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flights of units not larger than one squadron together with the right to maintain necessary personnel, materiel and supplies. The United States will enjoy emergency traffic rights at Windsor Field in the event Oakes Field is non-operational.

b. When in the opinion of the United States a state of emergency exists which endangers the peace and security of the United States and/or the Western Hemisphere, the two governments will consult as to the use and control of the two airfields in order that increased rights may be determined and granted to the United States commensurate with the nature of the emergency.

g. In view of the fact that under normal conditions, Oakes Field will be used primarily for commercial purposes under British control, the United States will not be obligated to pay any portion of the cost of maintenance. In the event of an emergency as defined above the two governments will consult in order that an equitable distribution of costs at either or both fields may be determined."

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

(SIGNED)

W. G. LALOR,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Secretary.

Copy to:
CINCPAC, PAF, JCS, JCS
ADM. SEC. (100-100)

(FOR INFO - ADVISE IT (100-100))

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

~~TOP SECRET~~

SN-8899

8 September 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE: ✓

Subject: Over-all Examination of
U.S. Requirements for
Military Bases and Base
Rights.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff request that the Secretary of State be informed as follows:

"In view of national and international trends, the Joint Chiefs of Staff wish to supplement and revise the contents of their memorandum of 4 June 1946 (SWNCC 38/35) relative to military rights desired on the territory of foreign nations.

"The Joint Chiefs of Staff are aware of the difficulties attendant upon negotiations and the reluctance of foreign nations to grant 'rights' to any outside power, and accordingly have established the requirements for a minimum of such rights. However, there are certain areas, vital to the security of the United States, in which rights should be obtained as soon as possible so that our utilization of such rights can be effected with the least delay and within the legal framework of such rights. In such cases it may be expedient to conclude temporary arrangements for rights based upon occupation requirements, pending the obtaining of the required rights.

"In their previous memorandum (SWNCC 38/35) the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that the term 'base' was not intended to imply necessarily the permanent garrisoning of troops or stationing of aircraft or naval vessels during peacetime. Except for transit air bases and subject to the limitations of budgetary and personnel authorizations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff contemplate the peacetime garrisoning of all bases listed in the Enclosure.

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority

NND 740132

By

AKMS

JAN 27 1976

Date

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"The present strategic situation indicates the need of stationing U.S. armed forces in Iceland, Greenland, Labrador, the Azores, the Ryukyus, the Bonins and Volcanos, and Port Lyautey at the earliest practicable date and, accordingly, any interim arrangement that will make this possible will be acceptable, pending the ultimate obtaining of desired long-term rights.

"It should be noted that the Ryukyus and the Bonins-Volcano Islands are included in those locations for which suitable arrangements are desired. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have noted the acceptance by the Security Council of the United Nations and ratification by the U.S. Senate of the U.S. trusteeship of the former Japanese Mandated Islands, and consider that U.S. rights in these islands are adequately met. The status of certain former Japanese islands, namely the Ryukyus, the Bonins-Volcano Islands and Marcus, however, has not yet been settled. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have under further study the status of these islands, and will communicate their views to you separately regarding the desired status of these islands.

"The locations mentioned above and other locations at which rights are desired have been summarized in the Enclosure which the Joint Chiefs of Staff desire to be considered as their appraisal of military rights desired on the territory of foreign nations. In addition to locations at which rights are desired, there are certain areas of the world in which the United States, by reason of budgetary limitations on personnel and funds available to the armed forces, is not able to maintain bases, but which areas should be kept under surveillance with a view to denying or restricting military development by other powers. Such areas are also indicated in the Enclosure.

"As will be seen in the Enclosure, the locations at which rights are desired have been considerably reduced from previous estimates which in turn places additional emphasis on our previous statements that failure to obtain the stated requirements for any particular area will necessitate a re-evaluation of the importance of adjacent areas.

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"The Joint Chiefs of Staff request, therefore, that they be kept advised of the progress of negotiations for all base rights in order that they may promptly revise the rights desired at alternate sites should the need arise.

"In conclusion, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stress the importance to the security of the United States of obtaining the military rights set forth in the Enclosure. These military rights are required in peacetime, under currently estimated world conditions if the United States is to have that adequate military posture which is essential to United States security."

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

SIGNED
W. G. LALOR,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Secretary.

Enclosure.

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~~TOP SECRET~~E N C L O S U R E

<u>BASE</u>	<u>SOVEREIGNTY</u>	<u>RIGHTS DESIRED</u>	<u>USE</u>	<u>REF. SWNCC PAPER</u>
<u>1. Required</u>				
Iceland	-	Joint (par. 3)	Naval, Air, & Ground	38/41
Greenland	Denmark	Participating (par. 3) (With Canada)	Naval, Air, & Ground	38/41
Goose Bay, Labrador	Newfoundland (British)	Participating (with British Empire only)	Air & Ground	
Bonin-Volcano Islands	Japan	Will be communicated by separate Memorandum	Air & Ground	
Azores	Portugal	Participating (with U.K. only)	Naval, Air & Ground	38/40
Ryukyus Islands	Japan	Will be communicated by separate memorandum	Naval, Air, & Ground	
Panama Republic	-	Joint	Air & Ground	38/42 38/44
<u>2. Desired</u>				
Port Lyautey	French	Joint	Naval & Air	38/36
(or Canary Islands if rights at Port Lyautey are unobtainable)	(Spanish)	(Joint)	(Naval & Air)	38/43
Galapagos Islands	Ecuador	Participating (with other American nations only)	Naval & Air	38/41
Marcus	Japan	Will be communicated by separate memorandum	Air	
Ascension Island	British	Participating (with British Empire only)	Air	38/39
Talara	Peru	Participating (with other American nations only)	Air	38/41
Batista Field and St. Julian-LaFe	Cuba	Transit(par. 3)	Air	38/41
Surinam	Dutch	Transit	Air	38/37

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<u>BASE</u>	<u>SOVEREIGNTY</u>	<u>RIGHTS DESIRED</u>	<u>USE</u>	<u>REF. SWNCC PAPER</u>
Curacao-Aruba	Dutch	Transit	Naval & Air	38/37
Casablanca	French	Transit	Air	38/43
Dakar	French	Transit	Naval & Air	38/36
Monrovia	Liberia	Transit	Air	38/34
Cayenne, French Guiana	French	Transit	Air	38/36
Noumea New Caledonia	French	Transit	Naval & Air	38/36
Viti Levu Fiji Islands	British	Transit	Naval & Air	38/39
Algiers	French	Transit	Air	38/30
Tripoli	Italy	Transit	Air	38/30
Cairo, Egypt	Egypt	Transit	Air	38/30
Dhahran	Saudi Arabia	Transit	Air	38/30
Karachi	Pakistan	Transit	Air	38/30
Agra	India	Transit	Air	38/30
Kharagpur	India	Transit	Air	38/30
Rangoon, Burma	British	Transit	Air	38/30
Bangkok	Siam	Transit	Air	38/30
Saigon, French Indo-China	French	Transit	Air	38/36

3. a. Joint right is the right to use for military purposes, in common with the nation exercising sovereignty, mandate or trusteeship, an area, installation or facility, and to debar any other nation from such use unless it is mutually agreed between the United States and the nation exercising sovereignty, mandate or trusteeship, that another nation or nations may share use.

b. Participating right is the right to share, on the most favored nation principle, with the nation exercising sovereignty, mandate or trusteeship, and with any other nation which that nation may accord the right to participate, in the use for military purposes of an area, installation or facility.

c. Transit right is the right of military air transit and technical stop as defined in SWNCC 38/30.

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4. Strategic Areas. Specific areas in addition to such obvious ones as Northwestern Europe, United Kingdom and South American, for which surveillance is particularly necessary with the objective of denying or restricting therein the development of military potential either directly or indirectly by possible enemy powers. These areas include:
- a. Japan.
 - b. Islands of the Pacific Ocean generally south of the equator, north of Australia and New Zealand and east of the Malay Peninsula; including all of the Malay Archipelago.
 - c. Clipperton Island.
 - d. Northwest and North Africa, the southern shores of the Mediterranean, the near and Middle East, and including the following countries: Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Syria, Transjordan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Crete, Libya, Algeria, Morocco, Rio de Oro, French West Africa, Sierra Leone and Liberia.
5. The above list is predicated on the following assumptions:
- a. The U.S. strategic trusteeship of the former Japanese Mandated Islands continues effective.
 - b. Military base rights and air transit privileges in South and Central America and Mexico will be available as required from the implementation of the Act of Chapultepec (J.C.S. 570/51).
 - c. Bases and locations at which the U.S. already has long-term rights such as the Panama Canal Zone, Guantanamo, and the destroyer-lease bases remain unaffected.
 - d. The recently negotiated base rights in the Philippines remain unaffected.
 - e. Presently effective understandings between Canada and the United States recognize the mutual acceptance by the two nations of their responsibilities for collective security for

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the northern part of the Western Hemisphere. It is expected that all provisions for military security evolved by the Permanent Joint Board on Defense Canada-United States will provide for joint use of facilities in Canadian territory rather than exclusive U.S. bases.

f. An extension of the present Brazil-U.S. Base Agreement, or a satisfactory similar agreement, will be negotiated.

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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SM-9114
27 October 1947

*File
EOS*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY, STATE-ARMY-NAVY-AIR FORCE
COORDINATING COMMITTEE:

Subject: Establishment of Consular Offices
in British/U.S. Zone of Trieste
Free Territory during Military
Government Period.

References: a. NAF 1367.
b. SM-8926.

Enclosure: Memo by Representatives of the
British Chiefs of Staff.

The enclosed memorandum by the Representatives
of the British Chiefs of Staff is forwarded in connection
with NAF 1367 now under consideration by the State-Army-
Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee.

SIGNED

M. M. STEPHENS,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Executive Secretary.

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COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFFTRIESTE FREE TERRITORY - ESTABLISHMENT OF CONSULAR OFFICES
IN BRITISH/U.S. ZONE DURING MILITARY GOVERNMENT PERIODMemorandum by the Representatives of the
British Chiefs of Staff

1. On receipt of NAF 1367 (Enclosure "C") dated 9 September from the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean (SACMED), the British Chiefs of Staff sought the views of the Foreign Office. These views, with which the British Chiefs of Staff concur, are set out in the succeeding paragraphs.
2. One of our main concerns in Trieste is to make the city as viable as possible by encouraging trade through the port. The more trade there is, the less will be the political unrest, Communism and expense in the form of subsidy. For the establishment of the necessary shipping communications and trade connections, consular facilities are important and, should the present interim regime continue for long, the Foreign Office would not like to deny interested countries consular facilities.
3. The Foreign Office agree with paragraph 4 A of NAF 1367 and think that, until the Governor of Trieste has taken over authority, the formal appointment of full consuls in Trieste cannot be entertained for legal and administrative reasons. They suggest that any foreign consular officers should be styled "consular representatives" so as not to give the impression of prejudicing the rights of the Governor to appoint consuls de jure. The activities of these "representatives" would not extend beyond the Anglo-American zone of the Free Territory of Trieste, save by agreement between the Power concerned and the Yugoslave.

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Enclosure

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Ultimately it will not be possible to exclude the Soviet Union or her satellites from maintaining consulates in Trieste. During the interim period the Foreign Office consider that it would be fully justifiable to ask any Power which wanted to maintain a consular agency in Trieste to show that it had sufficient commercial or consular interests to maintain in the territory. This partially meets paragraph 4 B of NAF 1367. Paragraph 4 C of NAF 1367 is more serious but it is felt that the Yugoslavs and the Communists in Trieste have already sufficient facilities for espionage and that the establishment of consular agencies would not assist them to any degree.

4. The Foreign Office agree that the British and American "representatives" should retain their present nominal titles and should not style themselves "British and American Consuls General" until after the Governor assumes office. This need not prevent them from performing certain consular duties. Communication between the Yugoslav Government and the Anglo-American authorities could be carried out through the existing liaison machinery, which might also enable Yugoslav consular functions to be performed.

5. The Foreign Office favour a representative of the Italian Government being sent to Trieste as soon as possible, and suggest that this might take the form of a liaison mission whose official function would be to take up with our military authorities matters affecting Italy in the Free Territory of Trieste. A suitable member of this mission could be permitted to exercise consular functions.

6. The British Chiefs of Staff invite the United States Chiefs of Staff to consider the above views and, if acceptable,

- a. To agree to the despatch of a telegram to General Airey on the lines of the draft message in Enclosure "A", and
- b. To agree to the despatch of the memorandum in Enclosure "B" to the Department of State and the Foreign Office.

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ENCLOSURE "A"

D R A F T

MESSAGE TO GENERAL AIREY

Reference NAF 1367.

1. It is most important for the future economy of Trieste that trade should be developed through the port. For the establishment of the necessary shipping communications, consular facilities are important and we would not like to deny interested countries these facilities.

2. Regarding paragraph 4 A of NAF 1367, until the Governor of Trieste has taken over authority, the formal appointment of full consuls in Trieste cannot be entertained for legal and administrative reasons. Any foreign consular officers should be styled "consular representatives" so as not to give the impression of prejudicing the rights of the Governor to appoint consuls de jure. The activities of these representatives would not extend beyond the Anglo-American zone of the TFT save by agreement between the Power concerned and the Yugoslav authorities.

3. Reference paragraph 4 B of NAF 1367. In the long run it will be impossible to exclude the Soviet Union or her satellites from maintaining consuls in Trieste. During the interim period it is considered that it will be fully justifiable to ask any Power which wanted to maintain a consular agency in Trieste to show that it had sufficient commercial or consular interests to look after in the territory.

4. Paragraph 4 C of NAF 1367 is more serious but it is felt that the Yugoslavs and the Communists in Trieste have already sufficient facilities for espionage and that the establishment of consular agencies would not assist them to any degree.

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- 3 -

Enclosure "A"

TOP SECRET

5. It is agreed that the British and American representatives should retain their present nominal titles and should not style themselves British and American Consuls General until after the Governor has assumed office. This need not prevent them from performing certain consular duties. Communication between the Yugoslav Government and the Anglo-American authorities can be carried out through the existing liaison machinery, which might also enable Yugoslav consular functions to be performed.

6. The Foreign Office and State Department are being asked to arrange for the Italian Government to be represented in the form of a liaison mission whose official function would be to take up with our military authorities matters affecting Italy in the Free Territory of Trieste. A suitable member of this mission will be permitted to exercise consular functions.

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ENCLOSURE "B"

D R A F T

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND
THE BRITISH EMBASSY

Subject: Trieste Free Territory - Establishment of
Consular Offices in British-U.S. Zone
during Military Government Period.

1. On 9 September the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean sent a despatch (Enclosure "A")* to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the question of the establishment of consular offices in the British-United States Zone of the Free Territory of Trieste during the military government period and requested endorsement for the proposed policy contained therein.
2. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have sent a telegram (Enclosure "B")# on this subject to General Airey and they request that the United States and United Kingdom Governments consider approaching the Italian Government regarding the early despatch of a liaison mission to Trieste whose official function would be to take up with the Anglo-American military authorities matters affecting Italy in the Free Territory. A suitable member of this mission could be permitted to exercise consular functions.

* Enclosure "C"

Enclosure "A"

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SECRETENCLOSURE "C"

From: The Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean

To: Combined Chiefs of Staff

DTG: 093557B

NAF 1367

9 September 1947

Subject is establishment of Consular Offices in British/
U.S. Zone of FTT during Military Government period.

1. Question is likely to arise in near future of establishment of Consular Offices in British/U.S. Zone of FTT during Military Government period.

2. Hitherto Foreign Consuls have not been recognized in Zone A of Venezia Giulia. Embargo has been applied impartially to U.S. and U.K. as well as to other nations. Only exception has been Swiss Consul who is a de carriere officer of years standing, has acted on behalf of British and U.S. Governments during the war and who in view of his special position has been allowed to remain in Trieste.

3. Possible advantages of changing present policy and permitting establishment of Foreign Consulates are:

A. Desires of countries such as Italy and Yugoslavia, who are anxious to further their special economic and political interests in FTT would be met.

B. Existing Consuls in Italy and elsewhere; e.g. British Consul in Milan would be relieved of work they are now doing on behalf of their nationals in Zone A.

C. Establishment of British and U.S. Consulates in British/U.S. Zone would convey to world that our two governments had faith in future of FTT as a whole and thereby assist in revival of economic life of territory.

4. On the other hand General Airey feels following objections to such a measure:

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A. Such view of the fact that sovereignty over FTT rests with Security Council and not with the governments whose armed forces are continuing temporarily to administer the territory within their respective zones. It seems doubtful whether Zone Commander would be empowered, either to receive or appoint consuls.

B. Once established consuls would be difficult to eject, and the discretion of the Governor regarding this aspect of foreign relations of the territory would be fettered. Moreover, precedents set by establishment of Consulates in British/U.S. zone might lead to indiscriminate admission into Yugoslav Military Zone of large number of Consular Officials from countries of Slav Bloc, thereby further embarrassing Governor.

C. Through past experience has shown that Consular Offices of countries of Slav Bloc, which would have to be authorized if British or U.S. Consulates were set up, would almost certainly be used as centres for espionage, and anti-allied subversive activity. Such activities might well endanger the security of the Allied forces and the tranquillity of the zone as well as causing the Governor to be confronted with an even more difficult situation than would otherwise be the case.

5. General Airey feels that, apart from purely technical consular functions, the AMG organization will be sufficient secure British and U.S. interests. He moreover anticipates that some arrangement may be possible to permit Foreign Consuls stationed outside of FTT to pay short visits to Trieste to handle the affairs of their nationals.

6. He therefore considers that the objections to any relaxation after R day of the present embargo on Foreign Consular Representation in the British/U.S. Zones still substantially outweigh the possible advantages of such a measure and propose to make no change in the current practice.

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7. In view, however, of the wide implications of the problem, before making any pronouncement on the subject, the Zone commander designated would be grateful for your endorsement of his proposed policy.

End

CM-IN 1681

(11 Sep 47)

SECRET

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

SECRET

SE-7526
4 February 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CROSSROADS COMMITTEE:

Subject: Communication by Joint Crossroads Committee with Sir Geoffrey I. Taylor and Dr. William G. Penney (British subjects) on atomic questions.

References: a. JCS 1719/3.
b. JCS 1719/6.

Enclosure: Copy of memo from Atomic Energy Commission, 30 Jan 47, with indorsement.

The enclosure is forwarded for information and appropriate action. Attention is invited to the last sentence of paragraph 2 of the basic communication and to paragraph 2 of the indorsement.

FEB 4 1947

3539



SIGNED

W. G. LALOR,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Deputy Secretary.

U.S. WAR & NAVY COORDINATING

Copies to: COMMITTEE

Admiral Leahy
Admiral Nimitz
General Eisenhower
General Spaatz
Secretary, JCS
Secretary, SWNCC ✓

SECRET

S E C R E T

Subject: Recommendations Regarding Correspondence with Sir
Geoffrey I. Taylor and Dr. William G. Penney

MLC 231.2

1st. Ind.

War and Navy Departments, Military Liaison Committee, P. O. Box
1814, Washington, D. C. 31 January 1947.

TO: Joint Chiefs of Staff. Attention: Captain Lalor

1. The Military Liaison Committee affirms the understandings
in paragraph 2 of the basic communication.

2. Your attention is invited to the qualifications attached
to the Atomic Energy Commission's approval, that such approval
will not result in making available to Sir Geoffrey and Dr.
Penney any information relating to atomic energy which has not
already been made available to the British.

For the Committee:

/s/ C.C. NOBLE
Lt. Colonel, Corps of Engineers
Deputy Executive Secretary

S E C R E T

UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
Washington 25, D.C.

January 30, 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR Captain F. L. Ashworth, USN, Executive Secretary,
Military Liaison Committee.

SUBJECT: Recommendations regarding correspondence with Sir
Geoffrey I. Taylor and Dr. William G. Penney.

1. Reference is made to letter from the Military Liaison Committee forwarding to the Commission the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) letter of 17 January 1947, wherein SWNCC has recommended that the Chairman, Joint Crossroads Committee should (a) correspond with Sir Geoffrey I. Taylor and Dr. William G. Penney, both British subjects, on matters arising from Operation Crossroads; (b) forward to them reports, photographs and samples of material (not including fissionable material) concerning Operation Crossroads; and (c) receive from them comments, advice and the results of their calculations.

2. The Commission understands from the foregoing letter to SWNCC and from discussions with Captain F. L. Ashworth, USN, Executive Secretary, Military Liaison Committee, that Sir Geoffrey and Dr. Penney have collaborated as consultants to the Manhattan District; that Dr. Penney has participated actively in Operation Crossroads, worked closely with the Los Alamos Laboratory, and flew with the bomb mission to Nagasaki; and that both of them made important contributions during the planning and carrying out of Operation Crossroads. The Commission also understands that the Military Liaison Committee's approval of the recommendation is based upon its determination that great benefit to the United States will be derived from Sir Geoffrey's and Dr. Penney's personal contribution to the technical aspects of the Operation. The Commission further understands that approval of the recommendation will not result in making available to Sir Geoffrey and Dr. Penney, any information relating to atomic energy which has not already been made available to the British.

3. If the foregoing understanding of the situation is known by the Military Liaison Committee to be correct, then SWNCC may be notified that the Commission has approved the recommendation as described in paragraph 1, above.

/s/ CARROLL L. WILSON,
General Manager.

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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SM-5996
13 June 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE:

Subject: Invitation to Secretary-General,
United Nations, to Attend Operation
"CROSSROADS".

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have been informed by the enclosed memorandum that Mr. Trygve Lie desires an invitation to attend operation CROSSROADS. There is a place available for Mr. Lie in the event the State Department desires to invite him. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have no objection to the State Department's issuing such an invitation if it so desires.

It is requested that the State Department be informed of the contents of this memorandum. Any arrangements arising therefrom should be made directly between the State Department and the Commander, Joint Task Force One.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

(SIGNED)

A. J. McFARLAND,
Colonel, U.S. Army,
Secretary.

Enclosure.

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WAR DEPARTMENT
Washington, D. C.

1 June 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:


Subject: Invitation to Mr. Trygve Lie to Attend
Operation CROSSROADS.

1. It is recommended that an invitation to attend operation CROSSROADS be extended promptly to Mr. Trygve Lie, Secretary-General of the United Nations. The commander, Joint Task Force One, has told me that the invitation to Mr. Lie must be approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2. I have been informed by Mr. Baruch that Mr. Lie desires such an invitation, although he probably will not accept it, and further that issuance of such an invitation will be helpful to the negotiations which Mr. Baruch is about to enter upon in the Atomic Energy Commission.

/s/ L. R. GROVES,
Major General, USA

Return to
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O.P.D., G.S.

OPD 014.1 (9 Mar 46)

12 March 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC,
TOKYO, JAPAN.

SUBJECT: Official Channels of Communications Between the US Govern-
ment or its Agencies and SCAP or His Staff.

1. On 8 March 1946, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendation in JCS 1638 and the message in Appendix "A" there-
to was dispatched to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers
as WAR 99981.

2. The inclosure, subject as above, is forwarded for information.

H. A. CRAIG,
Major General, GSC
Acting Ass't Chief of Staff, OPD

JAMES R. LANEY
Lt Colonel, GSC
Ass't Executive Officer
Strategy and Policy Group

1 Incl
JCS 1638, Cy No. 7⁵ to 90, incl

Copies Furnished:

G-1, w/incl JCS 1638, Cy No. 91
BD, w/incl JCS 1638, Cy No. 92
✓ State Dept (Far Eastern Desk & Japanese-Korean Economic Affairs
Div), w/2 incls, JCS 1638, Cys No. 93 & 94.
G-2, w/o incls
G-4, w/o incls
CAD, w/o incls
CGAAF, w/o incls
CGASF, w/o incls

CONFIDENTIAL

57 Days
CONFIDENTIAL

COPY NO. 93J.C.S. 16383 March 1946Pages 1 - 7, incl.JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFFOFFICIAL CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT OR ITS AGENCIES AND SCAP OR HIS STAFFMemorandum by the Acting Chief of Staff, U.S. Army

1. Representatives of the State and War Departments have proposed procedures for governing the relations between the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), and his Political Adviser as well as all other governmental personnel, including missions or groups sent to SCAP's theater to examine special questions. These proposals outline the channels of communication between the United States Government or its agencies and SCAP or his staff. They are embodied in WAR 91800 (Appendix "B") to SCAP which requested his comments.
2. In CA 56823 (Appendix "C") SCAP advised that he concurred in the proposals contained in WAR 91800.
3. The Secretary of War and the Secretary of State have approved the proposals.
4. It is recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff agree to the dispatch of the message proposed in Appendix "A".

Inclosure /

JCS 1638

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX "A"

D R A F T

MESSAGE TO THE SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

Reference WAR 91800. Procedures contained in reference message approved.

CONFIDENTIALAPPENDIX "B"MESSAGE TO THE SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

From: The Chief of Staff.
Number: WAR 91800
To: CINCAFPAC Advanced Tokyo Japan

7 January 1946

1. Would appreciate your comments and suggestions regarding solution of inter-departmental problem of United States Government currently of concern.
2. Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff, War Department and United States Army are charged in the administration of occupied territory with administering applicable governmental or inter-governmental policy, the development and formulation of government policy in the framework of the United States Government rests primarily with the civilian agencies of the government, in particular the State Department. The view of the civilian departments of the government has been that in order to properly formulate policy with respect to the government of occupied countries they should be free to nominate representatives to act in an advisory capacity to the military authorities in occupied countries with the right to have free and direct communication for the transmission of information and instructions between such representatives and the department nominating them. This position has been held especially by the State Department in the over-all field of foreign policy and the Treasury Department with respect to financial problems.
3. The problem is illustrated by the view which has been held in the State Department that a State Department representative designated as your political adviser should have his own staff and should act not only as your political adviser but as a representative of the State Department with right of direct

DC/R
#27 Tokyo
JCS
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communication to the State Department with respect to problems arising within your responsibility as SCAP. Treasury Department desire a similar arrangement with Treasury representatives who may be provided to you as advisers or otherwise attached to your staff. Position of these departments is based on their view that within the responsibility of the United States Government for the administration of occupied territory, the Secretaries of State and Treasury have definite responsibilities for policy consideration and determination which can be discharged only if they have the right of communication with and to some extent control over their personnel who may be serving in occupied countries. This view of the civilian departments is also reflected in the many requests which are received for the dispatch of specialized missions to investigate and report to the appropriate civilian departments on special matters of concern in the government of occupied areas, such as textile production and the Zaibatsu problem.

4. Efforts to recruit personnel for your staff have been seriously hampered by this position of civilian agencies of the government. By far the most productive field for recruitment of working staff is in the departments of the government most concerned with the particular problem to be considered. This is true not only because of the specialized type of personnel available from these sources but also because the fact of the termination of the war inevitably makes general civilian recruitment for service overseas increasingly difficult.

5. It is recognized that the primary responsibility within the United States Government for the formulation of government policy with respect to the administration of occupied areas must rest with the civilian departments of the government. It is also recognized that the desire of the civilian departments of the government to obtain advice and information upon which policy must be formulated from their own experts in the various fields under investigation is a natural one.

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6. Problem has been the subject of several discussions between the Secretaries of the State, War and Navy Departments without final solution. In the present situation recruitment of personnel for your staff is delayed and with respect to certain types of personnel prevented completely. Moreover, with particular reference to your political adviser, it appears here that you are not receiving the maximum of benefit from his presence in Japan, and State Department is dissatisfied with its inability to receive what to it seems appropriate information and reporting from him.

7. Following solution of the problem with respect to which your comments are desired was suggested in conference between War Department representatives and the Acting Secretary of State:

a. Your political adviser will be assigned, with such assistance as he may have, to your staff, and, as a member of your staff, will be subject to your authority and control. All other government personnel, including missions or groups to examine special questions, will also be assigned to your staff and will be subject to your authority and control.

b. There will be no official channels of communication between the United States Government or its agencies and SCAP or his staff except between SCAP in the theater and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or, where appropriate, the War Department, as the Executive Agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in Washington. All recognized that the position, views or recommendations of SCAP on any question will be for your decision and advice to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or, where appropriate, the War Department as Executive Agency for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

c. The normal flow of inquiries regarding information as to operation of government or other factual information will be between SCAP and the War Department.

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d. In the event the policy-making civilian agencies of the government desire the particular views or recommendations of their personnel who are assigned to your staff because of such personnel's technical experience or particular relationship with the department involved, on a special subject, request for such views or recommendations will be transmitted to you by the War Department as Executive Agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the replies of the representatives of the civilian agencies of the government should be transmitted through you to the War Department with such comment or recommendation as you may deem appropriate. It is also proposed that representatives of policy-making civilian agencies who are assigned to your staff will be permitted to send reports and information to their departments in Washington by transmission through your headquarters and the War Department.

8. It is recognized that the foregoing suggested arrangement has the objectional feature of increasing the burden on your staff to transmit or answer inquiries. However, it represents substantial concessions by the civilian agencies of the government, particularly the State Department, with respect to their obligations and responsibilities regarding which they hold very strong views. The State Department is pressing very strongly for issue of instructions on the matter, consequently your comments are requested as soon as you can conveniently send them.

CM-OUT-91800

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CONFIDENTIALJ.C.S. 15663 November 1945Pages 1 - 17, incl.

COPY NO. _____

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFFPOLICY ON JAPANESE IMPORTS - EXPORTS

Reference: J.C.S. 1380/15

Report by the Joint Civil Affairs CommitteeTHE PROBLEM

1. To consider and make recommendations on two cables from the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) (Enclosures "F" and "G") regarding United States policy for handling Japanese imports - exports during the initial period of the occupation of Japan.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. In ZA 5510 (Enclosure "F") SCAP requests instructions as to:

a. Rules and procedures by which imports will be handled after recommendation as to quantity and commodity have been made to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers;

b. Rules and procedures for handling exports when exporting is approved;

c. Whether payment is preferred in gold or commodities and if in commodities, the preferences desired.

3. In CA 52579 (Enclosure "G") SCAP lists quantities of raw materials which have been frozen to provide funds from exports. He states that it is his plan to force the Japanese to pay for imports, although the extent of the ability of the Japanese to pay has not yet been determined.



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4. SCAP later advised (Enclosure "C") that the Japanese Government has requested certain imports for the last quarter of 1945 and that Japanese import requirements for the first quarter 1946 will be at least equal and probably greater. SCAP further states his view that the draft economic directive for the occupation of Japan transmitted to him in WARX 68524 (Appendix "B" of J.C.S. 1380/8) for information and comment provides for importation only where payment can be made by exports. He requests the designation of the U.S. Commercial Company or some other agency for service in connection with the sale of Japanese exports and the procurement of supplies for importation to Japan.

5. SCAP also advised (Enclosure "D") that coal is being shipped from Japan to Korea and that other shipments to areas occupied by United States forces are anticipated and requests advice as to whether such shipments should be considered as commercial exports to provide a credit in foreign exchange or commodities for import into Japan.

6. In the civilian supply and relief portion of the draft economic directive (J.C.S. 1380/15) for Japan it is provided in paragraph 29 b that SCAP will be responsible for providing imported supplies to the extent such supplies are needed "to prevent such widespread disease or civil unrest as would endanger the occupying forces or interfere with military operations" and in paragraph 29 d that if he deems he should assume responsibility for additional imports "to accomplish the objectives of your occupation," he will submit recommendations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In paragraph 29 c of the directive SCAP is directed to obtain imported supplies required by him to the extent possible from surpluses in other Asiatic and Pacific Ocean areas. This directive has been approved by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee and the Joint Chiefs of Staff without amendment of the above portions of the directive as transmitted to SCAP in WARX 68524.

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7. The State Department (Mr. Martin, Economic Adviser on Japanese Affairs) has advised the policy contained in this report and concurs in the recommendation contained in paragraph 9.

DISCUSSION

8. See Enclosure "B".

RECOMMENDATION

9. That the message in Enclosure "A" be dispatched to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

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ENCLOSURE "A"

D R A F T

MESSAGE TO THE SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

Japanese imports - exports is subject. Refer urad ZA 5510; CA 52579; CA 52910; and DTG 180952Z (Enclosures "F", "G", "C" and "D").

1. The problems of Japanese imports - exports raised in urads ZA 5510 and CA 52579 have been considered with the State Department which advises the following policy to be followed with respect to Japanese import - export trade.

Part I. Import - Export Machinery

2. All imports to and exports from Japan will take place initially under your direct control and administration. For the present it is desired that Japanese import and export trade transactions involve no direct contacts between the Japanese Government or Japanese individuals and other governments, or individuals. You, rather than the Japanese Government, will determine quantities and commodities available for export from Japan.

3. Your comments requested on present view here' that in assuming direct control and administration of Japanese imports and exports, you will, among other things:

a. Consider Japanese export proposals and receive upon your demand from appropriate Japanese authorities goods for export at points of shipment which you designate.

b. Consider and recommend import requirements to the War Department as executive for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

c. Arrange for distribution of imports by delivery at ports of entry to Japanese authorities or by such other

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means as may be determined by you and hold any payments received by you from all your sales of such imports in accordance with paragraph 1 D of WARX 72604 (Enclosure "E").

Japanese Government would be responsible, subject to your supervision, for (a) internal operations necessary to inspection, purchase, collection and storage of goods for export and the delivery of these goods to designated ports, (b) custody, sale and distribution of imported goods within Japan, except in cases where you determine other means of distribution are necessary, (c) provision of all funds and conduct of internal financing arrangements necessary to these operations.

4. Negotiations with the State Department and other civilian agencies of the government have resulted in agreement that U.S. Commercial Company is proper agency to be used by you to (a) arrange in accord with government instructions for exports to those recipients who agree to provide necessary imports in exchange or agree to pay for such exports in foreign exchange useable for procuring necessary imports; (b) arrange in accord with government instructions to make proceeds of Japanese exports available for reimbursement to the United States Government for initial financing of supplies under paragraph 6 a and 6 b below; (c) arrange in accord with government instructions to procure approved imports under paragraph 6 c below and to make proceeds of Japanese exports available to pay for such imports. Details are now being worked out to this end. If U.S. Commercial Company is made available for these purposes, as appears likely, we are advised it can begin functioning immediately. You will be kept advised of developments.

Part II. Types of Imports and Methods of Procurement and Financing

5. Your statement in CA 52910 that directive in WARX 68524 provides for importation only where payment can be made by

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exports is incorrect to the extent that it limits imports to those which can be initially financed by Japanese. It is United States policy that Japanese Government will ultimately pay for all imports. It is also United States policy that the United States Government will use foreign exchange available from proceeds of Japanese exports to make ultimate payment for imports which are required by you or for which you recommend you should assume responsibility, as set out below in paragraphs 6 a and 6 b. However, if the United States Government finds that initially no Japanese foreign exchange or other assets exist with which Japanese can pay for approved imports which are required by you or for which you recommend you should assume responsibility, as set out below in paragraphs 6 a and 6 b, War Department will undertake procurement and initial financing of such imports.

6. Civilian supply and relief portion of draft directive forwarded you in WARX 68524 contemplates three types of imports into Japan from standpoint of procurement and financing action thereon as follows:

a. Supplies under paragraph 29 b required by you to discharge your responsibility "to prevent such widespread disease or civil unrest as would endanger the occupying forces or interfere with military operations." Requirements for such supplies will be submitted by you to War Department for consideration and approval and to the extent approved, War Department would assume responsibility for procurement and initial financing in absence of Japanese ability to pay therefor and shipment would be made against your requisition.

b. Supplies under paragraph 29 d required by you in addition to those under a above for which you deem that

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you should assume responsibility in order "to accomplish the objectives of your occupation." Requirements for these additional supplies will be submitted with your recommendations to War Department as executive for the Joint Chiefs of Staff for consideration in coordination with other governmental agencies and to the extent they are approved and responsibility therefor assumed by United States as a matter of governmental policy, War Department would assume responsibility for procurement and initial financing in absence of Japanese ability to pay therefor and supplies would be shipped against your requisition, insofar as funds may be available.

c. Supplies which you do not consider are required to be imported by you under a or b above, but which the Japanese desire to import to meet needs of Japanese economy. It would be the responsibility of the Japanese Government to pay for such imports and no procurement or initial financing of such supplies would be undertaken by War Department. Requirements must be submitted here for approval with your recommendations prior to use of proceeds of exports to pay for such imports. No such imports will be permitted until such time as it is possible to appraise more accurately than can be done at present Japan's foreign trade position and amount of proceeds of exports required to pay for imports under a and b above.

7. Decision as to availability of proceeds of exports and the use thereof to pay for any imports into Japan will for the present be made here after considering your recommendations. Subject to paragraph 8 below, until position regarding amount of proceeds of exports is clarified, War Department will procure and initially finance approved requirements within paragraphs 6 a and b above, subject to availability of funds as set forth in 6 b above.

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8. Procurement by War Department of supplies required under paragraphs 6 a and 6 b is subject to your implementation of paragraph 29 c of directive in WARX 68524. All imports, procurement of which is to be effected under paragraph 29 c, must be approved by the War Department prior to procurement. However, you are authorized to proceed to investigate available sources of supply in other Asiatic and Pacific Ocean areas and to consider the means of payment necessary to obtain any available surpluses. If surpluses available, you should, if possible, report the sources at the time of submitting the requirements together with proposed method of payment for such surpluses.

9. Until contrary advice received from you, it is assumed that the items and quantities listed in urad 52910 as desired imports of the Japanese Government do not fall under category 6 a or 6 b and are not considered as being required to be imported by you.

10. The United States Government will authorize payment for imports not procured with United States funds only by exports approved in accordance with paragraph 11 below or the proceeds thereof.

Part III. Exports

11. Before any binding arrangements are made by you for export of supplies from Japan, a statement of the quantities and commodities available for export which such detailed specifications as are possible should be submitted here for consideration and approval. Such statement should include any barter or trade arrangements which you are in a position and desire to recommend with respect to such exports. Consideration and approval of exports here is necessary as an interim measure to deal with problems arising out of disposition of world surplus goods and allocation of goods in short world supply,

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pending establishment through intergovernmental negotiations of other machinery. Quantities and commodities listed in Part II urad CA 52579 being considered here as statement of available supplies for export and you will be advised.

12. Decision concerning commodities required by United States from Japan will be made on ad hoc basis in light of:

- a. Your advice concerning availabilities from current production or stocks on hand, and
- b. Spot decisions by appropriate civilian agencies concerning domestic needs.

13. Refer urad DTG 180952Z. Shipments of commodities from Japan to other occupied areas are to be considered as commercial exports from Japan and such exports will be used to provide a credit in acceptable foreign exchange or commodities for import into Japan. Under what arrangement is coal being exported to Korea? Advise fully concerning details.

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ENCLOSURE "B"

DISCUSSION

1. Initially, it is necessary that all imports to and exports from Japan be under the direct control and administration of SCAP in order to avoid any direct contact between the Japanese Government or individuals and other governments or individuals in Japanese import and export trade transactions. The Japanese Government should be made responsible, subject to the supervision of SCAP, for all internal operations within Japan with respect to imports and exports and the financing necessary to such operations.

2. The U.S. Commercial Company is the proper agency to be used by SCAP to arrange for exports and to make the proceeds of exports available to pay for imports in accord with government instructions. The U.S. Commercial Company should also be used to procure approved imports, the procurement of which is not undertaken by the War Department.

3. The Japanese Government will ultimately be made to pay for all imports. The War Department will procure and initially finance approved imports required by SCAP under paragraphs 29 b and 29 d of the economic directive for the occupation of Japan transmitted to SCAP in WARX 68524, if United States Government finds that no Japanese foreign exchange or other assets exist with which Japanese can initially pay for such imports, insofar as funds may be available. In such event, reimbursement to the United States Government for such initial financing of imports will ultimately be made out of foreign exchange available from proceeds of Japanese exports. Payment for Japanese imports not procured and initially financed by War Department with its appropriated funds will be authorized only by approved exports or the proceeds thereof. For the present, until Japan's

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foreign trade position is more clarified, decision as to the use of proceeds of exports to pay for imports will be made on a governmental level and imports not required by SCAP, for which Japanese must pay initially by approved exports or the proceeds thereof, will not be permitted.

4. For the present it is necessary that all exports from Japan be approved on a governmental level, pending establishment of other machinery through intergovernmental negotiations. Negotiations with other governments with respect to exports from Japan will be handled within the United States Government by the State Department. Action in this matter is already being taken with respect to supplies available for export from Japan listed by SCAP in his cable CA 52579. United States domestic requirements will be taken into consideration by the State Department in coordination with other interested civilian agencies in reaching decision as to the disposition of available supplies for export.

5. The Japanese import requirements listed in CA 52910 were not stated as being required by SCAP but as being desired by Japanese Government. Until contrary advice is received it is proper to assume that these requirements are not considered by the SCAP as required to be imported by him.

6. In keeping with State Department policy to treat other occupied areas as separate sovereign states not dependent politically or economically upon Japan, exports from Japan to such areas should be treated as commercial exports and be used to provide a credit in acceptable foreign exchange or commodities for imports into Japan.

RESTRICTEDENCLOSURE "C"

From: Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers

To: Joint Chiefs of Staff

Nr: CA 52910

7 October 1945

Reourad ZA 5510 and CA 52579, the Japanese Government has submitted request for importation 100,000 tons salt, 100,000 tons rice, 100,000 tons wheat or small grain, 120,000 kiloliters petroleum for last quarter, 1945. Based on previous imports of basic commodities and present shortages such imports considered urgently necessary for minimum essential needs. Requirements first quarter 1946 will be at least equal to above probably greater. Your directive WX 68524, 25 September 1945, provides for importation only where payment can be made by exports. Pending your decision on export import policy and financial procedures queries have been forwarded to U.S. forces this theater regarding available surpluses those areas. To pay for imports total of 46,000 bales silk available for export plus other export commodities now being inventoried. Commercial details on commodities available for export will follow. Urgently request designation of U.S. Commercial Company or other agency for service re: Sale of Japanese exports in areas needing them and procurement of supplies for importation to Japan. Reply soonest requested.

End

CM-IN-3495

(7 Oct 45)

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ENCLOSURE "D"

From: Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers
To: War Department
Information:
Headquarters China Theater
DTG: 180952Z

18 October 1945

Shipments from Japan to other occupied areas is subject.

Shipments now being made coal to Korea; other shipments expected from Japan to areas occupied by U.S. forces.

Will such shipments of commodities from Japan for essential needs of civilian economies in other occupied areas be considered as commercial exports from Japan?

Will such exports provide a credit in foreign exchange or commodities for import into Japan?

CM-IN-8740 (18 Oct 45)

SECRETENCLOSURE "E"

2 October 1945

Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers

INFORMATION:

Commander in Chief, U.S. Army Forces Pacific

Number WARX 72604

Signed WARCOS

Instructions below relative accounting civilian supplies will apply for Japan and Korea reference paragraph 12 WARX 55338 August and WARX 60420 September respectively.

1. You will maintain following records relative supplies for civilian use coming under your control and will render summarized monthly reports with respect thereto:

A. Quantitative record, by commodity, of all supplies furnished to you by United States Government for civilian use indicating separately supplies

1. Furnished directly by United States Government
2. Diverted from military stocks.

B. Record of quantity, source and cost, by amount and monetary unit of value, of supplies for civilian use from sources other than those specified subparagraphs A-1 and 2 above.

C. A quantitative record by commodity of all supplies issued by you for civilian use. These records will include supplies issued as direct relief. Appropriate receipts concerning each issue supplies will be obtained from such indigenous distributing organizations as may be approved by you in absence such organizations appropriate certifications will be required of representative of United States forces.

D. Money value records of proceeds of sales in terms local currency of civilian supplies either made directly by you to consumers or to supply agencies or to other consignees.

S E C R E T

Local currency proceeds of all your sales civilian supplies will be held by you in suspense account pending determination further disposition thereof.

E. A record of quantity and cost of exports by commodity and country.

2. For your information you will be furnished with price lists in terms United States dollars showing landed cost each commodity included in supplies referred to subparagraph 1 A-1 above; also War Department will apply appropriate costs in terms United States dollars to quantitative records contained your summarized monthly reports mentioned subparagraphs 1 A-2 and 1 B above and will maintain such priced records in War Department for use connection with settlement and for other required purposes.

End

CM-OUT-72604 (Oct 45)

RESTRICTED

ENCLOSURE "F"

From: Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers
To: Joint Chiefs of Staff
Nr: ZA 5510 16 September 1945

Japanese imports exports is subject.

Part 1. Raw material stocks in Japan for essential minimum civilian requirements extremely small and will shortly be exhausted. You will be furnished quantities later, but it is clear Japan must promptly import cotton, wool, petroleum, and similar essentials.

Part 2. Limited exports from Japan possible. Probably as much as 40 thousand bales of silk of uncertain but probably poor grade is available. Stocks of bituminous coal and production of coal are in excess of Japanese ability to transport. Green tea will be available. Bank Japan has gold equivalent 125 million dollars. Other but limited export possibilities may develop.

Part 3. Every endeavor will be made to have imports exports carried in Japanese shipping. If coal is desired for export, shipping will have to be provided outside of Japanese resources.

Part 4. Instructions are requested as to:

(A) Rules and procedures by which imports will be handled after recommendation as to quantity and commodity have been made to Joint Chiefs of Staff by SCAP.

(B) Rules and procedures for handling exports when exporting is approved.

(C) Decision as to whether payment is preferred in gold or commodities. If in commodities, request preferences stated.

End

CM-IN-13565

(17 Sept 45)

RESTRICTED

ENCLOSURE "G"

From: Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers

To: Joint Chiefs of Staff

Nr: CA 52579

1 October 1945

Part I. Reourad ZA 5510 early reply requested. Petroleum products must be imported immediately. Raw cotton stocks will be exhausted December. Agriculture Ministry predicts heavy deficit in essential food products for year 1946. Japanese state must import million tons salt and fertilizer.

Part II. 10,000 tons rubber, 10,000 tons leather, 40,000 bales silk, all silk piece goods have been frozen to provide funds from exports. Japanese have been directed to furnish 75,000 tons coal monthly for Korea beginning October and additional coal can be exported. Plan here is to force Japanese pay for essential imports. Extent of ability to pay not yet determined. Request instructions for interim financing pending such information.

Part III. Fullest information required for our guidance in directing local activities associated with import export problems.

End

CM-IN-605

(2 Oct 45)

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
SECRETARY'S COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 2-E-230

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J.C.S. 963

21 July 1944

Pages 1-9, incl.

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JLC 141 Series

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

JAPANESE PROTEST ALLEGING ATTACKS ON HOSPITAL
INSTALLATIONS AT RABAU

Note by the Secretaries

1. A letter from the Department of State dated 26 June 1944 (Enclosure "B") was referred to the Joint Logistics Committee for comment, recommendation and draft of reply.
2. The report of the Joint Logistics Committee (Enclosure "A") is submitted for consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

A. J. McFARLAND,
E. D. GRAVES, JR.,
Joint Secretariat.

Concur in downgrading from Confidential to Unclassified.

Edward E. Hunt, Chief
Division of Protective Services

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ENCLOSURE "A"

JAPANESE PROTEST ALLEGING ATTACKS ON
HOSPITAL INSTALLATIONS AT RABAU

Report by the Joint Logistics Committee

THE PROBLEM

1. To consider a letter of the Secretary of State, dated 26 June 1944, forwarding a protest from the Japanese Government alleging attacks by United States aircraft against hospital installations at Rabaul and to submit recommendations, including the draft of a reply to the Secretary of State.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. By letter, dated 26 June 1944 (Enclosure "B", page 7), the Secretary of State forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff a memorandum from the Spanish Embassy, dated 16 June 1944 (Appendix to Enclosure "B", page 8), transmitting the text of a protest from the Japanese Government alleging that on 23 May and 24 May 1944 United States fighter and bomber aircraft attacked and seriously damaged a hospital and its annexes at Rabaul. The protest alleges that the hospital buildings were distinctly marked with large red crosses, weather was fair, visibility good, and attacks were made in daylight from low altitude. The protest does not state the location of the hospital buildings.

3. The Secretary of State requests the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding the nature of the definitive reply to be made to this protest.

4. Since information available in the War and Navy Departments was insufficient to form a basis for a reply, inquiries regarding the alleged attacks were addressed to Commander in Chief, Southwest

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Pacific Area and to Commander, South Pacific Force (COMSOPAC). The former replied that the aircraft operating in the Rabaul area on the dates in question were under the operational control of Commander Air Solomons (COMAIRSOLS). A paraphrase of the reply received from Commander South Pacific Force is attached hereto as Appendix "A" (page 3).

5. A summary of routine mission and operation reports, available in the War and Navy Departments, of aircraft attacks against the Rabaul area on the dates in question is attached hereto as Appendix "B" (page 4).

6. The reply from COMAIRSOLS, the routine mission and operation reports from the theaters, and an examination of photographs of Rabaul town and its environs disclose that hospital buildings were located in close proximity to several anti-aircraft gun positions which were the objects of attack on 23 May and 24 May 1944.

7. Informal advice from the State Department indicates that the protest now under consideration was addressed to the U.S. Government alone; consequently, consultation with the British Government is not required under the provisions of C.C.S. 228/7.

CONCLUSIONS

8. In the absence of specific identification of the hospitals alleged by the Japanese to have been attacked, it must be presumed that they were those located among anti-aircraft gun positions on the ridge to the northeast of the town of Rabaul.

9. The United States Government should reject in its entirety the protest of the Japanese Government in view of the fact that the hospitals allegedly damaged or destroyed were located at Japanese risk and peril in close proximity to legitimate military targets.

RECOMMENDATIONS

10. It is recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff approve and forward to the Secretary of State the letter attached hereto as Appendix "C" (page 5).

CONFIDENTIALAPPENDIX "A" TO ENCLOSURE "A"PARAPHRASE OF DISPATCH OF 10 JULY 1944
COMSOPAC TO COMINCH

In reply to your inquiry regarding attacks against Japanese installations at Rabaul on 23rd and 24th May, the records of ComAirSols show that fighter, dive bomber, and horizontal bomber attacks were made on concentrations of heavy, automatic, and machine gun anti-aircraft (A/A) weapons located on the high ridge 600 yards northeast of the town of Rabaul. Our planes, on attacking airdrome installations, shipping and supply concentrations in the area have been subjected to intense fire from these A/A guns which has caused serious damage to our planes, nine of which were hit during the attacks of 23rd and 24th May. These guns form an important element in the A/A defense system of Lakunai airdrome--Simpson Harbor--Rabaul. On the same ridge and in the area of the A/A guns are many buildings, about ten of which are marked with red crosses. One of the buildings so marked is located 650 yards from an A/A position containing two heavy guns and another is located 300 yards from three heavy A/A gun positions. After dropping 145 tons of bombs in two days, photographs show five large and several small buildings were destroyed or damaged. So long as the enemy elects to locate his hospital areas adjacent to A/A gun positions, some damage will inevitably be done to the hospitals although any such damage would be positively unintentional. Further attacks on these guns are necessary and are contemplated.

Concur in downgrading from CONFIDENTIAL
to UNCLASSIFIED.

Edward E. Hunt
Chief, Division of Protective Services

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APPENDIX "B" TO ENCLOSURE "A"

SUMMARY OF REPORTS OF AIRCRAFT ATTACKS
ON 23 MAY AND 24 MAY 1944 AGAINST TARGETS
IN RABAU AREA, AS AVAILABLE IN WAR AND
AND NAVY DEPARTMENTS

1. Mission reports available in War Department.

a. On 23 May, 24 P-39's of 13th Air Force attacked 3 heavy A/A gun positions north of the hospital on Hospital Ridge. The general target area was covered with bombs. Cloud coverage prevented accurate spotting of all hits. Later the same day, 10 P-39's ran a mission against the gun positions on the same ridge.

b. On 24 May 8 P-38's of the 13th Air Force attacked heavy A/A gun positions on Hospital Ridge, dropping 15 bombs in target area. Six straddled the top of the ridge near the gun positions, 4 hit just east of the ridge, and 5 were unobserved because of clouds but were in the same general area. In addition to A/A fire from guns on the ridge, fire was observed from other guns sited about 500 yards from the hospital.

2. Operation reports available in Navy Department.

a. On 23 May, 24 Army Mitchells bombed Matupi reporting much smoke and many fires, one visible for 45 miles. On the same day 20 Corsairs fired and damaged trucks, while 24 P-39's, 32 B-25's and 10 P-38's bombed Rabaul gun positions, with clouds obscuring the results.

b. On 24 May 25 B-25's, 23 Dauntless, 18 Avengers and 19 fighters bombed A/A gun positions on Rabaul, causing explosions and scoring direct hits; 24 Corsairs strafed 10 trucks.

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to UNCLASSIFIED.

Edward E. Hunt, Chief, Division of Protective
Services

JCS 963

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APPENDIX "C" TO ENCLOSURE "A"

D R A F T

REPLY TO SECRETARY OF STATE

Reference is made to your letter of 26 June 1944 (SWP 740.00117 Pacific War/119) enclosing, for the attention of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a copy of a memorandum dated 16 June 1944 from the Spanish Embassy transmitting the text of a protest of the Japanese Government alleging attacks by United States aircraft on certain hospital installations at Rabaul on 23 May and 24 May 1944. It is noted that you request the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding the nature of the definitive reply to be made to this protest.

Upon receipt of your letter, inquiries were addressed to the Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific Area and to Commander South Pacific Forces for more complete information regarding the attacks alleged by the Japanese Government.

The replies from the theaters, as well as the operational reports already available in the War and Navy Departments, indicate that attacks by fighter and bomber aircraft were made on the dates in question against a ridge about 600 yards northeast of the town of Rabaul. On this ridge the Japanese installed concentrations of heavy, automatic, and machine gun anti-aircraft weapons which form an important element in their anti-aircraft defense system of Rabaul, its harbor and adjacent airfields. On the same ridge, interspersed among and in close proximity to the anti-aircraft gun positions were many buildings, including several marked with red crosses; in fact, the ridge is referred to in routine operational reports as "Hospital Ridge". One of the buildings so marked was only about 300 yards from three heavy anti-aircraft gun positions.

Concur in downgrading from CONFIDENTIAL
to UNCLASSIFIED.

JCS 963-

Edward E. Hunt, Chief
Div. of Pro-
tective Services.

- 5 - Appendix "C" to Enclosure "A"

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The attacks in question on 23 and 24 May were directed at these concentrations of anti-aircraft guns. During the course of these attacks, several of the buildings on the ridge were unintentionally destroyed or damaged. In the absence of specific identification of the hospitals alleged by the Japanese to have been attacked, it must be presumed that they were those located among the gun positions.

It is the intent and practice of United States forces scrupulously to observe international law, including the 1907 Hague Convention relating to customs of war on land, and the 1929 Red Cross Convention. However, it is obvious that if the Japanese elect to locate their hospitals adjacent to legitimate military targets they do so at their own peril, as it is quite possible that the hospitals will be damaged or destroyed unintentionally during the course of attacks directed at the military targets.

In view of the foregoing facts and circumstances, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the reply to be made to the Japanese Government should emphatically disclaim all responsibility for any and all damage alleged to have been incurred by the hospitals located in the attack area.

In accordance with the terms of agreement among the Combined Chiefs of Staff, it is requested that the British Government be advised of the Japanese protest and of the reply of the Department of State thereto.

CONFIDENTIAL

ENCLOSURE "B"

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

In reply refer to
SWP 740.00117
Pacific War/119

26 June 1944

My dear Admiral Leahy:

I am enclosing a copy of a memorandum dated 16 June 1944 from the Spanish Embassy in charge of Japanese interests in the continental United States transmitting the text of a protest from the Japanese Government alleging attacks by United States aircraft on certain hospital installations at Rabaul on 23 May and 24 May 1944 (Appendix, page 8).

I should appreciate receiving the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding the nature of the definitive reply to be made to this protest. The receipt of the memorandum from the Spanish Embassy is being acknowledged at this time, however, with the statement that the message from the Japanese Government is receiving the attention of the appropriate United States authorities.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ CORDELL HULL

Enclosure:
From Spanish Embassy,
16 June 1944.

Admiral William D. Leahy, U.S.N.,
Chief of Staff to the Commander
in Chief of the Army and Navy,
The Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Washington, D.C.

JCS 963

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Enclosure "B"

Concur in downgrading
from CONFIDENTIAL to

UNCLASSIFIED: Edward E. Hunt, Chief, Div. Protective Services.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE "B"

MEMORANDUM

RE: Attack on Japanese
Hospital in Rabaul.

No. 154

Ex.119.01

The Spanish Embassy presents its compliments to the Department of State and begs to transmit the following Memorandum received through the "Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores" of Madrid, from the Japanese Government:

MEMORANDUM - 16 June 1944 -

"1. United States fighters and bombers, that raided Rabaul on the 23rd and 24th May, constantly and repeatedly bombed and fired at the residential sections.

They even perpetrated unscrupulous attacks on a hospital and its annexes, causing a serious damage to the buildings and large number of casualties among the sick and wounded who were under medical treatments there and the nurses. All the hospital buildings were at that time filled to capacity with the sick and wounded, and of course, no part thereof was used for any military purpose. They were all marked with distinct and large red crosses on a white ground so that they might easily be identified from above.

The United States raiders made the attack in broad daylight and from a low altitude. The weather was fair, and the visibility good. It was therefore, perfectly easy for any pilot, however unskilled, to discern from the red cross marks that his objectives were hospital buildings. In spite of this, the American attackers did not stop the bombing and firing until the greater part of the hospital and its annexes had been destroyed. These facts cannot but show that the raid of the hospital was carried on deliberately and intentionally.

JCS 963

- 8 -

Appendix to Enclosure "B"

Concur in downgrading
from CONFIDENTIAL to

UNCLASSIFIED: Edward E. Hunt, Chief, Div. Protective Services.

CONFIDENTIAL

2. The above mentioned conduct of the United States airmen is a flagrant violation of International Law, and in particular of Article 27 of the 1907 Customs of War on Land, and Article 6 of the 1929 Red Cross Convention. Moreover, it is in under (utter ?) disregard of principles of humanity.

3. The Japanese Government lodge an emphatic protest with the United States Government against the unlawful act committed by the United States raiders, demanding at the same time the punishment of the persons and a guarantee for the prevention of recurrence of similar acts.

The Japanese Government also reserve all rights of claiming an indemnity for the damage and injury caused by the above-mentioned unlawful attack."

WASHINGTON, 16 June 1944

Department of State,
Washington, D. C.



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

~~TOP SECRET~~

SM-6313
17 July 1946



MEMORANDUM FOR THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE:

Subject: Termination Agreement for Sino-American Special Technical Cooperative Organization (SACO) Agreement.

Enclosure "A", a draft of a termination agreement for the SACO agreement, is forwarded for presentation to the Department of State for formal approval by the United States and Chinese Governments.

Enclosure "B" indicates the Chinese Government's approval of the termination agreement. Lieutenant General Cheng Kai Min was appointed by the Generalissimo as a special envoy to the Commander Seventh Fleet for the negotiation of the agreement.

Enclosure "C" indicates the consummation of consultations between the Commander Seventh Fleet and the Commanding General, U.S. Forces, China Theater, and the latter's concurrence in the agreement.


For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

(SIGNED)

A. J. McFARLAND,
Colonel, U.S. Army,
Secretary.

Enclosures.

JUL 17 1946



~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRETENCLOSURE "A"D R A F T

TERMINATION AGREEMENT
TO
SINO-AMERICAN SPECIAL TECHNICAL COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT

The National Government of the Republic of China and the Government of the United States of America recognize that the Sino-American Special Technical Cooperative Agreement has played an important part in bringing the war against Japan to a successful conclusion and that, since this agreement has fulfilled the purpose for which it was drawn, it should be terminated. The signatory governments recognize the great and mutual benefits that have accrued from this agreement and further that under the agreement as originally drawn certain obligations remain to be fulfilled. Therefore, the signatory governments, animated by a mutual desire to bring about the termination of the Sino-American Special Technical Cooperative Agreement and to provide for the fulfillment of commitments under this agreement, have appointed their plenipotentiaries:

who having communicated to each other their full powers, which have been found to be in good and due form, have agreed upon the following provisions of the termination agreement:-

ARTICLE I

The Sino-American Special Technical Cooperative Agreement shall be considered terminated to the mutual satisfaction of both signatory governments on the date that this termination agreement becomes effective.

Enclosure "A"

~~TOP SECRET~~ →ARTICLE II

The outstanding commitments under the Sino-American Special Technical Cooperative Agreement that remain to be fulfilled are as specified in Section 1 and Section 2 of this article. All materials and supplies required to fulfill these commitments are listed in Appendix "A" of this article, and shall be furnished by the United States to the Chinese Government gratis. All materials not so listed and later required may be furnished to the Chinese Government by the United States Government on a sale basis, the method of transaction to be in accordance with the accepted method of inter-governmental transfer of materials in effect between the signatory governments.

SECTION 1 - COMMUNICATIONS

In order to provide an adequate communication system, which will permit the efficient collection and dissemination of weather information, the United States shall:

- (1) deliver to properly designated Chinese officials in Shanghai, the communication equipment listed in Appendix "A".
- (2) provide a group of personnel not to exceed twenty-four (24) in number, for assisting and rendering advice in the installation of the major stations listed in Appendix "A" for a period to extend not beyond 1 July 1946. However, if due to unavoidable delays in receipt of material from the United States, more time is required, the Chinese Government may make request to the senior United States naval officer present in China for a reasonable extension, which request, in so far as practicable, will be complied with.

The Chinese Government shall be responsible for the transportation of all materials under this section from Shanghai to the areas as specified in Appendix "A", and shall furnish the necessary installation personnel.

Enclosure "A"

TOP SECRET

The Chinese Government shall furnish the sites, buildings, grounds and all public utilities required for all installations listed in Appendix "A" to Article II, and defray operating and maintenance costs thereof.

SECTION 2 - AEROLOGY

In order to maintain an efficient weather system utilizing Chinese personnel and the equipment previously furnished under the Sino-American Special Technical Cooperative Agreement and such other equipment as may be acquired from other sources, the United States shall:

(1) provide a group of personnel not to exceed fifteen (15) in number, for rendering advice on technical and operational matters relative to the establishment and maintenance of a suitable weather collection agency and international weather broadcasts for a period to extend not beyond 1 July 1946. However, if technical difficulties arise subsequent to this date, the Chinese Government may make request to the senior United States naval officer present in China who will, in so far as practicable, render the required assistance.

(2) provide not to exceed five (5) instructors for the training of not more than one hundred fifty (150) Chinese personnel in aerology for a period to extend not beyond 1 July 1946. However, if additional instruction is required, the Chinese Government may make request to the senior United States naval officer present in China who will, in so far as practicable, render the required assistance.

The Chinese Government shall furnish all sites, buildings, grounds, and all public utilities and defray operating and maintenance costs thereof.

ARTICLE III

The provisions of Article XVII of the Sino-American Special Technical Cooperative Agreement have been settled separately and to the mutual satisfaction of the signatory governments.

Enclosure "A"

~~TCP SECRET~~ARTICLE IV

The Chinese Government shall make available to the United States of America the weather services established under Article II of this agreement for a period of five (5) years from 1 July 1946. Prior to expiration of this five (5) year period negotiations may be initiated for the continuation of these services beyond this five (5) year period.

ARTICLE V

This agreement shall become effective when representatives of both signatory governments, duly authorized by the Chairman of the National Government of the Republic of China, and by the President of the United States of America, have affixed their signatures thereto.

ARTICLE VI

This termination agreement shall be drawn up in both Chinese and English, both equally authentic, each party to hold one copy in each language.

Enclosure "A"

~~TOP SECRET~~APPENDIX "A" TO ENCLOSURE "A"ESTIMATED COST OF EQUIPMENT FOR MAJOR STATIONS

Shanghai Weather Central	122,745.00
Nanking	40,428.00
Canton	40,428.00
Peiping	29,962.00
Hankow	29,962.00
Mukden	29,962.00
Tihwa	37,432.00
Patuo	32,452.00
	363,371.00

ESTIMATED COST OF EQUIPMENT FOR SECONDARY STATIONS

Taipei	7,046.00
Fukien	14,516.00
Nanning	17,006.00
Lhasa	22,758.00
Chengchow	14,516.00
Tainan	17,006.00
Lanchow	28,286.00
Jimus	19,496.00
Hailar	19,496.00
Kunming	21,986.00
Sian	24,476.00
Tulun	17,006.00
Taiyuan	14,481.00
Kanting	14,481.00
Ili	19,496.00
Dairen	17,006.00
Changchun	17,006.00
	305,064.00
Estimated Total	668,435.00

Appendix "A" to Enclosure "A"

~~TOP SECRET~~MATERIAL LIST - MAJOR STATIONS

Shanghai Weather Central

TDH Transmitter	2
TCM Transmitter	5
T4/FRC Transmitter	2
AN/TRC-1 VHF Transmitter	2
SX-28 Receivers	12
LR Frequency Meter	1
LM Frequency Meter	1
Rhombic Transmitter Control Kits	8
Rhombic Receiver Control Kits	1
Doublet Transmitter Control Kits	5
Doublet Receiver Control Kits	5
Hand Telegraph Keys	12
Generator, Diesel, 25 KVA, 220 V, 3 phase	2
Miscellaneous Wire, tools, etc. incidental to installation	

Nanking

T4/FRC Transmitter	2
AN/TRC-1 VHF Links	2
SX-28 Receivers	5
LR Frequency Meter	1
Rhombic Transmitter Antenna	2
Rhombic Receiver Antenna	2
Doublet Transmitter Antenna	2
Doublet Receiver Antenna	4
Hand Telegraph Keys	5
Generator, gas, 10 KVA, 220 V, 3 phase	2
Wire, tools, etc.	

Tertiary Stations

Spares and Maintenance Equipment

~~TOP SECRET~~

Canton

T4/FRC Transmitter	2
AN/TRC VHF Links	2
SX-28 Receivers	5
LR Frequency Meter	1
Rhombic Transmitter Kits	2
Rhombic Receiver Kits	2
Doublet Transmitter Kits	2
Doublet Receiver Kits	4
Hand Telegraph Keys	5
Generator, gas driven, 10 KVA, 220 V, 3 phase	2
Wire, tools, etc.	

Tertiary Stations

Spares and Maintenance Equipment

Peiping

T4/FRC Transmitter	2
SX-28 Receivers	5
LR Frequency Meter	1
Rhombic Transmitter Kits	2
Rhombic Receiver Kits	2
Doublet Transmitter Kits	2
Doublet Receiver Kits	4
Hand Telegraph Keys	5
Generator, gas driven, 10 KVA, 220 V, 3 phase	2
Wire, tools, etc.	

Tertiary Stations

Spares and Maintenance Equipment

~~TOP SECRET~~

Hankow

T4/FRC Transmitter	2
SX-28 Receivers	5
LR Frequency Meter	1
Rhombic Transmitter Kits	2
Rhombic Receiver Kits	2
Doublet Transmitter Kits	2
Doublet Receiver Kits	4
Hand Telegraph Keys	5
Generator, gas driven, 10 KVA, 220 V, 3 phase	2
Wire, tools, etc.	

Tertiary Stations

Spares and Maintenance Equipment

Mukden

T4/FRC Transmitter	2
SX-28 Receivers	5
LR Frequency Meter	1
Rhombic Transmitter Antenna Kit	2
Rhombic Receiver Antenna Kit	2
Doublet Transmitter Antenna Kit	2
Doublet Receiver Antenna Kit	4
Hand Telegraph Keys	5
Generator, gas driven, 10 KVA, 220 V, 3 phase	2
Wire, tools, etc.	

Tertiary Stations

Spares and Maintenance Equipment

~~TOP SECRET~~

Tihwa

T4/FRC Transmitter	2
SX-28 Receivers	5
LR Frequency Meter	1
Rhombic Transmitter Antenna Kit	2
Rhombic Receiver Antenna Kit	2
Doublet Transmitter Antenna Kit	2
Doublet Receiver Antenna Kit	4
Hand Telegraph Keys	5
Generator, gas driven, 10 KVA, 220 V, 3 phase	2
Wire, tools, etc.	

Tertiary Stations

Spares and Maintenance Equipment

Patuo

T4/FRC Transmitters	2
SX-28 Receivers	5
LR Frequency Meter	1
Rhombic Transmitter Antenna Kit	2
Rhombic Receiver Antenna Kit	2
Doublet Transmitter Antenna Kit	2
Doublet Receiver Antenna Kit	4
Hand Telegraph Keys	5
Generator, gas driven, 10 KVA, 220 V, 3 phase	2
Wire, tools, etc.	

Tertiary Stations

Spares and Maintenance Equipment

TOP SECRETMATERIAL LIST - SECONDARY STATIONS

Taipoi

TCM Transmitter	1
SX-28 Receivers	3
LM Frequency Meter	1
Doublet Transmitter Antenna Kit	1
Doublet Receiver Antenna Kit	1
Hand Telegraph Keys	2
Generator, gas driven, 3 KVA, 115 v, 1 phase	2
Wire and miscellaneous installation material	
Spares and maintenance equipment	

Fukien

Same Equipment as above
Tertiary Stations
Spares and Maintenance Equipment

Nanning

Same Equipment as above
Tertiary Stations
Spares and Maintenance Equipment

Lhasa

T4/FRC Transmitter	1
SX-28 Receivers	3
LM Frequency Meter	1
Rhombic Transmitter Antenna Kit	1
Doublet Transmitter Antenna Kit	1
Doublet Receiver Antenna Kit	1
Hand Telegraph Keys	2
Generator, 5 KVA, gas driven, 115 V, 1 phase	2
Wire and miscellaneous installation material	
Tertiary Stations	
Spares and maintenance equipment	

Chengchow

Same Equipment as above
Tertiary Stations
Spares and Maintenance Equipment

~~TOP SECRET~~

Tainan

Same Equipment as above

Tertiary Stations

Spares and Maintenance Equipment

Lanchow

T4/FRC Transmitter

1

SX-28 Receiver

3

LM Frequency Meter

1

Doublet Transmitter Antenna Kit

1

Doublet Receiver Antenna Kit

1

Hand Telegraph Keys

2

Generator, gas driven, 5 KVA,
115 V, 1 phase

2

Miscellaneous wire, etc.

Tertiary Stations

Spares and Maintenance Equipment

Jimus

Same Equipment as Taipoi

Tertiary Stations

Spares and Maintenance Equipment

Hailar

Same Equipment as Taipoi

Tertiary Stations

Spares and Maintenance Equipment

Kunming

Same Equipment as above

Tertiary Stations

Spares and Maintenance Equipment

Sian

Same Equipment as above

Tertiary Stations

Spares and Maintenance Equipment

Tulun

Same Equipment as above

Tertiary Stations

Spares and Maintenance Equipment

TOP SECRET

Taiyuan

Same Equipment as above

Tertiary Stations

Spares and Maintenance Equipment

Kanting

Same Equipment as above

Tertiary Stations

Spares and Maintenance Equipment

Ili

Same Equipment as Taipo

Tertiary Stations

Spares and Maintenance Equipment

Dairen

Same Equipment as Taipo

Tertiary Stations

Spares and Maintenance Equipment

Changchun

Same Equipment as Taipo

Tertiary Stations

Spares and Maintenance Equipment

ENCLOSURE "B"TRANSLATION

Shanghai
April 7, 1946

My dear Admiral Cooke,

It gave me the greatest pleasure in having an interview with you the other day. As regards the termination of the Sino-American Special Technical Cooperation Agreement I have the pleasure to inform you that I am instructed to accept the terms of the Termination Agreement as set forth in the draft of 30th March, 1946 on your Flagship. I am enclosing herewith copy of the draft of the Termination Agreement (Enclosure "A") and shall appreciate it if you could advise us of the arrangement for the signing of the document in order to bring the matter to a successful close.

Respectfully yours,

Signed,

Kai-min Cheng

Enclosure "B"

TOP SECRETENCLOSURE "C"UNITED STATES FLEET
COMMANDER SEVENTH FLEET

10 February 1946

From: Commander SEVENTH FLEET.
To : Commanding General, U.S. Forces, China Theater.
Subject: Sino-American Special Technical Cooperative Agreement - Proposed Termination Agreement.
Reference: (a) JCS 021049 November to ComGenChina and CinCPac (citing WARX 76282).
(b) JCS 129015 of 15 October 1945.
Enclosure: (A) Copy of Proposed Draft of Termination Agreement.

1. The consultations required by references have been carried out by the designated representatives of the Commander SEVENTH Fleet and the Commanding General, U.S. Forces, China Theater. The result, Enclosure (A), is submitted herewith.

2. The Commander SEVENTH Fleet as the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet's representative desires to start immediate negotiations for and to effect the termination of the Sino-American Cooperative Agreement prior to 2 March 1946.

3. The Commander SEVENTH Fleet is of the opinion that the acceptance of Enclosure (A) as a basis for negotiations will permit meeting the date specified above and thereby effect a considerable saving to the United States. Likewise he is of the opinion that the non-acceptance of Enclosure (A) will result in a greater ultimate cost to the United States.

4. It is essential that the U.S. Navy receive adequate weather information from China, suitable for its use, and the non-receipt of it would constitute a hindrance to the performance of its mission in the Pacific. The Commander SEVENTH Fleet is of the opinion that the continued weather services made possible under Article II and Article III of Enclosure (A) is the best solution that will permit the immediate realization of the desired services.

Enclosure "C"

~~TOP SECRET~~

5. Concurrently with the negotiations for the termination of the SACO Agreement, the Commander SEVENTH Fleet will designate representatives to meet and collaborate with your representatives for the purpose of effecting non-duplication of services in the continuance of U.S. communications, weather and intelligence activities required by reference (a).

C. M. COOKE, Jr.

1st End.

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES FORCES, CHINA THEATER, APO 971,
22 Feb 1946

TO: Commander, Seventh Fleet, Shanghai, China.

1. The draft of the proposed termination to the SACO Agreement, received as Enclosure A to the basic communication, has been noted in this headquarters.

2. The Commanding General, China Theater, has consistently opposed the transfer of supplies and equipment to the Chinese Government gratis. In order to effect an early termination of this Agreement, however, consideration has been given to the facts indicated below.

3. Particular note has been taken of the desire expressed in paragraph 3, basic letter; the significance of the date, as indicated in paragraph 4, basic letter, is appreciated.

4. In connection with the consultation referred to in paragraph 3 of the basic communication and based upon the statements of your representatives during these discussions, it is the understanding of this headquarters that:

a. Ultimate cost to the United States, if committed to the provisions of the proposed termination agreement, will be less than would be the case if the SACO Agreement is not terminated in the near future.

Enclosure "C"

~~TOP SECRET~~

b. Requirement of the U.S. Navy for continued receipt of weather data from China is such that presently existing and available means may not adequately provide for this requirement.

5. It is assumed that the proposed termination agreement is in accord with pertinent instructions appearing in letter, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, Serial 0001, dated 3 January 1946, Subject: Sino-American Special Technical Cooperative Agreement - Proposed Termination Agreement.

6. Based upon the provisions of paragraph 4, above, and in consonance with the opinions expressed in the basic letter, this headquarters will interpose no objections to the proposed termination agreement to the SACO Agreement.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

RAY T. MADDOCKS,
Major General, G.S.C.
Chief of Staff.

Enclosure "C"