

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

Def. Doc. # 2568

Exhibit # _____

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.,

v.

ARAKI S/D/O, et al.
Defendants

A F F I D A V I T

SUGANAMI, SABRO



I, SUGANAMI, Sabro, am living at No. 2035, 3-chome, Himonya, Meguro-ku, Tokyo City.

I was one of Gen. ARAKI's subordinates and had many chances to be brought into contact with his words and conducts. I also moved as one of what were then called the "Young officers." So I know quite well whether it is true or not that Gen. ARAKI was concerned about various kinds of reform movements.

Some people made a mistake in taking him for a militarist, while he himself abhorred militarism. The reasons why such misunderstanding had been produced were, I thought, two: 1. the stern attitude toward any matter, which coming from his righteousness; 2. the counter-propaganda made by his adversaries because of jealousy against his fame and of conflicting interests. For my part as I at first had no direct access to ARAKI and heard others speak of him, I thought him to be a very militant general. Yet, contrary to my preconception of him, he proved to be a man of very moderate thought as I approached him and had chances to listen to his opinions. Gen. ARAKI came to Kumamoto to hold the post of the 6th Division Commander in August in the 4th year of Showa (1929), when I was a lieutenant attached to the 45th Infantry Regiment in KAGOSHIMA under his command. In every instruction which he, as the commander of the division, issued for the purpose of guiding and educating his officers and men, stress was laid on a kind of moralism which was expressed by the words- "penetration of the consciousness of the Imperial army." Through his words and my personal interview with him I came to know that he was a devotee to moralism. His devotion to moralism never changed after he was transferred to Tokyo as the head of the Inspection Department of the Military Education in August in the 6th year of Showa (1931), after he accepted the post of the Minister of War in December of the same year, and even after he resigned the post. Frankly speaking, he was a peace-loving moralist. Now, I shall write down about him, referring to the facts. For convenience of description, I should like to begin with explanation of what young officers really were at that time, which knowledge I acquired from my association with them.

In relation to the so-called "Young officers"
I. Definition of the "Young officers"

here, they indicates those officers or sub-lieutenant rank before and after the Manchurian Incident and also these having the rank of captain, lieutenant, or sub-lieutenant at the time of the February 26th Incident. But those officers who belonged to the so-called 'Sakura-Kai' (cherry Society) or to the TOSEI Group (Control Group) are not included in the same category.

2. Union of Young officers

After the 1st World War, Japan suffered from her internal discordances which aggravated year after year. There were social contempt for the army, the internal weakening of the whole army, the difficulty of living of the peasantry which sent young men to the army, the indolence of the Government and the army leaders, the tyranny of the political parties, the selfishness of Zaibatsu, and the unspiritedness of foreign policy. Indeed, Japan had been driven into such a perilous situation that there was no alternative but to effect the national reforms in order to pass through the crisis. So it was quite natural that this situation influenced the minds of young officers who were sensitive to the current tendency.

This led the young officers autonomously to start the national reform movements. Being not informed of the truths, some people make a mistake in saying that ARAKI and MAZAKI led and agitated the young officers into the reform movements. But this is a calumny, which could, as will be seen later, be traced to the propaganda carried on intentionally by some men. It was some years after those movements were started that the young officers came to know MASAKI and ARAKI. According to my own experiences, the movements by the young officers were already going on in secret, and there after the 6th year of Showa (1931, when the March Incident, the Manchurian Affair, and the November Incident took place) that the connection of ARAKI and Masaki with the movements came to be mentioned. As far as I am concerned when I was a student of the Military Academy, I came to know MASAKI as its president. I also came to know ARAKI as the 6th Division Commander in the 5th and 6th years of Showa when I was attached to the 45th Infantry Regiment. But the relation was that of a student to a president and that of a subordinate officer to a division commander. I have never been led or agitated by either of the two generals with respect to the reform principles or movements. In addition, they were always in a position of suppressors, whenever various kinds of incidents in the army took place after the 6th year of Showa (1931). Frankly speaking, some young radical officers were discontented with the idea conceived by ARAKI and MASAKI; while others, in favour of radical actions, expressed deep dissatisfaction with the moderateness of the generals. But the respect for ARAKI's unblemished character was common to all the young officers. Thus the reform movements by the young officers pursued their own course in respect of the origin and developments. The young officers in general were so much inclined to get rid of the feudalistic element and cliquish influence lurking in the army that they were considered as harmful central army by the authorities and were kept under close watch by the military police. Moreover, they were suppressed whenever any matter took place. But their spiritual union became the stronger at every suppression. We young officers did not like the then reported "cell" method of organization used by the Communist party or by the Nazis, but thought much of the freedom of the individual will. We were of opinion that the national unification should be organically tensified and consolidated on the basis of autonomy in which the above freedom

never infringes others' freedom, and that spiritual movement of autonomy was to be launched in every locality.

3. Ideological difference between us young officers and the other reformists

There seems to be many people who do not discriminate between the two categories when the young officers are mentioned. One category is composed of those young officers of lieutenant or sublieutenant rank who were mostly attached to the units in the rural districts and were conducting the above-mentioned movements of autonomy; while the other means those middle-aged officers of field officer rank who were mostly on the central staff of the army and conceived a totalitarian reform thought. So there was a wide, ideological difference between the two categories. Without a clear knowledge of this difference, the truths cannot be grasped of the incidents which occurred later on in the army. We young officers (who will later be called the young officers), being mostly in service with the units in the rural districts, were in contact with those who enlisted in the army each year at the age when a perilous thought was prevalent. We saw the difficult conditions of the agricultural, mountainous and fishing villages, and the corruption of politics, and the slackening discipline of the army. We could not suppress patriotic passion which led us to renovation of the nation and of the army. Then what were the principle of our national reform and the main aim of purging the army? These may be summed up as follows;

The young officers expected a social evolution by means of the co-operation and unification of classes rather not of class-struggle. So their opinion was that in Japan the Emperor should be, on the basis of Japan's history and traditions, the spiritual centre of the people which transcended classes, and that the whole people being knitted by the tie of the Emperor, should establish on the principle of organic solidarity, a 'family-nation,' pregnant with the love of brotherhood.

The purgation of the army, which was intended for the ideological wakening of high-ranking officers, was felt prerequisite to the national reform. Meanwhile, egoism consisting in a keen desire to get on in the world prevailed among army officers. In particular, the combined power of the academic clique composed of the Staff College graduates who thought themselves to be privileged and the feudalistic clique formed an insuperable obstacle. We anticipated not a few difficulties lying in ambush on the way we were going. So we were firmly determined to break down the Prussian type of high-ranking officers, to introduce really Japanized system, and thus to lay a corner-stone for the work of the unification of officers and men and of the purgation of the army. In doing so, we made up our minds not to covet for our own promotion nor to enter the Staff College though all of us were endowed with talents, but to be satisfied with being officers attached to the units in the rural districts.

But, on the contrary, most members of the other group were graduated from the Staff College and served as the Staff of the central military authorities, taking the position where they more or less wielded power. And they had access to the atmosphere of rising Germany, Italy, etc. and their Fascistic inclination

gradually became conspicuous. The first and plain manifestation of such inclination was what might be called the March Incident (in the 6th year of Showa, or 1931). On hearing that such a big incident, although it ended in an attempt, was left to itself by the central military authorities at that time, the young officers in local districts, who had often been oppressed unreasonably by them, were furiously indignant. Some of them held such positive views that, if they stick only to the local autonomous movements as before, they could not know when any incident might break out; therefore they should keep watch closely on movements of those Fascistic staff of the central military authorities and, if necessary, plunge voluntarily into the movements before hand to prevent the Fascist revolution or to induce the movements by rectifying them, into the purge of the Army and the national reformation in the Japanese manner. Both groups, however, could not be in harmony after all and after the October Incident, came to show more and more marked opposition to each other. Of course, some of many young officers joined for a while the banner of the staff of the central military authorities, but before long almost all of them parted from it. It was because of the difference between the fundamental ideas as mentioned above.

Apart from which of our group and the other was right or wrong, those members of both groups who viewed the then national situation with apprehension were pure-hearted, although their views were different from each other. Besides the both groups, a third group of wise and cunning officers sat on the fence in the beginning and later adroitly obtained power, making itself the nucleus in constructing Japan in what might be called German style. We were, on the contrary, oppressed and even branded by them with infamy. In this connection we feel regret even now.

During these times Mr. ARAKI admonished and suppressed us for reconsideration, but never approved of our actions. Every time such unlawful measures as the March, the October, the May 15, the February 26 incidents, etc. were to be taken or were taken, Mr. ARAKI strongly admonished me and young fellow-officers stressing that the officer of the Imperial Army should not assume such attitude as in those incidents.

4. Relations of young officers with March Incident; 'October Incident' May 15 Incident' and 'February 26 Incident'.

The 'March Incident', as universally known already, is an attempted coup d'etat which was designed in absolute secret by generals and field-officers of the central authorities of the Army (such as the War Ministry and the General Staff) and to which young officers in local districts had no relation at all.

The 'October Incident' is an extension and expansion of the 'March Incident' with the exception that leadership was transferred to field-officers of the General Staff. Some of the young officers were concerned with this Incident which, as mentioned hereinafter, was pacified before the fact by Mr. ARAKI's desperate persuasion.

In the 'May 15 Incident' no young officer from the Army participated as the result of prudence on the part of the young officers who had confidence in General ARAKI, but only military cadets did. The cadets, who did not understand the circumstances thoroughly owing to their youthfulness, and were carried away by ardour, complied with the inducement of young naval officers and took action, severing communication with the young military Officers.

The 'February 26 Incident' took place as follows; Young officers of the units in Tokyo who were the nucleus of the Incident became indignant at hearing the report of transferring the First Division to Manchuria and roused themselves to action intending to purge the Army in order to check such measures and at the same time to carry out resolutely the national reformation at a stroke. When they rose to action, no communication was made with the majority of young officers in local districts. And what was noteworthy was that these officers who rose up assumed an attitude of not placing confidence in General ARAKI. That is, they thought that if General ARAKI, who held moderate view, learned even a bit of their plot, he would immediately persuade them to stop it by explaining the spirit of the Imperial Army. Therefore they strictly concealed their plan from him so as not to be interrupted by him, as they were resolved to risk their lives this time.

The main object of those incidents mentioned above was to get rid of the corruption prevailing in the nation.

Relation between General ARAKI and Young Officers.

1. The reason why General ARAKI was brought forward as the head in the October Incident.

There were two reasons why General ARAKI was brought forward as the head in this Incident. Firstly, radical elements who played the leading part in the October Incident were on the field-officer level, so it was necessary for them to bring forward someone from among generals as their robot head. Secondly, they thought that by having a figure of moral influence as the centre, they would be able to win the hearts of the people and to mobilize on a large scale the revolutionary influences. For these reasons the leaders in the October Incident selected General ARAKI as their head. It is a matter of course that General ARAKI himself was not concerned with the Incident at all, but on the contrary, the result was that they were suppressed by ARAKI whom they brought forward as their head.

General ARAKI's action which suppressed the 'October Incident' makes manifest his character of strong moral sense.

The military heads at that time (War Minister MINAMI, Jiro, Chief of the General Staff KINAYAMA, Hanzo, etc.) who were informed of the plot before the fact were embarrassed as to how to deal with it, called then Lt. General ARAKI, Chief of the General Affairs Department of the Office of Inspector General of Military Training, who was a senior on the Vice-Minister level at that time, and ordered him to investigate and suppress the plot.

After he investigated it, he understood that Lt. Colonel HASHIMOTO, Major CHO, Isamu, etc. were their leaders and went to an inn at Tsukiji in Tokyo where they stayed, when he, considering possible danger, was accompanied by Colonel OKAMURA, Yasuji (later General -- then Chief of the appointment Section of the War Ministry). There he met Major CHO, etc. and talked to them earnestly, then some of them showed an attitude of reconsidering the matter. ARAKI continued to talk to them calmly even amidst the threatening atmosphere and finally succeeded in persuading CHO. Colonel OKAMURA who sat by him, considering it dangerous to stay longer, brought ARAKI back against his will and had him report to General MINAMI, the Minister of War on the details of his interview with

them. Afterwards the military heads took the measures to have military policemen detain several leaders of the plot and put them under protective custody on the ground that such leaders gathered only to talk together, and thus the matter was peacefully settled.

Immediately before the so-called 'October Incident', I (who was then a first lieutenant attached to the Third Infantry Regiment and in Tokyo) visited alone Lt. Gen. ARAKI at his private residence and alluded to my views and my desperate resolution by referring to social conditions. Then Lt. General ARAKI, with Colonel OBATA, Toshishiro (then Instructor at the Staff College -- later Lt. General) who was just there with us, reprimanded me strongly and admonished me earnestly that young officers should be more prudent, quoting such instances as the 'March Incident', etc. which occurred in the past and saying that private activities of the Imperial Army would bring disgrace on the Imperial Army. Thereupon I conveyed what he told me to other fellow-officers. As the result, all of our group came to hold prudent views since then.

One of those concerned with the Incident told me that, if Lt. General ARAKI had not taken such desperate actions of suppressing young Officers on one hand and checking the leaders of the plot on the other, hand the 'October Incident' might have broken out and brought about serious confusion.

2. That young officers did not push ARAKI's appointment to the post of War Minister.

As mentioned above, it was entirely due to Lt. General ARAKI's desperate persuasion of young officers that the October Incident was successfully prevented. Inspector General of Military Training MUTO and every military head else thought that, when the aftermath of the Incident still remained and indications to make another attempt in secret were pronounced, the prevention of confusion of the Army and the stabilization of the nation could depend only on the personality and ability of Lt. Gen. ARAKI. I was told by Lt. Gen. OBATA, Toshishiro later that the ideas of those heads chiefly caused Mr. ARAKI to assume the position of War Minister. In this connection there was no fact that the young officers pushed ARAKI's assumption of the position. Needless to say, the young officers' position was low, therefore there was no room for such political maneuver as pushing his assumption of the post of War Minister and they had little necessity to do so. Because we did not expect ARAKI's ability so much in the capacity of the War Minister as in the capacity of Inspector General of Military Training.

3. Extensive change in Personnel after ARAKI's Inauguration.

On his assuming office as War Minister in December 1931, Lt. General ARAKI took a resolute step of changing the staff in the Army on quite a large scale. He transferred without exception the unlawfully radical elements who had been in Tokyo since the March Incident to the posts in local forces in order to have them devote themselves to military service. As a result, the War Minister ARAKI became the target of resentment on the part of those extremists who abused him as the head of "the Maintaining the Status Quo Group"

4. Circumstances under which Military Officers Held Prudent Attitude to ward the May 15 Incident
Having undergone the October Incident, the Young Officers of the Army thoroughly studied the truth about the March Incident and with deepened contemplation

and careful reflection opened their eyes to the principle upon which Japan's national polity had its base and came to realize that the present Japan should be elevated to a moral country in accordance with the universal principle which governs any place and any time. Thus they promised to take a legal step excluding such unlawful activities as before and agreed never to commit any rash and reckless acts in future, placing full confidence in War Minister ARAKI, a person of absolute sincerity and loyalty. The gradual change of the frame of mind on the part of those young officers was in fact the fruit of the earnest and persuading instructions given both publicly and privately, by such Generals as ARAKI and OBATA, taking advantage of every opportunity.

Previous to the May 15 Incident, young naval officers disclosed their program to the young officers of the Army and asked them to participate in the action in cooperation with them. As the army officers declined the request the navy officers secretly approached military cadets. Consequently, it became impossible for the young officers of the Army to know what kind of talkings were going on among the conspirators. Before that time in January 1932, I was dispatched to the front from the 111rd Infantry Regiment joining in the force mobilized lastly for the SHANGHAI Incident 1. Hostilities on the Continent, however were soon suspended and early in May that year I returned to TOKYO. I was told by my friends of the occurrences in my absence. One of them said to me; "In these days we are informed of nothing as to the activities among military cadets. There are at least, some facts which indicate that they are plotting some thing in secret communication with the naval side. Will you start to inquire into the situation at once?" On this request, I took every possible measure for that purpose, but about a fortnight was spent in vain without getting any information.

On the evening of May 15, I came to know of the occurrence of the Incident by the alarming news of an extra. I was astounded. To make sure the facts of the event, I hurried to the War Minister's official residence. The War Minister was not in, for he attended the Cabinet meeting. I met maj-General OBATA who happened to be there to whom I remarked as follows:

"I believe that young officers of the Army will in obedience to the instruction of War Minister ARAKI, not dare commit any reckless action this time.

Please try to save the situation without any anxiety about this point. I assert in conclusion that the prudent attitude of the young military officers toward the May 15 Incident was as stated above, the very result of the appropriate direction by Generals ARAKI and OBATA.

5. Disappointment of the KAKUSHIN (Reformation) Group as to ARAKI

In the pacification of the October Incident, in the extensive purge after the March Incident and in keeping the young officers ----aloof from the May 15 Incident etc, ARAKI always played his important role, thus suppressing the activities of the KAKUSHIN Group which tended to appeal to an illegal and radical step. This caused a great disappointment among the KAKUSHIN Group. Disappointment turned into reproach, and then into abuse, until at last it became an exclusive attitude, which was materialized on the occasion of the SHIMPEITAI Incident in July 1938. The terrorists

followed ARAKI, as one of the members of the SAITO Cabinet, for his life then.

Situation in the Army after ARAKI's Retirement

1. KODO Group and TOSEI Group

a. People often refers to the KODO Group and TOSEI Group. So I will make some explanation about them so as to make clear the situation in the Army in those days.

The KODO Group was not the name by which the members called themselves. Since the time prior to his inauguration as War Minister, General ARAKI often employed the word "KODO" or the Emperor's Way in his speech. People began to call, half in fun, a group of those who respected ARAKI's personality and gave mental support to him the KODO Group. Of course, this term was used by their antagonists, too.

As regards the name of the "TOSEI" or Control Group, I don't know its etymology. However, it might be again a spontaneous title dedicated to a group of military officers who were inclined to the centralism under total control and held the principle of powerful control and insisted on controlled economy for, the maintenance of order in the Army and for the reformation of the nation. This group stood against the movement of self-governing young officers and, taking every opportunity, suppressed such a movement. The difference of the basic opinion between the two naturally gave rise to the two antagonizing factions, which, however, were not organized at all.

Our company of young officers, however, took their own independent position and called themselves "officers of the KOKUTAI-GENRI Group (or National Polity Principle Group)" in order to draw a line between them and other groups. To add, the idea of the KOKUTAI-GENRI Group had, strictly speaking, certain points which were different from that of the KODO Group. But there was a strong tendency among the young officers of our group to place confidence in Generals worthy of our respect among those in the KODO Group. Such being the case, the TOSEI Group regarded us to be included in the KODO Group in a wide sense. Subsequently, the TOSEI Group's attack upon the KODO Group was carried out simultaneously and in parallel with the suppress upon the young officers of the KOKUTAI-GENRI Group.

b. Basic difference between the KODO Group and the TOSEI Group.

It is apparently a strange phenomenon that there should exist two groups so strikingly contrasted with each other in the same Army of the same country. But this was too conspicuous a fact to be overlooked. The basic difference between the two groups shall be explained briefly as follows:

The KODO Group deemed the Emperor's gracious wish to realize the world peace to be the way for the people to follow and also the spirit of the Japanese Army. The devoted themselves to the training of the Army as a guarantee for the defense and maintenance of the world peace.

Personages representative of this group were Generals ARAKI MASAOKI and OHTA. Especially General ARAKI was an important leader. Make a study on the idea he entertained and the spirit on which he stood, and the truth of the KODO Group will be understood.

As I mentioned before, General ARAKI was a moralist with a firm belief. Now I will explain what sort of opinion he had about "relation between the end and the means." His opinion about this point was thorough-going. What I heard from him about it will be summed up as follows: "When we take a certain means, whether there is a sting of conscience or not becomes the best criterion of our conduct. Some people say 'the end' justifies the means', but a good end never justifies a wrong means. In life there are not a few cases where an intention to attain a just object with a just means confronts a great obstacle. In such a case, one who has a sensitive conscience is liable to be at a loss which to select, to give up a just end or to resort to an unjust means. It is a tragedy of conscience. We, however, getting through such a tragic plight, must choose a fair means for a just end. You must have a firm belief that though you might be defeated for a while, you will thus after all obtain the final victory." As for his view of war, he told me as follows: "Of course, I am against such a sort of militarism as intends to swallow up weaker nations by depending upon military strength, and thereby to satisfy avarice. However just end fair such objects as proclaiming the KODO (T.N The Imperial Way) or the peace of Orient or of the World may be, it would never be the way for Japan to resort to a war for attaining those objects." Furthermore, he went so far as to say that if the Japanese forces should be used for an aggressive war, Japan would inevitably be led to ruin and the forces would prove anything but KOGUN or the Imperial forces.

What I mentioned above shows his remarkable merits. However, in the situation at home and abroad at that time, I saw that moralism he advocated all the time was often drawn into a trap by an unexpected unfair and unjust means of the opponent. It was a pity that after his assumption of the position as the Minister of War he was criticized as being short of political ability and that he was obliged, after resigning his post, to wink, with deep agony and melancholy, at the crisis into which Japan was led by the passion for war and at her plunging herself into an abyss of misfortune because of the moralism in which he stood firm, of his political powerlessness due to his being away from an important position and of his uprightness. It is, however, a settled opinion that once the righteousness in him makes him indignant, he ventures forth with so surprisingly thorough-going attitude and proves himself self sacrificing and sympathetic, when he displays his great ability. So far as I know, it is at any rate a pertinent remark that it is the best way to irritate ARAKI.

On the contrary, a remarkable feature of the TOSEIHA or the Control Group was that it had a tendency to adhere to a sort of Machiavellism which teaches, "the end justifies the means." Therefore, they made always the best use of their wisdom at home or abroad to obtain power. After 1934 (Showa 9) they caused the KODOHA or the Imperial Way Group to fall and in 1936 (Showa 11) they disrupted the KOKUTAI-GENRI-HA or the Principles of National Polity Group. As the result they came to hold real power at home.

*The February 26 Incident and Junior Officers

1. Why it occurred?

The direct and real cause of the Incident has not yet been made clear.

Most of those junior officers who rose to action in the Incident were attached to the units in the Metropolis. To the TOSEIHA or the or the Control Group they were the final force which resists the Group and the final objective which the Group intended to drive out. About those called "the TOSEIHA" or the Control Group who were mostly absorbed in foreign problems, junior officers had misgivings. The junior officers were always restraining them from doing any attempts. Therefore, the Group felt the utmost apprehension and inconvenience as to those junior officers stationed in the Metropolis where then was the center of the Army, and at last decided upon the transfer of the 1st Division to Manchuria. It was an unprecedented case.

Getting a news that such an exceptional measure was taken against the 1st Division which had never been moved except for a great war because of its duty for maintaining peace and order in the Metropolis, those junior officers there, being much excited and indignant and fearing that the TOSEIHA or the Control Group might at last carry out its own policy as it likes, immediately opened a conference and deliberated together upon measures against it, as the result of which the positive plan, overcoming the negative one, was adopted. I heard about this fact from junior officers belonging to the Metropolitan units. It was, under these circumstances, inevitable for them to take such a step, though they knew, of course, the unlawful means was wrong. Now that they were determined to rise to action, they tried not only to strike down the TOSEIHA or the Control Group, but also to go so far as to bring about an over-all revolution of the State. I, being attached to a local regiment, did not directly participate in their action, but I came to be punished as a sympathizer. Here lies a lot of dubious points.

The trial of this Incident was held in secret and it was a sort of revolutionary trial. This trial was carried on according to a plot prepared beforehand; no defence, no attendance and no appeal being permitted. The accused concerned were sentenced to predetermined penalties. This also caused us to entertain a lot of questions.

When he held the position of the Education Minister ARAKI Confessed that it was an endless agony that he could not render his service for bringing the China Affair to an end because of his being a general on the reserve list. I, being full of indignation at seeing great expectations of thoughtful people betrayed at every change of the Government and the China Affair developing into the Great Eastern Asia War, after called on ARAKI and asked for his instruction. I thus always kept prudent.

2. Reason why they had nothing to do with ARAKI

Some of the officers rising in the Feb. 22 Incident were of the so-called KOKUMAI GENRI HA (National-Polity-Principle-Group) and ought to support the KODO HA (Imperial-Way-Group). They, however, shunned General ARAKI (Then the Supreme War Conncillor) in this Incident.

They, although respected ARAKI's character, did not like his moderateness and paternalism. Especially these was a difference between ARAKI's point of view and theirs on "the relation between the end and the

means." They thus came to shun General ARAKI in such an emergency. The young officers were of course against Machiavellism advocated by the Control-Party.

They were, however, more or less discontented with General ARAKI who strictly restricted their action saying that in any case, just means should be taken for a just end.

After all, General ARAKI remained from the beginning to the end a moralist with a firm belief. He, being against both Fascism and Militarism, took charge of the disposal of affairs after the Manchuria Incident and put down the hostilities with the Shanghai Incident.

From the China Incident to the Great East Asia War, he always took a stand against them. In the Army circles, however, anyone once removed from the active list became quite powerless toward the Army and; even while in active service, the voice of those in the position with no personnel power was made light of by the staff officers in the central position of planning and execution. Such being the actual circumstances, it was unavoidable that ARAKI, an old General once removed from the active list, looked on the changes of the times all along in silence and agony. But it was really regrettable that he could not show his seriousness of his personality and display his ability for the sake of saving our nation.

After all, General ARAKI is a tragic character amidst a great revolution of history. Nevertheless, in the last days of a tragic character, the essence of his personality is made manifest and emits its real light.

On this 5th day of September, 1947

At I.M.T.F.E.

DEPONENT SUGANAMI, Saburo (seal)

I, _____ hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At the same

Witness: (signed) HASUOKA, Takaaki (seal)

O A T H

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell
the whole truth withholding nothing and adding
nothing.

SUGIYAMA, Saburo (seal)