






the national archives

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Since last report.

C.A.S. 30 missions (12 heavies) of 1,000 sorties

Hamburg - And weather once

Essen - 4: rickety, last night, believed good.

Photo. Lubise 1/2 da brown gutted.

Last night - Italy: Turin: no black-out: diverted fr. Genoa. Full reports not in.

Figures 2,900 sorties. Lost 22 (9 pilots)

Y'day 9 bombers hit + 250 fighters. Large no enemy ⁽¹⁹⁰⁾ - Lost 15 (4 pilots) Destroyed 4. 4 prob. 11 damaged.

Coastal. 8 lost. (470 sorties) - hit only 1 ship, saw no k. boats.

Enemy - Fighters (day) - missing. Beam on Brockworth, but turned away.

P.M. Fighter work over France and in shut down if no profit shown. Look at it again in a week's time.

C.A.S. Malta. Bombing more inaccurate or indiscriminate.

10 extra Hurricanes flown in. Aircraft are being damaged on ground - 15 total.

Enemy 35: 9: 32 Lost 5 in combat.

A.D.C. v. critical of German tactics.

Egypt. Lost 14: 7 dam. 6 on grd.

Enemy 10: 4: 8.

2 night attacks Alex. ^{night-fighters} 1/2 shot down 2 1/2.

Burma. Am Vol. Gp. in action again. 47 of K. I. bombers (40 50) over India.

Destroyed 18 for loss 2 Hurricanes. 6 lost on ground.

But v. hard to support troops

Saisconales. 94 capt fr. carriers. Bldgs. damaged. 14: 12: 2 for loss of 6.

Alencaria lost 5 out of 9. shot down 4 but missed carrier.

Fileno won 3 for loss of 2.

Ceylon total = 21: 14: 5. Against 14: 7: 10 is so.

P.M. 10,000 ton. Jap. carrier spends 100 aircraft - many more than we do.

1st Lt. They haven't abandoned them. They carry on upper deck. They have hangars open at sides.

P.M. Army. to look into this, to see what we can't increase carrying capacity of ours.

C.A.S. Pacific. Stinson v. Kopyang I. 17 J. dam. grd. 2 destroyed in air for loss of 4: 2.

P.M. Income & expendⁿ of Japs?

C.A.S. 2,000 in 17 weeks. lost. ^{output. Japs =} Output / 350 p. month. - i.e. prob. 1/2 of loss. (750)

But previous records not known.

1st Sea Lord

- For work. 15 ships sunk by sub.
- 6 " " " aircraft
- 2 " " " mined
- 3 " " " fr. Götterburg
- 4 " " " marine casualties
- 2 Japs in Bay Bengal
- 5 N. Atlantic - not known how.

213,000 tons. }
 Overdue 52,000. } 50 ships 265,000 tons.

180 - 190,000 tons in the week in N. Atlantic alone.

P.M. How came it that ships sheltering in Calcutta were sent out to their doom.

1st S. Lt. They were ordered out before known Japs were in Bay Bengal.

Agreed however that reconnaissance work has helped.

Convoys of N. America. Middle section (Hampton Rds to Key West) is to be introduced by 15/7 May. Southern section in July.

Russian convoys. Bad time. 24 ships + 16 escort
 3 ships damaged + returned. 1/2 of convoy going on - submarines awaiting them.

Returning convoy 17 + 8 escort. Being attacked by air. 11 U-Boats -
 + 3 known to have been sunk.

20 U-Boats can be concentrated in this area.

P.M. ? convoy to Russians seriousness of effort we are making - the great risk we are running.

Army + F.D. support to see Russians on this, and press for more air + sea support. + co-operation.

1st S. Lt. ^{some} Frigate (sub) 2 returning Jap transports. (empty).

C.I.C.S. Burma.

(Chinese)
 On E. Rd. 20th Div? lost 1200 men (heavy).

96th.

Chinese expected to occupy Mandalay soon.

P.M. No guerrilla activity going on in China. Their own war is not being waged. In Burma they are fighting well.

Libya. 7th A. Div & now Sidi Omet

5th Indian Div in Sidi Barrani area.

} changes in dispositions as fr. map.

R. came on 3 columns. last few days. 4/5 signs retirement north plus + far south

But center (Sidi Bregda - Squali) they are holding out. We have withdrawn outpost line. Looks like reconnaissance in force. We don't want him in South I. r. as it gives back then news.

Russia. No change in line. Draw in South restricting fighting. Offensives at start in May. Sent. indic^{ed} of back offensives in Crimea.

F.O. Russo-Turkish situation over bomb.

R. conv. this Germ. plane & has handled on vet. basis asking them to release the 2 Russians arrested. Turkey has refused this, as they had to do, & R. has started with tart communique.

Turks annoyed with R. attitude - wh. has not been sensible.

H.O. Glushin Aircraft Factory - attack on change-over of shift - C.D. services have shown up well.

S/Doms. Laundries. M/L. I have scheduled them.
(i.e. prices)
M/H. On "my" point / this is with W.O. not me.

I am concerned only with civilian decontamination. The W.O. are negotiating with the laundries & the neg^{ns} are now in last stage. Results expected in 2 weeks.

S/Doms. We shall have to put an order on them if we can't get them into line v. soon.

S/Doms is upset in a week.

III. Political Meetings in Factories.

L.P. Summarised memo. General agreement by Dpts primarily concerned.

New rule wd. not prevent informal gatherings to be addressed by m^{ng}ts of managements or T. Unions.

Adm^y. Diffy about "political" m^{ng}s - Ship Stewards returning fr. national gathering & holdg m^{ng}s.

Agreed.

IV. Supplies to Russia.

[M/T. Hopkins Harrison pressed for prelim. study to find out prob. ceiling for supplies to Russia. We must get finality on limit of capacity to convoy & protect. This wd. be an stable element. Wang. get stat, decide tank & aircraft figure, get monthly figure of free space & ask Russians how they want it used.

This may throw into relief diff^y of dealing with this on Protocol basis.

S/S. Air. Will this mean any increase on present quantities? V. doubtful.]

F.O. Americans not anxious for conf. in Moscow. Wd. prefer to U.S. & we wd. decide with us what we can send. Tell Russians this is all we can manage.

Agree early discussion with U.S. people - on what level?

Agreed with Hopkins no commit^{nt} to Russia till we had agreed with us.

Prepare our pos^{ns} not only qua prod^{ns} but also qua protection.

M/T. This is being done now by my people - in touch with M/W.T. & Adm^y.

F.O. This must be a joint ceiling for U.S. & our supplies - even tho' we have to do all the conveying.

M/W.T. We see no chance of continuing to convoy the numbers with U.S. are laying on.

See
1st/hold. 20 ships in each of 2 convoys a month is our present estimate. But our

experience of a heavy escort now accompanying present convoys will teach us something. Weight of escort attack now near U.S. coast.

S/Doms. Estimate of R. production and needs?

M/W.T. $\frac{4}{5}$ of the 40 U.S. ships ^{a month} are carrying non-Protocol material. The U.S. are laying on ships for the sake of it and we have to provide the convoy. The lack of lifting capacity on their ships means they can't lift the tanks & for this reason they are loading food & other material wh. R. need less.

M.A.P. 14-16 ships a month have fulfilled our part of the Protocol.

40 a month fr. U.S. will go well beyond their part of the Protocol.

M/W.T. This 40 a month is at our expense - some are our ships.

Not so far the words of joint discussions.

M/P. We can't get informants about R. needs w/out disclosing our strategic plans: and we shall tell the truth and they won't!

Mr Lord. Experience suggests we must expect to lose 20% of merchant tonnage used in each journey. And having to cover the convoy by major naval units involves a large measure of risk to us.

S/Doms. Continuance of specific commitment ties our hands elsewhere. And we don't know how far it takes precedence over all other needs - even in new situation.

M/P. See where we get to on basis of convoy limitation - what is a reasonable rate fr. Army point of view. But if they answer 50 ships a month - then this wd. carry the Protocol + the 50% promised - and perhaps more. So it wd. be much help.

Mr Sea Lord. We cd. give better protectⁿ to 1 convoy of 25 ships p. month.

This wd. half the risk to the Home Fleet (out 7 days inc 4 p. month).

S/Doms. Complete study initiated by M/Protⁿ & W. Cab. consider it again.

F.O. S/S. Was suggested linking this with negotiations on Treaty. Generally agreed preferable to keep them separate.

Agreed - consider next week; and tell Americans meanwhile what we are doing.

Naval Military Situation.

C.A.S. Bombs 75 day ^{sorties} lost 5
 800 night " 30.
 75 tons bombs 232 mines.

Light bombers on France almost every day.

Lancasters. Unlucky in night fighters (lost 4) Fighters expected to be diverted.

Fighter 5-400 sorties. Enemy disoriented fighter. Lost 15 (12 pilots)

Enemy 17: 9: 23. Day
 4: 3: 1. Night

Coastal 2nd sorties 3 lost.

Malta Slight fall. 4 - still worse. 2 Squadrons ^{in air} without loss. (subject to check).

Signs of enemy squadrons leaving Sicily.

Depending on a.a. we got 15: 5: 17.

" lost. 2 (air) 5 (ground) 1 damaged.

Egypt Abrupt on convoy Beaflighted - no definite work. $\left. \begin{matrix} 2 \\ 2 \end{matrix} \right\}$ Torpedo bombers lost

we lost 11 + 1

enemy " 6 + 1 + 3.

Wellingtons go direct w/out call at Malta.

Burma Attacks aerodromes + Jap. shipping ^{flying boats Fox-Blair} We got 5. + flying boats.

Pacific. Enemy loss 7: 22 damaged.

We " 9: 5 "

P.A. Record our admiration of admirable raid on Augsburg. This is quite outstanding.

Germans will imitate this - don't you worry.

Army. over us x Profors queue - sh. must now be returned, as soon as possible.

V.L.N.S.

Remorse + Wasp sh. to on their way back to the Straits

Dedroyer attacked by sub., when out to pick up an aircraft down.

Convoy to Newfoundland in ^{only} 8 arrived: 1 sunk y'day close in: 15 turned back.

Fleet back y'day morning. Those undamaged by ice will be in next convoy

starting 26/4. Distribution of cargo - some ships more valuable than others

x) but efforts made to spread. M/W.T. to look into this.

Likely to be bad year for ice.

65 ships loaded or on their way to have joined next convoy. Congestion.

We can't convoy more than 25 - and not more than 3 convoys in 2 months.

But operations for Home Fleet; + we'd better not give a figure.

F.O. Many ships fr. U.S. don't have high priority cargo. Must stop this.

M.L. What is counterpart in U.S.A. to Allied Supplies Executive Com. Munitions Assignment Board, I think.

P.M. Diffy in getting ships thru is a new development.

F.O. My Prob. F.O. 1st time to meet & discuss.

V.C.N.S. 2 U Boats sunk and 1 probable.

2 Platons Marines destroyed WPT station at ...

Trouant (sub) got 2 transports (cutty) in Malacca Straits

Shipping Losses. (103,000 tons. what is lot 2 vols of month.)

166,000 tons lost

31,000 belated

38,000 overdue

236,000

[81,000 damaged.]

Actual loss this week is about 150,000.

P.M. Bulk still on N^E/Am. coast. Arranged with President to lay off until U.S. convoys are going. Lamentable necessity. U.S. v. slow in getting this on foot.

Enemy may run short in air: & we may do so in ships.

B. & Bengal. Why did they send out 100,000 tons w/out knowing what was on?

Did they confer with us?

V.C.N.S. We wanted them to reduce traffic on B. Coast. They had thinned it a bit that week was less than the week before.

U.S. Navy expect begin first convoy 1/5

C.I.G.S. Burma. No qt. change. 35 miles back

Chinese moving down in support.

Mandalay's strength in effect less not likely to be more than 10,000.

Promised to enquire.

Air support - about 15 B. + 15 A.V.G.

Taps have landed another Div. Hard to say how long they will take to reach China frontier.

Refugees between Mandalay India. 70,000 in Mandalay alone & present road takes only 1,500 a day.

Not worth putting more troops in: we can't supply them.

Pacific American re-inforcements.

New Caledonia filling up. New Hebrides also

M-East No change.

Russia Little change. Report of German success at Moscow. - prob accumulation of some

Foreign. F.O. Vichy. Genl. view German anxiety about internal situation.
Hence put in man likely to give them most help.
Diff. to make a better guess.

P.M. Fleet turned against us? Army. Not v. easy to guess.

P.M.'s telegram to M.S. F.O. inclined to think sign of weakness.
Condition of ships at Toulon? Army. Not fit to fight, tho' fit to steam.

P.M. thinks they wd. scuttle, rather than let Germans take & fight them.

1st Lord. Esp. Adml. is going to Madrid & Lisbon. What does that portend? Bases
for submarines

Sec/Doms. Vichy people in Dominions.

Canada. (Welles anxious that they shd. stay for the time)

S. Africa. Smuts anxious to throw them out.

P.M. Why do it now, when things are in the balance.

F.O. Vichy man in S. Africa has been up to no good. No harm in sending this
individual.

P.M. Tell Smuts we aren't pressing Canada and [] - but leave it to him.

Home. 40 aircraft in Salon des

20 " being fired in some area - Avonmouth

12 " used/unused. Tessa = Tyne. 100 houses ^{half} damaged Middlebury

Naval Military Air Operations.

C.A.S. Bomber Command. 1100 tons.

Cologne - Rostock (4 running)

Losses 18 night 7 day. Fewer than usual target.

Fighter 4:100 day 4:100 night better Germans F.W. 190 + best pilots

7:6:16 for 27

6:4:11 in night fighting for loss of 2.

} 32 Fighters lost.

Enemy Attack. Exeter - Bath. Neither have AA defence. Prob. Germans selecting undefended targets. Moving mobile units, 10 Bath + likely targets.

3,750 of note only 1900 We destroyed 3 Sunday night.

Sat. night 30 bombers do 2 sorties each. Attack made by 200 on London flying at 14,000 Sat. and 5,000 Sunday.

Coastal. Lost 8. 4 attacks on subs. 2 merchant ships off Norway + 2 Danish

Enemy Attack. { Sunday 50 killed + 200 injured.
Sunday 150 killed + 200 injured.

Adm. estimate fair amount damage.

P.M. Don't make too much of this in Press - we're hitting them 3

times as hard - don't give impression this is quiet. H.Q. communicate a bit

to operational. Tone down, stick in proportion. Don't give out photos

H.Q. Dilemma. Don't make Bath think we are making light of it.

M.H.F. Let Air Min's bulletin keep in step also.

P.M. M.E.W. say Augsburg not important for Diesel manufacture - and another more important target nearly not touched.

F.O. Can we not announce targets in advance - no matter how long the list.

C.A.S. Picks in it. Discourage our crews if they hear heavy casualties in attacking a place on the list. Psychological effect. Agreed, however, to examine it again.

Malta 100-150 enemy bombers a day - bit less. Re'd. attacks on hospitals - don't

in Egypt. We lost 12:30. Enemy ⁵⁸ 16:31. On ground we lost

22:25 damaged. In 6 weeks ^{destroyed} 76:40 ^{prob.} Malta 151:45 ^{prob.}
cost { 75 } 90:110 damaged ^{vids. ground.}

H.O. Enemy Attack.

27th April

Bath. Started 1:27 am, lasted 1 hr. 60 HE. 16 + mod. H. City. 26 fires.

480 houses destroyed 5,000 slightly damaged.

For 2 nights 148 dead (20-30 more likely).

Water - not serious. Gas - out for week. Electricity - OK.

Railway - Bath St. out of use. Diversions.

Force in Bay of Bengal likely to be used as concentrated force & kept together.

Libya. Nothing new. P.M. Why don't we pounce on isolated Italian force?

Answer - we did; at least they didn't stay there.

Russia. No change. P.B. weather. Now not before 15/5 & prob. later. No marked indications of movement at all. 7 or 8 armoured divisions "lost" to our intelligence for a few weeks.

Move of flank southwards to cover bridge etc.

Always in south improved too: but believe that done also in North.

C.A.S. Indications of more troops east in Mediterranean. Those moving fr.

Sicily may go part to Russia part to E. Mediterranean.

P.M. Garrison in Cyprus is weak. C.A.S. M/Est are considering this.

Foreign Situation. Hitler's speech. Apologia for Russian campaign. Looks as tho'

F.O. this a bit nervous, not about Army, but about civilian morale.

Black market in food. Po. preparing for a purge.

Much more of this speech devoted to us, not Russia.

Russian Convoys Just seen Ambass. - worried about delay - explained position & said might put in with to get 35 in next time.

P.Q. 16, they said, cd. go to Archangel.

Guadeloupe & Martinique - trying, without success, to get U.S. to back a stronger line. P.M. Don't want U.S. to break with Vichy.

II. Admiralty Construction Programme.

A.Y.A. 5 cap. ships to replace 5 lost.

Main Staff of Fleet.

Carricks. - - -

cruisers 58 + 4 by Allies Lost 18.

destroyers 249 " 71, but more than made up losses.
(31 by air attacks alone)

sub. 80 + 22 Allies.

corvettes 169 + 9 "

sloops 37 + 6 "

a) Still not proposed to put Lion in, tho' going on with gun mountings.

Interim report of Brackenhill C.A.S. on loss of P.Q. 17, ^{Republic} almost ready.

Vanguard likely to be ready in 2 years.

b) Cruisers. 8 in. gun cruiser prop. app^d. Impossible to go on with them.

Propose to go on instead with middle class

c) Destroyers - wd. like more but proposals will fill all available berths

Will take 3 months more to build " of increased protection & armament.

P.M. raised battleships question - 1 carrier per ship - 'consideration'

a) Carriers. 2 bldg. Ask for 4 intermediate carriers - 3 ordered, with 1 concurrence. They will be 28 months or so bldg. - but Nav. Staff asked to go into details to cut out refinements & get down to 24 months.

P.M. U.S. are bldg 20 carriers. + 80 auxiliaries.

CNS. Many are converted cruiser hulls (8) - small carriers 25 aircraft each.

P.M. ? Tell them only 2 more in next 4 years. But ours are worn after at risk. Will you give us replacements of first 2 or 3 we lose. We will build others for them later.

CNS. President now says don't turn over anything larger than a destroyer but instead pass over the duties. Policy end war as supreme naval power.

P.M. let me have a draft to write to President.

c) T.L.C. Seizable ships. 12 1/2 knots & carry 150 tons - 150 ft long.

P.M. Don't let them screw them up to the point where you can't get any.

AVA. ¹⁾ Speed - ²⁾ de-gaussed - ³⁾ crew accounts for distances. Requirements of C.B.H.

P.M. On c) let crew live ashore until after training.

P.M. Are U.S. making any? AVA. They are bringing on the short ones & putting larger ones at end of programme.

MyProb: Piping, masts, on this. Canada can do a lot of small ones - 50 ft, 6 1/2 knots. Any other engines. As soon as these are assembled in our ports they will draw German strength to the West.

C.I.G.S. We shall need 650 at least: and we are talking only of 450 by May ⁽¹⁹⁴⁵⁾

MyL. Work will have to be spread over more yards & simplified. We like to see a quick decision. Hope some work can be done in later - so simplify

C.D. release problem. Want also to know designed so that we can begin training the men.

Also can we put some in Severn. If Acrostow - ships built opposite ^(in last war)

Also Portsmouth.

P.M. Ch. V. Chiefs look into this, report to Defence Com. ? with C.B.H.

F.O. R. class battleships to stay un-modernised? P.M. Floating coffins. Unable to face any modern vessels or air attack. CNS. If you increase their armament & add big bridges you will reduce speed to 15 knots: and this will reduce their value. As ocean going ships they have

K.W. No ship to programme.

AVA. Merchant shipbuilding was proceeding at rate of 1/4 in quantities in the year.

W.M. (42) 56th Meeting.

4th May, 1943.

P.M. welcomed Evatt.

Naval, Military & Air Operations.

C.A.S. Bomber 700 night 70 day. Lost 41. 821 tons 280 mines

Oslo - Kiel Hamburg. 2 mines. - back Tripitz in Norway. - more mines

Paris - Gnome Rhone factory missed.

Fighter 5600 / ^{sortie} 750 night. Lost 42 (35 pilots)

of 140 ea. bombs combat 48 21:4:11.

A.A. 1:6.

Night Bombers 1:2:2.

53:35:61. ^{for loss of} 43 fi. 86 (total)

Germans admit loss of 45 in exp^{ts} to England.

Norwich first night Germans admitted 3 lost when we claimed none.

4 months of '02 destroyed 212 for loss of 190.
^{Fighter Command}

Attack.
Enemy 60 over last night - all over E. side.

Enter. R.O. Lasted 1 hr. 10 min. 50-100 HE + 40 UXB. Damage mainly
fire in centre. All fires now out. ^{hit on} Direct/cathedral. City bomb + 8% damaged.

Other details as in written report by Home Security.

Gas - serious. Electricity - 66% available.

Always - substantial interference.

Police re-inforced. Labour force 1,000 (400 soldiers) brought in + at work.

44 killed + 56 seriously injured - but material increase expected.

C.A.S. Fighter - defence All 7 were brought down by fighters.

H.S. thanked R.A.F. for success of

Coastal. 600 sorties Lost 2. 7 attacks on subs. (one prob. hit) + 8 merchant ships
(one sunk) + 1 destroyed.

Malta. First 3 days 156 bombs a day } Marked falling off.
Last 4 " 28 " " }

17 destroyed : 13 : 22. Lost 3:3. 5:6 on ground.

M. East. Normal - casualties about even.

Burma. Av. G. shot down 13 for 0. at "Loayuen." Total loss / 1 damaged. ^{to west}

Pacific. Destroyed 6:8:4 for loss of 12. Java + Port Moresby.

Naval.

C.N.S. 14 ships (9 by sub. - 5 cause unknown) - 81,700 tons.

P.A. 2 Tankers lost of Trinidad (23,000 tons) C.N.S. Not stopped all traffic - they are
routed to Azores but they have to turn in fr. then to Trinidad. 10th. Some

services must be continued to meet urgent commitments. No general re-opening of these services. Admitted no defence on our side in Trinidad.

C.N.S. 6,000 tons for April - total losses.

P.M. McGovern's speech - inclg. reference to shipping losses over 800,000 tons p. month. N.Y. Inf. He said "I can say: publicly announced..."

P.M. Assumption that this based on P.M.'s speech in Secret Session.

Invidious L.P.S. to look into this as breach of privilege.

C.N.S. Russian Convoys Attack by T.B. 88 fought off. Later by U. Boat, 1 ship torpedoed. Y'day attack by 5 subs. downed out. Germans have announced 3 sunk - but no confirmations. They are now 1 1/2 days out of Murmansk. 13 escorts (6 destroyed)

Returning. 10 escorts (5 destroyed) inclg. Edinburg. Latter torpedoed & had to return to Murmansk - with 2 destroyers towing. Enemy attacked them - Ed. ~~attacked~~ ^{destroyed} one destroyer & damaged one. Ed. subsequently sunk.

Geo. V in collision Punjabi. Latter sunk & her depth charges exploding damaged Geo. V.

Net vessels returning convoy will have lost 1 ship

" " outgoing " " prob " " 2 ^{or 3} ships. - of 25.

V. important to say nil alt. Geo. V. Mayor pres. to put her right in course of 6 hrs visit with she was to emerge.

P.M. Telegram fr. Roosevelt about surplus of American ships - protests about our re-loading & re-arranging cargoes so as to concentrate in available ships the high priority munitions supplies. Various interchange endg. with proposal by Adm. King that we should take 10 ships off Atlantic convoys. Read text of his reply on this point.

F.O. We can pack our Protocol requirements in 24 ships in 2 months. This leaves 26 for U.S. - ample. Reason for U.S. surplus now is overstock, armors, and also despatch of useful but superfluous cargoes - eg. food.

Evans. Last Wed. at Pacific Council Washington R. spoke on this point in a sense which indicated that he now accepted P.M. view.

Strings on the Protocol? P.M. Yes. We can alter on our side.

Military.

C.I.A.S. Burma. Last wk. fighting on E-W. road: main thrust was on Lashio.

Rapid progress made & Japs. were in Lashio by 30/4. This forced retirement on Mandalay front. 29/30 ⁴⁰ withdrawal over hasty - no complete news of our present dispositions. Given account of best situation we can make for here.

Certain Chinese forces will have to conform with this withdrawal.
N.E. of Lashio new Divn from inside China.
Heave sea-coast evacuation of Malin ordered.

Advance on Lashio not carried out in qt. force. - done with tanks and
M.T. Feared both Ch. Army didn't fight well.

5 Tap. Divn. active in Burma.

P.M. Telegram fr. Govt. Burma, who is out off fr. Alexander.

I have ordered him to return by air to India, as soon as he feels he can
do no more. Now heard that he has left, by air.

As regards Alexander, I have told Wavell that when his force falls below
that of Divn. he shd. return to India. Wavell ^{uphis-} can't get him out until
he reaches Kalua.

C.I.G.S. Further east, no more signs of movement with Manchuria.

Libya. Bad sandstorms little change.

Repairs going well, or better. ^{Andy's reports} have improved.

Russia. V. little. Minor operations at Murmansk - landed behind German
lines & moved down S.W.

Still no sign of big offensive. Inclined now to think don't start
until 1/6. And even so no sign that we shd. do anything v. big.

Malta. Change of Govt. Report by M/Stall favoured change, & appointment
of Govt.

P.M. Reported on action taken. Read telegrams sent.

C.O. I have wired Deltic about public? - ascertain his views.

Told him Govt shd. take over at once on arrival.

Agreed - no announcement until Govt has arrived.

F.D. Can we publish the weight of the attack?

Agreed - F.D. to consult with other I.D.s a substantial statement. ~~the~~ Malta
for release to Press on Deltic's resignation, ^{high} announced. - by statement
in Commonwealth pts. on Thursday.

War Cab. approved P.M.'s action.

Tankers. (M/W.T. and Sec/Petroleum attending).

M/W.T. No fuel stoppage. Complete ~~at~~ U.S. sea-board - considerable on way to
Caribbean. But we can't stop all. Certain amount of re-routing - using
Freetown convoy so far as they can. We must do this, to meet commitments

Plans unless we stocks. When enemy gets to know, we must reshape our course.

Since orders for stopping off given 3 wks. ago losses have been much less.

Face it, we lose one here & other must be taken as reason for complete stop.

Sept 9th. No tanking a ^{month} ~~week~~ lost in March & April. Down now to 6.

Stoppage in Caribbean for a week will mean loss on our stocks of 200,000 tons.

What we do, like is small shuttle convoy fr. W. of Trinidad to E. of Aruba.

This is now under considⁿ by A.M.S.

P.M. Accepted the case put fwd. by M/W.T.

Sept 9th. Supplying Australia from Trincomalee.

Only way in which we can supply U.S. needs in Australia was to run down stocks in Trincomalee. These stocks were 850,000 tons.

C.N.S. Convoy off U.S. Coast. Have just had Signal fr. Adm. King to say that convoy for central section - Hampton Roads to Key West - Ready by 15 May, but think wait to able to start until 15 June.

Franked: think Adm. King still not wholly convinced of value of convoy system. This was being cleared up.

Foreign Affairs.

F.O. Giraud. Did go to Vichy. Laval wants him to see Petain - to let latter do work him not to play heroic part! We believe he is still in Vichy. Germans have asked for his surrender - Adm. Vichy have refused.

Australia

Evatt: invited by P.M. to speak - said kept good witness of his Govt. & P.M. who has no other plan than to advance the common cause.

Prodⁿ improved but that doesn't mean our Army is well equipped.

To-day short work in small arms. Increased output - overtime - losses getting well - dirⁿ into danger spots in North.

MacArthur and his Directive. Disturbed by "priority plan" of dealing with Germany first Japan later. Japan had shown themselves v. highly skilled in use of all 3 arms. On outbreak of war with Japan we had not one fighter plane in Australia. We now have aircraft: of fall of Dutch E. Indies.

MacA. now gives orders about his duties, inclg. attack on Japanese.

Much Chinese supplies are not sufficient. Also U.S. are putting in 700 aircraft
then are 13 squadrons of R.A.A.F. An. less nothing better than Harvard trainers.

Tendency to segregate the requirements of the 3 diff. services.

Aust. Govt. think it necessary to have a re-assessment of the strategic
situation. We understand that we are only one part of the world
situation - but we fear a certain tendency, here and in U.S.A., to
misdirect the Japs.

McIntosh feels that, subject to grand strategy, one Australian Div. might
be left in M-East but not might come back.

We don't want it to appear that Australia is the responsibility of the
USA. Our allegiance is to H.M. the King.

P.M. We will facilitate your enquiries into requirements - details but v.
important. Let me know if you want any help.

See re Army what our strengths & commitments are.

But in principle Japs next move is uncertain. Got all he wants in
Co-Prosperity sphere, if he cd. hold it. Is he now going to make another
move - if so where? Signs etc. possibly they may go v. Russia while
he is in death grapple with Germany. Or will they go up into China &
liquidate that? And, if either, what resources for attack on either India
or Australia. Our view, on the whole, is that he is unlikely to make a
heavy attack either on Australia or on India. For why hasn't he done it
earlier?

Eos. is work out itinerary - if we decided, the 8th Armoured Div. is sent
for India how we they proceed i.e. where land & where go first.

Evatt. We suggest small expenditure of aircraft now might serve to prevent the Japs
fr. attempting invasion of Australia.

Fact that America has taken operational command for defence of Australia
does not for one moment mean that we shall see fit of our determination
to see that our people in Australia are defended to the utmost of the power
of the United Nations.

W.A. (42) Base Meeting.

11th May 1942.

I. Naval, Military & Air Operations.

C.A.S. Bomber. 760 sorties loss 35.

Hamburg. Stuttgart Warnemunde - night. Visibility bad: results less good.
3/ lost 19. - cause abrupt low attacks + heavy light concentration.

Day. Power stations.

Fighter. 5,000 sorties. Enemy not concerned now to stop bombing by light bombers.

17: 9: 18 for loss of 25 (23 pilots)

Night of 17 bombers destroyed 7: 3: 1. AA 4: 1. Balloons 1. i.e. 12.

Night bombers 14: 3: 5. Total 32: 15: 26 for loss 46 (total).

Conrad. 550 sorties for loss of 6.

Malta. 64 Spitfires flown off 59 more Malta but 2 lost on way in.

132 sorties on Sab. by our fighters

30 (9 guns) : 25 : 40 (6 guns) } losses 9: 11
1 3 on ground.

[Lost 36 hrs. 18 (5) : 19 : 23. ^{loss} 3 (2 pilots).]

Attack made by 60 bombers.

Burma: A.V.G. v. Rangoon.

Coral Sea: Apparent Japs. 37: 8: 18 for our loss of 13: 4. This takes no % of aircraft lost in carriers.

Heavy damage to ships.

C.N.S. 27 ships by sub. 5 aircraft 6 marine loss 2 unknown.

= 210,000 tons. 9 were tankers.

23 of ^{American} U.S. coast - 3/4 of the tonnage.

P.M. How much is British? 1st loss: 9 ships.

P.M. Why is U.S. traffic not stopped? I will telegraph to President about this.

P.M. 100,000 tons of imports lost week - something of an improvement.

Coral Sea. Attack by air at Tulagi Island, where Presidency of Solomon Islands is.

Moving round N. Guinea to attack P. Moroby or Australia - expedition.

Intercepted by 2 forces. Japs had sunk 1 carrier / 1 heavy cruiser

damaged 1 carrier (big one: prob. was sunk): 1

U.S. 1 destroyer sunk. 2 carriers hit } hopes to get
damaged " } in back

Espid: believed to have turned north.

(40 transports = 1 Div. - guess)

No ship v. ship fighting. Aircraft attack only - on both sides.

P.M. US. want the Warp back.

Evad. What inference as to J. intent?

CNS. Attempt to consolidate their poss. of. on Ft. Maudslayi.

AVA. I have lost 5 cruisers now - 1/5th of original strength.

Evad. Anxiously about Army denial of J. report of sinking of ship of Warspite class.

Malta. Govt has asked for more powers.

CNS. Told him to read his instructions - he has got all he should want.

Read out para. 4 of original telegram.

P.M. He shd. have more power. The Commanders shd. be under him, not under this G.O.C. in M/East. But wait & see what he replies.

Russian Convoy. Belgian Hipper & Schere back of ^{gone to} Nadrak & U-Boats come down their line.

Looks as tho' intent is work U-Boats south & surface ships up in the north.

[Problem is get Trinidad out.]

Pos: will be better in June, ice further north, & can keep away fr. air attacks.

P.M. have telegraphed to Stalin - is more clear to him our grt. diff.

C.I.G.S.

Burma. J. occupied Mandalay 4/5.

20000 Divn. left behind, have attacked J. fr. the west - prob. them, not certain.

3 Divns. up in north: 4th at Rangoon.

F.O. Advice of J. opinion of announcements that we are "continuing to with draw," while Chinese (going in same direction) are said to be advancing!

P.M. Decis not words count. Don't care. And don't bother about words.

Madagascar. { Attack fr. west. No. 5 Commando led. Arrived 4.15 pm. Diego Suarez
Landed Ankaravato Bay - another force. 17th Brig. vs. forces. etc.

General account of the operations.

Casualties 457 in all.

P.M. As soon as possible Union Brigade shd. get in to Madagascar & release a Brigade to get on to M-East - & thus enable Australian brigade to leave Ceylon.

CNS. Submarines: 2 sunk, & the rest gone off.

F.O. Why was Brig. Luck sent as Political Offr. with Air Force, after his failure in Abyssinia? P.M. asked W.O. for report on this.

Administration. If Free French are to go in, gov. best man wd. be M. Le Galhonnec. We must bring them in to this, if we are to keep French going at all.

Jap. Forces. 23 Divns in Mandchuria - but divisions could scatter.

Russia. Not v. much. But attack in Crimea of 5 with 2 Divs + 1 armoured Div.
Prob. beginning of some ^{offensive} ~~movement~~. Some signs of movement to the south.

Poles say indications of large movement, but no coordination.

P.M. Book by Victor Cazale based on experienced gained ~~and~~ official visit

Describes himself as "P.M.'s up" in Poland. Not mine! P.T. Not ours!

His position did. be regularised. My/huf. He is "hostess to the Poles."

C.I.S. Russian Front. Genl. offensive by G. not now likely to begin before 21/6.

P.M. referred to statement in Times 11/5. about report by Moscow. - last year G.

were battling only against screen of 2nd rate troops; this time they will be up
against core of ^{good} R. troops. Put out deliberately - prob. by Army v. Party.

C.N.S. (cont²) Queen Mary arrived with 9,500 Americans - in the Clyde, for transshipment to N. Ireland.

Real attack on Alexandria with 'human torpedoes' failed.

C.I.G.S. Burma. Our forces now withdrawing over border into Assam.

7/ Remnants of 2 Chinese Divs. also moving into Assam.

Bulk of Chinese forces now back in China - but elements still holding out much further south. Japs operating well inside China.

95. India. Telegram fr. Assam indicates Chinese at 1/2 an angle, tending to east.

Suggested disarming them. P.M. Consult F.O. about this.

6-8,000 B. and 25-30,000 Indian ^{etc} with Alexander's force.

C.A.S. A.V.G. we think have gone to China. We have nothing now in Burma and can only bomb over the mountains fr. India.

Madagascar. F.O. - do we go on clearing up when S. Africans arrive? P.M. Depends how long it will take. Don't want to lock up for too long troops who might be going on to India, or M/East. Political negotiations may give us the guarantees we need. Choice to be made when Union Brigade arrives in Madagascar.

Russia. Kerch offensive has pushed Russians back with fairly heavy losses.

Karkov. Russian attempt to widen base of salient to get K.

Today looks as tho' they are carrying on. G. forced to throw in a fresh Armoured Divn.

Otherwise no indications still of major offensive - ^(Kerch) this is not the beginning of a major push, wh. now cd. not start until 15/6/42.

I. Convoy to Russia.

P.M. 22 out of 25 got thro' - but st. does not reflect true risk. Convoy at 8 knots will be 6-7 days w/in range of air attack fr. Norway - i.e. ice still further south & no longer poss. to go N. of Bear Island.

Lost Edinburgh on convoy & Trinidad the next.

Next convoy now due - and C.N.S. believe more may be lost than got through. The G. air reconnaissance is v. good in this area. Not only was Trinidad spotted & sunk. But the covering force of cruisers also spotted tho' none hit.

Quite is i.e. what to suspend until July - i.e. missing two convoys. We shd. have to inform Russians & Roosevelt.

C.N.S. Suggest put to Stalin the slender chances of an 8 knot convoy moving within range not only of Jk 88 but also Jk 87, & ask what he wd. prefer to lose a lot now or

or wait 6 weeks and get much more through.

C.A.S. G. has 100 bombers sent, of which 70 are long range, & 30 from reconnaissance.

Only chance of getting much through is bad weather.

C.N.S. Weather prospects - on average of last 14 years - in 2 months much inferior weather. But Trinidad was sunk when visibility at sea level was poor.

M/L. Can convoys be enlarged after July? C.N.S. Yes. But diff. to make up the full loss - & limits to what Archangel can take.

L.P.S. Ask Stalin what in desperate need - & if so will he tell us what - we will try to run a convoy in.

M/W.T. Mairky saw me to-day & urged need for trucks as well.

F.O. We must decide - & put all risks to Stalin even if we decide to send it.

C.N.S. By end May 102 ships will be piled up waiting.

We might in July put up the convoy to 50.

F.O. We had grave doubts about the last, but 22 out of 25 got through. It may be difficult to persuade Americans & Russians that we are wise.

L.P.S. & M/L. Suggested putting facts to Stalin before convoy sails. P.M. Not much time.

P.M. Our duty is to fight our way through & get as much as we can to those who are fighting this fearful battle against the German Army.

1st Lord. There is the risk to our naval strength, as well as poss. loss of merchant ships.

C.N.S. If we are going to do this, we are inclined to put in 35 in the convoy.

L.P.S. Try to get as speedy a convoy as possible. M/W.T. We have selected the ships already & it's difficult to change them now.

L.P. Send this convoy - tell Stalin all about it & say ^{if losses heavy in May} we may have to defer the June convoy until July. M/Prod. Agreed.

P.M. Press Stalin at same time to send up his heavy bombers to help.

Agreed. Send convoy: tell Stalin we are comp. but explain risks urge him to send his bombers to attack their aerodromes: & put the warning suggested by L.P.

III. Defence Arrangements in W. Africa.

C. Govt Conference in W. Africa lately modified by giving Chairman over-riding powers. But even so not satisf. Govts. & G.C.'s often in disagreement & no one person to decide. Agree: write C.A.S. recommend?

Draft Directive - not to exercise operational control over Services.

Service man - so as not to prejudge post-war question of closer union of W. or E. African Colonies.

We wd. live at Lagos. Exact machinery to be worked out after arrival.

L.P.S. Support need for co-ordination. But it is essential a job of civil co-ordination.
Feel strongly: need is for a good civilian.

M.P. Agree with this - and in so far as necessary to coordinate Services more difficult
still for a Service man.

P.M. Some minor M/Staff - who cd. co-ordinate relations with Belgians, U.S. etc.?

M/W.T. Support suggⁿ for co-ordination, of wh. v. great need.

Agreed - shd. be civil, not military, man.

T/P.M. But shd. there not also be a centralised military command.

S/S. Was. I believe it shd. be military man with [latent] operational control, as Layton has
in Ceylon.

C.I.G.S. Agreed with P.M. at X, whatever decision about the other man.

F.O. Two quite separate jobs, both of wh. shd. be filled.

First Lord. Wd. like military man because of diffy. of finding civilian superior to both
interests.

Coal - Reorganisation - Production Programme 1942/43 - Fuel Rationing.

L.P. Summarised statistical review set out in W.P. (42) 22b.

Leaving out economy in domestic consumption, we have deficiency of 3.2 m. tons & have made no allowance for contingencies of Orders.

On this - do not recommend withdrawal of men from Field Army.

What we proceed with rationing - etc. we save 6 m. tons?

This turns on decision about re-organisation. Summarised proposals.

Regional organisation - complete control over operation of mines - no interference with financial structure of the industry.

If good will behind it, this re-organisation should arrest decline in output and in addition give us some net increase in production.

That being so, prefer to put the emphasis on increased production - but get ready to introduce points rationing at short notice & press for voluntary economy.

B/T. On the rationing scheme. Many consult & widely conform with Local Fuel Overseers.

Conclusion - v. of. diffy. in applying any scheme without points & coupons. Alternative scheme wd. involve more staff (for enforcement) & persons of higher calibre.

Original scheme simplified & modified. Total staff reqd. reduced. Overriding limit of 33 1/3% to reduction wd. relieve anxieties about the larger houses. Householders appl. form - v. simple - wd. give a simple assessment. Wd. disclose stocks held. Provision to claim supplementary ration.

Agreed with some reluctance too, if re-organisation can be got going with good will, we need not introduce rationing at this stage. There are some running large risks - some of the industries in L.P.'s memo. are risky.

L.P. the unanimous view, if rationing has to come, this is the best (and indeed the only practicable) scheme so far devised.

Restrictions on deliveries will be maintained meanwhile - under control.

W.W. Certain people are now doing without their basic allowances while others are getting supplementary allowances. B/T. We will look into this.

B/T. If we wait till autumn, the scheme can't differentiate between those with & those without stocks. Much of the domestic winter coal will be already in stock, & that much ^{now} will be outside rationing control.

P.M. Man. Power. Short-term. Release proceeding satisfactorily.

Long-term. Foster etc? Report end June.

L.P. Wastage - must be checked. M/L. Hope to check losses

on medical grounds by rehabilitation scheme. Experiment at Mansfield great success. Great man-power gain both ways - the fit men should stay in mining, but those not fit enough for mining can be retrained for other work before it is too late.

Attitude of owners? K.W. No great diffy. expected.

Wages? B/T. Miners ^{owners} have asked to see Ministers on wages.

P.M. Peace-time system of ascertainment doesn't fit disturbed slightly. But new factor introduced by direction to attention in mining. L.P.S. And you have also fixed prices - Govt. is withholding the amount available for distribution.

P.M. On this account Govt. should give something additional in wages.

K.W. We shall have to hear what they say. Advantage in relating increased wages to increased output, if that is possible. P.M. Consider, yes, but we must open that door.

Miners are a special community - & if you ever taken them living away there is a case for differentiating them from men in other industry. Something separate & apart from what will be paid under the ascertainment procedure.

K.W. All financial questions left over for discussion with the parties.

P.M. But in White Paper a) Foster's Office & long-term intake.

b) Finance, wages, to be subject of consultation.

S/Doms. Bear in mind psychology of industry. Agree can't interfere now with the financial structure of industry. But we should say something about the future - to show that Govt. will not let the industry down after the war. I.e. this is immediate war-time system; we shall consider the future as part of post-war problems.

M/L. Two questions on wages. a) minimum. This affects my direction of men to return. I wd. wish miners wd. consent to deal with this first & quickly. Men returned have been out of mines for some time, & it's a little while before they can earn their money. This bag is difficult for me. Settle it quickly.

b) B/T. is keen on output bonus. V. difficult.

Experience of datum line in last war not v. encouraging. This is sound in principle, but will take some time to work out.

K.W. Even on a) we must consider repercussions.

P.M. If there is one trade you can pick out from all others, surely mining is that one.

K.W. Economy. Sustained publicity will be needed. Prepared to see Editors and get them right. Also get them to lay off criticism of rationing.

M/L. Wages. No reference in White Paper. No diffy to reference in speech to willingness to discuss wages with industry.

P.M. White Paper. Statement on Tuesday that Debate will be held on ^{Wednesday} Tuesday week -

L.P. to open and L.P.S. to wind up.

lay White Paper on ^{Wed. evening} Tuesday - show it to both sides on Wednesday (earlier).

After Debate (Sunday evening) I will be ready to broadcast.

Ch. Whip. H.C. will want 2-day Debate. If so P/Bd. of Trade should speak.

L.P.S. May I arrange the order of debate? P.M. Yes.

Cranborne. Unnecessary to have Debate in H/Lords.

Foreign Affairs.

A.E. Sikorski plans via Russian Treaty.

China. Chinese for we are more interested in the war v. Germany than that v. Japan.
Suggest a) P.M. to see Koo ^{this week} b) Koo to go back to China to report. c) Loeu - we shall have to try to help. They recognise our diffy are greater than A.E. but Chiang K-S. has committed himself too far to his public.

P.M. Wd. like to send personal message to C.K.S. as soon as we know what we can do militarily to help.

A.E. Ground personnel of P.A.F. with Chinese - they hope something airborne may follow it.

C.A.S. Diffy is range for supplying. Maintenance maybe beyond our power. Gen. G. will dislike it. A.V.G. ought to go, if anyone.

Pence. Australia's news abt importance of war v. Japan ch. is quiet with effect to Chinese.

Air Raid Casualties.

H.O. Reg. Comms warned v. reprisals for Köln.

Attack on Canterbury. 50 overhead, mostly over Canterbury. New type of 18. oil bomb.

Collected library & walls damaged. 2,000 - 2,500 houses damaged.

Fire in hand.

Casualties (to 3pm, 5 days) 22 killed: 40 injured: 300 slightly injured.

Functions of Chairman of Reconstruction Problems Ctee.

A.E. Agreed with C.O.S.

P.J.G. W.O. have been exploring problems of military occupation immediately post war. Wd. like ^{clear} line of distinction between W.O. functions & Forster's functions

A.E. No proposal to remove any functions from any Dept. Intention merely to give J. co-ordinating power. - to bring together the ideas & plans of all Depts concerned.

P.J.G. Don't want too much detailed work put on W.O.

P.M. Come & complain if you get too much.

Daily Worker.

Took note.

H.O. Cab. doesn't dissent fr. suggest that we might review the position later on?

Requising Dept., F.H.C. will consider this. Their decision may make it awkward.

And the longer Communist believe with, the thicker the wicket will be.

P.M. We'll decide when the time comes - meanwhile I've not been on reviewing this day.

S/S. Air. The Labour Party resolution does affect the position. But for that, I still favour the immediate removal of the Ban.

Agreed - ^{not} no intention of change, and let it run until September.

Milk - White Paper.

M/Food. During winter milk scarcity - hence need to control distributors to ensure that it reaches right people.

Trade v. difficult - full of disagreements - but they are agreed now on plan outlined in W.Paper.

Plan - M/F. with interview between producer & seller, who will technically buy & will then direct distribution.

War-time association of distributors. Agreed - provided smaller men get share.

Maps showing orderly distribution - as cpd. present chaos. Eliminate v. long hauls.

Only risk - that some one may run out on it. D. Express campaign stated this will kill the small man. Have written to D. Express and they have stopped their campaign.

A.N.A. Special bonuses?

M/F. " " for production will remain & to paid by M/Food.

" " " deliveries will not remain.

A.N.A. Individual consumers also want pasteurised milk.

M/F. Most will be pasteurised. Consumers who want h.t. milk will be able to get it.

Approved.

Coal - White Paper.

S/Doms. ↓ Para. 7. Make industry attractive to boys - don't give impression of dragging them into the mines.

Para. 12. State reasons why you can't nationalise? financial structure of the industry (ways). And indicate that Parlt. will consider ^{long term} future.

↓ K.W. But this is not the only reason. If you mention one, you should mention others.

B/T. Raise these points in debate.

M/L. ↓ Point on para. 8 - comment to B/T.

Para. 17.

S/Mines. Para. 10. Omit figures. Parlt. only. They may raise controversy.

Generally agreed.

Agreed - L.T. B/T. 10 with final draft.

Foreign Affairs.

A.E. a) Remind about need for F.O. to see in advance draft speeches on foreign affairs - particularly now we are getting nearer the point when post-war post is being envisaged.

Woburn's speech in H/ Lords Debate unfavourably noticed by P.M. - who asked Grahame to keep an eye on him.

P.M. Military matters (not concerned only with his own Dept.) - Ministers outside War Cabinet can & shd. consult Ismay.

Secretary to prepare a Minute for circulation.

A.E. b) Talk with Sikorski - & pleased with new Russian Treaty. Asked to meet Molotov on return. V. good thing that he should.

M.H. Copini (Polish Minister/Trade) tells me that morale of Russian Army is being well maintained by regular arrival of our convoy supplies - less well impressed with American performance.

P.M. Appreciation by I.L.C. cd. to circulated by War Cab. (but not sent out of country) of Russian chances with covering note by C.I.G.S. warning not to be too optimistic.

A.E. c) Negotiations between Turkey & Germany. Not good - need watching. Perhaps try to get Molotov to talk with Turkish Ambassador.

d) Tobacco - telegrams. Purely political. P.M. Essential to give them something to keep them in good heart.

Yugoslav Army Crisis.

A.E. Military people in M/East incline too much to military view & pay insufficient attention to our political diffy here.

Army. These offrs. were associated with Simovitch & the decision to capitulate. They carry no conviction among their countrymen. They have got support fr. M/East mostly by made friends with our military here.

A.E. Right course is to ship them home.

C.I.G.S. 1200 men leave upon the wheels of the M/East. Cheat the lot out.

A.E. Handled round copies of draft telegram.

P.M. Too submission. Civil power pre-dominant. The Govt. have the right to appoint their C-in-C. & we must accept view that he must be obeyed. Our offrs. has no right to encourage the dissident elements.

L.S. Some of these offrs. are bad lots - 2 were in Russia & suspected of espionage.

W.D. See para 4 of Tel. 1147 from M/State. "Get Yugoslav Govt. to accept a reasonable solution or

I will ship the lot home?

C.I.G.S. Then transfer them to some quiet Front, e.g. India or S. Africa.

A.E. Why? There is no trouble over those who are actually in the field.

P.M. ^{more shortly and more strongly} Telegraph ^{to} saying that these 300 men are to be sent to this country at once.

[There is no principle to be followed except to support the national Govt.]

Agreed.

Policy in Madagascar.

P.M. Turns out Mr. Barnett hasn't got Annet's outly. V. ditto pair of shoes.

A.E. Three courses - a) stay put & let Vichy Govt. stew

No more troops. But Smuts against, & insecure.

b) capture the whole island. Advantages obvious.

Disadvantage - troops needed, long campaign.

c) make truce with Vichy man in Madagascar.

Tell Smuts what has happened, put alternatives to him, & let Platt Sturges & Smuts get together & make proposals.

Meanwhile Barnett shd. carry no message back.

P.M. Let Platt go to M. & discuss with Sturges. Then both go on to see Smuts.

Bruce. If Smuts indicated shd. he would have his plan even if it were backed up by the Govt. P.M. Not since he saw my fuller explanation.

P.M. Smuts diffy - his advisers were against sending the Brigade.

Tell whole story to Smuts - it isn't fr. Govt. i. we'll do no more - we will send P.S. to talk it over with you. Had it come fr. Govt. it had the basis of something sh. wd. have been satisfied in view of our anxiety to free our troops.

C.I.G.S. May be the Govt. is behind this?

A.E. Too thin, esp. if Smuts is hostile.

W.D. Remember Platt favours doing a deal at Tihiti. He may be inclined to favour finding a modus vivendi in Madagascar.

Reprisal for German Massacre of Village

- P.M. Conversation with Beves about possibility of reprisal for savage cruelties now being practiced by Germans in Czechoslovakia. Suggested wiping out German villages (3 for 1) by air attack.
- View of A.D. in C. Bomber Command. 100 bombers wd. be required. Low attack 2/3 hrs. incandescence.
- Bright moonlight wd. be right. Objective & reasons shd. be announced afterwards.
- F.O. in favour.
- & thought wrote white, give RAF discretion to fit it in when they can.
- L.P.S. Is accuracy of report beyond doubt? P.M. Germans announced.
- S/S.Air. Disliked it. Discussion of effort for military objection. Risking aircraft & crews.
- Wd. we not be led on to do it more & more - if Germans know we wd. answer thus.
- S/Doms. Doubt if it is useful to enter into competition in frightfulness with Germans.
- H.O. Wd. like to consider - reprisals on English villages, where no shelter, & low-scale a.t.f. Public wd. say - why did you draw this down on us?
- C.A.S. If they come in low & not far inland they wd. run a small risk.
- F.O. Even so, there might be a deterrent element in this.
- M/L. German responds to brute force & nothing else.
- Beves. It might lead to even greater atrocities in Czechoslovakia.
- General view that it wd. be wise to think this over.
- L.P. Danger is that it costs us something & them nothing. Against it.
- General feeling of Cabinet - against doing this. (i.e. L.P., M/Luf, C.O., H.O.)
- P.M. - my instinct is strongly the other way.
- F.O. Strongest argument against - waste of a moonlight night. Biggest discussion than had thought.
- Amey. Why a village? Why not a quiet residential town?
- L.P.S. Operational argument against is v. strong.
- P.M. I submit (unwillingly) to the view of Cabinet against.

India.

- Amey. Viceroy increasingly convinced Gandhi means real mischief. Would act until after next Congress Works. after beginning July. Propose circulate memo - so that Cab. may consider its line, so as to inform Viceroy.
- W.O. If need to act v. q., speed essential if effect on India is to be produced. Wait do so wait until quite abundantly clear that action must be taken.
- L.P. Act quickly when you do - but not prematurely. And take him right out of India.

The Levant-Caspian Front.

C.I.G.S. East news: R. has asked us to help to mend some of the roads in North.

Possible: i.e. R. may agree to proposed reconnaissance.

Wd. F.O. take it up.

M/L. Are our people in Persia dealing with Russians in the ^{new} spirit we adopt?

Wd. we not get it straighter if taken up on higher level?

L.P.S. We have too formalists in our approach, over N. Persia & Caucasus - 2/3.

Trying to push people in w/out permission.

P.M. Awkward moment - they want enquiries re suggest this front may crack.

And we're not v. strong - we've only 2 men & a boy there, and Libya has lost us some face again.

F.O. Why not start talks to R. general who is here with a broken leg.

If we do, there must be clear understanding that, while we are negotiating this, our people must not snoop around on their own.

i.e. we'll see what can be done, but meanwhile our soldiers must behave.

Report on Public Feeling.

P.M. Likely news for next few months will cure undue optimism.

No practical chance of the Second Front etc. newspapers think so easy.

M/I The Second Front decision is now to be celebrated at mtgs. organised all over the country.

P.M. Can't be helped. But Ministers shd. be careful - the less said the better on qtd. of not saying anything about forthcoming operations.

Re-organisation of Colonial Service.

C.O. Consider advance already made towards unification. a) Post salaries still paid by C.O. Govts - a protest, also need best men, often get worst. b) Rapid fluctuation in demands, acc. to Col. boom & slumps. c) Power to remove passengers.

Ask only for approval in principle & leave to proceed with detailed scheme.

Agreed.

Empress Hall Demonstration.

H.O. Mtg. discussed privately. Inside control by Communist Party.

250 C.O. workers in uniform asked for - diff. for us to refuse, as Coldstream Guards Band & the S.P.S. are going.

But for future, Mid. Cab. decide to ^{or C.O.} not attend functions unless

organised by State or L.A. or for charity.

W.D. We asked I.O. and they said they were in favour. P.M. This was political
above and she. have you dealt with before. Ministers

L.P.S. Or, better still, organise this sort of thing ourselves.

P.M. Important thing is to make it clear that close relations with Russia does
not involve cuddling our Communists.

This question is considered by War Cabinet - H.S. being present.

Message to the M.P. Agreed - L.P.S. is going but no need for other
Minister to send messages. representing the Govt.

Air Operations.

C.A.S. Weather - only missing Wed. & Thurs. nights.

M.E. Conway. U.S. aircraft did quite well, did nothing like what they claimed in Russ. They did materially better than over Russia's airfields.

Air losses in M.E. We started ahead & losses so far have been equal.

II. Report of Arrival of American Forces.

Y.C.I.G.S. Leakages - inevitable. Genl. Chaney agrees can't do more than avoid disclosure of date & place of arrival.

M/L. Americans main source of leakage.

Propose to take to Editor on basis of memo. The date & place of arrival are covered by general D Notice. But will ask for general dampening down of publicity.

Agreed.

III. Carriage of American Troops in B. Vessels.

M/W.S. Genl. Lee is keen on stepping up the nos. carried - both in large & small ships. If we with sanction of Genl. ships, they will adopt it at once Genl. troops. Ques of public interest so far as large ships concerned.

Mr. Lord. Risk of subm. attack not v. great, with these large ships. But there is always a chance of an unlucky find & hit. Also signs of increased air attack in W. Approaches. Wd. is favour of no increase.

W.O. 120,000 show by March 31st '43 - this measure wd. reduce the shortage by half.

H.S. Speed of their arrival will affect civil problems. Unless militarily necessary to get them here as quickly as possible, better to have them in steadily.

W.O. No phased plan. But Americans want to push them in as fast as they can - & politically P.M. wd. not wish to stand in their way.

Account will not be a bottleneck.

M/L. Don't like idea of 15,000 on these ships.

L.S. But even 10,000 raises that problem. And it is the Americans who want this.

M/W.S. Wd. W.O. do it with B. troops?

H.S. Wd. depend on the operational urgency. We have no comparable problem. But we have stepped up our stowage by 30% for a 2 month journey.

L.S. Cd. we charter the ships to them & leave the whole responsibility to them.

M/W.T. 25 miles or under our flag & we shall be responsible. Our flag & our crew -
not our "chartered" or not.

M/L. Difficult to resist if Americans press

M/W.T. In the end they put it to us on the basis - not the crew's mind.

L.P. This is not a thing we wd. do ourselves. Make this plain to them
& say our risk is only the crew & then leave the responsibility to them. Put
this in writing.

W.O. You can say that W.O. wd. do this except for reasons of ^{extreme} operational
necessity.

Agreed.

ii. Parliament.

Statement on M-East on Tuesday. Anticipation to be asked for statement.

v. Pitt's Offer to Lecture to Troops.

W.O. Pitt is angry at having his offer refused. Threat to make public statement.

Propose to let him talk if he wants to. Shall not give him any reasons.

W.O. The answer is "P. is not a suitable person to address the troops". Better to keep
that answer until extracted from you.

L.P. Disposed to give a reason at once.

I. Naval Military & Air Operations.

C.A.S. Mainly mining. Heavy approx. effect.

Bomber { 750 sorties - 25 missing.

Coastal. New searchlight attack technique - promising.

Fighter. Success on heavy engines causing trouble to Germans.

3,100 sorties - lost 112. 10:11:13 for loss of ?

17:41:2. Total enemy loss.

Malta. Destroyed 21:4:16 for 15:10.

Claims to damage to Ital. warships (2+1 hit) not confirmed.

Libya. Activity mostly v. ground troops. Over Tobruk much outnumbered.

Now concentrating all available aircraft in W. Desert - some air superiority gained - increasing supplies at expense of other theatres.

by (112) - Discussion of Spitfires & Mustangs: We cd. send 42 Spitfires now being embarked for Australia -

C.A. this wd. mean delay of 1 month to Australia & gain of 1 month for M/East.

Bruce. They won't like this. Crisis of course has changed. But Aust. Govt. will have to give clear picture of diff. in M/East and proposals for dealing with it - make it clear these aircraft won't be thrown away there.

A.S. The squadrons will go to Aust. as planned - all that will happen is that their machines will be a month late.

Bruce. Give also assurance that this is only a one month delay - not to be repeated.

Agreed - Aust. to be asked, on basis of full statement.

Lloyd. 46:16 for 25:9:18 enemy.

Only 5 damaged on aerobatics - as against over 400 ^{enemy} aircraft picked up in our advance. Tribute to salvage & removal organisations.

Pacific. 21:8:10 for 18:4 of ours.

C.N.S. Losses. $\left. \begin{array}{l} 52 \text{ Total} \\ 37 \text{ by U-Boats (34 off U.S.)} \\ 44 \\ 6 \text{ mine} \\ 1 \text{ marine casualty and 1 unknown} \end{array} \right\}$

261,000 tons. Possibly 559,000 for month.

Plus related up to 14,000 tons for previous months.

U.S. Convoys in Caribbean to start on 31/7 (or 1/7).

Then U-Boats will swing back to Atlantic convoys - wh. we don't back up so much now.

W. Med. Convoy. 43 aircraft destroyed. + 22 probable.

E. Med. Convoy. 22 " "

V.C.I.A.S. Russia. Centre. Partisans being eliminated.

South. G. bridgehead slightly extended at Jemel. Russians say G. attack definitely held up. Air support decreased.

Crimea. G. now v. close to bay itself. V. heavy losses. Inference offensive in S. Sector delayed until Sevastopol cleared up.

Libya. W.D. asked for info about circo. attack. our loss of tanks. No confirm of Press story of tanks running into tank trap.

Tobruk. V. little info. Attack began with air onslaught. G.C. asked if was given leave to fight his way out. Not known how many have, or will, get out.
C.N.S. Demolition of harbour carried out effectively.

F.D. Murmansk.

Air Raids. 50 aircraft v. Solon.

14 killed 29 seriously injured - Nos. may increase.

4 destroyed; 4 damaged - enemy aircraft.

Libya. Telegram from P.M. to Auchinleck. Read out.

I. Statements on Libya and Malta Convoys.

S/Doms. Much to be said for following. Best precedent + reading out only or mainly Auchinleck's statement. Add - Tobruk has now fallen - no full info - and then something on lines of P.M.'s telegram to Auchinleck.

No doctoring of A's communique. Give it as his, + add brief comments of my own.

M/L. Express fighting confidence w.r. situation will be restored.

S/Doms. This is not the end in Libya - battle is still on.

Must be a discussion - but premature to have it now.

L.P.S. Awkward day - Const. Fund Bill + on 13. They can debate this issue if they want.

W/C. reply on this - wait someone's blood.

Convoys.

A.V.A. Read draft statement.

Suggested this sh. be limited to factual statement - omit praise appreciation of the diff.

S/S. Wat. There is suggestion false in this statement.

Criticism likely to be "over-optimistic communiqué" - part 4 in M/Bast.

Some substance in this. And this statement is disingenuous.

Agreed 1) Yes "not without some loss" read "admittedly with serious losses"

2) Amend to show Mr. E. Conway turned back for lack of fuel.

3) Statement to be made by S/Doms together with Libya statement.

III. Miners' Wages - Effect of increases on Stabilisation Policy.

K.W. Nothing to add to memo.

No great difficulty so far as concerns cost of living, which dropped a point this morning.

L.P.S. Understood that this rise was to make no difference to cost of living.

S/Doms. Agreed - this was my impression.

K.W. No. I said I wd. see it didn't affect stabilisation policy - i.e. I would see that we didn't break ^{our} the ²⁰¹ £80 limit.

M/L. I said - C. of L. reviewed every month: and we will adjust to make sure we don't go over a pt. ceiling.

K.W. Will prepare a statement - keeping to basis of L.P. Council.

M/L. Keep away from any Parl. debate or statement on wages.

Parliament.

S/Doms!) In answer to Ques. or afters.

Agreed - Say in answer to that I will make a statement at end of Ques.

Then you can't adjourn the house first.

2) Can I say, ^{is this in answer} Mr. I'll be making this statement? Agreed. Yes.

I. Debate in H/ Commons.

S/Doms. Labour Party not likely to support any Motion of Censure - but want an enquiry - designed to safeguard future rather than reprimand about past.

W.O. Material or quality?

Whitely. First stressed rather than second.

S/Doms. Diffy. in doing this w/out the Govt. in the Field.

W.O. On equipment I'm reasonably satisfied w/ our tanks & anti-tank weapons were likely to be sent our troubles in about 6 mos. time. Arrangements made for production policy in U.S. relate to minimum no. of types etc.

L.P.S. Say to-morrow - "we propose if Mot. of Censure put down to allow time ^{for that on} Wed. & Thurs. If not put down, we will have a debate on salary of M/Defence - with a vote."

S/Doms. If W. Milne Motion not put down, unlikely that Labour Party wd. table Motion asking for enquiry.

P.M. shd. speak on first day - so that Labour Party can meet before the 2 days.

L.P.S. I shd. like P.M. to wind up also, answer criticisms & get the vote. He can ⁷ speak twice if it is Supply Day.

S/Doms. Developing as personal attack on P.M. Important ∴ Govt. shd. speak early.

Cranborne. Danger of table it on M/Def. salary is focussing whole attack on P.M.

Whitely. We wd. put 2 or 3 Votes down, incldy. M/Defence to get the necessary breadth of Debate.

Cont. H/Lds. Addison's Motion ^(next week) Tuesday & Intends to go for Govt., not generals. Will not press it to a Division. Will not suggest anything like Censure Motion. Will ask for enquiry.

II. The Tank Position in Middle East.

M/S. Past history in narrative.

Hardly does justice to Mech. & Aero. Facts are as set out - but cumulative effect does them less than justice. They have done v. good work on tanks - tho' in this part. tank steel were faults due to engineering etc. were not tackled early enough.

For future, organization keyed up to catch these defects earlier & quicker. Duty of Tank Design Dept. to follow up complaints & see that modif'ns carried out.

These old models will always give trouble ∴ engineering skill in original designing was not good enough.

Cromwell I will be regarded as reliable engineering job from the start. V. diff. matter fr. adapting faulty old designs. We shall then have better tanks than Germans.

Remember etc. tanks now being used by G. were designed in 1935. i.e. they had this degree of start on us.

Cromwell I begins late summer. Will be free of this type of defect.

" II " end of '42. " " a really superior article.

L.P.S. Mar. 41 - Feb. 42 Who was Dir. of Tank Design? M/S. Durrant. He had't enough staff - he assumed Muffield's engineers wd. have been at the trials. He still is Director: but is supervised now as he wasn't then.

L.P.S. See top of p.3. He left simply remedy unapplied for 11 months.

M/S. Disagreed. Capable of palliation but not remedy w/out fundamental ^{or} design change.

M/P. In fact, it isn't easy to remedy. W.O. And doubtful if it's right even now.

L.P.S. Has system of inspⁿ been changed? M/S. Noting. much wrong there. ^{Even} These defects were mostly ^{not} revealed in test. - only M/Est broke them out. You'd never get prodⁿ if much more inspⁿ. First test is pre-prodⁿ model, and we'll get more of that in future.

M/L. Complaints of excessive inspⁿ met by leaving much to the firm. Was this the cause of these troubles? M/S. No.

L.P.S. Do arrangements at Fairbairn & Hulworth correspond to those described in memo? The defects found at Hulworth etc. surely have been found in the 7 mos. at Fairbairn?

W.O. Many of the defects in tanks disclose themselves after long time.

M/S. These were operational tests - not the sort done at Fairbairn's.

L.P.S. But didn't them be done simultaneously with other tests? To avoid this delay.

S/Doms. No one person who throughout was looking at the tank as a whole rather than a collection of parts each of which has to be tested individually.

M/S. ^{Right} Method - now in force - is to test all yr. components before assembly. Trouble was that

M/P. These things do happen. The American light tank had v. many operational defects of this kind.

M/S. Originally D/Prodⁿ was responsible for design. When at M/S. earlier I separated them & appt^d a D/Research, Development & Design.

M/L. ~~When~~ When under test, are reports taken fr. men themselves? M/S. Yes. Soldiers - trained as testers.

M/L. This is what engineers often do.

- L.P. Design - too highly specialised and too much sub-divided.
- W.D. Crusader etc. is being modified to take 6 pdr. The alterations make it v. difficult ^{to} ^{to} ^{uncomfortably} for the men - but quickest way to get these 6 pdr. tank.
- Recall also crisis after Dunkirk - decision to concentrate on numbers of the only available design.
- L.P. Why was Valentine the only satisf. tank then?
- W.D. Because it was infantry tank, only type considered pre-war, & worked out by one man in one firm.
- M/S. Lesson of this is - don't press us, when we've got a winner, to rush into prodⁿ before we've fully tested ~~the~~ them out. Or, if we have to rush it, don't expect to avoid ^{all} these troubles.
- Policy in past has been devote full energy to improving existg designs and to go ahead rather more quietly with new designs.
- F.O. Reports on re-conditioned Churchill?
- W.D. Slow - & useless in Egypt. Drinks in sand.
- M/S. Amendments of wording of App I. Handed in for incorporation.

Part I of the Report.

- L.P.S. Who failed to pass the report on? 2nd para. of Summary on p. 5.
- W.D. Well known in W.D. Only complaint can be that W.D. failed to pass it on to Defence Ctee & War Cabinet.
- S/Doms. have para. in Part I of my Rpt.
- W.D. Point is - wd. Nov. Affairs have been postponed if more had been known about the German gun.
- M/P. If that is the point, what happened in Nov. We ran Rommel out of Libya.
- S/Doms. But Auchinleck's statement, as quoted, was not quite correct.
- M/L. Who wd. know of this at W.D.?
- W.D. Telegrams to W.D., copies of which went to P.M.
- M/L. Who at W.D. was responsible for not bringing this specifically to Defence Ctee.
- W.D. When Def. Ctee considers a particular operation, they take the advice of the Commanders on guns what they feel able to undertake it.
- M/L. This is vital. (controversy in War Cab. about ^{German 4 1/2 pdr. and our} _{b pdr. - revealed for first time} _{lack of tank space. in War Cabinet.}

This was followed by controversy between B'brook & Magnusson.

The comparisons of strength were put to War Cab. while 4th were being considered & at no material time was the danger of the ^{4 1/2} ₉ disclosed to us.

W.O. Remember Mr. Auchinloch wanted the offensive postponed.

M.P. In the M/Est we were prop^d to go on, tho' we knew they had some 4 1/2 pds.
It was not until after the beginning of the ^{Nov.} offensive that it was realised,
even in the M/Est, that the 4 1/2 pds. made such a difference.

W.O. Once informant had gone automatically to P.M. no one in W.O. wd. think
it necessary to bring it specifically to the notice of War Cabinet & Def. Ctee.

S/Doms. The lay members of the War Cab. (or Def. Ctee) shd. have all the material
facts.

L.P. 2 points. 1) Telegrams went automatically to P.M. & Staff.
Is that sufficient for purpose of bringing informant as such
to Def. Ctee.
2) When this informant came in, ^{the} ~~the~~ ^{of the gun} ~~was~~ ^{was} to be appreciated.
It is clear that up to March, tho' knowing of it, he did not
think it so important.

On 1) I shd. have said tho', if the informant was relevant to a question under
discussion by Def. Ctee, W.O. shd. be responsible for seeing tho' it was
brought to the notice of the D. Ctee.

W.O. What about informant recently given by C.A.S. about relative merits of Spitfire
& F.W. 200.

F.O. What is clear is tho' no-one has appreciated the significance of the 4 1/2 pds.
of gun.

M.P. What I want to ensure is tho' any significant change in relative is appreciated
brought to notice & acted upon.

W.O. Assurance tho' we have set up an organisation with exactly that duty.

L.P. There shd. in each Service Dept. be an organisation responsible for picking up all
this informant - appreciate it, working on it, and in addⁿ considering what
circulation this informant shd. be given.

S/Doms. The significance of the 4 1/2 pds. was appreciated - because action was taken to
counter it. But W.O. evidently did not think it worth while to bring it to the
notice of the Def. Ctee.

M.P. Is specialist treatment & enquiry by experts carried out while operations proceed?

W.O. Yes. M.P. Cd. the appreciations of relative - weaknesses & strength -
be circulated to War Cabinet?

S/S. Air. But this the responsibility of the C.I.G.S. & Ch. of Staffs.

A.C.I.G.S. Two questions. 1) What informant shd. C.I.G.S. have put to W. Cab.
2) Had W.O. appreciation in diff. wd. prob^d of 6 pds. have gone quicker

If C.I.G.S. did not put this factor in W.Cab. it was: he didn't think it was of primary importance. Nothing wrong with the system. Our judgment may have been wrong - and may be again.

On 2/ W.O. is matter of course were develop. new weapons. Two on hand: 6 + 7 yds. And we realized then ^{full} significance of this factor it wd. have made no diff. to rate of prod. of either of these guns. This is it happens is true. But remember too, we are always working to beat the Germans - apart fr. our knowledge of what Germans have.

S/Doms. Position of W.Cab. Minutes. We are ready to take risks, but wd. like to take them with our eyes open.

M/L. Don't accept the statement too, we did not accelerate the 6 yds.

M/S. W.O. Discussed.

"Take note of memo"

A.N.A. Anxiety to show st. at this stage shipping is so critical st. it can't be met only by

a) relying on bldg., incldg. American and b) limiting consumption of imports.

Adm. Sec. Mr. Otto Rpt. is optimistic. Unless we reduce sinkings less with tonnage than 6.5 m. tons. $3\frac{1}{2}$ m. already by enemy action this year. Other causes, marine losses etc, with an 650,000 tons. The gap will be : 7.5 m. tons, or something like it.

Expectations for next 6 mos. losses for half of year due largely to U-Boats in W. Atlantic

2,221,000 tons = losses since 12/1 of U.S. coast & in Caribbean.

513 ships convoyed Total losses 3 all mined - Results of Key West Convoy.

120 " " " - 3. - Aruba convoy.

Convoys thus improv. the posⁿ - but this only means that U-Boats will move closer.

Assistⁿ to U.S. has meant a rearrangement of our convoy groups in N. Atlantic & and when U-Boats move there we shall be less well equipped to beat them off.

Expected U-Boat strength. In 13 German ports 271 U-Boats bldg. or fitting out now. By March 500 will be available, 140 will be always training or fitting.

Unless we can sink a good many there will be 500 working against us by July '43.

Losses of escort vessels & destroyers v. heavy in first 6 mos. - 30 destroyers alone.

Replacement of merchant vessels. Much depends on fulfilment of original programme.

Discussion of U.S. effort is bldg. of escort ships reduces their programme of merchant ships.

Vital is to concentrate attack on U-Boats at sea.

We can't guarantee that there won't be increasing losses in next 6 months

thus, too dangerous to ^{seek to} return posⁿ only by a) and b) at outset.

Extended help fr. R.A.F. during last few weeks shows how much more can be done with greater air attacks.

S/Doms. Three points for review -

a) prospects of building

b) efficacy of convoy system

c) Offensive v. U-Boat as opⁿ. with defensive action by merchant ship.

(a) U.S. Bldg. Prospects v. good.

M/Prodⁿ / 30,000 tons d.wt. over schedule in May.

8 m. tons d.wt. in 1942. Shortage of steel might reduce it to 7.5 m. tons.

20 m. tons in 1943.

M/W.T. Much of this will be taken away for other use - e.g. aircraft carriers.

S/Doms. Cd. Kaiser's methods be applied here?

M/P. No. Pre-fabrication carried to an extent not feasible in this country.

Escort vessels. Optimum = 20:100 merchant ships. Or pro. 17.

Our programmes provided estimates for only 5:100.

A.V.A. The escort vessels won't affect the ports until at least end 1942.

S/Doms. The rest of this year will be v. tight. What will port be in 1943?

Does M/P. report mean est. U.S. building will offset our losses?

L.P. Only if we get the use of that tonnage. M/W.T. We can get no indication of that.

Danger is margin of error, on the balance sheet - 3 m. tons either way.

That is the significant feature: it could not slip margin but into essentials.

M/W.T. Our calculations were on U.S. building of 14 m. tons for '43.

M/P. I am pretty sure that they will get their big increase on this, apart from diversion of yards to escort vessels which might mean 2 m. tons d.w.t.

K.K. Production.

A.V.A. $1\frac{1}{4}$ m. q. tons. + Canada = 1.7 m. q. tons.

7.2 m. q. tons inclg. U.S. production.

And losses may be anything up to 7.5 m. tons.

So there will be some loss in a year when we want to see increase in shipping available for offensive purposes.

S/Doms. Will there be any compensation: new ships or faster?

M/W.T. We have gone as far as we can in this direction. Can't push speeds for transp.

U.S. standard speed for transp. $11\frac{1}{2}$ knots

A.V.A. In last war considered this. Now again have considered gains & losses from fast ships

11 knots ^{ship} in 7 knot convoy	= 4 round voyages	= 77,000 tons cargo
15 " " " " " "	5.5 " " " "	= 89,000 " " "

} 11% more off.

Because of bunker ^{capacity} in relation to cargo space.

S/Doms. Is the 15 knot speed better than 11 knot, in convoy? M/W.T. No.

M/W.T. Our losses of over 15 knot would independently be lost in proportion to those of ships in convoy. And we are getting an increasing no. of these

A.V.A. Large addⁿ to convoy losses: of losses in convoys with military operations.

Doubt whether balance wd. be ^{much} in favour of independent sailing if these excluded.

L.P. From pt. of view of cargo-carrying capacity, do you favour faster ships?

M/W.T. I don't altogether agree with A.V.A.'s view on this.

- M/L. Why have you stood aside from welding - as done in U.S.A.
- A.V.A. We don't have laid them out in our shipyards. Only 3-4 yards cd. do it.
And labour required. Army doing something in this way - as much as they can.
- M/L. Don't agree. Shipbuilders have held it back ∴ it doesn't fit in with their future. L.P.S. Why not get Kaiser over? M.P. First await results of investigation into ship-bldg. methods - by Panel of M.P.'s appointment.
- S/Doms. Replacement 1943. M/W.T. Everything depends on what we can get from U.S.A. Hopkins was said they'd get us 24 m. tons of imports - keep up at this rate.
- L.P. But the Sh. C. Co. calculation is based on running down stocks on assumption of v. much increased rate of imports in second half of '43.

(b) Efficacy of Convoy System.

- A.V.A. No indicⁿ of decrease in U-Boats fr. June to Dec. - increasing - yet losses post war improving. ∴ effective escorts.
- Postⁿ deteriorated since Dec. ∴ entry of Japan into the war.
- If U.S. entry into war had not opened W. Atlantic to U-Boats we shd. have expected to do some better against continuance of attack in W. Approaches.
- S/Doms. Cd. you give us figures for nos. of unsuccessful attacks?
- A.V.A. Yes. But you'd have to allow for deterrent effect of larger escort strength.
- M.P. 17% of nominated ships for Poland already sunk!
- M/W.T. When U.S. convoy base completed, we shall expect improvement ∴ bulk of our vessels will remain w/in the protectⁿ - only a small propⁿ will have to go on outside the convoy. But this is what I wd. rely on to estimate that the present rate of 7.5 m. losses will not take us over-all above 6.5 m. from the war.

(c) Offensive against U-Boats.

- A.V.A. Many come fr. Biscay - & you can get them there more easily. They stay out 6-8 weeks - of wh. 12/14 days on target stations.
- M/W.T. Americans will now press us to do more to stop them coming out.
- S/Doms. What can we do? A.V.A. Nothing more than increased air attack.
- L.P.S. Methods of increasing cargo space. Towing cargo shells eg. have all these bn. considered?
- M/W.T. Studied & abandoned ∴ of danger to ships. Now being considered again - made of glass.

S/S. Air. Ready to co-operate.

Diverts 4 squadrons of Bomber to Coastal.

84% of Mdg. capacity for U-Boats is in reach of Bomber Command all the year round. And we think the best way of keeping down the U-Boats is to hit them in the places where they are being built. 64% are Mdg. in Bremen Kiel Hamburg.

Raid on Emden was particularly successful. U-Boat yard hard hit.

A.V.A. This is welcome - but it won't much affect the nos. of U-Boats in operation in next 6 months.

L.P. If you get equal destruction at sea and at yard, balance wd. be in favour of attack at sea: then you kill the crews also.

C.I.G.S. Russian Front.

North. G. claims of captures & Leningrad.
 " " " " 13,000 before Moscow } nothing serious.

From Kursk southwards signs of definite offensive. R. holding on at Sebast. delayed
 men of air force n. for major offensive. New attack at Kursk started 6 day.
 Going, at Poltava. This looks like first stages of major offensive.
 up to now 3-4 armoured & 8-10 infantry div't have been doing these attacks - no
 indic^{ns} of strength comparable with last year.

Air Raids. Wed/Thurs. 50 of sch. 35 on Norwich.

Fri/Sat. Norwich (30) - fire: serious damage.

Sat/Sun. 40 - 32 overland in S.W. counties inclg. Weston - 3. Mass.

Sun/Mon. Weston - 40 overland - 70 fire, many houses.

Weston - aerodrome, B. aircraft factory, R.A.F. training estab^{ts}.

C.A.S. Sun/Mon. 2 destroyed.

Foreign Affairs. a) Evacuation of Civilians fr. Egypt.

F.O. Lampsdown told this was not to be discussed by telegram.

Agreed - Details to be arranged with M/State if nec. War Cab. will support.

b) Removal of civilians fr. Iraq.

Agreed - stay where they are.

c) Foreign Visitors - Norwegians, Dutch etc.

Minister to tell F.O. what is said: & if possible consult F.O. in advance.

d) Moscow - Amb. not like to come home. Let him come after he
 has finished with Molotov conversations.

Agreed - subject to P.M.

e) Imperial Policy Group - poisonous publ^{ty}: esp. about Russians.

K. de Courcy up to mischief. [M/Int. will consider calling him up]

H.O. Publ^{ty} not within limits of what can be suppressed.

III. Evacuation of Families of Service Personnel from Malta.

C.O. Dockyard - decided months ago.

Military - now decided by Govt.

We were against it: effect on Maltese. We still are. If now we clear

relations of B. and do nothing about Maltese, unfortunately reactions.

Suggest a) notes to voluntary basis: of

A) open facilities for vol. evacuation of M. dependents.

W.D. Unless quota basis, this wd. mean none wd. go.

C.O. Offer 50% share of available facilities.

S/S. Air. a) moral claim of those who have gone is higher than that of indigenous pop.

b) If Malta fell, public opinion wd. condemn action resulting in B. being left behind

[Lab. discussed from (b)]

C.O. 1200 British. Many more Maltese.

C.A.S. Any aircraft reaching Malta fr. Gibraltar, wd. go back at once.

Any increase in traffic means increased petrol consumption fr. Malta.

Only a trickle wd. be brought out.

No regular air traffic fr. Egypt.

K.W. In fact v. little will be done. Why not give 50/50 facilities, for the little that will be worth. Let it be voluntary for the Maltese.

F.O. Don't like it. Wd. prefer to tell everyone to stay where they are.

S/Doms. Any priority at all shd. be given to those needed elsewhere.

L.F. If those shd. be evacuated, we think it shd. be shared. An item could be any, put a stop to all of it. Good to be so instructed.

A.V.A. Could we bring out children of Naval ratings. Cabinet - No.

Agreed - As in L.F. view. Bring up again if becomes possible to undertake large-scale evacuation.

IV. Auschwitz $\frac{1}{2}$ 8th Army.

P.M. proposes to announce in Commons at noon to-morrow.

P.W. agreed not to announce. But now leaky via U.S.A.

C.S.G. to inform Auschwitz.

V. Representation of Baltic States.

Agreed.

Foreign Affairs.

- A.E. of Madagascar. Genl. staff wants colly pol. off. to continue & my man to serve under him. (Brig. Ladh) P.M. approved (7/5) sending my man out.
- P.M. Settle this with S/S War - not for Cabinet (?). I will settle if you can't agree.

Czecho-Slovakia:

- A.E. Wait for Benes all he wants - he once resigned & there isn't ; some continuity in his Govt. But it will clear the point about Munich.
- L.P.S. Para 7. What does ded? mean?
- A.E. Schedules are talk, like they wait go. I want to make it clear that they can't rely on that - rather the other way round.
- P.M. Make it clear that it is population not territory.
- S/S Doms. Smuts pres. asked Mr. Dom. P.M. should be consulted before changes made.
- P.M. Necessary? S/Doms. Smuts felt strongly.
- Agreed in principle : At. is talk to Benes on these lines ; Doms. to be consulted & then in a few days ded? can be made public.

Treatment of War Criminals.

- P.M. Idea of my paper - you don't pass judgment but collect facts in multi^{ty} manner. Make a big show of it. Publish with a view to this to hot up the fires of war.
- Fact-finding Comm^{tee} only. Flourish of trumpet. Washington will ^{take} initiative.
- Simon. Similar the app^o Sept. 1914 - Bryce. Pellers. H.A. Fisher. Harold Cox. Alfred Hopkinson. But contained no names of offenders.
- P.M. Contemplate that if Hitler falls into ^{our} hands we shall certainly put him to death. Not a Sovereign who can be said to be in hands of Ministers, like Kaiser.
- This man is the mainspring of evil. Instrument - electric chair, for gangster, no doubt available on home-land.
- A.E. "Talkg. dispo. & interrogating eye-witnesses" } need revision.
Names suggested
- L.P.S. They must be 'official' body. App^o by Govt.
- P.M. One to work out details } - Lt. Chancellor : L.P.S. : F.D. : A.G. : My/Inform^t.
of both W.P. Papers.
- A.A. DPs with minor points can send them to the Ctee.

Debate on Shipping Situation - deferred.

Policy in Relation to Gandhi.

- V.S.A. G. will encourage resistance of peasants to troops - non-compliance with salt law
- P.M. Why go on with salt tax - v. little money in it. S/S. War 10% of pre-war revenue.
- P.M. But universal requirement - like taxing air.
- V.S.A. Congress now only - by how much we shall know
- L.S. G. is on the wheat surely: latest speeches suggest v. little fire in him.
- V.S.A. Statement on 30/6 is fairly strong.
- P.M. Back to salt. Get rid of it.
- S/S. War. What of Viceroy's prof. for holding G. in India?
- Good feeling in favour of removing him from India.
- Otherwise - none note.

Debate on Shipping Situation.

- L.S. Debate is on M/W.T. Vote: but they have said they want to take up shipping.
- P.M. On practice is in Secret.
- Ch. Whip. Sec. Session getting unpopular. Two Priv. cases arise fr. it.
- P.A. We can't make our case in public.
- A.V.A. Policy of U.S. Navy Dept - publish sinkings only where survivors land on Am. soil and even there no mention of name of Konrags. Nothing is in claim list. we are withheld, while U.S. are publishing sinkings figures.
- Goehle regularly publishes figures wh. are wrong but not deliberately inflated.
- We don't want to give him the correct figures.
- Therefore dead against surrender to present claim in H/C for publⁿ of losses.
- P.M. I suggested to President that it was inconvenient for they did. publish more about losses than we do. Weekly publⁿ enables him to check their L-Boat reports. Bad also for public to take its pulse so frequently.
- I didn't know how limited their publication was. I have asked Hopkins that we know at once their final conclusion on my request.
- A.V.A. Press conference accepted my view of this.
- L.S. You won't satisfy H/C unless you give them the figures in Secret Session at end.
- Ch. Whip. Disagree.
- M/L. Stand on our existing practice.
- L.S. But you can't explain in Public Session why U.S. figures are not satisfactory or full.
- Simon. Why can't you explain publicly reasons v. publⁿ - as Churchill did in last war.
- M/L. Get back. Goehle to read what U.S. papers say in ref. to Am. publⁿ with value.

- M/L. Don't satisfy Shinnott - the critics in W/C. at expense of confidence of the sailors.
- A.V.A. No Kick in the last Debate.
- P.M. Our losses are not so v. bad.
- Craik. Admirals wants Details in W/Lords. ^{*} But he is concerned rather about B. building.
- S/Doms. W/C doesn't want a Secret Session. A.V.A. But you can't deal with ^{*} in public session.
- P.M. Pitt is having some-mongering public debate, then answers it in Secret. - Approval.
- S/Doms. They want to talk of methods in shipbuilding & possible need for further belt-tightening.
- P.M. My diff. is not a really good answer (even on this) can't be given in public. Leader shd. explain why we don't intend to publish figures of losses.
- L.S. figures are on a diff. basis: [but they are so designed that it doesn't give info to the enemy.] L.P.S. lean out [I: it will lead to argument.
- In spite of losses arrangements made with U.S. will enable war to be carried on, enough shipping. Want full debating point - can't have it done in S. Session.
- If you want it i. you must have it in Secret Session.
- A/Whip. We have had one Secret. We don't want - nor do they - another.
- No need to have it in Secret if we aren't going to give the figures.
- P.M. From the Govt. can't make its best case.
- K.W. They will walk out of a Secret Session.
- Craik. W/Lords what look at a S. Session.
- L.P.S. Trouble is necessarily & rumours built up on the Am. figures.
- P.M. This can be met by our saying that we can see our way thro' with U.S. assistance.
- If you want this fairly debated, it must be in Secret.
- L.P.S. Then if they raise losses we shall have to go into Secret - not 'd' afraid of facts that i. give info to enemy.
- P.M. We like to be able to take W/C into confidence - & give them all we can.
- Hatfield. Hope care will be taken to avoid impression in U.S. that things are all right.
- L.P.S. I will tell them then that we can't have losses discussed in public Session - we will discuss the other matters.

Select Committee on Expenditure - Enquiry into Tanks.

- A.E. Precedent of Govt. S.S. War: G. was special case: then Govt. has gone since.

Shipping Debate.

L.P.S. If these votes are down you can't say talk on losses is out of order. Question or not goes will answer is immaterial. You can't answer in public. Next is to know House at outset but if they talk on this we'll go into Secret Session. Even then, what we give the losses?

P.M. I would mind giving them a picture, in Secret.

I don't distrust H/Commoms.

K.W. Indiscipline - this may reach the enemy.

P.M. Much smaller risk. Real trouble is public in Press.

A.F. No indication yet anything has got out into Secret Session.

P.M. Don't take too long a view of H/Commoms.

L.P.S. View of you can't have this in public. Apart from other things, it would be possible in public to give any explanation of U.S. post which might be interpreted in U.S. as criticism.

P.M. What you are really discussing is American affair - their losses & their potential gains for Hdg.

A.V.A. Ditto with shipping - when I would debate anywhere if allowed to give the figures. I have a very good case - but am not allowed to make it in public.

P.M. We risk full disclosure rather than have criticism in public & answer in Secret.

Ch. Whip. Labour Party have asked for debate in public - but they haven't asked for losses.

L.P.S. Gentle dislike of Secret Sessions. Labour Party have asked for it; and a general feeling in H/Commoms against Secret discussions.

M/L. People think now we have been giving too much information - endangering the lives of our men.

P.M. Say "we will not take this in public" & if they protest [move into Secret Session and say why.] K.W. Unfortunate public effect. P.M. Two or three newspapers will write what they wish with anyway.

Cannot be discussed satisf. or thoroughly except in Secret. If House desires will move into S. Session to explain reasons.

L.P. Cite the reasons for not holding it in public in stated in public ^{publicly} ~~secretly~~. You can't give all the reasons - but surely you can say enough to satisfy the House.

Agreed - withdraw H/above.

L.P.S. I will draft statement on business & show it to P.M. tomorrow again.

A.V.A. If we talk about Hdg. how much can we say about naval programme? P.M. Give the figures give global results - "in every category we have upped our losses."

P.M. Let L.P.S. explain reasons why we hold it in Secret. Then let Sir A. Salter
open.

Salter. Difficult for me. H.C. has complained before of not having qual. background.
stated at outset. We must ^{opening} object by person known to have been out of the
house for 15 months.

Great feeling etc. First Lord should open.

P.M. Wed. L.P.S. on Procedure

First Lt. open on merits.

Salter to wind up.

I. Post-war relief.

- P.M. As in his memo. Talk of the nation did know before we tried ourselves to such a far-reaching commitment.
- F.O. We say only (!) then will be a system of rationing after the war.
We shall then be dependent on U.S. They intend to continue lease-lend.
- P.M. We shall then have greater home production cost.
- K.W. Gratuitous offer. Post-war same as regards stocks.
- F.O. Disagreed as regards stocks. Ty. policy is now what it was when it provoked this war.
- K.W. Don't bind ourselves now. See how we stand then.
- M.P. Stocks. Question is why we shall do better by putting ours into pool with U.S., or by selling them against gold.
- M.L. How will you get over when the chaos is on us unless we begin to plan now.
Not afraid of promise - so long as we don't bind ourselves to any specific level of rationing.
There must be orderly relocation after the war: we must see people begin to plan it now.
- P.M. We can't tie our people up in this suffering - bureaucratic machinery.
- Hollis. If there are starving people in the countries with which we have fought to liberate, we our people hesitate to accept rationing in their interest.
Anyhow you will have to do it in any event.
We'll have to live on U.S. charity for some time after the war. And this sort of thing is the only contribution we can make to international relief after the war.
- Spons. Position is that we are saying now that after war we shall immediately scrap all control & engage in unregulated scramble. We will maintain a system of rationing, to control the position.
- P.M. Canada can supply us if we needed it.
- M.L. Yes - as after the last war. And 2-3m. unemployed followed.
- F.O. For some yrs. after the war there will not be enough food or shipping to allow us to revert to system of winning food by sale of goods. We shall have to continue a system of rationing.
- P.M. At the end of this war I will submit to no inequality with U.S.
- B.T. Our proposal is consistent with your Minute. Quoted from Amos.
Our standard of living will remain, for all this, above that of European countries.
B.T. advise that in any event we shall have to maintain rationing for some years after the war.
- M.W.S. Shipping. By end of '43 U.S. will have more shipping than B. + B. controlled.

- L.P.S. We want a plan to be made for relief. What other contribution can we make. And if we make it, we shall be protecting ourselves from being put on a level with other "distressed" countries.
- M/P. Textiles. After war there will be no stocks of clothing in Europe at all. Unless you maintain rationing for 2 yrs or so, the prices will be so high that the poor won't be able to buy a shirt.
- Halifax. U.S. will be supplying most of the food etc., that will mean v. heavy taxation. That will be their contribution.
- P.M. If we contribute, let our people do so as a generous gift.
- S/S. Air. European Allies are working out relief plans for their countries which contemplate rationing. In Washington they are bound to ask what we are going to do.
- F.O. The Allied Govts. are already trying to buy and to collar the shipping. We must avoid this competition scrambling.
- M/L. I favour this. I believe the poor will get a better deal that way in the period immediately after the war.
- Smith. This means only - Some system of orderly distribution to avoid waste. We can't give much in the way of food. We say: etc. we won't indulge in plenty while the rest of ^{Europe} the world is starving.
- F.O. The whole thing is governed by "as part of a common plan". We are not committed unless we like the plan.
- L.P.S. Referred to P.M.'s statement of June 1940. This implies that we are going to do something to build up supplies. K.W. is now saying don't do anything about it now.
- P.M. Position has deteriorated since then.
- L.P.S. If we are going to plan, to enable us to redeem this pledge, we must make some contribution now.
- K.W. y/ let us at least avoid public declaration at this stage, until we have seen the ^{common} plan.
- M/L. Favoured y/. So long as L. Ross knows where he is.
- K.W. Can we agree to ^{y/} of enter into no commitment
 y/ introduce L. Ross in ^{y/} see etc. no pub^l of this.
 then line - ^{y/} when we see the plan as a whole we will make up our mind.
 (c) ^{y/} when we see the plan as a whole we will make up our mind.
- M/N.T. We have no assurance of getting a share post-war of the surplus of U.S. shipping.
- K.W. Further telegram to L. Ross - in light of further discussion in Cabinet - to effect of y/.
- P.M. Remained of opinion that we should not do this unless U.S. equally bind themselves to ^{equal} rationing.
- Let K.W. prepare a draft ^{telegram} & bring it to the War Cabinet.
 [Also need to consult Ministers above the line.]
 in consultⁿ with F.O. and ^{y/} Trade.

I. Foreign Affairs.

French Ships at Alexandria.

A.E. Godfrey's attitude + use of w/t. F.O. and Admir. to investigate.

Evacuation of civil popⁿ fr. Alexandria.

A.E. Bad plan - and bad moment. Agreed, subject to C.S., lay off this.

Madagascar.

P.M. C.S. asked to consider further cleaning up - in view of unhelpful attitude of Govt.

II. Air Raids.

W.B. Nothing much - save indications of lone daylight attacks increasing - e.g. Leamington and Duxford.

III. Conscription of B. Subjects in Egypt.

W.B. Why not (a)?

C.O. Because local legⁿ can deal with Colonies - not necessary for them.

W.B. Canada? M/L. Now they have conscription, same plan as in U.S.A.

L.P.S. When will it be introduced? A.E. Before recess if possible. L.P.S. What keep the sitting for this. Simon. If introduced + not taken, some vol. volunteers.

L.P.S. Might take a day. Go away on Friday via Thursday. P.M. Or sit later on only.

Agreed.

IV. Polish + Greek Refugees fr. M/East.

C.O. 60,000 p. war } Total 88,000. Have been accepted by E. African Colonies.
13,000 It. civilians } they can take no more - a) food. b) no accommodⁿ.
1,000 others etc. } Until the newcomers build, no more can be put up.

S/Doms. Dito for S. Africa + Rhodesia. Ask, but don't expect favourable answer.

F.O. How can I get the Polish Boms. - if I can't accommodate their families.

L.O. 1,000 - 1,500 p. fortnight after mid-Oct.

P.M. x | F.O., C.O. + D.O. ^{with W.O.} meet + decide what can be done.

A.E. And I will press the U.S. Govt. to take more.

M/W.T. I can carry many in returning ships.

S/Doms to continue + report back only if necessary.

Minister about 1/2 to be brought in.

VI. Campaign of Respirators by Members of Public.

W.S. Need for economy much greater - rubber shortage, large nos. sent abroad.

P.M. When last brought up I opposed it "we were about to make our treaty about 6,000 of gas in Russia."

No obj't now. Couple it with increased precautions to ensure they're in order.

VII. Report on Home Opinion.

Para. b. Agreed - cd. have been better handled.

Took note.

VIII. Parliamentary Recess.

L.P.S. b/s - s/q. Then after 3 days adjourn again to end of Sept.

As last year.

Criticisms likely - we cd. find time to discuss a) Army pay b) Air cooperation.

Wt. some members want to debate & we've said "no time".

K.W. Cd. P.T. see the leading Conservative M.P.'s & quieten them down. on (a).

L.P.S. Lib. Nat. Whips have asked for (b). Cd. they do it on Appropriation Bill?

S/S. Air. Diff. time to discuss it - organization now under review, with the Americans.

Now thinking of drastic re-organization. Cdnt discuss that now.

P.M. Offer day for that in Sept.

Air Raids

49. Thurs/Frid. 40. inland - scattered.

Sat/Sun. 20. " Middleborough. Considerable damage to shops & commun^{ty}.

1.41. Billingham - prob^{ly} wire to hold up.

Mon. a.m. 5.45 am S. Coast. 7 am. E. Anglia. 7.30 N.E.

25 in all. Every Region except Scotland & Newcastle had warnings & in most bombs dropped.

Derby - R. Royce: central machine stone shop.

2nd nr. R. Royce works.

Witnam - Crittall's.

Swindon - Groh. works & gas-holder.

Noticeable how widespread the attack was. Worrying - need to get them down.

Action defence shd. be as lively as possible.

C.A.S. We scattered them. But weather was v. diff. for us.

Precision bombing by isolated aircraft v. diff. to stop.

AA claimed damaged one - only, tho' fire opened at many places.

II. Air Officers at Battle Schools in N. Ireland.

P.M. W.D. propose they shd. attend. Americans will be at these schools as well as British.

Situation changed as opt. 2 yrs ago - no risk now of invasion of Ireland & at least 100. danger has receded.

S/Doms. This won't affect Air neutrality. If attacked she will fight. Important is to make them as efficient as possible. And also encourage them by supplies (Hew/IV)

Comp. small amounts. Mil. auth^{ty} in Air v. co-operation.

We have given them small amounts for time to time.

P.M. Doubtful about giving them mines. - so lay in Air harbours: against whom?

Don't mind the other things so much.

S/Doms. AA guns & predictors.

S/Air Surely we sh. do with them ourselves.

HP. Air can't defend herself: we wd. have to do it. They have trustworthy elements.

S/CA Good thing to back up mil. auth^{ty} esp. Mulcahy(?)

AV.A. 1st Sea Lord & I are opposed to supply of mines.

P.M. AA guns & predictors - don't we need them off Biggin Hill. Surely those points shd. have priority over Air.

S/Doms. But this list passed by V/C.O.S. so what we can give if question of policy cleared. Their view = useful to let Eric have these, for support of their mil. outfit, if no political objection to sending them.

P.M. C.O.S. to examine afresh.

S/Doms. Yes - quite apart from any political question.

P.M. Course - discuss separately.

No suff. obj. is that.

S/Doms. But this connection that if they are taught to handle weapons they will want the weapons to use.

S/Col. Shd. not N. Ireland Govt. be consulted? W.O. Yes. I will look into this.

IV. Power of Punishment to Indian Commissioned Officers.

S/India. K. Comm. Offs. have the power. } Small matter, but cause v. great
The Ind. = - was not given that power. } diff. in mixed form + great resentment.

Matter raised 3 mos. ago, as matter of urgency, by Viceroy. I put ^{W.O.} objⁿ to Viceroy and have now had his view re-in-C. - as in mem.

B. Offs. throughout Indian Army wd. support their view.

This is a distinction on ground of colour.

W.O. King Comm^d Off. V. few were appt^d after last war - but died out. Viceroy's Comm^t is now normal practice.

Not a small thing.

Soon or late we may have to do this. But face of white man in East is low enough & this is not the time to do it. Gandhi's likely movement.

AVA. Navy - no real precedent: no mixture of black & white crews.

S/Air. Matter of discipline, not principle. Off. shd. not have to go outside his unit to find some other off. who can punish. The posⁿ in R.A.F. is the same - we wd. be willing to change, but wd. need leg^{is}.

C.I.G.S. Have to do it ultimately - but not now.

L.P.S. If they are fit to command, they should not be denied the attributes of command.

L.P. Why is it more degrading to be punished by an Indian than to be ordered about by one?

S/Doms. Really logic of W.O. case is opposition to Indianisation.

L.P.S. Draw attention to x/ in Mem.

P.M. But political capital will be made out of it in India.

S/Doms. ^{India} No. Will encourage our friends.

The Shipping Situation.

- L.P. Repts to U.S.A. At least 3 m. tons of imports in first half of '43.
Even so factors up? large margin of error - a) sinkings b) military demands
c) Bolero.
- A.F. As in P.M.'s memo. Base demand on full employment of our seamen.
- M/W.T. Wd. prefer to put it quantitatively first.
In Bolero negotiations I am seeking assistance/in first 9 months/wh. wd. give us
margin. [Hope this to get 7 = 7½ m. tons imports, over period of 18 months] 500,000 tons gross shipping
1.7.42 - 31.3.43
and 1,500,000 tons 1.4.43 - 31.12.43.
- L.P. This is a diff. method of bridging the same gap.
- M/W.T. Churchill now wants 28 vice 27.
- P.M. I said to President "27 or 28". Stand by that.
- M/W.T. 500,000 ^{gross} t. shipping ^{in first phase} ~~more~~ additional; and up to 1.5 m. at end of 9 mos. ^{for second phase.}
- This is what I am asking Americans for.
If we get this help on Bolero, we shall benefit by repercussion.
1.3 gross tons remain no doubt? thru Bolero.
We now found we can ship less than ½ of U.S. original demands for Bolero.
Even if they reduce their scale fr. 9 tons to 6 tons q. max we can't do it.
Sinkings in first 9 mos. / ^{estimated} or first 6 mos of 1942 less 25%.
Turn-round. Less good " military stores. & voyage vice 4-7.
Better to have this ½ m. + ½ m. in the 2 q mos. + get [] extra imports.
- P.M. Bolero is subject to delay - fixed for April but is to be put back.
- M/W.T. Estimates based on 23 m. U.S. ship programme. Tho' M/P more optimistic,
their programme has since been cut. Can we help them with steel?
- M/P. Not if we have to cut ourselves.
- P.M. Let the 25 + 27 m. be fixed figures - Bolero variable, in time. Bolero must
carry any contingencies - esp from sinkings.

Consumption Economics.

- P.M. Rationing bread. Why not? of great value.
Hens - new regulation will mean that people will feed them bread.
- M/F. Rationing means equal distribⁿ to all. Important to preserve one commodity free
for ironing out personal inequalities. Bread makes up individuals' variation.
Fill up on bread.
Doubt how much waste of bread there is - don't believe there is much.

We rather risk that than risk people going hungry.

Differential - v. difficult.

I can save 800,000 tons of shipping without rationing bread.

P.M. But a) will stop waste of saving in tonnage c) bargaining point with U.S.A.

M/F. Straight rationing of bread wd. increase consumption.

Points wd. help that - but wd. involve loss of variety.

And burden wd. fall most heavily on heavy workers, whose need for bread is greatest.

P.M. You might save 500,000 t. imports by this means.

Agreed - h.P. etc is reasonable. Not worth doing unless it brings $\frac{1}{2}$ m. tons.

Dilution. Agreed: as in h.P. etc conclusions.

[Waste of Potatoes. New machinery for reducing to a minimum]

U.S. Army Requirements. What scales are U.S. Army working on? Not excessive.

M/F. said his people were looking into these points - a working ^{plan} out.

M/F. Press them to use our equipment + ship their direct to theatre of war.

P.M. Waste of space by Services in shipping space allocated to them.

Churchill. 1400 vehicles loaded in April = 80,000 tons saved.

1400 " " " May = 100,000 " "

No. ships req^d is defined by no. of vehicles - then search round for cargo.

Shipping waste of space in past: position is now much improved.

Scale of equipment for M.T.

S/S War. { Promise of 20-30% reduction - now come down to 10-12% in view
of change in role of Army.

P.M. Circulate to those concerned the Cba's Rpt. wd in W.O. to day.

P.M. Only way of getting results here is to impose over-all cuts + let Dpts work out how they will operate them.

We can't press U.S. to cut down w/out doing it ourselves.

Services have bn. completely uncombed for man-power. Need for searching enquiry into use of man-power by R.A.F. + Army. Service Ministers must help.

S/Air. We've tried hard. But new strategic demands - bringing Air Forces from one theatre to another.

A.E. Wastage rates (sick) v. high in N/East + India.

P.M. We must lighten our establishments for overseas service.

A/A. We ought to have a go at it - it had to be done in 1917 + again in 1918.

M/L. You will have to do it if you expect production to keep in step.

Need for co-operation, not opposition. Everyone says that can't be done.

M/L. You call up only grades 1 + 2. Yet you use them on "tail" at 1:1 Army.
60:1 R.A.F.

That is surely a waste of fit men.

I can only ring the changes on priorities.

W.O. Taking troops abroad will mean an increase of our tail - not a decrease.

P.M. Women drivers on home service?

W.O. We can't get enough women.

And can they be directed into searchlights? P.M. Yes. This doesn't involve use of lethal weapons.

Phosphates.

M/Ag. Now has to come fr. Gulf. We are now 2 mos. short. ∴ U-Boats off U.S. coast. If we have sinkings, then we shall be able to keep factories going after June. 40,000 tons must be moved in winter & and this is v. unlikely.

Agatite fr. N. Russia is off!

We haven't enough in country to last beyond Christmas.

M/Prod. is helping me with this: and I can wait for 2 weeks.

Tractors.

L.P. There is a plan for pushing them as before. W.O. and M/Ag. Total to co-ordinate.

P.M. Let us have a memo. for Cabinet. on this. (∴ Not persist in this request.)

L.P. Facilities for service & repair can also be improved by pushing.

P.M. This was exploratory.

But - a) Bolero - used. legal.

b) 25 + 27 for 42 + 43 are firm.

c) F.O. to focus up to U.S.A. for firm guarantee as to shipping required to meet b)

d) Economics - L.P. recommend app.

e) Bread rationing - L.P. Office to consider.

f) Service man-power - Cab. Office, R.A.F. and Army.

Comb tail and sharpen teeth. Beach Drive. to be made fully effective.

g) Vehicular economics. Report to come to Cabinet.

S/Doms, L.P.S. + F.O.

h) Packing of vehicles.

W.O. May Office on (f) proceed in such a way as will not involve detailed scrutiny of part establishments.

P.M. has held one view already.

Only way to do it is to fix global figure + let Army work out details.

9/Doms. Food supplies of expeditionary Force should be as far as possible dried etc.

L.P.S. Other aspects for discussion -

Shipbuilding in this country.

Anti-U-Boat campaign.

A.V.A. Army have on this 'two' problems of concrete ship or other variant for economical bldg.

M/L. Civil engineers should be allowed to try.

P.M. M/W.T. to obtain report fr. U.S.A. on their new methods of bldg.

M/L. T.L.C.'s being built like 1st class ships: not "rough & ready."

Super accommod^g on crews quarters - too much amenity.

P.M. Let Cab. have a memo. on this - W.D. & Army. in consultⁿ.

I. P.M.'s Visit. Leakage.

S/Doms. Fri. night Lisbon - then in Continental Russ. Telegram from P.M. fr. 6/8.
i.e. before answer rec'd fr. Moscow.

M/P. Bullitt? Talking as about Torch.

EEA. Reports prevalent in Lisbon pm. 3/7. Then on Transocean 5 a.m. 1/8.
Esperts say cypher break unlikely

Read preliminary report on enquiry.

S/Doms. a) Enquiry into leak.

b) Where and when now announce? Read terms of P.M.'s note + telegram sent
to him: suggesting we shd. now disclose visit to Moscow

L.S. Diff. between aft. announcement and mere rumour. Second much less certain.
May be a "fish" to elicit the announcement.

S/Doms. Trouble if we hold it.

L.S. Don't assume they know for certain. Announce it in Secret Session only.
And do it Tuesday. i.e. no public announcement about Moscow part of visit.

M/L. Leave it to P.M. to decide what he announces about Moscow.

F.D. Public announcement - quite left now to P.M. on C.P.A.'s telegram.

M/L. Draft statement for S. Session. Don't refer to Moscow (or even Russia).

Ch. Whip. WD. takes it down Tuesday. In any event, before Wed. adjournment.

L.S. & Ch. Whip to meet S/Doms 10.30 a.m. on 4/8.

Bullitt's indiscretion. AE. agreed to speak to Whiant.

i.e. speak to M/P. about Torch in presence of Layton.

Leakage: enquiry.

S/Doms. By "C" - or if more formally someone else of AE.

II. Service Pay & Allowances.

(Byons and S.D. Davis)

W.D. Two questions Tues. / Soldier's pay. Don't want to give a stalling answer without
knowing mind of Cab.

Seen Benkin with (as sugg'd by C/E). Want some figures. No poss. complete US table.
Always some anomalous comparisons possible. He nevertheless said he wd. press for
another 1/2 a day. 1922 also, however, not thought to have any definite ideas

Last time Cab. decided to give something, the Sec. Ministers kept a few minor concessions
wd. do.

Pos: looks like slipping. D. Herald has said increases wd. be made.

Non-Ministerial Member of Army Council (prev. against increase). Married soldiers small balance in favour of ^{industrial employees:} civilians. Small intrinsic case: for some rise. But Riser have led troops to think they're underpaid - psycholog. diff. Recommended: 1/2 a day rise, privates, grading down with higher rank. Nately. more on allowances - tinkering with fam. all^{tho} undr. give same result. Officers: prom^t to Lieut. at 6 mos vis 18. If that done, no case for genl. increase - tho' some case for increasing married allow^{ncs} - outfit allow^{ncs}.

Answer sugg^d by Ty. would do if there's any quest of standing pat. "Await debate" answer will invite cont^d Press agitation.

AVA.

Genl. quest - no time to consider.

(April)
Last time / were wily. to stand fast. Cab. quest may - at cost of £M. 65.

Agitation growing. We like to have more time for details.

Pay of offrs. (junior) we are anxious about: and already in cont^d with Ty. on this.

V. late demand in R.N. & ratings - except for genl. background.

S/Air.

Agree about junior offrs. Feels. tho' they are underpaid. Wd. like that considered pilot offr. flying offr. Prom^t (first) at 6 vis 12 mos. wd. help.

Want not to discourage young offrs. fr. marrying / having families. Consider a increased allow^{ncs} for offrs. with children.

Allow^{ncs} while living with families - but get "consolidated" allow^{ncs} if they move away from families. This is hard on families. Wd. please R.A.F. if "consolidated" all^{tho} abolished.

But can't do this for offrs. & wd. for men. Admit no pressure for increased pay fr. ranks. ^{Propose:} Increase 1/2 p. day for N/C 2. Reduc. to 6^d p. day for sergeants.

K-W.

Last increase. Cab. the app^t to consider. At opening each Serv. Min^{is} said no demand for further increases & that they didn't ask for any. Part^{ly} true of W.O. When I said some increase necessary to meet P.M. the W.O. objected v. strongly: put it in writing tho' there was no case - demand shd. be resisted. Non-Service Ministers on the thought something shd. be done (part^{ly} : of rel^{to} to industrial workers).

When our Rpt. considered, thought so important tho' P.M. said he wd. announce it. Reasons a) concessions important. b) avoid continuing pressure for more: final award. We have since knowⁿ Quest in this sense.

Since then - arrival of U.S. troops & many more to come. About 6 weeks ago P.M. asked what was being considered about U.S. soldiers. I have talked to Winant. Hoped some of their pay might be retained in U.S.A. Winant said this was out of quest - settled by Congress & jealously guarded by them. Any sugg^d fr. us wd. be v. ill-received.

Not a hope of Congress legislating now, when decisions pending & little hope thereafter.

Mitigating action taken thro' Billets - ^{military} U.S. authorities co-operate well in these.

In (Bill) N. Ireland the men are in fact making a lot of money, of their own free will.

80-90% were doing the right thing.

No hope of basing our pay on U.S. Standard.

This really is only material change in circs. since last decision.

Views in H/Comm.

Conservative: agitⁿ engineered by Taylor M.P. & one or two others with a little influence. Taylor got cold welcome from 1922 C.M. If anything to be done, not on basic pay.

Labour. Saw M. Lister M.P. (Chairman: Sub-Com on Service). Impressed mainly with allowances - tho' they wd. have to ask for 1/2 p. day on basic.

Memo.

W.O. put fwd. nothing much but agitation in Press & its unsettling effect.

V. Flimsy reason for increased expenditure £M. 85-100 at 1/2 p. day (incl. C.D. Service).

And a new level set ^{may} have to extend into the peace - when armed forces of some size will prob. have to be maintained for some time. Effect in reducing our capacity to afford some re-construction plans.

Anyhow advocate White Paper setting out comparative position.

Officers.

Admty. have asked for increase for all offrs up to Admiral - & no rise for ratings.

Wd. be ready to agree to statement giving no encouragement or expectations but indicating Cal. C.M. to enquire. Put out at same time W. Paper on facts.

L.P.S. Say we'll lay a White Paper on facts & say no more, save you'll have a Debate ^{next} after.

If anything said about "considering", we shall not be able to avoid concessions.

Setting out facts as to Serv. Remuneration

L.P. { Cf. misapprehension as to Serv. commitments & how they compare other walks of life and W. Paper will show it.

M/L. Take care not to draw too sharp contrast betwⁿ ^{including} Civil & Service.

L.P.'s formula wd. do better.

A.E. W.O. to agree terms of answer with L.P.S. & M/L. & Treasury.

"Setting out all material necessary to enable judgment to be formed."

Refer to misunderstanding as in L.P.'s phrase.

M/L. Cf. Exchange to answer this Qⁿ as it affects all 3 Services. - Agreed.

M/L. Wd. like statement on expenses wh. offrs. have to incur. ^{White Paper to be done by} Service Dpts. & Ty. after consultⁿ with M/Labour.

III. Russian Convoys. Statement in Parliament.

- S/Doms. P.M. thought unwise to make public statement.
- L.P.S. But all I want to know is edit, if pushed for info in Secret Session, I should say something on the lines of the Press statement.
- AE. Last para. Pulp scattering this is not v. good. Reverse order.
- S/Air. Third para. $\frac{1}{2}$ When threat materialised they withdrew.
- Ch. Whip. Vague - no indicⁿ how serious losses were - House unlikely to be satisfied. General feeling that the statement cd. be improved - in detail.
- L.P.S. If Skirrow gets on to this, we'll move into Secret Sec^y + make some such statement as this. Prob. Thursday.
- AVA. I will prepare another draft (for considⁿ? Trust) bear^g in mind Sat^y's decision and to-day's discussion. Agreed.

IV. Statements about Second Front.

- S/Doms. Don't see that much can be done. Radcliffe not in favour of seeing Editors.
- AVA. This kind of thing does "impinge on security".
- L.P. But you only check statements of fact - not expⁿ of opinions.
- AE. You cd. tell Editors how that one sentence came into the communiqué. As neg^s. Maistry saw him - he promised stringent instr^s to see that nothing more will be put out by Embassy.
- W.O. These demands are doing much harm - to spirit of nation + Army.
- K.W. Too late - too dangerous to touch this.
- L.P.S. D'brook Mtg. No good dealing with this on "Press" lines. Radcliffe here entered the meeting. Said - nothing cd. usefully be said to Editors unless you cd. tell them definitely that it wd. or wd. not, take place.

V. Foreign Affairs.

- AE. of Russian convoys Re-routing neg^s? ^{We have} Agreed nothing fr. here to be shipped via Persian Gulf that can go direct fr. USA. Politically disadvantageous - economically sound. Except: if ships via 100 Hurricanes etc.
- a) Second Front. Soviet News Sat^y. "Hitler is talk^g to Juro fr. West". Reply to Maistry on this. Agreed
- b) Evacuation fr. M/Exot. Stay-put - some modifⁿ wanted in Persia Palestine (Iraq). + other S.W. Expt
- c) Telegram fr. Seymour. Can Air Min^y think again for more help to China. Rf. ed. we swap with American squadrons. S/Air to consider.
- L.P.S. the loan? AE. No. What they really want is to have this for post-war. We won't do that even for Doms. Seymour is send^g another telegram on this. We'll reconsider when that is in.

Foreign Affairs.

- A.E. Harmanin Co. day. Res. had told him to be avail. for any journey. Wd. is to be useful for him to go to Cairo & on. Advised him to write Res. and invite him to visit his views to P.M. - if he favoured it.
- L.P.S. Doubt wht H's contact with Stalin was part^{ly} good. I'm discouraged it, when P.M. smoothed it to me.

Leakage.

- A.E. Told Maisey this a.m. Put out. As a loss to explain. Stated break of cipher. (P) He has learned he is not to go back to Moscow for the visit
- S/Doms. P.M. on telephone has said he doesn't want R. visit to be announced publicly.

I. Publicity for Dominion and U.K. Troops.

- S/Doms. Troublesome part^{ly} of correspondents in theatre of war.
- M/huf. 18 English newsp. correspondents (accredited) in Cairo.
- W.O. Their standard said to be low.
- M/huf. Generally are poor.
- W.O. There exist men in suit several times to M/East. In last 10 days attacks were primarily infantry - & they are mainly Dom. and Indian.
- M/huf. Name done throughout world to England has been incalculable.
- Bruce. Both Aust. Press & returned Aust. soldiers have criticised this.
- M/huf. Ban now withdrawn on mention of names of B. regiments. W.O. now giving reasonable facilities. W.O. 6 months ago.
- M/huf. Content of hand-outs to Cairo is what matters.
- W.O. D.P.R. W.O. has rebuffed the Press many times on this point.
- L.P.S. Then cd. someone go out & try to straighten this out.
- M/P. The D.P.R.'s job in Cairo is impossible. It's always wrong. Only way is to leave it to the Off. communiques on one hand and on the other to journalists alone. Cover in Off. communiques the point about U.K. troops - by instructions - and leave the background to the unaided efforts of the journalists.
- M/huf. I will be content if U.K. troops mentioned in communiques. Then I will bound the journalists out of the Cairo base and go back informt. I can then stop them fr. hanging about for background from D.P.R. talk in Cairo. Also - the good journalists are all in the Army.

Took note.

III. Use of Psychologists and Psychiatrists in Services.

L.P.S. I can re-assure Cabinet on this.

Nash. ^{Para. 22.}
P.10/- despatch of feeble-minded men to M/East's last quarter of 1941. This was
preposterous. General feeling (strong) in agreement.

L.P.S. No selection technique applied to drafts? W.D. No. But if selection is on its
legs, they won't get into (or stay in) Army.

S/Doms. Selection for drafts. W.D. to consider how it ed. be tightened up.

M/L. Welcome report. Pleased so long as this is kept under control.

W.D. On Appendix, my advice seems too heavily loaded on the conservative side.

Wh. paper that this should be left for discussion.

L.P.S. These were suggestions of McLaughlin & Jameson.

A.V.A. My people think their selections v. bad - fr. pt of view of working together. Great deal
of controversy between Parkes & Lewis v. Service psychologists.

S/Air. I think L.P.S. mistaken in thinking Services don't agree.

Agreed - subject to recomd^s of Appendix by L.P.S. & Service Ministers.

IV. Supplies to Russia. Statement in Parliament.

A.V.A. Circulated revised draft.

A.F. Omit para 2 of Note for Supplementaries - if possible. Agreed.

Ch. Whip. Undesirable to have an opportunity for Shawcross to raise this on Adjournment.

Otherwise - agreed.

I. India - Possible Action against Congress. (- part heard).

a) Considering some form of deport? fr. India (Gandhi) wh. will not involve risk to his life.
Destination?

L.P. Prop. that solution is to take him to Aden first - by sea. Agreed.

b) Deportation or not?

L.P. I favour deport? ∴ I don't believe Govt. of India will be strong enough to hold him if he
hunger-strikes in custody in India.

If those (30-40) who hunger-strike in Andamans had to do so in Bengal, the job
wd. be ^{much more} v. difficult.

I am confirmed in my view by what Viceroy now says about letting him out.

Simon Then? say to Govt. of India you think you must hold him, even if he does h-strike.
Will you be able to? Hence recommend deport? now.

L.S.A. Can you force Govt. of India to agree in advance to hold him even if he does h-strike.

L.P.S. & J.D. with W.D. Disagreed.

A.P. a) You must act. b) Co-Motion: nonsense c) That being so, better surely to take him
off now, out of India. We sh. say this to Viceroy now.

L.P. If you get G. away before he h-strikes, good chance the others would do it. If he starts,
the others much likely to follow his example.

Agreed - a) No c. Motion: ^{please fr.} no detention once he gets in, even he h-strike
b) Tell Viceroy in our view better to take him out of India first
- to Aden by sea.

L.S.A. The other 15/20 leaders?

L.P. & W.D. They don't matter if you get G. out.

L.P.S. From publicity pt. of view doubtful if wise to isolate G.

L.P. Take 1/2 doz. to Uganda by air - Agreed.

Simon. Send response off with him.

Avoid phrase prison - deport?

} Agreed.

L.P.S. Publicity - declare support of Executive Council.

Make it clear only beginning of trip scheme - publish documents.

A.P. We like to notify U.S. Govt. & China in advance.

L.P.S. Send details of our plan to President. - Agreed.

M.L. Say we're doing this for sake of United States Nations, not Britain only.

Agreed: Don't tell China in advance.

III. Alexandria.

L.P. Request essential. But prof. perhaps to do it for some other ostensible purpose.

Telegram approved.

IV. Statements about a Second Front.

L.P.S. Many letters - Press up^{to} approach - suggⁿ that something was said, be said.

Favour statement of what might be done - on lines discussed in Cab. other day.

S/Doms. P.M. said "you can say we are going to have a 2nd Front this year." Some Ministers doubted what he said "this year."

"Agree... urgent task" doesn't imply decision to do it.

L.P.S. the communiqué is what causes the diffy.

M/L. Wise to say anything before P.M. sees Stalin? Anything said now wd. surely prejudice his talks. Best line surely is to keep quiet.

S/Doms. Public interest a) F.S. and b) Russian. We wdnt know how any statement of ours might affect Russian public opinion.

Now its only a qtn of waiting for a few days - and W/Commons not now sitting.

M/L. I told 1,500 delegates of Hdg. trade what this Hdg. was for. The knowledge wd. we are moving is seeping through, surely.

I think that the best way of letting people know. Best form of propaganda is to avoid Press likely plague & tell people nothing that it's a great secret!

Wait ∴ till we get the text out of the P.M. - Stalin talks.

Agreed - await P.M. communiqué - then consider what we say on whole question.

V. India.

L.P.S. If object is divorce India fr. G., "desirable to say something to acknowledge Tej. B... S... movement. Help to divorce moderates from G. - & distract thoughts from G.

Draft outline as basis for discussion. - handed round.

L.S.A. No use at this stage trying to do anything to help S's movement.

Clear fr. cont^{ts} with G. W. he has put off his response to this: & Nehru has said this for this is past.

Congress ind^{iv} interested in constitutional quise - only in creating revol^{ut} movement.

Futile: also bad effect on mod. opinion in India & on Ex. Council. Some members of that Council are beginning to weaken. This wd. tend to make them wobble even more.

Tel. 2315-5. We don't make such a move after Congress resolution passed.

Firm action essential now.

Convention of V. agreeing with Ex. Council grows rapidly. He must to gain every chance of carrying them with him.

L.P. Don't think Sapru cuts any ice. This m. is taken as sign of weakness on our part. Ass. to Pres. G. has said publicly nothing drastic will follow had no pass. of resolution. Pres. he isn't s. sure of his ground - prob. he wants more time to prepare.

W.O. Agree. Saw on statement "we wd. support him in any action in agreement with his Council." We must make it clear that he must act for good of India, what Ex. Council can be carried along or not. Some of the Members are certain to run out. But it's his responsibility not the Council's.

M/L. We can give way no further. Too late.

M/P. Agreed.

S/Dome. " "

L.P.S. I agree wd. Congress won't accept such overtures.

I agree to strong action v. Congress.

But I suggest this only qua effect on public opinion world-wide as well as India. For we must not behave as tho' G. = India.

L.P. Yes. But way to treat Indians at this stage is "polite but firm". Don't under-rate their val respect for firmness in Govt.

L.S.A. Dispose of G. first. Then seek ways of encouraging Sapru.

W.O. Will S/D. India convey to V. impression that time is acting wd. not to lose for sake of carrying Council with him. This can be fought & beaten; but delay at the start may lengthen the struggle.

L.P. Don't be overworried by signs of wobble in individuals. They can be nursed into collective firmness.

L.S.A. Must [not sacrifice ^{to this} vital importance of showing firmness & determination in this crisis] to advantage of carrying Council with him. Attach v. great importance to prompt action. Will call it v. in that sense.

L.P. Every sympathy with his desire to carry his Govt. with him; but feel sure he will [] he will draw the War Cabinet behind him.

L.S.A. Pressure for Finance Home Dept for Indians. None dismissed - continuity preserved - Indianised by increasing portfolios - no need now to turn out 2 Europeans to appease Congress elements.

S/Dome. No movement or change in this crisis. Agreed.

- L.S.A. Reports of V. V's reply to telegram sent last night.
- W.O. This telegram confirms my disquiet in V's capacity to govern in such a crisis. He is putting too much weight on carrying his Council with him.
- L.P. In this part you must allow V. to be swayed by his Council's view. I favoured deportⁿ: I doubted capacity of Govt. India to stand him. If they give a firm assurance to hold G. even tho' he h. strikes we must accept their view on deportⁿ. But we must get this assurance.
- L.P.S. It's beyond expediency. For deptⁿ in India, with all its implicit, will strain the competence of the Council to breaking point.
- L.S.A. Will G. fast if told in advance tho' he wait to be asked if he does?
- W.O. Trouble - " of V.'s weakness.
- Becoming necessary to telegraph to him that he, and not his Council, is responsible.
- A.E. Sorry he has taken this decision. But can't over-rule him.
- L.P. Yes. Say - we thought deportⁿ wd. have made his postⁿ easier. If he thinks better, well & but we must ensure tho' he will hold G. in spite of h. strike.
- No Cas + Mouse etc., Agreed - as in EEP's notes.

VI. Mr. C. Taylor, M.P. Proposed Visit to Middle-East.

- S/Doms. Taylor M.P. ^{+ others at Air Min^y} invited by Mr. Balfour to go to M/East to see for himself. Provided he gets P.M.'s consent. Came in to me.
- S/Air. Let me investigate.
- S/Doms. Any genl. line about M.P.'s facilities? Should there be a general policy?
- W.O. Nothing moved about distant fronts. There was one tour to France. But not by self-selection. Anyhow, he's a military officer & and tho' get W.O. consent.
- Agreed. S/Air to enquire. Permission must be refused in this case. W/out prejudice to future considⁿ of the genl. case.

Directing A.S. to Searchlight Duties. Part heard.

- MyL. Anticipated Party. diff.
- K.W. +/ Do it now: and announce it by Qm's when Parl. is assembled. Sept. 8.
- MyL. Thought this wd. cause trouble.
- K.W. Then you'll have to wait till 9/9.
- L.P. H.O. are directing women to fire-watching, wh. is more dangerous.
- L.P.S. Surely no trouble over this.

Agreed as above.

- W.O. Given individual est. only small no. wd. be affected before now. Sept. 7 nitrate now small.
- S/Doms. Then can't we wait until Sept.?
- W.O. None will be on the job by then - tho' some may be being trained.

Liquor Policy in W. Africa.

- C.O. Better to distil good stuff than sit back & watch growth of traffic in "hoorah".
- Diff. is Convention. But its object was to ensure that they got good gin & not too much of it.
- MyL. What mind if it were a State monopoly.
- C.O. Willing to put that to Govts. If it all, must be done by Govt. action.
- A.E. Willing w. Convention shd. be breached temporarily.
- Belifax. U.S. were signatories. Will FO. tell them the reasons?
- A.E. I will tell all the respectable signatories.
- Find out what French & Belgians & Portuguese are doing about this: & then try to concert a common policy.
- S/Doms. S. African gin? C.O. V. high class: not potable by W. Africans: no interference now with their importing it, but they can only sell it to Europeans & the v. richest W. Africans.
- Nash. You shd. keep inside the Convention if you manufactured outside W. Africa & imported it. E.g. if S. Africa were willing to distil a cheaper gin. (Not much enthusiasm for this).

India.

- L.S.A. Little aft. news of trouble, fear rising in Bombay Presidency. Police only tho' they need more. Press clamour upon troops called in (Bombay).
to Govt/India
Sugg^d limitation on cattle to UK. - detailed stuff. War talk. Might might be

applied also to USA. L.S.A. would not suggest further damping down of
sensitive messages.

Hullfax. Balance of evils. Danger to give info in U.S. but we are building up.
Cdr Govt/India damp them down by persuasion.

Imperial Conference - War Conference.

S/Domb. Telegram fr. P.M. 10th Sept. likely to come here early Sept. & suggest i. Imp.
War Cab. discussions, and get Curtin etc.,
Am Down P.M.'s.

Nash. Fraser will be in USA next week. But has to return N.Z. 16/9. to open Parl.
Possible 10th opening night to be deferred.

Bunce. Curtin not intending to go to U.S. just yet. But wd. try for this.

S/Domb. Will wire all P.M.'s suggesting early Sept.

L.S.A. Two Indian up^{ms} due 8-10th Sept.

U.S. Forces.

L.S. What is being done about social aids?

M/Huf. All v. ob. sec^{ts} under one hat. likely to get sensible organ? going before winter.
They will segregate blacks. Contingents of negroes comp. to care for them.
Amds weigh - too late in the day.

W.O. F. Stewart at work on some of this. M/Huf. asked to get into touch with him.

M/Huf. Liaison with W.O. and Air Min^r will be arranged.

M/Huf. to refer to L.S. if he finds diff^{ty}.

Diff^{ty} about black troops. M/Huf. Fraser still more wd. come (up to 200,000).
France undertook to ask exper^{ts} of black troops in Australia.

India. Gandhi.

L.S.A. Viceroy consulted Govts. on W. Cab. views. Their views (with one exception) are
strongly against allowing G. to starve to death.

Govr. W.P.

L.S. Don't talk about jail. When in prison clear oblig^{ty} on govt officers etc,
to look after. When under detent^{ns}, oblig^{ty} is v. different.

L.S.A. Punjab. favours release when dangerous.

Bihar. less bitter if he dies outside

Bombay. grave polit. blunder to let him die in detent^{ns}. In Bombay we shd.
then have few friends in any class of community.

Ct. local reactions most unfavourable - no friends in India.

Hartley (via Wankly) No effect on Muslims. Some on Hindu ranks. The
off. class as a whole wd. be v. critical.

Assam. Similar view.

Sindh. Only one is taken opposite view.

Viceroy can't disregard the unanimity of Govs. Attack prob. report^s to
Lumley's view?

W.O. Viceroy told no one was against deport^t. Hallett's telegram shows.
not only wd. he favour deport^t, but also wd. he was not consulted on that
point. H. being one of the few Govs. who ^{has} had experience of civil disobe^d.

Haltax. We have no doubt myself wd. it wd. be a mistake to let him die in detent^t.
whatever the disadvantages of letting him out, his death in detent^t wd. be worse.

L.S.A. We like to wait for Viceroy's final opinion.

L.P. What you must do is to prevent G. from carrying on his campaign. - No greater
degree of detent^t than is necessary for that purpose. Shd. be possible to
devise some method of detent^t wh. while securing that object, wd. leave
on others the responsibility for his health etc. And much to be said for
arranging that word - before he starts to hunger strike - at least don't wait
till he is so ill that he has to be moved.

W.O. I wd. leave him to die when he is - i.e. at Poona when he is in a Palace not a prison.

S/Doms. It is up to Viceroy to tell us how he proposes to meet the L.P.'s condition.
Put that condition to him & ask him how he will meet it.

I. Provision of Aircraft for the War at Sea. Text heard.

- S/Air. Bomber Command is short of all for aircraft.
- M/L. Someone shd. deal with (c) in memo. L.P.S. Sinclair means (b) is not a priority.
- S/Air. Aircraft does not exist to satisfy all.
- L.P. a & re. over-simplify. Bound to be some switching.
- M/L L.P.S. Not prop^d to have comnd on these data.
- S/Doms. We need facts to support S/Air view that bombing of Germany is overriding priority.
- L.P.S. This paper says we are sacrificing minimum needs for bombing.
- S/Air. This puts too much emphasis on minimum.
- L.P.S. Report of Brendan Jessel - was it to same effect?
- M/L. Need whole picture, including wastage rates. But depreciate automatic removal P.(E) 1/1.
- L.P. Paper showing what aircraft used for (c) shd. be used for (b) & showing why not desirable. After using a & b, how are aircraft under (c) being utilised.
- S/Doms. EEB formula & wastage. Agreed.
- Boucher Para 19. Further parts on this - what types dealt with, why not others. Agreed.

II. Burma.

- S/Doms. Can't make decisions, our job is to leave Govt.
- D-Smith. Returning to Burma is Simla: wd. like some genl. guidance. Great debt to Burma: we can't defend them. Flight of prosaids - who will suffer coming. severe starvation. Future - economic & political - split road. Country in trouble before war. Poverty (esp. Upper Burma). Little chance for emp^l for business, either in Indian or European firms. Debt - rural moneylenders. Constant hostility between Business & Indians: almost worst feature of all. Completely corrupt politics. These are the abuses we want to tackle on our return. Period of direct rule after our return, so that we can build new Burma on more solid foundations. Economic reforms - abolition of moneylenders (38% is lowest rate of interest now!) - medical services - education (essential if there is to be any form of Democratic Govt.) - legal code. These things shd. not be carried through by the Business themselves. During the last days, when heavily supervised, the Burmese Minister admitted this to me. Want on my return to begin thinking out a plan. So that when we get back to Rangoon we shall know what we want & how we propose to seek it.
- L.P. Wants while considering approach of Govt: in interim period vice appears to

n-introduce C. Col. Govt. This wd. enable you to associate some Burmese, in more than advisory capacity.

Govt. as Chairman with 4 or 5 Members inclg 2 Burmese.

L.P.S. What about including Americans & Chinese?

A.E. Difficult internationally to appear to go back to direct rule. You don't really want to go back.

M.P. Philippine model. Direct rule + definite time limit.

M/L. Should firms be called upon to make greater contribⁿ to welfare of Burmese. We shd. conserve mineral & other assets for benefit of inhabitants.

D.S. Propose to go into this.

M.P. Bavin's suggⁿ is fantastic. But big firms have made the largest contribution.

Agreed. Authorise D.S. to study and work up programme for submission at a later stage to War Cabinet as specific proposals.

D.S. to enlist services of experts on this study.

III. India.

M/L. Labour Party, tho' in genl. support of Govt. policy, are disturbed by Press report of proposal to use c. provisions.

L.S.A. Lunley has n-introduced this Ordinance in Bombay. No off. informⁿ.

May be only one provision in the code - & no intention to use it specially.

L.P.S. V. unfortunate publicity. Cant Viceroy handle the Press more intelligently.

L.S.A. 3 telegrams already sent; no answer.

S/Doms. Find out what^{is} attitude of Govt/India towards control over Press.

Say Govt. take v. serious view; bldg up misleading picture.

Also see Editors here, in consultⁿ M/hfⁿ.

Find out about whipping Ordinance.

I. Russian Warships and Merchant Ships in Black Sea.

[Malta Convoy - latest news

Yesterday. Byblos, High Seas.

30 Spit. flown into Malta - carrier not hit.

1 merchant vessel hit

6.40 pm. Air attack. Unknown hit by bomb.

Destroyer damaged & not to hit.

8.30 pm. C. Bom. U-Boat. Damaged Nigrid; turned back to hit.

Carrier torpedoed & sunk by us.

9.15 pm. Kenya torpedoed or mined. Prob. turned back.

4 ships of convoy sunk.

10.15 pm. Deception believed sunk.

Italian surface force - turned E and went home.

Today. 4.30 am.

+ 4 destroyers + 1 ship 20 m. behind with destroyers

7.0 am. 5 ships (130 miles off Malta at daylight) - under Spitfire cover.

But fighter dir? with in looking? RAF ships sunk or damaged.

Out of 14 ships 6 survive - prob. 7.

2 Italian cruisers prob. damaged.

2 U-Boats sunk & 1 probable.

Main losses due to U-Boats + v. heavy attack by E. Boats throughout last night.

IF we get 5 ships in, it will give 9 weeks' supplies.] Losses of 7 ships now two r. miles
Fighter cover.

Ay.A. Considerable Fleet in Black Sea. Acc. to law, nothing but to have them interned (if R. don't destroy them). V. unlikely that Turkey will commit at breach of law.

There is a possibility is the next supply in means.

Submarines might break through.

* / Some months ago we helped them to get 4 out of 5 out. Subject to same condn they might do same again.

Some tankers might be Fleet oilers. They wd. have to be turned into tankers

AE. Approach to R. diff. ∴ assumed they will lose last bases

Turks. R. relations not so good now as w/.

Wd. not encourage R. to run warships thro' ∴ Turks wd. fight. Do not encourage them even about submarines. Tankers we might try. Merchant ships no diffy.

→ tell him to discuss with P.M.
Wd. like : to send telegram to Clark Kerr. / Terms of draft mad.

Wd. repeat telegram to Hugeson & get his comments on Turkish reactions.

Agreed to remind H. of sale of G. H-Boat to Spaniards.

L.S. Shd. telegram give impression that we favour internment vs destruction?

If we have a preference, we shd let C. Kerr know what it is.

Halif. That depends on estimate of Turkish reactions. Prob. more likely to come in our side than theirs. If so, wd prefer internment.

A.E. Unless it made ^{some} temptation to Germans to attack Turkey. Or to demand their surrender of the ships.

Halif. Say to H. "we've come down on side of internment : of our view of likely T. attitude." Get his views on this.

L.P. If you can't
Add para - ^{radically} ~~propose~~ ^{propose} it, you tell Turkey what hand over the ships - then are you right in saying internment is better?

A.V.A. Turkey wd surely resist pressure to surrender them.

L.P. They wd. thus put tremendous weapon into G. hands.

A.E. Wd. sooner see the ships sunk than being ground of controversy.

Genl feeling - pref. to sink the warships & run the risk out.

Agreed. Make it clear that politically this wd. be easier course.

II. French Fleet at Alexandria.

A.E. Disappointed - but agree with conclusion.

And would want the sailors' mistress' cd. hold the sailors' attention while F. French or Americans get possession of the ships.

S/Doms. Cd. Lavelle's recent pronouncement, to make occasion for protest v. use of W/B for command? to France.

A.V.A. We can't physically stop them.

A.E. V. uncomfortable position.

L.P. But worst poss. part if we ^{do} ~~opt~~ anything, implying distrust of G.'s honour.

III. Shipping Situation.

S/Doms. Concl^{ns} were "provisional". But action is proceedg.; and we cd regard these concl^{ns} now as final.

L.P. Broad retaining - discussed by L.P. etc, who decided against it. Put this on record.

L.S. Yes. But keep it under progress Rpt. to Cabinet. Say in 2 weeks time. holdg. reports on cuts in materials ^{inputs} ~~and~~

II. India.

S/Dome. L.S.A. don't like our proposition to see Editors 'i' time improving.

Reason to believe now that trouble is mainly Reuters. Prefer to see them.

Agreed - Easy to deal with them. L.S.A. to see them + or - Brackley.

Press Interviews by Senior Officers Abroad.

M/L. Statements in Sunday pp. by Air/V. Lloyd in U.S.

a) Opportunity to cut Rommel's supplies not taken. Report on this.

b) Possibility of taking Tunis.

Dangerous. Senior Offs. abroad should engage in this sort of talk.

S/Air. Must know first if mis-reported.

At home only ^{now} ~~not~~ Offs. should give interviews w/out permission - M/L/H.F. is co-operating.

In this case man at B. Embassy got him to give the talk, w/out ref. to Minister.

One up^{ns} abroad should be told not to give such invitations.

L.P.S. No objection if in fact stuck to facts about Malta.

Agreed - S/Air to obtain full report on what he said, who asked him etc.

Malifax. Hope no rule yet. Senior Offs. abroad should say nothing w/out ref. home.

E.g. Dill was once asked after to speak: I have said "Yes" if I saw brief. The up^{ns} abroad should be in posⁿ to judge w/out reference home, which would involve delay.

K.W. Warning for Offs. to enter "political" arena at all.

S/Air. Normally avoid "asked questions", etc. they are pressed to answer.

If that suggⁿ adopted, I don't mind but I can't then take responsibility.

L.P.S. Diplomatic up^{ns} don't always know military background. Mal I have Joint Staff Mission to advise me.

Statements out - but interviews with Press & much more objectionable.

Malifax. Rigid rule about interviews. But give some latitude for set speeches.

S/Doms. Statements "if asked" can be passed by B. up^{ns} abroad. But no Press interviews.

Agreed.

Nash. Don't young hero types don't have scripts in advance. They just talk. Don't stop them doing that.

L.P.S. Junior Offs. in diff. posⁿ. One ruling should be limited to senior officers.

Exceptions can be made in particular cases - e.g. Mountbatten - with permission of War Cabinet.

"Officers who have held high command"

Report on Women's Services.

L.P.S. Suggⁿ that women's ^{or has been} ~~has been~~ ^{is} being implemented. Can you publish statement of what is being done.

W.O. Say at publication a great many programmes have been, or are being, carried out.

Agreed.

W.O. Will M/huf. lead Press on disposal of the rumours & vilification.

M/huf. Yes. If W.O. will give me a hand-out. Agreed.

M/L. So. 21/22. Immobile women. I think much more can be done. Cf. some other countries in detail. Agreed - defer till consider merits of Rpt. W.O. There is a Ctee wh. will take this in its stride - it is considg. how work in mixed stations can best be divided betwn. A.S., soldiers, civilians etc.

Carlton Hotel as Officers' Club for U.S. Forces.

L.P. U.S. auths now don't want it. Opps. as against men.

Read letter fr. Eisenhower. Action dictated solely by interests of U.S. Forces.

Took note.

India.

a) Situation.

L.S.A. Generally better. Most serious in Bihar - interference always continuing at Patna and scattered violence.

Widespread attacks on commun^{ist} indicate premeditated purpose: but usually indicate lack of organisation.

No serious communal trouble so far.

L.P. Report that Police in Bihar are cause for anxiety.

L.P.S. Publicity in India leads to spread of disorder. Can't that be stopped?

L.S.A. Viceroy is "considering." War Cab. He seems a bit slow. W.O. But really he has decided not to do it - L.P. agreed.

Halifax. Interest of Press Authorities before would be voluntary cessation of public^{ity} of Nat. Press. These rumours produced an almost worse situation. Pres. Govt/India are thinking of that.

L.S.A. Give Viceroy time + discretion.

L.P.S. Press here can play it down - but not to suggest that the thing is all over.

b) Assurance to Viceroy's Council.

L.S.A. Personal risks wh. members had run

Viceroy's approval to draft etc. Since then - amended to meet L.P.S.'s criticisms.

Amended draft approved.

c) Gandhi's Fast.

L.S.A. No alternative but unconditional release or let him die.

Neither Govt. nor P.C. nor Council will face second.

L.P.S. Why not let him out as soon as he begins to fast.

L.P. This is cons. Let him out when he is likely to die. Who will judge that?

Then M.O. He will take no risks. What intⁿ will you give to M.O. - you can't do it. Either responsibly professionally or not. He can't accept intⁿ v. his prof. discretion. With a man of this age, he will take no risks.

Walfax. Then M.O. will let him go as soon as health goes back.

L.P. It's a mockery then to talk about detaining him until health is in danger.

Walfax. Will you eat & moude?

L.S.A. Original plan - but ^{Walfax} G/India didn't like it.

Walfax. I wd. in no case. have G. die on my hands. Re. informed by Deia's dying.

That being so, wd. leave handling of it to Viceroy. Make up your mind on the fundamental question.

L.P.S. Once you've made up v. mind not to keep him to death, let him out the moment he begins to fast.

W.O. Moral of this is to our original decision to deport was right.

L.P. Not going v. Viceroy if you accept my view.

My own experience. I've resisted suggestⁿ of intⁿ to M.O.

You can say "we'll hold him whatever happens? you do v. trust for him" - he can resist.

But given this situation, M.O. will play for safety.

Unfair to ask M.O. that. Say "Tell me when in yr. judgment it is unsafe to keep him."

Doubtful policy to put G. in, if you weren't going to let him.

V. dangerous as yield to hunger strike.

I wd. put him in a ring fence - but take no responsibility for him & his health. except at G's request. No Govt. M.O. / No rules about food. Then I wd. see it thro'!

That propⁿ has never be. put to G/India. This is what I did with

Indians in Bengal. Made clear that they were responsible. Then let him starve.

W.O. agreed - & written to be so recorded.

Modified form of internment, of "Home domicile" in Bengal. Met with well known in India.

W.O. Question arose when I was in India. Viceroy asked his Council & also Field - who said people in India wd. soon get over his death.

L.S.A. L.P.'s propⁿ didn't meet obj^s.

S/Doms. Agreed with L.P. K.W. and L.S.A. because that's the Viceroy.

L.P. Effect of A. during wd. to considerable, in my view.

Halifax. Tell Viceroy we don't like his 5. telegram. But L.P.'s proposal to him. We wd. withdraw - our only contⁿ being preventⁿ of his revolutionary course.

Agreed.

(A) Whipping Discipline.

L.S.A. Telegram fr. Humly. Act v. useful - welcomed by large sections of community.

Spanning need - 39 cases in 9 wks riot.

Riot, p.d.h. and only.

1) Asked to find out nature of the instrument.

M/bf. Why did Humly broadcast?

L.P.S. 2) Issue some re-assuring statement.

Agreed - 1) and 2)

L.P. Hope they won't do any whipping.

Agreed } Convey that impression to Viceroy.
i.e. Don't withdraw, but don't use.
Strong caution against.

(C) continued.

W.O. Was it to make clear in telegram to we attach importance to G. not winning or scoring by fast. Issue is who G/India or G. are going to win.

Express grave disquiet about this side.

North American Supplies.

Took note of W.P. (42) 353.

Mr. Nash.

Expressions of farewell.

I. Service Pay & Allowances.

- K.W. Debate line - people want to put news, let 'em: Govt. W. Paper said "matters with Govt. until later this know. At end promise consider & announce decision later.
Conservatives - division of opinion likely.
- S/Air. No comment.
- L.P.S. V. dangerous document - will provoke demands for increase. Shows soldier much lower paid than industrial & p.u. workers.
- K.W. You are comparing raw recruit with worker who has been in industry for long time.
- L.P.S. Wrong to make the comparison at all. Confine to statement of Servicemen's post?
- K.W. Fact fact that comparison has been & will be made. This puts it in proper perspective.
- L.P.S. The nearer the comparison the greater the danger. Close enough to provoke argument that the narrow gap shd. be closed. Put first the facts, w/out comparison! and don't say w/out comparison can properly be made. Only true comparison is what spending money has each left.
- L.P. i.e. purpose of Paper is to show what ^{comparison} shd. be, consolidated rate inclg. all emoluments if he were in civilian life. This is the equivalent of an income of X in civil life.
- W.O. Necessary to bring out diff^{ts} in system - e.g. differential pay of married men.
"No comparison can fairly be made" vice "consider before comparison is made".
- Parliament. 1st Lord should vice of L.P.S. Promise of W. Paper has excited expectations in Fleet: avoid it giving for material for argument.
- K.W. Remarkable that, when last addition made to pay, Army. said no occasion for it. Then, a few weeks ago, Army. asked for increases for offrs. and nothing for men. Then they heard W.O. suggests another 1/2 a day. Then suddenly Army. find Fleet v. much disturbed by announcement of W. Paper and advocate increased pay for ratings!
- H.O. Repercussions on C.D. pay. We have rejected industrial analogy, and stuck to cash value of emoluments of married soldier + 1 child. If you prove your case for Army pay too well, C.D. will ask for more! We like further chance to consider W. Paper.
- S/Doms. W. Paper did not appear to make out a case. Factual & objective.
- Commons. Offr. class "specially favoured" in income tax. K.W. Modify wording to avoid that.
- L.P.S. Benefit of pensions not mentioned. W.O. Other than regulars, don't get any save disability. L.P.S. Cheap goods at N.A.A.F.I. L.P. Mention Fleet as further indication that you can't make precise calculations.

Halifax. last para. to foot of p 3. K.W. This has been done already.

K.W. Let me re-cast, in consultⁿ with H.O. and L.P.S. Service Ministers to see final version. Publish end of next week. Agreed.

W.O. Tactics in debate. Shd. we not make up our minds in advance.

K.W. Better, as they want to air views, to listen.

H.O. But Govt. is losing its initiative then. Reason to consider will only mean concessions. Sooner you make up your mind & say so, the better.

S/Air. If we are going to make a concession, K.W.'s tactics are right. Otherwise, not. Generally agreed - decide before Debate what concession is to be made.

W.O. If you make it, do it or pay not by kidding with allowances.

K.W. Then Cab. Cts at once.

A. Whip. Agree that, if we aren't going to consider concessions, better say so at once.

Brentford? Our posⁿ has been changed: of tax in mercantile marine pay.

L.P.S. You will never get this right w/out having a wages policy - for rest of war.

H.O. Question of policy on Service pay is to go to L.P.C. etc? Agreed.

II. Participation of de Gaulle in Preparations for Operations in France.

A.E. Troublesome - no ideal solution.

We are agreed a) F.F. is to assist in adminⁿ in Madagascar.

b) F.F. not to be used at all in Torch.

Sorry they know so much about it. Heard from Bulet & Gen. F. Phillips (U.S. Embassy).

France itself: The more you interest de G. in this, the easier to keep him out of Torch. I wd. recommend fullest practical use of him in Round-up &

S.O.F. in Mch. France - as a way of keeping him out of Torch.

I wdnt have as much hope as C.O.S. of Vichy Army.

C.O.S. W.P. 349. para 2. Re-considered.

(1) Use of Army: but now agree to return of Air Force.

(2) C.I.G.S. has talked to de G. about co-ordinⁿ of sabotage etc. with plans:

captⁿ Lt. S.O.F. is general staff for this. We wd. like S.O.F. to go on co-ordinatg. & to see him with us.

Selborne. de G. has no secret organizⁿ in France. Various units working on their own use him as symbol. We will go on co-operatg. with him & will help him. But don't want to hand this over to him in France: he has no organization there.

S/Domo. Long-term position. A.E. Don't know what de G.'s long-term posⁿ will be after Torch.

L.P.S. Difficult with French people? if 2 diff. organiz^{ns} work, in parallel w/out co-ordination.

Silverton. Many independent groups etc. came to life independently - & use de G. only as symbol.

Possible suggⁿ of working other etc. as key in with de G.

L.P.S. Tho' not now, de G. will soon be working a separate organization of his own.

S. Germans can break organiz^{ns} in France much more easily than in Norway.

A.E. Consider closer co-ordination - S.O.E. being channel for contact with C.O.S.

S. We must maintain our non de G. contacts - etc. he wants us to repudiate.

C.O.S. (A) in para. 2. Still feel v. dangerous to let F.F. H.Q. to know plans. But no sign of de G. being associ^{ed} with plans for administration in France.

W.O. U.S. if they command etc. is responsible for adminⁿ? And the U.S. rep^{ts} on x) our other tasks vis-a-vis de G. shd. not be in.

A.E. Tendency for U.S. politicians is to encourage de G. overmuch.

L.P. x) is an impossible view.

S. We expect bitter civil strife in France when Boche goes. Our contacts are with the people who have been sitting on the fence.

A.E. Surely you shd. keep yr. Vichy contacts quite separate from yr. organization in occupied France.

W.O. On (H) dilemma. In military occupied territory source of auth^y is military commander, whom object will be to restore civil Govt. In France, there is no constituted Govt. to restore - as in Holland or Belgium.

L.P.S. Isolate occupied fr. unoccupied France for S.O.E. + adminⁿ purposes. And broadly, bring de G. in on former while excluding him fr. latter.

S. and S/Doms. Not so simple. Unoccupied is base for work in occupied F.

A.E. 1. (adminⁿ?) - postpone till after Torch.

2. S.O.E., S.I.S. etc. Bring them in for occupied F., and leave ourselves a free hand with unoccupied.

1. Operations. What do C.O.S. say?

C.A.S. We shd. disclose until late stage, for security reasons.

L.P. What wd. you say to him. Afraid of their flying off the handle if told nothing. Wd. prefer to tell them outline & put them on honour not to discuss.

V.C.I. & S. They know we have plans. We can say v. little w/out going into ^{some} detail. Any detail passed on to people at de G. H.Q. is gone - no security at all.

If we begin & then have to refuse to go further into detail, we are worse off than ever.

S/Doms. Can you bring him in as technical expert - sp. on tanks?

W.D. Adding would be injury.

L.P.S. Can't keep him fr. knowing what we are at, can you?

V.C.G.S. Apart fr. Bulbit, yes.

A.E. I think he knows already.

But I wd. be ready to rely on 2/ + hold up 1 & 2 until after Torch.

My problem is to prevent an explosion when he hears about Torch.

L.P.S. What is obj to 3?

W.D. It runs back into 1. Also U.S. have the lead on this.

S/Air. After Torch you really can't keep him out of propⁿ on Round-up.

S/Doms. Impose. to give him inf. about sp. plans far in advance.

Impose. to keep him out of considⁿ of adminⁿ problems.

Needs looking into.

Walford. Can't discuss open^l plans.

Can talk to him about S.O.F. activities. Explore & discuss & gain time.

Adminⁿ - discuss with him principles on hypothesis not plans.

Principle - gain time, talk, tell him nothing about plans.

L.P. Fact that C-in-C is American ^{citizen} does not mean that source of all judicial power is American. He is i/c on behalf of U.Nations.

W.D. V.well. Then my objⁿ still stands: the Americans take this line. I'm not saying it's not our affair: I'm saying only that it may be diff. to carry U.S. Army with us on this point.

Agreed. Approach U.S. Govt. on 3 & get their consent (F.O.).

A.E. Beware of developments after Torch. Someone else may come fwd.

L.P. Could trouble by keeping d. & at arms length.

Agreed - $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Do 2 \& 3 (subject to U.S. consent)} \\ \text{Leave 1 alone.} \end{array} \right.$

Death Sentences in Belfast.

S/Doms. 6 men condemned to death in Belfast for shooting policeman. Appeal now pending.

Reptⁿ from Sir & U.S. Govt.

Have we any locus? Ordinarily p. of mercy is for Govt. N/Ireland: but clause in instructions that he personally with advice of his Ministers shd. consider any case in wh. national interest involved.

W.M. (42) 116th Meeting.

22nd August, 1942.

Middle-East: Division of Command.

- C.A.S. C.A.S. considered. Welcome unit of Air Command. On splitting Army Command nothing to add to news conf. to A.C.M. on 7/8.
- V.C.I.G.S. Welcome Wilson's appointment.
- S/Dome. We can only endorse - Agreed: S/Dome to telegraph accordingly.
- V.C.I.G.S. Estimated strength of Rommel's forces.
- C.A.S. About 100 up on us in aircraft - but some are Italian.
- L.R.S. Tunis article today - ill-judged. Can't Press to give guidance? - Can we not have more time to prepare ground for the next appointments.
- Ismay. M/Huf. did see Editor before announcement of Auchinleck.
- Agreed - { M/Huf. to see Tunis Editor.
Ismay to handle this - via Radcliffe - or by seeing B. West himself.
Ismay to do it if P. Bracken is not available.
- Add to telegram { you will arrange for synchronized
10 P.M. { Assume no immediate announcement. We still have 24 hours' notice.
-

P.M.'s Journey.

S/Dome. announced P.M.'s return. no one is to be told until arrived in A.K. Then other Ministers, High Comm., Wainwright & Maistry. In advance War Cabinet & C.C.S.

I. India.

L.S.A. Most admin in 5-93 Provinces.

Latter telegram 2558-5.

Hence not worth discussing till Gov's views known. Agreed.

Tendency to suggest Gov. Gen. in Council should exercise greater influence in Province.

Mudbariwalla is insensible on Prov. autonomy in name of Indianisation.

Assam will now return to democratic govt.

General Situation.

Looks better. ^(now the only cause of trouble) Even in Bihar / improvement in most parts - tho' still anxiety in some areas.

Loyalty of Police (except in Bihar) striking.

S/Dome. 50% Column not Congress?

L.S.A. Telegram - some movements since Congress inspired. May be engineered by force directly by enemy. Money behind it - prominence of students (tho' Muslim students have held aloof).

M/L. Need for labour policy for India in present stage. Political strikes: only people organising labour are politicians. Standard of life too low for state of production.

Viceroy shd. consider development of social & industrial policy for India.

of Indian seamen: paid less than Chinese. Obstacle to improvement = big business in India. Insurance contributions paid into pool for B. seamen: if they wd. run an Indian scheme, we cd. let them have the contribⁿ in respect of labour.

L.S.A. On seamen, M/L. M/W.T. and I.O. considering post war - hope something will emerge.

L.P.S. A good man shd. be sent out to India. M/L. Looking into that now.

S/Dome. Cabinet to have a report on progress.

Gandhi.

L.P. Viceroy in recent telegram S- strongly in favour of letting G. starve to death: + added all Muslim members of Council wd. have same view. Yet at the time of decision we were assured that all opinion was solid against that.

This was a relevant point on Sh. Cab. we have had information at the time. We are told now: but not told at the time of decision.

Gave us a partial opinion - without telling us it was a partial opinion. Disturbing.

L.P. Intelligence in India shd. be able to find out what anything more behind the disorder - eg. attempt to cut Bihar off. Important that, if this is so, we should show it up & make full use of it.

II. Machinery of Government.

L.P.S. Re-consider in light of war experience & post-war needs.

Small Ctee - L.P. in chair - co-opting as necessary - report to Cabinet & decide then whether publication is advisable.

K.W. "Other central auths" in +. f. L.P.S. Semi - Govt. Dept. & not local govt. except its relation to central govt.

S/Doms. Civil Service. L.P.S. Yes. "machinery and management."

M/L. Distribution of functions? L.P.S. Yes.

L.P. Haldane Ctee procedure inappropriate for domestic govt. such as super-minister. Hence liberty to call in outsiders but not giving them responsibility & not necessarily publish all the results.

Merits - agreed.

Procedure - agreed better to do it "domestically." Against "outside" bodies.

Too much work? L.P. Slender & skilled Secretariat.

Method in memo. agreed. Personnel to be decided by P.M. Either

3 or 5: smaller the better.

III. Parliamentary Business.

S/Doms. Shd. Parl. meet earlier than 8/9, now that P.M. is back; for statement by him. General feeling - public content to wait & give P.M. a rest.

Ch. Whip. Heard nothing. Rise don't now expect it. P.M. adverse from it. "We wd. have little to add."

S/Doms. Then hope P.M. won't broadcast.

Ch. Whip. When return known, put out idea that he shd. have a rest.

Programme ^{agreed} - 1/20 last year. Meet & sit 1 week; adjourn 2 weeks clear; then clear up outstanding business; and a few days recess before new Session.

IV. Foreign Affairs.

A.F. ^{visit to day.} Argentine Amb. / Dif. Dept. in view of Brazil's declaration. "If Brazil wants us in they had better ask for our help" i.e. better way than U.S. bullying us in.

Foreign Affairs.

A.E. Visit to Turk. Amb. fear of pressure on Turks - if R. fall back in south. Emphasized lack of armaments - where wd. be able to supply them. We had taken American supplies en route for Turkey. Particularly, need anti-tank guns.

? 2 1/2 pds. C.I.G.S. Short of ammo for Iraq Persia front.

Ca. P.M. see the Ambassador? P.M. Yes.

Talks with Stalin.

P.M. 4 Mtgs. nil to add to info circulated. But opinions - large man: great sagacity. Expl. some past mysteries. Re. war misleadg. of our Mission etc. 'certain B. didn't intend war - wd. frame-up with French. Confirmed by our office - F. So Duvie and B. 3 Duvie. Sure H. wasn't bluffing. At Munich an effort might have been made - after let. nil with our armed strength.

When Molotov there in June '40 you raided Berlin. Ribbentrop took him to shelter.

Effort on M. of his visit here has been permanent - never stops smiling - now thought in Russia to have a B. orientation, whereas of old he had a German orientation.

Public Statement. If battle in next few days, will broadcast on that - & swing in some references to these other matters. If not, then I will wait until Party. n. assembly.

Stalin did not exaggerate his plight in order to exploit or extort help from us.

S/Doms. Expresses gratitude of War Cab. to P.M. for his great efforts.

P.M. Shahn of Persia - v. good impression: thought well of him.

Khediv - didn't care for him. Liked Nahaas Pasha.

Reference to need for Thermopile (?) to keep our upst. cool in hot climates.

Will send telegram to Stalin to-night, thanking him.

Air Services to M/East.

P.M. Everyone wants better services, but what is the best?

C. V. de problem - Nov. '41 - Air Min. was doing their best

{	12,000 lbs. a week April 42
	16,000 Sept. 42

But apparent to G.P. wd. get v. little of the increase.

When 12,000 lbs. total, G.P. wanted 7,000 lbs. Sec. of the said impossible.

Finding agreement. asked C.O.S. to fix priorities - they preferred urgent freight to wait.

S/Mr. Promised 14,000 lbs. to end Aug. & then 6,000.

Average already 16,500 in last weeks - in spite of great diff. Boujis & Whittys.

But we can't see our promise already. But we like to do still more. Recognize morale point.

Now considering (a) taking 1 Sunderland ^{from production} / a month for 6 months beginning Oct.
(Cost of 17 a month)

(b) (reluctantly) taking Warwicks (6000 lbs. for 800 mile range) - 10/12

might be provided - at expense of Bomber Command. 2/3 in Sept.

rising to 10/12 over next few months.

Result: from 16,500 ^{increase} - / by 10,000 by end of year.

P.M.G. Substantial increase in aircraft capacity - already - but no increase in allocation of space for mails. That stands for 2 years. This p.c. + a/craft not enough in view of ^{air} demands. Demand for sealed letter (b.d. a time). But I need 6,000 lbs to start it. No prospect, not only of getting that, but even of quantity. P.T. + a/craft.

4,000 lbs. had recently to go by sea to W. Africa & thence on by air.

1,500 + will have to go in end Aug.

Army grows a little chance of maintaining existing facilities, still less provide more.

Feb. '42 ^{load} p.c. = 953 lbs. a week } Due to increase in Army strength
last week = 3,106 " " "

M/L. If capacity is ^{1/2} raised by 10,000 lbs. can't you get some of yr. extra 6,000 lbs.?

W.O. Point he must have a large & steady allotment before he can start a new venture.

P.M.G. More than allocation - ^{absolute} shortage of capacity. I can't ask for priority over tank spares.

S/Air. We can put extra stuff on for special crises for eg. tank spares.

P.M. Matter of high military importance to ensure that the Army gets its letters.

Let Coastal Command & Bomber Command (1:2) provide the aircraft needed.

Morale of that Army must be maintained.

AVA. Crisis of 2-Boat was a bad time for me to give up even one more aircraft.

P.M. See what can be done. And remember this is a military objective. The men's minds are more important than their bodies.

Reading matter (by sea).

P.M.G. I want 6,000 lbs. a week on a definite basis.

S/Air. I accept that ruling - if we can work up sealed fr. Oct. onwards.

P.M. ① Mandate to produce a scheme for 6,000 ^{lbs. a} weeks to start in a month. If the cost is shown to be too great, we'll re-consider. But vital military objective.

② W.O. to submit scheme for reading matter. Holdg. re-printing in Cairo.

Air Raid Damage.

- H.O. High level - single bomb attack. B'hol. 48 killed & much damage.
Swinden B. 6 seriously injured.
- P.M. Importance of avoiding announcement indicating trouble. Why not set up announcements.
- H.O. No casualties issued. Will look into question of giving it away in news.

China.

- A.E. ^{Air} Instructions sent. Party Mission (2 M.P.'s + 2 Peers) are being sent. This will help.
- P.M. Why send 2 good men away for 3 months? A.E. They will do good. They were chosen by Speaker. Churchill knows.
- L.P.S. Announcement in Press today re R.A.F. will be done. Looked official. Where came it?
- S/Air. Renewed effort sent to Peirse. A/Huf. Promised to enquire.
- A.E. Groundstaff already there - doing nothing - bad impression.
- P.M. Favoured sending a squadron. S/Air - considering only what it can be done.
Am in favour of it, if practicable.
- P.M. Renewed air protest v. Party mission; and indicated that he wd. like at least to be consulted in advance before anything like this is done again!
- Loan to China.
- A.E. Think C/E is right. Can't be pressed further.

India.

Gandhi Starving.

- L.S.A. Viceroy's latest telegram - L.P.'s suggested conditions seem acceptable to Viceroy.
- L.P.S. Put the issue as it presented itself previously to Cabinet. Issue = who is to be responsible for his health and welfare.
- K.W. Against letting all his friends visit him.
- L.S.A. Showing no signs so far of wanting to starve.
- P.M. Indian show-down v. satisfactory. Recruiting v. favourable. Congress shown unable to move the masses - a great flop. They have come out as a revolutionary movement: influenced or working with Japanese; and have failed. Show that Congress don't represent India - only Congress caucus and Hindu priesthood.
- L.S.A. Tell U.S.A. that this impression has been done by Indian Executive Council and 5 Indian Provincial Govts. R.J.G. Go slow on that - the Council may yet run out.

H.O. Take the money from the offending Indian rich & distribute it to the suffering Indian poor.

M/L. Time is overdue for progressive social policy in India.

P.M. Yes - Start an anti-profiteers movement. Why doesn't some Indian Party take it up?

What death-duties? P.I. None. P.M. Why ever not?

Agreed - Suggest to Viceroy etc. he submits some proposals.

Disciplinary Powers of Indian Army Officers.

L.S.A. ① No legislation here.

② Numbers. Mostly junior officers. V. few in command. A few ind in command who might command temporarily. Considered P.M.'s suggⁿ of giving them King's Comm^{ns} when occasion arises. Diffy is lot. need often temporary - awkward to make them permanently diff. in status. Also automatic temp. cov. when superior wounded.

Numbers small - but principle important. They may be turned out, as Washington was ^{by} being put under B's ^{junior} officer

W.O. Worst moment for an inevitable change.

G. was writing about misconduct of B. troops. It will be raised up against you.

S/Domo. You are presenting them with great argument against us.

P.M. Pity to raise it now.

Agreed - accept L.S.A.'s proposal.

State of Home Opinion.

P.M. State of morale p. good. K.W. Always is when Parl. is not sitting.

P.M. How long do we sit? K.W. If we sit on the Friday, we may get them to go away for 3 weeks. Two days on the war.

P.M. Statement first day about D/Kent. Follow with general statement on the war.

A.E. Impression in Press etc. 2nd Front is off for this year.

P.M. Important to play up the Germans - not let them draw off troops fr. France.

Took note.

Re-organisation of A.F.V. Division of My Supply.

Took note.

I. The Military Situation.

Bombes. 1,000 sorties 750 tons dropped. 34 or 35% lost. No moon.

Day - anti-sub mostly 1 U-Boat attacked & prob. damaged.

420 tons on Saarlauten via Saarbr. by mistake.

430 " Karlsruhe

409 " Bremen 1/5

420 " Duisberg - ground target not v. well concentrated.

U.S. Bombes. 115 sorties. 150 tons.

Y'day attacked for first time - lost 2: claim 5: 13: 25. Bomb form/

Coastal. 100 s. lost 7. 13 U-Boats attacked 2 bombed, 3 prob. damaged.

Shot down 2 Arado

Fighters. 2500 sort. lost 4. U.S. 250 no enemy met.

Enemy: 49 day 31 night. vice versa. Fighters 8: 3: 9 for loss 4.

Enemy loss for UK. 10: 3: 16 v. U.F. 27 3: 4 Coastal.

Difficulties: Coastal raids - R.A.F. wanting: patrols & coast guns v. expensive.

High flying raids - Spitfire VI wait near the height, blowers being fixed. Spitfire IX will do the height, but no pressure cabin.

Spitfire VII has both: but not used till Dec. Pilots especially trained.

Malta. 3: 2: 5 for our loss 4. 4 raid-free days

Loss of enemy merchant ships

Egypt. 3800 sorties (890 in one day) with U.S. Mostly (3/4) v. Army. V. heavy

Losses by concentrated bombing. 7 tanks by air weapons.

V. shipping - 3 sunk, 1 + 1 destroyer hit. Now hunting convoys of 10.

C.R.S. upland coast ports now 3 + 9 destroyers.

Enemy 67: 30: 55. Our 63: 23.

India & Burma. Nil or upst.

Pacific. Minor raids Darwin. 2 destroyed for none lost.

C.N.S. 3 destroyers sunk U-Boat at Barbados. Another damaged into Saarlauten.

P.Q. 18. has sailed - 24 hrs. late. 40 ships.

M.F.B. raided Gages on 2/3/42. (C.O.H.)

Losses. 55,000 tons. ^{with} ~~with~~ Baled = 114,000

W. India (4) Freetown (4) + new development. Aden by Jap. sub.

C.I.G.S. 180 tanks to Pt. 122. held there at 3/8.

300 rounds p. gun fired on 2/9 v. Kum.

Genl. retirement started there - & carried on 3 days.

50 tanks destroyed: for loss of 52 of ours (30 Grants).

M.T. casualties: mainly by air attack on concentrations of 1000 + 1200 MT.

Some signs of fuel shortage.

Night 3/4th Italians landed 44 men to cut ^{railway} pipe line. W' in 4 hrs.
re-established & raiders captured.

G. 100 ^{tanks} remaining now.

193 Shearwaters disembarked fr. 2-6 Sept. 18 trained for training already
20 p. day this workshop. 24th Bth completed by 14/9 and ready to fight 1/10.
2nd " " " " 20/9 " " " 6/10.

Front now held by Italians, while G. re-fit behind. Saw in north.

Clear indication now that G. are getting the better of tanks
in this desert fighting.

S. Pacific. New Guinea. Indio? Taps may re-inforce. Another tank to re-inforce; now 2 Divs.

Solomons. Taps seem to be preparing another ^{counter} attack.

Russia. V. little in north.

Stalingrad area. V. intense.

Grozny. Attacks mainly held.

In the past - some progress in most westerly pass. Should be freezing up now.
Capture of Novorossiisk - most serious event of week (if G. claim true) ∴ it will
enable them to supply fr. Crimea.

P.M. Statements by L. Divinov in U.S. ? Worth while to ask the Russians to put a
muzzle on their. P.D. to consider (doubtful).

Foreign Affairs.

Extra-territoriality in China.

A.F. In spring set review on foot. Supreme litig. no time to discuss future
("our stock so low"). U.S. agreed. U.S. now wd. like to take it up - leave.

Treaties affecting our post-war trade.

Trade agreements to stand over till after the war. We agree: & glad U.S. have

approached us. We stand to gain if we move with U.S. rather than alone.

Will circulate details. But do War Cab. agree in principle Yes.

Turkey.

A.F. Waitg. C.O.S. Rpt. on supplies (C.O.S. to-morrow).

Operational training of Turkish pilots. P.M. Enquired. But the training covers the whole range of Fighter Control - & we know that some of those included among the pilots. Air Min. will now give them a modified system of operational training. S/Air wd. like to tell Ambassador as he has to refuse him before - Agreed.

P.M. May be able to spare some tanks for Turkey if Libya is cleared up satisfactorily. W.O. to look into it. 2 pts. quere also.

Russia. Ministry - troubled by recent advances on mobility of Armies. Lorne to take precedence in over tanks in our convoys. We'll do this. Transport aircraft also. Said, however, that we haven't any. Asked about U.S. output.

No record. P.M. Preparation of another P.Q. Convoy - will have to be considered by smaller * mtg. Within the next weeks.

de Gaulle. Syria receives subsidy from us. Expect to hold it up - as pressure.

Air Raid Damage.

H.D. Small attacks. Main diff. as in C.A.S. statement. Casualties not heavy.

India: Detention of Gandhi.

L.S.A. Visitors - bond as in telegram.

Armed object - discussion unlikely to go on to day.

Wd. ask Viceroy to reduce visitors to minimum.

Meanwhile no indication that he will fast.

W.O. Doubtful about visit, ⁱⁿ principle: danger of communication of with Japs.

Agreed - subject to caution to Viceroy about not going too far.

M/L. Have you ^{telegraphed} Viceroy about social policy. L.S.A. I've written. Yes. But we can do it in 2-3 Provinces. M/L. But was there not an understanding that protection leg. shd. not be introduced while interim Govt. in force?

L.S.A. Something like that.

M/L. But 3 years have passed. We really shd. act on this now. Areas being industrialised.

Publication of Documents

F.O. As in memo.

We might to put out documents now. If not, at least prepare for public & damaging our interest by not doing so. & release at appropriate moment.

K-W. Weight + size. Not 20 people will read them. Only damaging excerpts will be published.

A.E. Also a shorter document Draft, which will sell.

S/Doms. No reason why should be published.

M/huf. At least prepare for public?

H.F. Will not object to publ? now of the shorter edition.

Simon. I did read them, at yr. request, + I made a report. No v. decided line - but what advantage will be gained? They show up G. as unreasonable and treacherous - but all know that. On other hand, the material is offered for those critics who want to pick out damaging documents.

L.P.S. Opinion in L.P. is the most important considⁿ. This will provide the material for those who wish to support us.

Prepare for publ? (incl^y. short version)

Cabinet anti? for issue to be obtained.

Air Transport Facilities.

Note taken.

Scientists

Note taken.

Service Pay + Allowances.

L.P. Double War Pay. i.e. 3/6 to 7/6

Children's Allowance, and other points as noted at L.P. Cite

Estimated cost £50M. - incl^y. increases on C.D. pay.
£34M for
£5M. children 3/6 prompt 3 for offrs. allowances.

Agreed.

M/L. to see - G
Cd. Rise of stories about coloured troops?

Herald to-day. Dance at Eye.

P.M. Discuss it with M/huf.

Parliamentary Business.India Debate.

- L.P.S. ^{Friday} ~~Thursday~~ adjournment - free at present.
- P.M. Anyone can raise any subject in plenary. But don't want organised debate India.
(Stud. have thought in order to discuss y'day - at least military situation.)
- A.E. Pity to have whole day on India.
- L.P.S. If others raise it - stud. we then Govt. reply?
- Ch. Whip. If debate unimed. following P.M. statement, pref. to make the statement on an adjournment not refer it. If ed. still in statement, not speech.
- P.M. In that case, I wd. prefer to make a speech. L.P.S. Better not. Wd. encourage a days Debate.

L.P.S. Statement on 9.9.47.

- P.M. Why encourage criticism?
- L.P.S. Didn't. Required last opportunity to express support.
- P.M. Silent support is pro. best. W/G. in v. good mood - better to have left them alone.
- L.P.S. Gent. effect was bad. P.M. Disagreed.
- L.P.S. If Parle. is not, then after a month's holiday then they might wait - at least until P.M. had finished his speech.
- P.M. Didn't worry me - luncheon engagements etc.,
- S.Doms. Root diff? is hours of mtg. Lunch breaks first speech - and effect & dinner hour in place.
- L.P.S. House would agree to meet 2 pm. Ch. Whip. Paper going early to Press - diff. of transport - reasonable etc. W/G. stud. want to go on mtg. earlier.
- P.M. M.P.'s don't work by making speeches: watchdogs can be silent.
- L.P.S. Diff. view - many Members can debate w/out speaking.
- P.M. Country not prepared - mtg. on with their jobs.
- A.E. f. Manchester Guardian - debate not an anti-digest.
- S.Doms. Members with engagements (Clerks etc.) "unimed. after P.M. has spoken". And the Clerks etc., who are part of Parle? life now has to be crowded into the 3 days sitting.
[Torch. Danger of pieces of information being built into a story.]

India - no organised Debate. Day is free if others raise it.

- P.M. Stud. I make my India statement Thursday - in order to separate it fr. Debate. Then have Friday free for all subjects at choice of members.

Say today - ^{P.M.} ~~we~~ make those statement on India tomorrow. If asked about
Debate - say "not to. tomorrow" : interference with Soldiers' Pay : but there's Friday
when any subject can be raised on the Adjournment."

[Enemy ^{Mediterranean} convoy / the ship. 1 sub. claim's one. Liberator claim's hit.
Looks promising.]

I. Parliament. Debate on India.

- Ch. Whip. After P.M. statement (adjournment talk + later debate) Conservatives table a Motion (to name). Argued that this wd. stop discussion to-morrow, on gal. at P.M. had promised time for formal discussion later. Done deliberately to stop discussion to-morrow.
- Ch. to be avoided by saying no definite date for future debate - S.O. "reasonable time!"
- P.M. Don't want benefit by trick. But don't want debate w/out Division. Prefer to promise debate w/in 2 wks. of return. But ch. bring house back for formal debate Tuesd. & Wed. Much less harmful than sporadic talk Friday.
- W. During wk. trying hard to avoid debate. Hoppy. p. statement wd. clear the air. That statement did however irritate certain sections of House. I suggest to split the vote and have organized debate Friday - balanced view. This resolution put down. Our policy to avoid Divⁿ - that is what I've tried to avoid - eyes of the world on this discussion. I recognise no trick: but can I convince my Party of this? Put down, I think, to meet the challenge given this morning. But I wd. prefer a Debate to-morrow, without a Divn.
- S/Dowd. A lot of steady Labour Members wd. speak to-morrow. Balanced view.
- L.P.S. If taken on Motion speech will be called in turn.
- M/L. Found tempers in H/Commons to-night running v. high. All this among our friends, not the Shivwells - they feel they'd been tricked by the Motion. If debate to-morrow avoided, we may get split in Labour Party v. members of Govt. All our Labour friends who have supported us in the India ^{crisis} Congress - must not be allowed to go off the rails over this point of procedure.
- Ch. not given wd. withdraw this Motion? L.P.S. They can't.
- P.M. If we say to-morrow full Debate w/in 1/3 weeks of re-assembling, Speech will call no-one on India. If we don't say that, he will call India to-morrow. Therefore the issue is in hands of Govt.
- L.P.S. Can - if said P.M. promised debate, does that stand: answer wd. have to be given. P.M. "I won't say anything to-day wh. will hamper the House in their desire to talk about India to-day." "On some future date, dependent on crisis in India." wd. meet Speaker.
- P.M. What sort of debate do we have to-morrow?
- S/Dowd. Solid view will be exp^d - tho' some screams will no doubt intervene.

Given promise of future Debate is being agreed with Speaker, and then let the discussion on Adjournment proceed.

P.M. Feeling only about Resolution?

L.S. Not only that. Some objⁿ to provocation some of P.M.'s statement.

A.E. If it goes till to-morrow, we can put a Govt. motion down & get a vote later.

Why did Conservatives put the Resolution down?

Ch. Whip. V. largely: they believed this was not the time to debate India.

L.S. But P.M. & I have both said they wd. be chance of talking about it on Friday.

Say - we don't want to take any action wh. wd. defer discussion.

L.S.A. to speak at about 3 P.M.

Right of secession - discussed.

Decision - We think better to have had fixed Debate later. But as expectⁿ raised, wd. not be proper Govt. take any steps wh. wd. make that impossible. ∴ no date for future debate sufficiently precise to prevent Spkr. from calling people on India to-morrow.

P.M. Remains only to square the people, whom I promised to-day a debate soon after Recess. Ch. Whip to see these members.

Make it a reasonable Debate to-morrow.

W. Greenwood will begin. Will take line of Labour party resolution.

Jim Walker will follow. Spkr. will take whatever names sugg^d to him.

II. Citrine's Visit to U.S.A. Statement at Blackpool criticising Halifax.

A.E. Saw Citrine about his visit to U.S. Said hoped he wd. do go. He gave no promise - said initiation with U.S. not him.

L.S. He telegraphed saying ^{he} understood A.F. would him to cancel his visit.

A.E. We had said we wished him to take initiation.

To-day he spoke at B/p. - disclosing that he had asked him not to go - criticised Halifax for his advice. See account in "Star" this evening. Said to give false impression of what happened.

Shd. I say something in support of Halifax - who was [advised by Tawney & H. Butler] will wait & see what Press play it down. If they don't will have P. Notice given & answer freely to-morrow informing to [] & sayg. satisfied with H. advice.

M/L. Say it - what Press play it down or not.

Foreign Affairs.

P.M. Libvior squealing: Airway planis.

Worrying about P.Q. 'only 1/5th of the time', is it worth while going on? More radios
cars must be considered.

Air Raid Damage.

H.O. Light work: but fear we shall get it later on.

P.M. Milestones round necks of our Bomber Command.

M/L. Are we lagging up our AA. Defence for the winter? C.A.S. Borrowed a lot: but
we have good allocation of Befors guns for Sept., with an ad. use.

Current probⁿ in G. - only 1,200 operational types p. month + trams (Transport)

Total potential bomber strength v. us on 1/1/43 only 450. (Intelligence estimate)

That wd. mean only 250/300 on a big night. Always rather large no in Germany

& fitting etc. V. low - didn't put too much weight on it.

Supply of Transport Aircraft to Russia.

M/P. Saw mainly Tri: said none in probⁿ here: only one type in large scale probⁿ in USA.

Promised ask P.M. to consider approach to President.

Replied to cover Wellington: but promised to consider other possibilities - eg.

Altamoras. There are 45 of these in maintenance units etc. in 3/4 etc. to
be converted to carry 20 men. ^{Then at} 20 a month up to 250.

C.A.S. If we have to do it, A. wd. fill the bill with least cost to us. But one of
the divisions etc. after Bomber Coastal Command indirectly. They were to be used
to free Hudsons. ^{Operational} 43 Squadrons a year ago now only 32 in Bomber Command.

P.M. It is for U.S. if they will. M/P. W/out up^{ing} to President, you won't get
it out of them.

M/P. While P.Q. diff^{er} with Russia: we might at least do the 45 p. maintenance
units.

P.M. Give this as interim measure - while we look into possibility of pressure
on U.S.A. Russians must ^{3 want.} ~~press~~ Agreed. - No decision: M/Rosⁿ to supply
P.M. with material for telegram to Stalin.

Food for Ceylon.

R.M. In Mar. Ceylon Govt. asked for rice. More related to military sitⁿ - willing to
supply Ceylon on same basis as India. Indigenous prodⁿ 150,000 tons.

30,000 t. p. m. reqd. 35,000 tons. April & May to build up stocks. End of April shipping sitⁿ deteriorated - only Karachi & country boats fr. Southern ports. We did all we cd. in shipping situation - 16,000 tons in 5 months.

Then sitⁿ worsened. Sindh crop lost (1 m. acres flooded 800/900,000 tons out of 26 m. tons). Normally we import 1 1/2 m. tons fr. Burma.

Transport worsened. I envisaged surplus prodⁿ in various areas of Bengal & Orissa. Bengal 3 m. tons excess. But ^{rural areas} both to send crop to market. Orissa has small surplus; Ministry will now be able to send this.

Since then commit^{ed} to supply Arabian States (on same priority) rice Burma supplies lost.

Madras now main source of surplus supply. Trouble here is transport. If we can overcome that, we cd. prod. work up to 30,000 tons.

Reluctance of Prov. Govts to control prices. Since I left, conference wh. indicates likelihood of more price control.

Recommend urging Govt/India to concentrate on this - no Directives yet. More effort. In reply to latest telegram.

C.O. When wd. full supply begin?

P.M. Pro. in October. Wd. deprecate pressure at this stage.

C.O. Ceylon will be out by 3rd week of Oct. We must fill the gap somehow. If I knew when Indian supply wd. come in, I cd. ask for more Australian wheat. I want current supply + 2 months' reserve.

A.E. Only 1/3rd of Indian requirements will meet Ceylon's needs.

Tam Sahab. My area has no rice at all - eating millet.

C.O. Cd. M/W.T. supply fr. Australia to carry us over until Oct.

M/W.T. 30,000 tons in Sept. is all we cd. do. Extravagant use of shipping.

L.S.A. Cd. G/India to ask to ship as much as poss. early in Oct.

M/W.T. We can carry as much rice as India can provide.

P.M. If it is only in 1 month, in advance, India cd. arrange.

Agreed - I.O. & L.O. to agree procedure.

Foreign Affairs.

Madagascar. P.M. doit avoir further thoughts there for sake of peace, F. French.

War Criminals. Stage for public announcement - Lt. Chase. Thursday 19/10. Propose to say of favour fact. finding Comm? b) press for arrest in America. Will circulate memo. to W.Cab.: merely give notice now so that Ministers will know that announcement is to be made.

Air Raids.

H.S. Tendency for d. light raids to increase. Bournemouth: Petworth. 6 on Wed: Woking + elsewhere in Sussex + Kent. Colchester: 60 casualties, 7 fatal.

Soviet Warships in Black Sea.

F.O. No immediate action - authority to proceed w/out delay when need arises.

P.M. Sideshow: we have 2 destroyers to give to Turkey: do we give them to N. Russia if they give 2/3 to Turkey.

F.O. Difficult quite to raise: shall leave it till last minute.

P.M. Best arrangement possible in the circumstances.

Agreed.

Refugee Children from Occupied France.

H.S. A no. of de facto orphans - we wd. prob. have to yield to pressure - better announce at once something on this. we doit have to give way. then I'd stand pat.

Agreed.

Postwar

Quinca Extra-territoriality.

F.O. Recd text of proposed Treaty: wh. they propose to announce 9/10. Will circulate to-night. May have to ask for special mtg of War Cabinet.

Parliament.

H.S. Bernays' Quo - motion for discussion of Army in Secret Session. Have sugg. to Rajahit de la dome on K's speech. If they asked for S. Session, we wd. comply. They wd. accept that.

W.S. had consulted P.M. suggestg. public Debate: of minutes: Effect on troops in M/East - feeling of lack of confidence at home. Wd. prefer Debate later and in public.

H.W. Can you give your defence in public.

has heard the
On Whip, f. Topical de Bernays. ^{which is really} Sign of Army in relation to its role. Show promotion for 1/corporals. Machinery for Parly could ^{W.D.} admit of Army.

L.P.S. They feel it awkward to discuss their views in public of their dual role as M.P.'s and
junior officers.

P.M. : Say: on K's speech
in principle, shd. be in public. But House can move in & out: & we sh. have a
part of Debate in secret if desired. Ch. Whip. You can't come out ^{again} until topic
concluded.

No qt. harm in secret debate? But W.O. shd. have chance of making his
statement. Why not have 2 Debates on this subject on the Address. Or, why
not have the open Debate early on the address: & then have the Secret Sectⁿ on the
amendment to the address. Or, preferably the other way round: debate in
secret on the amendment then revive the genl. Debate in public for W.O. to reply.

This matter will be discussed in any event in Debate on Address:
Then say - / they can raise their matter by putting down amendment to Address
& this, if House desires, can be taken in secret.

F.O. Soviet Annual Day - demonstrⁿ at Empire Hall. I've been asked to speak. H.O. told me
however it is prohibited under Comm. influence. I've refused.

My colleagues shd. know in case they are asked.

P.M. Off. show of our own? H.O. This is anniversary of R. revolution! L.P.S.

But in Russia it is comparable to the King's Birthday. H.O. i.e. the Gaiety Holiday!

P.M. why not have a mtg. sometime in Nov. (no specific ^{Russian} date) - to celebrate the R.
resistance. Consider this (carefully!)

Manufacturing of Prisoners of War.

- S/Doms. Letter of communiqué, demanding to manufacture 3 times as many P. prs.
Saw Massey & 2 Canadian Ministers & Bruce. Don't like post.
- a) Ref^d shd. have been made to Protectg. Tower.
b) Subterfuge in our statements.
- If this kind of thing is started, no knowing where it may stop.
What response fr. Canada? Adam. No reply yet.
We thought this was thing G. to their senses. It hasn't.
- S/Air. News thought it wd. at first. We knew we had to go thro' with it.
- A/L. Don't go in for any further reprisal yet.
- L.P. Distinction betw. manufacturing men in custody & tying up men not yet in custody.
- S/Doms. Canadians think we have put ourselves in a false post by concealing the truth.
- Adam. What we kept wrong was the advance instⁿ to the hands in every case to prevent destruction of documents. Are or not any need to do so to prevent escape.
- S/Doms. Before any other action taken, we shd. invite views of Dom Govts.
- L.P. We did not give more informⁿ, for our own people, about what happened at Dieppe.
But don't manufacture any more.
- Adam. Hope G. Army will put a stop to this nonsense.
The only get-out we have offered them is that we will countermand any orders to this effect.
- S/Doms. It's not only a question of ^{orders} fact^s. It is now a question of fact: at Sark it has happened again.
Must we not say, e.g. we have given orders, but we can't make rules governing conduct in the heat of action.
- Adam. They will keep this on for a time & then give up, saying they'll resume if we do it again.
- A/L. Doms shd. be given full report on the facts.
- S/Air. And? consult them on question of manufacturing equal nos. as Germans, prob. after verifying thro' Protecting Tower etc. Germans have done it.
- A.V.A. Explain reasons why we acted y'day w/out consultⁿ.
Public criticism if we take no action until Monday.
- Agreed a) Nothing more to done at present. b) Continue with what we have said we wd. do.
(Dieppe & Sark) and our view of propriety
- c) Tell Doms - facts, Law of War: & that, if G. carry out their new threat, we shd/ do
same: invite their views on that, quickly, with view to adj. Sat. night or Sunday.
- Statement to Press? No further statement at present.
- P.M. consulted on telephone. Agreed: but asked to see draft of statement.

Massing of Prisoners of War.

- W.O. Intercept radio - Germany refusing require intervention by Swiss. Besides Biopp pro. 3 times 4,000 odd ^(?) put in chains.
- P.M. Doubt soft. If we are defeated on air, ill-treatment of pros. will be used as black-mailing tactics. What happens if in truck raids doesn't affect relations future. Goets. No enquiry possible into events in battle - if did a person was killed who might have been taken pro. And business of Protecting Powers is with events in camps, not in field.
- W.O. 240 held in U.K. during daylight only. Handcuffs with about 1 ft. chains - taken off at night.
- P.M. Nothing to be published to indicate diff^{erent} opinion between us & Doms.
- M/L. No danger in U.K. Press. Danger pro. later in Dom. Press.
- S/Doms. All 4 Doms. are unhappy: not Canada only. While they stand in with us on what we've done, they don't want to go further & wish to explore arbit^{ration} by P.Powers.
- P.M. Bad ground to argue on facts.
- M/P. Begin by differentiating between events in battle & treatment in cage. L.P. Said already.
- M/L. In Fleet St. help. us. in direction of atrocities G. bound to win. No criticism (needs) about actions taken so far: but don't want to see it pressed further.
- P.M. We've each had up 1,500. G. remains to go up to 5,000. They haven't publicly announced they've done it. No ^{further} action from us: until aft. G. announcement. Let them have done so. We say to W/C. to-morrow "no further statement."
- L.P.S. Advantages in saying to-morrow enough to enable us to stall for some days.
- Combs. Motion in W/hords by Bishop Turo.
- P.M. Still think no statement unless further announcement by Germans. If they make a further bid, then we go on to manacle the rest of the 5,000. I wd. then G. wd. have to chain ^{another} 12,000. Then diff^{erent} begin to be great. Then we chain 12,000. Then they have to go to 36,000. They will find that v. hard. And don't many of them work? W.O. Yes - in mines, roads etc. Then 3 times 36,000 wd. run the Germans out. But we cd. go on with Italians. G. wd. be at end of tether after the 3rd. round: no more pros. left.
- Alternative. Turn the other cheek & submit. We may have to - if opinion in W/h. Doms. divided.
- Hitler has triumphed - proved B. at fault - wd. know he cd. do what he liked to and pro. w/out fear of retaliation on his.

But even that wd. be preferable to arbitration by a neutral Power into our actions, than
wd. to the worst solution of all.

M/L. German propaganda stresses a) interests of Colonial Troops & U.S. has led to this.
B. wd. be like this.
b) followed on War Guilt statement

Stidit of to sent to Doms.

M/P. Another course. If you don't say nos. claimed. G. have threatened to hold
but we aren't going to say how many we will claim. Reserve right to
manacle as many as we like. I wd. manacle them 3,000.
This wd. get away from the arithmetical
proposition. And depose them of a datum line.

S/Doms. Risk of other forms of brutality.

A. Shd. we not stand pat & wait for them to get tired.

M/L. Risk to Doms. wd. manacle any more.

S/W.O. We ca. then take up the running with Italians.

M/L. That will our public opinion support any more.

German (radio) don't seem happy about it. Stand pat & await developments.

S. You can't withdraw. But if you make another threat, you invite rejoinder.

Fear wd. this may lead to G. shooting pos. - an example wd. we shd. follow.

P.M. I wd. shoot in those circumstances. M/L. Doubt if public opinion wd. support that.

Statement in W/L. to-morrow or not. L.P.S. This may be last occasion you
can make one. Make it - if G. makes no more before then. P.A. best not to

to say nothing. L.P.S. Something to be said for upcast in Paris. in somewhat
diff. way the latest statement $\frac{1}{2}$ Press. If G. make announcement
to-morrow morning, then say "no statement".

M/L. Supported M/P. sugg. In reply to criticism W.L. Prot. Power wd. find out
what numbers, yes but that will take time & meanwhile it will all simmer
down.

W.O. What of ultimate release fr. this situation - by whose intervention?

Cadogan. Offer of Swiss Govt. F.O. wd. answer - "if any deal you wd. like to make to
both sides, no objection." Possible way out. Related of course only to ^{treatment} ~~event~~ in Camps.

L.P.S. A proper course.

S/Doms. Public anxiety "how are you getting out of this?" Welcome Swiss help if it
affords a way out. What is alternative? L.P.S. Go on till both sides are tired.

L.P. Treatment in camps is regulated by Convention: & we can't refer to discuss that
with anyone, as implied by M/P. sugg.

7 | Need to explain to our own people distinction between treatment in camps and
treatment in course of capture.

Cadogan. Article in Convention about dispute between belligerents. Providing for conference of belligerents on neutral soil. Dangerous if we get involved in that sort of thing.

Craib. There is in W/Lords a Motion for Debate: +, altho' I can ask him, I doubt what he will take it off.

A. Whip. Valuable if statement cd. be made in W/Lords to clear up x/. M/Lord supported this. M/L. didn't object, providg. no statement of future action. M/L. to commit ourselves to future action. Also "no wordy discussion" with G.

P.M. Why not reply to Swiss. Read out ^{offer and} reply in W/L. + decide to say more, on prod. W.L. we must await reply.

Say to Swiss - Typing in heat of battle depends on crisis. W/L. & we prop^d discuss events in field - this is diff. fr. campo. There they are protected by laws. You offered to intervene. Pl. convey to G. our protest at their "upraid" based on courts in field. As soon as G. unchain them, we will unchain their pos.

Cadogan. Private offer of help. Embarrassing to them if we refuse in public.

L.P. Make P.M. statement w/out us

[P.M. withdrew to dictate draft statement.]

Statement approved.

W.O. to submit written statement to-morrow showing how we are chaining the Germans

Sept 19

S/Domo. C.O.S. warned by Ribbentrop that Morgenthau had told nothing "likely to leak."

P.M. Let C/Exchequer know.

Sept 20

W.O. Madagascar. Ch. Cabinet know what Fd. has said to de Gaulle?

P.M. I have sent him a minute drawing his attention to Platt's ^{recent} statement that everything is going so nicely in Madagascar, + advising caution.

W.M. (42) 1400 Meeting.

13th October, 1942.

Munitions Production. Read telegram from President

Mrs. Elizabeth Taylor & etc. Mrs. Fr. Halifax to effect that Hopkins won't come here.

P.M. Looks as tho' M/P. will have to go to U.S., taking Portal with him.

M/P. Ready to go in 10 days. P.M. OK. but we see beforehand what you will say.

Managing of Prisoners of War.

W.O. 240 G. warned 9 a.m. to be manacled 12 noon.

Knud protected, asked re Treatment - who was produced before noon. He said order must have ^{to} given by Hitler in person. Found however had cezeva in wrists & hands

M. tied. Sick asked to be chained with convicts.

Handcuffs with 1 ft. chain. Chained 9 a.m. - 9 p.m.

Telegram fr. Ottawa: insistence to shackling order. 400 only chained so far. Some injured. Enforcement in Ozada Camp not had to rising. Cd. Suris find out what

Canadians have notified & what force has to be used. Shd. we ask this question?

L.P.S. Ask for info about cond^{ns} etc. of shackling & add incidentally "has there been any trouble over it in camps?"

L.P. Wait that prompt Germans to make some enquiry?

P.M. Wait - until Canada has rec'd our telegram, anyhow. Wait for next move.

We want to enquire in day or two into cond^{ns} in Germany.

Done. Reply to Ritz X? P.M. Say we are acts thro' Protected Power.

P.M. Read out letter fr. Archbishop of Canterbury. Views of Bishops. Grant. I have promised to see General Smuts. Speaks to Parliament. to postpone his Motion.

P.M. Good thing for S. to speak to both Houses in Painted Chamber?

Grant. In favour - but? effect on Mackenzie King & others. Will they be affronted if they aren't asked when they come?

P.M. Smuts is unique. Age: mil. rank: on Jan P.M. who has fought against us: & only [one who was in War Cab. in last war] let him do it as [].

Ch. Whip. Royal Gallery can take 700 chairs.

L.P.S. Adjourn house at 4.30. for it. - some day before 22/10.

Announce arrangements Thursday (Secret Session) if possible.

Agreed: Ch. Whip to arrange in consult^{ns} with L.P.

U.S. Coloured Troops in A.K.

P.M. Views of U.S. Army must be considered.

Nothing to stand between U.S. Off. and his troops: we mustn't interfere.

W.O. I accept that. What I won't have is B. Police enforcing their rules for them.

W.O. Eisenhower's instr^{ns} are disingenuous - proscribes Mr. Roosevelt's doctrine as principle but adds rules of practice which have opposite result.

M/L. Against written instructions.

W.O. So am I. The S. Command instr. has "leaked," beyond those to whom issued.

We won't segregate or discriminate in our canteens.

Publish in ABB (for off. only) article on history of problem

Other account in end of memo.

Post-war Anglo-Am. relations will depend on relations wh. we ^{establish} ~~have~~ now with U.S.

Army in this country.

Is. Ch. Test this. a) Victoria St^o Canteen. If we conform to U.S. attitude then at this

Canteen coloured troops can't be served.

W.O. But see my proposal

not App. - we won't discriminate in our canteens,

b) Effect on our coloured people.

I think the statement by L.P.S. is v. clearly right.

What I can't accept is W.O. suggests that we shd. conform to U.S. attitude - of.

last sentence of memo.

W.O. I wd. modify this statement.

S/Air. Avoid "coloured". The U.S. prefers to call them "American negroes."

W.O. We agree: a) if any request: U.S. must do it not us. their responsibility.

b) explain U.S. attitude & ask our people to pay attention to it.

c) there shd. be a good deal of reserve in attitude of our troops particularly A.T.S. to negroes.

M/L. Educate them yes; but don't try to educate them into U.S. prejudices.

W.O. Comborne advocates no guidance at all. H.O. advocates not giving even informⁿ.

S/Air. Education unsafe unless you include reference to our attitude to coloured people.

Combs. Diff. in "not too watery" principle: because we have nos. of coloured people here, of coloured Canadians. Change of policy.

Educate both ways: both Americans & British in view of the other: then learn it to common sense.

If it can be said we have advocated "colour bar" all the coloured people here fr. our Empire will go back discontented & preach disaffection there.

H.O. With v. small amendment wd. support L.P.S. memo.

W.O. Refered to instr^s issued by Eisenhower: guidance about our views.

Codogan. Eden accepted W.O. memo. - saw for wording of last phrase of all. Suggest "adapt ... so far as may be possible w/out practicing unfair or objectionable discrimination."

T.M. L.P.S. document is better than any other. Let L.P.S. (with W.O., H.O.) settle any

amendments: and then consider how & to what extent it shd. be published.

L.P.S.

Objective - a document wh. can go down as far as Col. of Regt.

Also to scrutinise the article for ABBIA magazine.

Armistice Day.

a) As last year.

b) Parle. if possible that day to open at noon.

Smuts' Address to Parliament.

P.M. All arrangements made.

M/I. Any objⁿ to announcing. Tues. day on B.B.C. - so S. Africa can hear?

P.M. Unwise (C.A.S. agreed). Better to make records & play later.

M/I. It is being played - & no one will know in advance.

Agreed - better play ^{record} later to S. Africa. No announcement before 1 p.m. news.
& no summary in earlier news bulletins.

P.M. Accommodation - to be restricted to B. Commonwealth visitors. i.e. exclude Diplomatic Corps.

Commonwealth Trade Union Conference.

S/Doms. Citrine wants conf. with U.K. + + Doms. T.U.'s. Sometime in April.

Small nos. fr. all parts of Empire.

Smuts. We have approved: a good thing.

Agreed.

Man Power: Lowering Age to 18. for call-up to Service.

L.P. Last Proclamation affected all who had reached 18 at date.

Instead of waiting another 6 months we propose another Proclⁿ after 3 months covering all who became 16 between 30/6 and 22/10.

Further suggⁿ - amend law so as to enable provisions to be got over before 18 is reached. Machinery proposal: but may be criticised.

L.P.S. Care needed in drafting Bill to make it clear we aren't calling up boys of 17.

W.O. Hitherto we have allowed voluntary enlistment 6 months below compulsory age.

May we now enlist volunteers at 17 1/2? Yes.

Agreed.

American Technical Mission to India.

L.S.A. Attribⁿ to para 4 of final accountⁿ in para 9.

P. Audalan Some accountⁿ said to implementⁿ of some bottlenecks.

V. cautious alt. wh. can be adopted w/out interfering with existg. programmes.

Read extract fr. report fr. Indian M/Supply. Think of going too fast, & getting involved in large projects wh. will be embarrassing.

X/ No promise fr. here / directly: U.S. has recommended, on G/India

W.O. Endorsed X/. U.S. tendency to intervene industrially in these hitherto ours.

Took note with approval.

Strike in Belfast.

P.M. Looking a stirring a day.

M.A.P. C.E. has been set up; sitting to day. Meanwhile boiler-makers H.W. have gone back. N.I. strikers due this pm. Total now out 8,000 ^{minus} 700 boiler-makers.

H.O. By 9 pm, little development - slight trickle back to work. Hope more may return to-morrow.

K.W. N.I. strong views - no action wh. wd. weaken I.U. influence. Stand aside.

Leggett. When Enquiry set up, found large extension of strike. Felt Court wd. help to stop it. Impression now that position is improving.

P.M. Disgrace to N. Ireland - hope Govt. feel it.

Weakness there - no conscription in N. Ireland.

L.P. We team in N.I. departed N. policy to wh. we have adhered in Tyneside strike.

Took note.

Foreign Affairs.

A.E. Demons^t on Soviet Day. We undertook to accept invitⁿ to send Service contingents & on L.P. decision we did not now send them. If we now withdraw ours, others Allies wd. be in awkward posⁿ.

L.P.S. Our L.P. decision not intended to be introspective.

P.M. On merits, doubtful about wisdom of sending our troops to Communist organized affair.

L.P.S. Incident if we withdraw now we have promised. F.O. supported this.

P.M. Not so much if we take Allies into confidence & all withdraw.

W.D. Original decision by Service Dept. based on rather casual advice fr. H.C.

S/Air. Wd. have preferred to stand by same decision of W.Cab. against Service attendance at this kind of thing.

P.M. x|| This must be discussed by Cab., after notice, & in presence of Home Secy.

S/Air. But we have withdrawn our promise to attend.

L.P. Home Secy. wd. have preferred to let it stand, as promise given: but deferred to W.D. wishes to get out of it.

P.M. Separate military parade.

M/L. Risk letting them go. Far more trouble by withdrawing.

x|| Agreed: meet Tuesday to decide. Full programme to be submitted to P.M. at least, if not W.Cab!

Prisoners of War.

P.M. Stand where we are. No answer to our query to Protecty Power. Wait for it. Hitler's action, not that of German Gen. Staff or adminⁿ of p.o.w. camps, wd. have been correct. Clear etc. his order is being questioned in off. circles in Germany. He is in a diff. posⁿ fr. wh. he seeks to escape by enlarging area of controversy. See what they do before we act. German Army & F.O. will do their best to detain him.

Even if present reprisals drag on, no of. harm will be done. We can ease it off.

S/Doms. Trouble in Canada - who are disturbed. So is opinion in country & in N/Common. Await reply, yes, but can't wait v. long.

F.O. Int. Red Cross telegram sent to us re G. Some answer req^d? Shd. we answer by referring to our commⁿ to P. Power? Generally agreed.

P.M. "Weekly review" Germany to N.America. - "Do Allies intend to respect Geneva Conventⁿ?" If that is line they are going to take, our answer is easy.

Smt. Notify Canada of our decision; Thursday pm.

S/Doms. They have be informed, as have all Doms.

Agreed - a) Wait b) Answer B. Red Cross.

Bruce. Dom. Govts. views. I told my Govt. premature to reach any decision before we get reply fr. P. Power. I think it nec. to do so "not clear from D.O. telegrams. Post^s shd. be more clearly explained to Dom. Govts. - i.e. we are waiting on reply fr. T. Tourt, & we can't wait indefinitely.

P.M. Agreed - to prepare further statement (incldg. (b) above).

S/Doms. ? Consult Doms. on (b) F.O. unnecessary. Agreed unnecessary.

P.M. This crossed D.O. telegram. No need to do more - saw explain to Canada that they have crossed.

Posthumous Awards.

P.M. What is done in case of V.C. & other high awards might with advantage be extended to other Awards - with limit on number.

L.I. x/ Ask Ctee on honours for report, with a lead that. Can. not like it done, ^{if scheme can be} devised.

S/Air. Diffy in doing it now " of need for retrospective review

P.M. Refer to Ctee as at x/ with up^t to retrospective diffy.

Agreed.

Celebration of Soviet Annual Day - Participation of B. Troops.

H.O. When Cab. decided unopposed for AE to speak at the mtg, the decision of Gen. Gifford to send contingents was reversed by mtg. of offrs representing all BPs interested. Since then L.P. & the decision: as usual of wh. this edit arise again.

F.O. Dept^{ly} were at mtg. & were in agreement.

If w/out loss of dignity Gen. Gifford cd. agree to let contingents go, this wd. be best way out.

W.O. V. few & small contingents. A.T. cadets (10). Army & Band only.

L.P. What about taking the salute? R.N. = none. Invitation never answered. Agreed. learn's maneuvered.

W.O. No regular contingents to go. leave it as it stands.

Agreed. Send nothing more than is already arranged.

F.O. to con with A.P. in future, and see to this now.

Coal. Address to Miners.

P.M. Promised to address miners on ^{Sat.} Friday, 10.30 a.m.

Will talk about coal. Will talk about the war: give them feeling that we're on the move. "So give us the coal."

Will like Smith to come with me.

Prisoners of War. (part heard).

P.M. Can the marching be gradually reduced?

A.E. How can this be made known?

W.O. Tell P. Powers revised nos. & revised Rules.

P.M. Don't let us be seen publicly to withdraw.

[M/L. Any way in which we can help people in occupied Europe who resist or evade the labour conscription of the Germans. Can F.O. consider what any means are available?

S/Doms. It has been considered.]

P.M. Let P. Powers find out - by visits to camps - don't tell them.

Books and Magazines for the M/East.

P.M. Best way to deal with Army in M/East. Paper locally produced - why shouldn't

get proprietors to add another Supplement for Army & subsidise the newspaper on that condition.

M/L. a) The B. Ambassador has told us not to interfere with local Press.

b) Paper supplies wd. have to be increased.

Print subject to that & try support we can make that a much more lively paper.

Agreed M/Luf. to investigate & submit a scheme.

M/L. Ad. the S. African produced paper - and books also - to be made available to Army.

Smith. Better scheme is the P.M.'s The add. paper shd. come from U.S.A.

W.O. Question raised in last para. Pushing with U.S.A.

Genl. feeling of Cabinet against this. Too dangerous.

I. United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.

B/T. Ask W.Cab. auth. to reply to U.S. on limit in Annex.

Mechanism - Lynd-pain a Policy Ctee (Art 3) U.S. G.B. U.S.S.R. China

Not committed at this stage to any precise promises as to extent.

Agreement is to subject to one point about Canada being on Policy Ctee. We ::

recommend members extended to 7 incldy Canada.

Raise qn with Doms, India & U.S.S.R. before replying to U.S.A.

P.M. Don't let us drift into attitude that we can't speak to U.S. before consulting U.S.S.R.

A.E. On this occasion we have already had consult^{ns} with U.S. ; & we are referring to U.S.S.R. only at this stage before formal communication to U.S. This agreement was initiated by U.S.A.

P.M. May be right as diplomacy - but no rigid rule.

"No obligation on us to consult Stalin before we communicate with U.S." Can this maxim be recorded.

L.P.S. Depends on subject matter. This is one affecting Europe. Right that we shd. let U.S.S.R. shd be informed of nature of reply wh. we propose to send.

P.M. As regards Canada, everyone surely agrees.

S/Doms. Diffy: if you bring in all Doms, it will open the door to v. many others.

We must preserve our freedom to bring in one or other Dom. w/out all.

C.O. ^{III} Para/B. - (a small point not perfectly heard!)

P.M. Will you at least omit [] from para 5. A.E. Very well.

Agreed - subject to omission of this phrase in communication sent.

S/Air. Propose that this Body shd. deal with p.c. war. Wd. it not be better to leave this to military? B/T. undertook to clear this up with S/Air.

II. Post-War Atlantic Bases.

A.E. Scheme proposed by Norway - after consult^{ns} with Dutch, Belgians.

P.M. Why do you want bases on Continent? Tremendous departure in foreign policy.

A.E. V. like S. Island bases.

P.M. If air is reason - deal with that by international control of air forces, not by seeking & maintaining air bases all over the world.

S/Doms. When we thought in terms of sea-powers, we secured bases all over the world. Worth considering.

L.P.S. Perhaps; but don't say it has not political support. That, surely, is going much too far.

A.E. This is not national policy - proposal is that G.B., U.S. & countries concerned should join in this.

L.P.S. Enough to say we are prep^d to explain the position.

M/L. Unwise to deal with this piecemeal. L.P.S. Selection, at initiation of Norway, and based on a particular Alliance.

A.E. Americans have already been discussing this with Dutch & Norwegians.

If U.S. went on with this & we were left out it wd. be v. awkward.

Prep^d however to re-draft para. 6 in light of discussion: and circulate as amended.

Smith. ^{original} U.S. demand for bases ^{fr. us} was a mistake: now abandoned.

Equally mistaken for us to claim bases in Europe.

We don't know what we'd stand after the war.

And what precedents will you set? Russia will want them, too. And when will it end?

Whatever the small defeated countries say now, many people will say later on that this was pure Imperialism.

Policy for Europe shd. not be initiated by the smaller Powers "as a whole". Wait till we are ready to make the right approach. Let these questions be considered by the Big 2 or 3 - don't listen to cries of agony fr. the minor sufferers.

Are items like this meant to be fitted into a larger scheme - we must see the pattern.

L.P.S. Then can we see the memo. prep^d by F.D.

III. Malta.

P.M. Preserve status quo until we see what happens in France.

Defer this item until Wed.

I. Rudolf Hess.

- P.M. Include reference to health, & fall over banisters etc.,
- L.P.S. : Separate statement.
- P.M. Why not say on verge of insanity.
- L.P.S. He wasn't when he arrived, we can't say he was.
- P.M. Add - "medical report follows"; and put an addendum.
Name of this for public? - for Ministry only.
- F.O. Will send this to C. Kerr to-day saying "medical report follows"

Agreed.

II. King's Speeches.

Controversial legislation.

- P.M. We can't have 50/100 Conservatives or Labour Members steadily opposing a Bill.
- S/Doms. Controversy on Party lines must be avoided - but Bills raising controversy within Parties ed. to taken.
- K.W. Must be a ^{substantial} measure of agreement. S/Doms. Win the Govt. L.P. And W/Comm
- P.M. Controversial for war effort doesn't matter. S/Doms. But some ^{was} legis^{lators}?
- P.M. Formula for pledge - as in K.S. (42) 1st July Minutes annotated.
- L.P.S. Yes - but what do you mean by "genl. measure of agreement".
- P.M. Cabinet decides. It means that oppos^{ition} by a small group can't hold it up.
- M/L. Consider my difficulty. Labour Party's 1922 Oth. letter says no organised oppos^{ition}.
Then the interests outside say it's controversial.
- P.M. My phrase means that. The outside interests won't stop it if "genl. measure of agreement".
- M/L. Not concerned fr. Party pt. of view. Concerned about admin^{istration} - of demobilisation
- L.P. "A substantial measure of general agreement". Rejected.

P.M.'s formula agreed.

- P.M. No oblig^{ation} to include in K. Sp. every measure you intend to bring forward.
Before putting a thing into K. Sp. you shd. have clear idea of what will be in the Bill.
E.g. Education Bill. Nothing better than to reach concordat. But want to be
sure we don't get into religious controversy.
- S. Both sides have forgotten the catch-words of 40 yrs. ago. R.A.B. has gone v. far
& skilfully and is v. near to an agreement.

R.A.B. 2/3rds of my plan is ready for Cabinet. Sketch of other kind (training of youth: with M/Labour)

P.M. Produced a formula for K. Speech - wh. was generally agreed.

R.A.B. Memo. to R.P. C. the first: after debate in National ^{Church} Assembly.

Scott - Utterall Reports.

P.M. Promise here of legislation

S/Doms. Only on machinery.

P.M. Where are the heads of the Bill?

K.W. We may agree at once on machinery + compulsory purchase by L.A.'s.
But ^{from} ref. in para. talks about compensation + betterment etc, wh. ^{is} a matter on wh. we are unlikely to reach early agreement.

P.M. Vague + general. Will create diff^{ies}.

L.P. Need this to be in the Speech - can't it be dealt with in the Debate.

Catering Trades.

M/L. Trying to complete organ^{is} of Trade Boards. Next trade is catering trades.

Can't apply to Trades Bd. to it: too amorphous a Trade.

Same principles as Road Haulage Wage Bd.

Genl. agreement or support fr. many sections of the industry. But Hotels Rest. Assoc^{ns} are raising the cry of controversy.

P.M. What about one-man family business? M/L. That is matter for the Comm^{tee}.

If you had a Trade Bd. it wd. have to cover them.

K.W. Could you appoint the Comm^{tee} to enquire (non-statutory) + promote leg^{is} later to implement their recommend^{ns} group by group.

3 Enquiries so far led to nothing.

M/L. But that was on scope - wh. Trades Bds. sh. be applied to this industry.

Ch. Whip. If I'm being asked if it is necessary for the war.

if it goes into the K. Speech, we'll get an amendment to the Address.

M/L. The trade is organised in Switzerland + in U.S.A.

P.M. I'm not against regul^{is} of wages in these trades. The only quest is when it wd. raise distracting controversy wh. we shd. find it diff. to ^{overcome} carry. You may get obstruction - cf. by Robert Williams.

S/Doms. What about a Standing Order? K.P.S. Let them hear it on the floor. Keep them quiet.

Ch. Whip. Do you need to start the controversy early by putting it in K. Speech.

Agreed - Omit fr. K. Speech: but go on with the Bill (mentioning it in the Debate).

III. Malta.

K.W. Consultations taken place since last discussion.

£M.10 free gift. Available for war damage compens^{ns} under Malta legⁿ.

Agreed.

Statements in H/Lords & H/Commons/Committee
(K.W.)

IV. Parliamentary Procedure.

P.M. At Guildhall will deal summarily with war - & say will reserve more for Parl.

In H/Commons I will speak: and will deal in narrative with these great events wh. are now unfolding - & will themselves put in the right light prev. events of my visit to Russia. Nearly an hour.

L.P.S. must speak on the social ques. Which up the genl. Debate before the amendments.

Longest possible Debate on the Address.

L.P.S. to make a scheme - 11 or 12 days.

Junior Ministers & Staff Cooper shd. speak: 3 Ministers for every 2 days.

Ch. Whip. Colonial Development

Army Training

Post-war.

} subjects already promised for this Debate.

M/L. Secret Session later to disclose true man-power position. When the figures available.

Military Situation (part heard).

C.A.S. Air movement. Paratroops (U.S.) fr. U.K. left midn Sat. Nothing heard of them since #) 30 aircraft seen nr. Oran #) ordered today to go on to Bona.

1 Airport Oran taken: Spitfires flown in Also Algiers: Sp. & Curt. flown in. To-night B. paratroops leave. U.S. aircraft.

Casablanca - Fr. fighters attacked: air fighting: no news of airports captured.

Total Air Force strength put in = 1250 U.S. + 420 RAF. if all goes well, drop next month.

P.M. Biggest combined effort since attack on low Countries. And largest amphibian opⁿ ever undertaken.

26th suggⁿ is President but we need. unless U.S. staffs of/ political differe. Read out assumptions etc. 1 suggⁿ they did proceed upon. Proved by the event to have been sound complications in planning due to anticipatg

A.E. Agreed.

P.M. Beg my colleagues & mil. auth^s to look on this as a springboard. We must look at once at mil. opⁿ undertaken fr. there. This is the moment for the offensive.

Smuts. We must go ahead at once with planning.

P.M. Frog's mistake to think we can take our time with this war. Hitler is playing now for a stalemate. This is our real danger. Never has there been more need for urgency in the war.

Smuts. This is our first big chance in the war. Move on at once & we shall then be able to strike hard in the spring. Vast advantages in shipping. In N. Africa we have the base for a real victory front - from the South not fr. the West.

P.M. Read exchange of telegrams with Stalin. - on victory in Egypt, Torch, and promise of 20 Squadrons (U.S. & B.) to S. Russia. V. friendly in tone.

F.D.R. calls this the Second Front. We won't contradict this.

Foreign Affairs. King's Speech.

A.E. Passage in Opening Speech, about the victory.

P.M. Let the Ctee insert a para. "Prov. has blessed Our Arms with notable victory stimulus to further effort." F.O. & H.S. to draft a paragraph.

Ringing Church Bells.

P.M. V. anxious to do this next Sunday.

Generally agreed - subject to progress during the week.

A.E. Supplies to Russia. To be given Thurs. Propose to give

1. U.S. + British
2. Amvols.

In 12 months - this is <u>awful</u> .	despatches
2,500 aircraft	3,000
3,000 tanks	4,500
22,000 other vehicles.	30,000
66,000 <u>dt. weight</u> <u>from miscellaneous.</u>	\$31,000.

W.O. This is comparable to what we have sent to M/East. Best not say so.

Agreed - give what was sent.

Persia.

A.E. Best wait until we hear fr. Butler. Disposed to avoid talking Persia over.

Prisoners of War.

P.M. Exchange of Telegrams with P.M. Canada.

Tell Parlt. still in negot. thro' Swiss Govt. - hope in little while to have a statement to make. We are ready at any time to initiate our pos. if P.P. can get assurance Wt. G. will do same.

Tell Swiss Govt. - why not try atq. both Powers who they will initiate.

A.E. They will ask me what reply I wd. give.

H.S. New circ. might make Swiss Govt. more willing to act.

P.M. Was hoping to get away with no further action for a week.

A.E. Then I will ask Swiss if they have any news.

W.O. will reduce the hours. No objects as Swiss getting to know this.

Madagascar.

W.O. Object to draft statement. Want to omit []

A.E. Risk is Wt. French will raise Nativ Force & ask to take over mil. command of the Island.

Sumt. And add at end "under the terms of the ^{arrangement made} ~~agreement~~ with the Fr. Nat. Ctee."

P.M. We saw A.G. y'day: & he has behaved v. well.

We can't throw him over. He asked us to prevent U.S. fr. dividing the F. French.

It was in this conn^{ty} that I was anxious to announce app^{nt} of Legationhouse.

A.E. That is why I don't want to refer to arrangement. Wt. has no fr.

Liability of Members of Parliament

M.L. Register: cards kept separately: I write atq. M.P. to define his choice: & on hearing his decision enter it on card. This is system for U.S. Acts - wd. like

W.O. to assimilate their practice to mine.

Approved.

Armistice Day.

P.M. Wd. have had the 2 Minutes Silence & no more.

W.O. We haven't had it since the war. Recent decision already announced.

Agreed - stat.

B. Nationality Status of Alicks Bill.

H.P. We shd not go beyond French & extend to other nationalities.

A.Y.A. French naval off. who has done v. dangerous work for us - approved the
pledge given by P.M. has not been honoured.

Agreed.

Major Marcham M.P. Visit to U.S.A.

H.P. Wants to go to U.S.A. to discuss books with his publishers
| see U.S. war effort.

No national advantage in letting him go. Shall I refuse?

Agreed - refuse permission: either as a soldier or as M.P. he
shd remain here.

✓ Enemy Breaches of Rules of Warfare.

P.M. Why not publish this?

V.O. Some of it depends on info't derived fr. prs still in custody.

L.P.S. Deprecate early publ'.

Foreign Affairs. Spain.

P.M. Things not looking quite so good.

A.E. Agreed: not ground for special anxiety.

Report of H. making demand - not, however, fr. Berlin: only Rome.

Ceylon Rice Supply.

P.M. Mudaliar leaving for U.S. & Canada - till Jan. Wish gr. success in his visit.

Congrats. also to M. on visit to Manchester. Bound to India.

Tam Sahib's visits to naval & mil. stations. Thanks for their work.

C.O. Last time's conclusion - grateful to M's efforts: but situation no better.

Normal consumption 47,000 tons a month: this is real minimum.

Further in. fr. M. - 9/India 36,500 tons in Nov./Dec.

Give 60,000 + present reserve. Means no reserve at all

X | at end Dec.

Thus urge fresh pressure on India. War prodⁿ in Ceylon (rubber) already beginning to suffer.

Suggest addl. 20,000 tons fr. India in next 2 months - fairly, wh. correspond.

increase in cereals fr. Australia.

M/W.T. No alternative ^{possible} - $\frac{1}{2}$ shipments fr. Brazil or N. Orleans is negligible.

R.M. Dec. 6,700 tons. rest. Diff. methods calc^d

36,500 t. exclusion of most allotments in ~~the~~ ^{now} - wh. can't be assessed yet.

Our trouble is food contⁿ. Quantity in market less than estimates of Rev. Dept.

9/India fully aware of sitⁿ - estab^d separate M/Food & central Govt. will now touch further on Provincial Govts. No further prodding fr. here will do good

Ceylon Govt. shd. expedite dispatch of their up^d to India.

No detⁿ fr. W/Cab.: better to hear it is personal up^d by us & C.O.

After Dec. new crop will come on & M/F will have ^{more} power to acquire.

C.O. Reluctant to press: but want W/Cab. notice X/.

R.M. The area nearest Ceylon is the deficit area for rice, unhappily.

A.E. Importance of rubber prodⁿ.

L.P. Rice is only practical solution. Wheat ^{supply} & diff. to increase.

R.M. The rice in it on market - the farmers are hoarding.

W. If 9/India wd. allow commercial firms to buy - they sh. get it fr. the hoarders.

R.M. We have exploited the comm. agencies & it's " they have failed but we have put the job to Prov. Govts.

[C.O.] I will impress on G/India great importance of getting the \$6.500 by end Dec.

P.M. Magnitude of India's need by ref. to this small need.

Strategic import: Ceylon as naval barrier v. attack on India. Vital interest of India is to protect the gulf of Ceylon.

G/India shd. make a strenuous effort. Will M. country out v. strong wish at. further help in quins.

I.S.A. Vital importance - need \$6.500 - hope for more in new year.

R.M. Only 2 m. tons in India now - end of season.

Publication of Beveridge Report.

M/L. B. has asked us to fact. Prior conf. with him expound his Rpt. to English Press.

B. also proposes to have conf. Lobby Correspondents 2 who before publ.?

Work up political campaign.

Propose no facilities at M/hf. or B.B.C. } To disclose not only contents of Rpt. but his views on it.

Propose no facilities at M/hf. or B.B.C.

W.A.S. Saw B. tonight - told him improper to discuss before present.

K.W. Special interview (26/10?) D. Telegraph. "Half way to Moscow"

Give details of B's remuneration.

P.A. Pity if such a comprehensive scheme failed to get fair chance of propag. of its author. Cab. will have to consider - small Ctee of Ministers. He will spoil it all if he pushes it: will arouse opposition. W.A.S. shd. tell him so. Let us have a little order & discipline.

Endorse M/hf. proposals.

W.O. Shdnt we suspend publ. also. Or B. will say we are depriving him of a chance to expound his own Rpt.

M/L. Shdnt accept his date for publ. Tell him he presents v Govt. decides publ. Then fix a diff. date. Re-arrangement in M/C if B. goes round expounding.

M/L. W.A.S.'s permit reqd before B. expounds.

P.M. The Rpt. is Govt. property. B. must be told he is not to expound the Rpt. - Minister has ^{Privilege} the right.

H.B. R. Comm. procedure - Chairman presents and Govt. expounds.

P.M. Promise to lay as Cnd Paper - say until then protected as Cnd Sp. am.

At same time defining our attitude to it: "like it, or not like it, or haven't made up our minds about it."

I. Migration to Dominions.

S/Doms. Ask for advice to consult Doms on qual. ques.

Consult with Smuts & some other Dom. Ministers.

Bruce. Agree - seems du better.

But approach will provoke enquiries as to post-war ^{world} economy - if expansionist, then will be soon etc. Useful start made in imp. discussions on economic ques. But this enquiry will intensify Dom. curiosity about these ques. No harm in that. migⁿ fr. Europ. countries shd. also be opened.

We want, most, people fr. here. But problem: people unwilling to sacrifice their rights here

* | Means will have to be found to get over this. E.g. reciprocal systems, wh. will ^{not} work in favour of Doms. if most of our people go out. Diffic^y of this shd. be tackled.

Agreed. (wldg. demobilisation in Doms.)

D.O. to consult with Ty. on 21.

2. Res. to Doms.

Bruce. I want take part in v. domestic discⁿ. But may 1 ~~not~~ be S/Doms. later & learn your concl^{ns} for consult to Aust^l.

II.

P.M. Future review of v. constⁿ work. Discⁿ in W. Lab. every 3 months. To verify int. work is progdy. on right lines. Periodic stock-taking.

Agreed.

II. Progress Rpt.

M/S. Survey - no decisions yet? Review of qual. economic sitⁿ: post-war.

Para. 6-7 summary. Background for our study of detailed problems.

S/Doms. Next report - means to avoid sudden deflation.

M/L. Only way through will be Atk. Party Govt. for 3/4 years after war.

K.W. Post-war credits - sudden increase of purchasing power - need to continue savings v. unpopular: can be done only by united Govt.

M/L. Inducement to convert into capital goods. E.g. bonus if they put the money into houses. I.E. m. marriages w/out houses.

A. Bldg. trade has been reduced to put up a training scheme. Wll. like to announce a 20 year bldg. programme & but who will announce M/H. or M/Planning. V. big thing if they will train at cost of 100,000 a year. V. important - we shall be longer than this in v. looking (12/18 mos.). Bldg. is first line of defence v. unemployment.

- B.A.T. to convene CMA to decide
- a) demarcation between M/H. & M/W. on housing
- b) training scheme.
- c) post-war bldg. programme.

Training a) 3/4 mos. course for dilution

b) longer period for craftsmen.

B. Importance of setting agricultural policy. We like to retain 1 m. in eq. for some years
This is less dependent on external affairs.

W.A.J. Report now being considered by R.P. etc.

P.M. What prospects of getting our export trade back? What likelihood of U.S. agreeing not to
have high tariffs?

L.P.S. India - will demand goods v. their accumulated credits.

P.M. You'll get no return for them: K.W. has "borrowed" the credits already.

Controlled currency: one only w/in limits.

K.W. Increase of consuming power + steady price level: this will give us best hope.

M/L. Price level I wd. aim at is about present level. This wd. enable you to recover the
export trade. Aim: 30% rise in ϕ living as above the war. Thus wd. be
slight fall in prices, + this wd. relieve the Fréchet cost of stabilisation.

K.W. First step of all is to begin our talks with U.S. Hope we shall begin soon.

M/L. Better understandy than ever before of value as against money - + real fear of depreciation.

L.P.S. V. desirable to do it before pd. landslide in U.S.

K.W. Genl. approval of paras. b-8 of W.P. (42) 347. ? Agreed.

IV. Demobilisation.

P.M. Based on length of service (40) + age (40)! The young men wait wait. Experience of
last war. "First out, first home" is the only principle they will understand.

M/L. But this time they're bc. called in by age group: this means reversing the way they come
out. Age is is a good criterion, now. Length of service introduced: benefit to
territorials - those who volunteered early.

Explain it to Army in advance - so they will understand.

Para. b of W.P. (42) 498 - Approved.

Para. 13. L.P.S. how far does (1) go? W.A.J. See para. 12.

S/Air. Para b(a) 4. Will this be made public now. W.A.J. No. Public statement is
para. 13.

P.M. * War Lab. not C.O.S. to decide.

Paras. b and 13 Agreed.

V. Statement by Pay-masters General.

K.W. This surely is O.K. Agreed.

Reference to p. 1. - can't go too fast.

VI. Central Planning Authority.

K-W. First alternative : Ctee of Ministers + Commission for planning
Second " : planning to be responsibility of a M/Planning.
" : Planning to be looked after by a Ctee of Ministers.
Commission for some purposes - semi-judicial etc.

By this compromise we did hope to meet Party feeling v. ultimate Rpt.

Set up : Planning a Ctee of Ministers

planning = Minister + Commission to help him.

This is going to help, esp. with dissident Conservatives.

