Japan) have a very dangerous enemy to the north".

Thus, Yoshida, in the capacity of the head of the Japanese Government, which capitulated to the Allied Powers, made a hostile attack against the Soviet Union, one of the Allied States.

In inviting the attention of the Government of the U.S.A. to the declaration of Yoshida, the Soviet Government anticipates that Yoshida will be called to account for such a hostile expression against the U.S.S.R. and that in the future provocative statements of a similar nature will not be permitted.

By instruction of the Soviet Government I request you to bring the above to the attention of the Government of the United States of America.

Accept, sir, the renewed assurances of my highest esteem,

S. Tsarapkin,
Chargé d'Affaires of the U.S.S.R.
in the U.S.A.

The Acting Secretary of State
Dean Acheson,
Department of State,
Washington.

Translated:
EE:WJBoessel:MD
4:1:47

UNOFFICIAL SUMMARY
Note #39, Mar. 31 from
USSR Embassy

Protests with regard to an interview granted to the press by the Japanese Prime Minister, in which he made several allegedly unfriendly remarks concerning the Soviet Union.

SF
4/1

(Summary furnished by Mr. Stoessel of EE)

№39

31 марта 1947 г.

Сэр,

По поручению Правительства Союза Советских Социалистических Республик я имею честь сообщить Вам нижеследующее:

20 марта в американских газетах и 21 марта в японских газетах опубликовано сообщение об интервью японского премьер-министра Иосида.

По сообщению газет, в этом интервью Иосида одобрил недавнее предложение генерала Д.Макартура относительно переговоров о договоре и об окончании оккупации и дал ясно понять, что после подписания договора он предпочтет американское покровительство покровительству Об"единенных Наций. При этом Иосида выразил надежду, что гражданское руководство Об"единенных Наций "будет основываться на той же самой просвещенной политике, которой руководствуются военные под водительством Макартура".

Наряду с этим в своем интервью Иосида позволил себе сделать заявление о том, что "Мы (то-есть Япония) имеем очень опасного врага на Севере". Таким образом, Иосида, являющийся

главой правительства Японии, капитулировавшей перед Союзными державами, сделал враждебный выпад против Советского Союза, одного из Союзных государств.

Обращая внимание Правительства США на это заявление Иосиды, Советское Правительство ожидает, что Иосида будет призван к порядку за такое враждебное выступление против СССР и что впредь не будет допущено подобного рода провокационных выходок.

По поручению Советского Правительства прошу Вас довести о вышеизложенном до сведения Правительства Соединенных Штатов Америки.

Примите, Сэр, мои заверения в весьма высоком к Вам уважении,

С. Дарапкин,
Временный Поверенный в Делах
СССР в США

Исполняющему Обязанности
Государственного Секретаря
Господину Дин Ачесон
Государственный Департамент
Вашингтон.

3/20/49

New York Times

YOSHIDA URGES U.S. TO REMAIN IN JAPAN

Premier Holds Protection by Americans Is Necessary After Treaty Is Signed

TOKYO, March 19 (AP)—If the United States expects to insure world peace, Americans must remain indefinitely in Japan after the Japanese peace treaty is signed, Premier Shigeru Yoshida said today.

In an interview with The Associated Press, the Premier voiced strong approval of Gen. Douglas MacArthur's recent proposal for treaty negotiations and end of the occupation, but made it plain that he preferred American protection to that of the United Nations upon signing the peace.

"We are having our battles with the Communists, too," Premier Yoshida said, "and we have a very dangerous enemy to the north."

The Premier interpreted President Truman's recent address to mean that the United States would lead a world-wide opposition against communism, and said:

"You Americans have got to remain in Japan after the peace treaty if the United States is going to insure world peace. No matter how much you might want to go home, this must be done. It is to the advantage of your country as well as mine."

Collapse Feared

The American supervision should "continue as long as the world situation is so confused. * * * Otherwise all the work you put in to democratize Japan will collapse," Premier Yoshida declared.

In a comment on General MacArthur's proposal that the United Nations take over the stewardship of Japan, the Premier said "I am not acquainted with the strength of the United Nations. But we know the League of Nations was not very good. Maybe the United Nations will not be ready when peace comes."

Premier Yoshida predicted that military forces would be necessary in Japan for a time at least after the peace treaty was signed. General MacArthur's statement did not foresee "military formations of any kind" as necessary after the treaty.

The Premier said that General MacArthur in his press conference report on the occupation gave the "Japanese people faith in a bright new world to replace the past uncertainty."

Premier Yoshida stressed, as did General MacArthur, the necessity of industrial and foreign trade revival for a healthy Japanese nation.

Dr. Evatt Concurs

CANBERRA, Australia, March 19 (AP)—Australian Minister of External Affairs Herbert V. Evatt said today that the Australian Government agreed with General MacArthur's view that armed occupation of Japan should be terminated as early as possible.

Dr. Evatt said that the Government considered that a Japanese peace treaty should be expedited to enable the most rapid definition of Japan's future position.

Meanwhile Sydney papers expressed doubt about the wisdom of General MacArthur's suggestion that occupation forces should be withdrawn when the treaty was signed.

The Daily Telegraph said: "One can hardly believe that in so short a time since the Japanese soldiery were enjoying the sadistic pleasure of bashing and murdering their helpless prisoners—to the plaudits of the Japanese nation—these people have come to endorse the ethical values they outraged."

Singapore Is Critical

SINGAPORE, March 19 (AP)—The Straits Times declared today that American occupation forces had "abandoned their attempt to democratize Japan, not publicly or officially, of course, but in fact that is what has happened."

The Times, regarded as an important factor in British colonial public opinion, said that economic necessities influenced General MacArthur to permit the emergence of the Rightists to full control over the Japanese Government.

The paper also was skeptical that the social and political reforms that General MacArthur has instituted would remain permanent and expressed concern for the Malayas if Japan should quickly regain its pre-war position as the Far East's dominant industrial nation.

The American reform record is impressive, observed The Times, but added that "some observers on the spot" are convinced that the reforms are superficial and without "the slightest guarantee they will last after the Americans leave."

New York Herald Tribune 3/20/47

Japan Premier Asks U. S. Not to End Occupation

Says Nation Has an Enemy to the North; American Troops Preferred to U.N.

TAKYO, March 19 (AP).—If the United States is going to insure world peace, Americans must remain indefinitely in Japan after the Japaneze peace treaty is signed, Premier Shigeru Yoshida said today in an interview.

The premier voiced strong approval of General Douglas MacArthur's recent proposal for treaty negotiations and end of the occupation, but made it plain that he refers American protection to that of the United Nations upon signing the peace.

"We are thaving our battles with the Communists, too," Yoshida said, "and we have a very dangerous enem yto the north."

The Premier interpreted President Truman's recent address to mean that the United States is going to lead a world-wide opposition against Communism, and said: "You Americans have got to remain in Japan after the peace treaty if the United States is going to insure world peace. No matter how much you might want to go home, this must be done. It is to the advantage of your country as well as mine."

Australia Urges Peace Treaty

CANBERRA, March 19 (AP).—Australian Minister for External Affairs Herbert V. Evatt said today that the Australian government agrees with General MacArthur's view that armed occupation of Japan should be terminated as early as possible.

The government considers that a Japanese peace treaty should be expedited to enable the most rapid definition of Japan's future position, Mr. Evatt said.

U. S. Policies Criticized

SINGAPORE, March 19 (AP).—"The Straits Times" declared today that the American occupation forces have "abandoned their attempt to democratize Japan, not publicly or officially, of course, but in fact that is what has happened."

Climaxing the most complete British-Malayan newspaper comment on Japan in months, the "Times" editorialized that the main reason for what it termed the United States policy change was the "American conviction that Soviet Russia is a world menace." The paper said the United States now is thinking of Japan as "the aircraft carrier of the Pacific" rather than "the nursery of Asiatic democracy."

The "Times," regarded as an important factor in British colonial public opinion, said economic necessities influenced General MacArthur to permit the emergence of the Rightists to full control over the Japanese government.

Washington Post 3/20/49

Jap Premier Calls for Long Occupation

Tokyo, March 19 (AP).—If the United States is going to insure world peace, Americans must remain indefinitely in Japan after the Japanese peace treaty is signed, Premier Shigeru Yoshida said today.

In an interview, he voiced strong approval of General MacArthur's recent proposal for treaty negotiations and end of the occupation but made it plain that he preferred American protection to that of the United Nations upon signing the peace.

"We are having our battles with the Communists, too," Yoshida said, "and we have a very dangerous enemy to the north."

He interpreted President Truman's recent address to mean that the United States was going to lead a worldwide opposition against communism.

The American supervision should "continue as long as the world situation is so confused. . . . Otherwise all the work you put in to democratize Japan will collapse," Yoshida declared.

Quarters dominated by reaction in America have recently been calling for the use of American economic power--that is, the American dollar--as a weapon of oppression against the European nations ruined by the war.....

The American dollar is a tool held by the American expansionists for aggression against other nations. In attempting to bring these nations under American domination, the controlling class in America is trying to turn to their advantage, for the above purpose, the difficult food situation in which many of the world's peoples find themselves....

***

...the export of grain and other foods is carried out by the exporter nations without consideration of the various food situations in the consuming nations.

..cause not less important than the above is the raised prices of food. This is not only an added burden on the millions of the consuming people; ..is equally a situation that enriches even more the monopolizing capitalists who fatten themselves on the empty stomachs of the masses.

***

. ...The group of American monopoly capitalists who, for their own selfish purposes, turn their backs on the food which is so vital a necessity in the everyday life of mankind, are the target of popularcriticism throughout the world.

***

It is worthy of attention that the exporter nations of the world are against the European nations who advocate concerted action, and that the United States is absolutely against this measure. The United States is completely self-seeking and wants to retain a bargaining position even over its surplus food. And by this method the United States clearly intends to bring economic and political pressure to bear upon the nations who cannot escape the food shortage.

***

Today, when thewar is over, but peace not yet restored, the United States is attempting to use her economic power, especially the exporting of food, as a tool of political aggression, and to put political pressure on the post-war nations which suffer from food shortages... thus the monopolist class in America dreams willfully of expansion, and is using American foreign policy as a tool of its own imperialist plotting. In such manner, the tactics of starvation are aiding dollar democracy. [Exerpts from Article appearing in 7 Jan 47 edition of SHINSEIMEI Newspaper of Southern Sakhalin]

...Food,..as the government itself admits, remains Japan's most pressing problem.

***

...The Japanese Government's economic policy has not only proved completely ineffective in restoring conditions to normal but has even added to the disorder.

...Japan's industrial reconversion is being carried out by methods which are injurious to the rightful interests of the workers.

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...American assistance to Japan, as far as food is concerned, is simply political in nature. The Government's reactionary laws and policies relating to the food problem are merely spreading theopposition movement and making it sweep like a wave over the entire country.

...The demonstrations, meetings and strikes which are increasing within the country every day show that the administration of the Yoshida Cabinet, which is supported by the American Occupation authorities, is not only piling crime upon crime and following a course opposite to that of Japan's transformation into a democratic nation, but is even promoting the maintenance of the order which prevailed in the militaristic period.
/Excerpt from article appearing in 11 Jan 47 edition of SHINSEIMEI Newspaper of Southern Sakhalin/

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The United States did not uphold to the fullest extent the terms of the Potsdam Declaration on the surrender demands since it did not guarantee the accomplishment of basic reforms in the economic and political structure of Japan in accordance with the intentions of all the Allied countries.....

****

...Present conditions in Japan are not only proof of the complete failure of the Yoshida Government but are also the natural result of the course taken by MacArthur since the reactionary policies of the present Japanese Government would be absolutely impossible without MacArthur's support.

...Backed by American strength, the political power of Japan is in the hands of the reactionary bourgeoisie and landowners. Furthermore, Japan's reactionary economic system has not been affected at all by the changes of an external nature which have occurred since Japan's surrender.

A clear example of the American policy of supporting the reactionary forces in Japan and of suppressing the democratic

elements can be found in the Japanese Diet election held on 10 April 1946. As a result of this election, many reactionaries who come under the purge law and, in some cases, persons who were subject to arrest as war criminals were elected. The American representative on the Allied Council for Japan not only failed to prevent these reactionary elements from becoming members of the Diet but rather encouraged them. [Excerpt from article appearing in 8 Jan 47 edition of the SHINSEIMEI Newspaper of Southern Sakhalin]

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...With what reasons did Stalin not recognize the occupation policy as satisfactory? It was because the American Officials in Japan did not establish policies in building up the foundation of the Allied victory, but focused their endeavors in supporting America's Imperialism, which is a great danger to world peace.

The American Occupation Forces as directed by General MacArthur is not doing its work in executing the policies of the Allied Powers, but is changing into an American Military Administration which does not approve the Allied Organizations; the Far Eastern Committee and the Allied Council. This is why Japan is still under the feudalistic land-owing system and the monopoly of few great capitalists. The Japanese economic system has been set up to benefit the American capitalists. This is the reason why America did not give a thought to the plans of the Soviet Representatives at the Allied Council. The American Occupation Authorities have made no efforts toward changing the miserable conditions of the Japanese peasants and approve the plans of the Yoshida Cabinet which is giving support to the landowners.

General MacArthur's policies against the "ZAIBATSU" are decided according to the benefit of the American Capitalists.

***

The American Occupation authorities are not only executing the one-sided economic policies but are also opposing the plans of the Allied Powers in improving the Japanese Labor conditions.

***

The reason why America is acting like this is because they want to rule the Pacific by exploiting Japan. The anti-democratic circles in America are planning to use Japan as a weapon for its Imperialism. Not only the Allied Powers, but also the Japanese people must prevent this. [Excerpt from article appearing in November 16, 1946 issue of SHINSEIMEI"]

...American Industrial policy is not utilized to break up industrial monopoly. The policy is to take over these ZAIBATSU and thus gain complete control over the markets of Asia. [Excerpt from October 29 1946 edition of SHINSEIMEI]

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...American Capitalists' policy of oppressing the laborers is one part of their general post war plan. This pre-arranges a war to dominate the world by the American imperialists with a large scaled plan for expansion of their power. [Excerpt from article appearing in Nov. 14, 1946 issue of NIPPON SHIMBUN]

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...Among the policies of the United States, their plan of establishing bases throughout the world truthfully shows that their trend towards world control is getting much stronger. [Excerpt from article appearing in October 15, 1946 edition of NIPPON SHIMBUN]

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...America themselves are boasting of their stores of atomic bombs and carrying on experiments to create fear, and from the standpoint of we people who are sound and sensible, what complaint can they have against Soviet Russia for continuing her maintenance of a powerful army when they are shamelessly demonstrating their naval power before the eyes of the whole world. [Excerpt from article appearing in October 15, 1946 edition of NIPPON SHIMBUN]

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The ZAIBATSU have a definite responsibility in this war, but not one of these ZAIBATSU was prosecuted as a war criminal. MacArthur could not find any other wise way to clear out the ZAIBATSU than to entrust this work to the Japanese Government. This actually means that General MacArthur still recognizes the monopoly in Japan. [Excerpt from Nov. 23, 1946 issue of SHINSEIMEI]

The monopoly leaders are also trying to get the support from the American Capitalists. On the other hand the American Capitalists are trying to gain profits through ZAIBATSU shares (Stock) and also by preserving this ZAIBATSU system to gain complete control over Japanese economy. ...It is a long time since General MacArthur ordered the directive of liquidating the ZAIBATSU but through the whole post-war period the ZAIBATSU is still directing Japanese policy. The ZAIBATSU with the other former ruling circles; land-owners, bureaucracy, and aristocrats are trying to prevent the democratization of Japan. [Excerpt from Nov. 23,1946 issue of SHINSEIMEI]

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When sent?
→ May 10, 1947

Excellency:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the note of March 31, 1947 from the Charge d'Affairés of the Soviet Embassy inviting the attention of the United States Government to a certain alleged statement derogatory to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics reported in the United Statespress as having been made by Premier Yoshida of Japan.

After a thorough investigation of this matter, I am able to inform Your Excellency as follows:

(1) No evidence exists that PremierYoshida actually made the remark attributed to him, namely, that "We (Japan) have a very dangerous enemy to the north". Only one American correspondent present at the interview reported such a remark and it appears that his inaccurate reporting was due to language difficulties.

(2) The remark cited in the Embassy's note was never published in Japan. As Your Excellency is aware, the strictest orders of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers prohibit any press or radio criticism in Japan of any of the Allied Nations, either officially or informally. Every effort has been and is continuing to be made to see that these regulations are scrupulously and meticulously followed.

(3)

(3) In this connection, I should like to invite the attention of the Soviet Government to numerous instances of attacks upon the United States and upon the Occupation of Japan broadcast to Japan from the USSR and published in Japanese language newspapers extensively circulated in Soviet-occupied former Japanese territory and in Japan.

(4) Out of a vast number of examples of radio braodcasts and of articles derogatory to the United States, the following excerpts have been selected at random:

Radio Broadcasts

Moscoy in English to Japan, March 27, 1947, 6:00a.m. EST:

> "The intrigues of Japanese reaction threaten to turn the elections of Apr. 25 into an antidemocratic farce like those staged in Japan on Apr. 10, 1946. This farce, which has been prepared by the Japanese reaction with the sanction and approval of the American occupation authorities, is fraught with dire consequences if the democratic Japanese public doesnot cast the reaction aside which, contrary to the surrender, is pulling the country backwards toward the sinister days of police terror and facism."

Moscow in Japanese to Japan, Dec. 23, 1946, 8:45 a.m. EST:

> "The monopolistic capitlists of Americaand Japan are an important threat to the future peace...."

Moscow in English to Japan, October7, 1946, 4:00 a.m., EST:

> "... Can it be that the Japanese militarists will be able, with impunity,to carry out their undermining work and prepare for fresh aggression in the Far East, not only utilizing the shortsightedness, but even enjoying the protection, of certain representatives of the American military authorities?

"That

"That is what all true loversof peace are asking themselves. They sharply condemn the present practice of the American Occupation authorities in Japan who are giving the Japanese military elements a chance to continue their undermining work."

Japanese Language Newspapers:

Shinseimei, Southern Sakhalin, January 7, 1947:

"The American dollar is a tool held by the American expansionistsfor aggression against other nations."

Shinseimei, Southern Sakhalin, November 16, 1946:

"For what reasons did Stalin not recognize the occupation policy as satisfactory? It was because the American officials in Japan did not establish policies for building up the foundation of Allied victory, but focused their endeavors in supporting America's imperialism, which is a great danger to world peace....

"The reason why America is acting like this is because of a desire to rule the Pacific by exploiting Japan. The anti-democratic circles in America are planning to use Japan as a weapon for imperialism. Not only the Allied Powers, but also the Japanese people must prevent this."

Nippon Shimbun 'newspaper published for Japanese prisoners of war in the Soviet Union; editor, I. I. Kovalenko), November 14, 1946:

"The American capitalists' policy of oppressing the laborers isone part of their general postwar plan. This prearranges a war to dominate the world by the American imperialists with a large scale plan for expansion of their power."

Shinseimei, Southern Sakhalin, January 11, 1947:

"The demonstrations, meetings, and strikes which are increasing within the country every day show that the administration of the YoshidaCabinet,

which

which is supported by the American Occupation authorities, is not only piling crime upon crime and following a courseopposite to that of Japan's transformation into a democratic nation, but is even promoting the maintenance of the order which prevailed in the militaristic period."

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

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(Peace)

MAY 10 1948

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Control (Japan)
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Excellency:

I have the honor to refer to this Department's note of April 11, 1947 to the Chargé d'Affaires of the Soviet Embassy acknowledging his note of March 31, 1947 which invited the attention of the United States Government to a certain alleged statement derogatory to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics reported in the United States press as having been made by Premier Yoshida of Japan.

+R
741.61

After a thorough investigation of this matter, I am able to inform Your Excellency as follows:

(1) No evidence exists that Premier Yoshida made the remark attributed to him, namely, that "We (Japan) have a very dangerous enemy to the north", nor that he made any comment of similar implications. Only one American correspondent present at the interview reported such a

His Excellency
Nikolai V. Novikov,
Ambassador of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics.

3 DOC - ARS Unit

Ekt

such a remark and it appears that his inaccurate reporting was due to language difficulties.

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Radio Broadcasts

Moscow in English to Japan, March 27, 1947, 6:00 am. EST:

"The intrigues of Japanese reaction threaten to turn the elections of April 25 into an antidemocratic farce like those staged in Japan on April 10, 1946. This farce, which has been prepared by the Japanese reaction with the sanction and approval of the American occupation authorities, is fraught with dire consequences if the democratic Japanese public does not cast the reaction aside which, contrary to the surrender, is pulling the country backwards toward the sinister days of police terror and fascism."

Moscow in Japanese to Japan, December 23, 1946, 4:00 a.m. EST:

"...Can it be that the Japanese militarists will be able, with impunity, to carry out their undermining work and prepare for fresh aggression in the Far East, not only utilizing the shortsightedness, but even enjoying the protection, of certain representatives of the American military authorities? That is what all true lovers of peace are asking themselves. They sharply condemn the present practice of the American occupation authorities in Japan who are giving the Japanese military elements a chance to continue their undermining work."

Japanese Language Newspapers:

Shinseimei, Yuzhno Sakalinsk (Toyohara), Southern Sakhalin, November 16, 1946:

"For what reasons did Stalin not recognize the occupation policy as satisfactory? It was because the American officials in Japan did not establish policies for building up the foundation of Allied victory, but focused their endeavors in supporting America's imperialism, which is a great danger to world peace...

"The reason why America is acting like this is because of a desire to rule the Pacific by exploiting Japan. The anti-democratic circles in America are planning to use Japan as a weapon for imperialism. Not only the Allied Powers, but also the Japanese people must prevent this."

Shinseimei, Yuzhno Sakalinsk (Toyohara), Southern Sakhalin, January 11, 1947:

"The demonstrations, meetings, and strikes which are increasing within the country every day show that the administration of the Yoshida Cabinet, which is supported by the American Occupation authorities, is not only piling crime upon crime and following a course opposite to that of Japan's transformation into a democratic nation, but is even promoting the maintenance of the order which prevailed in the militaristic period."

The United States

The United States Government requests that the fact of these hostile attacks be brought to the attention of the Soviet Government and anticipates that appropriate measures will be taken to ensure that they do not recur.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

NA:JKEmmerson:mls
5-1-47

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My dear Mr. Chargé d'Affaires:

I have received your note No. 39 dated March 31, 1947 with reference to a press interview of the Japanese Prime Minister reported in American newspapers of March 20. I note that you make certain quotations from the press reports of this interview, including one which you describe as a hostile attack against the Soviet Union.

I have not received the full text of Prime Minister Yoshida's interview and am therefore unable to confirm the statements attributed to him by the press reports in question. However, your communication has been brought to the attention of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and his comments have been requested.

A further reply will be made to you upon receipt of additional information from Japan.

Sincerely yours,

Dean Acheson



The Honorable

Semen K. Tsarapkin,

Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of the

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

CR

APR 9 1947 P.M. to A-H

APR 10 1947

NA:JMcCherson:xa
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(initials L.E.S. on tel to Tokyo)

26

NA

AIRGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
RESTRICTED
UNRESTRICTED

Department of State

NO. A-26

TIME

Washington,

April 11,1947

To the

United States Political Adviser to the
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers,

Tokyo.

1415

1415

894.002/3-3147

Following is translation of note received from Chargé d' Affaires Soviet Embassy:

QUOTE At the request of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics I have the honor to communicate the following to you:

Information with regard to the interview of the Japanese Prime Minister, Yoshida, was published in the American newspapers on March 20 and in the Japanese newspapers on March 21.

According to the account in the newspapers, in this interview Yoshida approved the recent proposal of General D. MacArthur concerning the negotiations for a treaty and for the termination of the occupation and he made it clear that following the signing of the treaty he would prefer American protection to the protection of the United Nations. In this connection, Yoshida expressed the hope that the civil direction of the United Nations INNERQUOTE will be founded on the same enlightened policy of MacArthur END INNERQUOTE.

Side by side with this in his interview Yoshida permitted himself to make the statement that INNERQUOTE we (that is, Japan) have a very dangerous enemy to the north. END INNERQUOTE Thus, Yoshida, in the capacity of the head of the Japanese Government, which capitulated to the Allied Powers, made a hostile attack against the Soviet Union, one of the Allied States.

In inviting the attention of the Government of the U.S.A. to the declaration of Yoshida, the Soviet Government

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894.002/3-3147

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AIRGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
RESTRICTED

Department of State

UNRESTRICTED

NO. A-26

TIME

Washington,

April 11,1947

TOKYO

anticipates that Yoshida will be called to account for such a hostile expression against the U.S.S.R. and that in the future provocative statements of a similar nature will not be permitted.

By instruction of the Soviet Government I request you to bring the above to the attention of the Government of the United States of America. UNQUOTE

ACHESON Acheson
Acting

NA:JKEmerson:xa
4-7-47

FE

EE
(see initials LES on tel to Tokyo)

A-H

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APR 8 1947 P.M. to A-H

APR 10 1947

Form DS-302
(7-2-46)

DIVISION OF
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

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DIVISION OF NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS
MAY 12 1947
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OFFICE OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS DISTRIBUTION OFFICE
MAY 8 1947
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Office of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAY 12 1947
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Department of State

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Rec'd May 7, 1947
11:58 a.m.

FROM: Moscow

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1681, Seventh

Highlights IZVESTYA April 30 "On Results Parliamentary Elections in Japan" by V. Kudryavtsen.

"Large percentage abstaining votes striking. Around 40% voters failed go to polls, largest percentage being peasants and women. No doubt situation is explained by results campaign terror directed against democratic organization and political backwardness part of population as well as shortage propaganda carries among democratic organizations in localities. Reaction in this manner 'rid self' of that part of voters which by virtue its social and material position is vitally interested in democratic change.

Developments of recent months have shown social base of Yoshida Cabinet has narrowed catastrophically and Cabinet is maintained only through grace occupation authorities. For this reason Jap reaction before elections took all steps undermine positions democratic organizations. With toleration occupation authorities Prime Minister Yoshida began persecute representatives 'left ideologies' thereby stimulating terrorism on part Fascist organizations.

If one approaches results elections formally as do directors American military administration it turns out majority elected concillors and deputies belong to reactionary camp.

In essence, however, elections to both houses ended with defeat Govt Party whose president is Prime Minister Yoshida.

PLAIN

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MAY 23 1947

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PLAIN

-2-#1681, Seventh, from Moscow

Yoshida. In chamber counsillors it has 38 representatives against 44 Socialists. In lowerhouse Govt Party, Liberals, have only 131 deputies as compared with 143 in previous parliament and as compared with 143 Socialists elected on 25 April (in previous Parliament 94 seats). Socialist Party is in first place in both houses in number seats obtained.

Elections if only indirectly reflected same mood of masses of population which have been repeatedly seen during strikes, congresses of organizations and in mass demonstrations. These moods show Yoshida Govt was and is in power contrary to will Jap people.

Typical for elections is also fact representative trade unions, peasant organizations and 8 women were elected to upper house unprecedented fact in Jap history.

CP elected five representatives to upperhouse and four to lowerhouse as compared with six in previour parliament. CP of Japan has never removed itself from general democratic movement in country since it stands for consistent realization terms Potsdam Declaration adopted by Allied powers. However, fact number deputies from CP is less has brought forth extremely symptomatic reaction from American occupation authorities. Summarizing results elections General MacArthur said 'CP was given full freedom political activity but it suffered defeat in honest and open fight'. In second part of April alone ten act violence were noted in Japan taken against speakers in electoral campaign and majority of them against CP 'honest fight' appears more than peculiar."

Dept please repeat Tokyo.

DURBROW

ERA:DCB

NOTE: Repeated to Tokyo May 7, 1947, 4:20 p.m. (JS)

PLAIN

PLAIN

-2-#1681, Seventh, from Moscow

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Dept please repeat Tokyo.

DURBROW

ERA:DCB

NOTE: Repeated to Tokyo May 7, 1947, 4:20 p.m. (JS)

PLAIN

UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER
FOR JAPAN

Tokyo, December 2, 1947.

FOR USE OF THE DEPARTMENT ONLY

Unnumbered

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Statement by HIRANO, Rikizo Concerning His Dismissal on November 3, 1947 From the Post of Agriculture and Forestry Minister.

THE HONORABLE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

SIR:

I have the honor to enclose copies of the text of a statement, together with seven sub-enclosures, informally presented to me on November 14, 1947 by HIRANO, Rikizo, former Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, who was recently dismissed from the Katayama Cabinet. At the time of receiving the enclosure I made it clear to Mr. Hirano that this Mission is in no position to take sides in the controversy which had developed between himself and the Cabinet; that his statement would be received only on an informal basis and as a matter of interest; and that any further action in the matter is the function of the appropriate Section of this Headquarters. The statement contains a description of an alleged political plot against Hirano and makes several broad accusations. The sub-enclosures thereto are copies of statements prepared as evidence for the Central Screening Board of the Japanese Government in connection with the possible "purge" of Hirano.

An announcement by NISHIO, Suehiro concerning the probability of Hirano's "purge" was reported in the Japanese press on October 28 while Hirano was absent from Tokyo. Upon the latter's return it was rumored that he was asked to resign his cabinet position. On November 3, 1947 the Prime Minister dismissed him in accordance with Article 68 of the Constitution, accusing him of "non-cooperation" with the Cabinet.

The enclosures are forwarded to the Department as interesting background material and as an indication of the intense feeling which has arisen in the Hirano camp

over

over the latter's dismissal. While the statement is obviously one-sided and heavily weighted in Hirano's favor, this Mission has insufficient information at its disposal adequately to evaluate the statements contained therein.

Respectfully yours,

W. J. Sebald
Acting Political Adviser

Enclosure:

Copy of the text of a statement by Hirano, Rikizo, November 14, 1947, together with seven sub-enclosures.

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CONFIDENTIAL

Enclosure to Unnumber Despatch dated December 2, 1947 from the Office of the United States Political Adviser for Japan at Tokyo, on the subject of "Statement by HIRANO, Rikizo Concerning His Dismissal on November 3, 1947 from the Post of Agriculture and Forestry Minister.

The dismissal of the former Agriculture Minister Hirano by Prime Minister Katayama is not supported by public opinion, as it is considered to be a political intrigue. As the person concerned, Hirano wishes to clarify the process, based upon facts, leading up to his dismissal. He also wishes to point out that the whole affair was a plot as if it were done under the despotic regime, and at the same time, he shall explain the purpose for which this plot was planned and executed.

1. In the first place, pursuing in the chronological order, on October 28 at 7 p.m., Hirano was called and examined by Prosecutor Idei of the Tokyo District Prosecution Office as to a legal charge against him dated May 27, 1947, for the wilful omission of an important matter from the questionnaire he submitted at the time of the general election in last April.

When Hirano explained that Kodokai is not an organization ordered to be dissolved, and that the omission is not an important error, as will be stated later, Prosecutor Idei agreed to his view. Hirano left the Prosecution Office after taking procedure for producing witnesses.

2. (A) As Justice Minister Suzuki requested an interview by telephone on October 29 at 6 a.m., Hirano met him at the Prime Minister's Office at 9:30 a.m. At that time, the Justice Minister told that the Government Section of GHQ felt indignant over Hirano's prosecution affair, and that Col. Kades made a presentation that Hirano be purged. Hirano replied that if it was concerned with the prosecution affair, he had secured general understanding from the Prosecution Office on the previous night. He, therefore, told that there would be no question as far as that affair was concerned. The Justice Minister continued that the same proposal from the Government Section was to have been addressed to the Prime Minister. Questioned what solution could be found, the Justice Minister replied that, if Hirano resigned from his post, his purge would not be pursued. As Hirano could not understand this explanation, he said:

"It is strange to hear that, if I stayed the Agriculture Minister I would be purged, and if I resigned and remained only a Diet Member, I would not be purged. If I fall under purge at all, I should be purged whether I am the Agriculture Minister or not. I should not be able to stay Member of Diet which is a public position. As this matter feels excessively political to me, I do not wish to resign and escape purge according to your advice."

"The present time is particularly important for the delivery of rice," continued Hirano, "As the Agriculture Minister, I am leaving Tokyo tonight for Niigata, Gifu and Shiga Prefectures for pursuading the farmers to deliver rice. As I am returning to Tokyo on November 4, I wish to talk with you."

Thus ended our interview.

(B) After interview with Justice Minister Suzuki, Hirano met Prime Minister Katayama in the same place and asked him whether or not the Justice Minister's remarks were true that the Government Section of GHQ had made a proposal to the Prime Minister as regards his qualification. The Prime Minister replied that there was no such presentation. He, however, added that he had heard from Justice Minister Suzuki that there was a legal case against Hirano for his omission in the questionnaire which might develop into a serious matter. Then Hirano asked the Prime Minister whether or not he could go on journey the same night for expediting the delivery of rice. The Prime Minister replied to the affirmative. Relieved at this assurance, Hirano left for Niigata by 8 o'clock train that night.

3. On October 30 when Hirano was attending a conference with the Food Adjustment Committee in the City of Niigata, he heard that the Mainichi issued an extra reporting that Hirano's purge was decided. This extra was published under the following conditions:

(a) The Tokyo Shimbun of October 25 published a news that big men would be purged in the near future. (It is reported that other papers wished to publish the same news, but were prohibited by censorship.)

(b) On the night of October 28, Chief Cabinet Secretary Nishio invited for dinner several news reporters including a Mainichi reporter. Nishio told at that time that Agriculture Minister Hirano would be purged. (The story of Reporter Koyasu of the Yomiuri.)

(c) On October 29, at an official conference with the news reporters assigned for the Prime Minister's Office that lasted from 7:30 to 9:00 a.m., Chief Cabinet Secretary Nishio said, with reservation that he would talk not as in his official capacity and not to the reporters, but as fellow friends, as follows:

> "I shall speak without reservation about the purge question of Agriculture Minister Hirano with which you are already familiar. Saturday last week (October 25) Col. Kades visited Prime Minister Katayama and made a presentation that: 'Hirano's qualification became a question at the time when he entered the Cabinet. By an extraordinary request of the Prime Minister that Hirano was indispensable to the Katayama Cabinet, Hirano saved his life. Though GHQ is supporting the present Cabinet, it became clear to GHQ that Agriculture Minister Hirano makes minus to this Cabinet, judging from Hirano's talk at Nara, his attitude toward the price of rice and his interview with Mr. Handleman. As the Katayama Cabinet with

Agriculture Minister Hirano cannot be supported, Hirano should be purged promptly." The question came to the front from this incident.

"Naturally the question before us is to fill vacancy rather than to reorganize the Cabinet. Reorganization means a change of Cabinet members, whereas a Cabinet can be consolidated by replenishing a vacant post.

"Purge is applied by GHQ and we have no power to stop it. I am trusting that a dispute between the Japan Agricultural Union and the National Agricultural Union can be solved by this decision and the Social Democratic Party will be strengthened thereby."

(d) As the same story was officially told by the Chief Cabinet Secretary at an official press interview on October 30, the Mainichi issued an extra reporting a decision on Hirano's purge and all other papers of October 31 published news to the same effect.

4. When a group of Diet Members belonging to the National Agricultural Union had an interview with Chief Cabinet Secretary Nishio on the evening of October 30, the former asked the latter the following question:

"You told that GHQ made an official presentation concerning Hirano's purge, which was a strong direction. A strong direction usually takes the form of a directive or memorandum. Was direction given in the form of a directive or memorandum, or else in the verbal form?"

The Chief Cabinet Secretary replied:

"No document has arrived from GHQ yet, but it will come soon. The question of form, however, has no importance. Agriculture Minister's purge is definite. This is based upon the presentation from Col. Kades' to Prime Minister Katayama and myself on October 25 at 11 a.m. You are opposed to the appointment of Mr. Katsu NOMIZO of the Japan Agricultural Union as successor to Agriculture Minister Hirano. However, at the time when Hirano was appointed Agriculture Minister, the same opposition came from the Japan Agricultural Union just as you are doing now. If this fact is remembered, the chair of the Agriculture Minister must go to the Japan Agricultural Union and it would probably impossible to meet with your desire. You do not need to meet the Prime Minister."

Though Nishio tried to prevent an interview with the Prime Minister, the delegation met the Prime Minister and asked in what form Hirano's purge was communicated. The Prime Minister did not give a clear reply, and only repeated that he was embarrassed.

The members of the National Agricultural Union received a clear impression at that time that the Prime Minister had received neither directive nor memorandum from GHQ as regards Hirano's purge.

5. On the night of October 30 when Member of Diet Kanoo of the National Agricultural Union, Member of the House of Councillors Toshikatsu TANAKA of the General Federation of Labor, and Shigeichi ASO, attache to the Agricultural Ministry met Mr. Matsuoka, Speaker of the House of Representatives, Mr. Matsuoka said: "It would have been Justice Minister Suzuki's friendly personal view when he said that Hirano would be saved from purge, if he resigned from the Agriculture Minister. I am also of the same opinion. Mr. Hirano should resign and be saved from purge to remain Member of Diet."

Speaker Matsuoka said again: "When I met Prime Minister Katayama and Chief Cabinet Secretary Nishio, I heard that there was a presentation from Col. Kades on October 25 (ref. 3-C). Hirano invited such a result as he went to General Eichelberger and Chairman Atcheson of the Allied Council for Japan to report his appointment as Agriculture Minister without going through Col. Kades. As Col. Kedes is in the Government Section, outside contact should be done through him. I am doing so."

6. On October 30 at 1130 p.m., Hirano asked the Prime Minister from Niigata City by long distance telephone whether or not there was a formal presentation from GHQ. As the Prime Minister clearly denied, Hirano said he would return after completing his scheduled program. The Prime Minister, however, wished him to return as soon as possible as "the people are noisy."

Not knowing that the whole affair was cleverly plotted, Mr. Hirano completed his addresses and round table discussions at seven places on the following day (Oct. 31), and returned to Tokyo on November 1 at 7:30 p.m.

7. On November 1 at 5 p.m. Justice Minister Suzuki told the press reporters assigned to the Prime Minister's Office at the front entrance that GHQ proposed to purge both Minister of State Hayashi and Agriculture Minister Hirano.

8. At an official press interview on November 1, Teiji IKEDA, Secretary to the Prime Minister, told Murai and Kanakubo, both reporters of the Yomiuri, that there was a presentation from Col. Kades and Mr. Marcum of the Government Section to dismiss Agriculture Minister Hirano and do it quickly that day.

P. 5

On November 1, at the closed meeting of the Diet Members of the Social Democratic Party held in the House of Representatives where Prime Minister Katayama, Chief Cabinet Secretary Nishio and Justice Minister Suzuki attended, Justice Minister Suzuki said in reply to questions concerning the Hirano affair: "There was a proposal from the Prosecution Office that they wished to examine Agriculture Minister Hirano in connection with his omission in the questionnaire." He also stated the same thing as Chief Cabinet Secretary Nishio told to the press reporters. (Ref. 3-C) Nishio also confirmed what Suzuki stated.

Justice, Ryoji INOUYE, Parliamentary Vice Minister for Agriculture and to six others, all Members of Diet belonging to the National Agricultural Union. The Justice Minister added: "When Nishio presented a list of Cabinet Ministers to GHQ at the time when the Katayama Cabinet was formed, Agriculture Minister Hirano alone was checkmarked showing disapproval."

10. At interviews with Hirano on November 2 and 3, Speaker Matsuoka repeated the same view as was described in paragraph 5.

11. As regards the facts mentioned in Paragraph 5, when Nishio met Hirano by mediation of Speaker Matsuoka at the official residence of the latter on September 13, Nishio told Hirano that: Col. Kades and Mr. Marcum are indgnant toward you for three reasons: (1) You are associated with Jiro SHIRASU, Deputy Chief of the Central Liaison Office; (2) You built a garage without permission; and (3) You went to General Eichelberger and Chairman Atcheson to report your appointment as Agriculture Minister. Col. Kedes is still questioning your qualification. Don't you mind even if you are hated by Col. Kades? Nishio added that Ken INUKAI and Nataru NARAHASHI would be released from purge by the new screening committee.

Hirano replied: "(1) As I am privately associating with Shirasu, there is no reason why I should not. Nishio himself associated with Shirasu before and after the formation of the Katayama Cabinet; (2) The garage question is settled as permit was issued; (3) It is natural that I went to General Eichelberger and Chairman Atcheson for greetings. I may be scolded for not going to see these people, but how can I be for going to see them? Thus, Hirano pointed out that Nishio's indignation was without reasons.

12. On November 3, when Hirano went to the Prime Minister's Office by the call of the Prime Minister, Justice Minister Suzuki, in the presence of Chief Cabinet Secretary Nishio, questioned Hirano: "If you resign quietly, I shall not presecute you. How do you decide?" Hirano replied indignantly: "I cannot give in under intimidation. As I shall never resign under such circumstances, do as you please."

13. On November 5, at the plenary session of the House of Representatives, in order to avoid responsibility for using purge as a political tool, Nishio replied to the interpellation of Akira SAITO that newspapers mis-reported what he said.concerning Hirano's purge. The fact that this was a false statement is known not only from what was stated in Paragraph 3 (a) to (d), but also it is clear from a request for a formal denial presented to the Chief Cabinet Secretary Nishio on November 6 by the press reporters assigned to the Prime Minister's Office.

On the same day (Nov. 5), in reply to the interpellation of

Hidetoshi TOMABECHI in the House of Representatives, Prime Minister Katayama said that his request for Hirano's resignation was based neither upon the legal case nor upon his qualification, but upon the ground of non-cooperation with the Cabinet. If this is a true statement, the purge question must have been used as a means of intimidation. Morevoer, there is a clear contradiction between the affirmation made by the Prime Minister and denial made by the Cabinet Secretary and Justice Minister, to the statement that GHQ proposed that Hirano be purged.

14. As to Hirano's qualification, at the meetings of the screening committee held March 22 and 23 this year, non-relationship existing between the Dai Nippon Kodokai (which fell under Paragraph C) and Kodokai with which Hirano was connected was established, and Hirano's case was passed. Re-examination of Kodokai was opened from April 21 to May 9 to determine the nature of Kodokai and its organ Kodo. Again the Screening committee unanimously agreed that Kodokai camouflaged itself to escape the suppression of the authorities, and that it never cooperated actively with war efforts. Moreover, the decision taken at the first screening committee was reaffirmed at the second meeting, on condition that this question would not be used as a political tool. Hirano presented three copies of Kodo to the screening committee as data for study. Therefore, though the publication was omitted in the questionnaire, the screening committee saw and examined the publication and passed it. Under such condition, omission cannot constitute an important error. Prosecutor Idei also understood this point. (ref. No. 1)

Thus an attempt was made in actuality to kill the political life of Hirano by using legal power and the tool of purge which should be applied most fairly, and also by indiscretely using the name of GHQ. This is a subtle intrigue only used in the Nazis regime, never to be allowed in a democratic country.

15. Misuse of the power of dismissal. As it became clear that purge and prosecution were of no avail to force Hirano to resign, the Constitutional power of dismissal was applied for the reason that Hirano did not cooperate with the Cabinet. How the basis of this argument is weak will be shown below.

A. Mis-report of Hirano's talk at Nara. When questioned about the rumored November crisis of the Cabinet at a press conference at Nara, Hirano said that whenever a Cabinet is in major crisis, Diet should be dissolved and the confidence of the people sought, instead of turning political power by rotation among the political parties. The Yomiuri, however, gave a wrong impression as the manuscript was cut short by its editorial adjustment section. The Nippon Keizai of October 13, however, reported Hirano's talk at Nara fairly truly, generally speaking, showing that Hirano did not suddenly propose the dissolution of Diet in November. (When Hirano talked this, he

had in mind to shut out a plot for turning political power by rotation under a joint work of Nishio-Ashida. On the contrary, Nishio used it for propaganda against Hirano's alleged intrigue toward a new party movement.)

B. As regards the interview with Mr. Handleman, Mr. Handleman wished to hear from Hirano about ~~the inside story of the~~ political ~~circles~~ at his private house. Judging from the circumstances, Hirano never imagined that his story would be published, and he talked rather freely. As Mr. Handleman listened to him without taking note, there were many errors in his article. Hirano exceedingly regretted that his story was published without previous agreement or even without hint.

When asked, Hirano talked about the question of State control of coal mines, saying that: "When the coal Bill is shelved or rejected by the Diet, the Cabinet should either resign en bloc or dissolve the Diet. In order to establish parliamentary government, it will be impossible to turn deaf ears to such an important development." It is said, however, that Hirano was quoted by Stars and Stripes as having told that: "When the Coal Bill is rejected, Chief Cabinet Secretary Nishio and Commerce Minister Mizutani will have to resign." Hirano was of the opinion that, when an important bill is rejected by the legislature, the Cabinet as a whole and not the individual members of the Cabinet should take responsibility. He always opposed to turning Cabinet making by rotation. The description in the preceding paragraph endorses this conclusion.

As to the peace conference, Prime Minister Katayama stated at a Foreign Affairs Committee meeting of the House of Representatives on October 16 that his Cabinet will deal with the peace conference. Chief Cabinet Secretary Nishio also said that Prime Minister Katayama would be a qualified chief delegate. Thinking that such statements are indiscrete and that the chief delegate should be chosen in democratic way, I told Mr. Handleman that: "Such a stateman who asserts himself that he will handle the peace conference should be questioned. Democratization of Japan is the prerequisite to the peace conference, and the composition of the Japanese delegation is out of question. The important point for Japan is to attend the peace conference with international confidence, especially of the United States. A mere attendance to the peace conference has no meaning." It is said that Stars and Stripes quoted Hirano as having said that there is no need of hurrying the peace conference.

C. The Price of rice. As the Agriculture Minister, it is a matter of course to take the farmers' desire into consideration in fixing the price of rice. The Agriculture Minister's view on the price of rice was strongly supported by the Staff Union of the Agriculture Ministry by writing presented to the Minister. In spite of this,

at the last stage, Hirano left the final decision with the Prime Minister, and followed that decision. His Attitude should be worthy of praise as a democratic statesman. Had the Agriculture Minister had not expressed his view at a Cabinet meeting before the final decision, the State Minister would have no freedom of expression.

D. From the foregoing statement, it is clear that Hirano's charge for non-cooperation with the Cabinet is not founded. I shall next point out that no democratic and open step has been taken until the legal power of dismissal was applied.

In view of the importance of this question for the Social Democratic Party, the Diet Members of the National Agricultural Union requested in writing Mr. Asanuma, Acting Secretary General of the Party, to call a meeting of the Central Executive Committee on November 3. This request, however, was not realized.

On the other hand, Prime Minister Katayama pressed Hirano to decide his attitude whether he should resign or not within November 3. Hirano and the Diet Members of the National Agricultural Union again requested that the reply be postponed until after the convocation of the Central Executive Committee meeting or of all Diet Members of the Social Democratic Party. This request was again categorically denied, and Hirano was pressed for reply, without giving him a chance of explaining his position to his party. As the reason for the pressure of decision within November 3 which was a national holiday, Prime Minister Katayama said that Diet session would be held on the following day (November 4). It is reported that information had reached the Cabinet that not only the Diet session, but also the Diet Members of the Social Democratic Party would meet on November 4 to discuss Hirano's case. It was also reported that General Eichelberger would arrive in Japan on the same day.

Hirano was finally dismissed on the same day by a unilateral decision. When it is considered that even one office boy of the Agriculture Ministry cannot be discharged unilaterally in the presence of the collective agreement with the Staff Union, how Hirano's dismissal was an outrageous act can be easily understood.

The dismissal was Nishio's plot. In spite of the fact that there was no single reason worthy of purge, prosecution or dismissal, why has the situation developed to the worst stage? No other explanation can be given except a political plot. Below will be given an explanation who, how and with what aim it was done.

1. In the first place, it is necessary to understand the subtle and tricky personality of Mr. Nishio. He is so despotic in nature that Members of the Social Democratic Party, it is said, must become either his vassals or his enemies within the Party. As his

direct influence is so limited that he always employs a cunning means of "fighting the enemy by letting the enemy's enemies fight," as a Chinese saying goes. While Nishio was in the course of forming the Katayama Cabinet, he promised Ministrial posts to Kanju KATO and Mosaburo SUZUKI, left Socialists. When this promise was not fulfilled, Nishio used a clever tactics of transferring the responsibility to Hirano, saying that the promise failed because of Hirano's opposition. Nishio always manipulated various influences within the party in this way. Though Nishio is influenciaà in his party, his power stays on the balance of various influences in the party.

Nishio's skill in manoeuvring was illustrated in No. 3 of this note when he made use of press reporters in the present case. He broadcast a rumor of Hirano's purge among a few reporters as the first step. Then he talked to reporters with reservation that this was unofficial. As soon as the rumor has reached various quarters, he announced it officially. When his announcement invited political complications, he shifted his responsibility to newspapers which "mis-reported." This tactics has strong resemblance to the publicity control exercised by the army during the war in the name of "internal guidance" of newspapers.

Nishio also broadcast "Hirano's new party movement." And yet was contemplating turning political power by rotation with Mr. Ashida, President of the Democratic Party. Knowing that Ashida is playing double tricks of taking political power either by rotation or by the establishment of a conservative new party, Nishio is recommending Mr. Ashida to form his Cabinet under Mr. Katayama's eye. Complicated, tricky, unscrupulous, Mr. Nishio may be called the first Machiavelist in the world.

2. Confrontation between Hirano and Nishio was challenged by Nishio. The Social Democratic Party was organized after the war, with Katayama, Nishio, Hirano, Mizutani (Chozaburo) as the central figures. As Nishio and Mizutani were in the west, the party made a start using Hirano's private house and office for business purposes. Nishio and Hirano were intimate friends, being called the two right pillars of the Socialist Party. Why has this friendship developed to enmity involving a political plot is explained by the fact that Nishio, in order to increase his inferior power in the party, changed his political conviction siding with the Communist-tolerating elements in the party. A fuller explanation will be given.

A. Hirano was expelled from the Japan Agricultural Union when he insisted that the Communists and their fractions be rejected from the Union. At that time, Nishio, in spite of his anti-Communist principle, looked on this affair with cold eyes, exposing Hirano alone to become the target of attack from the Communists and the left elements within ghe party.

B. At ~~tmmk~~ the time of the formation of the Katayama Cabinet,

Mr. Nishio unexpectedly picked up Mr. Wada, leader of the Third Bureaucracy and tinted with Communism, and appointed him Director General of the Economic Stabilization Board. As soon as the views of Wada and Hirano disagreed, Nishio supported Wada, non-Socialist Minister, without exception and even with sentimental attitude, in utter disregard of Hirano, Socialist Minister.

C. Mosaburo SUZUKI, left Socialist, was appointed President of the Political Research Department of the Party, rejecting opposition from Hirano and the former members of the Japan Labor Party in the Social Democratic Party. For this there was a previous understanding between Nishio and Suzuki and Kato.

D. Mr. Matsuoka, Speaker of the House of Representatives, offered his good offices for mediation between Nishio and Hirano, but this was ended only in deepening conflict between the two.

III. Fundamental difference in thought between Hirano and Nishio.
When the Socialist-dominated Cabinet was formed and its operation started, fundamental difference of thought between the two, unnoticed heretofore, became gradually apparent.

A. In one word, Nishio's thought stands on Marxism in the economic sense which served the basis of shaking hands with the left Socialists. Specially noteworthy in Japan is the fact that the Fascist-Communists and their supporters are extremely fond of despotism and control. This may look strange from the common sense of the world. However, in Japan where thought has not been well founded, it is often found that one and the same person accepts two different thoughts according to the time, with extreme destructionism or despotism hiding beneath. This was called totalitarianism during the war and almost all militarist leaders belonged to this type. Nishio is one of them. It is prominent in the memory of the people that Nishio, in a speech in favor of the National Mobilization Law at the 1938 session of the Diet, declared: "Like Hitler, Mussolini and Stalin" in praise of these outstanding dictators.

The same tendency is found in Mr. Wada, a career bureaucrat who is called a sympathizer of Communism. He is proud in enforcing war-time economic control in the form of economic stability. It is understood that these two persons go together quite well.

B. On the contrary, Hirano stands, in the economic sense, on British socialism or Bernstein's modified socialism with addition of marginal utility theory. Nishio upheld the forcible execution of socialism (see a book "Proposal for Japanese Socialism" by Tetsu Katayama), and controlled economy. Hirano, on the contrary, is of the opinion that, unless control is based upon the common sense, control is not practicable.

C. Though Nishio speaks anti-Communism, he has been pro-Soviet

and anti-U.S.-Britain and a southward expansionist from the prewar time. On the other hand, Hirano was anti-Soviet and pro-U.S.-Britain. As a result, Nishio is close to Kokusui Domei (Ultra-nationalist League). (Bin Akao of Kenkoku Kai is considered to be the best informed man in this connection.) When Nishio made a peech in the Diet in favor of the National Mobilization Law, The China Incident just broke out and liberal influence was still felt in the Diet. Nishio's praise of despotism, therefore, provoked protest to such an extent that he was expelled from the Diet.

D. The anti-Soviet and pro-U.S.-British principle of Hirano led him to support General Kazunari UGAKI with a view to restraining the main current of militarism. He entered Kodokai and engaged in the agricultural labor movement, camouflaging himself under cover of the retired soldiers. For this reason, Kodokai was dissolved by the Tojo Cabinet as anti-nationalistic organization.

When the National Polity Forward Association and the Anti-Emperor-Organ-Theory Association were formed by the rightists at that time, all organizations of right tendency - 86 in number- joined them in fear of being called unpatriotic. Hirano's Kodokai alone stood aloof with dignity. This seems to be nothing today, but it certainly required courage at that time, as it was terpreted as a silent protest against military tyranny. Moreover, at the time of discussion on the subsidy to be granted to the Imperial Rule Assistance Association at the 76th Session of the Diet in 1941, Mr. Nishio voted in favor thereof, while Hirano, together with Mr. Etsujiro UYEHARA of the Liberal Party, were the only two who cast negative votes among the all Diet members.

As Japan is under military occupation, Nishio's pro-Soviet and Hirano's pro-U.S.-British attitudes do not show a clear color, but these two attitudes remain as the fundamental factors. Naturally Hirano did not agree with such leftists as Suzuki and Kato in the Socialist Party, while Nishio shook hands with them and fought Hirano with the assistance from the left side.

At the time of the formation of the Katayama Cabinet, Hirano advocated the anti-Communist front with a combination of the Socialist, Democratic, liberal and Cooperative Parties, while Nishio chose the course of combining Nishio-Ashida-Wada-Suzuki line. Let us clarify the purpose for which this course was taken.

This makes us remind of the motives of the army, which advocated the northward movement, with the Soviet as the potential enemy, but gradually moved southward during the China Incident until the Pacific war was broken out. The army fought the Soviet passively only for a short time immediately before the termination of the war.

When the government was undecided before the Pacific war whether

Japan should go northward or southward, there was one called Hidesane OZAKI, a critic on China, among the Konoye's brain trusts. Ozaki, a Communist, strived hard to prevent a Japan-Soviet clash, and drove Japan to the Pacific war. As Ozaki was arrested and killed before the outbreak of the war, the Communists are calling him an anti-war advocate. Though he was a pacifist so far as Japan-Soviet war is concerned, he provoked the Pacific war. The persons who were influenced by Ozaki were the intellectuals who joined the Show Kenkyu Kai (Showa Research Association) and Showa Juku and the so-called Reformed Bureaucrats working in the Planning Board. This group of persons were united in leading public poinion and officialdom to the war. This group closely resembles to today's leftists in the Social Democratic Party and the Third Bureaucrats led by Wada, Director General of the Economy Stabilization Board. How such an implicit combination of politicians, theoretists and bureaucrats invited a dreadful result has already been told.

And yet Chief Cabinet Secretary Nishio has strengthened such combination. Hirano, stout opponent of Communism, tried to prevent this combination, and came to a frontal clash with Nishio and Wada, and came to be regarded as the enemy of the left Socialists.

Reasons for rejecting the leftists.

After the World War I, the Communists movement spread in Japan like a wild fire. At that time, there appeared two opposing strategies for advancing the Communist movement. One was the orthodox method of propelling proletarian revolution by a combination of labor unions and cultural organizations controlled by the Communists. This is still represented by Kyuichi TOKUDA today. The other was represented by the Labor-Farmer group, as this was advocated through the publication called "Labor-Farmers" edited by Hitoshi YAMAKAWA. This group aimed at penetrating Communism through mass movement, in particular the social democratic movement. Naturally the mass political parties established for this purpose appeared to be independent of the Communist Party, but proletarian revolution was taught to the masses who joined these parties by secret method.

The intellectual leaders of the Labor-Farmer group were Hitoshi YAMAKAWA and Kanson ARAHATA, both members of the Central Committee of the early stage of the Communist Party, and Kanju KATO and Mosaburo SUZUKI were their political leaders. Kato and Suzuki were engaged in the legalized left movement for about thirty years by changing the names of their parties whenever prohibited by the authorities. They were finally arrested for their peoples front movement.

After the war, Kato and Suzuki quickly joined the movement for the democratic peoples front sponsored by Yamakawa and Arahata taking the opportunity of Sanzo NOSAKA's return. This endorses the color of the two outstanding leftists in the Social Democratic Party. In one word, the Communist Party and the left Socialists represent a double-headed red snake.

Nishio, knowing this inside story and disregarding his political stand for anti-Communism, shook hands with the left Socialists to gain his political power. Under such condition, it will be justifiable that Hirano requested Nishio to disconnect with the left elements.

IV. Rotation of political power and a new conservative power party.

To understand that Hirano's dismissal was a political plot, it is necessary to understand the reality of the new Conservative Party shheme being discussed widely at present.

1. It is generally considered that President Yoshida of the Liberal Party or Baron Shidehara of the Democratic Party is the promoter. In fact, however, it is President Ashida of the Democratic Party who is the leader of this movement. According to Ashida's view, it the Democratic and Liberal Parties are merged into a new conservative party, Ashida will lose 20 votes in the Democratic Party which go to the Shidehara group, but will gain 40 from the Liberal Party, controlling majority votes in the new Conservative Party. Ashida is planning to operate the new party by committee system in the beginning and to become the president by public election later on.

2. On the night of October 29, Ashida and Nishio met at the Prime Minister's Office. Nishio said: "As there are many questions, unless your Cabinet-making scheme is expedited, you will lose chance." Ashida replied: "It is premature." Ashida told this story to his patron, Dosai SUGAHARA, building contractor. Sugahara said: "Go ahead. It is, however, pity that the Democratic Party is so deeply penetrated by Nishio." Later Home Minister Kigura and Communications Minister Hitotsumatsu visited Sugahara and asked him to tell Ashida that now is the time to materialize an Ashida-headed Cabinet making plan which was decided at a meeting at a house of President Sato of the penissilin making company. (The foregoing story was told to Reporter Murai of Yomiuri by President Hinohara of Show Electric Manufacturing Company, brother of Sugahara.)

3. The following fact shows that there was a scheme of turning political power by rotation at the time of the formation of the Katayama Cabinet. During the Cabinet making, Yoichi NAGASAKA, Mainichi reporter, came to Nishio and said as representing the views of Wataru NARAHASHI and Hideyuki MIYOSHI: "The next Cabinet will go to the Democratic Party, and the next to the Socialist Party. Thus political power may be maintained for about six years. The tactics of turning political power by rotation pursued by the political parties in the past will be practiced by us this time." Itis reported that Shigeichi Aso who was listening to this story indignantly said: "What a foolish story!"

4. As the fact is clear from the preceding paragraph, as the string pullers of such a clever and subtle scheme as called a new conservative party are the purgees such as Narahashi, Inukai, and Chisaki, the Democratic Party cannot be controlled by Ashida or Shidehara. As these purgees are promised to be freed, what Nishio told Hirano that the purge of Narahashi and Inukai would soon be released, as already mentioned, presents a prfound meaning and a definite evidence. For this rarpose, the rotation of political power wetween Ashida and Nishio becomes necessary.

5. Ashida schemed to victimize Hirano by the question of rice price and to shift the responsibility of the coal question to the Social Democratic Party, wherrby throwing Nishio over his shoulder not to be bit by Nishio perpetually. Nishio, on his part, finding it embarrassing if Ashida fled to a new conservatine party, was determined to execute rotation of political power. He, therefore,

put it into practice to get rid of State Minister Hayashi of the Democratic Party simultaneously with the dismissal of Hirano. There is a person who heard the plan for purging State Minister Hayashi from Ashida's secretary before the announcement of Hirano's purge. This man was surprised when this story came true. This is a true story.

6. Nishio said at the meeting of the Socialist Diet Members on November 4 that Hirano is using Shirasu to keep contact secretly with the Liberal Party. When Shigeichi ASO met Shirasu on November 6, Shirasu asked: "With whom in the Liberal Party has H Hirano consulted to form a new party?" When Aso told the statement made by Nishio, Shirasu laughed saying: "If demagogue goes that far, it is rather non-sense." Nishio has spread rumor for Hirano's new party for the purpose of camouflaging his scheme for the rotation of political power.

7. Why was it necessary to forcibly purge Hirano while he was away on official mission and finally dismiss him without hearing his explanation? This is because the Katayama Cabinet is on the eve of collapse. There are many plausible reasons for the collapse of the Katayama Cabinet such as the Coal Bill, failure of the price policy or labor offensive. More important are the hidden and scandal-like reasons.

(a) As the Seko question develops, it is reported that the Prosecution Office is taking a strong attitude to take up the question of funds furnished by Sugahara to Nishio and Ashida at the time of making the Katayama Cabinet, regardless of the positions of the defendants.

(b) Nishio was prosecuted for his militaristic Diet speech he made in favor of the National Mobilization Law in 1938, and for his false report in the questionnaire.

(c) Investigation into Wada's research activities in the Planning Board and Showa Kenkyu Kai.

(d) The position of Ashida who was on the editorial staff of the Hochi Shimbun and the President of the Japan Times at the screening of the publishers.

As Nishio and Wada have many reasons whereby they should decide their positions, Nishio decided to shift the world's attention to Hirano, and to find a way out by rotation of Cabinet even at the expense of the Katayama Cabinet.

The points which Hirano emphasized when he met Katayama at the last interview will be told here. This will show how Hirano was a victime of a political intrigue, and how he maintained his stand as a upright and democratic stateman. Hirano's story follows:

"Hirano is never sticking to the chair of the Agriculture Minister. He will resign any time if there is reasons. During his official trip for expediting the delivery of rice, he

received a surprise attack. He was publicly announced that as a difinite purgee. Later he was intimidated that he would be presecuted unless he resigns. Under such intimidation, he cannot resign. If he accepts resignation, he will be taken as having surrengered before intimidation and his political life and stand will be lost.

"Hirano is charged with non-cooperation with the Cabinet. If the charge is correct, there must be opponents. If Hirano alone is to be ousted, it is one-sided, and the outside people will think that Hirano was on the wrong side. As Hirano's purge was first published, the people will think he has weakness. I, therefore, cannot resign.

"If, however, the Prime Minister guarantees Hirano's qualification, or if this question is turned to a blanc paper, Hirano will never stick to the chair."

To this view, Prime Minister Katayama simply repeated his request for resignation. As the Prime Minister did neither listen to Hirano nor expressed his view, he could not find any reason for resignation before the simple repetition of the unjust request. Hirano, therefore, could not resign even at the risk of dismissal.

The foregoing facts show that the whole process leading to Hirano's dismissal is nothing but an intrigue peculiar to the despotic regime, without a single just cause. Once such an intrigue is successful, its promoters will repeat in the political field. If such a plot is repeated, democracy in Japan will remain only in name, and the people will keep away from false and unjust politics. Where the people have no confidence in politics, there will be no progress of democracy. The appearance of Communism in despotic Russia and of Fascism and Naziism in Italy and Germany furnishes good examples.

During the war, the militarists machine-gunned their opponents. If the application of dismissal from the Ministrial post took the place of a machine gun in the postwar politics, there would be no progress. This is a political gang-like crime committed before the millions of people in the bright day light.

Let us see the political world during two years after the war. We can find clearly one fact that the statesmen who clarified their anti-Communist attitude fell one after another. Examples are furnished by Ichiro HATOYAMA, and Tanzan ~~ISHIBASHI~~ ISHIBASHI, both being stout opponents of Communism. Hirano is the third who is about to be thrown out. ~~Hirano is the third~~ If the situation is left without remedy, some reasons will be sought to justify purge.

The foreign press correspondents count the following factors as reasons for the increase of the Communist members in Europe: Even if a Soviet-American war should break out, the Americans will not kill the people because they are Communists. Under the Soviet rule, however, all pro-American elements would be cleaned up. Many safety-seekers are said to be joining the Communist Party. There may be an irony in this view, but, if the anti-Communist statesmen are ousted one by one under various reasons, the above story will furnish a hint to the Japanese statesmen.

Purge is the greatest weapon for the Communist Party. The Communists in Japan are implicitly requesting every Japanese stateman to choose one of two ways - anti-Communism or pro-Communism. If anti-Communist statemen are pushed away, the statesmen will have to follow either the path of the Social Democratic Party, which is assisting Communits ~~underxsurface~~ with an anti-Communist sign in front, or flatter Communists with anti-Communist conscience. This is never the question of purge that concerns Hirano alone.

The Communist Party, with world revolution as its aim and with organization nets all over the world, are engaged in activities as a legal party in Japan. The party is controlling its members with "iron discipline" peculiar to the Communist Party. Its cellular system is spreading in every field of the society, and unexpected people are furnishing the Communist Party with information and other helps. Though this is well known, its schemes are beyong imagination.

As was already stated, it is becoming increasingly difficult for the statesmen to work in the political field with openly declaring anti-Communism in front, in the presence of a secret revolutionary organization. We trust that this point has clearly been understood.

In order to continue the agricultural labor movement before and during the war, it was found necessary to camouflage under the name of Kodokai, in order to avoid suppression. This point has already been accepted by the Central Screening Board. However, nobody knows when and in what form the feelers of the untiring Communists may fabricate any faults picked up from small corners of statesmen's records. Under such circumstances, all statesmen are feeling as if they were under a drawn sword placed upon the back of their necks, and cannot develop their full powers.

By the concentrated attacks from the Communist side, Hirano's case was examined twice and his thought and past records were found qualified. It is argently hoped that a certificate be issued proving his qualification, in order to assure his full activities. If Hirano's power is weakened as a result of a political intrigue just experienced, it will affect the National Agricultural Union, of which he is the President, and which stands with the banner of anti-Communism in front. If this Union becomes inactive, the first line of anti-Comminist bulwark will be broken. This is not the affair that affects Hirano alone, but is the matter that affects the fate of Japan.

If a clearance certificate is issued in favor of Hirano, he is firmly determined to devote his entire energy for the cause of anti-Communist movement. As long as Communism stays in Japan, there cannot be amity between the U.S. and Japan.

CONFIDENTIAL (Translation)

Sub-enclosure No. 1 to Tokyo's Unnumber Despatch dated December 2, 1947.

K O D O K A I

Purport of Its Establishment and Its Nature

Different Character from Ordinary Patriotic Organizations

Kodokai was the organization established for the purpose of suppressing the political movement that sharply gained momentum among the aggressive militarists after the Manchurian Incident. It aimed at leading Japan to the middle course and preventing war. As a practical means of attaining this end, it was considered necessary to:

(1) Form a Cabinet that can purge the army;

(2) Call together the moderate elements among the soldiers to make them oppose the extremist group as the first step, to overcome this group as the next step, and finally to bring about the normal political condition.

Under the circumstances that prevailed at that time, the formation of a Cabinet headed by General Kazunari UGAKI was considered as the most suitable step to carry out a purge. Kodokai, therefore, strived hard to bring Ugaki Cabinet into being. Naturally it opposed Meirinkai which actively supported the aggressive militarists. (Shiho Kenkyu (Judicial Research), p. 31, issued by the Justice Ministry, Evidence No.)

A certain degree of camouflage, however, was absolutely necessary to start a political movement under the situation where there was no freedom of expressionof thought at that time. If such camouflage is considered inexcusable, not a single political

movement of anti-militarist nature could have existed, and the whole country would have been left under the domination of the war-craving soldiers. The adoption of the name Kodo (Imperial Way) and the insertion of patriotic slogans, found practically in all organizations that existed at that time, among the principles of this Association, were not only inevitable, but also indispensable prerequisites. If such superficial camouflage of Kodokai is mechanically taken up and Kodokai is stemped as an ultra-nationalistic organization, it will be tantamount to charging every and all the Japanese, except those in prison, with war crimes from the beginning of the China Incident up to the ending of the Pacific war.

In spite of this superficial camouflage, Kodokai followed the path reverse to the course taken by other ordinary patriotic organizations, and ended its life from the beginning till end as the most active anti-militarist union. This is elequently spoken by the fact that Kodokai was under the constant vigilance of the Gendarmerie as a dangerous association from its creation. Oppression upon Kodokai was so severe that its voluntary dissolution was frequently requested by Commander Hata of the Tokyo Gendarmerie, and was finally ordered to close as "anti-nationalistic organization" by the Tojo Cabinet in April 1942. (Evidence No.) How many active anti-militaristic movements were there such as Kodokai? Look at handbills, attached hereto, with the title "Appealing to our dear farmers in the entire prefecture", distributed in Yamanashi Prefecture. These handbills bear such phrases as: "The behavior of Kodokai is contrary to Imperial wishes and unpatriotic to such an extent that it has been dissolved by order";

"Kodokai has been dissolved for reason harmful to national unity." They are the best proofs that Kodokai and the Agricultural Union were "anti-Nationalistic" and "anti-militaristic". Evidences are listed below.

I. Evidence will be shown that Kodokai, unlike ordinary patriotic organizations, had not only nothing to do with the militarists, but also it belonged to the Ugaki group who was opposed to the aggressive militarists of that time.

Data:

A. 1. "Record of Japanese Militarists and Kodokai"

2. "Sandai Shiso Roku" (Record of Three Generations thought) by Katsuo IMASATO, p. 130, the paragraph dealing with Ugaki's pacific idea.

3. "After the February 26 Incident" by Hidekichi WADA, p.21 - Movement of Ugaki group

B. A striking example showing that Kodokai was different from ordinary patriotic associations is furnished by the fact that Kodokai did not participate in "National Polity Clarification Movement" and "Anti-Emperor-Organ-Theory Movement", the two main aims of nationalistic movement, supported by all patriotic organizations. (Evidence No.)

C. To show that Kodokai was established for producing Ugaki Cabinet to suppress the aggressive militarists and purging the extremist elements in the army, the following evidences are shown:

Certificate of General Ugaki (Evidence No.)

Certificate of Shoichi Mitoro, then Chief Editor of Tokyo Asahi Shimbun (Evidence No.)

Certificate of Gaku MATSUMOTO, then Chief of the Public Safety Bureau, Metropolitan Police Board (Evidence No.)

II. Certificate for Kodokai's opposition to Meirinkai

A. "Shiho Kenkyu" (Judicial Research), issued by Justice Ministry, p. 313, reading: "Kodokai is different in nature from Meirinkai); "Kodokai rejects both extreme right and extreme left (Presented to the Central Screening Board on)

B. "Nihonshugi Kenkyu Shi" (Historical Study of Japanism) by Hanji KINOSHITA, p. 18, reading: "Standing opposed to Meirinkai is Kodokai" (Presented to the Central Screening Board on)

C. "Nihon Seiji Shakai no Shisoshi Taikei" (Principles of Thought History of Political Society in Japan) by Shigeomi NOMURA, p. 436

D. "Nippon Nomin Shimbun" (Japan Farmers Newspaper), Feb. 15, 1934

III. Reasons why Rikizo HIRANO joined Kodokai

IV. Opposition vote cast by Rikizo HIRANO to a subsidy given to the Imperial Rule Assistance Association at 76th Session of Diet (Certificate issued by the Secretariat of the House of Representatives

Certificate of Kodokai being requested by Gendarmerie to dissolve voluntarily (Evidence No.)

Certificate of Kodokai being under surveillance of Gendarmerie (Evidence No.)

V. A. Evidence of Kodokai being ordered by the Tojo Cabinet to

close in Yamanashi Prefecture on April 2, 1942 (Tokyo Mainichi Shimbun, April 5, 1942, presented to the Central Screening Board)

B. Certificate of prohibition of Kodokai issued by Home Minister Yuasa (Presented to the Central Screening Board)

VI. Four copies of pamphlet issued by Kodokai (Presented to Central Screening Board), showing Kodokai being different from ordinary patriotic organizations. The principles of agricultural reform advocated in the pamphlet are in the same line as the present land reform.

VII. Handbills distributed in Yamanashi Prefecture with the title "A ppeal to our Dear Farmers in the Entire Prefecture"

7

CONFIDENTIAL

Sub-enclosure No. 2 to
Tokyo's Unnumbered Despatch
dated December 2, 1947.

(Translation)

Character of Kodokai

By

Evidence No. I - 1.

Kazunari UGAKI

Kodokai was an organization which rejected ultra-nationalism and aggressive militarism that gained influence after the Manchurian Incident, It was an anti-war and pacifist organization opposing the extremist militarists. I hereby certify that Kodokai stood opposed to ordinary nationalistic organizations which supported militarism.

1. After the World War I, in Japan, Communism spread rapidly, class struggle sharpened and social unrest was intensified as time passed on. The thoughtful statesmen in Japan, therefore, had great apprehansion for the future of the country. At that time, there were two groups of thinking to cope with this situation. One was the expansionist group represented by General Giichi TANAKA. This group maintained that, intensification of class struggle being the result of poverty caused by excessive population, solution should be sought in the expansion of territory and emigation. To this thinking, I opposed foreign aggression. I advocated that the evils of capitalism which is the cause of class struggle should be removed, exploitation of labor be suppressed, parliamentary government with complete representation of the will of the people be established, and armament be reduced, with a view to solving the question by international cooperation. In other words, I tried to remove social unrest by stabilizing the people's livelihood and reforming the country. For this purpose, I wished to stabilize the living of the farmers by solving the agricultural question, establishing the right of cultivation of land,

reducing farm rent and by rationalizing the farming enterprise.

2. Standing on the conviction stated above, I forcibly reduced armament and suppressed the extremist elements of the army. The main current of the army, therefore, vigorously opposed me. Mr.Rikizo HIRANO supported my principle and always advised me to suppress the extremist militarists who gained influence after the Manchurian Incident and to purge the army.

3. The Gendarmerie was aware of this situation, and appeared to have exercised pressure upon the Japan Farmers Union led by Mr.HIRANO. In order to face this situation, HIRANO thought it the only effective way to let the soldiers fight the soldiers, by organizing the pacifict soldiers into an impressive size to crush the war-craving militarists. At that time, Mr.HIRANO came to me and expressed his desire that he wished to actively support the movement that started among the pacifist retired soldiers who were hostile to the aggressive militarists and who entertained the same view as his. I entirely agreed with him and supported him.

4. As Kodokai was organized through the process stated above, the army in power at that time made Commander Shinji HATA of the Gendarmerie constantly oppress Kodokai. As pressure was especially severe upon Lt.-General (retired) Morizo TODOROKI, its President, he proposed that Kodokai should change its orientation to avoid the frontal opposition of the army. As Mr.HIRANO strongly opposed to this proposal, the Lt.-General was placed in such a difficult position that he was obliged to resign. After this incident, Kodokai expressed itself more clearly as an organization

standing on the anti-militaristic and pacific principle. Naturally, Kodokai was placed in a difficult position by oppression from the army and by opposition from the patriotic organizations in general.

5., When I received Imperial Command to form a Cabinet in 1936, I could not form a Cabinet because of the united opposition from the army and from all the nationalistic organizations supporting the army. At that time, Mr.HIRANO's Kodokai supported my Cabinet making most courageously before any individuals and organizations did.

6. When I was appointed the Foreign Minister in the Konoye Cabinet, I adopted the principle of non-expansion of the China Incident, had parleys with the British Ambassador Cragie and opposed the Tripartite Alliance. At that time, all the nationalistic organizations unanimously opposed me, but Kodokai and the Japan Farmers Union strongly supported me.

7. Such being the case the Tojo Cabinet considered Kodokai as an anti-war and anti-militaristic organization, and ordered its dissolution on April 5, 1942.

8. I am believing that Mr.HIRANO is a consistent pacifist and an agricultural labor leader of social democratic principle. I have no doubt that Kodokai was an anti-war and pacifist organization which rejected both extreme right and extreme left and opposed direct action, as stated in its Declaration.

Kazunari UGAKI (Signed)

November 10, 1947

Note: It is remembered that Chief Prosecutor Keenan recently declared that General Ugaki and three other former Prime Ministers were pacifists and worked to prevent war.

Sub-enclosure No. 3 to Tokyo's
Unnumbered Despatch dated
December 2, 1947.

(Translation)

November 10, 1947

Certificate

I hereby certify as follows:

I have no acquaintance with Mr. Rikizo HIRANO. While I was in office, Kodokai stood outside the nationalistic organizations. It belonged to the Ugaki group which stood opposed to the main current of the army at that time. As the Japan Agricultural Union headed by HIRANO was an anti-militarist socialist organization, and as Kodokai was closely related to this body, the dissolution of Kodokai was frequently discussed in the office as a dangerous organization.

Shumma SAKAMOTO

Former Commander of Tokyo Gendarmeries

(Signed)

Sub-enclosure No. 4 to Tokyo's
Unnumbered Despatch dated
December 2, 1947.

(Translation)

November 11, 1947

Certificate

As Mr.Yoroku TAKIZAWA, a friend of mine, visited me and requested my view, I shall state what I knew as follows:

(1) As I have no acquaintance with Mr.Rikizo HIRANO, I do not know in detail his thought and other matters;

(2) From our point of view, we considered Kodokai and the Japanese Agricultural Union as socialist organizations. We, therefore, never worked with these organizations;

(3) When we made various patriotic movements, Kodokai never participated in our movements, and our comrades opposed its participation in our movements.

Ainosuke IWATA (Signed)

Note: Ainosuke IWATA is a prominent ultra-nationalist as everybody knows.

Sub-enclosure No. 5 to Tokyo's
Unnumbered Despatch dated
December 2, 1947.

(Translation)

November 10, 1947

Certificate

I hereby certify as follows:

Before the Pacific war, Kodokai stood outside the nationalistic organizations. It had anti-militarist tendency and supported the pacific Ugaki group. Kodokai opposed all nationalistic movements such as the National Polity Clarification Movement, China Crashing Movement, and the Anti-U.S.-British Movement. As Kodokai did not support the nationalistic movement, we considered Kodokai as a socialist organization.

Yuji SATSUMA(Signed)

Note: Yuji SATSUMA is a well-known extreme rightist.

Sub-enclosure No. 6 to Tokyo's
Unnumbered Despatch dated
December 2, 1947.

(Translation)

November 10, 1947

Certificate

I hereby certify that:

(1) I was legally responsible for the printing of the publication "Kodo". I printed this publication from to ;

(2) The number of copies printed was from 400 to 500 each issue. Though this publication was supposed to be a monthly periodical, it was published irregularly in practice;

(3) Mr.Rikizo HIRANO appeared to be occupied with political activities of Kodokai, and never visited the printing office;

(4) The editing of the publication was managed entirely by Mr.Kotaro OKUNO, Chief of the Publication Department of Kodokai. Like other small periodicals, Mr.HIRANO was merely the nominal publisher of the periodical "Kodo".

Kuniji YAMAGATA (Signed)

CONFIDENTIAL

(Translation)

Sub-enclosure No. 7 to Tokyo's Unnumbered Despatch dated December 2, 1947.

Relationship between various military influences and Kodokai

Before and after the Manchurian Incident, the Japanese army was divided into various power groups, opposing each other, which finally found expression in direct actions known as the May 15th Incident, January 5th Incident, February 26th Incident and the like. All the nationalistic organizations in Japan were born and eveloped as the supporting pillars of these military influences. A determination with what influence or influences of the army Kodokai was related is considered to be the key point in dicidingthe character of Kodokai. Below will show relations between various influences of the army and their supporting organizations.

1. The Japanese army began to study counter measures in about 1921 to face the class struggle movement based upon Marxism that developed lake a wild fire at that time. General Giichi TANAKA and General Kazunari UGAKI, two giants of the army at that time, had views fundamentally different each other. Below is given an excerpt of a book "San Dai Shiso Roku" (Record of thoughts of three generations) by Katsuo IMASATO which clearly describes different points of thought between the two army leaders just mentioned.

"General TANAKA had a deep apprehension for the penetration of the Communistic thought into the agricultural labor class in about 1921. From the point of view that the solution of this question depends solely upon the settlement of the population and food problems, General TANAKA tried to stabilize the livelihood of the people by emigration and the development

of natural resources in the Asiatic continent, especially in Manchuria"; "For that reason, General TANAKA became the president of the Seiyukai Party, and despatched the expeditionary forces in utter disregard of public opinion, or forcibly oppressed the Chang Family for gaining control of Manchuria. Thus he tried to expand to the Chinese continent." (p. 130)

"There was no reason why pacific idea that prevailed in Japan at that time could accept the expansionist policy pursued by General TANAKA. The Minseito Party and all publicity organs vigorously opposed this militaristic and expansionist policy which went against the current of the world. It was General UGAKI who stood up giving echoes to this pacific idea running high in the civilian circles." "General UGAKI rejected General TANAKA'S continental expansionist policy as an outrageous act ignorant of the time. As to the China policy, General UGAKI advocated non-intervention and cooperation with China even by abandoning a part of Japanese rights and interests in China, in agreement with the international cooperation policy dominant in the Foreign Office at that time. He reduced armament and was praised by the pacifists of the world." (p. 130)

In the book "After February 26th Incident" by Hidekichi WADA, it is stated that "UGAKI was called the Idol of the status quo among the politicians of the army. He was stamped as the supporter of the London Treaty and was disliked by the army in spite of his being a soldier." (p.21) "UGAKI as the War Minister of a Minseito Cabinet that was handed down since the time of the

Cabinet of Count Komei KATO was called an unofficial member of the Minseito Party." (p. 22). As these statements suggest, UGAKI was a consistent pacific thinker from the time when the party politics was in the height before the Manchurian Incident.

1. What were born to oppose the pacific thought represented by General UGAKI in the army were new influences represented by Generals ARAKI, MASAKI, HAYASHI, and others who inherited the current of General TANAKA. The May 15th Incident was a coup d'etat to drive out UGAKI'S thought out of the Japanese army and politicians, and to change the country into TANAKA'S thinking. The Manchurian Incident was also a political revolutionary movement which was carried out echoing to the May 15th Incident.

   By these two incidents, UGAKI'S influence was driven out of the army, and the military influence penetrated into the political circles. In order to oppose the new military influence, the liberal political parties started a movement to enthrone UGAKI as the head of a political party, and UGAKI leaned more and more toward the democratic parties. Thus UGAKI became the target of attack from the aggressive militarists.

2. The new military influence represented by ARAKI, MASAKI and HAYASHI forcibly carried out the independence of Manchukuo, and strived to lead Japan toward a militaristic State. On the way toward this goal, the military power was divided into two groups. One group advocated a fundamental political reform to change the national structure into a Nazi-patterned organization on the strength of armament built up by the militarists. The other group maintained that Japan should exclusively be prepared for anti-Soviet war without touching

the domestic question. The former was called the Control Faction(Toseiha) while the latter the Imperial Way Faction (Kodoha). The former was represented by Araki, Mazaki and others, while the latter by Hayashi, Ishihara, Tojo and others. Conflict between the two factions was sharpened by the China Incident and the Pacific War.

All the nationalistic organizations established after the May 15th Incident belonged to either one or the other, and fought each other.

3. Kodokai supported neither the Control Faction nor the Imperial Way Faction. Kodokai belonged to the Ugaki group which stood on the pacific thought in opposition to both factions. Naturally, Kodokai fundamentally differed from ordinary nationalistic organizations, opposing all aggressive military influences that gained power after the Manchurian Incident.

Q. SFK Mr Hoover and Miss Burton
Mr. Allison
JDJ
JDJ to file
P

UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER
FOR JAPAN

Tokyo, February 14, 1948

PERSONAL and CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Jim:

As Jacobs is scheduled to arrive from Seoul at about 3 p.m. today and expects to take off on the regular plane at 4:45 p.m. for the States, I am asking him to carry this letter to you. The enclosure is a self-explanatory memorandum written for General MacArthur concerning another difficulty which arose in connection with a proposed subject for the meeting of the Council scheduled on February 18.

As you can well imagine, General MacArthur was unalterably opposed to having any one from GHQ appear before the Council to expound upon the reasons for the resignation of the Katayama Cabinet as well as upon the future Cabinet. In fact, he felt that the entire subject is irregular and that discussion by the Council of a matter primarily dealing with internal political problems should not be allowed. I argued with him to the effect that we should not attempt to censor subjects which Members propose to place on the agenda, nor should we attempt to dictate how these subjects are worded. I felt that any subject which is placed on the agenda can be met squarely and that we have nothing to fear from an open discussion on any problem. The General, however, was adamant regarding the representative of GHQ and instructed me to tell Kislenko accordingly.

The upshot of the matter was that the subject has now been reworded to read "Discussion of the Reasons for the Resignation of the Katayama Cabinet etc."

I might say that there is some danger that the Soviet Member may take the position that a change in the Government as a whole is a matter which requires approval by all the Members of the Allied Council for Japan, that he (the Soviet Member) does not agree, and that the question of the formation of a new Cabinet must therefore be sent to the FEC for agreement. If maintained, this position would, of course, effectively forestall for a considerable time the formation of a new Cabinet. In my opinion such a position would be untenable especially as no FEC directive is involved. Without a directive, the premise of the Soviet Member falls, and it can be

maintained,

James K. Penfield, Esquire,
Deputy Director, Office of Far Eastern Affairs,
Department of State,
Washington 25, D.C.

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PERSONAL and CONFIDENTIAL

maintained, I believe, that a change of Cabinet not brought about as a result of implementation of an FEC policy or by a directive from SCAP is a matter not within the province of the Allied Council.

On the other hand, I shall, of course, allow discussion on this subject by any or all Members although it appears to me that General MacArthur's press release of 9 February 1948, and particularly the last sentence in paragraph 2 thereof, clearly sets forth the policy to be followed by SCAP in a situation of this kind (copy of press release enclosed).

The past week has been one of considerable harassment, most of which unfortunately has fallen on my shoulders. While I am not complaining and fully realize that these things are all part of the day's work, I do hope that you can do something to expedite Drumright's arrival here. My need for someone to carry a greater share of the administrative load is real and genuine.

With best regards,

Sincerely yours,

Bill

W. J. Sebald

Enclosures: 7/23/69

1. Copy of Memorandum for General MacArthur.

2. Copy of press release dated 9 February 1948.

13 February 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR: General MacArthur

SUBJECT: Conversation with Acting Soviet Member, Allied Council for Japan, Major General Kislenko.

General Kislenko called at my office at my request at 4 p.m. today together with two interpreters. After preliminary greetings I told General Kislenko that the Acting Secretary-General had advised me of his desire to place the following subject on the agenda for the fifty-second meeting of the Council: "Information of the Representative of the GHQ, SCAP, regarding the reasons for the resignation of the Katayama Cabinet and also regarding outlook and nature of the new Cabinet which is being formed".

I then stated the following:

"Once again I am compelled to state that your proposed subject for the fifty-second meeting of the Council is ill-advised and that it has become necessary for me to instruct the Secretary-General not to place the subject, as worded, on the Agenda. I had thought that the discussion in a previous meeting regarding your attempt to force me as Chairman to report to the Council had settled this matter. However, I now find an attempt to force a representative of General Headquarters, SCAP, to furnish information regarding matters the solution of which is solely a matter for the Japanese to determine for themselves as an internal political issue in accordance with due constitutional process.

"I have already repeatedly stated that there is no objection in a Member of the Council making any statement in a meeting of the Council he might wish to make on any subject, provided only that the subject-matter is properly placed on the Agenda and appropriately worded.

"In any event, it is my considered conclusion that the proposed subject is not one which can or should be appropriately open for discussion in the Allied Council. Your

attention

attention is invited to the Supreme Commander's recent statement in which, in clear and succinct language, he explained his attitude concerning the resignation of the Katayama Cabinet. This statement has appeared in the press and needs no further clarification. It certainly needs no further discussion. It is my feeling that the information requested in the proposed subject has already fully appeared in the press and elsewhere, and that nothing can be added to the vast amount of factual as well as speculative writing which has already been published.

"In view of the reasons which I have just stated, I cannot agree to allow the proposed subject to be placed on the agenda in its present form."

In reply General Kislenko stated that in his opinion the Allied Council for Japan was formed by the Governments concerned for the purpose of consulting with and advising the Supreme Commander regarding major problems of the Occupation and that in his opinion a change in the Japanese Government certainly was of sufficient importance to warrant interest on the part of the Members of the Allied Council. He stated that his sole reason for placing this subject on the agenda of the Council is to obtain information from General Headquarters, as well as from the other Members of the Council, concerning the reasons leading to the resignation of the Katayama Cabinet. Likewise, he is interested in learning as much as possible concerning the formation of a new Cabinet. He said that he is not satisfied with the information which has appeared in the press and that he knows no other way to become well-informed on this subject than by raising the question in the Council.

General Kislenko than asked why as Chairman I refused to allow him to place subjects on the agenda of the Allied Council and, if it is a matter of form rather than substance, could I advise him how to overcome the faulty wording.

I told the General that I had upon several occasions already stated that General Headquarters could not agree to being forced by any Member of the Council to make a statement of any kind; furthermore, I had made it clear in previous discussions that I, as Chairman, would not allow the Acting Soviet Member to force me to give a report to the Council. On the other hand, I have also made it clear that there is no objection whatsoever to any Member properly placing a subject for discussion on the agenda provided it is in appropriate form.

General Kislenko

General Kislenko than asked whether I would agree to rewording this subject to read: "Discussion of the reasons for the resignation of the Katayama Cabinet and also regarding outlook and nature of the new Cabinet which is being formed".

I replied that this subject is not a proper one for discussion as to do so would interfere with an internal political issue and that such discussion might naturally be construed as interference with internal Japanese politics. General Kislenko replied that he knows of no other way in which to place the subject on the agenda and that regardless of how the subject is worded, having once been placed on the agenda, discussion is bound to follow. He said that were he to limit the name of the subject to "Statement by the Soviet Member regarding the reasons.....", the other Members might construe that subject as shutting them out of the discussion.

In view of the above and as I felt that the Chairman will be in a stronger position by replying directly to the Acting Soviet Member's statement, if any, I agreed to instruct the Secretary-General to place the subject, as amended, on the agenda.

WJS

W. J. SEBALD

COPY

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Public Information Office

Press Release: Immediate Release
9 February 1948

General MacArthur tonight issued the following statement:

"The Prime Minister has just called to inform me of the decision that he and his cabinet will resign. He pointed out that whereas his government has received no non-confidence vote by the Diet, it felt that it lacked the legislative support which a government should have to be truly representative of the people. The problems which it has faced are not novel but are inherent in the Japanese situation. As with all governments since hostilities ended, his has been confronted with the serious political, economic and social dislocations which are a natural consequence of the war and defeat.

"These conditions in more or less degree will continue to confront future Japanese governments until through the combined energies of the Japanese people and wise and prudent leadership, the forces of recovery re-establish a self-sustaining economy and political and social stability. This will of course take time, but decisive progress already has been made. The action now being taken is in full accord with democratic procedure, as will be the manner in which the National Diet meets the issue. The solution will be left to its decision, as the Occupation will continue to regard the determination of such internal political issues as a responsibility of the representatives of the Japanese people.

"Mr. Katayama and his cabinet have given the country a conscientious and patriotic leadership, and I have every confidence that a new government which emerges through the democratic processes ahead will be guided by no less high principles."

~~JMLA~~

AIRGRAM

FROM: SCAP, GSPOLAD, Tokyo

Date of mail: March 12, 1948

Rec'd: Mar. 16, 1948 8:09 AM

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Secretary of State,

Washington.

A-41, March 11, 1948.

Organization of new ASHIDA Cabinet was completed late March 9, and attestation by the Throne took place afternoon of March 10. Cabinet posts were divided, six to the Democrats, eight to the Social-Democrats, and two to the People's Cooperative Party. Membership of new cabinet is as follows:

Prime Minister and Foreign Minister,
ASHIDA Hitoshi, Democrat.

Finance Minister,
KITAMURA Tokutaro, Democrat.

Education Minister,
MORITO Tatsuo, Socialist (Center).

Welfare Minister,
TAKEDA Giichi, Democrat.

Agriculture and Forestry Minister,
NAGAE Kazuo, Socialist (Right-Center).

Commerce and Industry Minister,
MIZUTANI Chosaburo, Socialist (Right).

Transportation Minister,
OKADA Seiichi, People's Cooperative.

Communications Minister,
TOMIYOSHI Eiji, Socialist (Right).

Labor Minister,
KATO Kanju, Socialist (Left).

State Minister, (Chief of the Cabinet Secretariat)
TOMABECHI Gizo, Democrat.

State Minister, (Director General of the Economic Stabilization Board)
KURUSU Takeo, Democrat.

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State Minister, (Attorney General)
SUZUKI Yoshio, Socialist (Center).

State Minister, (President of the Construction Board)
HITOTSUMATSU Sadayoshi, Democrat.

State Minister (Deputy Prime Minister)
NISHIO Suehiro, Socialist (Right).

State Minister (Chairman of the Local Finance Commission)
NOMIZO Masaru, Socialist (Left).

State Minister, (Director General of the Reparations Board)
FUNADA Kyoji, People's Cooperative.

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INCOMING AIRGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS TELEGRAPH BRANCH

AIRGRAM 4210

FROM: Shanghai, China

DATE: March 17, 1948

MAILING DATE: Mar. 18, 1948

NO. : A-232

Mar. 25, 1948 8:05AM

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A-232, March 17, 1948.

In one of numerous local vernacular editorials on Ashida, all of which are critical, Chung Yang Jih Pao (KMT) on 3/16 says in part:

"From the recent Cabinet crisis in Japan we should be able to see that politically there are now two trends in that country which cause us much worry: First, the conservative forces in Japan are now waiting for an opportunity to gain influence, and secondly, due to the differences among the minor political parties, no strong Cabinet can be produced to carry out faithfully the Allied occupation policy and to stabilize the livelihood of the people. It is under these circumstances that the Ashida Cabinet has been born. The process of forming this Cabinet met with many obstacles, and although the Cabinet has now been established, yet the path ahead of it is not a broad and level one. However, under no circumstances must a Liberal Party or Conservative Party Cabinet be allowed to emerge, so our Ally, the United States, should be careful about this matter."

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Copy to Embassy, Nanking.
Copy to SCAP, Tokyo.

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INCOMING AIRGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS TELEGRAPH BRANCH

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AIRGRAM 4210

FROM: Shanghai, China

DATE: March 17, 1948

MAILING DATE: Mar. 18, 1948

NO. : A-232

Mar. 25, 1948 8:05AM

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SECSTATE,

WASHINGTON.

A-232, March 17, 1948.

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9:00 am

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Hectograph and copy to Department.
Copy to Embassy, Nanking.
Copy to SCAP, Tokyo.

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UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER
FOR JAPAN

No. 206 Tokyo, Japan, March 30, 1948.

CONFIDENTIAL (For Department Use Only)

Subject: Formation of the Ashida Cabinet.

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose a memorandum of conversation between Mr. MATSUMOTO Takizo, Parliamentary Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, and an officer of this Mission concerning the formation of the Ashida Cabinet. The major points of interest are:

1. Dr. KURUSU Takeo, Finance Minister in the Katayama Cabinet, and Mr. KITAMURA Tokutana, Minister of Transportation in the KATAYAMA Cabinet, were Dr. ASHIDA Hitoshi's closest advisers, although the final selection was made almost single-handed by Dr. Ashida.

2. Twenty-eight candidates were submitted to Government Section on March 1, 1948, including all members of the Katayama Cabinet. Only one name was questioned at first, that of a Tokyo business man who was being considered for Director-General of the Economic Stabilization Board.

3. During all discussions, the Headquarters took special pains to avoid instructing the Japanese as to what to do, emphasizing that the selection of a Cabinet was a Japanese matter.

4. Both this Headquarters and members of the three coalition parties suggested to Dr. Ashida (who agreed) that Mr. SUZUKI Yoshio, Attorney-General in the Katayama Cabinet, be continued in his post instead of either of the men proposed by Dr. Ashida.

5. Dr. Ashida tried to persuade the Social Democrats to accept the post of Finance Minister because of expected difficulties with their left-wing members when the budget for 1948-49 is formulated. They declined on the ground that there were no available candidates except Mr. SUZUKI Masaburo, leader of the left-wing faction, who refused, and Mr. MIZUTANI Chozaburo, who was needed for the post of Commerce and Industry Minister.

6. Mr. KATAYAMA Tetsu, former Prime Minister, refused to become Minister for Foreign Affairs, despite the utmost pressure on the part of Dr. Ashida. Mr. Katayama believes he can make a greater contribution by bringing unity to his party, the Social Democratic Party. He has accepted the post of adviser to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Dr. Ashida is holding the post of Minister for Foreign Affairs concurrently, hoping to persuade Mr. Katayama later.

7. The

Tokyo's 206,
March 30, 1948.

7. The inclusion of Mr. MORITO Tatsuo as Minister of Education was questioned by Government Section because of his book entitled "War and Culture", which was attacked in the Christian Science Monitor, issue of February 9. He was finally included because Dr. Ashida considers that the Central Screening Committee has cleared Mr. Morito and because of his importance in the Ronoto, labor-farmer group of the Social Democratic Party.

8. The Social Democrats were adamant in insisting on the Agriculture and Forestry post. The designation of Mr. NAGAE Kazuo was questioned by Government Section because he fell within the labor purge category. After considerable debate, it was determined that he could hold any post except one in the Labor Ministry. The Japanese consider this case an important precedent.

9. The appointment of Dr. KURUSU Takeo as Director-General of the Economic Stabilization Board hit a last-minute snag when the Secretary-General of the Democratic Party learned that no one could be appointed to this post without prior approval of the Economic and Scientific Section of this Headquarters. While his appointment was being discussed, the top members of the Board interpreted his non-appearance as lack of interest and decided to resign. However, his appointment has been cleared and he has made efforts to retain members of the Board.

10. A plan is under consideration to have two parliamentary Vice Ministers for each Ministry (24 in all), one to be selected from the House of Representatives and one from the House of Councillors.

Respectfully yours,

W. J. Sebald

Enclosure:

Memorandum of Conversation,
dated March 15, 1948.

Original and ozalid to Department.

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WHenryLawrence,Jr./blc

CONFIDENTIAL (For Department Use Only)

Enclosure to Despatch No. 206, dated March 30, 1948, from the Office of the United States Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, on the subject "Formation of the Ashida Cabinet".

(COPY)

UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER
FOR JAPAN

March 15, 1948

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Formation of Ashida Cabinet.

PARTICIPANTS: MATSUMOTO Takizo,
Parliamentary Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs;
W. Henry Lawrence, Jr.,
Second Secretary.

PLACE: Office of United States Political Adviser,
March 15, 1948.

Mr. Matsumoto, who carried on all liaison between Dr. ASHIDA Hitoshi, Prime Minister, (at his request) and this Headquarters concerning the formation of the new Cabinet, has described the behind-the-scene activities which resulted in its selection on March 9, 1948 (this Mission's airgram A-41, March 11, 1948). Mr. TOMABECHI Gizo, Secretary-General of the Democratic Party, was to have headed the Cabinet Formation Headquarters, but became ill so that Mr. TAKEDA Giichi was made Acting Chief. According to Mr. Matsumoto, Mr. Takeda conducted the press conferences, but Dr. KURUSU Takeo and Mr. KITAMURA Tokutara were Dr. Ashida's lieutenants. Mr. Matsumoto, however, believes that the final selection was made almost single-handed by Dr. Ashida.

On March 1, a list of twenty-eight candidates was presented to the Government Section. These included all members of the Katayama Cabinet except Mr. WADA Hiroo, Director-General of the Economic Stabilization Board. His name was not included, according to Mr. Matsumoto, because the Social Democrats of the House of Councillors insisted that all posts allotted to the Social Democratic Party be held by Diet members of the Party. Mr. Wada is an independent, although from time to time it has been rumored he would join the Social Democratic Party. In addition to members of the Katayama Cabinet, the following seven names were listed who were finally included in the Ashida Cabinet:

TOMABECHI Gizo,
Secretary-General of the Democratic Party. (Prior to this, Transportation Minister in the Katayama Cabinet).

KATO Kanju,
Left-wing member of the Social Democratic Central Executive Committee.

OKADA Seiichi,
Secretary-General of the People's Cooperative Party.

NAGAE Kazuo,
Right-wing member of the Central Executive Committee of the Social Democratic Party and Parliamentary Vice Minister of Education in the Katayama Cabinet.

NOMIZO

NOMIZO Masaru,
Left-wing member of the Central Executive Committee of the Social Democratic Party and Vice Chairman of the Japanese Farmers' Union.

FUNADA Kyoji,
Chief of Political Affairs of the Research Committee of the People's Cooperative Party.

TOMIYOSHI Eiji,
Right-wing member of the Central Executive Committee of the Social Democratic Party.

The following five names completed the list of twenty-eight names:

KATO Masato,
Business man in the textile industry from Osaka.

ISHIKAWA Ichiro,
Business man from Tokyo.

KOIZUMI Hidekichi,
Councillor for Transportation, General Bureau of Marine Transportation, House of Councillors.

ITO Ushiro,
Chairman of the Mining and Industry Committee, House of Representatives.

INAGAKI Masaki,
Member of the House of Councillors and President of the Yokohama Tire and Rubber Company.

After consideration of the twenty-eight individuals, Government Section raised no objection at the time except to Mr. Ishikawa. His inclusion in the Cabinet was questioned because of the possibility that he might be purged. Mr. Matsumoto thought Dr. Ashida was considering him and Mr. KATO Masato for the post of Director-General of the Economic Stabilization Board. A tentative list of possible holders of Cabinet posts was then drawn up and submitted by Dr. Ashida to Government Section for further discussion, it already having been decided that eight posts would go to the Social Democratic Party (SD), six posts to the Democratic Party (D), and two posts to the People's Cooperative Party (PCP). The list submitted was as follows:

(D)	ASHIDA Hitoshi or	
(SD)	KATAYAMA Tetsu	Foreign Minister
(D)	TAKEDA Giichi	Finance Minister
(SD)	MORITO Tatsuo	Education
(SD)	NAGAE Kazuo or	
(SD)	KOISUMI Hidekichi	Communications
(SD)	MIZUTANI Chozaburo	Commerce and Industry

(SD) TOMIYOSHI

(SD)	TOMIYOSHI Eiiji or	
(PCP)	MIKI Takeo	Agriculture and Forestry
(SD)	KOISUMI Hidekichi or	
(D)	ITO Ushiro	Transportation
(D)	HITOTSUMATSU Sadayoshi or	
(PCP)	FUNADA Kyoji	Welfare
(SD)	KATO Kanjù	Labor
(D)	KITAMURA Tokutaro	State Minister and Economic Stabilization Board
(PCP)	FUNADA Kyoji or	State Minister and
(D)	HITOTSUMATSU Sadayoshi	Attorney General
(SD)	NISHIO Suehiro	
(PCP)	OKADA Seiichi	
(SD)	NOMIZO Masaru	State Ministers
(D)	KURUSU Takeo	
(D)	TOMABECHI Gizo	

It seemed clear from the entire discussion that followed with Mr. Matsumoto that the individuals in General Headquarters with whom he, and other members of the Japanese Government, discussed the suggested Cabinet list took special pains to avoid telling the Japanese Government what it should do. Mr. Matsumoto indicated that while suggestions and questions were raised, the final selection was emphasized as up to the Japanese. The first problem arose both within Headquarters and within the three parties concerned with the formation of the Cabinet in connection with the suggested individuals for Attorney General. It was felt that Mr. SUZUKI Yoshio, Attorney General in the Katayama Cabinet, should continue in the post because he is considered an impartial and sincere individual. Government Section feels that there were some questionable things in Mr. Hitotsumatsu's background and that while Mr. Funada is a scholar and an authority on some aspects of law, he does not measure up to Mr. Suzuki. It, therefore, was decided that the post of Attorney General should be given to the Social Democrats. This instigated a reconsideration of allocation of posts because it had been originally planned to give the post of Attorney General to either the Democratic Party or the People's Cooperative Party.

The next thing that happened, according to Mr. Matsumoto, was that Mr. Takeda declined to become Finance Minister because he felt the burden was too much for his health. During the original allocation of posts, the Social Democrats had waived that of the Economic Stabilization Board because they had no one whom they felt could fill the post except Mr. SUZUKI Masaburo, leader of the left-wing faction. Mr. Suzuki, however, refused to take any Cabinet post. Mr. Kitamura had been suggested as Director-General of the Board, but since Mr. Takeda refused the post of Finance Minister, he was shifted to this latter post. The Democrats had tried strenuously to get the Social Democrats to take over the Ministry of Finance because they knew the left-wing faction of the Social Democratic Party will undoubtedly cause a great deal of difficulty

in

in the formulation of the 1948-49 budget. However, the Social Democrats insisted that they have no men available for this post as well as that of Chairman of the Economic Stabilization Board. Mr. Matsumoto said the Social Democrats did consider that Mr. Mizutani could have held these posts, but he was needed for the Commerce and Industry Ministry.

Mr. Matsumoto pointed out that it was not felt wise to have Dr. Kurusu continue as Finance Minister because of the protests filed by the union workers in his Ministry. Dr. Kurusu had originally been slated to be State Minister without Portfolio. He was, however, prevailed upon to undertake the post of Chairman of the Economic Stabilization Board.

Mr. Katayama refused the post of Foreign Minister, although a great deal of pressure was brought upon him by Dr. Ashida. Mr. Matsumoto, who among others was sent to see Mr. Katayama in an effort to persuade him to accept, said that Mr. Katayama felt he could make a greater contribution by consolidating his party. During the conference between General MacArthur and Mr. Katayama, when the latter told the General he and his Cabinet were planning to resign, Mr. Matsumoto declared the General had given Mr. Katayama the impression that the General would like to see him continue in the Cabinet. Upon finding Mr. Katayama adamant, Dr. Ashida decided to hold the post concurrently in the hope that Mr. Katayama might eventually be persuaded to accept the post. Mr. Katayama has become adviser to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, a post which up to this time has not been filled since the war.

The Government Section raised a question concerning the inclusion of Mr. Morito in the Cabinet because of the publication of a book, "War and Culture". An article published in the Christian Science Monitor, issue of February 9, 1948, attacking Mr. Morito, was sent by Civil Information and Education Section to Government Section. The article in the Monitor quoted some of the sections from the book. Mr. Matsumoto said that members of Government Section stated they raised the question of the inclusion of Mr. Morito because of possible ill effect upon world opinion. However, they stated that if Dr. Ashida wanted to include Mr. Morito, it was up to Dr. Ashida. He was finally included because Dr. Ashida felt Mr. Morito had been cleared when the publication mentioned had been brought up before the purge committee. Mr. Matsumoto pointed out that Mr. Morito claimed the publisher had distorted some passages by making changes and by deleting several pages. Dr. Ashida feels the presence of Mr. Morito in the Cabinet is essential because of his importance in the Ronoto, the labor-farmer group.

The Social Democrats made such a firm stand for the post of the Agriculture and Forestry Ministry that neither the Democrats or People's Cooperative Party were able to insist upon retaining the post. It was finally settled among the three parties that Mr. Nagae should be the Minister. However, there was considerable discussion with Government Section because he fell within the labor purge category. After three days of argument, it was determined that a just interpretation of the prohibition that those within this category should not hold government posts having to do with labor meant only a prohibition on holding a post within the Labor Ministry. Mr. Matsumoto said this was a test case and as such would be considered a precedent allowing such men as Mr. ITO Ushiro, Chairman of the Mining and Industry Committee of the

House

House of Representatives, and Mr. ASANUMA Inejiro, Secretary-General of the Social Democratic Party, to hold posts in a similar manner.

After making the changes in the proposed Cabinet necessitated by the considerations highlighted above, the Cabinet as it now exists was submitted to Government Section and General MacArthur on March 9. Since no objection was raised, Mr. Matsumoto reported that he took the list to Mr. Tomabechi who, in the meantime, had just had called to his attention that the Finance and Economic Stabilization Board posts should not be filled without the concurrence of the Economic and Scientific Section of this Headquarters. After consulting with Dr. Ashida, it was decided, in view of the fact that no objection had been raised by Government Section and General MacArthur, announcement should be made of the Cabinet. The Economic and Scientific Section was contacted and after several conferences,Mr. Matsumoto reported that everything was straightened out.

Meantime, Dr. Kurusu did not meet the members of the Economic Stabilization Board which gave rise to considerable difficulties because the members of the Economic Stabilization Board interpreted his not taking over immediately from Mr. Wada as lack of interest. Actually, Mr. Matsumoto said it was due to the fact that Dr. Kurusu did not wish to proceed until he was certain the Economic and Scientific Section would not object to his holding the post. Once everything was cleared, he met with members of the Board who had decided to resign. Mr. Matsumoto thinks that some members of the Board may be persuaded, particularly Dr. TSURU Shigeto, Deputy Director-General, whom it is understood Dr. Kurusu particularly hopes to retain.

The posts below Cabinet rank are still under consideration. It is planned to have two parliamentary Vice Ministers in each Ministry (24 in all), one from the House of Councillors and one from the House of Representatives. There is some question still in Dr. Ashida's mind as to whether or not there should be proportionate representation from the two Houses, since the House of Representatives has a larger number of members. Mr, Matsumoto said it was a suggestion of Government Section, however, that there be one from each House. The Chief Cabinet Secretary is to have two Deputies as contrasted with one in the Katayama Cabinet. The two men are Mr. FUKUSHIMA Shitaro, who until now has been Chief of the Central Liaison Office in Osaka, and Mr. ARITA Kiichiro, who has been Director of the Maritime Bureau of the Transportation Ministry. Mr. Fukushima was formerly a Foreign Service Officer and at one time Consul in New York.

Mr. Matsumoto pointed out that Mr. Nishio very much wanted the post as Foreign Minister but Dr. Ashida did not consider him to have the qualifications necessary for that particular post, which is coming to be looked upon as the stepping stone to premiership. Dr. Ashida, according to Mr. Matsumoto, feels the Ministry for Foreign Affairs is growing in importance and, of course, with the peace treaty will assume even greater significance. It is apparent that both Dr. Ashida and Mr. Matsumoto consider Mr. Nishio as too much of a politician for this particular post and to be rather naive as far as foreign affairs are concerned.

For

Encl. to
Tokyo's 206,
March 30, 1948.

CONFIDENTIAL (For Department Use Only)

For purposes of convenience, the names of the fifteen men in the Ashida Cabinet are listed below and three copies of their biographies are enclosed as they appeared in the Nippon Times, issue of March 11, 1948:

ASHIDA Hitoshi (Democrat),
Prime Minister and Foreign Minister.

KITAMURA Tokutaro (Democrat),
Finance Minister.

MORITO Tatsuo (Socialist, Center),
Education Minister.

TAKEDA Giichi (Democrat),
Welfare Minister.

NAGAE Kazuo (Socialist, Right-Center),
Agriculture and Forestry Minister.

MIZUTANI Chosaburo (Socialist, Right),
Commerce and Industry Minister.

OKADA Seiichi (People's Cooperative),
Transportation Minister.

TOMIYOSHI Eiji (Socialist, Right),
Communications Minister.

KATO Kanju (Socialist, Left),
Labor Minister.

TOMABECHI Gizo (Democrat),
State Minister (Chief of the Cabinet Secretariat).

KURUSU Takeo (Democrat),
State Minister (Director-General of the Economic Stabilization Board).

SUZUKI Yoshio (Socialist, Center),
State Minister (Attorney General).

HITOTSUMATSU Sadayoshi (Democrat),
State Minister (President of the Construction Board).

NISHIO Suehiro (Socialist, Right),
State Minister (Deputy Prime Minister).

NOMIZO Masaru (Socialist, Left),
State Minister (Chairman of the Local Finance Commission).

FUNADA Kyoji (People's Cooperative),
State Minister (Director-General of the Reparations Board).

Enclosures:
Biographies of Ashida
Cabinet (three copies).

W. Henry Lawrence, Jr.

CONFIDENTIAL

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NIPPON TIMES: March 11, 1948 WHL

THE NEW ASHIDA CABINET

The Ashida Cabinet poses for its first photo in front of the Prime Minister's official residence. The Cabinet Ministers are from left to right: (Front row) Chozaburo Mizutani, Giichi Takeda, Suehiro Nishio, Hitoshi Ashida, Sadayoshi Hitotsumatsu, Gizo Tomabechi, Tokutaro Kitamura; (Back row) Eiji Tomiyoshi, Kanju Kato, Seiichi Okada, Kazuo Nagae, Takeo Kurusu, Masaru Nomizo, Tatsuo Morito, Kyoji Funada. (Photo by Courtesy Asahi Shimbun)

Profiles of Cabinet Ministers Revealed in Thumbnail Sketches

Prime Minister Ashida Heads 16-Man Government; Socialist Nishio Is Deputy Premier

Dr. HITOSHI ASHIDA
Prime Minister, concurrently Foreign Minister

Dr. Hitoshi Ashida, new Prime Minister, was the Foreign Minister in the Katayama Cabinet, and is the President of the Democratic Party. He is 61 years old, and hails from Kyoto prefecture.

He entered diplomatic service upon graduating from Tokyo University, and was stationed in the Soviet, France, Belgium and Turkey. Resigning from the diplomatic service, he was slected to the House of Representatives in 1932.

From 1933 to 1940 he was the President of the Japan Times.

He was one of the sponsors of the Liberal Party, but disagreeing with its leaders, he left the party and formed the Democratic Party in March, 1947. He was selected as the party president in April, the same year.

SUEHIRO NISHIO
Deputy Prime Minister

Suehiro Nishio, 57, Chief Cabinet Secretary in the Katayama Cabinet, was returned to the House of Representatives seven times since 1928. He is one of the strong leaders of the Social Democratic Party, having acted as its secretary-general.

He is from Kagawa Prefecture. While he was employed at the Sumitomo Steel Works, he organized a Workers' League, when he was only 25. He represented the Japanese labor at the International Labor Conference in 1925 and 1932.

In the Social Democratic Party, he is the right wing leader, and as the Chief Cabinet Secretary in the Katayama Cabinet, he became the main adviser to the Prime Minister.

TOKUTARO KITAMURA
Finance Minister

Tokutaro Kitamura, 62, former Transportation Minister in the Katayama Cabinet, and member of the Democratic Party, was a well-known figure in the business world before his entry into politics in 1946.

He is a native of Kyoto and a graduate of Kansai University.

In 1947, he became Parliamentary Finance Vice-Minister in the Yoshida Cabinet.

He became chairman of the Democratic Party's Political Affairs Research Committee in succession to Shotaro Yano, who was named Finance Minister in the Katayama Cabinet, and in December he succeeded Gizo Tomabechi as Transportation Minister.

TATSUO MORITO
Education Minister

Tatsuo Morito, 60, Social Democratic member of the House of Representatives, is inclined neither to the right nor the left although he once worked to have his party sever relations with the Communists through the National Salvation League which he sponsored.

He is a member of the party Central Executive Committee.

A native of Hiroshima Prefecture, he became assistant professor in Tokyo Imperial University upon graduation, but was imprisoned in 1920 for his article on the thoughts of Kropotkin, which appeared in the school magazine "Study in Economics."

Following his release in March 1921, he joined the Ohara Social Science Research Institute, which sent him on a two-year tour of England, France and Germany to study. Upon his return to Japan, he started the Osaka Labor School, where Suehiro Nishio, and Ryoji Inouye received instructions.

GIICHI TAKEDA
Welfare Minister

Giichi Takeda, 53, is a leading member of the Democratic Party, having served as party secretary-general and State Minister in the Katayama Cabinet.

A graduate of the Kyoto University, Mr. Takeda, who hails from Ishikawa Prefecture, practiced law in Osaka before beginning his active political career.

In March, last year, he quit the Liberal party with Dr. Hitoshi Ashida. He ran as an Independent in the general election of April, last year, and in May he joined the Democratic Party, where he was given the post of secretary-general.

CHOZABURO MIZUTANI
Commerce-Industry Minister

Chozaburo Mizutani, 51, Commerce and Industry Minister in the Katayama Cabinet, joined the labor movement while he was a junior at Kyoto University. He has been a Diet member since 1928.

Upon graduation from Kyoto University, he joined the Ohara Social Problems Institute to study social and labor problems. He also lectured at Ritsumeikan University of Kyoto. His name became publicly known when he became the counselor for 37 university students who were charged with the violation of the Peace Preservation Law, in 1927.

He attended the International Labor Conference in 1937. He is one of the top lieutenant to Tetsu Katayama.

KAZUO NAGAE
Agriculture-Forestry Minister

Kazuo Nagae, 46, member of the Central Executive Committee of the Social Democratic Party, is the right-hand man of Suehiro Nishio, Chief Cabinet Secretary of the Katayama Cabinet.

A native of Gifu Prefecture, he came to Kobe at the age of 18, and while attending the Kansei Gakuin, he took part in the trade union movement.

At 28, he was elected to the Kobe Municipal Assembly in the first election held under universal manhood suffrage.

He wields great influence with men who belonged to the old Nippon Labor-Farm Party.

EIJI TOMIYOSHI
Communications Minister

Eiji Tomiyoshi, Social Democratic Party right-winger and member of the party's Central Executive Committee, entered the political field in connection with the labor movement while teaching at the Seika School in his native prefecture of Kagoshima.

He was first elected to the House of Representatives in 1926 and has since been returned four times. He is 49 years old.

In June, last year, he was appointed Parliamentary Commerce and Industry Vice-Minister under Minister Chozaburo Mizutani.

SEIICHI OKADA
Transportation Minister

Seiichi Okada, 56, member of the House of Representatives and secretary-general of the People's Cooperative Party is a self-made man.

As a boy he went to Osaka from his native Tokushima Prefecture and after working as an apprentice in a shipbuilding yard, graduated from the Osaka Shipbuilding School, a private institution. He was returned as an Independent to the House of Representatives for the first time in 1946 and joined the People's Cooperative Party upon its organization.

With over six months of experience as a party secretary-general, he is considered a trustworthy person.

KANJU KATO
Labor Minister

Kanju Kato, 56, fiery left-winger of the Social Democratic Party, laid the foundation for his political leadership on the rise of the labor movement in Japan during the brief period of liberalism after World War I.

He is a native of Aichi Prefecture. After working his way through Nihon University, he joined the staff of the magazine Rodo Sekai (Labor World) in 1919. He was jailed in 1920 for leading a strike at the Yawata Iron Works.

After a trip to the United States in 1935 upon the invitation of the American Federation of Labor, he ran in the general election of February, 1936, from the Fifth Electoral District of Tokyo.

In 1937 he was arrested again for his activities in the popular front movement and spent two years in jail.

YOSHIO SUZUKI
Attorney General

Yoshio Suzuki, 54, former Justice Minister in the Katayama Cabinet, is a member of the Central Executive Committee of the Social Democratic Party.

A native of Fukushima Prefecture, he became assistant professor in Tokyo University and held part-time positions in the Agriculture and Commerce Ministry in 1919. He was three years abroad studying in America, England, Germany, France and Italy.

Returning home, he became a professor in Tohoku University. Later he practiced law and at one time was director of the Teikoku Lawyers' Association.

DR. TAKEO KURUSU
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Dr. Takeo Kurusu, 53, former Finance Minister in the Katayama Cabinet, is a Democratic member of the House of Councillors.

A native of Yamaguchi Prefecture, he graduated from the law department of Tokyo University and in 1921 entered the Japan Industrial Bank of which he became president in May, last year.

He taught at Chuo and Keio universities following a tour of Europe and America some 11 years ago.

In the general election of April last year, he ran from Yamaguchi Prefecture as an Independent. He belonged first to the Shinsei Club, a group of House members affiliated to the Liberal Party, and then to the Ryokufukai. He joined the Democratic Party in January, this year.

GIZO TOMABECHI
Chief Cabinet Secretary

Gizo Tomabechi, 68, one-time Transportation Minister, is secretary-general of the Democratic Party. He resigned his post of Transportation Minister in the Katayama Cabinet on December 4, 1947, and succeeded Giichi Takeda as party secretary-general.

A native of Aomori prefecture, Mr. Tomabechi graduated from the Tokyo Technological School. Though an experienced businessman, he is relatively new to the political stage.

In his campaign in the general election of April, 1947, he championed the principle of equal division of profit between capital and labor under a system of management based on trusteeship, thereby stimulating the change of the old Progressive Party towards the principle of revised capitalism.

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Minister-without-Portfolio

Sadayoshi Hitotsumatsu, former Communications Minister and Welfare Minister, 73, was elected to the House of Representatives from Osaka eight times since 1928, and thus is a veteran leader of the Democratic Party. He is a graduate of Meiji University.

In 1937, he represented Japan at the world conference of parliamentary members held at Paris. In January, 1940, he was made Parliamentary Welfare Vice-Minister. He became the Communications Minister in Yoshida Cabinet formed in May, 1946. In the Katayama Cabinet, he was Welfare Minister.

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He heads the Political Affairs Research Committee of the People's Cooperative Party, where, together with Takeo Miki, chairman, and Seiichi Okada, secretary-general, he provides ideological leadership.

A native of Tochigi Prefecture and a graduate of the law college of the Tokyo University, he ran for a seat in the House of Representatives in the general election of April, 1946.

MASARU NOMIZO
Minister-without-Portfolio

Masaru Nomizo, 57, the leader of the left-wing of the Social Democratic Party, is a veterinary surgeon by training. He is from Nagano Prefecture.

For more than 20 years, he associated himself with the agricultural movement. He was returned to the House of Representatives in 1942.

Not only he is a member of the Central Executive Committee of the Social Democratic Party, but he is also the vice-president of the Japan Farmers' Union. He is Chairman of the Agriculture and Forestry Standing Committee of the House of Representatives.

Encl. to
Tokyo's 206,
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

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Masaru Nomizo, 57, the leader of the left-wing of the Social Democratic Party, is a veterinary surgeon by training. He is from Nagano Prefecture.

For more than 20 years, he associated himself with the agricultural movement. He was returned to the House of Representatives in 1942.

Not only he is a member of the Central Executive Committee of the Social Democratic Party, but he is also the vice-president of the Japan Farmers' Union. He is Chairman of the Agriculture and Forestry Standing Committee of the House of Representatives.

Encl. to
Tokyo's 206,
March 30, 1948.

NIPPON TIMES: March 11, 1948 WHL

THE NEW ASHIDA CABINET

The Ashida Cabinet poses for its first photo in front of the Prime Minister's official residence. The Cabinet Ministers are from left to right: (Front row) Chozaburo Mizutani, Giichi Takeda, Suehiro Nishio, Hitoshi Ashida, Sadayoshi Hitotsumatsu, Gizo Tomabechi, Tokutaro Kitamura; (Back row) Eiji Tomiyoshi, Kanju Kato, Seiichi Okada, Kazuo Nagae, Takeo Kurusu, Masaru Nomizo, Tatsuo Morito, Kyoji Funada. (Photo by Courtesy Asahi Shimbun)

Profiles of Cabinet Ministers Revealed in Thumbnail Sketches

Prime Minister Ashida Heads 16-Man Government; Socialist Nishio Is Deputy Premier

Dr. HITOSHI ASHIDA
Prime Minister, concurrently Foreign Minister

Dr. Hitoshi Ashida, new Prime Minister, was the Foreign Minister in the Katayama Cabinet, and is the President of the Democratic Party. He is 61 years old, and hails from Kyoto prefecture.

He entered diplomatic service upon graduating from Tokyo University, and was stationed in the Soviet, France, Belgium and Turkey. Resigning from the diplomatic service, he was slected to the House of Representatives in 1932.

From 1933 to 1940 he was the President of the Japan Times.

He was one of the sponsors of the Liberal Party, but disagreeing with its leaders, he left the party and formed the Democratic Party in March, 1947. He was selected as the party president in April, the same year.

SUEHIRO NISHIO
Deputy Prime Minister

Suehiro Nishio, 57, Chief Cabinet Secretary in the Katayama Cabinet, was returned to the House of Representatives seven times since 1928. He is one of the strong leaders of the Social Democratic Party, having acted as its secretary-general.

He is from Kagawa Prefecture. While he was employed at the Sumitomo Steel Works, he organized a Workers' League, when he was only 25. He represented the Japanese labor at the International Labor Conference in 1925 and 1932.

In the Social Democratic Party, he is the right wing leader, and as the Chief Cabinet Secretary in the Katayama Cabinet, he became the main adviser to the Prime Minister.

TOKUTARO KITAMURA
Finance Minister

Tokutaro Kitamura, 62, former Transportation Minister in the Katayama Cabinet, and member of the Democratic Party, was a well-known figure in the business world before his entry into politics in 1946.

He is a native of Kyoto and a graduate of Kansai University.

In 1947, he became Parliamentary Finance Vice-Minister in the Yoshida Cabinet.

He became chairman of the Democratic Party's Political Affairs Research Committee in succession to Shotaro Yano, who was named Finance Minister in the Katayama Cabinet, and in December he succeeded Gizo Tomabechi as Transportation Minister.

TATSUO MORITO
Education Minister

Tatsuo Morito, 60, Social Democratic member of the House of Representatives, is inclined neither to the right nor the left although he once worked to have his party sever relations with the Communists through the National Salvation League which he sponsored.

He is a member of the party Central Executive Committee.

A native of Hiroshima Prefecture, he became assistant professor in Tokyo Imperial University upon graduation, but was imprisoned in 1920 for his article on the thoughts of Kropotkin, which appeared in the school magazine "Study in Economics."

Following his release in March 1921, he joined the Ohara Social Science Research Institute, which sent him on a two-year tour of England, France and Germany to study. Upon his return to Japan, he started the Osaka Labor School, where Suehiro Nishio, and Ryoji Inouye received instructions.

GIICHI TAKEDA
Welfare Minister

Giichi Takeda, 53, is a leading member of the Democratic Party, having served as party secretary-general and State Minister in the Katayama Cabinet.

A graduate of the Kyoto University, Mr. Takeda, who hails from Ishikawa Prefecture, practiced law in Osaka before beginning his ac-

(Continued on Page 2)

tive political career.

In March, last year, he quit the Liberal party with Dr. Hitoshi Ashida. He ran as an Independent in the general election of April, last year, and in May he joined the Democratic Party, where he was given the post of secretary-general.

CHOZABURO MIZUTANI
Commerce-Industry Minister

Chozaburo Mizutani, 51, Commerce and Industry Minister in the Katayama Cabinet, joined the labor movement while he was a junior at Kyoto University. He has been a Diet member since 1928.

Upon graduation from Kyoto University, he joined the Ohara Social Problems Institute to study social and labor problems. He also lectured at Ritsumeikan University of Kyoto. His name became publicly known when he became the counselor for 37 university students who were charged with the violation of the Peace Preservation Law, in 1927.

He attended the International Labor Conference in 1937. He is one of the top lieutenant to Tetsu Katayama.

KAZUO NAGAE
Agriculture-Forestry Minister

Kazuo Nagae, 46, member of the Central Executive Committee of the Social Democratic Party, is the right-hand man of Suehiro Nishio, Chief Cabinet Secretary of the Katayama Cabinet.

A native of Gifu Prefecture, he came to Kobe at the age of 18, and while attending the Kansei Gakuin, he took part in the trade union movement.

At 28, he was elected to the Kobe Municipal Assembly in the first election held under universal manhood suffrage.

He wields great influence with men who belonged to the old Nippon Labor-Farm Party.

EIJI TOMIYOSHI
Communications Minister

Eiji Tomiyoshi, Social Democratic Party right-winger and member of the party's Central Executive Committee, entered the political field in connection with the labor movement while teaching at the Seika School in his native prefecture of Kagoshima.

He was first elected to the House of Representatives in 1926 and has since been returned four times. He is 49 years old.

In June, last year, he was appointed Parliamentary Commerce and Industry Vice-Minister under Minister Chozaburo Mizutani.

SEIICHI OKADA
Transportation Minister

Seiichi Okada, 56, member of the House of Representatives and secretary-general of the People's Cooperative Party is a self-made man.

As a boy he went to Osaka from his native Tokushima Prefecture and after working as an apprentice in a shipbuilding yard, graduated from the Osaka Shipbuilding School, a private institution. He was returned as an Independent to the House of Representatives for the first time in 1946 and joined the People's Cooperative Party upon its organization.

With over six months of experience as a party secretary-general, he is considered a trustworthy person.

KANJU KATO
Labor Minister

Kanju Kato, 56, fiery left-winger of the Social Democratic Party, laid the foundation for his political leadership on the rise of the labor movement in Japan during the brief period of liberalism after World War I.

He is a native of Aichi Prefecture. After working his way through Nihon University, he joined the staff of the magazine Rodo Sekai (Labor World) in 1919. He was jailed in 1920 for leading a strike at the Yawata Iron Works.

After a trip to the United States in 1935 upon the invitation of the American Federation of Labor, he ran in the general election of February, 1936, from the Fifth Electoral District of Tokyo.

In 1937 he was arrested again for his activities in the popular front movement and spent two years in jail.

YOSHIO SUZUKI
Attorney General

Yoshio Suzuki, 54, former Justice Minister in the Katayama Cabinet, is a member of the Central Executive Committee of the Social Democratic Party.

A native of Fukushima Prefecture, he became assistant professor in Tokyo University and held part-time positions in the Agriculture and Commerce Ministry in 1919. He was three years abroad studying in America, England, Germany, France and Italy.

Returning home, he became a professor in Tohoku University. Later he practiced law and at one time was director of the Teikoku Lawyers' Association.

DR. TAKEO KURUSU
Director-General, Economic Stabilization Board

Dr. Takeo Kurusu, 53, former Finance Minister in the Katayama Cabinet, is a Democratic member of the House of Councillors.

A native of Yamaguchi Prefecture, he graduated from the law department of Tokyo University and in 1921 entered the Japan Industrial Bank of which he became president in May, last year.

He taught at Chuo and Keio universities following a tour of Europe and America some 11 years ago.

In the general election of April last year, he ran from Yamaguchi Prefecture as an Independent. He belonged first to the Shinsei Club, a group of House members affiliated to the Liberal Party, and then to the Ryokufukai. He joined the Democratic Party in January, this year.

GIZO TOMABECHI
Chief Cabinet Secretary

Gizo Tomabechi, 68, one-time Transportation Minister, is secretary-general of the Democratic Party. He resigned his post of Transportation Minister in the Katayama Cabinet on December 4, 1947, and succeeded Giichi Takeda as party secretary-general.

A native of Aomori prefecture, Mr. Tomabechi graduated from the Tokyo Technological School. Though an experienced businessman, he is relatively new to the political stage.

In his campaign in the general election of April, 1947, he championed the principle of equal division of profit between capital and labor under a system of management based on trusteeship, thereby stimulating the change of the old Progressive Party towards the principle of revised capitalism.

SADAYOSHI HITOTSUMATSU
Minister-without-Portfolio

Sadayoshi Hitotsumatsu, former Communications Minister and Welfare Minister, 73, was elected to the House of Representatives from Osaka eight times since 1928, and thus is a veteran leader of the Democratic Party. He is a graduate of Meiji University.

In 1937, he represented Japan at the world conference of parliamentary members held at Paris. In January, 1940, he was made Parliamentary Welfare Vice-Minister. He became the Communications Minister in Yoshida Cabinet formed in May, 1946. In the Katayama Cabinet, he was Welfare Minister.

DR. KYOJI FUNADA
Minister-Without-Portfolio

Dr. Kyoji Funada, 50, a member of the House of Representatives, to which he has been returned two times, is a recognized authority on Roman laws for which he received the prize of the Imperial Academy.

He heads the Political Affairs Research Committee of the People's Cooperative Party, where, together with Takeo Miki, chairman, and Seiichi Okada, secretary-general, he provides ideological leadership.

A native of Tochigi Prefecture and a graduate of the law college of the Tokyo University, he ran for a seat in the House of Representatives in the general election of April, 1946.

MASARU NOMIZO
Minister-without-Portfolio

Masaru Nomizo, 57, the leader of the left-wing of the Social Democratic Party, is a veterinary surgeon by training. He is from Nagano Prefecture.

For more than 20 years, he associated himself with the agricultural movement. He was returned to the House of Representatives in 1942.

Not only he is a member of the Central Executive Committee of the Social Democratic Party, but he is also the vice-president of the Japan Farmers' Union. He is Chairman of the Agriculture and Forestry Standing Committee of the House of Representatives.

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No. 263

United States Political Adviser
for Japan

Tokyo, May 5, 1948.

CONFIDENTIAL

(For Department Use Only)

SUBJECT: Political Factors Surrounding Resignation of Katayama Cabinet and Election of Dr. ASHIDA Hitoshi as Prime Minister.

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose a memorandum prepared by Foreign Service Officer W. Henry Lawrence, Jr. concerning the political situation in the interim between the resignation of Mr. KATAYAMA Tetsu, as Prime Minister on February 9, 1948 and the Diet's election of Dr. ASHIDA Hitoshi as his successor on February 21, 1948. It may be summarized as follows:

1. This Headquarters pursued a "hands-off" policy with respect to the selection of a new prime minister. (See also this Mission's despatch No. 206 of March 30, 1948 concerning the formation of the Ashida Cabinet.)

2. The fall of the Katayama Cabinet came earlier than anticipated. The right wing faction of the Social Democratic Party hoped to delay the crisis until consideration of the 1948-1949 budget.

3. Mr. SUZUKI Mosaburo leader of the left wing faction of the Social Democratic Party, took the responsibility for precipitating the downfall of the cabinet and resigned his position as Chairman of the Budget Committee of the Diet.

4. Selection of a new prime minister was difficult because of the confusion and complexity of the present political situation wherein politicians are more concerned with their own interests or those of their party than with the national interest.

5. The strength of the Liberal Party had increased and, as the opposition party it felt it merited consideration as the logical successor to the Social Democratic Party, a position more theoretical than practical for no single party in the Diet possesses a majority.

6. Dissolution

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6. Dissolution of the Diet was opposed on the ground that Japan could not afford the luxury of a general election and that a new Diet might be inferior in quality to the present one, because new men, controlled by undesirable elements, would probably be elected. Even leaders of the Liberal Party publicly opposed dissolution.

7. There is wide-spread belief among the Japanese people that the Government Section of this Headquarters did not look with favor upon the possibility that Mr. YOSHIDA Shigeru, then President of the Liberal Party (now of the Democratic Liberal Party), might be elected Prime Minister although he is reputed in some quarters to have matured considerably from a political point of view.

8. Support for a Yoshida Cabinet came from many quarters. A leading adviser of the Democratic Party, Mr. SAITO Takao, State Minister in the Katayama Cabinet, gave his support. Even the communists had secret orders to support Liberal Party endeavors to obtain the prime ministership.

9. The Democratic Party was the other major contender for the prime ministership. Dr. Ashida, President of the Democratic Party, sought the position on a platform advocating a coalition cabinet with middle-of-the-road policies, a type of cabinet recommended by Mr. Katayama at the time of his resignation. Dr. Ashida's drive for power began in earnest late in 1947, immediately after the launching of a movement for a new conservative party by the Liberal Party. He sought to counter this move by stimulating the People's Cooperative Party to proceed with plans for a new party movement which the Democrats would join and members of other parties would be invited to join. Premature announcement of this plan, however, antagonized the People's Cooperative Party. With Dr. Ashida's election as Prime Minister, no further effort has been made to form this new party and, as is known, the People's Cooperative Party has joined in a coalition cabinet with the Democratic Party and the Social Democratic Party.

10. It was not clear at first whether the Social Democratic Party would join the coalition. However, the urgent need on the part of Dr. Ashida for labor support led him to accept left wing members of the Social Democratic Party in his cabinet.

11. If a deadlock, in the selection of a prime minister had occurred, it is possible that Mr. Katayama might have been asked to form the new cabinet.

12. The "dark horse" in the picture was reputed to be Mr. MATSUDAIRA Tsuneo, President of the House of Councillors.

13. Although

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13. Although the House of Councillors gave a majority of votes to Mr. Yoshida, Dr. Ashida obtained a majority in the House of Representatives and, under the Constitution, became Prime Minister.

This mission is of the opinion that the enclosed memorandum gives a reasonably accurate picture of the fluid nature of the interplay between political parties and of the processes by which Dr. Ashida came to the premiership. It reveals the unstable nature of the political coalition now in power and the precariousness of Dr. Ashida's tenure of office. However, despite the weakness of his position, it is not impossible that his cabinet may manage to remain in power for some time, both because of its middle-of-the-road character which appears to meet the requirements of the Occupation and because of opposition of Japanese leaders and of this Headquarters to dissolution of the Diet and a general election. While not mentioned in the memorandum, the possibility of greater American aid which might result from the visit of Under Secretary of the Army William H. Draper is exerting a stabilizing influence, both economically and politically, and is reacting in Dr. Ashida's favor.

Respectfully yours,

W. J. Sebald

Enclosure:

Memorandum dated
May 4, 1948.

Original and ozalid to the Department.

800.2
WHLawrence, Jr.:cs

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER
FOR JAPAN

No. 328

RESTRICTED

Tokyo, June 7, 1948.

Subject: Bill for Establishment and Organization of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose a copy of an English translation of a bill currently submitted to the Diet by the Japanese Government, together with one copy of the Japanese text, to establish the organization and functions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As the Department may be aware, the law under which the various ministries have been operating was valid for the period of one year from the effective date (May 3, 1947) of the Constitution of Japan. The previous law was therefore to have expired as of May 3, 1948; but since new bills for the various ministries were not ready the time was extended, first until May 31, and again until June 30, 1948.

The draft of the proposed bill was brought to this Mission's attention informally by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Mr. ASAKAI Koichiro, Chief of the Bureau of General Affairs, stated that it is realized that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is in a different status from the other ministries in the Japanese Government because Japan's foreign affairs are presently conducted by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. The Ministry, however, obtained clearance from the Government Section of this Headquarters for writing a bill under which a normal Ministry of Foreign Affairs might eventually operate. Consideration was given to making mention of the fact that many of the functions are necessarily in abeyance until such time as the Occupation ends, but on the advice of the Japanese Attorney-General such reference was felt unnecessary since the authority of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in any event takes precedence over legislation even without specific provisions therein.

The proposed bill was submitted by the Government Section to this Mission in its capacity as the Diplomatic Section of General Headquarters for review and comment. This Mission suggested the word "directed" for the word "demanded" in Article 3 (13), and expressed its concurrence in the bill as proposed.

It is

RESTRICTED

Tokyo's No. 328
June 7, 1948.

It is of interest that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs feels that there may be a question concerning the function described in Article 3 (5) when the bill is considered by the Diet. This article would entrust to the Foreign Office and its foreign service the maintenance and promotion of interests relating to foreign commerce and navigation. The Ministry of Commerce and Industry is reported to desire to have jurisdiction over matters relating to foreign commerce and to have its own commercial organizations abroad. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the other hand, wishes to adopt the United States practice of having such matters under the jurisdiction of a single foreign service.

Respectfully yours,

W. J. Sebald

Enclosures: att

1. English translation of Bill for Establishment and Organization of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

2. Japanese text of same bill.

Original and ozalid to Department.

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WHLawrence,Jr.:mhp

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d B.B.

Enclosure to Despatch No. 328
dated June 7, 1948 from the Office
of the Political Adviser for Japan,
Tokyo, on the subject, "Bill for
Establishment and Organization of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs".

RESTRICTED

(COPY)

Bill for Institution of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Chapter I. General Rules

(Institution)

Article 1. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Gaimusho) shall be instituted by this law.

The head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs shall be the Minister for Foreign Affairs (Gaimu Daijin).

(Organs)

Article 2. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs shall consist of the Ministry Proper and of Diplomatic and Consular Establishments Abroad.

Chapter II. Ministry Proper

(Functions and Authority of the Ministry Proper)

Article 3. The scope of functions within the competence of the Ministry Proper is defined below, and the Ministry Proper shall perform the said functions by acting within the limits of its authority and in accordance with treaties and international laws and regulations, as well as national laws (including orders issued under laws).

(1) Planning, formulation and execution of foreign policy.
(2) Participation in international organizations and conferences, and promotion of international cooperation.
(3) Conclusion of treaties and other international agreements and disposal of matters of international law and other international legal affairs.
(4) Disposal of matters relating to the dispatch and reception of Diplomatic Representatives and Consular Officers.
(5) Maintenance and promotion of interests relating to foreign commerce and navigation.
(6) Protection of Japanese nationals abroad.
(7) Disposal of matters relating to travel and emigration to foreign countries.
(8) Issuance and visaing of passports.
(9) Research and documentation relating to foreign countries.
(10) Promotion of international understanding through the dissemination of information and knowledge relating to conditions at home and abroad, and through the development of cultural relations with other nations.
(11) Liquidation of matters relating to Korea, Formosa, Saghalien, the former leased Territory of Kwantung, the former mandated South Sea Islands and other areas.

(12) Arrangements

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(12) Arrangements for the repatriation of overseas Japanese and for the expatriation of foreigners in Japan.
(13) Investigation, custody and disposal of articles and property to be restituted as demanded by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and handling of other matters relating to Civil Property.
(14) Collection and compilation of records and documents relating to the occupation and control of Japan by the Allied Powers.
(15) Training of diplomatic and consular service personnel.
(16) Disposal of matters relating to such intra-Ministry personnel, finance, communications and miscellaneous duties as are connected with administrative affairs within the competence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
(17) Disposal, coordination and adjustment of matters relating to international relations, other than those mentioned under the preceding numbers.

Chapter III. Diplomatic and Consular Establishments Abroad

(Functions, etc. of Diplomatic and Consular Establishments Abroad)

Article 4. The Diplomatic and Consular Establishments Abroad are under the control of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and shall respectively, in foreign countries, take charge of the functions assigned to the Ministry Proper.

Article 5. The Diplomatic and Consular Establishments Abroad shall, for the time being, be governed by the provisions of laws and ordinances relating to such establishments, which have hitherto been in force, except where otherwise provided for by laws or Cabinet Orders.

Appointment and dismissal of Ambassadors Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary and Envoys Extraordinary and Ministers Plenipotentiary shall be attested by the Emperor.

Supplementary Provisions

Article 6. This law shall come into effect as from June 1, 1948.

Article 7. The Ordinance Relating to the Organization of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Imperial Ordinance No. 258, 1898) shall cease to be valid. It is provided, however, that, except where otherwise provided for by laws (including orders issued under laws), the existing organs and their personnel shall be deemed to be the same as the corresponding organs and their personnel under this law and shall continue to function as such with the same status.

外務省設置法案

第一章 総則

第一條 (設置) この法律により、外務省を設置する。

2 外務省の長は、外務大臣とする。

第二條 (機関) 外務省に本省及び在外公館を置く。

第二章 本省

第三條 (本省の所掌事務及び権限) 本省の所掌事務の範囲は左の通りとし、その権限内で條約、(法律に基く命令を含む。)に従つてなされなければならない。

一 外交政策の企画立案及びその実施に関する事項を処理すること。

二 国際機関及び国際会議への参加並びに国際協力の促進に関する事項を処理すること。

三 条約その他の国際約束の締結に関する事項及び国際法律事項を処理すること。

四 外交使節及び領事官の派遣及び接受に関する事項を処理すること。

五 通商航海に関する利益を維持増進すること。

六 在外邦人を保護すること。