

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

Def. Doc. # 2568

Exhibit # 3389

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.,

v.

ARAKI SADAO, et al.
Defendants

A F F I D A V I T

SUGANAMI SABRO

I, SUGANAMI, Sabro, am living at No. 2035, 3-chome, Himonya, Meguro-ku, Tokyo City.

I was one of Gen. ARAKI's subordinates and had many chances to be brought into contact with his words and conducts. I also moved as one of what were then called the "Young officers." So I know quite well whether it is true or not that Gen. ARAKI was concerned about various kinds of reform movements.

Some people made a mistake in taking him for a militarist, while he himself abhorred militarism. The reasons why such misunderstanding had been produced were, I thought, two: 1. the stern attitude toward any matter, which coming from his righteousness; 2. the counter-propaganda made by his adversaries because of jealousy against his fame and of conflicting interests. For my part as I at first had no direct access to ARAKI and heard others speak of him, I thought him to be a very militant general. Yet, contrary to my preconception of him, he proved to be a man of very moderate thought as I approached him and had chances to listen to his opinions. Gen. ARAKI came to Kuramoto to hold the post of the 6th Division Commander in August in the 4th year of Showa (1929), when I was a lieutenant attached to the 45th Infantry Regiment in KAGOSHIMA under his command. In every instruction which he, as the commander of the division, issued for the purpose of guiding and educating his officers and men, stress was laid on a kind of moralism which was expressed by the words- "penetration of the consciousness of the Imperial army." Through his words and my personal interview with him I came to know that he was a devotee to moralism. His devotion to moralism never changed after he was transferred to Tokyo as the head of the Inspection Department of the Military Education in August in the 6th year of Showa (1931), after he accepted the post of the Minister of War in December of the same year, and even after he resigned the post. Frankly speaking he was a peace-loving moralist. Now, I shall write down about him, referring to the facts. For convenience of description, I should like to begin with explanation of what young officers really were at that time, which knowledge I acquired from my association with them.

In relation to the so-called "Young officers"
I. Definition of the "Young officers"

here, they indicates those officers when I say the young officers who held the lieutenant or sub-lieutenant rank before and after the Manchurian Incident and also these having the rank of captain, lieutenant, or sub-lieutenant at the time of the February 26th Incident. But those officers who belonged to the so-called 'Sakura-Kai' (cherry Society) or to the TOSEI Group (Control Group) are not included in the same category.

2. Union of Young officers

After the 1st World War, Japan suffered from her internal discordances which aggravated year after year. There were social contempt for the army, the internal weakening of the whole army, the difficulty of living of the peasantry which sent young men to the army, the indolence of the Government and the army leaders, the tyranny of the political parties, the selfishness of Zaibatsu, and the unspiritedness of foreign policy. Indeed, Japan had been driven into such a perilous situation that there was no alternative but to effect the national reforms in order to pass through the crisis. So it was quite natural that this situation influenced the minds of young officers who were sensitive to the current tendency.

This led the young officers autonomously to start the national reform movements. Being not informed of the truths, some people make a mistake in saying that ARAKI and MAZAKI led and agitated the young officers into the reform movements. But this is a calumny, which could, as will be seen later, be traced to the propaganda carried on intentionally by some men. It was some years after those movements were started that the young officers came to know MASAKI and ARAKI. According to my own experiences, the movements by the young officers were already going on in secret, and there after the 6th year of Showa (1931, when the March Incident, the Manchurian Affair, and the November Incident took place) that the connection of ARAKI and Masaki with the movements came to be mentioned. As far as I am concerned when I was a student of the Military Academy, I came to know MASAKI as its president. I also came to know ARAKI as the 6th Division Commander in the 5th and 6th years of Showa when I was attached to the 45th Infantry Regiment. But the relation was that of a student to a president and that of a subordinate officer to a division commander. I have never been led or agitated by either of the two generals with respect to the reform principles or movements. In addition, they were always in a position of suppressors, whenever various kinds of incidents in the army took place after the 6th year of Showa (1931). Frankly speaking, some young radical officers were discontented with the idea conceived by ARAKI and MASAKI; while others, in favour of radical actions, expressed deep dissatisfaction with the moderateness of the generals. But the respect for ARAKI's unblemished character was common to all the young officers. Thus the reform movements by the young officers pursued their own course in respect of the origin and developments. The young officers in general were so much inclined to get rid of the feudalistic element and cliquish influence lurking in the army that they were considered as harmful central army by the authorities and were kept under close watch by the military police. Moreover, they were suppressed whenever any matter took place. But their spiritual union became the stronger at every suppression. We young officers did not like the then reported "cell" method of organization used by the Communist party or by the Nazis, but thought much of the freedom of the individual will. We were of opinion that the national unification should be organically tensified and consolidated on the basis of autonomy in which the above freedom

never infringes others' freedom, and that spiritual movement of autonomy was to be launched in every locality.

3. Ideological difference between us young officers and the other reformists

There seems to be many people who do not discriminate between the two categories when the young officers are mentioned. One category is composed of those young officers of lieutenant or sublieutenant rank who were mostly attached to the units in the rural districts and were conducting the above-mentioned movements of autonomy; while the other means those middle-aged officers of field officer rank who were mostly on the central staff of the army and conceived a totalitarian reform thought. So there was a wide, ideological difference between the two categories. Without a clear knowledge of this difference, the truths cannot be grasped of the incidents which occurred later on in the army. We young officers (who will later be called the young officers), being mostly in service with the units in the rural districts, were in contact with those who enlisted in the army each year at the age when a perilous thought was prevalent. We saw the difficult conditions of the agricultural, mountainous and fishing villages, and the corruption of politics, and the slackening discipline of the army. We could not suppress patriotic passion which led us to renovation of the nation and of the army. Then what were the principle of our national reform and the main aim of purging the army? These may be summed up as follows;

The young officers expected a social evolution by means of the co-operation and unification of classes rather not of class-struggle. So their opinion was that in Japan the Emperor should be, on the basis of Japan's history and traditions, the spiritual centre of the people which transcended classes, and that the whole people being knitted by the tie of the Emperor, should establish on the principle of organic solidarity, a 'family-nation,' pregnant with the love of brotherhood.

The purgation of the army, which was intended for the ideological wakening of high-ranking officers, was felt prerequisite to the national reform. Meanwhile, egoism consisting in a keen desire to get on in the world prevailed among army officers. In particular, the combined power of the academic clique composed of the Staff College graduates who thought themselves to be privileged and the feudalistic clique formed an insuperable obstacle. We anticipated not a few difficulties lying in ambush on the way we were going. So we were firmly determined to break down the Prussian type of high-ranking officers, to introduce really Japanized system, and thus to lay a corner-stone for the work of the unification of officers and men and of the purgation of the army. In doing so, we made up our minds not to covet for our own promotion nor to enter the Staff College though all of us were endowed with talents, but to be satisfied with being officers attached to the units in the rural districts.

But, on the contrary, most members of the other group were graduated from the Staff College and served as the Staff of the central military authorities, taking the position where they more or less wielded power. And they had access to the atmosphere of rising Germany, Italy, etc. and their Fascistic inclination

gradually became conspicuous. The first and plain manifestation of such inclination was what might be called the March Incident (in the 6th year of Showa, or 1931). On hearing that such a big incident, although it ended in an attempt, was left to itself by the central military authorities at that time, the young officers in local districts, who had often been oppressed unreasonably by them, were furiously indignant. Some of them held such positive views that, if they stick only to the local autonomous movements as before, they could not know when any incident might break out; therefore they should keep watch closely on movements of those Fascistic staff of the central military authorities and, if necessary, plunge voluntarily into the movements before hand to prevent the Fascist revolution or to induce the movements by rectifying them, into the purge of the Army and the national reformation in the Japanese manner. Both groups, however, could not be in harmony after all and after the October Incident, came to show more and more marked opposition to each other. Of course, some of many young officers joined for a while the banner of the staff of the central military authorities, but before long almost all of them parted from it. It was because of the difference between the fundamental ideas as mentioned above.

Apart from which of our group and the other was right or wrong, those members of both groups who viewed the then national situation with apprehension were pure-hearted, although their views were different from each other. Besides the both groups, a third group of wise and cunning officers sat on the fence in the beginning and later adroitly obtained power, making itself the nucleus in constructing Japan in what might be called German style. We were, on the contrary, oppressed and even branded by them with infamy. In this connection we feel regret even now.

During these times Mr. ARAKI admonished and suppressed us for reconsideration, but never approved of our actions. Every time such unlawful measures as the March, the October, the May 15, the February 26 incidents, etc. were to be taken or were taken, Mr. ARAKI strongly admonished me and young fellow-officers stressing that the officer of the Imperial Army should not assume such attitude as in those incidents.

4. Relations of young officers with March Incident; 'October Incident' May 15 Incident' and 'February 26 Incident'.

The 'March Incident', as universally known already, is an attempted coup d'etat which was designed in absolute secret by generals and field-officers of the central authorities of the Army (such as the War Ministry and the General Staff) and to which young officers in local districts had no relation at all.

The 'October Incident' is an extension and expansion of the 'March Incident' with the exception that leadership was transferred to field-officers of the General Staff. Some of the young officers were concerned with this Incident which, as mentioned hereinafter, was pacified before the fact by Mr. ARAKI's desperate persuasion.

In the 'May 15 Incident' no young officer from the Army participated as the result of prudence on the part of the young officers who had confidence in General ARAKI, but only military cadets did. The cadets, who did not understand the circumstances thoroughly owing to their youthfulness, and were carried away by ardour, complied with the inducement of young naval officers and took action, severing communication with the young military Officers.

The 'February 26 Incident' took place as follows; Young officers of the units in Tokyo who were the nucleus of the Incident became indignant at hearing the report of transferring the First Division to Manchuria and roused themselves to action intending to purge the Army in order to check such measures and at the same time to carry out resolutely the national reformation at a stroke. When they rose to action, no communication was made with the majority of young officers in local districts. And what was noteworthy was that these officers who rose up assumed an attitude of not placing confidence in General ARAKI. That is, they thought that if General ARAKI, who held moderate view, learyed even a bit of their plot, he would immediately persuade them to stop it by explaining the spirit of the Imperial Army. Therefore they strictly concealed their plan from him so as not to be interrupted by him, as they were resolved to risk their lives this time.

The main object of those incidents mentioned above was to get rid of the corruption prevailing in the nation.

Relation between General ARAKI and Young Officers.

1. The reason why General ARAKI was brought forward as the head in the October Incident.

There were two reasons why General ARAKI was brought forward as the head in this Incident. Firstly, radical elements who played the leading part in the October Incident were on the field-officer level, so it was necessary for them to bring forward someone from among generals as their robot head. Secondly, they thought that by having a figure of moral influence as the centre, they would be able to win the hearts of the people and to mobilize on a large scale the revolutionary influences. For these reasons the leaders in the October Incident selected General ARAKI as their head. It is a matter of course that General ARAKI himself was not concerned with the Incident at all, but on the contrary, the result was that they were suppressed by ARAKI whom they brought forward as their head.

General ARAKI's action which suppressed the 'October Incident' makes manifest his character of strong moral sense.

The military heads at that time (War Minister MINAMI, Jiro, Chief of the General Staff KANAYA, Hanzo, etc.) who were informed of the plot before the fact were embarrassed as to how to deal with it, called then Lt. General ARAKI, Chief of the General Affairs Department of the Office of Inspector General of Military Training, who was a senior on the Vice-Minister level at that time, and ordered him to investigate and suppress the plot.

After he investigated it, he understood that Lt. Colonel HASHIMOTO, Major CHO, Isamu, etc. were their leaders and went to an inn at Tsukiji in Tokyo where they stayed, when he, considering possible danger, was accompanied by Colonel OKAMURA, Yasuji (later General -- then Chief of the appointment Section of the War Ministry). There he met Major CHO, etc. and talked to them earnestly, then some of them showed an attitude of reconsidering the matter. ARAKI continued to talk to them calmly even amidst the threatening atmosphere and finally succeeded in persuading CHO. Colonel OKAMURA who sat by him, considering it dangerous to stay longer, brought ARAKI back against his will and had him report to General MINAMI, the Minister of War on the details of his interview with

them. Afterwards the military heads took the measures to have military policemen detain several leaders of the plot and put them under protective custody on the ground that such leaders gathered only to talk together, and thus the matter was peacefully settled.

Immediately before the so-called 'October Incident', I (who was then a first lieutenant attached to the Third Infantry Regiment and in Tokyo) visited alone Lt. Gen. ARAKI at his private residence and alluded to my views and my desperate resolution by referring to social conditions. Then Lt. General ARAKI, with Colonel OETA, Toshishiro (then Instructor at the Staff College -- later Lt. General) who was just there with us, reprimanded me strongly and admonished me earnestly that young officers should be more prudent, quoting such instances as the 'March Incident', etc. which occurred in the past and saying that private activities of the Imperial Army would bring disgrace on the Imperial Army. Thereupon I conveyed what he told me to other fellow-officers. As the result, all of our group came to hold prudent views since then.

One of those concerned with the Incident told me that, if Lt. General ARAKI had not taken such desperate actions of suppressing young Officers on one hand and checking the leaders of the plot on the other, hand the 'October Incident' might have broken out and brought about serious confusion.

2. That young officers did not push ARAKI's appointment to the post of War Minister.

As mentioned above, it was entirely due to Lt. General ARAKI's desperate persuasion of young officers that the October Incident was successfully prevented. Inspector General of Military Training MUTO and every military head else thought that, when the aftermath of the Incident still remained and indications to make another attempt in secret were pronounced, the prevention of confusion of the Army and the stabilization of the nation could depend only on the personality and ability of Lt. Gen. ARAKI. I was told by Lt. Gen. OETA, Toshishiro later that the ideas of those heads chiefly caused Mr. ARAKI to assume the position of War Minister. In this connection there was no fact that the young officers pushed ARAKI's assumption of the position. Needless to say, the young officers' position was low, therefore there was no room for such political maneuver as pushing his assumption of the post of War Minister and they had little necessity to do so. Because we did not expect ARAKI's ability so much in the capacity of the War Minister as in the capacity of Inspector General of Military Training.

3. Extensive change in Personnel after ARAKI's Inauguration.

On his assuming office as War Minister in December 1931, Lt. General ARAKI took a resolute step of changing the staff in the Army on quite a large scale. He transferred without exception the unlawfully radical elements who had been in Tokyo since the March Incident to the posts in local forces in order to have them devote themselves to military service. As a result, the War Minister ARAKI became the target of resentment on the part of those extremists who abused him as the head of "the Maintaining the Status Quo Group"

4. Circumstances under which Military Officers Held Prudent Attitude to ward the May 15 Incident
Having undergone the October Incident, the Young Officers of the Army thoroughly studied the truth about the March Incident and with deepened contemplation

and careful reflection opened their eyes to the principle upon which Japan's national polity had its base and came to realize that the present Japan should be elevated to a moral country in accordance with the universal principle which governs any place and any time. Thus they promised to take a legal step excluding such unlawful activities as before and agreed never to commit any rash and reckless acts in future, placing full confidence in War Minister ARAKI, a person of absolute sincerity and loyalty. The gradual change of the frame of mind on the part of those young officers was in fact the fruit of the earnest and persuading instructions given both publicly and privately, by such Generals as ARAKI and OBATA, taking advantage of every opportunity.

Previous to the May 15 Incident, young naval officers disclosed their program to the young officers of the Army and asked them to participate in the action in cooperation with them. As the army officers declined the request the navy officers secretly approached military cadets. Consequently, it became impossible for the young officers of the Army to know what kind of talkings were going on among the conspirators. Before that time in January 1932, I was dispatched to the front from the 111st Infantry Regiment joining in the force mobilized lastly for the SHANGHAI Incident 1. Hostilities on the Continent, however were soon suspended and early in May that year I returned to TOKYO. I was told by my friends of the occurrences in my absence. One of them said to me; "In these days we are informed of nothing as to the activities among military cadets. There are at least, some facts which indicate that they are plotting some thing in secret communication with the naval side. Will you start to inquire into the situation at once?" On this request, I took every possible measure for that purpose, but about a fortnight was spent in vain without getting any information.

On the evening of May 15, I came to know of the occurrence of the Incident by the alarming news of an extra. I was astounded. To make sure the facts of the event, I hurried to the War Minister's official residence. The War Minister was not in, for he attended the Cabinet meeting. I met Maj-General OBATA who happened to be there to whom I remarked as follows:

"I believe that young officers of the Army will in obedience to the instruction of War Minister ARAKI, not dare commit any reckless action this time.

Please try to save the situation without any anxiety about this point. I assert in conclusion that the prudent attitude of the young military officers toward the May 15 Incident was as stated above, the very result of the appropriate direction by Generals ARAKI and OBATA.

5. Disappointment of the KAKUSHIN (Reformation) Group as to ARAKI

In the pacification of the October Incident, in the extensive purge after the March Incident and in keeping the young officers ----aloof from the May 15 Incident etc, ARAKI always played his important role, thus suppressing the activities of the KAKUSHIN Group which tended to appeal to an illegal and radical step. This caused a great disappointment among the KAKUSHIN Group. Disappointment turned into reproach, and then into abuse, until at last it became an exclusive attitude, which was materialized on the occasion of the SHIMPEITAI Incident in July 1938. The terrorists

followed ARAKI, as one of the members of the SAITO Cabinet, for his life then.

Situation in the Army after ARAKI's Retirement

1. KODO Group and TOSEI Group

a. People often refers to the KODO Group and TOSEI Group. So I will make some explanation about them so as to make clear the situation in the Army in those days.

The KODO Group was not the name by which the members called themselves. Since the time prior to his inauguration as War Minister, General ARAKI often employed the word "KODO" or the Emperor's Way in his speech. People began to call, half in fun, a group of those who respected ARAKI's personality and gave mental support to him the KODO Group. Of course, this term was used by their antagonists, too.

As regards the name of the "TOSEI" or Control Group, I don't know its etymology. However, it might be again a spontaneous title dedicated to a group of military officers who were inclined to the centralism under total control and held the principle of powerful control and insisted on controlled economy for the maintenance of order in the Army and for the reformation of the nation. This group stood against the movement of self-governing young officers and, taking every opportunity, suppressed such a movement. The difference of the basic opinion between the two naturally gave rise to the two antagonizing factions, which, however, were not organized at all.

Our company of young officers, however, took their own independent position and called themselves "officers of the KOKUTAI-GENRI Group (or National Policy Principle Group)" in order to draw a line between them and other groups. To add, the idea of the KOKUTAI-GENRI Group had, strictly speaking, certain points which were different from that of the KODO Group. But there was a strong tendency among the young officers of our group to place confidence in Generals worthy of our respect among those in the KODO Group. Such being the case, the TOSEI Group regarded us to be included in the KODO Group in a wide sense. Subsequently, the TOSEI Group's attack upon the KODO Group was carried out simultaneously and in parallel with the suppress upon the young officers of the KOKUTAI-GENRI Group.

b. Basic difference between the KODO Group and the TOSEI Group.

It is apparently a strange phenomenon that there should exist two groups so strikingly contrasted with each other in the same Army of the same country. But this was too conspicuous a fact to be overlooked. The basic difference between the two groups shall be explained briefly as follows:

The KODO Group deemed the Emperor's gracious wish to realize the world peace to be the way for the people to follow and also the spirit of the Japanese Army. They devoted themselves to the training of the Army as a guarantee for the defense and maintenance of the world peace.

Personages representative of this group were Generals ARAKI MASAKI and OBATA. Especially General ARAKI was an important leader. Make a study on the idea he entertained and the spirit on which he stood, and the truth of the KODO Group will be understood.

As I mentioned before, General MIKI was a moralist with a firm belief. Now I will explain what sort of opinion he had about "relation between the end and the means." His opinion about this point was thorough-going. What I heard from him about it will be summed up as follows: "When we take a certain means, whether there is a sting of conscience or not becomes the best criterion of our conduct. Some people say 'the end' justifies the means', but a good end never justifies a wrong means. In life there are not a few cases where an intention to attain a just object with a just means confronts a great obstacle. In such a case, one who has a sensitive conscience is liable to be at a loss which to select, to give up a just end or to resort to an unjust means. It is a tragedy of conscience. We, however, getting through such a tragic plight, must choose a fair means for a just end. You must have a firm belief that though you might be defeated for a while, you will thus after all obtain the final victory." As for his view of war, he told me as follows: "Of course, I am against such a sort of militarism as intends to swallow up weaker nations by depending upon military strength, and thereby to satisfy avarice. However just and fair such objects as proclaiming the KODO (T.N The Imperial Way) or the peace of Orient or of the World may be, it would never be the way for Japan to resort to a war for attaining those objects." Furthermore, he went so far as to say that if the Japanese forces should be used for an aggressive war, Japan would inevitably be led to ruin and the forces would prove anything but KOGUN or the Imperial forces.

What I mentioned above shows his remarkable merits. However, in the situation at home and abroad at that time, I saw that moralism he advocated all the time was often drawn into a trap by an unexpected unfair and unjust means of the opponent. It was a pity that after his assumption of the position as the Minister of War he was criticized as being short of political ability and that he was obliged, after resigning his post, to wink, with deep agony and melancholy, at the crisis into which Japan was led by the passion for war and at her plunging herself into an abyss of misfortune because of the moralism in which he stood firm, of his political powerlessness due to his being away from an important position and of his uprightness. It is, however, a settled opinion that once the righteousness in him makes him indignant, he ventures forth with so surprisingly thorough-going attitude and proves himself self sacrificing and sympathetic, when he displays his great ability. So far as I know, it is at any rate a pertinent remark that it is the best way to irritate MIKI.

On the contrary, a remarkable feature of the TOSEIWA or the Control Group was that it had a tendency to adhere to a sort of Machavellism which teaches, "the end justifies the means." Therefore, they made always the best use of their wisdom at home or abroad to obtain power. After 1934 (Showa 9) they caused the KODOHA or the Imperial Way Group to fall and in 1936 (Showa 11) they disrupted the KOKUTAI-GENRI-WA or the Principles of National Polity Group. As the result they came to hold real power at home.

*The February 26 Incident and Junior Officers

1. Why it occurred?

The direct and real cause of the Incident has not yet been made clear.

Most of those junior officers who rose to action in the Incident were attached to the units in the Metropolis. To the TOSEIHA or the Control Group they were the final force which resists the Group and the final objective which the Group intended to drive out. About those called "the TOSEIHA" or the Control Group who were mostly absorbed in foreign problems, junior officers had misgivings. The junior officers were always restraining them from doing any attempts. Therefore, the Group felt the utmost apprehension and inconvenience as to those junior officers stationed in the Metropolis where then was the center of the Army, and at last decided upon the transfer of the 1st Division to Manchuria. It was an unprecedented case.

Getting a news that such an exceptional measure was taken against the 1st Division which had never been moved except for a great war because of its duty for maintaining peace and order in the Metropolis, those junior officers there, being much excited and indignant and fearing that the TOSEIHA or the Control Group might at last carry out its own policy as it likes, immediately opened a conference and deliberated together upon measures against it, as the result of which the positive plan, overcoming the negative one, was adopted. I heard about this fact from junior officers belonging to the Metropolitan units. It was, under these circumstances, inevitable for them to take such a step, though they knew, of course, the unlawful means was wrong. Now that they were determined to rise to action, they tried not only to strike down the TOSEIHA or the Control Group, but also to go so far as to bring about an over-all revolution of the State. I, being attached to a local regiment, did not directly participate in their action, but I came to be punished as a sympathizer. Here lies a lot of dubious points.

The trial of this Incident was held in secret and it was a sort of revolutionary trial. This trial was carried on according to a plot prepared beforehand; no defence, no attendance and no appeal being permitted. The accused concerned were sentenced to predetermined penalties. This also caused us to entertain a lot of questions.

When he held the position of the Education Minister ARAKI Confessed that it was an endless agony that he could not render his service for bringing the China Affair to an end because of his being a general on the reserve list. I, being full of indignation at seeing great expectations of thoughtful people betrayed at every change of the Government and the China Affair developing into the Great Eastern Asia War, after called on ARAKI and asked for his instruction. I thus always kept prudent.

2. Reason why they had nothing to do with ARAKI

Some of the officers rising in the Feb. 22 Incident were of the so-called KOKUTAI GENRI HA. (National-Polity-Principle-Group) and ought to support the KODO HA. (Imperial-Way-Group). They, however, shunned General ARAKI (Then the Supreme War Concillor) in this Incident.

They, although respected ARAKI's character, did not like his moderateness and paternalism. Especially these was a difference between ARAKI's point of view and theirs on "the relation between the end and the

means." They thus came to shun General IRLKI in such an emergency. The young officers were of course against Machiavellism advocated by the Control-Party.

They were, however, more or less discontented with General IRLKI who strictly restricted their action saying that in any case, just means should be taken for a just end.

After all, General IRLKI remained from the beginning to the end a moralist with a firm belief. He, being against both Fascism and Militarism, took charge of the disposal of affairs after the Manchuria Incident and put down the hostilities with the Shanghai Incident.

From the China Incident to the Great East Asia War, he always took a stand against them. In the Army circles, however, anyone once removed from the active list became quite powerless toward the Army and; even while in active service, the voice of those in the position with no personnel power was made light of by the staff officers in the central position of planning and execution. Such being the actual circumstances, it was unavoidable that IRLKI, an old General once removed from the active list, looked on the changes of the times all along in silence and agony. But it was really regrettable that he could not show his seriousness of his personality and display his ability for the sake of saving our nation.

After all, General IRLKI is a tragic character amidst a great revolution of history. Nevertheless, in the last days of a tragic character, the essence of his personality is made manifest and emits its real light.

On this 5th day of September, 1947

At I.M.T.F.E.

DEPONENT SUGANAMI, Saburo (seal)

I, _____ hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At the same

Witness: (signed) H. SUOKA, Takaaki (seal)

O A T H

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell
the shole truth withholding nothing and adding
nothing.

SUGIYAMA, Saburo (seal)

極東國際軍事裁判所

亞米利加合衆國其他

對

荒木貞夫其他

宣
審
供
述
書

供
述
者
管
波
三
郎

自分儀我國ニ行ハルル方式ニ從ヒ先ツ別紙ノ通り宣審ヲ爲シタル上
次ノ如ク供述致シマス

私は管波三郎であります。東京都目黒區碑文谷三丁目二〇三五番に住んでおります。

私は元荒木大將の舊部下の一人でありまして、直接其言動に觸れる機会多く、又私自身當時の所謂「青年將校」として活動しておりましたから、特に大將が各種の革新運動に關係してゐたかどうかに就いてよく其真相を知悉して居ります。

世間では、彼を軍國主義者の如く誤解する者もありましたが其實彼はその軍國主義なるものを蛇蝎の如く忌み嫌つて居りました。而して其誤解を生じた原因として私の知り得たものは二つありました。

その一は、寧に臨んで極めて強い正義感から發する嚴格な態度その二は、彼の名聲に對する嫉妬と利害の不一致よりする反對派の逆宣傳の故でありました。私自身も最初彼を遠くから眺め又噂を聞いた時は彼を非常に武斷的な將軍と思つて居りました。然るに其後彼に接近し、彼の意見を屢々傾聽するに及んで、彼は全く私の豫想に反した極めて穩健な思想の持主であり軍國主義を蛇蝎の如く忌み嫌つて居たことが解りました。即ち昭和四年（一九二九年）八月彼が第六師團長として熊本に着任した時、私は其部下部隊たる鹿兒島歩兵第四十五聯隊附の一中尉でありましたが、彼が部下の指導教育の爲め屢々發した師團長訓示の中に於て、常に力説強調したところのものは、「皇軍意識の透徹」といふ言

業で表現せられた一個の道德主義 (Moralism) でありました。彼がこの (Moralism) の信奉者であつたといふ事は、昭和六年 (一九三一年) 八月教育總監部本部長として東京に轉任した後も、また同年十二月陸軍大臣に就任した後も、更にまた陸相をやめて野に下つた後も、終始一貫して變りないことを、私は其説話及面談によつて知り得ました。彼の本質は、端的に申して、直に平和を愛好する (Moralism) でありました。以下私は事實に即して少しく申し述べたいと思ひます。敘述の順序上私の關係して知り得た當時の青年將校なるものゝ實体から説明し様と思ひます。

所謂「青年將校」に就て。

一「青年將校」の概念

こゝに謂ふ「青年將校」とは、主として滿洲事變前後中少尉の階級に在つた者及び二・二六事件當時大、中、少尉の階級に在つた者を指します。但し所謂「櫻會」や統制派に屬する者は之れを含みません。

二青年將校の團結

第一世界大戰後の日本は種々の内部矛盾が嵩じて参りました。軍に對する社會的侮蔑、軍全般の内部的弱体化、壯丁農家の困窮、政府及軍首腦部の無自覺、政黨の横暴、財閥の我儘、外交の不振等で國家改造を斷行する以外此危機を切り抜ける道なしといふ状態に追ひつめられました。斯る状態は當然亦時代感覺に鋭敏な青年將校の思想にも影

響を及ぼし、やがて彼等自体から自主的に國家革新運動が起きて参りました。世間ではよく荒木、眞崎が青年將校を指導し煽動して革新運動をやらした等と誤解して居る向もありますが、これは全く眞相を辨へないものの誣言でありまして、後述するやうに一部爲にする所の者の宣傳より發したものであります。

事實青年將校が眞崎、荒木を知つたのは其運動を起してから數年經過した後でありまして私が直接觸れたところから申しまして、大正十四年（一九二五年）には既に秘密裡に青年將校の運動が起きておりましたし、此種運動と荒木、眞崎との關聯が彼是言はれる様になつたのは昭和六年（一九三一年）一月三月事件、滿洲事變、十月事件が起きました年）からであります。尤も私自身は士官學校時代、校長としての眞崎及び昭和五、六年（一九三〇、三一年）歩兵第四十五聯隊附時代第六師團長としての荒木を知つて居ります。然しそれは、校長と生徒、師團長と部下將校といふ關係に於て知つてゐただけでありまして、この二人の將軍から革新的思想や革新運動に就て指導を受けたり、煽動されたりしたことなど一度もありません。無いばかりか昭和六年（一九三一年）以降軍内に種々な事件が発生する度毎に、荒木等は常に抑制者の立場にありました。正直なところを告白しますならば青年將校中思想的に進んだ者は荒木、眞崎の思想に嫌らなかつたし、行動的に

尖鋭な分子は寧ろ荒木、眞崎の穩健さを甚だ不満に思つてゐた位であります。唯荒木の高潔な人格に對する尊敬の念のみは共通でありました。斯様な次第で青年將校の革新運動は其發生及過程に於て全く独自の立場で進んで參つたものであります。而して青年將校は一般に軍隊内部の封建的要素、派閥的勢力を併除せんとする傾向が強かつたので當時の陸軍中央部から甚だしく危険視され、常に憲兵の嚴重な監視下に置かれました。何か問題があると忽ち弾壓されるといふ有様でした。然し弾壓が加はる毎に其精神的團結は強化されました。私共は寧ろ當時傳へられてゐた共産黨やナチスの様な細胞組織を嫌ひまして、個人の自由な意志を尊重し、その自由が他を犯さるところの自治を基礎として、有機的に、連帶的に、國家の統一を強化せなければならぬと考へましたから、各地方毎に精神的な自治運動を展開するといふ風でありました。

三、我々仲間の青年將校と他の革新派との思慮の相異。

世間では、青年將校と言へば一概に、主として地方軍隊に所屬して前述の如き自治軍動を展開してゐる中少尉級の青年士官と、主として陸軍中央部の幕僚の職に在つて全体主義的革新思想を抱く佐官級の壯年將校とを混同してゐる向が多いやうですが、此兩者の思想は根本的に相異なるものがありました。此區別を明確にしておかなければ爾後軍内に起きました諸事件の真相を摑むことが出来ません。我々仲間の青年將校（以下單に「青年將校」と申します）は主として地方部隊に勤務して居りましたが、當時の險惡な世相の中に年々入營する兵士に接し、農山漁村の窮状と、政治の腐敗と、軍の弛緩をまのあたりに視て、憂國の至情禁ずる能はず、ついに國家國軍の改革を志すに至りました。其國家改造の原理を國軍肅正の要點は何であつたか、之を要約して申しますと青年將校は、社會の進化を、階級闘争からではなく、寧ろ階級の協調、一体化から期待し之が爲、日本に於ては、その歴史、その傳統に基づいて、天皇を超階級的存在者として全國民の精神的中心となしこの中心に結ばつて同胞愛の深い家族國家を建設せんとする有機的連營主義の原理に立ち、國家改造の前提條件として國軍の肅正が必須であると考へ、この肅正の眼目は將校の思想的覺醒にあると信じました。然るに當時の全軍將校の間には滔々として立身出世に

腐心するエゴイズムが横行し、特に陸軍大學校出身者の特權意識による學閥と他面の封建的派閥との絡み合つた勢力が一大牙城を形成する。めて、我々の進まんとする前途に容易ならざる困難を想はせました。斯くて我々は此困難と戦ふ爲に重大なる決意を爲し、自ら榮達を求めず、從つて皆何れも相當の能力を有しながら陸軍大學校に入らず、地方の部隊附將校の地位に甘んじ、先づ將校團のプロシヤ型を打破して眞の日本化を計り、將兵一体、國軍肅正の礎石を築かんとしました。ところが之に反して他の群は、多くは陸軍大學校を卒業して軍中央部の幕僚勤務に服し、大なり少なり權力執行の立場に立ち、且つ新興獨伊等の空氣にも接して漸次ファシズム的傾向が顯著になりました。其露骨な最初の現はれが彼の三月事件（昭和六年一九三一年）であります。此事件は未遂に終りましたが斯かる大事件が當時の軍中央部に於て放任されてゐるといふ事が段々地方側青年將校の耳に傳はつて参りますと、從來屢々無法な彈壓を受けておましただけに、その憤激は甚だしく、今後は地方的自治運動のみでは何時如何なる事態が発生するやも解らない、宜しく我々は中央部の幕僚ファシズムの動きを嚴重に監視警戒し、要すれば身ら進んで事前にその渦中に飛び込んで行つてファシズム革命を阻止し、或はその運動を日本的な國軍の肅正と國家改造へ是正誘導すべきだといふ積極的意見を抱く者も現はれました。

た。然し兩者は結局和合出來ず、後の十月事件を経ていよいよ鋭い對立を示すやうになりました。無論數多い青年將校中には一時中央部の幕僚連の傘下に入つた者もありましたが、間もなく其殆んど全部が離れて仕舞ひました。其原因は前に述べた根本の、理念の相意に基づくものであります。しかし我々も他の群もよかれ悪かれ當時の國情を憂へた者は其意見に相異こそあれ純なものであつたのであります。此外に智恵のある利口な一群は最初は日和見をし後には巧妙に權力を握つて所謂獨逸流の日本建設の中心となり、我々は却つて夫等の彈壓を受け、汚名さへ被るに至つたので、此點については今でも遺憾に存ずる次第であります。

之等の過程を通じ荒木氏より訓戒、抑制せられて反省したところあれ、我等の行動には一度だも賞意を表せられた事はありません。荒木氏は私及び我々青年將校に對し三月、十月、五、一五、二〇、二六其他の非合法手段に對しては其度毎に口を極めて皇軍將校の取るべき態度でないとして深く戒飾されました。

四、三月事件、十月事件、五、一五事件、二、二六事件、と青年將校との關係に就て。

◎三月事件は最早世間周知の如く軍の中央部（陸軍省、參謀本部等）の將佐官級に於て極秘裡に計畫されたクーデター未遂事件でありまして、地方側青年將校は全然關知しないところでありました。

◎十月事件は三月事件の延長擴大であります。指導總が參謀本部の佐官級に移つて居る點が相異して居ります。此事件には青年將校の一部が關與して居ります。此事件は後述する如く荒木大將の決死的説得によつて事前に鎮撫されました。

◎五、一五事件には荒木大將を信頼する青年將校の自重の結果陸軍側からは一人の青年將校も参加せず單に士官候補生のみが参加しました。これは年少の故によく事情を察せず、血氣に逸つて海軍側青年將校の勸誘に應じ、陸軍側青年將校と連絡を絶つて飛び出したものであります。

◎二、二六事件は在京部隊の青年將校が主体となり、第一師團の滿洲移駐説に憤慨し之れを防止せんがため肅軍と同時に一舉國家革新を斷行せんとの意圖の下に蹶起したものであります。此蹶起に際し地方に在つた青年將校の大部分には無連絡でありました。尙茲に注目すべきは荒木大將に對し是等蹶起將校が不信任の態度をと

つたこととであります。それは荒木大將の意見は穩健であり、不穩計畫が一寸でも彼れに判れば直ちに皇軍精神で説得され中止させられるので今度には決死だから邪魔されぬやうにと嚴に秘匿したのであります。以上の諸事件は國內の腐敗を肅正する事が其主目的でありました。荒木大將と青年將校との關係に就て。

一、十月事件に荒木大將が擔がれた理由。

此の事件に荒木大將が擔がれた事には二様の意味があります。即ち其の一は十月事件の主役者たる急進派は自己の階級が佐官級であつた爲ロボットとして上に將官級を擔ぐ必要があつた事其の二は徳望ある人物を中心に据える事により一般の人心を收攬して廣く革命勢力を動員することが出来ること考へた事。斯様な意味に於て十月事件の首謀者連は荒木大將を選んだのであります。無論荒木當人は何等關知するところではなく、却つて擔いだ荒木により逆に抑制される結果となりました。

十月事件を抑制した荒木大將の行動は流石に道義的の信念の強い彼の面目を發揮して居ります。

事前の陰謀を知つた當時の軍首脳部（陸軍大臣南次郎參謀總長金谷範三など）は處置に當惑し其時次官級の先任者であつた教育總監部本部長の荒木中將を招致して速かに事件を調査し鎮撫すべきを命じました。

彼は調査の結果橋本中佐、長勇少佐等が中心たることを知り之等の者が屯する築地の料亭に乗り込んだのであります。此時萬一の危険を慮つて岡村寧次大佐（後の大將）も當時陸軍省補任課長が隨行しました。其所に至り長少佐等に面會し懇々説得するや一部には稍々反省の色が見えました。荒木は脅威の中にも平然と尙説いてやまず遂に長を説伏しました。傍の岡村大佐は長座の危険を慮り無理に荒木を連れ歸り陸軍大臣たる南大將に報告せしめその後軍首脳部は唯寄々會談していた許りといふので憲兵をして首謀者數名を抑留軟禁するの處置を執り無事に済みました。之より先私（當時歩兵第三聯隊附中尉として在京）は所謂十月事件の直前單獨で荒木中將を其私邸に訪問しそれとなく世相に事寄せて決死的所見を開示しましたが丁度そこに同席して居た小畑敏四郎大佐（當時陸軍大學校教官）後の中將と共に荒木中將は過去三月事件等の例を引用し皇軍として私的に蠢動する事は皇軍を辱しむるものなりとて強く戒節を受け青年將校の自重を懇こと諭されました。なので私は之れを他の同志にも傳へ私共の仲間には爾來皆自重論を取るに至りました。若し荒木中將が一方に於て青年將校を鎮め他方に於て首謀者連を制するといふ決死的な行動に出でなかつたならば或は十月事件は勃發し大混亂を惹起して居たかも知れぬと關係者の一人は私に語りました。

二、青年將校は荒木陸相就任を推進したことはない。

上述の通り十月事件が未然に鎮撫されましたのは全く荒木中將の決死的設得によるものでありまして此事件後餘燼尙熄まず暗に再舉を計らんとする氣配濃厚なる際軍の混亂を防止し國內を安定せしむるは唯荒木中將の人格手腕に俟つ外はないと云ふ武藤教育總監始め軍首腦者達の考へが荒木氏の陸相就任を見るに至つた主因であつたと其後小畑敏四郎中將より聽きました。此場合青年將校が推進したといふ事實は少しもありません。云ふまでもなく青年將校の地位は低く従つて陸相就任を推進するが如き政治的策動の餘地もなく、又その必要も領り認めませんでした。といふのは私共は陸軍大臣としての荒木よりも寧ろ教育總監としての荒木に期待したからであります。

三、荒木陸相就任後の人事大異動

荒木中將は昭和六年（一九三一年）十二月陸相就任と共に人事の大異動を斷行しました。そして三月事件以來の非合法的尖鋭分子を悉く地方部隊に轉任せしめ専ら軍務に専念せしめました。其結果却つて荒木陸相は彼等から非常な恨を買ひ現狀維持派の巨頭などと稱して悪罵されるに至りました。

四、一五事件に陸軍側將校が自重した理由。
十月事件を経験し、更に三月事件に逆つて、其真相を究明するに至つた青

年將校は、次第に思索と反省を深めつゝ日本の國体が根ざすところの原理に目覺め東西古今を一貫する普通の道に則つて現實の日本を「ニッポン」の國に高めなければならぬ事を悟り從來の如き非合法運動を排して合法的に進むべきを約し、且至誠純忠の人荒木陸相を信頼して今後決して輕率盲動をしないと申合せをしました。斯る心境に漸次青年將校が到達しましたのは一に荒木、小畑等の將軍が機會ある毎に或は公的に或は私的に切々と訓戒説得された其感化の賜であります。

五。一五事件に於て先づ事前に海軍側青年將校が計畫の内容を打明けて陸軍側青年將校に参加協力を求めました。

然しこの勧誘を陸軍側は拒否しましたので海軍側は密かに士官候補生に接近し其後一切如何なる話が進んであるか陸軍側青年將校に解らなくなりました。これより先（昭和七年一月）私は歩兵第三師隊から第一次上海事變の最後の動員部隊として出征し、間もなく停戦となりましたので同年五月初東京に歸還しましたが不在中の出來事を友人から聞き一近頃士官候補生の消息が全然判明しない。海軍側と秘密に連絡して何か企らんでゐる形跡があるから至急探査してくれ」と依頼され八方手段を盡しました。したが遂に手掛を得ない儘約二週間を経過しました。

然るに突如十五日夕刻けたゞましい新聞號外の報道で事件の勃發を知り

五月

愕然とした次第であります。私は真相を確かむるため取敢へず陸相官邸に馳せつけました。然し陸相は閣議中で不在、偶々其所に居合せた小畑少將に面會し、次の様な事を申上げて辭去しました。「陸軍側青年將校はかねて荒木陸相より訓示されてあります通り此際決して輕率を動致しませぬから此點後顧の憂なく事態の收拾に當つて敢言度い」之を要するに五。一五事件に陸軍の青年將校が自重しました理由は以上述べた如く荒木、小畑の兩將軍のかねての指導宜しきを得たからに外なりません。

五、軍新派の荒木に對する失望。

十月事件の缺撫、三月事件以來の人學庸正、五・一五事件に青年將校を自軍せしめたる事等々、荒木の存在は常に非合法手段に訴へる軍新派の行動を抑制する役割を演じて参りましたが故に軍新派の連中は入なる幻滅を感じその失望は甚だしかつた。天皇はやがて非難となり、評語となり評撃となつた。その一つの現れが昭和八年七月の神戶兵隊事件に於て元不も亦爾藤内閣の閣僚の一人として狙はれテロ目標の一人となつた所以であります。

荒木 陸相退任後の 陸軍

一 皇道派と統制派

▲世間でよく皇道派或は統制派と言ひますから一言之れを述べて意見を明にしたいと思ひます。

皇道派とは自ら附した名符ではありませんそれは元不入將が陸相就任前からの言説中屢々「皇道」なる言葉を使用された爲元不の人格を尊敬し彼を精神的に支持する人々に對し與隊半分に誑れ言ふとなくつけた名符で誠意を持つ人も斯く稱して居りました。

統制派なる名符も私はよく知らぬが中央集權的統制萬能の思想を持ち軍内秩序維持の爲の統制主義更に又國家改造の統制經濟を主張する幕僚連に對

して誰云ふとなく附した名稱と忌みます。此連中は自治的なる青年將校の運動とは對立し且機會ある毎に之等を彈壓して居たのです。其の如く根本的意見の相違から自然派別が生じたのであつて組織的派別は全然ありません。我々の青年將校は又獨白の立場をとり之等と此同を延けて自らを「國體原理派青年將校」と稱して居りました。更にもう一つ茲に附言して置きますが國體原理派の思想は歐密に申しますと皇道派將校の思想とも異なる點がありました。然し彼等青年將校は人道的に尊敬する人物を皇道派將校中に見出して之を信頼する傾向が強かつたので所謂統制派から廣義の皇道派の中を含められ従つて皇道派に對する攻撃は常に國體原理派青年將校に對する彈壓と同時に平行的でありました。

B 皇道派と統制派との根本的相違。

同一國家の同一國草の中に在つて斯くも對蹠的な存在を見出す事は一見不可思議な現象であります。然しこれは敵ふべくもなき事實でありま

す。以下簡単に兩者の根本的相違を申述べます。

皇道派は眞の世界平和を思召し給ふ天皇の大御心を日本國民の道とし、同時に日本軍隊の精神として平和護符の保障方としての軍隊を正しく完成することとを尊念した。之れが代表的人物は荒不、眞崎、小畑でありま

すが殊に荒木大將の思想、精神を窺ふことによつて皇道派の本質がよく

理解出来るのであります。荒不天將が強い信念を持つた *Movements* である事は前にも申述べました。が新たに茲に彼が「目的と手段との關係」に就て如何なる考へを抱いて居るかと云ふ點を明かに致しませう。此の點に就ての彼の考へは實に徹底したもので、私が彼より聴取した處を要約して見ますと次の通りであります。「凡そ或る手段を講ずるに當つて良心の苛責の有無はその最高の標識である。世上『目的は手段を正當化する』といふ者あるが然し善い目的は決して悪い手段を正當化するものではない。尤も人生に於ては善い手段を以て止しい目的を達し得る爲めには大障害に逢着する場合は善くない。斯る場合誠感を良心の君主は往々にして正しい目的を放棄すべきかそれとも又不善い手段に走るべきかに迷ふものである。まさしく之れは良心の悲劇である。然しながら吾人は飽く迄この悲劇を超越して如何なる場合に於ても正しき目的の爲めの正しき手段を探らなければならぬ。斯くして假令一時敗者と成ることがあつても終にそれが最後の勝利を得るものである事を固く信ぜねばならぬ。又戦争に於ても「軍備に依頼して弱國を併呑し以て利慾を恣にせんとする爲味の草國主義」に反對するは勿論、皇道宣布とか東洋又は世界平和の爲と云ふ其目的は正しいものであるであつても之を遂行する手段として戦争に訴へる事は斷じて日本の道ではないと語られました。

彼は「若し日本軍隊を長崎戦争に用ゐる様なことがあればそれこそ白らの
 破滅であり、それは既に皇軍ではない」とまで極言して居りました。
 以上は彼の著しい長所を示すものであります。然し當時の日本の内外事情
 に於て彼の常に採つてゐる道徳主義は反對派の不正不肖な手段で付伏せを
 喰つて陥穽に落されたりしたのを見ました。彼が陸相就任後政治的能力が
 ないと言はれたり又退任後日本が戦争熱に融られて深淵に再落しようとする
 危機を彼の道徳的堅持性と中樞を離れた地位と清氣より来る政治的無力
 の立場からはどうすることも出来ず深刻な苦悶と憂愁の裡にすべてを見送
 らねばならなかつた等は洵に氣の毒の至りであります。然も彼が一反正義
 観に傾倒すると見違へる様を透明な態度で前送し犠牲的であり同情的であ
 りますがそこには大なる手腕も發揮するとは定評で兎に角流石は怒らすに
 限るとの評もありますが私の知る範圍では過評と考へます。
 之に以て新派の著しい特徴は目的の爲には餘り手段を怠らない一偏の
 マキヤベリズムの信奉者の傾きがあつたと思はるゝ點にあります。故に彼
 等は國內的にも對外的にも絶えず智慧が國を覆ふ力を求めました。彼等は昭
 和九年以後皇道派を没落せしめ昭和十一年國体原理派を粉砕して以て内
 ける権力を掌握する事になつたのであります。

二、二六事件と青年將校

一、何故起つたか。

二、二六事件は何故起つたかの直接的直因に就ては未だに闡明されて居ないのであります。

二、二六事件に蹶起した青年將校は主として在京部隊に所属する者でありまして統制派にとつては最後の反抗勢力であり最終の驅逐目標になつてゐたものであります。兎角對外問題に没頭してゐた統制派と稱せらるゝ人々に對し青年將校は疑懼の念を抱き寧ろ毎に之れを素制して居りましたので彼等は青年將校が軍中央部のお膝下に擴張つてゐる事に極度の不安と不便とを感じついに未曾有の異例として第一師團を滿洲に移駐せしむることに決したのであります。

從來は帝都治安の爲大戦争以外は動かさかつた第一師團にこの異例の措置が下された。此報に接して在京青年將校は統制派が愈々彼等の持論である政策を思ふがまゝにするのではないかと痛憤し急遽その對策を擬議した結果蹶起の積極案が自重の消極案を凌いで決行となつた次第である。在京部隊青年將校より聞きまされた。青年將校が萬止むを得ざる處置として其非合法手段は正善にあらざりしも已むに已まれずとし且一旦蹶起を決意した以上單に統制派を打倒するのみならず國家の全面的革新にまで直進せんとしたのであります。私は地方の師團附でありまして直接參加はしませんがシンバとして處罰されるに至りました。

こゝにも多くの疑を存します。

二、二六事件の裁判は秘密裁判であり一種の革命裁判でありました。辯護人も附せられず公開もされず上告も不可能であり是初から予定の筋書通り進行させ既に割當てられた刑期が關係被告に對しても言ひ渡されたばかりであります。こゝにも我々は多くの疑問を拍かせました。又荒木氏は文部大臣當時豫備役軍人では何の御役にも立たぬよと事變終熄に貢獻し得ぬ無限の苦衷を述べられた事があります。が政變の度毎に心ある國民の多大の期待を裏切つて遂に支那事變より大東亞戦争へと際限なく展開する様を見て私は悲憤の涙にくれながら荒木氏を訪問し教を受けつゝ常に自重して居りました。

ニ、荒木と關係なかりし理由

二、二六事件の蹶起將校の一部は所謂「國体原理派」に屬するものであり、當然皇道派を支持するものであつた筈ですが彼等は此事件に於て荒木大將（當時軍事參議官）を忌避しました。彼等は荒木の人格は尊敬してゐましたけれどもその穩健なる性格温情主義、特に其の「目的と手段との關係」に就ての考へ方の中に見解の相違があり此非常の場合荒木大將を忌避するに至つたのであります。青年將校は無論統制派のマキヤベリズムに反對しました。然しまた荒木大將の如何なる場合にも善の目的の爲に善の手段を用ゐねばならぬと嚴しく限定されたところに多少の不滿を持つて居たのであります。

結局荒木大將は一個の強い信念を持つモラリストとして終始しました。フアツシズムに反対し、ミリタリズムに反抗し、滿洲事變後の處理に當り上海事變と共に兵亂を鎮め支那事變から大東亞戦争にかけては不斷に反対の立場に立つて居りましたが、陸軍に於ては一度び現役を離れた者は全く軍に對し無力化し又たとへ現役に在る際も人事權を持たぬ立場の者の發言は企畫や實行の中樞にある幕僚から馬鹿にされるといふ實情でありますから一度現役を去つて一老將たりし荒木が終始苦悶の内に時局を見送りしは之又餘儀なき事でありました。唯救國のためにあの直面目な材幹を發揮し得なかつた事は洵に千秋の恨事でありました。

畢竟荒木大將は歴史の大きな廻轉の中に於ける一個の悲劇的人物であります。然し悲劇的人物の最後には彼自身の本質が闡明され其の光を放つて居ります。

昭和二十二年（一九四七年）九月五日 於

極東國際軍事裁判所

供 述 者 菅 波 三 郎

右ハ當立會人ノ面前ニテ宣誓シ且ツ署名捺印シタルコトヲ證明致シマス

同 日 於 同 所

立 會 人 蓮 岡 高 明

宣
審
書

フ 良心ニ從ヒ眞實ヲ述ベ何事ヲモ黙秘セズ又何事ヲモ附加セザルコトヲ誓

(署名
捺印)

菅
波
三
郎