upon personal liberty and dignity as far as our international relations are concerned. And confidence placed by a majority of the people upon the Democratic Liberal Party which is a sound and prudent reformer could never be shaken.

"Whatever the communists may preach with their lips, all their actual plans reveal that they are given to revolution by force. Once succumb to their violent forces, our racial pride would be immediately trampled down,



and there would remain nothing but a ruined nation governed by the Red Imperialism. We must resolutely fight them so as to safeguard our personal liberty and dignity.

"Economic stabilisation is duly under its way of realization; and we should attain the qualitative betterment of our economy, by liberating it from the financial burdens due to the inefficiency of control systems, through financial readjustments, lightening of taxes and abolition of control systems and by facilitating introduction of foreign capital and rationalization of industry. With such data as these, real increase of production and promotion of foreign trade becomes possible, and we may look forward to the substantial enhancement of the people's livelihood and the real solution of labor problems. Furthermore, stabilization of farming management and uplifting of small and medium enterprises should particularly be emphasized as the very basis of peaceful commerce and economic rehabilitation.

"Through the achievements in the first year in the life of the present Cabinet, we now greet the second year with a bright prospect of rehabilitation emerging out of austere stabilization, surmounting the post-bellum political and economic confusion. It is our bounden duty to respond to the trust reposed upon us by the people, by taking charge of the political situation for ever so long by attaining peace treaty and independence by our own efforts, winning overpowering victory in the coming election of the members for the House of Councillors."

#### Platform of the Democratic Liberal Party - 1950

##### Preamble

"In the general elections of January last year our party with powerful support of the people captured an absolute majority in the House of Representatives. The party has now been in power for a full year since. Meanwhile, through the 5th and 6th sessions of the Diet we have generally achieved our objectives, such as stabilization of national economy, administrative adjustment, reduction of the people's tax burden, abolition of controls, which constituted the major items of our party platform. We believe we have successfully responded to the trust of the people.

"Now news dispatches from abroad tell of the progress of preparations



a Japanese peace conference. The long-awaited day when we shall recover independence seems near at hand.

"The conclusion of peace, while restoring political autonomy to Japan, will impose upon us the responsibility for economic self-support. Weightier than ever is the task confronting the Yoshida Cabinet, and greater the mission of our party.

"Our party, in response to the popular demand for expansion of trade and solution of the financial stringency has formulated positive policies for national rehabilitation and reconstruction and the programs to promote national economy and to stabilize and elevate living. We do hereby establish and declare the new platform of our party."

#### Statement of Policies

##### "I. Peace Settlement

"We anticipate the speedy realization of an equitable peace settlement that will secure world peace, and the prosperity of mankind. Internally, we stand for thorough democratization of the nation and promotion of economic self-support; externally, for Japan's active role in international cooperation and the preservation of international confidence.

##### "II. Administration

"1. Radical adjustment of administrative business in both central and local governments relating to permits and licenses; unification of the multiple supervision organs; renovation and reform of the administrative machinery as a whole.

"2. Extension and strengthening of the authorities of local public entities; replenishment of local government finance.

"3. Enhancement of morale and discipline; substantial improvement of treatment for public service personnel.

"4. Renovation and improvement of the prosecution system; closer cooperation between the National Rural Police and the local police systems; improvement of the quality of police personnel.

##### "III. Education and Culture

"1. Perfection of the 6-3-3 system; development of private schools, replenishment of scholarship funds; other measures for the advancement of education.

"2. Wholesome development of publication, art, motion picture, theatrical enterprises.



"3. Encouragement of healthy sports, and recreation, and expansion of the facilities thereof.

"4. Elevation of national ethical standards, and enhancement of the respect for religion.

#### "IV. Finance and Banking

"1. Replenishment of construction appropriations through adjustment of the price-adjustment expenditure and debenture liquidation.

"2. Reduction of the people's tax burden through retrenchment of general administrative expenditures in both central and local governments; correction of excesses in the tax collection method; equitable distribution of tax burden.

"3. Effective utilization of the Counter-Aid Fund and the Savings Bureau funds; firm establishment of the loan-on-immovable property system; breaking of the financial bottleneck affecting smaller enterprises, and agriculture, forestry, and aquatic industries.

"4. Stabilization of stock prices by taking the necessary measure to facilitate loans on negotiable papers; positive steps to provide long-term credits for construction projects.

"5. Elimination of the obstacles against the induction of foreign capital.

#### "V. Industry

"1. Normalization of exchange transactions; epochal expansion of normal foreign trade through increased trade by agreement.

"2. Abolition, in principle, of all controls within fiscal 1950.

"3. Gradual transfer of government enterprises such as telephone to private operation; abolition of government control over coal and electric industries.

"4. Securing of funds for promoting smaller enterprises; improvement of facilities and increase of the operation rate.

"5. Positive acceleration of the development of hydraulic power sources as well as gold, sulphide, coal, petroleum, and other important subterranean resources.



"6. Promotion of the sciences and technologies necessary for the development of industry.

"VI. Agriculture, Forestry and Aquatic Industry

"1. Firm establishment of the policy for maintenance of floor prices for farm products, and the system of compensating farm losses caused by natural disasters.

"2. Positive measures relating to improvement and conservation of soil.

"3. Stabilization of farming by encouraging the planting of proper crop on proper soil and the use of animals in farming.

"4. Fostering of cooperatives, agricultural and aquatic.

"5. Encouragement of afforestation; disposal of state forests; improvement of the administrative system for private-owned forests; reinforcement of forestry cooperatives.

"6. Construction and repair of fishing bases; expansion and stabilization of pelagic fishery.

"7. Development of fishing grounds; positive measures for maintenance and fostering of fishery resources.

"VII. Labor

"1. Promotion of legitimate unionism; raising of the real wage; enhancement of labor productivity; capital-labor cooperation for economic recovery.

"2. Increase of employment through expansion of public works and positive promotion of industries; extension of the enterprises for emergency/<sup>un</sup>employment relief, expansion of unemployment insurance.

"VIII. Welfare

"1. Firm establishment of social security system through fundamental reform of the National Health Insurance system and amalgamation of various social insurance systems.

"2. Greater protection for bereaved families and widows; promotion of child welfare.

"3. Promotion of national health centering about anti-tuberculosis measures.

"4. Acceleration of repatriation of Japanese nationals still detained abroad; protection of repatriates.



## "IX. Construction

"1. Speedy restoration of disaster damages; overall development plans for land, water and natural resources in order to nourish national strength.

"2. Abolition of the temporary building restrictions for the purpose of accelerating housing construction.

## "X. Transportation

"1. Promotion of Japanese shipping service on foreign routes; measures for assisting and fostering the ship-building industry.

"2. Rationalization of government railway operation; electrification of government railways, and construction of new lines.

"3. Perfection and extension of roads and harbor facilities."

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The Democratic Liberal Party on 24 January delegated the responsibility of giving approval to Democratic Liberal House of Councillors candidates to President Shigeru Yoshida, Joji Hayashi - Deputy Prime Minister, Secretary-General Kozen Hirokawa, Chairman Jiro Hoshijima of the Executive Officers Board, and Chairman Eisaku Sato of the Political Affairs Committee.

Kenji Ozumi, Democratic Liberal member of the House of Councillors, on 31 January submitted his resignation from the Diet. Ozumi, concurrently president of the Sumida-Gumi Contract Company, had been convicted by the Yokohama District Court on 16 January on charges of embezzlement, theft, hoarding, and election law regulation violations. Ozumi was sentenced to six months imprisonment.

Vice-Governor Misao Oki of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government on 31 January joined the Democratic Liberal Party. It was expected that Oki would become a candidate for the House of Councillors' election.

Tadshiko Shimazu, Ryokufukai member of the House of Councillors, joined the Democratic Liberal Party on 26 January.

## Social Democratic Party

The struggle for control of the Social Democratic Party by the party's left and right wings came to a climax at the party's Fifth National Convention in mid-January when the party's right-wing led by party Chairman Tetsu Katayama



walked out of the party's fourth and final day session. The withdrawal of the right-wing subsequently left the party with three distinct groups, all claiming to be representative of the party's interests -- the right-wing or "orthodox" Social Democrats -- the left-wing Social Democrats -- and the neutral faction or Unification Council Social Democrats. Despite the fact that both the left and right-wings elected their own Central Executive Committees to determine their respective policies, the party remained for all practical purposes a unified body in the Diet. The neutral faction or Unification Council did not elect a Central Executive Committee, nor did it permit its followers to accept executive posts with either of the other two groups, according to instructions issued on 23 January.

The party's national convention which opened in Tokyo on 16 January was characterized by bitter left, right-wing struggles on virtually every issue placed before the convention agenda. The highlight of the convention occurred following the convention's third day session when Chairman Katayama issued an attack on the party's left-wing for attempting to usurp influence over party affairs. Katayama's statement set the stage for the following day's right-wing exodus.

The text of Katayama's statement was as follows:

"For a long time it has been my cherished hope to unify and develop our party as a Social Democratic political party which could fulfill the expectations of the people, especially the laboring masses. On the occasion of the national convention at which the results of the party's reconstruction efforts should be reflected, I find that actual intra-party conditions fail to live up to the expectations of the masses.

"Our Social Democratic Party on the occasion of its reconstruction convention last April made it clear that it would endeavor to conduct itself as a true Social Democratic Party. It is understood that the party chose this path as a defender of the laboring masses' interests towards realization of socialism based on Social Democratic principles.

"Our party should not adopt the stand of a narrow-class minded party for acquiring a single-party regime. I believe our party should follow the pattern of Britain's Labor Party. I regret, therefore, that some of our party members are struggling to gain influence within the party contrary to



its basic character. I hereby announce that I reject such endeavors conducted by a section of our party members, and will defend the ways of Social Democracy with such members as share my views and anxieties.

"Feeling keenly my responsibilities on the occasion of the present convention, I hereby warn the party's entire membership that unless these factional struggles are discontinued, I shall find it impossible to continue my participation in the proceedings of the convention."

On the following day, despite the urgings of Secretary-General Nosaburo Suzuki for reconsideration, Katayama declined renomination to the party's highest executive position, whereupon the convention's right-wing delegates departed en masse to continue their own version of the convention at a pre-arranged meeting place. The left- and neutral-wing delegates extended the regular convention for another day, and they re-elected Suzuki to another term of office as secretary-general, elected Hiroo Wada to the party's treasurer post, and selected a twenty-member Central Executive Committee. The right-wing, likewise, established their own party machinery by electing their own Central Executive Committee, Chozaburo Mizutani as their secretary-general, and Satoshi Nakasaki as treasurer. Katayama's position, meanwhile, remained somewhat vague. The left-wing purposely left the party chairman's position vacant at their executive officers' election, while the right-wing claimed Katayama as their leader. However, Katayama, himself, was noncommittal. On 24 January, Katayama denied that he had accepted the chairmanship of the right-wing. In a statement issued on that date, he declared his intentions to establish a new political party based on social democracy "open to all and free of factional strifes." Previously, four neutral Social Democrats had urged Katayama not to accept the right-wing chairmanship.

During the party's four-day national convention, and prior to the breakdown of relations between the feuding factions, the left-wing had generally been victorious over the right-wing in the struggle for influence in the party. Immediately prior to the convention's opening, the left- and right-wing groups wrangled over the issues of convention chairman, vice-chairmen, and the composition of the convention Steering Committee. The convention chairmanship was amicably settled when the left-wing conceded to the election



of neutral member Shozo Oya. The left-wing, however, refused to go along with a right-wing proposal to divide equally the convention's three vice-chairmen posts among the party's three factions, following which the left-wing's three candidates, namely, Toshiji Shigemori, Akira Iwai, and Soji Okada were all elected by the convention delegates. The Steering Committee issue was settled when it was decided that its membership would be limited to 62 members, one member for each prefectural chapter with a membership of 1,000 with 3 members established as the maximum representation for any one prefecture. The Steering Committee further reflected the left-wing's dominant position when it elected by a vote of 33 to 28 Zengoro Shimagami, a left-winger, as its chairman. In addition, by a vote of 35 to 26, it also elected left-wing member Kenji Nogami to the chairmanship of the convention's Credentials Committee.

The left-wing's definite superior strength became even more evident during the convention's third-day session when they swept the chairmanships of the convention's Bills Deliberations Committee, the Election Committee, and the Rules Revision and Appropriations Committee. The elected chairmen were: Tamori Narita, Zengoro Shimagami, and Koichi Yamamoto. The right-wing managed to salvage the chairmanship of the convention's Platform Committee by having Masao Nakamura elected by a vote of 30 to 26 in the Steering Committee.

The convention's two most disputed points, the Central Executive Committee membership issue and the controversy over the three leading party executive posts remained unsettled right up until the right-wing's abrupt "walk-out". The right-wing had gone on record as favoring a 30 member Central Executive Committee, all members of which would be elected on a single ballot. The left-wing urged the establishment of a committee composed of 20 members elected on individual ballots. The right-wing selected a slate composed of Katayama, Masutani, and Nakasaki for the party's chairmanship, secretary-generalship, and treasurer'ship; the left-wing countered with Suzuki and Wada for the latter two posts. The left wing was somewhat divided over Katayama, some favored his retention, some were prepared to cast blank ballots of non-confidence. The convention's Steering Committee, during the



third-day session turned down a Katayama non-confidence motion introduced by the party's prefectural chapter in Nagano.

Another one of the convention's controversies arose over the Independent Youth League, an anti-Communist labor group organized in the summer of 1949 under the auspices of some of the party's right-wing members. Both factions at the convention's second-day session had entered into a heated debate centering around the League. Shigemitsu Akanekubo, a left-wing delegate from Gunma Prefecture, strongly assailed Chairman Katayama for his failure to quell the intra-party disputes on the issue. In defense of the League, right-winger Ei Nakahara from Tokyo arose to take the rostrum, but a question arose as to his status as an accredited delegate. Vice-Chairman Akira who was in the chair ruled that Nakahara's statement should be stricken from the record, whereupon blows were exchanged between the delegates of the two factions. Following the restoration of order, both groups again returned to verbal exchanges, the right-wing attacking Secretary-General Suzuki for his failure to "reconstruct" the party, the left-wing accusing Treasurer Nakasaki specifically for having disrupted party unity and the left-wing as a whole of having lacked sincerity in their participation in the Joint Diet Struggle Committee.

The Independent Youth League continued to be an issue during the convention's third-day meeting. The Steering Committee, by a vote of 27 to 25, approved a left-wing motion calling for the expulsion from the party of Atsumi Yamasaki and four other right-wingers for their efforts in promoting the League. Infuriated right-wingers countered with a non-confidence motion against Organization Committee Chairman Kozo Sasaki. At this point, with the situation nearly out of hand, the convention chairman ruled that the issue be temporarily shelved.

Despite the nearly continuous bickering between the left- and right-wings, approval was granted to Secretary-General Suzuki's general report, Organization Committee Chairman Kozo Sasaki's membership report, and Treasurer Nakasaki's financial report, all of which were presented during the convention's second-day session. Suzuki, in his general report covering the party's activities since its fourth national convention in April 1949, in an indirect



attack on the right-wing warned the assembled delegates that there was a growing trend within the party "toward refusal to carry on a class struggle." Suzuki called upon the party members to eliminate "this ideology" and to respond to a "spontaneous call from the masses for a unified labor-farmer front and a unified political front embracing the right-wing of the Labor-Farmer Party and the Social Renovation Party."

The convention delegates also managed to reach agreement on the 1950 party platform, a statement of basic policies, and a labor policy, a tax revision program, a local party officers regulation code, and several other measures. Also adopted were two resolutions, one calling for a "March offensive" in cooperation with the nation's labor interests, the second recommending party unification. The approved party platform consisted of the ten planks listed below:

1. Defeat of the Government's "deflationary" 1950-51 fiscal budget.
2. Adoption of an integrated land development program.
3. Institution of a social security system.
4. Tax reductions.
5. Democratization and socialization of important industries, particularly financial institutions.
6. Opposition to all reactionary and oppressive policies.
7. Struggle for the attainment of an overall peace treaty for Japan to be followed by complete sovereignty.
8. Struggle for the defeat of the Yoshida Cabinet.
9. Unification of the labor-farmer front.
10. Unification of the political front.

By way of explanation, the Social Democrats in their platform statement charged that the Yoshida Cabinet had taken advantage of the Dodge Line in formulating the 1950-51 fiscal budget. The Yoshida Cabinet was also accused of having taken advantage of the nation's laborers, farmers, and small businessmen in the interests of financial and monopoly capital. The Social Democrats pledged themselves to a budget revision program calling for a raise in the current ¥6,307 public servant wage base, increased financial aid to the nation's farmers in order that they might expand their productive capacity,



and increased tax relief for the nation's small businessmen. The Social Democrats in their second platform plank claimed that the institution of an integrated land development planning program would be the sole key to the successful rehabilitation of Japan's economy. Such a program, they believed, would alleviate the "deflationary panic," improve the unemployment situation and create an effective industrial output demand source. The third plank, a social security system, would protect the people's livelihood, it was claimed. In their struggle to achieve substantial tax reductions, the Social Democrats announced that they would refuse cooperation with the Communist Party. The fifth plank, or democratization and socialization of important industries, included the coal, iron, power, fertilizer, and other important nationwide industries as well as the Bank of Japan. By adopting its sixth platform plank, the Social Democratic Party pledged itself to an all-out struggle against the Yoshida Cabinet's "disadvantageous" labor decisions and its restrictions imposed on the political activities of public service personnel. The "overall peace" plank was aimed at the Yoshida Cabinet's intent to conclude a "majority peace for the sake of convenience," thereby "neglecting the people's will." The Social Democrats announced that their peace treaty program would call for a pre-treaty general election as a referendum through which the people's will might be expressed. The party, in its eighth plank, again reaffirmed its anti-Yoshida Cabinet stand. To back up their stand, the Social Democrats announced their intentions to introduce a non-confidence motion in the Diet in the early part of 1950. In their labor-farmer front unification plank, the objective was to eliminate trade unionism in the labor union movement, and make labor unions more politically conscious. This program, it was planned, would be coordinated with a Diet struggle for increased aid to the nation's farmers. Finally, the party announced its intentions of proposing an immediate merger with the Labor-Farmer Party, and the Social Renovation Party, providing these two parties would reject Communist Party influences and rewrite their party platforms to conform to that of the Social Democratic Party.

Among the contributing factors to the complete breakdown in party relations was a series of pamphlets distributed during the early part of



January by the party's right-wing urging the replacement of Secretary-General Suzuki with Mizutani. These pamphlets accused Suzuki with incompetence in the dispatch of his duties, the effect of which only further aggravated the already delicate relations existing between the party's two factions.

The effects of the Social Democratic Party split resounded throughout Japan's political world. Especially noteworthy were the stands taken by the labor unions from which the party derived its greatest measure of support. For the most part, labor, although vitally concerned, chose to take a neutral stand on the dispute. Chairman Etsuo Kato of the National Railway Workers' Union (Kokutetsu), however, on 25 January threatened to resign from the party unless reunification efforts should prove successful.

That the party's lower echelons were also for the most part taking a neutral position was reflected in three resolutions issued by the party's Osaka, Kumamoto, and Okayama Prefectural Chapters on 30 January, all urging reunification. In addition, the Unification Council on the same date claimed that the prefectural chapters in Tokyo, Kyoto, Hyogo, Kanagawa, Aomori, Shiga, Nagano, Yamaguchi, Fukushima, Tochigi, Fukuoka, and Shizuoka were all supporting the Council's efforts.

That the Unification Council was making some headway in its reunification efforts was noted in the left-wing's Central Executive Committee acceptance on 27 January of a Council mediation proposal. The Council proposal called for a conference of the right- and left-wings towards settling the issues which had disrupted the fifth national convention. The left-wing accepted the proposal on condition that the convention be granted legal recognition by the disputing factions, and that the action policies adopted at the convention be given official approval. The Unification Council accepted the two conditions, but the stand to be taken by the right-wing remained unsettled at the end of the month.

The Social Democratic Party gained an additional seat in the House of Councillors on 17 January when Hosen Yoshida emerged victorious in a by-election conducted in Fukuoka Prefecture. Yoshida, a member of the party's prefectural chapter, had been a member of the Fukuoka Prefectural Assembly.

The Nippon Times on 21 January featured the following editorial entitled "The Socialist Split":



"Exposing an ugly struggle for party hegemony, the right- and left-wing factions of the Social Democratic Party have finally split their party. The general reaction is one of utter astonishment.

"The surprise was all the greater because it had been generally expected that the Fifth National Convention would prove to be one of the less turbulent meetings of the Socialists with both the right- and left-wing elements pooling their strength for the fundamental reconstruction of their party. But it was not to be as the leaders of the two factions rashly staked the very existence of the Socialist party in a bid for undisputed power.

"To be sure, this was not the first time that the Socialist party has hovered on the verge of a split, but on every occasion saner minds prevented a definite parting of ways. In its hectic postwar career, the party has expelled thirty-seven members, and through it all there has remained the basic confrontation of the right- and the left-wing. That the party finally had to split is testimony to the fact that the idea of party loyalty had been worn so thin no one seriously tried to hold it together.

"It is ironic that the break-up came after Chairman Katayama made an impassioned appeal for party unity. It is ironic because Mr. Katayama's statement acted as the direct cause for the split. His stand that the Socialist Party should not become a 'class party' gave heart to the right-wing, while antagonising the left-wing. It is also ironic because the difference of ideology over a 'class' or a 'people's' party as exposed by Mr. Katayama was given no hearing before the two factions turned their backs on each other.

"There is no doubt that both the right and the left-wing factions must bear the responsibility for the split. Both groups will doubtlessly point their fingers at the other, but the people will not lose sight of the fact that the breakup followed a mud-slinging match and a selfish struggle for party hegemony. As proof of this, the national convention hardly concerned itself with the basic nature and the policies of the Socialist party. They showed no concern over the weighty responsibility of the Socialist party in developing into a political organization which would make its contribution to the democratization and future prosperity of the Japanese nation.

"One of the initial misfortunes of the revived Socialist party was its



emergence as the leading political party in 1947 and its taking over of the reins of government together with the Democratic and the People's Cooperative parties. The party was definitely unprepared for such prominence, but the Socialists who took over Cabinet portfolios at that time have not forgotten that they were once Cabinet Ministers.

"It is, of course, useless to cry over spilt milk. And progressive people are anxious to know what the two Socialist households will do next. The hope is that they will take steps to effect a reconciliation. The hope is that the split is merely a crisis which will be overcome before the break is irreparably solidified.

"This hope is strong because the Socialist party has a definite place in the nation's political picture. The opponents of the Socialists to the right and to the left will be the only ones who will benefit from the breakup of that party. By the object lesson thus presented, the threatened strife in both the Democratic Liberal and Communist parties will simmer down.

"While the left-wing elements cannot be expected to veer sharply toward the Communist line as a result of this split, the right-wing faction may possibly cooperate more fully with the Democrats and the New Political Council. But what is more important is the effect of this breakup upon the labor and farmer groups which have only recently thrown out the Communists and expressed their support of the Socialist party. The split-up of the Socialist party may even result in dividing members of the labor unions and the farmers' unions.

"The situation, in a word, is extremely unnatural, if not outright comical, because the split of the party occurred only in its leadership and not among its grass-root support. And yet, the leaders have always maintained that they are the representatives of the masses.

"One cannot but hope that the Socialist leaders will seriously reconsider their senseless action and will make a new beginning for a true Socialist party based on social democratic principles."



Democratic Party: Opposition Faction

The opposition faction of the Democratic Party on 10 January publicly announced its peace treaty policy report prepared by the party's Committee on Diplomatic Policies headed by Tokutaro Kitamura. The report included the following pertinent provisions:

"1. National unity transcending all party and other differences should be established while taking into consideration every segment of public thought on the treaty issue. This should not, however, be interpreted as necessitating the establishment of a national coalition Cabinet.

"2. All political parties should confer without reservations on the peace treaty issue, and, if appropriate, sponsor meetings between the party presidents as a means for effecting closer collaboration.

"3. In preparation for a peace treaty, Japan should discard all remnants of feudalism from its national life, strive for economic independence, and reorganize its political forces, thereby creating a state trusted not only by its own people, but others as well.

"4. Japan should request the aid of the Allied Powers in guaranteeing the following provisions set forth in her Constitution: a) peace, neutrality, and security; b) international solidarity based upon universal brotherhood and trust; c) the opportunity to both contribute to and enjoy the fruits of world civilization.

"5. As steps towards achieving the above-mentioned principles, Japan should: a) interpret democracy based upon freedom and human love as a national principle; b) assure complete individuality for the Japanese people; c) avoid all relations with other nations which could involve her in war; d) decide upon such territories as rightfully belong to her from international, legal and historical standpoints; e) guarantee a reasonable standard of living for her peoples; f) cooperate with all nations on terms of mutual benefit and equality; g) participate in international cultural, scientific, and social undertakings; and h) encourage scientific studies designed to promote the welfare and freedom of humanity.

"6. It is to be desired that the aforementioned be attained by an over-all peace treaty."



The opposition faction's representation in the House of Representatives was increased from 37 to 43 on 23 January when former coalition faction members Kosarmon Kimura, An Yoshida, Takeshi Hara, Hisashi Amano, Yuji Komatsu, and Toshinaga Yamamoto transferred their party allegiance to the opposition group. (See this report above: Developments in the Conservative Merger Movement).

#### Farmers' Cooperative Party

Jiro Kita, a leading party member and a member of the House of Representatives from Hokkaido Prefecture, succumbed to a heart attack on 29 January. Kita, who was only 32 years old, was serving his second term in the Diet's Lower House. His death reduced the Farmers' Cooperative Party's membership in the House of Representatives to 7.

#### Communist Party

The Communist Party on 18 and 19 January staged their 18th Enlarged Central Committee Meeting. The sessions were reportedly attended by all of the Central Committee members, the sole exception being Satoji Sato, alternate Central Committee members; chairmen of district and prefectural party committees, and party Diet members. Since the meetings were held behind closed doors with only party members in attendance, the only accounts of the Enlarged Central Committee's sessions were those printed by the party's organ, Akahata, which on 23 and 24 January carried an account of the general report adopted by the Committee. Politburo member Ritsuo Ito explained the party's refusal to give a full account of the Committee's proceedings when he told reporters on 20 January that "when the Communist Party had made decisions on regulations and policies, it makes it a rule not to announce the course of debates leading to such decisions."

According to Akahata, the party's general report was delivered to the assembled Committee members by Secretary-General Kyuichi Tokuda. The report called upon the party members to support an "overall treaty" as the basis for a Japanese peace treaty and to oppose the retention of military bases in Japan by foreign powers following the conclusion of the treaty. The report named the defeat of the Yoshida Cabinet as the primary objective in the



"overall treaty" movement. It further urged the establishment of a "democratic racial front" composed of the masses and under Communist leadership as a step towards publicizing the movement. An additional feature of the report was the inclusion of a series of slogans designed to attract the public's attention. Among others, they included the following:

"1. - Opposition to a separate treaty leading to war; acceleration of an overall peace that guarantees peace.

"2 - Opposition to a separate peace that strengthens fascism; acceleration of an overall peace that guarantees freedom, independence, and democracy.

"3.- Launch a movement for an overall peace."

The Secretary-General's report called for daily class and political struggles, the institution of active popular front organization, vigorous election campaigning, utilization of scandal cases involving Government and conservative leaders, and faithful attention to duty by Communist Diet and prefectural assembly members.

In its attack on the Yoshida Cabinet, the report accused the Cabinet of being a "stool pigeon" of monopoly capital preparing Japan for participation in a third world war by permitting the establishment of foreign military bases. The report labelled the Cabinet as a "traitor" destined to suffer the same fate as the Nationalist Government in China. The report interpreted "strengthened police forces" as proof that Japan was preparing to suppress people's revolutions in Asia as the police state of the Far East.

Lifting of Government controls, increased petroleum imports, the Government's stand on education and scientific research were all instituted for the benefit of monopolistic capital and for the colonization of Japan, the report charged. Government unemployment figures ranging from 400,000 to 500,000 were termed utterly groundless, with the actual unemployed and part-time employed estimated at more than 12,000,000. The nation's farmers, the report continued, were suffering under excessive rice crop delivery quotas and prohibitive fertilizer prices while small business was being driven to the verge of bankruptcy by the exploitation of monopolistic capital and mounting taxes.

In order to consolidate the "democratic national front", the report



added, four points should be observed: 1) the front should be based on the participation of all classes of people, including workers, farmers, and fishermen; 2) "regional struggles" should be first undertaken and later expanded into a nation-wide basis; 3) cooperation should be sought from the Labor-Farmer Party and the "class conscious" Social Democrats; and 4) the League for the Protection of Democracy should be strengthened.

In touching upon international developments, the report hailed the Soviet Union's possession of atomic power and the remarkable advance of the Communist Government in China. The Communists contended that the advance of Chinese Communism would have a most favorable effect on similar movements arising in other Asiatic countries.

The Communist Party in the 27 January issue of Akahata further clarified the means by which it hoped to create a "democratic front." The Akahata said: "Communists in the past have been looked upon as special beings, and often misunderstood because they could not associate well with other people... to overcome this defect, it is suggested that party members visit places where people congregate, such as workshops, employment agencies, workers' boarding houses, etc., and listen to their views, and also spread our propaganda...; secondly, aside from party meetings, other gatherings should be organized in order to educate the masses...; thirdly, activities of party leaders should not be confined to a single phase or objective...all sorts of activities are needed...; finally, we should not hurry or become unduly excited since that might be to the advantage of the enemy." On 28 January, the Akahata declared: "We are confident that victory will be ours in this world-wide fight against our enemies...we must make a correct estimate of the strong and weak points of our enemies and ourselves...they will resort to all sorts of tricks in attempting our destruction." (For a further discussion of Communist Party affairs, see: "The Mosaka Incident," in this report).



## LOCAL GOVERNMENT

### Honda Named Director of Local Autonomy Agency

State Minister Ichiro Honda was named on 24 January to succeed ex-State Minister Kozamon Kimura as Director-General of the Local Autonomy Agency. Kimura resigned the Cabinet post on 20 January (see this report above).

### Otake Elected Governor of Fukushima Prefecture

Democratic Liberal candidate Sakuma Otake was elected Governor of Fukushima Prefecture on 23 January with a 100,000 votes as a margin over runner-up Social Democratic candidate Yoshio Suzuki, former Attorney General in the Katayama Cabinet. Otake received 386,357 votes; Suzuki received 287,851 votes; and the Communist candidate, Yoshie Hirata, received 37,327 votes.

### Kyoto Mayor Elected Chairman of Government Administration Investigation Commission

Ex-Mayor Masao Kambe of Kyoto, who was also chairman of the National Mayors' Conference, was elected chairman of the Government Administration Investigation Commission at its initial meeting on 7 January. Kambe subsequently resigned his post as mayor of Kyoto on 28 December in order to accept the commission's chairmanship.

The commission was formed in accordance with the Shoup tax reform recommendations and is charged with the task of making basic recommendations concerning the assignment of functions to the various administrative levels of government.

### Civil Affairs Teams Reorganization Effective 1 February

A further step in the encouragement of greater responsibility by Japanese prefectural and local governmental officials was taken on 1 February upon completion of the reorganization of the Civil Affairs teams of the Occupation Forces.



Eight regional Civil Affairs teams gradually absorbed duties of the prefectural teams since July 1949, when eventual discontinuance of the Civil Affairs Section of the Eighth Army goes into operation with the strengthened regional teams. Maj. General W. F. Shephard, Chief of the former Eighth Army section, was appointed Chief of the new GHQ Civil Affairs Section.

Under the regrouped organization, Civil Affairs teams will continue to offer technical advisory guidance to Japanese prefectural and municipal officials and maintain surveillance over their activities. The teams will encourage local initiative and development of prefectural and municipal projects by the Japanese.

Civil Affairs legal-government officers will visit procurator offices, courts, and local government offices in connection with local autonomy and government administration. Other Civil Affairs technical experts also will spend a high percentage of their time in the field, making periodic tours of prefectures in their region and holding conferences with corresponding Japanese officials in prefectural capitals.

Arrangements have been made at each prefectural capital for billeting and transportation of personnel on Civil Affairs missions. The regional teams will remain attached to Eighth Army for logistic support.

The entire Civil Affairs Section, including the regional teams, has approximately 400 American civilian employes, 31 Army officers and 80 enlisted men assigned to it, in contrast to 529 civilians, 528 officers and 2,361 enlisted men under its former organization.

With the exception of the chief and deputy chief who are military officers, each regional team is composed primarily of civilian technical experts in the fields of economics, industry, agriculture, labor, legal and governmental administration, education, information, public health, and public welfare. Several enlisted men are assigned to each team for administrative duties.

The make-up of each team varies according to the requirements of the region. For example, the Kanto Region Team, including Tokyo is heavy with commercial and industrial specialists, plus labor and welfare specialists to handle labor and welfare problems that arise in an industrial area. A primarily agricultural region such as Shikoku, has a team, containing a large



proportion of agriculture experts, to emphasize development of farming activities and education for rural people.

Maj. Gen. A. P. Fox, Deputy Chief of Staff, SCAP, in a statement on 31 December, has pointed out that continued surveillance by the teams is necessary for such tasks as observing crop collection in the prefectures. "As long as we underwrite the food deficit here in Japan with United States appropriated funds," General Fox said, "it is necessary to insure that the Japanese collect from farmers the indigenous food requirements for the population." These collections have exceeded 100 percent of quotas set during the past two years.



REPORT OF LOCAL ELECTIONS

Summary of Local Elections  
January, 1950

During the month of January, a total of 119 local elections were held in Japan to fill 426 vacant seats. Of these elections, 44 were "no poll" contests in which 113 candidates secured seats unopposed. In the remaining 75 elections, 253,429 voters cast their ballots for an average participation rate of 73.24 percent.

The percentage of the total vote accredited to each party was as follows:

Democratic Liberal Party.....	18.2	percent
Communist Party.....	6.9	"
Social Democratic Party.....	4.7	"
Democratic Party.....	4.4	"
Minor parties.....	0.1	"
Independents.....	65.7	"
	<u>100.0</u>	percent

The number and percentage of seats won by each party follows:

	<u>Number</u> <u>of seats</u>	<u>Percentage</u> <u>of total</u>
Democratic Liberal Party.....	18	4.2 percent
Communist Party.....	7	1.7 "
Social Democratic Party.....	4	0.9 "
Democratic Party.....	4	0.9 "
Minor parties.....	0	0.0 "
Independents.....	393	92.3 "
	<u>426</u>	<u>100.0</u> "

The attached tables of statistics summarizing in detail the results of the elections were compiled from reports furnished by the National Election Administration Commission:



**TABLE 1**  
**SCHEDULE OF LOCAL ELECTIONS, JANUARY 1950**

<u>Type of Election</u>	<u>Number of Seats Contested</u>	<u>Number of Voting Elections</u>	<u>Number of No Poll Elections</u>	<u>Total Number of Elections</u>
Prefectural Assembly	4	4	0	4
Town Headman	11	8	3	11
Town Assembly	80	7	2	9
Village Headman	55	34	21	55
Village Assembly	276	22	18	40
<b>Total</b>	<b>426</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>119</b>

**TABLE 2**  
**PERCENTAGE OF PARTICIPATION, LOCAL ELECTIONS, JANUARY 1950**

<u>Type of Election</u>	<u>Percentage of Participation</u>
Prefectural Assembly	66.04
Town Headman	79.88
Town Assembly	81.26
Village Headman	75.99
Village Assembly	80.55
<b>Average</b>	<b>73.24</b>



**TABLE 3****NUMBER OF CANDIDATES ACCORDING TO POLITICAL PARTIES, JANUARY 1930**

<u>Type of Election</u>	<u>SD</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>DL</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>MIN</u>	<u>IND</u>	<u>Total</u>
Prefectural Assembly	3	1	4	3	0	4	15
Town Headman	0	0	1	2	0	21	24
Town Assembly	0	0	3	4	2	100	109
Village Headman	1	2	4	7	0	83	97
Village Assembly	6	1	15	9	0	294	325
<b>Total</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>502</b>	<b>570</b>

**TABLE 4****SEATS WON BY PARTIES IN ALL ELECTIONS, JANUARY 1930**

<u>Type of Election</u>	<u>SD</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>DL</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>MIN</u>	<u>IND</u>	<u>Total</u>
Prefectural Assembly	1	1	1	0	0	1	4
Town Headman	0	0	1	0	0	10	11
Town Assembly	0	0	2	3	0	75	80
Village Headman	0	2	3	0	0	50	55
Village Assembly	3	1	11	4	0	257	276
<b>Total</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>393</b>	<b>426</b>



TABLE 5

SEATS WON BY PARTIES IN 75 VOTING ELECTIONS, JANUARY 1950

<u>Type of Election</u>	<u>SD</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>DL</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>MIN</u>	<u>IND</u>	<u>Total</u>
Prefectural Assembly	1	1	1	0	0	1	4
Town Headman	0	0	0	0	0	8	8
Town Assembly	0	0	2	2	0	66	70
Village Headman	0	2	1	0	0	31	34
Village Assembly	2	1	6	4	0	184	197
Total	3	4	10	6	0	290	313

TABLE 6

SEATS WON BY PARTIES IN 44 NO POLL ELECTIONS, JANUARY 1950

<u>Type of Election</u>	<u>SD</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>DL</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>MIN</u>	<u>IND</u>	<u>Total</u>
Town Headman	0	0	1	0	0	2	3
Town Assembly	0	0	0	1	0	9	10
Village Headman	0	0	2	0	0	19	21
Village Assembly	1	0	5	0	0	73	79
Total	1	0	8	1	0	103	113



**TABLE 7****PERCENTAGE OF SEATS WON BY PARTIES, JANUARY 1950**

<u>Type of Election</u>	<u>SD</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>DL</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>MIN</u>	<u>IND</u>
Prefectural Assembly	25.0	25.0	25.0	0	0	25.0
Town Headman	0	0	9.1	0	0	90.9
Town Assembly	0	0	2.5	3.8	0	93.7
Village Headman	0	3.6	5.5	0	0	90.9
Village Assembly	1.1	.4	4.0	1.4	0	93.1
Average	.9	.9	4.2	1.7	0	92.3

**TABLE 8****VOTES GARNERED BY PARTIES IN 75 VOTING ELECTIONS, JANUARY 1950**

<u>Type of Election</u>	<u>SD</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>DL</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>MIN</u>	<u>IND</u>	<u>Total</u>
Prefectural Assembly	10,800	9,472	42,003	8,716	0	33,214	104,205
Town Headman	0	0	0	1,865	0	26,667	28,532
Town Assembly	0	0	877	1,637	337	22,388	25,239
Village Headman	812	1,615	614	3,916	0	47,906	54,863
Village Assembly	345	86	2,615	1,306	0	36,238	40,590
Total	11,957	11,173	46,109	17,440	337	166,413	253,429



TABLE 9

PERCENTAGE OF VOTES GARNERED BY PARTIES, JANUARY 1950

<u>Type of Election</u>	<u>SD</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>DL</u>	<u>G</u>	<u>MINOR</u>	<u>IND</u>
Prefectural Assembly	10.3	9.1	40.3	8.4	0	31.9
Town Headman	0	0	0	6.5	0	93.5
Town Assembly	0	0	3.5	6.5	1.3	88.7
Village Headman	1.5	2.9	1.1	7.1	0	87.4
Village Assembly	.8	.2	6.5	3.2	0	89.3
Average	4.7	4.4	18.2	6.9	.1	65.7



House of Councillors' By-Elections  
Held in Hyogo and Fukuoka Prefectures

A local by-election was held in Hyogo Prefecture on 12 January to fill a seat left vacant in the House of Councillors by Chujiro Haraguchi (Democratic Liberal), who resigned in December to assume the post of Mayor of Kobe.

Shinichi Okazaki, Democratic Liberal Party candidate, was the victor in this election with a vote of 496,195. The runner-up was Seiichi Matsuura, Social Democratic Party candidate, who won 155,863 votes.

A total of 854,038 votes were cast in the election. Following is a detailed breakdown of the balloting:

<u>Candidate</u>	<u>No. of Votes</u>	<u>% of Total Vote</u>
Shinichi Okazaki (DLP).....	496,195	58.2
Seiichi Matsuura (SDP).....	155,863	18.2
Chuichiro Fukihara (Ind.).....	122,774	14.4
Kawuo Shinozuka (Communist).....	51,795	6.0
Katsuji Nakanishi (DLP).....	27,411	3.2
Total	854,038	100.0

(NOTE: A comparison of the results of this election with the results in the general election in January 1949 follows:

<u>Party</u>	<u>No. of Votes</u>	<u>% of Total Vote</u>
Democratic Liberal Party.....	496,130	41.6
Democratic Party.....	277,630	23.2
Social Democratic Party.....	153,423	12.8
Communist Party.....	142,315	11.9
Minor parties.....	60,297	5.3
Independents.....	62,076	5.2
Total	1,191,861	100.0 percent).

Another local by-election was held in Fukuoka Prefecture on 18 January to fill the vacant seat in the House of Councillors caused by the death of Tamotsu Hashigami (Democrat) who died on 27 November.

Michiharu Yoshida, Social Democratic Party candidate, was the victor in this election with a vote of 363,209. The runner-up was Kenso Ishibashi, Democratic Liberal Party candidate. Candidates, the number and percentage of votes received by each are given below:

<u>Candidate</u>	<u>No. of Votes</u>	<u>% of Total Vote</u>
Michiharu Yoshida (SDP).....	363,209	36.7
Kenso Ishibashi (DLP).....	253,200	25.6
Takaharu Miyagi (People's Cooperative).....	238,309	24.1
Kinichiro Takakura (Communist).....	74,626	7.5
Shichigo Matsumoto (Ind.).....	60,271	6.1
Total	989,615	100.0



## REPATRIATION HIGHLIGHTS

Lt. General Kusma N. Derevyanko, head of the Soviet Mission in Japan and Soviet member of the Allied Council for Japan, again "walked out" of a special meeting of the Council discussing the repatriation issue on 4 January. The Soviet member's departing words were: "I do not think it possible for me to take part in a discussion of Soviet repatriation of Japanese war prisoners."

The Soviet member's "walk out" was the second in three sessions of the Council concerning the repatriation question. The first incident took place on 21 December (see Review of Government and Politics in Japan, December 1949).

Previous to the meeting of the Council on 4 January, General Derevyanko had stated that the Soviet Union "will not take into consideration any recommendations" by Council members on the repatriation issue.

After the departure of the Soviet member, William J. Sebald, Chairman and United States member, read the following statement to the other two remaining members:

"The members will recall that the subject of 'The Problem of Japanese Repatriation' was discussed at the One Hundred-second Meeting of the Council held on December 21, 1949. At that time HIS EXCELLENCY AMBASSADOR HODGSON, representing jointly the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and India, pointing out the Council's responsibility for advising the SUPREME COMMANDER on the problem of repatriation, proposed that on the basis of the Prisoners of War Conventions of 1929 and 1949, as well as the Declaration of Human Rights subscribed to by members of the United Nations in 1948, the Soviet Union be invited by the SUPREME COMMANDER to conclude a new repatriation agreement incorporating the principles contained in these Conventions and Declaration and asking the Swiss Government as protecting power, or some international organization such as the International Red Cross, to make an impartial investigation of the status of the Japanese prisoners of war still remaining in Soviet territory.

"I promptly brought this thoughtful and constructive proposal to the



attention of the SUPREME COMMANDER, who immediately gave the COMMONWEALTH MEMBER's recommendation most careful consideration and in a statement made public the following day indicated his acceptance thereof in the following words: 'I have accepted the wise recommendation of the BRITISH COMMONWEALTH MEMBER made at yesterday's meeting of the Allied Council for Japan to ask the help of a neutral nation such as Switzerland, or of the International Red Cross, to gather the fullest possible details of the tragic fate of the 376,000 missing Japanese prisoners. To this end, I am requesting the United States Government to attempt to negotiate the necessary arrangements.' The full text of GENERAL MacARTHUR's statement will be included in the Minutes of today's meeting.

"At GENERAL MacARTHUR's direction, I accordingly submitted to my Government his request that it give urgent consideration to the COMMONWEALTH MEMBER's proposal with a view to determining what action might appropriately be taken under the Geneva Conventions or other international agreements toward securing the assistance of the Swiss Government, or some other appropriate government or international organization, in determining the fate of the Japanese prisoners of war still in Soviet hands and bringing about the completion of the repatriation of those prisoners still detained on Soviet territory.

"I am happy now to advise the Council that my Government, after giving most careful consideration to the problem, has approached the Soviet Government for the purpose of seeking that Government's cooperation in implementing the very reasonable and helpful suggestion of the COMMONWEALTH MEMBER. The Secretary of State has authorized me to make known to the Council the content of the communication which he has addressed to the Soviet Ambassador in Washington. It reads, according to the telegraphic text received, as follows:

'The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and has the honor to refer to the following statement contained in the Potsdam Declaration, issued July 26, 1945, by the heads of the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, and China, and subsequently subscribed to by the Soviet Government: "The Japanese



Military Forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives."

'From the outset of the Occupation of Japan, THE SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS instituted a program for the repatriation of many millions of Japanese from areas abroad. Excellent cooperation was forthcoming from the authorities of Australia, China, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippine Republic, the United Kingdom, and the United States, so that the entire program with the single exception noted below was virtually completed during 1947. The exception relates to the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, which, many months after the repatriation of Japanese from other areas had been completed, still held several hundreds of thousands of Japanese in detainment.

'On May 20, 1949, a Soviet statement reported by the Tass News Agency declared that at that time there was a total of 95,000 Japanese prisoners in Soviet-held territories remaining to be repatriated to their homeland. This figure did not account for an additional 376,929 Japanese who, according to figures compiled by the Japanese Government, were then, and still are, held in areas under Soviet control.

'This discrepancy in the number of unrepatriated Japanese is too wide to be attributed to clerical error or oversight. At the same time, repatriation results from all other areas have uniformly attested to the substantial reliability of Japanese Government statistics pertaining to Japanese to be returned from those areas. The Japanese Government statistics relating to Japanese detained in Soviet-held areas are further supported by letters from Siberia and interviews with many hundreds of repatriates.

'The supposition therefore arises that the discrepancy in question may only be explained by the continued detention of large numbers of Japanese in Soviet-controlled areas and/or by an abnormally high death factor among those who were to be repatriated.



As to the latter possibility, repeated efforts have been made by the SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS to obtain precise information from the Soviet authorities regarding the deaths of Japanese internees. The continued refusal of the Soviet authorities even to transmit information on the approximate number of deceased internees has already imposed on the families of all those who have not been repatriated many years of uncertainty and anguish. The withholding of this information, as well as the prolonged detention of prisoners after the cessation of hostilities, is in patent conflict with the accepted international concepts of the fundamental human rights and freedoms, and with the humanitarian principles set forth in the Geneva Conventions of 1949, which were signed by some forty-five powers including the Soviet Union. The United States Government therefore urges, in the interest of resolving an issue of long-standing concern to the Allied Powers and to Japan, that the Soviet Government agree to the designation of an international humanitarian body or organization which would be charged with making a complete survey of the situation at first hand with a view to obtaining exact information on the Japanese detained in areas under Soviet control since the cessation of hostilities. It is felt that only through such means will it be possible, other approaches having proved unavailing, to settle a controversy which is causing unrest in Japan and concern everywhere.

"That is the end of the text as I have it.

"I wish to thank, at this time, the members of the Council for their attendance at this special meeting in order to learn of the action which has been taken in response to the COMMONWEALTH MEMBER's proposal with respect to this important problem.

"I would also like to say a few remarks regarding the walkout which we have just witnessed. To me, it is indeed regrettable that the SOVIET MEMBER, the principal party concerned with this vital and important problem, should have refused to take part in the discussion of this morning. This



refusal, however, again focuses our attention upon the great difficulties which must be overcome if a solution to this problem is to be found. It also reminds us that only by patience and continued effort and by resort to world public opinion can there be any hope of resolving this question in conformity with the promise made in the Potsdam Declaration."

At the end of the reading of this statement, the Chairman asked if any of the other two members wished to comment. The following statements were made:

His Excellency W. R. Hodgson, Member representing jointly the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and India:

"Mr. Chairman, naturally I am gratified at the very prompt and spontaneous acceptance of our proposals by the Supreme Commander and by the prompt action taken by the Government of the United States. Our concrete proposals had a very solid foundation of prior international obligations and new obligations entered into by the Soviet Government on the 8th of December last year when the Soviet Government signed the revised Prisoners of War Convention of 1929, now known as the Prisoners of War Convention of Geneva, 1949. Now, sir, as no peace treaty has yet been signed with regard to the conflict in the Pacific, we are still in a state of war and from this certain consequences follow. Certain obligations are imposed on the signatory powers to that Convention, and I would like to invite the attention of this Council and to place on record certain of those very positive obligations laid on the Soviet Government. Now I think, sir, you will find them very interesting. It may be said in the first place that as Japan is not a signatory she is not a party, but I represent here today too India, New Zealand, the United Kingdom; they are all parties. China is a party. The United States is a party. The Soviet Union is a party. And at Geneva we tried to cover every possibility, every eventuality, and we did meet the position which has arisen today. Because Article 2 says, 'Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party to the present Convention' - that is so with Japan - 'the Powers who are parties thereto shall remain bound by it in their mutual relations.' That clearly establishes that the action taken by this Council and the action taken by the United States Government is perfectly correct and on the firm foundation of existing international law.



"Then, sir, it states in Article 4, Prisoners of war in the sense of the present Convention are persons belonging to certain categories, and one of the categories is, 'Members of the Armed Forces of a Party to the conflict.' Therefore, the Convention applies to the Armed Forces of Japan.

"Article 5 goes on to say, 'The present Convention shall apply to the persons referred to in Article 4 from the time they fall into the power of the enemy until their final release and repatriation.'

"Then, sir, here is the basis for my suggestion that we refer to a humanitarian body provided there is no agreement to accept a protecting power. Article 9 says, 'The provisions of the present Convention constitute no obstacle to the humanitarian activities which the International Committee of the Red Cross or any other impartial humanitarian organization may, subject to the consent of the parties to the conflict concerned, undertake for the protection of prisoners of war and for their relief.'

"I agree so far, sir, that all that indicates the acceptance of a protecting power or a humanitarian body is subject to an agreement amongst the parties. Now the question has been asked me, but suppose the Soviet Government will not accept that proposal of the United States Government, what will happen then? Now, sir, at Geneva we covered that too, and here is the clear international obligation if there is no agreement. 'When prisoners of war do not benefit or cease to benefit, no matter for what reason, by the activities of a Protecting Power or of an organization..., the Detaining Power' - that is in this case the Soviet Union - 'shall request' - mandatory language "shall request", the Soviet Union shall request - 'a neutral state or such an organization, to undertake the functions performed under the present Convention by a Protecting Power designated by the Parties to a conflict.'

"And then, sir, I would invite the attention of the Council to this significant paragraph. 'If protection cannot be arranged accordingly, the Detaining Power' - that is the Soviet Union - 'shall request or shall accept, subject to the provisions of this Article, the offer of the services of a humanitarian organization, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross to assume the humanitarian functions performed by Protecting Powers under the Convention.'



"Now, sir, during this war and subsequent to it one can quote instances where individuals have been made responsible for the treatment of prisoners of war. Under this Convention it clearly states in Article 12, 'Prisoners of war are in the hands of the enemy Power, but not of the individuals or military units who have captured them. Irrespective of the individual responsibilities that may exist the Detaining Power is responsible for the treatment given them.' In other words, in this instance the Soviet Government and the Soviet Government alone in the last resort must assume full responsibility.

"Now, sir, I will not traverse the whole of the provisions of the Convention relating to the proper treatment, housing, medical arrangements, but just draw attention to one or two vital points which affect the problem before this Council. Article 118 says, 'Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities.' I invite your attention to that very positive obligation. 'In the absence of stipulations to the above effect in any agreement concluded between the Parties to the conflict, or failing any such agreement, each of the Detaining Powers shall itself establish and execute without delay a plan of repatriation in conformity with the principle laid down in the foregoing paragraph.' Therefore, sir, quite irrespective of that agreement made between General Headquarters and the representative of the Soviet Union, irrespective of that, there is a clear obligation on the Soviet Union itself to make such repatriation arrangements. And for the purposes of the Japanese press who are here and the Japanese Government, and this is an important question, this Convention even provided for this. 'Deceased prisoners of war shall be buried in individual graves...Bodies may be cremated...on account of the religion of the deceased or in accordance with his expressed wish to this effect...In order that graves may always be found, all particulars of burials and graves shall be recorded with a Graves Registration Service established by the detaining power.' - I wonder if that Graves Registration Service has been established. 'Lists of graves and particulars of the prisoners of war interred in cemeteries and elsewhere shall be transmitted



to the Power on which such prisoners of war depended.' I understand, sir, that in no case has that been done. 'Responsibility for the care of these graves and for records of any subsequent moves of the bodies shall rest on the Power controlling the territory, if a Party to the present Convention. These provisions shall also apply to the ashes which shall be kept by the Graves Registration Service until proper disposal thereof in accordance with the wishes of the home country.' Now, sir, the only question before us is what other action can we suggest or propose which might reinforce the action already taken by the SUPREME COMMANDER and the Government of the United States. We can do this. We can propose that the International Red Cross itself volunteer its services. We as a Council can do that, or the SUPREME COMMANDER can do that in the absence of an agreement on the protecting power such as Switzerland, but personally, sir, I would think that the International Red Cross is already now seized with the position. I am hoping that, without any invitation, the International Red Cross may volunteer its services. I recall that in the Spanish Civil War and in the conflict in Palestine, the International Red Cross did offer its services in a humanitarian capacity to get all that kind of information, to do all that assistance of the nature we now desire, and those offers were accepted. So, sir, I would just ask this Council to leave this item on the agenda without anybody having to write in formally and again put it on the agenda, because we have not disposed of it. If our present efforts fail, there may well be other lines of approach such as the one I have indicated this morning about a direct invitation to the International Red Cross because I endorse and wholeheartedly agree with your final remarks that nothing, despite all the difficulties, all the setbacks, all the walkouts, should deter us from trying to resolve this tragic problem. Thank you.

"THE CHAIRMAN: MR. AMBASSADOR, I wish to express my appreciation to you for having brought to the attention of the Council the solid legal basis for your recommendations and the resultant action which has been taken by my Government. This is indeed a solid foundation as you have so aptly pointed out. There is, however, an additional and important facet to this problem. It is that of the humanitarian aspects which are involved. As you are aware, as we are all aware, this problem reaches into thousands,



literally tens of thousands, of homes in Japan. It reaches, I believe, into every hamlet in Japan. It is a problem which has caused untold misery, anguish, and worry, not only to the Japanese people or to those directly affected, but to all of us who are part of the Allied Occupation of Japan. I agree with you that this subject is one which needs, which must have, a continued airing in the light of world public opinion. I note that you have requested that the subject be carried forward. Consequently, it will appear on the agenda of the next regular meeting of the Council, and I presume that the wording of the subject should be, 'The Problem of Japanese Repatriation', if that meets with your approval.

"LT. GENERAL CHU: MR. CHAIRMAN, may I say a few words.

"THE CHAIRMAN: GENERAL CHU.

"LT. GENERAL CHU: I am very gratified that the SUPREME COMMANDER has seen fit to consult the Council on this most important question, and I am going to report duly and in full the proceedings of these last two meetings to my Government whose approval and support I am sure we will soon obtain. I would like to commend the COMMONWEALTH MEMBER for his contribution to the Council, which is quite out of proportion with the length of his service. I am not, however, quite ready to support his recommendation that this problem be kept on the agenda automatically and indefinitely. The CHAIRMAN has just made a ruling that the rules of procedure of this Council have been built up over a number of years and each problem is automatically closed unless it is specifically decided that it will be carried on in the next meeting.

"THE CHAIRMAN: May I correct....

"LT. GENERAL CHU: May I finish. I quite remember the good old days when we wrangled over the question of rules of procedure.

"MR. HODGSON: Why the good old days?

"LT. GENERAL CHU: I don't know whether it was good but it was the old days, and I certainly hate to see the same thing gone through all over again. So, although I have no objection to this problem being brought up again, I suggest that it be brought up each time individually so that there will be no misunderstanding. Thank you.

"THE CHAIRMAN: I merely wished to correct your understanding of what



I had said. I believe I said that normally, once the discussion has been had, the matter is considered closed unless it is continued in the next regular meeting at the request of one of the members. In the instant case the COMMONWEALTH MEMBER has requested that the subject be continued and accordingly I ruled it be continued.

"LT. GENERAL CHU: That is agreeable to me.

"THE CHAIRMAN: Are there any further comments? (No further comments). That would appear to conclude the business for today. The meeting is adjourned.

(The meeting adjourned at 1058 hours)."

The Soviet member again refused to participate in the discussion on the repatriation problem at the next meeting of the Allied Council for Japan on 18 January. Following is a transcript of the minutes of the session:

"THE CHAIRMAN: The Meeting will please come to order.

"The Corrected Verbatim Minutes of the One Hundred-Third Regular Meeting have been circulated among the Members and in the absence of objection (pause) are approved.

"The Corrected Verbatim Minutes of the One Hundred-Fourth Meeting (Special) have been circulated among the Members and in the absence of objection (pause) are approved.

"Are there any procedural matters? Under official matters we have 'The Problem of Japanese Repatriation'.

"LT. GENERAL DEREVIANKO: I ask you, MR. CHAIRMAN, to give me the floor.

"THE CHAIRMAN: Does it relate to procedure?

"LT. GENERAL DEREVIANKO: In this case, yes.

"THE CHAIRMAN: Please proceed.

"LT. GENERAL DEREVIANKO: For the reasons which I have stated earlier and which are known to the Members of the Allied Council, I do not deem it possible for me to take part in the discussion of the subject which is on the Agenda of today's meeting.

"(The SOVIET MEMBER and his staff left the Council chamber at 1005 hours).

"THE CHAIRMAN: The subject for today's meeting was originally proposed by the CHAIRMAN, DEPUTY FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER, and MEMBER FOR THE



UNITED STATES. It was carried forward at the request of HIS EXCELLENCY, THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH MEMBER, AMBASSADOR HODGSON. AMBASSADOR HODGSON, so you wish to make a statement?

"MR. HODGSON: Yes, I would like to say, sir, that I am pleased to report that my government and the Government of the United States accept the suggestions advanced before this Council on the 21st of December last by the Representative of the British Commonwealth with regard to certain steps which could be taken on the question of repatriation of the Japanese prisoners of war. And, on the fifth of January my government presented a note to the Soviet Ambassador in Canberra in the following terms. For the purposes of record, I would like to read the full text of the note so that it shall be placed on our records.

"The Department of External Affairs presents its compliments to the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and has the honour to inform the Embassy that the Australian Government is concerned at the large number of Japanese prisoners of war who appear to be still detained by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

"The Embassy will remember that paragraph 9 of the Potsdam Proclamation of July 26th, 1945, states: "(9) The Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives."

"The Embassy will also be aware that the repatriation of prisoners of war held by Allied Powers other than the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was virtually completed in 1947.

"TASS news agency reported on May 20th, 1949, that 95,000 Japanese prisoners of war were still held by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. According to figures carefully compiled by the Japanese Government and checked from every available source, this large figure given by TASS does not account for additional 376,929 prisoners still in areas under Soviet control. The Australian Government is forced to conclude that if the TASS figure is correct the discrepancy between that and Japanese Government estimate can only be accounted for by an abnormally high death rate among Japanese prisoners awaiting



repatriation by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In this connection the Australian Government has observed that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics continually refused to furnish notifications of the deaths of Japanese prisoners and feels bound to point out to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that the failure to provide legal information, as well as prolonged detention of prisoners after cessation of hostilities, is contrary to the accepted international concepts of fundamental human rights and humanitarian principles contained in the Geneva Convention of 1949 which has been signed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

'The Australian Government expresses the hope that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will accept the principle that an international or humanitarian organization should be designated as a protecting power to conduct full and impartial investigations into reckoning those Japanese detained in areas under the control of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics since the end of the war. The representative of the British Commonwealth countries on the Allied Council for Japan put forward such a proposal at the Council's meeting on 21st December and its acceptance by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would undoubtedly greatly assist in clarifying present situation.'

"The only other point I could add, MR. CHAIRMAN, is the suggestion made at our last meeting. So far we have heard no response to this suggestion. I think it is a fortnight now since your government submitted this to the Representative of the Soviet Union in Washington. There has been no reply. I feel, sir, we should still continue this item on the Agenda, because maybe at our next meeting, if no reply is forthcoming, we might take up the suggestion that the International Red Cross - as it is fully entitled to do - will itself propose to the Soviet Union that its services be utilized by the Soviet Government in connection with this question independent of the other proposal of nominating a neutral state to act as protecting power. I refer in this case to the purely humanitarian aspect which is the sole concern of the International Red Cross apart from any duties of a protecting power. Thank you.



"THE CHAIRMAN: I wish to thank you AMBASSADOR HODGSON, for providing the Council with such a helpful report on the action taken by your government. This action parallels and supports the action taken by the United States Government looking to a positive implementation of the suggestion made by you at the One Hundred-Second Meeting regarding a survey of the status of Japanese prisoners of war in Soviet territory by a neutral nation or international humanitarian organization.

"With respect to the note addressed to the Soviet Embassy in Washington by the Department of State which I read to you at the One Hundred-Fourth Meeting, I regret to report to the Council that the Soviet Government has so far given no reply and no acknowledgement to this approach.

"In the meantime, I feel certain that the Members of the Council will have noted with interest that General Headquarters has received a request from the SOVIET MEMBER dated January 9, 1950, for the dispatch of a vessel with a capacity of 2500 persons to the Port of Nahodka for the purpose of removing Japanese prisoners of war. Inasmuch as the repatriation movement from Soviet territory has hitherto been interrupted during the long winter months because of the Soviet contention that weather and 'icing' conditions would not permit the movement of vessels in and out of Soviet ports, the fact that the Soviet Government now requests a vessel to arrive at the Port of Nahodka on January 18, 1950, which is today, in the very heart of winter, provides most encouraging evidence that weather conditions along the Soviet coast have now undergone a vast change. (LAUGHTER) This will enable us to look forward to further repatriation movements without hindrance from the so-called 'icing' conditions which have in the past so completely blocked the Soviet ports, and in consequence all efforts of the SUPREME COMMANDER and his General Headquarters to accelerate the completion of the repatriation problem. This is indeed a gratifying development.

"With respect to your suggestion regarding the International Red Cross, I will, of course, convey your views to the SUPREME COMMANDER and perhaps at the next meeting we will be in a position further to discuss this proposition. It is my understanding, MR. AMBASSADOR, that you desire to continue this subject and accordingly it will again be placed on the Agenda with the same wording as the subject for today.



"MR. HODGSON: Yes, MR. CHAIRMAN. I think we haven't resolved it and until the question is resolved I think it should remain on the Agenda. I regret very much that our Soviet colleague has again walked out. You indicated yourself you would give him ample opportunity to make a statement after you. I myself want to ask him certain pertinent questions. Unfortunately, he does not seem to want to face up to those questions. He knows the nature of them because no doubt he reads carefully and closely our verbatim reports and I, therefore, would be glad if you would continue this item on the Agenda. At this stage I think we should leave to our next meeting my suggestion about the International Red Cross without taking any action in the meantime by the SUPREME COMMANDER. I think we should decide to leave that, say until the next meeting. Thank you.

"THE CHAIRMAN: I agree with you regarding the necessity of continuing the subject and if you had not expressed the desire to have it continued, I was about to propose, myself, that it be continued.

"MR. HODGSON: Yes, sir, I do desire.

"THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. GENERAL CHU.

"LT. GENERAL CHU: MR. CHAIRMAN, I have noted with interest your statement, as well as the BRITISH COMMONWEALTH MEMBER's, but I have no comment to make at this time. I am agreeable, as I stated last time, that any subject can be carried on the Agenda as long as there is somebody who expresses such a desire.

"THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you, GENERAL CHU. Are there any further comments? The meeting is adjourned.

(The meeting adjourned at 1020 hours).

\* \* \*



"SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS AND  
SUGGESTIONS FOR SCAP

"ITEM I - 'The Problem of Japanese Repatriation'.

"1. Ambassador W. R. Hodgson made the following recommendation: That the International Red Cross propose to the Soviet Union that its services be utilized by the Soviet Union (independently of nominating a neutral state to act as a protecting power) to ascertain the truth of allegations of ill treatment, apparent discrepancies in numbers, and obtain definite figures and information of the Japanese prisoners of war remaining in Soviet territory."

\* \* \*

SCAP announced on 9 January the receipt of a letter from the Soviet member of the Allied Council for Japan, requesting a vessel to lift 2,500 Japanese prisoners of war from Nahodka, Siberia, on 18 January. Included in the 2,500 to be transported to the repatriation center in Maizuru, were 459 Japanese who were hospital cases. Since the resumption of repatriation in June 1949, the Soviets had released through 30 November, 1949, a total of 94,973. SCAP received no request from the Soviets for repatriation shipments in December.

Again, 30 January, SCAP announced the receipt of a letter from the Soviet member of the Allied Council, requesting repatriation shipping to lift another 2,500 prisoners of war from Nahodka, Siberia, on 6 February.

This will make the second midwinter lift from the Siberian port in 1950, since 2,500 repatriates were returned to Japan from Nahodka to Maizuru on 22 January.

SCAP designated the "Takasago Maru" for the lift and the vessel was scheduled to depart Japan on 4 February.

\* \* \*



The repatriation issue was again discussed widely in the editorial columns of the metropolitan Japanese press.

On 24 January, Akahata, the organ of the Communist Party, came to the defense of the Soviet Union pointing out "the consistency of Soviet figures of the number of Japanese to be repatriated in contrast to the constant changes being released by the Japanese Government." Akahata, among other things, accused the Government of attempting to cover up a 300,000 figure discrepancy in its records by charging the difference to a high death rate prevailing in Soviet prisoner of war camps.



## CIVIL SERVICE

### Examinations for Top Level Government Posts Held

Open competitive examinations were held in fourteen Japanese cities for over 8,000 candidates for 2,649 top-level administrative positions in the Japanese government on 15 January and 20-22 January in order to select the best qualified persons for these positions. The program was designed to effect a reform of the bureaucracy by breaking up cliques, and eliminating favoritism, which was practiced in the selection and appointment of the top-level administrative staff under their old system, and to establish the principle of appointment and promotion based solely on merit. The positions, designated by the National Personnel Authority on 12 November 1949 in accordance with Article 9 of the Supplementary Provisions of the National Public Service Law, included administrative vice ministers, bureau chiefs, deputy bureau chiefs, division chiefs, section chiefs and deputy section chiefs in the central government administrative organization and corresponding positions in the field offices.

For purposes of examination, the designated positions were divided into sixty different occupational fields according to the similarity of duties, and into four levels within each occupational field according to the degree of administrative responsibility. Minimum experience prerequisites were established for each occupational group and the levels within each group. A minimum age limit of thirty years was also established. Incumbents of designated positions were declared to have met the minimum experience requirements and minimum age requirements for their particular positions.

Written examinations were given to all candidates. The first, common to all occupational groups, was designed to test administrative ability and knowledge, and was given on 15 January. The second, designed to measure whether the candidates possessed the minimum technical knowledge in their occupational fields was given 20-22 January in forty-six different occupational groups. A second test was not given for fifteen occupational groups because of the special nature of their respective groups. Personal investi-



gations of all candidates are being conducted as a part of the examination program.

The rating, certification and appointments resulting from the examination will require several months.

The following editorial in the Nippon Times, on 23 January, commented on the NPA-sponsored examinations:

"The first of the new civil service examinations were conducted during the past week as some 8,000 applicants sought to qualify for upper-level government posts. Questions of administrative practices and personnel relationships made up one-half of the examinations, and specialized knowledge was emphasized in the latter half.

"Despite reports of both open and undercover campaigns to delay the holding of these examinations, the National Personnel Authority conducted the tests as scheduled. The NPA arranged the first set of examinations to determine qualified personnel to hold more than 2,600 positions from deputy section chief up to vice-minister in the national government.

"As a complete break from the traditional bureaucratic system under which a government official, having passed his one and only hurdle of the so-called higher civil service examinations, could expect to ride the escalator of promotion during his career, the new NPA system of qualifying examinations is highly welcomed as a step toward placing the best men in government posts, particularly those in the upper echelon. The public can expect with greater hope a protection against the vagaries of the political weather and of the 'spoils system' in which predominant parties or cliques manipulate appointments of civil servants.

"There was an understandably strong opposition carried on by incumbents when these qualifying examinations were first suggested. But the NPA conducted itself in a courageous and responsible manner in carrying through its plan to hold the tests this month.

"However, preliminary reports of the tests themselves seem to agree that improvements are necessary to make the questions a more scientific and fairer test of ability. A common complaint to questions requiring the selection of one of a group of possible answers was that more than one of the



choices could be a correct reply. The NPA has recognized this possibility and announced that it would omit from grading any problem which could have more than one correct answer.

"Another charge was that the questions in the test of administrative practices gave incumbents and government officials a heavy advantage over candidates without bureaucratic experiences.

"Dissatisfied voices are to be expected in examinations of any kind, yet it must be acknowledged that since the recent NPA tests were the first of their kind, faulty conditions may have arisen. It is earnestly to be hoped that steps will be taken immediately to avoid similar errors and to make as foolproof as possible future processes in the selection of qualified government officials.

"The nation is entitled to expect the best trained, most alert and well qualified personnel in government posts to be of service as administrators of the country's well-being, and the NPA has taken one step in attaining this goal."



## LEGAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS

### Cartoons for Children Explain Criminal Code

Japanese children are being taught details of Japan's new Code of Criminal Procedure through one of a series of cartoons and accompanying illustrations.

Some 48,000 sets of the cartoons were distributed in the form of cards, pamphlets, and posters by the Office of the Attorney General to schools, police stations, courts, procurators' offices, and kanishibai, Japan's candy-selling storytellers.

Fourteen cartoons, each with an explanatory note for the benefit of the kanishibai, teacher, or whoever is displaying the illustrations, inform the children how a kidnapper is apprehended, tried, and punished under the provisions of the Code.

The story begins with the criminal (depicted by a wolf) snatching up the innocent victim (a baby pig). The policeman (a bear) attempts to stop the crime, but the wolf escapes with the pig. The policeman, however, grabs a piece of the wolf's tail.

The offense is witnessed by an owl, who later will testify at the trial as a prosecution witness.

After obtaining a warrant, the bear apprehends the wolf who has donned a goat's mask to disguise himself. The bear questions the suspect, finally pulling off the mask and revealing the wolf.

An illustration explains that the police may hold the wolf for questioning no longer than 48 hours without transferring him to the public procurator for further interrogation leading to an indictment. Another cartoon depicts a pre-Occupation policeman, who wears a mustache and Samurai sword, pushing a huge concrete roller over the suspect. A caption informs onlookers that third-degree methods of obtaining information no longer are legal.

Evidence is obtained when the bear gets a search warrant and discovers the pig in the wolf's house. The wolf, as entitled by law, refuses to talk



under interrogation by the procurator (a rabbit). The wolf insists on seeing his lawyer (a dog) and asserts his innocence. The dog replies: "If what you have told me is true, you have nothing to worry about."

At the trial, testimony by the owl and bear, supplemented by material evidence (the wolf's tail), leads to the wolf's conviction by the judge (a penguin). The final illustration shows the wolf serving his sentence at hard labor.

#### Posters Emphasizing Civil Liberties Distributed

Posters depicting a girl in a cage, a gang boss trying to extort payment at a rice cake shop, and a policeman about to arrest a young man, are being used to make the Japanese people aware of their postwar civil liberties.

Some 50,000 of the posters were distributed by the Civil Liberties Bureau of the Office of the Attorney General to schools, libraries, legal affairs bureaus, labor offices, courts and police stations, according to an announcement by the Legislation and Justice Division of SCAP's Legal Section on 27 January.

A smiling Japanese man is shown on the poster and he is saying: "I am for you, with you, on your side . . . I am a Civil Liberties Commissioner commissioned by the Office of the Attorney General. My duty is to protect your human rights. I will be stationed in city, town, and village."

The man is holding a scroll of cartoons. One shows a street racketeer trying to extract money from the proprietor of a rice cake shop for a "protection license." Aware of his new rights, the proprietor asks, "What license? Do you think you are alright? You haven't even greeted me in a respectable manner." An inscription beside the drawing asks, "Has your life ever been threatened by bosses or 'big' figures?"

Another cartoon on the scroll shows a bonded Japanese girl in a cage with the old man who owns her leisurely smoking as he squats beside the cage. "Are there children and women still suffering because they have been sold?" asks the caption. All contracts bonding Japanese to servitude have been made illegal by Japanese law enacted during the Occupation.

In a third cartoon a young man asks a Japanese policeman who has come



to his door: "Have you a warrant for my arrest?" Beside the drawing a caption asks: "Have you ever been forcibly taken to a police station without a warrant for your arrest, or has your house ever been searched without a search warrant?" (As in other democratic countries, to protect the public, arrests may be made during commission of a crime or in immediate pursuit of the suspect).

A law passed last May by the Diet provides for the eventual appointment of up to 20,000 civil liberties commissioners throughout the country to assure "the thoroughgoing protection of human rights. . .and to popularize and promote the ideal of civil liberties," as guaranteed the Japanese people under their new Constitution.



## INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS

### Sentences Demanded by Prosecution in Coal Lobby Case

The prosecution in the so-called Coal Lobby Case trial before the Tokyo District Court on 13 January demanded that the following sentences be passed on the seven defendants in the case:

1. Manitsu Tanaka, former Speaker of the House of Representatives and ranking member of the Democratic Liberal Party, to two years and six months imprisonment for bribery;
2. Shunei Azuma, former Democratic Liberal Party Diet member, to ten months imprisonment for complicity in bribery;
3. Kakuei Tanaka, former Vice-Attorney General, to one year and six months imprisonment for bribery;
4. Tamaichiro Fukazu, former Democratic Liberal Party Diet member, two years imprisonment for bribery;
5. Shigeyoshi Kiso, president of the Kiso Coal Mine Company, to two years imprisonment for bribery;
6. Hideo Haraguchi, president of the Haraguchi Coal Mine Company, one year and six months imprisonment for bribery, fraud, and violation of the Coal Mine Housing Project Construction Law;
7. Takanari Oyama, coal mine operator and director of the Nisshin Textile Company, to six months imprisonment and a fine of ¥100,000 for complicity in bribery and violation of the Price Control Law and Price Adjustment Law.

The Coal Lobby trial, (the case concerning alleged widespread bribery of officials and Diet members by coal mine operators in efforts to suppress the Emergency State Coal Control Bill when that measure was being deliberated in the Diet in the summer and autumn of 1947), opened in the Tokyo District Court on 12 May. (For details of the case, see Review of Government and Politics in Japan, September-December 1948; and January-May 1949).



House of Councillor Member  
Sentenced to Six Months Prison Term

Kenji Osuni, Democratic Liberal Party member of the House of Councillors from Kanagawa Prefecture, was sentenced to six months' imprisonment, with probationary term of two years, by the Yokohama District Court on 16 January. Osuni had been tried on charges of theft, embezzlement, hoarding, and violation of election regulations.



## THE PURGE

The Japanese Government screened 17,893 persons during the month of January. Of this total, 16,653 had been screened prior to their appointment to public office; 1,626 were candidates for elective offices; and 614 were screened for other reasons. Of these persons, 42 were disqualified for public service, including:

Career Army and Navy officers.....	15
Kempai Tai ("Thought Police").....	10
Branch Chiefs of Ex-Servicemen's Associations.....	9
Branch Chiefs of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association and affiliates.....	5
Others.....	3
Total	<u>42</u>

As of 31 January 1950, the total number of terroristic and ultra-nationalistic organizations dissolved under the provisions of Imperial Ordinance No. 101 of 1946 (The Purge Ordinance) and Cabinet Order No. 64 of 1949 (The Organizations Control Order, promulgated on 4 April 1949), was 194. Seven such organizations were dissolved during the month of January. These were:

1. Shukyo Hokin Amatsukyo (Religious Juridical Person Amatsukyo)
2. Amatsukyo Sekyocho (Central General Headquarters of the former Dainichi Kyo)
3. Shukyo Hojin Amatsukyo Shinmeigu Kyokai (Religious Juridical Person Amatsukyo Shinmeigu Kyokai)
4. Shukyo Hojin Dainichi Kyo Sukejin (Religious Juridical Person Dainichi Kyo Sukejin)
5. Shukyo Hojin Dainichi Kyo Bunkyo Kai Shion Kyokai  
(Religious Juridical Person Dainichi Kyo Bunkyo Kai Shion Kyokai)
6. Nada Gumi (Nada Group, Takeo City, Fukui Prefecture)
7. Yamaguchi Ikka (Yamaguchi Family, Sapporo, Hokkaido).

The Amatsukyo group in Ibaragi Prefecture preached the mythical doctrine that "the entire world should come under the rule of the Japanese emperor," direct descendant of the goddess Amaterasu-Omikami, and other Shinto doctrines.