

Doc. 2897 Evid.

Folder 10

(20)

30 December 1946

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. Nos. 2897-2898

16 Jan 1947

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Extract from Interrogations of MATSUOKA, Yosuke and TOGO, Shigenori

Date: 1946 Original (x) Copy () Language: English

Has it been translated? Yes () No (x)

Has it been photostated? Yes () No (x)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Document Division

PERSONS IMPLICATED: SHIMADA, Shigetero; (MATSUOKA, Yosuke); MUTO, Akira; NAGANO, Osami; TOJO, Hideki

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Preparations for War, Military

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS

2897 - Interrogation of TOGO, dtd 30 March 1946

2898 - Interrogation of MATSUOKA, dtd 15 March 1946

Analyst: W.H.WAGNER

Doc. Nos. 2897-2898

ok

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

REQUEST FORM - ACCUSED - INCIDENT

30 December 1946

TO JUDGE ALBERT WILLIAMS:

The undersigned requests the consideration of Document # 2897
Language _____ (Describe):-

E X T R A C T

Statement made by TOGO, Shigenori, delivered to IPS 30 Mar. 1946
(Pages 4 and 5)

⁴⁶
15, 16, 17

as proof of the particulars set forth in the Indictment under
APPENDIX _____, SECTION _____, PARAGRAPH _____; and/or
for the following purposes:

P. L.

P. Lopez, Staff Attorney

TO THE DOCUMENT OFFICER

The above Document has been approved for processing by you
with changes as follows:

*Cancelled
13 Jan 1947*

R. S. Passmore, Jr.
~~Judge Albert Williams~~
Document Control Attorney

By _____
Secretary

STATEMENT BY

SHIGENORI TOGO

The following statement was prepared by Shigenori TOGO and brought to the office of Mr. Roy L. Morgan, Chief, Investigative Division, IFS, by Fumihiko TOGO, son of TOGO, on March 30, 1946.

- - - - -

In order to make clear some of the efforts made by me to avoid war with the United States, I should like to explain them in writing as follows:

CIRCUMSTANCES REGARDING MY ENTRY INTO THE TOJO CABINET:

Following the resignation en bloc of the third Konoye Cabinet in October, 1941, the Imperial command to form a new cabinet fell upon General Tojo on 17 October. That night, about 11:30 O'clock, I saw the general for a talk at his request. His purpose was to ask me to take over the portfolio of Minister for Foreign Affairs. Because the previous cabinet had resigned on account of the strong views maintained by the army with respect to the Japanese-American negotiations and the resulting disunity of views within the cabinet, I told Tojo that before I said anything one way or the other on the offer I must first of all be informed of the situation which caused the preceding cabinet's resignation. To this Tojo said it was due to the strong and uncompromising stand of the army on the most difficult issue in the Japanese-American negotiations, namely, the stationing of troops in China, which resulted in disunity within the cabinet. He further said that since he had hitherto maintained strong views on the issue, he thought he would be in the position, if he became prime minister, to continue to maintain his strong stand. I told him that in the event Japan persisted

March 30, 1946

Shigenori TOGO - statement

in taking a resolute stand if only on the question of stationing troops in China the negotiations will in all certainty end in a breakdown. Since the continuance of negotiations would be meaningless in that case, I told Tojo that if the new cabinet was to be formed on the basis of such a prospect I could not take over the important post of Foreign Minister and had no choice but to reject the offer. That is to say, I made it plain to him that unless the army agreed to consider the question of stationing troops in China with considerable allowances and reconsider the various other questions as well, and if it were not the army's intentions to facilitate the consummation of the Japanese-American negotiations on a rational basis I could not permit myself to become Foreign Minister. As Tojo thereupon further enjoined me on the assurance that there were no objections to a reconsideration of the various questions including that of stationing troops in China and furthermore to a thorough reconsideration of the decision of the Imperial Conference of 6 September, I finally accepted the offer in the hope to lead the negotiation to a successful conclusion. On the following day, the 18th, the investiture ceremony was held and the Tojo Cabinet was duly organized.

Regarding the previous course of the Japanese-American negotiations which were naturally kept strictly confidential as a State secret, I was not informed of the detailed facts until I became Foreign Minister. I had completely no knowledge of the decision of 2 July which effected a decisive change on the course of Japan while regarding the decision of 6 September, which brought the negotiations virtually to a stalemate I had only slight knowledge. Not having seen the data which would enable

March 30, 1946

Shigenori TOGO - statement

me to form my own judgement of the situation directly, I felt the need first of all to acquaint myself in detail with the course of the negotiations by reference to the documents and papers relating to them. Immediately upon my assumption of office I made a study of the proposals advanced by both countries since April of 1941 and my first impression was that whereas Japan endeavored to secure the position she acquired on the Continent, the United States sought to repudiate it and that the negotiations had made no headway because of the fundamental and almost unbridgeable difference in the respective stands of the two countries.

EFFORTS TO BRING A NEW TURN IN THE NEGOTIATIONS
AND TO AVERT WAR (1)

Since the beginning of the negotiations, the United States demanded one-sided concessions on the part of Japan. Especially since the advance of Japanese troops into southern French Indo-China in the latter part of July its attitude became very cold and indifferent. Together with Britain and the Netherlands, the United States ruptured economic relations with Japan and strengthened the ABCD encirclement of Japan, thus making it appear as if American Government circles were regarding war as unavoidable anticipating its outbreak. At that time, Japan was engaged in a war with China, continuing from the Manchurian Incident into the China Affair. As public opinion within the country - practically all opinion, at least those manifested publicly - approved of and supported the actions since the Manchurian Incident, it was in reality wellnigh impossible to do such a thing as renounce all the gains resulting from those incidents as demanded by the United States. Strong

Shigenori TOGO - statement

March 30, 1946

policy advocates declared with finality that there were no prospects of a settlement with the United States and insisted that actions of self-defense be taken before any time was lost. The future was indeed very gloomy. However, it was my cherished desire to realize by all means the successful consummation of the negotiations for the sake of Japan as well as for the sake of the world, and it was because of such a desire that I had secured from Tojo before my entry into the cabinet assurances permitting efforts to realize that goal. Accordingly, the liaison conference between the Imperial Headquarters and the Government immediately after the formation of the new cabinet, undertook from every angle a thorough reconsideration of policy so as to meet the Japanese-American negotiations. In addition, the study of measures to meet possible eventualities was also carried on. Reconsideration, study, continued every day, some time into the late hours of the night. Often there were heated arguments. No efforts were spared at minute and careful discussion of the problems on hand. Although it is clear that the military beginning with Tojo held views which were strong from the outset, I did not think, judging by their words and attitude toward me, that Tojo and his clique had already decided on war at the time the cabinet was formed.

For the sake of reference, I should like at this point to explain the composition and the workings of the Liaison conferences between the Imperial Headquarters and the Government.

Members of the liaison conferences who regularly attended at that time were: From the Government - the Prime Minister, the Minister of War, the Minister of Navy, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister

Shigenori TOGO - statement

March 30, 1946

of Finance and the President of the Planning Board; from the High Command - the Chief of the Army General Staff and the Chief of the Naval General Staff (with their vice-chiefs in constant attendance before the outbreak of War). Other cabinet members attended when required. The secretaries were the Chief Secretary of the Cabinet, the Director of the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry and the Director of the Naval Affairs Bureau of the Navy Ministry. During the conferences there were others in attendance to make explanations. In accordance with the custom prevailing from the time of the Konoye Cabinet, all basic matters concerning the Japanese-American negotiations were deliberated upon at the liaison conferences in that they related to the fundamentals of national policy. Especially all important matters related to war, except those which belonged to the High Command, were entirely brought to these conferences for deliberation. Matters decided upon by the liaison conferences were, in accordance with necessity, presented to the Cabinet and/or the Imperial Conference. However, with the view to avoiding complication and duplication, the reporting of decisions to the Emperor was done entirely for the Government by the Prime Minister.

Emphasizing the need of hastening a decision at the very first meeting of the liaison conference, the Chief of the Army General Staff, General Gen Sugiyama, went so far as to explain in connection with the decision of 6 September that there was an understanding that during the month of September diplomacy was to be primary and military operational preparations secondary, but that from the beginning of October military operational preparations were to be primary and diplomacy secondary.

Shigenori TOGO - statement

March 30, 1946

Although the foregoing does not mean that a decision for war was made, it indicates that from the early part of October the desire for such preparations was very strong in the army High Command. Although it had been arranged that the decision of 6 September would be thoroughly reconsidered, the insistence upon preparatory action became a stumbling block and it was unfortunate that by becoming a bomb-like existence it greatly hindered the handling of the negotiation. It should be noted that the decision of 2 July referred to above was the first step of the preparatory action just mentioned.

At the first liaison conference on October 23, already referred to, the Vice-Chief of the Army General Staff, Lieutenant General Tsukada, declared that he saw no possible prospects of a successful outcome of the Japanese American negotiations and insisted that because the United States and Britain had already ruptured economic relations and strengthened the encirclement of Japan the negotiations should immediately be discontinued and actions of self-defense be taken. This I opposed by insisting that if there were means to break the deadlock in the negotiations it was necessary that all of them be tried and declared that since there was room to try them it would be an error of over-haste to take actions of self-defense now. Finally the conference was led to the view that the negotiations should be continued.

As I said before, there was an enormous divergence in the contentions of the two parties in the Japanese-American negotiations, and, moreover, the decision of 6 September made by the third Konoye Cabinet defining the limits of Japanese demands and concessions were so definite

Shigenori TOGO - statement

March 30, 1946

and uncompromising that it was clear that it would be extremely difficult to have the United States accept it. In reconsidering the entire question at this liaison conference, it was impossible to make a clean slate of the past course of the negotiations, as the "limit" decided upon in September naturally became the basis for consideration. Because of this situation, it was by no means an easy task to have the conference relax below that limit.

At any rate, it was agreed as a result of the deliberations in the liaison conferences that there was no prospect of consummating our minimum demands on the basis of the 6 September decision unless there was a sudden radical change in the American attitude. However, it being my foremost desire to seek every means toward reaching a successful settlement with the United States, I made no small effort in seeing to what extent the minimum demands of our country could be relaxed. In this connection, my most useful reference was the conditions which the Foreign Minister Toyoda had regarded, at the time of the collapse of the Konoye Cabinet, as having the possibility of bringing the negotiations to a success.

The first condition related to the stationing of Japanese troops in China. In this connection, not only the army but also the other members of the present liaison conference, strongly emphasized the need of stationing Japanese troops in specific areas in China indefinitely. However, as a result of my strong contention that it was unjust and illegitimate to station troops in other countries indefinitely, these members gave up their stand and gave their agreement to the principle of

Shigenori TOGO - statement

March 30, 1946

withdrawal of troops. It was an extremely difficult matter at that time to break up the army's principle of stationing troops, but since I had won them over to my view I considered that there were chances that the withdrawal might be expedited the negotiations progressed.

The second condition which was originally proposed by Toyoda was that of no increase of Japanese troops in French Indo-China in view of the apprehension entertained by the United States as to Japan's military advance to the south with French Indo-China as a springboard. With respect to this point also I prevailed upon the army to agree, in pursuance of the main object to avoid war, that upon reaching an agreement, I succeeded in making still greater concessions than that proposed by Foreign Minister Toyoda.

Thus the two major questions, regarded as stumbling blocks in breaking the deadlock in the negotiations at the time of the collapse of the Konoye Cabinet, were overcome. In addition, the conference decided, with respect to the question of the Tripartite Pact, to adopt the plan previously proposed to the United States regarding which, according to Ambassador Nomura's report in the first part of October, American understanding had been obtained. It was further agreed that with respect also to such other questions as the principle of non-discriminatory treatment in trade concessions be made as much as possible.

Proposition A, a relaxation of our proposals of 25 September was as follows:

March 30, 1946

(1) Question of Non-Discriminatory Treatment in Trade.

The Japanese Government recognizes the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations to be applied to all the Pacific area, including China, on the understanding that the said principle is to be applied uniformly to the rest of the world.

(2) Question of Interpretation and Application of the Tripartite Pact.

The interpretation and application of the Tripartite Pact shall be in accordance with Japan's own decision. (According to a report from the Japanese Embassy in Washington toward the end of the Third Konoye Cabinet, American understanding on this question was understood to have already been obtained. By "in accordance with Japan's own decision" is meant that Japan would not be bound by the interpretations of any of the other signatory powers. The original proposal, on which it was presumed the United States had agreed, was thus included.)

(3) Question of Withdrawal of Troops

a. Withdrawal of Troops from China.

Following the restoration of peace between Japan and China, the Japanese troops despatched to China in connection with the China Affair will be stationed for the necessary duration in specified areas and the rest of the troops shall be withdrawn upon the conclusion of

March 30, 1946

Shigenori TOGO -- statement

peace and in accordance with the agreement between Japan and China.

b. Withdrawal of Troops from French Indo-China

The troops in French Indo-China will be withdrawn immediately either upon the settlement of the China Affair or the establishment of peace in East Asia on an equitable basis.

The purport of the conditions relative to the Tripartite Pact was that Japan would, as much as possible, not put into effect the obligation to enter the war and, at the same time, that the United States, on its part, would not unduly enlarge the meaning of self-defense. The second condition relative to the principle of non-discriminatory treatment in trade sought for American agreement to the application of the principle on a world-wide basis in return for Japanese acceptance of the United States proposal, it being the Japanese view that it would be discriminatory and unfair to enforce this principle only in East Asia if the closed-door is maintained, for instance, on the American continent. The condition relative to the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China was an effort to conform with the American desire in view of the fact that the United States would not approve of the indefinite stationing of troops and desired a concrete demonstration of Japanese intent to withdraw her troops. The condition relative to French Indo-China sought to make clear, in view of American apprehensions that Japan might make armed advances with Indo-China as a base, that it was Japanese policy to withdraw troops immediately if

Shigenori TOGO - statement

March 30, 1946

the situation which necessitates the advance into French Indo-China as well as the joint defense agreement is eliminated.

If the United States would understand Japan's position and demonstrate the spirit of reciprocity, it was regarded possible to break the deadlock in the negotiations by means of Proposition A, but in case the proposition failed to succeed, as a result of continued American insistence on their demands, Proposition B was also drawn up with a view to reaching an agreement on a few items which were regarded as urgently necessary to ameliorate the dangerous situation and prevent the outbreak of war.

Proposition B was as follows:

- (1) The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan undertake not to dispatch armed forces into any of the regions, excepting French Indo-China, in the South Eastern Asia and the Southern Pacific Area.
- (2) Both Governments shall cooperate with a view to securing the acquisition in the Netherlands East Indies of those goods and commodities of which the two countries are in need.
- (3) Both Government mutually undertake to restore commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of assets. The Government of the United States shall supply Japan the required quantity of oil.

March 30, 1946

- (4) The Government of the United States undertakes not to resort to measures and actions prejudicial to the endeavors for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China.
- (5) The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw troops now stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific Area; and it is prepared to remove the Japanese troops in the southern part of French Indo-China to the northern part upon the conclusion of the present agreement.

Point One, it was regarded, should dispel American suspicions with respect to our southward advance. Point Two was not a particularly new proposal, but its aim was mutual cooperation for considerate treatment in the acquisition of petroleum, tin and other necessary items. As self-explanatory, Point Three sought to restore commercial relations to those prevailing before July. In view of the American attitude and our situation at the time, a guarantee was especially asked with regard to the supply of petroleum. Point Four was a request to the United States to halt its assistance to the Chiang Kai-shek Government and aimed to have the conflict between Japan and China settled directly between themselves on a fair and moderate basis. Moreover, I had the sincere intention and a concrete program to settle the China Affair as speedily as possible on such a basis. Point Five was a statement of Japanese intention to transfer, upon arrival

Shigenori TOGO - statement

March 30, 1946

at an agreement, Japanese troops stationed in the southern part of French Indo-China to the northern part of that country. It was a completely new proposal which concretely expressed the peaceful intentions and sincerity of the Japanese Government. In other words, the fundamental aim of Proposition B was to restore the critical situation to the situation prevailing prior to July, 1941. By making clear that Japan had no intention to advance southward, in view of the fact that the advance into southern French Indo-China had so greatly incited American and British feelings toward Japan, this proposition was calculated to dispel suspicions and thus gradually restore the situation to normalcy. Proposition B represents a supreme effort to realize such a situation. In other words, the two major issues, which were regarded as stumbling blocks in bringing about a settlement with the United States before the withdrawal of the Konoye Cabinet, offered, because of our concessions on them, prospects of being surmountable. Proposition A and B were, for Japan, concessions made after extreme difficulties. Yet, in spite of this fact, the United States was not responsive even toward this proposal.

EFFORTS TO BRING A NEW TURN IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND
TO AVERT WAR (II)

The deliberations of the liaison conference continued. It was regarded fortunate for the sake of world peace if the deadlock in the negotiations could be broken by the two foregoing propositions. However, in the light of the past attitude of the United States, sufficient expectations could not be entertained as to the success of the negotiations. Thus, the study of the liaison conference covered, together with the conduct of

Shigenori TOGO - statement

March 30, 1946

the negotiations, consideration of measures to be taken in the event the negotiations proved unsuccessful.

Feeling in the light of my personal experiences in Europe during World War I that modern warfare brought untold suffering and tragedy to the people of the belligerent countries and feeling also that the progress of a nation should proceed steadily and soundly and that the counsel of wisdom dictated the avoidance of sudden expansion, I made several vigorous efforts to urge that every effort be bent toward avoiding war.

As already stated, my efforts were first of all directed against those who contended in favor of cessation of the negotiations and immediate carrying out of actions of self-defense. In this I succeeded by having a decision made to continue the negotiations. Another of my efforts was devoted to making as great a concession as possible in the Japanese proposal. In this connection, I won over the military to the extent of making them agree to very great concessions on the question which had caused the downfall of the Konoye Cabinet, namely, the principle of withdrawal of Japanese troops from China. My efforts also were devoted to restoring the situation prevailing prior to July 1941 by ameliorating the danger in the relations between Japan and the United States and thereby effect a gradual return to normalcy.

These efforts of mine did not end there. I further insisted that even in case the Japanese-American negotiations should ultimately end in failure, we should exercise patience and forbearance, quietly observing the trend of international affairs. My proposition was met with

Shigenori TOGO - statement

March 30, 1946

a strong report on the part of the military. They declared that the amount of supplies required to replenish our consumption of materials, especially petroleum, was so great there was every danger of what they called "gradual exhaustion" and that if any pressure should be applied by the United States and Great Britain regarding China and other questions at a time when Japanese stock piles were low Japan would be placed in more difficult circumstances than she was in now. Japan, then, could not fight even if she were to fight and the possibilities were great that Japan would have no alternative but to succumb completely to the demands of these countries. Therefore, the military contended, it was necessary to prepare for emergencies while the situation was still favorable to Japan and, furthermore, it was essential that no time be lost.

The majority of those attending the liaison conferences were of the view that there was no alternative but war in the event of failure of the negotiations and especially that there were good prospects of success at the outset of the war. I was opposed to war irrespective of its chances, but as against this view, I strongly argued that, since it was clear that in case war broke out with the United States and Britain it would be a long war, it would, therefore, be a great mistake to decide on war merely on the basis of good prospects at the outset of the war. In other words, I declared that war should be avoided with the utmost prudence and that starting a war without definite prospects would be inviting extreme disaster to the people of our country. On the basis of such a stand, I urged that it was necessary that we exercise patience and forbearance in avoiding war even if the attitude of the other country should be mistaken and asked for the

March 30, 1946

Shigenori TOGO - statement

views of the War and Navy Ministers on the over all prospects of the war. The War Ministers (Tojo) replied by saying that prospects were certain that even with regard to the war as a whole victory could be won. The Navy Minister (Shimada) said that there was no need for pessimism. The Chief of the Naval General Staff (Nagano) stated that the navy had confidence in interceptive operations and that if the United States navy should approach northward into the mandated islands from the central Pacific the Japanese navy could destroy it. Such being the temper of the militarists at this time my counsel of moderation was totally unheeded.

It was difficult for me to place my entire trusts on the views of the Planning Board regarding Japan's material strength for war which had been under study. Being undisposed to giving immediate approval to the views expressed by the military authorities regarding war prospects, Kaya also being of the same mind, I asked for a overnight's time and gave deep and careful thought to the matters. However, since most of the data which constituted the basis of the views of the military and naval authorities belonged to the realm of military secrets it was impossible for those of us who were outsiders to secure such information. Especially with respect to matters pertaining to military operations we were not permitted to have any part. The prospects entertained by the armed services were drawn up after the enormity of American productive power had been pointed out and duly studied and after sufficient consideration had been given to my advice that no great expectations for assistance could be placed on Germany. Aside from these arguments, I was not in the position to possess appropriate data with which to question, disapprove or refute as miscalculations the views

Shigenori TOGO - statement

March 30, 1946

of the armed services on the prospects of the war and was, therefore, compelled to trust them.

On the following day I obtained from Tojo his agreement to my quoting the prospective views of the War and Navy Ministers, as mentioned above, at the cabinet meeting and elsewhere and also the agreement to providing room for further consideration of some of the points in case the United States gave general acceptance to Propositions A and/or B. After I had secured Tojo's agreement to these and other matters already mentioned, I told him that I now could not but submit to the views of the majority in the liaison conference, that is, to continue the negotiations on the basis of Propositions A and B with the resolve that in case they met with failure war might be deemed unavoidable. Because of the independence of the High Command in our country, outsiders had no access to military secrets and it was most regrettable that there was no choice but to trust the statements of the military and naval authorities on questions of a technical and professional nature. Japan's foremost defect at that time was the independence of the High Command and the system which compelled reliance on the fighting services, particularly the army. Another point to be noted is that since the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact, especially since July and September 1941, various decisions regarding the necessary steps to be taken in the event of failure of the negotiations were so often made that those in charge of military operations came to entertain over-confidence that there could be no defeat. As a result of the fact that this temper was gradually strengthened, the situation developed in which it was no longer possible to suppress it.

Shigenori TOGO - statement

March 30, 1946

Another step toward averting war was taken by me when I secured the High Command's agreement that in case the Japanese-American negotiations were successful all preparatory military operations would be immediately stopped and the former situation restored and brought this fact before the Imperial Conference and the cabinet meeting.

What I should like to add here is that I had expected that the army would present a firm stand, but I found the stand taken by the Navy not much weaker. On 30 October I sent a representative of mine to Admiral Keisuke Okada, veteran naval officer and ex-premier with influence within naval circles, to inform him of the situation I had discovered and to request him to use his influence on the Navy. Although the admiral tried his best, it was indeed unfortunate that the desired results could not be secured.
