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UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER
FOR JAPAN

NOV 6 - 1947

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Tokyo, October 14, 1947.

RESTRICTED

No. 1334

SUBJECT: Reform of Japanese Police System.

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to forward herewith copies of an exchange of correspondence between Japanese Prime Minister Tetsu KATAYAMA and General of the Army Douglas MacArthur on the subject of the
1/ reform of the Japanese police system. The Prime Minister's letter, which is dated September 3, has not been made public, although quotations from it appear in General MacArthur's reply. The latter's reply, dated September 10, was made public by the Japanese Govern-
2/ ment on October 9, 1947, and has received extensive coverage both in the English-language and vernacular press.

Following the Government's release of the text of General MacArthur's letter under reference, Chief Cabinet Secretary Suehiro
3/ NISHIO issued a statement on the subject on October 9, copy of which is enclosed. The Government's Police Reform Bill, which, according to press reports, is to be presented to the Diet by October 20, 1947, was approved in final form at a full meeting of the Cabinet on October 11.

In addition to considerable news coverage of the exchange of correspondence and the Government's conferences on the proposed reform, editorial comment in the Japanese press has been heavy. In its editorial survey covering the week ended October 11, the Nippon Times on October 12 summarized editorial reactions of the Mainichi Shimbun, Asahi, Nihon Keizai, Yomiuri, and Jiji Shimpo.
4/ A copy of pertinent portions of this survey and of complete texts
5/ of various editorials that have appeared to date are enclosed.

Respectfully yours,

W. J. Sebald
Acting Political Adviser

Enclosures:

894.00/10-1447

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Enclosures:

1. Copy of Prime Minister Tetsu KATAYAMA's letter of September 3, 1947.

2. Copy of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur's reply of September 16, 1947.

3. Statement issued on October 9, 1947 by Cabinet Secretary Suehiro NISHIO.

4. Excerpt from column entitled "Editorial Survey" of Nippon Times of October 12, 1947.

5. Single copies of eight editorials from Japanese press of October 10, 11, and 12.

Original and hectograph to Department.

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Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 1334, dated October 14, 1947, from the United States Political Advisor for Japan, Tokyo, on the subject "Reform of Japanese Police System".

COPY

Tokyo, September 3, 1947

Dear General of the Army,

In accordance with your suggestion made during our conversation on 26 August, 1947, I have the honor to submit in writing the basic reform plan of the Japanese Government on the police system as herein enclosed.

I should be very grateful if you would be kind enough to give your consideration to the plan and advise me of your comments and instructions thereon. I shall be ready to come to receive your instructions any time at your convenience.

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) Tetsu Katayama

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1. Ever since the formation of the present Cabinet, the Government has been giving a careful study to the police system in order to reform it in consonance with the new situation created by the enforcement of the new constitution, and, as a result of such study, it has recently arrived at a tentative conclusion on the basic principles which will govern the reform. In view of its political significance and bearings on the public peace or military implications, the Prime Minister of Japan wishes to hereby submit the Government reform plan informally and directly to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, with a view to seeking first of all his high opinions on the matter so that the Government may materialize its study in accordance with his directions and recommendations.

2. In the course of its study on the problem in question, the Government has given a thought to the memorandum of the Japanese Government dated 20 February 1947 and the informal suggestions advanced by the sections concerned of the General Headquarters. The Government, however, has strived for the formulation of a reform plan of its own from an independent standpoint, without any of the above restrictions and based on the needs of true democratization of Japan and the necessity to ensure the domestic public peace.

3. Prior to arriving at the present plan, the Government established a special committee within the Cabinet to study the problem, in which two fundamentally conflicting proposals were brought forth.

One of the two aims primarily at the perfection of local self-government and the fundamental remedy of the misuse of the police by the state power as in the past. It is a progressive plan whereby all the uniformed police will be transferred to the six large municipalities and prefectures, leaving to the central government only certain synthetic and technical functions (police schools, finger prints bureau, scientific criminal investigations, police radio communications, special detective corps, etc.) and, only in case of emergency, may the Prime Minister exercise control over the local police within the limitations of law.

The other purports to conserve the national police to a large extent and to place the metropolitan police under the national police, while establishing the police of a local public entity only in cities of over 200,000 population. According to this plan, the national police is not only by far the larger in number but also may direct city police in case of guard and protection of the objects of national importance and certain national offenses. This may be called a conservative plan.

4. Considering that perfection of local self-government is a prerequisite for the democratization of Japan, it is clear that from the political standpoint the decentralization of power is also desirable in the field of the police. Accordingly, the police power should be in principle entrusted with a local public entity by rectifying the present system whereby the central government has jurisdiction over personnel as well as organization and operation of the police, while an elected governor is made responsible, within a very limited scope, only to the police administration in the area of his jurisdiction.

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On the other hand, however, in view of the fact that the maintenance of the public order in Japan without armed forces is solely dependent on the police force, and that we cannot expect and depend upon the situation of complete occupation by the Allied Forces, especially when we think of a long future, it is deemed too hazardous for the central government to deprive itself of all its own resources to maintain the public safety.

5. After a careful study, therefore, the Government proposes to take the middle course between the above two extreme plans and to pursue a policy allowing the co-existence of both the national and local public entity police. Although delegation of the police power to the local public entities inevitably lacks completeness under this plan, it is our belief that we may improve and eliminate, even under the system of a national police, the situation in which the Japanese police in the past was used as an instrument of the suppression of human rights and the totalitarianism, by a vigorous enforcement of administrative supervision by the Diet, reform in the judicial administrative system, improvement of the police system, discipline and betterment of qualities of police personnel, and the like.

6. There shall be established the national police with the maximum strength of 30,000 uniformed police. There are two conceivable ways of disposition of the national police, one of which is to concentrate the national police in the metropolis or several localities, and the other is to distribute it throughout the rural districts outside the jurisdiction of the local (city) police as will be stated presently.

On the other hand, there are two possible ways of establishing the local police. It may be established either in each prefecture or in each municipality as a unit, and either one has its advantages and disadvantages.

We should like to adopt here a scheme under which the national police shall be distributed throughout the country and shall have jurisdiction over the rural districts, while the local police shall be established in municipalities.

7. In separating the national police and the local police, a good result cannot be expected by effecting the separation at once in view of the present financial status of local public entities, and, therefore, the transition from the present system to the organization under consideration should be gradually undertaken. We deem it proper to establish the city police in the first instance in large municipalities, say, several cities of over 200,000 population, which are ready financially and otherwise.

The national police shall gradually be decreased to the total of 30,000 as stated in the above while the local (city) police shall gradually be expanded to include cities of over 50,000 population.

8. The national police shall have the Public Safety Board as the central headquarters and shall be authorized to establish its local headquarters in approximately eight places throughout the country. The Public Safety Board may either be established within the Prime Minister's Office or be placed under the jurisdiction of the Justice Ministry. While there is an opinion which favors the

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former in order to keep the police free from abuses of extreme party politics and to forestall its emergence as an influential political force in the central government, others maintain that if the national police is to be established it is not appropriate to place the Public Safety Board vaguely under the Prime Minister's Office without making any Cabinet Minister responsible who is in turn responsible to the Diet, since it might result in the preservation of bureaucratic forces.

In the last analysis, it is deemed proper to place the national police under the jurisdiction of a responsible Cabinet Minister other than the Prime Minister.

9. As for the size and equipments of the police, it is our belief that in consideration of the future status of the occupation by the Allied Forces, the police force will have to be sufficient in size and adequate in capacity to maintain the domestic public order on its own resources.

For the immediate future, we hope that consideration be given to increase the total number of police to 125,000, including 30,000 to be retained as the national police as stated in the above.

10. The present plan is concerned with the general police. In addition to this, however, it is needless to say that there are to be economic inspectors, railway patrol guards, customs inspectors and sea control (coast guard) agency as special police organizations under the direct jurisdiction of the central government. Especially on the last agency, it is our sincere hope that consideration be given so that it may be strengthened in near future to maintain appropriate number of vessels and personnel sufficient to cope with its task of maintaining, in complement with the police on land, the public safety on the sea around Japan which is without armed forces.

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Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch No. 1334, dated October 14, 1947, from the United States Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, on the subject "Reform of Japanese Police System".

COPY

Tokyo, September 16, 1947.

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I have given careful consideration to your letter of September 3rd and to the plan for the reorganisation of the police system submitted therewith. I fully understand your difficulty in reaching an acceptable compromise between the two divergent schools of thought of which you speak--a compromise which will prove adequately effective to meet the requisites for the preservation of law and order within Japan, and yet at the same time not impinge upon the ideal of human liberty to which the people of Japan are now committed, nor upon that fundamental principle indispensable to a democratic society so aptly stated in the Preamble of the Constitution of Japan, "Government is a sacred trust of the people, the authority for which is derived from the people, and the benefits of which are enjoyed by the people."

I am in full accord with the proposition that the realities of the situation require the maintenance of a national rural police unit to maintain law and order in the rural areas and available to the National Government to meet emergency conditions with which police forces available to the several local governments may be unable adequately to cope, and your suggested increase in the overall authorized police strength to 125,000 men, to provide for such a national rural police meets with my full approval. I am not in accord, however, with the idea of, nor the necessity for, delaying the decentralization of the police power now existing, as I feel that the preservation of that power in its present centralized form is wholly incompatible with the spirit and intent of the new Constitution and inimical to democratic growth.

It has been a dominant characteristic of modern totalitarian dictatorships, as it was in Japan's feudalistic past, to establish and maintain a strongly centralized police bureaucracy headed by a chief executive officer beyond the reach of popular control. Indeed, the strongest weapon of the military clique in Japan in the decade prior to the war was the absolute authority exercised by the national government over the thought police and the Kempei Tai, extending down to prefectural levels of government. Through these media, the military were enabled to spread a network of political espionage, suppress freedom of speech, of assembly, and even of thought, and by means of tyrannical oppression to degrade the dignity of the individual. Japan was thus in the fullest sense a police state.

It is in recognition of this condition that the police system must be so reorganized as to provide what you so clearly describe in your letter as a "fundamental remedy of the misuse of the police by the state power as in the past." In the achievement of this objective the potentiality of a police state inherent in centralized control must scrupulously be avoided. It should never again be

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possible for anti-democratic elements, either of the extreme right or the extreme left, to enmesh the freedom of the people in a web of police terrorism.

This basic objective can best be accomplished by the thorough decentralization of the police system in accordance with the principle of local autonomy embodied in the Constitution. Each city and town should be responsible for the preservation of law and order within its boundaries through its own local police system independent of the central government and headed by a police chief to be appointed and removable by a commission composed of three civilian members appointed by the mayor of the city or town with the consent of the local assembly and holding office for a fixed term of years. At the prefectural level there should also be a corresponding commission similarly appointed which will exercise operational control over the national rural police operating within the boundaries of that prefecture, reserving to the national government administrative authority over such national rural police wherever stationed.

Such a reformation of the Japanese police system would be in consonance with the general pattern of the reorganization of the Japanese governmental structure, integrating police officials and services as agencies of the people at the appropriate levels of government. Action toward such end should proceed immediately upon enactment of the appropriate statute.

The national government should allocate the necessary funds until such time as local financing is possible. So long as it is necessary for the national government to make allocations of funds, the strength of the police in the various localities should remain fixed at the present number, but after provisions have been made for the localities to assume the financial burden, the responsibility for determining the necessary numbers within their respective borders should belong to the cities and towns, in accordance with local requirements.

The necessary legislation should, of course, be enacted at the present session of the Diet. If vigorously prosecuted, I believe that completion of the plan may be accomplished within a period of ninety days thereafter.

As to an appropriate organization on the national level, I believe that there should be created directly under the authority of the Cabinet a Public Safety Commission composed of five members who have not been career officials either in the police or the civil service. Such commission should be appointed by the Prime Minister, with the consent of the Diet, and should hold office for a fixed term of years.

To prevent the resurgence in disguised form of a centrally controlled national police network no channel of command should exist between the national rural police unit and the local police forces, but technical channels of communication should, of course, be permitted in the interest of overall efficiency and to facilitate a relationship of mutual assistance, liaison and coordination. The

intervention

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intervention by the national government into control over prefectural or local police affairs should temporarily be provided for, however, in the event of a national emergency when, upon the recommendation of the National Public Safety Commission, the Prime Minister might assume operational control over prefectural units of the national rural police force, subject to ratification by the Diet within twenty days. In this way the authority of the prefectural governor may be protected against arbitrary police interference by the national government, at the same time affording adequate safeguard for the national interest.

In the past, one of the ill-conceived aspects of the Japanese police system was the exercise by police officials of numerous administrative functions not related to the task of investigation and apprehension of criminals or the preservation of public order. All such functions should be exercised by non-police representatives of the particular ministry having responsibility for such matters, and wherever proper should be decentralized to local public entities in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution conferring upon such entities "the right to manage their property, affairs and administration."

Closely related to the law enforcement process is, as you have specifically pointed out in your letter, the subject of reform in the judicial administrative system. Under the Constitution of Japan, the Supreme Court is now vested with the administration of judicial affairs and the rule-making power. With the establishment of an independent judiciary, the Ministry of Justice no longer is responsible for the determination of rules of procedure and of practice, the internal discipline of the courts, or other attributes of the judicial process. Moreover, with the diminution of the role of the procurators in the administration of justice and their subordination to the rule-making power of the Supreme Court, the basic attributes of the procuratorial system under the Ministry of Justice have been radically revised.

On the other hand, to the Cabinet, as the executive branch of the government, is expressly delegated the responsibility for executing the provisions of the Constitution and of the laws enacted by the National Diet, as well as for determining questions of amnesty, commutation of punishment, and restoration of rights. To reflect adequately this constitutional separation of powers, it would seem desirable that the Ministry of Justice, within which authority over adjudicative functions has been traditionally intermingled with executive power, be replaced by an Attorney General, sitting in the Cabinet as a Minister of State and serving as the chief legal adviser to the executive branch of the government.

To administer the laws effectively requires the closest coordination between police officials charged with the apprehension of offenders against the national laws, and public attorneys charged with the prosecution thereof. The establishment of an Attorney General's Office with the responsibility of conducting all litigation, criminal and civil, in which the government has a direct interest, and of furnishing all legal advice to the Prime Minister and other Ministers of State in the discharge of their duties, would I believe provide a mechanism for such close coordination, facilitate the

faithful

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faithful execution of the laws, and support the independence of the judiciary as the bulwark of the liberties of the people. Consistent with this concept of an Attorney General, the present Legislative Bureau of the Cabinet can be dispensed with in the interest of governmental efficiency and economy.

Within the framework of the plan outlined in your letter, modified in the manner I have indicated, I feel confident that a law enforcement system may be evolved in Japan which will satisfy all requirements of public safety, which will provide for the definitive separation of the administrative from the judicial process, and which at the same time will comply meticulously with the underlying principles of the Constitution. In this connection it should be borne in mind that, in the final analysis, police power in the preservation of law and order in a democratic society does not attain its maximum strength through oppressive controls imposed upon the people from above, but rather does it find infinitely greater strength in the relationship of a servant of, and answerable directly to, the people. Thereby, and thereby alone, may it encourage respect for the people's laws through confidence and paternalistic pride in the police as the law enforcement agency of the people themselves.

I am hopeful that the legislation necessary to give effect to these programs in the reorganization of government can be completed in time for consideration at the current session of the National Diet. To such end do not hesitate to call upon this headquarters for any assistance which you believe would be helpful.

Sincerely yours,

DOUGLAS MacARTHUR

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Enclosure No. 3 to Despatch No. 1334, dated October 14, 1947, from the United States Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, on the subject "Reform of Japanese Police System".

COPY

PRESS STATEMENT BY MR. SUEHIRO NISHIO, CHIEF SECRETARY OF THE CABINET, OCTOBER 9, 1947.

Since the formation of the present Cabinet, the Government has established a special committee of Cabinet Ministers specifically with a view to giving a careful consideration to the reforms of the police and judicial administrative systems consistent with the new situation ushered in by the enforcement of the new Constitution, and has striven to determine the basic governing principles aimed at the perfection of Japan's democratization and fulfillment of the requirements for the preservation of domestic public order from the standpoint of its own, taking at the same time into due consideration of the recommendations made by the Police System Investigation Commission at the time of the former Cabinet, the opinions of the United States experts, etc.

As for the police reform, the Government has, as the consequence of the study, decided upon a policy whereby the national police will have the strength of 30,000 uniformed men placed in rural districts, while local public entities with certain population will have an independent local police, both maintaining the public order in the time of normal condition by sufficient mutual cooperation, except for the national emergency in which the Prime Minister may exercise operational control over all police forces. Furthermore, it has decided to seek the approval of the General Headquarters for the increase of the police strength from the present legal limitation of 94,000 to 125,000 dependent upon the financial status of the national and local governments. The Prime Minister brought the above points to the attention of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for decision.

In response, we have received a considerate letter from the Supreme Commander which is now for release with his approval.

The Government is determined to leave nothing to be desired of Japan's democratization and preservation of public peace by the faithful and expeditious materialization of the basic principles clarified by the letter.

In all reforms, it is required to reorient the former way of thinking. Especially in the reform of the police system, it is easily understood that some of our people who have been accustomed to a system of centralization for many years might entertain a feeling of uneasiness vis-à-vis the new system. However, detail plans are now being worked out, with the technical assistance from the CI&E experts, for organization and operation of the police consistent with the new policy, so that, we are confident, a fresh and firm system for preservation of public peace will be accomplished.

Inasmuch as the basic outlines of the projected new police law and the Attorney General Law are expected to be determined and made public shortly and the necessary draft legislations will be submitted

to

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to the current session of the Diet, it is hoped that the public servants charged with the preservation of public peace understand the new system and spare no effort to discharge their responsibilities in time of institutional change.

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Enclosure No. 4 to Despatch No. 1334, dated October 14, 1947, from the United States Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, on the subject "Reform of Japanese Police System".

COPY

EXCERPT FROM "EDITORIAL SURVEY" IN NIPPON TIMES OF OCTOBER 12, 1947

Editorial attention on Friday was focussed on SCAP's recommendation for decentralization of the nation's police power and establishment of an Attorney General's office to replace the Ministry of Justice.

The Mainichi expressed fear that as a result of the new system, political parties may "exert vicious factional influence" upon the provincial police force, and the national and provincial police forces may have difficulty in maintaining "technical contact" between themselves inasmuch as the Japanese people are poorly adapted to "keeping themselves horizontally interlinked."

The Asahi advanced that it is the duty of the provinces to nurture their police that can keep clear of the influence of local bosses, political parties, and moneyed people. The Nihon Keizai said that until bureaucrats crawl out of their habits to step on others' toes in discharging their duties, the democratization of the police force cannot be hoped.

Responsible for Police

To revamp the nation's police system along democratic lines, the Yomiuri said on Saturday that it is absolutely necessary for the masses at large to realize that they are responsible for operation of the police force in their own district. For the smaller autonomous bodies will thus be made able to work for preservation of peace and order on a more efficient scale.

The Jiji Shimpo saw special significance in the institution of the public safety commission, for it is destined to implement a fundamental remedy of the misuse of the police by the Home Minister which was notable before and during the war.

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Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: October 22, 1948

SUBJECT: Problems in the Japanese Police System.

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Frank Rizzo, Special Assistant to General Whitney, Chief of Government Section, GHQ, SCAP.

Mr. Richard L. Sneider, member of the Japan Political Section, North East Asia Political Branch, DRF.

COPIES TO: NA Mr. John M. Allison
NA Mr. Marshall Green

1—1493

(Note: Mr. Rizzo left Tokyo on August 29 and is on TDY with the Civil Affairs Division, Department of the Army. His official position is special assistant to General Whitney, chief of the Government Section, GHQ, SCAP. He describes his position in Government Section as that of mediator and general handy-man in matters of policy and operation. The conversation with Mr. Rizzo was designed to supplement information available in the DRF Situation Report of October 8, 1948 on the Japanese Police System. It can be assumed that Mr. Rizzo's views reflect the opinions of the Government Section, headed by General Whitney, and as such may be also considered a strong indication of SCAP policy.)

1. Background on the Police Law

Mr. Rizzo reported that there was considerable contraversy within both the Japanese Government and GHQ before the details of the Police Law were settled. The major issue in both circles was decentralization of the Police. Within the Japanese Government, a strong element spearheaded by the Police Affairs Bureau of the Home Ministry favored a centrally organized police under a Minister of Public Safety. This position was opposed by other elements in the Cabinet, which supported decentralization though not to the extent of the final version of the Police Law. The same split was present in GHQ, where the Public Safety Division, reflecting the professional police viewpoint, were pitted against the Government Section, strong proponents of complete decentralization.

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The Government Section version of the Police Law was finally accepted with some slight modifications which gave the national government emergency powers. In forcing extreme decentralization of police organization and powers, the Government Section realized that the efficiency of the police would be impaired until such time as the police adjusted to the new situation. However, it was willing to risk the lowering of efficiency since it considered decentralization the fundamental prerequisite of a police reform and the only sure method to totally discredit the old system. Furthermore, Government Section felt that the emergency provisions were strong enough to block any threats to the national security.

2. Problems in the Present Police System

Mr. Rizzo stated that the provisions in the law pertaining to the coordination of local and national police activities are not fully adequate. However, he pointed out that, in practice, the national and local police cooperate with each other. Actually, the force of tradition is so strong that the local police continue to seek guidance and even direction from the prefectural and national police headquarters, despite their legal independence.

If the force of tradition is not strong enough to compel acceptance of limited controls exercised by the national police headquarters, several other pressures are available. First, several articles in the law can be interpreted to give the national police a wider range of authority, namely: Article 55, authorizing the local police to request the assistance of the national police (provided the National Rural Police personnel act under the operational control of the Local Public Safety Commission); Article 58, authorizing the National Rural Police troop or local police to conduct investigations outside their jurisdiction if the case originated or extended into their own jurisdiction; and Chapter VII, dealing with emergency situations. Mr. Rizzo said that the interpretations of Articles 55 and 58 would have to be extremely broad, since the Police Law definitely bars the national police headquarters from operational control over either the local police or the National Rural Police troops, except in case of a national emergency.

An additional pressure is the power of the purse which the national government possesses over the local areas, until such time as the local areas become financially independent. The denial of funds completely or even the failure to provide promptly allocated funds could force the local police into line. The last resort is for the national government to institute impeachment proceedings against the local executives, including police chiefs, if the latter fail to execute national ordinances and regulations.

Mr. Rizzo commented briefly on the Public Safety Commissions and police methods. The local Public Safety Commissions are operating satisfactorily, and the corruption that exists is no more serious than under

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the old system. The National Public Safety Commission is playing a secondary role, but that is as intended since Director General Saito is better able to provide professional advice. Its major purpose is to represent the public interest in police matters. As to police methods, a gradual movement away from their former strong-arm tactics is prevalent. The police realize that they are not permitted to use the third-degree, but neither the police nor the judges and procurators can fully adjust to the fact that confessions are no longer essential to convict a criminal. In one instance cited by Mr. Rizzo, a procurator was given evidence of the corruption of a government official. The procurator returned to GHQ a few days later and reported that it was impossible to convict the man because the accused steadfastly refused to confess his crime.

3. Estimate of Future Policy

Mr. Rizzo indirectly gave the impression that SCAP does not object to modifications made by the Japanese in a decentralization of the police system as long as they occured within the framework of the present law. The operating procedures that have developed to give the national police greater authority in normal police activities than the law permits have been accepted without objection. However, the general trend of Mr. Rizzo's statement on the importance of the principle of police decentralization indicated that any attempts to recognize the expanded authority of the national police by revisions in the text of the law would probably elicit an unfavorable reaction from SCAP, since this would be considered tampering with the basic philosophy of decentralization. Mr. Rizzo did not express any fear of establishing a precedent of permitting the Japanese to circumvent the intent of a law rather than revising it openly. (There is, however, one element in GHQ, Mr. Rizzo added, namely the Public Safety Division responsible for day-to-day police operations, that might favor outright revisions in the law which give the national police greater powers. However, SCAP followed the Government Section in the original controversy and there is no evidence that he will not continue to follow their advice.)

Mr. Rizzo stated that there would probably be no opposition within GHQ to the Japanese proposals to strengthen the emergency provisions and to enlarge the National Rural Police with an additional 20,000 men. These measures would strengthen the internal security of Japan and not affect the core of the law. He mentioned, however, that the Public Safety Division tends to emphasize, for the present at least, qualitative, rather than quantitative, improvements in the personnel and equipment.

4. The Maritime Safety Law

Mr. Rizzo remarked that he knew very little about this situation, except that the law is generally considered effective since it concentrates in the hands of one agency responsibility for a task formerly executed by multiple agencies. The major unsolved question is the exact territorial jurisdiction of the Maritime Safety Boats. As he recalled, the contraversy

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revolved about whether the phrase used in the law "the high seas adjacent to Japan" would be interpreted as the three-mile limit or as one to three hours steaming time. In a Government Section report which Mr. Rizzo had available, five basic safeguards are listed to protect against the use of the coastal patrol as a military force:

1. Its use as a military organization is specifically prohibited in the law. There is no authorization to use arms other than sidearms.

2. The number of ships is limited to 125 and their total tonnage to 50,000 tons. Furthermore, except for two ships listed in the law, the maximum tonnage of any ship is limited to 1,500 tons.

3. The maximum speed of the ships is 15 knots.

4. The personnel are under the National Public Service Law rather than a special organization, to avoid the infiltration of ex-regular naval officer and non-commissioned personnel.

5. There is no direct connection with the National Rural Police, only a provision for cooperation between the two organizations. The water police of the National Rural Police are assigned to the inland waters with no overlapping of authority.

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FROM: Tokyo

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 7, January 5

PRIORITY

Soviet charges that the Japanese police are being used as a basis for the rearmament of Japan were characterized today (Wednesday) as "part and parcel of a coordinated campaign by the Soviet authorities to create mendacious rumors" for the benefit of "certain elements in Japan whose only purpose is to spread discord."

This reply to Soviet charges was made at a meeting of the Allied Council for Japan by W. J. Sebald, Chairman of the Council and member for the United States.

Sebald further invited the members representing the Soviet Union, China, and the British Commonwealths personally to inspect police installations throughout Japan to satisfy themselves that the Japanese police are organized according to law.

The reorganized Japanese police came into being on March 7, 1948 and were described by Sebald as having been organized to meet two primary criteria: (A) the avoidance of centralized control, and (B) the establishment of the principle of local autonomy.

"Two separate and distinct types of police presently form the police system at the disposal of the Japanese people for protection and law enforcement purposes", Sebald said. "These are the national rural police with an authorized strength of 30,000, and a system of local Municipal police having an overall strength of 95,000.

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In discussing the equipment of the present Japanese police, which he said has been "of considerable concern to occupation authorities", Sebald pointed out that there are only some 25,000 pistols available for use by a force of 125,000 persons and that "the overwhelming majority are armed with sticks and clubs only".

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SEBALD

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

G. DIVISION OF
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FEB 2 1949
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

United States Political Adviser
for Japan

Tokyo, January 28, 1949.

No. 59

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Subject: Monograph Prepared by Japanese Government on the Police System of Japan.

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to this Mission's despatch no. 11 of January 7, 1949, forwarding the record of a discussion in the Allied Council for Japan concerning the Japanese police system, and to enclose five copies of a monograph dated June 1948 prepared by the Japanese Foreign Office on this subject.

The enclosed monograph briefly describes the present police system of Japan and compares it with the pre-surrender police organization. The present water police system under the jurisdiction of the Maritime Safety Board is also outlined, and appendices contain statistics concerning the police system. It is believed that the data and observations in this monograph are generally accurate.

Two problems briefly discussed in the enclosure seem particularly noteworthy, one relating to the optimum size of the Japanese police forces and the other to the equipment of the police. It is stated on page 5 that "...the strength now prescribed for the Japanese police cannot be made a criterion for the future police strength of Japan". The argument is developed that the additional strength contributed formerly by the Japanese military forces and presently by the Occupation forces must be considered in determining the desirable size of the Japanese police forces.

It is indisputable that the present police forces of Japan are not entirely satisfactory and that in several instances they have required the assistance of Occupation forces. There would appear to be several reasons, however, for this inadequacy: one

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is that the very presence of the Occupation Forces and the uncertain legal situation in an Occupied country make Japanese police reluctant to take definite action in certain situations, as, for example, toward lawless foreign elements in Japan; another is the insufficiency of training and of equipment of the Japanese police. That the lack of adequate arms greatly reduces the efficiency of the police is undeniable.

It appears to this Mission that, when the present police force is adequately trained and possesses the authorized pistols and ammunition, it will be more feasible to determine the necessity or desirability of further measures to strengthen the police.

Respectfully yours,

W. J. Sebald

Enclosure: alt

Five copies of Monograph on
Police System of Japan

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Original and hectograph to Department

R.B.F.

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Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 59
dated January 28, 1949 from the United
States Political Adviser for Japan,
Tokyo, on the subject "Monograph Pre-
pared by Japanese Government on the
Police System of Japan".

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POLICE SYSTEM
OF
JAPAN

FOREIGN OFFICE

JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

JUNE 1948

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652, Sec 3(E) and 5(D) or (E) NND# 760050.

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I. NEW POLICE SYSTEM

In the past, the Japanese police was under a centralized national system, with the Home Minister at the top, the prefectural Governor (the Superintendent-General of Metropolitan Police, in the case of Tokyo) in the middle, and the Chief of Police Station at the bottom.

This national police system under centralized control had something to justify itself, when considered from the viewpoint of ensuring the preservation of peace and order on a national basis. But this system was open to the charge that it functioned more as a tool of the Government than as a servant of the people; and that it tended, under the pretext of maintaining order, to put undue restraints upon the freedoms of thought, speech, assembly, publication and religion.

Under the guidance of the Allied authorities, endeavours were made to complete the reform of Japan's police system, by eradicating all vestiges of feudalism and bureaucracy, which culminated in the enactment of the new police law of Dec. 8, 1947.

The new police system under this law came into being on March 7, 1948, replacing the 75 year old bureaucratic police by a police of the people for the people.

The salient features of the new system which has been realized through the said police law and other legislations are shown below.

1) Decentralization of Police System.

The old unitary system has been divided into a national police (National Rural Police) and a local police (Municipal Police), the latter consisting of 1,610 independent units belonging to local autonomous entities;

National Rural Police

The National Rural Police takes charge of peace preservation in the rural communities outside cities and towns. The country is divided into six Police Regions; and each Region has a Regional Police Headquarters which operates and controls the National Rural Police of the prefectures (*Fu* or *Ken*) within its jurisdiction. It is to be noted that the number of the police officers for National Rural Police is not to exceed 30,000. Again, the local

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state police force formerly under the supervision of the prefectural governor is now put under the direction of the Director of the Regional Headquarters, who is responsible for the maintenance of law and order in the rural communities of the prefecture. The elected prefectural governor has theoretically only the authority to appoint the local Safety Commission of his prefecture. Neither he, nor members of the prefectural assembly will have voice *vis-a-vis* the Director of the Regional Police Headquarters. However, it goes without saying that there is to be maintained close liaison and cooperation between the National Police Headquarters and the prefectural government.

Municipal Police

Municipal police was set up in cities and in towns and villages with a population of 5,000 or more, which are specially recognized as being of a municipal character. There are throughout the country 1,610 such municipal police boards, the Metropolitan Police Board with a force of 27,000 topping the list. Each municipal police board is independent of others, and all boards rank equal. The Regional Police Headquarters has no authority over them.

2) Democratization of Police

In parallel with the above-mentioned Police organization, there has been set up under the jurisdiction of the Prime Minister, the National Public Safety Commission consisting of 5 members, to which Messrs. Yonekichi Kanemasa, Jiro Tsuji, Makoto Ubukata, Saburo Kiyose and Mrs. Tamaki Uemura, were nominated by the Government, and approved by the Diet on March 7, 1948. On the other hand under the jurisdiction of the prefectural governors (*To, Do, Fu* and *Ken*), Public Safety Commissions have been respectively organized and the members appointed, for the control and operation of the National Rural Police of their respective *To, Do, Fu* and *Ken*.

Again in each city, town or village, having a municipal police, there has been established a Municipal Public Safety Commission, which appointed under the new legislation the Chief of its Municipal Police.

3) Delimitation of Police Functions

The police functions are limited to control and prevention of crimes and to traffic control, while various lines of general administration including labor and social insurance affairs have been transferred to other Government

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organs, and the political police known as "Special High Police" have been put out of existence.

4) Measures for Emergency

In the past 75 years of Japanese police history, there have occurred situations which police alone could not cope with, and martial law was declared or troops were called out. The new Police Law provides for the declaration of a state of emergency in such cases. This declaration is issued by the Prime Minister upon the advice of the National Public Safety Commission, to be effective over the whole or a part of the country. Once the declaration is issued, all the functions of the local Public Safety Commissions are suspended, and all municipal police boards in the affected area are placed under the direction of the Director-General of the Regional Headquarters. A declaration of a state of emergency must be approved by the Diet within 20 days from the day of its issuance.

II. NUMERICAL STRENGTH

1. The numerical strength of the Japanese police which stood at 93,935 at war's end is being increased to 125,000 as approved by the Supreme Commander. The number of 93,000 odd represents the strength to which the police force had been reduced during the war, and which was continued into the postwar period. With this limited police force, Japan has managed to prevent any disturbance of internal order in the midst of serious social unrest following the surrender. For this achievement due credit must be given to the police personnel who have discharged their duties with competence, willingly submitting to long hours and overwork; but the most potent stabilizing factor has been that the whole country is under Allied military occupation. Since with the eventual withdrawal of the Allied troops, the entire responsibility for the preservation of internal peace and order will rest with the Japanese police, the Government cannot but view with deep concern the future of the Japan's police force, in regard to both numerical strength and equipment.

2. The strength of the police in Japan proper from 1897 up to the present is shown in Appendix I. It may be seen that the police in 1897 numbered 29,976 or one to every 1,441 of the population; and in that year the strength of the standing Army and Navy in Japan proper was 162,621.

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In 1940, the police numbered 85,580 or one to every 847 of the population, while the number of soldiers and sailors in the regular service in that year was 1,463,173.

3. How does the numerical strength, as given above, of the Japanese police compare with that of other countries? The answer, according to the data on hand, is given in Appendix II. It will be seen that the number of population taken care of by one policeman in Japan is larger than that either in the United States or in Britain.

4. Japanese policemen are generally overworked. This fact is clearly demonstrated by the number of hours they are compelled to work. (See Appendix III.) Policemen are supposed to work, like Government officials in general, for the prescribed number of hours. In the case of police detectives, however, there can be practically no limit to work hours, nor can there virtually be any off-duty day or holiday. In actual practice, they have to work over ten hours a day. Officers serving at police-boxes work on two, three, or four day-shifts, depending on prefectures. For instance, the work hours for the officer of Metropolitan Police Board averaged 12 hours a day as of the end of 1947. Those under the two-shifts system there numbered some 14,600. In order to comply with the work hours prescribed in the newly enacted Labor Standards Law, it is necessary to place them on a three-shift system (which consists of eight hours on the first day, 17 hours on the second day and an off-duty day on the third day). This placement will require an additional force of about 7,300 men.

On the other hand, there has been a steady increase in occurrences of crime. The statistics for the years from 1941 to 1946 show that the number of reported crimes increased from 922,526 in 1941 to 1,387,080 in 1946; and increase is noted in the same interval from 771,653 to 803,264 in the number of arrests made, and from 334,417 to 445,484 in the number of persons arrested. These figures alone will suffice to indicate how Japanese police are overworked. (See Appendix IV.)

5. Peace and order in Japan as in any other country was not maintained solely by police, but on the occasion of serious disturbance troops were called out. Actual instances of such cases which occurred in the past may here be cited.

a. The first instance where, on occasions of natural calamities, troops were dispatched occurred at the time of the earthquake of the Gifu region in October, 1891, when 120 soldiers were mobilized. There

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b. The principal cases where troops were mobilized for the purpose of quelling and forestalling social disturbances number 20. The first instance is the Chichibu Incident of November, 1884, in which an attempt was made to overthrow the Government of the day. The eases include also the rice riots which broke out in various parts of the country in August, 1918. (See Appendix V.)

In considering the necessary strength of Japanese police force in the future, therefore, the fact should not be lost sight of that Japan of the future will no longer have the guarantee for internal peace and order formerly afforded by the armed services; and that to that extent will be made heavier the burden of responsibility to be shouldered by the police. In other words, the strength now prescribed for the Japanese police cannot be made a criterion for the future police strength of Japan. The criterion should be sought in the combination of the police strength now required and of the strength formerly contributed by the armed services or at present, by the Occupation Forces, to guarantee internal peace and order. Since war's end, there have been actually 26 cases where the Occupation Forces gave their assistance in dealing with mob violences and disturbances (as of the end of March, 1948). Again it was the order of the Supreme Commander which prevented the general strike scheduled for February 1, 1947. More recently, in the great floods of the Kanto district of last September, the Occupation Forces played a leading role in giving aid and relief to the stricken area.

III. EQUIPMENT

As the means of criminal acts has changed with the progress of times, so must the equipment of police be modernized. This truism applies to all aspects of the equipment, to the arms, to the means of transportation and even to the clothing. It needs scarcely be mentioned that the Japanese police should be armed with, beside pistols, means to cope with riot situation such as tear-bombs, and equipped with scientific means of communication, including radio appliances and light-armored cars. Nor is it necessary to say that the arms to be used by the Japanese police need not be of Japanese make, but may well be imported from abroad.

The arms formerly carried by the Japanese police consisted mainly of sabers, or short swords, and pistols, and also of a limited number of fire-

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arms (which were not much better than hunting-guns). As the equipment was so inefficient, so obsolete and so unscientific, police officers had to suffer the consequences in dealing with criminals. Cases of deaths and injuries caused to police officers in the performance of their duties numbered 10 and 326, respectively, in the year 1938, while the respective figures for the one year from August, 1945 to July, 1946 were 74 and 1,037. (See Appendix VI.) And, as mentioned in the preceding section, an immediate call had to be made to the Allied troops for assistance, if there was any serious menace to peace and order. Furthermore, the means of transportation at the disposal of the Japanese police are still extremely inadequate. It is only through the help of the Allied Headquarters that the Metropolitan Police Board of Tokyo and the Police Departments of Prefectures now have been provided with a total of 475 jeeps.

The SCAP memorandum of 16 January 1946 on "Armament of Police Forces in Japan" made clear the following: a) The Japanese Government is authorized to have its police carry pistols; b) The number of pistols available to the Japanese police shall not exceed the strength of police authorized for Japan; c) All firearms, other than the pistols so authorized, shall be delivered to the Occupation Forces on or before 1 March 1946; d) The Japanese Government is authorized to maintain a supply of 100 rounds of ammunition for each pistol authorized.

It has to be pointed out that, despite the authorization given under a) above, the number of pistols now carried by Japanese police officers totals no more than 24,958 (as of August, 1947) as against the numerical strength of 125,000 authorized for the Japanese police.

Under the Home Office Ordinance of March 12, 1946 relating to the Uniforms Regulations, police officers have since carried "bludgeons", instead of the sabers or short swords they had worn.

In this connection, it may not be out of place here to consider how many crimes are committed with the use of weapons, as may be seen from the following:

Weapons used in Crimes

Year	Crimes committed with Weapons	Of them, those committed with Pistols
1937	1,779	11
1943	921	5
1946	6,779	1,906
1947 (first six months)	3,955	851

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It should be noted that, since war's end, the number of crimes committed with the use of pistols has grown in a marked degree. Hunting guns may be cited as another kind of firearms used in crimes since before the war. There is also observable new trend among criminals in these days to use machine-guns. Attention must be paid to the likelihood of these weapons being smuggled from abroad. In addition to this increase in crime perpetrations with the use of weapons, it may be pointed out that there has been a steady increase in crimes in general, before, during and after the war, as shown in Appendix X.

In view of these circumstances, it will be understood that what is imperatively and urgently necessary in connection with the renovation of the Japanese police system is: (1) Adequate strength and equipment, (2) Adoption of scientific methods and principles, (3) Progress and adjustment of police equipment in keeping with the advance in methods of criminal activities.

IV. PRESERVATION OF LAW AND ORDER AT SEA

1. Water Police

The Water Police (Suijo-keisatsu) was established for the purpose of maintaining peace and order, and for keeping watch on the water, principally in ports and on rivers. Thus, with the Imperial Ordinance implementing the Regulations for the Opening of Ports, Water Police Stations were established in 1898 in most of the open ports. Subsequently, many of the Water Police Stations were gradually abolished, for the reason that the seas came to be adequately patrolled by the navy, rendering it unnecessary for the Water Police to extend its vigilance beyond ports and rivers; and that, even in ports and on rivers, the necessary control could be exercised by the ordinary land police.

The termination of the war, however, has introduced a complete change into the situation as is stated in the following chapter and the renovation and strengthening of the Water Police have become a pressing need of the moment.

The statistics relating to the Water Police, as of the end of February, 1947, shows 14 Water Police Stations, 58 Water Police Boxes, 207 boats assigned to the service, and 1,386 police officers. (See Appendix VII.) At the same time, there were 404 Police Stations which, though not called "Water

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Police Stations", included coastal waters in their jurisdiction. Among them there were sub-offices which were known as "Water Police Boxes", to which officers trained in the water police operation were assigned.*

2. Marine Safety System

The seas along the 4,300 mile coast line of Japan are hazzardous waters owing to the peculiar meteorological and oceanogpaphical conditions. Moreover, with the disappearance of the navy there exists practically no authority for the maintenance of law and order in these waters. The cases of smuggling, illegal entry, piracy, and all kinds of economic offences are on the increase with a tendency toward worsening in character. (See Annex VIII.) Control was exercised only by Government organs such as the Custom Offices, Police Stations, the Marine Transportation Bureau, the Quarantine Office, and the Aquatic Products Bureau independently with their ill-equipped boats.

It was necessary to provide more ships, better communication appliances and other equipment in order to eliminate such dangers and risks from Japanese waters. But it would be both uneconomical and irrational to let the various Government organs to own and operate such costly equipment and installations. It was considered best to have one administrative organ assume a unitary control and operation of the ships and equipment required for the safety of navigation and the maintenance of public peace on sea, while maintaining liaison and collaboration with such other authorities as the police, customs houses, quarantine stations, etc. on the basis of mutual aid and assistance and with due regard to one another's special functions.

With the advice and guidance of the SCAP the Government drew up the Marine Safety Authorities Law, which was passed by the 2nd Diet on April 15, 1948, and which came into effect as from May 1.

The Marine Safety Board set up under the above-mentioned law is an extra-ministerial organ of the Transportation Ministry. It is a large organization, combining in itself the functions formerly under the jurisdiction of the General Maritime Bureau, Maritime Transportation Bureau, Ship Bureau, Marine Casualties Inquiry Commission, Light House Bureau, and Hydrographical Bureau and other administrative authorities. It possesses also wide powers, relating to enforcement at sea of the laws relating to the

* The question of jurisdictional adjustment of the water police following the inanguration of the new police system and the establishment of the Marine Safety Board is being studied by the Government organs concerned.

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safety of ships, qualifications and numbers of shipping personnel, rescue work at sea, marine disaster investigation, pilots and prevention and suppression of crimes, search for and arrest of criminals at sea, affairs relating to hydrographical service, beacons, and all other affairs relating to safety at sea.

As for local organs, the country is divided into 9 Regions, each with a Marine Safety Headquarters. Some 50 Marine Safety Stations, Communications Depots, and Port Captain's Offices have been established as subordinate organs. Moreover, in order to facilitate the smooth and satisfactory functioning of the system, the Central and Regional Marine Safety Commissions have been set up.

By taking into consideration the special circumstances of Japan, demilitarized and under military occupation, the Marine Safety Authorities Law contains specific pertinent provisions; for instance, the number of entire personnel in the service is not to exceed 10,000. The ships are limited to 125 in number and to 50,000 gross tons in total tonnage, while each ship is not to exceed 1,500 displacement tons in size, and 15 knots in speed. Of the service personnel, the Marine Safety officers may carry arms but not beyond what the ordinary police are permitted to carry—such as pistols. In this regard, however, it is believed desirable and necessary that the coast guard craft assigned to the duties of patrol and vigilance over the wide waters are permitted to have small calibre cannons and machine-guns. (See Appendix IX.)

Finally, it is clearly stipulated that no provision of the law shall be interpreted as recognizing the Marine Safety Board and its personnel to be organized or trained as an armed force, or to perform the functions thereof.

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APPENDICES

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APPENDIX I.

Police Strength in Japan Proper since 1897

(By the Police Bureau, Home Ministry, August 30, 1947)

Year	Population	Number of Police Officers (Prescribed Full Number)	Population for Each Police Officer	Army	Navy (in Active Service)	Military Police
1897	43,228,863	29,976	1,441	143,000	19,621	5,070
1902	46,022,476	34,663	1,320	Not available	33,622	1,690
1907	48,260,300	33,670	1,433	216,000	47,243	2,094
1912	51,643,000	36,835	1,402	216,000	54,662	10,673
1916	54,681,700	40,418	1,352	216,000	63,225	6,573
1921	58,673,848	51,432	1,141	216,000	81,386	3,399
1926	59,966,900	59,735	1,003	179,000	76,331	2,837
1930	63,872,496	63,267	1,009	179,000	79,935	3,053
1935	68,668,654	66,578	1,030	229,000	94,661	2,843
1937	70,654,100	72,191	978	229,000	106,757	2,400
1940	72,539,729	85,580	847	(June) 1,240,000	223,173	Not available
1945	71,996,477	93,935	756	(January) 4,100,000 (August) 6,400,000	1,693,223	(September) 8,479
1946	73,114,136	93,935	778	None	None	None

Note: The above list gives figures of the end of each five year interval, except for the periods from 1912 to 1916 and from 1926 to 1930, for which the interval, for the sake of convenience in investigation, has been set at four years.

Population is taken from the "Teikoku Tokei Nenkan" (Imperial Statistics Year Book) compiled by The Cabinet Statistics Bureau.

The number of police officers and the population for each police officer are taken from the "Keisatsu Tokei" (Police Statistics) compiled by the Police Bureau of the Home Ministry.

The Army strength is taken from the "List of Standing Army Strength (Excluding that in Korea, Formosa and Saghalien)" and the "Outline of Army Strength", prepared by the First Demobilization Bureau on August 29, 1947. The statistics indicate standing Army strength for the years up to 1937, and total strength for the years since 1940.

The authority for the Navy strength is the "Imperial Statistics Year Book" and the results of the investigation made by the Second Demobilization Bureau.

The authority for the strength of the Military Police is, up to 1935, the "Imperial Statistics Year Book", and, since 1937, the results of the investigation made by the First Demobilization Bureau.

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APPENDIX II.

Comparative List of Present Police Strengths in Various Countries

Country	Population	Number of Police Officers	Population for Each Police Officer	Remarks
Japan	73,114,136	93,935	778	The population given is that ascertained by the National Census of 1946, and the number of Police Officers is the prescribed full number for that year.
Britain	45,183,000	70,460	641	The authority is the "Whitaker's Almanac for 1947". The population is that estimated for 1945. The number of police officers given is the prescribed full number for 1946 in regard to England and Wales, and for 1945 in respect of Scotland and Ireland.
United States	131,669,275	176,988	743	The authority for the population is "The World Almanac, 1946," where the figures of the 1940 national census are given. The number of police officers is taken from the 1940 national census of the United States (See "Law Enforcement", P. 16.)
Urban units, each with a population of 2,500 or over, in the United States	70,000,000 (Approximate)	120,000 (Approximate)	583	The figures are taken from "Police System in the U. S., 1940" by Bruce Smith.
South Korea	19,000,000 (Approximate)	38,000	500	Taken from a Seoul dispatch of July 29, 1947, from U. P. Vice-President E. J. Johnson, published in the Mainichi Shimbun of July 31, 1947. It reported that South Korea had a Korean constabulary of 10,000 men, and 28,000 police officers.
Italy	45,801,000	65,000	704	The population is taken from "The World Almanac, 1946", and the number of Carabinieri from the Peace Treaty with Italy of 1947.

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APPENDIX III.

Present Work Hours of Police Officers
(As of the end of October, 1947)

1. At present, principal police officers of the rank of Assistant Police-Inspector or over, as a rule, work in accordance with the number of hours prescribed for Government offices generally. In addition to these hours, however, Police-Inspectors and Assistant Police-Inspectors assume a night-duty under a rotation system.

2. (1) Of Chief Patrolmen and Patrolmen, those assigned to indoor duty or to traffic-control duty, as a rule, work for the number of hours prescribed for Government offices generally. In addition, they assume a night-duty under a rotation system.

(2) As a rule, a police-detective works for the number of hours prescribed for Government offices generally. If any criminal case occurs, however, he has to work day or night, until it is settled so far as he is concerned. Therefore, it is very seldom that a police-detective can go home at the prescribed office-closing time. Even on a holiday or on an off day, a detective has to attend to his duty, if any case occurs. The number of hours a detective has to work depends upon the circumstances of such cases, but on an average he works at least for 10 hours a day.

(3) Of policemen on outside duty, those serving at Police Sub-Stations (Chuzai Sho), as a rule, work for 8 hours. But those serving at Police-Boxes (Hashutsu Sho) work in two, three or four day shifts, depending on the Prefecture concerned.

a. The "two-shifts service system" means to serve for 24 hours every other day (that is to serve for 12 hours a day on an average). Policemen under this service now number above 14,500. In order to revise the work hours for these policemen, in accordance with the Labor Standards Law, it is necessary to change the two-shifs system into one of three-shifts consisting of 8 hours, 17 hours and an off-duty day, as mentioned below. This change requires an additional personnel of about 7,300 men.

b. Of the "three-shifts service system," there are two kinds: the one consists of a day of 8 hours, a day of 24 hours and an off-duty day; the

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other, a day of 8 hours, a day of 17 hours and an off-duty day. Policemen under the former system number about 900, and those under the latter system about 2,500. Under the latter system, the service is roughly on an eight-hour day basis, but this is exceeded under the former system. In order to bring the former system into line with the Labor Standards Law, it is necessary to change it into the latter system.

c. The "four-shifts service system" consists of two consecutive days of 8 hours each, a day of 17 hours and an off-duty day. On the two days of 8 hours each, the service is in the daytime, but one of the two days is given over to "waiting for work" (taiki) or to instructions and training. On the day of 17 hours, the service is at night and early in the morning, as is the case on a similar day under the three-shifts system.

Policemen under this system of service number about 6,300.

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APPENDIX IV.

Statistics relating to Numbers of Offenses, Arrests and Persons Arrested

Year	Number of Offenses	Number of Arrests	Number of Persons Arrested
1941	922,526	771,653	334,417
1942	890,331	691,314	299,395
1943	979,336	788,069	346,709
1944	905,836	709,596	510,951
1945	711,596	472,853	242,645
1946	1,387,080	803,264	445,484

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APPENDIX V.

Principal Instances where Troops were called out for preserving Peace and Order or for Rescue Work

A. At times of natural disasters

1. No-bi Earthquake, in Gifu and Aichi Prefectures, October 28, 1891, 6.30 a.m.

The earthquake caused throughout the plains of Gifu and Aichi Prefectures, with Neo-mura, Motosu-gun, Gifu Prefecture, as the epicentre. To assist in the rescue work and for the restoration of order, 120 troops were called out.

2. Sakurajima eruption, in Kagoshima Prefecture, January 12, 1914, 10.05 a.m.

In consequence of the eruption of the island, earthquakes, fires and floods occurred, and great conflagrations broke out in Kagoshima City and several villages. 3,395 troops were called out for rescue work.

3. Floods in Kurume City, Fukuoka Prefecture, June 17, 1921.

Owing to heavy rains, the Chikugo River overflowed its banks, and the embankments collapsed, causing inundations throughout the city.

Troops were called out to the number of 3,170.

4. Floods around Sai and Asano Rivers, Ishikawa Prefecture, August 3, 1921.

Heavy rains caused floods due to the overflowing of the Sai and Asano Rivers, with bridges washed away, embankments destroyed, etc.

300 troops were called out.

5. Great Earthquake of Kanto Region, September 1, 1923, 11.58 a.m.

Violent tremors visited the seven Prefectures of Tokyo, Kanagawa, Chiba, Saitama, Shizuoka, Yamanashi and Ibaragi, causing damage of unparalleled proportions. In the Tokyo area, the quakes were followed by conflagrations, which broke out at over 30 spots. Many parts of the Capital were reduced to ashes, and serious disorders were caused. In order to restore order, the Capital was placed under administrative martial law, and the following troops were called out.

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Prefectural Jurisdiction	Number of Troops called out	Number of Police Officers sent by Other Prefectures for Assistance
Tokyo (Metropolitan Police Board)	Number of Troops unavailable; martial law enforced	53,065 (From All Prefectures)
Kanagawa	206,700 (Including Military Police)	31,640 (From Gumma, Aichi and Shiga)
Chiba	4,610 (Composed of Infantry and Military Police)	
Saitama	7,989	
Shizuoka	6,820	
Total	226,119	84,705

6. Great Earthquake in Oku-Tango Districts, Kyoto Prefecture, March 7, 1927, 6.27 p.m.

The earthquake occurred, with the Japan Sea bottom off Tango Promontory as the epicentre, causing extensive damage and disorder in seven towns, including Miyazu-machi, and 51 villages. To restore order and to preserve public peace, Army and Navy units were called out to the strength of about 46,300; 272 police officers also came for assistance from Hyogo Prefecture.

7. Storms and floods in Okayama Prefecture, September 20, 1934.

Owing to heavy storms, many rivers in the Prefecture overflowed their banks, much damage being caused. Troops, 400 in number, were called out.

8. Storms and floods, Osaka Prefecture, September 21, 1934.

A typhoon moving from south-east of Shikoku brought on tidal waves, about 10 feet high, along the shores of Osaka Bay, working havoc throughout West Osaka and parts of Sakai City. 5,859 troops were called out for rescue work and for the restoration of order.

9. Rain damage in Kobe City, and between Osaka and Kobe and between Akashi and Himeji, Hyogo Prefecture, July 5, 1938.

Long-continued rains caused the overflowing of rivers and landslides, suspension of traffic, and washing away or destruction of dwelling houses, attended with many casualties.

The troops called out number 500. In addition, 1,440 police officers came from Osaka for assistance.

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10. Storms and floods in Kimotsuki-gun district, Kagoshima Prefecture, October 13, 1938.

Storms caused the Kimotsuki River and other rivers to overflow their banks, leading to serious floods and extensive damage throughout Kimotsuki-gun district. Troops were called out to the number of 1,554.

11. Abukuma River floods, Miyagi Prefecture, July 21, 1941.

Continued rains caused the embankments on the northern side of the Abukuma River to collapse, inundating Iwanuma-machi and four villages. 50 troops were called out for rescue work and for the restoration of order.

12. Storms and floods in the western part of Omuda City, Fukuoka Prefecture, August 27, 1942.

Storms, coinciding with the flood-tide, caused the rivers to rise. In Ariake Inlet, Breakwater No. 1, and then the Inner Breakwater, were broken through, with the result that the streets of Omuda City were inundated. Troops were called out to the number of 3,050.

13. Earthquake in Tottori City, Tottori Prefecture, September 10, 1943.

A severe earthquake caused disasters throughout Tottori City and neighborhood. Troops were called out to the number of 2,290, and 577 police officers came for assistance from the Police Departments of Okayama, Hyogo, Hiroshima and Shimane Prefectures.

14. Storms and floods throughout Shimane Prefecture, September 20, 1943.

Storms led to the overflowing of many rivers in Shimo-Iwami district and to landslides and cave-ins at many places. Troops were called out to the number of 300, and 11 police officers despatched from the Police Department of Yamaguchi Prefecture for assistance.

15. Floods in Tsurusaki-machi and neighborhood, Oita Prefecture, September 21, 1943.

Storms caused the Ono River to overflow its banks, bringing about damage in the neighboring six towns and villages, with Tsurusaki-machi as the center. There were called out 300 troops for rescue work.

16. Great earthquake in West Enshu district, Shizuoka Prefecture, December 7, 1944, 11.30 a.m.

The great earthquake occurred in West Enshu district on the Oi River, and 14,856 troops were called out.

17. Earthquake disasters in Hazu-gun, Hekikai-gun, Chita-gun, and the southern part of Nagoya City, all in Aichi Prefecture, January 13, 1945, 2 a.m.

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Owing to severe tremors, disasters were caused throughout the above-mentioned areas, and 10,000 troops were called out.

B. At times of rioting and disorders

1. "Chichibu Incident", in Saitama and Nagano Prefectures, November 2, 1884.

This incident broke out in Chichibu-gun, Saitama Prefecture. The rioters, enraged at what they regarded as the tyranny of the so-called "Clan" Government of the day, called for its overthrow. Frustrated in Chichibu, they fled to Gumma and Nagano Prefectures, where they attempted to commit further lawless acts. They were quelled by the troops called out in Nagano and Saitama Prefectures to the number of 3,342.

2. "Otsu Affair", in Shiga Prefecture, May 11, 1891.

This is the case where, on the occasion of a visit to this country of the then Crown Prince of Russia, one of the Japanese policemen assigned to guard duty on the road drew his saber and struck the Prince on the head, causing him an injury. 200 infantrymen were called out to preserve order.

3. "Hibiya Fire Attack", in Tokyo, Septemher 5, 1905.

A large crowd, numbering 40,000 or 50,000, who were dissatisfied with the terms of the Russo-Japanese Peace Treaty, attempted to hold a mass meeting at Hibiya, but the meeting was forbidden. Another meeting at the Shintomi Theater was also banned. The enraged crowds collided with police. They set afire the official residence of the Home Minister. This led, in various parts of the city, to attack on police stations and police-boxes, which were set on fire. The situation was brought under control by the partial enforcement of martial law and the issuance of a Proclamation by the Commander of the Tokyo Garrison.

Units of the Tokyo Garrison and the Military Police were called out, but their number is unavailable.

4. "Disturbance of 1913", Tokyo, February 10, 1913.

In December, 1912, Prime Minister Saionji tendered his resignation. The Elder Statesmen held a conference in the presence of the Emperor to discuss who should be selected to form a new Cabinet. No decision could be reached as to the selection of the next Prime Minister, and the Diet was twice prorogued on that account. On the third prorogation of the Diet, the crowds set fire to the offices of the Miyako Shimbun, and collided with police.

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Then they set afire police stations and police-boxes, and attacked the office of the Niroku Shimbun and other places.

Infantry units of the Tokyo Garrison and the Military Police were called out, but their number is unavailable.

5. "Rice riots of August, 1918".

The boom following the World War I raised commodity prices. Especially the price of rice which through the speculations of unscrupulous merchants shot up so high that riots broke out in various parts of the country.

Troops totalling 26,032 were called out in the Prefectures of Tokyo, Osaka, Hyogo, Niigata, Mie, Aichi, Yamanashi, Miyagi, Fukushima, Fukui, Shimane, Okayama, Hiroshima, Yamaguchi and Fukuoka.

6. Anti-Korean Outbreaks, September, 1923.

On the occasion of the Great Earthquake of September 1, 1923, extreme unrest was created in Tokyo. Rumors were circulated in various parts of the devastated areas to the effect that Koreans were rising against Japanese, perpetrating incendiarism, throwing poisons into wells, etc. The fear and hatred thus engendered against Koreans led to acts of violence by Japanese against Koreans mostly in the Kanto region.

The troops called out in Saitama, Gumma and Chiba Prefectures numbered 9,463.

7. Sai River Affair, in Gifu Prefecture, January 7 and 8, 1929.

In order to prevent the overflowing of the Sai River, the prefectural authorities diverted the river water to Anbachi County against a violent opposition of Namori-mura and six other towns and villages, of which all the town officials resigned in protest. This led to a riotous demonstration by the townspeople and villagers, which were quieted by calling out troops —400 on January 7, and 200 on January 8.

8. There are cases where, in labor disputes, such lawless acts as the destruction of houses and incendiarism were committed, and where troops were called out to preserve peace and order, as shown by the following list:

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Region	Prefecture	Mines or Shipyards	Date of Occurrence	Number of Troops called out	Number of Police Officers from Elsewhere
Hokkaido	Hokkaido	Sumitomo Mining	Sept. 10, 1945	30	
	"	Utashinai Mining	"	"	
Tohoku	Iwate	Kamaishi Mining	Nov. 10, 1919	300	
Kanto	Tochigi	Ashio Mining	Feb. 4, 1907	300	
	"	" "	Nov. 26, 1919	10	150 from Gumma Police Dept.
	Chiba	Noda Soy Co.	Sept. 16, 1927	1,000	
Kinki	Hyogo	Kawasaki-Mitsubish Shipyard	July. 6, 1921	160	
Kyushu	Fukuoka	Yawata Ironworks	Feb. 5, 1920	200	
	"	Mitsui-Miike Mining	Aug. 2, 1918	2,000	
	Saga	Aichi Colliery	Aug. 25, 1918	180	
	"	Kitakata Colliery	Aug. 29, 1918	150	
	"	Kaijima Colliery	Aug. 29, 1918	300	
	Kumamoto	Manda Colliery	Sept. 4, 1918	100	
Total		13		4,760	150

Note: From the above list are excluded cases where disturbances were caused by troops themselves, such as the so-called " May 15 Incident " of 1932, and the so-called " February 26 Incident " of 1936.

APPENDIX VI.

Statistics relating to Police Officers killed or injured while performing Official Duties

Year	Number killed	Number injured
1938	10	326
1939	6	239
1940	6	244
1941	2	213
One year preceding war's end, August, 1944-August, 1945	549(504)	1,373(928)
August, 1945-July, 1946	74	1,037

Note: The figures in parentheses indicate the numbers of the killed and wounded in air-raids, included in the preceding numbers.

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APPENDIX VII.

Statistics relating to Water Police
(Prepared by Police Bureau, Home Ministry, as of the end of February, 1947)

Prefectures	Water Police Stations	Water Police Boxes	Water Units assigned to Police Stations	Number of Boats	Police Officers	Seamen
Tokyo	1	—	—	(8) 12	396	12
Hokkaido	1	2	5	(3) 8	28	31
Kyoto	—	—	3	3	—	—
Osaka	3	—	—	7	224	65
Kanagawa	—	—	2	(2) 3	—	13
Hyogo	1	—	3	(4) 7	17	14
Nagasaki	1	—	5	(1) 9	50	22
Niigata	—	1	—	1	3	3
Chiba	—	2	—	2	5	1
Ibaragi	—	—	—	—	—	—
Mie	—	1	6	(4) 7	1	4
Aichi	—	7	2	(9) 15	29	15
Shizuoka	—	1	—	1	5	—
Aomori	1	1	1	7	31	5
Fukui	—	—	5	(5) 8	—	—
Ishikawa	—	1	1	2	2	6
Toyama	1	—	4	6	17	24
Tottori	—	2	—	2	8	2
Shimane	—	1	7	12	unavailable	32
Okayama	—	7	—	13	8	17
Hiroshima	1	9	1	(9) 24	76	—
Yamaguchi	1	2	3	(1) 11	34	60
Wakayama	—	4	(Dept.1)1	5	15	14
Tokushima	—	6	—	4	6	—
Kagawa	—	—	(Dept.1)4	4	11	4
Ehime	—	—	4	4	—	20
Kochi	—	—	2	2	4	6
Fukuoka	2	—	1	(2) 9	330	44
Oita	1	5	—	7	39	19
Saga	—	4	—	7	15	18
Kumamoto	—	—	1	1	1	2
Miyazaki	—	—	1	1	3	1
Kagoshima	—	2	(Dept.1)2	3	28	19
Total	14	58	64	207	1,386	473

Note: In the above list, the "Dept.", with a figure, enclosed in brackets, indicates the number of the Water Units under the direct jurisdiction of the Prefectural Police Department concerned, while the figures in brackets show the number of boats under repairs.

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APPENDIX VIII.

Statistics relating to Offenses committed on Water in 1946

(Prepared by Police Bureau, Home Ministry)

Prefectures	Violations of Criminal Law		Economic Offenses		Clandestine entry of Persons		Smuggling of Goods		Remarks
	Number of Cases	Number of Arrests	Number of Cases	Number of Arrests	Number of Cases	Number of Arrests	Detected by Police	Detected by Customs	
Tokyo	104	50	128	128	—	—	—	—	
Hokkaido	905	762	404	404	2	2	—	—	
Kyoto	23	18	17	17	52	52	—	—	
Osaka	796	635	191	191	4	4	22	10	Cases under jurisdiction of Occupation Courts, 782; goods smuggling 1
Kanagawa	1,136	1,091	282	215	3	3	—	4	
Hyogo	135	98	575	234	4	4	16	—	
Nagasaki	134	107	—	—	1,695	1,389	28	—	
Niigata	204	184	136	135	—	—	—	—	
Chiba	15	3	5	13	—	—	—	—	
Mie	—	—	—	10	—	—	—	—	
Aichi	273	249	4	4	1	1	2	6	
Shizuoka	44	28	6	6	18	18	1	—	
Iwate	8	2	4	4	1	1	—	—	
Aomori	186	174	79	79	—	—	—	—	
Yamagata	—	—	30	30	—	—	—	—	
Akita	43	43	53	53	—	—	—	—	
Toyama	18	18	12	12	—	—	—	—	
Shimane	—	—	—	—	1,708	1,669	—	—	
Okayama	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Hiroshima	208	154	39	38	104	104	11	—	
Yamaguchi	529	211	40	40	10,470	8,493	17	2	
Wakayama	20	20	6	6	4	4	3	—	
Tokushima	31	26	12	12	27	27	1	—	
Kagawa	77	54	46	46	—	—	—	—	
Ehime	74	39	208	178	4	4	2	—	
Kochi	52	52	22	22	5	5	5	—	
Fukuoka	661	1,007	478	478	554	554	118	11	
Oita	41	40	19	19	41	32	2	—	
Saga	52	42	5	5	3,295	2,582	15	—	
Kumamoto	66	66	93	93	87	87	5	4	
Miyazaki	—	—	4	4	335	332	14	—	
Kagoshima	14	14	66	66	40	98	65	—	
Total	5,849	5,187	2,964	2,542	18,454	15,465	327	37	

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APPENDIX IX.

Data relating to the Marine Public Safety Service

1. The requirements, in ships and personnel, for carrying on the Marine Public Safety Service are as follows:

a. Ships of the Marine Public Safety Board (excluding intra-harbor boats).

Number of ships:	125
Total tonnage:	50,000 (displacement tons)
Tonnage per ship:	1,500 („ „)

(The Nissho Maru XVIII, 2,005 gross tons, now employed as a supply ship for lighthouses, and the hydrographical survey ship Soya, 2,224 gross tons, are excluded.)

Speed: 15 Knots

b. Personnel of the Marine Public Safety Board: 10,000 persons.

2. The coastlines of Japan amount to 4,300 miles (excluding small islands). If the waters along these coast-lines are to be guarded by 125 guard-boats in two shifts, the area assigned to one guard-boat work out at 70 miles in coastline.

This area is the maximum over which a guard-boat, with a speed of 10 knots, can barely make one round and a half trip in a day. When allowance is made for repairs needed for guard-boats and for possible cases of emergency, such as disasters and the consequent rescue work at sea, it is desirable that about 20 per cent of the 125 guard-boats should be able to develop a maximum speed of 20 knots. (See the accompanying Table 1 and Table 2 giving statistics of disasters at sea.)

3. For the performance of guard duties over extensive seas, speedy means of communication relating to public safety at sea, including airplanes, are indispensable. As a matter of fact, Allied planes have given vitally needed assistance frequently since the occupation.

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Table 1.

Numbers of Marine Disasters at Sea
(For the Years 1933-1940)

Year	Steamers		Sailing Ships		Total	
	Total Loss	Serious Damage	Total Loss	Serious Damage	Total Loss	Serious Damage
1933	20	194	127	171	149	365
1934	19	178	108	154	127	332
1935	20	200	73	184	93	384
1936	26	160	93	200	119	360
1937	26	131	102	233	128	264
1938	33	159	101	218	134	377
1939	33	117	116	193	148	310
1940	21	124	108	232	129	356
Yearly average	24	157	103	198	128	343

Table 2.

Numbers of Casualties in Marine Disasters
(For the Years 1933-1940)

Year	Those Killed			Those Missing			Damage Sustained		
	Steamers	Sailing Ships	Total	Steamers	Sailing Ships	Total	Steamers	Sailing Ships	Total
1933	159	35	194	69	177	246	14	10	24
1934	26	37	63	64	38	102	15	3	18
1935	116	13	129	78	34	112	52	4	56
1936	36	24	60	84	104	188	10	18	28
1937	122	18	140	117	91	208	54	5	59
1938	58	37	95	34	67	101	86	8	94
1939	41	24	65	434	70	504	28	7	35
1940	18	26	44	9	60	69	10	15	25
Yearly average	72	26	98	111	80	191	33	8	42

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1	149	365
4	127	332
4	93	384
0	119	360
3	128	264
8	134	377
3	148	310
2	129	356
8	128	343

Marine

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	Damage Sustained		
tal	Steam-ers	Sailing Ships	Total
46	14	10	24
02	15	3	18
12	52	4	56
88	10	18	28
08	54	5	59
01	86	8	94
04	28	7	35
69	10	15	25
91	33	8	42

APPENDIX X.

Comparative List of Cases filed and of those prosecuted by Procurators' Office in 1940, 1942 and 1946

(Prepared by Criminal Bureau, Justice Ministry)

Description of Offenses	1940		1942		1946	
	Filed	Prosecuted	Filed	Prosecuted	Filed	Prosecuted
Arson	810	339	1,267	397	408	216
Currency Counterfeiting	9	2	6	1	552	193
Gambling	95,496	67,754	79,280	59,819	58,580	42,937
Bribery	3,024	1,224	4,274	1,499	2,478	812
Homicide	1,494	726	1,284	556	2,230	1,178
Abortion	609	163	382	80	178	27
Abandonment	209	16	153	117	241	51
Theft	105,846	18,671	97,053	18,018	252,728	75,337
Robbery	838	456	621	355	12,276	6,612
Fraud	45,700	4,377	28,920	3,789	23,392	8,080
Blackmail	3,542	624	2,870	469	7,033	2,285
Misappropriation	24,416	2,012	17,677	1,893	14,284	2,709
Violations of economic regulations	127,761	51,317	142,152	63,362	211,613	87,485
Other Offenses	165,951	46,324	132,524	37,618	103,263	29,432
Total	575,705	194,005	508,463	187,973	689,256	257,354

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MAY 4 1949

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652, Sec 3(E) and 5(D) or (E) NND# 760050.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MWB (State Dept. Northeast Asian Affairs Division from Green)

FROM : MG MEG

DATE: February 14, 1949

SUBJECT: Tokyo's 59 of January 28, 1949

HM
NH
BAF
AED

Suggest reading this brief despatch in toto.

The last paragraph appears to be an oblique rebuttal of the position which has been taken in NSC 13/2 recommending the expansion of the present centrally directed police system.

The trouble with the suggestion advanced by Sebald is that even if the police are properly armed and trained, as long as the occupation is there, it will never be known whether or not the police force is adequate. Referring to the preceding paragraph, it would seem to me that the presence of the occupation to back up the police is giving us a false sense that the police is adequate. Obviously the large well-organized gangs of extremists (mostly right-wing) already in existence are not going to contest the law openly as long as the occupation is there.

I am perturbed that Sebald seems to take a contrary view. The matter might be thrashed out by a letter from you to Sebald inquiring whether his last paragraph is a criticism of the NSC paper and if so what his objections are to the police recommendation of NSC 13/2.

RM/R Central Files

Document Must Be Returned to 894.105/2-1449

894.105/2-1449 CS/Y

Letter to Sebald of 3/31/49 filed in MWB NSC file (para 7.)

✓ done March 31, 49 MEG

please draft.

MWB

point out no longer are there any "troops" on our police recommendation call. Even in the U.S. we have to call out the National Guard on occasion.

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652, Sec 3(E) and 5(D) or (E) NND# 760050.

DIVISION OF NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS MAY 13 1949 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

United States Political Adviser
for Japan

Tokyo, May 9, 1949.

Action Assigned to NA

Action Taken noted in memo

REC'D
MAY 16

No. 295

RESTRICTED

Date of Action May 21, 49

Action Office Symbol NA

Name of Officer M. Green

Direction to DC/R -- file

ACTION
FE

INFO
DCR
OLI
SY

Subject: Japanese Police Organization in Odawara and Vicinity.

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose a copy of a memorandum prepared by Vice Consul Richard H. Lamb, an officer of the American Consulate General at Yokohama, on the subject of "Japanese Police Organization in Odawara and Vicinity". Odawara is located about thirty miles west of Yokohama and has a population of about 65,000 people.

The enclosed memorandum describes problems caused by the separation of Japan's police forces into the National Rural Police and the local autonomous police, particularly jurisdictional matters and the financial difficulties of small towns maintaining their own police. The memorandum suggests the need for some change in police organization at the village level and recommends that the local communities and local police be consulted before any substantial changes in present organization are made.

This Mission considers that the enclosed memorandum presents an excellent summary of Japanese police problems in an area containing a medium-sized city and several towns and villages. It also endorses the view that local opinion should be consulted before changes are made affecting village and city police.

Respectfully yours,

Cloyce K. Huston
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim

Enclosure: att.

Copy of memorandum prepared
by Vice Consul Richard H. Lamb.

370.1

RBFinn:gmd

Parchment Mat to the Department

ACTION COPY RETURN TO DC/R FILES WITHIN 14 DAYS, WITH A NOTATION OF ACTION TAKEN.

Copy to American Consulate General, Yokohama

894.105/5-949 FILED JUN 3 1949 DM R

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652, Sec 3(E) and 5(D) or (E) NND# 760050.

Enclosure to Despatch No. 295 dated May 9, 1949, from the United States Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, on the subject "Japanese Police Organization in Odawara and Vicinity".

RESTRICTED

MEMORANDUM

To: U. Alexis Johnson, Consul General

From: Richard H. Lamb, Vice Consul

Subject: Japanese Police Organization in Odawara and Vicinity

On April 16, 1949 I called on Haruji NAKANO, Inspector and Assistant to the Chief, Odawara City Police, in connection with a projected report on the political situation in Odawara. In the course of our private conversation which lasted about 45 minutes we discussed the police organization in the Odawara area in some detail, particularly the relationship between the city and other local police units on the one hand, and the National Rural Police on the other.

Friends who are long-time residents of Odawara recommended Nakano as one of the ablest and best informed officials in the city, and indicated that he enjoys a high reputation for efficiency and honesty in Odawara, even though his active performance of his duty in suppressing blackmarket dealings in fish and other products has discomforted a number of the more prominent members of the community. Nakano, who is perhaps just under 40, is a policeman by career, and as a result of examinations has risen in a relatively short period to the position which he now holds. During our short conversation he impressed me as being a man of integrity as well as intelligence, and he answered my questions with a directness and clarity unusual among Japanese public officials.

The police force of the city of Odawara, with a population of between 60,000 and 70,000, has a total strength of 110 men. The National Rural Police of the district, with headquarters in the building next door to city police headquarters, has a strength of approximately 55. The Rural Police are responsible for maintaining order in the Hakone resort district to the west and the rural areas between the larger communities to the north and south; they have little or nothing to do with police affairs within the city of Odawara itself. The city police are wholly responsible for maintaining law and order within the city limits; in addition to routine police duties, they are charged with suppressing blackmarketing and other economic violations which flourish in this relatively prosperous fishing and farming center. In this work they are frequently consulted, advised, and occasionally prodded by an Economic Officer of the Kanagawa Military Government Team. They also keep close watch on political activities within the city, particularly the activities of the Communists, with which the CIC representatives who regularly call at police headquarters seem greatly (but in Nakano's opinion unnecessarily) concerned.

Before meeting Nakano I had been informed that the Rural Police of the district were currently held in low esteem by most of the cityfolk, and that they were envious of the prestige of

the city

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652, Sec 3(E) and 5(D) or (E) NND# 760050.

the city police, whose gains in power and influence had been made largely at their expense. When I suggested to Nakano that this might be the case and that, moreover, there might be some friction between the two forces, he at first denied this absolutely, and stated that on the contrary the two forces cooperated very effectively, and in emergencies frequently called on each other for help, which was given without reserve. I then indicated that I had heard that the new system of independent forces in each town and Rural Police for the areas in between had proved both inefficient and expensive, and that it might be better to reorganize the police on a more centralized basis, perhaps with the prefecture as a unit. Nakano replied that I had no doubt heard that sort of thing from the people "next door", or from their superiors in Yokohama. Their attitude was quite understandable, he said: from a force of 3,300 in Kanagawa prefecture prior to the reorganization, the central police (or more properly the Rural Police, who had largely inherited the old organization) had been reduced in strength to approximately 600, with a corresponding diminution in power and prestige. They naturally resented the "upstart" forces in the local communities, and were anxious to regain their former position. (Although Nakano did not say so, others in Odawara have told me that the city police are believed to be abler and are consequently more respected than the Rural Police of the district, who seem to have inherited, in addition to the old organization, the dislike and distrust which most ordinary Japanese formerly felt for the "alien" police which the central government placed among them.)

I asked Nakano if he did not believe that there were some faults in the present system, which might be remedied if the police were to be reorganized on a more centralized basis. He admitted that there were faults, and proceeded to enumerate them. Although he believed that large population centers like Odawara had benefited from the new organization, he recognized that smaller communities had been confronted with new problems. Manazuru, a small fishing village a few miles down the Izu Peninsula, had at present a police force of seven men (prior to the reorganization, only one policeman had been regularly assigned to Manazuru). The force had been organized at a time when profits in the village were high, and the villagers had at first been highly pleased at the increased protection which it gave them. Lately, due to higher taxes and increasing restrictions on blackmarket dealing in fish, the income of the villagers had been sharply reduced, and they were having difficulty in paying police salaries and other costs (average salary for a police recruit, 4,000 yen per month). Nakano admitted that the limited and fluctuating income of small communities like Manazuru was probably not sufficient to support an adequate independent police force.

Nakano also recognized that the Rural Police were confronted by serious obstacles as a result of the present system. To the south, Manazuru and Yugawara had independent forces, but the Rural Police were responsible for the large area in between, including the smaller villages which did not have separate forces; and to the north of Odawara Kozu was outside their jurisdiction, but they were nevertheless responsible for Maeha and the area beyond Kozu. Nakano acknowledged that this system was not wholly efficient, and agreed that some changes would have to be made.

He believed,

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He believed, however, that the system of independent police forces in local communities also had very considerable advantages, and he certainly would not have it scrapped in favor of a restoration of the old pattern of centralized control. In Odawara and other communities of similar size the new force had proved to be most effective: most of the members of the force were natives of Odawara and the surrounding area, and were more familiar with the problems of the city than an outsider would be. They were also obviously more popular with their fellow-townsmen than their colleagues on the Rural Police force. In the smaller communities, too, it was not a question of the local police being unpopular or "inefficient" in the performance of their duties: it was only that the cost was sometimes too high for the community to bear. Nakano did not dwell on the other obvious advantages of a democratic police force, selected by and responsible to the community which it serves.

In Nakano's opinion the irrationalities of the present system could be most effectively resolved, not by restoring control to the prefectural government (and rebuilding a large bureaucracy in the prefectural capital), but by establishing a number of relatively small but efficient district police organizations, each with a central headquarters, which would still be responsible only to the people within the district, and be financially supported by them. To the south, for instance, the police forces of Manazuru and Yugawara (present strength, 13) could be combined and strengthened, and would then be able to operate efficiently in both communities and the area in between. To the north, an independent force with headquarters in Kozu could assume responsibility for the city and the farming area around it, extending south to the Odawara city limits. In this way, Nakano believed, the inefficiencies and overlapping jurisdiction and much of the expense of the present system could be eliminated, while at the same time the advantages of the "grass roots" pattern of organization could be retained. Nakano did not indicate what functions would be left to the Rural Police in a system such as that which he proposed.

Comment:

Nakano's statements should of course not be accepted without reserve, since he is clearly not a disinterested observer. As he has pointed out, however, those who are agitating for a more centralized police organization are probably not disinterested either. In my opinion it would be unwise to undertake any large scale reorganization of the Japanese Police without first consulting the opinions of local police and other officials, and the people of the communities which they serve.

/s/ Richard H. Lamb

April 20, 1949

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652, Sec 3(E) and 5(D) or (E) NND# 76 0056

HWM
RAF
PM

TOP SECRET

Para 7

3/21/49

Central Files
800.894.105/3-3149

Dear Bill:

Reference is made to your despatch No. 59 of January 28, 1949, forwarding a monograph prepared by the Japanese Government on the police system of Japan. I refer in particular to the concluding sentence of the despatch: "It appears to this Mission that, when the present police force is adequately trained and possesses the authorized pistols and ammunition, it will be more feasible to determine the necessity or desirability of further measures to strengthen the police."

It is the view here in the Department that improvement in the equipment and training standards of the police is essential but we regard it as equally important that without compromising the original tenets of the police reforms there be established now an agency for internal security (presumably in the Attorney General's Office) which would perform primarily investigative and surveillance functions now inadequately provided for by an over-decentralized police system. Also of comparable importance, in our opinion, is the creation of improved machinery for coordinating the activities of all police units, both local and national, at all times.

We believe that these steps should be taken now in order that necessary measures may be taken for as long a period as possible under the moderating influence of the occupation. Furthermore, it will never be known, as long as the occupation is there, whether or not the present police system is adequate. The mere presence of the occupation to back up the police may tend to create a false impression that the police is adequate. Obviously large well-organized groups of extremists are not going to contest the law openly as long as there is a military occupation. If in the relatively stable U.S., we have to call out the National Guard on occasions, how much greater is the need in a totally disarmed Japan for a strong police force.

We communicated

The Honorable
William J. Sebald,
U. S. Political Adviser for Japan,
Tokyo, Japan.

DC/R
Acq 71
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TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652, Sec 3(E) and 5(D) or (E) NND# 760050

We communicated our views along the foregoing lines to General MacArthur last Fall but have received no reply. In the meanwhile, there have been occasional press notices originating in Tokyo suggesting that structural changes in the police system are actually taking place.

I would therefore very much appreciate having any up-to-date information on the police situation, in particular your Office's views on the second and third paragraphs of this letter.

Sincerely yours,

Max W. Bishop
Chief
Northeast Asian Affairs

FE:NA:MGreen:br
3-31-49

See Attachment: WAR 92991 of Nov 22, 1948

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652, Sec 3(E) and 5(D) or (E) NND# 760050.

Smuggled Letter from Tokyo
by Mrs. Sebald, May, 1949

DIVISION OF
NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS
MAY - 9 1949
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

United States Political Adviser
for Japan

Tokyo, April 30, 1949.

I have had 2 copies made of this for our file mg.

SECRET

JAPANESE POLICE FORCE

1. Two steps are being taken to alter Japan's existing police system:

a. Fourteen thousand pistols with 400 rounds of ammunition per pistol have been brought from the United States for distribution to Japan's police. Holsters for these pistols are now being made in Japan and the pistols will shortly be distributed. Fourteen thousand pistols, presumably the most ineffectual, will be taken up from the Japanese police when the United States pistols are distributed. More pistols from the United States are expected later.

b. G-2 PSD, which handles police matters, is preparing a bill to be submitted to the Japanese Diet which would permit referendums by small-town units -- mura and machi -- to decide whether these units wish to retain their local autonomous police units or to come under the National Rural Police. The authorized limit of 30,000 NRP will be increased and the limit of 95,000 local police correspondingly reduced by such as choose NRP affiliation. The primary reason for this change is to relieve small towns of the financial burden of maintaining their own police.

2. G-2 PSD states there is no plan for national police emergency or reserve units, or for greater centralization on a national level. They know nothing of plans for a national investigative organization comparable to the FBI.

3. G-2 PSD officials appear generally satisfied with the progress of police reform and feel that the changes expected from the referendum process described in paragraph 1b above will provide the necessary degree of centralization now lacking. They feel that the NRP and local units are cooperating satisfactorily and are competent to handle emergency situations.

4. Consideration of the desirability of an investigative - surveillance type of organization would be a Government Section matter. General WHITNEY's feeling that communism has probably reached its high-water mark and can be contained by Occupation reforms is well-known. Although there is some disagreement in Headquarters on this point,

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DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652, Sec 3(E) and 5(D) or (E) NND# 760050.

point, it appears that no steps are now being taken to establish an investigative unit and that no steps are likely unless the situation changes.

DC

RBFinn:gmd

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652, Sec 3(E) and 5(D) or (E) NND# 760050

TOP SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: May 3, 1949

TO : FE - Mr. Butterworth
Mr. Allison

FROM : NA - Mr. Bond

SUBJECT: Japanese Police System.

This Document Must Be Returned to RM/R Central Files
894.105/5-349

On the basis of his periodic reports on the implementation of NSC 13/2, SCAP has given us no indication that he has done anything to strengthen the Japanese police system other than to obtain additional police small arms from U.S. surplus supplies. There has been no recognition in these periodic reports of the specific recommendations set forth in a State-Army cable of November 22, 1948 (copy attached) that (a) an adequate mobile national police be created, (b) a separate national police investigation agency be established, (c) provision be made for coordinating the activities of all police units at all times. CINCFE MIS Periodic Intelligence Surveys, on the other hand, have included several statements which would suggest that steps are being taken to improve the mobility and communications equipment of the police and to establish a central investigation agency.

Meanwhile we have received disturbing press reports that police budgets have been appreciably cut and that Japanese police authorities' efforts to strengthen investigative and coordination machinery of police system have been turned down by SCAP.

Since the problem of establishing adequate internal security in Japan is pressing and is basic to the consideration of the new NSC paper proposing the rearming of Japan, it is recommended that the underlying cable go forward to SCAP immediately. The cable would also have the desired effect of emphasizing to SCAP our continued concern over NSC 13/2.

If you have the time, I suggest reading the attached recent DRF study, prepared at our request, on the status of police reorganization in Japan.

Attachments:

State-Army Cable 11/22/48
DRF Study #137
Draft Cable to CINCFE

DC/R
Anal. 7/
Rev.
Cat.

FILED
DEC 1 2 1956
TOP SECRET FILE

894.105/5-349

319045

NA:MGreen:br

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652, Sec 3(E) and 5(D) or (E) NND# 76 0050.

TOP SECRET

CINCFE

ACTION

PO:OUSA:CAD:State

FROM CS/CAD CITS ECON

1. Re NSC 13/2 and WAR 92991 of 22 Nov 48.

Japanese police is subject.

2. Problem of adequacy of Japanese police to maintain internal security independent of U.S. military forces will shortly be raised in National Security Council. Info therefore requested to supplement CINCFE MIS Periodic Intelligence Surveys which will, in general, throw more light on Public Safety Division's program and time-schedule for improving equipment, personnel and organization of Japanese police to point where it will prove adequate to meet Japan's internal security needs. In particular would appreciate your views on effect recent cut in national and consolidated local budgets will have on plans to improve equipment pay and training of police.

3. State-Army continue to regard it essential that provision be made for broadening the powers and responsibilities for national police in order that there will be standardized police enforcement of national laws and coordination of activities of all police units at all times. Lack of such provision invites decided hazards such as (a) lack of proper coordination of activities; (b) exposure of local police to corruption and infiltration of extremist elements; and (c) inadequate financing, poor training and variable standards.

The above

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652, Sec 3(E) and 5(D) or (E) NND# 76 C050

The above-recommended degree of centralization also appears warranted in view of Japan's small geographic area and in view of mounting desire of Japanese public opinion (as expressed in public opinion surveys, editorials and statements by responsible officials, both local and national) to correct weakness of police arising out of decentralization. It would be in keeping with one of basic purposes of NSC 13/2 that emphasis be given to Japanese assimilation of police as of other reforms and that the Japanese authorities be restrained only if they compromise fundamentals of these reforms as they proceed with process of implementation and adjustment.

4. We believe that one of soundest guarantees for continued Japanese observance of fundamental tenets of police reforms lies in education of police in democratic methods and in extension and safeguarding of civil liberties. It is felt that, under your guidance, our immediate task is to work toward a solution which will ensure observance of these tenets and which at same time will provide maximum internal security, without dependence ~~of~~ on U.S. forces, for a disarmed Japan.

wlg.
FE:NA:MGreen:br
DRF:RLSneider
RLS.

FE

G
FR

Army

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652, Sec 3(E) and 5(D) or (E) NND# 760050.

TOP SECRET

CINCFE

ACTION

FO:OUSA:CAD:State

FROM CS/CAD CITE HCOM

1. Re NSC 13/2 and WAR 92991 of 22 Nov 48.

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DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652, Sec 3(E) and 5(D) or (E) NND# 760050.

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DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652, Sec 3(E) and 5(D) or (E) NND# 760050.

Please Return to
M. GREEN (NA)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOP SECRET

PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED

Civil Affairs Division
Lt Col Hendrick
Mr Rudland (State) 74081

TO: CINCFE

Nr: WAR 92991

22 November 1948

From CSCAD cite ICO.

1. Ref Para 7 of NSC 13/2 apd by the President as of 9 Oct 48.

2. Without compromising fundamental tenets of police reforms, urgent that problem of internal security be satisfactorily met in order that post-occupation disarmed Japan may have eff police protection. Recognized that responsibilities for insuring solution this problem through improvement in numbers, equip and tng standards of police and through steady realizations of provisions of maritime safety auth bill will devolve upon you. In this connection early shpmt from ZI of caliber 38 revolvers contemplated.

3. Understood here legislation amending police law is contemplated at next regular session diet. Therefore fol principles considered basic to Japanese internal security are furnished.

A. Creation of adequate mobile national police reserves for handling disaster or civil violence.

B. Establishment of separate national agency for internal security directly under one of the Ministries, possibly Attorney General's Office. Such agency would be similar to FBI and like organizations in other democratic countries. Such agency would be primarily investigative and surveillance agency for advising Natl Govt and all police auth re state of internal security.

C. Provisions of broadened powers and responsibilities for Natl Police in order that there will be standardized police enforcement of Natl Laws, and coordination of activities all police units, both local and natl at all times.

ORIGINATOR: GEN EBERLE
DISTRIBUTION: GEN EBERLE (STATE), GEN IRWIN, MR DRAPER, GEN MADDOCKS

CM OUT 92991 (Nov 48) DTG:222048Z wwb

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652, Sec 3(E) and 5(D) or (E) NND# 760050

6 DIVISION OF
NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS
APR 26 1949
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Copy No. 3

SECRET

Please Return to
M. Green (NA)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Division of Research for Far East

THE STATUS OF POLICE REORGANIZATION IN JAPAN

DRF #137

April 22, 1949

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652, Sec 3(E) and 5(D) or (E) NND# 760050.

THE STATUS OF POLICE REORGANIZATION IN JAPAN

Present indications are that SCAP intends in the near future to take only limited steps to implement the principles outlined by the Department of State for strengthening the Japanese police force (in re para 7, NSC 13/2).

A. Equipment and Personnel

In regard to the fulfillment of its responsibility for strengthening the equipment and training of the Japanese police, SCAP has undertaken affirmative measures to provide a greater number and an improved quality of sidearms and ammunition to the police. Furthermore, the reorganization and improvement of the police communications network was, according to press reports, completed during the past winter. However, serious shortages of modern police equipment remain a current problem; the Japanese police lack, for example, sufficient high frequency radios, radio cars, and armored cars. In addition, training facilities are inadequate and the pay scales for police personnel generally continue to be low. Without direct SCAP assistance in providing the required equipment or special funds, the Japanese Government is dependent upon its own financial resources for the improvement of police personnel and equipment.

For the 1949-50 fiscal year, the national government planned to budget some 30 billion yen for the national police and for assistance to the local police and to increase the local government consolidated budget to 434 billion yen, thus allowing more funds for the

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652, Sec 3(E) and 5(D) or (E) NND# 760050.

local police from that source. However, the stabilization program forced a police budget cut at the national level to 9-10 billion yen and at the local level to 350 billion yen. The 9-10 billion appropriation should enable the national police to cover their current operating expenses but will prevent them from buying the new equipment needed and from improving facilities, as a result effectively blocking one channel for the strengthening of the Japanese police. The status of the local police under the 1949-50 budget is more doubtful, despite the fact the local police have the first lien on specific tax revenues. The larger cities will probably be able to maintain their present police services without improvements in quality or quantity. On the other hand, the inability of many smaller cities and towns to pay for police expenses during the past year emphasizes their need for supplementary appropriations to guarantee even minimal police protection in these areas.

During the past year, the gap between the minimum expenses of the police in these smaller cities and towns and the appropriations made by their local governments was filled through voluntary contributions made by members of the community and by local oyabun (leaders of certain illegal activities). Dependence on such voluntary contributions obviously can have (and, in some instances, already has had) a corruptive influence on the police, since the voluntary contributors are able to use their contributions to buy police protection for their illegal operations. Consequently, there is little likelihood of a material improvement in the equipment and training of the Japanese

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652, Sec 3(E) and 5(D) or (E) NND# 760050.

police unless the local and national budgets are increased or unless SCAP institutes measures to provide equipment and funds outside the budget.

B. Basic Principles

As to the basic principles outlined by the Department of State, available sources indicate that the following steps have been taken:

1. Creation of an Adequate Mobile Reserve. At present, the creation of a police reserve through the addition of more national policemen is not contemplated; SCAP has evidently rejected the Japanese Government's plans for an additional 25,000 national police. As a result, a mobile reserve, if organized, will have to be formed from existing national police units. These units are generally assigned in small detachments to rural areas and would require more automotive and communications equipment than is at present available to them in order to constitute an adequate reserve force for all types of internal emergencies. Under the present budget, they will probably not attain adequate mobility this year.

2. Establishment of a National Authority for Internal Security. In general, the present plans of the Japanese Government, with which SCAP apparently concurs, are to strengthen the legal provisions against extremist activities and to assign enforcement of these laws and ordinances to the Special Investigations Bureau of the Attorney General's Office, an agency that could in time be developed into a full-fledged national authority for internal security. On April 4, 1949, the Japanese Government broadened the provisions of Imperial Ordinance 101 in order

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652, Sec 3(E) and 5(D) or (E) NND# 760050

to provide a legal basis for action against the Communists as well as the right-wing extremist groups. The ordinance empowers the Attorney General to investigate and maintain surveillance over extremist groups and to dissolve and purge groups that violate the ordinance. The Special Investigation Bureau, which will enforce the ordinance, will probably increase its staff by 100-150. In addition, the Japanese press has reported that Prime Minister Yoshida plans to create a special organ, perhaps under the Attorney General, to enforce projected legislation directed against the Communists.

3. Powers of the National Police. With the recent rejection by SCAP of Japanese plans for the reorganization of the Japanese police system, any action in Tokyo to increase the powers of the national police to coordinate operations of the local police appears to have been deferred indefinitely. The Japanese Government's plans, which were never formulated in detail, contemplated transferring the local police of the smaller cities and towns to the National Rural Police. Cities with a population variously set at figures between 20,000 and 300,000 would be permitted to maintain an independent police force. These government plans, supported by the national and local police as well as most local governments, evidently did not suggest giving the national police power to coordinate the activities of those independent local units remaining after the reorganization. The reasons presented by the Japanese Government to support its plans were the inability of many local governments to finance their police forces; the high crime rate, coupled with the inefficiency of many local police

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units; and the inadequate provisions for internal security under the present decentralized system. SCAP refused to approve these plans on the grounds that any such changes tended to recreate a centralized police. Neither SCAP, which holds to both full police decentralization under the present system and limited police budgetary appropriations, nor the Japanese Government, which seeks drastic reamalgamation of many local police units with the national police, appears to be working toward a compromise that will provide maximum internal security under a decentralized system. In the meantime, the question of broadening the national police's powers to coordinate local units and standardize enforcement of law remains unsettled, as does the problem of the smaller local communities who have not been relieved of their police responsibilities but have not received the financial aid they need to pay for adequate police protection.

It should be noted, finally, that the Japanese Government appears to be fully aware of the Department of State recommendations and may be using them as a lever for securing even greater concessions pointing to a more centralized police system.

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INCOMING AIRGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS TELEGRAPH BRANCH

NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS
AUG - 5 1949

Action Assigned to ----- File DC/R WA ~~WE~~ ~~NEA~~

Action Taken No action

989 except as noted marginally

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ACTION: FE
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Office of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS 5 1949 DIRECTOR Department of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Date of Action -----

FROM: USPOLAD, Tokyo

Action Office Symbol NA

Date of mailing: August 3, 1949.

Name of Officer MacLean

Routing to DC/R File

Rec'd: Aug. 5, 1949 9:52 a.m.

RESTRICTED

Secretary of State,

Washington.

A-194, July 30, 1949.

On July 27, 1949 a resolution was passed at a conference of prefectural governors from Hokkaido and the Tohoku district meeting in Tokyo requesting the abolition of the local autonomous police force in the prefectures concerned because of financial difficulties and the reported inability of the police under the current autonomous system to check increasing crime in those areas.

In Hokkaido and the six prefectures of the Tohoku district it is reported that crime has reached a postwar peak. A considerable number of instances of "social unrest" have been reported in this area along with more than 700 cases of railway sabotage since the first of 1949.

This was pointed out in WWB's letter to Mr. Voorhees 8/4/49 enc.

Yomiuri Shimbun in its issue of January 29, 1949 quotes State Minister Higai as stating that "many resolutions have been passed on the abolition of local autonomous police but I cannot say anything regarding the matter . The amendments to the police laws to be presented to the coming special Diet are being drafted with the weak points of the local autonomous police in mind."

Local prefectural authorities have on numerous occasions expressed dissatisfaction with the system of local autonomous police particularly in view of the financial burden this system imposes upon the local administrations which are already facing serious fiscal difficulties.

AUG 8 1949 FILED

SEBALD

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894.105/7-3049

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DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652, Sec 3(E) and 5(D) or (E) NND# 760050.

SUBJECT OR FILE NO. 894.105/8-249 | DATE DUE 8/6/49
DATE OF DOC. | DOC. NO. | SECURITY CLASS. | DATE CHARGED 8/8
TO/FROM NEA Memo - W. Hepler, Chester | ENCLOSURES
CHARGE TO O'Neill | OFFICE SYMBOL Ly
Form DS-933a (9-1-51) (Signature) DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Department of State

STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: 8/2/49

HM
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SUBJECT: FBIB Reports

There are two developments in today's FBIB reports of particular interest:

(1) The first concerns a press statement by Higai, State Minister in Charge of Police, on the need to improve the mobile and crime detection equipment of the police and to increase the ratio of national rural police to local police. Higai points out that in several communities local police are being disbanded for lack of local funds. Since SCAP regulations set a limit of 30,000 rural to 95,000 local police, no police are available to fill the vacuum created by the resignations.

KA

XR 740.00119 Control (Japan)

(2) The second is a Reuter report that Hepler, Chief of SCAP's Labor Division is resigning this September to become head of the ILO's Manpower Section in Geneva.

Chester W.

Comment:

Re item (1), this supports the position taken in the draft letter sent forward to you last week. Further supporting that position is the following paragraph excerpted from a despatch by Mr. Spinks, received today:

> "Already local 'vigilant committees' have been organized by the townspeople of Taira and nine other communities where it is felt that local units of the National Rural Police are unable or unprepared to deal with incidents like the communist seizure of the Taira police station on June 30 (this Mission's A-175, July 8, 1949)."

Re item (2), I understand this report is probably true. If so, it is unfortunate, for Mr. Hepler has done a very good job, notably in negotiating revisions of the Japanese labor standards laws and in handling the recent railway workers controversy. His successor is likely to be Paul Amis, number two in the Labor Division and a man of little consequence. Hepler not only displayed good judgment but was in a position to carry out his views because of the prestige he gained from being able on occasion to have private audiences with SCAP. SCAP is reported to have pleaded with Hepler not to resign.

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NND 750065
By TG/CJ NARS, Date 8-10-78

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652, Sec 3(E) and 5(D) or (E) NND# 760050.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

~~RESTRICTED~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : FE - Mr. Allison

FROM : NA - Mr. Bond

SUBJECT: FBIB Reports

Office of Far Eastern Affairs AUG 3 1949 Director Department of State

DATE: 8/2/49

HMT RAF ALD ~~HE~~ file DC/R

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XR 740.00119 Control (Japan)

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DECLASSIFIED NND 750065 By TG/CJ NARS, Date 8-10-78

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FAR EAST
Japan
July 29, 1949

NEED FOR REVISING POLICE LAW STRESSED

Dispatch in English Morse from James Shen in Tokyo for CENTRAL NEWS in Canton, July 29, 1949, 3:00 a.m. EST--H

(Text)

"Tokyo, July 29--'When the time comes the Japanese Government will petition SCAP for an increase of police and scientific equipment and for the revision of the ratio between State and rural police forces, Senzo Higai told 'CENTRAL NEWS' this afternoon. Higai, State Minister in charge of State and rural police, emphasized that in order to bolster Japan's police force 'it is not so much important to increase the number of police as to improve police mobility.'

"Higai regarded the revision of the Police Law as (necessary in) order to establish 'a truly democratic and enlightened police force.' He said in revising the law efforts are being made to bring about an early accord between State and rural police, and between the Government and the Public Safety Committee.

"Higai continued, meanwhile, the police authorities are making preparations which he felt convinced should be able to cope with any eventuality prior to the revision of the Police Law. He added, 'When the whole situation is considered, it must not be forgotten that Japan is an occupied country'--apparently implying the occupation forces were expected to help where the Japanese Government was unable to cope with a situation.

"Higai, confirmed reports that at least two localities have disbanded local police forces because it was financially impossible for them to maintain them. Many other regions are intending to take similar steps, he added.

"Higai said when the local police disbanded the state police would automatically take over and no vacuum would be allowed to exist, but this cannot be done effectively unless the ratio between State and rural police be revised.

"According to SCAP regulations, Higai said Japan was allowed only 125,000 police of whom 30,000 are State police and (50,000) local police. While the increase in the over-all police number is not being considered, a revision of the ratio so as to increase the number of State police to make up for the reduction in ~~rural~~ local police seems highly desirable, Higai said.

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"Regarding police mobility, Higai said the Japanese police would like to have more motor cars among other things, but he added, this problem must be considered in connection with the police budget. In this connection, he pointed out, the Japanese Government intended to take fingerprints of the whole Nation, but it will take at least 25 billion yen to do this--a sum more than double the 10 billion yen police budget."

B R I E F S

CHESTER W. HEPLER, chief of MacArthur's Labor Division, is resigning to become head of the International Labor Organization's Manpower Section in Geneva, according to a July 29 Tokyo report. Hepler, an American Labor Department official loaned to SCAP, returned recently from a joint SCAP-Japanese visit to the International Labor Organization talks in Geneva and, reportedly, will leave for Geneva in the middle of September. (REUTERS dispatch in English Morse from Tokyo, July 28, 1949--H)

TRADE POSSIBILITIES--The trade journal BOEKI NIPPO reported that representatives of the Chinese Resident's Association in Japan are expected to visit China on a 2-month trip soon to "sound possibilities of effecting trade between Japan and Communist China." The paper says candidates are now being selected by the Chinese Resident's Association destined chiefly for Formosa, but they will try to go to Canton and Hong Kong. The candidates under consideration at present are understood to include mostly Formosans who desire to ship out Japanese bicycles, machinery, chemicals, and medicine in exchange for Formosan sugar and bananas. (AFP dispatch in English Morse from Tokyo, July 29, 1949--H)

HOKKAIDO DEVELOPMENT--"Japan's future lies in Hokkaido," wrote TAMOTSU MURAYAMA for the English language daily NIPPON TIMES from Hokkaido. He said there is ample room and enough work in Hokkaido today to take care of at least 6,000,000 settlers. The possibilities for developing this island, which is slightly less than half the size of Honshu, are unlimited, he said. (CENTRAL NEWS dispatch in English Morse from Tokyo, July 28, 1949--H)

RETRENCHMENT PROGRAM--The Federation of Government Workers Unions at a conference of its Executive Committee July 28 announced its decision to "fight" discharges under the Government's personnel retrenchment program. Meanwhile, the National Communications Workers Union, next on the list of Government workers to be discharged, claimed that the Government, instead of reducing the number of communications workers, should add an extra 80,000 persons. (REUTERS dispatch in English Morse, from Tokyo, July 28, 1949--H)

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THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

894.105/8-549 Secret File

Office of the United States
Political Adviser for Japan

Tokyo, August 5, 1949.

6 - DIVISION OF
NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS
AUG 24 1949
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

no action required
WJF 9/6/49.

REC'D
AUG 17

No. 529.

action
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SECRET (For Department use only).

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Subject: View of Headquarters Police Official in Regard to Police Situation in Japan.

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The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to report the gist of a conversation between Mr. H.S. EATON, Chief Police Administrator of the Police Safety Division of the G-2 Section of Headquarters, and an officer of this Mission in regard to changes in the present Japanese police system.

Mr. Eaton was asked specifically concerning rumors now current in the Japanese press that the Japanese police forces would be greatly centralized and possibly expanded in number. Members of the YOSHIDA Cabinet and of the Democratic Liberal Party have given this thesis wide currency in public statements and in criticism of the National Rural Police. Mr. Eaton stated that no sweeping changes in the police are planned and that the position laid down in General MacARTHUR's letter of September 16, 1947, (see despatch no. 1334, October 14, 1947, enclosure 2), to Prime Minister Tetsu KATAYAMA concerning the new police system for Japan still represents Headquarters policy as to the organization and size of Japan's police forces. Mr. Eaton said he had emphasized to Japanese officials on several occasions that the great centralization desired by Mr. Yoshida was entirely contrary to the purposes of Occupation police reform. Mr. Eaton said he has no knowledge of a letter alleged to have been written to General MacArthur recently by Mr. Yoshida requesting a "special police" force; other Headquarters officials have denied this report, which was published in Tokyo by the International News Service (see this Mission's despatch no. 528 of August 5, 1949).

Several minor

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Several minor changes in Japan's police are being planned, according to Mr. Eaton. His office has for some time been working with Japanese officials on a draft bill to amend the Police Law in certain respects. Only two changes of note are now being considered: one would permit small local entities -- machi and mura -- to hold elections for the purpose of deciding whether they wished to retain their autonomous police or whether they wished to be brought under the jurisdiction of the National Rural Police; and the other would strengthen the authority of the Director General of the National Rural Police so that he would be empowered to direct the operations of all National Rural Police units and not merely those of the Headquarters of the National Rural Police. This draft revision of the Police Law is now being considered by the Japanese Cabinet and will thereafter be submitted to concerned sections of Headquarters for concurrence; it will probably be submitted to the special Diet session to be convened this fall for consideration. Mr. Eaton said there is no plan presently being considered for increase of the size of Japan's police forces.

When asked whether the centralization contemplated by the above revision would be sufficient to assure proper police coordination, Mr. Eaton stated his opinion that the new decentralized system is still in its formative stage and can not therefore be judged conclusively. He observed that many local entities are very proud of their local police and do not wish to be put under the national police. He indicated that the new system is working out well, in spite of acute financial difficulties.

Mr. Eaton also noted another recent development of significance in connection with the police. In the middle of July 14,000 pistols received from the United States were distributed to Japanese police. Because of the inferior quality and very inadequate number of pistols heretofore available to Japan's police, this addition is expected to have the effect of greatly strengthening the operations and increasing the morale of the police. This action has to date received no publicity in the press in Japan, somewhat to the surprise of Public Safety Division officials, but it appears impossible that the news can be kept secret for long. These 14,000 pistols are the first of 125,000 to be distributed, along with ammunition, to Japan's authorized 125,000 policemen.

Mr. Eaton was asked about the recent controversy between Prime Minister Yoshida and Director General Noboru SAITO of the National Rural Police over the latter's alleged failure to coordinate with the Government. Although he conceded that there probably are shortcomings in the Police Law in regard to the relation between the Government, the National Public Safety Commission, and the national police, Mr. Eaton felt that the difficulties are not primarily legal but are ones that will be worked out in practice when greater experience with the new system is acquired.

It is

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It is the opinion of Public Safety Division officials that the situation in Japan with respect to law enforcement is now considerably improved. They note that public unrest has greatly subsided in the past several weeks. Mr. Eaton felt that improved police methods and morale were factors in this change for the better, although he admitted that many other considerations had to be taken into account.

The Japanese press and public have in the past several months expressed great anxiety over the ineffectual efforts of the police. The early stages of the rumored "labor offensive" during the summer months provoked a rash of strikes and disorders, which the police put down with considerable difficulty. The incident in the town of Taira in Fukushima Prefecture, in which the local police were rendered helpless for several hours and outside reinforcements were prevented from entering, and the Mitaka incident in Tokyo, in which an electric train consisting of seven cars, all empty, was apparently pushed on a downgrade with the result that it crashed into several buildings killing eight people, greatly increased public apprehensions. The mysterious SHIMOYAMA case, in which the mangled body of the president of the National Railway Company was found on railway tracks in a suburb of Tokyo, contributed to these fears.

Since the Mitaka incident on July 15, there have been no serious disturbances in Japan. General revulsion at the series of defiant and provocative outbursts of disorder, together with hostility toward leftist elements suspected of instigating these acts, has apparently frightened those who have an interest in disturbing public peace. The vigor with which the police have pursued suspects in the Taira and Mitaka incidents and in the Shimoyama case also seems to have impressed both the public and would-be trouble-makers. Japanese law-enforcement and crime-prevention agencies are now taking vigorous action and it is hoped that they will begin to demonstrate both the effectiveness of the new system and their ability to handle any civil disturbance in labor, political, and repatriation disorders.

Respectfully yours,

W. J. Sebald

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THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

JFE

DIVISION OF
NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS
AUG 24 1949
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Office of the United States
Political Adviser for Japan

Tokyo, August 5, 1949.

No. 528

no action required
WLS
Sept. 6, 1949.

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894.105/8-549 Secret File

REC'D
AUG 17

Subject: INS Report Alleging Headquarters Communication to Prime Minister Regarding Proposed Police Reorganization.

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The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

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1/ I have the honor to refer to an article (enclosure one) which appeared in the Nippon Times of August 1, 1949, by John RICH, International News Service staff correspondent, alleging that General WHITNEY, Chief of the Government Section of General Headquarters, had replied for Headquarters to a letter of July 21 in which Prime Minister YOSHIDA had proposed a reorganization of the Japanese police. The Rich story asserted that Prime Minister Yoshida is seeking approval for the establishment of a special police force and that Headquarters has responded unfavorably; that General Whitney reiterated to the Prime Minister that SCAP's attitude still is that the extreme right in Japan is of greater danger than the extreme left; that the Occupation authorities lend their support to Prime Minister Yoshida not because he is a conservative but because he is the choice of a majority in the Diet; and, incidentally, that there will be no relaxation of the purge by categories, and that it is not to Japanese interest to talk of a separate peace treaty with the United States.

Pursuant to the appearance of the article on August 1 this Mission got in touch with Mr. Katsumi OHNO, Chief of the General Affairs Bureau of the Foreign Office, who had already prepared (for the Prime Minister's information) a brief paper attempting to trace the origin of the INS
2/ story (enclosure two). It will be noted that the Foreign Office account gave some emphasis to the assertion that the story was concocted for political purposes and had been given circulation a week earlier by Norman SOONG, Tokyo correspondent of the Central News Agency of China.

At noon on August 1 the Prime Minister issued to the press a
3/ denial of the current stories on the subject (enclosure three). He referred to reports of an alleged exchange of letters between himself and Headquarters upon certain policy matters including the question of a special police, and stated that there was absolutely no foundation in fact

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in fact for the story. He took the occasion to assert that his Government will continue to cooperate, as always, fully and wholeheartedly with the Occupation in every respect. Stories incorporating the denial were published in the press generally and that
4/ published in the Nippon Times of August 2 is attached (enclosure four). It will be noted that the spokesman for the Government Section is reported by the Nippon Times as having denied that General Whitney or any other section official had issued the reported statement of SCAP policy.

From the oral explanation made by Ohno in connection with the Foreign Office appraisal of the origin of the story it was clear that certain oral communications between the Government Section and the Japanese Government had in fact taken place with regard to the question of the organization of the police and other subjects. It would appear that the special interest of the Foreign Office in accounting for the origin of the story was a result in considerable part of the fact that similarity between the story and the oral communications made by the Government Section to the Japanese Government raised a presumption that a leak had taken place through Japanese officials.

The more serious implications of the occurrence, viewed in the light of instructions to the Supreme Commander, will not have escaped the Department's attention. This Mission is of opinion that several of the points alleged in the INS article have in fact been currently communicated by Government Section to Japanese officials. The probability of the correctness of this diagnosis is supported by the well-known existence of a segment of informed opinion among concerned officers in Headquarters that the points alleged ought to be asserted to the Japanese if they have not yet been. We strongly incline to the view that General Whitney in his current contact with the Japanese Government is continuing to say that the purge should not be appreciably relaxed, that the extreme right in Japan is a greater danger than the extreme left, and that such support as the Occupation gives to the Prime Minister's administration is not because he is a conservative. Personnel of Government Section in their informal contacts in and out of Headquarters do not hesitate to advocate these points of view.

The Prime Minister was aware of the contact of Mr. Ohno with this Mission in the matter and did not choose to supplement the official denial by any fuller explanation to us. It is evident that he has been in communication with General MacARTHUR regarding the police; that General Whitney (who is always a difficult problem to the Japanese Government) has interposed comments along the lines described above; that the Prime Minister relies on his direct approach to General MacArthur in those matters which he considers of sufficient importance; and that the Prime Minister chose to issue a denial of the INS article, at the desire of Government Section, in order to avoid further friction with General Whitney.

The Prime

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652, Sec 3(E) and 5(D) or (E) NND# 760050.

The Prime Minister has however taken occasion to supply me direct information in discreet confidence with regard to a mounting difference of view between his Cabinet and General Whitney on the subject of police powers and the relative responsibilities of the Cabinet and the National Public Safety Commission in the maintenance of public order. It will be noted that the Nippon Times article of August 2 (enclosure four) ended by referring to an assertion by Chief Cabinet Secretary MASUDA that the press reports of Headquarters attitude on police matters would not deter the Government from seeking revision of the Police Law. On the following day the newspaper Nippon Keizai published an article (which the Foreign Office informs us has the merit of authenticity) purporting to outline the police system revision proposed by the
5/ Democratic Liberal Party (enclosure five). Consequent upon its publication General Whitney summoned Mr. Masuda, who is known to be the Government's principal proponent of police reorganization. Mr. Masuda sent instead the principal liaison officer of the Foreign Office, Mr. KIMURA, to whom General Whitney voiced strong disapproval of the proposed plan and instructed that the Prime Minister should have his Party disavow the plan as contrary to General MacArthur's letter of September 16, 1947, (text of which was transmitted as enclosure two to the Mission's despatch no. 1334, October 14, 1947).

Following this development the Prime Minister sent Mr. Ohno to inform me in the strictest confidence concerning the present difficulties which he is experiencing with regard to Japanese police matters. Mr. Ohno called on August 5 and left with me a paper
6/ (enclosure six) embodying, in his own English translation, the Prime Minister's statement to me on the subject. It will be noted that the Prime Minister makes a very positive statement in favor of direct responsibility on the part of the Cabinet for the maintenance of public order, and states that he considers the National Public Safety Commission a body of political tinge which was established by a previous government and ought not to be predominant in current police control.
7/ (Enclosure seven lists for reference the current membership of the National Public Safety Commission.)

It is evident that General Whitney meantime has pressed for broad powers for the National Public Safety Commission in the operation of the Police Law, and that he views this as a desirable Commission-method means of checking the police powers of the Government. It is the view of the Mission that a clear issue is now drawn in this matter, that the Prime Minister attaches importance to it, and that the subject is not closed. The Department may find the enclosures herewith useful for reference in connection with possible further developments.

With regard

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652, Sec 3(E) and 5(D) or (E) NND# 760050

With regard to Headquarters views concerning the police situation in Japan reference is made to the Mission's despatch no. 529 of August 5, 1949.

Respectfully yours,

W. J. Sebald

Enclosures: att.

1. Nippon Times article, August 1, 1949, entitled "'Special' Police Setup Said Rejected by SCAP".

2. Account by Japanese Foreign Office, August 1, 1949, of background leading to press articles alleging Government-SCAP exchange regarding police.

3. Press release by Prime Minister, August 1, 1949, denying story.

4. Nippon Times article, August 2, 1949, entitled "GHQ and Premier Brand as Untrue Report in Papers".

5. English translation supplied by the Foreign Office of article published in Nippon Keizai newspaper, August 3, 1949, on Democratic Liberal Party proposed revision of police system.

6. Statement delivered to Mr. Sebald, August 5, 1949, by Mr. Ohno of the Japanese Foreign Office as from the Prime Minister. Translation into English by Mr. Ohno.

7. List of members of the Japanese National Public Safety Commission.

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DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652, Sec 3(E) and 5(D) or (E) NND# 760050

Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 528 dated August 5, 1949, from United States Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, subject: "INS Report Alleging Headquarters Communication to Prime Minister Regarding Proposed Police Reorganization".

COPY

Nippon Times, August 1, 1949

'SPECIAL' POLICE SETUP SAID REJECTED BY SCAP -- Feelers by Yoshida Reported Turned Down in Letter by Gen. Whitney

by John Rich
INS Staff Correspondent

General MacArthur's headquarters has reportedly rejected feelers from Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida seeking approval for establishment of a "special" police force.

Premier Yoshida was reminded that SCAP's attitude still is that the extreme right in Japan is a greater danger than the extreme left.

The Premier's July 21 letter to Gen. MacArthur proposing the new police set-up has been answered by Brig. Gen. Courtney Whitney, head of the Government Section.

An authoritative source told International News Service that Gen. Whitney in his reply also outlined Headquarters feeling on several other policy matters, as follows:

There will be no relaxation of the political purge by categories but each case must be considered individually.

The Japanese government must distinguish among Communists, anti-communism and the Communist Party.

It is to the best interests of the Japanese not to talk of a separate peace treaty with the United States.

The occupation authorities support Premier Yoshida, not as a conservative, but because he is backed by a majority in the Diet.

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RESTRICTED

Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch No. 528 dated August 5, 1949, from United States Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, subject: "INS Report Alleging Headquarters Communication to Prime Minister Regarding Proposed Police Reorganization".

Account by Japanese Foreign Office, August 1, 1949, of background leading to press articles alleging Government-SCAP exchange regarding police:

COPY

1 August 1949

Subject: News Stories concerning an Exchange of Correspondence between General MacArthur and Prime Minister Yoshida.

1. No correspondence has been sent by the Prime Minister to General MacArthur under the date of the 21st. This fact has been confirmed today with the private secretary of the Prime Minister and it has further been clarified by the Prime Minister's denial issued at noon today.

2. With regard to General Whitney's reply to the Prime Minister's alleged communication, it is clear from the statement of Mr. Rizzo, deputy chief of Government Section, that it is without foundation in fact.

3. From the above it is believed that report of an alleged exchange of correspondence is a complete fabrication. Insofar as we have been able to investigate into the matter confidentially, the fact has been confirmed that about a week ago Mr. Norman Soong of the Central News Agency of China circulated a similar story among foreign correspondents in Tokyo.

Thus there are indications on the basis of which it can be surmised that he had some motive in circulating information from which news of the kind in question could be fabricated and that he, not filing the story himself, made the reporting appear like an INS and AP scoop.

4. By a consideration of the above the following three angles or theories could be deduced:

a. Considering that some newspapers reported there were possibilities that the Yoshida Cabinet will propose relaxation of the Dodge policy and increase of lightly armed police officers as suggested by General Eichelberger, it may be surmised that the lower echelons in GHQ entertained intentions of making the first move to nip the anticipated proposal in the bud and thus shut it out. This intention was taken advantage of by some designing elements who manufactured

news out

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news out of talks with some officials in General Headquarters on the several points which have been taken up in the reports as published. In this case, it is certain that the alleged exchange of correspondence was fabricated to clothe the story with an appearance of truth.

b. It may be a subversive move on the part of communist elements who, snatching information concerning plans allegedly contemplated by the Government circles, had the information utilized by the above-mentioned elements in GHQ.

c. In view of the common knowledge that parties opposed to the Democratic Liberal Party, especially the so-called middle-of-the roaders, are maintaining connections with certain officials in GHQ, it may be surmised that the news story representing a conglomeration of truth and fiction was manufactured to utilize it for the purposes of political strategy.

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Enclosure No. 3 to Despatch No. 528 dated August 5, 1949, from United States Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, subject: "INS Report Alleging Headquarters Communication to Prime Minister Regarding Proposed Police Reorganization".

COPY

Statement of Mr. Yoshida, Prime Minister

August 1, 1949

Today's and yesterday's newspapers carry stories by Tokyo foreign correspondents concerning an alleged exchange of letters between myself and the Allied Headquarters on certain policy matters including the question of a "Special Police."

Even the date of my letter to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers is given, while the contents of his Headquarters' reply are indicated point by point, all of which serve to clothe the dispatches with an appearance of truth.

I desire to say that there is absolutely no foundation in fact for the stories. I am greatly puzzled as to their source, and the reason why such canards have been concocted for circulation.

My government will continue to cooperate as always fully and whole-heartedly with the occupation policy in every respect.

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Enclosure No. 4 to Despatch No. 528 dated August 5, 1949, from United States Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, subject: "INS Report Alleging Headquarters Communication to Prime Minister Regarding Proposed Police Reorganization".

COPY

Nippon Times, August 2, 1949.

GHQ AND PREMIER BRAND AS UNTRUE REPORT IN PAPERS -- Yoshida Denies Ever Making Request to SCAP for 'Special Police'

Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida issued a formal statement yesterday categorically denying reports issued by foreign press agencies and carried by local venaculars /sic/ that SCAP had turned down among other things an alleged request for the creation of a "special police."

The statement of denial issued by the Prime Minister follows:

"Today's and yesterday's newspapers carry stories by Tokyo foreign correspondents concerning an alleged exchange of letters between myself and the Allied Headquarters on certain policy matters, including the question of a 'special police.'

"Even the date of my letter to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers is given, while the contents of his Headquarters' reply are indicated point by point, all of which serve to clothe the dispatches with an appearance of truth.

"I desire to say that there is absolutely no foundation in fact for the stories. I am greatly puzzled as to their source, and the reason why such canards have been concocted for circulation.

"My Government will continue to cooperate as always fully and wholeheartedly with the Occupation policy in every respect."

The news reports, quoting "authoritative sources stated that SCAP had told Prime Minister Yoshida: (1) not to revise the so-called Dodge Economic Line, (2) not to lift the "purge" on Zaibatsu and militarists in power during the war, (3) not to revise the present police system, (4) to differentiate between Communists and the Communist Party, the latter being a legal political organ, and, (5) not to work for a separate peace treaty with the United States.

Report without Foundation
By Rutherford Poats
UP Staff Correspondent

Gen. Douglas MacArthur's Government Section dismissed as "completely without foundation" reports that it had rejected an alleged effort by Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida to win Occupation approval for establishing a "special police force."

Frank Rizzo,

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Frank Rizzo, Deputy Chief of Government Section, said neither the Section's chief Brig. Gen. Courtney Whitney, nor any other section official had issued the reported statement of SCAP policy.

An aide to Mr. Yoshida told the United Press that the Cabinet had not received, either in writing or orally, such a statement and that he knew of no inquiry by the Prime Minister which might have led to the reported GHQ reply.

The reported SCAP policy statement, covering police matters, the "purge," the Japanese Government's attitude toward communism and the Communist Party, a separate peace treaty, and economic matters, was published by foreign news agencies other than the United Press.

Mr. Rizzo said the report apparently had been "planted" by some group interested in its publication. This view was supported by members of the Japanese press corps covering the Prime Ministers Office. One reporter stated that a rumor that Mr. Yoshida had been rebuked by SCAP's Government Section for his efforts to expand police action against Communist elements was circulated recently by "opposition party members."

It was understood that high SCAP officials were seeking late Sunday, to determine the source of the rumored SCAP action.

Secretary-General Kozen Hirokawa of the Democratic-Liberal Party told the press that he believed the newspaper stories on the alleged exchange of letters between Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida and the Allied Headquarters emanated from some Japanese source possessing "ulterior motives."

Meanwhile, Chief Cabinet Secretary Kaneshichi Masuda said that the Yoshida Cabinet would submit to the next Diet session a bill designed to revise the current Police Law.

Mr. Masuda stressed that newspaper reports concerning the alleged GHQ rejection of the Government's plan for "a special police" would have no effect on the Cabinet's decision to seek revision of the police system.

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Enclosure No. 5 to Despatch No. 528 dated August 5, 1949, from United States Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, subject: "INS Report Alleging Headquarters Communication to Prime Minister Regarding Proposed Police Reorganization".

English translation supplied by the Japanese Foreign Office of an article published in the August 3, 1949, Nippon Keizai Shimbun, Tokyo.

COPY

Draft Outline of Plan for Revision of the Police System as proposed by the Democratic-Liberal Party

In view of recent disturbances such as the National Electric Railway (Kokuden) Strike, the Taira incident and the Hiroshima (Japan Steel) incident and also the collision between the Cabinet and the National Public Safety Commission over the question of the proposed removal of the Director-General of the Headquarters of the National Rural Police, the Democratic-Liberal Party has been studying, with the Policy Research Section playing the principal role, the question of the revision of the police system with a view to amending the shortcomings of the present police system and thereby insuring the maintenance of public safety. As a result of this study, a Draft Outline of Plan for Revision of the Police System has been completed and submitted to Prime Minister Yoshida, Mr. Masuda, Chief Cabinet Secretary and Mr. Higai, Minister of State. The gist of the plan is as follows:

1. So far as it is necessary for national public security, the National Rural Police (NRP) may, as a matter of course, exercise its authority, conducting the detection and suppression of crimes and apprehension of suspects, in the areas under the jurisdiction of the Police of Autonomous Entities (PAE). In this case, each PAE shall be obligated to cooperate with NRP upon the request of the latter. The authority of NRP shall concern the following types of crimes:

Crimes concerning rebellion and affecting foreign relations;
Crimes of disturbing internal peace;
Crimes which harm international relations;
Crimes committed against important persons;
Crimes of counterfeiting currencies and securities;
Crimes concerning smuggling;
Crimes committed against national properties and establishments;
Crimes of corruption of government officials.

2. The PAE shall be obligated to report to NRP information concerning national public security, and NRP may as a matter of routine practice accord guidance and training to the PAE.

3. In cases

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3. In cases where law is not duly enforced or there exists any such case in a city, town or village having a PAE, NRP may extend its authority upon the demand of the governor or the assembly of the district or prefecture (To, Do, Fu, Ken) concerned.

4. As between the NRP and the PAE, between the PAE of different autonomous entities and between several units of NRP, prompt mutual assistance may be accorded upon the request of the Chief of Police of any such unit. In this case, the concurrence of the Public Safety Commissions concerned must be obtained within 20 days. The PAE shall be obligated to comply with such request of NRP. Police officials dispatched for purposes of assistance may exercise their authority in the locality to which they are sent.

5. Interchange of personnel between NRP and different PAE shall be permitted.

6. Provisions shall be made to the effect that the rights of the people may be restricted in case where a state of emergency has been proclaimed. A governor may, upon the recommendation of the Public Safety Commission concerned, proclaim a state of emergency over the whole or a part of the area under his jurisdiction. In this case the governor shall report to the Prime Minister without delay and must obtain the approval of the assembly of the district or prefecture concerned within 20 days.

7. Cities with a population of 100,000 or more shall invariably establish a PAE. A city, town or village with a population of 5,000 or more may choose not to establish a PAE. In such cases, the fixed number of police personnel of NRP shall be increased automatically by the fixed number of personnel for the cities, towns and villages which choose not to establish a PAE.

8. Over and above the present prescribed number of personnel which consists of 30,000 for NRP and 95,000 for PAE, totaling 125,000, NRP shall have additional police personnel of 50,000 of which 20,000 shall be engaged in affairs concerning national public security and the remaining 30,000 shall be organized into an armed Keibitai (Security Force).

9. The National Public Safety Commission shall, besides six members, have a chairman who shall be appointed by the Prime Minister from among the ministers of state. The term of office of members of the Commission shall be three years and two of them shall be renewed in turn each year. As for the conditions of disqualification, only those who have at any time been in the police service shall be excluded from being a member of the Commission.

10. The Director-General of the Headquarters of NRP shall be appointed by the Prime Minister after hearing the opinion of the National Public Safety Commission.

11. The Metropolitan Police Board shall be incorporated in NRP.

12. All police telephones and telegraphic facilities shall be independently administered by NRP.

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Enclosure No. 6 to Despatch No. 528 dated August 5, 1949, from United States Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, subject: "INS Report Alleging Headquarters Communication to Prime Minister Regarding Proposed Police Reorganization".

Statement delivered to Mr. Sebald, August 5, 1949, by Mr. Ohno of the Japanese Foreign Office as from the Prime Minister. Translation into English by Mr. Ohno.

COPY

As to the interpretation of Police Law by the National Public Safety Commission and by the Director-General of National Rural Police Headquarters, it has been revealed that they have an opinion that the question of public safety is outside the jurisdiction of the Cabinet. This line of thinking is preposterous and it is extremely inappropriate to entrust the administration of police force under such persons. It is my firm belief that, in view of the prevailing unrest, the maintenance of public peace and order is one of the biggest and gravest problems facing the Cabinet today. On the surface, it appears as though peace and order are being kept in Japan by her own police force, but it must be frankly admitted that public safety is being maintained in Japan by the assistance of the United States Army.

Japan had heretofore a strongly centralized police bureaucracy and she was a police state in the literal sense of the word. To remedy the situation, it was pointed out by the Allied Headquarters to decentralize the police system in accordance with the principle of local autonomy. As a result, the National Rural Police was established on one hand and the Police of Autonomous Entities on the other. However, due to scant appropriation in local areas, many difficulties are being confronted by the Police of Autonomous Entities for its smooth, efficient and mobile operation. The operation is further hindered by the lack of mutual action and of exchange of important information between the National Rural Police and the Police of Autonomous Entities.

It is said that the National Public Safety Commission believes that the problem of maintaining public safety must be considered on a non-partisan basis. This is quite natural, for the police force must be made totally independent from any political party but certainly not from the Cabinet.

In viewing the present composition of the National Public Safety Commission, it can not be denied that there is a political tinge among its members. The Commission was established during the days of the

Katayama

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Katayama Cabinet and persons with Socialist lineage had been included at that time. As the members of the Commission are identical from the day of its inauguration, it is quite evident that men from political parties are still holding their post in the said Commission.

It is readily admitted by everyone, particularly by those who underwent bitter experiences under the past rigid system, that advent of new police structure has greatly contributed to the democratization of Japan. However, in the light of mounting social unrest, inefficient operation of police and the recalcitrant attitude shown by the National Public Safety Commission towards the Cabinet, it is keenly felt by all law abiding citizens of the entire nation that something must be done to cope with the prevailing situation. Like many other problems faced by Japan in these trying days of postwar period, the new police system may also require ample time for its ultimate fruition, but it is deemed necessary that further reform of the entire police system and of the National Public Safety Commission must be carried out as soon as possible in order to establish peace and order for this insular nation upon a solid foundation.

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Enclosure No. 7 to Despatch No. 528 dated August 5, 1949, from United States Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, subject: "INS Report Alleging Headquarters Communication to Prime Minister Regarding Proposed Police Reorganization".

COPY

LIST OF THE MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL PUBLIC SAFETY COMMISSION

TERM OF OFFICE REMAINING		NAME	OCCUPATION
3 years	Chairman	TSUJI, Jiro	President of the Riken Keiki K.K.
5 years	Member	UEMURA, Tamaki	Vice president of the World Y.M.C.A.; President of Japan Y.M.C.A.
4 years	Member	KANEMASA, Yonekichi	Vice president of the Rōdo-sōdomei (Japan Federation of Labor Unions).
1 year	Member	KIYOSE, Saburo	Attorney and counselor at law; Chairman, Board of Directors, Nihon Taiiku-kai (Japan Athletic Association).
2 years	Member	UBUKATA, Makoto	Mayor of the town of Numata.

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : NA - Mr. Bond

DATE: September 7, 1949

FROM : NA - Mr. Green

894.105/8-549 Secret file

SUBJECT: Tokyo's 529 of August 5, 1949

OFFICE OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS SEP 8 1949 DIRECTOR Department of State

Mr. Finn of POLAD was informed by Mr. Eaton (Chief Police Administrator of G-2, GHQ) that no major changes in the police system are planned. The only changes of note in the Police Law now being worked out between G-2 and the Japanese Government would (a) permit towns and villages to hold elections to decide whether they wished to retain their autonomous police or to be brought under the National Rural Police; (b) empower the Director General of the NRP to direct the operations of all NRP units, not merely those of the Headquarters of the NRP as at present. These changes in the Police Law will probably be submitted to the Diet at its special session this fall. Mr. Eaton said no thought is being given to increasing the size of Japan's police forces.

When asked whether the centralization contemplated by the above revision would be sufficient to assure proper police coordination, Mr. Eaton ventured that the new decentralized system is only in its formative stage and can not therefore be judged conclusively.

POLAD comments that strikes and disorders have greatly abated over the last few weeks. It feels that the abatement is due to popular indignation at the series of recent outbursts of disorder, which has scared off those who would defy the public interest. Japanese law-enforcement agencies, continues POLAD, are now taking vigorous action and it is hoped they will soon be capable of handling any civil disturbance.

Secret

FE:NA:MGreen:clh

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JUL 14 1952

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Important — ~~FE/JMA~~ HM ~~RAF~~

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

~~AID~~ DCR files

TO : NA - Mr. Bond

DATE: September 7, 1949

FROM : NA - Mr. Green disp. 894.105/8-549 Secret file

SUBJECT: Tokyo's 528 of August 5, 1949

An INS article appeared on August 1 in the Nippon Times alleging that General Whitney, in a letter to Yoshida, turned down the latter's police reorganization plan. General Whitney was said to have further informed Yoshida that (a) GHQ views the extreme right in Japan as a greater threat than the extreme left, (b) there will be no relaxation of the purge by categories, (c) it is not in Japan's interest to talk of a separate peace treaty with the U.S.

Despite denials of this INS article by Yoshida and the Government Section, POLAD comments that the Government Section misses few opportunities to communicate precisely the above-quoted views in its oral contacts with Japanese officials. Mr. Ohno of the Foreign Office said as much in his confidential account of the episode to POLAD. Yoshida's denial of the story was evidently delivered at the behest of the Government Section.

Yoshida has taken occasion to inform Mr. Sebald in strict confidence of the widening gap between the Japanese Government's and General Whitney's views on the police problem, with particular reference to the relative responsibilities of the Cabinet and of the National Public Safety Commission in the maintenance of public order. Yoshida favors direct Cabinet responsibility for the maintenance of public safety. He regards the National Public Safety Commission a body of liberal political tinge, which, because it was selected by a government now out of office should not have control over the police. General Whitney, on the other hand, is pressing for broad powers for the National Public Safety Commission as a desirable Commission-method means of checking the police powers of the Government. The issue promises to be a live one over the next few months.

SECRET FILE
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