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Exhibit # _____

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

AMERICAN EMBASSY

Tokyo, June 7, 1939.

No. 3936

SUBJECT: JAPAN'S FOREIGN POLICY IN RELATION TO THE
SITUATION IN EUROPE.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL: FOR THE SECRETARY AND UNDER SECRETARY

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I had the honor in my telegram no. 245, May 26, 8 p.m.,
to present an analysis of certain trends in Japanese
thought with regard to foreign policy in relation to the
situation now developing in Europe. I observed that there

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were elements in Japan - not to be confused with certain congenial, but withal ineffectual, persons educated abroad who have been telling us that reaction to Japan's China policy was "just around the corner" - who realized that, in the event of a war in Europe, the maintenance by Japan of neutrality between the democratic and totalitarian camps would afford Japan little security, and that national security could be assured in the long run only by liquidating the conflict with China. I was not unaware of the need for resting an observation of this nature on a reasonably firm basis, and it is my purpose in this despatch to lay before the Department the circumstances, some of personal knowledge and the others which derive by deduction, on which my view was based. As there is no discussion in the press or in any other public forum of the question whether or not Japan should align itself with Germany and Italy - indeed, any reference by the press to this question is officially interdicted - information with regard to thought trends has come to me largely by word of mouth.

The first conversation which needs to be recorded took place on May 16, at a luncheon which was given in honor of the Ambassador and Mrs. Grew by a Japanese who, while holding no official position, is a close friend and confidant of high officials of the Court and of Prince Konoye, Minister

without Portfolio, and Marquis Kido, Minister of the Interior. He is in a position to exercise through various contacts considerable influence on the Government. As we left the table, our host drew the Ambassador and me into another room and talked substantially along the following lines:

Although the Japanese Government has decided not to conclude a military alliance with Germany and Italy, there was being exerted on the Government, not only by Germany and Italy but by reactionary groups in Japan, strong pressure toward entering into some arrangement with the latter countries which would reaffirm the solidarity among the nations whose policies were opposed by the democratic nations. The groups to which he belonged had succeeded in defeating the proposal to conclude the alliance and are now doing their best to defeat the "strengthening of the Anti-Comintern Pact", or at least to prevent it from becoming a political link with Germany and Italy; but it was difficult to meet the argument of those who had advocated the alliance and are now favoring close association with Germany and Italy, that Japan cannot afford to be isolated. Germany and Italy are urging Japan "to come over to their side", while the democratic nations are turning to Japan a very cold shoulder. If, therefore, the democratic nations,

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especially the United States, could indicate to Japan that restoration of good relations with Japan is desired and that the way is open for Japan to align herself with the democratic nations, but not against the totalitarian states, those Japanese who are working for precisely those objectives would have their hand greatly strengthened.

The Ambassador said that he was very much interested in the views just expressed, but that it must be obvious that the restoration of peace and good relations between Japan and China must be a condition precedent to the restoration of good relations between Japan and the United States and other democratic nations. He could not, therefore, recommend that his Government give any gesture of welcome to Japan unless he were first satisfied that the terms of peace with China which Japan had in view could be reconciled with China's peace terms and would meet with the approval of the American Government.

Our host then talked very vaguely about the readiness of Japan to withdraw from central and South China, but when asked to give specifications he replied that a full statement on Japanese peace terms might better come from the Minister for Foreign Affairs. He undertook to report the conversation to Mr. Arita, and to suggest to Mr. Arita that he give the Ambassador a precise explanation of

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Japanese objectives in China during the conversation which the Ambassador had arranged to have with Mr. Arita on May 18th.

Mr. and Mrs. Arita were entertaining the Ambassador and Mrs. Grew at luncheon on May 17, and Mr. Grew prearranged with me that I should endeavor during the luncheon party to ascertain from Mr. Arita whether our host of the previous day had consulted him. I accordingly took advantage of a favorable opportunity to engage Mr. Arita in conversation. I found that he was quite familiar with the discussion of the previous day. He said that there had been a suggestion that he give Mr. Grew an assurance that Japan would withhold any action to "strengthen the Anti-Comintern Pact" until Mr. Grew returned to Washington and had an opportunity to discuss with his Government the possibility of making to Japan some "gesture of welcome". Mr. Arita said that there was no important opinion in the country unfavorable to the measure which had been proposed to combat communistic activities, and that, if the time became ripe for the conclusion of the agreement under discussion with Germany and Italy, the Japanese Government intended to proceed with it. He could, however, assure Mr. Grew that the agreement would contain no military, political or economic clauses; but with this proviso - if it were found that these activities were being instigated by the Soviet Government, the counter-measures

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proposed would have to be directed against that Government.

Mr. Arita then passed on to the negotiations between the Soviet and British Governments concerning the "common front against aggression". He said that Japan is very anxious to avoid involvement in the affairs of Europe, but that Japan could not ignore the fact that Russia straddled Europe and Asia, and that, whether Japan liked it or not, its policies and actions form a bridge by which events in the Far East and in Europe act and react on each other. The British Ambassador had, he said, given him definite assurances that the arrangement under discussion by the British and Soviet Governments would specifically be made inapplicable, but he (Mr. Arita) replied that any arrangement which formed the basis for the close collaboration contemplated by Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union in respect of their common interests in Europe would be bound to bring about similar collaboration among them in the conduct of their policies in the Far East. He delivered himself at some length and with considerable show of heat over Sir Robert Craigie's insistence that the assurances given Mr. Arita should dissolve any Japanese anxiety with regard to the effective scope of the proposed arrangement. Mr. Arita concluded the conversation with me with the observation that decision over Japan's attitude vis-a-vis the situation developing in Europe would have to

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be withheld until results of the Anglo-Soviet negotiations were known.

A full account of the Ambassador's conversation on May 18 will be found in his telegram No. 235, May 18, 7 p.m.

The impressions which the Ambassador and I had formed of Mr. Arita's views as expressed in the conversations of May 17 and 18 agreed in every respect. It seemed to us that Mr. Arita, far from indicating any eagerness to find a way to approach the democratic nations, was preoccupied with the effects on the Far East of the establishment of the "front against aggression" and was not in a conciliatory mood. The Ambassador came, therefore, to the conclusion, as I did, that there was no justification for believing that desire to bring Japan into line with the democratic nations as against the totalitarian nations animated the Japanese Government as such.

Whether by accident or by design, I was approached on the same day, May 18, by a Japanese hitherto unknown to me but who had made the acquaintance of the Ambassador as a fellow passenger during a voyage across the Pacific, with the suggestion that I have a "chat", as he put it, with the Prime Minister. I asked the gentleman to call again, as I wished to consider the matter. I informed the Ambassador of the call and of the suggestion that I have a talk with the Prime Minister. Mr. Grew said that he had

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formed a favorable impression of Mr. Fujii, the person who had called on me, and that he saw no reason why I should not return a favorable reply. When Mr. Fujii called again, I said that I would be glad to have an opportunity to make the acquaintance of the Prime Minister, but that I had heard rumors of the possibility of a change of government and wondered, therefore, whether a call at that time would be opportune. Returning on the following day, Mr. Fujii brought an invitation from Baron Hiranuma to dinner on May 23, when he intended to explain his purpose in sending through Mr. Grew his message to the Secretary, and word to the effect that no change in the government was impending. I accepted the invitation. Mr. Fujii then emphasized the importance of keeping a profound secret the forthcoming talk. He said that Baron Hiranuma's political position was reasonably secure, but that the alignment of factions within the Government over European policy was so delicate as to require that the Prime Minister act very cautiously.

Mr. Fujii called for me on the evening of May 23. As we went in my car, which bears an Embassy license tag, Mr. Fujii proposed that we alight some distance from the Prime Minister's private residence and go the rest of the way on foot; we did. At the gate of the residence there stood a number of policemen, who, although obviously

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surprised by seeing a foreigner, made no attempt to stop me. The servants were prepared for my visit, but I have reason to believe that they, as well as two female relations of the Prime Minister's who served us later at dinner, and no knowledge whatever of my identity. It might be added that the residence, which is situated in the suburbs, is small and quite unpretentious and would barely grace a small tradesman. These details, while inconsequential, may perhaps reflect my impressions at the moment.

Baron Hiranuma received me very courteously. He said that he unfortunately had few opportunities to meet foreigners and thus to receive at first hand the impressions of foreigners with regard to conditions in various parts of the world. The situation in Europe was, in his view, a delicate one, and he felt confident that he could obtain from an American a more objective appraisal of that situation than he would be likely to procure from a European.

I expressed regret that I was not in a position to give him any information other than that which was public knowledge. There then ensued a colloquy on the situation in Europe, during which Baron Hiranuma displayed knowledge not only of a factual nature but of political trends in

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Europe which surprised me. One of the points brought out which, in his view, made for danger in Europe was that Chancellor Hitler - with the objectives which he has in mind for Germany to achieve - provides an issue around which all elements in Great Britain can rally; the imperialists, who do not propose to tolerate a Germany which can pretend to equality with Great Britain; the industrialists, who fear German commercial competition; and, finally, the Jews, radicals and even the Germanophiles, who, vie with each other in their hatred of Hitler.

Baron Hiranuma then said that the possibility of a war arising in Europe was one which he contemplated with horror. It would inevitably result in the total destruction of civilization, as no nation, however remote from the seat of war, would hope to escape the eventual consequences even though it might be fortunate to avoid direct involvement. He had publicly stated on several occasions that Japan could never be a democracy or a totalitarian state, and that Japan could make its greatest contribution by bringing together in harmonious and peaceful relations the two groups of nations. There were, he continued, elements in Japan which considered that Japan could not afford to maintain a condition of isolation and that her security demanded that she enter into "special relations" with Germany and Italy. He was insisting, however, that Japan follow what he termed "moral diplomacy". A nation's

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existence was not to be measured by decades, and it was essential, therefore, that statesmen charged with the destinies of national fix their attention on long term objective rather than on gaining favorable tactical positions, which were after all, ephemeral. The most important of these objectives was a stabilized peace to replace interludes of preparation for the next war. Japan, like the United States, was not directly involved in the troubles of Europe; and it was his thought that these two nations, which were the only Great Powers situated outside of Europe, were in a position to exercise a moderating influence on Europe. To exercise that influence was a duty which they owed their own peoples, for the downfall of Europe would inevitably bring with it the downfall of the rest of the world. In his opinion, the first step which had to be taken was to check the tendency toward the division of Europe into two politically hostile camps. He wondered whether the views of the American Government were responsive to those which he had expressed in his message to the Secretary.

I said that the American Government had taken a lead, in respect of both time and emphasis. In making known discord fact that nations are today interdependent and that discord between any nations is a matter of concern to all others. His message to the Secretary did not, I said, contain any definitive suggestion as to how the United States and Japan

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might proceed toward averting war in Europe. The principal difficulty, in my opinion, in the way of the collaboration which he had suggested in talking to me was Japan's policies and actions in China. I felt certain that the American Government would, in other more happy circumstances, have welcomed Japanese cooperation toward alleviating the threat to peace in Europe which, the great majority of Americans believed, arises from the policies and actions of Germany and Italy; and I doubted whether the American people would favor collaboration with a nation which it believed to be following in the Far East precisely those policies and actions that are considered to be the root of the trouble in Europe. I also said that the American people have laid before them nearly every day reports of bombings of American property and of other instances of violations of American rights and interests in China. The Foreign Office was trying to exculpate the Japanese military authorities by pleading military necessity or inadvertence, but enough had happened to justify belief that the the Japanese authorities, in China at least, were systematically and deliberately trying to expel American and other foreign interests from China. The views of the American people in these respects were, I said, very definitely formed. I could not but feel, therefore, that the adjustment of the conflict in China on terms satisfactory to all concerned would have to be a condition precedent to that degree of

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collaboration between the United States and Japan which could reasonably be expected to bring about the desired results in Europe.

The Prime Minister observed that he was well aware of the state of feeling which prevailed in the United States against Japan. The American people had assumed that Japan had deliberately provoked the conflict in China with a view to seizing the more populated and productive parts of that country, but he felt confident that the American Government realized that it had not been the original intention or desire of Japan to do anything more than to protect its rights in North China. It was also supposed by Americans that Japan intended to close the Open Door in China; and to his regret the actions of the Japanese authorities in China were not entirely reconcilable with the desire of the Japanese Government to respect foreign rights and interests in China. But he wondered whether the American Government realized that the Japanese people labored under a very real feeling of grievance against the Occidental Powers, especially Great Britain. When the Great War broke out, Japan was an ally of Great Britain. There were no legal obligations on Japan to support her ally, but she conceived that she had a moral obligation to do so. She accordingly declared war against Germany, her navy undertook operations against the German

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fleet in the Pacific, her merchant marine cooperated in various ways, and finally her military forces eliminated Germany from Shantung. "The only thanks we got from Great Britain", continued Baron Hiranuma, "was the abrogation of that very alliance which inspired Japan to support Great Britain." Again, the rights which Japan had acquired in Manchuria as a result of her war with Pussia and later by agreement with China were essential to Japan; nevertheless, the efforts of China to prejudice those rights were regarded by Great Britain and the United States with complacence, if not with benevolence; China took courage to persist, with the result that Japan had to resort to force in 1931 to protect those rights. Finally, the Japanese people came to the conclusion that the Nine Power Treaty and the Naval Treaties operated, not to stabilize peace in the Far East, but to bind Japan against safeguarding her interests in China. So long as the Japanese people felt that it had just cause for grievance, it was politically impossible for his government or any government which would succeed him to bring about complete equality of opportunity in China for all nations.

The Japanese people, Baron Hiranuma continued, have considerable sympathy for Germany and Italy, as they conceive these countries to be in many important respects in the same position as Japan. It was not to be expected

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that Germany would have permitted herself to remain under the restrictions of the Versailles Treaty, nor that Italy would have been content to be dependent on other nations for supplied of raw materials. At the same time, the consequences of efforts on their part to redress their grievances by force, or of the stubborn refusal of the democratic nations to offer to correct these grievances could not possible to confined to the protagonists in the European quarrel but would have to be shared by other nations. He referred to my observation that the settlement of the China conflict would probably have to be a condition precedent to joint American-Japanese efforts to moderate the situation in Europe. If that were to be the view of the American Government, any hope of proceeding along the course which he had in mind would have to be abandoned. The objectives which Japan has had in China are essential for her security in a world of sanctions, embargoes, closing of markets to foreign competition, and lack of free access to raw materials, and so long as such conditions exist any moderation or her objectives in China and, therefore, of her peace terms, could not be considered. Nevertheless if conditions could be brought about which would assure to all nations markets for the world's goods on the basis of quality and price and supplies of the materials which they needed, the importance to Japan of

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securing a market and sources of raw materials in China would greatly diminish; and by the same token there would not be the urge that there now is on Germany and Italy to expand at the expense of weaker and smaller nations.

Baron Hiranuma stated that the conditions which brought about the situations in the Far East and Europe are not local but universal in character, and that neither situation could be settled in a manner calculated to bring about a stabilized peace unless the conditions which brought them about were corrected.

Baron Hiranuma said that the belief was widely held abroad that Japan was considering a military alliance with Germany and Italy. He had endeavored to explain frankly the basis of Japanese sympathy for Germany and Italy, and he could say quite definitely that the basis of what appeared to be a concerting of Japanese policy with that of Germany and Italy lay in the fact that all three countries are in the same economic strategic position. He personally was of the opinion that Japan, whose government would for all time to come rest on the sanctity of the Imperial Family, could not tie itself by special relations to any foreign government whose stability depended on the continued existence and political prestige of one individual. There were both in Germany and Italy political currents

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flowing beneath the surface which, in his view, would gravely prejudice confidence in any political arrangement, such as an alliance, which Japan might make with whose countries. Hidden dissident elements would be certain to make themselves felt in time of war and thus are to be reckoned as a threat to the success of German and Italian arms.

At this point we were interrupted by notice that dinner was served. The conversation during dinner was not in any way pertinent to the subject of this despatch, being confined to discussions of points in Chinese philosophy, personal reminiscences, and so on, the Prime Minister discoursing in a most interesting manner.

Returning to his study, the Prime Minister said that he wished to draw together the various threads of our conversations, as follows:

The United States and Japan were the only powers which could help to prevent the crystallization of the trend toward the division of Europe into armed camps. There can, however, be no confident hope that a permanent peace can be established until the world-wide economic and political conditions which bring about unrest in Europe and in the Far East can be corrected: and if an international conference can be called to solve the problems which create unrest, Japan would be prepared to agree to

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the inclusion of the Far Eastern situation among the problems to be discussed. Before any call for such a conference could be issued, Great Britain and France, and Germany and Italy, would have to be sounded out. If the President were prepared to make a confidential approach to the European democracies; he would be glad to approach Germany and Italy; and, if there were returned favorable replies by these nations, he would be glad to have the President call the conference under such conditions as might be agreed upon after discussion through normal diplomatic channels.

I wish to make it clear, before setting forth certain conclusions which I draw from these conversations, that I do not put forward the views of those Japanese - even though they be persons of great importance and influence - who harbor hopes of restoring good relations with the democratic nations, as being necessarily the views of the Japanese Government. These are, however, the views of a powerful element in the Government; they may prevail or they may not, but they cannot be ignored.

Any observer who is in any way sensitive to things not seen would, if he were in Tokyo today, become aware of the groping for security against the gathering storm in Europe. I should perhaps add parenthetically that the

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European situation today has assumed primary proportions, and that it would be visionary to suppose that the present confusion concerning the course which Japan should follow is due to despondence over the apparently ineffectual hostilities in China. The Army and other elements which have thus far controlled China policy have assumed that the Far Eastern conflict could be permanently and completely insulated against repercussions from situations elsewhere, as they did not look to American and other occidental armed intervention in that conflict. Although reference has been made in the Embassy's telegrams to the effects of the President's message to Chancellor Hitler, I do not believe that I could, by further reference to that message, exaggerate the impulse which it had toward persuading the Japanese Government to realize that there may be grave danger of involvement with the United States "not directly across the Pacific but by way of Europe", as one Japanese put it to me. I should, however, place that observation in proper perspective. A threat by the United States to eject Japan from China would, I am confident, be resisted. But if war were to break out in Europe with the United States participating on the side of Great Britain and France, the outcome in the view of those Japanese who think along rational lines would admit of no doubt. With Germany and Italy crushed, the prospect of confronting the

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victors would not be a palatable one to Japan.

There are, therefore, in the situation which seems to be developing but two courses for Japan to follow - either to go over unreservedly to the totalitarian side, or to restore good relations with those nations which, in the opinion of one element of the Japanese Government, would be the victors. True, in rejecting the proposal to join Germany and Italy in an alliance, Japan provisionally chose a third course - neutrality. I am inclined, however, to doubt whether there are many Japanese who confidently believe that neutrality would afford security. The arguments of those who believe in the superior power of Germany and Italy are obvious and simple: Japan has only to associate herself with those countries and wait for the European war to pick China like a ripe plum. But, for those Japanese who have other views concerning the power of Germany and Italy, there is but one way by which Japan's security can be safeguarded, and that is to bring the conflict with China to an end on some reasonable terms. Here again I wish to make it clear that the desire for a settlement of the conflict does not derive from moral regeneration but from realization of stark facts,

In concluding this despatch, which is already unconscionably long, I wish briefly to allude to the

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discrepancy between the attitude of the Prime Minister as indicated in his conversation with me and that of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, whose preoccupation over the Anglo-Soviet negotiations has already been mentioned. It is obvious that the desire of the Prime Minister for American collaboration to bring about peace in Europe (and in the Far East) cannot be reconciled with the readiness, which is almost an eagerness, on the part of the Foreign Minister to meet a fancied threat from Great Britain. These two points of view reflect conflicting policies, and which of these policies will prevail may perhaps be decided by events of the next few days.

Respectfully yours,

/s/ Eugene H. Dooman
Charge d'Affaires ad interim.

EHD:C

夫故今紛争中ナリト思ハルル情勢下ニ於テ日本ノ進ムベキ道ハ二ツニ過ギナイ無條件ニ全体三變ノ側ニ立ツカソレ共日本又府ノ取ル人々ノ意見ニ依レバ勝利者トナルデアロウ國民トノ友好關係ヲ回復スルカ孰レカデアアル獨伊トノ同盟締結ノ申込ヲ退クルコトニヨリ日本ハ一時第三ノ途、中立ノ道ヲ選ダコトハ事實デアアル、ダガ私ハ疑ヒ度クナル、中立ハ日本ヲ安全ニスルト確信スル多數ノ日本人ガ居ルカドウカ、獨伊ノ優勢ヲ信スル人ノ議論ハ簡單明瞭デアアル日本ハ獨伊ト同盟シテ歐洲戰事ヲ持チ、支那ヲ熱シタ卒ノ如クモギ取ラウト然シ獨伊ノ力ニ對シチガタ見解ヲ持ツ人ハ日本ノ安全ヲ守ル爲ニハ唯一ツ途シカナイ。即チ相當ノ條件デ支那トノ紛争ニケリヲツケルコトデアアル。ココデ私ハ再ビ次ノコトヲ明カニシタイ。支那事變解決ノ希望ハ道德的ナ心機一轉カラ來テルノデハナイ。動カスベカラサル事實ノ自覺カラ來ルノデアアル。

和ヲス和ヲズ不相當ニ長クナツタ此通信ヲ結ブニ當リ私ハ會談ニ於テ未サレタ總理大臣ノ態度ト外務大臣ノ態度——英ソ交渉ニ關スル彼ノ取越苦勞ハ解ニ述ベタ——トノ間ノ矛盾ヲ簡單ニ言及シ度イ

歐洲（及極東）ノ平和ヲモタラスニツイテ米國トノ協調ヲ求メル總理大臣ノ希望ト英國カラノ脅威ノ幻影ニ對處スル爲メヤツキトナツテ居ル外務大臣ノ態度トノ間ニハ一致スルコトハデキナイ、コノ二ツノ點ノ見解ガ相

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矛盾スル政策ヲ反影スルコノ二ツノ政策ノ執レカ勝ヲ占メルカハ次ノ日
中ノ出来事ガ決定スルデアロウ

臨時代理大使

ユージン・エイテ・ドローマン

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