

TAKAHASHI, Santichi DOSSIER


Case File No. 169

(6)

(10)



88  
TAKAHASHI, Sankichi,





DOSSIER

TAKAHASHI, Sankichi - Admiral

(Case File No. 169)

In Sugamo Prison

I STATUS OF SUBJECT:

- A. Arrest was ordered by letter to Imperial Japanese Government of 1 December 1945, GHQ, SCAP, AG 383.7 (1 Dec 45) CI, Subject: Apprehension of Japanese Personnel.
- B. Entered Sugamo Prison - 12 December 1945.

II DIRECT AND IMPLIED CHARGES AGAINST THE SUBJECT:

No charge was proposed.

From the information accumulated in the file it can be implied that the charges to be considered were:

That the subject planned, prepared, initiated and waged aggressive warfare and/or conspired to perform the same in that he:

- a. Participated as an Admiral and member of the Navy General Staff for 12 years prior to April, 1939, and subsequent thereto: as a War Councillor and adviser to the Government until 1945.
- b. Aided in the formation of national policies.

The evidence presumed to support the said implied charges will be hereinafter cited.

III FACTS REFLECTED FROM THE FILE:

- A. Curriculum Vitae shows the following pertinent information:

Born 1882 (age 65) a commoner.

Excellent record of advancement after graduation from Naval Academy.

1927 - attached - Navy General Staff.

1929 - President - Navy College - Vice Admiral.

1933 - Vice Chief Navy General Staff; Chief in 1934.

TAB  
A



DOSSIER - TAKAHASHI, Senkichi, Admiral (cont'd)

1936 - Admiral; Supreme War Councillor.

April, 1939 - Placed on reserve list.

July, 1939 - Member Asia Promoting Committee.  
Delegate Asia Construction Committee (Cabinet).

1941 - Advisor on Admiral Yamamoto's HAKKO KAI (8 Rays Society -  
aims similar to I.R.A.A.).

1941 - Envoy to North China.

1937 to 1943 - Director or prominent in other societies or  
research, patriotic inspiration, etc. -  
Tai Heiyo, Dai Nippon Koa Domei, Yokusan  
Seiji Kai (I.R.A.P.S.), Koa Shombu, Nihon  
Seinen Kyokai, Nihon Gaiko Kyo Kai, et al.

1942 - On Greater East Asia Construction Conference (Cabinet).

B. Memoranda from staff sections:

1. Serial 4 and 35. M.I.D. (Wash. D.C.) report of 21 July  
1945 gives biographical data and comments:

"Reported to have been a member of the Renovationists  
within the Navy who advocated war against Great Britain  
and America. (7) Has been one of the most vocal of  
Japanese naval officers in promising annihilation of the  
American fleet in the Pacific at the proper time."

NOTE: No evidence has ever been given IPS to support this.

2. Serials 5 and 33. C.I.S. report of 4 December 1945 -  
the gist of which is:

"One of the staunchest and most vocal advocates of  
Japanese expansion. Stated in 1940 Japan dominated  
Greater East Asia would embrace "in stages" India, the  
East Indies, the Philippines, and Australia. Repeat-  
edly advocated Southward advance in public addressed  
before war, preparation for war with U.S. Influential  
with younger officers. One of the few senior naval  
officers whose role in supporting Japanese expansion  
is patent."

3. Serial 21 notes that C.I.S. study "War Politics in Japan"  
should be referred to at pages 45, 75, 89.



DOSSIER - TAKAHASHI, Sankichi, Admiral (cont'd)

NOTE: This reveals subject's membership in (a) Dai Nippon Koa Domei (Greater Japan Rise Asia League - 61 societies) (b and c) Yokusan Seiji Kai (I.R.A.P.S.), which C.I.S. now rates as neither secret nor terroristic.

4. Serial 37. G-2 report of 9 June 1947 states after evaluating the data in the file to date:

"Such statements as TAKAHASHI 'has been one of the most vocal of Japanese naval officers in promising annihilation of the American fleet' are not verified by an examination of his publications."

Also -

"Such sentiments as he had on the subject of expansion and as he expressed them in the preface of this volume advocate economic expansion, not war."

This book published in May, 1941, reflects the writer upholding Japan's aim "Asia for the Asiatics", "Co-prosperity in the Far East" etc, but not urging war like measures. This G-2 report acknowledges that after war started, subject became positively aggressive, charging that U.S. aid to China started the war, etc. The report absolves subject's membership in the societies mentioned as no basis for a charge unless policy dictates same. It reviews subject's writings and connections with organizations mentioned, and concludes recommending his release.

C. Summary of Interrogations of subject.

1. On 12 February 1946, I.P.S. Attorney Darsey interrogated subject at Sugamo - the gist of it being:

Subject reviewed his life history - considered his retirement in 1939 as due to being one of the older Admirals - that he could not then keep still with war in China so made speeches whenever requested to encourage public spirit.

He wrote several articles in Sugamo which he read to the interrogator (same are in the file) explaining his activities in the various societies he belonged to, their purposes, etc.

He criticized the military extremists (but could name none) who took part in the Manchurian Incidents, the local plots and assassinations, etc. - although he disclaimed any part in any of them. He claims he was either



at sea or at the Navy College when most of them occurred. He denies that he favored any theory of Japan dominating the world, but believed in her "mission" to lead East Asia to prosperity and peace. He claims that the Naval authorities never let retired officers (or him) know any actual story regarding the present war more than official reports, though they were invited to the Navy Minister's residence several times to discuss operations, such as were official reports. That he did not know the true results of the disastrous naval battles until October, 1945, nor did he know the advance schemes.

He discussed the war and gave his opinions but his feeling is illustrated by his saying "The loyal Japanese people had to obey his (the Emperor's) order. If he says fight we fight. If he said stop - we will stop at once. We should never criticize his words."

His articles on past expansion, population increase, economic needs, etc., are quite reasonable. His alleged lack of knowledge concerning the officers responsible for Japan's misdeeds implies that he is concealing information and would not testify against other accused

He claims he considered the Tri Parte Pact wrong but had nothing to do with it. He admits, however, that MATSUOKA was his friend. Public opinion, he says, was against the Nine Power Treaty but he had no idea what the military thought. Regarding the Shanghai Incident he says orders came from the Emperor. Asked if he suggested any, he claims they would have come from the Navy Chief of Staff Prince Fushimi. His idea was to settle the incident locally.

NOTE: Throughout the 54 pages of this 4 day interrogation subject was not trapped in any admissions of value to the prosecution. He even claims he did not know of the Pearl Harbor attack until after it occurred - yet he was War Councillor at the time. Either he is a smart liar or the Cabinet kicked him upstairs to the War Council when they retired him, to preclude his resistance to the military element. The latter is not mentioned in any report in the file.

D. Summary of evidence by this subject:

None exists. He has not been a witness in the present case.



DOSSIER - TAKAHASHI, Sankichi, Admiral (cont'd)

E. Other facts reflected in the file:

Although the file contains many statements of facts or conclusions the main items of value and provable are:

1. Overt acts.

- a. Participation as staff officer in Shanghai Incident.
- b. Participation as staff officer in Abrogation of Washington Naval Treaty and various other treaties with China and the powers involved in China conflicts.
- c. Participation in plans for political and economic aggression in South Seas and Northward - see TAB A - Document 1463 - translation incomplete but illustrative of probative value. The report of the Committee who did this research for the Government on which subject served is treated below with facts outside the file.
- d. Books and articles by Takahashi
- e. Nationalist Organizations.

Items d and e are discussed in the file and considered of minor importance so not narrated herein. (Serial 169-37)

Facts outside the file.

1. Testimony of two prosecution witnesses proves duties, responsibility and access to inside information and policy, with regard to Supreme War Councillors. (Subject held that post from 1936 through the war.

OKADA testified in the present case (R. 1879):

"Q" - "Are the reports you received as Navy Minister and the reports you received as Supreme War Councillor all the same?"

"A" - "Generally the same -- Reports were received from the Navy Minister on important matters -- I had the freedom to go to the Navy Minister to procure the information."

Also note: UGAKI (R. 1624) said:

"His duties (Supreme War Councillor) are to reply to the Emperor whenever he is asked questions regarding military affairs."



PLAN OF AGGRESSION.

In October, 1941, subject was on a committee of 12 (their Chief Investigator), who made the "Report of the Committee for Administrative Measures" (Document 1987, Exh. 679 - only excerpts are translated). This investigation and others were financed by secret funds of the cabinet ministries concerned, also by certain of the zaibatsu firms - under the auspices of KOKUSAKU KENKYU KAI (National Policy Research Institute) a supposed study group but a very influential circle who played an extremely important part in advising the Government. OKA, Navy Minister, contributed 20,000 yen of his secret funds - according to translated excerpts not yet processed.

This report has been identified by witness (P) YATSUGI (R. 7359-67) who testified as to the contributions, purpose, membership (naming subject) and the work of the Committee. He was Chief of the Bureau supervising the work. He told how the Government furnished secret documents and information for the research. The excerpts of the October, 1941, report are incomplete but very illustrative: e.g. - "Assuming that Japan will inevitably expand in the near future either southwardly or northwardly, if our measures are taken without preparations, -- we may repeat what we are experiencing in Manchuria and N. China." Also: "We must pay heed to different cases, -- for permanent occupation ---- In the cases of the Soviet Maritime Provinces and Dutch East Indies -- we are required to think how to make use of the people -- the natives should not be used in D.E.I. -- (but) use the White Russians."

Note this was reported before war started.

The December, 1941, plans and reports are more detailed (P. Doc. 1987-B - Exh. 1334), but reveals the planned type of sovereignty, economy, etc., for not only East Asia but Australia, Alaska, Central America, etc.

These documents are from the Soviet Military Prosecutor but our ATIS has a large collection of the same documents scanned but not translated. See Memo to I.P.S. from R.L. Morgan, 26 June 1946, revealing 55 titles. See also Fleisher memo to I.P.S., 6 June 1947, and affidavit of OKURA - not processed. He was a committee member and verifies Yatsugi's testimony.

F. Re - SAONJI's DIARY.

Mr. Horowitz reports that subject is not mentioned.



DOSSIER - TAKAHASHI, Sankichi, Admiral (cont'd)

G. MAXON'S INDEX.

This reference was checked and those referring to subject were analyzed and mentioned in E, above.

IV DISCUSSION.

Subject was not a Cabinet member but was Vice Chief of Staff from 1933 and Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet from 1934, until 1936, then War Councillor on through the war. The exact continuity of offices is not reported. His responsibility though great is broken or relieved at intervals such as by retirement in 1939, thus to support Class A charges his positive part in the plan is necessary.

The evidence at hand would make only a fair case under part a of the implied charge, but it does prima facie prove part b that he aided in forming national policies. His work on the National Policy Research Committee is the best example.

Obviously he succeeded in throwing off his interrogator who reported him a crackpot and unreliable, and concluded that no information of value was obtained.

The books and articles by SANKICHI are of minor value, but are of some value to show continued support of the regime and its plans of expansion.

His alleged ignorance of government policies and plans are refuted by his overt acts with the Research Society and its committee above referred to. The subject matter is too important to dismiss lightly.

Likewise the duties of War Councillor places him far above the retired writer or lecturer class he claims at the critical stages of the conspiracy. It is respectfully suggested that further investigation of his advisory duties be made - to insure that he had not objected or demurred to a majority of his influential group. He is a border line case which can develop easily one way or the other, but the present evidence is not quite adequate.

TAB  
A



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TAB  
A



INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1463

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

Fundamental Measures to be Taken in Occupied Territories of South Seas in Greater East Asia War.

December, 1941.

\* \* \* \* \*

II. Essential outline (pp. 4-6):

1. To drive U.S., Britain, and Netherlands away from Asia when Japan occupies the South Seas.
2. To establish the co-prosperity sphere in Greater East Asia with concrete plans.
3. To obtain raw materials in order to establish a "highly defensive nation," to contribute to the welfare of natives, and distribute products in consideration with supply and demand in sphere.
4. Those who live in area where peace is restored will be released and independent after Japan's occupation except in her military zone.
5. According to circumstances, kingdoms will be established if necessary.
6. Self-governing administration will be gradually given.

\* \* \* \* \*

IV. Territorial considerations. (pp. 21-29)

Controlling of different districts by government generals. Australia and New Zealand resources which Japan's future depends upon.

Philippine Islands are to be self-governing and independent but must be watched and kept under control.

Alaska coal mines, petroleum and agricultural products are essential to Japan.

Monetary and customary systems are to be the same all over the sphere, but legislation should be based on manners and customs of inhabitants.

The establishment of co-prosperity sphere is an essential part of Japan mission, so she should carry her policy out in reference with experience incurred in Manchuria and China where Japan often made serious mistakes with excessive oppression or disgraceful deeds made by Japanese greedy merchants and officials.

British policies over her colonies should be studied.



LEGAL SECTION (ATTN: INVEST DIV. (2544) Takahashi, Sankei

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SECRET

NAME: TAKAHASHI, Sankichi (Admiral Ret.)

PRESENT STATUS: Confined in Sugamo Prison.

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION:

In 1901 graduated from the Naval Academy; 1926 Chief-of-Staff of the Combined Fleet; 1929 President, Higher Naval College; 1932 Vice-Chief Naval General Staff; 1933 to 1934 Commander-in-Chief Second Fleet, Commander-in-Chief Combined and First Fleet; 1936 member Supreme Military Council; 1943 Advisor of Greater East Asia Headquarters of IRAA; Chief Delegate to Second East Asia Conference at Hanking, Envoy of East Asia General Headquarters to Inner Mongolia, visited North and South Central China; 1944 Councilor to New Asia Movement of IRAA; 1945 Permanent Advisor to Central Association of Overseas Japanese.

Popular and influential with younger officers in the Navy. Responsible for revision of General Staff Regulations to provide that Chief of General Staff is responsible for determination of size as well as operations of the naval forces. Member of Renovators within the Navy which recommended war against Great Britain and the United States. Has been most vocal of Naval Officers promising annihilation of the U.S. Fleet in the Pacific at the proper time. No recommendations regarding the final disposition of SUBJECT have been received from CIB/G-2, FEC/

REMARKS:

The positions held by SUBJECT in the Japanese Government, his connections with political organizations and the nature of his activities in these, show that during the period involved he took an active part in the

"planning, preparation, initiation or waging of war of aggression or a war in violation of International Treaties, agreements and assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of the foregoing"

within the meaning and intent of paragraph 1.a. of Reference A.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that SUBJECT be retained in custody as a Class A war criminal suspect and tried before an International Military Tribunal in Tokyo.

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SECRET



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
LEGAL SECTION

5 March 1948

MEMORANDUM:

TO: Chief, Legal Section, SCAP  
SUBJECT: TAKAHASHI, Sankichi

I. PRESENT STATUS:

Subject has been incarcerated in Sugamo Prison since 15 December 1945 as a Class "A" war crime suspect.

II. PURPOSE OF MEMORANDUM:

This report is based on the oral request of the Chief, Legal Section, to examine all available evidence against the twenty (20) Class "A" war crime suspects now held in custody to determine whether or not they can be indicted for "B" or "C" war crimes.

III. SOURCES OF MATERIAL EXAMINED:

1. All files and information available in Legal Section.
2. The complete G-2 report, dated 9 June 1947, with reference to subject.
3. All files, records and reports available at the International Prosecution Section of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East.

IV. RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that subject be released from custody immediately.



Memo: TAKAHASHI, Sankichi (Cont'd)

V. DETAILS UPON WHICH THE RECOMMENDATION IS BASED:

1. Pertinent curriculum vitae:

Commander, First Air Squadron.	April 1929 to Feb. 1932
Vice-Chief of Naval General Staff.	Feb. 1932 to Nov. 1933
Commander-in-Chief of Combined Fleet.	Nov. 1934 to Dec. 1936
Appointed Supreme War Councillor.	December 1936
Placed on the reserve list.	April 1939
Member of the Asia Development Committee.	July 1939
Member of the Greater East Establishment Council.	February 1942

2. Subject, a career naval man, was retired from active duty more than two years before Pearl Harbor.
3. Although he was appointed Supreme War Councillor in 1936, it is not believed that his activity in this capacity is sufficient to justify an indictment on a "B" or "C" charge.
4. His very slight activities during the war as a committee member in Greater East Asia affairs appears to have been nominal and he took no decisive or active part in the formation of Greater East Asia policy. For this activity, he could not be charged with "B" or "C" crimes.
5. The last reviewing authority to submit a recommendation for the International Prosecution Section recommended further limited investigation, but the nature of this investigation involved possible activities that could only constitute Class "A" crimes.



Memo: TAKAHASHI, Sankichi (Cont'd)

6. Subject was active in the Navy at the inception of and throughout the first years of the Manchurian aggression and at the time of the first Shanghai incident. The Chinese Government has not evidenced any interest in having his custody transferred.

L. P. B. LIPSCOMB  
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY



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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

~~UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC~~  
FAR EAST COMMAND

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File No.:

Subject: TAKAHASHI Sankichi, Internee in Sugamo Prison.

Note  
No.

From: G-2

To: Legal Section  
(Attn: Invest. Div.  
Lt. Col. R.E. Rudisill)  
Info Copy To: IRS (Attn: Invest. Div.  
Mr. E.P. Monaghan)

Date: 9 JUN 1947  
CIS: OD/TPD/cn

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1. Curriculum vitae of TAKAHASHI Sankichi (TAB A) shows that he pursued a normal naval career until his retirement in the rank of admiral in 1939, at the age of 56, after which he became active in the DAI NIPPON KOA DOMEI (Great Japan Rise Asia League) and in the formative committees of the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society, as well as vocal with respect to the state of the nation.
2. "Japanese Government Officials - 1937-1945", published by Military Intelligence Division, War Department, Washington, D.C., 21 July 1945 evaluates TAKAHASHI as per TAB B.
3. Evaluation of TAKAHASHI in "Biographies of Prominent Japanese", published by ONI, 15 September 1945 reads as per TAB C.
4. Evaluation of TAKAHASHI at the time of his arrest in December 1945 reads as per TAB D.
5. Direct and implied accusations embodied in these documents (TABS B, C, and D) are:
  - a. "Reported to have been a member of the Renovationists within the Navy who advocated war against Great Britain and America. Has been one of the most vocal of Japanese naval officers in promising annihilation of the American fleet in the Pacific at the proper time."
  - b. "In 1943, as an adviser to the East Asia Development Headquarters of the IRAA, he made an inspection tour of North China and was guest speaker at a celebration in Peking commemorating the second anniversary of the GEA War."
  - c. "He appears to be a staunch advocate of Japanese expansion and to be aiding in the dissemination of propaganda."
    - (1) In November 1940 he editorialized on the meaning of GEA, which he said was to embrace 'in stages' India, The East Indies, the Philippines, Australia, and the Western Pacific Isles. He inferred that the Japanese Navy was ready to fight the U.S. fleet if it became necessary to do so, an eventuality, he said, which was taken into consideration before

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**~~UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC~~**  
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Japan entered the Axis Camp."

(2) "In April 1941, a Japanese language newspaper in Hawaii announced that TAKAHASHI was to deliver a radio address via short-wave from Japan on 'The Mission to Advance Southward'."

(3) "In June 1941 he said, 'If Japan expands economically into the South Seas, needless to say, this means political expansion also'. He advocated building up the national strength and speculated that with events in Europe favoring Germany, the U.S. would quite possibly withdraw her interests from the Orient."

(4) "In July 1941 he wrote an article entitled 'Thoughts on Modern Naval Warfare' for the magazine 'The Pacific', considered a propaganda medium."

(5) "In December 1942 he stated, 'We will make our entrance into Melbourne, San Francisco, and Seattle. We have the determination and preparation to make our entrance into New York...and even Washington and London'."

(6) "In November 1943 he stressed American weaknesses: disunity; lack of determination and realization of the importance of the war's outcome."

d. "As the war approached progressively closer to the Japanese homeland, TAKAHASHI made many radio commentaries trying to bolster morale of the people and emphasized Japan's invincibility."

6. In addition TAKAHASHI was a member of the various preparatory committees charged with working out the details of organizing YOKUSAN SEIJI KAI (Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society) in 1942. He was vice president and director of the DAI NIPPON KOA DOMEI (Great Japan Rise Asia League), advisor of the KOA SOHOMBU (Rise Asia Headquarters) and the HAKKO KAI (Eight Rays Society), director of the TAIHEIYO KYOKAI (Pacific Ocean Society), Chief Director and office manager of the NIHON SEINEN KYOKAI (Japan Youth Association), Advisor of the KAIGAI DOBO CHUO KAI (Central Association of Overseas Japanese), and a member of the NIHON GAIKO KYOKAI (The Institute for Foreign Affairs of Japan).

7. Facts bearing on TAKAHASHI's case are as follows:

a. Following the London Naval Treaty of 1930, feeling ran high

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in nationalist circles against the government and the naval officials who had agreed to reduction of Japan's naval strength. The participants in the ultra-nationalist coups d'etat plots of the early 30's such as the March, Blood Brotherhood, 5-15 and Gods' Troops Incidents pointed to the Treaty as the primary motive for their rebellion. Whereas army elements were active in the majority of these affairs, a group of low ranking navy people was likewise engaged in conspiracy which found vent in the 5-15 Incident (See CIS publication "The Brocade Banner"). In their high-sounding, ideological justification of their actions these ultra-nationalist platters, army, navy and civilians, called themselves "renovationists."

Later the term "renovationists" came to be applied in some quarters to the group in the navy which stood for a more efficient, if smaller navy; it did not mean a group advocating "war against Great Britain and America" or any other power. TAKAHASHI, as Commander of the 1st Naval Air Force and head of the Naval College at the time, took part in this program. In his article "Confidence of Victory in Sea Battle" (TAB E), written for interrogators after his arrest, TAKAHASHI has expressed his sentiments about naval reduction: "we sank...the secondary battleships...etc... off Tokyo Bay, with our own guns and torpedoes during 1924-25. Thus the limitation agreement was perfectly accomplished by ourselves, and with this limited force we had to defend our country...The severest drilling became the motto (of our navy)...Such severe drilling went on until 1941."

Such statements as TAKAHASHI "has been one of the most vocal of Japanese naval officers in promising annihilation of the American fleet" are not verified by an examination of his publications. In his KINDAI KAI-SEN ZUISO (Random Thoughts on Modern Sea Warfare, July 1941) (TAB F) TAKAHASHI, however, did say "It is not difficult to imagine that should Japan and the United States go to war, a naval battle of unprecedented scale would take place between the two navies. In all probability neither of them would chance a decisive battle against the other, for fear of being placed in a defensive position in case of defeat. If neither country commits her fleet to a decisive battle, we may expect a long drawn out war."

In his NANPO KYOEIKEN WO KATARU (Talks on the Southern Co-Prosperity Sphere, 10 May 1941) (TAB G), TAKAHASHI stated that "The United States will not participate in the European War...It is my opinion that the United States will not engage in war very easily. If this should happen, Japan will never

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fight the United States." These sentiments hardly "promise annihilation of the American fleet" but appear to be of a tactical-strategic nature. Such sentiments as he had on the subject of expansion and as he expressed them in the preface of this volume advocate economic expansion, not war. In this preface TAKAHASHI said that "in order that we may become a great nation in the Far East Japan, in cooperation with the peoples of the South Sea Islands, should exploit the abundant natural resources and the waste land...now unutilized. It is the responsibility of Japan to emancipate the Southern people who are living in misery. The ultimate aim of the present sacred war is to make China a member of the Far Eastern Co-Prosperity Sphere and, cooperating with Japan, establish the Far East for Asiatics. Even when Japan succeeds in establishing the Greater Far Eastern Co-Prosperity Sphere, she will never be so greedy as to refuse the United States rubber, tin and other necessary basic materials." TAKAHASHI devotes the first nine chapters to historical and factual information regarding Asia and the Southern Islands. Chapters 10 and 11 cover the current problems arising out of the Asiatic and European conflicts. Chapters 12 and 13 discuss military preparations and naval policies of the United States and the potential courses the United States might take in attacking Japan should Japan and the United States go to war. In concluding TAKAHASHI stated: "Japan wishes to establish the Co-Prosperity Sphere in the Far East to include Manchukuo, China and the Southern Islands. It is not ridiculous for us to insist on the open door policy of the Far East for Asiatics..."

It is worthy of note that Otto Tolischus in his "Tokyo Record" reports: "May 31, (1941). Kenkichi YOSHIZAWA...declared...that the Japanese note (to Batavia) regarding Japan's demands for raw materials was final... The pressure tactics...were being applied to the Dutch...The press was unleashing the customary verbal barrage against the Netherlands, but also against the United States and Britain...However, some same voices were still left in Japan. Admiral Sankichi TAKAHASHI warned in a new book: 'Some of our die-hards demand immediate occupation of the Netherlands. But while the Sino-Japanese conflict is still going on, will it be wise for us to venture into another war in which the national purse and military power will be further taxed? Our government is short of raw materials. If you lose your temper and try to bring in these raw materials at the point of the sword, they (The Dutch, British and Americans) will destroy these natural resources rather than let them fall into our hands.'"

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b. It was after the outbreak of the war that TAKAHASHI's statements became positively aggressive. In April 1942, in his WAGA KAIGUN NO IRYOKU (Our Naval Power) (TAB H), TAKAHASHI stated that the United States began to interfere with Japan after the Russo-Japanese War and that the Japanese Navy having determined that its next enemy would be America, prepared for war with America. He further stated that the cause of the Pacific War was the bold challenge of America and Britain by supporting the Chiang Kai-shek government, seizing control of Asia and forming the ABCD encirclement.

TAKAHASHI further commented in 1943 that the United States Navy suffered heavy blows in the battles of Hawaii, Midway, the Solomons and the Southern Pacific and as a result it was no longer the rival of the Japanese Navy. The "Stark Plan" would provide the United States with battle-ships aggregating astronomical tonnage. The plan, however, would not materialize as quickly as scheduled due to the shortage of materials and labor troubles. It might take three or four years to restore the losses suffered at Pearl Harbor (TAB I - UMI WO YUKU (Traveling the Seas, 25 March 1943)). As for America generally TAKAHASHI expressed his sentiments by saying "The United States is a patch-quilt of heterogenous population, lacking entirely in national consciousness and the spirit of loyalty, such as possessed by the Japanese. Once it is deprived of its slender hopes of victory, the country will be thrown into confusion and restlessness."

c. TAKAHASHI served as a member of various preparation committees of the YOKUSAN SEIJI KAI (Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society), after which he became a mere member. Validity of such activity as basis for war crimes charges depends upon the ultimate evaluation of the Imperial Rule Assistance organizations. In its study "War Politics in Japan", of which LS and IPS have copies, CIS has already given its opinion of these societies and of the men active in them:

"These societies were neither secret nor terroristic. Nor did they disband for the purpose of avoiding detection. They were basically political and patriotic organizations whose part in the wartime life of Japan was to gear the nation's politics and economy to the war effort."

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**GENERAL HEADQUARTERS**

~~UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC~~  
FAR EAST COMMAND

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File No:

Subject: TAKAHASHI Sankichi, Internee in Sugamo Prison.

Note  
No.

From: G-2

To: Legal Section  
(Attn: Invest. Div.)

Date: 9 JUN 1947  
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These activities, likewise, should be judged in the light of general policy with regard to the Imperial Rule Assistance organizations, since the KOA SOHOMBU was part and parcel of the IRAA.

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TAB K - NIHON SEINEN KYOKAI  
TAB L - HAKKO KAI  
TAB M - TAIHEIYO KYOKAI  
TAB N - KAIGAI DOBO CHUO KAI  
TAB O - NIHON GAIKO KYOKAI

*for R.S.B.*  
C.A.W.

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TAKAHASHI Sankichi, Internee in Sugamo Prison.

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1. Curriculum vitae of TAKAHASHI Sankichi (TAB A) shows that he pursued a normal naval career until his retirement in the rank of admiral in 1939, at the age of 56, after which he became active in the DAI NIPPON KOA DOMEI (Great Japan Rise Asia League) and in the formative committees of the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society, as well as vocal with respect to the state of the nation.

2. "Japanese Government Officials - 1937-1945", published by Military Intelligence Division, War Department, Washington, D.C., 21 July 1945 evaluates TAKAHASHI as per TAB B.

3. Evaluation of TAKAHASHI in "Biographies of Prominent Japanese", published by ONI, 15 September 1945 reads as per TAB C.

4. Evaluation of TAKAHASHI at the time of his arrest in December 1945 reads as per TAB D.

5. Direct and implied accusations embodied in these documents (TABS B, C, and D) are:

a. "Reported to have been a member of the Renovationists within the Navy who advocated war against Great Britain and America. Has been one of the most vocal of Japanese naval officers in promising annihilation of the American fleet in the Pacific at the proper time."

b. "In 1943, as an adviser to the East Asia Development Headquarters of the IRAA, he made an inspection tour of North China and was guest speaker at a celebration in Peking commemorating the second anniversary of the GEA War."

c. "He appears to be a staunch advocate of Japanese expansion and to be aiding in the dissemination of propaganda."

(1) In November 1940 he editorialized on the meaning of GEA, which he said was to embrace 'in stages' India, The East Indies, the Philippines, Australia, and the Western Pacific Isles. He inferred that the Japanese Navy was ready to fight the U.S. fleet if it became necessary to do so, an eventuality, he said, which was taken into consideration before

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Japan entered the Axis Camp."

(2) "In April 1941, a Japanese language newspaper in Hawaii announced that TAKAHASHI was to deliver a radio address via short-wave from Japan on 'The Mission to Advance Southward'."

(3) "In June 1941 he said, 'If Japan expands economically into the South Seas, needless to say, this means political expansion also'. He advocated building up the national strength and speculated that with events in Europe favoring Germany, the U.S. would quite possibly withdraw her interests from the Orient."

(4) "In July 1941 he wrote an article entitled 'Thoughts on Modern Naval Warfare' for the magazine 'The Pacific', considered a propaganda medium."

(5) "In December 1942 he stated, 'We will make our entrance into Melbourne, San Francisco, and Seattle. We have the determination and preparation to make our entrance into New York...and even Washington and London'."

(6) "In November 1943 he stressed American weaknesses: disunity; lack of determination and realization of the importance of the war's outcome."

d. "As the war approached progressively closer to the Japanese homeland, TAKAHASHI made many radio commentaries trying to bolster morale of the people and emphasized Japan's invincibility."

6. In addition TAKAHASHI was a member of the various preparatory committees charged with working out the details of organizing YOKUSAN SEIJI KAI (Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society) in 1942. He was vice president and director of the DAI NIPPON KOA DOMEI (Great Japan Rise Asia League), advisor of the KOA SOHOMBU (Rise Asia Headquarters) and the HAKKO KAI (Eight Rays Society), director of the TAIHEIYO KYOKAI (Pacific Ocean Society), Chief Director and office manager of the NIHON SEINEN KYOKAI (Japan Youth Association), Advisor of the KAIGAI DOBO CHUO KAI (Central Association of Overseas Japanese), and a member of the NIHON GAIKO KYOKAI (The Institute for Foreign Affairs of Japan).

7. Facts bearing on TAKAHASHI's case are as follows:

a. Following the London Naval Treaty of 1930, feeling ran high

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in nationalist circles against the government and the naval officials who had agreed to reduction of Japan's naval strength. The participants in the ultra-nationalist coups d'etat plots of the early 30's such as the March, Blood Brotherhood, 5-15 and Gods' Troops Incidents pointed to the Treaty as the primary motive for their rebellion. Whereas army elements were active in the majority of these affairs, a group of low ranking navy people was likewise engaged in conspiracy which found vent in the 5-15 Incident (See CIS publication "The Brocade Banner"). In their high-sounding, ideological justification of their actions these ultra-nationalist platters, army, navy and civilians, called themselves "renovationists."

Later the term "renovationists" came to be applied in some quarters to the group in the navy which stood for a more efficient, if smaller navy; it did not mean a group advocating "war against Great Britain and America" or any other power. TAKAHASHI, as Commander of the 1st Naval Air Force and head of the Naval College at the time, took part in this program. In his article "Confidence of Victory in Sea Battle" (TAB E), written for interrogators after his arrest, TAKAHASHI has expressed his sentiments about naval reduction: "we sank...the secondary battleships...etc..., off Tokyo Bay, with our own guns and torpedoes during 1924-25. Thus the limitation agreement was perfectly accomplished by ourselves, and with this limited force we had to defend our country...The severest drilling became the motto (of our navy)...Such severe drilling went on until 1941."

Such statements as TAKAHASHI "has been one of the most vocal of Japanese naval officers in promising annihilation of the American fleet" are not verified by an examination of his publications. In his KINDAI KAISEN ZUIJO (Random Thoughts on Modern Sea Warfare, July 1941) (TAB F) TAKAHASHI, however, did say "It is not difficult to imagine that should Japan and the United States go to war, a naval battle of unprecedented scale would take place between the two navies. In all probability neither of them would chance a decisive battle against the other, for fear of being placed in a defensive position in case of defeat. If neither country commits her fleet to a decisive battle, we may expect a long drawn out war."

In his NANPO KYOEIKEN WO KATARU (Talks on the Southern Co-Prosperity Sphere, 10 May 1941) (TAB G), TAKAHASHI stated that "The United States will not participate in the European War...It is my opinion that the United States will not engage in war very easily. If this should happen, Japan will never

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fight the United States." These sentiments hardly "promise annihilation of the American fleet" but appear to be of a tactical-strategic nature. Such sentiments as he had on the subject of expansion and as he expressed them in the preface of this volume advocate economic expansion, not war. In this preface TAKAHASHI said that "in order that we may become a great nation in the Far East Japan, in cooperation with the peoples of the South Sea Islands, should exploit the abundant natural resources and the waste land...now unutilized. It is the responsibility of Japan to emancipate the Southern people who are living in misery. The ultimate aim of the present sacred war is to make China a member of the Far Eastern Co-Prosperity Sphere and, cooperating with Japan, establish the Far East for Asiatics. Even when Japan succeeds in establishing the Greater Far Eastern Co-Prosperity Sphere, she will never be so greedy as to refuse the United States rubber, tin and other necessary basic materials." TAKAHASHI devotes the first nine chapters to historical and factual information regarding Asia and the Southern Islands. Chapters 10 and 11 cover the current problems arising out of the Asiatic and European conflicts. Chapters 12 and 13 discuss military preparations and naval policies of the United States and the potential courses the United States might take in attacking Japan should Japan and the United States go to war. In concluding TAKAHASHI stated: "Japan wishes to establish the Co-Prosperity Sphere in the Far East to include Manchukuo, China and the Southern Islands. It is not ridiculous for us to insist on the open door policy of the Far East for Asiatics..."

It is worthy of note that Otto Tolischus in his "Tokyo Record" reports: "May 31, (1941). Kenkichi YOSHIKAWA...declared...that the Japanese note (to Batavia) regarding Japan's demands for raw materials was final... The pressure tactics...were being applied to the Dutch...The press was unleashing the customary verbal barrage against the Netherlands, but also against the United States and Britain...However, some sane voices were still left in Japan. Admiral Sankichi TAKAHASHI warned in a new book: 'Some of our die-hards demand immediate occupation of the Netherlands. But while the Sino-Japanese conflict is still going on, will it be wise for us to venture into another war in which the national purse and military power will be further taxed? Our government is short of raw materials. If you lose your temper and try to bring in these raw materials at the point of the sword, they (The Dutch, British and Americans) will destroy these natural resources rather than let them fall into our hands.'"

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b. It was after the outbreak of the war that TAKAHASHI's statements became positively aggressive. In April 1942, in his WAGA KAIGUN NO IRYOKU (Our Naval Power) (TAB H), TAKAHASHI stated that the United States began to interfere with Japan after the Russo-Japanese War and that the Japanese Navy having determined that its next enemy would be America, prepared for war with America. He further stated that the cause of the Pacific War was the bold challenge of America and Britain by supporting the Chiang Kai-shek government, seizing control of Asia and forming the ABCD encirclement.

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TAB M - TAIHEIYO KYOKAI  
TAB N - KAIGAI DOBO CHUO KAI  
TAB O - NIHON GAIKO KYOKAI

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Curriculum Vitae of TAKAHASHI Sankichi



Curriculum Vitae of TAKAHASHI Sankichi.

- 1882 Aug - Born, Tokyo
- 1901 Dec - Graduated, Naval Academy, Appointed Cadet,  
Assigned to Battleship HIEI
- 1902 Sept - Transferred to Minelayer TOKIWA
- 1902 Oct - Transferred to MATSUSHIMA
- 1903 Jan - Appointed Ensign aboard MATSUSHIMA
- 1903 Apr - Raised to 8th Senior Court Rank
- 1903 Oct - Assigned to Destroyer MURAKUMO
- 1904 July - Promoted To Lieutenant J.G.
- 1904 Aug - Raised to 7th Junior Court Rank
- 1905 Feb - Relieved of duty aboard MATSUSHIMA. Appointed  
Division Officer of Training Ship SHIKISHIMA
- 1905 Aug - Promoted to Lieutenant
- 1905 Aug - Appointed Judge, Combined Fleet Court Martial
- 1905 Sept - Raised to 7th Senior Court Rank
- 1905 Dec - Relieved of principal post.  
Student, Naval Gunnery Training School
- 1906 Apr - Conferred 5th Class Order of Military Merit and  
decorated, Order of Golden Kite and 5th Class  
Order of Rising Sun
- 1906 June - Appointed Division Officer of Training Ship ASAHI
- 1907 Apr - Appointed Auditor, Naval Academy
- 1907 Aug - Appointed Division Officer of Minelayer ITSUKUSHIMA
- 1908 Sept - Relieved of above post. Appointed Staff Officer,  
and currently Adjutant, KURE Naval Station
- 1908 Nov - Relieved of principal and concurrent post.  
Student, Naval College (Junior Course)
- 1909 May - Graduated Naval College (Junior Course)  
Student, Naval Gunnery School (Higher Course)
- 1909 Dec - Graduated Naval Gunnery School (Higher Course).  
Appointed Staff Officer and concurrent Adjutant,  
Kure Naval Station
- 1910 Oct - Raised to 6th Junior Court Rank
- 1910 Dec - Relieved of principal and concurrent post. Student,  
Naval College (Senior Course)
- 1911 Dec - Promoted to Lieutenant-Commander
- 1912 May - Relieved of Studentship, Naval College. Appointed  
Division Officer of IKOMA
- 1912 July - Relieved of above post. Appointed Division  
Officer of KAWACHI
- 1912 Dec - Assigned to Personnel Bureau, Navy Ministry
- 1913 Nov - Decorated, 4th Class Order of Sacred Treasure
- 1914 Mar - Appointed Assistant to Special Inspector
- 1914 Aug - Appointed Member, Investigation Committee,  
Military Merit of the Navy

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1915 Feb	- Relieved of principal post. Assigned to Navy Ministry. Toured European countries	B
1915 Nov	- Decorated, Minor Cordon of Order of Rising Sun	C
1915 Nov	- Raised to 6th Senior Court Rank	
1916 Apr	- Relieved of principal post. Appointed Staff-Officer, 4th Flotilla	
1916 Dec	- Promoted to Commander. Relieved of principal post. Appointed Sub-Commanding Officer of HIZEN	D
1917 June	- Relieved of above post. Appointed Staff-Officer, 1st Special Service Flotilla	
1917 Dec	- Relieved of above post. Appointed Staff-Officer, and concurrently Supervisor of Watch Tower, Yokusuka Naval Station; and Staff-Officer, Tokyo Bay Fortress	E
1918 Mar	- Conferred 3rd Class Order of Merit. Decorated Order of Sacred Treasure	F
1919 June	- Awarded, 3rd Class Order of St. Michael and St. George of Great Britain	G
1919 Dec	- Relieved of principal and concurrent posts. Appointed Staff-Officer, 2nd Fleet.	
1920 Nov	- Decorated, Medium Cordon of Order of Rising Sun	
1920 Nov	- Appointed Instructor, Naval College	H
1920 Dec	- Promoted to Captain	
1920 Dec	- Raised to 5th Junior Court Rank	
1922 Nov	- Relieved of principal post. Appointed Staff Officer, Naval General Staff, Concurrently, Member, Technical Conference of Naval Construction	I
1923 Feb	- Relieved of principal post	
1923 Mar	- Appointed Assistant to Special Naval Inspector	
1923 May	- Relieved of above post. Appointed Captain of ASO	J
1923 Nov	- Appointed Captain of Battleship FUSO	
1925 Dec	- Promoted to Rear Admiral. Appointed Staff-Officer, Naval General Staff. Concurrently, Member Technical Conference of Naval Construction	K
1925 Dec	- Appointed Judge, Higher Court Martial	
1926 Jan	- Raised to 5th Junior Court Rank	
1926 Mar	- Appointed Assistant to Special Naval Inspector	L
1926 Nov	- Relieved of concurrent post. Appointed Chief of Staff, 1st Fleet and Combined Fleet	
1926 Nov	- Relieved of Judgeship, Higher Court Martial	M
1927 Dec	- Assigned to Naval General Staff	
1928 Apr	- Appointed Commander, 1st Air Force and President, Naval College	
1928 Nov	- Promoted to Vice Admiral	N
1928 Dec	- Raised to 4th Junior Court Rank	
1932 Feb	- Appointed Vice Chief, Naval General Staff	
1932 Feb	- Appointed Member, Resources Deliberation Committee	O
1932 Nov	- Appointed Secretary, Imperial Household Ministry	



1933 Nov - Relieved of principal post. Appointed Commander-in-Chief, 2nd Fleet

1933 Dec - Relieved of Membership, Resources Deliberation Committee

1933 Dec - Relieved of secretaryship, Imperial Household Ministry

1934 Sept - Toured Manchukuo

1934 Nov - Relieved of principal and concurrent post. Appointed Commander-in-Chief of Combined Fleet and 1st Fleet

1936 Apr - Conferred 1st Class Order of Merit and decorated, Grand Cordon of Order of Rising Sun

1936 Apr - Promoted to Admiral

1936 May - Raised to 3rd Junior Court Rank

1936 Dec - Relieved of principal and concurrent post. Appointed Military Affairs Councillor (Supreme War Council)

1937 Mar - Appointed Special Naval Inspector

1939 Apr - Placed on Waiting List and placed on Reserve List

1939 Apr - Raised to 3rd Senior Court Rank

1939 July - Appointed Member, Asia Promoting Committee

1940 - Advisor HAKKO KAI (Eight Rays Society)

1941 Dec - Envoy to North China and Mengchiang

1941 - Director, TAIHEIYO KYOKAI (Pacific Ocean Society)

1941 - DAI NIPPON KOA DOMEI (Great Japan Rise Asia League) Director 1941

1941 - 1943 Vice President 1942 - 1943 May

1942 Feb - Appointed Member, Deliberation Committee of Greater East Asia's Establishment

1942 - YOKUSAN SEIJI KAI (Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society) Member 1942

Preparatory Committees  
 YOKUSAN SEIJI TAISEI KYOGI KAI 1942 Feb  
 SUISEN KOHOSHA SENKO TOKUBETSU IIN KAI 1942 Feb  
 YOKUSAN SEIJI RYOKU KESSEU KUNBI KAI 1942 May

1943 May-1944 Aug - Advisor, KOA SOHOMBU (Rise Asia Headquarters)

1943 - Chief Director and Office Manager, NIHON SEINEN KYOKAI (Japan Youth Association)

1945 Jan - Advisor, KAIGAI DOBO CHUO KAI (Central Association of Overseas Japanese)

\* - Member, NIHON GAIKO KYOKAI (The Institute for Foreign Affairs of Japan)

1945 Dec - Interned in Sugamo Prison as a war crimes suspect.

\* Date unknown



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Extract from "Japanese Government Officials -  
1937-1945"

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Extract from "Japanese Government Officials 1937 - 1945", published by  
Military Intelligence Division, War Department, Washington, D. C.,  
21 July 1945.

"Admiral Sankichi TAKAHASHI (Retd.): Councilor of New Asia Movement of  
Imperial Rule Assistance Association.

1883 Aug	Born Tokyo.
1901	Graduated Naval Academy.
1911	Lieutenant Commander.
1916	Commander.
1920	Captain.
1925	Rear Admiral.
1926	Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet.
1929	Vice Admiral. President, Higher Naval College.
1932	Vice Chief, Naval General Staff.
1933-34	Commander in Chief, Second Fleet. Commander in Chief, Combined and First Fleet.
1936	Member Supreme Military Council
1943	Advisor of GEA Headquarters of IRAA.
1943 Aug	Chief Japanese delegate to Second East Asia Conference in Hsinking.
1943 Dec	Envoy of East Asia General Headquarters to Inner Mongolia. Visited North and South Central China.
1944	Councilor to New Asia Movement of IRAA.
1945 Jan	Named permanent advisor to Central Assoc- iation of Overseas Japanese.

Address: 83, Shirokane Imazato-cho, Shiba-ku, Tokyo.

In 1934 reported to be one of most influential officers in Japanese Navy because of his popularity with the younger officers. Reputed to be an excellent administrator as well as a good leader of men.

While Chief of Naval General Staff he revised the General Staff regulations making the Chief of General Staff responsible for the determination of the size as well as the operations of the naval forces. Reported to have been a member of the Renovators within the Navy who advocated war against Great Britain and America. Has been one of the most vocal of Japanese naval officers in promising annihilation of the American fleet in the Pacific at the proper time."

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Extract from "Biographies of Prominent Japanese"

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Extract from "Biographies of Prominent Japanese" published by ONI  
15 September 1945.

Admiral (Ret.) Sankichi TAKAHASHI -Supreme War Councilor

TAKAHASHI was born 24 August 1882 in Tokyo. He is the brother of Toyotaro TAKAHASHI. In 1901 he graduated from the Naval Academy and successively became captain of the FUSO, chief of staff of the Combined Fleet, and president of the Naval Staff College. In 1933 and 1934 he was serving as commander-in-chief of the Second Fleet and later was made commander-in-chief of the Combined and First Fleets. He has also been vice-chief of the Naval Staff Board and a Supreme War Councilor. As of March 1937 he was said to be one of the seven admirals then on active duty. In 1943, as an adviser to the East Asia Development Headquarters of the IRAA, he made an inspection tour of North China and was guest speaker at a celebration in Peking commemorating the second anniversary of the GEA War. In June 1944 he was said to be a member of the Navy Officers' Society, and in January 1945 he was named permanent adviser to the Central Association of the Japanese Overseas. TAKAHASHI's name has appeared quite frequently in the news in connection with his written and spoken commentaries on the military situation of the Empire. He appears to be a staunch advocate of Japanese expansion and to be aiding in the dissemination of propaganda. In November 1940 he editorialized on the meaning of GEA, which he said was to embrace "in stages" India, the East Indies, the Philippines, Australia, and the Western Pacific isles. He inferred that the Japanese Navy was ready to fight the U.S. fleet if it became necessary to do so, an eventuality, he said, which was taken into consideration before Japan entered the Axis camp. In April 1941, a Japanese language newspaper in Hawaii announced that TAKAHASHI was to deliver a radio address via shortwave from Japan on "The Mission to Advance Southward." In June 1941 he said, "If Japan expands economically into the South Seas, needless to say, this means political expansion also." He advocated building up the national strength and speculated that with events in Europe favoring Germany, the U.S. would quite possibly withdraw her interests from the Orient. In July 1941 he wrote an article entitled "Thoughts on Modern Naval Warfare" for the magazine "The Pacific," considered a propaganda medium. In December 1942 he stated, "We will make our entrance into Melbourne, San Francisco, and Seattle. We have the determination and preparation to make entrance into New York...and even Washinton and London." In November 1943 he stressed American weaknesses: disunity; lack of determination and realization of the importance of the war's outcome. He was present at a 1944 New Year's party attended by representatives of Axis nations, and in May 1944 attended a meeting held under joint auspices of the GEA People's League for Bolstering Air Strength and the Japan-Germany-Italy Friendship Society to discuss ways and means of strengthening Axis ties as well as to bolster air strength. As the war approached progressively closer to the Japanese homeland, TAKAHASHI made many radio commentaries trying to bolster morale of the people and emphasized Japan's invincibility.

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Evaluation of TAKAHASHI Sankichi at time of arrest  
TAKAHASHI SANKICHI (AKA: TAKAHASHI)

Report of Staff of the Customs Service, District No. 1, San Francisco, California, dated 10/10/41 and First District, San Francisco, California, dated 10/10/41. This report is a copy of a report prepared by the San Francisco Office of the Customs Service, dated 10/10/41, and is being furnished to you for your information. The report contains information regarding the activities of TAKAHASHI SANKICHI, who is known to be a member of the Japanese Espionage Service, and is being furnished to you for your information.

Evaluation of TAKAHASHI Sankichi at time of arrest

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Evaluation of TAKAHASHI Sankichi at time of arrest December 1945.

TAKAHASHI, Sankichi Admiral (retired)

"Formerly Chief of Staff of the Combined Fleet, President Naval Staff College, Commander-in-Chief of the Combined and First Fleets, Supreme War Councillor. Advisor to East Asia Development Headquarters of Imperial Rule Assistance Association. One of the staunchest and most vocal advocates of Japanese expansion. Stated in 1940 Japan dominated Greater East Asia would embrace "instages" India, the East Indies, the Phillipines, and Australia. Repeatedly advocated Southward advance in public addresses before war, preparation for war with U. S. Influential with younger officers. One of the few senior naval officers whose role in supporting Japanese expansion is patent.

"He appears on the U. S. War Crimes list prepared by State, War and Navy Departments."

Arrested - Sugamo 12 December 1945.

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"Confidence of Victory in the Sea Battle"

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CONFIDENCE OF VICTORY IN THE SEA BATTLE

The drilling of our Navy has been well known in the world since Russo-Japanese War in 1904. By the Washington Naval Agreement our naval force was limited to 60 percent of the United States Navy and the British Navy, with regard to battleships and airplane carriers. We sunk accordingly the secondary battleships, Katori, Kashima, Aki, Satsuma, Kurama, Ikoma, Ibuki, etc., off Tokyo Bay, with our own guns and torpedoes during 1924-1925.

The miserable scene we have never been able to forget till today. Love for ships should be the same throughout the world for sailors. We sunk these ships on which we not only lived, but also sailed in southern waters, the Indian Ocean, co-operating with United States and British ships to beat Germany's. Thus the limitation agreement was perfectly accomplished by ourselves and with this limited force we had to defend our country by every means.

The severest drilling therefore became the motto in our navy. On the other hand, of course, engineering officers did their best to produce more effective ships, guns, torpedoes, airplanes, bombs, and other new weapons.

At the end of 1926 I was appointed to the Chief Staff of the Combined Fleet under Admiral Kato, who was one of the chief members to the Washington Conference in 1921, and one of the most patriotic men. The drilling carried on was so severely under him that during a night drilling on August 24, 1927, on the Japan Sea, we lost about one hundred and thirty officers and men, one destroyer sunk, and another destroyer and two cruisers were damaged severely by a collision. That happened in the dark of night. Under my command in April 1929, the airplane carrier "Akagi" and "Mosshou" lost almost all the airplanes by storm at the Western Sea of "Kinshure"; also during fleet drilling. We lost annually at this time 70 or 80 flyers; sometimes 100 persons in airplane drilling. The unfortunate events with submarine boats were not fewer. All these lost were the honorable sacrifice of our naval drilling. Such severe naval drilling went on every year until 1941.

Naturally, as a consequence of these ceaseless drillings, ability of officers and men had been highly raised year after year, and became confident in making up the quantity's inferiority.

It is needless to say, however, that the result of War depends not only on ability and confidence of fighting men, but on the total force of the country behind the guns, about which we had not been informed well, and our efforts were merely concentrated upon how to use the weapons given most efficiently.

TAKAHASHI, Sankichi  
(Retired Admiral)

13 February 1946

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KINDAI KAISEN ZUIZO

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Article Digest  
KINDAI KAISEN ZUIZO

(Random Thoughts on the **Modern** Sea Warfare)  
by TAKAHASHI Sankichi

Published in the TAIHEIYO (The Pacific), July 1941, pp. 23-28. "The Pacific" was a monthly magazine published by the TAIHEIYO KYOKAI (The Pacific Ocean Society) of which TAKAHASHI was a director.

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It is not difficult to imagine that should Japan and the United States go to war a naval battle of unprecedented scale would take place between the two navies. In all probability neither of them would chance a decisive battle against the other, for fear of being placed in a defensive position in case of defeat. The United States would, in order to conserve her naval strength, blockade Japan from a great distance, and take the offensive only when Japan has been considerably weakened by the blockade. So, even in case diplomatic relations are broken, a great naval engagement should not be expected at once. The marvelous improvements made in aircraft manufacture since World War I have brought about significant changes in present day naval strategy.

"Without command of the sea, don't send large armies far from home", has always been a principle of warfare. Germany, however, broke this rule in the present war by the successful use of her airforce and submarines but with considerable sacrifice. Nevertheless, without commanding the neighboring ocean, neither Japan nor the United States would risk landing a large army on the soil of the enemy. If neither country commits her fleet to a decisive battle, we may expect a long drawn out war (pp. 23-26).

It is easy to see that the airplane will prove to be a more and more important weapon but its operation area over an ocean is inevitably limited. At the present time a powerful battle fleet is the foundation of both an offensive and defensive force. Should a new weapon which flies like an airplane and dives under the water like a submarine, be invented, it would become the foundation of a naval power instead of the battle fleet (pp. 26-27.)

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NANPO KYOEIKEN WO KATARU

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Book Digest  
NANPO KYOEIKEN WO KATARU

(TALKS ON THE SOUTHERN CO-PROSPERITY SPHERE)

By TAKAHASHI Sankichi

Published by DAI NIPPON YUBENKAI KODANSHA, May 10, 1941. 281 pages.

- 
- I. The China Incident and consequent changes brought about in the Southern Islands.
    - a. The real meaning of Japan's Sacred War.
    - b. The Southern Islands after the outbreak of the China Incident.
    - c. Japan has been careless in the past.
    - d. The destiny of the Japanese.
  - II. The bulwarks which bind Australia and Asia.
    - a. The Pacific era has come.
    - b. The retreat of the British from the Far East.
    - c. The "Mediterranean Sea" between Australia and Asia.
  - III. My recollection of the Southern Islands.
    - a. The Australian situation at that time.
    - b. My recollection at the time of the World War I.
  - IV. The origin of the "Southern Seas."
    - a. The discovery of the Pacific and the Southern Seas.
    - b. Three divisions of the Southern Seas.
  - V. The discovery of the Southern Seas.
    - a. Vasco de Gama and Marco Polo.
    - b. Matherar's discovery of the South Seas and Philippines.
    - c. The downfall of the Portuguese influence.
  - VI. The Southern Encroachment by the European powers and America.
    - a. The maiden voyage by the Dutch.
    - b. The activities of the Dutch East Indian Co.
    - c. The Conquest of Java by Governor Kunn of Dutch East India, etc.
  - VII. Whither the peoples in the Southern Islands?
  - VIII. Struggles for natural resources in the Southern Islands.

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IX. The Ocean and the Japanese.

X. The policy of Southern advance and our resolution.

- a. What shall our policy be for advancing to the South?
- b. Let us by all means advance economically toward the South.

XI. The United States, Japan and the Alliance between the Axis countries.

- a. The British and German War and the 3rd Article of the Alliance between the Axis countries.
- b. What will be the attitude the U.S. will take after the Germans land on the British Mainland.

XII. Military Preparation and Naval policy of the United States.

- a. The colossal American Naval plan.
- b. The Great U.S. Naval plan against Japan.

XIII. If Japan and the United States go to War?

- a. Three courses open to the United States in Attacking Japan.

XIV. The way for the national defence.

In the preface of this book, Admiral TAKAHASHI says that "in order that we become a great nation in the Far East, Japan, in cooperation with the peoples of the Southern Sea Islands, should exploit the abundant natural resources and the vast land to the South which are now utilized." "It is the responsibility of Japan to emancipate the Southern people who are living in misery." (p.1). The ultimate aim of the present sacred war is to make China a member of the Far Eastern Co-Prosperity Sphere, and cooperate with Japan to establish the Far East for Asiatics. (p.7). Even when Japan succeeds in establishing the Greater Far Eastern Co-Prosperity Sphere, she will never be so greedy as to refuse rubber, tin, and other necessary basic materials. She will be able to exploit the Southern Islands much more successfully than at present. (p.23).

Japan wishes to establish the Co-Prosperity Sphere in the Far East to include Manchoukuo, China and the Southern Islands. It is not ridiculous for us to insist on the open-door policy of the Far East for Asiatics when the American and European countries are demanding it without reserve (p.247). The United States will not participate in the European War. I feel that all she will do is assist Great Britain more and more economically. It is my opinion that the United States will not engage in war very easily. If this should happen, Japan will never fight the United States (p.256).



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If there should be a war between the United States as a result of invocation of Article 3 of Japan's Alliance with Germany and Italy, it will be a prolonged war as in the case of the China Incident (p.272).

If there should be a war between United States and Japan, developing from the problems of the Southern Region or from the European War, the U.S. will attack us from one of three possible directions:

- 1) by way of the Aleutians from the North
- 2) by way of Hawaii, Guam, the Philippines and Singapore
- 3) by way of Hawaii, Samoa, Fiji Isles, the Dutch Indies, Manila, and Singapore. (p.268).



WAGA KAIGUN NO IRYOKU

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Article Digest  
WAGA KAIGUN NO IRYOKU  
(Our Naval Power)  
By TAKAHASHI Sankichi

Published in the TAIHEIYO (The Pacific), April 1942. "The Pacific" was a monthly magazine published by the TAIHEIYO KYOKAI (The Pacific Ocean Society) of which TAKAHASHI was a director.

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Our Navy destroyed the United States Fleet at Hawaii on 8 December in the Great East Asia War.....today our naval power extends as far as the Indian Ocean to the West, the Aleutian Islands to the North, the Western Coast of the United States to the East, and the Antarctic Ocean to the South.

After the Russo - Japanese War, America began to interfere with Japan in every way. Our Navy determined that our next enemy would be America and prepared for war with America. We have always fought for justice and world peace.

Today America and Britain support the CHIANG Kai-shek Government. Under the mask of peace they are trying to seize control of Asia. Forming the ABCD encirclement, they boldly challenged us. This was the cause of the Pacific War. To the amazement of the whole world, we are scoring unprecedented victories in every battle.

When we look back on history we note that the rise and fall of any nation depends entirely on naval power. The whole nation must devote its efforts to increase naval power as the Pacific War progresses.

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UMI WO YUKU

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Book Digest  
UMI WO YUKU  
(Traveling the Seas)

by TAKAHASHI Sankichi

Published by TOSUI SHA, 25 March 1943

Part I. Traveling the Seas.

- Chapter 1: Memories of Life at Etajima
- Chapter 2: Instruction in the Naval School
- Chapter 3: Memories of Plowing the Far Seas
- Chapter 4: The Patron God of KASUMIGAURA
- Chapter 5: Old Memories of Naval Commands
- Chapter 6: Three Chances
- Chapter 7: Discourse, Old and New, on Bomb Attacks by the Naval Eagles.

Part II. Standing on the Bridge.

- Chapter 1: With the Flag of the Battleship
- Chapter 2: Fragments from Life Afloat
- Chapter 3: Across the Death Line
- Chapter 4: Views on the American and British Navies

1. The American Navy.

The American Navy suffered heavy blows in the battles of Hawaii, Midway, the Solomons, and the Southern Pacific and as a result it is no longer the rival of the Japanese Navy. The "Stark Plan", when materialized, will provide the United States Navy with battleships aggregating astronomical tonnage. The plan, however, will not materialize as quickly as scheduled due to the shortage of materials and labor troubles. It might take the United States about three or four years to restore the losses suffered at Pearl Harbor. What strategy will she take in attacking Japan? She may form a guerilla unit of several aircraft carriers protected by a few battle cruisers and destroyers. This guerilla unit will make a lightning attack on Japan or on Japan's Co-Prosperity Sphere and then retreat as quickly as possible. The alternative will be guerilla warfare by sub-marines or sub-marines and aircraft together.

I should like to say a few words about the morale of Yankee sailors. There is a rumor in this country that about-20,000 desert the American Navy per year. It is dangerous to believe such a rumor. The American naval officers are selected from many candidates from the various states for education at the Annapolis Naval Academy. They are of excellent calibre. There are said to be 20 times more candidates than the 15,000 selected per year. However, the weakness of the American Navy is that these applicants are not always very patriotic. One of the

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remarkable characteristics of American soldiers is that they are very positive when the war situation is favorable, but they give up fighting when the situation is adverse.

## 2. The British Navy.

Some military critic of the Axis, commenting on the recent defeats of the British Navy, has said, "These were not due to the weakness of the British Navy, but to the strength of the highly trained Japanese Navy, which was too strong a combatant for the British Navy."

## Chapter 5: Special Characteristics of the German and Italian Navies.

The chief characteristics of the German Navy is many small-type submarines equipped with mono-power generating engines, which operate under and over the waves. Another characteristic lies in Germany's daring tactics -- well demonstrated by the Battleship Bismark which maneuvered the Atlantic and was sunk only by overwhelming numbers of British battleships.

The chief characteristic of the Italian Navy is high-speed warships; mostly torpedo boats and submarines.

Chapter 6: Evening Talks on Firing Practice

Chapter 7: The Eye of the Submarine

Chapter 8: Little Talk on the Technique of Torpedo Warfare

Chapter 9: Discussion of Personal Leadership

Chapter 10: Mist and Searchlights

## Part III. Gossip at the Desk.

### Chapter 1: The National Destiny and Naval Power

Japanese history shows that so long as Japan remains in command of the neighboring seas she makes splendid progress, but if she should lose such command her national progress will be shagnated.

Chapter 2: The Brilliant Admiral TOGO

Chapter 3: Astronomical Phenomena, Atmospheric Phenomena, and Naval Warfare

Chapter 4: Remembering Admiral KATO Kanji

Chapter 5: Attendance at the Funeral Services of Nine Naval Gods

Chapter 6: A Japanese Sea

Chapter 7: What is desired of Japanese Youth?

Chapter 8: Australia and the Southern Problem

I am deeply impressed with the opinion of SATO Nobufuchi, the great economist of the latter Tokugawa Shogunate. He advocated, about 44 years before Commodore Perry came to Japan, the importance of



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the colonization of the Philippines and other South Sea Islands. It is the responsibility of Japan to emancipate the peoples living in the South Sea Islands from the future of Western nations. For the prosperity of Japan, we should emigrate to the Co-Prosperity Sphere of Great East Asia including Australia.

DAI NIPPON KWA GAKAI



DAI NIPPON KOA DOMEI

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DAI NIPPON KOA DOMEI  
(Great Japan Rise Asia League)

The DAI NIPPON KOA DOMEI was established on 6 July 1941 as a league of 61 societies interested in one way or another in overseas affairs:

<u>Society</u>	<u>Representative</u>
AIKOKUSHA (Love Country Society)	IWATA Ainosuke
AJIA TAIRIKU KYOKAI (Asiatic Continent Association)	KOMORI Sadahisa
CHUKA MINKOKU HOSEI KENKYUKAI (Central China Republic Law Study Society)	MATSUMOTO Joji
CHUO CHOSAKAI TOAHAN (ASAHI) (Central Research Society East Asia Bureau)	OGATA Taketora
CHUO MANMO KYOKAI (Central Manchuria-Mongolia Association)	HATTA Yoshiaki
DAI AJIA KYOKAI (Great Asia Association)	MATSUI Iwane
DAI NIPPON DOSHIKAI (Great Japan League)	MATSUMOTO Noriaki
DAI NIPPON KAIKYO KYOKAI (Great Japan Mohammedan Association)	HAYASHI Senjuro
DAI NIPPON KEIZAI RENMEI (Great Japan Economics League)	ICHIJO Sanetaka
DAI TOA KAITAKU KOCYOSHA KYOKAI (Great East Asia Exploitation of Industry Association)	GODO Takuo
DAI TOA KENSETSU KOKUMIN UNDO KENKYUKAI (Great East Asia Establishment Peoples Movement Study Society)	TAMAN Kiyoomi
DAI TOA KYOKAI (Great East Asia Association)	KAWASAKI Saburo
DAI TOA SEINENTAI (Great East Asia Youth Corps)	MIKI Suketaka
DAITO BUNKA KYOKAI (Great Eastern Culture Association)	MATSUDAIRA Yoriyhisu
DOJINKAI (Fraternity Society)	MIYAGAWA Yoneji
DOMEI TOA KENKYUKAI (DOMEI News East Asia Study Society)	FURUNO Inosuke
GAKUTO SHISEIKAI (Students Sincerity Association)	NAGATA Hidejiro
KAIKYOKEN KENKYUJO (Mohammedan Affairs Study Institute)	OKUBO Koji
KAIYO SEISAKU KENKYUJO (Ocean Policy Study Institute)	FUJIMORI Seiichiro
KITA SHIN KYOKAI (North China Association)	YOSHIZAWA Kenkichi
KOA KENKYUJO (NIPPON DAIGAKU) (Rise Asia Study Institute)	YAMAZAKI Mannosuke
KOA MEIKYO RENMEI (Rise Asia Anti-Communist League)	IDA Iwakusu
KOA SEINEN UNDO HONBU (Rise Asia Youth Movement Headquarters)	KODAMA Yoshio

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DAI NIPPON KOA DOMEI (Great  
Japan Rise Asia League)

Society

KOJUNDO DOSHIKAI (Rise Asia Movement League)  
KOKURYUKAI (Amur Society)  
NANPO CHOSOKAI (NACCHI) (Southern Research  
Society)  
NANYO KYOKAI (South Seas Association)  
NANYO SHIBUKAI KYOKAI (South Seas Culture  
Association)  
NICHIRIN CHUO KYOKAI (Japan Manchuria Central  
Association)  
NICHIRIN GAKUIN (Japan Thailand Academy)  
NIKKO GAKKAI (Sino-Japanese Education Society)  
NIKKO JITSUGYO KYOKAI (Sino-Japanese Industry  
Association)  
NIPPON INDO SHIN KYOKAI (Japan Indo China  
Association)  
SEIKYOSHA (Politics and Religion Society)  
SEKAI KOMINJI KAI KOENKAI (World Red Buddhist  
Cross Society Discourse Society)  
SHIBUN KAI (Prose and Poetry Society)  
SHINA KENKYU KYOKAI (China Study Association)  
SHIN KOA KAI (New Rise Asia Society)  
TAIHEIYO KYOKAI (Pacific Ocean Association)  
TANISHI DOSHIKAI (Relations with China League)  
TANAN NANPO KYOKAI (Formosa Southern  
Association)  
TOA CHOSOKAI (East Asia Research Society)  
TOA DOBUNKAI (East Asia Uni-Cultural Society)  
TOA HOSO KYOKAI (East Asia Judicial Association)  
TOA KEIZAI KONDANKAI, NIPPON SHIBU (East Asia  
Economic Round-Table Society, Tokyo Branch)  
TOA KENKYUJO (East Asia Study Institute)  
TOA KENSETSU KYOKAI (East Asia Establishment  
Association)  
TOA KYOKAI (East Asia Association)  
TOA MONDO KENKYUKAI (YOMIURI) (East Asia  
Problems Study Society)  
TOA RENMEI KYOKAI (East Asia League)  
TOA SHINCHITSUJO KENKYUKAI (New Order in East  
Asia Study Association)  
TOA SHINKOKAI (East Asia Progress Society)  
TOHO BUNRA GAKUIN (Eastern Culture Academy)  
TOHO BUNRA KENKYUJO (Eastern Culture Study  
Institute)  
TOMAN JIL MINZOKU KAIHO DOMEI (Southeast  
Asia People's Liberation League)  
TOYO FUJIN KYOKU KAI (Oriental Women's  
Education Society)

Representative

FUJII Kiko  
KUZUU Yoshihisa  
  
SAKIMOTO Shumma  
HAYASHI Hisajiro  
  
SAKIMOTO Masahara  
  
MIYATA Mitsuo  
HAMASHI Senjuro  
HOSOKAWA Goryu  
  
KODAMA Kenji  
  
ITO Jiromaru  
IRIE Tanenori  
  
MATSUI Nanao  
TOKUGAWA Kuniyuki  
UCHIDA Katsushi  
SAKANISHI Rihachiro  
NAGATA Hidejiro  
KUZUU Yoshihisa  
  
SAITO KI  
TOKUTOMI Iichiro  
ABE Nobuyuki  
YAMAKI Mannosuke  
  
GO Seinosuke  
KONOE Fumimaro  
  
ENDO Ryusaku  
YAMATA Hakudo  
  
TAKAHASHI Yusai  
ISHIWARA Kanji  
  
SUZUKI Takeshi  
SAKANISHI Rihachiro  
TAKI Seiichi  
  
MATSUMOTO Bunzaburo  
  
ADACHI Kenzo  
  
MATSUDAIRA Nobuko

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D.I NIPPON KOA DOMEI (Great  
Japan Rise Asia League)

Society

Representative

TOYO KEIZI I KENKYUJO (Oriental Economics Study Institute)	KASUYA Soichi
TOYO KYOKI I (Oriental Association)	MIZUNO Buntaro
TOYO SEISHIN KENYUKU I (Oriental Spiritual Study Society)	MOROOKI Zon
YAMATO HOKOKU UNDO HONBU (YAMATO Save-the Country Movement Headquarters)	SHIMAMOTO Shoichi
ZENRIN KYOKU I (Neighborly Friendship Association)	ICHIJO Sanetaka

The societies were divided into four kinds:

JIGYO DOMEI (Project Groups)  
KENKYU DOMEI (Study Groups)  
SHISO DOMEI (Doctrinal Groups)  
UNDO DOMEI (Movement Groups)

Member societies ranged in type from the notorious KOKURYU KAI (Amur Society) of TOYAMA Mitsuru, and AIKOKU SHI (Love-Country Society) of IWATA Kinoshige to study groups like Prince KONOE's TOYO KENKYU JO (East Asia Study Institute) and philanthropic groups such as the DOJIN KAI (Fraternity Society) which has operated hospitals and clinics in Japan, Korea and China since 1902. In order to join the league an individual must obtain the recommendation of two or more members; a society the consent of the majority of the D I NIPPON KOA DOMEI's board of directors. The declared principles of the league were:

1. Abide by the spirit of the national foundation and extend it to all nations of the earth to bring happiness and prosperity to the human race by promotion of peace and civilization under the New Order.
2. Achieve the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere by adherence to the joint declaration of Japan, Manchuria and China for economic cooperation and coordination of national defense.
3. Enroll as members those who will abide by the national policy of raising Asia through hardship and difficulty to accomplish the Holy War.

The statement issued at the time of establishment almost simultaneously with the imposition of economic sanctions upon Japan by the ABCD powers set the tone of ideological Japanese nationalism:

"The greatest conflagration since the dawn of history is now sweeping across the entire face of the earth. The lofty ideal of our Emperor to establish a New Order which will allow each nation to enjoy an unfettered existence is the only means whereby the flames may be quenched throughout the world.



D.I NIPPON KOA DOMEI (Great  
Japan Rise Asia League)

"Let us turn our eyes to the history of Asia, where we find that the European races have encroached by a series of invasions and where it is our profound mission to eliminate the dominion of those European powers and to establish a new and just co-prosperity sphere blessed by the righteousness of our Gods and the historic accomplishments of our nation.

"Five costly years have elapsed since the outbreak of the China conflict. When we consider the precious life-blood which has been shed across the continent, when we consider that more than a hundred thousand of our countrymen have lost their lives, we realize that we must achieve prosperity for all men of Asiatic races in order that our compatriots' sacrifice may not have been in vain.

"The magnitude of the task which our country has undertaken calls upon every man to do his part toward fulfilment of the great mission of the Empire. However difficult the task may seem, we may feel confident of success if we unite in duty.

"It is upon this principle that the D.I NIPPON KOA DOMEI has been formed.

"Practically the D.I NIPPON KOA DOMEI was an effort to coordinate the activities of the various societies behind the Imperial Rule Assistance Association."

Since the original rules of the organization provided that the president of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association be chairman of the League, Prince KONOYE held the post until he was superseded by TOJO Hideki at the time of the cabinet change in October 1941. In March 1942 the rules were changed to allow appointment of the chairman by the president of the I.R.A.A. TOJO forthwith appointed H. Y. S. H. Senjuro to the job.

Operationally, the league headquarters was divided into nine bureaus:

- SOMU KYOKU (General Affairs Bureau)
- SHISO KYOKU (Doctrinal Bureau)
- KIKAKU KYOKU (Planning Bureau)
- RENSEI KYOKU (Training Bureau)
- D.I ICHI KYOKU (First Bureau)
- D.I NI KYOKU (Second Bureau)
- D.I SAN KYOKU (Third Bureau)
- D.I YON KYOKU (Fourth Bureau)
- D.I GO KYOKU (Fifth Bureau)

The intent of the named bureaus is obvious. The numbered bureaus handled research and affairs relative to geographic areas:

1. Japan Proper, Formosa and Korea
2. Manchuria



D.I NIPPON KO. DOMEI (Great  
Japan Rise Asia League)

3. North China and Mongolia
4. Central China
5. The Southern Area

In March 1942 the D.I NIPPON KO. DOMEI eliminated by dissolution its doctrinal and movement member-societies, including the D.I AJIA KYOKAI (Great Asia Association), D.I TO. SEINEN TAI (Great Asia Youth Corps) and the KOKURYU KAI (Amur Society) and on 23 May 1943 the DAI NIPPON KOA DOMEI changed its name to KO. SOHOMBU (Rise Asia Headquarters) and moved bodily into the organization of the IRAN as a headquarters directly under the supervision of the president, thereby replacing the old KOA. KYOKU (Rise Asia Bureau) in IRAN headquarters.

Officers of DAI NIPPON KOA DOMEI were:

SOSAI KONOYE Fumimaro (July-October 1941)  
TOJO Hideki (October 1941-March 1942)  
H. Y. SHI Senjuro (March 1942-May 1943)

KOMON ANDO Kisaburo  
ARAKI Sadao  
GODO Takuo  
H. T. T. Yoshiaki  
ICHIJO Sanetaka  
HISHIKARI Takashi  
KODAMA Hideo  
KOISO Kuniaki  
M. TSUMOTO Joji  
M. G. T. Hidejiro  
OI Narimoto  
TOKUTOMI Ichiro  
TOYAMA Mitsuru  
Y. N. G. M. Heisuke  
YOSHIZAWA Kenkichi

SOMU IIN H. Y. SHI Senjuro, Chairman  
ABE Nobuyuki  
M. D. CHI Kenzo  
HONJO Shigeru  
IDA Iwakusu  
KUZUU Yoshihisa  
M. TSUI Iwane  
MIZUNO Rentaro  
OHURA Kimochi  
OT. Koze  
S. K. NISHII Rihachiro  
T. K. H. SHI Sankichi  
TSUDA Shizue



D. I NIPPON KOA DOMEI (Great  
Japan Rise Asia League)

SOMU IIN  
(cont'd)

Y. MAOKI. Mannosuke  
YOKOYAMA. Sukenari

KYOGIKAI GIIN

MIYATA. Mitsuo, Chairman  
MIKI Bukichi, Vice Chairman  
AR. IKE Atsushi (Ko)  
FURUNO Inosuke  
H. SONUMI. Monzo  
H. YASHI Hisajiro  
H. YASHI Katsura  
HORIUCHI Bunshiro  
HOSOKAWA Goryu  
ICHINOMIYA Fusajiro  
IDOGAWA Tatsuzo  
IMAI Yoshiyuki (Kako)  
ITO Jiromeru  
KANDA. Masao  
KATO Kanji  
KATO Tatsuya  
KAWADA. Shiro  
K. YANO Nagatomo  
KIKUCHI Takeo  
KOBAYASHI Junichiro  
KODAMA Kenji  
KOJIMA Kazuo  
KURACHI Tetsukichi  
KURIMOTO Yunosuke  
KUSUMOTO Chozaburo  
MATSUDA. Teisuke  
MATSUDA. IR. Nobuke  
MATSUMOTO Tadao  
MATSUSHIMA Hajime  
MIYAGAWA Yoneji  
MIYAJIMA Daihachi  
MIZUNO Baigyo  
MURAKAWA Kongo  
MURASE Teijiro  
N. SU Ko (Akira)  
OBAYASHI Kazuyuki  
OGAWARA. Nagao (Chosai)  
OGATA. Taketora  
OKABE Nagakage  
SHIMMOTO Shoichi  
SHIODEN Nobutaka  
SHIONOYA Atsushi  
SHIBAKAWA Tomokichi  
SOEJIMA Giichi  
SUGISAKI Teijiro  
SUMIOKA Tomoyoshi



DAI NIPPON KOA DOMEI (Great  
Japan Rise Asia League)

KYOGIKAI GIIN  
(cont'd)

SUZUKI Yoshimichi  
TAKADA Toyoki  
TANABE Bunchiro  
TANABE Yasunosuke  
TOKUGAWA Kuniyuki  
TSUKUDA Nobuo  
UMEZU Kanbei  
UZAWA Somei  
WADA Tsuyoshi  
YANO Jinichi  
YASUKI Masaatsu  
YATABE Yasukichi  
YOSHIGAMI Jisaburo

RIJI

NAGAI Ryutarō, Chairman  
ENDO Ryusaku, Vice Chairman  
AKAGAMI Byōjo  
AKIYAMA Akiyoshi  
AYAGAWA Takeji  
FUJII Shinji  
FUJIKAKE Suematsu  
FUJIMORI Seichiro  
FUJISAWA Chikao  
HARA Tamashige  
HIJIKATA Seibi  
HIROSE Takabumi  
HONGO Yoshikazu  
IIZUMI Ryoza  
IKEDA Hiromu  
IRIE Tanenori  
ITO Kiyoshi  
IWATA Ainosuke  
KANAI Kiyoshi  
KANEMITSU Kunizo  
KANEMUCHI Ryosuke  
KARASAWA Toshiki  
KASUYA Soichi  
KAWAHARA Jikichiro  
KAWAHARA Shinichiro  
KAWASAKI Saburo  
KIYANO Kengo  
KIMURA Takao  
KIYOFUJI Akiko  
KODAMA Yoshio  
KOMORI Sadahisa  
KUMAJIMA Kazuo  
MATSUNO Tatsunosuke  
MATSUE Toyohisa  
MATSUI Nanao



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D.I NIPPON KO. DOMEI (Great  
Japan Rise Asia League)

RIJI  
(cont'd)

MTSUKI Yoshikatsu  
MTSUMOTO Bunzaburo  
MTSUMOTO Noriaki  
MTSUMOTO Shigcharu  
MTSUMURO Takayoshi  
MIKI Sukotaka  
MIYAZAWA Yutaka  
MORITA Sho  
MOROOKI Akira (Son)  
NAGAYAMA Tadanori  
NAKAJIMA Soichi  
NAKAMURA Tamoo  
NAKANO Yosaku  
NAKANO Hisashi  
NAKATANI Takoyo  
NARASAKI Kanichi  
NISHIMORI Hisaki  
ODA Hideto  
OGAWA Zensaburo  
OKANO Ryuichi  
OKUBO Koji  
OKURA Kunihiko  
OYA Genko  
OZAKI Keigi  
SAITO Mitsugu  
SAKIMOTO Masaharu  
SAKIMOTO Toshima  
SHIMOJI Genshin  
SOS Tanetsugu  
SUGAMURA Yutaka  
SUICHI Yoshio  
SUNDA Minoru  
SUZUKI Takashi  
TANIGI Rokuro  
TAKAGI Tomigoro  
TAKAHASHI Yusai  
TAKEI Juro  
TAKI Seiichi  
TAMEN Kiyoomi  
TAMURA Kosaku  
TONITA Kisaku  
TOYAMA Hideozo  
TSUBURAJI Yoshimatsu  
UCHIDA Katsuji  
UJITA Naoyoshi  
URUO Kisaburo  
YAJIMA Yutaka  
YAMAGAMI Hisashi  
YANAGIDA Kizo  
YATSUGI Kazuo  
YAMADA Hakudo  
YOSHIDA Seichi



NIHON SEINEN KYOKAI

Annual Report of 1949

Summary of Activities

Objectives

NIHON SEINEN KYOKAI

Objectives

Summary of Activities

Objectives

Summary of Activities

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II. NIPPON SEINEN KYOKAI  
(Japan Youth Association)  
III. (General Affairs Department)

Establishment: Spring of 1929

Address: Tokyo-to, Azabu-ku, Shinryudo-cho, 8.

Officers:

President: UGAKI Issei

Chief Director & Office Manager: TAKAHASHI Sankichi

Standing Directors: SEKIYA Ryukichi  
MATSUMURA Shoin

Directors: AOKI Joban  
FURUI Yoshimi  
HEKIKAI Yasuharu  
HIRAIDE Hideo  
KIKKO Yazo  
KODAMA Kyujo  
KOSAKA Masayasu  
MAKI Jiro  
NAKAJIMA Torakichi  
OYA Atsushi  
SHINOHARA Michio  
TABE Hijiri  
TAKEDA Ryutaro  
WANAMI Toyochi  
ZEN Keinosuke

Auditors: ISHIZAKA Taizo  
KOIKE Atsunosuke  
TSUJI Shoichiro  
WATANABE Tokuo

Managers: AOKI Joban  
ENDO Jitsuo  
HATTORI Rokuro  
TAMAI Tadahiko  
TSURUMOTO Ushinosuke

Membership: 15,000

Organization:

I. SHIDO BU (Guidance Section)

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- II. KIKAKU BU (Planning Section)
  - III. KENKYU BU (Research Section)
  - IV. SHOMU KA (General Affairs Department)

Organ: Magazine AKATSUKI (Dawn), and pamphlets

Object: To train and educate youth in Japanese ways.

Program:

1. Training at Central Schools.
  - a. Long-term courses for youth leaders.
  - b. Training courses for school instructors.
  - c. Training courses for leaders.
  - d. Re-education of members.
  - e. Lectures.
2. Local Training.
  - a. Short courses and lectures.
3. Management of Prefectural Branches.
4. Publication of AKATSUKI (Dawn) and pamphlets.

Schools:

1. KATSUOJIKI NOGYO DOJO (KATSUOJIKI Agricultural Institute)
2. YATSUGADAKE KOGEN DOJO (YATSUGADAKE Highland Institute  
(Summer school))
3. KANSAI DOJO (KANSAI Institute)
4. FUKUSHIMA DOJO (FUKUSHIMA Institute)
5. OSAKA SHOKO SEINEN DOJO (Osaka Industrial Youth Institute)
6. HYOGO SHOKO SEINEN DOJO (Hyogo Industrial Youth Institute)

Source: NIHON BUNKA DANTAI NENKAN, 1943.



HAKKO KAI

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HAKKO KAI  
(Eight Rays Society)

Plans for this ideological society were originally promoted by Admiral YAMAMOTO Eisuke in 1940 "for the organization of an association to give spiritual and moral guidance to the Japanese people in this time of emergency." The project was postponed, however, to avoid competition with the budding TAISEI YOKUSAN KAI (Imperial Rule Assistance Association). When the character and aims of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association were publicized, however, YAMAMOTO declared his objectives to be the same and hastened his efforts.

The inaugural meeting of the society was held on 5 May 1941, attended by some 550 men and women of prominence, including many generals and admirals in their gold braid. By means of lectures, round-table talks and the society's publication, the "HAKKO" (Eight Rays) membership was increased. Branches were organized in Kagoshima, Miyakonojo, Odawara and cultural training center was established on a farm at Ishizaki, Ibaraki Ken belonging to ISHIGE Eizaburo.

Officers of the society were:

SOSAI (President): YAMAMOTO Eisuke

KOMON (Advisers): ARAKI Sadao  
ARIMA Ryokitsu  
HAYASHI Senjuro  
HIRANUMA Kiichiro  
HISHIKARI Takeshi  
ICHIJO Sanetaka  
KOISO Kuniaki  
MAZAKI Jinzaburo  
SUZUKI Takao  
TAKAHASHI Senkichi  
TAKESHITA Isamu  
TOYAMA Mitsuru  
YANAGAWA Heisuke  
YASUI Eiji

SODAN YAKU (Counsellors): HARA Kozo  
IMAIZUMI Teisuke  
INOUE Tetsujiro  
KASAI Katsuhiko  
KATO Genchi  
KINOHIRA Masami  
KITA Reikichi  
KONO Shozo  
MIYAJI Naoichi

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MIYATA Mitsuo  
MORI Kiyoto  
MOROHASHI Tetsuji  
NAKANO Kuniichi  
NISHIYAMA Masai  
OGASAWARA Chosei  
OMORI Akiyori  
SAKURAI Hyogoro  
SHIMOMURA Juichi  
SHIRAKAWA Tomonaga  
TOKIWA Daiji  
WATANABE Ginjiro  
YAMAGOSHI Akimasa  
YAMAMOTO Katsuichi  
YANAGIHARA Yoshimitsu

HYOGIIN (Councillors): AKIOKA Yasuji  
ARIMA Chotaro  
FURUKAWA Yugo  
HORIUCHI Masumi  
IWAKIRI Shigeo  
KIMURA Naji  
KURIHARA Shigenori  
KUROKAWA Kiyoo  
MATANO Kensuke  
MATSUURA Hikozeru  
MORITA Shigehiko  
OCHIAI Hiroshige  
OMURA Keigon  
SENGE Takanori  
SUGIURA Munemori  
TAKAGAMI Kakusho  
TAKAHASHI Kenichi  
TAKASA Kancho  
TAKIMOTO Toyonosuke  
TANIGUCHI Eizo

RIJI (Directors): AYAKAWA Takeji  
IKEDA Kiyoshi  
INOGE Toshie  
INOUE Kiyosumi  
ISHIGE Eisaburo  
KAMIMURA Tsukamaro  
KATO Tatsuya  
KIDO Motosuke  
KODAMA Shizuo  
KOSAKA Masayasu  
MASUDA Masao



MORI Denzo  
OI Shizuo  
SASA Shigetake  
SHIMOMURA Eiji  
TAMURA Kenjiro  
TANAKA Jiroemon  
TANIMURA Isamu  
TOKIOKA Ichiro  
UMEZU Kanbe  
YAMAMICHI Joichi  
YOSHIDA Shigeru

YAKUIN (Minor Officials): AKAMINE Ichiro  
DOI Ichi  
HAMABATA Keibei  
INAZU Norizo  
ITO Tatsuo  
IWAMA Sosuke  
KUBOTA Kamezo  
MINAMI Tomoyuki  
MIWA Kan  
MORIZONO Toyokichi  
NAGAYOSHI Tokuyasu  
ODERA Kojiro  
OTANI Shichiro  
SASAKI Hajime  
TAKANO Kazuo  
UCHIDA Sakito  
UDA Kunie  
WATANABE Takuya  
YOKOO Morinaka

1942 statistics on branches were:

HAKKO KAI HOKKAIDO SHIBU (Hokkaido Branch)  
Registration: 1 December 1941  
Representative: CHIZAKI Usaburo  
Membership: 400

HAKKO KAI OKAZAKI SHIBU (Okazaki Branch)  
Registration: 24 November 1942  
Representative: OTA Koji  
Membership: 306

HAKKO KAI SAITAMA SHIBU (Saitama Branch)  
Registration: 8 October 1941  
Representative: KONO Shozo  
Membership: 400

HAKKO KAI SHIZUOKA KEN SHIBU (Shizuoka Ken Branch)  
Registration: 15 September 1941  
Representative: SUGIYAMA Kiminobu  
Membership: 100



THE EAST ASIAN LIBRARY

Number 100

- 1. The East Asian Library
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- 19. The East Asian Library
- 20. The East Asian Library

TAIHEIYO KYOKAI

The East Asian Library is a collection of books and journals in the fields of Chinese, Japanese, and Korean studies. It is one of the largest and most comprehensive collections of its kind in the United States. The library is housed in the East Asian Library Building at the University of California, Berkeley. The collection is constantly growing and is open to all members of the University community.

Number 100

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TAIHEIYO KYOKAI (Pacific Ocean Society)

Established: May 1937

Officers: NAGATA Hidejiro  
NAKAMURA Ryoza  
TSURUMI Yusuke  
MATSUOKA Yosuke  
ABE Nobuyuki  
YOSHIZAWA Kenkichi  
SAKURAUCHI Yukio  
KOISO Kuniaki  
HATTA Yoshiaki  
NOMURA Kichisaburo  
KOBAYASHI Seizo  
SHIMADA Toshio  
MURATA Shozo  
YOSHINO Shinji  
AKASHI Teruo  
FUJIYAMA Aiichiro  
KAWAKAMI Keichi  
MATSUE Haruji  
IWAKURA Tomohide  
KURIBAYASHI Tokuichi  
NAKANO Kinjiro  
KASAMA Akio  
YAMAJI Tosataro  
SHIMIZU Yonosuke  
TAKAHASHI Sankichi

- Objectives & activities: (1) Research and investigation of the Pacific Ocean with regard to politics, diplomatic relationship, culture, national defence, economic, trade, transportation, production, money circulation, resources, land utilization, races, social conditions.
- (2) Solution of Japanese population problem, overseas emigration, overseas trade, fair distributions of resources, peaceful alteration of territories.
- (3) Exchange of cultural intercourse with Pacific nations.
- (4) Exchange of informations, research groups.
- (5) Publications of magazine, lectures.
- (6) And other similar activities.

Organ: Magazine TAIHEIYO (Pacific Ocean)

Source: NIHON BUNKA DANTAI NENKAN 1943.







KAIGAI DOBO CHUO KAI  
(Central Association of Overseas Japanese)

Established: 9 April 1941 and became a foundation in July 1942.

Officers:

President: SHIRATORI Toshio

Standing Advisor: YAMAOKA Mannosuke

Chief Director: YAMAOKA Tetsujiro

Standing Directors: YASUI Seiichiro  
MARUYAMA Tsurukichi  
SATO Toshindo  
MIZUSAWA Kosaku

Managing Directors: TABARA Haruji  
IMAMURA Tadasuke

Manager: SUGITANI Seiichi

Purpose: The organization aimed to raise the culture standards and promote the happiness of various Japanese groups overseas.

Program:

1. Work with overseas Japanese groups.
2. Execute domestic business for overseas Japanese groups.
3. Establish Japanese educational and welfare groups.
4. Study various matters relating to overseas Japanese, including recreation.
5. Financial assistance to overseas Japanese.
6. Arrange co-educational schooling for overseas Japanese.
7. Handle other matters relating to overseas Japanese.

Source: NIHON BUNKA DANTAI NENKAN, 1943.



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NIHON GAIKO KYOKAI

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NIHON GAIKO KYOKAI  
(The Institute for Foreign Affairs of Japan)

Established: February 1935

Address: 10, Marunouchi 3-chome, Kojimachi-ku, Tokyo.

Officers:

President: KURACHI Tetsukichi

Chairman: YOSHIKAWA Kenkichi

MATSUMOTO Joji  
SEKIYA Teizaburo  
YAMAGAWA Mizuo  
BANZAI Rihachiro  
MARUYAMA Tsurukichi  
FUJINUMA Shohei  
YANADA Kyujiro  
FUJIWARA Ginjiro  
YANO Tsuneta  
EGUCHI Teijo

Membership: 3,000

Object: To study foreign policy and contribute in unifying the public opinion, thereby to be of some service in the practical statesmanship of the national policy.

Activities:

1. The Investigation Section of Foreign Policy.
2. The Section of Information and Propagation.
3. Other activities.

Publications:

1. Annual Reports of the Institute for Foreign Affairs of Japan.
2. Reports of various investigations.
3. A large number of publications including "A Collection of Lectures."

Sources: Academic and Cultural Organizations in Japan, 1939.  
NIHON BUNKA DANTAI NENKAN, 1943.



TAKAHASHI, Sankichi (2544)

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(59)



Date: 24 June 1947

Report of Investigation Division, Legal Section, GHQ, SCAP.

Inv. Div. No.  
2544

CRD No.

Report by: Lt. Daniel F. Resendes

Title: Sankichi TAKAHASHI.

Synopsis of facts: TAKAHASHI, Sankichi, born 1882, Tokyo. Graduated Japan's Naval Academy 1901, Commander-in-Chief of Combined Fleet and 1st Fleet 1934. Placed retirement list April 1939. Held key positions Japanese Societies. Interned Sugamo Prison December 1945.

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DETAILS:

At Tokyo:

This investigation is predicated upon a request of the Honorable Lord WRIGHT, President of the International War Crimes Commission.

Biographical history of TAKAHASHI shows that he pursued a normal naval career until his retirement in the rank of admiral in 1939, at the age of 56, after which he became active in the DAI NIPPON KOA DOMEI (Great Japan Rise Asia League) and in the formative committee of the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society, as well as vocal with respect to the state of the nation.

Evaluation of TAKAHASHI in "Biographies of Prominent Japanese", published by ONI, 15 September 1945, and at the time of his arrest in December 1945 reads as follows:

A. "Reported to have been a member of the Renovationists within the Navy who advocated was against Great Britain and America. Has been one of the most vocal of Japanese naval officers in promising annihilation of the American fleet in the Pacific at the proper time.

B. "In 1943, as an adviser to the East Asia Development Headquarters of the IRAA, he made an inspection tour of North China and was guest speaker at a celebration in Peking commemorating the second anniversary of the GEA War.

Distribution:

1 Prosecution  
1 CRD  
1 Inv. Div (File 2544) ✓  
1 Lt. Resendes

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INV. DIV.

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C. "He appears to be a staunch advocate of Japanese expansion and to be aiding in the dissemination of propaganda.

(1) In November 1940 he editorialized on the meaning of GEA, which he said was to embrace 'in stages' India, The East Indies, the Philippines, Australia, and the Western Pacific Isles. He inferred that the Japanese Navy was ready to fight the U. States. fleet if it became necessary to do so, an eventuality, he said, which was taken into consideration before Japan entered the Axis Camp.

(2) In April 1941, a Japanese language newspaper in Hawaii announced that TAKAHASHI was to deliver a radio address via short-wave from Japan on "The Mission to Advance Southward".

(3) In June 1941, he said, 'If Japan expands economically into the South Seas, needless to say, this means political expansion also.' He advocated building up the national strength and speculated that with events in Europe favoring Germany, the United States would quite possibly withdraw her interest from the Orient.

(4) In July 1941, he wrote an article entitled 'Thoughts on Modern Naval Warfare' for the magazine 'The Pacific', considered a propaganda medium.

(5) In December 1942, he stated, 'We will make our entrance into Melbourne, San Francisco, and Seattle. We have the determination and preparation to make our entrance, into New York...and even Washington and London'.

(6) In November 1943, he stressed American weaknesses: disunity; lack of determination and realization of the importance of the war's outcome.

D. "As the war approached progressively closer to the Japanese homeland, TAKAHASHI made many radio commentaries trying to bolster morale of the people and emphasized Japan's invincibility."

In addition, TAKAHASHI was a member of the various preparatory committees charged with working out the details of organizing YOKUSAN SEIJI KAI (Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society) in 1942. He was vice president and director of the DAI NIPPON KOA DOMEI (Great Japan Rise Asia League), advisor of the KOA SOHOMBU (Rise Asia Headquarters), and the HAKKO KAI (Eight Rays Society), director of the TAIHEIYO KYOKAI (Pacific Ocean Society), Chief Director and office manager of the NIHON SEINEN KYOKAI (Japan Youth Association), Advisor of the KAIGAI DOBO CHUO KAI (Central Association of Overseas Japanese), and a member of the NIHON GAIKO KYOKAI (The Institute for Foreign Affairs of Japan).

In April 1942, in his WAGA KAIGUN NO IRYOKU (Our Naval Power), TAKAHASHI stated that the United States began to interfere with Japan after the Russo-Japanese War and that the Japanese Navy having determined that its next enemy would be American, prepared for war with America. He further stated that the cause of the Pacific War was the bold challenge of America and Britain by supporting the Chiang Kaishek Government, seizing control of Asia and forming the ABCD encirclement.

As for America, generally TAKAHASHI expressed his sentiments by saying, "The United States is a patch-quilt of heterogenous population, lacking entirely in national consciousness and the spirit of loyalty, such as possessed by the Japanese. Once it is deprived of its slender hopes of victory, the country will be thrown into confusion and restlessness."

Summary of Relevant Points taken from Document No. 1463, IPS Exhibit 169-19, Analysis of Documentary Evidence follows:



"Crimes to which Document Applicable: Aggressive Warfare.

I. Principle: As the result of Greater East Asia War, if Japan should occupy the South Sea Territories of United States, Great Britain and Netherlands, she must establish her policy in regard to government administration laws, culture, and economics, and in accordance to the Imperial Edict, she must do away with the policy of U.S. and Great Britain in order to establish the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, to maintain peace and order in the Far East, to contribute towards the promotion of world peace as well as to assure her position in Far East.

II. Essential outline (pp. 4-6):

1. To drive United States, Britain, and Netherlands away from Asia when Japan occupies the South Seas.
2. To establish the co-prosperity sphere in Greater East Asia with concrete plans.
3. To obtain raw materials in order to establish a 'highly defensive nation', to contribute to the welfare of natives, and distribute products in consideration with supply and demand in sphere.
4. Those who live in area where peace is restored will be released and independent after Japan's occupation except in her military zone.
5. According to circumstances, kingdoms will be established if necessary.
6. Self-governing administration will be gradually given.

III. Disposition of lands in Co-Prosperity Sphere.

1. Districts where Japan will establish her government general.
2. Districts where Japan will permit independence.
3. Soviet territory. Japan will get Amur district and districts adjoining Manchuria, managing Siberian Railway with Germany as far as Omsk.
4. Japan's policies and armament in occupied territories.
5. Independent countries in the co-prosperity sphere and their armament.

IV. Territorial considerations.

Controlling of different districts by government generals.

Australia and New Zealand resources which Japan's future depends upon.

Philippine Islands are to be self-governing and independent but must be watched and kept under control.

Alaska coal mines, petroleum and agricultural products are essential to Japan.

Monetary and customary systems are to be the same all over the sphere, but legislation should be based on manners and customs of inhabitants.

The establishment of co-prosperity sphere is an essential part of Japan mission, so she should carry her policy out in reference with experience incurred in Manchuria and China where Japan often made serious mistakes with excessive oppression or disgraceful deeds made by Japanese greedy merchants and officials.

British policies over her colonies should be studied.

V. Report of "Committee of Measure" for controlling occupied territory.

1. Establishment of Special Service Dept. in the army separate from operations or higher home office.
2. Utilization of inhabitants in governing.
3. Treatment of Japanese civilians overseas.
4. How to win over the people in occupied territory.
5. How to secure raw materials necessary to Japan.
6. Degree and method of mercy and benefits given to natives.
7. Whether to send out colonists or not.



VI. Committee members, "National Policy Institute".

ODATE, Shigeo	TAKAHASHI, Sankichi
KISHI, Shinsuke	ABE, Nobuyuki
KOBAYASHI, Seizo	ISOGAI, Rensuke
GOTO, Fumio	OKURA, Kimochi
SAKURAI, Hyogoro	HORIUCHI, Rensuke
SHIOMURA, Hiroshi	YAMAKAWA, Hashio

VII. Report of the Committee by the Secretary.

1. Object of the committee is to inspire the government with careful investigation and study so they will not repeat such failures as Manchurian and China problems.

2. Opinions of members concerning titles in V. "

While TAKAHASHI was interrogated at some length, it developed that he was a crack-pot and unreliable witness, and no information of any value was obtained from him. TAKAHASHI was interrogated by Mr. John Dorsey, on 14 February 1936 at Sugamo Prison as follows:

Q. You are familiar with the Hakko-Ichiu philosophy in connection with Japan's foreign policy, aren't you?

A. Yes.

Q. Will you state as briefly as possible your concept of the Hakko Ichiu philosophy?

A. By the progress of the airplane the world became very small, so all the nations in the world must be a member in one big home. Ichiu means home and Hakko means world.

Q. And this foreign policy on the part of Japan which had the Hakko Ichiu philosophy as its foundation contemplated that Japan would afford the leadership or be the "home" for the nations which it considered to fall within its sphere, didn't it?

A. I understand as follows: All the members of the home must be happy. For instance, in East Asia from the first Emperor Jimmu some 1600 years ago to the present day before the war, Hakko Ichiu was not only a foreign policy, it was the doctrine of Japan I think. That means not only Japan, but every nation in East Asia should be independent, but they were very poor powers, except Japan, so Japan should conduct them, not oppress them. Japan should lead them and head the parade.

Q. You believed in that philosophy and in that doctrine, didn't you?

A. Yes.

Q. Then as the China Incident progressed in order to give more effective impetus to that philosophy and doctrine, the government of Japan caused the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere to be inaugurated, didn't he?

A. Yes. I don't know much about politics, but that is my private opinion.

Q. You understand so, don't you?

A. Yes.

Q. The Hakko Ichiu philosophy and doctrine was the very foundation of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity program which Japan adopted as a national policy, wasn't it?

A. Yes. I think so.



- Q. Now, further in that connection do you agree with the statement of policy by the Japanese Envoy which was presented to Secretary of State Cordell Hull in December 1941, breaking off diplomatic relations with the United States, to this effect: "It is the immutable policy of the Japanese government to enable all nations to find their proper place in the world, and that is the Heavenly task of the Japanese Empire?"
- A. Yes, I think each nation should find its proper place.
- Q. That pronouncement of policy which I have just read is consistent with the Hakko Ichiu philosophy which has been the foundation of Japanese foreign policy for the past century, isn't it?
- A. I think so.
- Q. You understand so, don't you?
- A. Yes, but not so well.
- Q. That has been the philosophy which has inspired your public service through the years?
- A. I think so. I would like to have you understand, because I am very vague on a lot of the answers. Right now America and England are the leading nations, and they should lead the other nations in following the principles of Hakko Ichiu. I felt then that Japan should lead the nations in East Asia.
- Q. For the period interim 1929 - to 1941 this Hakko Ichiu philosophy and doctrine on the part of Japan contemplated that Japan would afford the leadership in the Greater East Asia Sphere, didn't it?
- A. I suppose so.
- Q. Don't you know so?
- A. I think so.
- Q. And it was because you know so you lent your loyal support to the Japanese Government during those years, wasn't it?
- A. At this time I was on the active list, and was on the sea, and these matters did not matter so much. I only dreamed. As I said in one of my statements, fighting men should go on about their own duties.
- Q. But it was your personal understanding that during that period that was the policy of your government?
- A. I think so.
- Q. And you did your best to be loyal to that policy in whatever capacity you served?
- A. I have been loyal to the Emperor, not to policy. If the Emperor said "go", we go; if he says "stop", we stop.
- Q. And it is your understanding that this policy which I have just described had the support of the Emperor during those years, isn't it?
- A. I think so.
- Q. So that if you have been loyal to the Emperor you have also been loyal to the policy to which he lent his support, haven't you?
- A. I think so, because the Emperor accepted that policy.
- Q. And it was this Hakko Ichiu philosophy and doctrine which was the foundation of the so-called New World Order movement which Japan began to sponsor in the late 20's, in 1929 through 1941, wasn't it?
- A. I don't remember anything like that because I was overseas during that time.



- Q. Now, it was that philosophy and doctrine that each nation should find its proper place in the world which was the basis of Japan adhering to the Tri-partite Agreement with Germany and Italy, was it not?
- A. I know nothing about that. I was quite out at that time. I cared nothing for that alignment. For my own opinion, I think it was not well to make that alignment. I think many naval officers did not think it was well.
- Q. I didn't ask you whether you were sympathetic with the Tri-partite Pact or not. What I did ask you was: Whether or not it was that philosophy that each nation should find its proper place in the world which was the basis of Japan adhering to the Tri-partite Agreement with Germany and Italy?
- A. I don't know, because I was out of service. Very sorry. But at that time I thought it was no good to have such an alignment. Many naval officers thought the same. The army officers were very anxious to have the alignment.
- Q. Which army officers?
- A. I don't know.
- Q. You can't name any of them?
- A. No, at that time it was some of the military authorities and some of the so-called militarists.
- Q. And you don't know who they were?
- A. I don't know.
- Q. And you mean to say they imposed this policy of the Tri-partite alignment on your government, and you don't know who they were?
- A. I haven't heard any discussions about it, so I don't know, but the Imperial order was issued when the alignment was made. When the Emperor says so we must say nothing.
- Q. In the late 1920's Japan had acquired special rights and privileges by virtue of peace treaties and settlements in Manchuria, had it not?
- A. During those times I was overseas, and I know nothing about it.
- Q. Don't you know that you haven't enjoyed filling positions of public responsibility in Japanese affairs throughout the past decade without learning as a matter of fact that Japan had acquired special rights and privileges in Manchuria at that time by virtue of peace treaties and settlements?
- A. Yes, I know from reading history. I referred to that in my opinion "Past Expansion of Japan". (P.17).
- Q. At the time of the Manchurian Incident, which you spoke about on yesterday, the population of Japan was increasing during those years by about a million yearly, was it not?
- A. Yes, about a million per year.
- Q. And Japan had long since found itself short of supplies or raw materials and food for its population, had it not?
- A. I don't know.
- Q. You don't know that?
- A. No.
- Q. You know Japan had to find some place for this population to go, don't you?
- A. Yes. (Refers to "Past Expansion of Japan", P.17).



- Q. Under these circumstances Japan had to find some place for the increased population to go, didn't it?
- A. Yes, and naturally it went to Manchuria, etc.
- Q. And this increase in population in Japan had been a matter of grave concern to Japan for many years, had it not?
- A. Yes, I think so.
- Q. Do you recall a special conference which was held from June 27 to July 7 in 1927 and which was attended by all the civilian and military officers connected with Manchuria?
- A. I don't remember.
- Q. That was about the time that Tanaka submitted his memorial to the Emperor, wasn't it?
- A. There was no Tanaka in the Navy; that must be a mistake.
- Q. I didn't say he was in the Navy. Have you never heard of Premier Tanaka?
- A. Yes, there was in the army a very old general who was also Premier. I saw him once.
- Q. Did you ever hear of the Tanaka Memorial?
- A. I know nothing about this.
- Q. During that period Manchuria embraced an area three times as large as that of Japan, didn't it?
- A. I think so.
- Q. And it was inhabited by only one-third as many people as inhabited Japan, wasn't it?
- A. I don't know anything of that nature.
- Q. You know that it was thinly populated, don't you?
- A. I know it was less populated than Japan.
- Q. And its attractiveness didn't arise alone from the scarcity of its population, did it? It was a very fertile land, wasn't it?
- A. I don't know. At that time the military authorities cared for the North.
- Q. You have learned that subsequently to the establishment of the Manchukuo Government, Japan profited very materially from the fertility of the soil of Manchuria, haven't you?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And millions of Japanese people have migrated to that area, have they not?
- A. Yes.
- Q. In an effort to take full advantage of the resources of Manchuria, Japan developed the South Manchuria Railway Company a number of years before 1931, did it not?
- A. Yes.
- Q. As a matter of fact, Japan made the largest investment in its history in the development of the South Manchuria Railway Company, did she not?
- A. I heard so.
- Q. And the South Manchuria Railway Company became the strongest organization in Japan, did it not?
- A. I don't know whether it was the strongest, but I know it was a very big company.



- Q. And for all intents and purposes it constituted the government of Manchuria, during those days, didn't it?
- A. I don't know about that.
- Q. You know it represented the interest of Japan in that territory, don't you?
- A. I don't know, except it had the backing of the Japanese Government. I was on the sea during those times, and I had very poor knowledge of that. In 1938 I travelled to Manchuria because I had such poor knowledge, the Navy Minister said that to me. So he made me travel around Manchuria, so I could get some good knowledge. Therefore, I am very sorry I cannot answer some of those questions well.
- Q. And you know that Japan had immense interests in Manchuria and Mongolia at that time, don't you?
- A. I think so.
- Q. And it had been the policy of successive administrations since Meiji to expand and to continue to develop the new continental empire in that territory, had it not?
- A. I think so.
- Q. Do you know what is meant by the Three Eastern Province?
- A. I don't know. I am really ignorant as to what happened in Manchuria. I am very versed in the Pacific, but not in the North. The army operated there.
- Q. Don't you know that in China, Manchuria is always referred to as the Three Eastern Provinces because of its administrative division into Three Eastern Division, Liaoning (or Feingtian) in the South; Kirin in the East; and Helungkian in the North?
- A. I have some recollection that there was something like the three Eastern Provinces, but I know nothing in detail.
- Q. At that time, that is, prior to the Manchurian Incident, the integrity of China, the Chinese Government, was recognized by Japan through China's control of Manchuria by these Three Provincial Governments, was it not?
- A. I suppose so.
- Q. You know so, don't you? You know that Japan never claimed any right to govern Manchuria until after the Manchurian Incident, don't you?
- A. I think that's right.
- Q. All during this period when Japan's policy was to develop to the fullest extent its interest in Manchuria, China, through its local governments in Manchuria, was also conscious of its interests there, and was also active in developing Manchuria independently, wasn't it?
- A. I don't know whether they thought anything like that or not. The historians of the Manchurian Incident might know, but I do not.
- Q. Well, you know that Japan encountered difficulties with China in connection with its program of developing its interest in Manchuria, don't you?
- A. Yes.
- Q. This difficulty with China insofar as Japan's program in Manchuria was concerned began to develop as Chang Tao-Lin began to gain strength of his own and to lean in sympathy with the Chinese Government, didn't it?



- A. I don't know. I know nothing of the specific plans, especially of the so-called secret plan of the army.
- Q. You don't know that conflict of interests between Japan and China developed in Manchuria?
- A. Yes, I do think so.
- Q. And because of this opposition on the part of China and the inability to put Japan's program in Manchuria into effect the failure of successive governments during that period, 1920-1930, resulted, didn't it?
- A. I think so.
- Q. And you say you are not familiar with Chang Tao-Lin's regime in Manchuria?
- A. I know nothing, I never saw him.
- Q. You have previously stated that during this period, 1920-1930, Japan recognized the integrity of the Chinese Government insofar as Manchuria was concerned, haven't you?
- A. Yes, I think so.
- Q. However, during this same period Japan materially increased its military force in Manchuria, didn't it?
- A. I don't know anything about that.
- Q. You know that by 1930 Japan had very substantial military forces stationed in Manchuria, don't you?
- A. I don't know.
- Q. Did you bring your diary with you?
- A. Yes, this is my diary.
- Q. When did it begin?
- A. Last year.
- Q. Are you willing to let me take it and return it to you tomorrow.
- A. I use it every day and want to keep it with me.
- Q. You are not willing to let me keep it overnight?
- A. Yes. It is only my memory. There is no opinion in it.

Interrogation of TAKAHASHI, Sankichi, continued on 15 February 1946, 1430-1630 P.M:

- Q. Oh, yesterday we were talking about the conditions and circumstances prevailing in Manchuria for the period 1920 to 1930. During this period when Japan was seeking to develop its program in Manchuria the policies of the Japanese Government were predicated upon the Hakko Ichiu philosophy we previously spoke about... that every nation should be permitted to develop its influence in its proper sphere, weren't they?
- A. Yes, I understand so.
- Q. And during this period Japan each year was confronted with the problem of balancing its food supply with its increased population of at least a million per year, was she not?
- A. I don't know. I didn't care about the food supply.
- Q. Whether you cared or not and whether you were interested in this program or not, that situation prevailed, didn't it?
- A. I knew that the people would have to go somewhere with the increase of population, but I did not think as far as the food supply was concerned. But I think the population and the food problem were the same.



- Q. Japan had to find a place for this increasing population to live, didn't she?
- A. I think so.
- Q. It was with this background that the 9-Power Treaty to which Japan was a party was signed, wasn't it?
- A. I think so.
- Q. Japan came to consider that this treaty materially reduced its special rights and privileges in Manchuria, didn't it?
- A. I think so.
- Q. Japan considered that this treaty didn't leave it as free to carry on its program in the development of Manchuria as it had previously been, didn't she?
- A. I did not read exactly the 9-Power Treaty, but I suppose so, yes.
- Q. And the military became quite displeased with the limitations which this treaty placed on Japan's program in Manchuria, didn't it?
- A. I don't know about the army. What the military officers thought about I did not hear.
- Q. Do you have any opinion about how the military felt about the 9-Power Treaty?
- A. I have no opinion.
- Q. Public opinion in Japan became greatly aroused by the execution of that treaty, did it not?
- A. I don't know because I was overseas.
- Q. Do you have any opinion about it from what you have learned subsequently of Japan's policy there?
- A. I have no special opinion about that.
- Q. Don't you know that the Emperor called a conference of high officials and high officers of the army and navy to find a way to counteract this new situation created by the 9-Power Treaty?
- A. I don't know.
- Q. After the Execution of the 9-Power Treaty the Chinese began to flow into Manchuria in greater numbers than ever before, didn't they?
- A. Yes, I will tell you about that. When our fleet entered in Manchuria next to Port Arthur, Mr. Matsuokuo was the Minister. He was the President of the South Manchuria Railway Company, and he is my friend. I know him, so when I met him he said to me, "readily many Chinese come to Manchuria" and he said, "I want to expand more and more in Manchuria, so we want many laborers", and many laborers came from North China to Manchuria. I saw many Chinese come into the city.
- Q. When the immigration of Chinese into the Manchurian area kept increasing annually in that period it ultimately came to create a great deal of concern on the part of Japan, did it not?
- A. When I saw the immigration of Chinese into Manchuria, it was at the very start and what happened after that I don't know.
- Q. Japan ultimately became so aroused about the limitations which the 9-Power Treaty placed upon the development of its program in Manchuria that in 1928-1929, she was ready to declare the treaty void and to abrogate it, wasn't she?
- A. I don't know anything about that.



- Q. You don't remember the arguments in government circles about Japan abandoning the 9-Power Treaty?
- A. No. I was not here in 1928. I was commander of the flying squadron, and didn't know anything about what happened in Japan proper.
- Q. You know that Japan considered that it was the purpose of England and America through the 9-Power Treaty to crush Japan's influence in China, don't you?
- A. Not to destroy, but somewhat to control it, I think.
- Q. Japan ultimately violated the treaty, didn't she?
- A. I know that the naval agreement was ended in 1935, but I don't know if at the same time the 9-Power Treaty was finished.
- Q. You mean you don't know whether Japan violated it or not?
- A. I did not know. I don't know if it was broken or not, but I know with the end of the Washington Treaty, the 9-Power Treaty, became a four power treaty. The 9-Power Treaty gradually became void.
- Q. Japan employed force instead of negotiation in Manchuria in 1931, did she not?
- A. I don't think so. The cause of the Manchurian Affair was the disruption of the railroad in South Manchuria, I think.
- Q. Whatever may have been the cause of the Manchurian Incident Japan employed force rather than negotiation to settle such differences as arose there, didn't she?
- A. When I was in Kyushu as President of the Naval Academy I heard of the breaking out of the Manchurian Affair. Immediately when I came back to Tokyo, I heard from many of my friends that the government did not like to use force, but already in the South Manchuria area the collision of Japan and China had happened.
- Q. Tell us briefly and in your own way just what you consider to have caused the Mukden Incident on the 17th of September?
- A. The disruption of the railroad company, and I will read you my opinion. (The witness reads "The Manchurian Affair, p.10 of this record);
- Q. You gave me a diary which you started last year. Have you written any memoirs, or do you have any records of your official life for the past years?
- A. No, I have none; I have no material.
- Q. You don't have any written documents or written evidence of your public career?
- A. No, I have nothing.
- Q. Have you refreshed your memory since yesterday, and do you now recall the regime of Marshall Chiang Tsu-Lin in Manchuria?
- A. No.
- Q. On September 17, 1931, all of the Japanese forces in Manchuria and some of those in Korea were brought into action simultaneously on the night of that date over the whole South Manchuria Railway area from Changchung to Port Arthur, weren't they?
- A. That was an army action; I don't know how they fought.
- Q. Japan immediately occupied all of the principal points in Manchuria, did she not?
- A. I suppose so, because when the fighting began it was necessary to occupy all principal points.
- Q. You know enough about warfare to realize that the marshalling of troops over an area that large couldn't have been accomplished unless it had been anticipated by the leaders in charge of the troops, could it?



- A. According to military tactics any commander should be prepared to mobilize upon immediate notice, but whether they anticipated any outbreak, I don't know.
- Q. When the Central Government of China began to project its influence into Manchuria this created a great deal of concern on the part of Japan as to its rights and privileges in Manchuria, did it not?
- A. I don't know exactly, but of course after the Manchurian Incident Japan must have had some concern as to what attitude China would have toward Manchuria.
- Q. Under these circumstances Japan began to increase its military force in Manchuria, didn't she?
- A. I don't think so.
- Q. When hostilities broke out in Manchuria with the Mukden Incident in September 1931, where were you stationed?
- A. I was President of the Naval Academy.
- Q. How did you feel about the Mukden Incident?
- A. I thought it was terrible.
- Q. Were you sympathetic with Japan's policy of using force to settle the Incident?
- A. At that time I didn't know the actual facts of the conflict except that the Japanese and Chinese Armies had a clash and my first thought was that it should be settled as soon as possible.
- Q. Did you lend any support in any way toward Japanese military activities in Manchuria at that time?
- A. I didn't do anything.
- Q. This Incident was finally settled by Japan occupying the entire area of Manchuria and setting up the Manchukuo Government, wasn't it?
- A. I suppose so.
- Q. Don't you know so.
- A. I can't say anything definitely. I do know that the Manchukuo Government was set up by Imperial order.
- Q. And that was the puppet government of Japan, wasn't it?
- A. The Government was backed by Japan.
- Q. So that the effect of the result of the Manchurian Incident was that Japan acquired the territory of Manchuria, wasn't it?
- A. I don't think so. Japanese people went freely to Manchuria, but the sovereignty of Manchuria was in the Manchukuo Government.
- Q. The territory was no longer claimed by China, was it?
- A. China and Manchuria were different countries; I think so.
- Q. The next thing that happened was the Shanghai Incident in January of 1932, wasn't it?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Tell us in your own way your idea about the cause of that Incident?
- A. I think the Shanghai Incident started because of the conflict of ideas between China and Japan which was brought about by the Manchurian Incident, and it was also started by numerous killings that were brought about just before the incident.



- Q. Japan welcomed a reason to occupy Shanghai, didn't she?  
A. No, they did not welcome the idea.
- Q. Just previous to the Shanghai Incident, China had invoked a boycott on Japanese trade, had it not?  
A. I think they did.
- Q. And don't you know that that was the real reason which created the Shanghai Incident?  
A. I don't think so; it was not the boycott, but the conflict of ideas.
- Q. And you don't think the Shanghai Incident was created by Japan in retaliation for the boycott?  
A. I don't think so.
- Q. Did you participate in the Shanghai Incident?  
A. I made all my efforts to limit the affair.
- Q. What did you do in performance of your duties as Vice-Chief of Staff?  
A. I did everything I could do.
- Q. Did you send a fleet down to Shanghai?  
A. One was already there.
- Q. Did you send more?  
A. I don't think so.
- Q. Did you issue any orders to the fleet already there?  
A. The orders were issued by the Emperor.
- Q. Did you propose any orders to be issued by the Emperor?  
A. No, that was done by the Chief of the Naval General Staff, Prince Bushimi.
- Q. Did you propose any orders to him?  
A. Yes.
- Q. And you are willing to assume your share of the responsibility for Japan's policy with respect to the Shanghai Incident, aren't you?  
A. My object then was to settle the conflict in Shanghai, and not to let it extend to any other part of China.
- Q. Whatever may have been your opinion you are willing to assume your full share of the responsibility for the policies of Japan that were executed in Shanghai, aren't you?  
A. The Chief of the Naval General Staff should assume the responsibility. I had the responsibility to the Chief, and he had the responsibility for everything, I think.
- Q. You say that it was your opinion that the Shanghai Incident should have been confined to the area of Shanghai. It wasn't so confined, was it?  
A. According to my opinion it was settled within the Shanghai area.
- Q. You ultimately occupied the territory, didn't you?  
A. Yes.
- Q. And you drove the Chinese out, didn't you?  
A. We drove the Chinese troops out from the territory where the Japanese soldiers were stationed. Shanghai is a big area.



- Q. Now, after Japan consolidated its position in Manchuria by setting up the Manchukuo Government it acquired all of the railroads which had formerly been competitive to the South Manchuria Railway didn't it?
- A. I don't know.
- Q. During those years there were two schools of thought in Japan, weren't there; one, that Japan should expand to the South in China, and two, that they should expand to the North?
- A. Yes, that is written in my notes "Expansion of Japan."
- Q. And after the Manchurian Incident Japan gradually began to expand to the North, didn't she?
- A. Not after the Manchurian Incident, but after the Russo-Japanese War, I think.
- Q. Isn't it a fact that the capitalization of the South Manchuria Railway Company grew enormously in the period from 1931 to 1935?
- A. I heard that.
- Q. And the investment in this railway continued to increase and Japan continued to develop it until the time of the war with the United States, didn't it?
- A. I think so.
- Q. And isn't it a fact that it was the underlying policy of Japan in Manchuria that she would proceed on the basis of presumption of trade and commerce to expand her influence in China?
- A. I don't know of any such politics.
- Q. Did you ever hear of the expression "Niki Sansuke"?
- A. No.
- Q. Of course you know that Premier Tojo at one time was in charge of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria, don't you?
- A. I don't know if he had been in Manchuria or not.
- Q. Did you ever know Naoki Hoshiro?
- A. No.
- Q. I believe you said you knew Matsuoka?
- A. Yes.
- Q. You know that at one time he was president of the Manchuria Railway Company?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Do you know Sinsuke Kishi?
- A. Yes, I saw him once. He is here in jail. He was the younger brother of my friend in the navy, a retired Vice-Admiral.
- Q. He was in Manchuria at the same time Matsuoka was there, was he not?
- A. I don't know the time, but I know he was in Manchuria.
- Q. He was Vice-President of the Economic System of the Manchukuo Government, was he not?
- A. I don't know his position; I just knew he was there.
- Q. Do you know Giusuke AYUKAWA?
- A. I know him, and he was in Manchuria, but I don't know what kind of work he did.



- Q. You don't know that he was President of the Manchuria Heavy Industries Company?
- A. I heard so.
- Q. And that was a holding company of the South Manchuria Railway Company was it not?
- A. It seems to be.
- Q. What company represented the interests in Japan in acquiring war materials, didn't it?
- A. I don't know what materials, but some materials, I heard.
- Q. Didn't you ever hear of this group of men whom I have just identified being characterized by the expression "Niki Sansuke"?
- A. No. I suppose only very few men know about it. It must be some secret group if there was such a group.
- Q. You didn't ever hear that group of men referred to as the Japanese Brain Trust in Manchuria?
- A. No, I don't know.
- Q. That group was formulating Japanese policy in Manchuria, wasn't it?
- A. I don't know.
- Q. You are familiar with the 21 demands made by Japan upon China, aren't you?
- A. I don't remember exactly 21, but Japan wanted some privileges in China, but I don't know exactly what.
- Q. Those demands were made before the execution of the 9-Power Treaty, weren't they?
- A. I don't think so.
- Q. Those demands were compromised at the time, weren't they?
- A. I think one part of them was accepted by China.
- Q. Then in the period from 1927 to 1930 there developed in Japan a movement to revive in different form most of the original demands which were not accepted by China, didn't there?
- A. I don't know anything concerning Japan proper.
- Q. When was the first time you heard of the development of a positive policy on the part of Japan toward Manchuria in China?
- A. I suppose after the Manchurian Affair.
- Q. Now, after Japan established the Manchukuo Government she began a program of construction of additional railways, did she not?
- A. I heard that.
- Q. Prior to the Manchurian Incident the Japanese railways were in the South of Manchuria, were they not?
- A. Yes.
- Q. After the Manchurian Incident in order to build a barrier for defense against possible Russian aggression Japan began a construction of railways in the North of Manchuria, did she not?
- A. I think that was for both offensive and economic reasons as well.

Interrogation of TAKAHASHI, Sankichi, continued 18 Feb 1946.



- Q. I believe you want to say something about the China Affair during the Manchurian Incident?
- A. You asked me about the responsibility of the Naval General Staff during the Affair, and I said the responsibility was the Chief of Staffs, but I correct that. At that time the operation and conduction of the battles in Shanghai was all directed by the Navy Minister, not the General Staff. So I think the responsibility is on the Navy Minister, not the Chief of the Naval Staff. There is a difference between the Army and Navy. In the army the Chief of the General Staff runs the whole show, whereas in the Navy the Navy Minister runs the show.
- Q. In the last interrogation we dealt with the background of the Manchurian Affair, and covered its culmination and the setting up of the Manchukuo Government and then Japan taking over the Chinese railways and other railroads in Manchuria, and came down through the Shanghai Incident. No sooner had the Shanghai Incident been settled than did the Manchukuo Government begin an effort to extend its efforts and influence and jurisdiction into Mongolia, didn't it?
- A. I don't know.
- Q. You don't remember that that was when the Jehol expedition was begun? Jehol is the same as Nekka in Japanese.
- A. I don't know anything about that.
- Q. You know that there was no part of Mongolia within the jurisdiction of the Manchukuo Government at the time of its establishment, don't you?
- A. I don't know.
- Q. You haven't learned that Manchukuo took a part of Mongolia into its jurisdiction?
- A. I don't know.
- Q. You know that Japan continued its efforts to expand into China after it set up the Manchukuo Government, don't you?
- A. Some of the militarists tried to go into North China, but I was opposed to the idea.
- Q. Who were the militarists who wanted to proceed in North China?
- A. I don't know the names, but some Army Officers wanted to go on into North China.
- Q. Why were you opposed to it?
- A. I made all my efforts to limit the Manchurian Affair so as not to let it extend beyond the wall of North China. I did not want it because it was no good.
- Q. You didn't consider that Japan had any right to be pushing into China?
- A. I think it had no right to go there, because it was Chinese territory. We must respect Chinese sovereignty.
- Q. But they did proceed to expand into North China?
- A. Yes, I mentioned that in "Expansion of Japan". Also the "China-Japan Conflict".
- Q. This opinion which you have expressed in "China-Japan Conflict" constitutes the extent of your knowledge about it, you say?
- A. Yes.
- Q. During these years after the Manchurian Incident, Japan was lending active support to the opposition to the formation of a strong Central Government in China, was she not?



- A. I don't know in that point.
- Q. Don't you know that Japan vigorously resented the support that was being lent by America to a strong Central Government in China?
- A. I don't know. At that time, I had been at sea.
- Q. Haven't you learned that it was Japan's policy to keep China divided among herself so that Japan would have less difficulty in establishing puppet governments favorable to Japanese interests?
- A. I don't think so at that time.
- Q. Japan never lent any support to Chiang Kai-shek's efforts to establish a strong Central Government in China, did she?
- A. I don't think so.
- Q. Japan wasn't sympathetic with Chiang Kai-Shek's effort to establish a strong Central Government in China, was she?
- A. Before the China conflict I think the Government had no such ideas.
- Q. As Chiang Kai-Shek began to crystalize his strength Japan grew further and further away from him, didn't she?
- A. I don't think so. Until the China-Japan conflict Japan endeavored to be friendly with the Chiang Kai-Shek Government.
- Q. Now, at the time of the China Incident in July 1937 the European situation was developing at a fast pace, was it not?
- A. Yes. I think so.
- Q. Hitler was on the march during those years, and while war had not begun he was acquiring territory rather promiscuously, wasn't he?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And the situation in Europe was growing very tense in 1937, wasn't it?
- A. Yes, that is so.
- Q. Do you consider that this tense situation which was occupying the attention of all the European powers as well as the United States had anything to do with the breaking out of the China Incident in July of 1937?
- A. I think there was no relation between that and the breaking out of the China Incident.
- Q. Had Japan inaugurated its New Order in East Asia program by this time?
- A. I don't know what time the idea of the New Order arose in Japan, but I suppose it was about the time of the China-Japan conflict.
- Q. Now, the China Incident broke out at the Marco Polo Bridge and spread generally very rapidly, didn't it?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And Japan from that time continued to invade China until the outbreak of the war with the United States, didn't she?
- A. At that time I heard from the Navy Minister that the Japanese Government had planned to settle the affair in a short time. That was the doctrine of the Konoye Cabinet and Admiral Yonai. I am very sorry that the affair wasn't held to the local incident.
- Q. The incident wasn't held to the local area and Japan continued to invade China up until the war with the United States didn't she?
- A. Yes.



- Q. Now, it was during this period that Japan projected its Monroe Doctrine with respect to China, wasn't it?
- A. I think so. Some of the governing class said there must be an Eastern Monroe Doctrine, just as the American Monroe Doctrine.
- Q. Japan adopted the policy of protecting China against what it called the imperialism of the Western states, didn't she?
- A. I don't think so.
- Q. Do you recall that in 1934 the Japanese Foreign Office declared as follows: "It goes without saying that Japan at alltimes is endeavoring to maintain and promote here friendly relations with foreign nations, but at the same time we consider it only natural that to keep peace and order in Asia we must even act alone on our own responsibility, and it is our duty to pefform it. At the same time there is no country but China which isin a position to share with Japanthe responsibility for the maintenance of peace in East Asia.

Accordingly, unification of China, preservation of her territorial integrity as well as restoration of order in that country; are most ardently desired by Japan. History shows that these can be attained through no other means than awakening and voluntary efforts of China herself.

We oppose, therefore, any attempt on the part of China to avail herself of the influence of any other country in order to resist Japan; we also oppose any action taken by China calculated to play one power against another. Any joint operations undertaken by foreign powers even inthe name of technical or financial assistance at this particular moment after Manchurian and Shanghai incidents are bound to acquire political significance. Undertakings of such nature, if carried through to the end, must give rise to complications that must eventually necessitate discussion of problems like division of China and at the same time would have most serious repercussion upon Japan and East Asia. Japan therefore, must object to such undertakings as a matter of principle, although she will not find it necessary to interfere with any foreign country negotiating individually with China on questions of finance or trade as long as such negotiations benefit China and are not detrimental to peace in East Asia.

However, supplying China with war aeroplanes, building aerodromes in China, and detailing military and naval instructors or military advisers to China, or contracting a loan to provide funds for political uses; would obviously tend to alienate friendly relations between Japan, China, and other countries, and to disturb peace andorder in Eastern Asia, Japan will oppose such projects. Generally speaking, I understand so; that was the government's policy.

- Q. It is your understanding that that quotation which I have just read correctly represents the policy of Japan's government with respect to China at that time, isn't it?
- A. Generally speaking I think it is so, but since I amnot very familiar with it I cannot say definitely.
- Q. China had not requested Japan to come to its aid and defend her against what Japan alleged to be imperialism on part of the Western Hemisphere, or Western states, had she?
- A. I don't think so.
- Q. If Japan felt that way about China why was she always fighting her?
- A. Japan always thought of protecting China, but through some misunderstanding, war broke out and Japa was gradually drawn into a long battle



which could not be stopped. I thought it would be good to solve this problem with diplomatic missions, but I am very sorry that the two countries entered into the conflict.

- Q. Do you think Japan had any right to tell China she should not align herself with the United States and Great Britain?
- A. It was very bad, Japan was pulled into the war and it spread out all over China, and during that course the United States and England did not like to have the affairs spread. They helped China, but Japan got no goods from the United States, no cotton, etc., and the government of Tojo was very anxious to continue the conflict with China, and that was the cause of the Big War.
- Q. That doesn't have anything to do with the question I have asked. You have stated Japan had a Monroe Doctrine with respect to China which was predicated upon the theory that Western States should leave China alone. My question is, do you think Japan had any right to tell China that she shouldn't align herself with the United States and Great Britain?
- A. Japan did not say that China should not align herself with Great Britain or the United States, but said for the United States and England not to aid China against Japan.
- Q. All through these years Japan arbitrarily arrogated to itself the role of leadership to determine what it thought was good for Greater East Asia, didn't she?
- A. Not for Japan only, but for all East Asia. Japan was the only independent country in East Asia, so that we had the duty to lead the parade and be the leader.
- Q. Japan opposed every effort on the part of China to receive aid and assistance from America and Great Britain which might result in China adopting a policy contrary to Japan's program in East Asia, didn't she?
- A. I don't know very well, but I think Japan always felt that they would like to have the United States stop from helping China.
- Q. Simply stated, it was Japan's policy that America and Great Britain should stay out of East Asia and let Japan determine what was best for China to do wasn't it?
- A. But the United States only helped China and gave Japan nothing. It was all right so long as they helped both.
- Q. As the intensity of the China Incident progressed there was a simultaneous increase in the intensity of the European situation with respect to war, wasn't there?
- A. I think so.
- Q. And Japan, in the first one or two years after the beginning of the China Incident of July 1937 was growing progressively closer into alignment with the Axis, wasn't she?
- A. Some people in the government and some people in Europe, but not myself. The Ambassador in Germany, Oshima, thought that Japan and Germany should be friendly.
- Q. How do you account for this merging of the Japanese foreign policy with that of the Axis?
- A. I don't know. Some group of the government was for it. I was not in authority and didn't hear about it. I don't know if naval officers were in that group or not.
- Q. It was during this period, 1937-1939, that the program of the New Order



- in East Asia was promulgated as a policy by Japan, wasn't it?
- A. I don't think so: I don't remember exactly.
- Q. And this New Order in East Asia program was synonymous with the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity program, wasn't it?
- A. I don't think so.
- Q. And this New Order program and the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity sphere program contemplated that Japan would afford the leadership for Greater East Asia, didn't they?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And for that program to be put into effect and made successful by Japan it contemplated a change in the status quo with respect to East Asia, didn't it?
- A. In some points I think so.
- Q. It contemplated a change in the relation between Japan and Thailand, didn't it?
- A. I don't know exactly about the relations at that time with Japan and Thailand.
- Q. Don't you know that your New Order program contemplated that Thailand should be brought into the sphere of Japan's influence?
- A. I think that idea came just after the Great War.
- Q. And this program contemplated that the Philippines would be brought into Japan's sphere of leadership?
- A. Also that idea was after the Great War; not only Thailand and the Philippines, but Java, the East Indies, Borneo, Celebes, etc.
- Q. And it also contemplated that Burma would be brought within the sphere of Japan's leadership, didn't it?
- A. Yes.
- Q. In order for this goal to be accomplished it would be necessary for British and American possessions to be granted their independence and puppet governments set up for them wouldn't it?
- A. I think those people would be very grateful to be established as independent countries and to be self-governed.
- Q. Whether they were eager to do so or not it was Japan's program that they should be granted their independence and brought within the sphere of Japan's leadership, wasn't it?
- A. I don't know. If some people were eager not to be independent it would be out of the question.
- Q. It was not out of the question if Japan occupied and overran them was it?
- A. I don't think so.
- Q. Now, if Japan had been victorious she would have imposed her New Order program in Greater East Asia whether the countries involved wanted it or not, wouldn't she?
- A. No. I made a statement about that in "Future Way for Japan".
- Q. Isn't it a fact that the basic cause of war with the United States and Great Britain was because they did not agree to Japan's plan for setting up a New Order in East Asia?
- A. I think the cause of the Great War was the China conflict. If there had been no China conflict there would not have been a Great War. I refer to my statement "China-Japan Conflict".



- Q. Now, you have previously stated that you are familiar with the organization of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association in 1940; that is about the time you began to make public speeches, isn't it?
- A. I think so, yes.
- Q. What was the nature of your criticism of the United States and Great Britain?
- A. The nature of the criticism of the United States and England was that they should not help only China, but should also help Japan. That was the main part of my speeches.
- Q. Did you make a statement in 1940 that Japan dominated Greater East Asia would embrace in stages India, the East Indies, the Philippines and Australia.
- A. That meant to lead not dominate.
- Q. You repeatedly advocated the southward advance on the part of Japan in public speeches before the war, didn't you?
- A. Yes, the meaning of south-going is in my statement "Past Expansion of Japan".
- Q. When you were making these speeches you became identified as one of the few senior naval officers who was supporting Japanese expansion, didn't you?
- A. I think so, because I was honorable.
- Q. When you were making your south-going speeches you were making statements such as "it is most desirable for us if we are allowed to make some settlements in southern tropical land or some territory in the Pacific". What did you mean by making settlements in southern tropical land?
- A. To establish settlements there and to let Japanese people live there, such as Davao, Mindanao, etc.
- Q. In order for this to be accomplished it would be necessary for Japan to employ force, wouldn't it?
- A. I don't think so.
- Q. When you were making these speeches did you think that the countries and people involved were voluntarily going to let you take the settlements or land which you contemplated?
- A. I think all the Japanese people were of the same opinion.
- Q. You constantly urged preparation for war with the United States on the part of Japan, didn't you?
- A. I don't know what the government was doing, but as a naval officer we must defend our own country and if there was any war we must fight. That was the duty of a naval officer.
- Q. When you were making these speeches you contemplated that Japan was going to war with the United States, didn't you?
- A. I thought so if American policy to help China and to close the door from every part of the world, especially from the southern part, continued, and the conflict between Japan and United States would happen.
- Q. You did more than that, didn't you. You urged Japan to go to war with the United States, didn't you?
- A. All I requested was the lifting of the economic blockade by the United States from Japan.
- Q. Didn't you enjoy the reputation of being a member of the renovationists within the navy in advocating war against Great Britain and America?



- A. I never advocated war against the United States. I only asked for the lifting of the blockade by the United States.
- Q. You were one of the most vocal of the Japanese naval officers in promising defeat of the American Fleet in the Pacific, weren't you?
- A. Not only against the United States. Any country who would fight against Japan in the Pacific. In that case we must get victory, and we had confidence of that victory in naval battles, I said, and all the other admirals said the same thing.
- Q. Do you have any copies of speeches you made during those years?
- A. No.
- Q. Were they printed in the press and newspapers?
- A. There may have been some that were printed but I have no recollection about that.
- Q. Are you familiar with any of the Imperial conferences which were held in 1941?
- A. I was retired and knew nothing about those policies.
- Q. You remember the crisis which arose during the third Konoye Cabinet which resulted in its fall, don't you?
- A. No. After I retired I heard nothing about the policies.
- Q. You remember that the third Konoye Cabinet did fall, don't you?
- A. Yes, I know of the fall of the third Konoye Cabinet, but I don't know the reasons.
- Q. You know that Premier Tojo was requested to organize a new Cabinet, don't you?
- A. Yes, I read that in the newspaper.
- Q. And you don't know that the reason for the fall of the third Konoye Cabinet was the objection which Tojo, as war Minister, interposed to the Konoye policies?
- A. It was said by Konoye I read in the newspaper after the war was finished. This matter was quite secret except in the government itself.
- Q. And you mean to say you had no knowledge of the difference which existed between TOJO and KONOYE at the time of the fall of the third Konoye Cabinet?
- A. I don't know the real reasons.
- Q. Don't you know that in public addresses during that time that you were supporting the position taken by TOJO?
- A. I don't know the policies of TOJO. I spoke only as ordinary people, that TOJO did not plan to fight against the United States. The people did not desire to fight against the United States, and also TOJO, I think.
- Q. Don't you know that it was Konoye's policy to play down and try to settle the China Incident without any further use of force?
- A. I, myself, did not oppose Konoye's policy of making peace settlement with China without force.
- Q. You publicly supported the policies of TOJO's Cabinet after the Konoye Cabinet fell, didn't you?
- A. Yes. I don't know what was the real policies of TOJO just before the Great War, so I cannot help or oppose TOJO's policies.