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CAVOUR.

A MEMOIR.

BY EDWARD DICEY,

AUTHOR OF "ROME IN 1860."

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WILLIAM EWART GLADSTONE, M.P.

CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER,

ETC. ETC.

PREFACE.

The time has not come to write fully the life of Count Cavour. Many long years have yet to pass, before either friends or foes can judge fairly of the statesman's memory. The fame of the architect rests ultimately, not so much on the gorgeousness of his edifice, as on the stability of his structure. Time alone can show whether the great work which Cavour wrought and left—dying—all but accomplished, was built upon sound foundations. With the result of that trial, Cavour's repute will stand or fall. Some score of years hence, when the Italian question has passed from the domain of hot living passions, into that of cool judgment, men may be able to write the record of Cavour's life, which will also be the history of the Italian Revolution.

It is almost superfluous to say, that to such a character, this work of mine has no pretensions. It is a memoir, not a life—a chapter, and not a history. It has been my object to describe the character and policy of Cavour, as I have gathered it from his speeches, his writings, and his public acts. Of such sources of private information as were open to me, I have thankfully availed myself. Some experience of Italy, however, has taught me to place little confidence in second-hand reports about Cavour's confidential opinions. In all cases, I have preferred public to private information; and what my book has thus lost in novelty, I trust it has gained in truth.

If I have been successful in conveying to my readers the impression which I have personally of Cavour's true greatness, I shall be content.

EDWARD DICEY.

TURIN, 18*th July*, 1861.

CONTENTS.

INTRODUCTION.

PAGE
BIRTH AND LINEAGE 1

CHAPTER I.

THE RESTORATION IN PIEDMONT 5

CHAPTER II.

YOUTH AND TRAINING 14

CHAPTER III.

CHARLES ALBERT 19

CHAPTER IV.

THE LIFE ABROAD 25

CHAPTER V.

EARLY WRITINGS 32

CHAPTER VI.

CAVOUR ON COMMUNISM 38

CHAPTER VII.

DAYS OF WAITING 49

CHAPTER VIII.

PAGE
THE "RISORGIMENTO" 60

CHAPTER IX.

THE STATUTO 74

CHAPTER X.

THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 84

CHAPTER XI.

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1848 89

CHAPTER XII.

THE ARMISTICE 95

CHAPTER XIII.

NOVARA 106

CHAPTER XIV.

THE PEACE 112

CHAPTER XV.

MINISTER OF PIEDMONT 123

CHAPTER XVI.

HOME POLICY 133

CHAPTER XVII.

FOREIGN POLICY 141

CHAPTER XVIII.

THE CONGRESS OF PARIS 155

CHAPTER XIX.

PAGE
THE STATESMAN 160

CHAPTER XX.

THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 174

CHAPTER XXI.

VILLA FRANCA 183

CHAPTER XXII.

THE ANNEXATIONS 191

CHAPTER XXIII.

THE NEAPOLITAN REVOLUTION 198

CHAPTER XXIV.

THE GARIBALDIAN DICTATORSHIP 205

CHAPTER XXV.

THE KINGDOM OF ITALY 214

CHAPTER XXVI.

THE GARIBALDI DEBATE 226

CHAPTER XXVII.

LAST DAYS 231

CHAPTER XXVIII.

SANTENA 239

CAVOUR.

INTRODUCTION.

BIRTH AND LINEAGE.

THE Morbus Biographicus, as some one once baptized our modern passion for biographies, has not yet descended upon Italy. Biographies, even of the greatest of Italian celebrities, are rare in number; and such as there are, appears to our English notions, marvellously meagre and scant of detail. Research into a great man's antecedents—into the story of his parents' lives or the records of his childish days—is a thing foreign to the Italian mind. "Chi lo sa?" would, in nine cases out of ten, be the answer that any venturesome inquirer, on such a subject, received even from the best informed of his hero's admirers. Thus, in a memoir of Cavour, which I chanced to come across, the writer commences by the statement that, according to one version, the subject of his memoir was of ancient family and lineage:

according to another, he was the son of a small tradesman at Nice; but that as the matter was of no importance, the writer had not taken the trouble to inquire which of the two versions was the correct one. Happily, for the benefit of those, who are unable to appreciate this philosophical disregard for external facts, I am able to supply something of the required information.

The Bensi, then—for that is the real name of the Cavour family—are amongst the oldest of the noble houses of Piedmont. The tradition goes, that the founder of the race came, originally, from Saxon Germany. This much is certain, that as early as the year of grace 1150, there appears in the annals of the House of Savoy the name of Hubert Benso, Viscount of Baldisetto and Lord of Santena, the present seat of the Cavours, where, by his own wish, the late Count was buried. During the middle ages, the Bensi seem to have been chiefly connected with the small and obscure republic of Chieri, near which most of their property was situated. In the wars of the Guelphs and Ghibelines, they sided with the Imperialist faction; and when Henry VII. of Luxembourg entered Italy, an Ardicio Benso was sent, as envoy from the free city of Chieri, to the emperor of Germany. Later on, as the dukes of Savoy extended and confirmed their dominion over the sub-Alpine provinces, the names of the Bensi appear among the grandees of the ducal court and of its neighbouring states. Goffredo Benso, governor of Turin, defended the fortress of Mont Melian against the armies of Louis XIII. of France. Cesare Benso was about the same time Bishop of Asti. In 1598 Ascanio Benso was minister to the Duke of Parma; while Antonio Benso, holding the rank of colonel in the armies of the Venetian republic, distinguished himself in the siege of Cyprus, and so on, till at last we find that, in the 18th century, Michele Benso, knight of the order of the Annonciada, was raised to the rank of Marquis, taking the title of his Marquisate from the little village of Cavour, situated in the province of Pignerolo. In Italy titles are but loosely carried, and from this time forth, the Bensi di Cavours were known and spoken of commonly as the Cavours, though all the members of the race bore, and still bear, the name of Benso di Cavour.

At the time of the Napoleonic rule in Italy, the bearer of the title was the Marquis Michele Giuseppe, the father of our Count Cavour. When Piedmont was converted into the department of the Hautes Alpes, under the governorship of Prince Borghese, husband of the famous and beautiful Pauline Buonaparte, the Marquis Cavour held the office of grand chamberlain to the palace. In fact, the whole of the Cavour household of that day were closely allied with the Buonapartes: the Marchioness, who came from the old Geneva family of the Sellons, was lady-in-waiting to the Princess Pauline; one of the Marquis's sisters, the Duchess of Clermont-Tonnere, was maid of honour at the Imperial Court of France; while another, Madame d'Auzers, held, I have been told, the same office in the court of Queen Hortense, the mother of the present Emperor.

It was at the height of the Napoleonic fortunes, when the victories of Esslingen and Wagram, and the triumphant entry into Vienna, were followed by the marriage of the Emperor with the grand Duchess Marie Louise of Austria, that the baby Count Cavour, the second and last son of his father, was ushered into the world, beneath the especial protection of the Napoleons. He was baptized, so the record runs, on the 10th of August, 1810, under the name of Camillo Benso di Cavour, taking his Christian name from the Prince Camillo Borghese, who acted as his godfather, while the Princess Pauline held in her arms the infant at the font. Strange things happen in this world of ours. Half a century afterwards, another Napoleon, as Emperor of France kept sending hour by hour from Paris, to learn tidings of the great Italian statesman, who lay dying in the old house where he was born, and where he had first been presented to the world in the arms of Pauline, the sister of the great Napoleon.

CHAPTER I.

THE RESTORATION IN PIEDMONT.

"THE past," according to the Duc de Noailles' saying, "has been very short lived of late;" and, of all the dead pasts, there are few, which have left with us scantier memories, than the quarter of a century, which followed in Italy the fall of the first empire. The great wars, which preceded the commencement of that period, have left indeed recollections in our national memory, not to be soon forgotten; but it was not till 1846, that our own generation began again to feel much interest in Italy. I suspect that even in these days of competitive examinations, most of us would find it hard to state much about the history of Italy, between 1815 and 1840, beyond a general impression, that it was the era of "Carbonari" and "Illuminati," of hopeless conspiracies and fruitless oppression, of patriot poets and foreign occupations, the epoch of Silvio Pellico, and Mazzini, and Metternich. There is a good deal of rough truth about this, as there is about most popular impressions, and a good deal also of gross untruth. With regard to Piedmont, where the young Cavour was brought up, till he had reached the age of manhood, this general impression is especially erroneous. In order then to understand at all the influences, under which Cavour was reared, it is necessary to dwell very briefly on the history of Piedmont between 1814 and 1830.

To the Italians, as to all nations with a strong marked nationality, a foreign rule of any kind ever was, and ever will be, hateful. In consequence, the overthrow of the French rule was popular throughout the whole of Italy. The difference in this respect between Piedmont and the other Italian states, consisted in the fact, that there and there alone, that overthrow was not only welcome at the time, but was never regretted afterwards.

Instead of the independence which the Austrian generals on entering Italy promised should be the result of the war of liberation, the Italians found that they had only changed masters, and changed them for the worse. The system of law and order and progress, which, with all its faults and all its tyranny, the Napoleonic rule had introduced, gave place to a series of petty bigoted despotisms, hating their subjects and hated by them. In a short time the treaties of Vienna had done their work, and, throughout almost the whole of Italy, the days of the "Regno d'Italia," were remembered as a golden era. In Piedmont, happily, this was not the case. For upwards of eight centuries the princes of the house of Savoy had, amidst many vicissitudes of fortune, retained the affection of their people. Their virtues and their failings were those of the nation over whom they ruled. Their traditions, their glories, and their hopes, were common to themselves and to their subjects. As long as resistance was possible, Charles Emmanuel IV., supported by his troops, fought bravely against the revolutionary armies; and when, at last, he yielded to superior numbers, unlike the rest of his brother monarchs, he neither went into exile nor fought in the service of the coalition, but, accompanied by his two brothers, retired to the island of Sardinia, and there resigned his crown in favour of his second brother Victor Emmanuel I. The moment that the news of Napoleon's abdication at Fontainebleau reached Sardinia, the King returned to Piedmont, and without any foreign intervention, or even any permission from the Allied Powers, resumed his kingdom, amidst the enthusiastic welcome of his people.

There is a story told about this Victor Emmanuel I. which explains the character of his reign. "J'ai fait un mauvais rêve et je me réveille." Such was his only comment on his return. In that long Cagliari exile of his, he, like the Bourbons, had learnt nothing and forgotten nothing; fortunately, unlike them, he had not much to learn and had much worth remembering. He was full indeed of old-world prejudices; he disliked French novelties and hated the revolution; civil and religious liberty, and such like innovations, were to him words without meaning; the old aristocratic semi-feudal system of his youth seemed to him the right order of things, natural both for rulers and people. But deeper than all this, he held the conviction, that as a prince of Savoy he was bound to preserve the independence of his country and the affection of his people. It was this conviction which saved him from fatal errors. True to the traditions of his race, he hated Austria even more than he hated the revolution, and his first act almost, on regaining the throne, was to send to the congress of Vienna, to request the sovereignty of the Lombard-Venetian provinces, in order to constitute a powerful state in the north of Italy as a bulwark against Austria. About the same time, in language which reads strangely at the present day, he wrote in these terms to the Vatican to dissuade the Pope from the idea of an Italian confederation, then proposed by Austria.

"Every effort is being made at Vienna to appropriate the last remnants of Italy. There is no scruple as to the means employed. A league of all the Italian princes is proposed under the headship of the Emperor. This league is only a pretext to disguise the attempt at supremacy; there can be no other reason, for France is now too weak to think of reconquering Italy."

At the time, when Victor Emmanuel I. was restored to his throne, he was a man nearer sixty than fifty, and as the Salic law rules in Sardinia, his daughters were not eligible to the throne; the youngest of them, by the way, born very late in her father's life, was the mother of Francis II. ex-King of the two Sicilies. The brother, Charles Felix, the next heir to the throne, had no children, and being then over fifty, was not likely to have any. With him the direct line of the princes of the house of Savoy became extinct, and the heir presumptive was Charles Albert, Prince of Savoy-Carignan.

When the Sardinian monarchy was overthrown by the revolution, the then Prince of Savoy=Carignan, did not accompany the reigning princes into exile, but took refuge in France, where he resided till his death. The young prince was reared and bred at Paris in the great days of the Empire, and actually held a commission in the imperial army, though he was never on active service. He returned to Piedmont imbued to a certain extent with modern ideas and French sympathies. In the midst of the aristocratic and reactionary court of that day, he was looked upon as a republican and a revolutionist. The natural result followed. The young prince became the chief of the opposition, and his palace was the gathering-place of the youth and liberalism of Piedmont. Between the old king and the prince there was great personal affection, and, moreover, their common hatred to Austria was a strong bond of union. Charles Felix, however, looked with not unnatural jealousy on his young successor, and the Austrian clerical court-camerilla anticipated with dread the reign of a liberal sovereign.

Here, then, we come to the great difference between Piedmont and the other Italian states. From as long as half a century ago down to our own times, the liberal party in Piedmont, in contradistinction to that of the rest of Italy, was not republican, but monarchical. The Piedmontese liberals of that day had no desire for the restoration of French rule, or for a change in the ruling dynasty; they regretted the suppression of the French system of civil and religious equality, and the restoration of aristocratic privileges; they desired a liberal reform in the constitution, and, possibly, they went as far as to entertain hopes, that the old-fashioned king and his bigoted brother might be induced to resign in favour of the young and liberal prince of Savoy-Carignan, but beyond this, as a party, they did not go. How far Charles Albert shared in these plans, and how far he himself had any relations with the republican party in the other states of Italy, are questions too wide from my subject to enter into here.

Given such conditions, it is not hard to predict the result which followed. As the first enthusiasm at the restoration of the old national dynasty died away, the desire for liberal forms of government, suited to the changed state of things, became daily stronger, and as the liberal party grew in strength, it rallied more and more about Charles Albert. Then came the

Spanish revolution in 1820, with the proclamation of the Cadiz constitution, and then followed the ill-fated insurrection in the Two Sicilies. Piedmont, after a fashion of its own, according to its wont, followed in the general movement. The middle classes desired a change in the civil government, and the army, though at the time eminently aristocratic, wished for a change in the person of the sovereign, in order to enter on a war with Austria. Throughout Piedmont there was a general rising, in which the army took part, accompanied by a demand for the constitution. The King himself was not averse to yielding; but he was bound by personal obligations towards his brother, and towards the Allied Powers; and so, in order to solve the difficulty, he abdicated in favour of Charles Felix, and as the new monarch happened to be absent, appointed Charles Albert temporary Regent. There are two opposite versions as to Charles Albert's conduct during this crisis. The friendly one is, that the Regency was forced upon him, and that while, as Regent, he was obliged to grant the constitution, he used every effort to delegate his temporary powers into the hands of the rightful sovereign. The other, and unfriendly one is, that the whole insurrection was connived at, if not supported, by Charles Albert; that he induced Victor Emmanuel to resign in order to have the power of granting the constitution; and that it was only when he found the insurrection utterly hopeless, that he tried to make terms with the new King. Which is the true version, it is foreign to my purpose to discuss. It is enough to say, that the Court party, with Charles Felix on the one hand, and the advanced liberals on the other, inclined to the unfriendly faith. The former accused Charles Albert of having betrayed his King, the latter of having betrayed his adherents.

Charles Felix at the moment of the "émeute" was on a visit at the court of Modena, the most bigoted and despotic, perhaps, of the petty Italian despotisms. Influenced probably by the Duke of Modena, who had hopes of succeeding to the throne of Sardinia in the event of Charles Albert's deposition, he issued an edict, declaring all concessions made by the Regent null and void, and in the harshest terms ordered Charles Albert to resign his power. The Austrians invaded the Piedmontese territory with the connivance, if without the actual consent of Charles Felix, occupied Alexandria, and defeated the insurgent troops at Novara. The insurrection was suppressed, or rather, fell to pieces, and Charles Felix ascended the throne. His reign was a period of painful humiliation both for his kingdom and his heir. A proposal was actually made by Austria at the Congress of Laibach, to alter the succession, and deprive Charles Albert of his claim to the throne on the ground of his liberal opinions. Charles Felix, to do him justice, was, with all his despotic sympathies, a true prince of the House of Savoy, and in spite of his dislike to Charles Albert, could not brook the idea of diverting the succession from his own race. Finally the Austrian project was knocked on the head by a declaration of the French government, that any infraction of Charles Albert's rights would be considered by France a "casus belli."

For many years Charles Albert remained in disgrace at court. He lived for some time in France in semi-exile, and took part in the French expedition into Spain on behalf of the Bourbons. This act, which deprived him still more of the sympathies of the liberal party in Italy, obtained for him a sort of half-pardon from the King of Sardinia, and at the death of Charles Felix, in 1831, he was raised to the throne, distrusted alike by the revolutionary and the reactionary parties. The year of his accession was the year in which the young Count Cavour came of age.

CHAPTER II.

YOUTH AND TRAINING.

I AM no great believer in the doctrine of historical development. Given the circumstances in which a man grows up, I question much, whether you can tell with any certainty, what the man will be. There is, indeed, a class of remarkable men, whom I should be disposed to call men of second-rate genius, whose minds are eminently susceptible of external influences, and in whose career you can trace with ease the working of more powerful forces, whether personal or otherwise. That if there had been no Mazzini, the world would not have known Garibaldi as the deliverer of Naples, is a fact obvious enough. Further than this I cannot go. The really great men of this world, of whom Cavour was one, are not made, but make, and so, it is far easier to trace the influence, that Cavour had on Italy, than the influence, which the history of Italy had upon Cavour. I have given, then, this sketch of the history of Piedmont during the years of Cavour's youth, not to show why Cavour grew up to be the man he became, but to explain the medium, in which that great intellect worked out its own strength.

The facts known about Cavour's youth are not many in number. His first tutor was a Savoyard priest, the Abbé Frezet, who died little more than a year ago. At an early age he was sent to the military academy of Turin, and, when ten years old, was appointed page to Charles Albert, then Prince of Savoy-Carignan. For some time after the restoration of Victor Emmanuel I. the Cavours were coldly looked upon at Court, on account of their former connexion with the Buonaparte family. For the same reason, they were reckoned partizans of Charles Albert; and the appointment of the child Cavour to a pageship in the royal household was considered as an expression of the Prince's sympathy for the deposed *régime.* However, Cavour, child as he was, had nothing of the courtier about him, and in a very short time he was sent back to the academy, as unfit for the honours of pageship. There is a story told that, when he heard of his dismissal, the child's remark was, that "he was glad he had thrown off his packsaddle.' It is told in all memoirs, and I can only say of it that it is "*ben trovato.*" It is common enough, to meet with great men, of whom in their school days their companions thought nothing; it is still more common to find children, whom their masters and schoolfellows think destined to great things, and who turn out commonplace mortals afterwards; but it is rare indeed, to find a great man, whose talent was recognized from the earliest age. Happily, precocious infants are things unknown in Italy, so that there are no fabulous legends circulated of Cavour's childish sayings; but I have heard from men who were at school with him that, when a mere boy, he excited their attention, young as they themselves were then. He was good-humoured, popular enough, and "*bon enfant*," but he never played, never joined in boyish games, and never seemed to work; he was always reading, not works of fiction, but papers, political treatises, and histories. He paid no particular attention to his lessons, and troubled himself very little about them; but when the examinations came round, he appeared to grasp all he was required to learn without an effort, and surpassed his competitors easily. He passed his various examinations with such distinction, that his commission was given him at sixteen, and he was allowed to enter the army at eighteen, though twenty was the earliest age fixed by the regulations. At school, he had shown an especial aptitude for mathematics, under the tuition of the celebrated Professor Plana, and probably in consequence of this taste, he obtained, at his own request, a commission in the Engineers. He was stationed at Genoa, and employed on the fortifications which were then constructing at that port. Before he had been long there, some expression of liberal sentiments, uttered rashly in private society, was reported at Court;

and, as a sort of half-punishment, he received orders to do garrison duty for a year at the solitary fort of Bard, in the Val d'Aosta. The army, altogether, was little to his taste; and when the year was over, he resigned his commission. His father was much opposed to the step, having long ago given up the slight *soupçon* of liberalism that attached to his earlier days, and become instead, the most zealous of courtiers. When, however, Cavour represented, that the opinions he held, and the habit he had of expressing them, would infallibly lead him into further trouble with the authorities, the old Marquis reluctantly gave his consent to his son's retirement.

It is curious that not even then, in the heat of youth, and when smarting under persecution for liberal opinions, did Cavour show the slightest disposition to enter into any of the secret conspiracies or *confraternités* in which almost all the Italian youth of his day were implicated. His conviction that the Government of his country was a bad one, was not more strong than his belief, that no good could be done by conspiracies or insurrections. He had as little sympathy for Mazzini, who was then coming into note, as he had for Metternich; and so, feeling himself out of place in his own country, he obtained leave to travel for some years abroad.

There is an incident worth mentioning in connexion with the commencement of his journey. Somehow or other the Austrian authorities received intelligence that the young Count was likely to visit the Lombard provinces, and thereupon, Count Torresani, who was then Director-General of Police at Milan, issued the following instructions to the officials at the frontier:—

" **Milan, May 15, 1833.**

"A young Piedmontese nobleman, Camillo di Cavour, is about to set out on his travels. He was formerly an officer in the Engineers, and, in spite of his youth, is already deeply corrupted in his political principles. I lose no time in giving this intelligence to the Commissioners of Police, with instructions, not to permit the entrance of the person in question, if he should present himself at our frontiers, unless his passport is perfectly *en règle,* and, even in this case, only after the most rigorous investigation into his clothes and luggage, as I have reason to suspect he may be the bearer of dangerous documents."

Even the police, it seems, are sometimes right in their suspicions!

CHAPTER III.

CHARLES ALBERT.

For ten years or so Count Cavour resided chiefly abroad. Of these years of his "Wanderschaft" I shall say what little there is to say in the next chapter. During this period, he took no part and occupied no place in the history of his country. On reading, the other day, Rosetti's very able "History of Modern Italy, from 1815 to the Abdication of Charles Albert," I was struck curiously by the fact that, while at every page you come across the names of Ratazzi, Gioberti, Balbo, La Marmora, Garibaldi, D'Azeglio, and a score of minor celebrities, whose names are now well nigh forgotten, you never once, in that long volume, found an allusion even to Count Cavour.

This fact came from no want of sympathy with Cavour on the writer's part, but simply because, till after Novara, he was a man of little public note beyond his own circle. He was biding his time; but from the hour that he made himself known, he might say with truth that of the events that followed, he was not only "*pars magna*," but "*pars maxima*." From that time, indeed, the life of Cavour becomes, at its beginning, the history of Piedmont, and, at its close, the history of Italy. For the present, the two threads still run apart; and I must now say a few words of the changes that passed over Piedmont during Cavour's absence from home.

A hero's death and an exile's grave have shed a strange, and perhaps an undue, glory round the memory of Charles Albert. Knowing the past, when you look upon his pictures, you fancy you can read therein the lines of that sad fitful destiny. The high narrow forehead, the deep-sunken dreamy eyes, the mouth half-mild, half-stern, and still irresolute, all point to the royal Hamlet, whom an evil fate had doomed, to "set aright a world," which was "out of joint." He should have lived in the days of chivalry, when men would have known him only as a Bayard king, "*Sans peur et sans reproche;*" but in these evil times of ours, he was out of place. A man of boundless bravery, fine intellect, deep affections, and mystic piety, nature made him for a crusader, not for a reformer—for the champion of a falling cause, not for the founder of a new era. His very liberalism, for which he suffered so much, was of a strange confused kind. With a deep sympathy for modern thought in the abstract, he entertained a right royal aversion to revolution in the concrete. His patriotic feelings were always struggling in that troubled morbid mind, with his ideas of duty as a king and as a catholic. So, like the late King of Prussia, only in a far nobler and less self-seeking way, he was always halting between two opinions, turning now to the revolution, now to the reaction, and doubting ever. There was one point, and one point only, on which his mind never varied, in which his obligations as the most Catholic Prince of the House of Savoy were in unison with his ambition to be the champion of Italy—and that was in his hatred to Austria. I have been told by one, who has seen the letter, that early in his reign, when the first difficulties arose between the courts of Vienna and Turin, Charles Albert wrote these words to a friend: "Let Austria beware how she pushes me too far, or else *I* will be the Schamyl of Italy." "Austria est delenda" should have been the motto inscribed upon his tomb.

This animosity was in part due to injuries which the most forgiving of monarchs could not forget. Not only had Austria attempted to deprive him of his crown, but for the first years of his reign, she kept him under the most humiliating tutelage. At the time of his accession, the northern powers sent him a joint declaration, that the condition of their recognising his sovereignty must be his submission to the views of Austria in matters of internal government. In fact, he held his throne upon good behaviour. Any attempt to assert his own independence would have been followed by an Austrian occupation ; and there was no hope, in such a case, of French interference. The Orleans dynasty, then insecurely established in France, had no sympathy for Italy. "La politique française," in Louis Philippe's memorable reply to the proposal of an alliance between France and Sardinia, "ne peut pas s'engager pour une politique d'aventurier."

The Piedmontese army was dispirited and enfeebled ; while the liberal national party looked with distrust upon a king, who had fought for the cause of the Bourbons at the battle of Trocadero. There was nothing left then but submission ; and the proud spirit of Charles Albert had to consent "to reign without governing" in his own kingdom. His very ministers were appointed from Vienna. An Austrian Camarilla ruled in reality at Turin. The King's own orders were not executed, and the Piedmontese envoys abroad avowedly received their instructions from the Count della Margharita, the then chief of the Austrian party, not from the King himself. This state of things lasted for several years after 1831, and throughout that period, the country was governed autocratically, if not despotically. I do not believe that, until events forced him to it at a later period, Charles Albert had any clear desire or intention of introducing constitutional government. The reforms he wished to make, and which Austria would not allow him to make, were rather material than political. Meanwhile, the effect of this interference was to attract Charles Albert, more and more, towards the liberal party in Italy, who desired, with him, the overthrow of the Austrian dominion.

Personally the King was not unpopular in Piedmont, and the country, more or less, comprehending his position, respected him for the efforts he was making to restore the national independence. The more violent, however, of the liberal party looked upon him as a traitor and a tyrant; and with that strange blindness which seems to me to characterize the Mazzinians, whenever they pass from thought to action, an attempt was made to assassinate Charles Albert in the midst of his labours. The attempt served to delay the union between the King and his people, but fortunately for a time only.

Slowly and surely, with a dissimulation rather forced upon him by necessity than natural to his disposition, the oppressed monarch worked to free himself from the trammels that fettered him. In the hands of the Austrian Camarilla, he left for a time the government of the interior and the management of foreign relations, to which they attached chief importance, while he directed all his efforts, with the aid of Villamarina and Gallina, to reorganizing the army and to restoring the finançes of the country. At last the time came, in 1840, when on Austria proposing, in reference to the Syrian question of the day, that Austrian troops should occupy the line of the Po; Villamarina, as minister of Charles Albert, answered proudly, that these positions should be occupied only when the King of Sardinia thought good, and by Sardinian soldiers alone. From that time the reign of Metternich at Turin was over. Charles Albert began openly to avow his desire for the independence of Italy, and, in consequence, the severity of the internal government was relaxed.

It was at this time, when the expression of liberal sentiments was no longer a state offence, that Cavour returned to Turin. In the outward forms of government little change had been made, and, what change there was seemed at first sight almost a retrograde one; but the country had been growing ripe for liberty, and the King was ready for the war of independance.

CHAPTER IV.

"THE LIFE ABROAD"

I CALLED this period of Cavour's life the days of the "Wanderschaft." I use the term, which Goëthe's genius has associated for ever with the name of "Wilhelm Meister," because I know of no English one which expresses so well that period through which Cavour passed—the period when the boy grows into the man, when school-learning is enlarged and corrected by the lessons of experience, when, in fact, the man first wanders forth, often literally, and always morally, to seek his way through many wanderings, until at last he finds his end, or grows weary of the search.

During these years, then, of Cavour's wanderings I suspect that his friends said and thought, that he was leading an idle life. Very little is known or recorded of this period; Cavour himself spoke of it but little afterwards. Amongst his papers there has been found the commencement of an autobiography, which recounts his experiences during this period; but it has not yet been made public, and probably will not be for some years to come. I have talked to friends of Cavour's who knew him well, and they could tell me little more than this, that there was nothing much to tell. The truth is, that at no period of his life had Cavour friends, with whom he was on terms of real intimacy. He was friendly in disposition, kind-hearted, sociable. Up to a certain point, it was easy to become intimate with him, but beyond that point there was no advancing; and so, even those who knew him best cannot say much, about how he lived during his absence from home, beyond that he lived much as other young men in his position did. He resided for a long time in France, and a good deal in Switzerland. His visits to England were never of long duration, and his knowledge of English life and feeling was rather derived from reading than from personal observation. He was a great English reader at all times, not so much of our standard classics as of contemporary political literature. To the end of his life he took in and read the *Times*, the *Morning Post*, and the *Economist*, to which latter paper he was especially partial. He studied, too, for some time, though how long I have been unable to learn, at Edinburgh and at Geneva. Those countries, where he found freedom and progress, were the lands of his predilection, and, beyond them, he hardly extended his wanderings. Subsequent events showed that at this time he studied the character, the literature, and the government, of the countries he dwelt in, very carefully, and very deeply; but at the time, I doubt whether his casual acquaintances were much aware of his studies. Two incidents alone, that have come to my knowledge, might have caused those, who knew them at the time, to suspect that Cavour was not altogether as other men of his age are. When quite a young man he carried on a correspondence with the Marchioness Barollo, who returned him his letters many years afterwards. Among them was one written, when Cavour was only twenty-four, in reply to the Marchioness's condolences on his disgrace at court, and in it, were these words:—

"I am very grateful, Madame, to you, for the interest you are kind enough to take in my misfortunes; but I can assure you I shall make my way ('ferai ma carrière') notwithstanding. I own that I am ambitious—enormously ambitious—and when I am minister, I hope I shall justify my ambition. In my dreams, I see myself already minister of the kingdom of Italy."

Many young men have had, perhaps, dreams as wild as this; and I own that the second incident I have to relate, though less striking, impresses me more. Cavour's aunt, of whom I have spoken already, the Duchess of Clermont-Tonnerre, had large estates, chiefly of forest land in the Ardennes, which were badly managed and brought in much less than they ought to have done. Cavour heard of this, during his absence from home, and requested the Duchess to give him permission to undertake the management of her estates.

His request was granted, and for nearly two years Cavour lived upon this out-of-the-way property, managing it himself, until he had doubled both the value of the estate and its rental. Otherwise, the life of Count Cavour abroad was that of most young men of good family, large fortune, and gay temperament, living in foreign countries. His connexions introduced him to the governing classes and the fashionable world in all countries which he visited, and he led, to outward observance, the life which was natural for a young man to lead under such circumstances. He was not remarkable either for excess in pleasure or for abstinence. The only passion he ever showed, then or at other times, a leaning for, was a love of gambling. On one occasion, I have been told, he had incurred gaming debts to the amount of 8,000*l.* which the Marquis, his father, paid out of his future share in the property; the payment was, however, accompanied by a declaration, that no further debts he might incur would be paid from the same source. Thereupon Cavour, with that moderation which was always characteristic of him, instead of leaving off gambling and refusing to touch a card again, simply reduced his stakes, but continued playing as before. Till within the last few years of his life, when his occupations became overpowering, Cavour was a frequent visitor at the Turin Whist Club, and was reckoned the first whist player in the "Cercle." On one of his later visits to France, after he became minister, he was asked to play with M. de Rothschild at Paris, at 1,000 francs points, and rose from the table a winner of 150,000 francs. But with him even gambling was a taste, not a passion. His one passion in the world was for public life.

And now, ere I leave Cavour's early life, let me say a few words on a somewhat kindred subject. It is our English rule, and to my mind a very right rule, to dwell little in political biographies upon what is, strictly speaking, private character. There are some men, whose private and political relations are so interwoven, that you cannot separate them. You could not write a life of Antony without alluding to Cleopatra, or describe Fox without touching on his wild midnight orgies, or even, to come nearer to my subject, draw a true character of Victor Emmanuel without referring to the "*Chronique Scandaleuse*" of the city of Turin. But with Cavour, whatever relations of this nature he may have had, were a mere accident, not a vital element, in his career; and with this much of mention, I think I may fairly pass the subject by.

I am not writing a moral treatise—I am not describing an ideal character—I am seeking to make known a real man. Characters of his stamp are rare at all times, and impossible almost, except in a state of society like that of Italy at the present day. There (I am speaking rather of the time when Cavour entered life than of the present) religion had no hold on educated men—the sanctity of home and family were ideas hardly comprehended or comprehensible—the health-giving, public life of ours, worthy of a man's best efforts, did not and could not exist. There was no room there for, the deep religious aspirations, the sacred home affections, the strong sense of public duty, which were to be found in happier lands. All that was left of good, and great, and noble, and Godlike in Italy, was contained and embodied in the one passionate desire for freedom. To make Italy free was the one thing needful; and to labour in behalf of Italy was the whole duty of man. There have been higher creeds, doubtless, in the world, but there have been many lower also. Cavour, like all men who are born to rule their fellow-men, was eminently of his own time and of his own country. His genius was, above all, a material one. Abstract speculations, which led to no tangible result, had no attraction for him; ideal schemes, which could not be reduced into practice, were distasteful to him. His desires and plans and faith were all bounded by what was practicable, possible, and realizable. His genius consisted in the power of perceiving at once what was possible, and reducing the possibility into a reality. Very early in his career he saw that it was possible to free Italy, and to that task he devoted his energies and life. The accomplishment of his great work was not only his ambition, but his faith and religion also. About other matters he troubled himself little. There is no evidence that he was sceptical in his religious creed, there is as little that he devoted much thought to it. In his domestic relations, as a childless and wealthy bachelor, he was neither less nor more moral than the men amongst whom he moved. He lived for one object only, and having achieved it —died.

Laying aside any question of his political discussions with the papacy, nine hundred and ninety-nine Italians out of a thousand would stare with blank astonishment, if any one told them that Count Cavour's life had been other than a noble and a good one. Let him be judged by his own people!

CHAPTER V.

EARLY WRITINGS.

ALL Italian biographers of Cavour assert that, during his absence from Italy, he acquired considerable reputation by his writings. It seems odd they should be mistaken on such a point, but, I believe myself, that Cavour's early reviews were all published during the first years after his return to Italy. Certainly, the articles which first attracted public notice to him, and whose names have survived, all belong to this latter period. He may have written reviews previously, the memory of which has perished, but I am disposed to doubt it. The only ones, which have been republished in the collected edition of his writings, are of the following subjects and dates:—

"State and Prospects of Ireland"	1843–4
"Communism"	1845
"Italian Railroads"	1846
"Influence of English Commercial Reforms on Italy"	1845
"Model Farms"	1846

The first three of these reviews are written in French, and were published in Paris periodicals. The others are in Italian. It is worth while mentioning here, that French was as much a mother tongue to Cavour as Italian, and, that he spoke and wrote both languages with equal facility.

In these early writings, there are two things especially noteworthy, first, the writer's extraordinary partiality for England and English institutions; and secondly, the almost remorseless perspicuity with which he carries out all principles to their practical, rather than their logical, results. I call his partiality to England extraordinary, because it was so alien to the thought and feeling of those amongst whom he lived. It was not, too, that abstract partiality which was then the fashion with the French *doctrinaires* of the day. What he valued in England, more than all our forms and ideas of government, was our national preference of facts to theories, of what was real to what was abstract. Casual observers accused Cavour of inconsistency, because, with all his admiration of England, he was an early partizan of the second empire. A deeper view shows that, whether right or wrong, he was all along consistent to himself. His sympathies were always with what has been called the inexorable logic of facts, with doers and not with theorists.

Probably, the most interesting of his writings to an English reader would be the one on Ireland. It was written, at the time of O'Connell's greatest apparent importance, when the English Government had resolved to prosecute him for sedition. At that time throughout the Continent, and especially in Catholic countries, O'Connell was looked upon as the heroic leader of an oppressed nation; and the expected triumph of the repeal movement was welcomed with undisguised satisfaction. At such a time it required no small independence of mind to stand forth, as Cavour did, and, regardless of temporary popularity, to assert that England was in the right after all, and that O'Connell's success was an event to be deprecated by honest men. The line of argument adopted is characteristic of the writer. O'Connell is condemned, not so much because his cause is unjust, or abstractedly blamable, as because his object is unattainable. To have obtained the overthrow of the established church in Ireland, which Cavour looked upon as the great cause of Irish discontent, was, in the writer's opinion, possible for O'Connell; but to obtain the repeal of the Union was an obvious impossibility. He denies, that even for Ireland was repeal desirable; but his real ground of dissatisfaction with O'Connell is, that a possible reform had been abandoned for an impossible revolution.

The whole review shows a wonderful knowledge and appreciation of English character and ways of thought; of Ireland and the Irish the knowledge seems to me second-hand and imperfect. I believe that this review was once translated into English. Even if it had not been, the limits of my space would not enable me to reproduce it here. I must content myself with giving one passage, worth recording, as Cavour's opinion of England.

"Public opinion on the Continent is not, I must "confess, favourable to England. Both the extreme "factions in politics, opposed as they are in all else, agree "in the violence of their hatred towards England. The "moderate party love her in theory, but in their hearts "they feel for her but little genuine sympathy. A few "lofty minds alone, rising superior to popular instincts, "and to the passions of the mob, entertain for the "English nation that esteem and interest, which ought "to be inspired by one of the greatest nations, that has "ever dignified humanity—a nation, which has contributed powerfully to the moral and material development of the world, and whose civilizing mission is "far from being yet accomplished. Almost everywhere "in Europe the masses are hostile to England.

"This sentiment of repulsion is not confined to France "alone. In that country it is shown, perhaps, in a more "startling and striking manner than elsewhere; but, at "bottom, it is common to every nation in Europe. From "St. Petersburg to Madrid; in Germany, as well as in "Italy, the enemies of progress and the partisans of "political revolution alike consider England as their most "redoubtable adversary. The former accuse her of being "the furnace, where all revolutions are forged, the citadel "of refuge, as it were, of all propagandists and revolutionists. The latter, on the other hand, and perhaps "with more reason, consider the English aristocracy as "the corner-stone of the European social edifice, and as "the great obstacle to the success of their democratic "projects. This hatred which England inspires to both "our extreme factions ought, then, to render her dear to "men of moderation; to those who wish for moderate "progress, and for the gradual and regular development of "humanity; to those, in one word, who are equally "opposed on principle to violent convulsions of society, "or to its utter stagnation. Unfortunately such is not "the case. The motives which should induce men of "this class to sympathize with England are combated by "a host of prejudices and recollections and passions, the "force of which is almost irresistible. I don't pretend "to condemn all the causes of this hostility towards "England; it is enough for me to establish the fact of "its existence."

The three reviews on model farms, English commercial reforms, and Italian railroads, are all connected with points in Cavour's political career, of which I shall have to speak again. The Essay on "Communistic ideas, and the way to oppose their development," is almost the only one of Cavour's writings which is of an abstract character, and has no reference to any topic of passing interest. It not only possesses an intrinsic importance, as manifesting the opinions of one of the greatest men of our day on the great problem of modern society, but it gives a peculiar insight into Cavour's mode of thought and utterance. With this view I proceed to give a very full *resumé* of it.

CHAPTER VI.

CAVOUR ON COMMUNISM.

"COMMUNISM" (Cavour, it should be remembered, is writing in the last days of 1845), "under its various "manifestations, has for some years past attracted "public attention. Many remarkable indications of its "power and of its extensive ramifications have struck "all persons who take any interest in political and "social questions. . . . The partial successes of com-"munism, whatever their actual importance may be, are "far from being isolated facts. In order to appreciate "their true causes and character, you must compare "them with the analogous occurrences which derive "their existence from like principles. Thus, on the one "hand, we have the outbreaks of the 'Canuts' at Lyons, "in 1831–4; the disturbances caused by the anti-"machine men and the chartists in England; the anti-"rent movement in the United States, and the frequent "strikes of the French workmen;—phenomena which "may all be referred to the same sources. Again, on "the other hand, in the domain of intellect, we see that "our age has produced a number of schemes for social

" reform, all more or less chimerical, and more or less
" absurd; schemes, which have sometimes exercised
" an influence over intellects, to whom a certain amount
" of elevation cannot be denied. St. Simon, as well as
" Owen, have found zealous disciples, and even up to
" this day there exists a school of Phalansterians, who
" (subject to considerable modifications) profess to
" respect deeply the wild and fantastic ideas of Fourrier.
" Moreover, a number of men, of a very different class
" from the visionaries I have named, men who were
" never deceived by those wild delusions, have, without
" perceiving it, adopted a portion of those principles
" which constitute the strength of communism, and
" have lent the authority of their talents to schemes
" which could not be carried into practice without
" utterly upsetting the established order of society."

After alluding to Sismondi, to M. de Villeneuve-Bargemont with his essay on "Christian Political Economy," and then pointing out, how the bitter anti-English tone of feeling in France had biassed French writers against the English school of political economy, Cavour speaks of Lamartine in terms which show a keen insight into his character.

"Public attention has naturally been called to the
" speeches, in which M. de Lamartine has proclaimed
" with eloquence the absolute necessity for a radical
" reform, in the social order of things as it exists at
" present. This great poet, and illustrious writer, has

"hitherto shown too little power of appreciating the "positive and practical side of life for his opinion to "carry much weight on such a question as this. That "very richness and power of imagination to which "his great literary success is due, seem to be insur-"mountable obstacles to his disciplining his mind, and "submitting it to the severe exigencies of science and "logic. He is disqualified therefore, from forming any "precise or valid opinion with regard to questions, "which relate either to the politics of the day, or to the "great social problems, whose solution requires a pro-"found study of the hidden motives that operate on the "human will."

All questions as to communism or socialism, Cavour states, resolve themselves, finally, into this simple one: "What is the rational principle to adopt in cases of "conflict between the right of property, on which the "whole social order depends, and the right of self-"preservation, which cannot be refused to any living "man? What ought one to do when there arises a "positive collision between the social and the natural "right?—that is, between the principle of property "necessary for the preservation and development of "society, and the principle which imposes upon man an "absolute respect for the lives of his fellow-men."

This problem has been hitherto neglected. Any solution of it is attended with such painful consequences that, up to late times, both legislators and philosophers agreed to ignore its existence; while some recent writers, who have had the courage to grapple with it, have solved it by the theorem, that, in all cases of collision, the right of property must ultimately give way to the right of self-preservation. This solution, Cavour grants, may be true theoretically, but is not capable of practical application. In his own words:

" To put aside abstractions, let me take a very " melancholy, but unfortunately a very real example. " The population of Bengal is so dense and numerous, " it is reduced to so frugal a scale of consumption, that " a very slight diminution in the ordinary supply of " food entails starvation, as an inevitable consequence, " on many of the Bengalese. From time to time, the " ordinary vicissitudes of the seasons produce scanty or " inadequate harvests, and the invariable result is a " cruel famine. A deadly distress occurs in Hindostan, " as often as circumstances happen of an analogous kind " to those which, in Europe, produce a slight rise in the " price of grain. Now, while these famines carry off " thousands of unhappy victims, the English stations " and military forts, being amply provisioned, continue in " the enjoyment of habitual plenty. Wretched Hindoos " may be dying in the pangs of starvation at the doors " of the very building, where English officers are en-" joying at the mess-table a luxurious and plentiful " repast. In such a case, a most painful contrast " arises. If one of the victims of the famine could

" discover any means of carrying off some of the " superfluous dishes from that luxurious table, no " moralist could blame him for putting this means into " operation. Though in the subjective and individual " aspect of the case, there exists a certain absolute " and positive right for the wretch dying of hunger, " yet any attempt to proclaim this right as a social " principle, to recognise it by law, and to assure it the " positive sanction of public authority, would be simple " madness. How can you define the limits of the sacrifices which must be imposed on the European officers, " surrounded by the starving multitude? Where are " you once to stop on this dangerous path? Must you " reduce the garrison to the strictest necessaries of life, " and put them on short rations, as you would sailors " shipwrecked in the vast solitudes of the ocean? " Evidently, on such conditions, you would never find " efficient officers, who would consent to serve in Bengal. " If you do not go as far as this, where are you to " draw the line? When the Hindoos are perishing by " thousands, have you done enough when you have " saved a score or so, in the neighbourhood of each " military post? Must you go on to fifty, or a hundred, " or two hundred, until, in fact, you have reached the " extreme limit of privations which an European stomach " will consent to endure? Or are you to put the officers " on the rations of shipwrecked sailors, in order to " remedy the calamities, to which an improvident and "fatalist people exposes itself of necessity by its own "misconduct?

"Obviously this is a case in which the social power "must consent to close its eyes. While, judging the "matter in its individual and subjective aspect, any enlightened and upright man would acquit the starving "Hindoo, who stole a dish from the European's banquet, "in order to preserve his miserable existence; yet the "very same man, holding the office of judge, and looking at things from their social point of view, must also "acquit the English officer who defended his sumptuous "repast, even, if it proved necessary, by breaking the "head of the starving robber.

"This instance is admitted to be an extreme one; "but in a modified form the same problem arises daily "in common life. Indeed, unless human society should "undergo a complete transformation, unless the rich "and the poor should cease to exist, there will always "arise cases where the right of property comes into "collision with the right of self-preservation; where, "when, you compare the small advantage the rich derive "from their possessions, with the urgent need in which "the poor are placed, the latter will apparently possess a "plausible title, authorising them to sacrifice to their "own imperative necessities that respect, which is due "to the property of the former."

If you once admit either of these rights as absolutely true, you are drawn at once into a *reductio ad absurdum.*

In the one case you are brought to a conclusion so barbarous and cruel that the conscience revolts against it; in the other, if you recognise the right of every man to self-preservation, you are forced, logically, to admit the necessity of putting the whole human race on short rations. As the whole tendency of the age is towards investigation, the thinkers of the day have been brought to grapple with this problem, and deeming themselves obliged to accept one of these two solutions, they have almost invariably inclined towards the solution least inconsistent with human feelings. This fact, in Cavour's opinion, explains to a great extent the growth of Socialist doctrines amongst thinking men.

A more practical class of thinkers have substituted for the principle of the "right of self-preservation, the "more specious one of the right of labour." They assert that in all cases "where a collision occurs between this "irresistible 'right of labour,' and the right of property, "it is the latter, not the former, which must be sacrificed. "For as property itself is established for the benefit and "preservation of society, it ceases to be sacred, when the "respect which it inspires, compromises the very exist-"ence of society itself." Unfortunately it is as impossible practically, to recognise this "right of labour" as a social principle, as it is to recognise the right of self-preservation. It was the perception of the impossibility of placing this right under the sanction of society, which induced another class of thinkers, of whom Malthus was the chief, actually to deny the existence of any such right at all.

There follows then an exposition of Malthus's doctrines on population, to which, Cavour says, "a "grateful posterity ought to give the name of the "Malthusian theorem; for I do not hesitate to give the "name of theorem to truths so completely demonstrated, "that no mathematical proposition can surpass them in "weight of evidence." This exposition of the Malthusian doctrine concludes with these words: "I must "add, however, that in this, as in many other matters, "I should blush if I were to despair of the future "progress of humanity."

Granted the force of Malthus's deductions, you must admit that "the social power is obliged to reconcile "itself to the spectacle of certain evils which it is "powerless to prevent: but, nevertheless, if one was "obliged to choose between the two solutions of the "terrible problem, which one always meets with at the "root of all social questions, it would be better to follow "out the principle of the right of self-preservation to "its utmost consequences, than to deny *its* existence "absolutely, as some persons have been tempted to do, "in consequence of the numerous obstacles one meets "with, whenever one tries to organize any system for "the social recognition of this important right."

The review then proceeds with an exposition of Cavour's philosophy, rather practical, as it was, than profound, and eminently consonant with the tone of thought, which regulated his political career. "In the "system of the universe, there are two orders of "things utterly distinct from each other—the order of "principles and the order of facts. A close and "indissoluble bond unites these two orders without "identifying them. No real principle can exist, except "by virtue of some fact on which it is based; no fact "can be accomplished without entailing an inevitable "result on some principle." The philosophic mind may perceive clearly this broad general connexion which exists between facts and principles; but the working of this connexion in each individual instance is a thing impossible to trace. "Without question, in the "immense combinations of destiny, individuals seem to "be sacrificed in awful numbers. This fact I admit is "a most serious difficulty, for to the crushed victim it "is impossible that the triumph of a principle should "appear a sufficient compensation for his individual "disasters. In such cases as this, all you can do is to "take refuge in the idea of an all-wise and benevolent "Providence, which rules all events without losing sight "of the smallest individual; and which, in the presence "of the awful complications that arise in the universe "from the struggle between facts and principles, assures "to each of us that portion of happiness and comfort, "to which we are justly entitled. Reason cannot "penetrate all the secrets of this providence, but a "mind, which is at once religious and philosophical, "reposes thereon confidently for the solution of those "problems, it can solve alone but imperfectly."

Facts then are not principles; and principles are not facts. Between the two there is a general connexion, but one not reducible to any definite system. Given certain principles, you cannot deduce from them specific facts; given the facts, you cannot establish the principles. In accordance with this philosophy, there is no such thing as an absolute right of property or an absolute right of self-preservation. Both rights are merely relative, and their respective importance, in cases of collision, must be decided by the facts of each particular case.

One of the best ways, then, of opposing the development of Socialist opinions, would be by establishing and circulating a general knowledge of this conclusion, that there are no such things as absolute rights. It is true, that the classes among whom communism has most influence, are not easily accessible to abstract reasoning, but Cavour hopes that, just, as in the case of the English corn-laws, the doctrines of free-trade were gradually adopted by people, who were utterly ignorant of the political economical principles on which those doctrines rested; so, when educated men grow convinced of the unsoundness of communism, their convictions will be accepted by the masses.

In order, however, to dispel Socialist delusions, it is not enough for public writers to demonstrate its unsoundness, they must point out as well the untenability of the opposite principle. "It is perhaps necessary to "proclaim in our days, even more distinctly than in "past times, that the right of property, sacred and "inviolable as it is within certain limits, is not an "absolute and irreversible principle."

One of the chief practical causes, in Cavour's opinion, of the growth of communism, is the growing separation between rich and poor, between the employer and the workman, and the absence of any direct communication between them. The changes of society have inevitably produced this evil result amongst many good ones, and till it is rectified, communism will always have a hold on the proletarian classes.

"The remedies, then, which should be opposed to "these Socialist ideas, at whose propagation society is "justly alarmed, are, firstly, the diffusion of wholesome "truths calculated to enlighten the intelligence of man-"kind; and, secondly, the promotion of feelings of "mutual good-will between all classes of society. . . . "To every man, then, his proper work! The philosopher "and the political economist may easily refute in their "studies the errors of communism; but their labour "will be in vain unless all honest men, putting into "practice the great principle of universal benevolence, "act upon the hearts of mankind, as science acts upon "the minds."

CHAPTER VII.

DAYS OF WAITING.

THERE is extant in the archives of Vienna a letter from an Austrian envoy to Prince Metternich, giving a report of the state of Piedmont during the last few years, that preceded the accession of Pio Nono. The letter concludes by saying, that the writer had read a report of a medal having been struck, with a head of Charles Albert on one side, and on the other these words in old French,—"J'atans mon aistre." Be the report true or not, no words could describe better the spirit of those "days of waiting," from 1840 to 1846. King, statesmen, army, people, were all waiting for the rising of the star, for the advent of the foreseen destiny.

It was then, that Cavour came back to take his place in his own country. Judging beforehand, one would have supposed, that to a man of his abilities, with all the advantages of high rank, ancient family, and large fortune, the path to power, or at any rate to fame, would have been a short and an easy one. Such was not the case. The rising of Cavour's star, as well as of Italy's, had to be waited for long and wearily. The truth is, his position was a negative advantage to him.

The old Marquis Cavour, after the abandonment of his short-lived liberalism, had joined the aristocratic party at court, under Charles Albert's reign. The king still retained for him the partiality shown in earlier days, and appointed him to the post of "Vicario" of Turin. This post, which was always held by a man of high rank, seems to me, in plain words, to have very much resembled that of the head of the private police. For sixteen years he held this office; and regularly every morning he reported to the king the scandal, and gossip, and secret history of the previous day. It is hardly possible for any one to be popular, while filling such an office zealously; and whether, from excess of zeal on his own part, or from the growing feeling of the day against the existence of such an office at all, the Marquis Cavour was singularly unpopular in Turin. Rightly or wrongly, the people looked upon him as one of the chief supporters of the autocratic views which struggled in Charles Albert's mind, against his national sentiments, and hated the Vicario accordingly. The elder son, the present Marquis Cavour, was then, as he still is, a staunch aristocrat, of ultramontane politics in religious matters, and belonging to the almost mystic sect of the Rosminians. The younger Cavour, who, throughout his life, lived on terms of close intimacy with his family, shared the public unpopularity which they, at that time, enjoyed. His own class, who knew him better, looked upon him with equal suspicion. It was not in Cavour's nature to hide his opinions, and the aristocratic party soon became aware that his views were not their views, or their hopes his. The liberal party itself had little sympathy with the young count, whose avowed English predilections and desire for practical reforms, were out of place in those days of excitement and vague expectations. Throughout these years Cavour had, indeed, an uphill battle to fight; and alone, and almost unheeded, he worked on slowly and silently.

The first time he came before the public, was in 1842, in connexion with some infant orphan asylums. He had taken a great interest in the introduction of these institutions into Piedmont, and was appointed one of the managing committee; but very shortly after his appointment he was requested, "for the good of the society," to resign his seat, as his reputation for liberalism was found to injure the undertaking in court favour. Some years afterwards, Cavour, in speaking of this occurrence in the chambers, added, "And yet at that time I was not much of a revolutionist." Shortly after this, he took a leading part in the foundation of the "Sardinian Agricultural Society." It was only after considerable hesitation that the King could be induced to grant the charter for this "Societá Agraria," the avowed object of which was the encouragement of agricultural science and industry. In a state of national excitement, however, like that of those days, when there was as yet no legal occasion for public meetings or discussions, it was impossible that, in a society of this kind, political questions should not be mooted; and so, after a short time, the society assumed a political character.

It was in this society that occurred the first open schism in the ranks of the liberal party. All the members of the society were avowedly men of liberal opinions, but amongst them two parties soon showed themselves. The popular liberals, headed by Valerio, sought to establish the constitution of the society on a democratic basis, by giving supreme authority to the majority present at any meeting, and by thus reducing the power of the president to a mere name. The aristocratic liberals, amongst whom Cavour, for the first time, became conspicuous, insisted on giving the initiative in all discussions, and a power of veto, to the president. The dispute ran so high that the society was near breaking to pieces, when the King interfered and gave the decision in favour of Cavour's views, by investing the president with the character of a state official. Cavour was one of the society's most active members; but though he took every opportunity of expressing his liberal views, he never lost sight of the avowed object of the society. During his life, he held firm to the idea, that political liberty was useless or impossible, unless it was accompanied by commercial and industrial prosperity, and that in promoting the latter, you were really securing the former as well. At this time he wrote a review in the journal of the society, on model farms, which were then in high favour with agricultural reformers. He objected to them on the ground that their practical use was very small, and that the only reliable progress to be made in agricultural science was due to the real experience of the farmer, not to theoretical experiments, made under exceptional conditions. Nevertheless, he admitted that "being a most ardent "partizan of public instruction, and animated with a "most intense desire for seeing it propagated under all "forms and in all classes of society, if he saw any "prospect of model farms contributing to this object, he "would be one of their most zealous supporters, whatever might be his private opinion on their agricultural "merit. If he opposed them it was because he held them "to be unfitted for the promotion of this great object."

This review was soon followed by one more in accordance with the popular feeling of the time. In 1845-6, Charles Albert had taken up warmly the idea of the present "Victor Emmanuel" railroad, which was to connect France and Piedmont by the Mont-Cenis tunnel. I should doubt whether, then or now, or at any time, the inducement to make this line was the idea of pecuniary profit; certainly, then, if not now, it was a political rather than a commercial speculation. With a line direct and unbroken through France and Italy, from the Straits of Dover to the Straits of Messina, the traffic between the East and West would pass through Italy instead of Germany. Genoa and Reggio would supplant Trieste and Pola, and Italy would become, again, the highway of commerce. There were other and more obvious, though less avowed advantages. With Paris in direct communication with Turin, French troops could be carried, in a few hours, into Piedmont; and in the case of a Franco-Italian alliance, the Alps would cease to be any bulwark for the Austrian possessions in Italy. The Court of Vienna was not blind to these results, and in consequence opposed, with all its power, the prosecution of the projected railroad. This opposition was sufficient to make the scheme popular with Charles Albert and the Piedmontese, and, had it not been for the war, the line would have been finished long ago. During the excitement of its first novelty, Cavour wrote a very able paper on the Italian railroads in the *Revue Nouvelle*, which attracted much attention, both in Italy and abroad. It is curious, on reading it, to see how the chief attraction that the Italian railroads presented to the mind of the writer was their tendency to form Italy into one country, and to create a real if not a nominal unity. To the last days of his life, he took especial interest in the progress of the Italian railroads; and it was only a few months ago, he announced with pride to the Italian Parliament, that, within two years' time, Turin would be united to Naples by an unbroken line of railroad, thus carrying out these words, that he wrote years before, in this review :—

"Then railroads will stretch, without interruption, "from the Alps to Sicily, and will cause all the "obstacles and distances to disappear, which separate "the inhabitants of Italy, and hinder them from forming "a great and single nation."

It is curious too, to note the moderation of this review, written as it was at a time and on a subject of great popular excitement, as well as the fairness with which the writer speaks of Austria. He does due justice to the efforts made by that power to provide railroads in her Italian dominions. He combats the idea that the Sigmaringen railroad, which was to unite Vienna to Trieste, and afterwards to be carried on to Venice and Milan, was in reality detrimental to the interests of Italy. "If," he wrote, "the future reserves "for Italy a happier destiny—if, as it is lawful to hope, "this beautiful land is destined one day to recover its "nationality—it can only be in consequence of a re-"settlement of Europe, or of one of those great con-"vulsions—of those, so to speak, providential events—on "which the facility of carrying a few regiments, more "or less rapidly by rail, can produce no appreciable "influence. The era of conspiracies is gone by. The "emancipation of a people cannot now be the result of "a plot or a surprise; it has become the necessary con-"sequence of the progress of Christian civilization and "the development of human knowledge. The material "forces, of which a government can dispose, are in-

“ effectual to maintain conquered nations beneath its
“ yoke, when once the hour of their deliverance has
“ struck. Governments must yield before the action of
“ those moral forces, which are growing in strength
“ daily, and which sooner or later, with the aid of
“ Providence, must produce a political earthquake in
“ Europe, by which Italy and Poland are destined to
“ benefit, above all other countries. A railroad, which
“ brings Vienna some hours nearer to Milan, cannot
“ effect events of this magnitude.”

Perhaps the most remarkable passage in the whole review is the profession of faith as to Italy, with which the article concludes:—

“ Everything, then, proves that we are marching
“ towards a happier future. This future, whose coming
“ we pray for earnestly, is the conquest of our national
“ independence—that greatest of all blessings—one
“ which Italy can never obtain except by the united
“ efforts of all her children, and one, without which, we
“ can never hope for any real or durable consideration
“ in her political condition, or for any assured advance
“ in her career of progress. This is no dream, no result
“ of an idle thought, or of an exaggerated enthusiasm.
“ It is a simple truth which appears to me capable of
“ rigorous demonstration.

“ The history of all ages proves that no people can
“ attain a high degree of intelligence or morality, unless
“ the sentiment of its nationality is strongly developed.

"This remarkable fact is a necessary consequence of the "laws, which regulate human nature. The truth is, "that the intellectual life of the multitude revolves in a "very small circle of ideas. Amidst the few ideas they "can possibly acquire, the noblest and the most elevated "(after religious ideas) are certainly the ideas of country "and nationality. If, however, the political circum-"stances of a country hinder these ideas from manifest-"ing themselves, or give them a false direction, the "multitude will always remain sunk in a state of "deplorable debasement. This is not all. With a "people, which can feel no pride in its nationality, the "sentiments of personal dignity can only exist ex-"ceptionally, in the persons of a few privileged indivi-"duals."

The numerous classes which occupy the lower scales in the social sphere require to feel themselves great in a national point of view, in order to acquire the consciousness of their personal dignity. "Now this con-"scientiousness, we do not hesitate to say, at the risk "of shocking abstract moralists, constitutes for nations, "as well as for individuals, an essential element of "nationality.

"So then, if we desire passionately the emancipa-"tion of Italy—if we declare that, in presence of this "great question, all questions which might divide us "should be laid aside, all private interests kept silent—"it is not only in order to see our country great and "glorious, but, above all, in order to see her rise, in the "scale of intelligence and moral development, to the "level of the most civilized of nations."

It is the fashion now with the Garibaldian party to say, that Cavour never thought of the independence or unity of Italy till they forced the idea upon him. It is hard to reconcile this statement with the above words written by Cavour, then almost unknown, sixteen years ago.

During this period Cavour's private life was a very active one. He spent much time and money in the improvement of his estates at Leri, and also entered largely into speculations of different kinds. All these speculations, however, were in railroads, steam-mills, or other enterprises intended to promote the prosperity of the country. Most of them ultimately turned out profitably, but Cavour himself lost by them; for on his entering office as Minister of Finance in 1854, he sold his shares at a considerable loss, on the ground that a Finance Minister ought not even to be liable to the suspicion of promoting his private interests. One speculation alone he kept to, and that was a steam-mill company for grinding corn, which had been established near Turin at Cavour's suggestion, and of which he was the principal shareholder. At the time of his entering office, the speculation had proved unsuccessful, owing to the opposition it had met with from popular prejudice, and the shares were at a heavy discount.

The withdrawal of Count Cavour's name from the list of shareholders would have been fatal to the scheme, and as he said, with a smile, to a friend who told the story to me, "I am willing to sell all my shares which "are worth anything, but nobody can complain if I "choose to ruin myself with a losing speculation."

On the whole, he lost by his speculations; and his fortune, which when he entered on public life was about 2,000,000 of francs, was some 200,000 to 300,000 francs less at his decease.

To the last he took a great interest in the cultivation of his estates, and constantly visited his property at Leri. I have heard it said, indeed, that at the time of his death the Italians were not more downcast to think how Italy was to get on without the Premier, than the peasants at Leri were to think how the estates were ever to be managed, now that the "Padrone" was dead and gone.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE "RISORGIMENTO."

It seems hard to realize now, that the feeble, broken, querulous old man, who, supported half-contemptuously by a foreign soldiery, and surrounded by a sullen populace, drags out in the dreary Vatican, the remnants of a life, that has been lived too long—could ever have been the beloved hero, the chosen champion, of the Italian revolution. Even without Pio Nono there would have been a national outbreak in 1848; but both for good and bad, this outbreak took its peculiar character from the fact, that a Pontiff was its leader. Things were very different in the days before '48 to what they are now. For many centuries the sole national glory, of which Italy could boast, was the possession of the papacy. Her rulers and oppressors might say, that Italy was nothing but a geographical expression, but yet from that geographical expression, the Pontiffs were always chosen; and the great Catholic Church, which spread over half the world, was ruled by men of Italian blood, and birth, and lineage. Even to the most educated of Italian minds the papacy had a strange attraction—an attraction which nothing but the Pontificate of Pio Nono could have destroyed so rapidly and so utterly. The idea of a great Italian confederation under the presidency of the Pope had long been a favourite one in Italy. The chief popular leaders of the day, Cesare Balbo and Gioberti, had advocated it ably and consistently. It was an idea, welcome to the mystic piety of Charles Albert, and in accordance with the genius of the Italian nation. Indeed, the scheme was not so absurd a one as it seems to us now. Its inherent impossibility lay with the Pope, not with the Italian nation. It was quite possible for the Pope of Italy to have been head of an Italian confederation, but it was not possible for the head of an Italian confederation to be Pope of the Catholic world as well as of Italy. Still, this was a fact to appreciate which, required more knowledge of other countries and their religions, than the Italians possessed. Mazzini and his party perceived that the scheme was an impracticable one, but their influence in Italy was small compared with that of Balbo and Gioberti; and after all, any change was a gain for their views. It is probable that, for a mind of Cavour's stamp, such a project could have had little attraction; but still it was the best thing possible at the day, and as such Cavour supported it tacitly.

It is common to talk of the sagacity of Austria. It appears to me, on the contrary, that the Court of Vienna has always shown an unenviable talent for being rash at the wrong moment. It is certain, that when Pius IX. was halting between liberalism and reaction, it was the Austrian occupation of Ferrara which threw him into the arms of the liberal party. I have heard from men who have lived in Italy, throughout the years of the revolution, that never since, can they recall such an outbreak of enthusiasm, as greeted the announcement, that Pio Nono had declared against Austria, and for the independence of Italy. As the news spread throughout the world, the Italian exiles came flocking home. In the far off wilds of South America Garibaldi learnt the news, and left all to return to Italy, feeling that the hour was come. Nearer home the effect was even more powerful. In Tuscany and Naples, insurrections broke out, at once, with demands for a constitution: the popular feeling was too strong to be resisted, and the governments gave way.

It was some time before the Piedmontese government followed the example of the southern states. An oath was a very different thing in the eyes of Charles Albert from what it was in those of the Neapolitan Bourbons. What he promised, he meant to perform, and with his autocratic principles the grant of a constitution was no light matter. The desire, too, for reform in Piedmont, though more determined, was not nearly so impetuous as elsewhere. The nation knew, that the king felt with them as to the national independence, and smaller matters might well bide their time.

Meanwhile, the severity of the political system was considerably relaxed, and the publication of newspapers was permitted. The press was a means of action too consonant to Cavour's principles for him not to avail himself of it. In December, 1847, he founded the *Risorgimento* in company with Balbo, whose views it commenced by advocating. At first, Cavour acted as editor, and contributed to the paper frequently, till as late, in fact, as 1850. For newspaper writing he had no particular talent. Newspaper articles written about events, the interest of which is gone by, are at best heavy reading; and Cavour's articles have no brilliancy of style to redeem them from the common fate. The very qualities in which they excel, the closeness of reasoning and the moderation of sentiment, are not qualities which tell much in the columns of a newspaper. I think that one specimen will suffice to show the reader what Cavour's leading articles were like; and for this purpose I have chosen one in the opening number, headed, "The influence of the new "Reforms on the Economical Conditions of Italy:—

"The new public life which is spreading over all "parts of Italy cannot but exercise a great influence on "its material conditions. The political resurrection of "a nation can never be separated from its economical "resurrection. A people governed by a benevolent "monarch, advancing in the path of civilization, must "of necessity advance in riches and material power.

"The conditions of the two advances are identical. "Civic virtues, prudent laws, which protect all rights "alike, good political ordinances—things indispensable "for the amelioration of a nation's moral status—are, "likewise, the principal conditions of its economical "progress.

"Where there is no public life, where the national "sentiment is feeble, there, there can never be a really "powerful commerce. A nation kept intellectually in "leading strings, as regards all political action, and "amongst whom the progress of every novelty is blindly "suspected and thwarted, can never attain to any high "degree of wealth or power, even if its laws are good, "and its government administered paternally.

"The history of the last three centuries, as well as "the present state of the European nations, afford many "and incontrovertible proofs of this great truth.

"In all countries where no political progress has been "made, since the overthrow of the feudal system, commercial industry has either never sprung up, or has not "flourished, or has even declined. In those countries "whose political conditions have gone on improving, "and in which the nation has been called to participate "in the work of government, commercial industry has "increased constantly; and in some of them it has "increased to such a marvellous extent, as to fill the "world with its wonders. Let a comparison be made "between Spain and England. At the commencement

" of the last century, the former, though she had been " on the decline for more than a hundred years, still " surpassed the latter in wealth and power. If the " British people, on the one hand, were more energetic, " more widely spread and richer than the Spanish, on " the other, the colonies, which Spain had planted in the " four quarters of the globe, were more numerous and " flourishing than those of her rival. Both, after the " treaty of Utrecht, enjoyed a long period of uninter-" rupted internal peace ; and if they were disturbed by " foreign wars, they equally suffered the vicissitudes of " fortune. If the 'Seven Years' War' turned out suc-" cessfully and profitably for England, guided, as she was, " by the powerful intellect of Lord Chatham, the war of " American Independence proved most disastrous. Yet, " at the end of the eighteenth century, the relative com-" mercial condition of the two countries was entirely " changed. The British empire, where public life had " flourished freely, and where the political constitution " had advanced constantly, had increased in commercial " industry, in wealth, and in power, to such a degree that, " almost alone, it was able to withstand the fury of the " French Revolution and the overwhelming power of " Napoleon. Spain, on the other hand, in spite of her " still undiminished dominions, in spite of the energetic " character of her people, in spite of the natural riches " of her soil, and of the wealth which her colonies " supplied her with abundantly, had fallen so low, through

" the fault of a government utterly hostile to all
" novelty, that she could not exercise the least influence
" on the affairs of Europe.

" From the history of other civilized nations we
" might find many arguments for our purpose. And
" confining ourselves to Italy, we would point out, that
" if, amongst the various states of which she is com-
" posed, Piedmont has always been distinguished for her
" economical progress, this is chiefly due to the mild
" and wise rule of her princes, who, following the spirit
" of the age, have been wise enough to introduce
" opportune reforms into the State. It is due too, to her
" having had two princes in the eighteenth as well as
" in the nineteenth century, who were both reformers;
" to the fact, that the great King Charles III. prepared
" the way for the reforms of the magnanimous Charles
" Albert.

" The economical conditions of a people are in their
" most favourable state when the march of progress is
" conducted in a regular manner. But industry has
" such an absolute necessity for liberty, in order to
" prosper and extend, that we do not hesitate to say,
" that its progress is more general and rapid in a
" disturbed state, if endued with solid liberty, than in a
" tranquil one, if, under a system of compression and
" reaction. Thus Spain, in spite of the civil wars,
" the political convulsions, and the administrative
" disorders, which have agitated her for the last twenty

"years, has made more progress from an industrial "point of view in this period, than she ever made "during the quiet and peaceful reigns of Philip II. and "the Bourbon kings. It follows that violent com-"motions have proved less fatal to Spanish industry "than the dead calm of absolutism. Industry has "grown amidst civil tumults, while it lay prostrate "beneath a peaceful government averse to all change.

"Fully convinced ourselves of this truth, we proclaim "frankly, that the Italian political resurrection which is "now being celebrated with fraternal enthusiasm in the "Romagna, Tuscany, and Piedmont, is the indubitable "signal of a new era for the commerce and industry of "our country.

"We have implicit faith in the future fortunes of "Italian industry, not so much on account of the "beneficent reforms effected by our princes, and es-"pecially that most important one of the Custom-house "League, or on account of the internal and external "conditions of Italy, adapting themselves, as they do, so "readily to rapid development, but chiefly because, "knowing as we do, how our fellow-citizens are animated "by a spirit of generous ardour and concord, we have "full confidence, that now they are called to a new "political life, we shall see a revival of that talent, and "activity, and energy, which made their ancestors illus-"trious, powerful, and wealthy, in the middle ages, when "the Florentine and Lombard factories, the Genevese

" and Venetian fleets, had no rivals in Europe. Yes! " we have faith in the talent, activity, and energy of " Italy, as being more adapted for causing the progress " of commerce and industry than excessive protection " and unjust monopolies.

" This journal will labour with all its power to " create and promote this movement of our commercial " resurrection. It will seek out all intelligence, which " may be useful to commerce, and to agricultural or " manufacturing industry. It will endeavour to diffuse " sound economical doctrines, combatting all false ones, " which owe their existence to ancient prejudices or " serve as a cloak for the promotion of private interests. " It will make a rule of discussing every question, which " has reference to the production or the distribution " of riches.

" This journal will not hesitate to declare itself an " open partizan of free trade, though it will recommend " a cautious progress in the path of freedom. It will " use its best efforts to cause the transition from protection to free trade, to be effected gradually, and without " serious disturbance. It will give its most active " co-operation to the removal of all internal duties, so " that the economical unity of Italy may be rendered " possible; but, on the other hand, it will recommend " a continuous, though decidedly cautious, progress in " the removal of all duties which are raised on foreign " imports.

"Foreseeing, as we do, that little by little, our markets
" must be thrown open to foreign competition, it will be
" our duty, in this journal, to point out the most effectual
" means by which our producers may oppose and
" compete with foreigners successfully. We shall, there-
" fore, promote institutions of credit, scientific schools,
" and industrial competitions, means which, if well
" employed, will give a rapid development to those
" various branches of industry so wonderfully suited to
" the conditions of this Italy of ours, and which, before
" long, perhaps, will raise her to the first rank among
" the commercial nations of the world.

"The increase of the national production, however,
" will not be the only economical object this journal
" will have in view. It will employ equal, or even
" greater, care in the research after the causes, which
" operate on the well-being of that class of society,
" who contribute most directly to the production of
" public wealth—we mean, the class of workmen. All
" the writers, therefore, who have volunteered to under-
" take the direction of this journal, declare unanimously,
" that they should reckon no increase of public wealth
" an advantage or a real benefit to the country, unless
" the workmen derive an advantage from that increase,
" to whose production they will have contributed a large,
" if not a principal, part by their labours. The edifice
" of social industry, wherever it is once established, has
" grown, and will grow, to such a height, as to threaten

"ruin and fearful calamities to society itself, unless its "foundations are strengthened, and unless the other "parts of the building are connected more closely with "the great base of the working class; alterations which "can only be produced by rendering that class more "moral and more religious, by granting it a more "liberal education and an easier existence.

"We are prepared to combat everything which could "upset the established social order, and, therefore, we "consider it a strict duty of society to devote part of "the wealth, which accumulates with the progress of "the age, to the amelioration of the moral and material "conditions of the working classes.

"England, that land of great lessons, has too long "neglected this sacred duty. While its great commercial "emporiums, its immense centres of industry grew to a "portentous size; while Liverpool and Manchester, "in little more than seventy years, grew from small "villages into colossal cities; while, in the counties of "York and Lancashire, capitals accumulated by millions, "nothing was done by Government, and but little by "private individuals, to satisfy the intellectual and "moral requirements of the new populations whom "commerce and industry caused to concentrate in this "part of the kingdom. The effects of this culpable "neglect, though most pernicious, remained, for long, unobserved. When, however, they were revealed, by growing public disorders, and by the threatening attitude "of the Chartist associations, both the Parliament "and the public were obliged to investigate the causes "of this evil, and to endeavour to ameliorate the con- "dition of the working classes in the great centres of "commerce and industry.

"A fearful spectacle was the result of these investi- "gations. England perceived with terror, that if, at "the summit of the social edifice, there was an "enlightened, conscientious, and energetic class of men, "yet, in the lower regions, the vast majority grovelled "devoid of intelligence or moral instruction, and some "were found in so abject a state as to be ignorant of "the names of God and our Divine Redeemer.

"The Government and the public, terror-struck at "such fearful social disorganization, prepared to remedy "it with that wonderful energy, which characterises the "strong Anglo-Saxon race. Will their joint efforts be "sufficient to stay the progress of this fearful plague? "We can only hope they may.

"The example of England should be kept before our "eyes. Italy, now on the eve of entering a great "industrial career, should learn from it, to attach great "importance to the welfare of the working classes, and "to bestow constant and anxious care on the improve- "ment of their condition.

"In order, then, to escape the calamities which now "agitate Great Britain, let us try to develop those bene- "volent institutions which are the honour of our past

" and present history, subjecting them to those scientific
" laws, the observance of which is essential, in order to
" render institutions, designed for the relief of human
" misery, of real use and efficacy. Let us labour to
" enable all our fellow-citizens, rich and poor, and the
" poor even more than the rich, to participate in the
" benefits of civil progress and the increase of wealth.
" By so doing we shall solve peacefully, and like
" Christian men, the great social problem, which others
" seek to solve, by tremendous convulsions and awful
" disasters."

Such, then, was Cavour's profession of faith at the commencement of his journalistic career. The political programme of the *Risorgimento* was national independence, union between princes and people, progress in the path of reform, confederation between the Italian princes. In fact, it was the programme of Balbo's views; and the *Risorgimento*, which had at the time a great success, was looked upon as Balbo's organ. It was not the fashion to sign articles with the writer's name, and therefore Cavour's name was little brought before the public, by his connexion with the paper; but, meanwhile, the cause with which he had identified himself made progress, and with that, Cavour was content.

It was about this period that Mr. Cobden paid a visit to Turin, and there made acquaintance with Count Cavour. On this occasion, one of the Turin democratic papers, commenting on the visit, remarked that the liberal party had been much shocked by the intimacy of the great apostle of free trade with so well-known a reactionary and monopolist as the young Count Cavour. The writer then proceeds to state, that when Cobden was seen walking arm in arm with Cavour, an enlightened patriot called out, "Voilà la liberté du commerce gardée par le monopole!" and adds, by way of comment, that there was a story afloat (whether true or false the writer will not venture to state), that during the late dearth Cavour had bought up a large quantity of corn, and kept it in store in order to raise the market price of grain.

Insinuations of this kind were matters of daily occurrence, and were one of the many obstacles with which Cavour had to struggle.

CHAPTER IX.

THE STATUTO.

MEANWHILE, though Cavour's public reputation was small, he soon secured a high position in the political world. A few days after the establishment of the *Resorgimento,* Cavour, in company with several of the leading Italian politicians, addressed a petition to the King of Naples, calling on him, to unite himself with the policy of Pius IX. and Charles Albert, "the policy of Providence, forgiveness, civilization, and Christian charity."

The first independent act of Cavour's public life was, appropriately enough, a demand for a constitution in Piedmont. The extension of liberty granted by Charles Albert was guaranteed by no formal compact. What had been given by the royal pleasure might be resumed by the same power, and, amidst the vacillations of Charles Albert's mind, the reactionary party had grounds for hope, as long as the royal word remained unpledged. At Genoa, since the ill-fated insurrection of 1821, in which the Genoese were deeply implicated, Charles Albert had never been personally popular; and towards the end of 1857, a general impression prevailed in the city that the king intended to re-establish the despotic *régime* of the police, and to permit the return of the Jesuits. There was a sort of popular *émeute* in consequence of this impression, and deputies were sent to Turin to obtain an assurance from the king, that he intended to maintain intact the newly granted liberties. The deputation from Genoa wished to have the support of the Turin liberals in their address to the king, and a meeting was held at the famous "Hotel dell' Europa" to arrange the terms of the address.

It is curious now to read through the names of those who met on that occasion. There were present there the Marquis Roberto d'Azeglio, the most popular of the Piedmontese nobles, and beloved by the people of Turin, for the infant schools, which he had founded, and watched over personally, in days when the welfare of the people was a thing little thought of; the Colonel Durando, then editor of the *Opinione*, and destined in a few months' time to fight a gallant fight against the Austrian hosts on the hills of Vicenza, supported by the young Cialdini, of whom the world then first heard mention of; Santorre di Santa Rosa, the last act of whose life was to be the subjection of the clergy to the common law, and to whom, for that act, the last sacraments of the Church were to be refused at the hour of death by a priestly bigot; Brofferio, the leader of the Piedmontese democrats, whose chief fame is now that he was the bitterest opponent of the great premier; Castelli, who was then a writer in the *Risorgimento*, and who is now the Director of the Archives of the Italian kingdom, and whose many services to the cause of Italy, are almost overshadowed by the one great remembrance, that he was the dearest and most intimate of Cavour's few friends; Valerio, the Caius Gracchus of Piedmont, as he loved to style himself; and a host of others whose names never passed beyond the confines of their own land, and are now well-nigh forgotten even there. There was no question in the meeting, that full support should be given to the Genoese deputation, and an address to the king was about to be received without dispute.

It was then that Cavour, perhaps the man of least note in the whole assembly, first made his mark. To the surprise of all his colleagues, he opposed the adoption of the address, on the ground that it did not go far enough. "What is the use," he asked, "of these reforms "which conclude nothing? these demands which, whether "they are granted or refused, disturb the country and "diminish the moral authority of the government? Let "us demand the constitution. Since the government is "unable to rule upon the system by which it has ruled "hitherto, let a new system be granted, suitable to the "character of our times and the progress of civilization. "Let it be granted, I repeat, before it is too late; before "social authority is dissolved and overthrown, by the "clamour of the multitude."

The proposal was not warmly received. The more aristocratic members of the liberal party—D'Azeglio, Durando, and Santa Rosa—at once joined themselves to Cavour. On the eve of a great national outbreak, which it needed no penetration to foresee, the real question was, whether the revolution should lead the Government, or the Government lead the revolution. It was the same question with which, twelve years later, Cavour had to grapple during the Garibaldian dictatorship at Naples, and then grappled successfully.

Now, however, Cavour had not power to enforce his views. The advanced liberals had a dislike to the idea of a constitution, savouring, as it did to their minds, of Anglomania. They distrusted the quarter from which the proposal came, and felt instinctively that under a constitutional government the force of the approaching revolution would be virtually crippled. Brofferio was the only democrat who supported Cavour's proposal, and he did so solely on the ground that, be the proposer who he might, he, for one, would always support the proposition that went the furthest. At the moment Cavour's idea was provisionally adopted, and Durando was instructed to draw up a petition to the king, demanding the constitution. On the next day, however, when the committee met again, Valerio, who at that time had great weight with the popular party, supported by almost all the democratic members, opposed the demand for a constitution, as being in-opportune. As the demand had no chance of success, unless the whole liberal party supported it, the scheme fell to the ground. Cavour attempted to publish an account of these deliberations in the *Risorgimento;* but the Turin censorship refused permission for the publication; and subsequently a statement of the proposal, and its rejection, was published in the Tuscan papers. Cavour, also, wrote a letter to the king, containing an account of the proceedings, and assuring his Majesty that "his sole object had been to reconcile "the dignity of the throne, and the authority of the "Government, with the true interests of the country."

Unfortunately, Charles Albert, as usual, hesitated till the time for action was gone by. The agitation throughout Italy and Europe was increasing daily; and within a few weeks, on the eve of the French Revolution of February, the Piedmontese constitution was granted by the king rather in obedience to popular clamour than as the deliberate concession of the Government. Had Cavour's advice been accepted, it is possible that, in the period which followed, the revolutionary element would have been less powerful, and that many of the calamities, which ended in Novara, might have been avoided. There is, however, no speculation more useless than as to things which might have been, and none to which Cavour was himself less addicted. The revolution was made, not as Cavour would have made it, but, being once made, his sole object and endeavour was to mould it to his own purpose.

The premier of the first ministry appointed under the constitution was Balbo, the founder of the *Risorgimento.* Of the old class of Italian liberals, there was no better type than Count Cæsar Balbo. A man of good birth, high breeding, and great learning, he had passed a long life in the service of his country. He had never done much, for those early Italian liberals were not men of action; but he had written much and thought much, and at times spoken much, and his thoughts, and words, and writings, were always on behalf of liberty and independence. He was one of those men, who in evil times kept alive the memory of better things, and the aspirations towards a higher future. If, when the time of independence came, the whole Italian nation was found to be penetrated by a high national ambition, this result was due to the teachings of that class of whom Balbo was not the least. Still, these men were the forerunners of the revolution, not its leaders. When the time came for action, and Balbo, then a man of seventy, was placed at the head of affairs, he showed no capacity for statesmanship, The traditions of his youth were of the "Visconti" days, when federal government was believed to be the one thing needful for Italy, and when the papacy was looked upon as inseparable from the greatness of the Peninsula. He had strength enough of mind to lay aside the teachings of his youth, but the new ideas were strange to him, and in the new world, of life, not of books, he was out of place.

Immediately after the constitution was proclaimed, a commission was appointed, under the presidency of Balbo, to draw up an electoral law. There have been few instances of legislation more prompt or more satisfactory. In fifteen days, the committee composed a system, which has lasted to the present time, and which apparently has been found well adapted to the genius, not only of the Piedmontese, but of the Italian people, to whom it has gradually been extended. Of this committee Cavour was a member, and took a leading part in its deliberations. During its sittings he wrote a series of articles on the electoral law in the *Risorgimento*, and as the scheme adopted by the committee was, with some slight exceptions, in accordance with the views expressed by Cavour, one may fairly assume, that the Italian electoral law was, in no small measure, the result of his labours.

Reading through these articles, the thing that strikes me most is their independence of thought, when one considers the circumstances under which they were written. At that day there was a strong prejudice in Italy, in favour of keeping up the old municipal traditions, and of giving, to freely elected municipalities, the right of electing members of parliament. To this idea Cavour was most adverse. He points out how fatal the principle of municipal government is to the unity of the nation, or to the existence of any strong central power, such as Italy stood so fearfully in need of. He avows that he will do his utmost to extirpate an idea, which to his mind is so hostile to the good of the country, and which, though without much weight in Piedmont, may exercise a deplorable influence in central Italy.

He is even more decided in his dislike to universal suffrage. "We are," he writes, "most resolutely "opposed to this fallacious doctrine, the offspring of "one of the most perilous sophisms of modern days, "which calls the right of society to take part in its "new government, the 'right of nature.'" In truth, he was no advocate of an extended suffrage for Italy. The qualification which he proposes in his articles, and which was ultimately adopted, was the assessment of four pounds in taxes annually, the payment of a rental of twenty-four pounds or upwards, or the pursuit of any liberal trade or profession, qualifications, which, in most parts of Italy, ensure a very small proportion of electors to what would be given by manhood suffrage. The three moral qualifications, which he considered requisite for an elector, were, independence from bribery or coercion, intelligence sufficient to judge of the fitness of a candidate, and a stake in the preservation of social order. He distrusted these qualities being found in Italy, in any electoral body obtained by a low franchise, and therefore, throughout his life, he was opposed to any great increase of the electoral body. These principles are not so inconsistent, as they may seem at first, with his subsequent adoption of universal suffrage, in the annexation of the Italian states. Universal suffrage on great simple national questions, about which all men must have an opinion, wise or unwise, and in which they have all a common personal interest, is an entirely different thing, from universal suffrage in the election of deputies. The adoption, too, of universal suffrage was, in fact, forced upon him by the pressure of circumstances, and he made up his mind to it, as it was his rule to do, whenever facts came into collision with abstract theories. Still I doubt if he ever really had any sympathy for the innovation. I have been told by an old friend of Cavour's, that not many months ago, he met the Premier, and asked him in conversation what he thought of universal suffrage. Cavour paused and rubbed his hands, and then, with that strange chuckle of his, half cynical, half good-natured, added, "Oh! you know, it is a capital invention."

In other electoral questions he was guided by what was possible practically, rather than what was abstractedly desirable. He avowed his personal preference for an hereditary upper chamber and open voting. At the same time, the whole character and genius of the Italian people seemed to him to demand vote by ballot, and a Senate nominated for life only, and therefore he supported the latter systems in preference to the former. He was anxious, too, that minorities should be represented, and on this account recommended small electoral districts with a single member, instead of large ones with a number of deputies. Finally, he dwelt much on the importance of freely admitting the public to the tribunes, because "there is no popular education so "valuable to a free people, as that of listening to the "debates of its assembly."

CHAPTER X.

THE OUTBREAK OF WAR.

THERE was short time in those days for constitutional discussions. The war was coming nearer day by day. Whatever else Charles Albert had wavered in, he had never faltered in his hostility to Austria; whatever differences there might be between king and people, there was none in their desire for the independence of Italy. The hour of struggle had been coming long, coming, indeed, ever since the German race had sought to rule in Italy. It is a shallow view of history to ascribe the war to the ambition of Piedmont or of the House of Savoy. There were two great rival principles at issue on that battle-field—the preponderance of Austria and the independence of Italy. It was the force of circumstances, much more than the character of the individual princes, which caused the kings of Sardinia to throw in their lot with the cause of Italy. When once their part was taken, there was no choice left for them but to conquer or fall. They must be patriotic Italian sovereigns, or subside into viceroys of Austria.

Either Piedmont or the Austrian dominion in Italy must cease to exist. Between these two solutions there was and could be, and is now, no other. From the Alps to the Adriatic, Austria must rule by brute force, or Italy must be free. Such was the question then and now.

And at last the hour was come, the hour for which Charles Albert had longed and hoped and prayed; the hour when he could go forth to fight with Austria, to redress the wrongs at once of Italy and the House of Savoy. The war may have been right or wrong, but if ever there was in this world a war of independence, it was the Italian war of 1848. At the very hour when the Cabinet of Vienna was preparing to send troops into Naples, to crush the Neapolitan constitution, there came the news of the revolution in Paris. Ere many days had passed, Europe was in flames; and then, when the tidings came, that in Vienna itself the people had risen against the Austrian Government, the Italians believed that the hour of their deliverance had struck. At Milan and Venice, without concert, on one and the same day, the insurrection burst out with such fury that the Austrians had to retire before it. There was no question then, about the policy of Piedmont; no government, either there or elsewhere in Italy, could have stood, which refused to join in the national crusade; and in Piedmont alone, the wishes of the people were the wishes of the king also. I suspect that Cavour must himself have looked forward to the inevitable future with fear rather than hope. His intellect was too calm and clear to be blinded by the passion of the hour; he had little faith in the power of revolutionary armies, and entertained rather the Napoleonic creed, that in war Providence was on the side of the strong battalions; but here, as always, he thought only of what was best to be done practically, not theoretically. It was not the question whether Piedmont should go to war or not—Italy was at war, and Piedmont must side with Italy. The sole question was how soon the war should be proclaimed, and Cavour's view was that, as the blow must be struck, it should be struck at once.

On the morning of the 23d of March, the Austrians retreated from Milan; and on the same day Cavour issued, in the *Risorgimento,* an appeal to arms. It is the only one of all his writings which seems to me to rise to real eloquence. There is no boasting, or idle triumph, or vain prophecies of a certain victory, such as you find in other Italian writings of the day. It is calm, almost solemn, in its tones; but throughout there are flashes of suppressed passion, which have a strange, heart-stirring ring about them, even now.

"The hour of life or death has struck for the Sar-
"dinian monarchy—the hour of strong counsels—the
"hour on which depend the fate of empires and the
"destiny of nations!

"In presence of the events in Lombardy and Vienna, "hesitation, doubt, delay, are no longer possible. Of all "policies, such would now be the most fatal.

"We, men of cool minds, accustomed to listen rather "to the dictates of reason than to the impulses of the "heart, after we have weighed carefully every word we "have to utter, are bound in duty to declare the truth. "There is but one path open for the nation, the country, "and the king—War! War at once, and without delay!

"It is impossible to retreat. The nation is already "at war with Austria. It is rising now to help the "Lombards. Our volunteers have already crossed the "frontiers. Our citizens are furnishing ammunition to "the Milanese. The fact is palpable. The peace with "Austria is broken, and the old treaties, on either side, "are torn and trampled under foot.

"We have not got to decide whether we shall com- "mence war or not. Our sole option is, whether we "shall declare ourselves, loyally and boldly, for the cause "of humanity and Italy, or whether we shall follow, "for a period, the tortuous paths of a doubtful and in- "sincere policy.

"Such being the case, hesitation, we repeat, is no "longer possible. Even for the least enthusiastic, for "the most cautious of statesmen, the duty of the Govern- "ment is obvious. We are in a position in which "courage is the true prudence, and temerity wiser than "caution. . . .

"If Lombardy, indeed, were tranquil, it would be "madness to hasten on the event, and to commence "hostilities, before we had assembled an army and "prepared means of offence proportioned to the forces "of our enemies.

"But Lombardy is in flames, Milan is besieged—at "all costs we must go to succour her. If we had only "five thousand men upon the frontiers, they should "march at once to Milan.

"Woe to us, if, for the sake of increasing our prepara"tions, we came too late—if, when we were ready to "cross the Ticino, we heard that the Queen of Lombardy "had fallen.

"We say again, in our position there is but one "policy—not the policy of the Louis-Philippes and "Guizots, but the policy of the Fredericks the Great, "the Napoleons, and the Charles Emmanuels—the "great policy—the policy of bold counsels."

This appeal was not made to unwilling ears. On the 26th of March the Sardinian armies crossed the frontier, with Charles Albert at their head.

CHAPTER XI.

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1848.

YEARS hence, in calmer and happier times for Italy, the real history of the great war of 1848 will be doubtless written. The historian into whose hands the task may fall, will have a story to tell, second to none, that I know of, in dramatic episodes, in startling variety, and vicissitudes of incident. From whatever point of view you tell the history, it is brimful of interest. When passion is forgotten, even an Italian chronicler will dwell, not without something of sympathy, on the solitary figure of the stern old iron-grey Radetsky, "reculant pour mieux "sauter," undaunted when all seemed lost, unshaken even by revolution at home, playing his last card fearlessly, and winning at the end. When you hear the Austrian narratives of the war—when you read how in that foreign country, where man, woman, and child were hostile to them, the whole Austrian army clung together, with little to support them save their belief in their own masterhood—you fancy you are reading the narrative of the Sepoy Mutiny; and you forget the brutal cruelty of the Austrian rule, to remember only, that in the hour of danger, their soldiers fought and died with a courage worthy of a nobler cause. But still, the more you read, the more you feel that the *beau rôle* —the leading part—belongs to Sardinia and Charles Albert. History will, I think, own that almost from the first, the contest was a hopeless one. There was a chance, that, in the first flush of triumph, the Italians might have driven the panic-stricken Austrian army out of Italy; but when once that chance was lost, or had been allowed to slip by—which of the two it matters not to discuss—and when Radetsky had turned to bay at Verona, with forces overwhelming in numbers and still more in discipline, the game was up.

Still, for a time all seemed to favour the cause of Italy. As the tidings spread that Charles Albert had proclaimed the war, and, laying aside the royal flag of Piedmont, had hoisted the Italian tricolour, which had conquered beneath the Great Napoleon, the Italian nation answered the appeal. The King of Naples, the Grand Duke of Tuscany, and the Pope himself—these are facts worth remembering now—sent troops to aid Charles Albert in the national crusade. For a time fortune favoured the arms of Italy, and at last, on the evening after the victory of Goito, when the news came that Peschiera had surrendered to the Sardinians, the officers of the army crowded round Charles Albert in the camp, and hailed him as King of Italy.

Then the tide turned; the Quadrilateral barred the progress of the Sardinian army, and in such a war not to advance was equivalent to defeat. Then Italy learnt the lesson which she has never forgotten since, of, who was true to her, and who was false. The Pontiff-King, the Pio Nono whom Italy had worshipped with a mad enthusiasm, priest-like, was the first to desert a falling cause. On the eve of battle the King of Naples recalled his troops, an order which the Neapolitan army obeyed, as was their wont with such orders, promptly. The Grand Duke of Tuscany, not being able to recall his contingent, contented himself with betraying to Radetsky the secrets of the Sardinian campaign. There was another lesson, too, that Italy learnt, and that was to trust but little in revolutionary movements. With the best will and the most ardent patriotism, the revolutionary governments of Milan and Venice failed to do much for the war of independence. There was no want of noble words and nobler deeds, but that was all. Petty vanities, personal jealousies, and political prejudices paralysed the joint action of the Provisional Government. Singly, in their own cities, the revolutionary party fought like heroes, but to the great national movement they contributed but little. In a rich and friendly country the Sardinian army was left unprovided with food, and the volunteers broke down, as volunteers will do, when they come into collision with regular troops in open battle. Still, retreating step by step, the Sardinians fought a losing battle manfully, and when the disastrous defeat of Custoza was followed by the armistice and the evacuation of Milan, there were few, except Charles Albert himself, who thought that Sardinia had not done all which her honour required of her.

I dwell but little upon this period, partly because to enter on it with any degree of fulness would carry me far beyond my limits, partly because Cavour had but little direct part in the events of '48. Our English reminiscences of war can give us but little feeling of the absorbing interest, which the wars with Austria created in Piedmont. Happily for us, we have never known, what it is to have a war within two days' march of home, when the reverse of one day might be followed on the next by the occupation of the capital. In such a war all civil interests not only give place to those of the war, but disappear utterly. With the war itself Cavour had little part. His place was not in the camp; his work was elsewhere. It was only after the defeat of Custoza, when the very existence of Piedmont seemed to be at stake, when the one question became, how to stop the advance of the Austrian armies, that Cavour volunteered for the defence of his country. Within a few days the armistice removed the immediate danger, and the future minister of Italy was never called on to serve.

In the first elections Cavour failed to obtain a seat in Parliament. There are always, however, in Italy, as in all countries where parliamentary government is new, a considerable number of void elections, owing to the same person being elected for several seats, and at one of these supplementary elections for Turin Cavour was elected deputy. There were then three parties in the house; the left, which represented the revolution; the right, small in numbers, who, more or less, supported the old aristocratic *régime;* and the centre, which was composed of the Constitutionalists. It was amongst them, as supporters of the Ministry, that Cavour ranked himself. The Ministry, headed by Balbo, were well disposed, but without genius or decision, and Cavour's support was of a very independent kind. The great object which he proposed to himself was to maintain the Constitution at all risks. It was no easy task. The reactionary and revolutionary parties looked upon it with equal disfavour, and as yet it had taken no firm hold on the country.

That it was preserved intact, was in no small measure due to Cavour's efforts. He attacked the right, the left, and the Ministerial party alike, whenever they appeared to him disposed to modify the Constitution. His first speech was an attack on the Ministry, for their hesitation in accepting the proposal made by the Milanese, for the incorporation of Lombardy with Piedmont. He opposed, too, and defeated a proposal of the Minister Gioia, for altering the statute, so as to give exceptional powers to the police. Still, on questions which endangered the existence of the Ministry, he voted for them, on the ground, that they were more likely than their opponents, to maintain the Constitution.

In the division which overthrew the Ministry at the end of July, on the question, whether Milan or Turin should be the capital of the new kingdom, Cavour voted in the minority with the Ministry.

CHAPTER XII.

THE ARMISTICE.

IT was a strange state of things which followed the commencement of the armistice. The Austrian armies had gained the victory, and yet Austria could not call an inch of ground her own in Italy, except where her troops were stationed. Venice was still free, carrying on a gallant and, as yet, not a hopeless struggle. At Rome, Florence, and Palermo, the revolution was still triumphant. The Italian people, maddened at the disappointment of their hopes, could not believe that the battle was really lost. The democratic party still hoped that the revolution, alone and unfettered, would effect what regular armies had failed to do. Charles Albert himself, though with little hope of success, held firmly to the one article of his soldier's creed, that for him there was no choice left but to conquer or to die. In truth the cry of the nation was still for war.

Against that cry Cavour struggled manfully. To those who have accused him of suppleness and want of principle, I would recommend a careful study of this period of his history. On the one side lay the path of popularity and power, on the other the path of duty.

By opposing the renewal of the war, he incurred the bitter hostility of the popular party, while he knew that whether the war succeeded or failed, he would remain alike unpopular. By this opposition too, he sacrificed the favour of the king, who in reality looked with ill-will on anything, which thwarted his desire for a fresh campaign, and, what perhaps to a mind like Cavour's was more bitter still, he must have felt beforehand that his efforts would be in vain.

Cavour's judgment was too clear to be blinded by enthusiasm. He saw distinctly that, as far as Austria and Italy alone were concerned, the battle was fought and lost. Still there was hope left for Italy. Europe was in the midst of revolution. Hungary was in open insurrection, and if either France or England could be induced to take up the cause of Italy, Austria would be obliged to yield. What hope there was for Italy lay in negotiation and in the action of moral force. The hope might not be a very bright one, but to Cavour's eyes it was the best one possible. Upon the downfall of the Balbo ministry, the king requested M. Casati, the mayor of Milan, to form a ministry of Upper Italy, representing Lombardy and Venetia as well as the old provinces of the kingdom. The ministry, however, was hardly formed when the capitulation of Milan terminated the existence of the short-lived kingdom of Upper Italy, and in consequence the new ministry died stillborn. M. de Revel, who had great and deserved reputation in Piedmont, as a financier, was then summoned to undertake the government. His cabinet, which went by the name of the Revel-Pinelli ministry, was composed of the old Piedmontese party, and was actually, though not nominally, opposed to the resumption of the war. To this ministry, though with little sympathy for their domestic policy, Cavour gave his unflinching support.

At that time the Abbé Vincenzo Gioberti was the popular idol of the day. A Piedmontese priest, who had once been court chaplain to the royal palace at Turin, his connexion with the Mazzinian conspiracies in 1833 had forced him to leave his country. During these years of exile he had brooded much over the past and future of Italy, and had come to the conclusion that the revolution alone was powerless to free Italy. He was a republican and philosopher, but a priest still at heart. To his eyes the greatest power left in Italy was the priesthood; and he formed an idea, less mad then than it seems now, for an alliance between the Italian priesthood and the people. His work written in this sense, the "Primato civile degli Italiani," had an immense success, and when Pius IX. announced himself as the champion of Italy, Gioberti was almost regarded as an inspired prophet. That he was a man of rare intellect cannot be doubted, and the inscription on the statue which the Italians have raised to him on the Piazza Carignano, opposite the chamber of Deputies, describes him, not perhaps without justice, as the *sommo filosofo.* Unfortunately he was a philosopher and not a statesman. When facts proved that his theory was wrong he still clung to it obstinately. Intoxicated with his sudden popularity, he could not brook the idea of losing it. The applause of the tribunes, and the cheers of the mob as he passed along the street, were to him a necessity of existence. Gifted with real and impassioned eloquence, he became the chief of the democratic party, whom he followed rather than led. He was offered a seat in the Revel-Pinelli ministry, but declined it, on their refusal to promise an immediate resumption of hostilities. Disappointed at the rejection of his advice, he then waged an unceasing war against the peace ministry.

He was on the winning side. The king, eager for war, declared openly that his ministers misrepresented his policy. The hosts of Italian exiles who had taken refuge at Turin, the popular party, and the leaders of the revolution, regarding the Revel-Pinelli cabinet as the sole obstacle to the war, pursued them with determined hostility. The chambers were dissolved, but the country returned an immense war-majority to the parliament which met in October. The first act of the new chambers was to elect Gioberti president, and the ministry only prolonged their existence for a few weeks by the hopes, they held out of an European congress which was to settle the Italian question. When these hopes were deferred indefinitely, the popular agitation became so great, that in December the king dismissed the ministry, and requested Gioberti to form what was called the Democratic Ministry.

Gioberti himself stated in his subsequent writings, that the prolonged existence of the Revel-Pinelli ministry was due chiefly to Cavour, who, "by his speeches "and writings laboured with incredible ardour to confer a "reputation of ability on men of notorious incom"petence."

In his speeches and articles at this period there is little to interest those who have not made Italian politics their especial study. The only one which touches much on general questions is an article published in November, 1848, against the expediency of the so-called revolutionary policy, which illustrates very clearly Cavour's views upon the principle of revolution. From it I have taken the following passages, as worth noting :—

"There is only one standard, by which we can judge "of the character of any policy whatever, and that is, "by its efficacy, by its power of producing the end in "view. Whether you call your policy revolutionary or "pacific, popular or royalist, democratic or aristocratic, "according to our creed, your policy has no value, "except in as far as it carries out your object." . . .

"The men of 'energetic measures' are no novelty in "the world. Every period of transition has known them, "and history teaches us that they have never succeeded

" in anything, except sometimes in forming the subject of " a romance, sometimes in ruining the most important " interests of humanity. The more they despise the ordinary paths of nature, the less chance they have of " success. We might reprint and circulate by millions " the noble essay of Cormenin on the independence of " Italy, forming, as it does, a complete system for the " Lombard insurrection; but as, unfortunately, there exist " in the world of real life, a number of hostile forces, of " whose existence the author has taken no account in the " ideal sphere of his project, he has only written a couple " of pages of sublime impossibilities, in spite of which " the German soldiery will remain quartered at Milan.

" . . . In truth, what is it which has always ruined " the noblest and most just of revolutions? The mania " for revolutionary methods—the men who fancied they " could render themselves independent of the every-" day laws of nature, and thought they had strength " enough to make these laws anew.

" It is one of the laws of nature, that where peace and " order are wanting, money will vanish, and credit " disappear. The revolution of 1789 considered itself " superior to this decree of Providence, and created the " 'assignats.' It was a resolute and energetic measure, " fitted to the magnitude of the occasion; but never-" theless, it was not fitted to the magnitude of nature, and, " in spite of its essentially revolutionary character, it absolutely aggravated the evils it was intended to cure.

"The 'assignats' entailed the 'forced currency;' this measure necessitated the 'law of the minimum.' Vendors disappeared; then came the war against the phantasm of monopoly; then followed hunger and starvation; and, to sum up the whole, the revolutionary measure was born, fulfilled its destiny, and perished, leaving behind it dearth of credit, exhaustion of the treasury, ruin of private fortunes, and all the evils which were to be avoided, in despite of nature, by a single stroke of the pen."

"Nature has ordained that the heart of man should feel a horror of blood, and should revolt against whosoever sheds it. Marat and Robespierre imagined that they had discovered a great 'revolutionary measure' when they conceived the project of burying in blood all persons who stopped the progress of their ambitious schemes. Thousands of heads fell on the scaffold, but what fruit did the French revolution reap from these executions? The Directorate, the Consulate, and the Empire! . . .

"Of late times a wicked and ignorant sect (Communism) has established itself on an imaginary aspiration, as old as history, as suicidal as the blindest egotism. It finds opposed to it, science, human affections, the principles of individuality and family life, as well as every organic law of the human species What matters all this to such a sect? It has unfailing faith in revolutionary measures; it is certain

21145

"'of triumph, and organizes, the 24th of June, in Paris. " French blood flows in torrents. France, at the edge " of a precipice, wakes up and suppresses the new " madness. What has resulted from the mad attempt? " We were in search of a 'democratic and social republic.' We held within our grasp the germ of many " ideas which, developed peaceably and by ordinary " means, might have probably produced some progress " in social science; and now what have we reaped " instead? In Paris, we have a state of siege; in " Piedmont a lingering and doubtful mediation; at " Naples a shameless alliance between the republican " minister and the Bourbon tyrant. . . . Let us wait a " short time, and we shall see, as the last fruit of the " revolutionary measures, Louis Napoleon upon the " throne of France."

Language such as this, whether true or false, was not calculated to win popularity in those days of national excitement. At this period there were in Piedmont few men more unpopular than Count Cavour. Some years later, in a speech on the proposed commercial treaty between France and Sardinia, he spoke thus, in allusion to his past career:—

" Whoever intends to take part in politics, in times " of danger such as ours, must prepare himself for the " bitterest disappointments. For that I am now prepared. Had I to renounce all the friends of my childhood, were I to see the most intimate of my acquaint-

"ances turn into my bitterest enemies, I would still not "be wanting in my duty; I could never abandon those "principles of liberty to which I have devoted myself, "whose development I have made the object of my life, "and to which, throughout that life, I have been found "faithful."

His boast was not an empty one. Day after day, in the last months of 1848, he supported the peace ministry within the Chambers and in the press. Under Gioberti's *régime* the public of the tribunes had acquired great influence in the Assembly, and to this public Cavour was especially unpopular. His speeches were interrupted constantly by the groans and hisses of the gallery, while the applause, even of his own partisans, was faint and feeble. Opposition only served to excite that fearless spirit. Tyranny, whether of kings or mobs, was always hateful to him. On one occasion when the shouts of the gallery were interrupting the course of the debate, Cavour sprung up, and openly accused Gioberti, as president, of not causing the dignity of the Assembly to be respected. "There could be no liberty," he said, "where applause is permitted to" . . . Here his sentence was drowned in a volley of hisses from the gallery, and as the noise died for a moment, he continued, "This is the truth, and I declare it openly in the face of the country, and of those who seek to force upon us" . . . And here again his words were lost in the renewed outcry.

Very shortly afterwards, in the last days of the session, Cavour opposed vehemently a scheme, proposed by the democratic party, for a progressive tax on realised property, rising in proportion to the total value of the property. When he urged that this tax was unjust, because in reality, it was an arbitrary imposition on the wealthy classes, the galleries interrupted his speech with groans. "I repeat," said Cavour, "what I have stated; "noisy clamour has no effect upon me. What I believe "to be the truth I will state, in spite of all the tumult "and abuse in the world. Whoever interrupts me, "insults not me, but the Chambers, and the insult, such "as it is, I share with all my colleagues."

The organs of the democratic party joined with the public tribunes in their attacks on Cavour. His supposed English tendencies and sympathies were the never-failing object of abuse and ridicule. "Milord Camillo" was the nickname which the journals of the day give him constantly. I have read an article in the *Concordia* (7th October, 1848), the chief democratic paper of the day, edited by Valerio, speaking of Cavour in terms of contemptuous ridicule, which it seems hard to realise could have ever been written of such a man. The point of the article, comparing Cavour with some quack proprietor of a theatrical journal at Milan, who for a dozen subscriptions to his paper, would advocate the claims of any decrepit Ballerina, is, of course, lost to us now. I found there written, "that even the Turinese could scarce have "expected, that a Cavour should raise his voice (Query, "is it an Italian or an English voice?) to attack Gio-"berti," and so on, *da capo.*

When Gioberti was summoned to form a Ministry, his first act was to dissolve the Chambers. At the new elections, in January, 1849, the Democratic Committee opposed Cavour's re-election, and recommended the electors of Turin to choose a certain Pansoya in his stead.

The *Concordia* urged the claims of the new candidate in these words: "The name of Pansoya will be much "more welcome to the electors than that of the political "economist who defended the diplomatic mediation "and the Revel loan. The bugbear of Communism, "which Count Cavour flutters constantly before our "eyes, causes him to be thought a wonderful economist; "but, in truth, his politico-economical science cannot "be very profound, as he identifies Communism and "democracy."

This appeal to popular prejudices was successful. Cavour was rejected, and Pansoya, of whom history has left no further mention, was chosen in his place.

CHAPTER XIII.

NOVARA.

THE elections were almost unanimously in favour of the democratic party, and as far as obtaining an overwhelming majority was concerned, Gioberti succeeded in his object. Unfortunately, he had relied too much upon the magic of his name. The enthusiasm, he had evoked, was too powerful for him to restrain, when restraint was called for. On entering office, he found out the difference between declamation and action. Pledged to an energetic war policy, he discovered that he could do little more than follow the steps of the Ministry he had unseated. The negotiations he had inveighed against so bitterly, had to be resumed with even less chance of success than before; and yet, while the prospects of war became daily less promising, the popular cry for war grew more and more ungovernable.

All over Italy, the revolutionary party was in the ascendant, except in Naples and in the Austrian provinces. The Pope and the Grand Duke of Tuscany had fled to Gaëta, in the undisguised confidence that the fury of the revolution would soon prepare the way for their return in triumph. In Piedmont itself the republican faction was gaining ground, and action of some kind was absolutely necessary. It was then that Gioberti conceived the scheme of restoring the Pope and the Grand Duke by a Sardinian intervention. It is easy to understand the attraction that this scheme had for him. A dreamer, not a man of action, he conceived that the restored princes, grateful for their restoration, would rally themselves heartily to the national cause under Piedmont, and that thus the grand conception of his life, an independent Italian confederation, supported by the Pope and clergy, might become realized. It is not so easy at first to see how a scheme so apparently impracticable, could have recommended itself to Cavour's support. There were, however, many obvious considerations, which must have weighed with him in its favour. The Italian nation had then, as now, an instinctive dislike to revolution, and there was a grave danger for the future of Italy, if the nation learnt to identify the cause of national independence with that of the revolution. "To close the era of revolutions," in the words which ten years later Cavour put into the mouth of Victor Emmanuel, on his entry into the Papal States, was always to Cavour's mind the real mission of Piedmont. The adoption of Gioberti's project vindicated the character of the Piedmontese government from the suspicion of being identical with the revolution. Probably the chief argument in its favour to Cavour, was that, imperfect as the scheme might be, it was the best one practicable. Something must be done under present circumstances, some decided step taken, unless the nation was to be plunged at once into a hopeless war. Gioberti's scheme, if adopted, would have gained time, and warded off the evil day.

Whether the idea was wise or not, and whether Cavour acted wisely in advocating it, may, I feel, be questioned; but there can be no question that his advocacy was disinterested. Gioberti had been one of Cavour's most energetic opponents. It was owing to the influence of his policy and party, that Cavour's political career had been abruptly interrupted. Between the two men, with minds so different, there could be little of sympathy or even appreciation. But in spite of all this, the moment that Cavour saw, or believed he saw, that Gioberti was serving the cause he had at heart, he laid aside all personal feeling to support the views of his opponent. Such aid as he could give was given freely, but in vain. Gioberti's scheme was received with indignation by the democratic party; its author was denounced as a traitor; the other members of the ministry repudiated all connexion with it; and the prime minister, deserted and heart-broken, resigned amidst the execrations of the multitude who, a few days before, had hailed him as a hero. I have been told by one who was present, that, on the evening of Gioberti's fall, he came to the office of the *Risorgimento,* in order to thank the writers for their support, and turning to Cavour, said, "I knew that I could trust *you* to stand by me." When passions cooled down, his country again did justice to the priest-patriot, and his name is still dear in Italy, as one to whom much was forgiven, because he loved her much.

With the fall of Gioberti perished the last faint hope of peace. The ministry who succeeded him, headed by Ratazzi (of whom I shall have to speak anon) had no option left them. The expenses of the armed truce were so enormous, the position of affairs was so desperate, and the national excitement so great, that the one thing left to do, was to stake all on the issue of a last campaign. Reluctantly Cavour yielded to the inevitable fate, and admitted, that, as the war must come, it had better come quickly. On the 13th of March, the truce was declared at an end; and on the 23d, the war and the reign of Charles Albert ended with the battle of Novara.

I know of few more heroic passages in the world's history than that short campaign. You may question the policy which dictated it, but you cannot avoid giving your meed of admiration. To be free with a free Italy, or to fall with her fall, was the resolution of Charles Albert and of his people. Outnumbered and dispirited, the Piedmontese army marched boldly forth to a defeat that they felt to be well nigh certain. On the morning of the battle, General Passalaqua spoke thus to the officers around him: "Gentlemen, you know "that, being on the retired list, I might have declined "serving in this campaign. You know that I disap- "prove of the war, but I only pray that all in command "may do their duty as I shall do mine." And an hour after, he lay dead upon the field of battle. It was this spirit which animated the whole army, and which, for a time, almost turned the fortune of that fatal day.

It was all in vain. Fortune did not desert the great battalions, and when the day was over, four thousand Piedmontese had died for Italy. Each of them had his own story, but yet in the record of Novara, I think that history will dwell, in no servile spirit, on the figure of the hero-king. Wherever the danger was the greatest, there he was found, and as the day closed and went against him, he was seen to ride up to the batteries of the enemy, seeking death. But "even death," he said, "refused to help him," and his last prayer, that he might be allowed to die as a soldier and a king, was not granted to him. Then when all was lost he called his generals round him and spoke in words not soon forgotten:—

"I have sacrificed myself for the cause of Italy. I "have risked my own life, the life of my children, and "my throne, and I have failed. I perceive that my "person is now the sole obstacle to a peace become

" inevitable, and moreover I could never reconcile my-
" self to signing peace. Since I have not succeeded in
" finding death, I must accomplish one last sacrifice for
" my country. I resign the crown, and abdicate in
" favour of my son."

And then bidding those around to leave him to himself, he went forth alone, passed through the Austrian camp, and left for ever the country that he had loved so well.

From that day the cause of Piedmont was the cause of Italy, and even amidst the gloom of despair which followed Novara, such a mind as Cavour's could discern that all had not been in vain. Speaking of the war not long afterwards, he said to a friend of his, "We
" have lost thousands of brave soldiers; we have wasted
" many millions; we have had disastrous campaigns;
" and from all this we have only reaped one single
" thing: we have got the Italian tricolor as our
" standard, instead of the flag of Savoy. Well, in my
" opinion, we have not paid too dear a price."

From the history of the Italian War of Independence, which ended with Novara, Cavour came to the conclusion that there was no chance for Italy to withstand Austria, unless she were united; and that to overthrow Austria, Italy must have foreign aid. How he worked out these conclusions, the rest of his life has shown.

CHAPTER XIV.

THE PEACE.

SPEAKING of the days which followed Novara, Cavour once said, "We existed, and every day's existence was a gain." In truth, for a time, the existence of Piedmont, with its free institutions, seemed almost hopeless. It was only the fear of French interference, which prevented the Austrians from marching on Turin. As it was, the conditions of the peace were disastrous enough. The foreign legions had to be disbanded, and the Sardinian forces recalled from Venice. An indemnity of eighty million francs was demanded from the bankrupt state, and till its payment, Alexandria and a portion of the Piedmontese territory were to be occupied by Austrian garrisons. Intestine discord was not wanting to complete the disasters of the country. The overwhelming defeat of Novara had been too sudden for the country to realize at once, that all was lost—that the dreams of triumph, with which the war party had flattered the national vanity, were vanished utterly. An insurrection broke out at Genoa—a provisional government was established to proclaim the Republic, and it was only after serious loss of life that the *émeute* was suppressed by General La Marmora. Still, even then, the nation could hardly bring itself to believe that peace was inevitable.

The *Re Galant'uomo*, as the Italians love to call Victor Emmanuel, is no title of idle adulation. That the Sardinian Constitution was maintained after Novara, is due to the honesty of the present king of Italy. There was everything to tempt him at his accession, to adopt a reactionary policy. The liberal *régime*, which his father had introduced, had ended in a disastrous and fatal overthrow. The country was well-nigh ruined, and the safety of the throne itself seemed threatened by the revolutionary party, who had risen to power by virtue of the Constitution. If he had yielded to circumstances, and, adapting his policy to the views of Austria, had secured his internal power by the sacrifice of an ambition, that seemed well-nigh hopeless, few could have blamed him. Happily for Italy, Victor Emmanuel, true to the traditions of his race, was true also to his father's plighted word. There is a story told, for whose truth I cannot vouch, that on the night of Novara, when all was lost, the young king drew his sword, and shaking it towards the Austrian camp, said, with a fierce oath, "L'Italia sarà!" From that hour, it is certain, he resolved, that Piedmont should still remain the champion of Italy, and to maintain that character, it was essential, that Piedmont should remain also a free country.

There was then still a chance for the preservation of those constitutional liberties, which Cavour valued so highly. The one thing needful was to avoid any pretext for Austrian interference. The great object, therefore, of Cavour's policy was to induce the country to acquiesce in the conditions of the peace, and to strengthen the hands of the Government. The task was no easy one. After two short-lived ministries, about which I need say nothing, a cabinet was formed, with Massimo d'Azeglio as its chief. Few names were more popular in Italy. Few men had given greater proofs of their devotion to their country. A patriot of old standing, an author of more than Italian reputation, he had been severely wounded in the heroic defence of Vicenza. Even the influence of his name and authority was for a long time unavailing to bring the parliament to reason. The assembly, elected in the first days of Gioberti's rule, was too much pledged to war to consent to the proposed terms of peace, and was dissolved by the advice of the ministry. The country, however, returned a parliament as warlike, and nearly as unreasonable, as its predecessor. When the Treaty of Peace was submitted to the house, Balbo urged the Assembly to vote it without discussion under silent protest. This course, the only dignified one possible, was not adopted, and an amendment was carried, accepting the treaty subject to the condition, that a law should be brought in, regulating the position of the Italian exiles who had taken refuge in Sardinia. As the treaty had been already signed and ratified, a conditional acceptance was tantamount to a rejection, and the Government was again obliged to dissolve the Chambers. Meanwhile a reaction had set in. The country awoke to the necessities of the situation, and a parliament was returned, for the third time in the year, containing a strong ministerial majority. The treaty of peace was again proposed, and passed without discussion. Throughout this critical period, Cavour supported the Government vigorously. At the elections in August he was again returned for Turin, and from that time sat for the city without interruption till the day of his death. At this period he voted with the "Right," and in popular estimation was reckoned a supporter of the aristocratic and conservative faction.

It was from this time that Cavour began to identify himself with the liberal party, or more truly speaking, that the liberal party began to identify itself with Cavour. The elections at the end of 1849 had completely altered the political position of the country. The democratic party was demolished, and of the old revolutionary phalanx, there were scarcely a score or so returned to Parliament. The ministry had the support of the Right, who formed the majority of the house; while a large proportion of the radical Left declined any active opposition. In fact, a conservative reaction was then uppermost, and the danger was, that this reaction should be carried too far. The best explanation of the position that I can give, will be from a speech Cavour delivered at this period.

“ Before our great-hearted sovereign Charles Albert “ granted the Constitution, the country was divided into “ two parties: one of men, who ardently desired the “ establishment of liberal institutions—who wished for “ civil progress, and who, in order to obtain it, would “ not have been too particular about the means em- “ ployed; the other of men, well satisfied with the “ existing state of things, and prepared to employ all “ the means at their disposal for the maintenance of the “ *statu quo.*

“ The Constitution of Charles Albert produced, for a “ time, at any rate, the marvellous result of annihilating “ both these parties, and of rallying the immense “ majority of the nation round the Constitutional “ Government. In fact, the immense majority of the “ friends of progress accepted the Constitution freely, “ and even if they did not consider it fully in accordance “ with their wishes, they admitted that it was suited to “ the times, and sufficiently liberal to open the way for “ further progress. The largest section, too, of the other “ party accepted the Constitution, as a lawful act of the “ sovereign to whom they owed obedience.

“ As long as considerations of foreign policy, and the “ great enterprise undertaken by our noble Charles

" Albert, occupied all thoughts and hearts, there were
" no serious differences manifested about questions of
" internal policy. . . . When, however, the force of events
" obliged us to abandon for a time all thoughts of
" foreign politics—when the mental activity of the
" nation was turned to domestic matters, then the spirit
" of that party, which had always been devoted to pro-
" gress, acquired fresh vigour, and manifested a vehe-
" ment desire of seeing the Constitution carried out in
" all respects; so as to realize the progress promised.

" I am not speaking now of our political relations,
" nor do I intend to lay the responsibility of them on
" any party or individual in this parliament. I only
" wish to remark, that for many months, or even for a
" year, the state of those political relations rendered any
" reform impossible.

" What in my opinion then, was the result of this
" delay? In many minds there arose doubts and dis-
" couragement, under the impression that our Consti-
" tutional forms were incapable of producing those
" effects and those reforms, which were called for by
" public opinion, and which the necessity of our position
" demanded imperiously. There ensued a common feel-
" ing of disaffection for our representative institutions.

" This was certainly *not* true of those enlightened
" persons, who are able to distinguish transitory causes
" from permanent ones; but it was true of the masses,
" who judge rather of results than causes. I believe

"that the existence of this state of popular feeling is "most undeniable, and this fact constitutes in my eyes "a most weighty circumstance, of which both ministry "and parliament ought to take account.

"On the other hand, the party which, before the "issue of the Constitution, was satisfied with the "ancient order of things, and which accepted our new "fundamental compact with resignation rather than "with pleasure,—this party, I say, perceiving, that it "was possible to live under a constitutional *régime* "without any reforms, and with the maintenance of the "*statu-quo*, grew, little by little, to believe that it was "also possible to preserve the Constitution, and yet "even to retrograde in the path of progress."

In fact, the time had come when the political institutions of Sardinia must be followed by social reforms. The Constitution was now established; it was time that it should work, and now that reform was practicable as well as desirable, Cavour became a reformer.

At this period, the most rising man in the Turin Assembly was Ratazzi, the president of the present Chamber of Deputies. Of much the same age as Cavour, he was, throughout the early years of parliamentary government in Piedmont, sometimes his colleague, sometimes his opponent, and always his rival. Like almost every Italian of note at the present day, he had, in the first part of the century, been compromised for the expression of liberal opinions. In 1836, in spite of the vehement opposition of the Jesuits, he was appointed to a professorship in the University of Turin, which he left, after a short tenure, for the bar, where he soon acquired a very high reputation. Returned to parliament at the first elections, he soon became noted as one of the ablest, though far from the most violent, of the liberal party. Superior as an orator to Cavour, and not inferior to him in parliamentary dexterity, he was formidable as a party leader, but as a statesman he has failed to maintain his reputation. On the two occasions when he was placed at the head of affairs, before Novara and after Villa-Franca, he was equal to the occasion, but never rose above it. It has been his misfortune, rather than his fault, that he has constantly been placed in opposition to Cavour, and his repute has suffered unduly by the comparison. Still he has rendered many services to the cause of constitutional government in Italy, and not the least of them was the sacrifice he made of his previous convictions, to induce the democratic party to consent to the ratification of peace with Austria.

Ratazzi then, was the acknowledged leader of the opposition in the parliament of 1850. Cavour was the chief of the *centro destro*, or the moderate conservatives, if such a term applies to the ministerial majority, and gradually he began to detach his followers from the aristocratic party—the extreme Right—with which he and they had been hitherto identified.

The first occasion on which Cavour pronounced himself decidedly on the popular side, was in the discussions on the *Foro Ecclesiastico.* In no country had the Church more authority than in Piedmont. The very fact that the devout princes of the house of Savoy, down to Charles Albert, had been national sovereigns, more or less on good terms with their people, had enabled them to carry out their own policy in religious matters more successfully than more despotic princes in other countries. The consequence was, that up to 1848, Piedmont was far behind even Austria or Naples in religious liberty. The Constitution had proclaimed the principle of religious liberty, but as yet nothing had been done to carry it out legally. Every effort had been made to induce Pius IX. to agree to a concordat suited to the new system of things, but even in the most ardent days of his pseudo-liberalism the Pope had steadily refused his consent to any compromise. Balbo, Pinelli, Siccardi, and Rosmini, all devout Catholics, had tried negotiations with the papacy to no purpose. At last, in 1850, D'Azeglio's ministry resolved to take the question into their own hands, and introduced a measure, annulling ecclesiastical courts and other clerical immunities, and rendering the clergy amenable, in civil matters, to the common law. This measure, brought forward by Siccardi, the Minister of Grace and Justice, received the most energetic support from Cavour. Balbo, De Revel, and a great number of Cavour's political associates, refused to support the measure, as too revolutionary; but Cavour was not to be dissuaded. In March, 1850, he made a speech in favour of the reform, which contributed greatly to its success, and at the conclusion, amidst the cheers of the same galleries which used to drown his words with hisses, he exposed in the following passage the real considerations which led him to promote reform, not only for itself, but for its influence on the future of Sardinia:—

"Go on boldly, then, in the path of reform. Don't " hesitate because you are told that the time is inexpe-" dient; don't fear, lest you should weaken the con-" stitutional monarchy entrusted to your charge. Instead " of weakening it, you will cause it to take such firm " root in the country, that even if the storm of revo-" lution should arise around us, the monarchy will not " only not succumb to the onslaught, but, collecting ' around it all the real forces of Italy, will lead our " nation to the lofty destiny prepared for her."

From the date of that speech, the schism between Cavour and the aristocratic party was complete. Three months afterwards, he declared that he and those who followed him would support the D'Azeglio ministry in the next session, but only on condition that the cause of social and financial reform was prosecuted vigorously. The aristocratic party looked upon Cavour as a renegade, and the liberals had still but little confidence in, what seemed to them, his new-born liberalism. Probably, he would have remained some time longer out of office had it not been for an accidental circumstance.

In the autumn which followed the passing of the measure on the *Foro Ecclesiastico,* Santa Rosa, the Minister of Commerce and Agriculture, died suddenly. He had taken no particular part in the debate on the ecclesiastical question, but he was one of the ministers who had proposed the measure; and the priest of his parish, by the orders of the Archbishop of Turin, refused him extreme unction, unless he solemnly expressed his repentance for the part he had taken against the Church. Even in the hour of death, Santa Rosa remained resolute, and died unconfessed and unabsolved. It was, indeed, with the greatest difficulty that permission could be obtained from the priesthood for his burial. This exhibition of priestly bigotry was followed by such an outburst of popular indignation, that the Government had to protect the archbishop from the fury of the mob. When the vacancy in the ministry had to be filled up, public feeling pointed at once to Cavour, who had distinguished himself as an advocate of the reform. It is said that when the appointment was proposed to the king for his consent, he remarked, " I have no objection, " but mark my words, the man will turn every one of " you out before long"—words which since have been often quoted.

CHAPTER XV.

MINISTER OF PIEDMONT.

SOME years before the period I am now writing of, Cavour had been present at a meeting of the Political Economical Society of Paris. He had exposed his views on questions of political economy with such boldness, that Leon Faucher, who was present, got up and said laughingly, "Ah, Count, those plans of "yours, are of the kind men concoct at the door of a "minister's office, and throw carefully out of the "window, as soon as they have got inside." Cavour replied, almost angrily, "That may be your policy, Sir, "but, for my part, I give you my word of honour, if "ever I rise to power, I will carry out my ideas, or "relinquish office." What Cavour promised, he performed.

Interesting as this period of Cavour's life may be to the historian of Piedmont, it possesses but little direct interest for the foreign reader. To enter fully into the vicissitudes of men and measures which fill up the two years' time from October, 1850, to 1852, requires a much closer investigation into the state of Piedmontese politics and parties, than I could pretend to give at present. The national question of Italy was for the time in abeyance. It was but slowly that Piedmont recovered from the great disaster of Novara. The old leaders, the old parties, and the old principles, were dying out or dead, and a new era, for which Cavour waited, was coming on. Domestic reforms were the great questions of the day. In all these questions Cavour took an active part, in accordance with the principles he had professed in opposition. The most important measures passed, were the commercial treaties with England, France, and Belgium. They all rested on free-trade principles, and were supported by the new minister in speeches which produced a great effect. Of course, they were opposed with the prejudices and arguments we ourselves are so well acquainted with. The treaties, it was alleged, were one-sided bargains, in which Piedmont gave everything, and received nothing; the independence of the country was sacrificed to theories; native industry would be ruined, factories closed, the working population reduced to misery, and so on, according to the old story. Cavour's speeches in reply to these allegations seem to me to be master-pieces of clear reasoning. The only abstract theory for which he had an almost personal attachment, was that of political economy, or, I should rather say, his attachment to it was due to his deep conviction that its doctrines were not theories, but truths demonstrable by facts. "If," he said, in one of these speeches, "the ministry had "not implicit faith in the truth of the free-trade "system, but regarded it as a novelty, which might be "worth trying prudently and cautiously, with the "intention of abandoning it if the results obtained "from it were not exactly consistent with the hopes "entertained, then, I say, if the ministry held such an "opinion, the system of commercial treaties would be "reprehensible, and the minister who adopted it would "be deserving of your grave censure. If, on the other "hand, the chambers share the opinion of the ministry, "and have full confidence in the truth of a free trade "system, then I hold that the chambers should be "grateful to the ministry for having deprived the "Protectionist party of all power of retreat, when once "we have entered on the path of freedom."

Throughout the discussion Cavour repeated constantly that the real benefit in commercial treaties was to the nation who made the largest concessions, and he openly avowed that those reforms in the Piedmontese commercial system, were only steps on the road to that complete liberty of commerce, which he hoped one day to see effected.

The other principal reforms, with which Cavour was associated, during his career as a member of D'Azeglio's ministry, were the reduction of the tax on bread, the introduction of an income tax, and a law on the press. Throughout his political career, he was an unflinching advocate of the freedom of the press, and resolutely refused his support to all proposals, calculated to check the utmost licence of discussion in domestic matters. With regard to questions of foreign politics, he entertained a different opinion, and in common with the rest of the ministry, he believed in 1852, that it was necessary to check the licence of the Piedmontese press, in discussing the affairs of foreign governments. Whether he was right or wrong, is a matter of opinion, but there was much to urge in favour of his views. Piedmont was then in a most critical position. In almost every other continental country, the revolution was suppressed, and a reactionary system had been established. Throughout Europe the liberties of Piedmont were looked upon with distrust, if not with open hostility, and the commonest prudence bade the Sardinian government avoid giving any just cause of offence to her powerful neighbours. Unfortunately this prudence was not, and could hardly be appreciated by the Piedmontese journalists. The country was crowded with political exiles, who had great influence with the press. The liberty of free speech was abused, and the Piedmontese papers were made the channel of bitter invectives against Governments, with whom Piedmont was on terms of friendly alliance. For this evil, the laws on the press afforded no redress. The juries, ignorant for the most part, and always accessible to any appeal to their national pride, refused to convict. Under these circumstances, the ministry proposed a law allowing the judges to decide on offences of the press connected with foreign politics, without the intervention of a jury. This law was attacked by Ratazzi and the whole opposition, and was chiefly carried by Cavour's exertions. The view which he took of the true mission of the press, may be gathered from the following extract.

" With regard to internal politics, the excesses and " errors of the press find their own antidote in the " daily experience of the public, and in the good sense " of the nation, which is qualified to form its own " judgment, as to whether the opinions of the press are " exact or otherwise, just or unjust, moderate or " exaggerated.

" It is my deliberate conviction that, as a rule, " extreme factions only represent a small minority of " any nation, and that these factions are only dangerous, " when they are able to make themselves the organs " of the opinions and desires of the majority; when, " concealing their true character, they are able to " represent themselves to the public, as the most ardent " supporters of those reforms which the majority of the " country calls for.

" If then you allow the utmost licence of speech to " these extreme factions, they cannot confine themselves

" to upholding the views of the moderate supporters of " those reforms, which the majority of the public " desires, but abandoned to their own impulses, little " by little they must throw off their masks, and when " they manifest their true character, there is little or " no cause to fear their success.

" The press, however, in my opinion, is of small use " when it treats of questions unconnected with the " country, or with internal politics.

" In the first place, it is very difficult to find any " antidote for the abuses of the press, in foreign politics. " When it treats of events, which happen at a distance, " the public has no means of correcting by its own " judgment, or by the appreciation of facts patent to its " own eyes, the exaggerations and errors of the press.

" Secondly, the press, when it treats of foreign " politics, does harm instead of good to the cause it " seeks to advocate.

" If it attacks foreign governments, or undertakes " the defence of any party in a foreign country, whom " it may consider oppressed, it is, in all probability, " excluded from the state to which its criticism refers, " and therefore it cannot produce any influence on " public opinion there. . . . But while it is excluded " from private circulation, it is read by the government, " by the very persons against whom it directs " its accusations, or, to speak the plain truth, its invectives " and insults, a result which certainly produces "no effect whatever, except to irritate still more the "governments or individuals attacked, and possibly to "aggravate the condition of the very party whom the "press seeks to aid. . . . Without going too far, without "saying, that such a press as ours can be the cause of "war or diplomatic ruptures, I shall not be accused "of exaggeration, if I assert, that when the press of a "country continually insults and attacks the chief "personages of foreign governments, it creates in their "minds a feeling of ill-will towards the country where "such writings are circulated. . . . I am told that "we are 'violating a principle;' to tell you the plain "truth, I believe that great phrases and grand maxims "have, often and often, been the cause of a country's "ruin. I respect great principles as much as any one. "I hold that they should never be violated, but there is "all the difference in the world between abstract "principles and their practical application."

Happily, perhaps, for Piedmont, her "Conspiracy Bill" was more fortunate than our own. The law on the press was carried, and though never applied rigorously, was found sufficient to check the evil complained of. From the passing of this bill dates the commencement of the connexion between Cavour and the imperial government.

About the same period Cavour again stood forward against the opposition, in behalf of the Upper Chamber. The liberal party asserted that, by the analogy of

England, the Senate had no right to introduce modifications into a money bill. To this doctrine, in spite of his reputed Anglo-mania, Cavour could not consent. He argued that the Senate, unlike our House of Lords, had no intrinsic authority, no influence apart from its powers as an assembly. If it was deprived of independent action, it lost all weight as a legislature. It is true, he admitted, that the simultaneous action of two perfectly independent assemblies, was theoretically impossible, if either body carried out their rights to their extreme logical results, "We find ourselves in "the presence of two principles, which interpreted "absolutely, are incompatible with each other. This "is not the only feature in our constitutional system, "where we find this species of antagonism. There is "no power in the state which, if it resolved to exercise "the rights conferred on it by the constitution abso-"lutely and exclusively, would not be able to stop "the machine of government, and to render impos-"sible the action not only of government, but of "society. The constitutional system is a system of "equilibrium, a system in which principles not "theoretically compatible have to counterbalance each "other."

Whether Cavour judged wisely or not on these two questions, it is certain that, in his opposition to the liberal party, he risked the sacrifice of his personal ambition. Throughout this period, the Right had been falling more and more away from him. Experience had convinced him, that it was impossible to lead the Right in the path of liberal progress. "There is nothing," he said about this time to a friend, "I "should have liked better, than to have had the "support of a liberal Right, and with its aid to have "developed our institutions, but it is impossible, and "so I turn towards the Left. You cannot govern "upon a needle's point."

The time had come when he must either desert his principles or his party. And without hesitation he chose the latter alternative. The liberal Left still looked on him with distrust, but the value of his political support had now become so obvious, that as a party, they were disposed to accept his leadership. The political connexion between Cavour and Ratazzi grew daily closer as his own colleagues became more estranged from him in opinion. At last, in May, 1852, the ministry resigned in consequence of Cavour's supporting Ratazzi as candidate for the Presidency of the Chambers, and D'Azeglio formed a new ministry, from which Cavour was excluded.

In order to conciliate the support of the Left, the new ministry introduced a law for legalizing civil marriages, in favour of which Cavour spoke. The law was passed through the Chamber of Deputies, but owing to the opposition raised by the clergy, was rejected in the Senate. Soon after this ministerial defeat the session closed, and Cavour went on a visit to Paris, where he had several interviews with Louis Napoleon, who, as President of the Republic, was then on the eve of the *Coup d'Etat.*

Meanwhile the D'Azeglio ministry had made no progress. The court of Rome refused any kind of compromise, while every means, down to autograph letters from the Pope to the King, were employed to undermine the ministry. D'Azeglio was a man of little energy, and no aptitude for business. The blank caused by Cavour's absence was severely felt, and at last in October, the ministry, afraid to meet the chances of another session, resigned office. Cavour, on D'Azeglio's advice, was sent for, but refused to form a ministry, on the condition that negotiations should be resumed with the Vatican. Count Balbo, who had the especial support of the clergy, was then commissioned to carry on the government, but upon his failure to form a cabinet, the king sent again for Cavour, and requested him to take office without conditions.

For the next nine years, with but short intervals, Cavour was the sole premier of Piedmont.

CHAPTER XVI.

HOME POLICY.

DURING the ten years of his official life, Cavour held, at times, every office in the Ministry, with the exception of the Portfolio of Justice. In every one, without special knowledge on the subject matter, by mere force of intellect and grasp of mind, he distinguished himself as an administrator. Even his enemies admit the services that he rendered to Piedmont as Minister, of Foreign Affairs, of the Home Department, of Commerce, of the Navy, and of Public Instruction. The only department in which he can be said to have failed was as a Financial Minister. The broad fact remains unquestioned, that during his administration there was a constant and growing deficit, and that the public debt increased at a rate unparalleled even in England. There are, however, two sides to this question; and those who knew Cavour best, assert that the system of almost lavish expenditure, adopted by him, is one of the greatest proofs of his genius. At any rate it was the result, not of carelessness or financial incompetence, but of deliberate purpose. He was playing for a high stake, and in political as well as commercial enterprises, the wisdom of a speculation must be judged mainly by its failure or success. Cavour's reputation as a financier suffered at the time, because he could but imperfectly avow the real objects of his policy. If his sole object had been the nominal one of restoring the finances of Piedmont, the most you could say of his policy would be, that it was a splendid failure; but judging of it as part of his great scheme for the liberation of Italy, it was as prudent as it was bold.

In a speech he made early in his premiership, on granting a subvention to a Transatlantic line of steamers, between Genoa and South America, he indicated clearly enough the system he meant to pursue. "It must not be forgotten," so he spoke, "that we have adopted a "policy of action—a policy of progress. In order to re-"establish the equilibrium of our finances, we have "deliberately resolved not to restrict our expenditure, "and, by so doing, renounce every idea of improvement "and every great enterprise; not to endeavour by every "species of economy, to bring our expenditure within "our income; but, rather, to effect our end by promoting "all works of public utility, by developing the elements "of progress which our state possesses, and by stimu-"lating, in every portion of our country, all the indus-"trial and economical activity, of which it is found "capable."

If Sardinia was to become the leader of the Italian national movement, she must become so by advancing beyond the rest of Italy in all kind of progress, whether political, social, or commercial; and that Sardinia should do so, was Cavour's fixed resolve, no matter what might be the momentary cost. In pursuance of this view, he steadily opposed the idea of any reduction in the military expenses of the country, and even when pressed by the Right, refused to hold out any prospect of the State expenditure being reduced within a given period. He spent large sums on the restoration of the Sardinian navy, which almost owes its existence to Cavour's efforts. He promoted, and in many cases guaranteed, the railroads, which now intersect Piedmont in every direction, and he reconstructed the line of fortresses which protect the frontier. At the same time, in the face of this increased expenditure, he either abolished or diminished all protective duties, and this, too, to such an extent, that the tariff of Piedmont became one of the most liberal in Europe. The new taxes which he imposed to supply the place of the old ones were chiefly of a direct character, and the deficit which still remained was covered by a system of loans. The best proof that his financial reforms were based on sound principles is to be found in the fact, that, in spite of its increasing burdens, Piedmont has grown in wealth and internal prosperity under Cavour's ministry; and that, except on one occasion, when Cavour's windows were broken by a mob of mechanics, who believed that their trade would be ruined by the removal of protection, there has never been any popular dissatisfaction expressed at the growth of taxation.

The questions of home policy, with which this first period of Cavour's premiership were occupied, are of little interest, with the exception of the great dispute between the Church and State, which still remains unsettled. The opposition which the law of civil marriage had met with in the Senate, and the hostility of the clerical party in the Chambers, induced Cavour to dissolve the Parliament. The result of this measure was a great increase of the liberal majority. The democratic party ceased, from this time, to have any weight in the House, and the real opposition was from the clerical and aristocratic minority, composed almost entirely of the Savoy members; a minority which, though weak in numbers, was supported out of doors by a wealthy and energetic party. In the face of the increased ministerial majority and of the state of popular feeling, the Senate withdrew their opposition to the Civil Marriage Bill. Having once entered on a contest with the Church, it was necessary for the State to assert its supremacy. The favourite scheme of the liberal politicians was to confiscate the whole property of the Church, and to compensate the clergy by giving them pensions from the State. Cavour, however, held a different view. He believed that the sole result of such a system of confiscation would be, to destroy the community of interests, which still existed between the State and the regular clergy, from the fact of their possessing property in the country, and thus to connect them even more closely with Rome than they were already. "A free Church in a free country;" such, he often stated, was the ideal at which he aimed. In accordance with this view, he sought to reduce the number of the clergy, to suppress all conventual establishments, which took no active part in the service of the Church, and to raise the position of the poorer priesthood. Shortly after Cavour's accession to the premiership, a vacancy occurred in the Ministry of Grace and Justice, of which he availed himself, to bring Ratazzi into the Cabinet. Supported by his assistance, Cavour introduced the great measure of Clerical Reform, which, in Piedmont, goes under the name of the "Legge Ratazziana."

Consistently with the character of Cavour's policy, this measure was more important for its practical results than for the annunciation of any abstract principle. All parties were obliged to admit, that the condition of the inferior clergy was a public scandal which called for redress. Between two and three thousand parish priests in Piedmont had incomes under 20*l.* a year. The wants of the inferior clergy had, from time to time, been supplied from State grants, until in 1855 the subvention annually granted by the State to the Church in Piedmont had increased to a million francs a year, while the rental of Church property, according to the lowest estimates, amounted to fifteen millions. The avowed object of the

"Ratazziana" was to remedy this anomaly, by reducing the income of the bishops and wealthy clergy, and by suppressing a certain number of useless convents. The measure, in itself, was moderate enough, and if it could have been carried with the consent of the Vatican, would have met with little opposition from the Piedmontese Church. Unfortunately the Pope, more out of dislike to the free government of Sardinia than to the particular measure, refused positively to give his consent. Thus, the real question at issue in the "Ratazziana," was, whether the State should yield to the Church or not. The struggle was a long and severe one. The opposition of the clergy was determined and unscrupulous. A strange fatality indeed appeared to work against the passing of the measure. Twice the discussion of the Chambers had to be adjourned for the funerals of members of the royal family. Within one month the Queen-Mother, the Queen of Sardinia, and the king's only and beloved brother, the Duke of Genoa, died suddenly and strangely. Victor Emmanuel was exposed to every species of private solicitation and moral coercion, and, for a time, the clerical faction seemed to have worked successfully upon the King's mind. When it appeared certain that the bill must pass, the Sardinian bishops proposed as a compromise, that the million, required for the subvention of the poorer clergy, should be furnished by the Church of its own free will, on condition of the "Ratazziana" being withdrawn. The proposal was a specious one, as it satisfied the nominal financial object of the measure, and yet, in reality, defeated the attempt to assert the supremacy of the State. The king, attracted by the idea of this compromise, suggested its adoption to the ministry; but, sooner than consent to a desertion of their cause, the Cavour-Ratazzi cabinet resigned office. An unsuccessful attempt was made by General Durando to form a liberal ministry, on the condition of supporting the compromise, and the king, seeing that the scheme was impracticable, requested Cavour to return to office. Fortified by this evidence of their power, the ministry succeeded in May, 1855, in carrying the "Ratazziana," which received the royal signature immediately on passing the Chambers.

The moral courage required to accomplish this great reform was not inconsiderable. All the friends of Cavour's youth, the members of his own class, and even his own brother, opposed bitterly, not only the measure but the statesman, whom they considered its real author. Cavour alluded to this opposition, on speaking in support of the bill, in these words:—

"No one can deny, gentlemen, that the presentation "of this measure has directed against the persons of "some of the ministry, the fiercest passions, the most "bitter hatred. This measure has caused them the loss "of the most valued and precious friendships, and has "increased the number of their political adversaries.

"These consequences could easily be foreseen, and (let "me tell you) were foreseen, before we proposed the "law now under discussion. Nevertheless, gentlemen, "such considerations could not divert us from accomplishing an act, as necessary as it was a solemn and a "painful one, and in spite of lost friendships, of increased "hostility, of rekindled passions, and embittered hatreds, "we do not regret the decision that we have taken. "We shall always count it one of the proudest acts of "our political career, that we knew how to sacrifice "every personal consideration to the accomplishment "of what we considered then, and consider now, as a "sacred and bounden duty."

Since Cavour's death a strange incident has become known to me in connexion with this measure. When the discussion was at its height, Cavour told a private friend of his, that, mindful of Santa Rosa's fate, he had made arrangements with a priest whom he could trust, so that he might rely on the last sacraments being administered to him in the case of death. Whether this forethought was due to a conviction, that the fact of his dying unabsolved, would be an injury to the cause for which he lived, or whether it was owing to some deeper and more personal feeling, is one of those mysteries, which, perhaps, he himself could scarce have explained fully. It is certain that when he died, this priest, the now well-known Fra Giacomo, was not wanting to the promise given.

CHAPTER XVII.

FOREIGN POLICY.

In writing a memoir of Cavour, I am forced constantly to do involuntary injustice to many of his colleagues and contemporaries, who remain overshadowed by the greatness of his fame. The future historian of the rise and growth of the Italian kingdom will be able to assign to each of the characters in that great epoch his due place in the Pantheon of history. It is no low place, I think, will be then allotted to Victor Emmanuel. There have been plenty of kings, before now, who have had sense to know when they had found a great minister, and resolution enough to follow out his guidance blindly. Walpole and George II., Richelieu and Louis XIII., Metternich and Ferdinand of Austria, and a dozen others, might be cited as examples. What will constitute Victor Emmanuel's peculiar reputation, is that he adopted Cavour's policy, not so much because he submitted passively to the influence of a superior mind, as because he felt that Cavour had the power to aid him in the project of his life. With less enthusiasm, a cooler judgment, and a laxer faith than Charles Albert, he was still the true son of the hero king. A warlike, jovial, sport-loving monarch, he had little taste for the details of government, little knowledge of statecraft, except what his rough and ready wit taught him without study. On ordinary questions, he was apt to let others decide for him; but as to the foreign policy of Piedmont, he required no guide or counsellor. To avenge Novara and his father's fate, to drive the foreigner out of Italy, and to become the first of Italian princes, was the lesson his faith, and life, and heart, alike had taught him. Italy owes almost as much to the dogged perseverance with which Victor Emmanuel held that faith of his, as it does to the genius of Cavour. Both were alike needed for the work; alone, either would have remained powerless.

The disaster of Novàra had stunned Piedmont, not crushed her. Under a free government, the military power of the country was developed at the same time as her national energy. Within four years after Novara, Sardinia was again in declared hostility with Austria. The first open step was taken soon after Cavour became Prime Minister, on the occasion of the Austrian government confiscating the Lombard estates of Piedmontese subjects, who held property in the Austrian provinces. This infraction of common justice was protested against by the Sardinian Government, in a Memorandum to the European powers. In consequence of this protest, diplomatic relations were broken off between Turin and Vienna, and have never been fully resumed since.

But the time was come for a bolder measure. The Crimean war has become to us so completely a thing of the past, that it is hard to remember now the anticipations with which we entered on it. A search through the English papers of the day will shew you, that even those most friendly to the idea of the war looked upon it as the commencement of a vast European conflict—foretold, that no man then living would see its termination—and believed, that ere it was over the whole face of Europe would be changed. On the Continent, where these contingencies were rather hoped for than feared, this belief was even more general than with us. Though doomed to disappointment, it was no unreasonable faith. To any one who knows how utterly unsound and rotten is the state of Europe, based upon the treaties of Vienna, there can be no doubt that a shock far slighter than the Crimean war might well overthrow the whole edifice. I have often heard it said, that whether right or wrong, the treaties of 1815 secured Europe forty years of peace. It seems to me a truer and sadder reflection, how nearly half a century has failed to make wrong into right; how half a century has left Europe more unsettled than it was in 1815; and how, at the present day, the real strength of the French empire consists in the fact, that it is a protest against the oppression and the wrong accomplished half a century ago. But such ideas as these, whatever weight they had on continental thought and feeling, were not probably those which weighed most with Cavour. The proverb that "it is good fishing in troubled waters," expresses roughly the policy of Piedmont during the Crimean war.

It is not that Piedmont had no personal interest in the war. There has always existed a close commercial connexion between Italy and the East, and the trade of Sardinia with the Black Sea is stated to be the third largest of any of the European powers. Moreover, Russia was then, in popular repute even more than in reality, the great keystone of the European despotic system. The triumph of Russia would have been the triumph of absolutism, and if absolutism had triumphed in Europe, the liberties of a small country like Piedmont would very speedily have fallen a sacrifice. Russia, too, was the real support of Austria. With the downfall of Russian supremacy, the existence of the Austrian empire was doomed. All these reasons were sufficient to determine on which side should be the sympathies of the free Sardinian nation, and had Sardinia been a great power, there can be no question that, holding these sympathies, she was bound to have joined the war. On the other hand, her territory was in no risk of invasion; the army she could send out was too small to influence decisively the issue of the campaign; and there was every reason to expect, that the allied powers, in case of victory, would allow Sardinia to share in whatever commercial privileges they might obtain for themselves. On the whole, therefore, inaction seemed at first the right policy for Piedmont, and to this policy Cavour adhered during the early months of the war.

It was the fear of Austria, not of Russia, which forced Sardinia into the war. . On the 2d of December, Austria declared herself on the side of the Western powers, and promised, under certain eventualities, to join actively in the war against Russia. There was no reason then, to doubt that Austria was sincere, and if, as seemed probable, she really took part in the war, all the hopes of Italy and Sardinia, which rested on the issue of the war, vanished utterly. It was a matter of certainty, that Russia must succumb to the triple alliance, and then, on the conclusion of the war, the destinies of Europe would again be settled by a congress, in which Austria would be all powerful, and Italy have no voice. Under such circumstances, the position of Sardinia was a very difficult and dangerous one. Ordinary statesmen would have been content to do nothing, to wait and see what happened, and trust to Providence. It was one of those rare occasions, when in political affairs there is an opening for genius, and Cavour seized it. Within ten days from the adhesion of Austria to the cause of the Western powers, Sardinia had signed a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance with France and England, and instead of only agreeing to take up arms under certain possible eventualities, had pledged herself to send an army at once to the Crimea to join in the siege of Sebastopol. How the cabinet of Vienna judged of this *Coup d'Etat*, may be gathered from the remark made by an Austrian minister, on learning the news. "C'est un coup de pistolet tiré à bout portant aux "oreilles de l'Autriche."

But Cavour was not content with firing off a diplomatic pistol-shot. The Sardinian expedition was to be a real act of serious warfare, not a mere political demonstration. Overtures had previously been made from the British government, with a view to subsidizing the Piedmontese forces, but this proposal Cavour utterly rejected. The Sardinian army, if it went at all, was to go as an independent force, and in sufficient numbers to take a real share in military operations. For many reasons the active adhesion of Sardinia to the Western alliance was peculiarly acceptable to England. It was made in the depth of the Crimean winter, when our army was supposed to be well-nigh destroyed by hardships, and when the greatest efforts were being made to keep up the numerical strength of our forces. To England it was an especial object, that the French army should not have an overwhelming numerical superiority over our own, and therefore the succour of an independent Sardinian force of 25,000 men was relatively of greater importance to England than to France. Throughout the whole transaction the English government acted wisely and liberally. It was the loan of a million of English money, which enabled Sardinia to support the expenses of the expedition, and it was by English vessels that the troops were transported to the scene of war. The Italians are a very matter-of-fact people, looking to facts much more than words; and this active assistance of England in the Crimean Campaign has done more to create a sympathy for England in Italy, than all the moral support and abstract aid, with which our government has since befriended and overpowered her. I know, from personal experience, that the recollections left by the Crimean campaign amongst the Sardinian officers are all of the most friendly character towards England; and if the power and character of England are truly appreciated anywhere in Italy, it is in the ranks of that Sardinian army, which dates its first real glories from the days of the Crimea.

Subsequent events justified, very shortly afterwards, the wisdom of Cavour's policy; and even at the time of its announcement, it was popular with the army and with the nation. Both sections however of the opposition united to attack it. The sympathies of the aristocratic party were, in Piedmont even more than elsewhere, on the side of Russia. The connexion between the courts of St. Petersburgh and Turin, had been, until Sardinia became a constitutional country, a very friendly one. The house of Romanoff had, on more than one occasion, shown active sympathy for the princes of Savoy. Besides, Russia was the representative, the champion, the patron saint almost of absolutism; and the party which looked back with regret on the days of the old absolutist rule, could not regard favourably an attack on Russia in her hour of danger. The reasons why the democratic party were opposed to the alliance are not equally obvious. Their opposition was due partly to a dislike and distrust of Cavour; partly to a strange short-sightedness and narrowness of vision, which, politically, has always distinguished them; and more than all, to an innate, rather than an avowed conviction, that the governments of France and England were the real obstacles to the triumph of the revolutionary cause, and that the alliance of Sardinia with the Western powers was a death-blow, for the time, to the hopes of the revolutionary party. Be the cause what it may, the opposition to the treaty was bitter and determined.

It is curious now to read the opinions expressed by the opposition about the treaty. "I am told," said Farina, "that our reward will not be a material one; "but that we shall gain glory, political consideration, "the esteem of other powers, and moral preponderance. "My answer is, that by no possibility can we gain any "of these things from the war." Tecchio, whose feelings as a Venetian exile, rendered him averse to the idea of any alliance to which Austria was a party, stated it as his deliberate conviction, that "the alliance

" we have contracted, renders us accomplices in the oppression of the peoples, precludes us from vindicating
" our nationality, and places us defenceless, disarmed,
" and bankrupt, at the mercy of strangers. The alliance
" is inexpedient, impolitic, ruinous for the country, and
" fatal to Italy."

Brofferio, trying, as usual, to surpass all his brother democrats in vehemence, exclaimed, " If I were to give
" free vent to the feelings of my heart, my voice would
" utter a wail of lamentation. With this treaty the
" Ministry, I tell it them openly, have sacrificed all
" share in the future destiny of Italy. When the war
" is over, do they fancy that these despots of theirs will
" be content to remain spectators of our liberty, being,
" as it must be, a cause of envy and agitation to their own
" subjects? Some pretext will be found; our liberties
" will be sacrificed. The loss of our liberties will be
" the inevitable consequence of the victory, whichever
" side may win. God grant my dismal forebodings may
" not be accomplished; but I tell the House if it consents to this treaty, the overthrow of Piedmont and the
" ruin of Italy will be then accomplished."

I have taken these out of a score of such attacks to which Cavour was exposed. More formidable, though less violent opponents to the treaty, were those, who dwelt on the immense expense the expedition was likely to entail on the country, and on the madness of embarking on such an enterprise in the exhausted state of the finances. Cavour, in advocating the treaty of alliance, was hampered by the fact that prudence, as well as his obligations towards the Allied Powers, hindered him from avowing explicitly the real motives which had induced him to enter on the war. He dwelt much on the importance to Italy of checking the growth of Russian power. "If Russia," he said, "became "mistress of Constantinople, she would be the mistress "of the Mediterranean; for she would then be the "absolute owner of the Black Sea, the only really "Mediterranean Sea, which exists upon the face of the "globe. The Black Sea would thus become, in truth, "a Russian lake, and when this vast Russian lake was "in the hands of a power, which counts seventy "million of inhabitants, it would shortly become "the greatest military arsenal in the world, an "arsenal which would, perhaps, resist the united "force of every other naval power." He observed, "that in the event of Russia's triumph, and of her "thereby acquiring in consequence irresistible weigh "in European affairs, their own country, their liberties, "and even their national existence, would incur the "greatest peril." He explained that the finances of Piedmont could bear the strain of the expense required for the immediate wants of the expedition; and that if further advances should be requisite, it could only be in the event of the war coming nearer home, in which case Piedmont must needs join in the contest for her own safety's sake. The true motives of his policy were hinted at, not indistinctly, in the conclusion of his speech.

" Is, then, our adhesion to the alliance injurious or " beneficial to Italy? That is the point to solve; that " is the question which must be answered. I believe " I can reply, without hesitation, that our adhesion " is most beneficial to the interests of Italy.

" I must state, on the threshold, that we entered the " alliance without abjuring our external sympathies, " just as we have not abjured our internal principles. " We have not concealed, therefore, that we take the " deepest interest in the welfare of Italy; that we " nourish the warmest desire, some day or other, to " behold her position improved.

" But how, you may ask, can this treaty aid Italy? " I answer, in the one only way by which we (and, " possibly, anybody) can aid Italy under the actual circumstances of Europe.

" The experience of past years and past centuries has " shown abundantly (or, at least, has shown so, in my " opinion,) how little Italy can gain by conspiracies, and " plots, and revolutions, and vague insurrections.

" Far from aiding Italy, these things have proved the " greatest of the many calamities which have afflicted " her. This result is due, not only to the numerous " individual misfortunes which have resulted from these " movements, nor to the fact, that they have often been

" the cause and pretext for increased oppression, but " above all, to the circumstance, that these continual " conspiracies, these repeated revolutions, these purposeless insurrections, have had the effect of destroying the " esteem and, in a great measure, the sympathy, which " the other nations of Europe entertained for Italy.

" Now, gentlemen, it is my belief that the principal, " nay the vital condition for the amelioration of " Italy's position, is to re-establish her reputation, to " cause all the nations of the world, governments as " well as peoples, to render justice to her great qualities. " To attain this object two things are needful; first, to " prove to Europe that Italy has civil training enough " to govern herself regularly, to rule herself with " freedom, and to support the most perfect form of " government that has yet been discovered; and " secondly, to show that her military valour is equal " to that of her ancestors.

" The first part of these services you have already " rendered to Italy by your conduct for the last seven " years, showing, as you have done unmistakeably, that " the Italians know how to govern themselves with " moderation, prudence, and loyalty. It behoves you " now to render her an equal, if not a greater service. " It behoves our country to show that the sons of Italy " know how to fight like heroes on the field of battle. " I am certain of this, gentlemen, that the honours our " soldiers may win in the distant East, will do more for

" the future destiny of Italy, than all which has been " done hitherto by those, who believe that they can " work out the regeneration of Italy by treatises and " declamations."

After a week's discussion, the treaty was ratified by a majority of ninety-five to sixty-four, and, in the spring of 1855, the Sardinian contingent sailed for the Crimea, under the command of General La Marmora.

The first few months after the sailing of the expedition must have been an anxious time for Count Cavour. The failure of the expedition would have been a fatal blow, not only to his reputation and ambition as a statesman, but, to what he valued more, to the cause of Italy. Even the absence of failure was not sufficient. For the end he had in view, a brilliant success was required, and that success was long coming. The Sardinian troops were attacked by cholera on their landing in the Crimea, and suffered severely. The progress of the siege itself seemed to languish, and the small Sardinian contingent had no special chance of distinction. At last, in August, came the news of the battle of the "Tchernaya," fought, strangely enough, on the anniversary of the day when, 138 years before, Victor Amadeus II. stormed the fortress of Belgrade. Throughout Italy there was one shout of triumph. An Italian army fighting, not as mercenaries, nor as forced levies in the service of a conqueror, but as independent Italian troops, under the flag of Italy—had fought and won a gallant victory. Cavour's aim had been realized, and Italy was no longer counted a land of conspirators and opera-singers, but a land of soldiers. All opposition to the war disappeared; and when fresh supplies were demanded at the end of the year from the parliament, they were granted readily, and by a vast majority.

Early in the following year Victor Emmanuel, accompanied by Cavour, paid a visit to Paris and London, about which, there is little beyond the fact that needs noting. It is said, I know not with what exact truth, that while Cavour was in England, he sounded our ministry, to know how far Italy could hope for English assistance in overthrowing the rule of Austria in the Peninsula, and that the replies he received were so discouraging, that he saw there was no hope of England interfering in behalf of Italy. During the royal sojourn in Paris, the Emperor Napoleon is recorded to have said to Victor Emmanuel, "Que peut on faire pour l'Italie?" words which laid the seeds in Cavour's mind of the Plombières alliance, and which produced the famous Memorandum of the Congress.

CHAPTER XVIII.

THE CONGRESS OF PARIS.

When the Congress was summoned at Paris, to regulate the terms of the peace with Russia, Massimo D'Azeglio was selected, by Cavour's advice, as the representative of Sardinia. In truth, there was no Sardinian statesman who enjoyed a greater European reputation, or who was better qualified for representing his country with dignity, if not with efficiency. At the time, it seemed probable that the duties of the Sardinian Plenipotentiary would be little more than nominal. The terms of Peace were certain to be actually decided by the great belligerent powers, and, willing or not, Sardinia could only accede to the decision of her powerful allies.

D'Azeglio, at first, accepted the post; but, on the very eve of departure, he shrunk from the responsibility of the mission, and declined going. The other ministers then urged Cavour to go himself as envoy, much against his own wishes. "What is the good," he said to a friend at the time, "of my going, to be treated like a child?" Finally, he yielded to the representations of his colleagues, and undertook the mission.

During the discussions on the terms of peace, Cavour took but a small part. He knew that his vote, as envoy of Sardinia, would have little weight in the decision, and talking for talking's sake, was contrary to his nature. It was only on the question of the proposed union between the Danubian Principalities, that he put himself prominently forward. The question was, in fact, whether the wish of a nation for its own nationality, should be preferred or not to a diplomatic arrangement, calculated to maintain a Danubian balance of power. On such a question, bearing as it did on the future of Italy, Cavour could not keep silent, and he vigorously supported the French project for the union of the two Principalities, in opposition to the policy of Turkey and England.

It was only at the termination of the Congress, that Cavour's opportunity came unexpectedly. When the terms of peace between Russia and the allied powers were concluded, Count Walewski, as President, called the attention of the Congress to the position of Italy. A proposition was made, that the powers represented in the Congress should address a representation to the petty Italian potentates, calling upon them to avert the danger of revolution in Italy, by more equitable and liberal systems of government. The proposition fell to the ground, owing to the refusal of the Austrian plenipotentiaries to enter upon the subject. In the discussion on this topic, Cavour was requested to indicate the reforms necessary to insure tranquillity in the Papal States.

To this request, according to a statement he made in the Italian Parliament very shortly before his death, he replied in these terms. "I refused to indicate any pro-"gramme, of the kind proposed. I proclaimed boldly "my conviction, that it was impossible for the Pope to "follow the advice given him; and I declared explicitly "that the only means of restoring the Romagna and the "Marches to their normal condition, and of rendering it "possible to govern them without a foreign occupation, "was to separate their government entirely from that of "Rome, and to make them judicially and administra-"tively independent."

By a strange coincidence, the scheme for the solution of the Papal question developed by Cavour, and roughly sketched out in these words, was almost identical with the Aldini project, sanctioned by the first Napoleon in 1808, the existence of which was not known till within the last two years.

When it became clear that the Congress would separate without doing anything for Italy, beyond giving her a sterile expression of sympathy, Cavour seized the opportunity of recording a solemn protest in the face of Europe. In the famous Memorandum addressed to France and England, at the close of the Congress, he expressed clearly the wishes and the fears, not only of Sardinia, but of Italy. Speaking as the representative rather of the Italian nation than of the Piedmontese provinces, he pointed out how the hopes of Italy had been disappointed by the conclusion of the war; how the revolutionary party would acquire fresh strength, now that the prospect of any diplomatic solution for the Italian question could no longer be entertained; how Austria was rapidly extending her dominion over Italy, and threatening the existence of all independent States; and how, finally, the Government of Sardinia, "disturbed "within by the action of revolutionary passions, excited "without by a system of violent repression and foreign "occupations, and threatened by the extension of "Austrian power, might at any moment be forced, by "an inevitable necessity, to adopt extreme measures, of "which it is impossible to foresee the consequences."

In truth, now for the first time, the fact was officially announced to Europe, that the existence of the free State of Sardinia was incompatible with the maintenance of the Austrian dominion in Italy; and the declaration was received with acquiescence, if not with approbation, by the Western powers. A great step had been made in the progress of the Italian cause, and at the same time this step was an open act of defiance to Austria. It was so, Cavour knew it to be, and desired it to be known. In the speech delivered in the Sardinian chambers on his return from Paris, in which he announced the results of his mission, he declared openly that "the "result of the Paris negotiations had not "been to "improve our relations with Austria. I must say that "the Sardinian and Austrian Plenipotentiaries, after "sitting side by side for two months, and co-operating in "one of the greatest political works accomplished during "the last forty years, separated with the intimate con-"viction that the political systems of their two countries "are more opposed than ever. These differences may "give rise to difficulties and create dangers, but that is "the inevitable and fatal consequence of the system of "liberty, which Victor Emmanuel inaugurated on as-"cending the throne, and which you have ever since "upheld. I do not think that the prospect of these "perils ought to induce the King to alter his policy. "The cause of Italy has been brought before that "tribunal of public opinion, whose verdict is without "appeal. The trial may be long, but I am confident "that its ultimate issue will be conformable to the "justice of its cause."

CHAPTER XIX.

THE STATESMAN.

THE two years which followed the Congress of Paris were, I suspect, the happiest of Cavour's political career. From one end of Italy to the other, Piedmont was looked up to as the future saviour of Italy, and Cavour was felt to be the statesman destined for the accomplishment of his country's mission. Addresses of hope and gratitude poured in from all parts of Italy. The Milanese celebrated the visit of the Austrian Emperor, by raising a subscription for the erection of a statue at Turin in memory of the Sardinian soldiers who fell in the Crimea. A hundred cannon, which had been voted for the citadel of Alexandria—the outpost of Piedmont against Austria—were paid for by a voluntary subscription, collected for the purpose throughout Italy. A wealthy Venetian, dying childless, left a fortune of 24,000*l.* to Cavour, to use it for the good of their common country. The Tuscans presented Cavour, by public subscription, with a marble bust, on which Dante's line was inscribed :—

> "Colui che la difese a viso aperto ;"

and medals of Cavour were distributed over Italy. Moreover, contrary to the old saying, Cavour had honour in his own country. His influence in the Parliament became so great that the idea of his leaving office, except of his own free will, was never mooted. The opposition itself for a time ceased its attacks, and the nation at large placed implicit faith in Cavour's guidance, feeling convinced that, whatever he advised, was right and would turn out right.

Of these, the last years of Piedmont's existence as a separate nation, there is not much that need be told in a memoir like this. In Piedmont itself Cavour ruled uninterruptedly. The contest with the Papacy still raged unabated, but the battle was already won by the State, and the occasional outbursts of impotent indignation from the Vatican had ceased to excite notice. By an old "Concordat" between the Papal See and the Kings of Sardinia, the Pope has the right of veto on any nomination to a bishopric in the Sardinian dominions, but he can only exercise his veto on candidates proposed to his choice by the Court of Turin. Cavour, therefore, adopted the simple expedient of not nominating any candidate at all, whenever a vacancy occurred in the Episcopal bench; and so, in the course of a few years, the number of Sardinian bishops was reduced from forty to thirty; and the country discovered that it got on quite as well without its full complement of bishops. The Church itself prospered, and the lower clergy grew more reconciled, to say the least, to the new order of things. Railways were completed rapidly; the country increased in wealth and property; Genoa became firmly united to the Piedmontese provinces, and the finances improved so fast that, at the close of 1858, it seemed as if the equilibrium between receipts and expenditure might be again established. As for external politics, there was little outward change. The enmity between Austria and Piedmont grew daily deeper and more violent. The Mazzini faction made but small stir; and the unfortunate expedition of Pisacane served to show, how hopeless insurrectionary movements had grown even in the decrepit kingdom of the Neapolitan Bourbons. There was, indeed, a deep-rooted and growing feeling throughout Italy that, with the birth of the French Empire, a new power had come into the world, destined, for good or evil, to work a great work in Europe. But this feeling only prompted the Italians to bide their time patiently. Abroad the career of Piedmont had ceased to excite especial interest. The Indian Mutiny, and its effect on England, swallowed up less pressing questions; and, I suspect there were few European statesmen or politicians, who would not have listened in blank wonder, if any one could have told them, that there was anything different in the state of Italy, from its normal condition of chronic discontent, or that the Iron Crown, which Austria had held for centuries, was about to pass away from the grasp of the

Hapsburgs. Before, then, I enter on the vexed question of the great War of Independence, let me now dwell somewhat on the private side of Cavour's character as Prime Minister of Piedmont.

When I begin by saying that Cavour was a thorough Piedmontese, I must wander off to explain what meaning these words bear to me. It is the fashion now, when you say that anything or anybody is thoroughly Piedmontese, to mean, that he, or it, is thoroughly un-Italian. From reasons, which I need not enter into, foreign politicians, and a considerable party even in Italy itself, are always dwelling on the differences and contrasts between the various provinces of Italy. It is true that the most careless of observers, in travelling from north to south, can scarce fail to notice that the Piedmontese and the Sicilian, to take the two extreme cases, are widely different from each other in race, character, and language. The observation is a correct and important one enough, but when from this observation you draw the further conclusion that Italy is composed of distinct races and nations, you are arguing without grounds. I defy any one to show where the Northern Italian race ends, or where the Southern begins. The Piedmontese differs from the Lombard, the Lombard from the Tuscan, the Tuscan from the Roman, the Roman from the Neapolitan, and the Neapolitan from the Sicilian; but the degree or shade of difference is much the same in each instance. And even if you take the two extremes, and jump over the intermediate steps, the Piedmontese is not more different from the Sicilian than the French Flamand of Lille is from the Provençal of Marseilles, than the Spaniard of the Pyrenees is from the Spaniard of Grenada; less so, certainly, than the Scotch peasant is from the Cornish miner. On the other hand, the features common to all parts of Italy are undeniable. From Susa to Syracuse, there is but one written language, and though dialects may differ, in no part of Italy is there such a thing as a local literature, or even a local newspaper written in the local *patois*. Throughout Italy there is one literature, one religion, and for the educated classes one spoken language. As for the local jealousies and traditions of which we hear so constantly, I can only say, that in any part of Italy, the proposal to raise a monument commemorating a victory which one Italian State did or did not win over another, I forget how many centuries ago, would be received with simple ridicule, and therefore it is not for a subject of the United Kingdom to dwell much upon such jealousies. When Italy becomes consolidated into one country, one of the chief sources of her greatness will, I believe, be found in the variety and richness of race and character, which her different provinces will show; but these varieties, great as they are, are the varieties between different sections of the same race, not between different races. The Piedmontese and the Sicilian have no race but the Italian, no country but Italy; and this, not by political arrangements, but by the laws of geography, and language, and nature.

I have often heard the Piedmontese call themselves the "English of Italy." The epithet is not undeserved. Compared to the other Italian races, they have many of the virtues, some, too, of the faults, which we are wont to consider characteristic of our own country. They are a hard-working, truth-telling, practical people, with a strong love of law and order. On the other hand, they are a people burdened with many prejudices, and inferior to their fellow-countrymen in refinement of feeling and quickness of intellect. They have much to teach the rest of Italy, much also to learn from it. The best and noblest part of the Piedmontese character consists in its generous enthusiasm for the common mother country, in its desire for a freer life, for a larger national existence. So with Cavour, being, as I said above, a thorough Piedmontese, these high instincts were developed fully; the only difference being, that as his nature was greater than that of common men, the development was fuller also. The body, the heart, the mind of Cavour were Piedmontese, but the soul was Italian.

Thus it happened that to those who had not the ability or the opportunity to judge of Cavour, except by the outward aspect, he seemed a "thorough Piedmontese," and nothing more. His liberal and popular sentiments were the result of conviction, not of instinct. By birth, and tastes, and breeding, he was to the end of his days a Piedmontese country gentleman of rank and fortune. Fond rather than proud of his old family name, he was deeply attached to his own kindred. He lived and died in the old family palace of the "Via del Arcivescovado," where he was born and bred. He was never married, and after the death of his brother's wife, the two bachelor brothers lived in the same house alone together. Politically they were opposed to each other, and on all religious questions the elder brother, as senator, always voted against the younger's policy; but in their personal relations there was no breach of friendship. To his brother's children, also, the Count was much attached, especially to the younger son, who was killed in '48, fighting by Charles Albert's side, at the victory of Goito. When Cavour died, thirteen years afterwards, and the King offered that the body of the great statesman should be buried in the vaults of the Superga, amidst the royal princes of the House of Savoy, the family declined the offer, because they knew that the dead man's own wish had always been to be buried, where he now lies, in the family vault of the Cavours at Santena, side by side with his young soldier nephew.

Personally, Cavour had no fear of danger. On the occasion of his first and last duel, after shots had been exchanged, his adversary remarked, that he had heard the ball whizz past his ears. "Yes," Cavour answered, "J'ai tiré pour vous manquer." During the height of the cholera at Turin, he visited the hospitals daily, and, in defiance of the advice of his friends, exposed himself recklessly to the danger of infection.

True, too, to his Piedmontese nature, the private life of Cavour was a very simple and unpretending one. He rose between four and five, had audiences chiefly on matters connected with his private property till six, breakfasted very lightly, according to Italian fashion, and then, with the interval of half-an-hour's walk in the middle of the day, worked till the Chambers met. He dined late, after the Chambers were over, and almost always, except on the rare occasions when he gave state dinners, alone with his brother. When dinner was over he smoked a cigar, sitting in summer-time on his balcony, where the citizens of Turin used to come and look at "the Count," as they were wont to call him; then slept for half-an-hour, and worked again till he went to bed at midnight. His amusements were few. and simple. He would drive out at times with his brother in a little pony carriage, known to all Turin. When he was dead tired he went to the theatre, and generally fell asleep there; and, in truth, what he seemed to enjoy most was going over, whenever he could spare time, to his own estates at Leri, or to his brother's property at Santena, and there strolling about the fields, talking with the farmers, and watching the progress of his agricultural experiments. His was a rich genial nature, which took interest in everything and everybody that he came across ; and so, all persons, who had to do with him in private life, became fond of him, not so much for his open-handed charity as for the ready kindly sympathy, which was never wanting.

It is very difficult to convey an impression to any one who never saw and heard Cavour speak, of the peculiar position he occupied in the Turin Chambers. He had no natural advantages as an orator. His voice was unimpressive and monotonous, his attitudes and gestures awkward, and his command of words very limited. Yet, with all this, he exercised a strange fascination over his audience, quite apart from his position and reputation. It was owing, I believe, to the extraordinary lucidity of his mind. His speeches read like essays, they are so clear, so definite, and so logical; and yet they were delivered with little preparation. An intimate friend of his told me, that, not long ago, Cavour came to him towards midday, and remarked that he was tired to death ; that he had got to make a speech in the Senate (in Piedmont the Ministers speak in both Houses), that he was utterly at a loss what to say, and that it was already time for him to be at the House. His friend pointed out to him that he had mistaken the time, and that there was half an hour still to spare before the Senate met. Cavour immediately proposed, that they should take a stroll together, but, on his friend observing to him, that the question before the Senate—the Freedom of Religious Worship—was a very important one, Cavour reluctantly gave up the idea of his walk; sat silent for half an hour, and then went down to the Senate, and delivered there one of his longest and ablest speeches. In itself there is nothing wonderful in this. There are plenty of orators, at home and abroad, who could deliver an eloquent harangue on any subject whatever with five minutes' notice. But it is remarkable, when you consider that to Cavour, the mere speaking was an effort, that he never resorted to declamation, and that the sequence of his arguments was always perfect. To make up for his deficiency in words, he had adopted the habit of interposing between every sentence, a sort of strange hum or cough, which destroyed all pretension to oral eloquence. According to the happy expression of an Italian biographer, M. Boughi, his speeches were *rotte sempre, interrotte mai.* The thread was always broken, but never dropped. During his long tenure of power, the carelessness, almost slovenliness, of diction and gesture which were natural to him, grew upon him. He would sit for hours with his legs crossed, his hands buried in his pockets, and his back almost turned to the House, talking perhaps to his colleagues, and apparently paying no attention to the speeches; but the moment that an observation was made, requiring answer, it was found that Cavour had borne the whole discussion in his mind; and his reply, though halting, was ever ready. He had, moreover, a strange contempt for pompous mediocrity; a perfect antipathy to empty declamation, which he took little trouble to conceal. It is the custom to say that he was the countryman and disciple of Macchiavelli. If so, he had never learnt to use the *volto sciolto*, or the *lingua muta.* His face conveyed his feelings clearly, often too clearly, and frequently, by his inability to restrain himself from uttering what came uppermost in his mind, he gave offence to those whom he happened to disagree with.

It was this same impatience of disposition which gave him, very falsely, the reputation of being greedy of power. He had such an innate conviction that he could manage all State affairs better than anybody else, that his ideal would have been to have had no minister but himself. Failing this, he preferred to have men about him, who would execute his directions without question, or without expressing independent opinions. It was thus, that his ministries were almost always composed of men of his own making, not of men who had made a reputation of their own. Besides, there is no disguising the fact that Cavour was a poor partisan. As long as he carried out his ends, he cared but little by what colleagues or what party he realized his object. He had a great work before him, and for its accomplishment he was ready at all times to sacrifice himself, and his friends also. So he changed his party often, his cause never. As was said of Lammenais, "il ne tourna pas, il marcha."

And those who could not keep up with Cavour's progress, he let fall without scruple, but not without regret.

To bear malice was foreign to his nature. If he could have had his own way, he would have liked to be friends with every body. Any appeal to his charity always found a ready answer; but above all he was always anxious to help his political adversaries. Often when he heard that any of the Turin newspaper writers, who had assailed him most bitterly, were in distress, he would request a friend of his, who told me of the circumstance, to give them money on his account, but not to do it in his name, for fear they should think the Minister wished to buy their services; and it is only since Cavour's death, that many who have received welcome aid in time of need, have known the name of their unknown benefactor.

There is a story told by M. Torrelli, that on some occasion Cavour lost his temper with him and with Farini, both of them then comparatively unknown men, and addressed them in such language, that they considered their friendship was at an end. The next day Cavour wrote to request them to see him on urgent business. They returned no answer. Again he wrote to beg them to call upon him, but without effect. And so things went on, till a few days after, as Torrelli was walking in Turin, he felt an arm passed through his, and the well-known voice of Cavour whispered him, "Avete capito chè non voglio bronci?"—Can't you understand that I don't want to quarrel? Thus Cavour was always ready to go half-way, and more than half-way, to make peace with an adversary.

After the famous attack of Garibaldi on Cavour, it was Cavour, and not Garibaldi, who was first ready to make up the quarrel. In fact, Cavour was not a "good hater." When Goethe was attacked, during the German War of Independence, because he abstained from writing patriotic poems against the French, the excuse that he gave was, "that really he could not find it in his heart "to hate the French." As it was with Goethe so with Cavour. The minds of both were too vast and too well poised to leave room for strong personal dislikes and national hatreds.

With regard to Cavour's outward form and person, any photograph will give the reader a clear perception of it, and, what no photograph can give—the look of power, the half-mild, half-sceptic smile, and the keenness of those worn, overworked eyes—I despair of giving alone. It was thus that, elsewhere, not long ago, I attempted to depict him in words:—"The squat, "—and I know no better term—pot-bellied, form; the "small, stumpy legs; the short, round arms, with the "hands stuck constantly in the trousers' pockets; the "thick neck, in which you could see the veins swelling; "the scant, thin hair; the blurred, blotched face; and "the sharp, grey eyes, covered by the goggle spectacles "—these things must be known to all who have cared

" enough about Italy to examine the likeness of her " greatest statesman. The dress itself seemed a part " and property of the man. The snuff-coloured tail- " coat; the grey, creased, and wrinkled trousers; the " black silk double tie, seeming, loose as it was, a " world too tight for the swollen neck it was fastened " around; the crumpled shirt, the brown satin single- " breasted waistcoat, half unbuttoned, as though the " wearer wanted breath, with a short, massive gold " chain dangling down in front, seemed all to be in " fitness with that quaint, world-known figure."

This description, written of the time just before his death, when I saw Cavour last, conveys an unfair impression of what he was some years before, when the complexion was clearer, and the lines of that great massive forehead were still undisturbed by the swelling of the blood-laden veins. Moreover, like all word-portraits, it depicts the sitter not as nature, but as tailors made him. In this latter aspect, I think that it is true enough. Cavour's dress was always the same. As one suit wore out, he ordered another, of the same cut, and cloth, and colour; not because he had any partiality for that especial suit, but because, having once ordered it, it saved him trouble to repeat it constantly.

CHAPTER XX.

THE FRENCH ALLIANCE.

THERE is no history, according to an old paradox, one knows so little of as one's own; and thus, now that I am come to the last and greatest epochs of Cavour's career, to the history of these last two eventful years, my narrative will, of necessity, be brief and incomplete. The mere events can scarce have been forgotten, even by the most short-memoried of readers; and, as to the histories of the actors in that great drama, they will only be known after many years' time; possibly, even then, but imperfectly. There are many things, in this period of Cavour's life, which call for explanation—some things even, which demand vindication. I believe myself that, as time goes on, and as the real history of our days becomes more fully known, Cavour's character will rise higher in public estimation. But, at present, all that I can do, is to put forward clearly such facts, in connexion with this strange time of ours, as bear upon Cavour's part therein, and leave others to form their own judgment from the facts given.

From the Congress of Paris to the end of 1858, the alliance between France and Sardinia became daily closer. Whether the project of a war with Austria was agreed upon between Cavour and the Emperor Napoleon, before or after Plombières, and what were the exact conditions agreed upon, I shall say subsequently what little there is that I, or any one else, can say with truth. Of this, however, there can be no doubt: that the alliance, with all its immediate and inevitable consequences, was planned deliberately and unhesitatingly by Cavour.

I have seen it stated positively, that Cavour himself never believed, till the outbreak of the war, that the French Government really meant to take up arms against Austria. So little is this the fact, that Cavour staked everything, with full reliance, upon the certainty of a war between France and Austria. It was only on one occasion, when a proposal appeared in the *Moniteur*, that Sardinia and Austria should dismiss their armaments till a congress met, that Cavour doubted the sincerity of the Emperor's promise to support Italy by arms; and then his alarm and dejection were so extreme that his friends had to watch him during the day for fear of his mind giving way.

He was not and could not be ignorant of the dangers and evils to which he exposed Italy, by bringing in a foreign army in order to work out her liberation, and, had other means been possible, he would have recoiled before the danger. But—and this is a fact always to be borne in mind—no other means were possible. The same state of things had come round again, as in the days before 1848. The existence of a free Piedmont, and of the Austrian rule in Italy, had grown incompatible. The policy which prompted Austria to rule by viceroys in every part of Italy, was no mere selfish ambition, but the instinct of self-preservation. Austria could no more allow the existence of a free national state in Italy, than the East India Company could have allowed, if such a thing had been possible, the existence of a prosperous and powerful native state in the heart of India. After Novara, Austria conceived that she had crushed Piedmont; but the native vigour of the Sardinian race, the courage of the King, and the policy of Cavour, had now raised Piedmont to a position, in which she was again a vital danger to Austria, and a second time Austria declared, in terms that could not be mistaken, her intention of crushing Piedmont. On the occasion of Francis Joseph's visit to Milan, the Austrian Government, embittered at the utter failure of the Emperor's reception, caused an article against Piedmont to be inserted in the official gazette, concluding with these words: "If the disappointments Sardinia's policy "has met with at the end of the last century, and in "more recent times, are not sufficient to teach her moderation, then, while there is yet time, it will be well "to remind her of a possible future, by quoting the "warning, which Guicciardi drew from the practical "experience of ancient Venice:—'In State affairs it is "'the height of infamy, when imprudence is accom- "'panied by ruin. Let the punishment of whosoever "'offends you be such an example to others, that they "'shall not dare to provoke you.'"

Given this state of inveterate and innate hostility between Austria and Sardinia, there were but two alternatives. If Sardinia chose to sacrifice her free institutions, to give up the traditions of her race, and to abandon all idea of a great Italian nation, then, no doubt, there was an end to the collision between her and Austria. Fortunately the Sardinian nation never could be got to assent to this; and if they could have been induced to do so, Cavour was not the man to induce them. There remained, then, the sole alternative of resisting and conquering Austria. Granted this necessity, there was but one way of overthrowing the Austrian supremacy in Italy, and that was by foreign intervention. I know that the revolutionary party think otherwise; that they believe, or at any rate assert, that the Austrians might have been driven out of Italy by the Italians alone. A year ago, a friend of mine had the pleasure of meeting M. Mazzini at Naples, and asked him how, allowing as he did most freely, that Cavour entertained a sincere desire of freeing Italy, he explained the hostility of himself and his party to the Piedmontese Minister. His answer was, in fact, that Cavour had formed the French alliance because he was afraid of the revolution, which, without that alliance, would have freed Italy unaided and alone. Now, I take the real truth to be, not that Cavour was afraid of the power of the revolution, but that he had no faith in its existence. Had it been possible for any independent national movement to free Italy, he would undoubtedly have preferred it. The normal feeling of Italy is conservative enough for him to have been certain of controlling the movement, when the revolution had done its work. Unfortunately he was convinced, as I think with reason, that the revolution would never do more for Italy than it had done already, or than the experience of thirty years of unsuccessful insurrections and ill-fated conspiracies had shown it capable of doing. The proud boast, "L'Italia farà da se," was one never uttered by Cavour. The time of miracles is past, and without a miracle it was impossible for Italy to act alone. A small state of 4,000,000, like Piedmont, could never collect an army sufficient to conquer the 300,000 tried troops, whom Austria could pour at any moment into Italy. The nominally independent governments of the other Italian States existed only by the grace of Austria, and from them Italy could hope for no aid. The only assistance that the revolution could give, was by the formation of insurrectionary movements and volunteer regiments; and what the value of such assistance was, 1849 had shown only too clearly. If the volunteer troops, led by Garibaldi, and flushed with unexpected triumph, were brought to a dead halt by the second-rate fortress of Capua, defended as it was by soldiers who would only fight under cover, what chance could there have been of an insurrectionary movement, directed against the quadrilateral. It is far from my wish to decry the power and might of a national movement. I believe, that when, as would be the case in another Italian war against Austria, the national movement is on the side of the Government and of the regular army, its influence is incalculable. But if, as was the case before the war of 1859, the national movement is directed against the Government, and in opposition to a regular army, I have little faith in its efficacy.

Assuming that foreign aid was essential to combat Austria, there were but two powers in Europe which were able to assist Italy, France and England. I have little doubt that if it had been feasible, Cavour would have preferred an alliance with England, but it was not possible. I am not discussing the question now, whether our English policy is wise or not, laudable or otherwise. I am only stating a simple fact, when I say, that there is not a single statesman in England, who would have dared to propose an alliance with Italy against Austria —not a party, which would not have treated the proposal with contempt. What England was not willing to do, France was.

If then one admits, as I think one must, the three conclusions I have sought to establish, that a war between Austria and Italy was inevitable; that there was no hope for Italy's success except by foreign assistance; and that the only power which both could and would assist Italy was France, it is easy to understand why the French alliance became henceforth Cavour's great object. Much, too, of his subsequent policy may be explained by the old French proverb, "Qui veut le fin, veut les moyens."

There are some who take a higher view than this: who say, that the mind of the great statesman looked even beyond the interests of Italy; that to him the great war of 1859—the first war in the world's history in which a great nation risked its own greatness to make another people free, and to redress wrongs which were not their own—"the war for an idea,"—was the commencement of a new era—the inauguration of a better time—in which might should be on the side of right, not as of old, against it. Whether the higher view is the truer one also, time, as I have said before, alone can shew.

Though the exact terms of the treaty of Plombières have never yet been known, some facts have been pretty certainly established. There is no doubt that the union of Italy into one kingdom was not a case contemplated directly, even if—which to me is doubtful—the eventuality was foreseen. If, by help of France, Austria was driven out of Italy, the Austrian dominions were to be incorporated with Piedmont. Southern Savoy and Nice were to be ceded to France, and Switzerland was to be offered Northern Savoy in exchange for the Italian Canton of Tessin. Putting aside for the moment the question of these cessions of territory, the arrangement was the best practicable one for Italy, and I am not sure that it was not in itself the best possible. With Austria driven back behind the Alps, and a powerful free Italian state occupying the whole of northern Italy, the whole position of the southern states would have altered. The governments of these states having no longer Austria to fall back upon, must, if they continued to exist at all, have ruled in accordance with the principles which prevailed in northern Italy. No doubt, in the course of time, the great national state of the North would have absorbed the smaller southern ones; but the work would have been a work of time, and would have been accomplished only as the free national life of the northern kingdom pervaded with its influence the states of the South. It is an open question still, whether the Garibaldian movement, which forced the unity of Italy to an unexpected, if not a premature development, has been a real benefit to Italy?

Victor Amadeus is recorded to have said, that Italy was like an artichoke, which must be eaten leaf by leaf. It was a favourite reproach against Cavour that he was an advocate of the artichoke theory. I have no doubt the charge was true, in so far as, that he regarded the formation of a northern Italian kingdom as the first step to the unity of Italy. This was his ideal theory, when he formed the French alliance. The moment, however, that he saw his theory was rendered impracticable, he abandoned it at once; and, according to the rule of his life, accepted facts in preference to theories.

Let me close this chapter with a story I think is little known. When Cavour was at Plombières, and the terms of the alliance were under discussion, the Emperor Napoleon turned to him one day, and said, "Do you "know, there are but three *men* in all Europe: one is "myself, the second is you, and the third is one whose "name I will not mention."

This anecdote was related by Cavour, on his return, to my informant.

CHAPTER XXI.

VILLA FRANCA.

After the reception of the Austrian ambassador at the Tuileries, on New Year's day of 1859, the approach of the war became certain; while the marriage contracted between the Princess Clotilde of Sardinia, and Prince Napoleon, served to show that the alliance between France and Italy was a thing decided on. I own that, to my mind, of the many charges alleged against Cavour, this charge of having brought about the marriage in question, though the one least dwelt upon, has always seemed to me the hardest to answer. It is true that the person most responsible for the guilt, if guilt there was, was the king and father, not the minister; it is true too, that royal marriages are seldom made for love, and that there is no reason to suppose that this marriage has turned out more or less happy than such marriages are wont to do. It is certain, that the motives which urged the marriage on either side, and the reasons which induced the Sardinian government to consent to it, are still unknown; and till they are known, it is hard to say what part Cavour took therein. Looking, however, at what we do know of the patent facts, it is difficult not to conclude that, for political motives, a young girl was sacrificed to a man old enough to be her father, whose private character was more than doubtful; and that in this act Cavour was an accomplice, if not the chief actor. To Cavour indeed, as to all men who are called to accomplish a great work, the end in view became everything; and just as he would have sacrificed himself, or whatever was dearest to him, for the attainment of his end, so I suspect that in the alliance between the Napoleons and the house of Savoy, he thought of but little except the good of Italy. If I were writing a panegyric of Cavour, I should pass by this passage in his life unnoticed; but both for good and bad, I am seeking to describe him as he seems to me to have been in truth.

With the outward history of the war, with that great series of victories beginning at Magenta, and ending at Solferino—which overthrew for once and for ever, the Austrian supremacy in Italy, I have nothing to do, as in military matters Cavour took no leading part. With regard to the inner diplomatic history, to what Balzac called "L'envers de l'histoire," there is next to nothing known. The country had such confidence in the Government, that all parliamentary institutions were suspended for the time; and the Government had such confidence in Cavour, that the negotiations between the French and Sardinian Cabinets were, to a great extent, carried on by Cavour privately; so much so, indeed, that it is doubtful whether he has even left any full record of them behind him.

There is no doubt that the peace of Villa Franca disappointed, if it did not surprise, Cavour. Whatever Austrian partizans may have since asserted, it was not the fear of Austria which stopped the French armies. Solferino had given a death-blow to Austria, and as an insurrection was on the eve of breaking out in Hungary, Austria, defeated or not, must have yielded had the war continued. How far Cavour was cognisant, or approved, of the personal and political considerations which dictated the peace, is an unsolved problem. As far as Italy was concerned, he was bitterly opposed to it, and sooner than be obliged to sign the treaty of peace, as minister, he resigned his office. A few days after his resignation, he wrote the following letter in explanation of his conduct.

"This resolution (of retiring from office) has not been " dictated either by anger, or by discouragement. I " have full faith in the triumph of the cause for which " I have striven till now; and I am still ready to devote " to it what little of life and power may yet be granted " to me. But I am profoundly convinced, that at this " moment, any participation of mine in public affairs " would be hurtful to my country.

"The destinies of Italy have been transferred into the " hands of diplomacy. I am in bad odour with the

" diplomatic world; while my resignation is so accept-
" able, that its effect will be to render diplomatists more
" favourably disposed towards the unhappy nations of
" Central Italy, whose destinies they are about to
" decide on. There are some circumstances in which a
" statesman cannot put himself too prominently forward.
" There are others, in which the welfare of the very
" cause he serves, requires him to retire from notice.

"This is the demand that the present condition of
" affairs makes upon me. A man of action, I retire from
" public life for the good of my country."

Unfriendly critics of Cavour's character used to assert, that the real motive of resigning office, was a desire to preserve his own popularity, which might have suffered, had he taken any part in the necessarily unpopular arrangements that followed the peace of Villa Franca. I own that this hypothesis seems to me untenable. For good and bad, Cavour was justly regarded as the author of the French Alliance, and no temporary retirement could release him from the reponsibility attaching to this reputation. I have no doubt Cavour considered the maintenance of his own authority essential to the welfare of Italy. I have little doubt, that to maintain that authority he would not have been scrupulous as to the measures he adopted; but in the present instance, the motives alleged in the above letter for his retirement were probably the chief, if not the sole ones. The last advice given by Cavour, as Minister, to the

King, was to accept the peace, as far as accomplished facts were concerned, but not to pledge himself to any of the ulterior arrangements contemplated by the treaty. In this advice lay the clue to the policy Cavour himself purposed following.

If Ratazzi and his colleagues accepted office under a sense of duty, they deserve the gratitude of the country. Their position was an arduous and a thankless one. The idea of a federation had grown unpopular. The reasons which have induced, and still induce, some of the most cultivated intellects in Italy to favour the scheme, were not such as to appeal to popular instincts. The very name of a Congress was hateful to Italy; still more so, when it was imposed upon her by foreign powers. Moreover, there was an immediate practical difficulty to be dealt with. At the outbreak of the war, the Dukes of Parma, Modena, and Tuscany, had fled, hoping to return in triumph in the suite of the victorious Austrians. The Romagna had revolted from the paternal rule of the Pope the moment that the Austrians had left Ferrara. The insurgent States had received the sanction, if not the support, of Sardinia; and now, by the treaty of Villa Franca, the deposed princes were to be restored to power. The treaty, however, had not stated how the restoration was to be effected. The deposed sovereigns had no party in their own States, and their *quondam* subjects declared resolutely, they would never accept the old governments except by force. No one was both able and willing to employ the force required. There was, indeed, one very obvious and simple solution. If the French regiments, after Solferino, had been marched southwards, instead of northwards; if, with French troops stationed in the insurgent provinces, and with the prospect of a restoration of the deposed princes hanging over the country, a proposal had been made for the establishment of a Central Italian State under a French prince, the States would have consented readily, if not gladly; and the otherwise inevitable annexation of the Duchies and the Romagna to Sardinia, might have been avoided, without any actual employment of force. Whatever may have been the motives of the French Emperor, he was not willing to adopt this policy; and from the time it became evident, that an independent Central State was not to be established by French intervention, it became clear, also, that non-interference was to be the principle pursued. Neither France, nor Sardinia, could interfere to replace by force the dynasties, whom their arms had virtually deposed; and Austria could not be permitted to interfere, as she gladly would have done. Those conclusions may seem obvious enough now; but at the time it required the genius of statesmanship to appreciate their force. The difference between Cavour and Ratazzi was, that the former saw the real consequences which must result from Villa Franca, and the latter saw only the nominal ones.

As it was, the Ratazzi Ministry had no settled policy, and, not knowing what was best to do, did nothing. The Sardinian envoys were recalled from the Duchies and the Romagna; Garibaldi was requested to resign the command of the Emilian army; the vote of the different Provisional Parliaments for annexation to Sardinia was neither refused nor accepted. The nomination of Prince Carignan to the regency of the provinces was declined; and Buoncompagni, who had not been asked for, was sent in his stead, as "locum tenens." The organization of the Sardinian army was neglected; and the incorporation of the Lombard provinces with Piedmont was conducted so inefficiently, as to cause grave discontent. Everything seemed to be going wrong, and, whether justly or not, the popular feeling was, that nothing could go right till Cavour returned to power. In fact, the ministry were weighed down by the comparison with Cavour; and Ratazzi complained bitterly that, in this time of need, Cavour, by declining all participation in public affairs, refused to give even the authority of his name to his successors in office. The charge is not altogether an unfounded one. It was necessary for Cavour's ends to maintain unimpaired the *prestige* of his authority, and if, as I conceive, he believed that by complete abstention from politics, until the horizon had cleared itself after Villa Franca, he should be able to carry out his designs better, regard for the embarrassments of a former colleague would not have deterred him from executing his purpose.

At last, in January, 1860, the outcry against the Ratazzi Ministry became too strong to be resisted; the ministers resigned office; and, for the last time, Cavour returned to power.

CHAPTER XXII.

THE ANNEXATIONS.

WITH the return of Cavour to power, a new and bolder policy was inaugurated. Within four days of his assuming office, the Sardinian Constitution was proclaimed in the Duchies and the Romagna; while in a circular addressed to the foreign courts, Cavour openly justified the step, on the grounds that there was now no prospect of a Congress, that the restoration of the deposed dynasties was impossible, and that, in the common interests of law and order, it was necessary to re-establish some regular government in Central Italy. Soon after this, France agreed to recognise the annexation of Tuscany and the Emilia, on condition of the question being submitted to universal suffrage in the states whose annexation was proposed.

The result of the vote was an immense majority in favour of annexation, and two months after Cavour's return to office, Central Italy was officially annexed to Sardinia; and thus, for the first time in history, there existed an Italian kingdom worthy of the name of Italy.

There were, however, two sides to the picture, and the national exultation at the annexation of Central Italy was damped by the proposed cession of Nice and Savoy. No part of Cavour's public life has been so bitterly criticised; no part, I think, has been so much misunderstood, out of his own country.

With regard to the verbal dishonesty, of which Cavour used to be accused, on account of his famous declaration that there was no intention of ceding Nice and Savoy, the justification is a simple one. When the Emperor Napoleon made peace at Villa Franca, he was unable to fulfil the prospects, he had held out at Plombières, of ceding all the Austrian dominions in Italy to Sardinia; and on surrendering this prospect, he gave up, at the same time, his claim to the execution of the other side of the contract, which consisted in the cession of Nice and Savoy. It was only when Sardinia became a powerful state, by the annexation of Central Italy, that he claimed the fulfilment of the original contract; and, therefore, at the date of Cavour's declaration, he spoke the truth, or at least as much of the truth, as the diplomatic code of morals is understood to require.

It is more difficult to acquit Cavour of virtual dishonesty towards Italy and towards the ceded provinces. The common English justification is, that "necessity knows no law;" and that Cavour, knowing that Italy was in the power of France, had no choice except to accede to any demands of the French government. This justification, to me, is more simple than satisfactory. It is by no means clear, that there was such an absolute necessity of yielding to France. France could not make war against Sardinia, in order to annex Savoy and Nice; and, short of making war, there was no way by which the annexation could be effected without Sardinia's consent. If, then, the cession was a political crime, as it is commonly represented to have been, I do not see how anything but absolute necessity could excuse it.

This is one of those many questions in which Cavour's character is implicated, for whose solution the time has not yet come. All, therefore, I propose to do, is to point out some considerations which explain, if they do not justify, his policy. With respect to Savoy, I say unhesitatingly that the cession was not only excusable, but actually desirable, both for Savoy and Italy. By geography and language, Savoy belongs to France, not to Italy. The connexion between Savoy and Piedmont was a dynastic, not a national one; and from the time that Sardinia became a constitutional country at the head of the Italian movement, all community of feeling ceased between Savoy and Piedmont. The increase of the Sardinian dominions to the south of the Alps injured instead of benefiting Savoy. The sympathies of Savoy, where the priests are all-powerful, were with the Pope against the government of Piedmont. The aristocratic anti-national party in the Chambers, was recruited almost entirely from the Savoy members. These gentlemen resented as an insult the imputation of being Italians; their speeches were delivered in French, and the ministers in replying to them were obliged to speak in French also. In a great Italian kingdom, there was no place for a distant outlying French province, a fact of which the Savoyards were well aware. On this account Savoy was always opposed to the Italian wars; though her soldiers fought gallantly in the Italian armies, as they have done in all times and all countries. A united kingdom of Italy and Savoy was an impossibility. A despotic government can rule, under one sceptre, any number of different countries; but our own experience of Ireland has shown, how difficult it is to unite, under the same constitutional system, two countries occupied by different races, with different languages and interests. That the separation of Savoy from Italy took place, as it did, before bitter animosities and intestine divisions had grown up between the two countries is, I consider, one of the greatest benefits Cavour conferred on his country.

With respect to Nice the question is different. Whatever the town of Nice may be, the province is, to say the least, as much Italian as it is French: and, if there had been no reasons of political expediency, no Italian statesman would ever have thought of ceding Nice. On the other hand, the political reasons for the cession were very powerful. No man appreciated more highly than Cavour, the undeveloped sources of greatness, which the Italian nation contains; no man, also, appreciated more fully her present weakness. Italy could not, at that time, and in my belief, cannot for many a year yet, stand alone. There was but one power in the world who had really helped or could help her, in case of war, and that power was France. The Imperial dynasty was the mainstay of the French alliance with Italy. Nothing, therefore, was so important to Italy as to strengthen the power of the Imperial *régime*, and nothing could strengthen it so much as the popularity arising from the cession of Nice. Moreover, in the event of the Empire being overthrown, and succeeded by a government hostile to Italy, like that of the Bourbons or the Orleanists, it was of immense importance to bind France to the maintenance of the Imperial policy. France holds Nice and Savoy, as a material guarantee for the maintenance of the Italian kingdom; and, by the cession of these provinces, the French alliance was secured definitively. As to how far the wishes of the transferred populations were really consulted, is a question on which opinions differ. I have no great faith in the positive evidence of universal suffrage; but I have considerable confidence in its negative testimony. From what I have seen of its action, I believe that in any country, where political life is not of old date, a small but active party may gain immense majorities by universal suffrage, as long as the mass of the people are indifferent; but that if you once have a strong national popular conviction, you cannot induce the majority of a nation to vote contrary to its will. I conclude, therefore, from the result of the voting in Nice, that the great majority of the population had no decided dislike to annexation, and that the party acting in favour of annexation was more energetic than the party actively opposed to it.

Still it is hard to say that the cession of Nice was the wish or the interest of its inhabitants, and, I own, that they seem to me to have been sacrificed for the interests of the common Italian country.

As to the other European powers, I do not see that, in this matter, they have any cause to complain of the conduct of the Sardinian government, as directed by Cavour. The treaties of Vienna may be right or wrong, but, considering that the French Empire and the Italian Kingdom exist by violation of these very treaties, it is difficult to see why France and Italy should have been bound by them in their territorial arrangements. It is true that the balance of power was upset by the annexations, but, as the chief effect of the balance of power was to maintain Austria in possession of Italy, an Italian statesman was under no obligation to sacrifice to it the interests of his country. Switzerland deserved no gratitude from Italy; and in the question of the annexation, a minister of the House of Savoy was justified in preferring the interests of Savoy, wishing, as she did, to remain united, to the interests of Switzerland, which demanded the separation of Northern from Southern Savoy.

I give these considerations as some explanation of the vexed question of Nice and Savoy, not as an exculpation of Cavour's policy. If, as I still think, he erred with respect to Nice, he suffered bitterly for his error. To the end of his life he was taunted with the cry, that he had sold his country. Happily that cry is never repeated now, and Italy has freely forgiven the sin, if sin there was, which was sinned for her sake alone.

CHAPTER XXIII.

THE NEAPOLITAN REVOLUTION.

ITALY has had many sons who have loved her "not wisely, but too well." Cavour was the first who loved her not only well, but wisely also. It is impossible to understand Cavour's policy unless you bear in mind, that in his conviction there was but one way in which Italy could be made independent, and that was under a national and constitutional government. His desire therefore, for the independence of Italy was identical with his desire for the establishment of constitutional government. Any step, which tended to a revolutionary system, was to him a step towards the unmaking, not towards the making, of Italy. When Garibaldi, baffled, thwarted, and disheartened ,was retiring from the dictatorship of Naples, he turned half trustfully, half impatiently, to the counsellors, who were perplexing him with their advice, and said, "Fate quel, chè volete, purchè l' Italia sià" (do what you like, so that you make Italy). No policy in the world could have been more directly opposite to that of Cavour. In his mouth the words would have rather run, "Do what I like, not whatever you like." It was this which constituted Cavour's real superiority over other Italian patriots, that he not only knew his end, but the means necessary to attain it.

There is no greater error, then, than to suppose that the whole history of the Italian revolution was an elaborate scheme of Macchiavellian ingenuity, forecast and devised by Cavour. His genius as a statesman, consisted in the power of making the best of the circumstances in which he was placed, while the circumstances themselves were but in small measure of his own making. His original idea, as I have before stated, was the foundation of a kingdom of Upper Italy, composed of Piedmont and the Austrian provinces. When this idea failed, through the treaty of Villa Franca, he modified his scheme by the annexation of Central Italy; and, when that was accomplished, he would personally have preferred pausing in the work of Italian liberation. It required no gift of prophecy to foresee that, if once the new Italian kingdom were firmly constituted, Venetia must be ultimately added to it, and then, sooner or later, the great Northern State would rule virtually, if not nominally, over the whole of the Peninsula. But, in order for the kingdom to become firmly constituted under a free constitutional government, time and peace were wanted. When the new provinces of Tuscany Lombardy, and the Duchies, were really incorporated with the old dominions of Sardinia, then, and not till then, the next step towards the liberation of Italy could be safely and surely taken. Such was Cavour's scheme, and the circumstances which caused him to abandon it were accepted by him, but not desired, or still less planned beforehand.

At the commencement of 1860, there was nothing further from Cavour's thoughts than the annexation of Southern Italy. The Sardinian Cabinet was sincerely anxious that the young King of Naples should enter into a path of reform, and educate his people by constitutional government. It is true that the goodwill exhibited may not have been perfectly disinterested, and may have partaken somewhat of the feeling, which induces the heir to an estate to urge the owner to spend money on improvements of the property, but, in themselves, the advice and sympathy were sound and genuine. The Marquis de Salmour was sent to Naples with an autograph letter from Victor Emmanuel to Francis II. pointing out how the whole position of Italy was changed by the war of 1859, and how the best course, for the interests of the Neapolitan monarchy as well as of the Neapolitan people, was for the king to assume the character of a national and constitutional sovereign, and to ally himself openly with Sardinia. The young king, as despotic as his father, and more ignorant, turned a deaf ear to this advice. The finest opportunity ever offered for establishing a great kingdom of Southern Italy was allowed to slip by; and Austrian influence triumphed at Naples, destined to prove as fatal to the monarch as it had proved hitherto to his people.

While Victor Emmanuel was making his triumphal entry into Tuscany, the first tidings came of the Sicilian insurrection. He had not left the Duchy of Parma, at the conclusion of his royal progress, when the rumour spread that Garibaldi was about to join the insurgents.

Of the insurrection itself, the Sardinian Government thought little, and with reason. From what I could learn in Sicily, some months after the revolution, the native insurrection was practically suppressed by the royal troops, and it was only the announcement of Garibaldi's coming, which kept the insurgents at all together till the landing at Marsala. Cavour said at the time, that "this was not *one* of the most difficult, "but *the* most difficult conjuncture in which he had "ever been placed." It was impossible for Sardinia to take part in the insurrection, still less to take the lead in it. Sardinia could not make war without the aid of France, and in an expedition designed to overthrow the Neapolitan dynasty, the aid of France was not forthcoming. On the other hand, it was impossible for the Ministry to put down volunteer expeditions in aid of the Sicilian insurgents. The Government, which had gone to war with Austria to free the Lombards, could not join in thwarting the efforts of the Southern

Italians to free themselves from a worse than Austrian tyranny. Moreover, the sympathy of the nation, especially in the new provinces, was ardently excited in behalf of Sicily. Ever since the war of 1859 had rendered the unity of Italy a possibility instead of a dream, the idea had taken a deep hold on the national mind. If the Ministry had resolved on suppressing by force the Garibaldian expeditions, they must either have adopted measures inconsistent with constitutional liberty, or else allowed their power to pass into the hands of the democratic party, who would have represented the feeling of the nation. In a position of such difficulty, to quote the words employed by M. Bonghi, a Neapolitan deputy of great talent, "The only way of escaping " from these embarrassments, and of turning them to " advantage, was to allow others to do what the Govern- " ment would not do, to let others profit by the prestige " of the Sicilian expedition if successful, and to bear " the responsibility if it proved a failure; to permit, in " fact, a new series of events to be developed without " the guidance of the Government, and to watch for a " favourable opportunity of appropriating these events " to the service of the country, and of settled insti- " tutions."

This was the policy Cavour worked out with consummate skill. He avoided any overt act which might have given hostile governments an excuse for interference. The difficulties he placed in the way of

Garibaldi's expedition were merely nominal ones; though during the earlier stages of the insurrection, no active assistance of any kind was given by the Government. At the outset Cavour had little belief in the success of the expedition, but when once the capture of Palermo showed that the Neapolitan army could offer no valid resistance to Garibaldi, the question was decided in favour of the revolution. From that time Cavour's policy of inaction was exchanged for one of active sympathy. The insurrection had taken place against his judgment, and without his sanction. Possibly he would not have regretted its failure; but the insurrection having taken place, and having succeeded, the interest of Italy demanded that Sardinia should recover the leadership of the national movement.

It is impossible, as yet, to say how much Sardinia contributed to the success of the Sicilian insurrection. The Government, for obvious reasons, cannot state what they really did in the matter; and the Garibaldian party are naturally anxious to prove that Garibaldi did everything, and Sardinia nothing. On the other hand, the expenses of the Garibaldian campaign were enormous, and as the money certainly did not come from Garibaldi's own funds, and still less from the contributions of Naples and Sicily, it is difficult to suppose that Sardinia did not supply it. The arms and accoutrements of the Garibaldian army, such as they were, were undoubtedly supplied by Sardinia.

Just at the moment when Garibaldi's success became probable, the King of Naples awoke to a sense of his danger, granted a constitution, and proposed an offensive and defensive alliance with Piedmont. The proposal had the one irremediable fault of being too late, but nevertheless, it placed the Sardinian Government in great difficulty. An alliance with Naples, entailed upon Sardinia the almost absolute certainty of having to hinder Garibaldi by force of arms, from invading the mainland. At the same time it was impossible for Piedmont to disregard openly the advice of all the European powers, who urged upon her the acceptance of the proffered alliance. It was Cavour again, who found a means of escape from the dilemma. He neither declined nor accepted the offer, but refused to enter on the matter, until the Neapolitan Government had shown that it was sufficiently secure of its position to make any alliance at all. He added that, the essential condition of any alliance would be the recognition by the Court of Naples of the independence of Sicily, a condition which he knew would never be accepted.

With this refusal vanished the last faint chance for the Bourbon dynasty. The victory was virtually won, and almost unopposed Garibaldi advanced from Sicily to Naples, proclaiming along his march, that he had come to unite Italy into one country, under the constitutional sceptre of Victor Emmanuel.

CHAPTER XXIV.

THE GARIBALDIAN DICTATORSHIP.

An Italian once said to me that no countryman of his "could speak the truth about Garibaldi." And, even for a foreigner, uninfluenced by the national sentiments of pride and gratitude, which all Italians entertain towards Garibaldi, it is very difficult to say, what the exact truth is. These words are enough, perhaps, to show that I am not an enthusiastic admirer of the ex-Dictator. That he is endowed with matchless courage and great physical energy—that he has a wonderful art of winning over, though not of influencing, all with whom he comes in contact—that, sprung from the people, he has an instinctive power of appealing to the people's energies—that he has a perfect genius for irregular warfare—and that, explain it away as you like, he has performed one of the greatest exploits of modern times, all this I freely and readily admit; but beyond this I cannot go. He is the beau-ideal of a guerilla hero; and it was not his own fault which placed him in a position, for which he was utterly and ludicrously disqualified. Without political education, with no knowledge of the principles of government, he is devoid of that rough sharpness which often serves uneducated men, in lieu of learning. A warm friend, and a bitter hater, he judges of political affairs by his personal prepossessions. Without power of appreciating character, or of withstanding flattery, he is "fooled to his bent" (I know no truer term) by men whom ordinary prudence should teach him to distrust. Possibly, if Garibaldi were a greater man, his influence would be less. The fact that his ideas are limited, and that his mind is not able to grasp more than one side of a question, gives him that concentration of purpose and intensity of faith necessary to form a popular leader. His very weaknesses and affectations endear him to the common people as much as his virtues. Honesty, to impress the vulgar mind, must be truculent as well as true. To educated feelings, there was more sterling honesty shown by Cavour when he sold all his shares before becoming Minister of Finance, without ever alluding to the fact in public, than there was by Garibaldi going in state to the Opera at Naples in a worn red shirt, because, at the time he was spending hundreds of thousands of public money without thought or care, he refused to incur the expense of a new coat for his own use and wear: but the latter sort of honesty is of the kind, written in large letters, which the most ignorant can read.

That such a man was, according to the Italian phrase, *antipatico* to Cavour can easily be conceived. In taste, mind, and principles, there could scarcely be two men more different, and the one deep sympathy they had in common, the love for Italy, was, as it happened, the chief cause of their mutual distrust. The reasons which excused or accounted for the cession of Nice were incomprehensible to Garibaldi; he only knew that his birth-place had been ceded to the French, towards whom he had a personal dislike, and that Cavour had been the chief actor in the cession, if not its author. With an almost parrot-like pertinacity, he repeated the cry, that Cavour had sold an Italian province, and, as this was the weak point in Cavour's policy, the attack, however unsuccessful, could not fail to cause pain. The bitterest mortification, too, of Cavour's career was to come from Garibaldi. There was a moment, when in the first flush of triumph, before the tide had begun to turn, the Dictator of Naples was the most powerful man in Italy, and the use made by him of this moment of power was to offer the King of Sardinia the immediate annexation of Southern Italy, on the condition of his dismissing Cavour from office. Not for the first time the honesty of the "Re Galant'uomo" saved Italy. He knew that Cavour had served him truly, and he refused to be dictated to, even by Garibaldi. When this application failed, the evil counsellors who surrounded the Dictator, induced him to publish a letter in the official gazette of Naples, repudiating the idea of any reconciliation with Cavour, and stating that he could never be friends with a man, who had sold an Italian province. Cavour must have been more than mortal had he failed to feel resentment towards Garibaldi, and to some extent, his subsequent policy was doubtless tinged by his personal feelings towards the ex-Dictator.

Still at best, Cavour was, as I have said, an indifferent hater, and was always ready to sacrifice his personal animosities, as he would also have sacrificed his personal friendships, to the good of Italy. The public reasons, which induced him to oppose the prosecution of Garibaldi's enterprise, were weighty and obvious enough. In a very few days Garibaldi's incapacity for governing a great country became painfully apparent. From all parts of the world the survivors of the old republican and revolutionary parties flocked to Naples, and placed themselves in open communication with the Dictator. The educated classes in Southern Italy, who had taken part in the revolution from the wish for a settled and constitutional government, were growing discontented; and the necessity for annexation to Sardinia became imperative. The Garibaldian party, intoxicated with triumph, had other projects. Garibaldi himself had declared, that he would not annex Naples to Sardinia, till he could do it from the Quirinal at Rome. An immediate march on the Eternal City was spoken of as a certainty. Having swept the French out of Rome by the action of moral force, or, in case of resistance, by force of arms, the revolution was then to move on to Venice, drive the Austrians out of Italy, and afterwards cross the Alps, in order to redress the wrongs of Hungary and Poland. This mad scheme was no dreamer's vagary, but the deliberate, avowed programme of Garibaldi and his colleagues. Being at Naples myself throughout the period, the only hypothesis by which I could ever explain the existence of such delusions, was that all Naples was mad at the time. It was deemed an impossibility that Garibaldi could not succeed in any enterprise, and the days of Joshua's trumpets and of the fall of Jericho were believed to have come round again. If Garibaldi had been permitted to march on Rome, one of two results must inevitably have followed: either, as is most probable, he would have been defeated at once, and then the Bourbons would have reconquered Naples almost without an effort, or else Sardinia would have been involved in a life and death struggle with Austria, without the support (possibly with the hostility) of France. In either case, the cause of Italy was lost. At the time, it was impossible to foresee, or even to surmise, that the Garibaldian army would be stopped, on its first day's march to Rome, by the Neapolitan army at Capua; and except for this contingency, the position of affairs appeared well-nigh desperate.

The invasion of the Papal States was the masterstroke of Cavour's political genius. It was necessary to stop Garibaldi's progress—to restore Sardinia to the position of leader in the Italian revolution, and to annex Naples without delay to Northern Italy. The mere despatch of Piedmontese troops to Naples would not have answered the purpose: it was essential to show, that Sardinia, as well as Garibaldi, could free Italy. Moreover, the growth of Lamoricière's army on the extended and defenceless frontier of Tuscany, was a positive danger to Sardinia, and it was important to check its formation. All these objects could be attained only in one way, and that was, by the invasion of the Papal States. The one apparently fatal obstacle to the plan, was the presence of the French army at Rome. It is possible, though the evidence appears against it, that Cavour had private reasons for knowing the French would not really oppose the scheme; but it is more probable, that he relied upon the conviction, that the Imperial Government was as unwilling as he himself could be, to see a revolutionary movement inaugurated in Italy, under Garibaldi's leadership; and that the advance of Garibaldi on Rome would have placed France in a most difficult position. There was, therefore, a great chance, that the Emperor would only protest at the measure, and not withdraw the protection he had hitherto afforded Italy, by preventing any interference on the part of Austria. At any rate, the time was come for desperate measures, and whatever else Cavour lacked, he never failed in courage.

The stroke was a bold one, and succeeded. With but two or three days' notice, the Sardinian armies crossed the Papal frontier, utterly routed Lamoricière's army, captured Ancona, and added some of the finest and most celebrated provinces in Italy to the new Italian kingdom. The massacres of Perugia, in the preceding year, had created such indignation in Italy, that the rescue of Perugia from Papal tyranny was almost as popular as the deliverance of Naples; while victories won by Italian troops, over a foreign army commanded by a French general of high repute, were more gratifying to the national vanity than the easy triumphs of Garibaldi over Italian soldiers. Thus, when at the head of his victorious army, Victor Emmanuel passed from the Papal States into the kingdom of Naples, Garibaldi could no longer claim alone the title of the Deliverer of Italy. The revolution was defeated by its own weapons, and again the policy of Cavour became the policy of Italy.

Into the rights or wrongs of Garibaldi and his army after the annexation, it would be foreign to my subject to enter. With regard to the Dictator himself, it ought to be remembered that, individually, he might have had any reward or distinctions he chose to name. Wisely and nobly he declined the offers pressed upon him, and redeemed by the grandeur of his retirement the errors of his government. Still, it is hard to accuse the Sardinian ministry of ingratitude to Garibaldi, when they offered him everything a subject could ask for, but without success. The interests of the volunteers suffered much from Garibaldi's leaving Naples abruptly, before their claims had been entered into or recognised. There were cases of individual injustice, but on the whole, the Sardinian Government behaved fairly and liberally. Whatever unfairness or ingratitude the volunteers can complain of, was due not to the policy of the Government, but to the natural prejudice with which the old officers of the regular army, men who had fought and conquered in far other battles than those of Garibaldi, looked upon the motley ranks of the army of the South.

After all, as it was often my lot to hear remárked during those days in Naples, if the Garibaldian volunteers invaded the Two Sicilies for the sake of pay and promotion, they were not heroes, whatever else they may have been. If, on the other hand, they were, as I believe, inspired with a true sense of patriotic duty, then the less indiscreet friends say about the inadequacy of the reward paid to patriotism, the better for the credit of the patriots.

I have perhaps spoken hardly of Garibaldi. I believe that I have spoken truly, but I cannot forget that when every town in Italy was grieving for Cavour's death, when all enmities were for the moment laid aside in the presence of the open grave, when even the Austrian and Ultramontane papers paid their tribute of praise to one whom, with all his faults, they called the greatest son of Italy, there was one place alone, from which was heard no utterance of sorrow, no expression of respect, no word even of regret, and that was from—Caprera.

CHAPTER XXV.

THE KINGDOM OF ITALY.

So at last the dream of many centuries was realized, and with the exception of Venetia and Rome, Italy was one country under the rule of one Italian sovereign. The promise which the Emperor Napoleon had given at the commencement of the Lombard campaign, "that Italy should be free from the Alps to the Adriatic," was more than fulfilled; for Italy was now not only free, but united. The course of events had not been such as Cavour, perhaps, would have desired. The latter part of his great enterprise had been carried out, incompletely and prematurely, by inferior workmen; but still the work was his. It was his policy alone, which had broken the power of Austria, and by so doing rendered possible the fusion of Southern with Northern Italy. He was in chief responsible for the danger, and to him, therefore, is due the chief glory of the triumph. This, at least, was the judgment of his own nation. From every part of Italy, even from the Southern provinces, where the local prejudices against Piedmont, and the local feeling for Garibaldi, were the strongest, an immense Ministerial majority was returned to the new

Parliament. To most of the members, Cavour was known only by reputation; but in a short time they became subject to the same influence, which the Minister had wielded over the Deputies of his own country, and in no Parliament was Cavour more omnipotent, than in that first of Italian Parliaments, and that last of his career.

With his old talent, he recognised at once the necessities of the position, and moulded his policy accordingly. His own conception of forming Italy, by a gradual absorption of the different States into the National and Constitutional Kingdom of Sardinia, had to be given up as impracticable. Italy was made in name, and it remained now to make her in reality. To make Italy, it was necessary to have Rome for a capital. Theoretically I should doubt if the necessity of this measure was obvious to Cavour. He had no artistic or archæological tastes, and even the historical traditions and glories of ancient Rome had with him but little influence. In all his speeches I have never once seen any of those allusions to the grandeur of Italy in Roman days, which you find so plentifully in all other Italian writings. Whether the Northern Italians were, or were not, the descendants of the old Romans, was a question on which he probably held no opinion, and even if he did, his opinion one way or the other, would not have affected his judgment as to whether Rome was the best practical capital for Italy. Moreover, he saw, with perfect clearness, the embarrassments into which the selection of Rome for a capital would bring Italy, both with France and with the Papacy.

A *poco curante*, like most educated Italians, in theological matters, he looked with apprehension on the prospect of the religious discussions and disputes, which the possession of Rome must entail; while his conviction of the absolute necessity for Italy of maintaining the French Alliance, caused him to dread the possibility of a collision with France on the Roman question. Moreover all his personal tastes and enjoyments would, he knew, be sacrificed by the removal of the capital to Rome. A genuine Piedmontese in heart and feeling, he was only at home in the straight, staid city of Turin, where his family, and friends, and property were situated. In Turin he was known and loved. Every Piedmontese, from the prince to the peasant, knew "Papa Camillo" by sight, and used to greet him affectionately as he passed along the street. The applause of a mob, or the clamour of an unknown multitude, were distasteful to him; but to that easy, kindly nature this simple, unaffected regard, shown by the people amongst whom he lived, was doubly welcome. All this he would have to sacrifice at an age when men's habits are not formed readily, in the event of the government of Italy being transferred to Rome.

But theoretical considerations and personal predilections never weighed with Cavour, when compared with practical expediency. The existence of an *imperium in imperio* in the heart of Italy had become impossible. If the Kingdom of Italy was to be a reality, the King of Italy must be King in Rome also. The Papacy had chosen to put itself forward as a rival power to Italy, and therefore, the triumph of Italy demanded the deposition of the Pope as sovereign. Then, too, Turin from its geographical position could hardly be the capital of the Neapolitan provinces; while the traditional jealousies of Northern and Southern Italy would yield more readily to a central government at Rome than at Turin or elsewhere. Of all reasons, however, the one which probably weighed most with Cavour, was the instinctive feeling of the Italian nation about Rome. The ideas of a people are, as he once said, few in number, and to the common Italian mind the idea of Italy was inseparable from that of Rome. An Italy, of which Rome was not the capital, would be no Italy for the Italian people. For the existence, then, of a national Italian spirit, the possession of Rome as capital was an essential condition.

But on this point, Cavour's own words will speak more fully than the general considerations I have offered. In the first great debate of the Italian Parliament, when the Kingdom of Sardinia was merged by the vote of the Assembly into the Kingdom of Italy, and when, by the advice of the Ministry, Rome was officially declared the seat of the new monarchy, Cavour seems to me, even as an orator, to have shown himself equal to the greatness of the occasion. His speeches on that debate, the last and greatest triumph of his parliamentary career, have a force of language and a width of view not often found in his plain matter-of-fact oratory. I am sorry that I can only give an extract or two from his speech on the Roman question. Let me take first his allusion to Turin.

". . . . The choice of a capital must be determined " by high moral considerations—considerations on which " the instinct of each nation must decide for itself. " Rome, gentlemen, unites all the historical, intellectual, " and moral qualities, which are required to form the " capital of a great country. Rome is the only city in " Italy which has few or no municipal traditions. Her " history, from the days of the Cæsars unto our own, is " that of a city, whose importance stretches far beyond " her own territory—of a city, destined to be the capital " of a great country. Convinced, deeply convinced, as " I am of this truth, I think it my bounden duty to " proclaim it as solemnly as I can before you and be- " fore the country. I think it my duty, also, to appeal, " under these circumstances, to the patriotism of all " Italian citizens, and of the representatives of all our " most illustrious cities, when I beg them to cease all " discussion on this question, so that Europe may be- " come aware, that the necessity of having Rome for our " capital is recognised and proclaimed by the whole " nation. I think that I have some personal claim to make "this appeal to those who, for reasons that I respect, dif- "fer from me in this question. I do not wish, gentlemen, "to lay any claim to the stoicism of an ancient Spartan; "I admit frankly, that for me it is a bitter grief to be "obliged to tell my native city, that she must renounce "at once, and for ever, all hope of retaining within her "walls the seat of government. Yes, gentlemen; in as "far as I personally am concerned, I shall go to Rome "with sorrow. Having but little taste for art, I am "persuaded that, amidst the splendid monuments of "ancient and modern Rome, I shall regret the formal "and unadorned streets of my native city. But there is "one thing, gentlemen, I can assert confidently, knowing "well the character of my fellow-citizens—knowing, "because I have seen them in the hour of trial, that "they have been always ready for the greatest sacrifices "on behalf of the sacred cause of Italy—having wit- "nessed the resolution, I will not say the joy, with "which they faced the danger of a hostile occupation— "acquainted, I repeat, with all their feelings, I assert "in their name, as Deputy of Turin, without fear of "contradiction, that my city is ready to submit "herself to this last great sacrifice, for the sake of "Italy."

It is curious to see how, even on a question like this, the preference for practical to abstract considerations retained its hold over Cavour's mind. Some of the speakers in the debate had complained, that the Minister had not taken high ground enough, had not dwelt sufficiently upon the right, of the Romans to be free, and of Italy to possess her own capital. Cavour's reply to this complaint is characteristic.

"I reckon it a certainty, if we cannot employ the "powerful argument, that, without Rome for a capital, "Italy can never be firmly united, nor the peace of "Europe securely established, then we shall never be "able to induce either the Catholic world, or that nation "which believes it to be its duty and its place to act as "representative of the Catholic world, to consent to the "union of Rome with Italy.

"To prove the truth of this assertion, let me make an "hypothesis. Suppose that the residence of the Sovereign Pontiff, instead of being at Rome, in the centre "of Italy, in that city which unites so many historical "traditions, was situated on the borders of the Peninsula, in some town of importance if you like, but to "which no great historical prestige attached—suppose, "for instance, that the ancient ecclesiastical city of "Aquilea had been restored, and that the Papacy held "its residence there, do you believe it would be easy "to obtain the consent of the Catholic powers to the "separation of the spiritual and temporal power in this "corner of the Italian land? No, gentlemen; you "know that it would not.

"I am aware, that in such a case as this, you might "assert the principle of non-intervention, the right that

" every people has to manifest its own wishes, and all
" the grand maxims on which international law is
" based.

" But diplomatists would tell you, that in politics
" there are no absolute principles, that all laws have
" their exceptions, that we ourselves have no idea of
" applying to all parts of Italy the principle of
" nationality, and that, as we are satisfied to leave
" Malta in the hands of England, we may well consent
" to a territory not essential to the formation of Italy,
" remaining subject to the Papal dominion.

" We should be told, too, that the interests of Italy,
" being in this instance of a secondary order, could
" not overbalance the general interests of humanity;
" and I assure you that against such arguments as
" these, the finest declamations in the name of abstract
" principles and moral justice would prove of no effect.
" Our Minister of Foreign Affairs, even if he had the
" good fortune of being assisted by all the professors of
" international law that could be found, would never
" succeed in convincing the diplomatists with whom he
" had to treat; and no negotiations could solve a question
" based on these terms. I know that when all
" other arguments failed, we might employ the final
" argument of cannon balls; but we are all, I trust,
" convinced that this is an argument not to be adopted
" in this question.

" I repeat, then, that a declaration of the absolute

" necessity for Italy of possessing Rome as her capital, " is not only a prudent and opportune measure, but an " indispensable condition towards the success of any " steps the Government may take for the solution of " the Roman question."

But perhaps of all the speech, the part which possesses the most lasting interest, is that, in which Cavour exposed his views as to the religious aspect of the Papal question.

" If the overthrow of the temporal power was to " prove fatal to the independence of the Church, then " I should state without hesitation, that the union " of Rome with Italy would not only be fatal to " Catholicism, but to Italy itself. I cannot conceive a " greater calamity for a civilized people, than to see " civil and religious authority united in one hand, " and that hand, the hand of government. The history " of all ages and all countries establishes this fact; " wherever these two authorities have been united, " civilization has almost instantaneously ceased advancing, and has never failed to retrocede ultimately; " the most odious of despotisms has been established; " and this result has happened equally, whenever a " sacerdotal caste has assumed temporal authority, or " whenever a caliph or sultan has assumed spiritual " power. Everywhere this fatal confusion of authority " has led to the same result. God grant, gentlemen, " that this may never be the case with us. . . . .

"... It is my opinion, then, that the independence "and dignity of the Sovereign Pontiff, as well as the "independence of the Church, would be protected by "the separation of the temporal and spiritual autho-"rity; by the free application of the principle of "liberty to the relations of civil and religious "society.

"It is evident, gentlemen, that if this separation "could be effected in any clear, definite, and irrevocable "manner, and if the independence of the Church could "be thus established, the independence of the Pope "would be placed upon a far surer foundation than it "is at present. His authority would become more "effectual, when no longer trammelled by all those "'concordats,' and all these bargains, which always "have been, and always will remain, indispensable, "as long as the Pope continues to be a temporal "sovereign. These weapons, with which civil autho-"rity, both in Italy and elsewhere, has been obliged to "arm itself in self-defence, will become needless when "the Pontiff confines himself to the exercise of his "spiritual powers; and the authority of the Pope, far "from diminishing, will increase enormously in its "rightful sphere.... The only question is, how can "we secure this separation, this liberty which we "promise to the Church? It can be guaranteed, I "believe, in the most absolute fashion. The principles "of liberty, of which I have spoken, should be for-"mally inscribed in our statutes, and form an integral

"part of the fundamental constitution of our new
"Italian kingdom.

"But the surest guarantee would be in the character,
"in the very conditions of the Italian people. This
"people of ours is an eminently Catholic one; it has
"often struggled for the reformation of the temporal
"power, never for the destruction of the Church.
"Such have been the views of our boldest thinkers at
"every epoch in our history. Arnoldo of Brescia,
"Dante, Savonarola, Sarpi, and others, have one and all
"desired the reform of the temporal power, not one of
"them, the overthrow of Catholicism.

"This reform is ardently desired by Italy; but when
"it is once accomplished, I do not hesitate to say,
"that no nation will be more warmly attached than
"ours to the independence of the Papacy, and the
"absolute liberty of the Church. . . .

"The great object then, is to persuade the Holy
"Father that the Church can be independent without
"the temporal power. But it seems to me, that when
"we present ourselves before the Sovereign Pontiff,
"and can say to him, 'Holy Father, the temporal power
"is no longer a guarantee for your independence.
"Renounce it, and we will give you that liberty which
"for three centuries you have sought in vain to
"obtain from all the great Catholic powers—that
"liberty, a few fragments of which you have wrung
"from them by 'concordats,' on the condition of
"parting with great privileges, and even with the use

" of spiritual authority—that very liberty, which you " have never obtained from those powers, who boast of " being your allies, we, your devoted sons, come to " offer you in all its fullness. We are ready to pro- " claim in Italy the great principle of a free Church " in a free country."

I think that these extracts explain sufficiently the view Cavour held about the Church. Like all his policy, it is explained by, and contained in, the idea of liberty. The Church was not more entitled to perfect liberty of thought and action than any other body or institution in the State; but on the other hand, she was equally entitled to it, and, as a matter of conviction, not of mere policy, Cavour was willing and anxious to concede the right. In accordance with these views, part of the terms he offered to the Vatican, not long before his death, consisted in an unlimited power of appointment to all clerical offices within the Italian kingdom. The offer was refused, and is not likely to be renewed. Whether the idea of a "free Church in a free country" was a feasible one, may be doubted; it is certain that it could alone have been carried out by the great mind which conceived it. Possibly the day may come ere long when the Catholic Church shall awake to the consciousness, that Cavour was the wisest friend whom the Papacy has had for centuries; but then the knowledge will come—too late.

CHAPTER XXVI.

THE GARIBALDI DEBATE.

NOT many days had passed since the Kingdom of Italy had been formally proclaimed. The almost boyish dream of seven-and-twenty years ago had become realized, and Cavour was now the first minister of the King of Italy. Then, by that strange law of Nemesis, which seems to doom all human triumphs to be embittered by disappointment, came the most painful event, perhaps, of Cavour's political career. The ambition of his life had been granted, but not in the way that he could have desired. It is true that, even now, Cavour is looked upon as the author and founder of the Italian kingdom; but in the days of its first foundation, this was hardly so. In the eyes of the world, if not of his own country, Garibaldi was the hero of the day, the saviour of Italy. Europe was ringing still with the greatness of Garibaldi's exploits. It was in Garibaldi's name that the victory had been fought and won. The part, which Cavour had played in the liberation of Southern Italy, was not, as in the former triumphs of the Italian cause, the foremost and conspicuous one. It is only as the real story becomes known, that men are getting aware how much of Garibaldi's success was due to Cavour, how many of his failures were redeemed by Cavour's wisdom. Last spring, however, the true facts were little known, and the self-exiled hero of Caprera was then, perhaps, the most powerful man in Italy.

So, within a few days, after Cavour had announced the existence of the Kingdom of Italy, the news reached Turin, that Garibaldi was coming to demand from Cavour an account of his stewardship. Garibaldi himself had probably no definite purpose in his attack. His own true instinct told him, on first thoughts, that his place was not in parliament, and it was only on the representation of his friends that he accepted the seat offered him by the electors of Naples. The Garibaldian party, however, had an object clear and definite. There was a faction, small in numbers, but powerful in ability, which, from convictions more or less sincere, was opposed to Cavour's policy. There was a still larger class of politicians, jealous of Cavour's ascendancy, impatient of the obscurity into which, even against his will, he obliged all rivals to descend; and these two parties combined together under Garibaldi's name, and beneath the shadow of his great reputation, to overthrow Cavour. The first use made of the liberty which

Cavour had won, and of the parliament which he had founded, was to be his dismissal from office, and the reversal of his policy.

The incidents of that memorable debate are too recent to require dwelling on. There is no need to tell how Garibaldi took his seat in the Turin Parliament clad in that worn red flannel shirt, which the world knows so well, cheered by the thronged galleries, and surrounded by the leaders of the Mazzinian party; nor how he raised his voice on the question of the Southern army, to attack Cavour. Again he repeated his old taunt, that nothing would induce him to be friends with the man who had made him a foreigner in his own country; spoke of the cold and baneful influence of Cavour's policy having blighted his own success at Naples, and at last accused the Minister of having created a fratricidal war in Italy. Nor is there a necessity here to speak of Cialdini's bitter, out-spoken letter to Garibaldi, written after this debate, or of Garibaldi's mad challenge in reply. These are all things which it is not my province to record. To me the one thing of interest is Cavour's part in the quarrel.

At the moment, his quick temper overcame him. There was a sort of aristocratic pride about him, accompanied by an innate distaste to charlatanism of any kind, which made the mode of Garibaldi's attack even more galling to him than the substance. But his passion was of short duration. With him, then as always, all personal feelings gave place, almost at once, to the feeling of public duty. There was no room in that great heart for petty rancour. It was he who first accepted frankly the offer of reconciliation made by General Bixio; he, who spoke the first words of peace; he, who justified, as it were, Garibaldi's vehemence, by the confession that "from the grief he felt himself, when he thought it his "duty to advise the King to cede Nice and Savoy, he "could understand the General's feelings, and the re-"sentment exhibited."

When, too, Victor Emmanuel arranged a meeting at Moncalieri between Cavour and Garibaldi, it was the former, who was most ready to make peace, and who first offered his hand in friendship. The cordiality of the reconciliation was on Cavour's side alone. After the meeting was over, and Garibaldi had left Turin, foiled and defeated, Cavour always spoke of him kindly, with a sincere, if not an enthusiastic, appreciation of his high qualities; and amongst the last letters Cavour wrote during his life, was one he seized an occasion of writing in his own hand to Garibaldi, informing him, that his recommendation about some ex-officer of the Southern army had been acceded to. This was not the first act of personal kindness that Cavour had shown Garibaldi. In the days of Garibaldi's sojourn in America, Cavour had assisted his family in their distress. It is a pity for the hero's fame, that these kindnesses have not since been more cordially acknowledged.

Thus the last attack on Cavour failed, as all previous ones had done; but it was one of those victories, a succession of which are fatal to their winners, a fact which Cavour knew, and felt at heart bitterly.

CHAPTER XXVII.

LAST DAYS.

For some months past, in fact, ever since his return to office, Cavour's health had caused uneasiness to his friends. More than once, he had been attacked with apoplectic seizures, which had only yielded to copious bleeding. Other signs were not wanting to show that that iron frame was beginning to break down. He complained that he could not sleep as he used to do. At night he would lie awake, haunted by the thoughts of his political labours, and unable, as in former days, to chase them from his mind. For the first time, too, he felt that his work was too much for him. At the opening of Parliament, his colleagues were very anxious that he should undertake the Ministry of Finance; and Cavour himself felt the necessity of the step. The clerks in the Finance department, who, like all men who ever came across Cavour, as inferiors, were personally attached to him, offered to work extra hours, if the Premier would undertake the ministership; but still Cavour hesitated, and at last, he declined the office, saying, "I cannot do it; I am overworked already. On another occasion, but a few months ago, speaking to one of his most intimate friends, he expressed a conviction that he was wearing out. "I must make haste," he said, "to finish my work as soon as possible. I "feel that this miserable body of mine is giving way "beneath the mind and will, which still urge it on. I "go, on and on, but I get weary and lame; and some "fine day, you will see me break down upon the road. "Patience! May I only be allowed to finish my great "work, and then I care but little what happens; indeed, "I should be glad to die."

Those, too, who knew him best, could trace a strange irritability (or, perhaps, excitability is the proper word) to which hitherto they had been unaccustomed. The uncertainties and inconsistencies of the French policy, the difficulties of Naples, and the attacks of the Garibaldi party, seemed to weigh upon his mind more than greater dangers had done in former days.

Still, even those who knew most of his ailings felt uneasiness rather than alarm. To the very last, he worked on without sign of failing. Throughout the long debates of the first Italian Parliament, he was always at his post, speaking almost daily. To every question or interpellation—and they were neither few nor easy to reply to—he was never wanting in an answer. The defence of the Ministerial policy, the explanation of the measures proposed, and the management of the House, fell almost to his hands alone; not so much, because his colleagues were unable to support him in debate, as because support never appeared to be required. It seemed, in those last days, as if, with some foresight of the future, he devoted especial care to initiating the new Assembly in the forms of Parliamentary government. Every manifestation of ability on the part of the new members was acknowledged by him cordially; and the talent exhibited by the Neapolitan deputies was especially welcome to him, as giving earnest of a brighter future.

Meanwhile, out of the House, he laboured with redoubled zeal, though not perhaps with the old facility. The internal arrangements of the new kingdom, the policy to be pursued at Naples, the negotiations with the Court of Rome, and the constant communications with the Imperial Government, were all carried on through his hands, and directed by his orders. Even in his private life, little outward difference was visible. There was the same readiness to answer any application, the same willingness to grant interviews to all who wished to see him, the same keen interest in the affairs of his friends and tenants, as had been known in former days. Altogether there was about him such an exuberance of life, that the idea of death seemed impossible. He was so completely the mainspring of the Government, the motive power in the great work which was then being worked out, that till the work was finished it appeared incredible the worker could be called away. In men's eyes the time had not come for Cavour to die.

It was on the fourth of last June that the great national festival of the Statuto was to be celebrated for the first time, since Italy had become a nation. The Chambers were to be prorogued during the three days of the festival; there was an accumulation of work; the sittings of the Assembly were unusually prolonged; and the weather was hot, even for May, in Turin.

During those last few days, which preceded the adjournment, Cavour took part constantly in the debates. Wednesday, the 29th of May, was the last day of his public life. It was a hot, sultry afternoon, and the discussion, which, like most debates of that period, turned upon the supposed wrongs of the Garibaldian party, was an excited one. In reply to a bitter speech of Brofferio, Cavour's old adversary, taunting the Ministry with speaking instead of acting, the Premier replied with somewhat more of irritation than he was apt to exhibit. His last act, however, was, with a strange fitness, to urge the House to adopt a conciliatory compromise, and to declare that all who had fought for Italy deserved well of their country. This was the last message that Cavour addressed to Italy.

The next day was the Festival of the Corpus Christi, and there was to be no sitting of the Chambers. Cavour had thus a little time to spare, and went off on the Wednesday evening to visit his estates at Leri.

He walked about the fields, when the heavy evening dews were falling, and, after complaining of feeling chilled, returned to Turin. The next morning, the uneasy sensation continued, and he had himself bled.

Whether the bleeding was wise or not, and what was the actual nature of Cavour's disease, are medical questions, which, for me, have little interest. No examination took place afterwards, and therefore the exact cause of death will never be ascertained. Those best qualified to judge believe that the real malady was congestion of the brain; but, be the final disease what it may, there can be no doubt of the broad fact, that Cavour killed himself by over-work. If bleeding was not the proper remedy, the fault of its adoption lay with Cavour, not with the doctors. Like most Italians, he firmly believed in the efficacy of bleeding, and was accustomed to be bled in every case of illness. He had little faith in medical skill, and had, moreover, an impatience of all interference with his own personal arrangements, which caused him to treat himself in cases of illness. Some two or three years ago, a servant in Cavour's house was taken ill; the regular doctor of the family could not be found; but Cavour at once ordered bleeding, and called in a young surgeon's apprentice from a neighbouring shop. He was taken with the lad's manner, and from that time, he employed the young Rossi to bleed him, whenever he himself believed it advisable.

He was bled again the following day, and felt too weak to attend the Chambers. On the Saturday, he was apparently much relieved, and saw several persons on business; amongst others, M. Nigra, the late Governor-General of Naples. The effort was too much for him; he grew excited, and passed a disturbed night. On the Sunday morning, Dr. Maffoni, a physician of eminence, was called in, and again recommended bleeding.

Naturally enough, the most contradictory stories were spread afterwards about the details of Cavour's illness, and the incidents, more or less dramatic, which were reported to have attended it. The truth, however, is a very simple one. From the time of the relapse on Sunday, both the physicians, and Cavour himself, when conscious, saw that there was little hope of recovery. During the last four days his mind was constantly wandering. If anybody spoke to him, he woke up, and answered collectedly and calmly; but when left to himself, his thoughts seemed to stray back confusedly to the interests of his public life. The names of Rome and Venice, and, above all, Naples were constantly on his lips. Of the hundred sayings, which he is reported to have uttered in this half-conscious state, few, I suspect, are genuine. His words were hardly consecutive enough to adapt themselves to the epigrammatic remarks which have been attributed to them. This much is certain, that throughout the whole of those days of half-delirium, he spoke no word that was not a kindly one; he alluded to no adversary with an expression of bitterness. Constantly, too, he kept repeating, "Ma la cosa va, la cosa va," words which fancifully, perhaps, are believed to have expressed his unconscious faith, that the work of Italy had not been wrought in vain.

But as I have said before, his mind, when roused, was clear enough. On the Monday he sent for Fra Giacomo, the parish priest of the Madonna degli Angeli, an old and valued friend, whom he had employed often on acts of charity. Though he knew that he was dying he showed no fear of death. He was ready enough to die, if it were not that he must leave Italy. "Let us say a prayer for you, my son," the padre is reported to have said, and Cavour replied, "Yes, father; but let us pray, too, for Italy."

Meanwhile the rejoicings for the Feast of the Statuto were going on gaily, and it was not till the Tuesday that the news began to ooze out, that Cavour was dying. That day and the next, the street leading to his doors were crowded with a multitude, waiting anxiously to learn the last tidings of the Count's health. I was told by one who went to the palace to make inquiries, that he found the porter sobbing so, he could get no answer; and the incident, slight as it is, seems to me to show better than an elaborate description, what the city felt in those days of sorrow. Access to the palace was at all times easy, and the staircases now were thronged with persons, who came to ask after the dying minister. Amidst the crowd on the last day, Victor Emmanuel entered almost unnoticed the room where Cavour lay; but the dying man's eyes caught sight of the King, before those around his bed had done so. The room was cleared, and what passed between the first King and the first minister of Italy on this, their last meeting, after so many years of friendship, remains a secret. As Victor Emmanuel turned away, at last, to go, with the tears running down his face, he was heard to say to Cavour, "I shall come to see you again to-morrow," and Cavour answered, "No, your Majesty, to-morrow you will not see me here."

Throughout the day there came hourly telegrams from the Emperor Napoleon, asking for news of Cavour's health, but there was no good news to return. The hopes which had been felt in a rally at the last, gave way, and towards evening Cavour began to sink. On this night there was much apparent restlessness, but little, as it seemed, of actual pain; and still, words about Italy were always hovering indistinctly on his lips. With the first morning light there was a faint recovery of consciousness, and the family and servants came in to see him once again. For a few minutes he roused himself, recognised them all apparently, then sunk into a deep stupor for three hours or so, and soon after sunrise, died.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

SANTENA.

THERE have been few sadder sights in the world than Turin upon that first Thursday in June. The whole city seemed stunned with the suddenness of the blow. Theatres were closed, shops shut, business suspended, the town clad in mourning—and this, without orders being issued, without previous concert, but simply from the depression felt at the great shock and sorrow, which had fallen on every household of Turin. As to what was to come next, or happen after, men thought or cared little: they only knew that Cavour was dead.

Then when the first shock died away, there followed that strange, half-reproachful feeling which most of us must have known, hinting that in life we did but scant justice to the merits of the dead. And so all Turin seemed anxious then to prove, how good and how kind, as well as how great Cavour had been. Many an act of charity but ill repaid, many a word of kindness, long forgotten, was recalled, by those to whom the charity was given, or the word spoken—and recorded gratefully. For men felt as if they had never known before the greatness of their loss. Even the political adversaries of Count Cavour forgot their old quarrels in the bitterness of their common sorrow. The *Armonia*, forgetful of the Pope's wrongs, told how, in cases of distress, they had never applied to Count Cavour in vain. The *Gazetta di Verona*, remembering for once, that after all it was an Italian paper, told how Italy had lost her greatest son, who stood upon the same rank with her Dantes, and her Michael Angelos. To these utterances there were but two exceptions; Franzoni, the exiled Archbishop of Turin, now residing at Lyons, vented the bitterness of his spleen, by inventing stories of Cavour's death-bed repentance; and the organ of the Mazzini party at Turin, uttered a timid expression of satisfaction at the death of its most powerful opponent. There are some people, however, from whom blame is better than praise, and of such in the judgment of the Italian people are politicians of the Franzoni and Mazzini school.

On the Friday, the body was exposed in state. On the Saturday, the funeral took place. On the details of the solemn ceremonial, I see no good in dwelling. Pomp and ceremony of any kind was foreign to the nature of Cavour; and the honours paid were rather to the fame of the Italian statesman, than to the memory of the Piedmontese gentleman. His body might have been buried in the royal vaults of the Superga, but

Cavour's own wish had been to lie in the little chapel of his old Santena home; and those who knew him best, loved him too dearly to think much, in that hour of grief, of his European fame, or indeed of anything, but what he himself had wished for.

It was at Santena they buried him. I was there but a few days ago. Opposite the front of the old rambling château, between the high road and the house, close to the entrance of the gates, stands the village church. Opening out of the gardens, but forming part of the church, is the chapel of the Cavours. A low narrow vaulted building, it has no decoration of any kind except an altar and a crucifix. Along the walls are many vaults, and in one near the ground, with no inscription on it, but with the mortar fresh upon the joinings, lies the body of Count Cavour.

About this mortar there is a story worth telling. In the village of Santena there resides a well-to-do landed proprietor, who, years ago, made his fortune as a mason. On the occasion of the funeral the farmer begged permission to be allowed for the time to resume his old trade, and fasten up the slab himself. The permission was granted, and when the work was done some one noticed to him, that the black clothes, he had put on for the funeral, were stained with plaster marks. "Don't touch "them," he answered; "I shall leave these clothes, just "as they are, to my children as the most precious of "my possessions." And the stained clothes now hang treasured up in the house of the mason-farmer.

Large legacies, chiefly for charitable objects, were left by the Count's will, but the bulk of his property goes to his nephew, the young Marquis of Cavour, who, as the old gardener of Santena told me, must marry soon to keep alive the house of the Bensi di Cavour.

As to Cavour himself, I know not that, those who loved and those who honoured him, have much cause to regret his, too early, death. He died in the full strength of life, in the hour of triumph, in the midst of a people's gratitude. He had lived just long enough, and not too long. Æneas-like, he had found his Italy after many chances and many perils. His eyes had seen the salvation of his country, and then he departed in peace, with a death that was calm and painless.

But for Italy, the loss of the strong will, and the wise brain, and noble heart, which ruled and guided her so long, is to me most terrible. It seems as though the old fate still clung to that much-tried country, as though her story, in the words of one whose loss England, as well as Italy, has had to grieve for not many days ago, would again be—

> "sad in the end,
> Because her name was Italy."

But there is room still to hope.

It struck me much, living at Turin, as I have done, during the weeks that followed Cavour's death, how, when the shock passed away, the first thought both of Government and people, was to follow in the path that Cavour had pointed out to them. The measures which he had proposed, the policy he had pursued, the men whom he had valued, acquired at once an influence altogether irresistible. For a long time to come yet, the dead Cavour will direct the destinies of Italy. There is no sign that I know of more hopeful than this. A great statesman may do much for his own country, but there must be an innate greatness in a people, which can show such love and honour, as the Italians have shown of late, for the memory of Camillo Benso di Cavour.

THE END.

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