Unused cell had been repaired and was being used.

Police chief had instituted a procedure for daily check on status and condition of prisoners.(11)

It will be observed that, of the corrective measures recommended by Police Branch representatives, only one, the cleaning of the cells, required any special equipment, in this instance, creosol. Police chiefs frequently complained about the lack of disinfectants or soap, but one or the other usually could be found with a little effort or could be procured through the local Military Government Team.

Osaka Prefectural Police Headquarters, inspected on 19-20 August 1946 during the same survey trip, revealed similar conditions. Mr. Gabrielson stated in his report that "when the doors of the cells were opened, the stench coming from the cells was unbearable(12). He recommended to the Police Chief that a barbed wire enclosure be built in the station yard, which would serve the double purpose of allowing the prisoners fresh air and exercise while the cells were being cleaned. This enclosure was built by the following day with barbed wire on hand at

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Recommendations were transmitted personally by Police Branch Investigators to all of the 1,130 police stations in Japan, with the various Military Government Teams supervising and assisting in their fulfilment. By the end of 1947 almost all police lockups inspected by PSD Investigators were considered satisfactory from the point of view of sanitation, ventilation, and lighting.

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(11) Ibid.

(12) Memo, W. A. Gabrielson, Police Branch, to Chief, PSD, dtd 28 Aug 46; Sub: "Inspection Trip, August 24th to 29th, Inclusive, 1946". (Dates erroneous; 14-19 Aug 46 correct.)

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Fresh air and exercise were provided; flush toilets and running water were installed wherever possible; segregation of male from female, and juvenile from adult prisoners was practiced; detention periods were considerably reduced. While flagrant deficiencies were noted occasionally, minimum standards of sanitation and cleanliness were generally adhered to, and reported violations of civil rights were much less frequent.(13)

(4) Police Stations

Police Branch Investigators, in their surveys of Japanese police stations, did not confine their recommendations to the condition of detention cells. Police methods and operations, often found to be cumbersome and inefficient, were modified or completely altered through personal instruction. Many stations had lost a large percentage of their experienced personnel; these were replaced by young recruits who needed instruction in the maintenance of records, fingerprinting, examination of evidence, and other aspects of police work. Many suggestions were offered regarding more efficient use of the limited communications and transportation

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(5) Juvenile Welfare

As a result of various economic and sociological causes, juvenile delinquency in post-war Japan had reached a point where it was considered a serious

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(13) Eaton, H. S. (Chief Police Administrator, PSD), "Orientation Lecture; the Japanese Police;" 1947.

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police problem. During the past 25 years, legislation for the protection of minors was written into the statute books, but the spirit of these laws has seldom been ~~adhered to~~ followed. A few years prior to the outbreak of World War II, four or five of the larger cities in Japan initiated movements within their respective areas to rehabilitate juvenile criminals and offer counsel to potential delinquents, but these programs were loosely organized and functioned in a desultory manner. The activities of the police in this field were confined for the most part to apprehension of juvenile criminals, with very little or no consideration given to prevention or rehabilitation. All juvenile programs fell into complete discard during the war years.(14)

The Police Branch took more active recognition of the problem of juvenile crime in March 1947, when a Juvenile Sub-Section of Police Group No. 5 was assigned the responsibility of establishing and maintaining liaison with those departments of the Japanese police system whose function was the control of juvenile delinquency.

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(14) Memo, Police Administrative Group #5 (Juvenile Sub-Section) to Chief, PSD, dtd 13 Sep 47; Sub: "Analysis of Past Activities and Future Proposals of Juvenile Sub-Section, Administrative Group No. 5, Police Branch," pars. 4-7.

(15) Ibid., par. 9.

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the Home Ministry's Police Bureau revealed that in September 1946 an order had been issued by that office to all prefectural headquarters requesting that juvenile details be set up in all police stations. However, when the Police Branch requested a report showing the number and distribution of police officers assigned to juvenile work throughout Japan, it was divulged that the Home Ministry order was being complied with in only a few prefectures. Police Branch Investigators suggested that the order be repeated with greater emphasis. This was done, and a subsequent report indicated full compliance.(16) As of 27 May 1947, in all the police districts of Japan (then 1,130), there were 1,512 officers assigned full time, and 1,368 officers assigned part time to juvenile problems.(17)

The officials in the Home Ministry and Metropolitan Police ~~Bureau~~ Board responsible for administering the program and the police personnel assigned to it were inexperienced in this type of work. To assist Japanese officials in formulating a co-ordinated program, the Police Branch

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The officials in the Home Ministry and Metropolitan Police ~~Bureau~~ Board responsible for administering the program and the police personnel assigned to it were inexperienced in this type of work. To assist Japanese officials in formulating a co-ordinated program, the Police Branch presented the Home Ministry with extracts from "General Order No. 1 of the Los Angeles Country Sheriff's Office." This document, which contained suggestions for the organization of juvenile units, an outline of duties and responsibilities, and a suitable chain of command, formed the basis of a booklet issued to all prefectural police headquarters throughout Japan.(18)(19)

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(16) Ibid., pars. 10-13.

(17) Memo, Police Administrative Group #5 (Juvenile Sub-Section) to Chief, PSD, dtd 21 Jul 47; Sub: "Progress Report No. 3," par. 3.

(18) Ibid., pars. 1-2.

(19) See Appendix ____ for copy of "General Order No. 1 of Los Angeles County Sheriff's Office."

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At the suggestion of the Police Branch, the Home Ministry investigated and consolidated information concerning the membership, location, and functions of all youth welfare groups throughout Japan with a view toward co-ordinating their activities under the guidance of the police department. A California State publication, "A Suggested Outline of a Community Program for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency" was edited by the Police Branch for specific application to conditions in Japan, and was distributed by the Home Ministry to all prefectural police headquarters. A third document, a U. S. Federal Government publication entitled "Techniques of Law Enforcement in the Use of Policewomen, with Special Reference to Social Protection" was treated in the same manner.(20)

In June 1947, the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Board sponsored a cartoon book designed to influence very young children. Purporting to mold character rather than to illustrate any specific delinquency problem, the book was not too didactic in tone to detract from its entertainment value, especially in Japan where com-

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In June 1947, the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Board sponsored a cartoon book designed to influence very young children. Purporting to mold character rather than to illustrate any specific delinquency problem, the book was not too didactic in tone to detract from its entertainment value, especially in Japan where comparatively few resources exist for the amusement of the young. The Police Branch approved the draft and assisted the Metropolitan Police Board in securing the necessary priorities for publication. During August 1947, 100,000 copies were distributed to book and magazine dealers and the entire issue was sold out at cost in a few days.(21)

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(20) Memo, Police Administrative Group #5 (Juvenile Sub-Section) to Chief, PSD, dtd 13 Sep 47; Sub: "Analysis of Past Activities and Future Proposals of Juvenile Sub-Section, Administrative Group No. 5, Police Branch, pars. 19-20.
(21) Ibid., pars. 21-26.

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In addition to maintaining continuous liaison with Home Ministry officials regarding delinquency control, Police Branch Investigators contacted juvenile officers at the various police stations throughout Japan during field trips to discuss problems and methods. In order to co-ordinate activities among juvenile officers and the various welfare groups, a PSD Police Investigator, during the regularly scheduled survey of police facilities of Ehime Prefecture in August 1947, requested the prefectural police chief to convoke an assembly of juvenile officers and other interested persons, including representatives of newspapers, parent-teacher associations, teachers from every school district, and other individuals and organizations. Previously it had been observed that parent-teacher associations usually performed no other function than that of providing funds for the operation of schools; the various "youth protection societies" confined their activities to observing and reporting the activities of juveniles, who for some reason had come under the surveillance of law enforcement bodies, while newspapers and other publications

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(22) Ibid., pars. 30.

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Similar meetings were held in Saga Prefecture in September and in Wakayama Prefecture in October, 1947. In December of the same year a model delinquency control area was set up in Tokyo in the Joto Police District, which was selected because of a reported high incidence of delinquency and a wide variety of problems to overcome. The extension of this program to other districts in Tokyo and other prefectures throughout Japan was postponed temporarily during the period of police reorganization, but was scheduled to be resumed by early summer, 1948.(23)

6) Police Training

(a) The Reynolds Report

One of the principal factors in promoting and maintaining efficient law enforcement within the framework of a democratic society is the amount and quality of training given to police force personnel. Accordingly, Colonel Pulliam directed Police Administrator Daniel G. Reynolds to study the existing police educational facilities in Japan and submit recommendations concerning their possible improvement.(24)

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In compliance with this request, Mr. Reynolds submitted "A Report on Training the Japanese Police" on 31 October 1946.(25) This report was divided into five sections, comprising (1) a general discussion of the scope and value of police training, (2) a study of police training in Japan, (3) recommendations for improving Japanese police training, (4) suggestions for putting

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(23) Monthly Report of Activities, Public Safety Division, December 1947; par. 3, a.

(24) PSD Office Memorandum No. 43, 30 June 1946.

(25) Reynolds, Daniel G. (PSD Police Administrator); "A Report on Training the Japanese Police." Copy included as Appendix _____.

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these recommendations into effect, and (5) appendix, including curricula of police schools on various levels from recruit to inspector.

Mr. Reynolds pointed out in this report that no effective, direct, central control over police training was exercised by the Home Ministry Police Bureau. Actual responsibility for police training devolved upon the superintendents of the education and training sections of the various prefectural police bureaus, who appointed instructors and devised curricula which followed the standards of the Central Police Bureau only in broad outline. Generally, the instructors had no special educational qualifications. The course material, although varying widely among the prefectures, was almost universally outmoded. Very little effort was made to revise the training curricula to conform to democratic police standards. In-service training was conducted primarily at the police stations.(26)

The report recommended that the entire police training program, except for basic operational subjects, such as use of equipment and handling of arrests and

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The report recommended that the entire police training program, except for basic operational subjects, such as use of equipment and handling of crowds, and traffic control, be suspended altogether until the entire curriculum could be revised and an efficient cadre of instructors and top-level administrative personnel thoroughly indoctrinated with democratic training aims and methods.

Additional recommendations covered the proposed organization and administration of training agencies, personnel management, program planning, equipment, training material, teaching methods, and the use of supplementary education agencies. Although the recommendations in

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(26) Ibid., Section II, pp. 5, 7.

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this report were not followed explicitly, they provided a substantial basis for subsequent action by the Police Branch.

(b) ~~Central and~~ District Police ~~Colleges~~ The Police College and Training Schools

One of the first measures taken by the Police Branch to improve police training in Japan was the rejuvenation of the ~~Central~~ Police College in Tokyo and the District Police ~~Colleges~~ Training Schools in Tokyo and Osaka. Two additional district police ~~colleges~~ schools were established in Hiroshima and Fukuoka during the first half of 1947, for which the Police Branch assisted in preparing curricula. Special attention was given to the class of 200 inspectors at the ~~Central~~ Police College during the school year 1946-47. Police Administrator Byron ENGLE and other Police Branch representatives assisted the Japanese authorities in modernizing the curriculum, prepared visual aids, and secured written material from the United States on relevant subjects. A PSD Police Administrator lectured at least once a week during the entire school year on American police

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(c) Prefectural Schools--Training Curricula

To provide pre-service training for the expected normal annual replacement requirement of 12,000 recruits and an anticipated increase of 30,000 in the authorized strength of the police force during 1948, and to provide in-service training for police personnel below the rank of sergeant, the Police Branch prepared basic police

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(27) Verbal statement of Mr. Byron Engle (PSD Administrator) to the writer, 19 May 1948.

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training curricula for use in the 46 prefectural training schools. Their curricula were offered to the Japanese Government by PSD on 1 November 1947 in a comprehensive memorandum on all aspects of the future training program.(28)

Based on an extensive study of police training methods and facilities by PSD Police Investigators and Police Administrator Engle, between March and November 1947 in addition to the information in the Reynolds report, the new curricula stressed police procedure in a democratic society, with special emphasis on vocational training. Two courses, a basic course for pre-service training, and an advanced course for in-service training, were prepared. These courses were divided into four sections, Basic "A" and Basic "B", Advanced "A" and Advanced "B", each of which would provide 384 hours of training over an eight-week period. The subjects taught in each course, and the number of hours allocated to each general subject, are shown on pages 153 and 154, following.

The courses were distributed to all 46 prefectural police training schools by the Culture Section, Police

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The courses were distributed to all 46 prefectural police training schools by the Culture Section, Police Bureau, Home Ministry on 23 December 1947 for effectuation on 10 January 1948.(29) Subsequent investigations by Police Branch personnel disclosed that these programs

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(28) Memo Chief PSD to Director, Bureau of Police (Home Ministry), and Director, National Rural Police (then not established), dtd 1 Nov 47; Sub: "Police Reorganization and Training Program." Included in Appendix _____.

(29) Memo Byron Engle (PSD Police Administrator) to Chief PSD, dtd 31 Dec 47; Sub: "Basic A Training Course."

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POLICE PRE-SERVICE COURSE

	Basic Course "A"	Basic Course "B"
ADMINISTRATION Rules & Regulations, Reports, Correspondence, Records, Property, Handling & Disposal, Organization (Local & NRP), Cooperation with & Jurisdiction of Other Agencies, Occupation Forces.	67 hrs	56 hrs
LAW Authority & Limitation, Constitution, Police Law, Classification of Crimes, Criminal Code, Economic, Civil Law, Administrative Code.	56 hrs	96 hrs
COURT PROCEDURE Court System, Procurators' Office, Testimony, Preparation of Cases, Rules of Evidence.	30 hrs	40 hrs
PATROL ACTIVITIES General Duties, Patrol & Observation, Meetings, Parades & Gatherings, Strike Duty, Riots & Disorder Control, Gangs & Rackets, Vice & Gambling, Raids.	34 hrs	38 hrs
TRAFFIC CONTROL Enforcement, Engineering, Education.	15 hrs	5 hrs
POLICE TACTICS & SELF DEFENSE Physical Training, Drill, Discipline, First Aid, Technique of Arrest & Disarming, Search of Prisoner, Baton Exercises, Marksmanship.	104 hrs	48 hrs
INVESTIGATION Crime Scenes, Interviews & Statements, Practices of Prof. Criminals, Proper-	46 hrs	36 hrs

COURT PROCEDURE Court System, Procurators' Office, Testimony, Preparation of Cases, Rules of Evidence.	30 hrs	40 hrs
PATROL ACTIVITIES General Duties, Patrol & Observation, Meetings, Parades & Gatherings, Strike Duty, Riots & Disorder Control, Gangs & Rackets, Vice & Gambling, Raids.	34 hrs	38 hrs
TRAFFIC CONTROL Enforcement, Engineering, Education.	15 hrs	5 hrs
POLICE TACTICS & SELF DEFENSE Physical Training, Drill, Discipline, First Aid, Technique of Arrest & Disarming, Search of Prisoner, Baton Exercises, Marksmanship.	104 hrs	48 hrs
INVESTIGATION Crime Scenes, Interviews & Statements, Practices of Prof. Criminals, Preservation of Evidence, Sources of Information, Methods of Investigation.	46 hrs	36 hrs
ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY Recognition of various types of Mental Abnormals.	2 hrs	5 hrs
CRIME PREVENTION Causes of Crime, Juvenile Delinquency, Potential Delinquents, Coordination of Agencies.	6 hrs	12 hrs
CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION Fingerprinting, Handwriting, Photography.	6 hrs	15 hrs
PUBLIC RELATIONS	2 hrs	15 hrs
SCIENTIFIC AIDS	8 hrs	10 hrs
MISCELLANEOUS Examinations, Graduation.	8 hrs	10 hrs
TOTAL	384 hrs	384 hrs

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POLICE IN-SERVICE TRAINING COURSE

	Advanced Course "A"	Advanced Course "B"
ADMINISTRATION Principles of Democracy; General administration of justice; Significant changes in Japanese Policing; Organization of new police system; Responsibilities; Cooperation with and Jurisdiction of other law-enforcement agencies; Occupation Forces; New regulations, reports and records; Communications.	58 hrs	60 hrs
LAW The Constitution - its meaning; The Police Law; New laws effecting police;	78 hrs	68 hrs
COURT PROCEDURE Reorganized Courts and Procurators; Rules of Evidence and Procedure; Preparation of Cases; Testifying in Court.	40 hrs	36 hrs
POLICE PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES Arrests and Detention: (1) Methods; (2) General Duties; (3) Gangs and Rackets; Principles of Riot Control; Defense Techniques; First Aid; Marksmanship.	96 hrs	104 hrs
TRAFFIC CONTROL Present and Future Problems; Factors of Enforcement, Education and Engineering.	8 hrs	12 hrs
INVESTIGATION New limitations and practices;	26 hrs	26 hrs

Reorganized Courts and Procurators;
Rules of Evidence and Procedure;
Preparation of Cases;
Testifying in Court.

POLICE PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES Arrests and Detention: (1) Methods; (2) General Duties; (3) Gangs and Rackets; Principles of Riot Control; Defense Techniques; First Aid; Marksmanship.	96 hrs	104 hrs
TRAFFIC CONTROL Present and Future Problems; Factors of Enforcement, Education and Engineering.	8 hrs	12 hrs
INVESTIGATION New limitations and practices; Interviews, confessions and statements; Preparing and Handling Evidence; Crime scenes.	26 hrs	26 hrs
CRIME PREVENTION Causes (new factors); Juvenile Delinquency Control; Psychopathic Cases.	24 hrs	32 hrs
PUBLIC RELATIONS Dealing with public; (1) Attitudes (development and effect); (2) Public servant - courtesy - conduct and appearance; Cooperation and coordination with other agencies.	20 hrs	16 hrs
CRIME IDENTIFICATION AND SCIENTIFIC AIDS Increased importance under new police system; General techniques and purposes; Application in modern policing.	18 hrs	14 hrs
MISCELLANEOUS Assembly; Examination; Graduation Other events.	16 hrs	16 hrs
TOTAL	384 hrs	384 hrs

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were being carried out in a uniformly intelligent manner by the prefectural schools.(30)

(d) Standardization of Self-Defense and Arrest Techniques

Although the Japanese have a world-wide reputation for skill in the techniques of unarmed defense, and although in one form or another it has been in the police training curriculum for many years, no standardized text or teaching outline was ever developed. The types of defense technique taught varied widely, reflecting for the most part the background of the teacher. Generally speaking, either judo or Kendo (stick-fencing) was emphasized, and often comprised the entire defense program of a training school.(31)

Neither Judo nor kendo by itself can provide sufficient defense against a vicious, desperate, and armed criminal. Although the techniques developed in judo provide an excellent basis for self-defense, it is primarily a sport and as such presupposes sportsmanlike behavior on the part of an apponent. Kendo is an anachronism, useless to a modern police force.(32)

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Because of the natural increase in crime since the end of the war, the disarming of police, the general weakening of police authority, and the loss of great numbers of experienced personnel, it became apparent that a standardized self-defense instruction course was necessary. As the Director of the Police Bureau, Home Ministry

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(30) Verbal statement of Mr. Byron Engle (PSD Police Administrator) to the writer, 19 May 1948.
(31) Memo Byron Engle (PSD Police Administrator) to Chief PSD, dtd 10 Dec 47; Sub: "Police Technique of Arrest and Self-Defense.
(32) Ibid.

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stated:

> Increasing difficulties have recently been felt in common by policemen to make arrest and control criminals who have been becoming more vicious and atrocious every day, and that considerable numbers of policemen fell as their victims. With this aggravated situation, it became an urgent necessity to have arresting art be perfected and standardized as one of the countermeasures for the situation, so as to ensure successful discharge of police duty.(33)

On 22 July 1947 a committee of 23 members, comprising representatives of interested sections of the Home Ministry and Metropolitan Police Board and experts in the various defense techniques, was appointed for the purpose of formulating a course that could be standardized and used as a text throughout Japan. A PSD Police Administrator and a Police Investigator were invited to attend the committee meetings in an advisory capacity.

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During the ensuing few months, numerous meetings, conferences and demonstrations were held until 10 December 1947 when the curriculum was drawn up in final form. While retaining some of the elements of judo, the course generally employs Western techniques, providing basic instruction in (1) Making arrests, (2) Searching prisoners, (3) Restraining dangerous persons, (4) Overcoming resistance, (5) Using baton, (6) Defense against weapons,

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(33) Hisayama, Hisao (Director, Police Bureau, Home Ministry), "Objective of Committee," dated 22 July 1947. Committee referred to is described in paragraph below quotation.

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(7) Safeguarding against personal injury, and (8) Escaping from applied holds. The course is divided into two parts, Basic Technique and Applied Technique, and will require a total of only 30 hours of instruction. Kendo has been eliminated altogether, not only because of its obsolescence, but because many of its principles are opposed to proper use of the baton. It was recommended that judo instruction be continued in police stations and training schools because of its utility in physical conditioning.(34)

A class of 110 physical instructors, two from each prefecture and a group from the Tokyo MPB assembled at the Central Police Academy from 12 December to 20 December 1947 for orientation in the new course. Copies of the printed texts, accepted as standard police training, have been distributed to all schools and police stations throughout Japan. During ~~the coming year~~ 1948 and 1949, PSD Police Investigators will observe the application of the training curriculum in the various prefectures.(35)

(e) Post-Reorganization Training

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(e) Post-Reorganization Training

Post-reorganization training of the police, calling for ~~training~~ completion of an estimated ~~100,000~~ 91,000 training course units by 55,000 individual policemen during 1948 in pre-service and in-service courses, will be discussed in paragraph 7.

c. Special Studies

1) Police Contributions(36)

(a) Original Information

During an investigation of the manager of the Daiwa Industrial Company in Kyoto, agents of CIC Area No. 10 learned that a society was in existence one

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(34) Engle, Byron, loc. cit.

(35) Engle, Byron, loc. cit.

(36) The subject of police contributions and almost all PSD reports and studies concerning it are classified as confidential.

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whose purposes was to collect funds from private citizens and business firms for the benefit of the police in Kyoto Prefecture. This society, known as the Kyoto Prefectural Public Peace Society, was headed by the Governor of Kyoto, and included in addition to others, all of the policemen in Kyoto Prefecture. In a report to the 103rd Military Government Team, on 25 September 1946, CIC Area 10 cited two drives being conducted by this society, one of which had already netted 21,000 yen, and another with a quota of 70,000 yen.(37)

(b) Japanese Government Report

This report, coming to the attention of PSD, corroborated reports of similar incidents previously uncovered by PSD Investigators. On 30 September 1946, Major Smith, Assistant Chief of PSD, conferred with Mr. Tanakawa, Chief of the Police Bureau, Home Ministry, about this matter and requested that agency to submit a report covering (1) the existing policy and police regulations governing solicitation of funds, and (2) the method of accounting employed in such collection campaigns, if authorized. Accordingly, a committee of nine Japanese officials was appointed at the request of the Home Minister ~~to "examine and~~

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with a quota of 70,000 yen.(37)

(b) Japanese Government Report

This report, coming to the attention of PSD, corroborated reports of similar incidents previously uncovered by PSD Investigators. On 30 September 1946, Major Smith, Assistant Chief of PSD, conferred with Mr. Tanakawa, Chief of the Police Bureau, Home Ministry, about this matter and requested that agency to submit a report covering ~~(1)~~ the existing policy and police regulations governing solicitation of funds, and ~~(2)~~ the method of accounting employed in such collection campaigns, if authorized. Accordingly, a committee of nine Japanese officials was appointed at the request of the Home Minister ~~to "examine and~~ to inquire about money contributed to the police, ~~by the request of the Home Minister."~~ Their report, submitted to the Public Safety Division in February 1947, discussed contributions as a necessary evil.(38) Police units,

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(37) Ltr CO CIC Area No. 10 to CO 103rd Military Government Company, dtd 25 Sep 46; Sub: "Establishment of Kyoto Prefectural Public Peace Society (Kyoto-fu Chian Kyokai)." (Confidential) The literal translation of "chian" is "peace;" however, the names of similar societies throughout Japan are loosely translated as "peace society," "peace preservation society," "crime prevention society," and "public peace society."

(38) Yamamoto, Shoichi (Member of House of Representatives, Japanese Diet), "Report of the President of the Investigating Committee for Police Contributions," dtd 22 Feb 1947.

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especially lower echelon, receive a very small allocation which is further diminished by the constant depreciation of the yen. According to the report:

> Police stations, sub-stations, and sub-sub-stations have been given very little budget for their activities....Therefore, for police which needs quick activities and strengthened equipment, it is very hard to do perfect activities with official funds only....Besides, police personnel have had serious apprehensions in their living affairs....The authorities concerned are doing all they could in improving the dwelling situation and for their welfare so that all police personnel may work at their best without any worries, but they cannot find the source for the budget.... Moreover, people naturally desire to have a strong and fair police...People are very grateful to policemen for their brave fighting against crimes despite the fact that the pay they get and the equipment they have now are

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apprehensions in their living affairs....The authorities concerned are doing all they could in improving the dwelling situation and for their welfare so that all police personnel may work at their best without any worries, but they cannot find the source for the budget.... Moreover, people naturally desire to have a strong and fair police...People are very grateful to policemen for their brave fighting against crimes despite the fact that the pay they get and the equipment they have now are very poor....Consequently, they are ready to give financial aid for poor police which cannot get enough budget for their activities.... Such being the case, it is very natural that some parts of police expenses have been paid from the contributions collected from among the people....Conspicuous harms cannot be seen in accepting contributions.(39)

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(39) **Ibid.** Occasional misuse of English is the result of translation difficulties.

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The purposes for which contributions were used were stated to be the following:

Filling up the police equipment (police buildings, official residences, and automobiles).

Securing the houses for policemen.

Welfare of policemen.

Supporting the family of policemen who died during the (police) service.

Education of children of policemen.

Crime prevention activities, popularizing the thought of traffic safety, and security of the equipment.(40)

The committee agreed that the system of contributions as it existed was unsatisfactory and recommended controls which would have the effect of (a) removing from the police any suspicion or opportunity of using their authority as pressure in obtaining contributions; (b) placing the problem and responsibility in the hands of a group of local citizens who are interested in their

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died during the service.

Education of children of policemen.

Crime prevention activities, popularizing the thought of traffic safety, and security of the equipment.(40)

The committee agreed that the system of contributions as it existed was unsatisfactory and recommended controls which would have the effect of (a) removing from the police any suspicion or opportunity of using their authority as pressure in obtaining contributions; (b) placing the problem and responsibility in the hands of a group of local citizens who are interested in their local police problems; (c) limiting the frequency of solicitations; (d) concealing the names of contributors from police officials; and (e) placing the accounting and control of expenditures in the hands of local citizens outside the police department with the books open to public inspection. The extent of the contributions seemed to astonish the committee; they reported ¥136,468,064 received from 1 January to 31 December 1946, with returns incomplete or lacking from about one third of the prefectures. "This total," they stated

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(40) Ibid.

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"has been very much increased when compared with former ones; however, this is the temporary phenomenon...(and) ...it is thought that there would not be so much contribution hereafter."(41)

(c) PSD Investigation

Concurrently with the Home Ministry investigation, Police Branch conducted a separate inquiry assigning one Administrator and three full-time Investigators, in addition to conducting supplementary investigations during regularly scheduled field trips. Their findings were substantially in agreement with those of the Home Ministry regarding the cause of the solicitations and application of the funds; however, they found the accountability very lax, reporting that none of the books examined could stand a thorough audit. Some evidence of coercion was uncovered, although rare. It was pointed out, however, that for establishments urgently in need of police protection only a very thin line could be drawn between "coerced" and "voluntary" contributions.(42)

(d) PSD Police Branch Study of Police Contributions

In response to a specific request for policy from Eighth Army regarding contributions, the Police Branch

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Ministry regarding the cause of the solicitations and application of the funds; however, they found the accountability very lax, reporting that none of the books examined could stand a thorough audit. Some evidence of coercion was uncovered, although rare. It was pointed out, however, that for establishments urgently in need of police protection only a very thin line could be drawn between "coerced" and "voluntary" contributions.(42)

(d) PSD Police Branch Study of Police Contributions

In response to a specific request for policy from Eighth Army regarding contributions, the Police Branch prepared a study in which the following pertinent facts were disclosed:(43)

1. Historical brief: - The system of contributions appears to have originated through

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(41) Ibid.

(42) Memo Chief PSD to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, FEC, dtd 6 May 47; Sub: "Police Contributions." (Confidential)

(43) Ltr Hq I Corps to CG Eighth Army, dtd 10 Feb 47; Sub; "Police Societies," and 1st indorsement Hq Eighth Army to SCAP, dtd 19 Feb 47. (Confidential)

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the feudalistic practice of the barons of the land exacting large contributions from the people as their feudal right and returning a portion to them in case of public need.

2. Relation to National Budgets: - Contributions seem to have little or no weight in compilation of local and national budgets.

3. Ministry Level

   (a) Authority: - No positive law discovered in regard to contributions at Ministry level.

   (b) Accountability: - No system of accountability for contributed funds exists in the Home Ministry or Ministry of Finance, although Ministry officials are aware that contributions are involved in local finance.

   (c) Responsibility: - Ministry officials have no legal or other responsibility in regard to solicitation, amounts,

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ered in regard to contributions at Ministry level.

(b) Accountability: - No system of accountability for contributed funds exists in the Home Ministry or Ministry of Finance, although Ministry officials are aware that contributions are involved in local finance.

(c) Responsibility: - Ministry officials have no legal or other responsibility in regard to solicitation, amounts, extent or disbursements of contribution funds.

4. Prefectural Level

(a) Authority: - None.

(b) System of Collections: - There is no uniform practice. The collection is usually planned by a group of public officials and citizens organized as a Crime Prevention Association or Police Supporters Association. The

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actual collection may be accomplished as follows:

1. Letters from Association to prospects.
2. Personal solicitations by police.
3. Personal solicitation by employees or members of Association.
4. Through neighborhood associations.
5. Through the OYABUN (block-boss system).
6. Assigning merchants associations to collect a stipulated sum.

5. Summary: -

(a) No legal authority exists authorizing solicitation of contributions to defray the legitimate expenses of government.

(b) No local or national budget reflects the true cost of government in Japan.

(c) Japanese tax rates do not give weight to costs of government defrayed by contributions.

(d) No system of accountability or uni-

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[illegible] merchants associations to collect a stipulated sum.

5. Summary: -

(a) No legal authority exists authorizing solicitation of contributions to defray the legitimate expenses of government.

(b) No local or national budget reflects the true cost of government in Japan.

(c) Japanese tax rates do not give weight to costs of government defrayed by contributions.

(d) No system of accountability or uniform practice or procedure exists in regard to contribution funds.

(e) No agency in the Japanese Government is able to determine the total amount of legitimate government expense defrayed from funds obtained through public contribution.

(f) Some Japanese businessmen are unwilling victims of a system they abhor but comply with through fear.

(g) Blackmarket activity on the part of

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businessmen has increased fear to refuse exhorbitant demands.

(h) Much benefit accrues to government officials and employees from funds secured by public subscription.

(i) The contributions system is deeply rooted in Japanese local government finance.

(j) An insidious form of racketeering is practiced in large cities of Japan similar to "protection" organizations in the United States during and immediately following the Prohibition era. These gangster organizations in Japan systematically divide a city into districts and blocks, levying extra-legal toll on the businessman as a form of protection. This system is called "OYABUN" and is apparently unchecked by police.(44)

This memorandum was forwarded to the Assistant

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This memorandum was forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, for information and possible distribution to appropriate Occupation Forces agencies.

While it is patently undesirable for a police force to be even partially dependent on private contributions, social and economic issues were involved which were beyond the scope of Public Safety Division, and no further action was taken by the Police Branch. However, ~~the~~ surveillance over the police was maintained to prevent extortion, misappropriation, corruption, and other abuses to which this system is amenable. The effect of

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(44) Memo Chief PSD, loc. cit.

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police decentralization upon the collection of contributions has not yet been investigated.

2) The "Boss-Follower" (Oyabun-Kobun) System

(a) ORIGINAL INFORMATION — THE MATSUDA-GUMI

In the course of their investigation of the police collection of contributions, Police Branch Investigators were confronted constantly with evidence of powerful extra-legal organizations which, at their best were unofficially performing recognized functions of local government, apparently with the consent of the duly elected authorities, and which at their worst were gangsters and terrorists operating in open defiance of the law. Colonel Pulliam directed that a thorough investigation be made of this system as a basis for recommendations to other Occupation Forces agencies and the Japanese Government.(45)

The pattern and influence of these organizations was first brought to the attention of Police Branch in August 1946, when PSD Police Investigor Shupak was directed to investigate an ~~armed~~ altercation involving firearms at Shimbashi Market, Tokyo, between the Matsuda-gumi, a typical

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duly elected authorities, and which at their worst were gangsters and terrorists operating in open defiance of the law. Colonel Pulliam directed that a thorough investigation be made of this system as a basis for recommendations to other Occupation Forces agencies and the Japanese Government.(45)

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(45) Memo Chief PSD, loc. cit.

(46) Memo Harry Shupak (PSD Police Investigator) to Chief PSD, dtd 6 Aug 46; Sub: "Shimbashi Incident of July 24th (1946)."

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a Japanese police translation of the statement of Mrs. Matsuda, made to the Metropolitan Police Board on 26 August 1946 is quoted here in some detail, since it describes the origin, functions, and operation of a typical Oyabun-Kobun organization within the sanction of the law:

> He (Matsuda) came to Tokyo early in September (1945) and started the carrying trade. In the meantime the open-air stall market got very booming, so he quit his carrying trade and started to supervise the open-air market at Shimbashi.
>
> On 10 June 1946 my husband was shot to death by a Kobun (henchman or follower), and after this I came to live alone, and have been in charge of the Matsuda Gumi which my husband used to manage...
>
> The beginning of that Shimbashi Open-Air Stall Market is this: Around October 1945, peddlers coming up to Shimbashi Station to

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very booming, so he quit his carrying trade and started to supervise the open-air market at Shimbashi.

On 10 June 1946 my husband was shot to death by a Kobun (henchman or follower), and after this I came to live alone, and have been in charge of the Matsuda Gumi which my husband used to manage...

The beginning of that Shimbashi Open-Air Stall Market is this: Around October 1945, peddlers coming up to Shimbashi Station to sell their stuff to those lining up waiting for the ticket-office to start selling tickets, used to be threatened by bad guys from other places, so we Matsuda Gumi drove those guys away and made those peddlers open stalls just before the rear entrance to Shimbashi Station....Then the stalls rapidly increased in number, and so my husband made his "Kobun" control over the market place and, in cooperation with the ward office and the police, formed all those stalls into what people used to call the "Open-Air Stall Market" or "Blackmarket."

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Such being the case, there came to be an urgent need of the supervisor, and in November 1945, the Matsuda Gumi was organized, with my husband managing it as its chief, and its members totalling 30 or so. The number of the open-air market dealers in Shimbashi Station areas numbered 1,500 at the time of the issue of new currency (April 1946).

Each of these stall-keepers used to be given by the Matsuda Gumi a certificate for opening a store there and be charged 3 yen a day, one yen each for lease, for sweeping and cleaning, for electricity, and sometimes the total sum of these charges amounted to the maximum, about 4,000 yen a month.

The Matsuda Gumi came into being in order to carry out a standard necessarily required by the need of getting rid of bad people coming up to Shimbashi from other places to threaten the stall market dealers for money

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The Matsuda Gumi came into being in order to carry out a standard necessarily required by the need of getting rid of bad people coming up to Shimbashi from other places to threaten the stall market dealers for money or drinks and preventing struggles or troubles among them.

The main jobs of the Matsuda Gumi are division and allotment of space, collecting charges, crime and fire prevention, sweeping and cleaning the market place, and so on, and we Matsuda Gumi members worked always in cooperation with the Ward Office and the police. We are proud of the results of efforts we have made heretofore.

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With regard to the establishment of the Shimbashi Shinsei Market, the Shinsei Sha (New Life Society, a joint stock company formed to rebuild the Shimbashi Market) is in full charge, though it has been started nominally by the cooperation of the Shinsei Sha and our Matsuda Gumi. Our Matsuda Gumi is now helping the Shinsei Sha by keeping it from all troubles or interference from outside, by having charge of crime and fire prevention, and by managing all matters concerning dealers' rights for opening stores there. Thus we have been rendering material and moral support to it.

"Asobinin" as they are usually called, can be classified into three kinds, that is, "Tekiya," (Street-stall keeper), "Bakuchiuchi" (or "Kashimoto") "Gamblers", and "Gurentai" (ruffians). "Tekiya" are proud of being traders of chivalrous spirit.

Since the death of my husband Giichi Matsuda, I have been the chief (boss) of the

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Since the death of my husband Giichi Matsuda, I have been the chief (boss) of the Kanto Matsuzakaya Matsuda Gumi.(47)

In September 1946, the Police Branch requested the Home Ministry to conduct an investigation into the Matsuda affair, but without any particular attention to the characteristic Oyabun pattern. Two "drives" were

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(47) 2nd Investigation Sec., Criminal Investigation Dep't., MPB (Tokyo); "Statement by Yoshiko Matsuda," dated 26 August 1946. (Translation by MPB.) Frequent abuse or misuse of English in the translation above indicates some of the problems of dependence upon Japanese for the majority of translation work.

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conducted by the Home Ministry, 15-25 September 1946 and 10-15 March 1947 which purported to be directed against the Ovabun, but an examination of the Home Ministry directives and subsequent investigations by Police Branch disclosed that these campaigns did not ~~consider~~ treat the Ovabun as a special police problem. No attempt was made to differentiate the Ovabun from the ordinary criminal until the Police Branch investigation which began in March 1947.

(b) Historical Antecedents

Although the dislocations in the Japanese social structure caused by World War II modified the pattern of the Ovabun organizations and gave impetus to the formation of new groups as illustrated by the Matsuda-gumi described above, the institution can easily be traced back at least 300 years (and probably existed long before that time). During the Tokugawa Era, Ovabun organizations were formed as strong-arm squads to protect merchants, shopkeepers, amusement places, gambling houses, and the common people generally against the repressive, terroristic activities of the idle aristocracy and their ever-growing groups of landless

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(2) Historical Antecedents

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(48) Memo William G. Fritz (~~PSD~~ Police Administrator, PSD Police Group No. 5) to Chief PSD, dtd 15 Sep 47; Sub: "Investigation of the Oyabun (Boss) System." Included in Appendix _____.

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Although Oyabun organizations have certain features in common with ordinary gangster organizations in Western countries, attributes peculiar to the Japanese culture interpose fundamental differentiating elements.

While the adhesive power of Western gangs was based on brute force and their relationship to the community was that of an interloper, the Japanese organizations were held together by deep-rooted tradition and ingrained respect, and were considered an integral part of the social structure. The term "Oyabun" means literally "substitute father" and "Kobun" signifies "small person" or "child". While the natural extension of these terms is "boss" and "follower," the relationship indicated by the literal meanings maintains an awesome ptency; the Oyabun supplying the Kobun with money, goods, advice, and paternalistic direction, while the Kobun holds for his Oyabun an absolute and unquestioned loyalty in the best tradition of the Japanese family system.

In the course of their study of the Oyabun system,

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In the course of their study of the Oyabun system, Police Branch Investigators found three principal types of Oyabun organizations, the Kashimoto, Tekiya, and Gurentai mentioned by Mrs. Matsuda, which had genuine historical antecedents. Many new types of organizations along this same pattern grew up during or after World War II.(49)

(c) The Gambling Boss (Kashimoto Oyabun)

The oldest known and most firmly established group was the Kashimoto, or gambling Oyabun, each of whom controlled all the gambling houses in a specified area,

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(49) Ibid.

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"protecting" them from the police and rival gangs, for which they collected rent and tribute. Kashimoto Oyabun were of two types, the "quiet" type, who was usually a respected property owner in the community, a "gentleman" thoroughly averse to violence, and the "violent" type, who "negotiated" disputes arising from gambling debts, spheres of influence, etc. At the time of the Police Branch report on the Oyabun System, (15 Sept 1947) there were approximately 57 Kashimoto Oyabun with some 3,000 followers in Tokyo. Kobe was known to have 23 gambling bosses with 2,853 followers. Similar organizations of comparable size and numbers existed in Osaka, Kyoto, and to a lesser extent in other large Japanese cities. The Kashimoto had considerable political influence, supporting their favorites by electioneering and with heavy financial contributions.(50)

The Tekiya Oyabun, or street-stall boss (Tekiya Oyabun) system, although hardly less venerable than the Kashimoto, was less spectacular until the period of World War II, when

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(d) The Street-Stall Boss (Tekiya Oyabun)

The Tekiya Oyabun, or street-stall boss system, although hardly less venerable than the Kashimoto, was less spectacular until the period of World War II, when it grew to amazing proportions, controlling 88 percent of the 45,000 street stalls in Tokyo and having a partial interest in the remaining 12 percent. Known as the Street-Stall Tradesman's Cooperative Union (Roten Dogyo Kumiai), it comprised at the time of the Police Branch report 200 bosses, 4,000 followers, and 22,557 lesser followers under the leadership of Ozu Kinosuke, a ruffian of the lowest type.(51) Official recognition was granted the Roten Dogyo Kumiai by Tokyo-To Finance

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(50) Ibid.

(51) See p. 174-177 for description of Ozu's activities.

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Regulation No. 1, which authorized the organization to collect taxes from its members for the Government, and to receive a two to ten percent commission on the amount collected. The tax amounted to an average of three yen per day for each stall, collected by the Union, which paid the Government in a lump sum yearly. No Government official assisted in, or supervised the collection, nor was any audit required of the Tekiya accounts. In January 1945 the Metropolitan Police Board directed Tokyo police to force all independent street-stall vendors' unions or associations to join the central organization. Later, MPB Ordinance No. 10, dated 28 September 1946, legally placed the licensing of street-stalls in the hands of the Roten Dogyo Kumiai, and gave them the right to make their own rules as to fees, dues, and other payments.(52)

In addition to these "legal" concessions, the Tekiya after the war usurped property rights, establishing shops and markets in bombed out areas, while the protests of the rightful owners were silenced by intimidation or violence.

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The Tekiya, in addition to performing many of the functions of local government, wielded enormous influence over the national economy, controlling to a large extent the marketing, distribution, and prices of everyday commodities.

(e) The Gang Boss (Gurentai Oyabun)

Of the three prominent types of Oyabun organization, the one most closely approximating the Western pattern was the Gurentai, or gang boss, system. An

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(52) Fritz, William G., loc. cit.

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outgrowth of World War II, the Gurentai are distinctly underworld gangs of hooligans and thieves, most of whom have long police records. They exact monetary tribute from bars, cabarets, dancehalls, theaters, restaurants, tea shops, and similar establishments, threatening violence which they have no hesitation ~~in~~ about inflicting if their demands are not met. One theater in Tokyo was rumored to have paid 100,000 yen a month for "protection." The average monthly "take" ~~is thought~~ seems to be about 5,000 to 10,000 yen for each establishment.

The Gurentai, loosely organized within themselves, and seldom federated with each other, engaged in gang wars featuring power-aspiring subordinates, "muscling in," "hijacking," "pineapples," and other features familiar to Western movie-goers and newspaper readers of the last two or three decades. In Tokyo, 181 Gurentai Ovabun were known to be operating with 7,384 followers. Similar groups operated in Kobe, Osaka and Kyoto with relatively fewer numbers.(53)

(f) Other Manifestations of the Boss System

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(f) Other Manifestations of the Boss System

Oyabun organizations also flourished in construction, agriculture, fishing, mining, transportation, and other industries whose activities lay outside the field of Public Safety Division. The ramifications of the Oyabun system and its effect on the social and economic structure of Japan were discussed at length in a conference on 12 Sept 1947 ~~among~~ representatives of more than a dozen Occupation Forces agencies who had encountered one or more of the different types of Oyabun groups. A transcript of this conference, which includes the program proposed by each

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(53) Fritz, William G., loc. cit.

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agency for suppressing the Oyabun, is shown in Appendix _____.(54)

The Oyabun organizations directly concerning the police were the Kashimoto, Tekiya, and Gurentai described above. These gangs usually were either entirely criminal in nature or had committed ~~some~~ breaches of law which rendered them liable to prosecution. Their continued existence with the co-operation and connivance of, or more often in open defiance of, the law enforcement agencies of Japan was a serious obstacle to the establishment of a democratic and efficient police force. The Police Branch urged the Metropolitan Police Board and the Home Ministry to conduct an unrelenting drive against these elements and to report periodically on the progress of these campaigns.

(g) The Case of Ozu Kinosuke, Tekiya Oyabun

On 16 May 1947 the following direct complaint was received by the Public Safety Division from land owners in the Shinjuku district:

> We undersigned had owned and kept stores on the Shinjuku Street, and been active in

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On 16 May 1947 the following direct complaint was received by the Public Safety Division from land owners in the Shinjuku district:

> We undersigned had owned and kept stores on the Shinjuku Street, and been active in our respective business for twenty to fifty years until we had to move out of the above location because either of forced evacuation or of warfires during the war.
>
> Soon following the end of the war, and taking advantage of the post-war confusion, an organization of open-marketeers, known as

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(54) Controls Coordinating Committee, ESS, GHQ, SCAP; Report of conference on Oyabun-Kobun System on 12 September 1947.

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Otsu-(~~or~~ Ozu)Gumi built "market-shops" there with permission of neither landowners nor the competent authority which our building law requires, and have been and are operating their stores in spite of our repeated objections.

We have asked the Otsu-Gumi repeatedly to move out of our properties, directly and indirectly, but the "boss" of the said organization would not listen to our rightful objections and, moreover, denying our legal rights with threatening words, he continues to occupy illegally the properties which belong to us and operate his business there.

Thus, in spite of the new constitution now being enforced, our rights are being infringed upon. Moreover, our means of income are cut off, our special deposits (war-time insurance, etc.) with which we expected to meet the expenses of reconstruction of our stores,

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to move out of our properties, directly and indirectly, but the "boss" of the said organization would not listen to our rightful objections and, moreover, denying our legal rights with threatening words, he continues to occupy illegally the properties which belong to us and operate his business there.

Thus, in spite of the new constitution now being enforced, our rights are being infringed upon. Moreover, our means of income are cut off, our special deposits (war-time insurance, etc.) with which we expected to meet the expenses of reconstruction of our stores, were frozen and with property taxes to be paid, we are in danger of losing entirely our means of living.

Last May (1946) we finally brought a civil action against Otsu with the prupose of restoring our rights. Otsu, however, has tried to postpone the dates of hearing by presenting false excuses and thus even today (May 1947), after a year since we took the action, we have not been able to reach any solution of our case.

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Our problem, of course, is purely domestic and it should be taken care and solved by the Japanese Government. With that understanding we have tried to urge the government to solve the situation, but with little avail, and now we are at the end of our resources.

We, therefore, humbly petition that our case be investigated and appropriate measures be taken from your just and fair standpoint in the work of restoring law and order in our country.

We have all the papers which certify that the above said properties do belong to us, and also a copy of the written order issued by the Ku (city ward) office in the name of the Governor of Tokyo, which orders Otsu to stop contruction, which Otsu rejected.(55)

Police Branch investigation of this complaint indicated that the claims were just and valid, and cited the delinquency of the police and procurators for their failure to take action against Ogu, a delinquency caused by fear

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Police Branch investigation of this complaint indicated that the claims were just and valid, and cited the delinquency of the police and procurators for their failure to take action against Ozu, a delinquency caused by fear of the physical power and political influence at Ozu's command. Ozu at this time was believed to be the most powerful gang boss in Japan with a long police record that included one conviction for murder and several for felonious assault.(56) In addition to his personal following of

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(55) Ltr from 10 Japanese merchants to CIS, dtd 16 May 47; no title. This letter was preceded by similar petitions addressed to the Tokyo Provost Marshal and dated 21 August 1946 and 9 September 1946. All appear to present a just grievance.

(56) See Berrigan, Darrell; "Tokyo's Own Al Capone" in Saturday Evening Post, 25 October 1947, p. 34. The Berrigan account contains some inaccuracies and exaggerations, however.

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three thousand ruffians in the Kanto Ozu-gumi, his control over the street stall vendors' union (Roten Dogyo Kumiai) made him a powerful financial and political figure. He ran for election as a Diet representative from his district, and although defeated (by a small margin), he often boasted of the number of political office-holders in his employ.(57)

In response to the complaint received by the property owners in Shinjuku, the Police Branch directed the Metropolitan Police Board to take action against Ozu after securing the evidence required. On 22 May 1947, Investigator Shupak of the Police Branch conferred with Chief Shigehara of the Yodobashi Police Station, whose district included the headquarters of the Ozu-gumi. Chief Shigehara condemned the dilatory action of the civil courts in the suit against Ozu, and expressed himself as willing to take the responsibility for gathering evidence and instituting criminal charges against the gang leader. On 26 June 1947, Chief Shigehara ~~threw a cordon of~~ and 20 armed police ~~around~~ surrounded Ozu's home and served him with a warrant. He was formally indicted on 3

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(57) Contemporary Japanese press accounts played up the Ozu case and gave many details of his "career" and trial.

(58) Memo for Record, Howard Meyers, Courts and Law Div., Government Sec., GHQ, SCAP, dtd 17 Sep 47; Sub: "Oyabun-Kobun System; Case of Ozu Kinosuke."

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(h) The Case of Sekine Ken

The success of the police in handling the arrest of Ozu stimulated them to action against other powerful bosses. Charges of intimidation, extortion, robbery and illegal possession of a machine-gun were filed against Sekine Ken, leader of the Sekine-gumi, whose illegal activities were found to be even more extensive than Ozu's. Sekine surrendered to the police on 30 September 1947 after an exhaustive three-month police search that led across ten prefectures. Brought to trial by an Occupation Provost Court on 13 November for illegal possession of a machine-gun and for establishing a headquarters "for a disorderly purpose and with felonious intent of carrying out acts of physical violence," Sekine and eight of his henchmen were each sentenced to serve prison terms of five years and to pay fines ranging from 50,000 to 75,000 yen. Sekine also faced trial by Japanese courts on many separate charges.(59)

(i) The Police Campaign Against the Ogabun

In the meantime many lesser gangsters were being rounded up throughout Japan as a result of numerous directives issued to prefectural police chiefs by the Home Ministry and to chiefs of police [illegible]

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(i) The Police Campaign Against the Oyabun

In the meantime many lesser gangsters were being rounded up throughout Japan as a result of numerous directives issued to prefectural police chiefs by the Home Ministry and to chiefs of police districts in Tokyo by the Metropolitan Police Board. As of 30 September 1947, the Home Ministry reported a total of 7,942 arrests in 16 prefectures including Tokyo for typical Oyabun offenses, such as gambling, riotous conduct, illegal possession of weapons, and other related offenses. An analysis of statistical data on arrests submitted by the MPB and the Home Ministry, however, indicated that a (*) The figures showed only the number of arrests for typical

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(59) CIS Periodical Summary No. 21, 15 Oct 47, par 3a; p. PSD-9. (Secret; however, paragraph cited is Restricted.)

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Oyabun offenses, not the number of gangsters rounded up; (b) the number of gangsters apprehended was only a small percentage of those known to be operating; and (c) the small ratio of convictions to arrests indicated a lack of sufficient zeal on the part of the public procurators. Furthermore, as late as November 1947, a Police Branch Investigator reported that the Ozu Commercial Company, which replaced the voluntarily disbanded Ozugumi, was functioning in the same manner as before. He reported that:

> This leaves the situation unaltered with the exception of the presence of Ozu. His Kobun still hold sway over Shinjuku, collect "rentals" and taxes. This problem, Tanemura (Chief, CID, MPB) stated, was deplorable but the police could do nothing more as it was up to the Ward Office and other governmental agencies involved.(60)(61)

(j) A Reminder to the Japanese Government

To remind the Japanese Government of the importance with which this issue was regarded by the Occupation

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(j) A Reminder to the Japanese Government

To remind the Japanese Government of the importance with which this issue was regarded by the Occupation Forces authorities, Colonel Pulliam sent the following

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(60) Memo Harry Shupak (PSD Police Investigator) to Administrator, Police Group No. 5, dtd 25 Nov 47; Sub: "Data Re Ozu and Sekine Investigations."

(61) A comprehensive Japanese police report on the Ozu and Sekine investigations is inclosed in Appendix _____; it was prepared by the Crime Prevention Sec., Criminal Affairs Dep't., Domestic Affairs Office (which replaced the old Home Ministry on 1 Jan 48), and entitled "Concerning the Instances of Arrest of Gangs and the Forecast of Arrest."

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letter to the Director of the Police Bureau, Home Ministry, on 20 November 1947:

20 November 1947

MEMORANDUM TO: Director, Bureau of Police, Home Ministry

SUBJECT: Oyabun-Kobun Gangster Systems

1. Information indicates that much remains to be done to eliminate and control the illegal and vicious Oyabun-Kobun Gangster systems. Satisfactory progress has been made concerning the subject during the past year but there is yet much to be accomplished before the systems are stamped out or weakened to the point of ineffectiveness.

2. The Oyabun-Kobun System is the same power wielded by a different group under another name, as that of the old military dictatorship. If these systems are permitted to survive, democracy cannot prevail nor democratic processes freely operate in any echelon of government. Presently, the entire political,

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cerning the subject during the past year but there is yet much to be accomplished before the systems are stamped out or weakened to the point of ineffectiveness.

2. The Oyabun-Kobun System is the same power wielded by a different group under another name, as that of the old military dictatorship. If these systems are permitted to survive, democracy cannot prevail nor democratic processes freely operate in any echelon of government. Presently, the entire political, economic and cultural life of Japan is at the mercy of these lawless gangster groups. This condition must be corrected. The civil police and the courts are the only forces available and capable of performing this service.

3. With the new Constitution as a guiding principle, a major and continuing effort should be made and instructions issued to prefectural chiefs of police to stamp out all traces of the Oyabun-Kobun and other gangster systems. The plan should be nation-wide. No

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effort should be spared to eliminate these systems from the national life of Japan. PSD personnel are available at all times to assist and give counsel on these matters.

4. Request that PSD be furnished a copy of the instructions issued on this subject.

H. E. PULLIAM
Colonel, GSC
Chief, Public Safety Division

(k) Educating the Public — Public Support of the Anti-Ovabun Drives

In coordination with police drives against the Ovabun, the Police Branch encouraged representatives of Japanese information media to assist in destroying the "hidden government" represented by the Ovabun system by exposing it to the glare of publicity. On 3 July 1947, a Police Investigator conferred with Mr. Goro Murata, Managing Editor of the Nippon Times, regarding a publicity drive to be carried on by that newspaper. During the following months, conferences were held almost daily between Police Branch and Civil Information and Education Section representatives, in which radio skits and press releases were prepared based on material in Police Branch

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The drive against gangsterism was intensified after Colonel Pulliam's letter. A sincere campaign against intimidationist organizations was carried on by law enforcement agencies, and no abatement of this drive was observed during or after the reorganization of the police. Police agencies reported that 489 groups of gamblers with

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16,117 members, 504 groups of street-stall brokers with 29,559 members, and 267 gangster groups with 7,375 members were under surveillance throughout the nation, adding however, that "in view of the nature of these groups, we are afraid that there are many which are not counted in the above statistics."(62) The volume of arrests for typical Oyabun offenses such as extortion, intimidation, eating and drinking without paying bill, illegal possession of weapons, and violence and injury to others remained on a high level, indicating that offenses of this type were being kept under control.

(e) The Outlook for the Oyabun System

Prospects of completely eliminating Oyabun influence over the social and economic life of Japan cannot be viewed with optimism. A number of notorious criminals and their followers are in prison, a larger number are being closely watched for any overt breaches of the Criminal Code. However, there is no appreciable indication that the influence exerted by these deeply entrenched, hereditary organizations over prominent political figures ~~was being~~ has been weakened, nor is it within the province of the law enforcement agencies to effect this. Vigilant police action might successfully combat lawless elements,

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(62) Criminal Affairs Bureau, Home Ministry; "Arrest of Terrorist Organizations in Various Districts (Second Report)," dated 22 December 1947.

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might create an emotional and intellectual vacuum susceptible to pernicious ideologies. Obviously the problem admitted of no easy solution; continued study and long range planning were required, much of which was beyond the scope of Public Safety Division. However, regardless of what policy might ultimately be decided upon with regard to the Oyabun system as a whole, the destruction of its criminal element was essential, and the Police Branch continues to assist and advise the Japanese law enforcement agencies toward that end.

3) Job Analysis of Police Precedures ~~from~~ (on the Police Box) (Koban) level

PSD Police Investigators from 22 May to July 1947 conducted a study of the typical activities of the smallest police unit, the police box (Koban). Most contacts between the police system and the general public occur at the Koban. The success or failure of a police system is in the last analysis nothing more than an extension of the capability and integrity of the individual policeman in the lowest echelon, for upon him ultimately rests the responsibility for ordinary maintenance of law and order in a democratic society.

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The study of police box activities was executed for the purpose of learning the theoretical duties of the individual policeman in the Koban, determining to what extent these duties were fulfilled, and making recommendations based on the findings. The investigators found that a policeman on duty at the Koban spends from 56 to 61 hours on duty weekly, of which approximately 20 hours are for "rest", during which he may eat, read, or sleep in the rest room at the Koban, where he is subject to immediate call in an emergency.

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Police box activities are broken down into five main categories: Watch duty, patrol duty, administrative duty, census-taking, and rest. Each box is provided with a duty register (Kimuhyo) in which each policeman stamps his seal in the appropriate column to indicate how his time was spent. One of the policemen in the box designated as group head (Kumi-cho) has the responsibility of making decisions in matters not specifically covered by instructions, in addition to his ordinary duties.(63) A detailed description of police box duties may be found in Appendix _____.

As a result of the analysis of police procedures, PSD Investigators reported two types of deficiencies, deviations from the standard routine, and defects in the routine itself. In regard to the former, it was observed that, in numerous instances, the time allotted for patrol was not actually spent on patrol nor were the functions of the patrol thoroughly accomplished. Spot checks indicated that many policemen did not have even a superficial knowledge of the contents of the files.

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(63) Memo James B. McCarthy (1st Lt., PSD Police Investigator) to Byron Engle (PSD Police Administrator), dtd 2 Jun 47; Sub: "Job Analysis of Patrolman."

(64) Pencilled notes by Police Administrator Byron Engle, attached to above memo.

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The main criticism of the police system described above and ~~in Appendix~~ is that maximum use is not made of the individual policeman's time, and as a result he spends more hours on duty than necessary without sufficient time off. Functions like "resting," watch duty, and administrative duty could be consolidated, allowing the policeman to spend more time away from the police box.

d. Planning for Police Reorganization

1) General

Police Branch personnel, as we have seen, were occupied during the year and a half following the start of Phase II on 30 June 1946 with special studies, such as those on the Ovabun and Police Collection of Contributions; with routine surveys and investigations of police facilities in Tokyo-to and other areas throughout Japan; and with offering, and insuring compliance with summary recommendations in nearly all phases of police work. The Police Branch projects described in detail on pages 141 to 184 represent only the high-

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While these essential functions were being carried out more or less on an operational level, other Police Branch personnel were making studies and formulating

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policy indident to the overall reorganization of the Japanese police, in compliance with Office Memorandum No. 43.(65) The fundamental issue in this task of reorganization was whether Japan should have a strong national police force, which, within recent memory had been so closely associated with excesses of brutality and repression, or whether her police units should be autonomous, self-supporting, and distinctly limited in power and geographical jurisdiction, with the almost inevitable weakening of efficiency and economy. As a basis for the formulation of an integrated PSD policy, to be submitted later to the Supreme Commander for his consideration, Colonel Pulliam on 30 June 1946 directed the Police Branch to prepare reports representing three fundamental viewpoints on the subjects of police reorganization and decentralization.(66)

2) The Saitama Police Survey Report (Bower-Mealon)

The Saitama Police Survey Report was begun by the Police Branch in July 1946 as a follow-up of the Olander Report (see pp. 133-135), with a view toward becoming better acquainted with police organization and operations in a predominant-

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(65) See pp. 137-8, for outline of PSD Office Memorandum No. 43. Full text Included in Appendix _____ also.
(66) PSD Office Memorandum No. 43, 30 Jun 46.

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With this report, the Valentine and Olander Reports, and the preliminary survey of police facilities in all the prefectures available for study, and with the reports on police training and police communications nearing completion, the Police Branch undertook to formulate specific plans for reorganization. Between October 1946 and January 1947 two plans were drawn up by Police Branch, one ~~by Mr.~~ by Police Administrator Engle and ~~Mr.~~ Kimberling, assisted by Police Administrator Fritzy, entitled "Report on Japanese National Police System," and another by Mr. Eaton, entitled the "Municipal Police Reorganization Plan."

3) The Report on the Japanese National Police System (Engle-Kimberling)

The "Report on the Japanese National Police System" presents, from the point of view of efficiency and economy of operation, many sound arguments for the establishment of a centralized national police force, divested of its autocratic powers and confined to the field of recognized police functions. It points out (a) that Japan as a defeated nation, has no army, navy or militia for ~~defense~~ security against lawlessness or domestic

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utilization of communications and other facilities.(67)

The national police system, as visualized in this report, would be limited to the following functions: Prevention of crime, suppression of criminal activities, detection and apprehension of criminals and violators of criminal law; protection of life and property, preservation of peace and order, regulation of conduct, control of traffic and traffic safety, and the serving of warrants, subpoenas, and other court orders as directed by competent authority.(68)

The "Report on the Japanese National Police System," submitted to Colonel Pulliam by Police Administrators Engle and Kimberling on 17 January 1947, is divided into two parts, entitled respectively, "Present System" (as of October 1946) and "Conclusions and Recommendations." Each of these parts deals separately with organization, personnel, administration, facilities and equipment, responsibilities, and operations. It was pointed out in this report that the Japanese police system was only nominally a national police organization. Actually it was little more than a loose federation of prefectural

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(67) Engle, Byron, and Kimberling, Arthur E.; "Report on the Japanese National Police System," dated 17 January 1947; Introduction to Part II, pp. 1-8. Entire report is included as Appendix _____.

(68) Ibid., Part II, p. 91.

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of autonomy under the authority of the prefectural governor, who had the power of appointment and removal over most of the police officials within his prefecture, and considerable latitude in the interpretation of the general policies of the Home Ministry. As a result, there were wide variations in policies, practices, and efficiency among the prefectures which was particularly noticeable in such tangible features as police station sanitation, care of police prisoners, training, and maintenance of equipment.(69)

Another factor which tended to weaken the central authority was the wide span of control that prevailed on almost all levels. The Governor and police of each of the 46 prefectures were directly responsible to the Home Ministry with no intervening level of command or regional supervision to coordinate activities and establish uniformity of operation and precedure. This wide span of control was carried over to the police district level, where the district superintendents, ranging in number from 12 in Miyazaki Prefecture to 53 in Osaka, reported directly to the prefectural police chief. This looseness of super-

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To remedy these and other unsatisfactory conditions inherent in the old Japanese police system, the Engle-Kimberling report recommended and presented a specific plan for a true centralized police organization,

(69) Ibid., Part I, p. 51.

(70) Ibid., Part I, p. 55.

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with adequate precautions provided at every level to safeguard against the abuse or usurpation of authority. This plan would:

Confine police activities to the recognized fields of police functions.

Transfer numerous duties and responsibilities to other appropriate government agencies.

Establish regional districts for closer supervision and coordination.

Reduce the span of control to reasonable and practical limits.

Establish personnel management on a national civil service basis.

Provide for tenure and promotion to the higher ranks through merit and ability.

Provide clear and definite channels of command and responsibility.

Provide uniform methods of technique and procedure throughout the system.

Establish a central record and identification file, and a central crime laboratory.

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Establish regional districts for closer supervision and coordination.

Reduce the span of control to reasonable and practical limits.

Establish personnel management on a national civil service basis.

Provide for tenure and promotion to the higher ranks through merit and ability.

Provide clear and definite channels of command and responsibility.

Provide uniform methods of technique and procedure throughout the system.

Establish a central record and identification file, and a central crime laboratory.

Permit the shifting of personnel to cope with civil disturbances and unusual criminal activities in a particular locality.(71)

4) The Municipal Police Reorganization Plan (Eaton)

An alternative plan for the organization of the Japanese police system was presented in Mr. Eaton's "Municipal Police Reorganization Plan," submitted to Colonel Pulliam in October 1946. This report consists

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(71) Ibid., Part II, p. 7.

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first of a detailed analysis of the Tokyo Metropolitan Police System as it was in October 1946, followed by the recommended functional reorganization of the same system, which could be applied with suitable modifications to the 118 cities of Japan with populations of 50,000 and over.(72)

Six principles of law enforcement were proposed as standards in this plan for reorganization. They were:

The maintenance of an honest civil service system.

The development and maintenance of the latest types of communications.

The reimbursement of police officers in ratio to the unusual hours of employment, the hazards of the job, and the training and professional knowledge required.

The maintenance of an active juvenile delinquency program.

The establishment of scientific crime laboratories, with suitable equipment and personnel.

Development of crime prevention measures.(73)

For the accomplishment of these ends, the "Municipal

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The maintenance of an active juvenile delinquency program.

The establishment of scientific crime laboratories, with suitable equipment and personnel.

Development of crime prevention measures.(73)

For the accomplishment of these ends, the "Municipal Police Reorganization Plan" proposed that each metropolitan police department be managed by a single head, assisted by a vice-administrator and operating through an established chain of command. Each municipal police department would be divided into seven bureaus with a

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(72) Eaton, Henry S. (Chief Police Administrator, PSD); "Municipal Police Reorganization Plan," 25 November 1946. Copy included as Appendix _____.

(73) Police Reorganization Plan for Japan (undated), Tab "F": "Summary of Metropolitan Police Report." This document originated in PSD and was submitted to CIS on 24 February 1947.

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director in charge of each. These bureaus would be a Patrol Bureau, Detective Bureau, Juvenile Control Bureau, and Traffic Bureau (line activities); Technical Services Bureau (housekeeping activities); Personnel Bureau and Training Bureau (staff activities). These functional sub-divisions, under the plan, would be consolidated in smaller cities corresponding to the size of the cities and their police needs. The transfer of police facilities and authority would be transferred gradually from the national government to the municipalities in the order of decreasing magnitude of population. (74)

5) The Japanese Government Plan of 27 February 1947

Concurrently with these studies, the Japanese Government prepared a plan for police reorganization which was approved at a cabinet meeting on 27 February 1947, and submitted to SCAP.(75) This plan proposed the establishment of a national police force of 30,000 uniformed police administered by a central agency through eight regional headquarters. This force would take charge of matters concerning the national interest or on a national scale, while police authority was [illegible]

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