

AMAU on Sino-Japanese Conditions

BACKGROUND:-

CHINA'S CONDITIONS - JAPAN'S CONDITIONS

by AMAU Eiji

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The Far Eastern conditions have entirely changed after this war. Particularly there have been fundamental changes on the position of the United States of America in the Far East. I am, therefore, afraid that if a statement which was issued soon after the Manchurian Incident had occurred, is judged by the present conditions it may be liable to misleading. Therefore, we have to study the conditions existing then in order to explain my statement.

China was still in chaotic condition at that time. The Central Government had been established in Nanking but China was far from being united. At the Washington Conference, we had made to China various concessions in the hope that she, soon achieving unity and settling her house in order, would on her own part redeem the various obligations which she had shouldered at that conference. However, such hopes were betrayed by subsequent events. China failed to unify herself and to meet her obligations of the Washington Treaty. It is to be remembered that when Mr. Stimson, Secretary of State, proposed to Great Britain and France to send a similar note which we was going to send Japan, the Government of Great Britain did not adopt the suggestion and published its own communique (which was entirely in a different sense). The London Times had an editorial on January 11, 1932 in support of the British Government to the following effect:

"Nor does it seem to be the immediate business of the Foreign Office to defend the "Administrative integrity" of China until that integrity is something more than an ideal. It did not exist in 1922 and it does not exist today. On no occasion since the Nine Power Treaty was signed has the Central Government of China exercised any real administrative authority over large and varying areas of the huge territory. Today its writ does not run in Yunan or in other important provinces, and while its sovereignty over Manchukuo is not disputed, there is no evidence that it has exercised any real administration there since Nanking became the Chinese Capital."

On the other hand various kinds of anti-Japanese movements such as movement to despise Japan and the Japanese, to resist Japan by force or to boycott Japanese goods were rampant and spreading vehemently among the Chinese people throughout China. There were many evidences that the Nanking authorities were behind such movements. Not only they were agitating or instigating them but also were busy in importing arms and ammunition and war-planes, building aerodromes, detailing military instructors or

raising political loans to be used as funds for the purchase of arms. Various reports from various directions coincided that China was preparing her forceful resistance to Japan or even to wage war against Japan by assistance from other Powers or the League.

It was reported also that China was increasing her armies, by disbursing an enormous amount of money out of the loan which has been raised for use of National welfare in spite of the resolution passed by the United States of America and other nine powers at the Washington Conference to the effect that "It is resolved that this Conference express to China the earnest hope that immediate and effective steps be taken by the Chinese Government to reduce the aforesaid (the maintenance in various parts of the country of military forces) military forces and expenditures as it will not only advance the cause of China's political unity and economic development but will hasten her financial rehabilitation, etc.

(It may be interesting to know some of the news concerning this matter).

a) A Spokesman of the Chinese Government was reported to have said that Japan aimed to bar the sales of American and other airplanes, China's employment of American flying instructors and experts, and to object to Nanking's employment of German military advisers and employment of the international rehabilitation experts recommended by Geneva, etc. (New York Times, April 20, 1934).

b) The British Government notified the Japanese Government in writing in February 1935 that it regarded a loan to China as not only futile but harmful, for it would only increase China's indebtedness.

c) The Japanese Foreign Office informed Dr. T. V. Soong in July 1933 that it objected to the loans which China had been contemplating to raise and the contract which China had planned to make with other powers for supplying arms to China

d) The United States of America was reported to have passed a bill for purchase of Chinese silver in June 1934 and agreed to advance a loan for cotton and wheat for \$50,000,000. - and made agreement of currency with China by which she purchased a great deal of Chinese silver in 1935, 1936 and 1937.

There were some doubts about the American attitude. We wondered if the United States of America would help China by supplying her arms and ammunition to fight with Japan while she recognized that Japan would assume responsibility for the maintenance of peace in East Asia. Such suspicion was deepened by learning the reactions of the statement in the United States of America and studying carefully different repercussions made by

the statement in different countries. (Reactions abroad will be treated later). It was still deepened by various reports such as for example was reported in the Japan Advertiser later:

"Arms Deal Details Aired by Nye Group - September 16, 1934.

Senator Gerald P. Nye, Chairman of "Senate Munitions Investigations Committee" told newspapermen that they, the Committee, was in possession of evidence indicating that China used the Ten million dollars wheat and cotton loan she obtained from the United States for the purchase of guns and airplanes. (A.P. Report).

The Nye investigators today produced evidence that a Du Pont Agent in Shanghai named R. E. Montague Smith, suggested to his home office that representations be made to the State Department and the British Foreign Office in an effort to lift the British restrictions on shipping explosives to China during the hostilities at Nanking and Canton in 1933.

Senator Nye, Chairman of the Committee, charged that China used the thirty million R.F.C. loan last year (1933) to buy arms and ammunition for the Chinese troops engaged in hostilities with Japan. He did not reveal the details of such transaction but it is understood most of the grain was traded to Italy. The Committee curtailed certain startling disclosures due to Secretary of State Hull and Secretary of Commerce Roper having protested against the inquiry's wide scope, as foreign governments were harassing the State Department with protests. Secretary Roper said American business would suffer as a result of the disclosures of private negotiations."

It seemed then to have been confirmed that the policy of the United States of America would help to increase China's supply of arms and restrain Japan's supply for the reason that she "would not be disposed to take any action which would favor the military operations of the Japanese". According to "Peace & War", Mr. Hull said in a statement made to the Senate Committee on May 17, 1933, concerning embargo on the export of arms from the United States of America that:

"In the spring of 1933, in connection with proposed legislation to authorize the President under certain conditions to apply embargoes on the export of arms from the United States, consideration was given to the possibility of an arms embargo against Japan.

He said that an arms embargo would not be an effective means of restoring peace in this instance, that Japan was an important producer of arms with industries sufficiently developed to supply its own needs; that China was dependent upon her importation of these commodities; that an arms embargo applied to both China and Japan would, therefore, militate against China and in favor of Japan; that an embargo directed against Japan alone would probably result in the seizure by the Japanese of arms intended for China,

thus ultimately decreasing China's supply of arms and increasing Japan's supply. The Secretary stated that this Government would not dispose to take any action which would favor the military operations of the Japanese. Further, he said that we would not under any circumstances agree to participate in an international embargo of this kind unless we had secured substantial guaranties from the Governments of all the great powers which would insure against the effects of any retaliatory measures which the Japanese might undertake".

What would be the result if it were left as it was going to be? Disturbance of peace or outbreak of war would be inevitable in East Asia.

It was our fundamental policy in East Asia to maintain peace. The instructions given by President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull to the United States delegate to the Brussels Conference (The Nine Power Treaty) in November 1937 stated that the first objective of the foreign policy of the United States was national security and consequently we sought to keep peace, promote the maintenance of peace. ("Peace & War" page 25). This was exactly in the same line as ours. We must, first of all, preserve peace and security in the Far East at any cost. We had, therefore, to give warning to the parties concerned.

Now I would turn to the internal conditions of Japan. As Mr. Stimson wrote in his book ("The Far Eastern Crisis" - page 28) there had been two kinds of policy toward China. One was the "friendly policy" which was guided by the Minseito party (Wakatsuki, leader of the party and Prime Minister Baron Shidehara, Foreign Minister) and the other was "The Positive policy" which was advocated by the Seiyukai party (Baron General Tanaka). But after the Manchurian Incident and the proclamation of the Imperial Rescript on withdrawal from the League of Nations, our people were united on our policy on Manchuria and East Asia.

Baron Wakatsuki himself explained Japan's position in his article in the American Magazine "Foreign Affairs" in July 1935. He was Prime Minister at the time of the Manchurian Incident and was regarded as champion of the liberal policies in foreign affairs as Mr. Stimson wrote. I understood also this article had been submitted to Baron Shidehara before it was published.

Refer to "Japan and her Aims" by Baron Reijiro Wakatsuki. July 1935, American Magazine "Foreign Affairs".

Baron Matsui, former Minister for Foreign Affairs and member of the Privy Council who was regarded to be in the same school as Baron Shidehara wrote to the "Fortnightly Review" a little earlier than Baron Wakatsuki".

Refer to "Anglo-Japanese Relations" by Baron Kishiro Matsui.

After the Manchurian Incident, our policy was to consolidate the new state of Manchukuo as was clearly guided in the Imperial Rescript, and it was our duty to make other powers recognize the new situation of Manchuria and understand our position and policy in East Asia as was enunciated by the Foreign Minister.

It was not an easy task for me to make foreign people, particularly the American and English people whose conditions were entirely different from ours, as Baron Wakatsuki and Baron Matsui had mentioned in their articles referred to above, understand our policy and mission. However, I had to do my best.

First I had to explain that the actual conditions of Japan would not allow the Japanese people to be compressed within the limited area of their small islands. Baron Wakatsuki and Baron Matsui well explained it. And then I had to explain why we tried to consolidate Manchukuo.

We thought it was the natural course to move to the north, Manchuria, which was adjacent to Korea and it was the safest way to confine our activities to Korea and it was the safest way to confine our activities within Manchuria, if we had to bound outward. Marquis (Baron at that time) Komura advocated a policy of concentration of Japanese immigration to Manchuria when the immigration question had been raised in the United States after the Russo-Japanese war.

Dr. Sun Yat Sen, father of the Chinese Revolution, and founder of the Kuomintang Party, preached the doctrine of the so-called "Great Asianism" and, urging its cooperation of Japan and China, declared that China should abandon Manchuria which was most likely source of friction between these two countries (1913). Manchuria was a part of China but it was in reality different from other parts of China in many respects and governed by a ruler independent from the central authorities for a long time, having an entirely independent status. As the London Times said in its editorial quoted above, on no occasion since the Nine Power Treaty was signed has the Central Government of China exercised any real administrative authorities over Manchuria.

We thought honestly that the American public would gradually understand our position and policy if we sincerely explained our real intention to them, particularly more progressive element of them would easily grasp it. (Such as Colonel House or ex-Ambassador Castle, for example).

References:

a) Colonel House often met Count Makino and other Japanese representatives at the Versailles Conference and he well understood Japan's position. He wrote later that "It is understandable that

Japan should with its dominating influence in the Far East and she has a right to demand an outlet for the crowded population within the restricted borders". He continued that "Japan is looking for her easiest and most effective channel into which she may pour her superfluous population and trade", and he appealed to the four powers possessing the world - Great Britain, France, Russia and the United States - to reconsider the drastic territorial readjustment for the sake of international peace and mankind.

b) Mr. Hugh Byas wrote that the "Industrial revolution struck Japan much later than Europe and America but its results - increasing wealth, enormous energy, rising population - were the same". The situation then reveals in active operation some of the most powerful factors in the historical process which has made and is continuously making the world - necessity, power, and opportunity". (Hugh Byas "Japan's Destiny As She Sees It" the New York Times Magazine, August 26, 1934).

c) Mr. Yoshida, Japanese Ambassador to Great Britain (Foreign Minister at present) said to Mr. Hull on June 12, 1936 that the people of the United States should recognize the rapidly growing population of Japan and the absolute necessity for more territories for their existence. ("Peace and War" - page 29).

d) Mr. Hull expressed his conviction in his address on November 1, 1938 that without economic security and well being there could be no social or political stability in national life and that without economic, social and political stability within nations, there could be no peaceful and orderly relations among nations.

It is stated in "Peace and War" that Mr. Grew reported a comprehensive appraisal of the situation in Japan in his dispatch of December 27, 1934 in which he said that:

"A comprehensive appraisal of the situation in Japan was sent to the Secretary of State by Ambassador Grew in a dispatch of December 27, 1934. The Ambassador reported that things were being constantly said and written in Japan to the effect that Japan's destiny was to subjugate and rule the world. He said that the aim of certain elements in the Army and Navy, the patriotic societies, and the intense nationalists throughout the country was "to obtain trade control and eventually predominant political influence in China, the Philippines, the Straits Settlements, Siam and the Dutch East Indies, the Maritime Provinces and Vladivostok, one step at a time, as in Korea and Manchuria, pausing intermittently to consolidate and then continuing as soon as the intervening obstacles can be overcome by diplomacy or force."

The conditions in Japan were so complicated indeed at that time that it was sometimes very difficult to conjecture the real

intention of the military and naval circles or the right wing elements. Sometimes it might be rather easier for foreign observers to grasp the real state of affairs when the Japanese civil officials themselves who had been left out as a rule in the cold. However, I myself conceived at that time that those elements were mainly concentrating their energies upon consolidation of our footsteps in Manchuria. There were some elements which advocated the Southward Expansion policy but I thought they were not so strong and significant as the Northward Expansionists. However, insignificant as they were, we endeavored to suppress such movement.

It was our policy to encourage the healthy development of the new state of Manchukuo. It was a tremendous task to do so. Our both hands would be so full of work for it that no more energy would be left for any other task. Moreover, we did not like to pick up another difficulty with other powers. However, as regards Manchuria, we thought the United States and Great Britain would not fight with us on it. There might be conflict with the U.S.S.R. but she would not fight with us on it, particularly now that she had disposed of the Chinese Eastern Railway. On the contrary, the Southward Expansion would cause trouble with Great Britain and the United States. We were afraid such clash of interests as that might lead to war among those powers. We had to maintain peace in East Asia at any cost. Therefore, we thought that the Southward Expansion should be thwarted. Therefore we fought against the Southward movement. On the other hand, it would be good policy to restrain the military orientation to the already established direction and the narrowest sphere if its activities could not be checked. The military clique was, as it were, like a spoiled child; we had to give him always some toy to play with. The Manchurian Affair was found to be the best toy for them. This was what we thought at that time.

It did not mean domination of China nor did it reflect a policy of world supremacy, on the contrary, it aimed to check the dangerous movement to the South and other directions.

It is not to be overlooked in this connection that there were some pamphleteers published in the U.S.S.R. Urging an alliance of the two Soviet Unions of Russia and China (The Sinchin Government) and furiously raging over the advent of Manchukuo because it shattered a link for the projected alliance. There was another factor which we had taken into consideration in connection with my statement. We had really apprehension of our military men going too far into Chinese affairs to retreat. We thought we must have had our hands off China. We, foreign office officials, had been endeavoring tacitly and tediously to achieve that purpose. One of the reasons why we advocated the so-called "Hands-Off Policy" was to lead our military clique to retreat from its intervention in Chinese affairs. Our claim to foreign powers to "Hands-Off China" would, of course, reflect eventually to us in the same way.. "Our Hands-Off China". We have lately succeeded in crystalizing it

into a "New Policy to China" in recent years. At that time there was a strong movement for renouncement of the Nine Power Treaty but we were against it. (See later).

We thought that if the East Asian affairs were left to them, they would keep peace there. If the Chinese affairs were left to them, they would keep peace there. That was the fundamental idea underlying the statement which aimed above all at preserving peace in the Far East.

Our military power had been in ascendancy after the Manchurian Incident. The military clique began to influence more positively and sometimes dominate home politics and foreign policies. It was a very dangerous tendency. I sometimes talked intimately that my country would be ruined by the military men if this tendency went further. It was, however, always a delicate matter to us, foreign office officials, how to deal with the military circles. If we opposed them in the direct front, we must have parted with them. If we obeyed them blindly, we would have ruined our country. The best way for us was to lead them tactfully and wisely by working with them.

At the time when I was appointed Chief of the Information Bureau, the Army and Navy had established their own organization concerning information and propagation in their ministries respectively. There was the Investigation Bureau and, under, the Press Section, in the Department of War while there was the Propagation Bureau in the Department of Navy. The selected men were appointed to the posts. They had probably more money to spend than we, and their accounts were not to be submitted to audit of the Board of Audits. They had tremendous influence upon the various right wing bodies which were very active always about that time. They disseminated news freely. We very often entered into collision with them because they were suspected of having given out news on foreign affairs which was to be naturally within our jurisdiction.

The Army, as a rule, cried out the so-called Continental Policy while the Navy, advocating the so-called Oceanic Policy tried to get rid of the restriction of the Naval treaties. Both demanded increase of their budgets, emphasizing "The Crisis of 1936". One favored the northward expansion policy while the other, the southward expansion. My Bureau of Information had to steer between these two dangerous reefs of the army and navy. It was not an easy task. I had great struggles with them constantly. Only their frequent changes of the personnel at the high posts relieved me of unbearable pressure.

First of all, we (Our Bureau) had to propagate by the spirits enunciated by the Foreign Minister. We had to help the healthy development of Manchukuo. We had to clarify to the world our position and missions in East Asia, and if necessary the causes of the Manchurian affair.

On the other hand, I thought it was most important to dis-

seminate foreign news as much as possible in our press in order to educate our public. It was at this time and for this purpose that I established the press investigation room at our Bureau and planned to increase foreign news.

We grinned sometimes that we had to take more pains to deal with the military and naval bureaus than with foreign governments. But they planned at last to abolish the Information Bureau of the Foreign Office and transfer it to the Prime Minister's Office. I had fought against it but they succeeded in establishing an Information Committee under the Prime Minister in September 1937 after I left my post of Chief of the Information Bureau. Later it was developed into the Board of Information of the Cabinet directly under the Prime Minister when Mr. Matsuoka was Foreign Minister in 1940, and the Information Bureau of the Foreign Office was abolished.

AMAU's Views on Foreign Policy

Below is an explanation and translation of the Foreign Minister's Opinion on the Japanese-American Negotiation (13 October 1941) by AMAU, Eiji. The original document is in AMAU's possession.

The Foreign Office on the Japanese-American Negotiations, October 1941

In the course of the Japanese-American negotiation at the time of the Third KONOYE Cabinet, the Japanese Government received a note from the American Government at the beginning of October 1941 in reply to the note of the Japanese Government. A question then arose among the Cabinet members whether there would be any prospect of reaching an agreement with the United States. The Prime Minister held a meeting of some of his cabinet members who were directly concerned with the negotiation about the 13 of October at his residence (the so-called "Ogikubo Conference"). The Foreign Office insisted upon continuing the negotiation, observing that there was a prospect of coming to an agreement. The Foreign Minister also sent two notes to the Prime Minister, expressing his opinion on the negotiation and explaining the international relations and Japan's foreign policy at that time.

The Foreign Minister's Opinion on the Negotiation (13 October 1941) (Excerpt).

Taken into consideration the American attitude and the progress of the negotiation, there is no possibility of reaching an agreement, if Japan sticks to the proposals presented to the United States by her on September 6 and September 25 last.

I will do my best to achieve our object, without undergoing virtual alteration on the question of the stationing of Japanese troops in China and various policies concerning it, if the Government decides to continue the negotiation with a revised proposal and to take proper measures in internal and external affairs of Japan.

I believe that our fundamental policy, that is to say, the establishment of a New Order in East Asia should be attained only by peaceful means. Forces shall be used only for the necessity of self-defense.

1. There is no possibility to come to agreement upon our proposals already made. The United States' authorities seem to be suspicious and uneasy of our Government as to if our government is well controlled itself or if it has really an

intention to execute its policy by peaceful means. They attach therefore great importance to the question of the withdrawal and the stationing of our troops in China and French Indo-China and desire to have this point clarified most explicitly by the Japanese Government. I think the United States has no intention to come to agreement unless and until it is assured that Japan's policy is not in contradiction to the four principles (proposal by the United States) in these matters and Japan will take actual measures in order to enforce her policies, and it is confident that Japan will really keep her promise.

Therefore, there is no hope of agreement unless such suspicion on the side of the United States be cleared off, the question of the stationing of Japanese troops be clarified more explicitly and a revised and compromising proposal be made.

2. I have hope of coming to an agreement if the following plans are formed and the execution of them is firmly assured on the question of the withdrawal of the Japanese troops and various policies connected with it as well as the internal and external affairs in Japan.

- (a) The reinforcement of the Japanese troops in French Indo-China should be suspended.

All kinds of such action as may cause suspicion of Japan's territorial ambition in French Indo-China or of her intention of forceful advance to the adjoining districts of French Indo-China should be avoided.

- (b) As regards the question of the withdrawal and the stationing of Japanese troops in China, the United States thinks that (i) in the Japanese proposal, the question of the withdrawal of troops is confused with that of the stationing of troops and no definite limit of time of the withdrawal is mentioned, (ii) the insertion of the item of stationing of troops in peace conditions is in contradiction to the ideas of the withdrawal of troops and the peace agreement itself and also it is not in agreement with the four principles, (iii) the indefinite stationing of troops under whatever reasons can not be recognized, etc.

Therefore, our proposal shall be revised in the following way on these matters while the question of the stationing of

troops be stricken out of the peace conditions and the American understanding be procured by means of exchanging the confidential notes or of recording in the protocol.

All Japanese troops in China shall be withdrawn in accordance with the items of the Sino-Japanese Agreement which shall be concluded between these two countries.

The withdrawal shall commence soon after the peace is restored between these two countries and be completed within two years at the latest in accordance with the agreement.

A part of the troops shall be stationed in certain parts of North China and Inner Mongolia for five years after the peace is restored, in order to cooperate with Chinese troops for maintenance of order and for reconstruction of China, in accordance with the protocol which shall be concluded between Japan and China at the same time with the restoration of peace. The period of the stationing may be prolonged at the expiration of the time upon agreement of the two parties and consideration of the situation at that time.

(c) As regards the Japanese troops in French Indo-China, the United States seems to harbor suspicion of Japan having intention of using French Indo-China as her base to advance her forces to the neighboring districts or having territorial ambition in French Indo-China.

Therefore the following draft shall be proposed for agreement.

"Japan assures to respect the sovereignty of French Indo-China.

"The Japanese troops stationed in French Indo-China shall be withdrawn as soon as the conditions which necessitate the just defense cease to exist. The withdrawal shall be completed not later than the China Incident is solved."

Japan shall be ready to revise the items concerning the stationing of Japanese troops in French Indo-China in the Agreement between Japan and French Indo-China in agreement with the parties concerned as soon as an agreement is reached between the United States and Japan on these matters.

(d) The action and speeches of the Japanese people in Japan shall be led and controlled not to be in contradiction to the Governmental policies or not to give bad effects upon

the negotiation.

3. The National policy of Japan shall be executed only by peaceful means. The solution by forceful measures shall be avoided.

It is contrary to the fundamental foreign policy of Japan to use forceful means in order to execute our national policies. Moreover if we take into consideration, the internal conditions of Japan, the progress of the China Incident, and the prospect of the European war, it is absolutely impossible and unwise to attain our object by use of forceful measures. It should be our fundamental policy and our mission that we should do our best to adjust our relations with the United States first of all, solve the China Incident, then settle definitely the East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, and maintain the security on the Pacific districts. The forces should be used only for the purpose of self-defense.

Below is a translation of a document prepared by AMAU Eiji on Views on International Situation and Japan's Foreign Policy. The Original document is in AMAU's possession.

Views on International Situation
and Japan's Foreign Policy.

Attached to the Foreign Minister's views on the Japanese-American Negotiation presented to Prime Minister Prince KONOYE on 13 October 1941, prepared by the Foreign Office (By AMAU Eiji, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Third KONOYE Cabinet, from August to October 1941).

1. It is Japan's immutable policies to finish successfully the China Incident and establish a Great East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere and to carry out these policies on its own initiative and not to permit interference by other powers. However, it is absolutely impossible to carry these policies to a successful completion, if we disregard the complicated international situation. There are indeed inseparable relations between our policies and the European War and the international situation arising therefrom.

2. The present war had occurred at first between England and France on one side and Germany and Italy on the other, but it was extended to the Balkan States while the U.S.S.R. was involved. The United States did not declare war but she is helping England with her whole strength and exercising in reality her belligerent rights.

It was presupposed that the U.S.S.R. would join the Tripartite Alliance of Japan, Germany and Italy when it was concluded, but she entered the Anglo-American block. Thus the combination of England, the United States, the U.S.S.R. and the Chiang Regime was formed while the encirclement of England, the United States, the Netherlands and the Chiang Regime against Japan was more and more strengthened.

3. The burning point of the actual situation is principally the Russo-German War. If Germany fails, it will really give fatal blow upon the morale of her people as well as upon her occupied territories and, consequently, upon her war with England. If she succeeds to occupy Moscow before this winter, she will probably try to make a peace proposal to the U.S.S.R. and if it is not accepted by the U.S.S.R. she will perhaps try to have a decisive battle with England, while she will hold the eastern front by force, by proceeding towards the South Russia or the East Asia. However, judging the present conditions of England, she will certainly continue more and more strong resistance to Germany with the

American assistance and consequently the war will probably be prolonged. And the longer the war lasts the more unfavorable will it be to Germany and Italy. We may well be apprehensive of the prospect of the war.

4. The solution of the China Incident and the establishment of a Great East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere are relevant to each other. Now we have been engaged in war already for four years with China during which we have exhausted various means to finish the incident, but there is still not the slightest sign of the collapse of the Chiang Regime. It has often been reported of the internal unrest or shaking within the Chungking regime, but it will continue its resistance to Japan, relying upon the United States and England. We stand, therefore at a cross road, at present, of whether we will try to wipe out the Chungking regime solely depending upon our force or we will try to sever the American and British assistance to it by our diplomatic means. We are now meeting with more and more difficulty on account of the economic blockade and the pressure of the encirclement forced by the United States, the British Empire and the Netherlands, etc. We should consider carefully, therefore, whether it is advantageous or not to enforce our policies by the use of our military and naval powers.

If Japan puts in motion southwards, we shall meet in collision with the encirclement camp of the United States, the British Empire and the Netherlands with which the U.S.S.R. and the Chiang Regime may rise in cooperation therefore we must be singlehandedly engaged in a war on the four fronts. Germany and Italy may move to render assistance to us in accordance with the terms of the Tripartite Alliance, but it is impossible for them to help us in any way under the present circumstances. Even if it is assumed, though it is hardly thinkable, that the U.S.S.R. will collapse, it may be extremely difficult for the German and Italian armies to move as far as the Russian territories in the Far East while their navies are not powerful enough to give any assistance to us. Only it may be impossible for the German army to hold in check the Russian Far Eastern army by giving pressure at its rear in Europe, but much can not be expected for it. Therefore, we can not expect any assistance but the moral one from them.

On the contrary, the United States will render assistance to the U.S.S.R. and at the same time move toward Japan by using of Siberia as the bases, of its attack. In China, the Chiang Regime will strengthen its resistance to us while we must even have an eye to the attitude of the Wan Chin Wei

Government of Nanking.

If a war breaks out between Japan and the United States, the United States will concentrate her whole strength and power on the Pacific, lessening her assistance to England and on the Atlantic and consequently it may bring advantageous effects upon the German strategies operation to attack England. But it is hardly possible for Germany to invade England. On the contrary, we can not overlook a presumption that a chance of restoring a peace between England and Germany may be accelerated by Japan's participation in the War. At any rate the United States will not hasten to have a decisive battle with Japan but she will take a strategy to prolong the war by strengthening the encirclement camp against Japan.

If the war ceases in Europe or a compromise is made between England and Germany while we are still at war with the United States and other powers, Japan must stand at the most difficult situation, facing singly with so many enemy powers. If Japan moves northward, the enemies may move from the south. If we move southward, there may be agitation of the enemy in the north. We cannot but expect to meet with the worst and the most difficult situation, if we try to execute our national policies by force.

It is well known that the officers and men of our army and navy are of matchless loyalty and valour while our people are faithful and courageous and their ardent feeling of patriotism can well endure a prolonged war. However, having constant endeavors for the war for a number of years already, they require sometimes some rest and their national resources should be fostered. More so, if we anticipate the change of international situation in the near future which may require still more national exertion of our country. Now is the time that we should think carefully and sincerely of a far-sighted policy of our state.

5. We are now in danger of withering away our economic resources on account of the economic blockade instituted by the United States and Great Britain against Japan by which the routes for obtaining raw materials have been cut off. If we drag on ourselves procrastinatingly, it is feared that we may be obliged to die meaninglessly. Therefore, there have been voices raised that instead of sitting and expiring, we should fight and seek a way out from the road to death.

However, we must see that since there are few natural resources in the north, we can not obtain resources by advancing northwards. There are resources in the south but if we

try to seize them by force then the equipment for exploiting these resources will be destroyed before we capture them and it will take considerable time and effort for their recovery. Furthermore, when we take into consideration the exploitation and transportation of these resources, we find that there are many difficulties to use these materials.

On the other side, if we go into a long fight without replenishing our resources, our national resources will be so exhausted and our national will be so fatigued that when the European war is ended and peace comes, our country will not have the prestige and power to have a voice in the decision of international relations.

Just now our country is using up our stored supplies without imports of materials but we should not overlook a fact that other powers are also consuming more acceleratively their resources as they are all engaged either in war or in semi-war. What is most important for our country at this juncture is to conserve its national strength at any cost so that it may be able to wield its power most effectively at the time of emergency.

6. Under such circumstances as stated above, it is extremely dangerous for our country to take arms and use up our national strength and to stake our country's destiny upon the outcome of the European War. Our country should restrain itself for a while and should foster the real and powerful strength of our nation in the Far East. At this moment, Japan should seek the recognition of Manchukuo by China through the American-Japanese negotiations and thus strengthen Manchukuo's position and the China Incident should also be solved so that Japan's stand in China may be strengthened. In case she has still any surplus power, then she may extend it to French Indo-China so that a base will be laid for the carrying out of Japan's southern policy at a later date. This will be our wisest policy.

SECRET

NAME: AMAU, Eiji.

PRESENT STATUS: Confined in Sugamo Prison.

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION:

Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs in August 1941; President of the Board of Information under TOJO. An ardent nationalist; was for a long time Foreign Office spokesman and authored the famous Amau Statement warning other powers to keep hands off China, in April 1934. He was Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1941 and succeeded TANI as President of the Bureau of Information under Premier TOJO. He was head of Foreign Office Information Department (Johobu) for a number of years.

REMARKS:

SUBJECT was very active in political fields. While Chief of the Information Board he was the censoring agency of the Japanese Government, excepting that of the military. This Board operated directly under and was responsible to the Premier. His nationalistic doctrines were directed against other powers long before the start of the war. Foreign Minister HIROTA stated to Ambassador Grew that AMAU made the statement concerning China without approval, and that its contents tended to give the false impression that Japan was seeking special privileges and rights in China. SUBJECT's views and activities greatly contributed toward Japanese war efforts. SUBJECT is discussed in "Ten Years in Japan" by Ambassador Grew. No recommendations regarding final disposition of SUBJECT have been received from CIS/G-2, FEC.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that SUBJECT be retained in custody as a Class A war criminal suspect and be tried before an International Military Tribunal in Tokyo.