

英譯先秦羣經諸子叢書

孫子兵法

鄭 鏗 編譯

世界學院中國學典叢書之一
上海世界書局發行

中國學典館叢書之一

英譯先秦羣
經諸子叢書

孫子兵法

鄭 璣編譯

英譯先秦羣經諸子叢書

鄭 慶編譯

羣經及先秦諸子爲中國思想文化之根源茲據最精佳之校本並利用最新之研究成果分別全譯或選譯並附精校之中文白文及討論作者年代本書異僞及其流傳始末之長序可暫作定本之用其要目如下

〔羣經〕 ○十三經○逸周書○大戴記○四書

○古文孝經 四川大足縣發見之宋石刻本

〔諸子〕

○管子○晏子春秋○孫子兵法○曾子○墨子○商君書○道德經
○莊子○惲子○荀子○公孫龍子○呂氏春秋○韓非子○燕丹子

孫子兵法序

楊家駱撰

部落之世，戰爭如械鬥，兵器既簡，陣線亦短，惟以猛勇相尚，自無計謀之可言。封建代起，諸國轄區較廣，政治組織較大，攻伐之章，權奇重於體力，兵書因以而起。漢書藝文志曰：「自春秋至於戰國，出奇設伏，變詐之兵並作。襄與、張良、韓信序次兵法，凡百二十八家，刪去要用，定著三十五家，諸呂用事，而盜取之。武帝時軍政楊僕，摺摺遺逸，紀奏兵錄，猶未能備。至於孝成，命任宏略次兵書爲四種。」此兵書略兵權謀、兵形勢、兵陰勝、兵技巧五十六家，八百八篇，圖四十七卷（班志原稱五十三家，七百九十篇，圖四十三卷，姚振宗校定如上數）之所據也。如兵形勢蚩尤二篇，兵陰勝神農一篇，黃帝十六篇，圖三卷，封胡五篇，風后十三篇，圖二卷，其依託不待言。兵權謀吳孫子兵法八十二篇，圖九卷，師古曰：「孫武也，臣於闔閭。」齊孫子八十九篇，圖四卷，師古曰：「孫臏。」蓋以史記解孫武、孫臏皆有兵法，而武嘗爲吳將，因指吳孫子爲武，後世以今傳十三篇有爲吳而發之語，遂以歸之；而齊孫子則佚不傳。自宋葉適、陳振孫、胡應麟始疑史記，吳越春秋、越絕書所記武事爲裴辨士妄相標指之言，而書亦非春秋時所能有，清全祖望、姚鼐持之尤力。近人錢穆謂二孫爲一人，二著爲一籍，駁讓中國學術編年史亦嘗一考，探以諸家之說，視爲戲疑則可，視爲定論則不可。史記孫子、吳起列傳敘孫武、孫臏、吳起事，於武謂爲齊人，以兵法十三篇見吳王闔閭，吳王出美人試其部勒之法，卒以爲將，西破彊楚入郢，北威齊魯。葉、陳、胡、全、姚五氏以其記敘甚簡，名不見於左氏傳，且吳越春秋、漢書人表、藝文志以之爲吳人，與史記歧，十三篇中有春秋時未用之辭，遂疑司馬遷所記之非實，而書亦後出。錢氏以求集之謂讀遺勝刑而得稱，其名無傳，乃以武名實蹟名，又因厥書之佚，又以武書實蹟書，斷厥在世爲公前三八零至三二零年間。然厥既未干吳，實無以解十三篇中爲吳而發之語也。

按唐時改記猶存，世系表謂：「孫氏有出自媯姓，齊田完字敬仲，四世孫桓字無字，無字子晉字子占，晉大夫，伐莒有功，景公賜姓孫氏，食采於樂安；生馮字起宗，齊卿；生武字長卿，以田鮑四族謀爲亂，奔吳，爲將軍；三子鮑、明、敞，明食采富春，爲富春人。」越絕書曰：「巫門外大冢，吳王客孫武冢也。」蓋武以客卿將兵，歸功武員，左氏據官書沒其名。武先著十三篇于吳王，

計篇云：「將聽吾計，用之必勝，留之，將不聽吾計，用之必敗，去之。」

虛實篇云：「越人之兵雖多，亦奚益於勝敗哉？」九地

篇云：「吳人與越人相惡也，當其同舟而濟，遇風，其相救也，如左右手。」昔爲求售於吳王而殺。吳越春秋曰：「吳王召孫子

問以兵法，每陳一篇，王不知口之稱善。」按十三篇外又有問答之辭，散見於何氏注（釋九地篇義）及潛夫論，北堂書鈔（按北

堂書鈔引孫子兵法，後太平御覽亦引之，釋出諸葛亮兵要，蓋孫子兵法十三篇外，至宋多佚，兵要所引，未註明出處，故太平御覽以爲

亮語也。）通典、文選註、太平御覽，皆釋十三篇之義者。十三篇簡要如經典，問答詳明如傳註，蓋至子明並十三篇爲八十二篇。

其學初傳於吳，故漢志載七略釋吳孫子。觀於何氏注引武答吳王釋九地篇義一節亦云「兵法曰」，則問答語在兵法八十二篇

中可證。世系表又曰：「明生讓，明雖食采富春，未久仍返齊，故史云廣生阿鄆之間。」呂覽不二篇曰：「孫臏實勢，」高誘注

謂：「廣楚人，爲齊臣，」疑以其曾從田忌奔楚而誤。惟史記稱其爲武後世子孫，而世系表謂明子，此則不然，自武入鄆至廣敗馬

陵，凡一百六十六年，武在世約當公前五零六年頃，則廣應爲武曾孫之子孫，世系表於先世無可考者，世次多脫落，未可以爲疑。漢

志齊孫子八十九篇，圖四卷，乃廣承家學，於武作別有增刪給釋而成。戰國策孫臏曰：「兵法百里而趨利者，馭上將，五十里走者

軍半至，」語出罕爭篇，釋「兵法」者，謂引武書也。又曰：「馬陵道狹而旁多阻險，可伏兵，」語意本武書行軍篇。又曰：「攻

其懈怠，出其不意，」語出武書計篇。可證齊孫子與吳孫子特如魯論、齊論、魯詩、齊詩、韓詩之別，爲武書之經廣增刪給釋而行於齊

者。是廣爲武後，皆齊人，吳越春秋、呂覽以其客吳楚而誤，謂其籍隸吳楚；漢志本七略，因吳、齊分承其學，稱吳孫子、齊孫子；人表

及漢志以下目錄，不列七略冠地之義，而稱武爲吳人，啓後世之疑，致以武名不見於左氏傳，武書雜入春秋後語，而廣書佚不復見

著錄，竟以所疑爲實，疑至合二人爲一人，合二書爲一書，其來愈不可解，而去真亦愈遠。至駱以二孫子書皆出於武，然亦如魯、齊論

及魯、齊、韓詩不可謂爲一籍也。

史遷謂世俗稱師旅，皆道孫子十三篇，如戰國策引吳起語，史記引陳餘韓信語，及呂氏春秋、淮南鴻烈、太元經、潛夫論言兵者，多

出武書可證。遷又多與並世將帥相往還，則不應未見其書，而妄著於史。張守節正義曰：「七錄云：孫子兵法三卷。按十三

篇爲上卷，又有中、下二卷。」是漢志吳孫子兵法八十二篇，圖九卷，十三篇外六十九篇皆爲中、下卷；杜牧謂武著書數十萬言，今傳十三篇不及萬言，餘九萬言當在中、下卷。隋志著錄：「孫子兵法二卷，吳將孫武撰，魏武注，梁二卷；又孫子八陣圖一卷，亡；吳孫子八陣圖二卷；孫子兵法雜占四卷；梁有孫子八陣圖六甲兵法一卷，亡。」唐志錄：「吳孫子三十二篇，魏武注一卷。」又有孫子兵法捷要七卷，疑卽魏武之兵法捷要，亦稱新書。周禮鄭注引八陣圖；杜佑通典引武對吳王問；太平御覽引三十二篇經及兵法雜占；宋鄭友賢輯諸傳記武語爲遺說一卷。隋唐志稱孫子兵法者外，多爲餘六十九篇及圖九卷之遺，隋志於梁三卷下各書不著撰人，則梁上「吳將孫武撰」不贅舉也。故隋志所著錄，皆武作，而唐志稱「吳孫子」，自亦爲武作無疑。至上下三卷之分，實與莊子內、外篇之分向其意，上卷爲經，中下卷爲問答、論釋、雜著及事例之屬。論釋、雜著之旨，既括於上卷，問答、事例則因時而異其用，後世不可混以爲法，此上卷之所以爲世所習，而中、下卷之所以佚也。且先秦舊籍，多降至西漢始成定型，古人著書，不盡出己手，因口授、傳錄、錯簡及承其學，有其篇者妄改舊文，夾入箋記，致雜以後世之學之辭，諸子書幾無不然，而據一簡之誤，斷全編之僞，其爲病尤甚。觀今存劉向校進各書敘錄，其成爲定型之經，猶大略可見。駱撰中國學術編年史，其西漢編於先秦舊籍定型之年代，多已考定，吳、齊兩孫子，張良、韓信之序次兵法時，當有之。高祖朝項籍、李左車各有兵法一篇，韓信有兵法三篇，均見著於漢志；隋志兵家引七錄有張良經，唐志有張良經一卷，張氏七篇七卷。司馬遷謂孫吳兵法，久爲世所稱，有項、李、韓、張四家，似皆受其影響而作。如史記韓信曰：「兵法不曰：陷之死地而後生，置之亡地後存乎？」語出武書九地篇，卽其一證。至唐書駱以爲如論語有魯、齊之異傳，詩經有魯、韓之三本，不然，亦如禮記有古文記二百四篇，河間獻王所得記一百三十一篇，王史氏記二十一篇，曲盡後者記九篇，大戴記八十五篇，小戴記四十九篇，慶氏記四十九篇，其源皆一，而互有去取刪定之處。疏之求用於齊也，以已意重端武作以爲己有，此原古人之所不以為病，非如後世著書，重名輕實，連「言公」之旨也。陳振孫以杜牧謂「魏武削其繁剩，筆其精切，凡十三篇，因注解之」，乃疑十三篇者曹氏所定。其實十三篇之數，早見於史記，筆其精切者，就關於經典性之十三篇而箋釋之也；削其繁剩者，刊落餘六十九篇，不使相廁列也。魏晉以來，餘六十九篇之日漸散佚，固以其爲問答、解釋、雜著，卓

倒不見重，而魏武削而不注，亦其因也。

武兵家之聖，今傳十三篇，爲原理原則之部，故能傳諸百世而不泯，放諸四海而皆準。唐時隨侯廷所遺學問僧歸始入東瀛，日本國見在會目有孫子兵法二卷、六陣兵法圖一卷、八陣書一卷、陣法一卷、八陣圖二卷、陣圖一卷，且有軼出隋唐志之外者。十九世紀泰西始有譯本。潮陽鄭相銜先生以英吉利文字譯軍經諸子，正歐人所譯漢籍之剽繆，而爲中西文化交通之媒介。於孫子兵法，病英漢學家齋爾士譯本之未盡當，乃就歐北美山館孫子十家註本而重譯之。既竟，以示略，爲一盲。略於象齊之學無所覓，然奕付之剽繆，與天下士共讀之。並就所知於武及其書者，撰序以破千古之疑獄，洗一帙之沈寃，爰以惡相銜先生之所責也！

中華民國三十四年七月十日楊家駱序於北泉山館史齋閣

目次

楊家駱孫子兵法序

計篇第一

作戰篇第二

謀攻篇第三

形篇第四

勢篇第五

虛實篇第六

軍爭篇第七

九變篇第八

行軍篇第九

地形篇第十

九地篇第十一

火攻篇第十二

用間篇第十三

諒平津館叢書孫星衍吳人驥同校孫子十家註本排印

孫子兵法

計篇第一

孫子曰：兵者國之大事，死生之地，存亡之道，不可不察也。故經之以五校之計，而索其情。一曰道，二曰天，三曰地，四曰將，五曰法。道者，令民與上同意也。故可與之死，可與之生，而民不畏危。天者，陰陽寒暑時制也。地者，遠近險易廣狹死生也。將者，智信仁勇嚴也。法者，曲制官道主用也。凡此五者，將莫不聞，知之者勝，不知者不勝。故校之以計，而索其情。曰主孰有道，將孰有能，天地孰得，法令孰行，兵衆孰強，士卒孰練，賞罰孰明？吾以此知勝負矣。將聽吾計，用之必勝，留之。將不聽吾計，用之必敗，去之。計利以聽，乃爲之勢，以佐其外。勢者，因利而制權也。兵者，詭道也。故能而示之不能；用而示之不用；近而示之遠；遠而示之近。利而誘之，亂而取之，實而備之，強而避之，怒而撓之，卑而驕之，敵而勞之，親而離之。攻其無備，出其不意。此兵家之勝，不可先傳也。夫未戰而廟算勝者，得算多也。未戰而廟算不勝者，得算少也。多算勝，少算不勝。而況於無算乎！吾以此觀之，勝負見矣。

作戰篇第二

孫子曰：凡用兵之法，馳車千駟，革車千乘，帶甲十萬，千里饋糧。則內外之費，賓客之用，膠漆之材，車甲之奉，日費千金，然後十萬之師舉矣。其用戰也勝久，則鈍兵挫銳。攻城則力屈，久暴師則國



用不足。夫鈍兵挫銳，屈力殫貨，則諸侯乘其弊而起，雖有智者，不能善其後矣。故兵聞拙速，未睹巧之久也。夫兵久而國利者，未之有也。故不盡知用兵之害者，則不能盡知用兵之利也。善用兵者，役不再籍，糧不三載。取用於國，因糧於敵，故軍食可足也。國之貧於師者，遠輸。遠輸則百姓貧。近於師者，貴賣。貴賣則百姓財竭。財竭則急於丘役。力屈財殫，中原內虛，於家百姓之費，十去其七。公家之費，破車罷馬，甲冑矢弩，戟楯蔽橈，丘牛大車，十去其六。故智將務食於敵。食敵一鍾，當吾二十鍾。芘秆一石，當吾二十石。故殺敵者怒也。取敵之利者，貨也。故車戰得車十乘已上，賞其先得者，而更其旌旗，車雜而乘之，卒善而養之。是謂勝敵而益強。故兵貴勝，不貴久。故知兵之將，民之司命，國家安危之主也。

謀攻篇第三

孫子曰：凡用兵之法，全國爲上，破國次之；全軍爲上，破軍次之；全旅爲上，破旅次之；全卒爲上，破卒次之。全伍爲上，破伍次之。是故百戰百勝，非善之善者也。不戰而屈人之兵，善之善者也。故上兵伐謀，其次伐交，其次伐兵，下政攻城。攻城之法，爲不得已。修櫓，繕輶，具器械，三月而後成，距闔又三月而後已。將不勝其忿，而蟻附之，殺士三分之一，而城不拔者，此攻城之災。故善用兵者，屈人之兵，而非戰也；拔人之城，而非攻也；毀人之國，而非久也。必以全爭於天下。故兵不頓，而利可全。此謀攻之法也。故用兵之法，十則圍之，五則攻之，倍則分之，敵則能戰之，少則能逃之，不若則能避之。故小敵之堅，大敵之擒也。夫將者，國之輔也。輔周則國必強，輔隙則國必弱。故君

之所以患於軍者三：不知軍之不可以進，而謂之進；不知軍之不可以退，而謂之退；是謂縻軍。不知三軍之事，而同三軍之政者，則軍士惑矣。不知三軍之權，而同三軍之任，則軍士疑矣。三軍既惑且疑，則諸侯之難至矣。是謂亂軍引勝。故知勝有五：知可以戰與不可以戰者勝。識眾寡之用者勝。上下同欲者勝。以虞待不虞者勝。將能而君不御者勝。此五者知勝之道也。故曰知彼知己，百戰不殆；不知彼而知己，一勝一負；不知彼，不知己，每戰必殆。

形篇第四

孫子曰：昔之善戰者，先爲不可勝，以待敵之可勝。不可勝在己，可勝在敵。故善戰者，能爲不可勝，不能使敵必可勝。故曰勝可知，而不可爲。不可勝者，守也。可勝者，攻也。守則不足，攻則有餘。善守者，藏於九地之下。善攻者，動於九天之上。故能自保而全勝也。見勝不過衆人之所知，非善之善者也。戰勝而天下曰善，非善之善者也。故舉秋毫不爲多力，見日月不爲明目，聞雷霆不爲聰耳。古之所謂善戰者，勝勝易勝者也。故善戰者之勝也，無智名，無勇功。故其戰勝不忒，不忒者，其所措必勝，勝已敗者也。故善戰者，立於不敗之地，而不失敵之敗也。是故勝兵先勝而後求戰，敗兵先戰而後求勝。善用兵者修道而保法，故能爲勝敗之政。兵法一曰度，二曰量，三曰數，四曰稱，五曰勝。地生度，度生量，量生數，數生稱，稱生勝。故勝兵若以鎗稱銖，敗兵若以銖稱鎗。勝者之戰民也，若決積水於千仞之谿者，形也。

勢篇第五

孫子曰：凡治衆如治寡，分數是也。鬪衆如鬪寡，形名是也。三軍之衆，可使必受敵而無敗者，奇正是也。兵之所加，如以稷投卵者，虛實是也。凡戰者以正合，以奇勝。故善出奇者，無窮如天地，不竭如江河。終而復始，日月是也；死而復生，四時是也。聲不過五，五聲之變，不可勝聽也。色不過五，五色之變，不可勝觀也。味不過五，五味之變，不可勝嘗也。戰執不過奇正，奇正之變，不可勝窮也。奇正相生，如循環之無端，孰能窮之？激水之疾，至於漂石者，執也。驚鳥之疾，至於毀折者，節也。是故善戰者，其執險，其節短。執如殲弩，節如發機。紛紛紜紜，鬪亂而不可亂也；渾渾沌沌，形圓而不可敗也。亂生於治，怯生於勇，弱生於彊。治亂數也，勇怯執也，疆弱形也。故善動敵者，形之，敵必從之；予之，敵必取之。以利動之，以卒待之。故善戰者，求之於執，不責於人。故能擇人而任執，任執者，其戰人也，如轉木石。木石之性，安則靜，危則動，方則止，圓則行。故善戰人之執，如轉圓石於千仞之山者，執也。

虛實篇第六

孫子曰：凡先處戰地，而待敵者，佚。後處戰地，而趨戰者，勞。故善戰者，致人而不致於人。能使敵人自至者，利之也。能使敵人不得至者，害之也。故敵佚，能勞之；飽，能飢之；安，能動之。出其所必趨，趨其所不意。行千里而不勞者，行於無人之地也。攻而必取者，攻其所不守也。守而必固者，守其所不攻也。故善攻者，敵不知其所守；善守者，敵不知其所攻。微乎微乎，至於無形，神乎神乎，至於無聲。故能爲敵之司命。進而不可禦者，衝其虛也。退而不可追者，速而不可及也。故

我欲戰，敵雖高壘深溝，不得不與我戰者，攻其所必救也。我不欲戰，畫地而守之。敵不得與戰我者，乖其所之也。故形人而我無形，則我專而敵分。我專爲一，敵分爲十，是以十共其一也，則我衆而敵寡。能以衆擊寡者，則吾之所與戰者約矣。吾所與戰之地不可知，不可知，則敵所備者多。敵所備者多，則吾所與戰者寡矣。故備前則後寡，備後則前寡，備左則右寡，備右則左寡，無所不備則無所不寡。寡者，備人者也；衆者，使人備己者也。故知戰之地，知戰之日，則可千里而會戰；不知戰地，不知戰日，則左不能救右，右不能救左，前不能救後，後不能救前。而況遠者數十里，近者數里乎？以吾度之，越人之兵雖多，亦奚益於勝敗哉？故曰勝可爲也。敵雖衆，可使無關。故策之而知得失之計；作之而知動靜之理；形之而知死生之地；角之而知有餘不足之處。故形兵之極，至於無形。無形則深閤不能窺，知者不能謀。因形而錯勝於衆，衆不能知。人皆知我所以勝之形，而莫知吾所以制勝之形。故其戰勝不復，而應形於無窮。夫兵形象水。水之行，避高而趨下。兵之形，避實而擊虛。水因地而制流，兵因敵而制勝。故兵無常勢，水無常形。能因敵變化而取勝者，謂之神。故五行無常勝，四時無常位，日有短長，月有死生。

軍爭篇第七

孫子曰：凡用兵之法，將受命於君，合軍聚衆，交和而舍，莫難於軍爭。軍爭之難者，以迂爲直，以患爲利。故迂其途，而誘之以利。後人發，先人至，此知迂直之計者也。故軍爭爲利，軍爭爲危。舉軍而爭利，則不及；委軍而爭利，則輜重捐。是故卷甲而趨，日夜不處，倍道兼行，百里而爭利，則擒三

將軍。勁者先，罷者後，其法十一而至。五十里而爭利，則蹶上將軍。其法半至。三十里而爭利，則三分之二至。是故軍無輜重則亡，無糧食則亡，無委積則亡。故不知諸侯之謀者，不能豫交。不知山林險阻沮澤之形者，不能行軍。不用鄉導者，不能得地利。故兵以詐立，以利動，以分合為變者也。故其疾如風，其徐如林，侵掠如火，不動如山，難知如陰，動如雷霆。掠鄉分衆，廓地分利。懸權而動。先知迂直之計者，勝。此軍爭之法也。軍政曰：「一言不相聞，故為鼓鐸；視不相見，故為旌旗。」夫金鼓旌旗者，所以一民之耳目也。民既專一，則勇者不得獨進，怯者不得獨退。此用衆之法也。故夜戰多火鼓，晝戰多旌旗，所以變民之耳目也。故三軍可奪氣，將軍可奪心。是故朝氣銳，晝氣惰，暮氣歸。故善用兵者，避其銳氣，擊其惰歸。此治氣者也。以治待亂，以靜待譁。此治心者也。以近待遠，以佚待勞，以飽待飢。此治力者也。無要正正之旗，勿擊堂堂之陳。此治變者也。故用兵之法，高陵勿向，背邱勿逆，佯北勿從，銳卒勿攻，餌兵勿食，歸師勿遏，圍師必闕，窮寇勿追。此用兵之法也。

九變篇第八

孫子曰：凡用兵之法，將受命於君，合軍聚衆。圯地無舍，衝地合交，絕地無留，圍地則謀，死地則戰。塗有所不由，軍有所不擊，城有所不攻，地有所不爭，君命有所不受。故將通於九變之利者，知用兵矣。將不通於九變之利者，雖知地形，不能得地之利矣。治兵不知九變之術，雖知五利，不能得人之用矣。是故智者之慮，必雜於利害。雜於利，而務可信也；雜於善，而患可解也。是故屈諸侯者，

以害；役諸侯者，以業；趨諸侯者，以利。故用兵之法，無恃其不來，恃吾有以待也；無恃其不攻，恃吾有所不可攻也。故將有五危。必死可殺也，必生可虜也，忿速可侮也，廉潔可辱也，愛民可煩也。凡此五者，將之過也，用兵之災也。覆軍殺將，必以五危，不可不察也。

行軍篇第九

孫子曰：凡處軍相敵，絕山依谷，視生處高，戰隆無登。此處山之軍也。絕水必遠水。客絕水而來，勿迎之於水內。令半濟而擊之利。欲戰者，無附於水而迎客。視生處高，無迎水流。此處水上之軍也。絕斥澤，惟亟去無留。若交軍於斥澤之中，必依水草而背衆樹。此處斥澤之軍也。平陸處易，而右背高，前死後生。此處平陸之軍也。凡此四軍之利，黃帝之所以勝四帝也。凡軍喜高而惡下，貴陽而賤陰，養生而處實，軍無百疾，是謂必勝。陵邱隄防，必處其陽，而右背之。此兵之利，地之助也。上雨水沫至，欲涉者待其定也。凡地有絕澗，天井，天牢，天羅，天陷，天隙，必亟去之，勿近也。吾遠之，敵近之；吾迎之，敵背之。軍旁有險阻蒺藜，井生葭葦，山林翳蒼，必謹覆索之。此伏竄之所藏處也。敵近而靜者，恃其險也。遠而挑戰者，欲人之進也。其所居者易，利也。衆樹動者，來也。衆草多障者，疑也。鳥起者，伏也。獸駭者，覆也。塵高而銳者，車來也。卑而廣者，徒來也。散而條達者，樵採也。少而往來者，營軍也。辭卑而益備者，進也。辭詭而強進者，退也。輕車先出居其側者，陳也。無約而請和者，謀也。奔走而陳兵車者，期也。半進半退者，誘也。倚仗而立者，飢也。汲而先飲者，渴也。見利而不進者，勞也。鳥集者，虛也。夜呼者，恐也。軍擾者，將不重也。旌旗動

者，亂也。吏怒者，倦也。粟馬肉食，軍無懸餼，不返其舍者，窮寇也。諄諄翕翕，徐言入入者，失衆也。屢賞者，窘也。數罰者，困也。先暴而後畏其衆者，不精之至也。來委謝者，欲休息也。兵怒而相迎，久而不合，又不相去，必謹察之。兵非益多也。惟無武進，足以併力料敵，取人而已。夫惟無慮而易敵者，必擒於人。卒未親附而罰之，則不服。不服則難用也。卒已親附而罰不行，則不可用也。故今之以文，齊之以武，是謂必取。令素行，以教其民，則民服。令不素行，以教其民，則民不服。令素信著者，與衆相得也。

地形篇第十

孫子曰：地形有通者，有挂者，有支者，有隘者，有險者，有遠者。我可以往，彼可以來，曰通。通形者，先居高陽，利糧道以戰，則利。可以往，難以返，曰挂。挂形者，敵無備，出而勝之；敵若有備，出而不勝，難以返，不利。我出而不利，彼出而不利，曰支。支形者，敵雖利我，我無出也。引而去，令敵半出而擊之，利。隘形者，我先居之，必盈之，以待敵。若敵先居之，盈而勿從，不盈而從之。險形者，我先居之，必居高陽，以待敵；若敵先居之，引而去之，勿從也。遠形者，勢均，難以挑戰，戰而不利。凡此六者，地之道也。將之至任，不可不察也。故兵有走者，有弛者，有陷者，有崩者，有亂者，有北者。凡此六者，非天之災，將之過也。夫勢均，以一擊十，曰走。卒強吏弱，曰弛。吏強卒弱，曰陷。大吏怒而不服，遇敵懟而自戰，將不知其能，曰崩。將弱不嚴，教道不明，吏卒無常，陳兵縱橫，曰亂。將不能料敵，以少合衆，以弱擊強，兵無選鋒，曰北。凡此六者，敗之道也。將之至任，不可不察也。夫地形者，兵之助也。料

敵制勝計險阨遠近，上將之道也。知此而用戰者，必勝；不知此而用戰者，必敗。故戰道必勝，主曰無戰，必戰可也。戰道不勝，主曰必戰，無戰可也。故進不求名，退不避罪，唯民是保，而利合於主，國之寶也。視卒如嬰兒，故可與之赴深谿；視卒如愛子，故可與之俱死。厚而不能使，愛而不能令，亂而不能治，譬如驕子，不可用也。知吾卒之可以擊，而不知敵之不可擊，勝之半也。知敵之可擊，而不知吾卒之不可以擊，勝之半也。知敵之可擊，知吾卒之可以擊，而不知地形之不可以戰，勝之半也。故知兵者，動而不迷，舉而不窮。故曰：知彼知己，勝乃不殆；知地知天，勝乃可全。

九地篇第十一

孫子曰：用兵之法，有散地，有輕地，有爭地，有交地，有衢地，有重地，有圯地，有圍地，有死地。諸侯自戰其地，爲散地。入人之地，而不深者，爲輕地。我得則利，彼得亦利者，爲爭地。我可以往，彼可以來者，爲交地。諸侯之地，三屬，先至而得天下之衆者，爲衢地。入人之地深，背城邑多者，爲重地。行山林險阻沮澤，凡難行之道者，爲圯地。所由入者險，所從歸者迂，彼寡可以擊吾之衆者，爲圍地。疾戰則存，不疾戰則亡者，爲死地。是故散地則無以戰，輕地則無止，爭地則無攻，交地則無絕，衢地則合交，重地則掠，圯地則行，圍地則謀，死地則戰。所謂古之善用兵者，能使敵人前後不相及，衆寡不相恃，貴賤不相救，上下不相扶，卒離而不集，兵合而不齊。合於利而動，不合於利而止。敢問：敵衆整而將來，待之若何？曰：先奪其所愛，則聽矣。兵之情：主速，乘人之不及，由不虞之道，攻其所不戒也。凡爲客之道：深入則專，主人不克，掠於饒野，三軍足食。謹養而勿勞，併氣積力，運兵計謀，爲不可測。投

之無所往，死且不北。死焉不得，士人盡力，兵士甚陷，則不懼。無所往則固，深入則拘，不得已則鬪。是故其兵不修而戒，不求而得，不約而親，不令而信。禁祥去疑，至死無所之。吾士無餘財，非惡貨也；無餘命，非惡壽也。令發之日，士卒坐者涕霑襟，偃臥者涕交頤。投之無所往者，諸劇之勇也。故善用兵，譬如率然。率然者，常山之蛇也。擊其首則尾至，擊其尾則首至，擊其中則首尾俱至。敢問兵可使如率然乎？曰可。夫吳人與越人相惡也。當其同舟而濟，遇風，其相救也，如左右手。是故方馬埋輪，未足恃也。齊勇若一，政之道也。剛柔皆得，地之理也。故善用兵者，攜手若使一人，不得已也。將軍之事，靜以幽，正以治，能慮士卒之耳目，使之無知。易其事，革其謀，使人無識。易其居，迂其途，使人不得慮。帥與之期，如登高而去其梯。帥與之深入諸侯之地，而發其機。焚舟破釜，若驅羣羊，而往驅而來，莫知所之。聚三軍之衆，投之於險，此謂將軍之事也。九地之變，屈伸之利，人情之理，不可不察也。凡爲客之道，深則專，淺則散。去國越境而師者，絕地也。四達者，衢地也。入深者，重地也。入淺者，輕地也。背固前隘者，圍地也。無所往者，死地也。是故散地，吾將一其志；輕地，吾將使之屬；爭地，吾將趨其後；交地，吾將謹其守；衢地，吾將固其結；重地，吾將繼其食；圯地，吾將進其塗；圍地，吾將塞其闕；死地，吾將示之以不活。故兵之情，圍則禦，不得已則鬪，過則從，是故不知諸侯之謀者，不能預交；不知山林險阻沮澤之形者，不能行軍；不用鄉導者，不能得地利。四五者不知一，非霸王之兵也。夫霸王之兵，伐大國則其衆不得聚，威加於敵則其交不得合。是故不爭天下之交，不養天下之權，信己之私，威加於敵；故其城可拔，其國可殲。施無法之賞，懸無政之

今犯三軍之衆，若使一人。犯之以事，勿告以言。犯之以利，勿告以害。投之亡地，然後存。陷之死地，然後生。夫衆陷於害，然後能爲勝敗。故爲兵之事，在於順詳敵之意。并敵一向，千里殺將，此謂巧能成事者也。是故政舉之日，夷關折符，無通其使。勵於廊廟之上，以誅其事。敵人開闔，必亟入之。先其所愛，微與之期，踐墨隨敵，以決戰事。是故始如處女，敵人開戶；後如脫兔，敵不及拒。

火攻篇第十二

孫子曰：凡火攻有五。一曰火人。二曰火積。三曰火輜。四曰火庫。五曰火隊。行火必有因，烟火必素具。發火有時，起火有日。時者，天之燥也。日者，宿在箕壁翼軫也。凡此四宿者，風起之日也。凡火攻，必因五火之變，而應之。火發於內，則早應之於外。火發而其兵靜者，待而勿攻。極其火力，可從而從之，不可從而止。火可發於外，無待於內，以時發之。火發上風，無攻下風。晝風久，夜風止。凡軍必知有五火之變，以數守之。故以火佐攻者明，以水佐攻者強。水可以絕，不可以奪。夫戰勝攻取而不修其功者，凶命曰費留。故曰明主慮之，良將修之。非利不動，非得不用，非危不戰。主不可以怒而興師，將不可以愠而致戰。合於利而動，不合於利而止。怒可以復喜，愠可以復悅。亡國不可以復存，死者不可以復生。故明君慎之，良將警之。此安國全軍之道也。

用間篇第十三

孫子曰：凡興師十萬，出兵千里，百姓之費，公家之奉，日費千金，內外騷動，怠於道路，不得操事者，七十萬家。相守數年，以爭一日之勝，而愛爵祿百金，不知敵之情者，不仁之至也。非人之將也，非主

之佐也，非勝之主也。故明君賢將，所以動而勝，成功出於衆者，先知也。先知者，不可取於鬼神，不可象於事，不可驗於度，必取於人，知敵之情者也。故用間有五。有因間，有內間，有反間，有死間，有生間。五間俱起，莫知其道，是爲神紀，人君之寶也。因間者，因其鄉人而用之。內間者，因其官人而用之。反間者，因其敵間而用之。死間者，爲誑事於外，令吾間知之而傳於敵。生間者，反報也。故三軍之親，莫親於間，賞莫厚於間，事莫密於間。非聖智不能用間，非仁義不能使間，非微妙不能得間之實。微哉微哉，無所不用間也。間事未發，而先聞者，間與所告者，皆死。凡軍之所欲擊，城之所欲攻，人之所欲殺，必先知其守將、左右、謁者、門者、舍人之姓名。令吾間必索知之。必索敵人之間，來間我者，因而利之，導而舍之。故反間可得而用也。因是而知之，故鄉間內間可得而使也。因是而知之，故死間爲誑事，可使告敵。因是而知之，故生間有使如期。五間之事，主必知之，知之必在於反間。故反間不可不厚也。昔殷之興也，伊摯在夏。周之興也，呂牙在殷。故惟明君賢將，能以上智爲間者，必成大功。此兵之要，三軍之所恃而動也。

THE ART OF WAR

When one is ingenuous he can obtain secret information about everything.

If one reports the findings of a spy before they are made public, both the informant and the spy should be put to death.

Whether one wants to attack an army, to storm a city, or to assassinate an individual, he must first possess information as regards the names of the commanding officer, the aide-de-camp, the servants and the porters. Spies must be sent to ascertain the required information.

Efforts must be made to ferret out the enemy's spies. When they are found they must be bribed and well treated so that they may become *Converted Spies* willing to work against their former masters.

Through the medium of *Converted Spies* one can recruit the services of the *Local Spies* and the *Inside Spies*. Also through the medium of *Converted Spies* one can make them denounce the *Doomed Spies* who have purposely imparted false information to the enemy. Also it is through the medium of *Converted Spies* that the *Missionary Spies* are enabled to work according to plan.

The common object of these five different kinds of espionage is to obtain information about the enemy. The surest way to obtain information about the enemy is through the *Converted Spies*. Therefore, the *Converted Spies* must be treated with utmost liberality.

Formerly, Shang Dynasty owed its rise to I Yiin who was an official in the government of Shiah Dynasty; and Jou Dynasty owed its rise to Leu Ya who was an official in the government of Shang Dynasty.

Therefore, only the enlightened sovereigns and wise generals know how to employ men of the highest intelligence to work as spies. Because of this fact they are sure of great successes. For espionage work is most important in the conduct of war, and on it depend the movements and actions of the army.

FINIS

CHAPTER XIII. ESPIONAGE

To raise an army of 100,000 men and to campaign over a distance of one thousand *lii*, it entails heavy expenses on the government and people. Each day as much as thousands of *taels* of silver may be spent. The life of every class of people is disturbed and hordes of people are driven to toil on the road. As many as 700,000 families are thus rendered impossible to pursue their ordinary occupations.

If armies are forced to fight for years for a victory which can be won in a single day simply because one is parsimonious in rewarding men to spy the enemy's conditions, he shows an extreme lack of benevolence toward his own people. Such a man cannot be a good leader of men, a useful assistant of the sovereign or an able master of victory.

What enables the wise sovereign and the good general to win victories, to achieve successes more than others, is that he possesses beforehand information regarding the enemy.

This information cannot be obtained by offering prayers to gods and spirits; nor by inductive thinking; nor by deductive calculation. It can be obtained only from men who have a thorough knowledge of the enemy's conditions.

Hence there is the need of espionage which has five different kinds:

1. The Local Spies
2. The Inside Spies
3. The Converted Spies
4. The Doomed Spies
5. The Missionary Spies

When these five kinds of espionage are employed together and when the enemy are unaware of their existence, they can work wonders and become the most valuable aid to the sovereign.

The *Local Spies* are recruited from the inhabitants of the country.

The *Inside Spies* are recruited from the discontented officials of the enemy.

The *Converted Spies* are recruited from the men whom the enemy have sent to do espionage work.

The *Doomed Spies* are those who having purposely imparted false information are denounced to the enemy by their unknown colleagues.

The *Missionary Spies* are those who are ostensibly sent on some mission but who secretly bring back useful information.

In the whole army none should be more favourably regarded than the spies; none should be more liberally rewarded than the spies; and none should work with greater secrecy than the spies.

Only the sagacious and wise can successfully use espionage. Only the benevolent and righteous can find right men to do espionage. Only with subtlety and ingenuity can one make use of the results of espionage.

THE ART OF WAR

Hence it may be said: What a wise sovereign has planned the good generals must execute.

One must not begin war unless there is some definite advantage to gain.

One must not resort to war unless there is an assurance of victory.

One must not fight unless the situation becomes so critical that there is no other alternative.

As a sovereign one must not start war on the spur of anger.

As a general one must not fight a battle out of spite.

Whether one goes to war or not should be decided by the consideration of possible gain.

For an angry man may change and become pleased; a grieved man may change and become contented. Whereas a State that is once destroyed cannot be restored; a man that is once killed cannot be resurrected.

Therefore a wise sovereign should always be most cautious about war, while a good general should always be alert in war. This is the way to secure peace for the State and safety for the army.

CHAPTER XII. INCENDIARISM

In the conduct of war incendiarism may take five different forms:

1. To burn men
2. To burn stores
3. To burn baggage trains
4. To burn arsenals
5. To burn supply routes

In order to be able to carry out incendiarism, one must have the aid of men and weather, besides the necessary materials for setting fires.

There is a proper season for attacks by incendiarism, and there are special days when it is easiest to start a conflagration.

The best season is when the weather is dry. The best days are those when there is a strong wind due to the four different positions of the moon.

To use the five forms of incendiarism one must be prepared to do the following:

As soon as the fire is started in the enemy's camps, one must at once rush to attack them from without.

When the fire fails to startle and confuse the enemy, one must not commence attacks immediately.

When the fire has already burnt out, one must exercise discretion as whether or not to pursue the enemy.

When it is found feasible to start fire from without, one need not wait for opportunity to start fire within the enemy's camps. The important thing is that it must be started when the moment is favourable.

When attacking the enemy by fire, one must not advance against the direction of the wind.

The wind that begins in the daytime will last, but one that begins in the night will soon cease.

One must know these five forms of incendiarism in warfare and be able to take appropriate measures in anticipation of them.

Those who resort to fire as an aid in attacking the enemy must possess perspicacity, while those who resort to water as an aid in attacking the enemy must possess strength.

By means of water one can cut the enemy's supply routes but cannot rob their belongings.

If after the victory is gained one fails to reward those who have rendered good services, the result will be calamitous. For thereafter no one will have the incentive to do his utmost.

THE ART OF WAR

One must neither try to contest against a combination of States nor must he allow a single State to become unduly powerful in the Empire. He tries to win the confidence of those who are willing to serve his purpose, and on the other hand to inspire awe in the minds of his enemies. Thus he is able to capture cities and overthrow States.

Because one does not make his designs known beforehand when he gives reward or orders, he is able to make the army obey like one man.

He only orders the army to do certain things but does not inform them of his plans. He only shows them the way to gain a certain objective but does not inform them of possible dangers.

When an army find themselves in a desparate situation they will struggle for survival. When they are threatened by death they will fight hard for life. For only when they are beset with dangers will they do their utmost to turn defeat into victory.

In the conduct of war one should be able to do things in anticipation of the enemy's designs.

When a whole army is able to make a concentrated effort, however distant the enemy, they can be defeated. The secret of success lies in the employment of artifice.

When war plans are decided upon after most careful deliberations, the army should be prohibited to have outside communications so that they are beyond the reach of the enemy's emissaries.

Every safeguard for secrecy must be taken when war plans are being deliberated in the ancestral temple so that they can be sure of successful execution.

When there is a chance to learn any secret about the enemy it should be speedily seized upon.

One should contrive to seize first by secret forestallment that which the enemy hold most dear.

One should not be bound by fixed rules of conduct but vary his plans according to the requirements of the enemy with the sole object of winning a decisive victory.

At the beginning one may appear as shy as a young maiden when he tries to entice the enemy to war. Afterwards he must act as fast as a fleeing hare when he wants to catch the enemy unprepared.

THE ART OF WAR

When they have penetrated deeply into the enemy's country, they should consider themselves in the *Serious Situation*.

When they have penetrated but a short way into the enemy's country, they should consider themselves in the *Facile Situation*.

When an army are placed between strong fortresses and narrow passes, they should consider themselves in the *Beleaguered Situation*.

When they find themselves cut off from all means of escape, they should consider themselves in the *Desperate Situation*.

In the *Dissentious Situation* one should inspire all the rank and file with the unity of purposes.

In the *Facile Situation* one should keep all parts of his forces in close contact.

In the *Critical Situation* one should rush up all the men that are left behind.

In the *Open Situation* one should do his best to strengthen the defense works.

In the *Commanding Situation* one should do his utmost to strengthen the ties between the allies.

In the *Serious Situation* one should try to protect the supply routes.

In the *Fearful Situation* one should try to advance as rapidly as possible.

In the *Beleaguered Situation* one should close the way of retreat.

In the *Desperate Situation* one should show his determination to risk death.

It is true of soldiers that when they are attacked they will defend; when they are hard pressed they will fight; when they are desperate they will do anything.

One must not enter into alliance with other state sovereigns before he is well acquainted with their designs.

One must not conduct war before he is familiar with the topography of the country—its mountains, passes, lakes, rivers, etc.

One cannot turn natural advantages to account unless he makes use of guides.

Failure to grasp any one of the above principles disqualifies a sovereign to attain hegemony among the States.

One who enables his State to attain hegemony must be able to do thus: When he fights against a more powerful State he can contrive to prevent the enemy from throwing their entire force upon him. When he fights against a State of equal status he can contrive to prevent the enemy from joining forces with their allies.

THE ART OF WAR

The adepts in warfare act with speed and coordination comparable to the movements of a kind of snake found in the Charng Mountain. When one hits its head he is attacked by its tail. When one hits its tail he is attacked by its head. When one hits its middle he is attacked by both head and tail.

If someone asks that whether or not an army can act with such speed and coordination, the reply is in the affirmative. For instance the people of Wu State and Yueh State have long been enemies. Suppose some of them should find themselves in the same boat caught in a storm. They will readily cooperate for the common rescue just as the left and right hands come to help each other. When not confronted by a common danger they will not trust one another even though they ostentatiously disarm themselves by tethering war horses and burying chariot wheels.

To make the army act in unison like one man it depends on the strict enforcement of discipline.

To enable the army to gain the best advantages under all circumstances it depends on the correct adaptation to terrain.

The adept in warfare can make the army obey like one man as easily and willingly as if he leads them by the hand.

It is the duty of the general to remain calm and inscrutable; to be upright and strict. He must keep the army in ignorance of his plans by presenting false appearances. He must frequently alter his methods and schemes so that no one can be sure of his intentions. He must frequently change his arrangements and routes so that no one can anticipate his movements. The hour for battle should be decided suddenly just like one unexpectedly kicking away the ladder by which he has ascended. After the army have penetrated deep into the enemy's territory he reveals his plans. When he wants to make a determined drive by burning boats and breaking up cooking pots behind them, he should act like a shepherd who forces his flock of sheep to run hither and thither without their knowing the final destination.

It is the duty of the general to lead his army to face dangers and to win victory in spite of dangers.

One must not fail to understand thoroughly the appropriate measures in dealing with the nine varieties of situations, the expediency of offensive and defensive tactics, and the various factors on account of human nature.

When fighting is on the enemy's territory the deeper the penetration the stronger is the cohesion among the invading forces. If the penetration is stopped early, dissension is likely to appear among the invading forces.

When an army are fighting within the borders of the enemy's state, they should consider themselves in the *Desperate Situation*.

When they have occupied a key position leading to neighbouring states, they should consider themselves in the *Commanding Situation*.

THE ART OF WAR

In the Desperate Situation one must fight hard.

As of old the adepts in warfare are able to prevent the enemy from affecting union, coordination, cooperation, reenforcement and rally among their fighting forces.

When the enemy's forces are scattered one should try to prevent them from coming together. After they have come together he should try to keep them in disorder.

One should make a forward move only when it is advantageous to do so. If it is disadvantageous he should remain still.

If someone asks: "What should one do when he finds a large and well organized enemy coming to invade his territory?" My reply is: "First get hold of that which the enemy prize most and they will become amenable."

In the conduct of war speed is the most important. One should move faster than the enemy, appear by unexpected routes, and attack when they are unprepared.

When fighting is done in the hostile country the following observations are true:

The farther the invading forces penetrate the more united they become and consequently the more difficult for the defenders to overcome.

If forays are properly conducted in a fertile country, there should be sufficient provisions and provender for the whole army.

If the army are properly nourished and spared of unnecessary toil, they will be able to husband their energy and execute their orders with promptitude and efficacy surprising to the enemy.

If the army are placed in a position whence there is no possible escape, they will prefer death to flight.

When the army are placed in a position whence there is no possible escape without risking death, both officers and men will be obliged to do their utmost.

When men are truly desperate, they will lose the sense of fear.

When men are conscious of the inevitable, they will be firm.

When men have penetrated deep into a hostile country, they will be stubborn.

When men are aware that they cannot stop, they will fight hard.

Under these circumstances the army become alert, willing, faithful and trustworthy though they are not under the close surveillance of the commanding officers. They will be free from superstitious fears and will not deviate from their duties even unto death. They refuse to accumulate private wealth not because they dislike wealth. They are not afraid to give up their lives not because they dislike longevity. Upon being ordered for action men may weep and cry piteously but once they find themselves in a desperate situation they will show courage equal to that of Juan Ju and Tsaur Guay.

CHAPTER XI. SITUATIONS

In the conduct of war one may find himself in nine varieties of situations:

1. The Dissentious Situation
2. The Facile Situation
3. The Critical Situation
4. The Open Situation
5. The Commanding Situation
6. The Serious Situation
7. The Fearful Situation
8. The Beleaguered Situation
9. The Desperate Situation

When the sovereign is fighting on his own territory, he is said to be in the *Dissentious Situation*.

When he has carried fighting into another's territory but has not yet penetrated far, he is said to be in the *Facile Situation*.

When he is fighting for a position which would prove advantageous for either side to gain, he is said to be in the *Critical Situation*.

When he is fighting on ground which is equally accessible to both combatants, he is said to be in the *Open Situation*.

When he is fighting in a country which forms a key position to several states and which leads to the mastery of the whole Empire, he is said to be in the *Commanding Situation*.

When he has carried fighting into the heart of a hostile country and left in his rear many fortified cities, he is said to be in the *Serious Situation*.

When he is fighting in mountain forests, dangerous passes, marshy lands or other difficult countries, he is said to be in the *Fearful Situation*.

When he is fighting in a country which is accessible by only narrow and tortuous paths and which can be easily guarded by a very small force, he is said to be in the *Beleaguered Situation*.

When he has reached the stage that his only chance of survival lies in speedy and hard fighting, he is said to be in the *Desperate Situation*.

In the *Dissentious Situation* one must not commence fighting.

In the *Facile Situation* one must not stop advancing.

In the *Critical Situation* one must not lay siege.

In the *Open Situation* one must not try blockade.

In the *Commanding Situation* one must use diplomacy.

In the *Serious Situation* one must forage on the enemy.

In the *Fearful Situation* one must leave with speed.

In the *Beleaguered Situation* one must use stratagem.

THE ART OF WAR

When resentful officers refuse to obey orders and without the consent of their superiors challenge the enemy, it spells *Ruin*.

When the general is weak and slack, when instructions are not clear, when the duties of officers and men are not distinct, when everything is done in a slovenly manner, it spells *Disorganization*.

When the general fails to know the enemy, uses a small force against a large force, matches weakness against strength, possesses no picked vanguards, it spells *Rout*.

The above principles regarding the causes of defeat and the supreme duties of the responsible generals should be clearly understood.

The advantageous type of terrain can help one to win successes in warfare. But the test of superior generalship lies in the ability to estimate and control the forces of the enemy, to calculate the difficulties and dangers that lead to victory.

He who makes a correct application of these principles in war is sure to win. He who makes not a correct application of these principles in war is sure to lose.

The general should fight when he is sure of victory even though the sovereign orders him not to fight.

The general should not fight when he is sure of defeat even though the sovereign orders him to fight.

Not because he wants to court fame when he orders an advance, not because he fears personal disgrace when he orders a retreat, but always acting for the welfare of his people and for the advantage of his sovereign—the general who conducts war in this fashion is the jewel of the State.

When the general takes care of his men like infants they will be willing to follow him even in the midst of dangers.

When the general treats his men like his own beloved children they will be willing to support him even unto death.

When the general is over-indulgent and does not know how to exercise his authority; when the general is over-solicitous and does not know how to command obedience—under these conditions his men will be like a bunch of spoilt children who are bent on disorder and unamenable to discipline. They will not prove themselves useful.

When the general knows the strength of his own army but knows not the strength of the enemy, he can have only half the chances of achieving success.

When the general correctly estimates the strength both of the enemy and his own but knows not the disadvantages due to unfavourable terrain, he can have only half the chances of achieving success.

The adepts in warfare once embarked on action never feel at loss to deal with any situation.

It may be said: When one has a thorough knowledge of both the enemy and oneself, victory can be assured. When one has a thorough knowledge of both earth and heaven, victory can be complete.

CHAPTER X. TERRAIN

As regards terrain there are the following types:

1. The Accessible Terrain
2. The Intricate Terrain
3. The Indifferent Terrain
4. The Compressed Terrain
5. The Precipitous Terrain
6. The Distended Terrain

The *Accessible Terrain* is that which affords free and easy access to both combatants. On this type of terrain he who first occupies the high sunny mounds and guards the supply route has greater advantage.

The *Intricate Terrain* is that which makes the exit easier than the re-entry. On this type of terrain the enemy can be defeated when they are caught unprepared. If the enemy are well prepared and if they are not overcome on the first attempt, it will be difficult and perhaps disastrous to make a re-entry.

The *Indifferent Terrain* is that which makes it disadvantageous for either combatant who makes the first move. On this type of terrain one should refuse to be drawn out by any allurements but should feign a retreat and attack the enemy when they have left their position. In this way he may win.

On the *Compressed Terrain* one should try to be the first in occupying the narrow passes and having them strongly guarded to wait for the approach of the enemy. In case the enemy first occupy the narrow passes then whether one should attack them or not depends whether or not they are strongly guarded.

On the *Precipitous Terrain* one should try to be the first in occupying the sunny side of the precipitous heights to wait for the approach of the enemy. In case the enemy first occupy the precipitous heights he should not pursue but try to allure them to leave their position.

On the *Distended Terrain* the chances of the two combatants are even. It is both difficult and disadvantageous for either party to throw a challenge.

The above principles regarding the six types of terrain and the supreme duties of the responsible generals should be clearly understood.

An army may suffer from: Flight, Insubordination, Collapse, Ruin, Disorganization and Rout. These six calamities are not due to natural causes but to the fault of the generals.

When other conditions being equal the enemy are able to use a concentrated force against a divided force, it spells *Flight*.

‡ When men are strong and officers weak, it spells *Insubordination*.

When men are weak and officers strong, it spells *Collapse*.

THE ART OF WAR

When banners and flags are seen shifting about, it indicates the presence of seditious movement.

When the officers easily get angry with their men, it indicates that they are weary of war.

When horses are fed with grain and men are feasted with meat, when cooking pots are broken up and men do not intend to return to their quarters, it indicates that they are determined to pursue the enemy to the utmost limit.

When men are seen whispering and murmuring, it indicates a general dissatisfaction among the rank and file.

When the commanding officer is obliged to use frequent rewards, it indicates that the army are near the end of resources.

When the commanding officer is obliged to use frequent punishments, it indicates that the army are in dire distress.

When the commanding officer has to play first the rôle of a bully and then that of a coward toward his men, it indicates an extreme lack of order and discipline.

When the enemy send envoys with lavish compliments, it indicates that they desire peace.

When the enemy appear to be greatly provoked but remain still for a long time without either joining battle or going away, it indicates the need of extreme caution and vigilance.

The strength of an army does not lie in mere numbers. Their advance does not depend on mere valour. If one can concentrate all available forces and anticipate correctly he can surely vanquish the enemy.

He who fails to plan ahead and at the same time underestimates the enemy is bound to suffer defeat.

When men are punished before they have had a chance to feel the affectionate regard of their superior, they will not obey with heart and soul and they cannot be trusted. On the other hand men who know the affectionate regard of their superior and yet refuse to accept discipline cannot be trusted either.

When an army prove amenable to civil treatment as well as military discipline, they will surely become invincible.

When discipline is regularly enforced on all rank and file, they will obey with heart and soul.

When discipline is not regularly enforced on all rank and file, they will not obey with heart and soul.

When one has long commanded the obedience and confidence of men, he can make them do anything for the common good.

THE ART OF WAR

When the enemy occupy a position seemingly easy of access, it indicates that they are holding out a bait.

When there is motion in a forest, it indicates that the enemy are approaching.

When the thick grass are bestrown with obstacles, it indicates that the enemy intend to mislead.

When birds are seen suddenly arise in flight, it indicates that the enemy are lying in ambush.

When beasts are seen startled out of their haunts, it indicates that the enemy are staging a sudden attack.

When clouds of dust rise in high columns, it indicates the approach of chariots.

When clouds of dust rise in low columns over a large area, it indicates the approach of infantry.

When clouds of dust are scattered in different directions, it indicates that the enemy are collecting firewood.

When clouds of dust are few and moving about, it indicates that the enemy are encamping.

When the speech of the enemy's messengers is humble and at the same time increasing preparations are being made, it indicates that they are about to advance.

When the speech of the enemy's messengers is arrogant and at the same time their movements appear hasty, it indicates that they are about to retreat.

When light chariots are seen advancing along the flanks, it indicates that the enemy have already completed formation for battle array.

When without warning of distress the enemy suddenly sue for peace, it indicates a plot.

When there is a good deal of unusual bustle and hustle in the enemy's camps, it indicates that the time for their action has arrived.

When the enemy appear to be advancing and retreating halfheartedly, it indicates a ruse to allure.

When men are seen leaning upon their weapons, it indicates a scarcity of food supply.

When water-carriers scramble to quench thirst, it indicates a scarcity of water supply.

When the enemy refuse to seize some sure advantage, it indicates that they are weary.

When flocks of birds are seen frequently, it indicates that the place is deserted by men.

When men are heard crying during the night, it indicates that they are suffering from fear.

When there is frequent commotion among the rank and file, it indicates the absence of strong authority.

CHAPTER IX. MOBILIZATION

In the following we deal with the question of encamping the army and the question of making observations of the enemy:

One should avoid mountains but keep to the valleys; encamp on highlands but not fight uphill. This much concerns with mountain warfare.

After crossing a river one should take up a position at some distance from it. While the enemy's boats are coming toward him he should not try to intercept them in mid-stream. It is advantageous to attack them when they are about to land. When he is anxious to engage the enemy in battle he must not be seen to wait for them by the river. He should encamp on highlands but not fight upstream. This much concerns with river warfare.

When crossing marshes one should travel as fast as possible without the least delay. If he is forced to fight in a marsh he must stay where there are reeds with his back against a clump of trees. This much concerns with marshy land warfare.

In the open country one should encamp on highlands with the right and back well protected by some height so that only the front is open to attacks and the rear is covered for safe retreat. This much concerns with open country warfare.

Because Hwang Emperor was well versed in these four kinds of warfare he was able to vanquish other feudal lords.

All armies prefer high grounds to low grounds, sunny places to shady places. If one takes good care of the daily food and living quarters of the army, they can be free from diseases and are sure to win.

When it is necessary to encamp on hills or mounds one should always try to occupy the sunny side with the back toward them. This shows how an army are profited by natural advantages.

When it is necessary to ford a stream during a torrential rainfall one must wait till the water begins to subside.

When one comes to a country where there are precipitous cliffs, deep caverns, inaccessible recesses, tangled thickets, treacherous quagmires or dangerous crevasses he must depart as fast as possible without approaching them. He should keep away from such a country but try to drive the enemy towards it. He should stand facing them and let them be in the rear of the enemy.

When an army find themselves in the neighbourhood of dangerous passes, ponds filled with reeds or woods full of thick undergrowth, a most careful and thorough search is necessary. For these places may be the hideouts for the enemy.

When the enemy are approached and they appear undisturbed, it indicates that they are confident of protection.

When the enemy come out a long way to challenge, it indicates that they are anxious for the other party to approach.

CHAPTER VIII. VARIATIONS

In the conduct of war the general, upon receipt of orders from his sovereign, proceeds to collect and organize an army.

One must not quarter the army in lowlands.

One must use diplomacy in a country where inter-state highways intersect.

One must not stay in an isolated country.

One must resort to stratagem when in a hemmed-in country.

One must fight his way out when in a dangerous country.

There are roads which one must not follow.

There are forces which one must not attack.

There are cities which one must not besiege.

There are positions which one must not contest.

There are commands of the sovereign which one must not obey.

The general who understands the advantages of varying tactics also knows the art of war.

The general who understands not the advantages of varying tactics cannot turn natural advantages to account, though he may be well acquainted with the topography of the country.

The general who knows not the art of varying tactics cannot make the best use of his men, though he may be well acquainted with the advantages of varying tactics.

In the deliberations of the wise both favourable and unfavourable factors are taken into account. On the basis of the favourable factors he plans how to pursue his objective, and on the basis of the unfavourable factors he plans how to extricate himself from difficulties.

One can cower the other state sovereigns by infliction of damages; weary them by creation of troubles; and allure them by temptation of gain.

In the conduct of war one must not count upon the enemy's failure to come but calculate how to meet them successfully; he must not rely on the enemy's failure to attack but consider how to make his position unassailable.

A general may be afflicted in five different ways:

When he is reckless it is easy to kill him.

When he is afraid of death it is easy to capture him.

When he is choleric it is easy to provoke him.

When he is sensitive of honour it is easy to insult him.

When he is over-solicitous of his men it is easy to harass him.

These are five common weaknesses which afflict a general and which often prove calamitous in the conduct of war. When an army suffers a crushing defeat or when a general loses his life, it is usually on account of these five weaknesses. They must be clearly understood.

THE ART OF WAR

When mopping up the countryside the army should be spread out in all directions. When occupying the country the army should be distributed to hold vantage grounds.

One must deliberate and balance all possibilities before he makes a move. One must first learn the art of deviation before he can hope to win. This is an important point in military maneuvers.

In an ancient record on the subject of military affairs it is said: "When words cannot be heard the signals of gongs and drums are used. When eyes cannot see things afar the signals of banners and flags are used."

The signals of gongs, drums, banners and flags are intended to focus the attention of men. When men act as a united whole neither the brave will advance alone nor the coward will retreat alone. That is the way to make a large body of men to act together.

During the night fighting is mostly directed by the signals of fires and drums. During the day fighting is mostly directed by the signals of banners and flags. By means of these signals the attention of men is varyingly directed.

A whole army may become demoralized just as a general may become disheartened.

In the early stage men's spirits are most fiery. Later they tend to flag. Toward the end they may peter out. Hence the adept in warfare tries to avoid the enemy when their spirits are most fiery, and attack them when their spirits are flagging or petering out. This is the way to deal with the spirits of men.

One must match order with the enemy's disorder, quiet with the enemy's disquiet. This is the way to deal with the state of mind.

One must match propinquity with the enemy's distance, ease with the enemy's toil, and plenty with the enemy's famine. This is the way to deal with the physical conditions.

One must not try to intercept the enemy when their banners indicate perfect orderliness. One must not try to pursue the enemy when their movements indicate perfect array. This is the way to deal with the varying circumstances.

In the conduct of war one must not advance uphill toward the enemy, nor must he confront them with his back against a mountain. One must not pursue when the enemy simulate flight. One must not challenge the enemy at the time when their spirits are most fiery. One must not be tempted by baits held out by the enemy. One must not try to stop the enemy when they are bent on returning home. One must provide the enemy with one free outlet when laying a siege. One must not press a defeated enemy so hard that they become desperate.

The above are points concerning the conduct of war.

CHAPTER VII. MANEUVERS

In the conduct of war the general, upon receipt of orders from his sovereign, proceeds to collect and organize an army. He sees to it that harmony reigns among all rank and file, and that order prevails in all quarters.

There is nothing more baffling than the matter of maneuvering. It is baffling because what is most direct often appears devious, and what is advantageous often appears harmful.

To force the enemy to take a circuitous route in order to reach some tempting bait held out to them one is able to arrive at the destination early though he may have started out late. This shows that he knows how to deviate the enemy.

It is always advantageous to outwit the enemy by clever maneuvers. It is always dangerous to pit against the full fighting force of the enemy.

An army carrying all the equipment may not march fast enough. An army leaving the equipment behind stand the danger of losing the stores of supplies.

Consequently when one orders his army to leave behind the equipment and forces them to march in great haste day following night over one hundred *lii* distance in order to fight for some advantageous position, he is most likely to suffer an ignominious defeat and lose all three commanders. Because only the strongest can arrive on time leaving the weary to lag behind and not more than one out of ten will be present.

When the forced march covers only fifty *lii* in order to fight for some advantageous position, the commander of the vanguards is most likely to suffer defeat and not more than half of the men will be present.

When the forced march covers only thirty *lii* in order to fight for some advantageous position, it is mostly likely that not more than two-thirds of the men will be present.

An army that has lost its baggage must perish. An army that has lost its provisions must perish. An army that has lost its bases of supply must perish.

A state sovereign must not enter into alliance with other state sovereigns before he is well acquainted with their designs.

One must not conduct war before he is familiar with the topography of the country—its mountains, forests, passes, lakes, rivers, *etc.*

One cannot turn natural advantages to account unless he can make use of guides.

War is based on deception and started by the desire for gain. Its tactics lie in the variation of concentration and division of forces.

One must be able to move as fast as winds or to stand as still as forest; to be as destructive as fire or to be as immobile as mountains; to be as impenetrable as darkness or to be as active as thunderbolts.

THE ART OF WAR

The place where one wants to attack must not be divulged. Because it is a secret the enemy are obliged to put up defense at many places. Because they are obliged to put up defense at many places, their forces are scattered and their resistance at any one point is bound to be weak. For if they concentrate defense in the front it will be weak in the rear. If they concentrate defense in the rear it will be weak in the front. If they concentrate defense on the right it will be weak on the left. If they concentrate defense on the left it will be weak on the right. If they spread their forces over all points then the defense will be weak at all points.

If one is on the defensive all the time he finds his forces insufficient. If one is on the offensive he finds his forces sufficient all the time.

If one can anticipate the place and time of a coming battle he can gather his forces together even though they are situated thousands of *lii* apart.

If one cannot anticipate the place and time of a coming battle he cannot make his forces help one another even though they are all close around him—not to say those who are many *lii* away.

Accordingly, when one fails to anticipate correctly even with a very large force he cannot be sure of victory. It may be said that victory depends on correct anticipation.

Though the enemy possess a large army they may be rendered powerless. By scheming one can ascertain their plans and plots; by provocation one can ascertain their mood and movement; by tactics one can ascertain their strength and weakness; and by contact one can ascertain the differences between the two opposing forces.

Those who can employ tactics with consummate skill are able to conceal their plans. Because of this even the ablest spies cannot detect anything, and even the most clever men cannot formulate counter plans.

To vanquish a superior force by clever tactics is something beyond the understanding of the multitude. They can see the execution of a victory but they cannot comprehend the tactics from which a victory is evolved.

The tactics by which a victory is obtained should not be repeated in the ensuing battles but should be varied indefinitely according to the variety of circumstances.

The guiding principle in military tactics may be compared to that of water. Just as water tends to flow from a high level toward a lower level, the army should direct attacks on weakness and avoid strength. Just as water adapts itself to the shape of the ground, the army should work out plans for victory according to the condition of the enemy. Just as water has no fixed form warfare has no fixed rules.

Those who are able to vary military tactics to win victories according to the requirements of the enemy may be compared to gods. They are as versatile as the five elements, the four seasons, the sun and moon which change and alternate without end.

CHAPTER VI. OPPORTUNISM

Those who reach the battle-field early have time to rest up and wait for the enemy. Those who reach the battle-field late have to rush into action when they are already weary or exhausted.

The adept in warfare always forces the enemy to traverse distances and dangers in order to meet him, while he waits for them at ease.

By holding out baits one can make the enemy go to places where he wants them to go. By inflicting damages he can prevent the enemy from reaching places where they want to reach.

When the enemy want to rest one must try to weary them. When the enemy have plenty of food one must try to starve them. When the enemy intend to settle down one must try to force them to move on.

One should attack where the enemy are expected to appear, and appear where they do not expect attacks.

If an army can traverse thousands of *li* without feeling weary it must be due to the absence of opposition.

An offense can have sure success when it is directed against places where the defense is weak. A defense can have sure success only when it is held in places which are invulnerable to attacks.

The adept in offensive warfare makes the enemy feel at loss as to where to put up defense.

The adept in defensive warfare makes the enemy feel at loss as to where to direct attacks.

The whole thing appears so subtle, so uncertain, so mystical, so intangible! On this account he is able to hold the destiny of the enemy in his hands!

When attacks are directed against the enemy's weak points the advance becomes irresistible.

When an army can travel faster than the enemy it can retreat without danger of pursuit.

If one wants to engage the enemy in battle and if the enemy seek refuge behind inaccessible shelters, he can draw them out by attacking some place which they will be obliged to rescue.

If one considers it advantageous not to engage the enemy in battle but wishes to hold fast to his position, he can mislead them by unexpected sorties.

If one is certain about the enemy's battle formations and keeps them ignorant of his own, he can have his forces concentrated and the enemy's divided.

When one's forces remain united while the enemy's are split up into numerous sections, he can always pit his whole against the enemy's part. As he can always use many against few the enemy find themselves in difficulties

THE ART OF WAR

He who knows how to weary the enemy keeps them chasing about by deceitful appearances. He would purposely give away something which the enemy are eager to accept. He would make them leave their position by holding out baits so that his men could ambush them.

The adept in warfare always seeks victory from an opportune situation, and relies little on the efforts of the individuals. He chooses men to fit the situation. In this his action is comparable to moving logs and stones. It is the nature of logs and stones that when they are placed on a secure base they tend to remain firm; when they are placed on an insecure base they tend to shift about; when they are cornered they tend to stand still; and when they are round they tend to roll about.

The adept in warfare is able to push his army in a manner comparable to the onrush of round stones rolling down from a mountain slope of thousands of feet high—due to momentum.

CHAPTER V. FORMATION

The management of a large force is the same as the management of a small force. It is only a matter of organization.

Whether one fights against a large force or a small force the guiding principle is the same. It is a matter of using arrays and signals.

In order to ensure the success of meeting the attacks of the enemy, the fighting forces should be judiciously divided into regulars and reservists.

When one delivers attacks on the enemy the impact should be forcible like a grindstone crushing eggs. In order to be able to do thus he must ascertain the strength and weakness of the enemy.

In every battle the regulars should be used at the commencement of fighting but only a judicious use of the reservists can ensure victory.

The adept in marshaling the reservists is as resourceful as heaven, earth and rivers; as versatile as sun and moon; and as perennial as the four seasons.

There are not more than five musical notes yet combinations of these notes produce an endless number of melodies.

There are not more than five colours yet combinations of these colours produce an endless number of beautiful objects.

There are not more than five flavours yet combinations of these flavours produce an endless number of palatable food.

Similarly in delivering attacks one's choice is confined to using either the regulars or the reservists, yet the variation is endless. One may lead to the other like moving in a circle and never reaching the end. Indeed who can know all possible variations?

It is the sudden push that enables rushing torrents to move stones. It is the correct timing that enables flying falcons to pounce upon preys.

Similarly the adept in warfare attacks with terrific speed and perfect timing. His readiness to stage a push is like a taut bow and his timing is like releasing a trigger.

The movements of the troops may have the appearance of confusion and disorder but in reality everything is done according to rule and order.

To be able to simulate disorder one must possess discipline. To be able to simulate fear one must possess courage. To be able to simulate weakness one must possess strength.

Order or disorder depends on organization. Courage or fear depends on the manner an advance is being pushed. Strength or weakness depends on appearance.

THE ART OF WAR

The science of war may be summarized under these headings:

1. Measurement of distances
2. Estimation of costs
3. Calculation of forces
4. Balancing of possibilities
5. Planning for victory

As regards the geographical distances we use measurement. On the measurement of distances we make an estimation of expenses. On the estimation of expenses we make a calculation of forces. On the calculation of forces we balance the possibilities of success and failure. On the possibilities of success and failure we make plans for victory.

An army confident of victory easily outmatch an army of defeatists just as a weight of 20 *taels* easily outbalances a weight of $1/24$ *tael*. The onrush of an army confident of victory may be compared to floods of water rushing into a chasm of thousands of fathoms deep—due to the difference in elevation.

CHAPTER IV. TACTICS

In ancient times the adepts in warfare would first place themselves in an invulnerable position before they would wait to seize some favourable opportunity to defeat the enemy.

To secure oneself against defeat depends on one's own efforts, while the opportunity of victory must be afforded by the enemy.

Thus even the adepts in warfare can only prepare themselves secure against defeat but they cannot be sure of opportunities for victory, which must be provided by the enemy.

Therefore it may be said: One may know victory but no one can create victory.

To secure oneself against defeat means defensive tactics. To fight for victory means offensive tactics.

When one has an inferior force it is best to adopt defensive tactics. When one has a superior force it is best to adopt offensive tactics.

An adept in defensive tactics is able to place his forces in the most inaccessible place of safety. An adept in offensive tactics is able to marshal his forces on all vantage grounds. Therefore, one is able to preserve his forces intact, while the other is able to win a complete victory.

To be able to win a victory that is within the calculations of everybody does not deserve the highest praises.

To be able to conquer the whole Empire because of the skill in killing does not deserve the highest praises.

To be able to lift a thin hair does not indicate unusual strength. To be able to see the sun and moon does not indicate sharp vision. To be able to hear thunderings does not indicate sensitive audition.

By the standard of the ancients the adepts in warfare are those who not only can win but also can win with ease and in the way unexpected by most men.

Therefore, in the case of the adepts in warfare victories often fail to bring them praises for either wisdom or courage. They are able to win without exception because they would make victory certain before they commence action.

The adept in warfare is one who places himself in an invulnerable position and does not miss a favourable opportunity to defeat the enemy.

The winner is one who always makes sure of success before he challenges the enemy. The loser is one who always challenges the enemy before he makes sure of success.

The adept in warfare sees to it that he first has a good moral cause and a strict military discipline at the same time. Because of this he can always be sure of victory.

THE ART OF WAR

He applies the same methods in dealing with military affairs as with civil affairs. This causes disorder in the army.

He appoints men who are ignorant of military science to responsible military posts. This causes lack of faith in the minds of officers and men.

When the army are beset with disorder and lack of faith the other state sovereigns are sure to take advantage and cause troubles. By bringing disorder into the army it is tantamount to inviting defeat by the enemy.

There are five ways by which one can win victories:

He who knows when to fight and when not to fight will win.

He who knows how to match a large force with a small force will win.

He who has the whole-hearted support of all rank and file will win.

He who is well prepared to seize favourable opportunities will win.

He who possesses generalship and at the same time is free from interference by his sovereign will win.

These are five roads to sure victory.

Therefore it may be said: He who has a thorough knowledge of his own conditions as well as the conditions of the enemy is sure to win in all battles. He who has a thorough knowledge of his own conditions but not the conditions of the enemy has an even chance of winning and losing a battle. He who has neither a thorough knowledge of his own conditions nor of the enemy's is sure to lose in every battle.

CHAPTER III. STRATEGY

In the conduct of war it is preferable to subdue a State whole and intact than to destroy it; to subdue an army whole and intact than to destroy it; to subdue a division whole and intact than to destroy it; to subdue a company whole and intact than to destroy it; to subdue a squad whole and intact than to destroy it.

To win every battle by actual fighting before a war is won, it is not the most desirable. To conquer the enemy without resorting to war is the most desirable.

The highest form of generalship is to conquer the enemy by strategy. The next highest form of generalship is to conquer the enemy by alliance. The still next highest form of generalship is to conquer the enemy by battles. The worst form of generalship is to conquer the enemy by besieging walled cities.

The besieging of walled cities should be avoided whenever it is possible. For it requires no less than three months to complete preparations in collecting the necessary weapons, and another three months in building up mounds before the walls can be scaled. During this time the commander may become impatient of waiting and recklessly launch attacks. In so doing he may lose as many as one man out of every three without reducing the city to submission. Such are the disastrous results of laying siege to a walled city.

Therefore the adepts in warfare are those who can conquer the enemy without fighting battles, capture cities without laying siege to them, and annex States without prolonged warfare. They can preserve their own forces whole and intact while struggling for the mastery of the entire Empire. They can win a complete victory without as much as wearying their men. All this is due to the use of strategy.

In the conduct of war when the enemy are out-numbered by ten to one the best thing is to surround them; five to one the best thing is to attack them; two to one the best thing is to divide them.

When the two forces are evenly matched the best thing is to take the offensive; when the enemy's forces are larger and superior to a small extent only, the best thing is to prepare for defense; when the enemy's forces are larger and superior to a great extent, the best thing is to dodge their attacks. For however obstinately a small force may fight, it must in the end succumb to a larger and superior force.

The generals are the guardians of the State. If they are proficient in the art of war their State is sure to be strong; if they are deficient in the art of war their State is sure to be weak.

A state sovereign may bring disasters upon the army in three different ways:

He orders the army to advance or to retreat when they should not do so. This means interference in military command.

THE ART OF WAR

In chariot fighting those who have captured the first ten chariots or more should be rewarded. After changing colours the captured chariots should be incorporated into service, while kind treatment should be accorded to the captives. This is the way to increase one's own strength by appropriating the resources of the vanquished.

Therefore in war one should aim at swift victory and avoid prolonged campaign.

The adepts in warfare hold in their hands the destiny of the people and the security of the State.

CHAPTER II. PLANNING

In the actual conduct of war there may be in the field as many as thousands of chariots and carriages, tens of thousands of armed men. Provisions may have to be carried over distances of thousands of *lii*. The military expenses for an army of 100,000 men—direct and indirect, guests' entertainment fees, costs of equipments and supplies—may amount as much as thousands of *taels* of silver per day.

When victory is long delayed the ardour and morale of the army tends to become dampened. When the siege on a city is prolonged the fighting strength tends to become exhausted. When the campaign is protracted the state treasury tends to become impoverished.

When the army's ardour and morale is dampened, when the fighting strength is exhausted, and when the state treasury is impoverished, it will be an opportunity for other state sovereigns to take advantage. Under such weakened conditions even the most resourceful men will not be able to make amends.

Thus the stupid may sometimes score quick success but even the most clever must fail in a protracted warfare. There has never been a case where a prolonged warfare proved beneficial to any State.

Therefore those who are not fully aware of the dangers of war cannot know the most profitable way of waging wars.

The adepts in warfare see to it that the army will need no second conscription and that the provisions will not need replenishment more than twice. The necessary armament are brought from home and the army are made to live by foraging on the enemy. In this way there will always be sufficient food supply for the army.

When military provisions have to be transported over long distances it tends to impoverish the state treasury as well as the whole people.

When military operations are close by the prices of things tend to soar, and high prices tend to deplete the stores of the people.

In proportion as the wealth of the country becomes depleted, levies and taxes tend to become heavier.

This depletion of wealth and resources may amount on the part of the people as much as seven-tenths of their total possessions. On the part of the State the expenses for such items as chariots, horses, armaments, *etc.* may amount to as much as six-tenths of its total revenues.

Therefore the wise general makes it possible for the army to forage on the enemy. One measure of provision or provender seized from the enemy is worth twenty times his own.

That which drives men to kill the enemy is provocation, and that which makes conquest of the enemy profitable is loot.

THE ART OF WAR

The generals who fail to deliberate in this fashion will surely suffer defeats and they must be dismissed from service.

One should follow that which is most profitable. He should also be prepared to deal with all emergencies and to modify plans to suit the requirements of changing circumstances with the object of obtaining the best results.

War is primarily a game of deception.

When one is capable he must feign incapable. When one is active he must feign inactive. When one is near his objective he must feign that he is far away. When one is far from his objective he must feign that he is near.

When the enemy are fond of small gains one should entice them by baits. When they are thrown into disorder one can crush them with ease.

When the enemy are strong one must be most careful in making preparations. He should avoid strength and attack weakness.

When the enemy are in a fit of anger one should do his utmost to provoke them. He must feign weakness to make them grow arrogant.

When the enemy are eager for action one should try to weary them by resting at ease.

When the enemy are united one should try to cause internal dissension.

One should attack the enemy where they are least prepared and when he is least expected.

All these considerations are essential to military success and they should be on no account divulged to the enemy.

The general who is able to make careful deliberations beforehand can win victory. He who is unable to make careful deliberations must suffer defeat. Careful planning will lead to victory. Careless planning will lead to defeat. How much more certain is defeat when there is no planning at all! From the way how a war is planned beforehand we can forecast victory or defeat.

CHAPTER I. DELIBERATION

War is a matter of vital importance to the State. It concerns with the life and death, and on it hinges the rise and fall of a State. Therefore it must need most careful study.

In considering the conduct of war the deliberation and comparison should be based on five principles which are as follows:

1. The Moral Cause
2. The Climatic Conditions
3. The Terrestrial Conditions
4. The Generalship of Commanders
5. The Organization and Discipline

The *Moral Cause* is that which enables the whole people to be in perfect accord with the leader, for which they are willing to give up their lives, and because of which they loyally follow him through thick and thin.

The *Climatic Conditions* concern with the weather, seasons and times—favourable or unfavourable.

The *Terrestrial Conditions* concern with the distance and nature of the terrain—long or short, advantageous or disadvantageous, safe or dangerous.

The *Generalship of Commanders* signifies wisdom, faith, compassion, courage and rigour.

The *Organization and Discipline* signifies the order and skill of management of men and affairs so that everything can be employed to the best advantage.

These five principles should be thoroughly understood by every general. He who knows them well can win victories; he who knows them not must suffer defeats.

Therefore when considering the means and conditions of war the deliberations must be conducted in this wise:

Between the two sovereigns who has a better moral cause?

Between the two commanders who has better generalship?

Which side has the advantages of climate and terrain?

Which side has better order and discipline?

Which side has a superior army?

Which side has better trained officers and men?

Which side has a better system of rewards and punishments?

On the basis of the answers to these queries we can forecast the outcome of war—victory or defeat.

The generals who can deliberate in this fashion will surely win victories and efforts must be made to retain their services.

In the original text each chapter opens with the words "Suen Tzyy said". This is the Chinese style common to the ancient classics. These words are omitted in the English translation. With the exception of this omission the present book is a complete translation of the Chinese text.

In conclusion the translator here wishes to express sincere gratitude to Prof. Yang Chialo, Head of the World Encyclopedia Institute, China Section for his scholarly essay on the history of *The Art of War* and for his painstaking effort in checking the Chinese text with several other versions. Prof. Yang's essay and the original Chinese text are both appended at the end of this book.

CHENG LIN

Little is known about the life of Suen Wu. He is said to be a native of Chyi State who for some reason or other chose to live in Wu State. The present book is said to have been especially written for the benefit of King Herlu of Wu State.

In this connection there is a story to the effect that after reading *The Art of War* the future royal patron asked its author whether or not the military discipline was applicable to women.

Thereupon Suen Wu consented to give a practical demonstration. Out of the King's palace women he picked 180 and divided them into two groups each being captained by the King's most favourite concubine. They were armed and drilled like common soldiers. After making sure that they had clearly understood his instructions he ordered them for a parade. Upon hearing his first command these women laughed hilariously and forgot to act. He told them that it was the duty of the highest commanding officer to give clear instructions just as it was the duty of the rank and file to obey orders. Failure to do either should entail dire punishment. Then he again called them to attention and repeated his command. They however laughed hilariously like the first time. Thereupon he ordered the two captains to be executed notwithstanding the entreaties of the King on behalf of the favourite concubines. After these executions the two groups of palace women acted like perfectly drilled soldiers and elicited great admiration from the King and other spectators.

Suen Wu's ability as an organizer and disciplinarian was amply proved in actual warfare after he became a general of Wu State. He was the hero of many most astonishing military exploits. Once with only 30,000 men he delivered a crushing defeat on Chuu's 200,000 men.

Suen Binn who is said to be a direct descendant of Suen Wu was also a great general and a skilful tactician of the first order.

Books on military science were not favourably regarded in China after Confucianism and Pacificism had become the national orthodoxy. They were either destroyed or jealously kept as family secret treasures. On this account few have been known and preserved by posterity.

The Art of War was first made famous by Emperor Wu of Wey Dynasty who was himself a great statesman-general well versed in the arts of peace and war. He was its first editor and commentator. Since his time there have been many other annotated editions.

This book was first translated into French in 1772 by a Jesuit missionary J. J. M. Amiot whose *Art Militaire des Chinois* also contains translations of two other military treatises known as *Sy-Maa-Faa* and *Wu-Tzyy*. It was rendered into English by Lionel Giles whose *Sun Tzu on the Art of War* first appeared in 1910 and was published by Luzac Company of London.

The present English translation is based on the standard edition with annotations and commentaries by ten different scholars including Emperor Wu and edited by Suen Shingyeen (1753-1818 A.D.). This edition is known as *Suen-Tzyy-Shyr-Jia-Juh* in six volumes.

INTRODUCTION

The Art of War is the oldest military classic in the whole corpus of Chinese literature. Though bibliographies list four or five similar books which claim greater antiquity, yet only their titles exist and today they are remembered by a few extracts quoted here and there in the writings of men who lived many centuries afterwards.

If not in point of antiquity it certainly has no equal in point of importance. This small manual has been exercising tremendous influence on the Chinese military science. No book of similar nature has been so highly esteemed and so popularly read. From the Emperor down to the common military student it has been the most important guide for the conduct of war.

The authorship of this famous military classic has been traditionally ascribed to Suen Wuu. This ascription however has been questioned by several scholars who opined that judging by internal evidence its author or authors could not be men who had lived before the Age of Warring States (B.C. 476-221).

In the opinion of another group of commentators it is maintained that the author was no other than Suen Binn (Cir.B.C. 380-320) who was a direct descendant of Suen Wuu.

Still another group of commentators propound the theory that Emperor Wuu of Wey Dynasty *alias* Tsaur Tsau (155-220 A.D.) had compiled the present book from the voluminous writings by either Suen Wuu or Suen Binn.

However, there is no conclusive evidence to support any one of these theories. The first half millennium preceding the downfall of Jou Dynasty was marked by frequent and intensive warfare. War was such a stark reality that it must have engrossed the attention of many thinking men. Judging from the large amount of literature relating to other subjects we can be sure that this period had also produced much in the field of military science. Unfortunately through the course of ages they were either destroyed or lost together with many other books and only *The Art of War* has been preserved.

It is not unlikely that the book in its present form is but a composite work compiled by man or men out of many military treatises current during the first half millennium B.C. As it was a very common practice regarding literary works of the same period, Suen Wuu may be merely a famous general who was chosen to father this compilation.

The Romanization of proper names
in the whole *Series* of Ancient
Chinese Classics is based on the
system adopted and promulgated by
the Chinese Ministry of Education.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

- I. INTRODUCTION BY TRANSLATOR
- II. *THE ART OF WAR*
- III. THE ORIGINAL CHINESE TEXT
- IV. PREFACE BY YANG CHIALO

THE ART OF WAR

CONTENTS:

- CHAPTER I. DELIBERATION
- CHAPTER II. PLANNING
- CHAPTER III. STRATEGY
- CHAPTER IV. TACTICS
- CHAPTER V. FORMATION
- CHAPTER VI. OPPORTUNISM
- CHAPTER VII. MANEUVERS
- CHAPTER VIII. VARIATIONS
- CHAPTER IX. MOBILIZATION
- CHAPTER X. TERRAIN
- CHAPTER XI. SITUATIONS
- CHAPTER XII. INCENDIARISM
- CHAPTER XIII. ESPIONAGE

THE ART OF WAR

First published in Chungking 1945

Reset and printed in Shanghai 1946

COPYRIGHT RESERVED BY CHENG LIN

Printed in China by
THE WORLD BOOK COMPANY, LTD.
Shanghai

THE ART OF WAR

MILITARY MANUAL

WRITTEN ABOUT B.C. 510

ORIGINAL TEXT APPENDED

TRANSLATED

WITH AN INTRODUCTION

BY

CHENG LIN

法 兵 子 孫

Edited & Translated by Cheng Lin

ANCIENT CHINESE CLASSICS SERIES

This Series consists of the most representative works of different Schools of Thought in ancient China. The Chinese texts used are the best available and embody the results of critical research up to date. Besides the original text each volume contains a historical and textual study. The following are some of the titles:

- THE THIRTEEN CLASSICS—*Selections*
THE HISTORY OF JOU DYNASTY—*Complete*
THE BOOK OF PROPRIETY—*Selections*
THE FOUR BOOKS—*Complete*
THE BOOK OF FILIAL PIETY—*Complete*
THE WORKS OF GOAN JONQ—*Selections*
THE WORKS OF YANN ING—*Complete*
THE WORKS OF TZENG SHEN—*Complete*
THE WORKS OF MOH DYI—*Selections*
THE WORKS OF GONGSUEN IANG—*Complete*
THE WORKS OF JUANG JOU—*Selections*
THE WORKS OF SHENN DAW—*Complete*
THE WORKS OF SHYUN KUANG—*Selections*
THE WORKS OF GONGSUEN LONG—*Complete*
THE WORKS OF LEU BUAWEI—*Complete*
THE WORKS OF HARN FEI—*Selections*
THE TRUTH OF NATURE OR DAW DER JING—*Complete*
THE ART OF WAR BY SUEN WUU—*Complete*
PRINCE DAN OF YANN—*Complete & Illustrated*

英譯先恭翠經諸子叢書

孫子兵法

編譯者：鄭 慈 發行者：張人傑（世界書局代表人）

發行所 上海及各地 世界書局

中華民國三十五年十一月初版



*Ancient
Chinese Classics
Series*

THE ART OF WAR

MILITARY MANUAL

Written Cir. B.C. 510

Original Chinese Text Appended

Translated

With an Introduction

By

C H E N G L I N

法 兵 子 孫

THE WORLD BOOK COMPANY, LTD.
SHANGHAI CHINA