

Interr. of Matsudaka, Yosuke

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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INTERROGATION OF

MATSUOKA, Yosuke

Date and Time: 14 March 1946, 1425 -- 1615 hours

Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan

Present : MATSUOKA, Yosuke
Lt. Cmdr. John D. Shea, USNR, Interrogator
Miss Clara B. Knapp, Stenographer

Interrogation conducted in English.
Questions by Cmdr. Shea.

Q. Now, Mr. Matsuoka, for the purpose of refreshing our recollection so that we may both have a definite understanding of the Tripartite Alliance, I will read a copy of it as it appears here, Document No. 536, and ask you if that is substantially your understanding of it: Beginning with the First Article, first paragraph:

"Article 1. Japan recognizes and respects the leadership of Germany and Italy in the establishment of a new order in Europe.

"Article 2. Germany and Italy recognize and respect the leadership of Japan in the establishment of a new order in Greater East Asia.

"Article 3. Germany, Italy and Japan agree to cooperate in their efforts on the aforesaid lines. They further undertake to assist one another with all political, economic and military means when one of the three contracting parties is attacked by a power at present not involved in the European War or in the Chinese-Japanese conflict.

"Article 4. With a view to implementing the present pact, joint technical commissions, members of which are to be appointed by the respective governments of Germany, Italy and Japan, will meet without delay.

"Article 5. Germany, Italy, and Japan affirm that the aforesaid terms do not in any way affect the political status which exists at the present as between each of the contracting parties and Soviet Russia.

"Article 6. The present pact shall come into effect immediately upon signature and shall remain in force ten years from the date of its coming into force. At the proper time before expiration of said term the high contracting parties shall at the request of any of them enter into negotiations for its renewal.

"In faith whereof, etc."

Q. Does that set it forth?

A. Yes.

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Q. On March 29 1941 it appears that there was a meeting in Berlin, attended principally by yourself and the Reich Foreign Minister, von Ribbentrop, in which the following conversation took place: "If Russia attacks Japan, Germany would attack Russia and quickly defeat it. If Germany attacked Russia, then Japan would attack Singapore. A German conflict with Russia always in the realm of possibility, if not probability. Russia's entry into the Three-Power Pact was unlikely because Germany did not want to grant the demands of Russia concerning Finland and Turkey. Matsumoto thinks that in case of a direct meeting between the Japanese and American navies, Japan would conquer but if the American Navy did not meet it, a Japanese-American war would last for five years. Japan feared this. Feels that Japan should declare war on England in the form of an attack on Singapore." Now do you recall any conversation concerning the substance of this that I have read, on 29 March 1941?

A. It may be when I called on von Ribbentrop, and I think he spoke in German with an interpreter, but this reference to the German-Soviet relations, I think that was when Ribbentrop and myself alone conversed in English.

Q. Yes, it appears here that you were alone with him. There was no one else present.

A. I recall him saying -- of course then I felt it was a casual remark -- in case Russia attacks Japan Germany would come to assistance, to which I made no reply whatever, and then he spoke on about the relations between Soviet-Russia and Germany, and he seemed to me thoroughly confident that Germany would beat Russia easily, and he never asked me that Japan should join the war.

Q. Or attack Singapore?

A. No, no. This is about Soviet Russia. He showed the attitude that he knew Germany doesn't need assistance had at all.

Q. In the Russian matter, you mean?

A. Yes. So I remained silent. But as to Singapore, he never referred to it.

Q. Did you refer to Singapore?

A. No.

Q. Do you recall whether or not you did make the comment concerning the engaging of the navies of America and Japan, expressing a fear that it would result in a war that would last about five years?

A. I don't recall, but I would say that I may have said so, because I used to say, by way of warning to any Japanese who spoke lightly of America, that America would never cease warring with us, once it started, not less than five years.

Q. Now, by coincidence, I notice that by the terms of the non-aggression treaty with Russia, you concluded it at the end of this tour and you set the term of years involved in this non-aggression treaty for a period of five years. Did this have any relation to this same thought that we have just developed about the length of time that the war might last?

A. No.

Q. Was there any specific reason why the period of time for which the anti-aggression pact between your government and that of Russia should be limited to five years?

A. No, no special reason. Five or ten -- you have to choose.

Q. But it was set at five years?

A. Yes, that is merely to choose some length of time.

Q. And it had no relation to any expectancy in relation to the war itself?

A. No. Of course I must make it clear sometimes I used to say by way of warning to anyone who spoke lightly about our relations with America, that was in the nature of advice, never to go to war with America. My meaning was Japan won't stand five years.

Q. Now, let us take quite a step from what we are considering here now, and move on to a date of July 2 1941, which was considerably after your return, and shortly before your resignation from the government. May I ask you on that date, 2 July 1941, if you recall, an Imperial Conference had been called which you attended?

A. Yes.

Q. Did this Imperial Conference have under consideration the question of Japan entering the war against Russia?

A. Oh yes.

Q. It did?

A. I think the second, third or fourth -- I don't exactly recall the date, but about that time, to report to the Throne that we decided not to join the war.

Q. Not to join the war against Russia?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, if certain persons were to testify or say that at that conference, or in the liaison meeting preceding the conference, or both, you advocated that Japan

enter the war against Russia at that time, would that be true? Did you advocate Japan's entry into the war against Russia?

A. I think I said -- I talked about it. That is, at the highest liaison conference. By way of trick, I said that rather than going to the southwest, with the danger of increasing coming into clash with Great Britain, I would rather see Japan joining the Soviet-German war, but I said so by way of trick. That is, because I knew full well then that both the Navy and Army would not, absolutely not, fight Russia, and particularly the Navy hated to do so. Then again, I knew that the Navy and Army authorities had an idea that they could cope with Great Britain and America at the same time, with some hope of victory, but no chance whatever if Soviet Russia comes into the war on the British and American side. They were definite in that opinion. Therefore, in order to prevent the tendency of going to the southwest, I contended we would rather join the Soviet-German war, which I knew as I have just said, that they absolutely would not do. And whether it was the result of my contention or not, Japan has been neutral about Great Britain, America and Soviet Russia all around, and I can tell you that it was by way of trick to cope with these military men and naval men. I didn't push my contention, and when we went before the Emperor, of course, we always agree that we would not join Soviet-German war. And moreover, I knew that Japan would not break the neutrality pact just made.

Q. It is my understanding that at this meeting, this Imperial Conference of July 2, there were three principal questions under consideration. 1) The attack on Russia, 2) the move southward by the military, 3) what was the third consideration, do you recall? My understanding is that the whole thing was resolved in three questions relative to what military move to make at that time. The third was some other consideration, whether it was to remain neutral altogether, I don't know.

A. I don't recall. It may be early cessation of hostilities in China, or something, but I don't exactly recall.

Q. I think that was it. The attempt to make rapid termination of the Chinese situation. Now, may I ask you this:

A. But I must say that about movement to the south and also about the Chinese question, that was not the main theme. Incidentally those things were mentioned.

Q. What was the main theme?

A. To join the Soviet-German war or not.

Q. Well now, it seems apparent that the third question, the one of mediating the Chinese-Japanese conflict, was basically the question which concerned the relationship between Japan and the U. S., was it not? Was it not part of the basic considerations upon which the U. S. demanded that something be done to better the Chinese situation?

A. In that sense, yes.

Q. In other words, the attack on Russia was under consideration, and also the move southward?

A. That was casual, simply remarks made.

Q. So that any one of the three decisions was very vital at that time. For example, if there was a unanimous opinion to attack Russia, it is quite possible that such a thing would have been done?

A. Yes, maybe.

Q. That if there had been a unanimous opinion to move southward that would have been done, and if there was a unanimous opinion to bring an end to the Chinese-Japanese conflict, that would have been done?

A. To bring an end? Oh yes, but that was long decided you know. And the Japanese government was making every effort for a long time to put an end to it.

Q. But if number one prevailed, war on Russia, obviously it would have involved the Japanese nation into war with Russia together with Germany at the same time if that had prevailed, if they have voted in favor of that, isn't that true?

A. Yes.

Q. If they had commenced on this southward move, Singapore, Pearl Harbor and the south, it would involve war with the U. S. and Great Britain?

A. Certainly.

Q. If they were able to bring the Chinese situation to a conclusion on some amicable basis, then the door would be open to a complete agreement and understanding with the U. S., isn't that true?

A. Yes.

Q. My impression is, from what I have learned of this Imperial Conference, that it was a very important conference in the history of Japan.

A. yes.

Q. Can you tell me, Mr. Matsuoka, what is the nature of an Imperial Conference? The setup of the various arms of the

government, how they are represented, and for my personal knowledge as to how this is brought about, the formality of the thing, and a little history as to what it is. I am not too keen a student on it.

A. Yes, we would call a conference or maybe several conferences at the highest liaison conference; that is, literally translated, you know. Including at the time the Prime Minister, Minister of War

Q. This is the liaison conference?

A. Yes. And Minister of Navy, Chief of Staff, Chief of the Naval Operations, and not always but generally the Chief of the Planning Bureau and Minister of Finance. Sometimes both are absent, or one or another absent. The Chief Secretary of the Cabinet, and this Chief of Military Affairs of the War Office and Navy. And we discussed matters brought up there and when we reached agreement we decided, or rather the Prime Minister decided, to bring it up to the Throne. And when we go before the Throne, we call in -- in those days, of course. The practice may differ from time to time, but in those days the Chairman of the Privy Council and when we come before the Throne, the government's side are all bound by the decision at the liaison conference.

Q. The government's side?

A. Yes, that is I must mention this --

Q. That is interesting; I am very glad to hear any sidelights.

A. And those who took part in the highest liaison conference are of course all bound by the agreement reached there, and we never said anything before the Emperor.

Q. In the presence of the Emperor, that would indicate that you were not in agreement?

A. Yes, well then the cabinet would break up immediately.

Q. I see.

A. Such a thing can't take place -- a special plea before the Emperor -- otherwise the Konoye cabinet would have fallen that very day.

Q. Does the Emperor at these meetings have any special advisory groups also present?

A. No, except the Chief of the Privy Council.

Q. Isn't there some sort of advisory boards or groups or councils set up about the Throne, independent of this Imperial Conference, such as I understand the Emperor has several advisors on matters civil -- the civil government; but on matters military, aside from his own personal aide-de-camp from the Army or Navy, there is from the military, a military group of admirals and generals representing the Army group, who are more or less representative, and not so much as advisors but there more or less in the light of that capacity. The understanding I have is that the Emperor is well represented and well protected by advisors on the civil side of the government, but that the Army and Navy groups are set up on a level that they have direct access to the Emperor, and more or less represent their own opinion rather than act as advisors to the Emperor. They are set up in such a way that they are not controlled in any way by advisors on the civil side of the government; that they may go directly to the Emperor and get an order signed on their own initiative without regard to the civil side of the government and that once signed by the Emperor, it places that group in a position over and above any of the civil authorities or members of the government. Am I correct in that?

A. So? I do not know the real inside maybe, but my understanding is that these Field Marshals

Q. Yes, that is it.

A. These Field Marshals are supposed to be general advisors, generally speaking that is, not only on anything particular, but I never heard of the Emperor giving an order to the Minister of War or Minister of Navy, Chief of Staff, or Chief of Naval Operations, over and aside from the civil officials. The Prime Minister is, in the last resort, the highest responsible man in the government.

Q. Well, what is there to this statement, what is meant when people say that the Army and Navy as such have direct access to the Throne, as distinguished from other government officials?

A. That generally no minister is supposed to see the Emperor, and give his opinion independently of the cabinet.

Q. I see. But both the Minister of War and Minister of the Navy may do so?

A. But that was done, and they continue to use their rights, I think when Marshal Uehara was Chief of Staff and he was Minister of War too, and when he was Minister of War he did that and a great deal of discussions were raised over it, and he asserted that right, and ever since the Minister of War asserted that. For instance a man like myself, and there were many other men like me, who downed such right.

Q. You of course never held a military portfolio, Minister of War, or anything of that sort?

A. Oh no, none.

Q. It is very interesting to understand these things.

A. Yes. I try to tell you to the best of my ability. I didn't finish just one point. The Chief of the Privy Council, of course, he was not bound by our agreement. He could say anything he liked. Mr. Hara spoke on that occasion fully -- July 2 and 3 or 4, whichever it was -- he spoke, but I don't speak. In fact, I couldn't speak. The Premier simply reported that we decided among ourselves not to join the war against Russia.

Q. What did the Privy Council, Mr. Hara, have to say?

A. I think I recall he spoke at some length. The sense of it was that if it absolutely necessitated Japan and if it was in the interests of Japan, Japan might join the war, but that is theory, argument. He doesn't contend to fight, but if, he said, it is absolutely in the interest of Japan, Japan might join in the war.

Q. Did the fact that this important meeting took place, and all of these officials reported to the Throne this decision -- was there then existing a situation from which you could say or we could say that there was an implied necessity to do some other thing? In other words, if the decision was made not to attack Russia, did that imply to this liaison conference group and the ministers then present, that by virtue of that there was a necessity to do some other thing, rather than this?

A. No.

Q. There was no implication that your decision had been reached, not to attack Russia, and there was then an implied decision to make war against Singapore, Pearl Harbor, and the U. S.?

A. No such consideration. It was to keep out of war.

Q. Then you would say that the conclusion reached at this Imperial Conference was that Japan was not to enter the war on either side, in either event, and there was no decision reached either, as to the Chinese situation?

A. No. Well, might I say this -- that upon my return from Europe, in my report to the Throne, I said that Japan was in no way obliged under the Three-Party Pact to join the Soviet-German War. If such a thing had taken place, which as I said the other day, I doubted very much, I thought mostly it was bluff on the part of Germany, but I said to the Emperor that in any event we were not obliged to join the war.

Q. Now, with respect to the conclusion of the Tripartite Alliance, was there an Imperial Conference concerning the conclusion of that pact?

A. There was a meeting of the Privy Council.

Q. Who were the Privy Council, as distinguished from this Imperial Conference? Is that a different type of conference?

A. About thirty some members appointed and always scrutinizing these things.

Q. Oh, I see, they are in the nature of legislative authorities, non-officials of the government. They are especially appointed by the Emperor, are they, as an advisory cabinet?

A. Yes, Privy Council.

Q. What class of citizens are in the Privy Council. Are they from the military?

A. No, largely those men who spend their lives in civil service, and mainly from among people like businessmen etc. For instance, Okada later became Minister of Finance, etc... By lots the men are chosen out of business circles, and then out of scholars, such as the principal of the Imperial University, etc., and then only very few military men. Only General Hara and General Karye, and General Oshima, the father of the ambassador.

Q. What is the principal function, Mr. Matsuoka, of this Privy Council?

A. The Principal function was originally about the constitution, getting the constitution and scrutinizing international agreements and treaties, but later on they began to consider even some of the administrative measures.

Q. Of the government?

A. Yes, of the government. And there was a loophole, I think, in that term of going into any important state matter. Clearly they ought not to have done that, but they did. So you had virtually, you know, the Japanese cabinet had another body controlling it to some extent.

Q. Now, they are not complementary to the cabinet, but rather to the Throne?

A. To the Throne, and very often they blocked the way and the cabinet failed.

Q. I see. Now, this Tripartite Alliance was brought under discussion by this body? Do you remember when that occurred?

A. That occurred -- I don't exactly recall the day, but some days before we concluded the Treaty. When OK'd by that body, then we finally asked the Throne to permit us to. But in that case it was, I think, ~~passed~~ passed through in one day. It took me eight hours all continuous from the beginning, to answer the questions by them, and I explained I think seven right through -- seven hours.

Q. Now then, after this discussion, do they go to the Throne and say they are in agreement as a body, or do you go with them, collectively, or how is it accomplished?

A. Sometimes the Emperor at the last meeting would be present, and sometimes not. But before we went before the Throne, I think the Emperor was not present, and after we arrived at an agreement -- and by the way, I should say that they agreed because they were satisfied it was a peace instrument -- then just formally we asked for the presence of the Emperor, and the essence of it was reported by the Chairman of the Privy Council.

Q. Do you know what his name is now? Do you remember who he was?

A. Yes, he was Mr. Hara.

Q. He was also then a separate individual advising the Emperor as well as Chairman of this Board?

A. No, no. In capacity of Chairman of the Privy Council.

Q. Now, at this time, at the time it was recommended, do you recall that the Emperor asked, or some direct representative of the Emperor asked for assurance that this alliance would not involve Japan in war with the U. S.?

A. No, I don't recall.

Q. You don't recall that the Emperor asked assurance of you, or someone representing the Emperor, for assurance that this alliance would not lead to war with the U. S. or Great Britain?

A. No. One day the Emperor asked me if this alliance would not ruffle the feelings of America, to which I replied it may to some extent, but by showing our sincerity and proving it was a friendly instrument and not a war alliance, and then approaching America gradually to improve our relations and settle the Pacific question and the China problem. I believed we could soften down the feeling. But the Emperor or anybody never referred to war possibility. And by the way, might I remind you to this day I am still wondering. While I was in the government there was no war talk with America at all, and according to the Kono Memoirs, all of a sudden in the third Kono Cabinet it says negotiations successful, or war. I am wondering how and why war talk with America all of a sudden. While myself in the government, we had no talk, no thought whatever, if negotiations unsuccessful war. My thought was simply through peaceful means, quietly, and wait for next chance. I am really wondering.

Q. Now, this conversation you say you had with the Emperor, concerning whether it would ruffle the feeling of the U. S. or not, did you have the conversation before this Privy Council meeting, and before the treaty had been approved by the Emperor, or afterwards?

A. I think it was before.

Q. Before. So you would say from this conversation with him that the Emperor was concerned about this matter?

A. Always concerned. But

Q. But you assured him you believed it only an instrument of peace, and while it might ruffle the feelings of the U. S. for the moment, eventually it would attain its object, which you had decided for it -- an object for maintaining peace.

A. By careful and skilful maneuvering.

Q. Well then, it is possible that this question of mine, whether or not the Emperor asked whether this would lead to war with the U. S., it is possible

that that may spring from this Imperial Conference you had with the Emperor?

A. It may be that that gave rise to such an imagined thing.

Q. Can you remember the circumstances as to time and place of this conference with the Emperor?

A. Yes, when I presented myself to the Emperor and reported about the intended Tripartite Pact. That took place in His Majesty's presence in the Court.

Q. May I ask you what formality is there about your presenting yourself under those circumstances? Is it a formal matter?

A. No.

Q. Do you appear with the Prime Minister or other members of the cabinet?

A. No.

Q. It is a lawful, constitutional manner in which the minister of that portfolio presents himself and reports to the Emperor?

A. Yes. I used to visit the Emperor every two or three days sometimes.

Q. I see, but it was at this meeting he inquired as to the effect of this?

A. Yes.

Q. Were there any of his advisory members present, who made any remarks would indicate to you there was some doubt on the subject?

A. No, and might I add they wouldn't -- we don't allow any third person to be present in our meeting; that is the state minister's meeting with the Emperor.

Q. Oh, you appear alone?

A. Yes, alone.

Q. Not even a stenographer? Nothing is set down in writing?

A. No.

Q. Do you know what the attitude of the military persons, that is these Field Marshals, was with respect to this Tripartite Pact? Did they make any expression?

A. No, I don't know. In fact, I don't even know when they met and how many and how they met.

Q. I see. Pretty much out of the realm of the civil portfolio officials of the government, or how they conduct their matters.

A. Yes.

Q. At this Privy Council meeting, previous to the approval of the Tripartite Pact, do you recall who was present at this meeting? The Chairman, of course, and who else?

A. Chairman, Mr. Hara, and Vice-Chairman Mr. Shinesu, and thirty some members. Some have since died, I think.

Q. Prince Konoye was not a member of this council?

A. Oh no. He was Prime Minister.

Q. Do you remember now any of the questions that arose in this seven hours with the Privy Council, concerning the approval of this Pact? What was the principal obstacle, if any?

A. They asked many questions to clarify the articles contained in the draft, and some even about the use of one or two words, you know.

Q. Do you remember what particular words they were so concerned about? Was this term attack specifically questioned -- this word "attack"?

A. I believe so. Almost every word you can call into question. That body was very scrutinizing.

Q. Did you make any explanation of the practical application of this treaty in eventualities? For example, did you make any explanation of the normal, natural result of the effect of this treaty in the eventuality that there was some obligation requiring Japan to go to war with some other party? In other words, it must have been apparent to the members of the Privy Council that, in effect, the Tripartite Alliance by excluding Russia from its terms, and having in mind -- I take it these members of the Privy Council were well-informed citizens of world conditions at the time -- they knew, of course, that Hitler had overrun Europe and that Britain was then faced with the possibility of imminent attack at that time -- what do you think, were they informed on that subject?

A. I think, except a few, that they were not very well informed.

Q. Did they not realize that England was facing the battle of her lifetime for the sustaining of her possessions?

A. I can't say. I think many of the Japanese people at the time thought that the war would end in a draw.

Q. And did it not occur to some of the members there that this treaty might from a very logical reading and application and analysis, apply only toward the U.S.?

A. They understood that it was an effort to prevent the U. S. from joining the war and making the war a real world conflagration.

Q. Did they consult with you specifically on Article 1, "Japan recognizes and respects the leadership of Germany and Italy in establishing a new world order in Europe"?

A. They considered generally about every article.

Q. And what explanation was made as to the exact meaning of this Article 1?

A. I said it was plainly put down in the preamble, for the first time in our history we made other peoples to recognize the Hakko Ichiu of Japan. That is, to give every race and nation its own place and to work out its own destiny, and so forth. I sincerely hoped that Germany and Italy would adopt the same idea.

Q. Well, by reading this Article 1, it does imply very definitely that "respects the leadership of Germany and Italy in the establishment of a new world order in Europe" -- it does imply the reduction of Great Britain to a position in keeping with the inherent terms of this article. True?

A. In keeping with the preamble.

Q. That Germany and Italy shall be the people who shall control Europe and establish a new order there. Now, Great Britain is a part of Europe, isn't it?

A. Yes, but we don't generally regard it so, you know. We generally have a way of thinking when we say Europe just the Continent.

Q. What about Russia? Do you consider Russia part of Europe?

A. No, we don't.

Q. But wouldn't that imply to these outstanding men of almost all arts and sciences in this Privy Council, wouldn't it occur to them that this was recognizing the right and authority of Hitler and Mussolini to establish a domination over all Europe?

A. That is in the sense of the preamble. If they disregarded the preamble, the sense of the preamble, well we will have to do something about it.

Q. Did they not carefully examine you as to the implication of recognizing this new leadership in Europe?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you give me, now, some essence or the nature of the interrogations or debate or statements that arose concerning this Article 1, by any members of the Privy Council?

A. First, they questioned me on the preamble. I explained, you know, as I repeatedly told you. Then we came to Article 2, and I explained as written down there. There is not much remains in Article 1 after explaining the sense of the preamble.

Q. It means exactly what it says, doesn't it?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, Article 2, "Germany and Italy recognize and respect the leadership of Japan in the establishment of a new world order in Greater East Asia." Now, what debate or explanation did you find necessary on that?

A. I didn't find such necessity of explaining. It meant as written down there, that in other words Germany won't interfere in Greater East Asia.

Q. Did you consider at that time that the Nine-Power Treaty was still in effect?

A. No, we didn't touch on this at all.

Q. Well, this Article 2 specifically is in contravention of the terms of the Nine-Power Treaty, to which Japan was a party, isn't it?

A. Maybe so, but it was never called into consideration in the Privy Council about it.

Q. Well, in your best judgment now, wouldn't you say that Article 2 was contrary to the terms of the understanding of the Nine-Power Treaty?

A. I don't think so. I have always regarded this Manchuria as belonging to the Manchu Dynasty and not to China.

Q. Well no, I mean a new order in Greater East Asia?

A. Yes, and as to the rest of the Greater East Asia no, it was not in contravention.

Q. According to this, Article 2, it established Japan and Japan only as the right of any leadership in Greater East Asia. Is that correct?

A. No, not Japan alone. Gradually, I meant to invite America and Great Britain to take part in the East Asia affairs. That was so written chiefly with the aim of preventing Germany and Italy carrying the European war to Greater East Asia.

Q. Was there nothing then pending which would justify a belief that Germany and Italy had any intention of carrying the war to Greater East Asia?

A. Well, not Italy, but Germany might carry on this U-boat warfare, for instance, or marauding expeditions just as she did in the first World War.

Q. In the Pacific areas?

A. Yes, in the Pacific areas.

Q. Practically speaking, Article 1 and Article 2 recognize the right of Germany and Italy to establish a new order in Europe, and Japan's right to establish a new order in Greater East Asia.

A. Yes, only I am saying that we don't mean to be so narrow as to monopolize it.

Q. Were the members of the Privy Council concerned about either one of these articles? Do you recall any serious objection or questioning of the terms?

A. No.

Q. Do you think it was either one of these two articles that the Emperor had in mind when he consulted with you concerning your opinion as to whether this would ruffle the opinion of the U. S.?

A. No. His Majesty does not say anything and I don't know what article he had in mind, but I suppose generally this pact as a whole.

Q. Now, Article 3, "Germany, Italy and Japan agree to cooperate in their efforts on the aforesaid lines. They further undertake to assist one another with all political, economic and military means when one of the three contracting parties is attacked by a power at present not involved in the European War or in the Chinese-Japanese conflict." Did that article give rise to any considerable discussion before the Privy Council?

A. Yes, naturally.

Q. Can you tell me, at least in substance, what was the nature of the discussion?

A. Japan's taking part, for instance, immediately in the war, and I said that we understood upon consultation it rested with Japan alone to decide whether to join or not to join the war. And Germany and Italy equally had that right.

Q. Yes, well this article here doesn't state in so many words that there shall be a consultation to determine this.

A. I think either on the face of that treaty somewhere, or in a secret understanding.

Q. There was that understanding?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, Article 4: "With a view to implementing the present pact, joint technical commissions, members of which are to be appointed by the respective governments of Germany, Italy and Japan, will meet without delay." Did that article give rise to discussion of any considerable length?

A. Of course, several questions -- but I explained as written there.

Q. Article 3, of course

A. I think I said but I placed most importance on peaceful industries.

Q. Well now, if this Article 3 depended on secret agreements or letters concerning such an important matter, was there presented at this Privy Council meeting secret letters or communications of any kind indicating this understanding for a conference before being engaged?

A. I don't recollect so, but I explained it. Isn't there some provision about it in the treaty?

Q. I don't see any here.

A. Well then, it must have been a secret understanding.

Q. It was a few days ago that we went into the question about some secret document or letter delivered to you by the German Ambassador, and you said some letters were delivered, but it is still vague to me what they contained.

A. Either secret or on the face of it, it meant that I have said. And as a matter of fact, as I told you, no such commission was ever appointed.

Q. By this understanding, you infer or leave the initiative with Japan as your interpretation of this Article 3, whether she should enter the war, if it doesn't appear in the document you say there is a secret agreement upon that point?

A. Yes, I have that recollection.

Q. This secret agreement concerning that matter, was that bi-lateral with respect to Germany? Did she also reserve that right?

A. I think there was something in a form of a letter. I am not sure. But you know, you have a right to question a specific case whether it was an attack by a third party or not, or whether it was attack by Germany or Italy, other way. That you have the right to consider very carefully to begin with.

Q. Yes. And that was cleared up, you say, and understood in some separate letters or agreement?

A. Yes.

Q. But you don't recall whether or not these letters or agreements were presented to this Privy Council meeting. My impression is that the question is one of such a serious nature that this meeting would have exhausted almost every effort to determine the nature of it.

A. Certainly, and all of the while I thought it was on the face of the treaty, the Triparty Pact, that agreement.

Q. Well, I read the articles to you.

A. If not, then my memory is failing.

Q. I have read the articles from one to six, and then the final clause, and I haven't found any sentence in there where you could construe anything -- any separate paragraph about that. Do you recall that anywhere?

A. All the while I thought so, but it must be a secret understanding.

Q. Well, now it has been represented in some documents that we have examined that there was an exchange of letters, not so much an exchange of letters between your Ambassador, Ott and Stahmer or both, but a letter addressed to you by Ambassador Ott, in which they go over the grounds of the conversation leading up to the signing of the Triparty Alliance, and then in one short paragraph they point out that the question of the interpretation of this clause on attack should be left to Japan to determine at a conference subsequent. This letter carries that out, but it is quite a lengthy letter addressed to you, in which it outlines the many things that have been said, and done up to the signing of this, and then in one almost -- well, very small paragraph, it says that it is understood that Japan will have the right to consider before committing herself to war. This was in a letter addressed to you from Ambassador Ott.

A. It must have been in the form of a letter or something. And I might say that we laid down the principle that when it was clearly attacked. That was the question, whether attacked or not, or which side started to attack. But granted it was a clear attack, we laid down the principle there.

Q. In this letter.

A. There.

Q. In this?

A. When I said attack there, it was beyond question that it was attack by third party.

Q. Yes, it says here: "When one of the three contracting parties is attacked by a power at present not involved in the European War or in the Chinese-Japanese conflict."

A. Yes, it laid down the principle when there is no question about attack.

Q. So that, if there is any understanding independent of this, you say, in interpretation of this word "attack" if it doesn't appear in this document, it is in a secret letter or understanding?

A. It must be.

Q. Do you recall having conversations with the Chief of the Legal Bureau of the Japanese Government, Mr. Matsumoto, concerning this very same point?

A. No, I don't recall, but he was in a position to scrutinize every word, and he might have discussed it with me.

Q. You don't recall now whether he discussed that very specific thing we are talking about now, this understanding about the word "attack"?

A. If he says he did, it would be so.

Q. But in any event the pact as it was presented at that time was never returned for alteration to the other parties, to include within it a more specific interpretation of this word "attack" or to include the right of Japan to consider independently the question when the situation arose concerning the attack.

A. Well at least about the point whether there was really an attack by the third party or not.

Q. But the pact was never returned to Germany or Italy to add anything further?

A. No, but let me remind you I never discussed it with the Italian ambassador. It was after practically the end of the deliberation, all at once to my surprise Ribbentrop wired out to add Italy. So I couldn't very well refuse.

Q. Now, for the purpose of clearing up something else in my mind -- if a representative of the German or Italian government came to your government and said "We are about to attack some other third party, or they have attacked us, not actually with gunpowder, but we contend that this embargo or this or that other situation amounts to an attack upon the integrity of our nation, and we hereby invoke the appropriate clause of the Tripartite Pact", to what clause do you think that would refer?

A. I think that would refer to the attack clause -- they were attacked.

Q. To clause 3?

A. And we would say we must confer with Germany and Italy, and then we must deliberate among ourselves to decide.

Q. Now, there is some evidence that the representative of the Japanese Foreign Office called upon the Foreign Minister of Italy several days previous to the attack on Pearl Harbor, setting up that they had been attacked and invoked the appropriate clause of the Tripartite Pact. If such a thing happened, would he, in your opinion, be invoking clause 3 or Article 3 of this pact?

A. It is my opinion that he would not be. We had no right, under the Three-Party Pact, to attack Pearl Harbor and Singapore.

Q. You don't think that in these secret agreements as to the word "attack", it was given such a broad interpretation as to include, or let us say any prerogative measure which this third party might take against a member of the Axis, which could not be really literally called a military attack, but which might be an attack by word of mouth, by institution of embargoes, or by some other interpretation, to attempt to include that in the normal understanding of the word "attack"?

A. Well, in some extreme case it would be very argumentative -- no, not argumentative, dubious. Generally speaking, it would not fall under those articles. This is another matter.

Q. I know you were out of the government.

A. I knew nothing about it, but later I heard that the Tojo government, after attacking Pearl Harbor, was very much worried that Germany might not join in the war against the U. S., and that he felt relieved when Germany responded. That shows that they were acting entirely upon new ground, not under the Three-Party Pact. Germany was not, in my opinion, obliged to join that war under the Tripartite Pact.

Q. Since Japan had attacked the U. S., rather than the U. S. attacking Japan?

A. Yes, and Japan was obliged under that Pact not to attack America.

Q. Well, that is a reasonable interpretation of it. I can understand that. It does appear, however, from this evidence, that this representative of the Japanese government did appear in the office of Ciano, the Foreign Minister of Italy, on a date which was several days previous to the attack on Pearl Harbor, and invoked the appropriate article of the Tripartite Pact, upon the theory that Japan had been attacked.

A. Is that so? What I heard later on was Japan never told any of the parties to the original Three-Party Pact that she was being attacked. She kept it ~~XXXX~~ secret from everyone and never told Germany or Italy. And just as I said,

and I think you understood, the pact was originally German-Japanese treaty, and I never expected that Italy would be invited from the start.

Q. I see. Well, it is your contention now, then, that the sudden attack which Japan made upon Singapore and Pearl Harbor, and this warfare in the Pacific areas, was actually in violation of the Tripartite Pact?

A. Yes, that is my opinion, and I said to some of my friends so at the time.

Q. Well, isn't it your belief that the preparation for this attack which Japan did make must have been under way during your term of office as Foreign Minister in Japan?

A. Maybe.

Q. It could have been?

A. Maybe, but these military men never tell us. From the fact, too, that they believed, I know, that they can cope with some success against Great Britain and America, together, but they couldn't have any chance if Soviet Russia takes part. Now, from that I think they must have made study and preparation.

Q. And don't you think that your conclusion of this non-aggression pact with Russia lent impetus to the armed forces of Japan in their initiation of this attack on Singapore?

A. No, I don't think so.

Q. You don't think that if there was some danger that Russia would attack Japan, in that eventuality that they would have followed another course, or been persuaded not to attack Singapore and Pearl Harbor?

A. To my mind at the time there was no danger of Soviet Russia attacking Japan in any event at the time. It was solely concluded with a view to enable me later on to go over to your country.

Q. But on the other hand, if there had not existed this non-aggression pact between Japan and Russia, and Japan had decided to enter the war against Russia as a party to the Tripartite Pact, and subsequently this attack on Singapore and Pearl Harbor had also taken place, the military forces of Japan would be fighting a war on two fronts, wouldn't they?

A. Two fronts, and that is what I feared.

Q. That is, Russia on the one hand on the land forces, and a great sea war between the U. S. and Great Britain and Japan. So that it is fair to assume that at least a logical effect of the non-aggression pact was in the reverse beneficial to the armed forces of Japan in this sudden attack in the Pacific area?

A. I think even in case we had no neutrality pact, I don't think Russia, -- unless attacked first.

Q. That is what I was thinking.

A. Unless Japan first attacked Soviet Russia, I don't think Russia would have attacked Japan.

Q. But assuming that Japan, as a party to this Tripartite Pact, and at the inquiry of Germany, or the suggestion or request of Germany, had gone to war against Russia shortly after June 22, and subsequently followed out this attack on December 7, as had been done, the military forces of Japan would be engaged in a two-front war.

A. Oh yes, that is exactly what I was dreading.

Q. So that, as a matter of fact, what the five-year non-aggression pact said to Russia was that we will not, for the next five years, according to the terms of this agreement, attack you with our military forces, and for that consideration we ask for the same agreement with you.

A. Yes.

Q. So that, in the normal understanding of the thing, it was in effect a neutralizing of the threat of war against Japan and against Russia, equally?

A. Yes.

Q. So that it left the armed forces of Japan as a whole with this single campaign in the Pacific areas to carry on?

A. Yes. On that point, I am repeating even if we had no pact with Russia, I don't think Russia would have attacked Japan. That is my understanding of the situation.

Q. On the other hand, Russia did abide by the terms of this treaty, didn't they? Even though they had been attacked by Germany, and even though they had become an ally of the U. S. and Great Britain in the war against Germany, they did not attack Japan within that five-year period, or within the terms of the treaty?

A. Before the five years terminated.

Q. The pact was signed in 1940.

A. The pact would have ended April 1945.

Q. It was a five-year period, wasn't it?

A. It would have ended this year.

Q. But didn't it contain a condition or clause that within a period of one year of the expiration of this treaty, either party may notify the other it has no intention of renewing it, but with relation to that clause Russia did not attack Japan within that period?

A. No.

Q. It seems to me, as I recall it, that they notified Japan almost on the day.

A. Yes, but they don't mean that Russia was absolved from the treaty.

Q. But in effect, in the early stages of the war against the U. S., when Japan had tremendous early successes in the Pacific areas, Russia did not join the war against Japan?

A. No.

Q. So that actually your treaty or your agreement and non-aggression pact with Russia did actually have the effect of allowing the military forces of Japan in the south and the Pacific to carry on war without having to meet a war against Russia in the north.

A. On that point, I have repeatedly said that even without the neutrality pact, Japan had no fear of being attacked in the north by Soviet Russia. And Russia would not have attacked Japan until she was sure Japan would collapse in a day or two.

Q. But on the other hand, it did have the effect? Leaving Japan with both arms free to fight the battle of the Pacific.

A. No, that is I wished to see around to your country and negotiate and that I could not do on account of my illness and the downfall of the Kono Cabinet.

Q. But in effect, the non-aggression pact with Russia did leave the armed forces of Japan free?

A. But on that point, I am saying that even if we had no pact, Russia would not have attacked Japan, and therefore left Japan free until she realized Japan would have collapsed in a day or two.

Q. Well, this is a change of opinion, then, of what you so urgently desired to obtain in this non-aggression pact with Russia.

A. I was repeating the other way, it took years of negotiating and it was not suddenly concluded.

Q. The point I am trying to make is this -- that you told me yesterday, even in your trip to Berlin it was to camouflage the main purpose which was the urgent necessity, as you saw it, to conclude this pact with Russia. That you even requested or urged the German government to use their good offices to this end.

A. I don't think you are right to put it as necessity. It had been negotiated for years, and now I thought I must push and accomplish the end.

Q. Then to put it mildly, you wanted and desired the thing to the extent that you went to Berlin merely as camouflage, and asked the German government to assist you in obtaining this.

A. That was the understanding from when we concluded the Tripartite Pact, and Germany failed to do so.

Q. But when we are confronted with that treaty, and what actually happened in the war, you make light of it and say even without this treaty, it would have made little or no difference to Japan.

A. No, big difference. It strengthened the stand Japan takes in leading world peace, and in coming around to the U. S. and cooperating with her. With that end in view.

Q. But when I propounded this question, that the effect of this non-aggression treaty left the armed forces of Japan free of threat from Russia to use their full power and weight in the Pacific war, you answer, as I get it, well even without this non-aggression pact, Russia would not have attacked Japan anyway, or Japan would not have attacked Russia anyway.

A. Can't you get my point -- that if what you said were the main objective of the pact, then I would say that because of the neutrality pact I don't think that Russia left Japan's arms free to fight in the Southwest. That is what I mean. But the main object was different with me in ~~me~~ concluding this.

Q. Well, in the normal analysis of the thing, it is much easier to see the logical effect of it, as we do, than to ~~say~~ see the contention which you bring forward, which you state here was to lay the foundation to make some negotiations with the U. S., which remains still to me in a nebulous state. I don't see what possible benefit it could have made with respect to the relations of the U. S. and Japan in that period in history, to have made a non-aggression pact with Russia. I am willing to hear your explanation of it.

A. I explained already, and I told Mr. Steinhart in Moscow, that I told truth when I inquired very frankly that I was trying to get a non-aggression treaty and I presumed the U. S. would welcome it as a link in keeping world peace, etc. I really thought it would be welcomed by your country.

Q. By that you mean that the relationship between the U. S. and Russia had reached, at the time, the U. S. and Russia had reached a relationship of friendliness?

A. No, that I don't know. I am speaking of a treaty like a neutrality pact it would be welcomed as a peaceful instrument.

Q. Just because of the fact that it was a neutrality pact? Not because of relations toward the U. S. or anyone else?

A. No.

Q. But by the mere fact that in that time of world trouble, you negotiated a neutrality pact that in and of itself painted a picture of neutrality?

A. And that Japan was making, as your country would have observed, an effort to improve peace with Soviet Russia and other countries.

Q. And by that now, do you think that the Japanese forces would still have carried out the campaign as they did, with the initiative, whether or not they had this treaty with Russia or not?

A. As I repeated often, no consideration of that kind was in my mind. I never thought of war against Great Britain, much less against America.

Q. Of course, it happened very shortly afterward.

A. Well, it did unfortunately, but I myself never dreamed of it. In concluding that pact, I had nothing of the kind in my mind.

Q. This pact was concluded in April of 1941, is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And it must be fair to assume, having in relation the date of December 7 or 8, in that period of months lapsing, that at the very time you were negotiating this non-aggression pact with Russia, the armed forces of Japan were already in advance preparation for the war which was initiated on December 7.

A. I don't think so, only in the sense that every country tries to make preparation for an eventuality.

Q. Were you a member of any planning board?

A. No.

Q. Were you a member of the Cabinet Advisory Board?

A. Some time ago.

Q. Do you remember what that was about?

A. Let me see, the Abe cabinet.

Q. Was this board organized for --- just what was its purpose?

A. To, when the government approaches, consider on any question to discuss and advise.

Q. Well, was it political or economic, or ^{what} was its purpose? It was a new institution, wasn't it?

A. Yes, established by Konoye. That is, we had some from political parties and from business circles.

Q. Wasn't it one of the steps which Japan took in preparation for this war? Was it not one of the steps that led up to the necessity of bringing the political and economical forces of the nation closer together for the war?

A. No.

Q. What questions were debated at this council?

A. All sorts of questions.

Q. For example?

A. Sometimes economic situation of a country.

Q. Did the armed forces ever make representations to this board concerning certain raw materials and the necessity for construction of armaments?

A. No, we never discussed military matters there.

Q. Did they ever advise concerning foreign policies?

A. Yes, I recall under the Harayama cabinet we discussed about the German-Japanese treaty. But very strange to say we couldn't find out exactly what was going on in the government. They just gave a bare outline.

Q. Why was this board created at that time?

A. Prince Konoye thought of adding advice from among experienced men to strengthen the cabinet, and I was really -- Prince Konoye consulted me then, and I was absolutely against that.

Q. In relation to the formation of that board, when did the suppression of political parties take place, and the installation of the so-called IRAA come into existence?

A. In the second Konoje cabinet.

Q. Were you on the advisory board on that matter?

A. As a state minister, my name was put down, but I was against many things.

Q. You were a member of the advisory board at the time it -- that the establishment of this act took place?

A. Well, I attended a meeting once, but never afterward.

Q. You were a strong advocate of the abolition of political parties, as they existed in Japan at that time?

A. Yes, but not for this body.

Q. You didn't consider the installation of the so-called IRAA as having effected the suppression of political parties?

A. I frankly said even in public speeches that you may change the construction a number of times, but it will remain impotent just the same. My contention was to strengthen the cabinet itself, and to respect the Parliament.

Q. How long were you a member of this advisory board?

A. As long as I remained State Minister, but I never attended.

Q. As long as you remained State Minister?

A. It is a matter of form, you know.

Q. What particular phase of Japanese life and government did you represent on this advisory board?

A. I don't represent any, but as Foreign Minister.

Q. Well, my impression is that this advisory board was a selection of persons representing political, big business, and all matters involving the economy and other matters of the Japanese nation as a whole.

A. You are talking about this Advisory Council to the Cabinet.

Q. Yes.

A. Well, I think maybe Konoje thought he might enlist my experience rather as a business man. I was then, you know, President of the South Manchurian

Railway. And I excused myself and I said I refused to be a member, telling him I was mostly in Manchuria and I couldn't attend the meetings, and he said if you have anything you can write us.

Q. How many members were there on this board?

A. I think twelve or thirteen.

Q. Do you remember any of the other members.

A. Yes.

Q. Can you name some of them?

A. Let me see. Akita, Maita.

Q. Akita? Who did he represent? What element?

A. Sautai.

Q. That is a political party, isn't it?

A. Maita also belonged to Sautai.

Q. Was Ugaki on it?

A. Later he joined. I think he was a member of Mitsui. Altogether twelve or thirteen. I can't remember many.

Q. Was big business represented?

A. Yes.

Q. Financial circles?

A. Yes.

Q. The military also represented?

A. Military? Let me see, who could there be? Later Tsunaga joined. He was Minister of the Interior then, and later he joined. And altogether twelve or thirteen.

Q. Well, a person could look it up, couldn't they?

A. Yes.

Q. It was a new institution in the government of Japan?

A. Yes.

Q. Organized in 1937 or 1936?

A. Under the first Konoye cabinet.

Q. Oh, the first Konoye cabinet? Well, let's see, his first cabinet failed when Germany made the treaty with Russia. Isn't that it, when they made some sort of a treaty with Russia?

A. That is next cabinet. That is Haraguma cabinet. The first Konoye cabinet failed -- well, Konoye was a man who if he begins to dislike his political life, he gives up for nothing. Of course, I was very intimate friend, but I have to say that.

Q. Waivering?

A. Yes.

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INTERROGATION OF

MATSUOKA, Yosuke

Date and Time: 15 March 1946, 1400 -- 1630 hours.

Present : MATSUOKA, Yosuke
Lt. Cmdr. John D. Shea, USNR, Interrogator
Miss Clara B. Knapp, Stenographer

Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan

Interrogation conducted in English.

Questions by Cmdr. Shea.

MATSUOKA: Before you go into questioning me today will you allow me to amplify one or two points in my answers to your questions yesterday, lest there might be some misunderstanding?

CMR. SHEA: Surely.

MATSUOKA: Let me see, I thought about it and the first point was that you asked me whether I reported to the Throne in favor of the Tripartite Pact. I said yes, but that must be modified in this way, or rather amplified. I answered yes, granted of course that the matter was decided in the government and reported in the presence of the Emperor before I spoke anything in favor in the audience. You know, I want I was in favor of the Tripartite Pact, after that process. In the Japanese government you are not supposed to speak pro or con on any subject before it is decided one way or another in the highest liaison conference. At least, or to strictly speak, I think not before the cabinet decided about it, but sometimes that part of the process is dispensed with and in any case until the agreement at the highest liaison conference was reported to the Throne, mostly the Premier on that occasion speaks about the decision. You are not allowed to say pro or con about it, and of course you may be received in audience to explain things, but not to say pro or con, or else before you know it it was decided, if you said anything opposite that might break up the cabinet itself. The second point is this -- you questioned me about the independent report to the Throne by Minister of War or Minister of Navy. I thought about it and you meant IWAKU JOSO. We say that in Japanese. That was started by the late Marshal UENAHARA some years ago, and ever since the Minister of War and Minister of Navy, they contended that they had the right of IWAKU JOSO.

Q. And they always exercised it since that time?

A. Seldom. Generally it brings the downfall of the cabinet immediately. And I go to see the Emperor every two or three days and that is we call SEIMU JOSO. Translated, the meaning of it is to report to the Throne on the affairs under your charge. It is the ordinary run of the affairs.

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Q. Is it an informal reporting? The other members of the cabinet are not present, are they?

A. I will explain. Each state minister has a right to go before the Throne and report on affairs in his charge. That is in nature of explanation, but he is not supposed to give pro or con on the subject.

Q. I see.

A. That is the difference. The other one is independently of the cabinet. Of course, you can see from it that generally in your position to what the cabinet decided upon, and so generally speaking it brings the downfall of the cabinet. That is the difference, you know -- independent of the cabinet. That means generally with Minister of War or Minister of Navy, when they disagree with the cabinet, he goes independent of the cabinet to the Throne and makes report and generally that brings the split and downfall of the cabinet. Now, you get it clear now?

Q. Yes.

A. I might say, for instance, I saw the Emperor nearly every day, as Foreign Minister, but just in nature of explanation.

Q. Did the Minister of Navy or Army have recourse to the highest liaison conference and bring matters before them?

A. Suppose he disagrees with the report of the members, and he is still determined to call the attention of the Emperor, he goes independent of the liaison conference or cabinet, and of course you can see it brings about the downfall of the cabinet. And if I said anything in opposition to what we agreed in liaison conference or cabinet, that would bring split.

Q. Now, these private conversations that you may have with the Emperor, by virtue of your ministry, these opportunities you have to explain concerning matters involving your ministry.

A. Not private, it is official.

Q. Well, your explanation at that time is more or less between yourself and the Emperor. It doesn't involve the cabinet, does it?

A. No.

Q. When you say to explain a thing, if the Emperor should inquire of you, for example, whether or not in your opinion in the negotiations on the Tripartite Alliance there was danger that it might involve the U. S. and Japan in difficulties, would you say that that would be a proper subject of explanation in one of these informal conferences between your ministry and the Emperor?

A. Yes, as I told you in that case I said it may ruffle the feelings of Americans somewhat, but I can go about with caution and sincerity, and I may soften that feeling and come to an understanding with America.

Q. Now, with respect to this right or prerogative that you exercise by virtue of your portfolio, in your ministry in the cabinet, you wouldn't have to wait for an invitation from the Emperor to go in on one of these missions, would you?

A. Sometimes by invitation, sometimes by my invitation.

Q. So it is possible when Prince Konoye refers to some conversation you had with the Emperor concerning the Tripartite Pact, it is possible he might have had reference to one of these occasions when either on your own initiative or at the request of the Emperor, you appeared and made some explanation concerning the matter.

A. Yes, that is possible.

Q. And that did not bring about a downfall of the cabinet.

A. No, no, no. It is in the nature of explanation, but even if I spoke, even in that interview, pro or con, or disregarded what the government decided, that may bring about the downfall.

Q. Let us assume, for example, that this conversation between yourself and the Emperor, based on your ministry, takes place before this matter is presented through the usual course of the government; that is, the cabinet and the highest liaison conference -- suppose this conversation takes place before that, and the issue is not before the government on that basis, then it would not result in the downfall of the government?

A. No, not if I spoke only in explanation.

Q. What I would like to know is whether or not you said anything, whether you had any of these personal or private conversations concerning the Tripartite Alliance with the Emperor before the matter was decided upon by the Imperial Conference or highest Liaison conference or cabinet. Did you have conversations before that?

A. I think some conversations, but not much. It is our habit not to report while things are in progress.

Q. While they are in progress you usually don't?

A. Not unless specifically questioned.

Q. May I ask you this -- what vehicle of the government between the Throne and the Emperor keeps the Emperor advised of what the government is doing concerning these matters before they are brought to his attention in their completion or act of completion? How does the Throne know what is in process of being done?

A. If it was a political matter the Emperor would request me to present myself and explain.

Q. Now, with respect to the Tripartite Alliance, from a very practical approach to it, my understanding is that before you became Foreign Minister in 1940, this whole question of alliance had previously been taken up in Berlin some years before. Is that true?

A. I never heard of it. It was discussed by the Hiranuma cabinet, that is all I know.

Q. At one time Gohma, Ambassador to Berlin, after your taking office as Foreign Minister, had previously been Ambassador to Berlin under some other cabinet?

A. Yes.

Q. And he remained there until Germany made some sort of an economic treaty or some sort of treaty with Russia that brought about the fall of a cabinet in Japan, and the eventual recall as Ambassador of Gohma, or he retired.

A. That was the Hiranuma cabinet.

Q. So that, did you have any knowledge previous to the conversations early in September with Stahmer or the German government, concerning the basis upon which the Tripartite Alliance was entered into?

A. No, not except as Counsellor to the cabinet, I with other members questioned about it in our meeting, but the answer by Baron Hiranuma was so vague and evasive, and as you say in America, spotty.

Q. You were on the Advisory Board of the cabinet in 1937?

A. I think so in 1937.

Q. When you became Foreign Minister, someone took the initiative to suggest that this Tripartite Alliance be entered into. Is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Who took the initiative in this case, as far as your government was concerned?

A. When the second Konohe Cabinet was to be formed, it was agreed upon between Premier Konohe, myself, General Tojo--the War Minister

Q. General Tojo was War Minister?

A. Yes, and Admiral Yoshida Minister of the Navy, that we should establish closer relations with Germany.

- Q. Oh, I see. At the time conversations were taking place concerning the formation of this Prince Konoye cabinet?
- A. Second Prince Konoye Cabinet.
- Q. The one in which you became Foreign Minister?
- A. Yes.
- Q. It was previously decided that action should be taken -- will you repeat that again? -- to bring about closer relations with Germany?
- A. And
- Q. And was that elaborated on, what the approach would be, or how it should be accomplished?
- A. No.
- Q. Was that left to your judgment?
- A. No, it was discussed after the cabinet was formed.
- Q. With whom?
- A. Among ourselves.
- Q. The same group that you mentioned before?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Prince Konoye, yourself, Tojo, and the Navy Minister?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Any others?
- A. Whether Chief of Staff and Chief of Operations were among us, I don't recollect. I think they are not.
- Q. Well, that was after the cabinet was formed?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Can you give me, can you possibly recollect what the substance of that conversation was?
- A. I think it was not the first alliance draft, you know, it was a long

document drawing us closer, but no military alliance there.

Q. Who made the draft of the document?

A. That was produced by Admiral Oka and General Nute, Chief of the Military Bureau.

Q. They presented a draft of an alliance?

A. Not alliance.

Q. Of a proposed agreement of some sort?

A. Of drawing us closer to Germany.

Q. Let us say then a proposed plan of how to draw Japan closer to cooperation with Germany.

A. To enter into some sort of agreement, but it doesn't mention any sort of alliance, much less a military alliance.

Q. Now, can you say upon whose suggestion these two gentlemen made this draft?

A. Well, I think they were directed by the Minister of the Navy and Minister of War.

Q. Oh, I see, they were not themselves either the Minister of War or Navy.

A. They were directed by their superiors.

Q. Were you present when this first draft was submitted?

A. Yes, it was handed to me through, I think the chief of the bureau in charge of those affairs, and through the Vice Minister.

Q. In any event, this draft came to you through the military members of the cabinet?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, did you examine this draft?

A. I examined it. I took many days.

Q. Do you recall now what, in substance, was the nature of it?

A. It was substance of, well all I can say is that it was to enter into an agreement drawing Japan closer to Germany, but not in alliance or any military arrangement. That is all I can say. So, after studying the draft I began my

questions to Germany and then Stahmer came and we discussed it.

Q. Oh, I see. Now, can you remember any single part of this draft, so that you could elaborate on the theory at least, that these people had? To bring close is so relative a term. We have no understanding what was meant by it.

A. At this date, I don't recollect any particular articles on the subject.

Q. Are you able to say, from your position officially, or your previous knowledge from being a member of the Cabinet Advisory Board, or any knowledge you might have had as a citizen -- what prompted the military to suggest to the Kono cabinet that such an agreement or such an approach should be made to the German government?

A. Well, in those days I heard about it, and I actually saw that the War Office and Navy Office were having their say in diplomacy, and as soon as I assumed portfolio, I began to fight against it, but there was no use.

Q. In other words, you considered that they were invading the field of the Foreign Office in diplomacy?

A. Certainly.

Q. Well, didn't you find that pretty much true of the military group, or parts of the military groups of Japan for some years previous to 1940?

A. That usage?

Q. Yes.

A. Yes, sometimes. I heard about it and then I actually saw it, and I used to almost fight against them, rebuking my inferiors, you know, and most of them were so cowed before the military and naval authorities.

Q. You mean the other members of the cabinet?

A. No, no. The chiefs of different departments in my office. I very often used to tell them what did they think about diplomacy--that is the business of the Foreign Office.

Q. I think you said previously that there were some conversations before the actual formation of the cabinet, that such a procedure should be undertaken, to wit: closer collaboration or relationship, at least, with Germany.

A. Yes.

Q. This preceded the formation of the cabinet?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, is that the occasion upon which, to your judgment, General Muto and Admiral Oka were at this conference previous to the formation of the cabinet, when they presented this suggestion -- or afterwards? This draft, I mean.

A. They were included.

Q. No. Did this general and this admiral from the War and Navy Departments, did they present this proposed draft or agreement with Germany before the cabinet was actually formed, or afterwards?

A. That was sometime after the cabinet was formed.

Q. Was there any indication in this conference before the cabinet was formed, that the military were going to make such a proposal to the cabinet when it was formed?

A. No, they never informed us.

Q. Was it not considered a bit unusual that the War and Navy Ministers should send other parties to the cabinet to represent a desire and a draft of this type?

A. No, in those days the chief of the bureau concerned with the particular affair in mind -- he was constantly in conference with these men.

Q. Now, General Tojo was the Minister of War in that cabinet?

A. Yes.

Q. Who was Minister of Navy?

A. Admiral Yoshik.

Q. Was it your impression or understanding that the men who presented this draft were present there with the consent, understanding or request of the Army and Navy Ministers of the cabinet?

A. Yes.

Q. That seemed clear?

A. Yes.

Q. It didn't appear to you that they had injected themselves over the heads of the Ministers?

A. No.

Q. If you recall, what was Prince Konoye's reaction to the first presentation of these drafts that were made to the cabinet?

A. I don't know whether it was a proposal made to the cabinet. It was made to me. They brought it to the Foreign Office to me, and whether Konoye was handed one copy or not I don't think so. Later I explained it to Konoye and Konoye is a man to say nothing. He simply listened.

Q. Before this draft was presented, had you had any conversation with the Minister of War, Tojo, and Minister of the Navy Yoshida, or had you had any conversation with these two cabinet ministers concerning the presentation of this draft? Had they mentioned it to you?

A. No.

Q. There were no preliminary conversations before these things were presented?

A. No, and Admiral Yoshida shortly resigned, you know, on account of his illness. He had this heart trouble and entered the Naval Hospital. And the third point is that I thought I made efforts to recall to my memory about the members of the council to the cabinet; that is the original counsellors to the second Konoye Cabinet, and I can now recall. It was Mr. Machida, then president of the Minseito Party, one of the major parties. And Mr. Kita of Mitsui. And Baron Oeaki, also, of financial circles in Japan -- he died since -- and General Araki and Admiral Abe, both retired, you know. And Akita, as I said the other day, and Maita, as I said, and I am not sure about them but I think this NAKAJIMA and let me explain. The ordinance that created us -- counsellors to the state -- it was rather strange. We had no right to form any board, you know. Each gives his personal opinions on anything upon his responsibility alone, so we can't vote on anything as a board.

Q. This Advisory Council?

A. Yes. That was rather strange ordinance, and then again do you consider I should have accepted that? They were created largely to pep up the cabinet by gathering these big men.

Q. Well, getting back to the question at hand, the first knowledge you had of any desire on the part of the Konoye cabinet, of a desire of the Army and Navy to enter into closer collaboration or relationship with Germany, was when these two persons presented you with a proposed draft of an agreement

with Germany, is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And you examined this, did you?

A. Not adraft, but what they thought might be considered in formulating an agreement.

Q. Can you give us the substance of that -- what their idea was generally?

A. In a general way I think it was to prevent Germany, as far as possible, from carrying the European war into Asiatic waters and to get their new inventions or machinery, whether military or peaceful, to Japan. And that is about all I remember. It was very evasive, and well, I should say, misleading statement of things. I don't remember the reason.

Q. Then you would say that for the most part it was a memorandum or written suggestion that some alliance or agreement be made with Germany along those lines?

A. Yes, and giving consideration included in any agreement, but it was short of an alliance.

Q. Well now, based on this suggestion from the Army and Navy, did you proceed then on your own initiative to develop and conclude the Tripartite Alliance, or did you send suggestions to Germany that such an alliance or some sort of an agreement of that sort would be welcomed or considered favorably?

A. No, I don't. Instead, as I told you the other day, I put some questions to Germany.

Q. Do you remember the nature of the questions?

A. Yes, I gave you.

Q. I don't recall them. Will you restate them now?

A. Their relations with America now and after the war, and their relations in regard to Japan trying to readjust its relations with Soviet Russia, and then Stahmer came out. I put the same questions, and he answered. Until Germany made their position clear on this, on those points, I never told Germany that we wanted to draw more closely to Germany.

Q. You didn't have any knowledge at that time that there had been approaches made by Oshima when he had formerly been Ambassador to Berlin, of just exactly the same subject matter?

A. No, but I knew Hiranuma cabinet was discussing for a long time about the alliance treaty.

Q. So that it is possible that when the Konoye Cabinet, the second cabinet that is, was again formed, the same forces who were attempting to bring it about in the Hiranuma cabinet again initiated their efforts in that regard?

A. No, I disregarded all the past and I put new questions.

Q. What reply did Germany give you with respect to your questions as to the U. S., to their attitude with respect to your operations in the past?

A. They don't give me any reply.

Q. They just sent Stahmer?

A. I was informed, I think I am correct in my memory, from Kurusu, our ambassador, that von Ribbentrop could not well understand my questions and therefore some days afterward Stahmer started for Tokyo.

Q. And he did call on you concerning these questions?

A. And I put the same questions to Stahmer.

Q. What was Stahmer's attitude in the matter, do you recall?

A. Well, as I said the other day, the very first question I put to Stahmer was what Germany thought about her relations with America now, and he immediately answered that Germany wanted to avoid any clash with America. In other words, wanted to be at peace with America. Then I stopped. I said from whom these replies came or these words came from?

Q. You mean by what authority he made this statement?

A. Yes. I said from whom may I regard these words to come from, and he replied directly from Ribbentrop, and then I proceeded and I questioned him about Germany's thought after the war, about Germany's relations with America.

Q. You mean, assuming that Germany would win the war?

A. No, not exactly win or end by draw or anything.

Q. Well, these conversations were taking place in September 1940, and at that period of time, Hitler had conquered all of Europe except Russia, isn't that correct?

A. That is correct.

Q. So what exactly did you mean about what von Ribbentrop's or Hitler's ideas concerning America were at that time, in the light of those circumstances?

A. Well, Stahmer replied they wanted to avoid any clash with America, and so I asked suppose the war ended either by draw or by victory. I don't say it

Q. May I interrupt at this point. Did you have in mind the complete domination of England by Hitler or Germany in that question?

A. No.

Q. Did you have in mind that so far as the war itself was concerned, it was at an end in Europe at that time?

A. I had in mind that some day it would end, either by draw or victory of Great Britain or victory of Germany. God alone knew about it, and I don't assume anything on that point.

Q. Up until this conversation, however, there had been no knowledge on your part that England and Germany were considering conclusion of the war? For all intents and purposes, it appeared the war was to continue?

A. But after the war ended, I asked what Germany thought about her relations with America, and Mr. Stahmer answered that they wanted to improve and be on best friendly terms with America.

Q. Wasn't there some conversation about America, in defense of England, becoming party to the war?

A. No.

Q. Stahmer didn't suggest that?

A. No.

Q. Hadn't the U. S. already been shipping goods to England?

A. Shipping goods, but not taking any part in the war, and we don't question that. We don't consider that help as intaking part in the war directly.

Q. Had not the Ambassador in Washington reported to the Japanese government by that time, the attitude of The American government with respect to aid to England and with respect to the war as a whole.

A. Well, not only from the Ambassador, but I saw in the papers America is doing her best to aid England.

Q. Was it a question under consideration that perhaps an alliance between yourself and Germany and Italy would have a tendency to checkmate or neutralize the aid which the U. S. was then giving to England?

A. No, not neutralize, but at least I felt that it might have the effect of preventing America from joining the war by armed force.

Q. Before you had this conversation with Stahmer, either before you sent the notes to Germany and his arrival, or in the interim, or both, the sending of the notes and this conversation -- we are now relating to the U. S. aiding England. They had ambassadors certified to Japan, didn't they, here in Tokyo?

A. The U. S. had Mr. Grew.

Q. Did you have any conversations with Ambassador Grew concerning the attitude of the U. S. with respect to Germany and the war on England, or the matter of the whole progress of the war in Europe?

A. I didn't particularly have any conversation, but I gathered from my conversations with him and otherwise that the U. S. was helping with goods and war equipment.

Q. So that there was already then apparent, the intention or at least an implied attitude from the facts and circumstances surrounding this aid to Britain, that the U. S. had definitely taken a stand against Hitler and his armed forces in Europe?

A. Yes, but I never thought that America would join the war directly with armed force.

Q. You didn't avail yourself of any opportunity to call on Mr. Grew for a consultation concerning this matter.

A. Oh no.

Q. Then, as a matter of fact, you were not so much seeking an agreement with the U. S. on the subject, as you were seeking an agreement with Germany with the same subject matter.

A. And first reach an agreement and wait for good chance to go over to the States and negotiate for an agreement, and in entering into this Tripartite Pact naturally I couldn't have it known by the British or American embassies, you know.

Q. What concern was it to Japan, particularly to their military representatives here, when you say presented this suggestion to you, whether the U. S. continued her assistance to England or not?

A. Only, I think, in some conversations with Stahmer, Germany doesn't regard the assistance America was giving them was considered to be breach of the Tripartite pact, and he said no.

Q. Doesn't it seem quite apparent that the attitude of the military members of your government and/or the government policies as such, had decided that

it seemed very apparent that the Axis or the Hitler powers and arms, and Italy, had been so successful in Europe that it seemed imminent that a division of the world in sphere of domination was actually about to take place, and that it was then time for Japan to join forces with the Nazis and the Italian Fascists who had carved such a large measure of the earth already, so that Japan would be in a position to continue her so-called development of the Greater East Asia co-prosperity sphere.

A. I don't think many of the military had that opinion, that they were sure of the final outcome. And I was not sure about the final outcome.

Q. Well, doesn't it seem highly inconsistent that a nation that was so concerned about the U. S. being drawn into the war should, as a matter of offsetting this possibility, enter into an alliance and suggest an entrance into an alliance of the type of the Tripartite Pact with the German government and the Italian Government, as a remedy?

A. Well, it is quite natural to limit the sphere of the European war on the one hand, and then to prevent Germany from directing American citizens of German origin to carry on propaganda against Japan, thus creating trouble between the two countries, and then to prevent America from joining the war thus leading to a world conflagration. This was quite natural in my mind, and then with Japan's position somewhat strengthened with respect, with self-respect, to approach America and reach an understanding.

Q. We seem to have no dispute on the principal question, that the purpose of the Axis alliance was to affect the course of the U. S. concerning the war.

A. To prevent.

Q. Yes, to prevent. And up to the time of the signing and implementation of the Tripartite Alliance, you had not, as Foreign Minister, entered into any consultation with the U. S. concerning this matter?

A. No.

Q. Why?

A. Well, I thought it is not time yet to consult America or give any other country about it.

Q. Well, up to that time, September 1940, had not the U. S. government, through its Secretary of State and ambassadors, through messages from the President of the U. S., public utterances, and otherwise, indicated to Japan strongly that her policies in the Far East needed diplomatic settlement and approach?

- A. I don't receive any memorandum to such an effect, but America was complaining also about the damage caused to American students in China, and as soon as I became Foreign Minister, I asked your ambassador, Mr. Grew, to bring these cases to me. I will personally study and try to remedy these things.
- Q. But this was just with respect to damage to American property in China. What about the protest of violation of the Nine-Power Treaty, and such things as that?
- A. That was never called to my attention.
- Q. How about the U. S. having broken off her commercial and navigation treaty with Japan? Hadn't that already taken place?
- A. I thought about the Manchurian question.
- Q. And the U. S. abrogated the treaty with Japan that had stood since 1911.
- A. As counsellor to cabinet, long before I became Foreign Minister I advised to remedy the situation.
- Q. But the first official act you undertook when you became Foreign Minister was, at the behest of military members of your cabinet, you sent questions to Germany, that you would like certain questions answered concerning the U. S., after which they sent Stahmer here, and shortly thereafter you made the Tripartite alliance, and this before you made any attempt to approach the situation outlined previously, between the U. S. and Japan.
- A. My plan was to approach the U. S. afterward, but at the same time I must say that the very first attempt was to approach Chiang-Kai-Shek for settlement.
- Q. Well, here -- the Japanese government had on more than one occasion indicated in their dealings between the U. S. and Japan, that they preferred to settle the Chinese question with the Chinese themselves, without the intervention of the U. S.
- A. Between Japan and China. The whole Kono declaration was already out, you know, and your government knew what we were aiming at.
- Q. And the U. S., previous to your becoming Foreign Minister, had already indicated to the world that they were sending aid and assistance to Chiang-Kai-Shek in China, in defense of that country against your troops in the field.
- A. I don't recollect but I knew of the facts.
- Q. Did you not know that Lend-Lease materials were being sent to China?
- A. That was after I assumed my portfolio.

Q. It was apparent to you that the U. S. was committed to a very definite policy concerning China and the taking over of China by Japanese forces?

A. And so I wished to go about in some way to withdraw our forces from China.

Q. When you say it was your desire and your purpose by the Tripartite Alliance to keep the U. S. out of the war so that it would not be brought to the Far East, to Asia

A. And from developing into a real world war

Q. The only question then presented between the U. S. and Japan which might result in the U. S. entering the war in Asia, was the Chinese question, principally.

A. I never thought that way.

Q. I mean, as a matter of fact, that was the situation, wasn't it?

A. No.

Q. And at that time, Japanese forces had not yet invaded Singapore, had they?

A. No.

Q. And their entrance into French Indo China had come after the fall of France, isn't that true? Sometime after France fell to the Germans?

A. Yes.

Q. So that the real contention between the U. S. and Japan was Japan's attack, as America put it, -- an aggressive action toward China.

A. Yes.

Q. So that the only persons in the Far East who were initiating any action which could in any event limit it to this circumstance and bring the U. S. into the war, was the Japanese Government. Isn't that true?

A. No. I thought that while the China problem was very serious, the U. S. would never join the war because of it. Nevertheless, inasmuch as it was very grave, I wanted gradually to reach an understanding with the U. S. and withdraw our forces from China.

Q. Now was there any suggestion at the time you discussed this matter with Mr. Stahmer and the Government of Germany, concerning this Tripartite Alliance -- was there any suggestion at that time that the U. S. be invited into the alliance?

- A. No, but I said referring to the idea embodied in the preamble of that pact, that gradually Japan would invite all the countries in the world to join.
- Q. What is the preamble of that?
- A. The preamble embodies the idea of Hakko Ichiu.
- Q. Was that in the preamble of the Tripartite Alliance?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And what is this Hakko Ichiu again?
- A. My interpretation is to give to every nation or race its own place, and let it work out its own destiny.
- Q. But also, in one of the articles to that preamble, it recognizes between Germany and Japan, Germany's right to carve out and control that area within their sphere, and Japan's right to develop this sphere here in Greater East Asia, didn't it?
- A. You are putting on a different idea. Germany to work out that preamble in Europe, and Japan to work out in East Asia, that is what is embodied in the preamble -- that is, Hakko Ichiu in Greater East Asia. I shan't put "carve out" -- that is your interpretation.
- Q. What is your understanding of Article one of the Tripartite Pact?
- A. That is modified by the preamble.
- Q. According to Article 2, Germany recognized the right of Japan to develop her course in the development of Greater East Asia, and territories to the south.
- A. The working out of the idea embodied in the preamble.
- Q. And you recognized that you would respect Germany's right to develop Europe and the Mediterranean area. Was there some idea of Hakko Ichiu too?
- A. I don't know, but I wanted to lead them to it. That is my idea, and finally I wanted to lead all the ones to agree to the Hakko Ichiu. Your interpretation of under Japanese leadership, that is preposterous.
- Q. I agree with you, it sounds preposterous, and I am a little amazed that you were able to sell that bill of goods to Hitler and his boys.
- A. I am living in Japan at this end, in Japan under Japan's leadership. Who requested, I used to say. You can't do it. In your own country you have these sore-headed men.

Q. Let me ask you this question please -- in your first speech after becoming Foreign Minister, I will ask you if you didn't make this statement: "From years before I have advocated the mission of Japan to be the propagation of the Imperial Way to the world." Now, by the Imperial Way, do you mean Hakko Ichiu?

A. Yes.

Q. "When we look at the Imperial Way from the standpoint of international relations I believe that in short it resolves itself into the argument for the enabling of each nation and each race to have its own rightful place. That is to say, in accordance with this great spirit of the Imperial Way the diplomatic object of our country, both before and now, must be first to plan the establishment of the Greater East Asia co-prosperity sphere with Japan, China and Manchukuo as its members, and I firmly believe without the shadow of a doubt that our nation must not only remove all tangible and intangible obstacles, but must voluntarily join hands with friendly nations who cooperate with us, and with an unquenchable spirit of valor, strive to fulfill the ideal and mission entrusted to us by Heaven." Now, this speech is said to have been made August 1 1940, shortly after you became Foreign Minister. Now, isn't it true that it was this purpose which you have announced here that motivated your desire to enter into the alliance and the completion of the so-called Tripartite Pact.

A. Yes, the same idea.

Q. What do you mean in this speech when you say, for example, "the removal of all obstacles, tangible and intangible" and that "we must voluntarily join hands with friendly nations who cooperate with us." Do you mean by that that you must join hands with Germany and Italy?

A. And any country, in peaceful way.

Q. There is embodied in this speech, then, the real purpose for which you entered into this alliance.

A. Well, one of the purposes. I mentioned several objects time and again, in entering the Tripartite Pact. And I still believe today, you know, that ought to be the spirit of Japan.

Q. On September 27 1940, you made a ~~xxxxx~~ radio broadcast, announcing the Tripartite Pact, and the speech is quoted as follows, in part: "At this time there is only one step our country can take, and that is at home to quickly establish a new structure in which the state of national defense shall be completed and the entire nation be as one in a firm determination, while

abroad we must join ourselves with the two countries of Germany and Italy who have more or less the same aims and purposes that we do. Furthermore, in every place, of our own free will, we must ally ourselves with those countries who can cooperate with us and firmly march forward in our confidence, at the same time causing countries which try to obstruct our efforts to awaken and to resolve to accomplish the final aim of the Yamato race -- the construction of a new world order." Did you make that speech?

A. The sense of it, although I don't recall every word.

Q. If this was made 27 September 1940, and the other speech was made 1 August 1940, there doesn't pertain anything in those parts of your speeches which indicates that you wanted to make any agreement with the U. S. concerning this situation.

A. Well, that is later on.

Q. But you haven't said anything about that in this speech.

A. No.

Q. Now, I will show you a book, the title of which is "Giant MATSUOKA Yosuke " by Sabura Okawa, published by Toyoda, April 28 1941, and ask you if you recognize that book?

A. I never read it all through, but someone called my attention to it, but I don't know Okawa Sabura. It may be a pseudo name. I don't recognize it at all.

Q. I will show you the book again and ask you if that is a picture of yourself appearing on that page?

A. Yes.

Q. What does it say below the picture?

A. That it is up-to-date picture of Mr. Matsuoka.

Q. Do you know about when that picture was taken?

A. No. So many pictures taken that I don't know, and who took it.

Q. Do you know this man who wrote the book?

A. No, I said that I don't know him.

Q. You never heard of him?

A. No, so I am figuring that it was what we call a pen-name, pseudo name.

Q. You didn't write the book yourself?

A. Oh no. I think it was a pseudo name, and I think it was that book or a small pamphlet where the author says he doesn't know me.

Q. I will ask you to look now on page four, between the brackets that are outlined here, and see if that isn't a correct transcription of that part of your speech that I just read.

A. "I have said for years that it was the mission of Japan to propagate to the world the Emperor's way. If we look at the Emperor's way from an international relations, it is to sum up each nation or each race to have each its own place." It amounts to that, so I believe I said it. That is what the diplomatic aim of my country now should be.

Q. Is there in that a "both" -- "both before and now must first be . . ."

A. No. That is to say that "the diplomatic aim of my country now is to hold to the great spirit of this Emperor's way and to begin with Japan, Manchukuo and China, should become one link and must endeavor to set up a Greater Asian co-prosperity." That is down to here.

Q. Well then, further on -- that one paragraph.

A. "That is the way and means of walking on the road to contribute to the setting up of world peace, a just world peace, and to propagate strongly the Emperor's way. And that the people of my country must not only remove all the tangible and intangible obstacles that lay in the way, and moreover must go on to join hands with the friendly nations who share the same view with us, and we must join hands with indefatigable courage, must endeavor to achieve the mission and ideal of our people that was commanded from Heaven, and I believe it and do not doubt."

Q. By that in this speech you meant that you recommended a policy of following the development of this co-prosperity sphere regardless of what stood in the way? It was a Heaven-designed duty, is that correct?

A. Therefore to do our very best -- peacefully of course -- that is always granted.

Q. Well, you don't say peacefully here.

A. Well, but that is.

Q. Well, wait a minute here. This is supposed to be your speech, and you are speaking as Foreign Minister, and you say this -- not by peaceful means. I will read it to you again. "And I firmly believe without a shadow of a doubt that our nation must not only remove all tangible and intangible obstacles

but must voluntarily join hands with friendly nations who cooperate with us, and with an unquenchable spirit of valor, strive to fulfill the ideal and mission entrusted to us by Heaven." That seems to be according to the first part of this development of the Imperial Way and the East Asia co-prosperity sphere. And you say that all obstacles, tangible and intangible, must be removed. There is no reference there to a peaceable means, is there?

A. No, but I am making a public announcement, and it is only fair to say that I was not declaring war on the world.

Q. But it amounts to a challenge to anyone who would place an obstacle in the way of your development of this Greater East Asia co-prosperity sphere, doesn't it, and you might say

A. Well, you might say a challenge, but we would fight in the spirit of the Emperor's way which is understood to be always peaceful.

Q. Does that correctly quote your speech there?

A. Well, I can't say anything offhand, but I presume yes.

Q. This speech you made August 1 1940 could not be construed to be an invitation to the U. S. to reach any agreement concerning the situation in the Far East?

A. No.

Q. And the next speech, the radio address of 22 September is one justifying the alliance with Italy and Germany.

A. I think you can't say that. I simply reported to the nation.

Q. There is nothing in that speech to indicate that you wanted to make any gestures to the U. S. or Great Britain concerning this situation?

A. No.

Q. In other words, it says in substance that you defend the policy of joining hands with Germany and Italy, the nations who have recognized the right and privilege to develop Hakko Ichiu, and the development of the Greater East Asia co-prosperity sphere, as you had previously outlined it.

A. Yes.

Q. There is nothing about that that would indicate to any person reading it that it was an offer of anything to the U. S.

A. No.

Q. Now, reading from page 154 of this same book which we have marked "Tentative Exhibit A", I think I will hand you the book and turn to that part and I will read the English translation. I think in all fairness it will give you a better opportunity to reach an understanding on it. In brackets and commencing "With furtherance in this treaty Germany and Italy have recognized Japan's leading position, or in plain language her position as a leader in the construction of a new order in East Asia, while in Europe Japan has recognized Germany's and Italy's leading position in the construction of a new order for which they are even now fighting with their all at stake, and the three countries of Japan, Germany and Italy have decided to join their strength and cooperate with each other to the end." Is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. That is a correct translation?

A. Yes. Well, whether this is correct or not, but

Q. What I have read is a good translation?

A. Yes, a good translation.

Q. Is that a part of your speech of September 27 1940?

A. The date I don't remember but it is likely.

Q. Now, you are accustomed to the English language, aren't you, Mr. Matsuka?

A. Yes.

Q. And in a reading of that part of your speech from page 154 of that book, isn't that a very strong declaration for the ears of the world to hear, with respect to what your foreign policy is going to be, and what your purpose was in making this alliance?

A. Yes.

Q. May I ask you now, whether you see in the text of that statement as it is, any inference which the U. S. could draw that you had any intention of negotiating any peace terms or agreement with the U. S.?

A. Not in that part.

Q. Now, in that speech you are speaking as Foreign Minister of Japan?

A. And announcing the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact to the nation.

Q. And you used this term, didn't you, "for which they are now fighting with their all at stake"?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, that means that you had understood that they were engaged in battle over this ideal, isn't that right?

A. No, they said they wanted to create a new order and I wanted to leave them to fall in with us about the Hakko Ichiu.

Q. Now then, that verbiage there doesn't indicate a peaceful method of obtaining this, because it says here "or in plain language her position as a leader in the construction of a new order in East Asia, while in Europe Japan has recognized Germany's and Italy's leading position in the construction of a new order for which they are even now fighting with their all at stake." What did you mean by that?

A. I simply told the people they are fighting, but in realizing our idea in itself it involves peaceful means.

Q. Well, do you consider fighting "with their all at stake" such as that is within the meaning and interpretation of this theory of the preamble of this doctrine of Hakko Ichiu?

A. No, I wanted to end the war by all means.

Q. You were in a sense here praising Germany for their battle in Europe to establish their new order in Europe, weren't you?

A. No.

Q. Furthermore, "in this treaty Germany and Italy have recognized Japan's leading position, or in plain language her position as a leader in the construction of a new order in East Asia, while in Europe Japan has recognized Germany's and Italy's leading position in the construction of a new order for which they are even now fighting with their all at stake."

A. Yes, but

Q. "And the three countries of Japan, Germany and Italy have decided to join their strength and cooperate with each other to the end." What strength did you mean? Wasn't it military strength?

A. Strength? I said as the motive power, strong motive power the Tripartite Pact was formed. That was strong motive power merely, etc. In Japan's case I placed importance mostly on the moral state. All my life I was praying for a moral state in Japan.

Q. I will now ask you to turn to page 231 of the book, which is purported to be your speech, the title of which is "Facing a Great World Change," an address delivered by Mr. Natsuoka at the Pacific Society, May 1940. Do you recall that?

A. Yes.

Q. I will read from page 231, and I think you will find it in brackets in red crayon. "The China incident has broken out. People have a tendency to place too much importance in the Sino-Japanese relations, but I believe that if they take a general view this is only one symptom of an unprecedented great world change. For several years I have predicted the imminent outbreak of a European war which would probably expand into a second world war." Do you recall making that statement?

A. Yes, I was afraid of that and prophesied that the U. S. might say

Q. Is that a good translation?

A. A pretty good one.

Q. "Last year, at last, the European war at any rate has begun. It is possible to say that Japan has not yet entered this war, but in the final analysis I do not believe Japan can avoid being pulled into it, either directly or indirectly. Not only so, but we can even say that the whole world is in reality already involved in this war." Do you recall having made that statement?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, there you called attention to the fact that you had predicted this second world war.

A. Yes.

Q. You further predict that in your opinion it is possible Japan will be drawn into the war.

A. Drawn into it directly or indirectly, and in the sense that in a way the whole world is already involved.

Q. Now, there is nothing in that paragraph by which you have denounced this world war, or the entrance of Germany into this war under your theory of Hakko Ichiu, by which you say you advocate peaceful means. There is nothing denouncing this, but rather it calls attention to the Japanese people that you had predicted this war and you now felt it was practically imminent that Japan would be drawn into it.

A. Yes, that is mere prophecy and advice.

Q. Now, will you turn to page 237, which I think is a continuation of the same speech. It is a continuation of the same speech, isn't it, Mr. Matsuka?

A. I don't know.

Q. Well, can you tell by reading the context before and after it?

A. I can't tell.

Q. Well, let me quote it then. Bracketed in red, on page 237.

A. Yes, please read it.

Q. "The European war in its ~~its~~ changing phases, America's foreign relations, and in particular the changing phase of her relations with Japan, threatening clouds over the south seas, portending storms in the entire Pacific, speculations as to the future -- without taking these problems into consideration we can neither decide plans as to the disposition of the China incident nor can we try to carry such plans out." Do you recall making that statement in a speech in May 1940?

A. Yes, maybe.

Q. Now, in that paragraph, you do take note of America's foreign relations, is that correct?

A. Yes, correct.

Q. So that in that speech you recognize

A. Rather than change, its development.

Q. Then this translation should read "The European war in its developing phases, America's foreign relations, and in particular the developing phase of her relations with Japan."

A. "Especially the development of relations between Japan and America."

Q. Do you read this part, "threatening clouds over the south seas, portending storms in the entire Pacific" -- are those your words?

A. I think so.

Q. Now then, from a reading of that paragraph, one would logically assume that you did have in mind America's representations concerning the Pacific area at that time.

A. I was dreading it.

Q. Will you turn to page 238, and there you will find outlined "Matsuoka goes on to say it may be an historic inevitability that Japan and America, the two great expanding powers on this one same stage, the Pacific, should collide, but continues that it is the duty of the men with reasoning power to try and prevent such an outbreak. If we must fight, let it be with the complete mutual understanding of each country's assertions and position. There is nothing more foolish and more tragic than to fight each other under a misunderstanding." Now, that paragraph indicates that you had considered that a fight would possibly ensue over this situation, isn't that right?

A. If left alone, I said.

Q. So that in May 1940 you had considered the situation serious enough to make those remarks concerning America's relations with you?

A. Yes.

Q. But this was three months or more before you concluded the Tripartite alliance.

A. Yes, about four months. That is a warning to the nation, you know.

Q. Will you turn to page 245, please, continuing the same speech, and in brackets, "He also says that at the present stage, a League of Nations of the entire world is a Utopian dream. The actual fact is that each great power of the world has its own sphere of influence, be it America or any other country. Should they interfere in the sphere of influence of another great power, in the final analysis war must be the outcome. I regret to say such is the conclusion, based on actual world relations. For instance, Japan has its own sphere of influence. Should another nation unjustifiably interfere with this domain, we must firmly oppose it. A diplomacy that would hesitate to do so would not only damage Japan's national integrity and interest, but would be the cause of disturbing world peace." Do you recall that?

A. Yes. On the whole, only slight mistranslation. "Other countries trying to interfere without reason." You don't have the word "reason."

Q. From a reading of that paragraph, you would judge that you had recognized that the right of Japan to develop her sphere of influence unalterably determined, and that if the U.S.A. attempted to stand in the way of it, though you regretted it, if it was necessary to fight to maintain this, it should be done.

A. Without reason whatever, that is modification here.

Q. And "A diplomacy that would hesitate to do so would not only damage Japan's national integrity and interest, but would be the cause of disturbing world peace."

A. That is a weak diplomacy, a "hesitating weak diplomacy."

Q. Assuming that this speech was made in May 1940, within a two months period you did become the Foreign Minister of Japan?

A. Two or three months.

Q. Now, between May 1940 and August or September 1940, you hadn't changed your mind on what you had enunciated in this speech?

A. No.

Q. And that is definite language you used there.

A. Yes, and I always used.

Q. That speech, coming to the attention of the U. S., would not indicate that you intended to make any agreements or understandings with the U. S. which would limit your development of the so-called Greater East Asia sphere in this area.

A. While it doesn't bear directly on that point, that was another subject.

Q. For example, "Be it America or any other country. Should they interfere in the sphere of influence of another great power, in the final analysis war must be the outcome."

A. Yes.

Q. Now, what did you mean by that?

A. Well, I meant suppose we interfered with the north and south America, Americans' sphere, why America had perfect right to throw us out.

Q. And what about America interfering over here, as you say, in this statement?

A. Well, we must try first by diplomacy best to urge America not to.

Q. But you do use this term in this speech "in the final analysis war must be the outcome." Now, is that the first time you have deviated from your Hakko Ichiu theory that you only intended it to be accomplished by peaceful means?

A. ~~Not~~, I was always saying ever since I went to Geneva, that we must respect each the sphere of each country and be at peace.

Q. But you recommended here -- these are your own words -- "The actual fact is that each great power of the world has its own sphere of influence, be it

America or any other country. Should they interfere in the sphere of influence of another great power, in the final analysis war must be the outcome."

A. Yes, I was always saying that.

Q. Then are we to consider that is what you mean when you say by peaceful means under this preamble of Hakko Ichiu, in the preamble of the Tripartite Pact? Are we to understand that is what you mean?

A. Here I was referring to my prediction of history. History tends to that, so I gave warning to others that we should respect the sphere of influence.

Q. Well, if war is the outcome, then it must be war?

A. War. Therefore, don't do it. And I said roughly the same thing while passing through your country from Geneva to Tokyo. This League of Nations was too big.

Q. Further quoting, you say "For instance, Japan has its own sphere of influence. Should another nation unjustifiably interfere with this domain, we must firmly oppose it."

A. I was making a speech. This was a contribution to a magazine, is it not?

Q. "Facing the Great World." Yes, it is an address delivered by you to the Pacific Society in May 1940, and I assume here in the City of Tokyo. I don't have the address here of the Pacific Society. Where did you make this address?

A. In Tokyo. I was then Vice President together with my colleague Nagata.

Q. Now will you turn to page 248, and follow the quotes there. This is the same speech which I repeated from page 245. "You may criticize this as a far too broad prophecy or too daring a prophecy -- it could be translated broad or daring -- but I believe perhaps within the next two or three years the fate of entire humanity, by which I mean all modern civilization above a certain fixed standard, may be decided. That is, the fate of Japan as a country actually on this planet as one of the civilized nations, as well as the fate of East Asia cannot avoid being linked to the fate of the world. I earnestly desire that our people, and particularly the younger generation, will awaken as quickly as possible to the fact that it is not only Japan, not only a problem of East Asia, but a great change of all mankind, unprecedented in history, which we are facing today." Do you recall that?

A. Yes, and I believe it even now.

Q. And this speech you made in May 1940, just before you became Foreign Minister?

A. This is an article. I think it was dictated in April. I recall it was my dictation, offhand, and taken down by stenographer.

Q. But you didn't suggest at that time, peaceful means as the solution. When you referred to nations who stood in the way of this sphere, so-called, in East Asia, particularly referring to the U. S., you said if war was unavoidable let us have war, or words to that effect.

A. Well, that is my attempt first, was toward diplomacy.

Q. And when you initiated, as you said you did this afternoon, and completed the Tripartite Alliance, together with its secret agreements and conversations, you had in mind the propagation of this theory of yours for the so-called expansion of Greater East Asia?

A. No, this policy of trying to begin with, to establish the Hakko Ichiu in the area and my diplomacy was always what I say, was always by diplomacy and if need be, use war. Then that is my prediction, and therefore we should awaken to the very critical situation of the world and do our best not to throw the whole world into war. That is what I always mean. As you know, the world war came as I predicted.

Q. Well, everyone that was involved in this second World War, when you made this speech in May 1940, and made your maiden speech as Foreign Minister in August 1940, -- most of the great powers of the world were already involved in war, except the U. S. and Japan.

A. Yes.

Q. So that there could be only two more principal characters in this great stage of slaughter, which would be the U. S. and Japan.

A. Yes, that is true.

Q. So, having that in mind, it is fair to assume when you made reference to war and if anyone should cross your path in this development, and particularly since you saw fit to mention America's name, it could be assumed that you were referring to the two parties, America and Japan.

A. Not necessarily to a war. A prediction of the history to come, generally.

Q. Well then you proceeded to send messages to Germany, to receive a special ambassador--emissary--and make sure he spoke for Ribbentrop, and entered into an alliance which amounted to a further threat by way of action to the U. S., concerning the action of the U. S. about world affairs in general.

A. I didn't send any courier to Germany.

Q. No, I said Germany sent an emissary to you, Mr. Stahmer, didn't she?

A. Yes.

Q. And you had conversations with him and you wanted to make very sure that he spoke with authority from Ribbentrop?

A. Yes.

Q. And by that time you knew of the Hitler and Ribbentrop, what they had accomplished in Europe up to that time in the way of carving out their sphere.

A. Yes, whether you regard it as a threat or not you have liberty to criticize, but my meaning was not threat.

Q. Now, Mr. Matsuoka, in 1933 you made a series of speeches in the U. S., didn't you?

A. That is when I was passing through your country, was it not?

Q. Well, I don't know what your business was there.

A. I don't remember.

Q. But you made a series of speeches in the U. S., all of which are compiled here in a volume. I will ask you to look at the title of that and translate it. What does it say?

A. "Compiled from Speeches by Yasuke Matsuoka."

Q. Good. Now, does it appear in these addresses, radio broadcasts, press interviews, and newreel interviews -- October 32 to April 33 -- is that the period of time you visited the U. S.?

A. Let me see, 8th year of Showa.

Q. Did you make, in the course of that visit, if you can recall, a speech delivered at the ~~Sum~~ Consul General Hiranuchi lunch, at the Century Club?

A. I don't recall.

Q. Hiranuchi was ambassador or Consul General.

A. I don't recall if he invited me to the Century Club or not, but it is likely.

Q. I will read you the opening paragraph, of a speech dated March 24 1933, at the Hiranuchi lunch at the Century Club? "It is a great pleasure for me
.....

That is the opening paragraph. Do you recall making that speech?

A. I don't recall. It is a luncheon speech, you know.

Q. I don't expect you to be able to, but I will read parts of it. In this speech in March 1933, I will read a paragraph from this speech concerning the Chinese, Russian and Japanese relations -- this paragraph: "Only six years ago"

And in the same speech, in a further paragraph: "Our government endeavored for many years....."

That was concerning the Manchurian and Chinese incident, and to withdraw from the League of Nations.

A. I think so.

Q. Now, yesterday or the day before when I made reference to your conversations with Ribbentrop and Hitler, after you visited the Pope, after you said the Pope had urged you to bring about peace in the world, you pointed out that it was Communism that was the element that was stirring up the world to war, and further along in that question, you specifically took issue with me when you said Communism does not bear any relation to Russia, that it is a misunderstanding with me; when you say Communism you don't mean Russia. Particularly when I called your attention to the non-aggression pact which you made with Russia for a period of five years, when I called attention to this fact, you had previously made this statement to Hitler and Ribbentrop concerning Communism, you said Communism does not mean Russia. Do you recall that?

A. Yes, but I said the Russians always declared so.

Q. But here in this speech in the U. S. in 1933, after leaving the League of Nations, and apparently all these speeches are made by you in justification for having left, you explain in this paragraph, and I will read the preceding paragraph to give you the color of it, "The difficult position of Japan"

Now then, this paragraph: "Only six years ago"

Did you make that statement?

A. Yes.

Q. Well, what is the difference between that situation, between your understanding of Communism now which you represented to Hitler and Ribbentrop concerning your conversation in Rome, and the situation in 1941 when you made the treaty with Russia?

A. Well, I recalled that I made answer yesterday that not only Communism. Communism yes, but other chaotic acts. Of course I counted Communism as one great factor in the Chinese case, you know.

Q. Well here in this paragraph, you connected up Communism with Russian agents and arms.

A. Well, that is what we say and Russian government denies, and officially we don't dispute with Soviet Russia. Personally I think it is rather funny, but Russian government always declared it had nothing to do with Communism and so officially we can't say so.

Q. Well, if you remember when I was developing your conclusion of this so-called non-aggression pact with Russia, the terminology of the phrase non-aggression pact, we discussed particularly why you thought it necessary to enter into a non-aggression pact or mutual treaty of neutrality with Russia, and you based it upon some commercial oil and fishing rights that had been pending for many years, and it was my question why you sought a non-aggression pact or mutual understanding not to attack one another, why that was necessary in the light of the fact it was commercial matters you were seeking to mediate.

A. That was so to induce Soviet Russia to conclude this pact. That Japan was anxious to come into better relations with Soviet Russia in general, and Japan had always to be on guard against Soviet Russia, you know.

Q. And when you made this non-aggression pact, it was to continue to be on guard against Soviet Russia?

A. Oh, we had to.

Q. And having in mind it was concluded such a short period of time before the attack on Singapore, Pearl Harbor, and the expansion toward the southwest Pacific, it is fair to assume that one of the principal considerations was to avoid, if possible, engaging Japanese troops in war with the Russians at the same time.

A. No, it was pending between the two governments for years, and I saw a chance now.

Q. Well, you say this afternoon you initiated these dealings with Germany at the request of the Army and Navy of your government, of your cabinet. Right?

A. Well, not initiated. Some of the papers were handed to me.

Q. Well, that is right, but you said here this afternoon that there was some conversation before the cabinet was formed, and after the cabinet was formed, this general and admiral presented you with some papers.

A. Yes.

Q. Up to the present moment, now, concerning the presentation by this general and this admiral of these suggestions for closer relations with Germany, there was no suggestion to you that you make a non-aggression treaty with Russia in that direction? Was there?

A. I talked with them before I left Tokyo.

Q. I see. Up to this time, from our discussion this afternoon, when we discussed this whole matter, your whole dealings had been with members of the cabinet, suggesting this and you had received a memorandum from the general and admiral, and as a result of the conversation with Stahmer, it was decided to draft the Triparty agreement.

A. Yes.

Q. I think you said to me your main objective at all times had been making some alliance with Russia, a non-aggression pact.

A. That was, I talked about it from very beginning with Premier Kano, and we had that understanding all through.

Q. And the Triparty Alliance does exclude Russia from it, doesn't it?

A. Not only that, but I was saying for years that non-aggression or neutrality pact must be concluded with Russia. That was my contention for years.

Q. Now in 1933 do you recall having delivered a speech before an audience at the University of Oregon?

A. Yes.

Q. I won't read the speech in its entirety, but I will read certain statements from it, and ask you if you recall having made these statements or not. It was particularly concerning, I believe, you were mostly concerned with the withdrawal of Japan from the League of Nations and the Manchurian Incident. I will read the paragraph ahead of the one I quote from, so it will give sense to what I select. I want you to have a full understanding; now, reading the paragraph preceding, "Japan has remained loyal (April 7 1933). . . .

Now, this is the next paragraph, "Japan and the U. S. together.

Now, do you recall the essence of that speech, and the substance of it? At that time, that was a statement, "Japan and the U. S." That is

quite a departure from the nature of the speech which you made in May 1940 and in August 1940, that I read previously.

A. I told you, I don't consider so. On one hand I was saying it depends largely on Japan and America to mould the coming Pacific situation.

Q. Quoting from the same speech, another paragraph, -- I am jumping a paragraph or two -- "So far as outside influence"

Do you recall the essence of that?

A. Yes.

Q. And the next paragraph: "I am of the opinion....."

Do you recall that?

A. Yes.

Q. From the same speech, the next paragraph: "I firmly believe, however,"

Do you recall that?

A. Yes.

Q. Now then, there is an entirely different attitude expressed in your speeches on this occasion than in your speeches of May and August 1940.

A. I don't think such a difference. The Hakko Ichiu idea may be fitted into this idea, and from boyhood I ever believed in the mission of America and Japan to contribute largely to the Pacific situation.

Q. Now, quoting further from the same speech, "Really, ladies and gentlemen"

And the next paragraph, "We have either among"

Do you recall that?

A. Yes.

Q. Well now, your speeches at that time are entirely different with respect to the U. S. than they are in 1940 and 1941.

A. I don't think so.

Q. Had anything happened in the interim to change your opinion?

A. No, nothing happened. I wanted to lead even America into the way of Hakko Ichiu.

Q. Well, I think we have covered enough for this afternoon.

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INTERROGATION OF

MATSUOKA, Yosuke

Date and Time: 18 March 1946, 1410 - 1615 hours

Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan

Present : MATSUOKA, Yosuke
Lt. Cmdr. John D. Shea, USNR, Interrogator
Miss Clara B. Knapp, Stenographer

Interrogation conducted in English.
Questions by Cmdr. Shea.

Q. Now, Mr. Matsuoka, as I understand your answers to questions up to the present time, you have justified the conclusion of the Tripartite Alliance on a basis that it was in keeping with your ideological principle of Hakko Ichiu, to prevent war, and by peaceful means to accomplish this place in the world for all peoples, of their just place in the world. Is that correct?

A. Yes, and more. For others. To free those under German machinations for many years. That one day Germany or someone in Germany might direct the American students of German origin to carry out propoganda eventually to bring about war between America and Japan. Rather, by establishing closer relations, I intended to prevent such an occurrence. It was a kind of nightmare with me ever since I was young and studying the situation in your country.

Q. Now, is there anything recited in the preamble of the Tripartite Pact, or the articles contained therein, which bears out this explanation?

A. No, nor did I ever disclose it. I was so afraid to give hint to the Germans.

Q. Why did you choose this particular moment in history to conclude an alliance with Germany, based on this secret fear which you say you had concerning some subversive activity of persons of German descent in the U. S.?

A. Well, because the world was in turmoil and even our relations with America were growing bad, and then Germany wanted to enter pact with us, and I felt I would devise some means to prevent it.

Q. By the terms of the Tripartite Alliance, and also the conversation which you had with Hitler that we have previously gone over here, you and he both

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agreed that Japan and Germany must stand firmly together under the terms of the Tripartite Alliance. Is that correct?

A. Yes, and in that way I hoped I could prevent ever carrying out German machinations against us. That was my reasoning.

Q. Who do you mean, us?

A. Against Japan, and also I mean their relations between America and Japan.

Q. Well now, this fear that you have that you have just enunciated, concerning the German relations with Japan and America, you have not previously outlined within the framework of your theory of Hakko Ichiu.

A. No, I am saying that I was so dreading it that I never disclosed it to anyone. Not to give hint to any people but by my studying your country and the situation among the American students of German descent and their relation with Germany, all leading to that fear for many tens of years. And I think anyone who studies the problem, I think would have agreed with me.

Q. But there seems to be nothing on the face of this instrument, the Tripartite Alliance or the so-called secret letters, any of the conversations that we have previously outlined here, which would substantiate this theory or belief that you now advance in explanation.

A. No, I purposely kept it back.

Q. So, when you did enter into this alliance with Germany, it was ^{not} for the avowed purpose as stated in the instrument itself, but upon the principle of this fear which you say you had for many years, being concerned about what German nationals within the U. S. might do, bringing about a war between the U. S. and Japan.

A. That was, as I say, one of the objects. Great object.

Q. Did you discuss that purpose, or that object, with any persons in the government?

A. Not with anyone.

Q. With any member of the cabinet?

A. No.

Q. With any members of the press?

A. No.

Q. Did you write any pamphlets or make any speeches on that subject?

A. Oh no. I so dreaded it that I kept it entirely secret and kept it to myself alone.

Q. Who was the first person you had announced that fear to, ~~xxxxxxx~~ if you recall?

A. I think I disclosed it, the chief object of the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact, to one or two after.

Q. Who were they?

A. I think one was KAMI MURA.

Q. Is that a person or a newspaper?

A. He is a writer.

Q. Where was he when you explained this to him?

A. He was in Tokyo.

Q. Where?

A. I don't know where he is, but in Tokyo.

Q. Under what circumstances did you make this disclosure to him?

A. He called on me and with the injunction that he should never disclose it until fear of giving hint to the Germans was past.

Q. Is he still alive?

A. Oh yes, I think he is in Tokyo.

Q. What did you disclose to him, if you can recall that?

A. What I just told you. That the chief and one of the great objects in concluding the Tripartite pact.

Q. What is it again? I would like to have you repeat it.

A. This -- Hitler or Germans were giving direction to the American students of German descent who, a great many of them -- I don't say all -- were well organized and connected under harmless names such as the Amateur Photographic Society or Amateur Theater Association or Literary Society, etc. For years in your country, I think it must be over thirty or forty years, and to carry out anti-Japanese propaganda aimed at war between America and Japan. And

actually they went against Japan during the first Great War, World War. That was before your country joined the European war, and President Wilson rebuked and stopped it, you know. I was then at Washington. And that moreover I don't think that in considering the relations between the U. S. and Japan, I always had that dread in mind. And it hanged on me like a nightmare.

Q. Well, then this

A. And I am still even today wondering why a man like Hitler didn't get that hint and carry that dread of mine out. He would, I think, have succeeded to bring about war between Japan and America, and avoid America joining the war in Europe. That is my opinion, you know; it was. I am still wondering today, rather than entering Three-party pact. As I told you the other day, it was not a three party pact to start. Germany simply, after the whole thing was determined between Japan and Germany, asked Germany to sign it in Berlin. At first it was intended to be signed at Tokyo and between Germany and Japan alone, and it was made later threeparty by von Ribbentrop.

Q. Then do you want to qualify your previous statements concerning the purpose of the conclusion of the Triparty Pact?

A. No, I repeated that point then and again.

Q. And you have previously said that your main object was to prevent the U. S. from entering the war.

A. Yes, that is right, and what I mentioned now too, and limiting the sphere of the theater of war, and not to make it a real world war. I have many objects, you know. I repeated that point more than twice yet.

Q. Well, you were the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the cabinet, and you never disclosed this other purpose or fear to anyone in the cabinet, and you never disclosed this purpose or fear to anyone else. The only one you ever told it to was this newspaperman. How long after the conclusion of the pact?

A. Long after. I think it was last year.

Q. Last year?

A. No, before the last year.

Q. Well, what did bring the U. S. and Japan to war? Do you know now?

A. Tojo Government attacked Pearl Harbor

Q. And also Singapore.

A. Singapore, but with America it was Pearl Harbor.

Q. Well, in this fear of yours about the people of German extraction in the U. S., that had no influence over Tojo or your High Command here which caused them to go to war.

A. No, that is why I say I never dreamed war would be started by Japan taking the initiative. That was not in my consideration of the relations between our two countries. And I was undone.

Q. Had you ever announced this fear in any of your public speeches?

A. Oh no. Purposely I kept it secret lest some Germans would get hint.

Q. But in order to protect yourself and the U. S. from becoming involved in a war over some agency which you feared the Germans might have or might use within the U. S., you entered into a military alliance with Germany?

A. No, not exactly a military alliance.

Q. Well, what sort of an alliance?

A. What I used to call at the time I concluded and announced to the public, a peace treaty.

Q. A peace treaty?

A. Yes, it was for peace. Oh, and by the way, let me add this -- when I was the Secretary of the Embassy, I used to refer to this fear several times in conversations with younger men. Of course that Kami Mura formerly was in South Manchurian Railway Company, and a very close man to me. We are great old friends, and he is a man whom you can trust and so I disclosed one day to him. Later, I think I disclosed it to my eldest son, but that is long after.

Q. Now, in a speech delivered on 22 September 1940, concerning the Tripartite Alliance, this is what you said. You advocated the alliance with Germany and Italy, as "having the same policy and mental attitude of cooperation with countries which can work with us all over the world. The establishment of a new world order is the final objective of the Yamata race." There is nothing in that statement expressing any fears you have about subversive activities in the U. S.

A. No.

Q. That is a pretty definite statement, isn't it?

A. Yes.

Q. What about that statement?

A. As I have just said, I was purposely keeping it secret to myself, lest others may get a hint.

Q. Well, another statement, "In this time there is only one way our nation can take. In huge affairs it means the establishment of a new social order effecting a defense status of the country, and creating one spiritual unity of one hundred million people." Do you remember making that statement?

A. No, I don't remember.

Q. Well, if that is your statement, is that in keeping with your idea of Hakko Ichiu? In support of it?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, in a speech delivered 15 September 1940, entitled "Looking Back at the Establishment of Manchukuo", -- "The day of 24 February 1933 will shine brilliantly and for a long time in the history of the world. On that day Imperial Japan challenged bravely the hypocrisy which is a principal characteristic of the present world civilization. This is the day on which Japan set the world on the road to real peace without hypocrisy. Also on that day, Japan dealt a fatal blow to hypocritical civilization, and maintained the status quo." Do you recall that?

A. Yes.

Q. Is that in keeping with Hakko Ichiu?

A. Yes.

Q. In a speech delivered 22 August 1940, entitled "The Original Mission of the Yamato Race," -- "The emphasis is on the establishment of the Greater East Asia co-prosperity sphere, with Japan, Manchuria and China as a basis, and adding to them the South Pacific region. I am convinced that this is the mission assigned to the Japanese people." Pages 9 and 10 from this collection of speeches. A speech made 22 August 1940. Do you recall that statement?

A. Something like that.

Q. And if that statement was made by you, would you say that that is within your meaning or understanding and ideology of Hakko Ichiu?

A. Yes, with the understanding that that same ideal, in principal, would

be carried out throughout the world, just as America is for democracy. Just the same.

Q. Now, in a speech entitled "The Establishment of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere," 10 August 1940, you referred to the announcement of "the elements of our fundamental foreign policy" and to the above speech as "clarifying the basis of Japan's foreign policy." It contains the following phrase, "In establishing the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity sphere, we cooperate with nations having the same beliefs as we. Above that, we must create more countries of that type and must eliminate all obstacles with firmness."

A. Yes.

Q. Is that within the meaning and understanding of Hakko Ichiu?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, in announcing the diplomacy of the Imperialway, August 1 1940, in a speech, "I have been insisting for many years that this is the mission of our Empire, to proclaim the ~~xxx~~ Imperial way to the world. At present the diplomatic policy of our nation must first of all be the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, encompassing Japan, Manchuria and China in accordance with the great spirit of the Imperial way." Do you recall that?

A. Yes.

Q. That was your speech of August 1 1940. I believe it was made at the Diet, or when you were Foreign Minister.

A. The date I don't recall, but I was saying that.

Q. Does that embody part of your understanding of Hakko Ichiu?

A. Yes.

Q. In a speech which you delivered 7 October 1940, exhorting your audience to devote themselves to the Emperor, "The Manchurian Incident was an exaltation of the national spirit. Also, in a way, it was the explosion caused by the operation of the peaceful development of Japan by Anglo-Saxon powers. The fundamental cause of the China incident was really ideological in the announcement of our national diplomatic policy. The fact that Japan is Divine country must be considered." Do you recall that?

A. I don't recall about Anglo-Saxon, but the rest I recall. It was that China then was laying every obstacle in the way and trying to drive Japan out of Manchuria.

Q. Well, if Anglo-Saxon is in the speech, is that in the meaning of this Hakko Ichiu

A. Well no, not necessarily.

Q. Not necessarily. What is meant by the term "The fact that Japan is a Divine country must be considered."?

A. Oh, that we always say. That is, a country of God.

Q. Well, what about other countries, aren't they from God too?

A. I don't know. Other countries may say whatever they like about it.

Q. What do you think about it?

A. We Japanese always refer to Japan.

Q. Well, what do you think about other countries springing from divinity or God?

A. Well, as the Jews say they are selected people, we always called Japan GINCHU.

Q. What do you mean by that?

A. Almost without thinking about the meaning we always called Japan GINCHU.

Q. Well, you called it to the attention of the people of the world, for example the "fact that Japan is Divine country must be considered." What do you mean about that?

A. Well, that is for over 1,000 years we used to say GINCHU, and we believe it is GINCHU.

Q. Now, in a speech delivered January 15, 1941, titled "Expecting Ambassador Oshima", -- "Ambassador Oshima has personally the confidence of the members of the German Government, and can speak with them openly." Do you recall that statement concerning him?

A. I don't recall that speech, but I believed that so I must have said so. Just as Admiral Nomura was very popular at Washington.

Q. Now, in a speech in April of 1941, entitled "A Message to the Axis" by yourself, "Last February I foretold that the Italian Army would stage a comeback in the near future. Many people were doubting this. Then Italy began to conquer in both the Balkans and North Africa. I knew it. Behind

the scenes there was a mutual understanding. Since I knew about it, I told you of this conclusion." Do you remember making that statement?

A. Maybe.

Q. What did you mean, you knew about it behind the scenes?

A. Simply I meant that I felt so.

Q. Well, you say "I knew it, behind the scenes there was a mutual understanding." What did you mean by that?

A. I used only strong words, that is all.

Q. What do you mean there was a mutual understanding behind the scenes?

A. I felt Italy would come out victorious.

Q. Well, in April 1941 you were Foreign Minister, weren't you?

A. Yes.

Q. And speaking as the Foreign Minister, you say "I knew it. Behind the scenes there was a mutual understanding. Since I knew about it, I told you of this conclusion." And you referred to something you told them in February. What do you mean by "there was a mutual understanding behind the scenes."?

A. No mutual understanding. I think I was told by the German and Italian embassies so.

Q. And it was based on the conversation with the German and Italian embassies that you made this disclosure that you foretold in February that the Italian Army would make a comeback?

A. I think it must be that. I think it must have come from conversations with Indelli or with General Ott.

Q. Now, this speech you delivered at Hibya Hall in Tokyo to an audience in April 1941. You were Foreign Minister.

A. That is after my return from Europe, was it not?

Q. Yes, in April. You were Foreign Minister and you were giving the people some firsthand information concerning what you had discovered, and you made this statement, "Last February I foretold that the Italian Army would stage a comeback in the near future." Now, did you say that, as stated here?

A. Well, if it is in my speech I must have said it, or maybe I got some information in Europe.

Q. Well, what interest did you have in the Italian Army in February, that you foretold the Italian Army would stage a comeback? What interest would that have to your people here in Japan?

A. The Italians were not making much headway and naturally there was much speculation about them, and so I said so.

Q. Well, as a matter of fact, when you were making this speech you were trying to justify the Italian connection with the Tripartite Alliance, weren't you?

A. No, I was saying something for Italy because a great many people thought Italy was weak.

Q. Why did you say fit to call to the attention of your audience -- you are Foreign Minister -- the fact that Italy had made a recovery in the assault on the Balkans and in North Africa?

A. Because Italy was one of the Three-Party Pact.

Q. And you were therefore interested in their success?

A. Naturally.

Q. In the same speech, "Soon after I came back from Geneva, I advocated strongly the dissolution of political parties. I was called crazy."

A. Yes.

Q. Was this dissolution of the political parties -- was that within the meaning of your understanding and interpretation of the ideology of Hakko Ichiu?

A. No, it had nothing to do with it.

Q. Well, the dissolution of the political parties, has that got anything to do with your theory of Hakko Ichiu?

A. No.

Q. What did this have to do with?

A. As I told you time and again, that I wanted to, I worked against that degradation and awful corruption rampant particularly among the two major parties in Japan.

Q. And the abolition of political parties as a matter of fact was the aim and accomplishment of both Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany too, wasn't it?

A. Yes.

Q. So in that regard you were advocating the same process, or at least the same accomplishments, as they had?

A. No, as I also said often, that I was at the same time telling people that Fascism or Nazism had no place in Japan, and my contention comes from what I said, and that comes from my idea of one house and let us unite for the time being as members of one house, and I pointed out to the people that the world is facing now a crisis, and let us be united and pass that crisis safely, and then, time and again I said it, and I think it is in print.

Q. Now, when you made this speech in which you advocated the dissolution of political parties, you say you do not consider that to be part of your theory of Hakko Ichiu.

A. No.

Q. I will read you the complete paragraph on that, "Soon after I came back from Geneva, I advocated strongly the dissolution of political parties. I was called crazy, but I told the young men that a race without ideals would perish. Today we talk of having a history of 2600 years and of Hakko Ichiu, the ideal of the unification of the world under the Japanese Emperor, but we pay only lip service to it. Are we doing anything to realize that?" That is the same paragraph that I quoted that other from. Now, does that refresh your recollection as to whether or not you consider the abolition of political parties to be within the purview of this Hakko Ichiu?

A. No, I am speaking of two different things.

Q. In relation to the time that Japan withdrew from the League of Nations, hadn't Italy and Germany also withdrawn from the League of Nations?

A. That is long after.

Q. How much after?

A. I don't remember, but pretty long time elapsed.

Q. Well, it is true, isn't it, that you were the person who led the delegation from Japan to the League of Nations, you are the one that withdrew Japan from the League, isn't that correct?

A. That is what some of the foreign writers say in their books.

Q. You walked out, didn't you?

A. Yes, walked out.

Q. And didn't you afterwards brag here in Japan that the fact Japan left the League of Nations was a noble gesture?

A. I may have said, but time and again I told people on my return to Japan that there was not, it was not I who led Japan out of the League, but I was commanded to do so by the nation, and I had no choice, and I even disclosed the fact that I was against it.

Q. Well, from one of your speeches, which I quoted to you, you justified that on the basis of high morality.

A. Yes, I had to as a representative of Japan.

Q. In any event, it is true that Japan, Italy and Germany did withdraw from the League of Nations.

A. Well, that is history.

Q. And it was over similar disputes, wasn't it, with the League? Over Germany's remilitarization and aggression, over Italy's aggression toward Ethiopia, and in Japan's case over the Manchurian Incident, that these nations primarily withdrew from the League of Nations?

A. As so you can make out theory.

Q. Well now, you are a man who was the Foreign Minister, and a keen student of these affairs, and isn't that substantially true?

A. Yes, and here let me tell you frankly the inside story. You know, the last telegram of mine from Geneva to the late Count UCHIDA, then Foreign Minister of Japan, in ciphers used between him and myself only, so that other embassies and no one knew about them except Count Uchida, to reconsider and stay in the League with the establishment of a small committee to watch the Manchurian development for some years, and I myself had in mind even to recommend SHIGEMITSU to represent Japan in that committee. And I did an extraordinary thing after that -- that Japanese minister should really never do as a matter of discretion, but I thought the step of withdrawing from the League was so grave that I departed from my way and sent a telegram to the only elder statesman of Japan then living, that is Prince SAIONJI, to see my last telegram to Count Uchida before he decides finally about the steps Japan was to take. But my appeal was not taken up apparently by the Japanese Government, and after returning to Tokyo, I was told by Count Uchida that my last telegram was shown to Prince Saionji. You know, this real inside story was revealed to some persons but not in a broad way. I often told that I was not the one who led Japan out and I said enough to be understood from Geneva to Tokyo, that a nation should not lose sight of the main purpose by sticking with some things. Meaning, of course, then that Japan ought not to withdraw.

Q. But your public utterances after withdrawal from the League was one of justification, wasn't it?

A. Well, I had to justify.

Q. But isn't it true your public utterances justified the move?

A. Yes, but I am simply giving you the truth about the inside story.

Q. Do you mean your public utterances, and also in your private life, it was all just a mere sham? You didn't believe what was said, or you didn't at the time and you now want to describe that behind the scenes no one knew except you or a few people?

A. Some part.

Q. Let me quote from a book by yourself, the title of which is "The Great Task of Reconstructing Asia," published in May 1941. Do you recall that title?

A. No.

Q. This book contains some of the most outspoken ultranationalistic essays by yourself.

A. That is East Asia, "Great Work of Uplifting East Asia," and addressed to the South Manchurian Railway Company's young men.

Q. "He states his belief that the present time, in spite of all difficulties, is the opportunity for the 'great expansion.' If this opportunity is lost Japan will have to fit confine herself for a few centuries," -- page 5. "He calls for an organization of total war for the expansionist forces, displayed in both armament and economic power" -- page 6. "He asserts that the Japanese spirit will not retreat before threat such as the U. S. embargo, and finds it necessary for Japan's heavy industries to become independent from the U. S." -- page 17. "He boasts of developing heavy industries independent of the U.S.A. during his days as President of the South Manchurian Railway" -- page 21. "In the Manchurian Incident, Japan's spirit burst forth and the fire which once flared up will never be put out" -- page 18. "Japan became the leader, responsible not only for Manchuria, Mongolia and China, but also for Greater East Asia Co-prosperity sphere, and by concluding an alliance with Germany and Italy she joined those who are constructing a new world order of the Yamato race. The Yamato race alone can save the people of the world from ruin and tide over the present crisis of civilization. He therefore calls for the return of the Japanese spirit at home and the enlargement of national power abroad. He supports ultra-

nationalism and Nipponism. Japan's push into the continent is inevitable, and should be carried out by the Government at all costs." Page 26 and 42. "He tells the younger generation to-day the destiny of Japan, not only in the world in general but also specifically in Asia, will be determined within the next few years. He then calls on Japan to choose between two possible national policies, 1) to live well materially within Japan's little islands, exercising birth control etc., the other is the prosecution of Emperor JINU's principals.

A. What?

Q. "To unite the universe, to open our capital to it, and to make a reef covering the eight corners of the world." "This is the Imperial Way of Japan. In order to pursue it we must not avoid any sacrifice, we must not shrink from danger or difficulty, we must definitely decide for it even if we have to reduce our meals to two per day and even if we die to do it, it is clear which way Japan must choose." -- page 117. Do you recall the substance of that book, and if so is that within your meaning of the ideology of Hakko Ichiu?

A. I don't recall all the things in a thick book, written many, many years ago.

Q. Did you advocate those things?

A. Some things you read.

Q. For example, what did you advocate to unite the universe, open our capital to it, and make a reef covering eight corners of the world?

A. I don't recall writing the capital, about that.

Q. Did you say in order to pursue it, we must not avoid sacrifices?

A. Yes, I used to say that.

Q. This was published in May 1941, in regard to the Manchurian Railroad. "He declares it is not like the other economic organizations which are established for profits' sake, but it was organized for the purpose of strengthening the foundation of Japan's national defense."

A. Not solely for that, but also for national defense. I had that idea.

Q. In May 1941?

A. I don't recall the date, but that is after leaving.

Q. You did write a book of that title, didn't you, "The Great Task of Reconstructing Asia."?

A. Not reconstructing Asia. I would translate it "Great Task of Uplifting East Asia."

Q. Uplifting instead of reconstructing?

A. Yes.

Q. The great task of uplifting East Asia?

A. Yes.

Q. Are the matters contained in this book that you wrote, are they your understanding of the ideal of Hakko Ichiu, or the Imperial Way?

A. Yes.

Q. And that was your attitude ^{while} ~~that~~ you were Foreign Minister, isn't that true?

A. Yes.

Q. And you still believe in those principles?

A. Yes, I do. But you must understand my work as

Q. Did you have a hand in developing the heavy industries in Manchuria?

A. What?

Q. Did you have a hand in developing the heavy industries in Manchuria?

A. Yes, about those works, South Manchurian Railway.

Q. Did you state that the Japanese spirit will not retreat before threats such as the U. S. embargo?

A. Maybe, although I don't recollect it.

Q. Did you say that the alliance with Germany and Italy was for the purpose of erecting a new world order?

A. For the purpose of what?

Q. Erecting a new world order.

A. Yes.

Q. Did you state that the Yamato Race alone can save the peoples of the world from ruin?

A. That is what I believe even today.

Q. Did you call upon them to support Continentalism and Nipponism?

A. Yes.

Q. Well, did you state Japan's push into the continent is inevitable, and should be carried out by the government at all costs?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, when you say this, how do you mean to do the pushing?

A. To defend Japan's position.

Q. In other words, to defend by pushing?

A. By pushing against Soviet Russia and China.

Q. And by that you mean the use of military force?

A. Well, if we come to clash.

Q. Well, your public utterances in that book are somewhat inconsistent with your explanations here for the purposes of the execution of the Tripartite Alliance and the peaceful uplifting of the peoples of Asia, aren't they?

A. You may say so, but I don't see any inconsistency myself.

Q. Well, you have admitted here, now, that notwithstanding what is contained in the Tripartite Alliance, the preamble, six articles, the understanding and talks, the private or secret letters that ran along with it, notwithstanding all that, you had some other peculiar object in view, in concluding this pact, isn't that true?

A. Yes.

Q. So that even where Hitler and Mussolini were concerned, in the conclusion of this alliance, you did not disclose to them this other idea that you had?

A. Oh no.

Q. So that, so far as you are concerned, the verbiage and expression of this alliance, together with all other written or spoken instruments

concerning it, was quite fictitious to your real purpose and intent?

A. Not entirely fictitious. It is they were the objects too, but the most important and chief object was what I dreaded, and the point is this

Q. Well, the point is this -- you, as Foreign Minister, and your representatives, entered into an alliance with the German government, the purposes and intent of which are set down in a very plain document, and by conversations and writing, etc., you come to an agreement as to the purpose of the thing. But here this afternoon you tell me that secretly you had some personal reason for which you decided this. No one else knew except yourself, and you did not disclose it to anyone else until long after the conclusion of it. So that, whatever representations you made to Hitler or Mussolini were, as a matter of fact, fictitious or not really the basis of the thing.

A. Well, they were the object too, and my dread that I referred to, I told you time and again, the other days, not only this afternoon alone.

Q. You also have stated that when you made this trip to Berlin, to call on Hitler, Mussolini, and the other people in Europe, you did it merely as a dress parade, and that your real object was not so much to have any conversation with these people, but to conclude the non-aggression pact with Russia.

A. Yes.

Q. You also have previously stated here that in conferences as a government official, that is as Foreign Minister, in conferences on as high a level as the highest liaison conference, that you made statements concerning going to war in the presence of the Army and Navy Ministers, with some special mental reservation in your mind concerning their reaction to this, and you made the statement by way of trickery or to fool or deceive them.

A. Yes. Always you needed some tact in handling military or naval men, you know.

Q. Well, in relation to these very serious and important matters, when are we to believe that you are absolutely in good faith about some representation you made, either here or to Germany or to your own government, or to your own Prime Minister, or to your own Army and Navy Ministers? How are we to determine when you are in good faith or when there is trickery, deception, or secrecy in your mind?

A. The latter means I seldom employed, but when I had to resort to them I did.

Q. It seems Germany took this Alliance quite seriously.

A. No, I don't think so.

Q. You don't believe they took it on its face value?

A. They were on their guard.

Q. Did they not do things which would indicate to a common, intelligent person, that they were doing things contained in this alliance?

A. Well, generally speaking, yes.

Q. You don't believe now that they were in good faith concerning the alliance?

A. I think they were on the whole in good faith.

Q. Do you think they had some secret, undisclosed purpose such as you had?

A. That I don't know.

Q. You were appointed a member of the Cabinet Advisory Board in 1937, weren't you Mr. Matsuka?

A. Yes, but as I say that was no such thing as Advisory Board. It is counsellors to cabinet, who acted singly on his own responsibility alone. I think when I mentioned the members, the counsellors, I think Mr. CHIKUHEI Majima, representing one of the major parties.

Q. May I read to you, for your observation, a more or less historical outline of this Cabinet Advisory Council. If you disagree with it, will you tell me after I conclude reading it. Without going into the background, I will read a paragraph concerning its formation: (Book No. 246)

"Confronted with the delicate task of reconciling diametrically opposed factions among prominent officials and citizens, Prince Kenoye decided to reinforce his Cabinet with councillors. Thus was organized in October 1937 the Cabinet Advisory Council. Such a body would be of extreme importance in preventing internal strife in Japan if the Government failed to settle the present war satisfactorily. By appointing representatives of all the factions to the council it would be possible to prevent any single group from being accused of mistakes. Premier Kenoye also hoped that the council would serve as a training ground for his successor. Furthermore, since this cabinet was composed largely of young men, with no party background and as a 'national cabinet' was incapable of mobilizing the entire national power of the country, it was thought necessary to have a supplementary institution with party representation."

Now, reading from the next paragraph:

"As the Cabinet Council was organized 'in order to participate in the Cabinet's discussion and planning of important State affairs concerning the China Incident,' the duties of the councillors were largely advisory.

However, they were considered important enough to be accorded court treatment similar to that afforded State Ministers. In fact, the real national policies were discussed at their semi-weekly meetings and the ministers of the various departments were thus left to deal with administrative matters. Serious national attitudes were not discussed at cabinet meetings; for it was felt that 'unless there is brought into being an organized body of influence equal in power to what may be expected from the possible combination of the Seiyukai and the Minseito. . . Japan will continue . . . to have Cabinets organized on the basis of compromise among the bureaucrats, the military and political parties.' Thus leaders of opposing factions, such as General Kazushige Ugaki and General Sadao Araki, Admiral Kiyokazu Abo and Admiral Nobunasa Suetsugu were named councillors. But in spite of the recent appointments of those advocating an aggressive attitude in China, sufficient antagonisms still existed within the political arena to cause Premier Konoye to consider resigning, first in the fall and finally at the end of 1938."

Now, I notice here a footnote, "Other appointments to the Council included . . . Mr. Yosuke Matsuoka, president of the South Manchurian Railway."

Now, from a reading of that, would you say that that was substantially what brought about the establishment of the Cabinet Advisory Board?

A. On the face of it. I think General Ugaki joined us later on. At first it was Araki alone. But that is a small mistake. It was chiefly, as I said the other day, to prop up the Konoye Cabinet and nothing important was ever done.

Q. The most important factor concerned about the establishment of these boards and cabinets and assistants to the government, such as the Cabinet Advisory Council, the national mobilization law, and such laws as were brought into effect during that period, was the war in China that Japan was then engaged in, is isn't that true?

A. Yes.

Q. So that it was of such a scope and such a nature as to require serious application of thought and action on the part of the Japanese Government -- the Chinese War?

A. Oh yes.

Q. As a matter of fact, I will read you a part of Chapter 4, having to do with the recent legislation and new administrative organs for the Japanese Government for that period, up to the point where we commenced reading about the Cabinet Advisory Council, and ask you after this if it doesn't substantially state the situation as it existed at the time:

"An unmistakable trend toward centralization of power had developed. The military were quick to profit from the general political disturbance following every national crisis, and gradually they acquired more power. After the outbreak of hostilities in China in July 1937, the extremists had even better chances to dictate policy, and the Konoye Cabinet found itself faced with the task of creating a strong nationalized state to meet the new crisis. The movement for a centralized state was greatly accelerated by the new hostilities, and the leaders quickly inaugurated measures which placed Japan on a war-time basis within a year.

"Inasmuch as large quantities of war supplies were immediately required for the army and navy, the Industry Mobilization Law, originally promulgated on April 17, 1918, was enacted on September 10, 1937. By this enactment the Government was empowered to take the necessary measures for efficient operation of the more important industries. Factories manufacturing or repairing articles of war and those producing raw materials or fuel for such factories were liable to Government control. Property could be confiscated, the import or export of raw materials and fuel could be controlled, and requisition could be made of materials as well as labor. As this law also provided for the effective operation of these provisions, the Government was in a far stronger position than at any other time since the World War. To supplement this measure, various laws, such as those restricting the transport of horses, and the reduction, exemption and postponement of the payment of taxes for soldiers and other persons serving in the war, were enacted. The movement toward national mobilization was under way.

"CABINET PLANNING BOARD

"The successful execution of the Munitions Industry Mobilization Law was facilitated by the existence of three policy-making commissions which had been appointed by, and were the heritage of, the nationalist cabinet of General Hayashi. The first of these, the Price Policy Commission, devised remedies for the unusual rise of commodity prices, and advised the Konoye Cabinet to adopt a stricter law of industrial control than the Principal Industries Control Law under which the cartels were operating. The second commission was that of Education and Culture, whose task was to study matters relating to the thorough diffusion of the concept of Japanese national polity (kokutai) and the promotion of the national spirit in general. And the third was the Cabinet Planning Board which had been established by General Hayashi following the failure of the Board of General Affairs to materialize under the Hirota Ministry. Headed by Mr. Toyotaro Yuki, Finance Minister in the Hayashi Cabinet, this new board was promulgated by Imperial Ordinance on May 14, 1937. It consisted of twenty full-time councillors, with fifteen assistants and permanent advisers appointed from among officials of other bureaus of the Government. Acting largely as a coordinating and directing agent, and directly attached to the cabinet, it transcended all departments and had power to decide the urgency, importance, and priority of the proposals and claims made by the various departments. Furthermore, as

evidenced by the fact that it was responsible for the authorship of the National Mobilization Law enacted March 16, 1938, it had the power to prepare bills for submission to the Diet, as well as to make recommendations on economic matters. It was, in fact, an extremely effective organization for the formation of a unified national policy.

"Following the inauguration of the Kenoye Cabinet, Mr. Koki Hirota succeeded Mr. Yuki as Chairman of the Board, so that by the beginning of hostilities in July 1937 an organization already existed to prevent any departmental suggestions from running counter to a unified national policy or those of any minister from being in conflict with the Prime Minister or his most influential adviser. The Board was closely related to the Central Economic Council established by Imperial Ordinance on July 1 to serve the Prime Minister by investigating and studying the policies which he referred to it, such as the coordination of economic measures and their execution in reference to the Japanese Empire as a whole. The president of the Central Economic Council was the Prime Minister; its vice-president, the president of the Board of Planning; and its chief secretary, the vice-president of the Planning Board. Thus it was practically the economic division of the Board. Finally, by Imperial Ordinance on February 19, 1938, both were amalgamated with the Resources Investigation Council into a Planning Council to 'investigate and give counsel, when referred to by the Prime Minister, on important matters relating to the development and employment of national resources in all their aspects both in peace and in time of war.'"

Q. Do you agree with that?

A. But what you read is not all true, as I see it. Really, the political parties were not so powerful.

Q. Well, they were represented in this council, weren't they?

A. Not as the leaders of political parties, but personally, and not much important business was placed before them.

Q. What element did you represent on this Advisory Council?

A. Simply to get my experience.

Q. Well, let me read this sentence here and see if that doesn't substantially state the situation as it existed at the time: "An unmistakable trend toward centralization of power had developed. The military were quick to profit from the general political disturbance following every national crisis, and gradually they acquired more power. After the outbreak of hostilities in China in July 1937, the extremists had even better chances to dictate policy, and the Kenoye Cabinet found itself faced with the task of creating a strong nationalized state to meet the new crisis. The movement for a centralized state was greatly accelerated by the new hostilities, and the leaders quickly

inaugurated measures which placed Japan on a war-time basis within a year."
-- Tokyo Gazette, No. 4, October 1937, p. 9. Now, the Tokyo Gazette is
more or less an official publication for Japan?

A. I don't know any Tokyo Gazette. Only one Gazette I know in Japan, that
is Government Gazette.

Q. Well, that paragraph -- do you recall that that was the situation at the
time?

A. Yes.

Q. And you were appointed October 1937?

A. Yes. I told you I was then in China. Anyhow, I don't attend the
conference very often. I was not in Tokyo.

Q. Well, the record shows you were appointed sometime in October 1937.

A. Then it must be true.

Q. Reading again, "Inasmuch as large quantities of war supplies were
immediately required for the army and navy, the Industry Mobilization Law,
originally promulgated on April 17, 1918, was enacted on September 10, 1937."
Do you recall that?

A. I don't follow these things.

Q. Well, there was a law called the Industry Mobilization Law which was
originally promulgated in 1918, but was enacted in 1937?

A. I don't know such law, even as originally enacted. I was in those days
way in Manchuria about the business of the South Manchurian Railway.

Q. Well, did you ever hear of the Industry Mobilization Law in Japan?

A. No.

Q. Then we will continue to read, "By this enactment the Government was
empowered to take the necessary measures for efficient operation of the
more important industries." Do you recall that?

A. No.

Q. "Factories manufacturing or repairing articles of war and those produc-
ing raw materials or fuel for such factories were liable to Government
control." Do you recall that?

A. No, about these things I had no interest and I never paid attention to.

Q. It was never discussed on this Cabinet Advisory Board?

A. No. And I -- ever discussed or not -- I was mostly not in Tokyo. That is why the other day I told you I refused point blank to be a councillor.

Q. Well, anyway, "Property could be confiscated, the import or export of raw materials and fuel could be controlled, and requisition could be made of materials as well as labor." -- Tokyo Gazette No. 3, September 1937, p. 48. That was one effect of this law. "As this law also provided for the effective operation of these provisions, the Government was in a far stronger position than at any other time since the World War. To supplement this measure, various laws, such as those restricting the transport of horses, and the reduction, exemption and postponement of the payment of taxes for soldiers and other persons serving in the war, were enacted. The movement toward national mobilization was under way." Do you recall that?

A. No, I don't interest myself in that.

Q. Well, when, in your present judgment, did the total mobilization of Japan for war commence?

A. I think gradually, as the China Incident progressed. And I knew generally that the government was mobilizing the country real strongly.

Q. Do you recall this, "The successful execution of the Munitions Industry Mobilization Law was facilitated by the existence of three policymaking commissions which had been appointed by, and were the heritage of, the nationalist cabinet of General Hayashi. The first of these, the Price Policy Commission." Do you recall that commission?

A. No, I don't.

Q. "devised remedies for the unusual rise of commodity prices and advised the Konoye Cabinet to adopt a stricter law of industrial control than the Principal Industries Control Law under which the cartels were operating." Do you recall that?

A. No.

Q. "The second commission was that of Education and Culture, whose task was to study matters relating to the thorough diffusion of the concept of Japanese national polity (kokutai) and the promotion of the national spirit in general. And the third was the Cabinet Planning Board..." -- did you ever hear of the Cabinet Planning Board?

A. Yes, I know.

Q. "...which had been established by General Hayashi following the failure of the Board of General Affairs to materialize under the Hirota Ministry. Headed by Mr. Toyotaro Yuki, Finance Minister in the Hayashi Cabinet, this new board was promulgated by Imperial Ordinance on May 14, 1937." Do you recall that?

A. I don't recall the date, but that planning board was founded.

Q. Would you say that that planning board was an agency designed to handle the matters as outlined in what I have read concerning the war in China?

A. No, at least I understood the Planning Board was founded to study and plan economic administration and industrial matters, more unified under one board.

Q. Well, did you consider it a war measure?

A. I don't consider the Planning Board as a war measure.

Q. Did you consider that it came into being on account of the international situation, the war in China, or the necessity to bring the material and other resources of Japan more fully under control to carry out the war?

A. No, I think it had nothing to do with the war.

Q. "It consisted of twenty full-time councillors, with fifteen assistants and permanent advisers appointed from among officials of other bureaus of the Government." Do you recall that?

A. I recall faintly that many advisers, etc., but I don't recollect who they were.

Q. Well, I don't expect you would remember who they were. "Acting largely as a coordinating and directing agent, and directly attached to the cabinet, it transcended all departments and had power to decide the urgency, importance, and priority of the proposals and claims made by the various departments. Furthermore, as evidenced by the fact that it was responsible for the authorship of the National Mobilisation Law enacted March 16, 1938, it had the power to prepare bills for submission to the Diet, as well as to make recommendations on economic matters. It was, in fact, an extremely effective organization for the formation of a unified national policy." Do you consider that statement concerning the Planning Board correct?

A. I think it is too broad. I think in the final analysis, I think it was the cabinet who decided anything. The Planning Board doesn't have any power to decide anything.

Q. Did you know Mr. Hirota?

A. Yes.

Q. Did he succeed Mr. UKI as Chairman of this Board, if you know?

A. Who is UKI?

Q. He was apparently Chairman of the Cabinet Planning Board.

A. I don't think Uki was ever.

Q. I will read the full text to you: "Following the inauguration of the Kenoye Cabinet, Mr. Koki Hirota succeeded Mr. Yuki as Chairman of the Board, so that by the beginning of hostilities in July 1937 an organization already existed to prevent any departmental suggestions from running counter to a unified national policy or those of any minister from being in conflict with the Prime Minister or his most influential adviser."

A. I know clearly that Koki Hirota never became head of that bureau or board, and I don't recall Mr. Yuki was ever the head, either. I think there must be a mistake.

Q. "The Board was closely related to the Central Economic Council established by Imperial Ordinance on July 1" -- do you recall that?

A. Central Economic Council of what? I don't recall.

Q. "to serve the Prime Minister by investigating and studying the policies which he referred to it, such as the coordination of economic measures and their execution in reference to the Japanese Empire as a whole." Do you recall that there was such an institution as this?

A. In those days they were creating offices and offices and offices. I don't recall.

Q. That is the point I am trying to bring out. What did that indicate to you? Didn't it indicate that they were preparing for a war, or to carry on the one that had already been in existence? According to this, in May or July 1937, the Japanese troops commenced some further activities in China.

A. I think it was largely an attempt on the part of the government to more effectively consider the national resources of all different kinds, but anyhow.

Q. For what purpose?

A. For finding more effective ways of national life, and anyhow you must know that Japanese officials like very much to create head offices.

Q. Now "The President of the Central Economic Council was the Prime Minister; its vice-president, the president of the Board of Planning; and its chief secretary, the vice-president of the Planning Board. Thus it was practically the economic division of the Board. Finally, by Imperial Ordinance on February 19, 1938, both were amalgamated with the Resources Investigation Council into a Planning Council to 'investigate and give counsel, when referred to by the Prime Minister, on important matters relating to the development and employment of national resources in all their aspects both in peace and in time of war.'" Do you recall those conditions?

A. No. While I don't recall, if it is so written it must be true. Might I tell you that the Prime Minister generally was made president of such boards and bureaus, etc., but oh no.

Q. Well, since you were a member of one of these boards,

A. I have never been except a councillor.

Q. According to this, you were appointed October 1937 on the Cabinet Advisory Council.

A. Yes.

Q. As a member, did you debate there?

A. Sometimes.

Q. Concerning the China war?

A. Yes.

Q. Who did you debate with?

A. We were gathered in one room.

Q. How about semi-weekly meetings that were held? Did you attend any of these?

A. When I was in Tokyo.

Q. When did you attend them?

A. Several times, and argued for an early ending of the incident.

Q. What incident?

A. I told them there that we must be doing something with America, to bring about better understanding.

Q. What was your recommendation for the process to bring an early end to the war with China?

A. To talk with America directly.

Q. What about Japan just withdrawing her troops and putting an end to the war?

A. Well, that will eventually come, but no attempt at conversations with America were made after the commercial treaty was abrogated.

Q. According to the many books and documents and speeches which you made, both as an official and as a private citizen, indicate that you had very definite opinions on matters involving the Greater East Asia co-prosperity sphere, and the development of the Japanese sphere in East Asia. Were you not concerned about these matters, when you were a member of the Advisory Council?

A. Well, from the start, as I said, I told Konoye that I might be excused because I wouldn't be able to take part in it, and as a matter of fact I didn't attend very often, and I don't know.

Q. Well, where were you when the war broke out against China in 1937?

A. Against China? I think I was in Tokyo.

Q. You were not in Manchuria at the time?

A. No, I was back in Tokyo.

Q. Did you have an office in Tokyo?

A. Yes, that company has always a branch office, and I had my own residence in Tokyo.

Q. Now when you were in Manchuria and president of the South Manchurian Railroad, did you have any official or unofficial conversation with the members of the Japanese military, particularly the Army?

A. What kind of conversations?

Q. Concerning the Manchurian Railroad operations and heavy industries.

A. Well, concerning heavy industries I had in my charge.

Q. Who were some of your friends in the Army in Manchuria?

A. Who could I call friend? General ITAGAKI, he was a chief of staff at now Chang Chin. Let me see, I think about NAGAKI, I think I can't call my friend, though I know him.

Q. Well, there is some evidence that certain members of the military were imbued with the same ideological ideas you had concerning Hakko Ichiu, the Imperial way, and uplifting of the people in East Asia. Had you any persons -- friends or acquaintances -- in the military with whom you discussed your ideas on this subject?

A. No.

Q. Not any?

A. No. ITAGAKI is a rather silent man. He seldom discussed anything.

Q. What was his idea about uplifting of the people of East Asia, and the Imperial way?

A. Well, I never discussed with him, so I don't know.

Q. Did you know TOJO when he was in Manchuria?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you ever have any conversations with him?

A. About Hakko Ichiu?

Q. The heavy industries in aid and assistance of the armed forces.

A. Concerning some of the heavy industries, yes.

Q. And what was the subject matter, then, of the discussion?

A. Tojo came there, I think it was tenth year of Taisho or Showa, and later as Chief of the Gendarmerie -- Japanese Military Police -- then I did not have much to converse with him, and later he succeeded ITAGAKI as chief of staff in Chang Chin, and naturally he made now and then inquiries about some of the heavy industries such as steel and iron, and I used to of course know it, and the extract of oil from coal. And then again, extraction of heavy oils from oil saved at Fuchu, and the like. I explained. Also you must know that Tojo is a man who don't argue things.

much, you know. He just asks you questions and listens. Then is the time I began to know Tojo.

Q. Were you appraised of any of the military plans and preparations for the carrying on of the war in China by any of the military?

A. No, I had nothing to do with it.

Q. And the supply of material or movement of troops?

A. I immediately detailed a general stationed at Mukden to take control so far as it relates to the transportation, etc. The Japanese military, you must know, are very jealous about any layman to discuss military matters.

Q. Well you, in one of your speeches here, and in your book, praised highly the activity which the Manchurian Railroad took in the Manchurian affair, as to the aid it had given to the military.

A. Yes.

Q. Well, in insofar as that is concerned, that was a co-relation of the South Manchurian Railroad and its resources to the needs and requirements of the armed forces of Japan in that area.

A. Yes, I was always saying that our works in Manchuria was both economic and strategic. But the president of that company is not supposed to know military matters. He just carries out the works assigned.

Q. In May 1941 HONDA -- did you ever know anyone by that name?

A. General Honda? I don't know him. I know General Homma.

Q. You don't know anyone by that name?

A. No.

Q. Did you ever have any conversation with a man by the name of Honda concerning cooperation with the Army and Navy aims in China?

A. No, I don't know a man by the name of Honda to start with.

Q. The name is not familiar to you?

A. Not only not familiar, but I don't know General Honda.

Q. Well, if it isn't a general, it could be a private citizen. Does the name mean anything to you?

A. There is a Honda who was our ambassador to China.

Q. "Honda forced Matsuoka to cooperate. . . . to take it out of the hands of the government and make Matsuoka virtually a dictator."

A. That is laughable.

Q. You never made that remark?

A. No no.

Q. Did you declare on September 13 1943 that you were overjoyed to hear that your close friend Mussolini had been rescued?

A. I don't recall. I was anyway confined in my house.

Q. Well, the fact that he was rescued. Did that make you happy? Were you happy at the result of his having been rescued after the fall of Italy?

A. Well, I admired the bold attempt of Hitler's.

Q. And on October 7 1943, did you go from Japan to Russia in an attempt to negotiate peace between the Germans and the Russians?

A. Why, I was laid up in bed.

Q. Well, that is the question -- on October 7 1943 did you go to Russia in an attempt to negotiate peace between Germany and Soviet Russia?

A. No.

Q. Did you carry on any negotiations?

A. No. Of course, in bed, I heard that in Tokyo there were rumors rampant to the effect that I was in Russia, while in reality I was laid up in bed in Tokyo.

Q. Did you make the statement that Japan had no choice but to enter the Axis pact because an agreement with the U. S. was quite impossible? Further, "You Americans," he said, "want us to withdraw our troops from China. You must know that it is impossible and that Japanese public opinion will never stand for it."

A. I don't recollect.

Q. Do you know a person by the name of Wilfred Fleischer?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you make such a statement to him?

A. I might have said so.

Q. This was in 1943.

A. Fleischer was not in Japan then.

Q. I mean the statement you might have made before. This was a book he published in 1943.

A. I don't recollect, but anyhow to Fleischer I never made such a statement because he was back in the States by that time.

Q. Did you secure the Imperial Rescript for the Axis treaty, to put it beyond criticism?

A. Yes, the Imperial rescript or ordinance, for any important instrument you get the Imperial rescript. And pardon me, that was Bert Fleischer, the father. Wilfred was the son.

Q. Did you publicly rebuke Ambassador Grew at a farewell luncheon given to Admiral Hara on the eve of his departure for the U. S., on the basis that Japan's differences was due to the lack of understanding on the part of the U. S.?

A. I never personally rebuked Mr. Grew. That is a fabricated story.

Q. Were you instrumental in bringing to Japan Nazi agents from Germany?

A. No.

Q. To carry on their work here?

A. No.

Q. Did you ever wear a uniform which was the "Strength to Join Movement" German uniform?

A. No.

Q. You never wore such a thing?

A. No.

Q. Do you know what such a uniform was like?

A. Yes, that is you mean worn by a German Nazi. Oh, no, no. I never wore a uniform of any kind.

Q. Do you know a HARADA Ken?

A. I don't know him.

Q. Are you an advisor or were you an advisor to the NIPPON SHAY SEN KOSAI (Japanese Spirit Association)?

A. No, I was never advisor to any association or society. I steadfastly refused, only sometimes these men put you on the list as advisor without the consent of me, but wherever they approached me for consent I steadfastly refused.

Q. Did you ever contribute as much as \$5,000 to a newspaper which was to be set up in Malaya and Batavia?

A. No.

Q. In talking of things Japanese at a luncheon, did you express admiration and respect for MATSUI TOMIYAMA, and do you belong to any secret society of which this Tomiyama was also a member?

A. I don't recollect such a speech, but I was always admiring MATSUI TOMIYAMA, but I don't ever belong to any societies under anyone's influence.

Q. Who was TOYAMA?

A. He was a great personality in Japan.

Q. What was his business?

A. He had no particular business, but we were always respecting him and admiring him. He was a great spiritual leader.

Q. Did you ever hear of the so-called Black Dragon Society?

A. The other day. I laughed over it.

Q. Do you know whether or not TOYAMA was a member of that society?

A. I think he was not a member.

Q. What was he a leader of?

A. That is something

Q. What did he advocate -- Hakko Ichiu?

A. Yes, I think so. And that is very hard for Americans and Europeans to understand, that in Japan we had this peculiar personality -- he has virtue and personality and he is respected and there are always many men contributing to his upkeep.

Q. Was he interested in uplifting the people in East Asia, too?

A. I think so, but he never talked about it.

Certificate of Interpreter

I, _____, _____
(name) (Serial Number)

being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of _____ pages, is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this _____ day of _____, 1946.

(Name and Rank)

Duly Detailed Investigating Officer,
International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP.

Certificate of Stenographer

I, Clara B. Knapp hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Clara B. Knapp

Certificate of Interrogator.

I, (MIA) John D. Shea, Lt Col, USA,

and _____,

certify that on 18th day of March, 1946, personally appeared before me (MIA) NASHIKI, Yasuko, and according to _____, Interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

Saiyo, Japan
Place

21 March 1946
Date

John D. Shea